Philosophy of Science (Syllabus)

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Philosophy of Science (PHI 4400) Instructor: Dr. Marina P. Banchetti Textbooks Required: Jennifer McErlean, Philosophies of Science: From Foundations to Contemporary Issues (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000). Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Other readings and videos – Posted on Blackboard. Armillary sphere Course Objectives: The objective of this course is to provide an overview of the main issues in contemporary philosophy of science. These issues include the nature and goals of scientific explanation, the validation of scientific knowledge, the historical development of scientific knowledge, and the ontological import of scientific knowledge. The questions covered under these topics include: "What form do scientific explanations take?", "How do we validate theoretical hypotheses?", "What is the distinction between normal science and revolutionary science?", and "Are the postulated entities of science to be taken as real, existing entities (even when they are unobservable in principle) or, rather, are they (along with the theory of which they form a part) to be taken as instruments for the achievement of certain scientific goals?"

Transcript of Philosophy of Science (Syllabus)

Philosophy of Science (PHI 4400)

Instructor: Dr. Marina P. Banchetti Textbooks Required: Jennifer McErlean, Philosophies of Science: From Foundations to Contemporary Issues (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000). Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Other readings and videos – Posted on Blackboard.

Armillary sphere Course Objectives: The objective of this course is to provide an overview of the main issues in contemporary philosophy of science. These issues include the nature and goals of scientific explanation, the validation of scientific knowledge, the historical development of scientific knowledge, and the ontological import of scientific knowledge. The questions covered under these topics include: "What form do scientific explanations take?", "How do we validate theoretical hypotheses?", "What is the distinction between normal science and revolutionary science?", and "Are the postulated entities of science to be taken as real, existing entities (even when they are unobservable in principle) or, rather, are they (along with the theory of which they form a part) to be taken as instruments for the achievement of certain scientific goals?"

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The course will also provide students with an understanding of the activity of philosophy: How philosophers ask questions, how they think about and attempt to answer them, and how they critique the answers given by others as they provide their own alternative answers. Course Evaluation Method: Quizzes There will be regular quizzes based on assigned readings and on class lectures. The purpose of these quizzes is to allow students to regularly assess their progress in the course and to identify any areas in which further study is required. The average of these quizzes will be worth 1/6 (16.66%) of the class grade, and student will receive a ‘0’ for each quiz that is missed. The quiz dates are listed in the ‘Course Outline’, which begins on p. 8 of this syllabus, along with the material covered by each quiz. Quizzes may be administered either at the beginning or end of class. Students are, therefore, strongly advised not to be absent, not to be late for class, and not to leave class early. Section Exams In addition to the above, there will be an exam after each major segment that is covered, for a total of four (4) semester exams. These exams may be a combination of multiple choice/true-false, short answer, and/or essays questions. These exams will each be worth 1/6 (16.67%) of the class grade. Study guides for each of the exams (including the final exam) will be posted on Blackboard, in an appropriately labeled folder. The study guides will list the concepts and ideas for which students will be responsible on the exams. Students are advised to also use the study guides when reading the assigned materials and when reviewing class notes. The exams dates are listed in the ‘Course Outline’, which begins on p. 8 of this syllabus. Students should make sure that they are present for the exams, since they will receive a ‘0’ for each missed exam. Final Exam Finally, there will be a cumulative final exam. The final exam will also be worth 1/6 (16.66%) of the class grade. The final exam will be entirely multiple choice/true-false. Grading Policy:

• Quiz Average: 16.66% • Exam #1: 16.67% • Exam #2: 16.67% • Exam #3: 16.67% • Exam #4: 16.67% • Final Exam: 16.66%

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Florida Atlantic University Statement of Academic Integrity (Honor Code): Students at Florida Atlantic University are expected to maintain the highest ethical standards. Academic dishonesty, including cheating and plagiarism, is considered a serious breach of these ethical standards, because it interferes with the University mission to provide a high quality education in which no student enjoys an unfair advantage over any other. Academic dishonesty is also destructive of the University community, which is grounded in a system of mutual trust and places high value on personal integrity and individual responsibility. Harsh penalties are associated with academic dishonesty. For more information, see: http://www.fau.edu/regulations/chapter4/4.001_Code_of_Academic_Integrity.pdf

Course Outline Key to abbreviations for readings and videos: PS = Jennifer McErlean, Philosophies of Science: From Foundations to Contemporary Issues. PSI = Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science: A New Introduction. CTE = “From Copernicus to Einstein” folder (Blackboard, in “Readings” folder, under “Content”). R = “Readings” folder (Blackboard, under “Content”). V = “Videos” folder (Blackboard, under “Content”).

PART I

Positivism, the Analytic Project, and the Standard View of Science Lecture 1 Reading:

• 1. Jennifer McErlean, “Introduction: A Note to Students” (PS, pp. 1-6). • 2. McErlean, “Chapter 1: The Standard View” (PS, pp. 7-27). • 3. Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher, “Preface” and “Chapter 1: Science and Philosophy” (PSI,

pp. ix-11). Video: “Two Statues: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science” (V). Lecture 2 Quiz #1 – Readings 1, 2, 3 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 4. Rudolph Carnap, “Theoretical Laws and Theoretical Concepts (PS, pp. 35-46). • 5. Barker and Kitcher, “The Analytic Project” (PSI, pp. 12-49).

Video:

• “A Brief History of Science: Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages” (V). • “The Rise of Logical Positivism” (V).

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Lecture 3 Reading:

• 6. Karl Popper, “Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge” (PS, pp. 47-56). Video:

• “A Brief History of Science: Renaissance to the Copernican Revolution” (V). • “The Fall of Logical Positivism” (V).

Lecture 4 Quiz #2 – Readings 4, 5, 6 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 7. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (PS, pp. 57-67). Video:

• “A Brief History of Science: The Copernican Revolution to the Darwinian Synthesis” (V). • “Classical Empiricism and Logical Positivism” (V).

Recommended Reading:

• Hans Reichenbach, “The Copernican View of the World” (CTE). • Hans Reichenbach, “Ether” (CTE).

Lecture 5 Reading:

• 8. Hans Reichenbach, “The Laws of Nature” (PS, pp. 68-71). Recommended Reading:

• Hans Reichenbach, “The Special Theory of Relativity” (CTE) • Hans Reichenbach, “The Relativity of Motion” (CTE)

Video: “How Does Science Work? Three Views” (V). Lecture 6 Quiz #3 – Readings 7 and 8 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 9. Ernest Nagel, “The Instrumentalist View of Theories” (PS, pp. 88-97). Recommended Reading:

• Hans Reichenbach, “The General Theory of Relativity” (CTE). • Hans Reichenbach, “Space and Time” (CTE).

Exam #1

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PART II

Scientific Revolutions, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress Without Truth Lecture 7 Reading:

• 10. McErlean, “Chapter 2: Reactions to the Standard View” (PS, pp. 98-114). • 11. Norwood Russell Hanson, “Observation” (PS, pp. 129-137).

Lecture 8 Reading:

• 12. Andy Pickering, “Against Putting the Phenomena First: The Discovery of the Weak Neutral Current” (R).

• 13. Mi Gyung Kim, “The ‘Instrumental’ Reality of Phlogiston” (R). • 14. Meinard Kuhlmann, “What is Real?” (from Scientific American, August 2013) (R).

Video: “Particles, Fields, and the Future of Physics”, Sean Carroll (California Institute of Technology) (V). Lecture 9 Quiz #4 – Readings 10, 11, 12, 13 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 15. Thomas Kuhn, “Paradigms” (PS, pp. 159-165). • 16. Richard Bernstein, “Scientific Revolutions and Incommensurability” (PS, 166-174). • 17. Barker and Kitcher, “Chapter 4: Science, History, and Society” (PSI, pp. 78-105).

Lecture 10 Reading:

• 18. Nancy Cartwright, “The Truth Doesn’t Explain Much” (PS, 175-179). • 19. Ronald Giere, “The Skeptical Perspective: Science Without Laws of Nature” (PS, 180-188). • 20. Reiner Hedrich, “Superstring Theory and Empirical Testability” (R).

Recommended Reading: • Paul K. Feyerabend, “Galileo and the Tyranny of Truth”, from Farewell to Reason, pp. 247-264

(R). Lecture 11 Quiz #5 – Readings 14 through 19 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 21. Ian Hacking, “Experimentation and Scientific Realism” (PS, 189-200). • 22. Jeffrey A. Barrett, “Toward a Pragmatic Account of Scientific Knowledge” (R).

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Recommended Reading:

• Paul K. Feyerabend, “Chapter Five from Against Method” (R). Exam #2

PART III

Reductionism and the Unity of Science: Alternative Views Lecture 12 Reading:

• 23. McErlean, “Chapter 7: Unity and Reduction” (PS, pp. 456-469). • 24. Carl Hempel, “Theoretical Reduction” (PS, pp. 470-475). • 25. Barker and Kitcher, “The View From the Sciences” (PSI, pp. 50-77).

Lecture 13 Reading:

• 26. Paul Churchland, “Matter and Consciousness” (PS, pp. 485-492). • 27. Jaegwon Kim, “’Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism” (PS,

pp. 502-510). Lecture 15 Quiz #6 – Readings 22 through 27 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 28. Larry Wright, “The Case Against Teleological Reductionism” (PS, pp. 493-501). • 29. Marina Banchetti and Jean-Pierre Llored, “Reality Without Reification: Philosophy of

Chemistry’s Contribution to Philosophy of Mind” (R). Lecture 16 Reading:

• 30. David Newth and John Finnigan, “Emergence and Self-Organization in Chemistry and Biology, from The Australian Journal of Chemistry 2006, pp. 841-848 (R).

• 31. Brian G. Henning, “Swarms, Colonies, Flocks, and Schools: Exploring the Ontology of Collective Individuals”, from Metanexus Magazine 2009 (R).

Video: “Causality and Complexity”, Derek Raine (Copernicus Center) (V). Recommended Reading:

• Brian G. Henning, “The Ontology of Collective Individuals and the Process Turn” (R).

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Lecture 17 Quiz #7 – Readings 28 through 32 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 32. Patrick Suppes, “The Plurality of Science” (PS, pp. 476-484). • 33. Stephen Kellert, “In the Wake of Chaos” (PS, pp. 511-526).

Video: “Scientific Pluralism and the Mission of History and Philosophy of Science”, Hasok Chang (Cambridge University) (V) – Lecture begins at the 13:40 minute mark. Exam #3

PART IV

Science, Values, and Politics: Cultural and Critical Dimensions Lecture 18 Reading:

• 34. McErlean, “Chapter 5: Narrative and Metaphor” (PS, pp. 323-333). • 35. Mary Hesse, “The Explanatory Function of Metaphor” (PS, pp. 349-354).

Lecture 19 Reading:

• 36. Roald Hoffmann, “Molecular Beauty” (PS, pp. 334-340). • 37.Rom Harré, “Some Narrative Conventions of Scientific Discourse” (PS, pp. 369-377).

Video: “Poetic Naturalism”, Sean Carroll (California Institute of Technology) (V). Lecture 20 Quiz #8 – Readings 33 through 36 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 38. McErlean, “Chapter 3: Cultural Critique” (PS, pp. 201-210). • 39. Leslie Stevenson, “Is Scientific Research Value-Neutral?” (PS, pp. 211-215). • 40. Barker and Kitcher, “Science, Values, and Politics” (PSI, pp. 136-164).

Lecture 21 Reading:

• 41. Edward Wilson, “Human Decency is Animal” (PS, pp. 216-222). • 42. R.C., Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon Kamin, “Not in Our Genes” (PS, pp. 223-232).

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Lecture 22 Reading:

• 43. McErlean, “Chapter 4: The Social Sciences” (PS, pp. 252-262). • 44. Fritz Machlup, “Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?” (PS, pp. 263-275).

Lecture 23 Quiz #9 – Readings 37 through 43 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 45. Robert Kuttner, “The Poverty of Economics” (PS, pp. 276-285). • 46. Paul Feyerabend, “How to Defend Society Against Science” (R).

Lecture 24 Reading:

• 47. McErlean, “Chapter 6: Feminist Dimensions” (PS, pp. 378-387). • 48. Ruth Hubbard, “Science, Facts, and Feminism” (PS, pp. 388-393). • 49. Barker and Kitcher, “Critical Voices” (PSI, pp, 106-135).

Lecture 25 Quiz #10 – Readings 44 through 48 and lecture notes. Reading:

• 50. Sandra Harding, “Feminist Justificatory Strategies” (PS, pp. 427-434). • 51. Cassandra Pinnick, “Feminist Epistemology: Implications for Philosophy of Science” (PS, pp.

435-442). Exam #4 Week 16 – Final Exam (Cumulative)

Glossary of Terms Philosophy A Posteriori Knowledge: Knowledge that is acquired with the aid of sense experience or observation. A Posteriori Propositions: Propositions that are derivable from and are known to be true through sense experience or observation. A Priori Knowledge: Knowledge that is acquired without the aid of sense experience or observation.

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A Priori Propositions: Propositions that we can derive and can know to be true without the aid of sense experience or observation. These propositions are universal and necessary, i.e., true everywhere and with certainty. Analytic Propositions: Propositions, such as "A bachelor is an unmarried male", in which the information contained in the predicate term is fully contained in the subject term. Analytic propositions are true by definition, i.e., tautological, and do not provide any new information. Argument: Reasoning or inference in which one or more statements (premises) are offered as support or evidence for some other statement (conclusion). Begging the Question: The fallacy of simply repeating or restating a conclusion rather than providing proof for it. Coherence Theory of Truth: The view that, for a statement to be true, it must cohere with other statements or propositions that are deemed to be true in the language. No reference to extra-linguistic facts is made. Correspondence Theory of Truth: The view that, for a statement to be true, it must correspond with some extra-linguistic fact. Deductive Argument: Argument in which the conclusion is presented as necessarily following from the premises. No new information is contained in the conclusion that is not already implied in the premises. Determinism: The view that the whole realm of nature, including human beings, is governed by causality (the principle of cause and effect). Dualism: The notion that reality is made up of two distinct substances that cannot be reduced to one another. Mind/body dualism is the idea that mind and matter are distinct substances, existing independently of each other, each capable of being known and studied apart from the other. Empiricism: The view that experience is the primary source of knowledge and that the proper test of truth is external. Ideas are true if they correspond to what is in the external world. Epistemology: The area of philosophy concerned with the nature, sources, limitations, and validity of knowledge. An epistemological issue is on that in some way has to do with knowledge: what knowledge is, how it is acquired, its different sources, what forms it takes under what circumstances, how one justifies a claim to knowledge, how knowledge differs from mere opinion (belief) or from accidentally true opinion (belief), etc. Essence: A technical term in philosophical metaphysics. The essence of an entity consists of those properties that are necessary for that entity to retain its identity. Any property of a system that is such that the system would loose its identity as that system, if it lost that property, is said to be an essential property of that system. Fallacies: Arguments that appear to be sound but that are actually not sound, for various formal and/or informal reasons. Free Will: The idea that human conduct or behavior, rather than being determined by divine intervention or physical laws, is the result of personal choice. (Inductive) Generalization: The use of a sample to reach conclusions about the whole. Indeterminism: The belief that some events do not have causes but spring into being by pure chance without any relation to anything preceding them.

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Inductive Argument: Argument in which the conclusion is presented as following from the premises with a high degree of probability. The conclusion contains new information that is not already implicitly contained in the premises and, thus, goes beyond the premises. Laws of Nature: One of the most controversial concepts in philosophy of science. The concept of laws of nature is originally based on theological conceptions of the universe. This concept has since been disassociated from religious meanings. Laws of nature are understood regularities in natural systems that hold between different types of states of affairs. Laws of nature fix the causal structure of the universe and ultimately explain why particular things exist and why particular events occur. Logical Positivism: A general philosophical movement of the 20th century (dating from the late 1920’s and early 1930’s) in central Europe. The positivists made philosophy of science a central field of philosophy, and their model of science was sufficiently powerful and influential to have defined the philosophy of science for several subsequent generations (see Vienna Circle). Materialism: The doctrine that the reality consists of material things and of nothing else. Metaphysics: The branch of philosophy concerned with first principles and with the fundamental nature of reality. Modus Ponens: An argument form that proceeds as follows; (1) If A is true, then B is true, (2) A is true, therefore (3) B is true. Modus Tollens: An argument form that proceeds as follows; (a) If A is true, then B is true, (2) B is false, therefore (3) A is false. Naturalism: The belief that the order and events of the universe can be understood through reason and scientific investigation. Paradox: A type of argument that leads to two contrary or contradictory conclusions. Phenomena: Objects of experience. Pluralism: In metaphysics, this is the view that reality is made up of more than one basic substance. Propositions: Statements that have two basic components; a subject, about which something is stated, and a predicate, what is stated about the subject. Rationalism: The view that reason alone is capable of arriving at a true knowledge of reality and that the test of truth is intuition, i.e., immediate insight or awareness. Scientific Anti-Realism: The view that the goal of science is to produce theories or models that are pragmatically or instrumentally useful, i.e., theories that are able to provide explanations of the observable phenomena and are able to make accurate predictions. A good scientific theory, according to the anti-realist, is one that 'saves the phenomena', i.e., makes true claims about observable phenomena. Scientific Realism: The view that the goal of science is to produce theories that give literally true descriptions of those aspects of nature that are unobservable. Scientific realists also claim that science will ultimately be successful in this endeavor. Skepticism: The view that real knowledge is inaccessible or impossible. Synthetic Propositions: Propositions, such as "The house is far away", in which the information contained in the predicate term is not fully contained within the subject term. In synthetic propositions, therefore, the predicate contains information that is not implied in the subject. Synthetic propositions can be either true or false.

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Truth: A property of statements. A statement is true if it agrees with the facts. Verification Principle: The principle used by the Vienna Circle (see below) to examine the traditional problems of philosophy. This principle states that a statement is meaningful only if it can be empirically verified. Otherwise, it is a pseudo-statement lacking any meaning or cognitive significance. Vienna Circle: A group of thinkers, centered around Moritz Schlick in the 1920s, whose goal was to make philosophy scientific by applying the 'Verification Principle' to philosophical questions and statements. The movement eventually came to be known as Logical Positivism. Physical Science Anomalies: Something that is anomos (in ancient Greek) or anomalous is something that is not consistent with law. In contemporary science, anomalies are experimental results that are unanticipated and do not fit with the prevailing theoretical doctrines, models, or beliefs. Dispositional Properties: Properties of a system that are such that their characteristic effects are manifested only under specific conditions, not under all circumstances. The system’s ability to manifest the appropriate behavior under specific conditions is a standing feature of its structure. Fundamental Forces: The way in which particles (or matter) in all stages behave, i.e., interact with each other. The three fundamental forces of nature posited by particle physicists are weak forces, electromagnetic forces, and strong forces. The gravitational force is treated separately since it is given a geometrical description. There have been, and continue to be, attempts at unifying these fundamental forces. But, it is uncertain whether the gravitational force can ever be unified, even if the other three are unified, precisely because, unlike the other forces, it is described geometrically. Gauge Invariance: The forms of equations or laws in a theory are unchanged under the action of the observer (action group). See also Local (Gauge) Symmetry or Principle of Invariance. Gauge System: Since physical events are independent of our choice of descriptive frameworks, it is necessary to set up a system of unit-standards (called gauge systems) in order to describe physical events as a coordinate system. All physical theories must, then, satisfy gauge invariance. Gauge Theory: A theory that incorporates the principle of invariance (i.e., a theory that display local (gauge) symmetry or gauge invariance). Gauge Principle: This principle states that the correct theory of nature must be one in which it is not significant if different observers (action groups) come up with different definitions, descriptions, or interpretations of things. General Relativity: (See Principle of General Covariance). Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: If one attempts to measure the position of a quantum system then one cannot measure its momentum, because if one of these (position or momentum) is determinate, the other is indeterminate. It is not just uncertain or indeterminate for us. It is indeterminate in quantum reality. Local Symmetry (or Local Gauge Symmetry): (See Gauge Invariance or Principle of Invariance). Non-normalizability: A theory or model is 'non-normalizable' when it is impossible to make meaningful calculations, beyond first order approximations, that will agree with experimental results. Particle-Wave Complementarity: This term refers to the complementarity of position and momentum. Position and momentum are incompatible, i.e., cannot be measured at the same time.

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Particle-Wave Duality of Quantum Systems: The wave properties (momentum) of a quantum system and the particle properties (position) of that quantum system are not simultaneously observable or measurable. In order to measure either of these properties, the system must be treated as a wave or as a particle. However, in quantum reality, the system is both a wave and a particle. Phlogiston: An 'inflammable principle' that was believed to be released upon combustion and calcination. It was not until the work of Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1775) that oxygen began to replace phlogiston in pneumatic chemistry. Principle of Complementarity: As viewed by Niels Bohr, this is a general framework within which to present a coherent and unambiguous description of phenomena associated with an objective physical reality even though, from this, we may not be able to represent the physical reality behind the observations. For Bohr, then, the emphasis shifted to the unambiguous description of phenomena produced by the interaction of an observed object with an observer. Principle of Equivalence: The effects produced by an accelerating frame of reference are indistinguishable from the effects produced by gravity. This is the second pillar of the general theory of relativity, the first pillar being the principle of general covariance (see below). Principle of General Covariance (also known as General Relativity): The laws of nature (or physics) and the forms of laws are the same in all (inertial and non-inertial) frames of reference. (Special relativity restricts the principle of relativity to inertial frames of reference.) Principle of Invariance: The values of specific properties (e.g., speed, mass, length, momentum, spin) remain unchanged under the action of the observer (action group). See also Gauge Invariance or Local (Gauge) Symmetry. Renormalizability: A theory or model is 'renormalizable' if, with the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques, approximate calculations can be carried as far as the theorist wishes to carry them, and these will agree with experimental results. Renormalization procedure produces some of the most accurate predictions found in science.