PoliticalPhilosophy

PoliticalPhilosophy

ABeginners’GuideforStudentsandPoliticians

THIRDEDITION

ADAMSWIFT

polity

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Contents

Preface

PrefacetoThirdEdition

Introduction

Furtherreading

Part1:SocialJustice

Conceptv.conceptions:thecaseofjustice

Hayekv.socialjustice

Rawls:justiceasfairness

Nozick:justiceasentitlement

Popularopinion:justiceasdesert

Socialjusticev.globaljustice

Conclusion

Furtherreading

Part2:Liberty

Twoconceptsofliberty?

Threedistinctionsbetweenconceptionsofliberty

1Effectivefreedomv.formalfreedom

2Freedomasautonomyv.freedomasdoingwhatonewants

3Freedomaspoliticalparticipationv.freedombeginningwherepoliticsends

Freedom,privateproperty,themarketandredistribution

Resistingthetotalitarianmenace

Conclusion

Furtherreading

Part3:Equality

Theegalitarianplateau

Equalityofopportunity

Genderequality

Equalityandrelativities:shouldwemindthegap?

Positionalgoods

Threepositionsthatlookegalitarianbutaren’treally

1Utilitarianism(oranyaggregativeprinciple)

2Diminishingprinciples,prioritytotheworseoff,andmaximin

3Entitlementandsufficiency

Equalitystrikesback

Conclusion

Furtherreading

Part4:Community

Correctingmisunderstandingsandmisrepresentations

Objection1:Liberalsassumethatpeopleareselfishoregoistic

Objection2:Liberalsadvocateaminimalstate

Objection3:Liberalsemphasizerightsratherthandutiesorresponsibilities

Objection4:Liberalsbelievethatvaluesaresubjectiveorrelative

Objection5:Liberalsneglectthewayinwhichindividualsaresociallyconstituted

Objection6:Liberalsfailtoseethesignificanceofcommunalrelations,sharedvaluesandacommonidentity

Objection7:Liberalswronglythinkthatthestatecanandshouldbeneutral

Summary

Outstandingissues

1Liberalism,neutralityandmulticulturalism

2Liberalism,thenation-stateandglobaljustice

Conclusion

Furtherreading

Part5:Democracy

Whatisdemocracy?

Degreesofdemocracy

1Directnessorindirectnessofthedecision

2Accountabilityofrepresentatives

3Equality(ofopportunity)forinfluence

4Scopeofauthorityofdemocraticwill

Proceduresandoutcomes

Isdemocracyparadoxical?

Subjectivism,democracyanddisagreement

Thevaluesofdemocracy

Intrinsic1:freedomasautonomy

Intrinsic2:self-realization

Intrinsic3:equality

Instrumental1:goodorcorrectdecisions

Instrumental2:intellectualandmoraldevelopmentofcitizens

Instrumental3:perceivedlegitimacy

Conclusion

Furtherreading

Conclusion

Furtherreading

Index

Preface

The idea for this book camewhen I read that TonyBlair, then theBritish primeminister, hadwritten toSir IsaiahBerlin, shortlybeforehis death in1997.BerlinhadbeenProfessorofSocialandPoliticalTheoryatOxfordandBlair ’sletterhadasked about his famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. I waslecturing to undergraduates at the time, on ‘core concepts’ in political theory,devoting two lectures to the variety of ways in which Berlin’s distinction wasconfused and confusing. Shortly afterwards, a newspaper reported that Blairregrettednothavingstudiedpoliticalphilosophyatuniversity. (HedidLaw.)Thenanex-studentofminewhoworkedat10DowningStreetrangtosaythattheprimeministerwasthinkingaboutthewayinwhichNewLabourdrewonideasfromtheliberaltradition.CouldIsuggestanythingthatitmightbehelpfulforthemtoread?Imentionedthefirstcoupleofbooksthatcameintomyheadand,aweekorsolater,wasamusedtowakeuptoaradioreportofaspeechbyBlair thatseemedtoowequiteabittomysomewhatarbitraryrecommendations.Thisbook tries, abitmore systematically, to tellpoliticians someof the things

theywouldknowiftheywerestudyingpoliticalphilosophytoday.Moregenerally,it is written for anybody, from whatever country and with whatever politicalallegiance,whocaresenoughaboutthemoralideasthatliebehindpoliticstovalueashortintroductionpresentingtheinsightsofpoliticalphilosophersinanaccessibleform.Recentyearshaveseenanexplosionofbookspopularizingdevelopmentsinscience.Manythinkthat that iswheretheintellectualactionisnowadays.Theyareprobablyright.Butenoughhasbeenhappeninginmyneckofthewoodstojustify,perhapseventodemand,theattempttomakeitavailabletoawiderreadership.Andthe issues treated by political philosophers clearly ought to be a matter fordiscussion in the public culture, not confined to academic journals and booksintelligibleonlytofellowprofessionals.In the old days, of course, before specialization and professionalization, this

dividedidnotexist.JohnStuartMill’sOnLiberty(1859)isaclassicthatwaswrittenforageneral readership. Idon’t think that anythingworth sayingmustbeeasy tounderstand, and have no doubt that the development of a distinctively academicidiom has been conducive to intellectual progress. So I have nothing against the

kind of difficult, precise, complicated work that political philosophers typicallyengage in. (And I can’t promise that everything I say here will be plain sailing.Some difficulty and complexity are inevitable, just because the issues underdiscussionaredifficultandcomplex.)ButIdothinkthatthey–we–oughttobeableto express some thoughts that would interest the non-specialist in a way that shecould,withabitofeffort,understand.Oratleastweoughttotry.My publishers assure me that most of those reading this will be students, not

politicians.Butstudentsareintelligentlayreaders.Theyarenotfullysocializedintothe mysteries of academic discourse. Nor are they expected to engage with theissuesatthelevelofsophisticationwherethatdiscourseishelpful.Sowritingforanon-academic audience is quite compatible with the demands of a genuinelyintroductoryintroductionforstudents.Themaindifferenceisthatstudentsaremorelikelytohavethetimeandinclinationtoreadmoreaboutthetopicsthancanbesaidhere. They may be expected to know who first came up with which idea orargument, or to go a bit further or deeper than I do. For them, each chapter isfollowed by suggestions for further reading, including sources of the moreimportantpositionsdiscussed.

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My greatest debt is to those political philosophers whose original thoughts arepresentedhere insimplifiedform.Ihope theyforgive thesimplification.Muchofmyunderstandingoftheirideascomesfromarguingaboutthemwithmystudents–listeningtoessays,tryingtoworkoutwhattheyaresaying,andchallengingit.(Yes,Igetpaidforthis.)I’mgratefultoallofyouandwellawareofhowluckyIam.Martin O’Neill first suggested that my lectures might make a book. Angie

Johnsonturnedtape into text,ClareChambershelpedwithresearchassistanceandindexing, and Lin Sorrell provided secretarial support. Sophie Ahmad’s wiseeditorialadviceandJanetMoth’sexpertcopy-editingdecisivelyimprovedthebookin its final stages.Many friends, colleagues and current students read a draft andoffered helpful suggestions. Thanks to Bill Booth, SelinaChen, ShameelDanish,Natalie Gold, Sudhir Hazareesingh, Margaret Holroyd, Sunil Krishnan, KirstyMcNeill, David Miller, Naina Patel, Mark Philp, and Micah Schwartzman. I’mgrateful also to a number of anonymous referees, but especially to two non-anonymous ones – Harry Brighouse and Matt Matravers – whose efforts farexceededthecallofduty.Whereit’sstillwrong,thefaultismine.ThebookwasfinishedwhileenjoyingtheluxuryofaBritishAcademyResearch

Readership.SinceIwasgiventhatawardtoworkonsomethingelse,I’mnotsurewhether theFellowsof theAcademywillappreciatemygratitude,but theyhave itanyway.NuffieldCollege very generously offeredme aResearchFellowship fortheperiodofmyleave.ThankstoitfortakingmeinandtoBalliolforlettingmego.

Myfather ’sinabilitytomakeanysenseofoneofmyjournalarticlesstiffenedmyresolve towrite something evenhemight understand. I dedicate thebook tohim,withmuch love and fingers crossed. Danny and Lillie are already argumentativeenough.I’mgladit’llbeafewyearsbeforethey’rereadytoreadit.

PrefacetoThirdEdition

Aswellasbringingthesuggestionsforfurtherreadinguptodate,andtidyingupafewpointsofdetail,I’vetakentheopportunitytoadddiscussionsofglobaljusticeandgender equality, and to say abitmore abouthowpolitical philosophycanbeappliedtotherealworld.Someoftheexamplesandallusionshavebeenbroughtuptodate:TigerWoodshasbecomeUsainBolt; the‘BigSociety’hascomeontothescene;SeamusHeaneyhasturnedintoDorisLessing;deathdateshavebeenadded,alas,forRonaldDworkinandmydearfriendJerryCohen.I’mgratefultoDanButtandZofiaStemplowskaforadviceonthenewbitsandtwoanonymousrefereesfortheir suggestions. For Polity, Emma Hutchinson and Sarah Lambert have beenpatientandsupportiveeditors,SarahDancytheperfectcopy-editor.Tomysurpriseanddelight,adramatizationofsomeofthediscussionofBerlinonlibertyhasmadeittoYouTube,thankstoLiamShiptonwhowasusingthebookatschool.Thosewhocan cope with Sir Isaiah as a young black woman in a miniskirt and extremelystrong language can find it at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K2qvoESODOk.Those interested in the ethics of the comedy of gendered abuse may enjoy thediscussion at http://crookedtimber.org/2010/11/07/swift-versus-berlin-on-positive-liberty/.

Introduction

Politicsisaconfusingbusiness.It’shardtotellwhobelievesinwhat.Sometimesit’shard to tell whether anybody believes in anything. Politicians converge on themiddle ground,worrying about focus groups, scared to say things thatmight bespun into ammunition by their opponents. There is some serious debate aboutpolicies,butlittleaboutthevaluesthatunderliethem.Whenitcomestoprinciples,wehavetomakedowithrhetoric,thefuzzyinvocationoffeel-goodconcepts.Whoisagainstcommunity,democracy,justice,orliberty?Thismakesitlookasifvaluesare uncontroversial. Politics comes to seemamerely technicalmatter: politiciansdisagreeabouthowbesttoachieveagreedgoalsandvoterstrytodecidewhichofthemhasgotitright.Therealityisdifferent.Beneaththesurface,concealedbythevaguenessofthese

grandideals,lurkcrucialdisagreements.Politicianswhosharetheviewthatlibertymatters,orthatcommunityis important,mayhaveverydifferentideasaboutwhattheyinvolve.Evenwheretheyagreeaboutwhatvaluesmean,theymayweightthemdifferently. These disagreements feed through into policy. What we ought to doabout tax rates, welfare, education, abortion, pornography, drugs and everythingelsedepends,inpart,onhowandwhatwethinkaboutvalues.Somepoliticiansmaybeclearaboutwhichinterpretationsofwhichidealsguidetheirpolicypreferences,andhowimportanteachiscomparedto theothers.Manyarenot.Andevenwheretheyare,thatdoesn’tnecessarilyhelpthoseofuswhosejobitistochoosebetweenthem.Todothatweneedtobeclearaboutourownprinciples.Weneedtobeawareof the different interpretations of these ideals. We need to see where claimspresentedintheirtermsconflictand,whentheydoconflict,weneedtodecidewhichisright.Weneedpoliticalphilosophy.Clarityismoreimportantthaneverbefore.Ofcourse,ithasalwaysbeenbetterto

work out exactly what you think than to rest content with vague generality. Butvague generalities are less of a guide than they used to be. To simplifyextravagantly,politicalviewsusedtocomeinblocks,pre-packaged.Ifyouwereontheleft,right,orsomewhereinthemiddle,youknewwhatyouthoughtaboutawiderange of issues, and you knewwhat your opponents thought too. Thismade lifemucheasier.Itwaseasierforpoliticiansbecausetheydidn’thavetogropearound

trying to work out their precise position on difficult questions – the kind wherecompetingconsiderationspulledindifferentdirections.Theyjustreferredtotheirblockofviews,whichusuallysuppliedananswer.Itwaseasierforvotersbecauseweknewwhichblockpoliticianssubscribedtoandcouldjudgethembyseeingwhatwe thought about that, without getting involved in the messy details. (What wethought about it often depended on our identification with a particular party –usually theonewehad inherited fromourparents–so therewasn’tall thatmuchthinkinggoingoninanycase.)Todaywe are suspicious of these pre-packaged blocks. Politicians are keen to

leave behind the old dogmas and orthodoxies, tomove beyond left and right, toadoptamix-and-matchapproach.Theyhave tomake itupas theygoalong.Theyarewillingtolookatwhatworks,toborrowgoodideasfromtheotherside.IntheUK,onecannowbea‘RedTory’orendorse‘BlueLabour ’.Thisbringsthechargeofopportunism,oflackinganyclearguidingprinciples.Politiciansreplythattheyarenotsellingout;rather,theyareadaptingthetraditionalvaluesoftheirpartytoanewcontext,whichmayincludeanelectoratelesssympathetictothosevaluesthanitusedtobe.Politicalphilosophyprovidesthetoolsthatpoliticians,andtherestofus,requiretoworkoutwhatthey–andwe–reallythinkaboutthevaluesandprinciplesthatcanguideusthroughthesecomplexities.

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This book does not tell the reader what to think. Its aim is clarificatory andexpository, not argumentative. It tries to present some of the more importantargumentsdevelopedbypoliticalphilosophersinawaythatwillhelpthereadertounderstandtheissuesatstakeandtodecideforherselfwhatshethinksaboutthem.True,gettingaclearersenseofwhataparticularposition involvesmaymake thatpositionlessattractiveorplausiblethanitseemedwhenthingswerelessclear.True,Iamcriticalofthewayinwhichsomeargumentsareformulated,mainlywhentheyobscurewhatisreallyatstake.(Part4givessomeappealsto‘community’aroughride.) But I’m not trying to persuade the reader of any particular political views.Whenabstracttopicslikesocialjustice,liberty,equalityorcommunitycomeupinpoliticaldebate,orinmystudents’essays,myusualreactionisnot‘Idisagreewiththis person. Can I persuade her to change hermind?’ It ismore: ‘This person isconfused.CanIhelpherseesomedistinctionsthatwouldhelpherunderstandwhatshe really thinks andwhy?’ I don’t pretend thatmy own views are irrelevant, orinscrutable to the careful reader. Making a distinction, or clarifying the precisemeaning of a claim, is often the first step towards exposing the kind ofsimplificationorambiguitythatleadspeopletogetthingswrong.(‘Nowthatyou’veseen what you’re actually saying, you can’t go on believing it, surely?!’) But itreallywouldn’tbothermeif,havingreadthisbook,somebodycontinuedtoholdallthepoliticalviewsthatshedidbeforeshestarted,howevermistaken.Whatmattersis

that she should understand better why she holds them, and have considered thereasonsothersmighthavetorejectthem.Someofthebookis‘conceptualanalysis’.Don’tworry.Thisisjustafancyname

for the obviously important jobofworkingoutwhat peoplemeanwhen they saythings. (Asked at a New York cocktail party what philosophers actually do, onereplied:‘Youclarifyafewconcepts.Youmakeafewdistinctions.It’saliving.’)Butthis is just a first step. Philosophers – at leastmy kind of philosopher –want toknowwhatstatementsmeaninordertodecidewhethertheyaretrue.Wedecidethatmainly by thinking hard about all the reasons there might be to think them true(includingwhethertheyfollowlogicallyfromotherpropositionstherearereasonstobelievearetrue)andallthereasonstheremightbetothinkthattheyarenottrue.Wemakearguments in supportofparticular conclusions, trying to explainwherethosewhodisagreewithushavegonewrong.Soalthoughthisbookdoesn’targuethatoneviewis rightandothersmistaken, that’sonlybecause this isabeginners’guide. Idocareabout truthand trust that readerswillmake theirown judgementsaboutwhichofthevariousargumentsgetsclosesttoit.Thisdistinguishesmefromadifferentkindofphilosopher,thepostmodernkind

who regards my interest in truth and reason as terribly old-fashioned.Postmodernismcomesinavarietyof(dis)guises,but,appliedtopolitics,ittendstoinvolvescepticismabouttheideathatthereissuchathingas‘truth’andamistrustof ‘reason’ as itself ‘socially constructed’ rather than a genuinely independent orobjectivebasisforassessingandcriticizingsociety.Sincesomepostmodernistsaredoubtfulabouttheideaoftruthinsciencessuchasphysicsandbiology,it’shardlysurprising that they should be wary of the suggestion that one can apply thatcategorytoclaimsofthekindmadeinpolitics.Idon’tknowabetterdefenceofmyapproachthantherestofthebook,soIwillleaveittothereadertojudgewhetherthekindofthingwe‘analytical’philosophersdoisindeedworthdoing.This is not a guide to the history of political philosophy. That history is

fascinating and important but it’s not – forme –whatmatters. I know somethingaboutPlato,Aristotle,Hobbes,Locke,Rousseau,Kant,Tocqueville,Mill,Marxandtherestofthegang.Occasionallythey’llgetamention(withdates).But,whenIreador teach the writings of these great thinkers, what grabsme is not the historicalcontextinwhichtheywerewritten,orhowwhattheythoughtdevelopedovertheirlifetime, or anything ‘historical’. I want to know what they believed, how theirargumentswent,andwhetherwhat theybelieved is true, theirargumentsvalid.Ofcourse,workingoutwhattheybelieved–exactlywhattheymeantwhentheywrotesomething – may well require detailed knowledge of the intellectual and othercontexts inwhich theywerewriting.Ofcourse, tracingandexplainingchanges intheirideas,orapparentinconsistenciesbetweentheirvariouswritings,canhelpusrender their views more precise. I greatly respect those historians of political

thought whose careful scholarship and interpretative sensitivity has brought us aclearerunderstandingofwhatthesegreatthinkersbelieved.But,forme,thisisallpreparatory to the taskofanalysisandassessment,ofdecidingwhether theywereright.Icertainlydon’t thinkthat thepantheonofall-timegreatsholdsamonopolyonwisdom.Justasscientistsworkingtodayholdmanymoretruebeliefsabouttheworld,andmorepreciseonestoo,thanthegreatest,mostbrilliant,scientistsofthepast–Galileo,Newton,Darwin–soevenordinarypoliticalphilosopherscanhaveprofitedfromthegeniusofaHobbesoraRousseauwithoutneedingtospendtheirlivesinhistoricalscholarship,andwithoutknowingallthatmuchaboutwhatthoseextraordinarythinkershadtosay.Political philosophy is philosophy about a particular subject – politics. Any

definition of ‘the political’ is controversial. If the personal is political, as thefeminist slogan has it, then institutions like the family, and other personalrelationships,haveapoliticaldimension.Perhapspoliticshappenswhereverthereispower.Thereisalottobesaidforsuchaview.Nonetheless,forthepurposesofthisbeginners’ guide I’m going to stick to the narrower perspective that sees ‘thepolitical’asconcernedspecificallywiththestate.Politicalphilosophyaskshowthestate should act,whatmoralprinciples shouldgovern theway it treats its citizensandwhat kind of social order it should seek to create. This isn’t as narrow as itlooksactually,since it includes thequestionofwhatweshoulddo,as individuals,when the state isn’t doing what it should be doing. It also includes the crucialquestionofwhatshouldandshouldnotbesubjecttopoliticalcontrol–whatisandisnottheproperbusinessofthestate.(Recententhusiastsforthe‘BigSociety’intheUKthinkthatthestatehastakenontoomuch,gettingintoareasthatshouldbelefttoprivate or voluntary associations.) So even on my narrow view, politicalphilosophershaveplentytothinkabout.As those ‘shoulds’ suggest, it is a branch of moral philosophy, interested in

justification, inwhat the state ought (and ought not) to do. The state, as politicalphilosophersthinkaboutit,isn’t–orshouldn’tbe–somethingseparatefromandinchargeofthosewhoaresubject toits laws.Rather, it is thecollectiveagentofthecitizens,whodecidewhatitslawsare.Sothequestionofhowthestateshouldtreatits citizens is that of howwe, as citizens, should treat one another. The state is acoercive instrument. It has various means – police, courts, prisons – of gettingpeople to do what it says, whether they like it or not, whether they approve ordisapproveof itsdecisions.Politicalphilosophy, then, is avery specific subsetofmoralphilosophy,andonewherethestakesareparticularlyhigh.It’snotjustaboutwhat people ought to do, it’s about what people are morally permitted, andsometimesmorallyrequired,tomakeeachotherdo.Fromtherangeofconceptsaddressedbypoliticalphilosophy,thisbooklooksat

five:socialjustice,liberty,equality,communityanddemocracy.I’velimitedmyself

tofivetokeepthebookmanageable.I’vechosenthesefivepartlybecausetheyformareasonablycoherentgroupandpartlybecausetheyaretheonesthatcomeupmostfrequentlyinactualpoliticaldebate.Thismeanstheyarethemostrelevanttothoseseekingguidancethroughtheconfusionsofcontemporarypoliticsandincreasesmychancesofpresentingphilosophicalargumentsinanaccessibleway.Thecostisthatsomeveryimportantconceptsareleftout.Twoarethecloselyinterrelatedissuesofauthority and obligation.What, if anything, gives the state the authority to makepeopledowhatitsays?Underwhatconditions,ifany,docitizenshaveanobligationtodowhatitsays?Thesearetouchedon,inpassing,inthediscussionofdemocracy,butarenotthefocusthereandreceivenothinglikethethoroughtreatmenttheygetinotherintroductionstothesubject.One last warning. The fact that the book is written for politicians as well as

students does not mean that it is practical or policy-oriented. This will frustratesome,perhapsconfirmingthesuspicionthatphilosophy–evenpoliticalphilosophy–issomuchhotairorself-indulgence.(The‘intellectualmasturbation’takeonmychosen career.) On the few occasions when I have been at think-tank seminarsbringingtogetherpoliticalphilosophersandpoliticians,thatsenseoffrustrationhasbeenall too evident.Formany politicians, a seminar (and presumably a book) isusefulonlyif ityieldsapolicy,orat leastaslogan,ideallyonethatwillgodownwellwith focus groups and electorates. This is a problem, sometimes two. In thefirstplace,philosophersdonottakekindlytothesuggestionthattheyshouldtailortheir conclusions towhat other people happen to bewilling to vote for. So evenwhere sound principled arguments yield clear implications for policy, the policythat’s implied might well be an electoral disaster and hence of little use topoliticians.Buttherecanbeasecond,deeper,problem.Itcanbegenuinelyunclearwhat policies are implied even by clear principles. Conclusions about what weshoulddo, inaparticularcontext,candependonawholerangeoffactsabout theworld that philosophers may know little or nothing about. It’s social scientists –economists,sociologists,psychologists,politicalscientists–whoare(supposedtobe) the experts when it comes to questions about how the world works. Take asimpleexamplefromPart1.Supposeoneagreeswiththemostinfluentialpoliticalphilosopher of our time, the American John Rawls, that inequalities in thedistributionofincomeandwealtharejustifiedonlyifthoseinequalitieshelp,overtime, to maximize the income and wealth enjoyed by the worst-off members ofsociety.Itisstillaverygoodquestion,asRawlshimselfacknowledges,whatkindsandextentsof inequalityare indeedjustifiedbythatprinciple,what taxrates,whatkindofwelfarestateitimplies,andsoon.Rawlsevenacceptsthattheprincipleshecomesupwithareindeterminatebetweencapitalistandsocialistwaysoforganizingtheeconomy.It’s not only politicianswho get frustrated, and the problem isn’t only that we

needsocialscienceaswellasphilosophytotelluswhattodo.Overthepastdecadeorso,thekindofpoliticalphilosophythatRawlsgoesinforhascomeunderattackfromotherphilosophers (and anti-philosophers) for beingutopian and irrelevant.(Greektopos=place,ou=‘not’,so‘utopia’=‘notaplace’.)Thesecriticsobjectto‘idealtheory’–theorywhichtellsuswhattheidealsocietywouldbelike–thoughit’sworth noticing that there are two versions of the critique. Some focus on theutopianism.Thechargehereisroughlythatphilosopherswhocomeupwith‘idealtheory’ are naive about human beings, overestimating their capacity for altruismandputtingtoomuchfaithinrationalmoralprinciples.Accordingtothese‘realist’critics, the results are implausibly ambitious visions of an ideally just or goodsociety–visionsthatcanneverberealizedandthatitmightevenbedangeroustoaim for. Some claim that these philosophers misunderstand the nature of thepolitical,neglectingtheirrational,theemotionalandsometimesthedownrightnastythat are inevitable parts of the struggle for power. From this perspective,philosopherswhoworkonidealtheoryaretooidealistic.Othersworrymoreabouttheirrelevance.Evenwherephilosophers’visionsare

realisticanddesirableaslong-termgoals,theyaren’tthathelpfulwhenitcomestothehereandnow.Thereisagapbetweentheprinciplesthatwouldbefollowedintheidealsocietyandthosethatapplyinthe,alasfarfromideal,realworld.Supposeyou believe that, in a just society, rich parentswould not be allowed to buy theirchildrenabettereducationthanisavailabletopoorchildren.Theprincipleatstakehereissomeversionofequalityofopportunity(seePart3)andittellsyouthateliteprivateschoolsshouldnotexist.Does it followthat itwouldbewrongforyou tosendyourownchildtosuchaschoolifyouhadthemoney?Thelawallowsitandotherpeoplearedoingit;perhapsyourlocalstateschoolsarereallypoor.(Perhapsthey’repoorpartlybecausethelawallowsitandotherpeoplearedoingit.)Doesitfolloweventhatyoushouldvotetoabolisheliteprivateschoolsifyouweregiventheoption?Othercountriespermit them.Maybeweneed toallowrichparents theoptionortheywillsimplysendtheirchildrenabroad,ormoveabroadthemselves.It’snotobviouslywrongtosendyourchildto,orvotetoallow,thekindofschoolthatwouldhavenoplaceinanideallyjustsociety.Theissuesarecomplex.Butidealtheorydoesn’thelpus.What’sneeded,accordingto thissecondcriticism, ismorenon-idealtheory.Theorythathelpsusthinknotabouttheperfectsocietybutaboutwhat to do in our actual circumstances. From this perspective, philosopherswhoworkonidealtheoryareansweringthewrongquestion.I’m sympathetic to some of this. Political philosophers could helpfully devote

more attention to the practical questions that confront us.They could domore tohelp us as citizens,whenwe come together tomake, or at least to decidewho isgoing tomake, policy.And they could domore to help us as individuals, in ourdaily lives, as we make choices about how to act within the existing policy

framework.(InanotherbookIhadagoattheissueofschoolchoice.)Butit’snoteither/or.Philosopherswhoworkon ideal theorydon’tonly telluswhat the idealsocietywouldlooklike,theyalsoexplainwhythatkindofsocietywouldbeideal.Theyexploreandarticulatethevaluesthatareneededforustojudgewhetheronepolicy, or personal decision, is better than another. Even if some of their overallvisionsare indeedutopian,weneedcareful thinkingabout ideals– suchas socialjustice, liberty, equality, community and democracy – simply to understand theissuesatstakeinthechoicesthatwemake,implicitlyorexplicitly,hereandnow.Nonetheless,thosehopingforguidanceonpolicy–likethosewantingtobetold

whattothink,thoseinterestedinthehistoryofpoliticalthought,anddeconstructorsoftruthandreason–willbedisappointedandmightdobesttostophere.Thisbookis for thosewhowant to think for themselvesabout themoral ideas that structurepolitical argument. The concepts to be discussed form the backdrop in front ofwhicheverydaypoliticaldebate isplayedout.Consciouslyorotherwise, andwithless ormore clarity and control, politicians conceive and couch their positions –including their positions on specific policies – in terms that invoke particularinterpretationsofthoseconcepts.Thisbookaimstohelpthosepoliticians,andthoseofusjudgingbetweenthem,tobecomemoreconsciousofthesebackgroundideas,andbetterabletoassesstheinterpretationsandargumentsframedintheirterms.

Furtherreading

Four introductions to political philosophy stand out from the crowd. One isJonathan Wolff’s An Introduction to Political Philosophy (2nd edn, OxfordUniversityPress2006),whichmanagesatoncetocoverallthebigareasinpoliticalphilosophy (includingdemocracyandauthority)and togive readersaglimpseofthebignames in thehistoryofpolitical thought (Aristotle,Plato,Hobbes,Locke,Rousseau,Mill,Marx).Andallthisinagenuinelyintroductoryandaccessibleway.Another is Will Kymlicka’sContemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction(2ndedn,OxfordUniversityPress2002).Thisisnotreallytheintroductionitsaysitis, but it is an extremely helpful guide to contemporary debates, and should beuseful both for advancedundergraduates and for themoredetermined lay reader.CatrionaMcKinnon’sIssuesinPoliticalTheory(2ndedn,OxfordUniversityPress2012) assembles an authoritative collection of survey articles and is linked to anOnline Resource Centre. David Miller ’s Political Philosophy: A Very ShortIntroduction(OxfordUniversityPress2003)isveryshortandverygood.The brief remarks about the nature of politics are filled out in my ‘Political

PhilosophyandPolitics’,inAdrianLeftwich(ed.),WhatisPolitics? (Polity2004).ThebookaboutschoolchoiceisHowNotToBeAHypocrite:SchoolChoicefortheMorallyPerplexedParent (Routledge2003).Forways into thedebateabout ‘idealtheory’ and the practical relevance of political philosophy, I’d suggest Raymond

Geuss’spolemicalPhilosophyandRealPolitics(PrincetonUniversityPress2008),AmartyaSen’sThe Ideaof Justice (AllenLane 2009), andAdamSwift andStuartWhite’s‘PoliticalTheory,SocialScienceandRealPolitics’,inDavidLeopoldandMarcStears (eds.),PoliticalTheory:MethodsandApproaches (OxfordUniversityPress2008).

Part1

SocialJustice

The ideaofdistributive justicehasbeenaround foravery long time– theGreekphilosopherAristotle(384–322BC)wroteaboutit.Socialjusticeisdifferent.Thatideaisrelativelyrecent,creepingintousefromabout1850on,andnoteverybodylikes it. It developed only as philosophers came to see society’s key social andeconomic institutions, which crucially determine the distribution of benefits andburdens, as a proper object for moral and political investigation. Somephilosophersaren’thappywithit.Peoplecanactjustlyorunjustly,butwhatdoesitmean to say that society is just or unjust? Some politicians aren’t crazy about iteither.Forthem,thosewhotalkaboutsocialjusticetendtoholdthemistakenbeliefthat it is the state’s job tobring about certaindistributiveoutcomes,whichmeansinterferingwithindividualfreedomandtheefficientworkingofamarketeconomy.(Togetacommonconfusionoutoftheway,let’sbeclearfromthestartthatsocialand distributive justice are usually regarded as different from retributive justice.Thatisconcernedwiththejustificationofpunishment,withmakingthepunishmentfitthecrime.Sowe’renotgoingtobedealingwiththekindofjusticeadministeredbythecriminaljusticesystem,thekindwherewewouldtalkabout‘miscarriagesofjustice’.)Giventhatitiscontroversial,andrelativelynew,wouldn’titmakemoresenseto

beginwithliberty,orcommunity–ancientideasthateverybodyvalues?Istartwithsocialjusticefortworeasons.First, andmost important,mostpoliticalphilosopherswould say that itwas the

publicationofabookonsocialjustice–ATheoryofJustice(1971)bytheAmericanphilosopher John Rawls (1921–2002) – that transformed and revived theirdiscipline. I would agree with them. For many years before Rawls, academicpolitical philosophywas either the history of political thought or quasi-technicallinguisticanalysisofthemeaningofpoliticalconcepts.SinceRawls,therehasbeensystematic and substantive argument about what the societies we live in shouldactually be like. (‘Substantive’ means ‘to do with substance or content, not justform’.)Much ofwhat has beenwritten since then can helpfully be understood asengagingwithRawls’stheory–likeitornot,thosewritinginhiswakehavetothinkabouthowtheirargumentsrelatetohis–soitmakessensetolayoutthebasicsofhis position right at the beginning. His theory invokes and incorporates ideas of

liberty, equality and community. These concepts are all closely interrelated, andthinkingabouthisapproachtojusticeprovidesthemostconvenientwayin.Second,oneofRawls’smost famousclaims is that ‘justice is the firstvirtueof

social institutions’. That is debatable, aswe shall see: onemight judge that othergoals, goals that conflict with justice, aremore important. But it is at least quitecommonforpeopletobelievethatothergoalscanonlybepursuedtotheextentthatthatpursuitiscompatiblewiththeclaimsofjustice.Thinkaboutthesituationwhereonecanmakealotofpeopleveryhappybykillinganinnocentman.(Supposetheymistakenlythinkheisguiltyandthat’swhytheywouldbehappy.)Mostpeoplefeelthat to do that would be wrong, because the most important thing is not to treatpeople unjustly. Something similar underlies the thought that it is better to let theguiltygo free thanunjustlypunish the innocent.On thiskindofview, justice is aconstraint on what we can do. It doesn’t tell us everything – remember we aretalkingaboutthevirtuesofsocialinstitutions,notthevirtueswemightexemplifyinourindividuallives.Butitdoestelluswhatmustbeourtopprioritywhenitcomestodecidingtheruleswearegoingtoliveunder.

Conceptv.conceptions:thecaseofjustice

Let’s begin with an elementary but very useful analytical tool: the distinctionbetweenaconceptandthevariousconceptionsofthatconcept.Muchconfusioncanbe avoided by holding on to this distinction, which applies to many politicalconcepts,notjustthosediscussedinthisbook.Withthisclearlyinmind,itgetsaloteasiertoseewhatisgoingoninpoliticaldebateswhere,typically,thoseondifferentsides use the sameword tomean things that, when probed, turn out to be ratherdifferent.Understandinghow theydiffer, andwhatunderlies thedisagreements, isthefirststeptowardsdecidingwhichsideisright.The ‘concept’ is the general structure, or perhaps the grammar, of a term like

justice,or liberty,orequality.A‘conception’ is theparticularspecificationof that‘concept’, obtained by filling out some of the detail. What typically happens, inpoliticalargument,isthatpeopleagreeonthegeneralstructureoftheconcept–thegrammar,thewaytouseit–whilehavingdifferentconceptionsofhowthatconceptshouldbefleshedout.Takethecaseofjustice.Thebasicconceptofjusticeisthatitisaboutgivingpeoplewhatisduetothem,andnotgivingthemwhatisnotduetothem.(This,atleast,ishowalotofpeoplethinkaboutit,thoughitistruethattheremightbedisagreementevenaboutthis.Idon’twanttogetontothat,moreproperlyphilosophical,terrain.)Whatisduetothem.Notwhatitwouldbeniceforthemtohave.Notwhatitwouldbepolitetogivethem.Notevenwhatitwouldbemorallygoodtogivethem.(I’llexplainthisoneinaminute.)Whattheyhaveastheirdue.This analysis, then, ties justice toduty– towhat it ismorally required thatwe,

perhapscollectivelythroughourpoliticalandsocialinstitutions,dotoandforoneanother.Notjusttowhatitwouldbemorallygoodtodo,butwhatwehaveadutytodo, what morality compels us to do. And, of course, there are many differentconceptions of this concept, because people who agree that this is what ‘justice’means,asaconcept,canstillendorsedifferentconceptionsofjustice,can(anddo)disagree about what justice ‘means’ in terms of the content fleshing out thegrammar of that term. This part of the book will say a bit more about theoverarching concept of justice, and then lay out three influential conceptions –Rawls’s justice as fairness, Robert Nozick’s justice as entitlement, and theconceptionofjusticeasdesert.Mostpeopleendorsebitsofallthree.Sometimesthisis done in an informed self-reflective way that has worried about whether theoverall package of beliefs about justice is consistent (for there are ways ofcombining elements of these – and other – conceptions into a coherent whole).Moreoften,however,ithappensunthinkingly,inawaythatturnsout,oninspection,tocontainadealofconfusion.Backtotheconceptofjustice.Theremightbethingsitwouldbemorallygoodto

do that aren’t requirements of justice. Think of justice as a specific subset of

morality. IfRawls is right that justice is the first virtueof social institutions, thenthatmeans that themost important setofmoralconsiderations relevant topoliticsandtheorganizationofsocietyisthatwhichconcernsgivingpeopletheirdue.Andwhatisduetopeoplehasagooddeal,thoughnoteverything,todowithwhattheyhavearightto.That’swhyjusticeandrightsaresocloselyconnected.Considerthecontrastbetween justiceandcharity.Onemight think itwasmorallygood togivecharitablyto thoseindistresswithout thinkingthat itwasarequirementof justice.Indeed,ifonethoughtofoneselfasgivingcharitably,thenonewouldpreciselynotbe thinkingofone’sactasarequirementof justice. (Ofcourseyoumightgive toparticularneedyindividualsororganizationscallingthemselves‘charities’becauseyoufeltthattheirclaimsonyouwereindeedclaimsofjustice,butthenyouwouldnot be giving charitably.) It is quite common, I think, for people to regard theirreasons for helping those who are starving in far-off countries as reasons ofcharity,orasderivingfromaprincipleofhumanity(say,aconcernandrespectforfellowhumanbeings),butnotasreasonsofjustice.Weoughttohelpthemintimesof need, it ismorally praiseworthy to do so, and the reasons to do so aremoralones,but there isnoduty todo so, for their claimsonusareclaimsof commonhumanity,notclaimsofjustice.Thesamekindofthinkingisappliedbysome–suchasthelibertarianNozick,whoseviewswe’llexamineshortly–toourobligationstohelpneedymembersofourownsociety.It’samorallygoodthingtodo,butjusticeisaboutprotectinglegitimatepropertyrightsanditshouldbeuptotheindividualtodecidewhethertohelpornot.This brings us to the big reasonwhy the distinction between justice and other

kinds of moral claim is typically seen as so important. The state is justified inmakingsurethatpeoplecarryouttheirdutiestooneanother.Itisjustifiedinusingitscoercivepowertoforcepeopletodowhattheymightnotdovoluntarily.Thisisa big deal. As I said in the introduction, the state, as political philosophers thinkaboutit,isnotsomethingseparatefromandinchargeofthosewhoaresubjecttoitslaws.Itis–orshouldbe–thecollectiveagentofthecitizens,whodecidewhatitslawsshouldbe.Sotosaythatthestateisjustifiedinforcingpeopletocomplywiththeirdutiesistosaythatcitizensarejustifiedinusingthecoerciveapparatusofthestate (laws, police, courts, prisons) to force one another to act in certainways –includingwaysthatsomecitizensmightbelievetobewrong.This,ofcourse,raisesbiganddifficultissuestodowiththejustificationofstateauthorityandwhether,orinwhatcircumstances, individualsareobliged toobey(andperhapssometimes todisobey)lawstheydisagreewith.Fortunately, thisbookisnotaboutthosebiganddifficult issues.Whatmatters here is the significance of justice, given a commonandplausibleviewofwhatthestatecanandcannotmakepeopledo.Ifyouthinkthatthestatecanjustifiablyforcepeopletobecharitabletooneanother,youareguiltyof conceptual confusion.But thinking that the state can justifiably forcepeople to

carryouttheirdutiestooneanotheris,formany,partofthepointorsignificanceoftheconceptofduty.Sojusticeiscentraltopoliticalmorality,becauseofthewidelyheldclaimthatonceweknowwhatourdutiesaretooneanotherthenwealsoknowwhenwecanjustifyusingthemachineryofthestatetogetpeopletodothingstheymightnototherwisedo,andmightevenregardaswrong.Clearly, if justice is about identifying the scope and content of coercively

enforceable duties, or if we think that by definition the duties that arise arecoercivelyenforceable,thenitbecomesparticularlyimportantcorrectlytoidentifythe scope and limits of justice. And it’s not surprising that there are bigdisagreements about that scope and those limits. Everybody will agree that it islegitimateforthestateto(tryto)enforcethelawagainstmurder.Weallhaveadutynot to murder one another, and a duty to do what we can to prevent peopleperforming the unjust act of murdering others. That some people might want tomurderothers,ormightdisagree that theyhaveadutynot to, isneitherherenorthere. But claims about social or distributive justice go way beyond this kind ofclaim,intermsoftheextentofthedutiestheyimply.Dotalented,productivepeoplehaveadutytoforgosomeofthemoneytheyearntohelpthoselessfortunatethanthemselves,aduty,compliancewithwhichwecan–orevenhaveadutyto–enforceuponthem?Oristhatproperlyamatterofcharity–somethingbeyondtherealmofthe state? The three conceptions of justice we will look at shortly give differentanswerstothesequestions.Justicecanbethefirstvirtuewithoutbeingtheonlyone.Thisisaninstanceofa

quite general point that it is always useful to keep in mind. Different morallyvaluable political concepts – justice, liberty, equality, democracy – need notcoincidecompletely.Thisisahardthingforpoliticianstoaccept,sincetheytendtobereluctanttoacknowledgethattheirpreferredpoliciesorpositionsmightinvolveanythingotherthanthecompleteandharmoniousrealizationofallgoodthings.Youdon’toftenfindapoliticianbeinghonestenoughtosaysomethinglike:‘Ibelieveinsocial justice of type x. I accept that this involves significant restrictions ofindividualfreedom,thatitdoesnotprovideanythingIcouldhonestlycallequalityofopportunity,andthat itsrealizationrequiressubstantial limitationsonthescopeofdemocraticdecision-making.Nonetheless,herearemyreasonsforbelievinginit.’ Why not? Because their opponents would make a big fuss about the loss offreedom,thelackofequalityofopportunityand/ortherestrictionondemocracy–each of which would doubtless be described in terms much more confused andvaguethantheyintended.Comparedtorealpoliticians–whohavetoworryabouthowtheirstatementswillbe interpreted, twisted,usedandabusedrhetorically,andspun–politicalphilosophershaveiteasy.Theycansaypreciselywhat theymean,withareasonabledegreeofconfidencethattheywillbetakenasmeaningpreciselywhattheysay.

Thispointaboutconflictsbetweenpoliticalvaluesshouldnotbemisunderstood.Of course, our aim is indeed to achieve the best reconciliation possible – in thesense of coming up with an overall position which does the best job of givingproperweighttothesedifferingvalues.Ofcoursetherearedifferentconceptionsofthe various concepts in question, and which conception we favour may in partreflect our other value commitments, which will in turn influence our preferredconception of another concept. We may well have an overall vision about howsocietyshouldbethatinformsthewaywethinkaboutallofthem.Butnoneofthismeans thatwe should start by simply assuming that, since equality and liberty orjusticeanddemocracyaregoodthings,wemustbelookingforawayofthinkingabout theseconceptswhichavoidsthepossibilityofconflictbetweenthem.Onthecontrary, clarity is best achieved by keeping concepts as distinct as possible,resistingthetemptationtoletthemmeltintooneanother.The most common example of confusion on this issue concerns the idea of

democracy,aconceptwithsuchpositiveconnotationsthatitistypicallystretchedinallsortsofdirections.Whowillconfesstonotbeingademocrat?Butdemocracy,atcore,istodowiththepeopleasawholehavingthepowertomakedecisionsabouttherulesunderwhichtheyaregoingtolive.This,onthewhole,isagoodthing–forlotsofreasons.Whoismorelikelytomakegoodrulesthanthosewhohavetoobeythem?Rulesrestrictpeople’sfreedom,butthoserestrictedbyrulestheyhavethemselves been involved in making retain a kind of freedom – at least whencomparedwiththosesubjecttorulesmadebyothers.It’sfair–it treatscitizensaspoliticalequals–ifrulesaremadebycitizensasawholeratherthanbysomesubsetof the population. It’s good for people’s characters and personalities that theyshouldtakeanactiveroleinthepubliclifeoftheirpoliticalcommunities.Thesearefour, different, weighty reasons that do indeed make a very strong case fordemocracy.Part5willaddmoretothelist.Buteventheweightofthesecombineddoesnotmeanthatdemocracyisalwaysagoodthing,orthatallgoodthingsmust,becausetheyaregood,thereforebe‘democratic’.Tothinkthatadecisionshouldbemadedemocraticallyistothinkthatitshouldbe

madebythepeopleasawhole.Dowereallywantalldecisionstobemadethisway?Aren’tsomedecisionsbetterregardedasprivate,betterlefttoindividualsthantothepolitical community? Imagine twosocieties. Inone, there is ademocraticvoteonwhat religions people are to be permitted to practise. In the other, there is aconstitution granting every individual the right to practise the religion of herchoice.Whichsocietyisbetter?Thesecond.Whichismoredemocratic?Ithinkthefirst. To be sure, some individual freedoms can be regarded as necessary fordemocracyitself.Freedomofassociationorfreedomofexpressionarelikethis.Ifasocietydeniesitsmemberstherighttosaywhattheythink,ortogettogetherwithotherswhoagreewiththem,thenwemaywelljudgethatitisdenyingthemthings

thatareneededforthatsocietytoberegardedasdemocratic.Thisisbecauseoftheconnection between expression, association and political activity. So someconstitutionalrightsmaybenecessaryconditionsof,notconstraintson,democracy.But is freedomof religion like this? Suppose a society doesn’t preventwould-befollowers of a religion from putting the case forwhy they should be allowed topractiseit,orfromorganizingwithwould-becoreligioniststoadvancetheircause.It simply prevents them frompractising it. Is there anything that should be calledundemocraticaboutthis?Orwhataboutfreedomofsexuality?Onemightwellthinkfreedom of sexuality to be a central human freedom. A society that allows itsmembers to dowhat they like sexually – as long, of course, as they don’t harmothers – is, other things equal, better than one that doesn’t. But I don’t think weshouldsaythatitisalsoamoredemocraticsociety.Infact,weshouldsaythatitislessdemocratic.Itremovesanissuefromthescopeofdemocraticcontrol.Ifwejudgethattheindividualhasarighttofreedomofreligion,orofsexuality,

thenthesefreedomscanberegardedascentraltosocialjustice.Asocietythatdeniesthemtreatsitsindividualmembersunjustly–beingwillingtoviolatepeople’srightsand to impose the will of the majority on a matter that should be left to theindividual. There is, then, plenty of room for conflict between justice anddemocracy.Botharegoodthings.Weareultimatelygoingtobelookingforthebestbalance between the different values that they embody. But we are not helped inthinking about the real issues by the misguided idea that the two concepts mustcoincide.On thecontrary,wemake intellectualprogressbyfocusingpreciselyontheplaceswheretheycomeapart.Asocietycouldbeperfectlyjust–everybodyisgettingwhattheyhavearightto

andallareactingdutifullytowardsoneanother–withoutitsbeingaperfectsociety.Perhaps the vastmajority of itsmembers are bored (or,worse, not bored) couchpotatoes, spendingvastamountsof their timewatchingdaytimeTV.Justice isonedimensionalongwhichwecanjudgesocietiesasbetterorworsethanoneanother,butitisnottheonlyone.Itmattersalsohowpeoplelivetheirliveswithinthesocialinstitutions that embody principles of justice –what they choose to dowith theirvariousrightsandtheirjustshareofgoods.Wherethingsgetinteresting,ofcourse,iswherewe think that justiceandothergood thingsare insomesensecompetingwith one another. Then it really doesmatter whether we agree with Rawls aboutjusticebeingthefirstvirtue.ThereisafamousclimacticsceneonthebigwheelintheclassicmovieTheThirdMan,whereOrsonWelles,asHarryLime,sketchestherelativemeritsofSwitzerlandandFlorenceundertheBorgias.Florencewassavageand violent – not much social justice there – and it gave us the Renaissance.Switzerlandhasbeenamodelofpeace,fair-mindednessandsocialsolidarity–anditgaveusthecuckooclock.Lime’sthought,ofcourse,isthatthisisnotcoincidence.It’snotsimply that therearemoregoodthings thansocial justice,but,worse, that

social justice is actually inimical to some good things. Justice, from thisperspective, can start to seem a rather tedious, tame virtue. A virtue, to echo theGermanphilosopherFriedrichNietzsche(1844–1900),fitforslaves,notforpeoplecapableofactionsnoblerandmoreheroicthanthepetty,cowardlyconcerntotreatoneanotherjustly.The idea that justice might be inimical to excellence has other, less drastic,

incarnations. Some defences of inequality appeal not to the idea that inequality isjust,buttotheclaimthatdisproportionatelyconcentratingresourcesinthehandsofthe few is a necessaryprecondition for intellectual or artistic progress.Alexis deTocqueville (1805–59), the French aristocrat who wrote about democracy inAmerica,thoughtthatthesystemwherebyestatesweredividedequallybetweensonsrather than passing intact to the first, as happened in France,meant thatAmericawould necessarily produce fewer, perhaps no, great thinkers. Great thinkingrequirespeoplewithleisureandanaristocraticculturecommittedtothecultivationoftheintellectsothat,forexample,childrenarenotexpectedtopaytheirwaybutrather devote many years, perhaps their whole lives, to the acquisition ofintellectually valuable but financially useless skills. America’s commercial anddemocratic culture, thoughbetter inmany respects, and, forTocqueville, overall,wasbound to lead to a kindof intellectualmediocrity.Similar arguments aboundtoday. Is it right to spend large amounts of public money subsidizing culturalactivities,suchasopera,thattenddisproportionatelytobevaluedbythebetteroff–especially if, as is the case with the UK’s National Lottery, the money isdisproportionately raised from those who are less well off ? Can the BritishuniversitiesofOxfordandCambridgejustifytheclaimthatthestateshouldprovideany of the extra resources required by their labour-intensive tutorial teachingmethods– especially if it is childrenof the better offwho are disproportionatelylikelytoreceivesuchanexpensiveeducation?Wearesurroundedbywhat,atleastatfirstsight,arehardchoicesbetweensocialjusticeandothervalues.

Hayekv.socialjustice

AccordingtoFriedrichvonHayek(1899–1992),theveryideaofsocialjusticeisa‘mirage’, or the kind of confusion that philosophers call a ‘category mistake’.Hayek, an Austrian, was Prime Minister Thatcher ’s favourite intellectual, and amajorinfluenceonthedevelopmentoftheNewRightinBritainandtheUSduringthe1970sand1980s.Inhisview,theideathat‘society’ issomethingthatmightbejust or unjust involves amisunderstanding of the concept of justice. Justice is anattributeofaction,apredicateofagents.Apersonactsjustlywhensheundertakesajust action. The aggregate distributions of resources that result from individualsinteractinginthemarketareunintendedbyanyindividualagent,and thereforenotsusceptible of being judged just or unjust. The idea of ‘social justice’ involves afundamentalfailuretoseethispoint.‘Society’,notbeinganagent,isnotthekindofthingthatcanbejustorunjust.Hayeksaysotherinfluentialthingstoo.Hethinksanycoerciveredistributionby

the state beyond the meeting of common basic needs involves an unjustifiableinterferencewithindividualliberty.Thetitleofhismostfamousbook,TheRoadtoSerfdom (1944), conveys the key idea. For Hayek, the state’s ambition to realize‘socialjustice’impliesacentralizedauthoritymakingpeopledothingstheymightnot want to do, interfering with their freedom to do what they like with theirresources – and all this in the name of a conceptual confusion. Relatedly, Hayekthinksthatstatepoliciesintheareaofwelfareandredistributionnecessarilyinvolvethe state making judgements about the criteria that should govern distribution.Shouldgoodsbeallocatedon thebasisofneedormerit? Ifmerit,whatcountsasmerit?Andsoon.Hayekisascepticonthesematters.Heisdoubtfulthatthereareright answers to such questions and thinks that the only thing to do is to leavejudgementsofthiskindtoindividuals.Finally,Hayekthinksthat,justaslongasthestatedoesn’tstick itsnose inanddistort theprocess, individuals interactingfreelywillproducea‘catallaxy’orspontaneousorderthatcrystallizestheinformationandwisdom dispersed in their individual heads. The free market represents such acatallaxy – with the price signal supplying knowledge of a kind in principleunavailable to any central planner, and guiding individuals towards economicactivity conducive to the general good. This critique of the planned, socialisteconomy – a variant of the Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith’s(1723–90)‘invisiblehand’defenceofthemarket–meansthat,forHayek,attemptstoplantheeconomy,ortoredistributeresourcesinpursuitofparticulardistributivegoals, arenot just invasiveof individual freedom, theyalsoamount to inefficientdistortionsofmarket processeswhich, left to themselves,would tend, in the longrun,tobenefiteverybody.These are all big and controversial claims – too big to discuss here. But it is

worth saying something about Hayek’s distinctive rejection of social justice as amirage. To begin with, even if it were true that nobody intended the overalldistributionofresourcesthatresultsfromthemarket,itdoesn’tfollowthatnobodyis responsible for it. People can be responsible for outcomes they don’t intend.Thinkofthemanwhofailstocheckhisbrakesand,asaresult,runsoversomebody.Hedidn’t intend torunanybodyover,but,becausehecouldreasonablyhavebeenexpected to have checked his brakes, he is responsible for having done so.He isnegligent, culpably negligent.NowHayekwould say that there is no agent in thedistributivecasewhocanbeheldresponsible,eveninthesenseofbeingnegligent.Butisthatright?Surelywe,aspoliticalactors,arecapableofcomingtogetheranddecidingthatwearenotpreparedtopermitcertainkindsofdistributiveoutcome–say that somemembersofour society, throughno faultof theirown,will live inpovertyandwithoutaccesstoeducationfortheirchildren.Ifweacceptthatthisisamatterof justice,notsomething thatshouldbe left to individualcharity, theneachindividualisresponsibleforensuringthatshedoesherfairshareofcontributingtothepreventionofthatoutcome,byagitatingpoliticallyandbybearinghershareofthe financialcost involved in itsprevention.Whatmatters isnotwhetheranybodyintends the injustice, butwhether anybody is responsible for the fact that it exists.Whengovernmentsdevise theireconomicpolicies, theyhaveagoodsenseof thedistributiveoutcomes thatwill result. If theydevise,andcitizensvote for,policiesthatcanreasonablybeexpectedtoproducedistributionsthatincludeavoidableandunjustified inequalities, then,whatever their intention, theyare responsible for theexistenceofthoseinequalities.Ifthoseinequalitiesareunjust,thentheactofvotingfor them is an unjust act. Hayek’s attempt to sever the link between individualagencyandaggregatedistributiveoutcomesfails.Hemissesthefactthatindividualscanactpolitically, inconcertwithothers, topreventoutcomesthat,as individuals,mayindeedbebeyondtheircontrol.

Rawls:justiceasfairness

JohnRawlswrotetwobigbooks–ATheoryofJustice(1971),followedbyPoliticalLiberalism (1993). These have a combined length of more than 1,000 pages andgoodnessknowshowmany forests-worthof commentary and criticism they havejointlygenerated.AlotofattentionhasfocusedonwhetherandhowRawlschangedhis position between the twobooks, so answering the question ‘What doesRawlsreallythink?’isfarfromstraightforward.Inthissection,concentratingonthefirst(thoughusingelementsof the secondwhere thathelps), Iwant togive themerestintroductory sketchofwhat all the fusshasbeenabout.MoreofRawls’spositionwillunfoldas Icompare itwith the twootherconceptionsof justice–entitlementanddesert–thatcomeafterwards.(IwilldiscussPoliticalLiberalisminpart4.)The ideas at the heart of Rawls’s theory of justice, which he calls justice as

fairness,aretheoriginalpositionandtheveilofignorance.Rawlsbelievesthatthewaytofindoutwhichprinciplesofjusticearefairistothinkaboutwhatprincipleswouldbechosenbypeoplewhodonotknowhowtheyaregoingtobeaffectedbythem.Hethusimaginespeoplechoosingprinciplesinanoriginalposition,behindaveilof ignorance.This isa thoughtexperiment.Theideais tohelpus thinkaboutwhat would happen if people deprived of all knowledge that might serve todistinguish them from one another – how clever they are, whether they areChristian,Muslimoratheist–weretogettogetheranddecidehowtheywantedtheirsociety to be organized. Justice, for Rawls, should be understood as that whichwouldemergeasthecontentofahypotheticalcontractoragreementarrivedatbypeopledeprivedofthekindofknowledgethatwouldotherwisemaketheagreementunfair.Theintuitiveideaisthelinkbetweenfairnessandignorance.IfIdon’tknowwhich piece of cake I’m going to get, I’mmore likely to cut fairly than if I do.Depriving people of particularizing knowledge means that they will choose fairprinciples rather than allowing that knowledge to bias the choice of principles intheirowninterests.There are two kinds of thing that the parties to this hypothetical contract don’t

know.First,theyareignorantoftheirtalents–theirnaturalendowments–andtheirsocial position. They don’t knowwhether they are bright or dim, or born into awealthy or a poor family. Second, they don’t know their conception of the good.They don’t know what they believe about what makes life valuable or what isworthwhile(art,sport,watchingdaytimeTV),whethertheyarereligiousornot(or,iftheyare,whichreligiontheybelievein),andsoon.Buttherearesomethingstheydoknow.Mostimportantly,theyknowthattheyhavewhatRawlscalls‘thecapacityto frame, revise and pursue a conception of the good’. Indeed, they regard thiscapacityasoneofthemostimportantthingsaboutthemandareveryconcernedtoprotectit,andprovideconditionsforitsexercise,whentheyengageintheprocess

of deciding what principles should regulate their society. And they know that, toexercise that capacity, they need certain all-purpose goods, which Rawls calls‘primarygoods’:liberties,opportunities,powers,incomeandwealth,self-respect.The original position, then, is a device of representation. It is a way of

representingparticularclaimsabouthowweshouldthinkaboutjustice.Rawls’sideais that itmodels fair conditionsby abstracting frompeople’s natural endowmentsand social (class) position, and from their particular conceptions of the good. Itmodels conditions under which people solely regarded as free and equal are toagreewhathecallsfairtermsofsocialcooperation.Society,forRawls,shouldbeunderstoodasafairschemeofcooperationbetweenfreeandequalcitizens,andtheoriginalpositionmodelsorrepresentsthatunderstanding.One way of thinking about what is happening in Rawls’s theory is that he is

attemptingtomodel–tocapturebymeansofathoughtexperiment–whatkindsofreasoning are and are not acceptable when it comes to thinking about justice.Suppose you met someone who favoured low tax rates and minimal welfareprovision.You ask herwhy, and she says that, as a very talented businesswomanwithchildrenatexpensiveprivateschools,sheandtheywouldbebetteroffinsuchasociety. She might well be right about that. But it’s hard to see how she couldseriouslypresentthesereasonsashavinganythingtodowithjustice–atleastnotifjusticehasanythingtodowithfairness.(Thereareotherkindsofreasonshecouldgivewhichwould, butwe’ll come to those later.)Doesn’t she think about all theuntalentedpeople,orchildrenwhoseparentscannotaffordtosendthemtoprivateschools?Doesn’titoccurtoherthatsheisluckytobetalented,thatshemightjustaswellhavebeenbornuntalented,andthatjusticeisaboutseeingthingsimpartially,orfromeverybody’spointofview?TheRawlsianway todo this is to imaginewhatdistributiveprinciplesyouwouldhave reason to endorse if youdidn’t knowwhoyouwere,therebythinkingofyourselfandyourfellowcitizensasequals.So ignorance about talents and social background models the sense in which

peopleareconceivedasequal.It is ignoranceof theirconceptionof thegoodthatmodelsthesenseinwhichpeopleareconceivedasfree.ForRawls,reasonsarisingfromconceptionsof thegoodshouldbekeptoutof theprocessof thinkingaboutjustice because allowing them in would imply not respecting people’s freedom,spelledoutastheircapacitytoframe,reviseandpursuetheirownconceptionofthegood.SupposeyouareaChristian,thekindofwholeheartedChristianwhobelievesyourstobetheonetruefaith.YoumightthinkthatitwouldbeagoodideaforthestateofficiallytoendorseChristianity:togiveitfavouredstatusinschools,toallowonlyChristians toholdcertainpublicoffices, toprotect it andnotother religionsfrom blasphemy. But, for Rawls, this would be to bias the state, which is thecollectivepoweroffreeandequalcitizens,inaparticulardirection,andthatwouldbeunfairtonon-Christians.Theonlywaytotreatallcitizensfairlyisforthestate

nottotakeaviewonhowpeopleshouldleadtheirlives(thesameappliestoart,ordaytimeTV),respectingtheirfreedom–theircapacitytochoosehowtheyliveforthemselves. This restriction on the kind of reasoning that may legitimately beinvoked when thinking about justice is modelled, in the original position, bypeople’signoranceoftheirconceptionofthegood.SowhatprinciplesdoesRawls thinkpeoplebehind theveilof ignorancewould

choose?These:

1Eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostextensivetotalsystemofbasiclibertiescompatiblewithasimilarsystemoflibertyforall.

2Socialandeconomicinequalitiesaretobearrangedsothattheyareboth(a)tothegreatestbenefitoftheleastadvantaged,and(b)attachedtoofficesandpositionsopentoallunderconditionsoffairequalityofopportunity.

(1) is the principle of equal basic liberties. This has priority over (2) which isconcernedwith social and economic inequalities and itself has two parts: (b), theprincipleoffairequalityofopportunity,whichhaspriorityover(a),thedifferenceprinciple. (It ismysteriouswhy– and rather irritating that –Rawls lists these lasttwoprinciplesinreverseorder.Perhapshewantstokeephisreadersontheirtoes.)Taken together thesemean that a just societywill, first andmost important, giveeach of its members the same set of basic liberties or rights – freedom ofexpression,ofreligion,ofassociation,ofoccupation,etc.Then,iftherearesocialand economic inequalities, it will make sure that all citizens enjoy equality ofopportunityintheprocessbywhichtheycometoachieve(andavoid)theunequallyrewardedpositions.Finally, itwill only allow such inequalities at all if they tend,overtime,tomaximizethepositionoftheworst-offmembersofsociety.Would people in the original position really choose these principles? Many

criticssaythattheywouldn’t.Inparticular,alotofattentionhasfocusedonRawls’sassumption–essentialtothedifferenceprinciple–thattheywouldbehaveasiftheywererisk-averse,concernedtomaketheworst-offpositionasgoodaspossible(or,inRawls-speak,to‘maximin’–tomaximizetheminimum)forfearthattheymightendupinitthemselves.Butwhyshouldtheybequitesopessimistic?Wouldn’titbemore rational to choose principles that would maximize the average position,perhapssubjecttosome‘floor ’levelbeneathwhichtheywouldindeednotwanttotaketheriskofsinking?(Empiricalsimulationsoftheoriginalpositionsuggestthatthis is in factwhat realpeopledochoose.)Rawlshasofferedvariousdefencesof‘maximin’thinking,thoughhehastendedtobackofffromtheinitialsuggestionthatthis would be the technically ‘rational’ way for them to proceed given theuncertainty they face.Oneargument–which invokeswhathe calls ‘the strainsofcommitment’–goesroughlyasfollows:‘Itmattersthatallthoselivinginasocietyendorseitinawaythatmeanstheywillbecommittedtoit–ratherthanseekingto

changethings.Ifthedifferenceprincipleisinoperation,thosewhoareatthebottomofthepilewillknowthattherulesareworkingtoensurethattheyareaswelloffastheycouldbe.Soeventheywillbecommittedtothesociety.’(Oneobviousproblemwith thismove is that somebodycouldaccept that thosewhoareworstoff are aswelloffastheycanbewithoutacceptingthatsheshouldbeoneoftheworstoff.Inthatcase,shemaynothavethekindof‘commitment’thatRawlsislookingfor.)Another focus of objection is ‘the priority of liberty’ – Rawls’s view that the

parties to the hypothetical contract would not be prepared to trade off the basicliberties for thesakeofeconomicgain. (Thekindof ‘priority’given to liberty isvery strict. It’s not just that liberty is given greater weight in any decision abouttrade-offs, it’s that there can’t be any trade-offs.)HereRawlswould appeal tohisclaimabout the importanceofpeople’s capacity to frame, revise andpursue theirconceptionofthegood,andthewayinwhichthebasiclibertiesareessentialtotheexercise of that capacity. Would you be prepared to take the risk of not beingallowedtosaywhatyoubelieved,orofnotbeingallowedtoassociatewithwhomyou liked,orofbeing forced topractisea religionyou thoughtwasnonsense, inreturnformoremoney?Youranswerwillprobablydependonhowpooryouwouldexpect to be without the extra. If the choice were liberty or food, we would allchoose food. Rawls accepts this, explicitly acknowledging his assumption thateverybodyinsocietyhasreachedacertainthresholdofeconomicwell-being.Onlyoncewehave reached that level do the basic liberties acquire their clear priority.(This in turnraises thequestionofhowuniversally– towhatrangeofsocieties–Rawlsthinksthathistheoryapplies.That’sabiganddifficultonethatwouldtakeustoofaroffthecurrenttrack.)Itisthelastprinciple,thedifferenceprinciple,thathasattractedmostattentionin

debates about distributive justice. How could inequalities tend to maximize theposition of theworst off? Isn’t the obviousway to do that to pay everybody thesame?Rawls’s thought is the familiarone thatpeoplemayneed incentives if theyare tobemotivated towork in those activitieswhere they aregoing tobeuseful.Some inequality, so the argument goes, is necessary (sociologists might say‘functional’) if the economy is going to be as productive as itmight be.Withoutinequalities,peoplewillhavenoincentivetodoonejobratherthananother–hencenoincentivetodothekindofworkwhichitismostuseful(foreverybodyelse)thatthey do. Imagine all those brain surgeons and dynamic entrepreneurswhowouldratherbepoets.Withouttheextramoneythatwillinducethemtoforgothepleasuresofpoetry,therestofuswillbedeprivedoftheirsurgicalandentrepreneurialskills.Generalize to the aggregate level and you have an inefficient, stagnant economywhich,becauseitpayseverybodythesame,doesnotprovidethekindofgrowththatbenefits everybody – including, over time, the worst off. This, so the argumentgoes,isroughlywhathappenedunderstatesocialismineasternEurope.

Thisjustificationofinequalityisverywidelyaccepted.Ithasledsomethinkerstoconcludethatthereisnoreasontoworryaboutinequalitiesatall.Ifwhatmattersisthe absolute position of the worst-off members of society, then we should bepreparedtocountenanceanyinequalitiesthatimprovethatposition.Thereis,onthisaccount, no need to ‘mind the gap’ between rich and poor – our attention shouldfocussolelyonwhethertheeconomyisorganizedinsuchawaythatthepoorare,overtime,becomingbetteroff.Iwillsaymoreaboutthislineofargumentlateron,inPart3onequality.Fornow, it isworthpointingout thatRawls’sprinciplesaysonlythatinequalitiesarejustifiediftheyservetomaximizethepositionoftheworstoff.Itisquiteconsistentwiththisthat,infact,noinequalitiesarejustified(becauseitis not true that any are needed to maximize the advantage of the worst off).Weshould (and will) think carefully about whether they are needed, and if so, why.Notice also that the principle is demanding: inequalities are justified only if theyservetomaximizethepositionoftheworstoff.Theoddbitof‘trickledown’isnotenoughtosatisfytheprinciple.Whatmattersiswhethertheworstoffareaswelloffastheycouldbe,notwhethertheyarebetteroffthantheymighthavebeen.Another major source of debate has been who is to count as the ‘worst off’.

Rawlsinitiallysuggestedthatwemeasurehowwelloffsomebodyisbyseeinghowmanyprimarygoodstheyhave.Thosewithleastprimarygoodsaretheworstoff.Theproblemwiththisisthatitpaysnoattentiontotheprocessbywhichthosewithleastcametohaveleast.Supposetheyareboneidle–peoplewhostartedoutwithafair amount of resources but chose to consume them rather than to workproductively.Afteracoupleofyearstheyhavenothingleftandarenow,byRawls’soriginalmeasure,theworstoff.Doesfairnessreallyrequirethehardworking–andhence better-off – members of society to channel resources in their direction?Seeingtheproblem,Rawlsamendedhispositiontorecognizethat‘leisure’mightbeincludedintheindexofprimarygoods.Wewillreturntothisissuewhenwelookatjusticeasdesert,andagaininPart3,whenweconsiderwhetherthosewhoarepoorbecausetheychoseidlenessreallyareworseoff,allthingsconsidered,thanthosewhochosetoworkhardandbecamerich.ToendthisquickintroductiontoRawls’sposition,acoupleofthoughtsaboutthe

‘contract’ aspect ofRawls’s argument.This can cause the kind of deep confusionthatreallygetsinthewayofunderstandingwhathe’supto.Rawlshimselfreferstothe great tradition of social contract theory exemplified by the work of ThomasHobbes(English,1588–1679),JohnLocke(English,1632–1704)andJean-JacquesRousseau(SwissFrench,1712–78).Thisisthetraditionthatthinksaboutsocialandpoliticalorganization– lawand state authority– as theoutcomeof an agreementbetweenindividualswhoseethattheywillbebetteroffunderlawthantheywouldbeinthestateofnature.Or,rather,itthinksaboutitasifitweretheoutcomeofsuchanagreement.It’snotatallclearthatanymemberofthetraditionreallybelievesthat

therewas amoment in historywhen the state and law emerged as the result of acontractualagreement.Thekeyideaisratherthatitmighthavedone;that,whateveritshistoricalorigins,itisinpeople’sintereststosubmittoit–theyshouldgoalongwithitbecausetheywouldhaveagreedtodoso(becausethealternativeisthestateof nature). On this interpretation, then, it is not just Rawls’s contract that ishypothetical – the contract tradition as a whole is most plausibly understood aspositingahypotheticalcontract, thepointbeing that thathelpsus thinkaboutwhatwe can properly expect people to go alongwith (on the grounds that theywouldhaveagreedtogiventhechance).A common objection to Rawls is that hypothetical contracts, unlike real ones,

havenobindingforce.Theyare,sothejokegoes,notworththepaperthey’renotwritten on. But this misunderstands the role of the contract in his argument. Ifsomebody asks, ‘Why should I go along with Rawls’s principles of justice?’ theanswerisnot,‘Becauseyouagreedto,andarethereforeunderacontractualdutyorobligation to do so.’ That, as the objection observes, is not true. The answer israther:‘BecauseyouhaveadutytoactjustlyandRawlshascorrectlyidentifiedwhatjusticerequiresofyou.’Thehypotheticalcontractcomesintothestoryonlybecauseit is, forRawls, the rightway to think about and identifywhat justice requires. Ifthere were other, better, ways, then we should use them, and we would still beobligedtocomplywiththeoutcome.Soitisnotacontractargumentintheeverydaysensethatpeopleareboundtogoalongwiththeoutcomebecausetheyagreedtoit.Thehypotheticalcontractissimplyadeviceforthinkingaboutwhatprinciplesareindeedjust,andit’sbecausethey’rejustthatoneisboundtocomplywiththem,notbecauseoneagreedtothem.(It’struethat,forRawls,thewaytoseethattheyarejustistoseethatwewouldhaveagreedtothemunderappropriateconditions,soit’snotsurprisingreadersgetconfused.)The contractual aspect of the argument sometimes generates another

misunderstanding. The normal way of thinking about a contract is as somethingvoluntarily entered into by people pursuing their own interests, for mutualadvantage, and Rawls talks about the motivation of the people in the originalpositioninawaythatsuggeststhatheseesthemasessentiallyself-interested(oratleastwhathecalls‘mutuallydisinterested’).Eachisconcernedtoendupaswelloffaspossible,toprotectherowninterests.Herthoughtis:‘WhatprinciplesaregoingtobebestformegiventhatIdon’tknowwhoI’mgoingtobe?’Allthisistrue.Butthatdoesn’tmeanthatRawls’stheoryisoneforpeoplewhoareultimately,orinanyoverallsense,egoisticorself-interested.Itisatheoryforpeoplewhoseesocietyasa fair schemeof cooperation,whocare about treating their fellowcitizens fairly,andwho regard themas free and equal.That iswhy theywill accept the originalposition–withitsequalizingandimpartializingveilofignorance–astherightwayto think about justice.Within theoriginalposition, people are indeed regarded as

choosingprinciplesbylookingoutforthemselves,bythinkingabouthowthey,asindividuals,willfareunderthem.Butthemoralcontentisalreadytherebythen.Itisthereinthewaythattheveilofignoranceissetupinthefirstplace.Thepartiestothe hypothetical contract look out for themselves, onemight say, only after theyhave been deprived of all information that might enable them to look out forthemselves.Oneoftenreadsthattheliberalapproachtojustice–andtopoliticsingeneral–

assumes that people arebasically self-interestedor egoistic.Thisviewused tobecommon in Marxist writings and is now most prevalent in communitarian andfeministcircles.(IwillexamineitinmoredetailinPart4,oncommunity.)Certainaspects of Rawls’s theory may have done something to encourage thatmisunderstanding.But it isamisunderstanding,andmustbediscardedbeforeonecan begin to see what Rawls is really about. Liberals like Rawls do care thatindividuals should be free to live the lives of their choice, but they care that allindividualsshouldbefreetodosoanddemandafairdistributionofresourcesforthat reason.Moreover, the livespeoplechoosecanperfectlywell includeconcernforothers.Itishardtoseewhatisself-interestedaboutanyofthat.

Nozick:justiceasentitlement

TheAmericanRobertNozick(1938–2002)wasRawls’scolleagueinthephilosophydepartmentatHarvard, teachingalongsidehimwhenRawlspublishedATheoryofJusticein1971.By1974,Nozickhadpublishedhiscounterblast,Anarchy,StateandUtopia, which is still themost coherent and systematic articulation of libertarianprinciples around, and one of the most fundamental critiques of Rawls’s wholeapproach.ForNozick,justiceisnotaboutagreeingfairprinciplesbyimaginingthatwedon’tknowhowluckyorunluckywehavebeeninthenaturalorsociallottery.Itisaboutrespectingpeople’srighttoself-ownershipandtheirrighttoholdproperty,leaving them free to decide for themselveswhat they dowithwhat is theirs. Theproper role of the state, for Nozick, is not to meddle with the distribution ofresources so as to produce some ideally ‘fair ’ distribution. That would involveunjustifiedintrusionsintopeople’slegitimateholdingsofprivateproperty.Itsroleshouldratherbelimitedtothatofprotectingpeoplefromsuchintrusionsbyothers.WhereRawlsisa‘leftliberal’(oran‘egalitarianliberal’)advocatingasubstantiallyredistributivewelfarestate,Nozickisa‘rightliberal’(or‘libertarian’),committedtotheideaofself-ownershipandarguingforalaissez-faire‘nightwatchman’state.Like Hayek, his views – or at least versions of them as filtered through variousthink-tanksandpolicyunits–wereinfluentialinthedevelopmentoftheNewRight.NozickattributestoRawls,andobjectsto,theviewthatwecanregardgoodsas

‘manna from heaven’. Were it the case that we had woken up one morning todiscoverthattheworldwassuddenlyfullofthingsthatpeoplewanted,thenitmightbeappropriatetoadoptRawls’sorsimilarprinciplestodistributethem.Inthatcase,after all, why should anybody get more than anybody else? But that is not howgoods came into the world. They are made by people. They are the result ofindividual people’s work, sometimes in cooperation with others. People createthingsbycombiningtheirownabilitiesandeffortswiththenaturalworld,enteringintovoluntaryagreementswithoneanotherforthemutuallyadvantageousexchangeofsuchabilitiesandefforts,andthethingsthattheytherebycreatearetheirs.Theyare not likemanna from heaven, unowned and up for distribution in accordancewith fairprinciples.Theycome into theworldalreadyowned,by thepeoplewhoproduced them(orby thosewhohavepaid for the labourof thosewhoproducedthem).Rawlsobjects toutilitarianismbecause it fails to takeseriously theseparateness

ofpersons.Maximizingoverallhappinessisamistakengoalpartlybecausethereisno overall person to enjoy that overall happiness. There are just lots of separatepeople,anditwouldbewrongtomakesomeunhappyforthesakeofcreatingmorehappinessinsomeothers.Thisthoughtunderliestheideaofthecontract,wherebyprinciples have to be agreeable to each individual considered separately –which

Rawlsthinkswillruleoutprinciplesaimedsimplyatmaximizingoverallutility(oroverallanythingelse).WhatifIamoneofthepeoplemadeunhappyforthesakeofother people’s happiness? But Nozick thinks that Rawls does not take theseparatenessofpersonsseriouslyenough.Rawlsdoesnotseethatweareindividual,separatepeople,eachwithherown talentsandattributes,whichbelong toherandheralone,andwhichmaynotbeusedtobenefitotherswithoutherconsent.Shecanchoose voluntarily to give the fruits of her labour to others, but the state actswrongly,failingtorespectherseparateness,whenitforceshertogiveupsomeofthosefruitstoothers.Nozick,then,opposesallredistributivetaxation.Ifthewealthyaretogivetothepoor,theymustdosovoluntarily,notbecausethestateforcesthemto.InNozick’sview,peoplecandowhattheylikewithwhatistheirs.Andthereare

threekindsofthingthatmightbetheirs:(a)theirselves–theirbodies,braincells,etc.;(b)thenaturalworld–land,minerals,etc.;and(c)thethingspeoplemakebyapplying themselves to the natural world – cars, food, computers, etc. I’ll saysomethingabouttheideaofself-ownership–thatmylimbsandbraincellsareminetodowhat I likewith– shortly.Andoncepeopleownbitsof theworld,andownthemselves,it’seasytoseehowtheymightbethoughttoownwhattheyproducebybringingthemtogether.Solet’sstartbyseeinghowNozickthinksbitsofthenaturalworldmightcometobeownedbypeople.Heidentifiesthreewaysinwhichpeoplecan acquire a legitimate property holding (or entitlement): initial acquisition,voluntarytransferandrectification.Initialacquisitionreferstothecasewherebysomebodycomestoappropriate–to

make theirownproperty–previouslyunownedbitsof theworld. Imaginepeoplesettling for the first time an uninhabited continent. InNozick’s view, the land andnaturalresourcesofthatcontinentdonotbelongtoanybody,andmaylegitimatelybeacquiredbyindividualsonafirst-come-first-servedbasis,aslongasnobodyismade worse off by their doing so. (This is Nozick’s variant on Locke’s famousclaim–inhisSecondTreatiseofGovernment(1689)–thatpeoplemayappropriatepropertyjustaslongas‘enoughandasgood’isleftforothers.)Thisviewhascomeunder substantial and sustained criticism, and it would be fair to say that mostpolitical theorists think that Nozick’s account of initial acquisition is inadequate.Whatexactlydoesonehavetodotomakepreviouslyunownedpropertyone’sown:walk round it, draw a circle on amap, put a fence round it? How dowe decidewhetherothersarebeingmadeworseoff?They’reclearlyworseoff in the sensethat theyareno longerable toappropriate thatbitof land.And, inanycase,whosaysthatthecontinentwasunowned–upforgrabs–inthefirstplace?Maybeit,andallthenaturalworld,isjointlyownedbyallofus,inwhichcaseanybodywantingtouseanyofitneedspermissionfromtherestofus.Iftheworldwerecollectivelyorjointly owned, then it might look appropriate for us to get together and decide,

collectively, how we want to use and distribute it – perhaps in accordance withRawls’sorotherdistributiveprinciples.ForNozick,however,theworldisinitiallyunownedandcomestobetheprivate

propertyofindividualsthroughlegitimateactsofinitialacquisition.Thatisthefirstwaytoacquireproperty.Thesecondwayisbybeinggivenitbysomebodywho,byowningitherself,hastherighttogiveittoyou.Oncesomebodyownsanything,shecandowhatshelikeswithit,including,ofcourse,givingittowhomevershelikes,onwhatever termsmay be voluntarily agreed between them.This, forNozick, iswhat happens in the market. I own my labour. You own some land (which youacquired, let’s suppose,byanactof initial acquisition).Weenter intoavoluntaryagreementwherebyIsell–orleaseyou–theuseofmylabourforacertainprice,therebycoming toownsomemoney,which I can in turndowhat Iwantwith.Sothose of us whomissed out on the initial acquisition stage – who came into theworldwheneverythinghadalreadybeensnaffledup–shouldn’tworry toomuch.We own ourselves and are therefore in a position to lease ourselves to others. Ifwe’relucky,theselvesweownmaycommandahighpriceinthemarket,inwhichcase we can lease ourselves for lots of money and ourselves come to ownsubstantialamountsofproperty.Sothehistoryoftheworldshouldbeoneoflegitimateactsofinitialacquisition

followedby legitimate transfers of property, through acts of voluntary exchange,theresultbeingthejustoutcomethatpeopleownexactlywhatistheirsandnothingelse.ButNozickknowsthatithasn’treallybeenlikethat.Heknowsthatthehistoryof the world is actually one of unjust, involuntary transfers, whereby those withbetterweaponshaveforced thoseweaker than themselves togiveupwhat– inhisview–wasrightfullytheirs.ThemostfamiliarexamplesofthiswouldbethewaythatwhitesettlerstreatedthenativepopulationsofNorthAmericaorAustralia,butworldhistoryhasreallybeenonelongsequenceofsuchunjusttransfers.Nozick’sthirdprinciple– the thirdwaywherebyonecancome tohaveanentitlementoverproperty–ismeanttodealwiththis.Itistheprincipleofrectification,whichholdsthat unjust transfers may be rectified by compensating transfers that themselvescreateentitlements. Inpractice,ofcourse,asNozick iswellaware, thedifficultiesraised by this idea of rectification are enormous. There is no way that we canidentifywhowouldownwhatiftherehadbeennounjustappropriations,hencenowayof rectifyingproperly.AtonepointNozicksuggests that thebest thing todomight be to give everybody, as a starting point, equal amounts of property – thatmightatleastbeacloserapproximationtoajustsetofpropertyholdingsthanthevast and structural inequalities (inequalities between different ethnic groups, forexample)thathavebeenbuiltuponthoseunjustactsofappropriation.Itwouldbeamistake, then, toseeNozickasanapologistforthestatusquo.He

canperfectlywellinsistthatexistinginequalitiesareunjust,preciselybecausethey

have not come about in accordance with his three principles. That said, what isreally significant about his position is that, on his view, vast and structuralinequalitiescouldbejust.Peopleownthemselves,buttheselvestheyownaregoingtobeworthvastlydifferent amounts toothers.Somewill beborn strong,healthyandwith high levels of natural ability.Othersmay be bornweak, ill andwithouteventhepotential todevelopthoseattributesthatothersaregoingtobewillingtopay for in the market. Some will be born to wealthy parents who can spend oneducation and bequeath their wealth to their children, and so on down thegenerations,withmore andmore advantage accruing all the time.Othersmaybeborntoparentsinpoverty,withnomeansofhelpingtheirchildrengetastartinlife.Nozickthinksthatthisisbadluck–hemightevenconcedethatitisunfair–butitisnot unjust. As long as people’s property rights are respected, which means nocoercive state actionexcept thatwhich isnecessary for theprotectionofpropertyrights(thenightwatchmanorminimalstate),whateverdistributionresults,howeverunequal it may be, is just. People can, of course, give voluntarily to those lessfortunatethanthemselves.Nozickmaywellthinkthattheyoughttodoso.Butthereisnojusticeclaiminvolved–andnojustificationforcoercivestateactiondirectedagainst the better off. Justice is simply about respecting people’s property rights,aboutleavingpeoplefreetodowhattheylikewithwhatistheirs.Nozick describes his three principles as ‘historical’ and ‘unpatterned’. A

summarysloganwouldbe: ‘Fromeachas shechooses, toeachas she ischosen.’Thecontrastiswith‘end-state’and‘patterned’principles–principlesthatprescribeaparticular state thatmust be realized (such as that inequalities arebenefiting theworstoff)orrequiredistributionsinaccordancewithaparticularpattern(suchas‘toeachaccordingtoherneed’,or‘toeachaccordingtoherdeserts’).OnNozick’sview, what matters is that people have stuff that is justly theirs, and whateverdistribution results from voluntary exchanges between them is necessarily just.Whethersomebodyhasajusticeclaimtosomethingdependssolelyonthechainofeventsthatledtothemhavingit.Inequalitycouldbejust,equalitycouldbejust.Thatdependssimplyonwhatitisthatpeoplechoosetodowiththeirproperty.OnewaythatNozickformulateshisobjectiontotheredistributivestateisthatit

usessomepeopleasmeanstootherpeople’sends.HetherebyleansonthethoughtfamouslyformulatedbytheGermanphilosopherImmanuelKant(1724–1804)thatmoralityrequiresustotreatothersnotasmeanstoourownorotherpeople’sends,but as ends in themselves. Treating people asmeans seems like a fairly accuratedescription of what is involved when the state coercively redistributes resourcesfromsometoothers.Notalltaxation,ofcourse,isusedforredistributivepurposes.Someofitpaysforstreetlights,andthepolice,anddefence.Somepaysforapubliceducationandhealthcaresystemfromwhichthosewhoaretaxedthemselvesbenefit.Butsomeofitdoesinvolveinvoluntarytransfersfromsometoothers.Whenwetax

peopleontheirincome,partofwhatwearedoingisusingtheirproductiveabilities,whichtheymightotherwiseusesolelyforthemselves,tohelpothers.Theymaynotbe forced towork,or todoanyparticularkindofwork– soNozick’sclaim thattaxationisakintoforcedlabourlooksabitoverthetop.But, if theydowork,weareusingthem–someproportionoftheexerciseoftheirabilitiesandefforts–asmeanstootherpeople’sends.Thoughtrue,it’snotobviousthatthisisanobjection.Itmightbewrongtotreatpeoplesolelyasmeans(whichiswhatKantactuallysaid)–tobewillingtoenslavethemandgenerallymaketheirlivesamiseryforthesakeofothers.Thatmightindeedfailtotakeseriouslytheseparatenessofpersons,eachof whom has her own life to live. But, if some people are lucky enough to beproductive,andothersunluckyenoughnottobe,onemightthinkitjustifiedtousetheformertohelpthelatter–eveniftheyhavenotconsentedtothatuse.Thatwillpartlydependonwhether,orinwhatsense,peopleownthemselves,ofwhichmoreshortly.AnothercoreNozickianthoughtistheideathat‘libertyupsetspatterns’.Nozick’s

objection to patterned principles of justice – those holding that the justice of adistributiondependsonwhetherornot itconformstoaparticularpattern–is thatthepreservationofjusticewillinevitablyinvolverestrictions,inhisviewunjustifiedrestrictions, on people’s liberty. This is the point illustrated by his famous ‘WiltChamberlain example’. Wilt Chamberlain was, in 1974, a very high-earningbasketballplayerintheUSA,theTigerWoodsofhistimeandplace.Nozickthinksthat,ifpeoplearewillingtopayalotofmoneytoseehimplay(andassumingthemoneytheyarewillingtopayismoneytowhichtheyarethemselvesentitled),thenhe is entitled to themoney.Thecleverbit about theWiltChamberlain example isthatNozickallowsustoimaginestartingwithwhateverdistributionofresourceswelike. Suppose we start with an equal distribution of resources. All members ofsociety have exactly the same amount of money. Now some people so enjoywatchingWiltChamberlainplaybasketballthattheyarewillingtopayabitextratoseehiminaction.Sohisclub,aswellaschargingthenormalticketprice,asksforan extra 25 cents specifically for Wilt. Millions of people watch him during aseason,andheendsupaverywealthyman.Thereisnolongeranequaldistributionofresources,butnothingobjectionablehastakenplace.Peoplehavesimplyfreelychosenwhat theywant todowithwhat is theirs.Thegeneral lesson is that libertyupsetspatterns.Iftheinitialdistributionwasjust–whateverpatternitconformedto– then whatever emerges from voluntary exchanges must also be just. Anyalternativeconceptionofjusticerestrictspeople’sfreedomtodowhattheylikewiththeirjustshareofresources.Initsownterms,theWiltChamberlainexampleisveryeffective.Ifpeoplereally

ownpropertyinsuchawaythatitistheirstodowhattheylikewith,thenthatmustincludeitbeingtheirstogivetoothers.Iftheywanttogiveittosomebodyelse,like

Wilt,withtheexplicitconditionthatitshouldtherebybelongtohiminthesamewaythatitbelongedtothem(i.e.,sothathecoulddowhathelikedwithit),thenitmustbe illegitimate for thestate tocomealongand takeanyof itawayfor thesakeofothers. So anybody who wants to challenge the conclusion – that vast inequalitycouldbejustandthatthestatewouldbeactingwronglyifitengagedinanykindofredistributive taxation –must challenge the premise. Shemust deny that anybodyever owns things in the sense that Nozick requires. The force of the WiltChamberlain example comes fromNozick’s saying that the initial distribution ofresourcescanbewhateverone likes–andshowingthatvast inequalitymayresulteven from an equal distribution. But this involves a sleight of hand. For Nozickassumesthattheinitialdistribution,whateveritis,mustbeadistributionoffullorabsoluteproperty rights: ‘fullorabsolute’ in thesense that they imply thatpeoplecandowhatever they likewith theirproperty. If thisweregranted, the restwouldindeed follow. Lots of the critical literature on Nozick’s view is concerned tochallengetheideathatwecaneverhavethatkindofownershipclaimoverproperty.Ownershipisacomplicatedidea.Icanhavetherighttousemyworkroomwithouthavingtherighttobequeathittomychildren.Icanhavetherighttousetheoffice’sshared photocopierwithout having the right to sell that right to others. If peoplehaveabsolute rightsoverwhat theyproduce,whycan’tparents sell their childreninto slavery? Nozick, it is widely thought, needs to do more to establish thatpropertyrightsofthekindhisargumentpresupposesarevalid.Whataboutownershipoftheself?Surelypeopleatleastowntheirownbodies–

including theirnatural talents– in this ‘full,absolute’sense?Onthis issueNozickcontrasts clearly with Rawls. Remember that, for Rawls, the original positionmodelstheideathatpeopleascitizensarefreeandequal,andtheideathattheyareequalispartlycapturedbytheirignoranceoftheirnaturalabilities.ThisrepresentsRawls’sviewthatthepossessionoftalentsis‘arbitraryfromamoralpointofview’.Itisjustluckwhetheroneisbornlessormorestrong,orclever,andsoitwouldbeunfair forpeople tobeworseorbetteroff thanoneanotheron thatbasis.Atonepoint, Rawls says that his conception of justice treats people’s natural talents as‘commonassets’.ItiseasytoseewhyNozickwouldobjecttothisapparentfailureto take seriously the separateness of persons, and the idea that people ownthemselves.Nozickdoesn’tdenythatpeople’spossessionofnaturaltalents(likethesocialclassof thefamily intowhichtheyareborn) isamatterof luck.But that isneitherherenorthere.Evenifitisluck,peopleneverthelessownthemselves.Most people accept somekindof self-ownership thesis.To test your intuitions,

imaginehowyouwouldfeelifthestatearguedasfollows:‘Itisjustluckthatsomepeople are born with two good eyes, and others with none. To create a fairerdistributionofeyes,wehavedecidedtoholdalotterywhichwillidentifyinrandomfashionsomeindividualswhowillberequiredtogiveuponeoftheirgoodeyesto

thosewhohavenone.’Mostpeople,whileacceptingthatthedistributionofeyesisunfair,would nonetheless insist that their own eyes belong to them in away thatwouldmakethestate’sproposalillegitimate.‘Look.Thesethingsaremine,theyarepartofme.IfIwanttogiveoneofthemtosomebodywhoneedsitmorethanme,then I can do so.Maybe I should. But the choice as to what I do must be mine,becausetheeyesare.’Thosewhoendorseredistributivetaxationwhilerejectingthecoerciveredistributionofbodyparts–probablythevastmajorityofthepopulation– agree with Nozick about self-ownership, but deny that ownership of the selfimpliesownership,inthesamefullsense,ofthethings–goods,money–wecreateby using ourselves. People generally believe that forcible redistribution of bodyparts would involve a violation of their selves – would violate their integrity aspeople– inaway that forcible redistributionof thingsmadebyusing thosebodyparts does not. (Applying pressure to the pro-self-ownership intuition, imagine anatural disaster that leavesmany injured and needing blood. Voluntary donationsaren’tenough.Isitobviousthatthestatewouldbewrongtosetupaprogrammeofcompulsoryblooddonation?)Rawls agreeswith some aspects of self-ownership. Even thoughwho haswhat

bodyis‘morallyarbitrary’,westillhavearighttobodilyintegrity,andanareaofpersonal freedomwithinwhichwemustbe immunefromintervention. InRawls’sview,forexample,theindividualmustbefreetodothejobofherchoice.ThemerefactthatIcouldbeabrilliantsurgeon,andwouldbestservemyfellowcitizensbybecomingone,doesnot justify therestofyouingangingtogether toforcemeinthat direction. This, for Rawls, has more to do with the importance of theindividual’scapacity to frame, reviseandpursueherownconceptionof thegoodthanwitharighttoself-ownershipinNozick’ssense.Still,itisimportanttoseethatRawls’sclaimaboutmoralarbitrarinessstillleavesroomtoaccommodatesomeofthe widely shared intuitions that Nozick tries to capture in his notion of self-ownership. The big difference between them is that Nozick wants to use thoseintuitions in away that extendsownershipof the self to includeownershipof theproductsmadebytheself.

Popularopinion:justiceasdesert

It’simportanttoseethatNozickdoesnotclaimthatWiltChamberlaindeservesthemoneyhegets.TocareaboutpeoplegettingwhattheydeservewouldbetogoalongwithapatterneddistributiveprincipleofpreciselythekindthatNozickdoesn’tlike.TheonlyreasonChamberlainhasajusticeclaimtoit–isentitledtoit–isbecausehisfanswereentitledtotheirindividual25centsandtheyfreelychosetogivethatmoneytohim.Whetherheisdeservingorundeservingisneitherherenorthere.Ifbasketball fans for some bizarre reason decided to pay a bit extra to see somecompletelyhopelessplayer,thatplayerwouldstillbeentitledtowhateverextratheypaid.ApartfromwantingtogetNozickright,gettingthisclearmattersbecauseithelps

us see how those who defend market outcomes on justice grounds tend verycommonly, and completely illegitimately, to run together what are in fact quitedifferent arguments.Oneargumentholds that themarket is essential to individualfreedom or to respecting people’s self-ownership. Forced redistribution ofresources away from the outcome resulting from individual exchange violatespeople’sfreedomtodowhattheylikewithwhatistheirs.(I’llsaymoreaboutthisargument in Part 2, on liberty.) Another, quite distinct, argument claims that themarketgivespeoplewhattheydeserve.Talented,hardworkingpeopledeservemorethan untalented, feckless ones, and the market makes sure that they get it. Thesejustifications may coincide, in particular cases, but defenders of the marketshouldn’tslidefromonetotheotherwithoutbeingawarethattheymaynot.SoNozickisnotofferingadefenceofmarketoutcomesthatappealstotheidea

ofjusticeasdesert.Rawls,too,fromacompletelydifferentdirection,ishostiletothe idea that those whose productive activities can command a high price in themarketdeserve themoneyothers arewilling topay them. InRawls’s case, this isessentiallybecauseluckplaystoogreataroleindetermininghowmuchpeoplecansell their productive activity for. The distribution of natural ability is ‘arbitraryfromamoralpointofview’,sothoseblessedwithlotsoftheabilitiesthatothersarewillingtopayforcannotclaimtodeservegreaterrewardsthanthosewhoarenot.Rawls is thushostile towhatmightbecalled ‘conventionaldesert claims’, claimssuch as: ‘Usain Bolt deserves to earn more than Jean Mason because Bolt is ahugelytalentedsprinterwhogivesgreatpleasuretomillionsaroundtheworldandis therebyable tosellhis labourforaveryhighprice,whereasMasonisasocialworker.’Suchclaimsareindeed‘conventional’inthesensethatmostpeopleendorsethem.

WeknowthatpopularopinionisonBolt’sside.ItmaynotthinkthatBoltdeservesasmuchashegets,butonthewholeitissympathetictotheideathatthosewhocando (and do do) things others arewilling to pay for deserve to be better off than

thosewhodon’t(eveniftheonlyreasonwhytheydon’tisbecausetheycan’t).Wethushavetheinterestingsituationthatthetwomostinfluentialpoliticaltheoristsonsocialjustice–RawlsandNozick–disagreewitheachotheraboutwhetherit’sjustthatBoltgetswhathedoes.(Rawlssays it isn’t,Nozicksays it is– indeedNozickthinks thathe shouldn’t evenpayany redistributive taxon it.)But theyagreewitheachotherthatachievingsocialjusticeisnotaboutmakingsurethatpeoplegetthevalueoftheirproductiveactivityonthegroundsthattheydeserveit.(Rawlsbecauseof the ‘moral arbitrariness’ objection, Nozick because distributing according todesert is a patterned principle.) And, in agreeing this, they both disagree withpopularopinion,whichislargelysympathetictoconventionaldesertclaimsofthiskind. Political philosophers are, on this issue, significantly out of step with thewomaninthestreet.Toclarifyour thinkingaboutdesert, let’sdistinguish threepositions,which I’ll

call the ‘conventional’ view, the ‘mixed’ view and the ‘extreme’ view. Theconventional view holds that one person can deserve to earn less or more thananotherevenifthisisduetofactorsthatarebeyondtheircontrol.SupposethatJeanMasonworksashardbeingasocialworkerasUsainBoltdoesbeingasprinter.Sheworkedjustashardatschoolandcollege,acquiringtheskillssheusesasasocialworker, as Bolt did acquiring his current skills. Her job now is at least asdemanding–intermsoftheeffortitrequiresofher(emotionallydemanding,longhours,shortholidays)–ashis is.Thedifferencebetweentheirearningscannotbeattributedtoanydifferenceintheirefforts,eitherpastorcurrent.Mostpeoplethinkthat,inthiscase,BoltdeservestoearnmorethanMason.Notbecausehecurrentlyworksharder,orworkedhardertogetwhereheis,butsimplybecausehishavingbeenblessedwithexceptionalsprintingabilityenableshimtodosomethingthatismore valuable – at least asmeasured by other people’swillingness to pay – thanwhatsheisabletodo.It’snotherfaultthatshecan’tdowhatBoltdoes,andBoltcantakenocreditforthefactthathecanandshecan’t.He’sjustlucky.Eveninthiscase,the‘conventional’viewholdsthathedeservestobebetteroffthanher.Contrastthiswiththe‘extreme’view.Thissaysthatpeopledonotdeservetoearn

lessormorethanoneanothereveniftheyareexerting–orhaveinthepastexerted–differentamountsofeffort.Somebodywhoworksharddoesnotdeservetoearnmore than somebody who does not. What could possibly justify such a view?Answer: how hard somebody works is itself something beyond their control.People’s character and psychological make-up are a function of their geneticconstitutionandtheirchildhoodsocialization.Somearebornwithawilltosucceed,or to tryhard.Othershave that attitude instilled in themby their parentsorotherformativeinfluencesfromanearlyage.Somearenotsolucky.Whyshouldthosewhohavethegoodlucktobe thekindofpersonwhoworksharddeserve toearnmorethanthosewhohavethebadlucknottobe?

The ‘conventional’ view accepts the idea that someone might deserve less ormorethanothersfordeployingskillsandabilitiesthatsheissimplyluckytohaveorunluckynottohave.The‘extreme’viewthinksthatluckunderminesdifferentialdesertclaimsand,becauseitthinksthateffortisitselfafunctionofluck,denieseventhatthosewhoworkharddeservetoearnmorethanthosewhodonot.The‘mixed’viewisthehalfwayhouseposition.Peopledon’tdeservetoberewardeddifferentlyfor things(or ‘circumstances’) thataregenuinelybeyond theircontrol, likebeingborncleverorstupid,or intoawealthyorpoorfamily.But theydodeservetoberewarded differently for things that are genuinely a matter of choice – whichinclude things likehowhardyouwork,orwhat job, from thoseavailable toyou,youchoosetodo.Rawlsisrighttothinkthatit’sunfairforanyonetobebetterorworse off thanothers simply as a result of how theydo in the natural and sociallottery,butwrongifhethinksthatpeople’schoicesshouldalsomakenodifferencetohowwellofftheyare.Rawls issometimespresentedasholding theextremeview.Heisnotaltogether

clear on this point, but a plausible reading of what he says would have himacknowledging a role for free will, not claiming that every supposed choice anindividualmakes isactuallydeterminedbygeneticsandsocialization.Hebelievesratherthatthechoicespeoplemakeabouttheirlevelofeffortaresoinfluencedbyfactors beyond their control that it would be unfair to reward them simply inproportiontothateffort.‘Theideaofrewardingdesertisimpracticable’,asheputsit, because it is impossible, in practice, to disentangle choices in the appropriatesense (i.e., choices uninfluenced by morally arbitrary characteristics) from thearbitrarycharacteristicsthattendtoinfluencethem.Thisseemsplausible.Evenifonebelievesthatpeopledomakechoicesforwhich

theyareresponsible,andcandeservelessormorethanothersonthebasisofthosechoices, it isgoing tobeverydifficult toseparateoutanybody’scurrentearningsinto (a) thatpartdue to factors forwhich theycanbeheld responsibleandwhichthey thus deserve and (b) that part due to factors for which they cannot be heldresponsible and thus do not deserve. An important consideration here is that theabilitiesthatadultspossessreflect,toagreatextent,howhardtheytriedwhentheywerechildren.Someadultabilitiesreflectnaturaltalent.Butwhatisn’tnaturaltalentmainlyresultsfrompeople’shabitsaschildren.Somekidstryhard,don’tgiveupafterthefirstattempt,developthecapacitytomakewhatRawlscalla‘conscientiouseffort’.Somedon’t.Butitissurelyimplausibletothinkthatchildrenareresponsibleforchoicessuchasthese.Theircharactersaschildrendepend–whennotontheirgenes–on theirparents, their teachersandother influencesoverwhich theyhavelittleornocontrol.Itmaybethat,asadults,wearecapableofmakingresponsiblechoicesaboutwhattodowithourabilities–andcanbesaidtodeservegreaterorlesserrewardsdependingonthechoiceswemake.Buttheveryabilitieswehaveas

adults–wheretheyresultfromchoicesatall–resultlargelyfromchoiceswehavemadeaschildren,andforwhichwecannotbeheldresponsible.The most important thing to keep in mind, however, is that the market makes

virtuallynoattempttodisentanglethesevariouscomponentsofpeople’smarketableskills.Isay‘virtually’becausetwoidenticallyskilledpeoplewilltendtoearnlessormorethanoneanotherdependingonhowhardtheywork.Butthemarginalreturntothatmarginaleffortistrivialcomparedtothereturntotheskillstheypossess,andthemarketcouldn’tcarelesshowtheycametohavethoseidenticalskills.Perhapsone was born lucky – high levels of natural ability, wealthy parents hence goodeducation–whiletheotherislessnaturallygifted,andhashadtostruggletobetterherself despite an unhelpful school. The market doesn’t care. It is blind todistinctionsofthekindIhavebeenoutlininghere.Itrewardspeopleasafunctionoftheirabilitytosatisfythepreferencesofothers(actually,tosatisfythepreferencesof thoseotherswhohave themoney topay tohave their preferences satisfied). Itpaysnoattentiontotheprocessbywhichpeoplecometohavethatability.Evensomeone,likeRawls,scepticalaboutconventionaldesertclaimsmightthink

thattherearesomethingsthatyoucanindeeddeserveonthebasisofattributesthatyou are just lucky to have. Suppose one thought that Doris Lessing deserved theNobelPrize for literature.That judgementneedhavenothing todowithanyviewonemightholdabouthowshebecameabletowritethosenovels–whetherthrougheffortornaturalabilityorpropitiousupbringing.Eveniftherewereminimaleffortinvolved – she just happened to have been born with a gift for writing and anunusuallypropitiousupbringing–one could still say that shedeserved theNobelPrize.But that isbecause theNobelPrize isawarded to thepersonwhowrote thebest literature. Since Lessing did that, she deserves the prize. So even the scepticabout conventional desert claims is likely to acknowledge that there are somecontexts in which they are valid. The disagreement between the sceptic and thepersonwhodefendsthemarketasgivingpeoplewhattheydeserveturns,itseems,notonwhetheranyconventionaldesertclaimsarevalid,butontheirproperscope.Thescepticsays:‘Whyshouldsomepeoplehavemoreresourcestodevotetotheirlife plans than others just because they are luckier than those others? Sure. Ifsomebodywantstoofferaprizeforthebestwriter,thenthebestwriterdeservestowinit–howeverluckysheistobethebestwriter.Butthemoneypeoplegetfromtheir jobs is not like a prize. It is too important to be left to chance.’ ThethoroughgoingscepticmightevensaythatLessingdeservedtobecalledtheNobelLaureatebutdidnotdeservethemoney.Whyshouldshehaveallthatextramoneytospend on her life just because she happens to be a great novelist? On this view,conventional desert claims extend to symbolic rewards, like prizes, but not torewardslikemoney.Like many concepts in this area, the term ‘desert’ is sometimes used rather

loosely. In line with my commitment to drawing nitpicking (but clarifying)distinctions, letmeendbyexplaininghowtheideaofdesert thatI’vebeentalkingaboutherediffersfromother ideas thataresometimesformulatedusing theword‘desert’.First,thereisadifferencebetweendesertand‘legitimateexpectation’.Imaginean

institutional structure, a firm or the market economy as a whole, in which, as amatter of fact, people are rewarded unequally depending on their possession ofcertain qualifications. We might then say that somebody who acquired thosequalifications‘deserves’therewardjustbecausetheinstitutionsweresetupinsuchawaythatthepersonacquiringthequalificationhasalegitimateexpectationthat,byacquiringthequalification,theywouldreceivethereward.Thisissometimescalledan ‘institutional’ conception of desert. The important thing to see is that it is acompletely separate questionwhether the institutions should have been set up thewaytheyare in thefirstplace.Wecanperfectlywellsay: ‘SinceweareoperatingwithinasystemthattypicallyrewardspeoplewithgoodmoneyiftheygetanMBA,andshehasmadevariouschoicesthathaveresultedinhergettinganMBAonthebasis of that assumption, her expectation that she should get good money islegitimate.In that limitedsense,she“deserves”togetgoodmoney.Nonetheless,asystem which rewards people withMBAs more than those without – indeed anysystemwhich pays people differently depending on their ability to pass examsofany kind – is fundamentally unjust, and certainly doesn’t give people what theyreally deserve.’ It is easy to formulate claims about legitimate expectations in‘desert’terms.Indeed,there’snothingwrongwithdoingso–aslongasoneisclearthat somebody can have a legitimate expectation of (hence ‘deserve’ in aninstitutionalsense)arewardthattheydonotreallydeserve(becauseinstitutionsaresetupunjustlyanddonotrewardpeopleinaccordancewiththeir‘actual’or‘brute’or‘preinstitutional’deserts).Second, some people use the term ‘desert’ when they are talking about

compensation or equalization. Suppose I think people whose work is dangerous,stressful, dirty, boring or inappropriately stigmatized should, other things equal,earn more than people whose work is safe, comfortable, interesting, healthy orprestigious.Imightwellsaythattheydeservetoearnmore.There’snothingwrongwiththiskindofdesertclaimaslongasitisclearhowitdiffersfromthekindIwasdiscussingabove.Thatkindwasspecificallytodowiththeissueofwhetherpeoplemightdeservelessormorethanothersonthebasisoftheirvariousattributes,andtowhatextentresponsibilityfor thoseattributeswasrelevant.Whatweare talkingaboutnowusesadesertclaimessentiallyasanequalizingclaim.Wecanthinkofitintermsoftheideaof‘compensatingdifferentials’.Inordertoensureoverallornetequalitybetweendifferentpeople,wetakeintoaccountthedifferentcharacteristicsof theirwork– interestingness, prestige, danger, etc. – and try to compensate for

anythingthatwouldotherwisetakethemaboveorbelowsomenorm.Again, there’s no real problemusing the term ‘desert’ in this kind of case. It’s

important,though,toseethatisunlikelytojustifytheclaimthatUsainBoltdeservesto earn more than Jean Mason. It is completely implausible to think that theinequalitiesgeneratedbythemarketinoursocietycanbejustifiedbyappealtotheidea of desert as compensating differentials. (Some economists and politicaltheorists think that the inequalitiesgeneratedbyan idealizedperfectmarket couldbe. In that case themoney people earned – the price for the job – would reflectnothing other than the net balance of advantages and disadvantages involved indoing their job. Employers would then have to pay more to get people to dounpleasantwork thanpleasantwork–whereas the reverse is often the case at themoment.)Thethirdandlastthoughttobedistinguishedherecanbe,butneednotbe,related

tothisideaofcompensatingdifferentials.Thisistheideathatitisjustifiedforsomepeopletoearnmorethanothersbecausetherewillbebadconsequencesiftheywerenottodoso.Sometimesthisisformulatedintermsoftheideaofdesert.Supposeweask:‘Dobrainsurgeonsdeservetoearnmorethannurses?’Somebodymightreply:‘Yes, they do.Because ifwe didn’t pay brain surgeonsmore than nurses nobodywouldwanttobeabrainsurgeon.Sinceit’sclearlyimportantthatsomepeoplearebrainsurgeons,theydeservetogetmoremoneyjustsothatwecanmakesurethatsomepeoplechoose that job.’This isaclaimabout incentives–about theneedtoinducepeopletodosociallyusefultasksandthejustifiabilityofpayingthemmoreifthatistheonlyorbestwaytogetthemtodothosetasks.Doesithaveanythingtodowithdesert?Notasitstands.Itisnot,initself,anythingtodowiththerelativedesertsofbrain

surgeons and nurses. It is simply a consequentialist observation, an observationabout consequences, aboutwhatwould happen ifwe didn’t pay themmore.As itstands,wedon’tknowwhy,togetbrainsurgeons,weneedtopaythemmorethannurses.Perhaps it’sbecausepotentialbrain surgeonsaremore selfish thannursesand,realizingthevalueoftheirworktosociety,arepreparedtoholdtherestofushostage,blackmailingusintopayingthemtheextra.Ifthatwerethecase,wewouldhardlywanttosaythattheydeservedthatextra.(Anymorethanwewouldsaythatkidnapperswhowillonlyreleaseahostageifwepaythemaransom‘deserve’themoney–evenifwethinkwearejustifiedinpayingittothem.)It can, however, be turned into a desert claim – at least a desert claim of the

‘compensating differentials’ kind. If we ask why we need to pay brain surgeonsmore than nurses if people are going to choose a career in brain surgery, theanswermightbethattheyhavehighlevelsofresponsibilityandstress,orthattheyneedtoundergomanyyearsoftraining–forgoingmoneytheycouldbeearninginother jobs and going through the arduous process of learning skills that most

peopledon’tneedtoworryabout.Soifwepaythemabovetheaveragewage,togetthemtodothejob, this is justacompensatingdifferential–moneythey‘deserve’given all the negative aspects of the job.The thought, now, is not simply thatwehave to give them extra money in order to get them to do the job – which isconsistent with the blackmail scenario. It is that they actually deserve the extra,deserveitinthesensethatitcompensatesforallthestress,longhours,trainingorwhatever, and so provides the necessary inducement for them to take up brainsurgery. Otherwise they’d be worse off, all things considered, than nurses.Construed this way, this is a genuine justice claim, and one that can be allowedappealtotheconceptof‘desert’–evenifitisadifferentconceptionofdesertfromthemainoneI’vediscussed.(Ofcourse,suchaclaimcouldwellbecontentious.Thekind of university education that some would present as investment, to becompensatedforbyhigherpay,mightwellbeenjoyableandvaluableinitself.Justbecausesomeonetellsus thatsomething isacostdeservingcompensationdoesn’tmeanthatwehavetoagreewiththem.)

Socialjusticev.globaljustice

This chapter is called ‘social justice’ and everything in it so far has taken it forgrantedthatthethingwecareaboutbeingjust,orunjust,issociety.Butmanyofmystudentsaremoreconcernedaboutinjusticeacrosstheglobeasawhole.That’snotbecause they think their own societies can afford to be complacent on the justicefront.Butinaworldwheremillionsdieeveryyearforlackofbasicnutritionandmedical care, andmultinational corporations reap huge profits from thework ofmillionsmoreearningsubsistencewages,itistheinequalitiesbetweensocietiesthatseemmoreblatantlyunjustthanthosewithinthem.Whetheraffluentsocietieshaveorganized things to benefit their least advantaged members, or whether thosemembersgetpaidwhattheydeserve,canindeedseemrathertrivialfromtheglobalperspective. Political philosophers have been devoting increasing attention to thewiderpicture,extendingtheirthinkingbeyondthedomesticcontextandconsideringwhatdistributiveprinciplesshouldapplyattheinternationallevel.A key issue – perhaps the key issue – iswhetherwe should think about global

justice as something like social justicewrit large. Perhaps principles devised forindividualsocietiesshouldsimplybeextendedintheirscopetocompasshumanityas a whole. If it matters that all members of society enjoy fair equality ofopportunity(asperRawls’sprinciple2(b)–seeabove,p.25),doesn’titalsomatterthatallhumanbeingsenjoyittoo?Ifso,thenjusticerequiresthatthemalnourishedchildrenamong theworld’sbottombillionshouldhave thesamechancesas thoseborntotherichestparentsintherichestcountries.Ratherthaninequalitiesbeingjustonlyiftheyservetomaximizethepositionoftheleastadvantagedinasociety(asperRawls’sprinciple2(a)),whyshouldn’ttheyberequiredmaximallytobenefittheleastadvantagedontheplanet?(Thiswouldbethe‘globaldifferenceprinciple’.)Ifsocialjusticeinvolvespeoplegettingwhattheydeserve,whynotthinkof‘people’asallhumanbeings,irrespectiveofgeographyornationality,andthinkabouthowfar the world falls short of realizing that principle? According to so-calledcosmopolitans, the idea that all humanbeings are fundamentally equalmeans thattheir nationality, or which society they are a member of, should not make adifferencetowhattheycanclaimfromothersasamatterofjustice.The alternative view insists that social justice and global justice really are

different things.Membersofa societyhaveduties tooneanother that theydonothavetomembersofothersocieties.Thosewhoshareanationality,orbelongtothesame state, are in aparticularkindof association– adistinctive relationshipwithparticularothers–thatmakesadifferenceasfarasjusticeisconcerned.Maybeallareowedsomedutiesofjusticesimplybecausetheyarehumanbeings.Theconceptofhumanrightsisoftenusedtocapturethatidea.Perhaps,forexample,itisunjustwhenthoseinsomecountriesaredeniedaccesstothenecessitiesoflifewhilethose

in others have far more than they need. Perhaps we have duties not to harm orexploitpeople,wherevertheymaylive.But,onthisview,theprinciplesthatapplyacrossbordersarelessdemandingthanthosethatapplywithinthem.Incontemporarypoliticaldebate,someversionofthesecondpositiontendstobe

taken for granted. TheUK government currently devotes 0.7 per cent ofGDP toforeign aid and any politician who urged an increase would immediately findherself on the defensive. That’s partly because of doubts about the efficacy ofinternational‘handouts’.Asalways,issuesofphilosophicalprincipleandmattersofempiricalfactareintertwinedwhenwemakejudgementsaboutwhattodo.But,asthe language of ‘aid’ and ‘handout’ suggests, it also reflects thewidespread viewthatglobalredistributionisamatterofcharity,notjustice.It’snotonlythatpeoplethinktheyowemoretotheircompatriotsthantheydotoforeigners.Evenwheretheaim is merely to relieve life-threatening deprivation – and nothing like globalequalityofopportunityortheglobaldifferenceprinciple–mostpeopledonotthinktheyareunderanenforceabledutytogiveupmuchofwhattheyhavetohelpthosewho live in other countries. Since even those philosophers who rejectcosmopolitanismusuallyholdthatwedohavesomedutiestohelppeopleallovertheworld enjoy basic human rights, including the right to subsistence, this is yetanother example of the mismatch between philosophy and public opinion.Compared to the statusquo, even a relativelyundemanding takeonglobal justicewouldberadicalinitsimplications.Thatsaid, thereisstillabigdifferencebetweenthetwoviews,andalthoughthe

secondismuchmorecommonlyheld,I’msuresomereaderswillfeelastrongpullin the cosmopolitan direction. After all, if we are approaching the issue from apurelyphilosophicalperspective,puttingasidefornowpracticalquestionsofwhat’sfeasible(includingwhatthoseinaffluentcountriescanbeexpectedtovotefor),theidea that duties of justice are owed to people as such, simply because of theirhumanityandwithout regard togeography,hasagooddealgoingfor it.Wemayknow,asamatterofpsychology,thatwetendtofavourthoseweidentifywith,justaswe tend to favourmembersofour family.But it’s temptingquickly todismissthatkindofthinkingasfailingtoachieveaproperlymoral,impartial,perspective–one that recognizes the fundamentalequalityofallhumanbeings.That temptationshouldberesisted.Evenifyoudoendupendorsingacosmopolitanperspective,it’sbetter to do that having carefully considered the case for the alternative. So it’sworthhavingasenseofthevarioustheoriesdefendingtheclaimthatthedemandsofjusticearedifferentathomeandabroad.Commontoallsuchtheoriesistheideathatthekindofassociationwehavewith

othersisrelevanttowhatweowethemjustice-wise.Theremaybesomeverybasicjusticeclaimsthatallhaveagainstall.Butdistributivejustice–principlesthatapplyto the distribution of benefits and burdens, or how much people should have

compared to one another – applies only among those in particular modes ofrelationship. Where the theories differ is over what kind of association orrelationship is the relevant one. If you’ve been reading carefully you may havenoticedthatIstartedthissectiontalkingabout‘society’,slidto‘nationality’,slippedin ‘state’, added in ‘countries’ and ‘borders’, and ended up with‘compatriots/foreigners’ and ‘home/abroad’. I also referred to ‘thosewe identifywith’.Thesecanrefertodifferentthings.Theyinvolvedifferentsetsofpeopleanddifferentideasaboutwhyweowemoretosomethantoothers.Onestartingpointseesdistributivejusticeasconcernedspecificallywiththefair

distributionofthefruitsofsocialcooperation.Ifourconceptionofa‘society’isofindividualscooperatingwithoneanotherfortheirmutualadvantage,thenitmakessensetothinkofdistributivejusticeasconcernedwithdistributingthebenefitsandburdensofthatcooperation.Thosewhoarenotmembersofthecooperativeschemethatis‘society’donothavethesamekindofclaimstofairsharesbecausetheyarenotinvolvedinproducing,orbearingthecostsofproducing,thegoodthingsthatare to be distributed. But in today’s globalized economy, with high levels ofeconomicinterdependencebetweenmembersofdifferentcountries,it’simplausibletosupposethatthepeoplewithwhomwearecooperatingtoproducethosefruitsareonlyourfellownationalsormembersofthesamestateasus.Soifthat’stheidea,then it looks as if the demands of distributive justice are going to extend waybeyondmyfellowcitizensorfellownationals.Asecondapproachfocusesontherelationshipbetweenthosewhoshareastate–

fellow citizens living together under the same coercive apparatus. That seems tocorrespondmorecloselytothewayweconventionallydividepeopleinto‘us’and‘them’,andit’scertainlythewaythatourstatesencourageustothinkaboutthings.Within this kind of view, some philosophers emphasize the way in whichcompliancewithasystemoflawsitselfcontributestoourmutualadvantage.Afairshare of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation iswhatwe should get inreturnforourcompliance.Thisisavariantofthepreviousperspective,butaddsintheideathatsubmissiontocoercionthroughlawispartofthecooperativepackage.Another angle sees citizenship as relevant to distributive justice because there issomethingspecialaboutbeingjointlyauthorsofthelawsbywhichwecoerceoneanother.Notonlyarefellowcitizenssubjecttothedecisionstheyjointlymake,thoselawsaremadeintheirname.Peopleparticipatinginthatformofassociationshouldnotbesubjecttoarbitraryinequalities–theyoweoneanotherajustificationofanyinequalities that exist between them – so principles of distributive justice applywithinstatesinawaythattheydonotbeyondstateborders.Afurtherreasontotakestatesseriouslywhenitcomestoglobaljusticeappealsto

thevalueofsovereigntyorcollectiveself-determination.Cosmopolitanswhoclaimthat the samedistributive principles should apply to all humanbeings seem to be

denyingthatdifferentstatesmaymakedifferentjudgementsabouthowtheywanttoallocateresourcesamongtheirmembers.Butit’snotcrazytothinkthat,aslongastheir collective decisions can be regarded as legitimate, and as long as theirdecisionsrespecthumanrights,themembersofastateshouldbefreetodecidethatfor themselves. (It’s a big question what counts as ‘legitimate’. We won’t get to‘democracy’untilPart5,soIcan’tgointothathere.)Still,theideathatajustworldwould consist of people divided into a number of different, legitimate, states –perhapswithdifferenthistoriesandculturalnorms–witheachstatemakingitsowndistributive decisions, should have some intuitive appeal. From this perspective,global justice is not about applying the same distributive principles to eachindividual human being. It’s more about making sure that the collectives (Rawlscallsthem‘peoples’)ineachindividualstateareprovidedwiththejustbackgroundconditions within which they can exercise the right to decide such matters forthemselves.A thirdway of resisting cosmopolitanism appeals to the relationship of shared

nationality.Atfirstsight,‘sharedcitizenship’and‘sharednationality’mayseemlikethesamething.That’sbecausewetendtothinkoftheworldasdividedintodiscretenation-states,inwhichthedistinctivelypoliticalassociationofthestateissharedbythosewho aremembers of a groupwith the same national (historical, linguistic,ethnicorcultural)identity.Butevenwherenationandstatedocoincide–soweareputting to one side multinational states and stateless nations – we can still askwhetherit’sthestatehoodorthenationhoodthatisdoingthework.SupposeIhaveanintuitivebutvaguefeelingthatIowemycompatriotsmorethanIoweforeignersbut I’mnotsurewhy.Oneway tomakeprogress is toworkoutwhether itcomesfrom a sense that those with whom I share a political relationship have specialclaimsonme, or froma sense that I have particular duties to thosewithwhom Ishareanidentitybasedonhistoryandculture?(I’llsaymoreaboutthisdistinctiontowardstheendofPart4(pp.171–82).)Whilephilosopherstendtoanswerintermsoftheformer,alongthelinesoutlinedabove,myguessisthatit’sthelatterthatliesbeneathmuchpopularanti-cosmopolitanism.Cosmopolitansaredoubtful about thesevariousattempts todefend the idea that

weowemoretoourfellowcitizens/nationalsthantootherhumanbeings.Butnoticethat theirpositionisquitecompatiblewiththinkingthatwedon’tactuallyoweourfellowhumanbeingsverymuch.AlibertarianlikeNozick,forexample,mightholdthatwehavenodutyofjusticetodoanythingtohelptheworld’spoor(justaswehavenosuchdutytohelpthepoorinourownsociety).Ourduties,onthiskindofview,arenegative–theyaredutiesnottodothingstoothers(murder,torture,rob,etc.)Generally,wemightsay,whatismorallyrequiredofusissimplythatwenotharmothers.Thoseattractedtothatkindofviewwillneedtothinkhardaboutwhatcountsasharm,andshouldconsiderthevariouswaysinwhichtheglobaleconomic

order–regulatedbythingsliketheWorldTradeOrganizationmightberegardedasharmingmembersofpoorcountries.Forexample,thephilosopherThomasPogge(b. 1953) argues that wealthy countries benefit from a range of internationalarrangementsthatencouragecorruptionamongelitesandthuscontributedirectlytothecontinuationofglobalpoverty.Eveniftherearenodutiespositivelytoaidthoseinneed,theglobalaffluentmightstillbeactingunjustlysimplybycolludingin,andbenefitingfrom,aglobalsystemthatharmstheglobalpoor.

Conclusion

Eachoftheconceptionsofsocialjusticethatwehavelookedatcanbethoughtofaspresentingadifferentjustificationofinequality.Hayekthinksthatthewholeideaofseeking social justice involves a philosophicalmistake, so that inequality doesn’treallyneedjustificationinthefirstplace.Rawlsholdsthatinequalitiesarejustifiedif they conform to the principles that would have been chosen in the originalposition,mostcontroversiallythedifferenceprinciplewhichholdsthatinequalitiesmustserve,overtime,maximallytopromotethewell-beingoftheleastadvantagedmembersofsociety.Nozickrejectsthiskindofthinkinginfavourofaprincipleofself-ownership that leaves people free to do what they like with property that istheirs–aprinciplethatcouldjustifyextremeinequality.Allthreeofthesethinkersreject the popular view that people deserve differently depending on theirproductivecontribution.Itisverycommontofindpeopledefendingthejusticeofthekindsofinequality

weseeinoursocietybyappealingtosomemish-mashofthesedifferentideas.Thatisthereasoncarefullytodistinguishbetweenthem.HowcoulditbejustthatUsainBolt,orBillGates,oranycorporatelawyershouldearnmorethanasocialworker,or a schoolteacher, or somebody who is involuntarily unemployed? Does thequestion involve a categorymistake? Is it because their earningmore – and thatmuchmore–serves,overtime,tohelpthepoor?Isitbecausetheyowntheirtalentsandwhateverpeoplearewillingtogivethemforexercisingthem?Isitbecausetheyareinsomewaymoredeserving?Thesejustificationscan,inspecialcircumstances,coincide – but they won’t always do so. Those who would defend the justice ofexistinginequalities–oranythinglikethem–needtothinkhardaboutwhichwaytheywant to jumpwhen they comeapart.Andbothdefenders and criticsof thoseinequalitiesneedareplytothechargeofparochialism.Perhapsit’stheworldasawhole, not any particular society within it, that should really be the subject ofdistributivejustice.

Furtherreading

MatthewClaytonandAndrewWilliams(eds.),SocialJustice(Blackwell2003)isanexcellentcollection.HarryBrighouse’sJustice (Polity2004)andTomCampbell’sJustice(3rdedn,Macmillan2010)arebothgoodtextbooks.CecileFabre’sJusticeinaChangingWorld(Polity2007)nicelyfocusesoninternational,intergenerationalandmulticulturalissues.OnHayek, the keywork isTheMirage of Social Justice (Routledge & Kegan

Paul),firstpublishedin1976,andincorporatedasvolume2ofhisLaw,Legislationand Liberty in 1982. ‘The Atavism of Social Justice’, in his New Essays in

Philosophy,PoliticsandEconomics(Routledge&KeganPaul1978)isshortandtothepoint. JohnGray’sHayekonLiberty (2nd edn,Blackwell 1986) andChandranKukathas’sHayekandModernLiberalism (OxfordUniversity Press 1989) are thetwobestcriticalaccountsofHayek’sworkasawhole.Rawls’sJustice asFairness:ARestatement (HarvardUniversity Press 2001) is

theuser-friendlyversionofhistheory.Fromthemountainofsecondaryliterature,and in increasing order of length and complexity, it would be worth trying theintroduction to StephenMulhall and Adam Swift’s Liberals and Communitarians(2nd edn,Blackwell 1996), Thomas Pogge’s John Rawls:His Life and Theory ofJustice (OxfordUniversity Press 2007) and Samuel Freeman’sRawls (Routledge2007).Nozick’sAnarchy,StateandUtopia (Blackwell1974) isanentertainingread(as

political philosophy goes); the middle section on distributive justice is the mostrelevant.ThebestcriticalcommentaryisJonathanWolff’sProperty,JusticeandtheMinimalState(Polity1991).WhatDoWeDeserve?(OxfordUniversityPress1999),editedbyLouisP.Pojman

andOwenMcLeod,isagoodcollectionondesert.Chapters7–9ofDavidMiller ’sPrinciplesofSocialJustice(HarvardUniversityPress2001)defendtheviewthatthemarketcan(thoughitcurrentlydoesn’t)givepeoplewhattheydeserve.Chapter8ofGordon Marshall et al.’s Against the Odds? Social Class and Social Justice inIndustrialSocieties(OxfordUniversityPress1997)ismoresceptical.Atthemoreaccessibleendofthescale,BrianBarry’sWhySocialJusticeMatters

(Polity2005)isathought-provokingpolemicandMichaelSandel’sJustice:What’sthe Right Thing To Do? (Penguin 2010) brilliantly illuminates a wide range oftopicalissuesviasomeofthegreatmoralandpoliticalphilosophers.ReadersinterestedinglobaljusticewillfindmanygoodthingsinThomBrooks’s

(ed.)TheGlobalJusticeReader(Wiley-Blackwell2008),whileJonMandle’sGlobalJustice (Polity 2006) is more than a good textbook. Thomas Pogge’s importantargument is most fully developed in his World Poverty and Human Rights:CosmopolitanResponsibilitiesandReforms(2ndedn,PolityPress2008).

Part2

Liberty

IfRawls’sATheoryofJusticeisthemostinfluentialbookofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophy,IsaiahBerlin’s‘TwoConceptsofLiberty’isthemostinfluentialsingleessay. (Itwashis inaugural lecture asProfessorofSocial andPoliticalTheory atOxford,in1958.)Thisistheessaywhich,asmentionedinthePreface,TonyBlairwrote to him about. In it, Berlin (1909–97) draws a famous distinction between‘negative’and‘positive’conceptsofliberty,andarguesthatthelattershouldbeseenasawrongturning.Sowrong,infact,thattotalitarianstateslikeNaziGermanyandtheUSSRinvokedtheconcepttojustifytheirregimes.Ifthemostblatantenemiesofliberty could persuade themselves that theywere its true friends, something verypeculiarmusthavehappened.Berlin’sessayisabrilliantaccountofjustwhatdidhappen:ofhowtwowaysof

thinkingaboutliberty,whichstartedoutveryclosetooneanother,graduallydriftedapart and became polar opposites. It is an insightful, stimulating and plausibletracingofahugelyimportantdevelopmentinthehistoryofideas.Itisnot,however,as clear as itmightbe.Berlindraws thedistinctionbetweennegativeandpositiveliberty inavarietyofdifferentways,andarguessimultaneouslywhatareactuallysignificantly different points. So it is not surprising that the reader can be leftconfusedabout justwhathe isand isn’t saying.Here I try tosortout someof theconfusion. In so doing, I will explain why Blair was standing up for ‘positiveliberty’,whichBerlinregardedasadangerousnotion,ripeforperversionintotheofficialideologyofatotalitarianstate.It’snotbecauseBlairisaclosetdictator.Theanswerislessexcitingthanthat.It’sbecauseBerlinuses‘positivefreedom’tomeananumberofdifferentthings,onlysomeofwhichhavetotalitariantendencies.Thekind of ‘positive freedom’ Blair was defending – and which plays a key role incentre-leftthinkingacrossEuropeandNorthAmerica–isnotthekindthatledto,orwasendorsedby,HitlerorStalin.Aswell as clarifying the distinction between negative and positive liberty, this

partofthebookcoverstwootherissues.First,itexplorestheconnectionsbetweenfreedom,propertyandthefreemarket.Thereisakindofright-wingargumentthatdefends private property and the freemarket by appeal to the value of individualfreedom. Nozick’s conception of justice as entitlement, discussed in Part 1, is agoodexampleofthis.ThereismorethanahintofitinHayektoo.Sincethislineof

argument is important in mainstream political debate – low tax rates are oftendefendedonfreedomgrounds–itisworthcarefulconsideration.Finally,itlooksatthe idea of positive freedom that Blair was not defending – the kind that Berlinthinks leads to totalitarianism. By making a few distinctions, we can better seewhethereventhiskindof‘positive’libertyisquiteasdangerousasBerlinthinks.

Twoconceptsofliberty?

MostreadersofBerlin’sessaycomeawaywiththeideathatthedifferencebetweennegative and positive liberty is that between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’.Advocatesofnegative liberty, they think,believe that freedom isessentially todowith being free from things (constraints, obstacles or interference), whereasadvocatesofpositivelibertyholdthatitisrathertodowithbeingfreetodothings.(Thereisnodifferenceworthworryingaboutbetween‘liberty’and‘freedom’,soIuse the two interchangeably.) This is a mistake. If there is a distinction betweennegativeandpositivelibertyitisnotthisone.The‘freedomfrom’v.‘freedomto’distinction is a redherring.Theway to see this is to notice that all freedoms arebothfreedoms‘from’andfreedoms‘to’.Takeanylibertyyoulike,itwillbebothafreedom from and a freedom to. Take, for example, the kind of freedom muchbeloved of advocates of negative liberty (the kind Berlin likes): the individual’sreligiousfreedom.Isthisfreedom‘from’–freedomfromthestatetellingyouwhatreligionyoucanpractise?Orisitfreedom‘to’–freedomtopractisethereligionofyour choice?Take thekindof freedom thatmightbe endorsedby advocatesof amorepositiveconceptionoffreedom(thekindthatBerlindoesn’tlike):freedomasrationalself-direction.Isthisfreedom‘to’–freedomtodotherationalthing,ortoactinaccordancewithyourrationalself?Orisitfreedom‘from’–freedomfromemotion,or ignoranceordesire,orwhateverelsemightpreventyou fromactingrationally?In a well-known critique of Berlin’s essay, the American philosopher Gerald

MacCallum (1925–87) argued that Berlin was wrong to think that there are twoconcepts of liberty, and very wrong if he thought that there was any differencebetween ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. According to MacCallum, all claimsaboutfreedomhavethefollowingform:

xis(isnot)freefromytodo(notdo,become,notbecome)z

Freedomisatriadicrelation.Itnecessarilyinvolvesreferencetothreethings:x,theagentorsubjectoffreedom;y,theconstraintorinterferenceorobstacle;andz,thegoal or end.Whatever claim about freedom you have in mind, it will contain –explicitlyor implicitly– the ideaofanagentbeingfreefromsomething todoorbecomesomething.Whatpeoplewhodisagreeaboutlibertydisagreeaboutiswhatcountsasanx,whatcountsasayandwhatcountsasaz.ForMacCallum,Berlin’stalkabouttherebeingtwoconceptsoflibertyisdoubly

confusing.Inthefirstplace,thereisonlyoneconcept,theoneoutlinedinthetriadicformula.Peopledisagreenotintheirviewsabouttheconceptoflibertybutintheirviewsaboutconceptionsof it.Conceptionsdifferbecause therearedifferences of

opinionaboutwhatshouldberegardedasanagent,aconstraintandagoal.Nowthisisconsistentwiththerebeingtwoconceptionsofliberty.IftherewerejusttwowaysoffillingoutMacCallum’sformula,thenwemightsensiblysaythatthereweretwoconceptions of liberty – and we could rescue Berlin simply by substituting‘conception’wherever he says ‘concept’.But there aren’t just twowaysof fillingouttheformula.Therearelotsofdifferentways,andanyattempttodividethemintotwocategoriesortypes–asBerlindoes–islikelytobeunhelpful.Itcanbeusefulto divide them into categories. There are interesting ways of grouping differentconceptions, as we shall see. But trying to fit them into just two boxes – called‘negative’and‘positive’–istoocrude.On this view, ifwewant to think about the differences between conceptions of

freedom, we should focus on how they regard the agent, what they regard asconstraintsonthatagentandwhattheyregardasthatagent’sgoalsorends.Thatisthe way precisely and carefully to identify what is going on in debates aboutfreedom.And,havingidentifiedthedifferentviewsavailable,wecanstart tothinkaboutwhichconceptionweourselvesfavour.Someissuesconcerntheagent.Istheagenttheempiricalindividualthatweobserve?Orisitherrationalor‘higher ’or‘moral’ self?Or is it a collectiveorgroup, suchasanationorclass?Othersareaboutwhatcountsasaconstraint.Isitonlyintentionalordeliberateinterferencebyothers?Canonebemadeunfreebyone’sowndesires (suchasone’sdesire foracigarette)? Does poverty restrict freedom? Still others have to do with goals. Issomebodyunfreejustwhentheyarepreventedfromdoingwhattheywanttodo?Orwhat they might want to do? Or from whatever would amount to true self-realizationforthem?ThesearethedifficultandimportantissuesraisedbyBerlin’sessay.Thenextsectionaimstobringthemintofocus.

Threedistinctionsbetweenconceptionsofliberty

I’vesuggestedthatitisnothelpfultodivideconceptionsoffreedominto‘freedomfrom’and‘freedomto’.Thethreedistinctionsoutlinedbeloware(Ihope)helpful.EachoftheseismentionedbyBerlinaspartofthe‘negative’v.‘positive’distinctionbut,becausetheyaredifferent,hisrunningthemtogethergetsinthewayofaclearunderstandingofwhatisgoingon.Inparticular,we’llseethathelabelsas‘positivefreedom’ what are really three quite different conceptions. This will help usunderstandhowBlaircouldendorsesomethinghecalledpositivefreedomwhilenottakingeventhefirststepontheroadtototalitarianism.

1Effectivefreedomv.formalfreedom

The difference between effective and formal freedom is the difference betweenhaving the power or capacity to act in a certain way and the mere absence ofinterference.Thefactthatnobodyispreventingyoufromdoingsomethingdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatyoucanactuallydoit.Areyoufreetodoit–becausenobodyisstoppingyou?Orunfree–becauseyouarenotabletodoit?Considerwhether allBritishcitizensare free togoonholiday to theBahamas.

Thoseanswering‘yes’mightsay:‘ThereisnolawagainstBritishcitizensgoingonholidaythere.CompareBritainwithacountry–Totalitaria–thatdeniesitscitizenstherighttogoanywhereonholiday.ThecitizensofTotalitariaarenotfreetogoonholidaytotheBahamas,becausethereisalawpreventingthemfromdoingso.ButBritain has no such law, so its citizens do have the freedom in question.’ Thoseanswering ‘no’ might respond: ‘It is true that there is no law preventing BritishcitizensfromgoingonholidaytotheBahamas.Butitisacrueljoketopretendthatallcitizensare therebyfree todoso.Thosecitizens living inpoverty,withbarelyenoughmoney to get through the week, are obviously not free to go on such aholiday. Theymay have the formal freedom – in the narrow legalistic sense thatnobody is actually preventing them from doing so – but they do not have theeffectivefreedom.’This is thedebateabout freedomwithmost relevance tocontemporarypolitics.

Veryroughly,therightarguesthatfreedomisessentiallyaboutnotbeinginterferedwithbyothers,sofreedomisbestpromotedbyastatethatdoesaslittleaspossibleandalaissez-fairefree-marketeconomy,whiletheleftclaimsthatthereismoretofreedom thannotbeing interferedwith.People’s realor effective (or, sometimes,‘positive’)freedomcanbepromotednotjustbyleavingthemalone,butbyputtingthem inaposition todo things theywouldnototherwisebeable todo.The rightwantstolimittheroleofthestate–perhapsallthewaydowntothe‘nightwatchman’roleadvocatedbyNozick(asdiscussedinPart1).Theleftclaimsthatamoreactive,interventionist, redistributive and ‘enabling’ state can be justified on freedomgrounds.Accordingtotheleft,therightisweddedtoasimplistic‘negative’viewoffreedom,whereastheleftseesfreedominamore‘positive’way.Itisthis‘positive’conceptionoffreedomthatBlairwasseekingtodefend.This distinction can, of course, be expressed in terms of MacCallum’s triadic

relation.Those endorsing thisvariant of the ‘positive’view think that poverty, orlack of resources, counts as a constraint on freedom – as a y in his formula.Whereasthoseendorsingthe‘negative’viewthinkthatonlydeliberateinterferenceby others (for example, by laws prohibiting particular actions) counts as such aconstraint.Thesuggestionbytheleftisthattherighthasanunreasonablyrestrictedviewofwhatcountsasinterference.Givingpeoplemoneyincreasestheireffective

freedom.So toodoesgiving themeducationorhealthcare.Witheducationand ingoodhealth, theyare free to takeadvantageofopportunities thatwouldotherwisenot really be available to them.Theymight be formally available.But, for somepeople,governmentactionisneededtomakethefreedomtotakeadvantageofthemrealoreffective.Thisconceptionoffreedomaseffective–ratherthanformal–freedomisoneof

the things thatBerlincalls ‘positive’ freedom,andoneof the things thathewarnsagainst.Weshouldnot,accordingtohim,confusefreedomwith‘theconditionsofits exercise’. On this view, all British citizens are free to go on holiday to theBahamas.Somehavetheconditionstoexercisethatfreedom,whereasothersdonot.Ifweendorseaconceptionofeffectivefreedom,weareconfusingfreedom,whichshouldreallybeunderstoodin termsof the‘negative’ ideaofnon-interferencebyothers,withothervalueslikeequalityorjustice.Berlinisherewarningagainsttheoptimistic thought that all good things necessarily coincide. Even if equality orjusticerequiresredistributionofresourcesfromsometoothers,weshouldn’tclaimthatsuchredistributionpromotesfreedomalso.Thestatemayberighttointerfereinpeople’slivesinthenameofjusticeorequality,butitisdangerouslymisleadingtoclaimthatthatactioncanbejustifiedbyappealtothevalueoffreedom.Berlinisrightthatoneshouldgenerallybecarefultokeepone’sconceptsdistinct,ratherthanletting them blur into a fuzzy mess. But it doesn’t follow that people living inpoverty are free to go on holiday to theBahamas, lackingmerely the conditionsneededtoexercisethatfreedom.Now I’m going to complicate things. Everything I’ve said about it so far has

assumedthat thedistinctionbetweenformalandeffectivefreedomisindeedarealdistinction.Itiscertainlyonethatplaysaroleinpoliticalargument.Butlet’spressatittoseewhatisreallygoingon.Thecontrast,intheexample,isbetweenTotalitaria,whose citizens are actually not allowed to go on holiday, and Britain, where allcitizensareallowedtogobutsomedon’thavethemoney.Intheformer,thereisalawthatstopspeoplegoing.In the latter, it’s their lackofresources.Bothsides tothe dispute I outlined would accept this description of the situation. What theydisagree about iswhat counts as a constraint on freedom.But is this actually therightwaytodescribethesituation?Thinkaboutwhathappens,inBritain,whensomebodywithnomoneytriestogo

on holiday to theBahamas. Shewalks or hitches a lift to the airport, she tries toboard the plane, she is stopped at the gate because she doesn’t have a ticket (andcan’t afford to buy one, even though, let’s suppose, there are empty seats), shepersists in trying togetonboard–shereallywants thisholiday–andeventually,afterastruggle,sheisarrestedbythesecurityguardsorairportpolice.Whatis itthat ispreventingher fromgoingonholiday? It is the law.The law that says thatpeoplemusthaveavalidticketbeforetheycanfly.Totalitariahasalawthatprevents

anycitizenfromgoingonholiday.Britainhasalawthatpreventsanycitizenwhodoesnothaveaticketfromdoingso.Sowhatactuallystopsourpoorpersonisnotsimply her lack of money, but that in combination with the law of the land, asenforced by the police. This is deliberate interference by others – just like theinterference inTotalitaria.Wehave setup the rules forour society in suchawaythatthosewithoutthemoneytopayforaticket(ortogetonebysomeothermeans)arenotallowedtogoontheholiday.Thesemaywellbetherightrules.I’mnotsuggestingthatanybodywhowantsto

should be able to get on any plane (nor even that exotic holidays should bedistributedrandomly,byballot,sothatpeople’schancesofgettingonehavenothingtodowithhowmuchmoney theyhave).The lawrestricting the freedomof thosewithoutthemeanstogetaticketmaywellbeajustifiedlaw,andtherestrictionoffreedomit impliesmaywellbea justifiedrestriction.Thepointof theexample isveryspecific.Itissimplytobringoutthefactthatthekindofconstraintonfreedominquestion is the lawbackedupby thecoercivepowerof the state– just like thekind of constraint on freedom in Totalitaria. Having money gives you the legalrighttodothingsthatyouwouldnototherwisehavetherightto(i.e.,befreeto)do:getbread ifyou’rehungry,a roofoveryourhead ifyou lackshelter.Wemayberighttohavethelawsaboutprivatepropertyandmoneythatwedo.Butweshouldacknowledgethatsuchlawsimplydeliberaterestrictionbythestate(inademocraticstate,bythepeopleasawhole)ofpeople’schoicesabouthowtheylivetheirlives.Theyare,inthatsense,‘formal’restrictionsonpeople’sfreedom.This doesn’tmean that the distinction between formal and effective freedom is

completely useless – another red herring like ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’.Unlikethe‘from’v.‘to’distinction,therereallyissomethingatstakebetweenthosewho hold the different views. If the last three paragraphs are right, then thewaythoseviewsaresometimescharacterized(restrictionaslawv.restrictionaslackofresources)canbemisleading.Butthosewhodoanddonotthinkredistributioncanbejustifiedinthenameoffreedomdostilldisagree,anddisagreeaboutsomethingimportant.Ithelpstodiscusswhatthey’redisagreeingabout.Remembertoothattheformal v. effective distinction does not always have something to dowithmoneyand law.Think about somebodywho is very ill, and cannot pursue her preferredcareerwithoutmedical treatment. If freedomweremerelyabsenceof interferencebyothers,wewouldhavetosaythatsheisfreetopursuethatcareer–shesimplylackstheeffectivecapacity(herehealth)todoit.Armedwiththedistinctionbetweenformal and effective freedom, we could, if we wanted, say that while nobody ispreventingherfrompursuingthatcareer,sosheisformallyfreetodoso,shewillnothavetheeffectivefreedomtopursueitunlesssheisgiventhemedicaltreatment.Here is a different kind of example where the distinction between formal andeffectivefreedomlookscapableofdoingsomework,andwherethestatemightbe

thoughtabletoacttopromotetheeffectivefreedomofsomeofitscitizens(inthiscase byprovidingmedical care). It’s different because the restrictionon effectivefreedom–theyofMacCallum’sformula–isnotlackofmoney(andhencelaw,adeliberatecreationpreciselydesignedtostoppeopledoingthings),butpoorhealth.

2Freedomasautonomyv.freedomasdoingwhatonewants

Theseconddistinctioniscompletelydifferentfromthefirstbutalsogetscalledthedistinction between negative and positive liberty. This is the difference betweenfreedomas autonomyand freedomasdoingwhatonewants.Autonomy, literally,means‘self-rule’or‘self-law’(‘auto’asin‘auto-mobile’–acarthatgoesbyitself;‘nomy’ as in ‘astronomy’ – a science concerned to discover the rules or lawsgoverningthestars).Thethoughtbehindthisdistinctionisthatsomebodycouldbedoingwhatshewantedwithoutreallyruling(orbeingincontrolof,orgoverning)herself.Shewould thenhavenegative freedom–nobody is interferingwithher–but would she have positive freedom?Would she have the kind of freedom thatconsistsofbeingincontrolofone’slife?Itshouldbeclearhowthisdiffersfromthepreviousdistinction.Nothing inmy

discussion of formal and effective freedom called into question the idea thatfreedomhastodowithlackofconstraintonpeople’sdoing(orbeingabletodo)whattheywant(ormightwant).Ifwegiveresourcestothepoorinordertoincreasetheireffectivefreedom,weareenablingthemtodothingstheywant(ormightwant)todobutwouldotherwisenotbeabletodo.Wedonotaddthefurtherthought:‘OK,nowthey’reabletodomoreofwhattheymightwanttodo.Butaretheyreallyincontroloftheirlives?Aretheyreallylivinganautonomousliferatherthansimplygoing along with whatever desires they happen to find themselves having?’Freedom as autonomy ismore controversial than freedom as effective power orcapacitytoact.Why?Becauseitinvolvesthethoughtthatapersoncouldbedoingwhatshewantstodobut,becauseherwantsdon’tsatisfysomefurthercondition–the condition that would make those wants autonomous – she is not really free.Many people, including Berlin, think that this is a dangerous idea. It is this,accordingtoBerlin,thateventuallyledtotheperversesituationwherebytotalitarianregimesjustifiedtheirruleinthenameoffreedom.Beforeseeingwhy,let’sstickwiththedistinctionbetweeneffectivefreedomand

freedom as autonomy. Think about what the state is doing for people when itprovideseducationtothosewhowouldnototherwisereceiveit.Aneducatedpersonmight be regarded asmore free than an uneducated person in two quite differentways.First,shewillhavemoreoptionsavailabletoher.Someonewhocanread,orprogramme a computer, is effectively free to do things – such as get jobs thatinvolvereadingorcomputerprogramming–thatsomeonewhodoesnothavethoseskills is not effectively free to do. By teaching her, the state is increasing hereffective freedom–her freedom todo things shemightwant todo. In that sense,giving her education is like giving her money. But there is a second aspect toeducation that is not like money, and that is intimately related to freedom asautonomy.Someonewhohasbeen taught relevant information,andbeen taught to

process it, to think for herself, to consider consequences, to evaluate differentcourses of action, is more autonomous, more in charge of her own life, thansomebodywhohasnot.Thisissoquiteindependentlyofthefactthateducationalsoincreases the range of options available to her. We might think of education ascomingintwoparts:thepartthatincreasesyoureffectivefreedom,openingdoorsthat would not otherwise be open to you, and the part that makes you moreautonomous,tellingyouwhatdoorsthereareandputtingyouinabetterpositiontodecidewhichoftheopendoorsyoureallydowanttowalkthrough.As well as helping get clear on the difference between effective freedom and

freedom as autonomy, the education example also suggests that freedom asautonomydoesn’thavetobescary.Ifpartofhavingautonomyissimplybeingableto thinkclearlyandmake informedjudgementsaboutwhatonewants, then itmayseemhard to seewhatBerlin isworried about, hard to seewhere the totalitarianmenacecomesin.Itiscertainlyimportanttoseethatautonomycanbeunderstoodina relatively innocuous way. Indeed, I will end this part of the book by outliningvarious other ways in which freedom as autonomy need not be as dangerous asBerlinthinks.But,toseewhatconcernsBerlin,theconceptofautonomyneedstoberelated to the idea–mostsystematicallydevelopedbyKant– thatwecan thinkofeachpersonasdividedintotwodistinct‘selves’.An‘ideal’,or‘inner ’,or‘higher ’,or ‘rational’,or ‘true’,or ‘transcendental’,or ‘noumenal’or ‘moral’ self, andan‘empirical’,or‘lower ’,or‘irrational’,or‘emotional’,or‘phenomenal’or‘base’self.Autonomyisachievedwhenthefirstoftheseselves–let’susetheterm‘higherself’fromnowon–isincontrolofthe‘lowerself’.Ifyouactinaccordancewithmeredesireoremotion,thenyouarenotreallyincontrol.Youareacting,inKant-speak,heteronomously(‘hetero’=‘other ’,asin‘hetero-sexual’).Ifyou’veeverfelttornbecauseyouwanttodosomethingbutsomethinginsideyou–yourhigherself– tells you that you shouldn’t (smoke? try to sleep with your best friend’sboyfriend?), thenyou’llhavesomeunderstandingof this idea.Andifyou’veevergoneagainstthatinnervoice,andfeltyourselftobelessfreethanyouwouldhavebeenifyou’dbeenabletodowhatitsaid,thenyou–likeKant–thinkthatthereismore to freedom than doing what you want.Where this idea gets dangerous, ofcourse,iswhensomebodyelseclaimstoknowbetterthanyouwhatisthe‘rational’or‘higher ’thingforyoutodo.That’swhensomebodyelse(suchasthestate)maybetemptedtocomealongandsay:‘YouthinkyouwantA.Butthatisonlywhatyourheteronomousselfwants.WhatyourtrueselfwantsisB.SoI’mgoingtogiveyouB.Thismayfeellikearestrictiononyourfreedom,butitwon’tbereally.Actually,bygettingyoutodowhatyourtrueselfreallywants,I’mmakingyoumorefree.’The most famous phrase in Rousseau’s most famous work The Social Contract(1762)talksaboutpeoplebeing‘forcedtobefree’.Aphrasewhichnicelycapturestheparadox(anddanger)inthislineofthought.

Ofthevariousdifferentthingsthathecalls‘positiveliberty’,thisistheonethatBerlinismostinterestedinandconcernedabout.Itisthis‘dividedself’perspectivethat is central to the tradition in the history of political ideaswhich he charts sobrilliantly,thetraditionwhichbeginswithRousseauandmovesonthroughGermanphilosophicalIdealism–Kant(1724–1804),Fichte(1762–1814),Hegel(1770–1831)andMarx (1818–83) – to the totalitarian doctrines of national socialism and statecommunism.Today,withtheColdWarover,theideathathumanbeingshavesomehigher or true purpose which justifies a state forcing them to live their lives acertainway–andtherebyputsthemonthepathtotruefreedom–ismostfrequentlyassociated with religious doctrines. One thinks of the Taliban in Afghanistan,convincedoftheirfundamentalistversionofIslamandreadytodenywomen,andofcourse religious dissidents, all kinds of conventional freedoms. Berlin wasessentiallyaimingatseculardoctrineshostiletothekindoffreedomhecaredabout.But, aswhenLocke and other key figures in the liberal tradition developed theirarguments,hismoreobviousenemytodaywouldbeintolerantstatereligion.One development within this way of thinking about positive freedom was

particularlyimportant.WhatonefindselementsofinRousseau’s‘generalwill’,andwhichiscompletelyexplicitbythetimeonereachesHegel,FichteandMarx,isnotjust the positing of a higher self ‘inside’ the individual but also the positing of acollective‘higher ’self.ForFichte,thiswasthenation(hewasamajorinfluenceonNazism).ForMarx,itwastheproletariat–whichrepresents,forhim,truehumanityas awhole. The individual’s higher self is that elementwithin herwhich puts theinterestof the collective aboveherown individual interests.Notonly, then, is thetrue subject of freedom something other than the empirical self –with her actualdesires,beliefsandemotions; itbecomes, in these theorists, somethingother thantheindividual.Andoncewethinkoffreedomassomethingthatisachievedbythecollective–bythenationorclassorrace–whenitachievesitstruepurpose(worlddomination,communism),thenitbecomeseveneasiertodenigratethefreedomofempiricalindividualstodowhattheyhappentowanttodo.This is the story that Berlin cares most about, and it correctly identifies a

profounddifferencebetweenconceptionsofliberty.That’swhy,ifIhadmyway,Iwould insist that the term ‘positive liberty’ should be restricted to this idea offreedomasautonomy.UsingthattermalsotodescribethetwootherideasI’velaidout doesBerlin and us no favours.Clearly one could agreewithTonyBlair thatfreedomshouldmeaneffective(andnotmerelyformal)freedom,whiledisagreeingwithKant–letalonehiscollectivistdescendants–thatfreedomconsistsinrationalself-directionorlivinginaccordancewiththeonetruefaith(ratherthandoingwhatonewants).Toevaluateclaimsabout freedomproperly,weneedfirstcarefully todistinguish and identify them. Thenwe can take them one at a time and be clearaboutwhatisatstakeineachcase.

AsMacCallum’sformulaimplies,thedifferencesI’vebeentalkingaboutconcernwhatcountsasanagentx,aconstrainty,andagoalz.Isfreedomessentiallyamatterof empirical individuals (x) being free from interference by other empiricalindividuals(y)toactontheirwants(z)?(InhisLeviathan (1651),ThomasHobbessaid:‘Afreemanishethat…isnothinderedtodowhathehaththewilltodo.’)Isitamatter of higher selves being free from desire or emotion or ignorance to actrationally or achieve self-realization? Or of a nation achieving freedom fromdomination by an imperial power to determine its own laws? There are manydifferentwaysofspecifyingtheconceptionoffreedomasautonomy,soweshouldthinkofthisconceptionasafamilyofmorespecificconceptions.Onsomeviews,likeKant’s,freedomconsistsinactingmorally.Onother,moreRomantic,views,itconsists in the trueexpressionof the self. Itmaybe identifiedwitha life spent inaccordancewith theone true faith.What all thesehave in common is anotionofagency (x) which allows that there can be internal constraints on freedom – thatfreedomcanbelimitedbyinnerfactors(suchasdesires),notjusttheinterferenceofexternalothers.

3Freedomaspoliticalparticipationv.freedombeginningwherepoliticsends

A third way in which Berlin draws the distinction between positive and negativefreedom contrasts those who see freedom as being achieved through politicalactivitywith thosewhosee freedomasbeingessentially todowith that sphereofactivitywhich is left to the private individual. This variant of ‘positive freedom’holds that one achieves true freedom through political participation in the state,through taking part in collective self-government, through being involved inmakingthelawsunderwhichonelives.Thecontrastiswiththemoreconventionalviewthatthelawsaretherulesthatdeterminewhattheindividualisandisnotfreetodo.This version of positive freedom can clearly overlap with a ‘freedom as

autonomy’conception.Supposeweidentifyfreedomwithtrueself-realization.Addtothisthethoughtthathumanbeingsachievetrueself-realizationthroughpoliticalactivity, andonewill conclude that freedom is achieved throughpolitical activity.Aristotlethoughtthat‘manisapoliticalanimal’,bywhichhepartlymeantthatwhatis special about humanbeings –what distinguishes them fromother animals – istheir capacity to come together collectively todeliberate anddecidehow theyaregoing to organize their society. Classical republicanism, on traditionalinterpretations, held just this view of freedom. For republicans, politicalparticipationisthetrueendofman,theprivilegedlocusofthegoodlifeforhumanbeings,andthusthewaytorealfreedom.(ForAmericanreaders,Ishouldsaythatthekindof‘republicanism’I’mtalkingabouthasnothingtodowithmembershipoftheRepublicanParty;forBrits,thatitdoeshavesomethingtodowithoppositiontothemonarchy.) This republican view is, of course, very different from themorecommonsensical liberal view that freedom is to dowith people being left to livetheir lives as they think best. In contemporary terminology, this kind ofrepublicanism would be seen as too ‘perfectionist’ – or insufficiently neutralbetweenrivalaccountsofwhat is thegoodlifeforhumanbeings–tojustifystatepolicyinitsname.(ThedifferencebetweenperfectionistandneutralistviewsaboutwhatthestatecandowillbeexplainedinPart4,oncommunity.)‘Freedomaspoliticalparticipation’canoverlapwith‘freedomasautonomy’ina

differentwayalso.Supposewethinkthattherehavetobelaws–ifonlybecausethealternativeisthestateofnature–andweacceptthatwhatlawsdoisrestrictpeople’sfreedom.Agoodquestionis:howcanpeopleliveunderlawyetstillbefree?(ThiswasRousseau’squestion.)Therearetwodifferentkindsofanswertothis.Thefirst,andmoreobvious,answeristhatlawitselfpromotesfreedom.Thelawcanrestrictpeople’s freedom in the name of promoting their freedom. For example, the lawagainst murder prevents me murdering – thereby restricting my freedom– but it

alsopreventsmebeingmurdered–therebypromotingmyfreedom.Onestrandofthoughtunderlyingthesocialcontracttraditionisthatitmakessenseforpeopletosacrifice their freedomtodowhatever they like(suchasmurderoneanother) forthesakeoffreedomunderlaw,which,onthewhole,ismoreworthhaving.Thisistheconventionalliberalaccountoftheroleofthestate.Onthisaccount,thekindoffreedom promoted by law is negative liberty (such as the freedom not to bemurdered).Thislinkbetweenlawandlibertysaysnothingaboutwhomakesthelaw.My freedom not to be murdered may be protected by law even if that law wasdecidedbyadictator.Thesecond,moreinteresting–anddistinctivelyrepublican–answerremindsus

that autonomy means ‘self-rule’. Rousseau says that the most important kind offreedomconsistsinobediencetoalawwegiveourselves.Howcanweliveunderlawbutyetbefree?Secondanswer:wecandothat ifweliveunder lawswehavegiventoourselves.Thatiswhythereisakindoffreedomachievedbycitizensofademocracy,participatinginthemakingofthelaw,thatisnotachievedbysubjectsofa dictator (howevermuch freedom of themore conventional, negative, kind thatdictatorgrantstothosesubjects).Eventhosewhoareoutvoted–andsoareforcedtocomplywithlawstheydonotthemselvesfavour–arefreeinthesensethattheyareequalmembersofaself-governingcollectiveratherthansubjecttolawdictatedbyothers.This is freedomas non-domination.The slave of a liberalmastermayfindthatsheisfreetodoallkindsofthingsthattheslaveofanauthoritarianoneisnot free to do. But she is still not her own master. She is subject to the will ofanother.Howevermuchherownermaycareaboutandlookafterher,ifhemakesthe decisions, she does not enjoy freedom as non-domination. In MacCallum’sterms,thiskindoffreedomisfreedomofacitizen(x)fromdominationbyothers(y)tomaketherulessheistoliveunder(z).Sofar,I’vedistinguishedtwowaysofspellingoutrepublicanfreedom;twoways

inwhich political participationmight be regarded as crucial to freedom, both ofwhichcanbeputintermsoffreedomasautonomy.Oneinvolvestheideaof‘self-realization through politics’. The other involves ‘freedom as living under lawsyou’ve made for yourself’. There is, I’m afraid to say, a third account of therepublicanposition.Thisholdsthat thekindoffreedomrepublicansareinterestedin is neither the controversial and metaphysically dodgy ‘freedom as self-realizationviapolitics’,norfreedomasnon-domination.Onthisthirdaccount,thekind of freedom republicans care about is boring old negative freedom, theindividual’s freedomfrom interferencebyothers.Politicalparticipation iscrucialto freedom not because freedom is achieved in the very act of participation, norbecause participation inmaking the laws one is to live bymeans that one is notsubjecttothewillofanother,butbecauseparticipationisthemosteffectivemeansof protecting it. On this account, participation is instrumental to freedom, not

intrinsictoit.Ifliberalsandrepublicansdisagreeaboutanything,theydisagreenotabout thegoodlifeforhumanbeings,norwhatcountsasfreedom.Theydisagreesimply about whether, or to what extent, an active, engaged, politically awarecitizenryisnecessaryforthesecureprotectionofnegativeliberty.Theinstrumentalrepublicanargumentrunsroughlyasfollows.Supposewecare

aboutnegativeliberty.Nowitisperfectlypossibletoimagineaveryliberaldictator,onewhocaresabout thenegativefreedomofhissubjectsandmakes lawsthataremaximally conducive to its protection. The people aren’t involved inmaking thelaws–sotheydon’thavefreedomonthe‘freedomasparticipation’or‘freedomasnon-domination’views–but theydohaveasmuch freedomfrom interferencebyothers as they could possibly have. Does the conceivability of a liberal dictatormean that thosewho care about negative liberty should favour dictatorship as thebestwaytomakethelaws?Ofcoursenot.Whynot?Becauseeventhoughthepeoplein the society may enjoy lots of negative liberty, that liberty is hardly robust orsecureorresilient.Theirenjoyingitdependssolelyonthegoodwillofthedictator.If he changes hismind, or is succeeded in power by his illiberal son, then theirlibertywill just disappear.What system formaking the lawsmakes itmost likelythat individualswill enjoynegative freedom?Underwhat system is theirnegativelibertymostresilient(orsecureorrobust)?Answer:aself-governingrepublic, inwhichallcitizensareactivelyengagedinpolitics.Citizensmustbeactivelyengagedinpolitics,and imbuedwithastrongspiritofcivicduty,because that is thesurestway for them to protect their freedom from interference by others. There issomething paradoxical about this view. (Quentin Skinner (b. 1940), the Englishpolitical theorist who proposes this interpretation and is sympathetic to the view,calls one of his articles ‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty.’) For the betterprotectionoftheirownfreedom,itmaybenecessaryforcitizenstoacceptthattheyhaveduties todo things that theywouldnototherwisechoose todo:vote,keep intouchwithpoliticalaffairs,bepreparedtodiefortheircountry(toprotectitfrominvasionbyilliberalexternalpowers).Iftheydon’tacceptit,itmaybejustifiedforthe state to impose compliance with the duty on them. In Australia, citizens arelegallyobligedtovote.Partofthejustificationforthisrestrictionoftheirfreedom– they aren’t free not to vote (at least not without paying a fine) – is that itencourages them to keep in touchwith politics, and therebyhelps to protect theirown,negative,freedom.

Freedom,privateproperty,themarketandredistribution

Alotofpoliticalargument involvesdebateaboutprivateproperty, themarketandredistributive taxation.The concept of freedomoften plays a pivotal role in suchdebate.InthissectionI’mgoingtosetoutfivepositionsthatonemighttakeonthisissue.Bykeepingclearonthedifferencesbetweenthem,thereaderwill,Ihope,bebetter placed to think about which position she agrees with, and about why shedisagreeswiththeothers.

1Justifiedredistributivetaxationdoesnotinfringethefreedomofthosewhoaretaxedbecausetheirclaimstothepropertyinquestioncannotbeestablishedinthefirstplace

This is the position argued for by the American philosopher Ronald Dworkin(1931–2013),whoistheotherleadingegalitarianliberal,alongsideRawls.Hesaysthat when we take property from those whose claim to it is not justified, weshouldn’t think of ourselves as restricting their freedom at all. This is becausejudgementsaboutwhatcountsasarestrictionoffreedomdependuponjudgementsaboutwhat property rights are justified in the first place. Essentially the oppositeview is put forward by theCanadian philosopherG.A.Cohen (1941–2009),whobelieves that my freedom is restricted whenever someone interferes with myactions, whether or not I have a right to perform them and whether or not myobstructor has a right to interfere with me. Dworkin thinks that the question ofwhetheranactionisarestrictiononfreedom,andwhetherit’sjustified,boildowntothesamething.Cohenthinksthattheyaredifferent.SupposewedecidedthatQueenElizabethIIcouldnot,afterall,justifyherclaim

to own ‘her ’ estate at Balmoral, and we decided instead either to take it intocommonownershiportodivideitupintoanumberofsmallplotswhichwerethengiventopreviouslypropertylessScots.Wouldwetherebyberestrictingthequeen’sfreedom?Shewouldnolongerbe,asshewasbefore,freetogowherevershelikedon that land, or free to decidewho else could cultivate, orwalkon, it. So in thissense itseemsright tosay,withCohen, that thiskindofredistribution,evenwhenjustified, does indeed restrict freedom.Of course,whether the queen does indeedhaveapropertyrighttotheBalmoralestateiscrucialtothequestionofwhetherwewouldbejustifiedintakingitawayfromher.Thisisnotanargumenttryingtoshowthatthereshouldbenosuchthingasprivateproperty,orthatredistribution(evenoflarge estates) is justified. The point is simply that, even if it were justified, weshouldacknowledgethatwearerestrictingthefreedomofthosefromwhomwearetakingit.

Others take a similar line to Dworkin. In his Second Treatise of Government,Lockesaid‘thatilldeservesthenameofconfinementwhichhedgesusinonlyfrombogs andprecipices’. In contemporary language: ‘If somebodyputsup a fence tostopuswanderingintoquicksandorfallingoffacliff,thenweshouldn’tcallthatarestrictiononourfreedom.’(InMacCallum’sterms,‘weshouldn’tregardthatfenceasay’.)Ithinkitmakesthingsclearerifoneacknowledges,whatissurelythecase,that the fencedoes restrictpeople’s freedombut that thismightwellbea justifiedrestriction. To see this, think about the contrast between a fence that actuallypreventspeoplewalkinginacertaindirectionandanoticethatwarnspeopleaboutthedangersbutleavesthem‘free’towalkwheretheylike.Notice the overlap between these approaches to freedom and the variant of

positive freedom that identifies it with autonomy. Locke’s thought is that, sincenobodyinherrightmindwouldwanttowalkintoquicksandorfallofftheedgeofacliff,preventingherfromdoingsoisnotreallyinterferingwithherfreedom.Thismakessenseifonethinksthatfreedomconsistsindoingwhatonewoulddoifonewereinone’srightmind.Dworkin’sthoughtisthat,sincethesuper-richdonothavearighttoalltheirpropertyinthefirstplace,takingsomeofitawayfromthemisnot really interfering with their freedom. This makes sense if one thinks thatfreedom consists in doing what one has a right to do, or is morally justified indoing.I’llsaysomethingaboutthisoverlaplateron.Fornow,itisworthpointingout that Dworkin and Locke are both working with what some call ‘moralized’definitionsoffreedom,aconceptionthattiesjudgementsabout‘freedom’tomoraljudgementsaboutwhatpeopleshould(andshouldnot)befreetodo.Againstbothofthem,Cohenwantstoseparatejudgementsaboutwhensomebodyisandisnotfreetodosomethingfromthequestionofwhatpeopleshould(andshouldnot)befreetodo.First,we lookandseewhatpeopleareandarenot free todo.Then,we thinkaboutwhetherwhatwehaveseenisjustified,and,ifnot,whatwouldbe.The distinction betweenmoralized and non-moralized conceptions of freedom

can help our thinking about the kind of libertarian claimwe came across in ourdiscussionofNozick’sviewofjusticeasentitlement.Part1discussedthesuggestionthat thosewho value freedommust believe in private property rights and shouldoppose redistributive taxation. Of course, few in real politics object to allredistributive taxation.But it is true thatmanyon the right think that the value offreedomnecessarilysupportsminimalredistributionfrommarketoutcomes.Theythinkthat,ifsuchredistributionistobejustified,itmustbeongroundsotherthanfreedom (equality, justice, public order). So it is worth looking at how thisargumentissupposedtowork.Itistruethatthosewhohaveprivatepropertyarefreetodothingsthattheywould

not be free to do if they did not have it. Think about the queen walking aroundBalmoral,orthewealthypersonwhoownsafleetofaeroplanesandcanflytothe

Bahamas whenever she likes. But what about those who do not have privateproperty?To them, the fact that thequeenowns thehillsatBalmoralconstitutesarestrictionontheirfreedomtowalkaroundthosehills.Thefactthatsomebodyelseowns the planes and will let others fly to the Bahamas only if they pay the fareconstitutesarestrictionontheirfreedomtogototheBahamas.Libertarianssaythattheycareaboutfreedom,andargueforprivatepropertyrightsonfreedomgrounds.But they don’t seem to care about, or even notice, the unfreedom implied by theexistenceofprivatepropertyrights.Whatexplainslibertarians’blindnesstotheunfreedomimpliedbytheirpreferred

arrangements? The best explanation is to see them as working with a moralizedconception of freedom. Their view is that private property does not restrict thefreedomofthosewithoutitaslongasonecanjustifypreventingthemfromdoingwhattheymightotherwisedo.Onthisview,weshouldnotthinkthatthosepreventedfromwalkingon theBalmoralhillsaredeprivedof freedom,because thequeen’spropertyrighttoherestatejustifiesthatconstraint.Totaketheestateawayfromthequeen,however,wouldinvolveaninterferencewithherfreedom,preciselybecauseit is rightfully hers. This suggests that the libertarian view is, ultimately, a viewabout the legitimacy of property rights.Where they appeal to freedom, it is to aconception that makes judgements about what does and does not count as arestriction of freedom depend on judgements about the legitimacy of particularproperty rights. In that sense, the term ‘libertarian’–with its appropriation of theword‘liberty–ismisleading.Thoseworkingwithanon-moralizedconceptionoflibertyaregoingtonoticethelackoffreedom,inalibertariansociety,sufferedbyallwhoarepreventedfromdoingwhattheymightotherwisedobytheveryfactthatproperty is privately owned. Such people might advocate the abolition, orredistribution,ofprivatepropertyinthenameoffreedom,andarelikelytoresentthesuggestionthattheyareenemiesoffreedom.

2Evenifjustifiedredistributiondoesrestrictthefreedomofthosewhoaretaxed,andwhetherornotitincreasesthefreedomofthosewhobenefit,itmakesthembetteroffinotherwaysandcanbejustifiedonthesenon-freedomgrounds

Beforegoingontoexplorethesuggestionthattheredistributionofpropertymightbe justified in the name of freedom, it’sworth pointing out that itmight also, oralternatively, be justified in the name of other values. Even if we think thatredistribution does reduce the freedom of those who are taxed, this reductionneedn’titselfbejustifiedonfreedomgrounds.Weshouldn’tthinkthatfreedomcanonlyberestrictedforthesakeoffreedom.Itmightbejustifiedbecauseitpromotesequality,orjustice,orsocialorder,orutility,oranyofanumberofothervalues.Thispointisgeneralizable.Thinkaboutlegislationmakingitcompulsorytowear

seatbelts.Onecouldperfectlysensibly thinkallof the following: (a) this isgoodlegislation;(b) it restrictspeople’sfreedom;(c) itdoesnotalsopromotepeople’sfreedom.Locke, presumably,wouldwant to say that, since they are protecting usfrom worse evils, seat belts should not really be thought of as restrictions onfreedom(‘Thatilldeservesthenameofconfinementwhichdramaticallydecreasesthelikelihoodofourdyinginacarcrash’).Butthislookslikeanimplausibleandunnecessaryadditiontowhatisalreadyaperfectlycoherentposition.Ofcoursewemight try toargue that seatbeltsactuallypromote the freedomof those forced towear them.Becausea fully rational selfwouldchoose towear themand freedomconsists in doing what a fully rational self would choose to do. Because peoplealmostuniversallyrecognizethattheyarebetteroffwearingseatbeltsandwelcomelaws thathelp themget into thehabitofdoingsomething theyactuallywant todoanyway.Orbecauseanythingthathelpsprotectpeoplefromdeathmustbethoughtof as promoting their freedom. (How free are the dead?) But these look likeunnecessarily controversial or misleading claims. Why not simply say that thelegislationisjustifiedbecauseitmakespeoplebetteroffthantheywouldotherwisebe,eventhoughitdoesthisbyrestrictingtheirfreedom?This,ofcourse,involvestheclaimthatpeopledon’talwaysfreelyandspontaneouslychoosetodowhatwillmake thembetter off – in that sense the legislation is paternalistic. It implies thatsome,likeparentsinrelationtotheirchildren,knowwhatisgoodforpeoplebetterthanthepeopledothemselves.Butthislooksmoreplausiblethanclaimingthatthelegislationpromotestheirfreedom.

3Redistributionreducestheeffectivefreedomofthosewhoaretaxed,butisjustifiedbecauseitmakesformoreeffectivefreedomoverall

As I suggested above, it is the appeal to effective freedom that tends to domostworkinthekindoffreedom-basedjustificationofredistributionmostcommonincontemporarypoliticalargumentfromtheleftandcentre-left.Thinkofallthattalkabout the ‘enabling state’. Since the idea of effective freedom should be clear bynow,let’sfocushereonthedistinctivelyquantitativeaspectofthisclaim.Why might redistributive taxation be thought to increase the total amount of

effectivefreedom?Oneanswermightbethattaking,say,£10,000fromaverywell-offpersonandgiving£500eachto20differentpoorpeoplemeansthatthereisanetincrease (of19) in thenumberofpeoplewhoare free todo things theywerenotpreviously free to do. Here the idea that redistribution produces more effectivefreedomdependson the thought that itmakesmorepeoplebetteroff, in termsofeffective freedom.Another thoughtpointing in the samedirectionnotices that thestatecanspend themoney it raises in taxesongoods thatareavailable tomany–perhaps all – citizens at once. Leaving the £10,000 with the rich individual may

leaveherfreetodothingsshewouldn’tbeabletodowithoutit,butspendingthatmoneyonhigh-qualityTV,oronpublichealthcare,mayproduceextraoptions(andhenceeffectivefreedoms)formany.Asecondanswermightbethattaking£500fromarichpersonandgivingittoa

single poor person counts as a net increase in effective freedom, because themarginal£500isworthmoretothepoorthantotherich.Herethethoughtisnotthatmore people have more effective freedom, but that money yields diminishingmarginal returns of effective freedom. This answer looks a bit suspicious. Onemightagreethatthemarginal£500isworthmoretothepoorthantotherich,andthinkthatagoodreasonforredistributing.Butisitworthmoretothembecauseitgives themmore effective freedom? Isn’t it rather becausewhat it gives them theeffective freedom to do ismore valuable or important?Being free to eat healthyfood,ortowatchtelevision,isdoubtlessmoreimportantthanbeingfreetobuythatextrabottleofchampagne.Butthatisn’tenoughtoshowthatdeprivingsomebodyofthe freedom to buy the champagne involves a smaller reduction in their freedomthanthatwhichisgainedbythoseenabledtoeathealthyfood.Comparisonsof amountsof freedomare famouslyhazardous.Luckily theyare

alsoprobablyworthavoiding,becauseamountsoffreedomarenotthatimportant.Whatmatters isnothowmuchfreedompeoplehave,butwhat it is thatpeopleareandarenot free todo,andwhether therestrictions thatsocietyplacesonpeople’sfreedomarejustified.AdaptinganexamplefromtheCanadianphilosopherCharlesTaylor(b.1931),compareBritainandAfghanistan.InBritain,peoplehavefreedomof religion but there are lots of traffic lights. InAfghanistan, there are very fewtraffic lightsbutpeopledonothavefreedomof religion.Supposewedon’tknowanything else about the two countries. Which gives its members most freedom?Well, inBritainoneisconstantlyhavingone’sfreedomrestrictedbytrafficlights.ButinAfghanistanthereisonlyonethingonecannotdo:practisethereligiononebelievesin.SoinpurelyquantitativetermsBritainlooksasifitrestrictsthefreedomof its citizens more than does Afghanistan. Taylor thinks that this conclusion isabsurd.HethinksitisobviousthatBritaingivesitcitizensmorefreedomthandoesAfghanistan. Taylor believes that this shows that, whenwemake comparisons offreedom,wecannotavoidmakingjudgementsabout thevalueofwhat it ispeopleareandarenotfreetodo.Thismayberightifweareaskedtocomparesocieties,or even individuals, in terms of their overall ‘freedom’. It does seem thatjudgementsabout thataregoing to find ithard toavoid somequalitative, andnotmerely quantitative, input. (One might bite the bullet and describe Britain as asociety inwhichpeople’s freedomismorerestricted than it is inAfghanistan,butthatwouldsurelybemisleading.)Butthelessonmightbethatclaimsabout‘overallfreedom’ are a red herring. There are some actions that Britons are not free toperform,andothersthatAfghansarenotfreetoperform.Whatmattersisnot‘Who

hasmost freedom overall?’, but ‘What are the actions that are restricted in eachcountry?’,and‘Istheirrestrictionjustified?’.

4Privatepropertyrightsandmarketrelationsencouragepeopletomisconceivetheirrealinterestsandhencerenderthemheteronomousandunfree

None of the positions discussed so far invokes ‘positive’ freedom in itscontroversial – ‘freedom as autonomy’– sense. Though some appeal to thedistinctionbetweenformalandeffectivefreedom,noneisconcernedwithanythingother than the actions that peoplemightwant to perform.There is nomentionofautonomy,orthekindofhigherorrationalorinnerselfthatmightleadustoclaimthat somebody was unfree even though she was doing what she wanted to do.Freedomisunderstoodastheabsenceofinterferencewithactionsthatpeoplewantor might want to do. There are, however, other arguments, particularly in theMarxistorradicallefttradition,thatwouldputthecasenotmerelyforredistributionbut, rather, for the abolition of private property and transcendence of marketrelationsaltogether,intermsofthismorespeculativeandcontroversialconceptionoffreedomasautonomy.Forexample,someMarxistsclaimthat theveryexistenceofaneconomybased

on private property andmarket exchange leads people tomisconceive their ‘realinterests’, fostering a conception of themselves as ‘possessive individualists’ or‘materialist consumers’ that takes them away from a proper understanding of thetrue essence of what it is to be a human being. True self-realization for humanbeingsdoesnotconsistintheacquisitionofprivatepropertythroughexchangewithothers.Onlypeoplealienatedfromtheirtrueselves,misledbybourgeoisideology,thefunctionofwhichistolegitimateandstabilizecapitalism,couldfailtoseethattrueself-realizationforhumanbeingsconsistsincooperativeorcommunalactivitywith other human beings; in production for use, rather than exchange; indistribution according to need, rather than according to productive input. If truefreedomconsistsinthiskindofself-realization,andcapitalistsocietiesencourageastunting and distorted conception of what it is to be a human being, then suchsocieties lead to thekindofheteronomythatstands in thewayoffreedom.Afreehuman being is someone who is free of all that distorting ideology and theinstitutions that embody and promote it. So true freedom consists in rejectingprivatepropertyandmarketsasembodyinganalienatedanddistortedunderstandingofwhatitistobehuman.

5Freedom=autonomy,autonomy=rationality,rationality=morality,morality=justice,justice=redistribution,thereforethepersonwhorecognizesherdutyto

redistributeherresourcesisherselffreerthanthepersonwhodoesn’trecognizethatduty

This(last)positionisavariantonthe‘freedomasautonomy’idea.Here,though,theargument does not run through the idea that true freedom consists in self-realization,withathicklythemupforpublicuse,orforspecifiedconceptionofwhatself-realization requires. Rather, it goes via the claim that the truly free (i.e.,autonomous)person is someonewho isacting rationally,hencemorally.Supposeactingmorallyimpliesredistributionfromrichtopoor.(Perhapsthisisforreasonsconcerning what would be a justified distribution of freedoms in a moreconventional,negativesense.)Thisleadstotheconclusionthattherichthemselvesaremorefreeingivingtheirmoneytothepoorthantheywouldbebyholdingontoit for themselves. They may have less freedom understood as ‘range of optionsavailable toonewithout interference’,but theyhavemore freedomunderstoodas‘actioninaccordancewithone’shigher(=moral)self’. Ifweassumethat there isonlyonemorallycorrect(orrational)waytoact–anassumptionI’llquestioninthenextsection–thenwehavetheparadoxthatfreedomconsistsindoingjustthatthingandnothingelse.Freedomasobedienceindeed.Obediencetothemorallaw.This suggests onemoremove. Suppose we think that the queen’s claim to the

Balmoral hills cannot be justified, and that a justifiable distribution of propertywouldinvolvehergivingallocationtothosemoreneedythanherself.Thepositionwe’reconsideringhereholdsthatsheherselfachievesrealfreedombyseeingandactingonthismoralinsight(eventhoughshealsolosesthefreedomtowalkaroundthe estatewithoutworrying about bumping into strangers). It’s not just that thosewhonowhaveaccesstothehillsarefreetodothingstheywerenotpreviouslyfreeto do – though that’s true too. It’s that she herself achieves freedom, in theimportant,‘real’sense,throughheractionofgivingupherown–lessimportant–freedoms. But suppose she doesn’t see or act on this insight. She persists in hermistaken belief that her claim to the estate is justified. If we take it off hernonetheless – on the perfectly reasonable grounds that it wasn’t hers in the firstplace–canwestillclaimthatwearepromotingherfreedom?Afterall,weareonlygettinghertodowhathermoralselfwoulddoifitwereincontrol,unimpededbywhateveritis–ideologicalillusion,unreflectivetraditionalism–thatpreventsherfrom seeing what her moral duties really are. Here, of course, we have thesuggestion that those who fail correctly to identify the ‘general will’ for theircommunity–aconcept that translates roughly intoKant’smoral law–shouldnotthink of the coercion that compels them to comply with that will as somethinginimicaltotheirfreedom.Rather,theyarebeing‘forcedtobefree’.ThisisjustthetrainofthoughtthatBerlindislikedsomuch.

Resistingthetotalitarianmenace

This setting out of various positions on the relation between freedom, privateproperty,themarketandredistributionendedupwithacouplethatinvokedpositivefreedom in the sense thatBerlin, andmanyothers, regardas leadingusdown theslippery slope to totalitarianism. It is this prospect of the totalitarianmenace thatdrivesBerlintodefendnegativeliberty–freedomfrominterferencebyothers–asthebestwaytospecifytheconceptofliberty.Inthislastsection,Iwanttodrawafewdistinctions that might lead us to wonder whether this particular ‘positive’conceptionof freedom–freedomasautonomy– is reallyasdangerousasBerlinsuggests.Wedon’twanttothrowthebabyoutwiththebathwater.Wemaynotliketotalitarianism,butthatdoesn’tmeanwehavetorejectanyandeveryconceptionoffreedomasautonomy.MyinterpretationofTonyBlair ’slettertoBerlinsuggestedthat the variant of positive freedom that he was trying to defend was ‘effectivefreedom’,whichwouldfitwithcentre-lefttalkabouttheenablingstate,andinvolvesnocontroversialclaimsabouthigheror trueselves.That’swhyBlairwas,on thisscoreatleast,clearedofthechargeofbeingaclosetdictator.HereIpointoutsevenwaysinwhichhecould, ifhehadwanted,havemadesomeof thosecontroversialclaimsyetstillsteerclearofthetotalitarianmenace.

1Promotingpeople’sautonomycaninvolvejustprovidinginformationandhelpingthemthinkforthemselves

Whenfirst introducing thecontrastbetween‘freedomasautonomy’and ‘freedomasdoingwhatonewants’, I used the exampleof education.Aswell as increasingpeople’seffectivefreedom,byopeningdoorsthatwouldotherwiseremainclosedtothem, education gives people a sense of what their options are and the likelyoutcome of any action they might take. This is the information-giving aspect ofeducation.Italsoteachesthemtothink–toevaluatethedifferentoptionsavailabletothem,toprocessandreflectupontheinformationtheyhave.Thisistheaspectofeducationthatpromotesrationalreflection.Imaginetwopeople.Pennywantstobeadoctor because she thinks that doctors have an exciting life and get paid lots ofmoney. She decided to be a doctor at a very early age because she saw a TVprogrammefeaturingaglamorousfemaledoctorandhasnotconsideredanyotherpossible careers. She has no idea about what it’s really like to be a doctor, anddoesn’tknowhowmuchtheyactuallyearn.Clairealsowantstobeadoctor.Shehasgatheredagreatdealofinformation.Sheknowswhatisinvolved,thechancesofhersucceeding, what the life is really like, howmuch she is likely to earn. She hasthought carefully about her various options and decided that, on balance and allthingsconsidered,medicineisthethingforher.SoPennyandClairebothwanttobe

doctors.Suppose theybothacton thisdesire.Are theybothactingequally freely?Isn’tClairemoreautonomous,more inchargeofher life,and in that sensemorefree, because her desire has emerged from rational deliberation based on goodinformation?Autonomyisherebeingtakeninafairlyweakanduncontroversialsense.People

who can think properly, and have appropriate relevant information, are moreautonomous than those who can’t or don’t. Does this way of thinking aboutautonomy involveany ideaofadividedself,orof internalobstacles?Well, ifwethinkClaire ismore free thanPenny, presumably that’s becausewe think that herdesiretobeadoctorissomehowmorerational,ortruertoherauthenticself,thanisPenny’s.Pennyisatthemercyofherirrationalbeliefs.Herdesire,thoughhers,isless trulyhers than isClaire’s.Thismaynotbeher fault.Shemaynothavebeenprovidedwith the relevant information, nor taught how to think clearly about theinformationshehasgot.Butitdoesseemthatherignoranceandlackofdeliberativecapacitystandasobstaclestohergenuineself-realization,toherbeinggenuinelyinchargeofherlife.Hertrueselfmayormaynotwanttobeadoctor.Perhaps,havingbeen taught to think sensibly and provided with full information, she would stillwant to be one. That desire would be truer to her real self than is the one shehappenstohave.Freedomwouldconsistinactingonthedesiresshewouldhaveifsheweremorerationalandbetterinformed.Herignorance,andherlackofcapacityto engage in rational deliberation, do indeed seem like inner obstacles to herfreedom.Thiswayofthinkingaboutautonomydoes,then,positsomeideaoffreedomas

‘rationalself-direction’andabsenceofinnerconstraints.Soitdoesbelongwiththeviews that Berlin dislikes so much. But it is surely an innocuous variant of thisfamilyofconceptions.Weareaverylongwayindeedfromanyfear that thestatewill comealongand forcepeople tobe free.Childrenare indeed forced togo toschool and this is usually justified precisely on the plausible grounds that it willincreasetheirfreedomasautonomy(aswellastheir‘freedomaseffectiveoptions’)later on. If being taught about the world, and learning how to think about it,promotesautonomy,thenautonomyneedn’tbesuchadangerousideaafterall.

2Torecognizethattherecanbeinternalobstaclestofreedomisnottosaythatanybodyotherthantheagentherselfisthebestjudgeofwhentheyexist

Theconventionalnegativeconceptionoffreedomholdsthatsomebodyisfreetodosomethingjustaslongasnobodyelseisstoppingher,aslongasshecoulddoitifshe wanted to. This view rejects the idea that there can be internal obstacles tofreedom.But,asCharlesTaylorargues,itseemsundeniablethatwedoexperiencesuch obstacles. Imagine somebody who really wants to be a politician but is so

terrifiedofpublicspeakingthatshecannotpursuethisgoal.Otherpeoplemaynotbepreventingherfrombecomingapolitician,butherfear–aninternalobstacle–surely is. Sometimes, indeed, we may experience our desires themselves asobstacles,theovercomingofwhichisfreedom,theactingonwhichisunfreedom.Imagineawould-beexplorerwhosedesire tosleep inacomfortablebedpreventsherevercarryingoutanyexpeditions.Orsomebodywhowants todothemorallyrightthingbutfindsherselfyieldingtotemptation.Orsomebodywhowantstodowell in her exams but finds herself unable to resist her urge to go out drinkingevery night. Or somebody who really wants to give up cigarettes but finds herdesire for nicotine too strong. Such people experience true freedom when thedesires of their ‘autonomous’ or ‘higher ’ selves overcome the desires of their‘heteronomous’or‘lower ’selves.Incaseslikethis,wearethinkingoftheselfasdividedintotwoparts.Freedomis

achievedwhenthe‘true’or‘higher ’partisincontrolofthe‘false’or‘lower ’part.Nowit isaverygoodquestionhowweknowwhichpart iswhich,andwhois thebestjudgeofthat.Whatmakestheseexamplesplausibleisthefactthat,ineachcase,the individual herself ismaking that judgement. Sooneobviousway to resist theslidetowardstotalitarianismistoinsistthat,thoughtherecanbeinternalobstaclestofreedom,itisalwaysandnecessarilytheindividualwhoisthebestjudgeofwhatistocountaswhat.Thatshouldbeenoughtopreventthestatejustifyingitscoercionbyappeal to theclaim that,because itknowswhatpeople ‘really’wantbetter thantheydothemselves,itscoercionisreallyforcingpeopletobefree.It’sworthpointingoutwhatthispositiondoesnotinvolve.Somebodycanbethe

bestjudgeofsomethingwithoutbeingalwaysandnecessarilyrightaboutit.Idon’tthinkthatIalwayscorrectlyidentifywhatIreallywant.Sometimes,forexample,Ipersuade myself that I want (really want) something, when it turns out, withhindsightandagreaterdegreeofself-awareness,thatmyjudgementwasbiasedordistorted, thatsomekindofself-deception,orat least lackofself-knowledge,hadbeengettinginthewayofmyforminganaccuratejudgement.ButthoughIhavetoacceptthatevenIcanbewrong,Idon’thavetoacceptthatanybodyelseisinabetterposition than me to judge correctly. Of course, if I believed that somebody elseknewmebetterthanIdidmyself,thenImightalsobelievethatshecouldbeabetterjudge.ButIdon’thavetobelievethat,and,mostrelevanttothepoliticalissueswearediscussing,Icertainlydon’thavetobelievethatthestateisinthatposition.

3Torecognizethattherecanbeinternalobstaclestofreedomisnottoidentifyfreedomwithrationality

Theideathattherecanbeinternalobstaclestofreedomisoftenassociatedwiththethoughtthatthetrueorhigherselfistherationalself.ThisisclearestinKant,for

whomtheautonomousselfisindeedtherational(andmoral)self,andwhatthatselfis free from is empirical desire and impulse. (Kant was so hostile to wants anddesiresthatheissometimesinterpretedasholdingthatsomebodywhowantstodothemorally right thing isacting lessmorally thansomebodywhodoesn’twant tobutdoessooutofduty, thatdutybeing recognizedbyher rational self.)The ideathat there is a ‘right answer ’ about what an autonomous person would chooseobviouslygetsalotofsupportfromtheidentificationofautonomywithrationality.Once the issueofwhatmakespeople free turns into thatofwhat it is rational forthem to do, then it looks as if the way is open for debate about what is indeedrational for people.And in that debate itmight seem that the individual does notoccupyaparticularlyprivilegedposition.Butconsidertheexamplesgivenintheprevioussection.Thesewereallsupposed

tobecaseswhereit isplausibletoacknowledgeinternalobstaclestofreedom,butnone of them required that what was impeded was the exercise of a person’srationality. It’s true that the would-be politician suffering from a fear of publicspeakingisplausiblyregardedashavinganirrationalphobia,butwecanregardherasconstrainedbythatwithoutknowingwhetherwantingtobecomeapoliticianisarationalthingforhertowant.It’struealsothatwemaybeinclinedtoseesomeonewhostudiesforherexamsasmorerationalthansomeonewhogoesouteverynight,and someonewhowants togiveup smokingasmore rational than someonewhodoesn’t.But theexamplesdon’tdependon that.Wecould, forexample, imagineastudentwhoreallywantedtogooutdrinkingandwhoexperiencedher‘conscience’asanirrationalurgeinculcatedbyrepressivesocialization,henceasaconstraintonthe freedomofher autonomous self. Imight reallywant togoandwatchOxfordUnited (or the Milwaukee Brewers) play, and regard my desire for warmth andcomfortasaconstraintonthepursuitof that truepurposeofmine.But thosewhohavewatched themwould agree that it is hard todescribewatchingUnitedor theBrewersasarationalwaytospendanafternoon.Onewayofthinkingaboutthis–developedbytheAmericanphilosopherHarry

Frankfurt (b. 1929) – is to make a distinction between ‘first-order ’ and ‘second-order ’desires.First-orderdesiresaredesiresforthingslikeacomfortablebed,orbeinganexplorer,doingwellinexams,orgoingoutdrinking.Thesedesires,asweallknow,canconflict.Agoodwayofthinkingaboutsuchconflictsistheideathatwealsohavesecond-orderdesires,whicharedesiresaboutourfirst-orderdesires:theyaredesirestohaveornothaveotherdesires.Takeourwould-beexplorer.Doesshereallywanttobeanexplorerandgetridofherpatheticdesireforacomfortablebed? Or is what she really wants to sleep in a comfortable bed untroubled byromanticyearningsforexploration?Toanswerthatquestion,shemustlooktohersecond-orderdesires.Thosewilltellherwhetherornotsheisbeingpreventedfromdoingwhatshereallywantsbyadesirethatshedoesnotreallywant.Anotherway

ofputtingasimilarpointistotalk,asTaylordoes,about‘strongevaluation’.Wedonotjusthave‘brute’desiresthatweassesssolelyintermsoftheirstrengthorforce.Wearealsocapableofevaluatingourdesires,ofjudgingthemmoreorlessworthyorappropriate,ofidentifyingwithordisowningthem.This,perhaps,issomethingthatdistinguishesus fromotheranimals.Unlike theirs,ourdesiresarenotsimplylessormoreintensethanoneanother.Wecanreflectonthem–identifywithsome,repudiateothers–anditisthiscapacitytodiscriminatebetweendesiresthatallowsustoregardsomeasconstraintson,orobstaclesto,ourfreedom,whichisachievedwhenweactonour‘real’or‘authentic’ones.Tothinkthatdesirescanbeobstaclesto freedom, then,wedon’tneed toposit freedomas rationality.Weneedonly theidea that less significant desires can get in the way of the realization of moresignificantones.Theissueofwhoisthebestjudgewillthenbeformulatedintermsofwhoisbestabletojudgewhichofaperson’sdesiresaremore‘significant’.

4Toidentifyfreedomwithrationalityisnottoclaimthatthesamethingisrationalforeachperson

Thoughwedonothaveto,wemightafterallwanttomakesomekindofconnectionbetween autonomy (and hence, on this conception, freedom) and rationality.Somebodydoingtherationalthingisdoingwhattheymosthavereasontodo,anditisnotabsurdtothinkthatsomebodydoingthatismorefreethansomebodywhoisactingirrationally.And,thoughagainwedonothaveto,wemightbelievethattheindividualisnotnecessarilythebestjudgeofwhatisrationalforher–atleastnotinareaswhereothershaveaccesstosuperiorinformationorarebetterabletoprocessinformation available to all. After all, most of us believe that parents are betterjudges of what is and is not rational for their children than those children arethemselves.Mightnotthesameapply,evenifonlytoalimitedextent,inthecaseofatleastsomeadults?Ifwemadeboththeseassumptions,rejectingthechancestogetoff the slippery slope offered by the two previous headings, would we then becommittedtogoingallthewaytototalitarianism?Theanswer isno.Berlin typically identifiesdoctrinesofpositive freedomwith

whathecalls‘monism’–theviewthatthereisoneharmoniousandcorrectsystemofvaluesthattellsushowweshouldlive.Berlinthinks,bycontrast, that therearemanydifferentvaluesthatconflictwithoneanother.Whatheobjectsto,primarily,aretheoriesthatclaimcorrectlytohaveidentifiedtherightwayforpeopletolive,andthenforcethemtolivethatwayinthenameoftheirownfreedom.Butevenifwe do identify freedomwith rationality, we don’t have to accept monism in thissense.Wecanthinkthatdifferentwaystolivearerationalfordifferentpeople,sothat a statehelps itsmembers towards freedomnotbygetting themall to live thesameway,butbydoingwhatitcantohelpthemtoliveinwaysthatarerationalfor

them,astheindividualstheyare.Theremightbeparticularareasoflifewherewhatis rational is the same for all people (drive around without getting killed, avoiddrugaddiction).Sotheremightbealimitedcommoncoreofthingsitisrationalforallpeople todoandnot todo (complywith traffic lights,avoidgettingaddicted).On theviewunderdiscussion, the state couldmakeusdoandnotdo those in thenameofourownfreedom.Buttheseneednotgoanywherenearasfarasthekindofextensivemonisticclaimstypicallyassociatedwithtotalitarianism.Onthecontrary,we are likely to end up with a pluralistic, liberal state in which individuals arebasicallylefttodecideforthemselveswhatisrationalforthem.

5Toidentifyfreedomwithrationalityisnottoclaimthatthereisasinglethingthatisrationalforanyindividual

Wedon’t,then,needtoassumethatthereisasinglewayoflifethatisrationalforallpeople.Butnormustweassumethatthereisasinglewayoflifethatisrationalforanyindividualperson.Thinkaboutyourownlife.Itmaybethattherearesomewaystoliveyourlifethatwouldbeclearlyirrational.Givenmyabilities,itwouldhavebeenclearly irrational forme topursue the lifeofaprofessional footballer.Givenmyinterests,itwouldhavebeenirrationalformetobecomeagardener.Butthat doesn’t show that there is only one life-plan that would be rational for me.Maybe my decision to try to be an academic was no more or less rational thanwouldhavebeenmydecisiontotrytobecomeanactor.Perhapsreasoncanhelpusdecide between some ways of life, but that doesn’t mean it can help us decidebetweenallofthem,narrowingtheoptionsdowntoasinglerightanswerforeachof us. Perhaps, to use the current terminology, some different ways of life aresimply‘incommensurable’:notcapableofbeingcomparedintermsofametricthatwouldallowustochoosebetweenthemonthebasisofreason.Ifthatisright,thentheideathatoneisonlytrulyfreewhendoingwhatisrational

looksevenfurtherfromthetotalitarianmenace.Notonlyaredifferentwaysofliferationalfordifferentpeople,butdifferentwaysoflifemaybeequallyrationalforthesameperson!Ofcourse,thestatemightstillclaimthattherearesomewaysoflife thatwouldbe irrational for anybody, and seek to promote the freedomof itscitizensbypreventing(oratleastdiscouraging)themfromlivingthoseways.Someways of life are evil; some are empty or worthless. Nobody has any reason topursue those, and so the state is promoting the freedom of its citizens when itdiscourages or prevents people from doing so. But the image of a state leavingcitizensfreetochoosehowtolive,andchoosingfromthearrayofoptionsthattheirownreasonhas identifiedasequally rational for them, isavery longway indeedfrom the kind of totalitarian state that Berlin regards as the consequence ofacceptingadoctrineofpositiveliberty.

6Toidentifywhatwouldberationalforapersondoesnotnecessarilyjustifyinterferingwiththeirirrationalaction

Thelasttwopointsaresupposedtoreassurethosewhodislikethestate’sinterferinginindividuals’livesinthenameof‘freedomasrationality’.Differentthingsmayberationalfordifferentpeople.Differentthingsmayberationalforthesameperson.Soevenastatethatbelievesitselfjustifiedinhelpingitscitizenstochooserationallives, because that is what true freedom consists in, can be pluralistic, not themonistictotalitarianstatethatBerlinfears.Butthereisanotherwayofavoidingtheslipperyslope.Thisconsistsinnoticingthatevenifwecouldidentifywhatwouldberational for a person to do, it doesn’t automatically follow that we can justifyinterferingtogethertodotherationalthing.Suppose you have a friend who uses drugs that are potentially addictive. You

know herwell enough to know that this is irrational for her. (She hasn’tmade acareful,reflectivejudgementaboutherchoicetousedrugs.Sheusesthem,let’ssay,becausethatisthenormamongagroupoffriendsthatshewantstobepopularwith,butyouknowherwellenoughtojudgethatherwantingtobepopularresultsfromirrationally lowself-esteemand thatdrugswon’thelpherbecomemorepopular.)Even if you are completely confident in your judgement that she is actingirrationally, itdoesn’tfollowthatyouwouldbejustifiedinusingforcetopreventherfromtakingthem.Youmight,ofcourse,bejustifiedintryingtogether tositdownandthinkaboutwhatsheisdoing.Youmightevenbemorallyrequiredtodothat.Butdoingwhatonecantogetpeopletoseeforthemselveswhatisandisnotrationalfor themisquitedifferentfromforcingthemtodothatwhichisrational.Thelatterinvolvesalackofrespect,afailuretorespectthevalueofherlivingherlifeinherown(irrational)way.Itinvolves,wemightsay,anunjustifiedrestrictionontheindividual’sfreedomtochooseforherself.If we did say that, then we would not, of course, be using a conception of

‘freedom as autonomy as rationality’. And we would want to know why therestriction is unjustified –why people should be free to choose irrationally. Thenotionof ‘respect’ is part ofone answer.The idea that people’s livinga life theythemselveshavechosenisnecessaryforthatlifetobevaluableforthemisanother.(ThisbuildsonLocke’ssuggestion,inhisLetteronToleration(1689),thatforcingnon-believersintochurchdoesthemnogood–evenifeverywordofthereligiousdoctrine being forced on them is true.) John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859)provides a number of different answers. Recall, from Part 1, Rawls regarding aperson’scapacitytoframe,reviseandpursueaconceptionofthegoodasthemostmorally significant capacity she has. Freedom matters, on these liberal views,becauseof the importanceof individualsbeingable to live lives theybelieve in–ratherthanthosefoistedonthembyothers.WewillexploretheseargumentsfurtherinPart4. In thiscontext, the importantpoint issimple:somebodycanknowbetter

thananotherwhatwouldberationalforthatotherwithoutbeingjustifiedinusingallavailablemeanstogethertodoit.

7Interferenceaimedatgettingpeopletoactrationallymightbejustifiedwhileacknowledgingthatitdoesinvolvearestrictiononfreedomandwithoutclaimingthatitisjustifiedonfreedomgrounds

Sofarthediscussionhasbeenwhollycouchedinfreedomterms.But,asnotedinthecaseofprivateproperty,weshould remember that thingsdon’thave tobearguedthisway.Recall thediscussionof seatbelts.Freedom-restricting legislationmightbejustifiedsimplyonthegroundsthatitmakesthoserestrictedbetteroffthantheywouldotherwisebe–and‘betteroff’intermsthathavenothingtodowithfreedom.Discussionsofpositivefreedom,andofthestateinterferenceithasbeeninvokedbysometojustify,canleadustoforgetthatfreedomisonlyonevalueamongmany.As always, what matters, ultimately, is whether, all things considered, the state’sactionisjustified.

Conclusion

Theconceptof liberty isused inmanydifferentways,withdifferent theoristsandtraditions invoking quite different conceptions of it. This leads to quiteunderstandableconfusion,confusionthatisnotdispelledbyBerlin’sfamousessay.It is not helpful to divide conceptions into twokinds, because doing that requireslumpingtogetherconceptionsthatareimportantlydifferent.Atitsworst,itleadstothereallymisleadingideathatthedistinctionbetween‘freedomfrom’and‘freedomto’capturesacrucialfaultline,whenitfactitcapturesnothingatall.MacCallum’ssuggestion–‘xisfreefromytodo(become)z’–isabettermeanstoclarity.Armedwith this,wecanbeprecise inour freedomclaimsandgetonwith the importantbusinessofdecidingwhoshouldbefreefromwhattodoorbecomewhat.Muchpoliticaldebateinvokingtheconceptoffreedomhasfocusedonissuesto

do with property and redistribution. During the 1970s and 1980s, the rightappropriated theconceptof freedomfor itsownpurposes.Tobelieve in freedommeant to favour the freemarket, and towant the state to do as little as possible,leaving individuals ‘free’ from its interference. The left responded in two quitedifferent ways. The mainstream or liberal left argued that the right seemedparticularlyconcernedwiththefreedomofthosewhohadproperty–theirfreedomtodowhattheylikedwithit–andnotmuchinterestedinthefreedomofthosewhohadlittleornone.TheradicalandMarxistleftquestionedtheveryideathatpropertyandfreedomwereconnected,arguingthattruefreedomrequiredthetranscendenceofthecapitalistframeworkthatreliedonandfostereda‘bourgeois’conceptionoffreedom.Ihopethatthispartofthebookhasmadeclearthebigdifferencebetweenthese two responses, as well as providing some more detail about the differentformstheymighttake.WhenTonyBlairsuggestedthatpositivefreedommighthavemoregoingforit

thanBerlinacknowledged,hewaspursuingavariantofthefirststrategy.Hewasnotarguingforamorecontroversialconceptionof‘positive’freedomasautonomy,letalonetheclosettotalitariansuggestionthatidentifiedfreedomwithrationality.ThelastpartofthisPartpointedtovariouswaysinwhich‘freedomasautonomy’neednotbeasdangerousas itseems.Berlin’sessaybrilliantlyshowedhow,over time,thisconceptionofpositivefreedomdevelopedintosomethingthatcouldbeinvokedto legitimate oppressive regimes in the name of freedom. But, to politicalphilosophers,whatmattersisless‘Whathappened?’than‘Whatistherightthingtothink?’ It is important to rescue the baby of ‘freedom as autonomy’ from thebathwaterof‘freedomconsistsindoingwhatatotalitarianstatetellsyouisinyourownbestinterests’.

Furtherreading

DavidMiller ’s (ed.)TheLibertyReader (EdinburghUniversity Press 2006) has ausefulshortintroductionandcontainsseveralofthepapersdiscussedhere.Anothervaluablecollectionofexcerpts fromawiderangeofhistoricalandcontemporarysources,withhelpfulcommentary,isFreedom:APhilosophicalAnthology,editedbyIanCarter,MatthewKramerandHillelSteiner(Blackwell2006).KatrinFlikschuh’sFreedom(Polity2007)isexcellent.RepublicanperspectivesarerepresentedbyPhillipPettitandQuentinSkinner in

bothcollections.Formoreoftheirthinking,seePettit’sRepublicanism:ATheoryofFreedom and Government (Oxford University Press 1997) and Skinner ’s LibertyBeforeLiberalism(CambridgeUniversityPress1998).Pettit’stheorywasexplicitlyendorsed and adopted by JoséLuisRodríguezZapatero, primeminister of Spainfrom2004 to2011.Fora fascinatingaccountof this real-worldattempt toenactapolitical philosophy, see his book, co-authored with José LuisMartí,A PoliticalPhilosophyinPublicLife:CivicRepublicanisminZapatero’sSpain(PrincetonUniversityPress2010).ThethoughtsaboutmoneyandfreedomcomefromG.A.Cohen’s‘Freedomand

Money’ in his sadly posthumous collection edited by Michael Otsuka, On theCurrency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy(PrincetonUniversityPress2011).PhilippeVanParijs’sRealFreedomforAll:What(ifAnything)CanJustifyCapitalism?(OxfordUniversityPress1997)usestheideaofeffectivefreedom–whichhecalls‘real’freedom–toargueforanunconditionalbasicincome.The easiest version of Ronald Dworkin’s view is ‘Do Liberty and Equality

Conflict?’, inPaulBarker (ed.),LivingasEquals (OxfordUniversityPress1996).Thereisamorecomplicatedonein‘ThePlaceofLiberty’inhisSovereignVirtue(Harvard University Press 2000). His last book, Justice for Hedgehogs (HarvardUniversity Press 2011), is a plea not for animal rights but for the unity of value.(According to an ancient Greek poet, ‘The fox knows many things, but thehedgehog knows one big thing.’ It’s unclearwhat that big thing is.) The last partapplies his ‘properly understood, values don’t conflict’ perspective to liberty,equality,democracyandlaw.J.J.Rousseau’sTheSocialContract(1762)andJ.S.Mill’sOnLiberty(1859)are

classic texts available in a range of cheap editions and online free athttp://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm andhttp://www.constitution.org/jsm/liberty.htm respectively. Mill’s is a reasonablystraightforwardread–theargumentsaregenerallyclear.IwishthesamecouldbesaidforRousseau.

Part3

Equality

Equalityismorecontroversialthanjustice–evensocialjustice–orliberty.Manyrejectequality.Egalitarians,itissaid,endorsethepoliticsofenvy,fosteracultureof dependence in which individuals nannied by the state lose all sense ofresponsibility, and show wilful ignorance of the functional requirements of amodern,dynamiceconomyoperatinginaglobalmarketplace.Equalityisregarded,evenbyitsformerfriends,asanoutdatedideal.Politically,‘equality’ isbadnews,outoftouchwiththeindividualistic,aspirationalvaluesoftoday’svoters.IntheUS,current debate is about whether inheritance tax should start to kick in on estatesworth less than$5million.Britishpoliticianswhosupport increasing theshareoftax paid by the wealthy are immediately accused of reviving ‘class war ’.Redistributive taxation, taxing thebetter off tohelp theworseoff, is done almostsecretly–‘stealthtax’,not‘wealthtax’.Eventhosewhostillbelieveinitframetheirobjectivesinotherterms:‘Opportunityforthemany,notthefew.’Allthisisatthelevelofpopularpoliticalrhetoric.Butequalityhasbeengivena

hard timebypoliticalphilosophers too.Valuingequality, theyargue, isamistake.Whatmattersisnotthatpeoplehaveequalsharesofgoodthings.Norisiteventhatpeoplehaveequalopportunity for (oraccess to)good things.Whatmatters, ifwethinkabout it, is that everybodyhas enough,or that thosewhohave least have asmuchaspossible,orthatpeoplewhomostneedthingstakepriority.Tocareaboutequalityistocarethatpeoplehavethesameamountaseachother,whichlookslikeapeculiarthingtocareabout.Afterall,apossibleworldinwhichpeoplehaveequalamountsisoneinwhichnobodyhasanything.Inthediscourseoftoday’selectoralpolitics,redistributivetaxationhasgotitself

abadname,iscarriedoutsomewhatsurreptitiously(whereitiscarriedoutatall),and,whenitdoesreachthesurface,ispresentedintermsthatmakescantreferencetoequality.Meanwhilepoliticalphilosophersareincreasinglyabandoningequalityas a political ideal. Against this background, it is important to see that thephilosophers’ arguments against equality are not necessarily arguments againstredistributive taxation. Someone who rejects equality can care passionately thatresourcesshouldbetransferredfromtherichtothepoor.Rejectingequality,inthissense, means rejecting a particular reason that might be off ered to justify theredistribution. One can, then, approve of the fact that redistributive policies are

presentedasaimingnotatequalitybutatothergoalswhilehavingnosympathywithpoliticians’reluctancetoarguethecaseforredistribution.Itisperfectlycoherenttorejectequalityatthephilosophicallevel,asafundamentalideal,whilearguingthat,for other reasons, resources should bemore equally distributed – perhapsmuchmoreequallydistributed–thantheyareatpresent.But it is also important to distinguish between philosophical and practical

arguments. Philosophical objections to equality, which point to the oddness offocusingonequalshares,arequitedifferentfrompracticalobjectionsthatopposeredistributionbecauseofitsallegedconsequences.SupposeIcareaboveallelsethatthe poorest members of society should be as well off as they can. I could stillopposeamoresharplyprogressivetax-and-transfersystem.Why?BecauseImightbelieve that the resultofsuchapolicywouldbeeffectsoneconomicproductivityseriousenoughtoreducethesizeofthepie,andhencethesizeofthesmallestpiece,inthelongrun.Peopledoubtfulaboutredistribution–asamatterofpolicy–coulddoubtpurelyonpractical,empiricalgrounds,whilebeingnolesscommittedtothegoalofhelpingthedisadvantaged.Asalwaysinpolitics,onemustkeepclearonthedistinctionbetweenmeansandends.Thekindofpoliticalphilosophydiscussed inthisbookclarifiesconceptsandarguments,enablingthemorepreciseidentificationofgoalsthatasocietymightseektoachieve.Whichpolicieswillbestrealizethosegoalsisafurtherandseparatequestion.

Theegalitarianplateau

Political philosophers have recently given equality a hard time. But almosteverybody – including almost all political philosophers – believes in equality insomesense.Withtheexceptionofafewracists,contemporarypolitics,andpoliticalphilosophy, is carried out on what the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka (b.1962) has called an ‘egalitarian plateau’. Nearly all agree with the principle thatmembersofapoliticalcommunityshouldbetreatedasequals,thatthestateshouldtreat its citizenswithequal concernand respect.What theydisagreeabout iswhat‘treatment as an equal’ amounts to.For libertarians such asNozick, aswe saw inPart1, treatingpeopleasequalsmeans respecting theirproperty rights, includingtheirrighttoself-ownership,equally;notusingsomeasmeanstoothers’ends.Thismay produce vast inequalities of money, but, for Nozick, that is not the kind ofequality that matters. Some think that treatment as an equal requires equality ofopportunity.Noprejudice,basedonraceorgender,creatingbarrierstoindividuals’efforts to better themselves. (I will discuss different conceptions of equality ofopportunity shortly.) Others take it to imply a much more equal distribution ofincomeandwealth.Andsoon.This is a strange state of affairs. Equality has recently been subjected to

fundamental criticisms by political philosophers, yet contemporary politicalphilosophy takes place on an ‘egalitarian plateau’. Few believe in equality, buteverybodyagreesabout the importanceof ‘treatment as equals’,disagreeingonlyabout how to interpret this claim. How can this be? The answer is that ‘the stateshould treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect’ is not a claim aboutequalityasadistributiveideal(whichisthewayitisunderstoodbythoserejectingit).What it really says is that all citizens have the same right to be treated withconcernand respect–and that the respect andconcernwithwhich they shouldbetreated depends solely on their status as citizens (and not on their race, gender,religion, how clever or rich they are, or whatever). Principles like this are notdesigned tomake distributionsmore equal, but to encourage recognition that thewell-beingofallcitizenscounts.Aswewillseeshortly,recognizingthatallcitizenshaveanequalrighttoconcernandrespectmay,onsomeviews,haveimplicationsfor the kinds of distribution of goods that are acceptable – including perhapsimplicationsforthekindsofinequalitythatarepermitted–butthefundamentalorunderlyingprincipleisnotthatofequalityasadistributiveideal.Itis,however,thatofpeoplerelatingtooneanother–andhencethestaterelating

to them all – as equals. Those who think that the value of equality is essentiallyconcerned with the distribution of goods are sometimes criticized for failing torecognize the importanceofequality in social relationships.What thosewhocareaboutequality (should) reallyobject to,on thisaccount, isnot thefact thatpeople

have unequal amounts of anything material, but that relations between them arehierarchical,conceivedasrelationsbetweensuperiorsandinferiors.Unequalsocialrelationsleadtooppression–marginalization,exploitation,exclusion,domination– which typically leads to inequalities in the distribution of goods. But it is theoppression and inequality in social relations that is the fundamental problem.Historically, egalitarian political movements have challenged the idea that somepeople – whites, men, aristocrats – are better than others, and asserted the equalvalueof all humanbeings, and the importanceof their relating toone another asequalmembersofacommunity.Today,groupssuchasethnicminorities,gaysandlesbiansand thedisabledseeknotsomuchequalamountsofgoodsasequalityofstatusorrecognition.Eveniftheideathatthestateshould‘treatpeopleasequals’isnot about equality as a distributive ideal, it still reflects a commitment torelationshipscharacterizedbyequalityratherthanhierarchy.It is surely true that we still live in a society characterized by oppressive

(exclusionary, exploitative, etc.) social relationships – between genders, ethnicgroups,thoseofdifferingsexualitiesorphysicalabilities,andsoon.Nonetheless,mostofmydiscussionwillbeconcernedwithequalityspecificallyasadistributiveidea. This is for two reasons. First, I don’t know any political philosopherswhodefendunequalandoppressivesocialrelationships.It’struethatsomeclaimthattheapproachesofothers toooftenneglect,orperhapsunwittinglycontribute to, suchrelationships.It’salsotruethatsomehavedonemuchtobringthemtoourattention,to illuminate theway inwhich theywork, and to identifywhat kinds of politicalactionmightremedythem.But,intermsofthekindofargumentIaminterestedin,thatisn’twheretheactionhasbeen.Second,andmoreimportantly,whatisbadaboutunequal and oppressive social relationships is, presumably, that they are bad forthose on the wrong end of them. Translate this into talk about their effects onpeople’swell-being–howwellorbadlyofftheyare,allthingsconsidered–anditlooksasifwecanimmediatelystarttalkingindistributiveterms,with‘well-being’asthestuffwecareaboutthedistributionof.Imaygivedisproportionateattentiontoinequalitywithrespecttoobviousandindividualisticgoodslikemoney,butmanyofthe points made could be generalized to include other factors relevant to thedistributionofhumanwell-being,suchasthequalityofpeople’srelationshipswithothers.Back to the idea of ‘treatment as equals’. This formula can be interpreted in a

varietyofdifferentways,yieldinglessormoreradicaldistributiveimplications.Bywayof example, consider twouncontroversial respects inwhichwe think that thestate should treat people as equals: equality before the law, and equality ofcitizenship.Equalitybeforethelawcouldjustmeanthatthelawappliestoallpeoplewithoutexceptions:thatthereisn’tonelawfortherichandonelawforthepoor,ordifferentlawsdependingonaperson’sstatus–property-holder,slave,orwhatever.

That would be a very thin or formal notion of equality before the law. But, byappealing to considerations such as those that might lead someone to prefer‘effective freedom’ to ‘formal freedom’ (as discussed in Part 2), one couldplausiblyclaim‘equalitybeforethelaw’toimplymorethanthat.Itcouldbetakentomean that inequalities in the resources available to people should not affect theirstanding inrelation to the legalprocessasawhole.Aweakversionof thiswouldsupportlegalaid:equalitybeforethelawrequiresthatpeople’sabilitytogotolaw,ortoputupaproperdefence,shouldnotbeimpededbylackofresources.Thisisweakbecauseitdoesn’tstopwealthypeoplespendingasmuchastheylikeontheirlegalrepresentation.Itmakessureonlythateverybodyhassomebasicthresholdofresources available for legal purposes. A stronger view would hold that peopleshouldn’t be allowed to spend their own resources on the legal process, ondefending their claims or making claims against others, if that results in a veryunequalinputbylitigants.Theremight,forexample,bealimitontheamountthatsomebody could spend – say twice the amount supplied by legal aid. And thestrongestviewwouldhold thatpeopleshouldbeable todevoteonlystrictlyequalamountsofresources.Onlythenwouldpeoplereallyhaveequalitybeforethelawunderstoodasequalaccesstothesamequalityoflegalrepresentation.Similarmovesapplyinthecaseofequalcitizenship.Formally,thismightmean

simplythatallcitizenshavetherighttovote,tostandforpublicoffice,andsoon.But it couldmean rathermore. It couldmean, for example, that all citizens havesomekindofbasicminimumorthresholdlevelofthosegoodsthatarerelevanttotheproperperformanceof theroleofcitizen:education, freedomfrompoverty–those preoccupiedwith finding their nextmeal are not in a position to deliberatesensiblyaboutthepoliticalissuesfacingtheircommunity–andsoon.Ifcitizenshipis about informed input to the political process and you really do care that allcitizens are able to exercise their citizenship rights, then you will be deeplyconcernedaboutthosewhoarenotinapositiontodoso.Morestronglystill,onemay worry about the extent to which inequalities in private resources lead toinequalitiesinpoliticalinfluence.PoliticsintheUSisincreasinglyabouttheabilityofcandidatestoraisefundstobuyairtimefortheirTVcommercials.Someobjectto this on the grounds that it violates the democratic principle of equality ofcitizenship.Aswiththelegalcase,oneversionwouldputacapontheamountthatindividuals or parties could spend, in order to keep inequalitieswithin acceptablelimits.Anotherwouldinsistonpublicfundingofpoliticalcampaigns,whichcouldinvolvestrictequalityoffinancialinput.Inbothcases,then,principlesdemandingthatallshouldbetreatedequallybythe

law, or as citizens, can be taken to have less or more stringent distributiveimplications.Theycanbetreatedpurelyformally,withnosuchimplicationsatall,ortheycanbetakentorequirecertaindistributivearrangements.Ifthelatter,these

arrangements can in turn differ in terms of how much they are concerned withequality.Makingsurethatallcitizenscanread,writeandarefreefromthekindofpovertythatprecludespoliticalparticipationimpliessomething–a lot–about thedistribution of education andmoney. But it implies nothing about how equal thatdistributionshouldbe.Aconcernthattwoopposingpartiesinalawsuitshouldnotbepermittedtospendvastlyunequalamountsofmoneyonmakingtheircaseshowssomeconcernwith relativities –withhowmuchpeople can spend relative tooneanother–butnoconcerntoachievestrictequality.At theegalitarianextreme,onemight indeed hold that equality of citizenship would only truly be realized ifpeople’s private resources made no difference whatsoever to their politicalinfluence.Someof these thoughtscanbeput in termsof theprinciples that ‘likecasesbe

treatedalike’,orthatinequalitiesbejustifiedby‘relevantreasons’.YouandImayhave vastly unequal amounts of money. Perhaps you are a brilliant entrepreneurwhospotteda lucrativegap in themarket,andperhaps this isa reasonrelevant toourhavingsuchunequalresources.Itjustifiesthefactthatyouaremuchwealthierthan I am. But that reason is, or should be, irrelevant to our (equal) standing ascitizens. As citizens we are like cases, and, in matters relating to our commoncitizenship,weshouldbetreatedalike.Thiswayofthinkingabouttheissuesclearlyfocuses attentionon thequestionofwhat counts as a relevant reason, and it is anapproachthathasbeenmostfullydevelopedbytheAmericanphilosopherMichaelWalzer (b. 1935).Walzer argues forwhat he calls ‘complex equality’.This is theidea that different goods belong to different distributive ‘spheres’, each ofwhichhas its own appropriate distributive principles. There is nothing wrong with theunequal distribution of money, as long as that inequality results from the rightsource – people’s ability to makemoney in the market – and as long as moneyinequality doesn’t influence (and distort) the distribution of goods belonging toother spheres, suchashealth, educationorpolitics.What isobjectionable,on thisaccount, isnot inequalityassuch,but inequalities thatarenot justifiedbyrelevantreasons.Ratherthanworryingaboutmoneyinequality(andinequalitywithrespectto commodities that are quite properly for sale in the market), we shouldconcentrate on preventing the conversion of money into goods that are not, orshouldnotbe,marketablecommodities–goodsthatshouldratherbedistributedinaccordance with their own, internal, sphere-specific, criteria. This ‘spherical’argument isn’t really an argument for equality. But, in appealing to the idea ofsphere-specific relevant reasons,Walzer does rely on some of the intuitions thatunderlietheseargumentsaboutequalitybeforethelawandequalityofcitizenship.

Equalityofopportunity

Can you imagine somebody saying they didn’t think that people should haveequalityofopportunity?Eventhemostferventanti-egalitarianislikelytosaythatofcourse she endorses that kind of equality. It’s equality of something else –somethingmore hostile to individual freedom, ormore damaging to an efficienteconomy – that she opposes. Equality of opportunity is the acceptable face ofequality, commanding support across the political spectrum. Does this mean thatthose of all political persuasions do actually agree on some fundamental value?Unfortunately not. The appearance of consensus is illusory. Instead, the term‘equalityofopportunity’isusedtomeanarangeofquitedifferentandincompatiblethings. Real and important disagreement is concealed by an apparentlyuncontroversial form of words. Politicians sometimes like it when this happens.They can seem to be agreeingwith everybody. Philosophers always hate it. Theywant to know precisely what people mean or believe, to dig down behind theinnocuousveneerandexposethedisagreement.Fromthemanydifferentthingsthatgetcalled‘equalityofopportunity’,let’spick

out three, which I’ll call the ‘minimal’, the ‘conventional’ and the ‘radical’conceptions. These terms aremade up byme and don’t refer to anywell-knownlabelsintheliterature,sodon’tworryiftheyseemstrange.(Incaseithelps,anotherphilosopher calls them ‘right-liberal’, ‘left-liberal’ and ‘socialist’.) (Generally, inmyview–thoughbewarnedthatthisissomewhatcontroversial–andthinkingasaphilosophernotapolitician,itdoesn’tmatterwhatapositionorargumentiscalled.Thatisjustamatterofwords.Whatmattersisitscontent.Wephilosophersspendalotoftimeworryingaboutwhatwordsmean,butthisisnotbecausewecareaboutwhatwords areused to refer towhat ideas.Wehave toworkouthowpeople areusingthewordstheydosothatwecanseewhattheymean.Oncewe’vedonethat,thewordstheyusedropoutofthepicture.I’dbehappytocallthethreeconceptionsTom,DickandHarry–aslongasweallknewwhateachofthemmeant.True,thosenameswouldn’tbeveryhelpfultothereader,sincetheydon’tgiveanycluesaboutthe content. True, oncewe had decidedwhich conceptionwe favouredwewouldprobablywant tomake it soundattractive,whichmightwell leadusback into thebusinessofusingthenormallyvalue-ladenlanguageof‘equality’and‘opportunity’.But, in principle, we could proceedwith the business of analysing and assessingclaimsinthis–andeveryother–areausinganywords,aslongasweallknewwhatweallmeantbythem.)What,then,isthecontentofwhatI’mcallingthe‘minimal’conceptionofequality

of opportunity? This means simply that a person’s race or gender or religionshouldnotbeallowedtoaffecttheirchancesofbeingselectedforajob,ofgettingagoodeducation,andsoon.Whenwetalkaboutequalopportunities legislation,or

admissions or hiring policies, it is this kind of attempt to combat prejudice ordiscrimination thatwehave inmind.On this view, race, genderor religion are–usually – reasons irrelevant to the question of who is the best person to do aparticular job, or get a place at university. What matters is their skills, theirpotential, their relevant competences. The way to secure this kind of equality ofopportunityisbycarefulmonitoringandregulationofrecruitmentandpromotionproceduresineducationalinstitutionsandthelabourmarket.Formostpeople,however,thisisnotenough.Thoseendorsingthe‘conventional’

conception hold that equality of opportunity requires more than that people’srelevantcompetences–ratherthantheprejudicesofothers–determinewhetherornottheygetthejobsoreducationtheyapplyfor.Itmattersalsothatallhaveanequalchanceof acquiring those relevant competences.People’sprospects in life shoulddependontheirabilityandeffort,notontheirsocialbackground.Thefactthatthepoorest50percentofitshouseholdssupplyonly7percentofitsuniversitystudentssuggeststhattheUKdoesnotgiveitschildrenequalityofopportunityinthatsense.The fact that middle-class children are roughly three times more likely to getmiddle-class jobs than are working-class children, and roughly three times lesslikelytogetworking-classjobs,suggeststhatclassbackgroundmakesadifferenceto people’s job prospects. (I say ‘suggests’ because it’s possible thatmiddle-classchildren are thatmuchmore likely to be clever andmotivated. In that case theseunequalprobabilitieswouldnotreflectinequalityofopportunityintheconventionalsense. They would result rather from poor or working-class children not beingclever enough, or working hard enough, to take advantage of their equalopportunities.)Ontheconventionalview,comingfromapoorfamilyshouldnotberelevant to one’s chance of getting into university, or getting a good job. Thatshoulddependonaperson’snaturalabilityandthechoicesshemakes,sothestateisjustifiedinlevellingtheplaying-field.Takingconventionalequalityofopportunityseriouslymaywelldemandextreme

measures. (Remember we are not yet discussing the ‘radical’ conception!) Aperson’s social background affects her prospects in so many different ways thatremoving its influence altogether is impossible, or achievable only bymassivelyrestricting parental freedom, almost certainly by abolishing the institution of thefamily.Thisshowsthatthosewhosaythattheybelieveinequalityofopportunityofthissecondkindusuallyonlythinkthattheydo.Theymaygenuinelywanttoremovesome of the mechanisms by which children’s differing social backgroundsinfluence their life-chances. Perhaps they oppose private education, supportuniversal grants for students and endorse policies aimed at giving disadvantagedchildrenaccess to thekindofpre-school education that researchhas shown tobehugely important to their development. Presumably they accept that policiespromotingthiskindofequalityofopportunityrequirearedistributionofresources

–thedisadvantagedthemselvescanhardlypaythecostofpoliciesdesignedtogivetheir children a more equal start in life. This is levelling the playing-fieldunderstood asmaking itmore level.But it is notmaking it completely level.Weknow that children whose parents read them bedtime stories do better than thosewhoseparentsdonot.ButIdon’tknowmanypeoplewhosecommitmenttoequalityof opportunity leads them to wish to ban bedtime stories (or to support a lawrequiringparents to read to theirchildren).Assooften,apolitical ideal therearegoodreasonstosupportcomesintoconflictwithotherthingsthatwevalue–here,the autonomy of the family. And many people say they want ‘equality ofopportunity’whenwhattheyreallywant–allthingsconsidered–isactuallyjustlessinequalityofopportunity.On the radical view, even the full-blooded pursuit of conventional equality of

opportunitywouldstillnotbeenough.Correctingforsocialdisadvantagedoesnotreallyyieldequalityofopportunity,because it leavesuntouchednaturalor inborndisadvantage. People should have equal opportunities in the sense that theirprospectsareinfluencedneitherbytheirsocialpositionnorbytheirpositioninthedistributionofnaturaltalents.Onlyinthatcasewilldifferentoutcomesreallyreflectpeople’schoicesratherthanunchosendifferencesintheircircumstances.Onlythenwillpeoplehaveanequalchanceoflivingthelifeoftheirchoice,ratherthanhavingtheir set of feasible options determined by factors beyond their control. It’s notenough for clever poor children to have the same opportunities as clever richchildren. Equality of opportunity requires also that untalented children –whetherrich or poor – should have the same opportunities as talented children. Notnecessarilyopportunitiestodoparticularjobs.Itwouldbeoddtowantthemusicallyinept tohave the samechanceofbecomingaconcertpianist as thechildprodigy.Butopportunitiestodoparticularjobsarenotthesameasopportunitiestogettherewards usually associated with those jobs. Someone who endorses the radicalconceptionofequalityofopportunitycanacceptthatthetalentedandtheuntalentedshouldhaveunequalchancesofgettingparticularjobs.Whatsherejectsistheideathattheyshouldhaveunequalchancesofgettingthesamerewards.Is the conventional position stable? Can it resist sliding into the radical view?

Those who think not argue as follows. The reason to endorse the conventionalconceptionofequalityofopportunity,ratherthanjusttheminimalone,isthatit isunfairthatsocialdisadvantageshouldholdpeopleback.Whyshouldsomebebornwith a silver spoon in theirmouth – on awell-trodden path fromposh family toposhschooltoposhuniversitytoposhjob–whileothersgotoworseschools,andhave to think hard about whether they can afford to stay on at school or go touniversity?Andwhatmakesitunfair is that,asfaraschildrenareconcerned,it isjustamatterofluckwhatkindoffamilytheyareborninto.Butifthisisthereason,itseemshardtoescapetheRawlsianthought(discussedextensivelyinPart1)thatit

isalsoamatterofluckhowcleverpeopleare.Thosewhothinkthatweshouldseekto provide greater equality of opportunity between those from differentbackgroundswithsimilarlevelsofnaturalabilitywantafaircompetitioninwhich‘merit’alone,andnotclassbackground,produces theoutcome.But ifwhatmakesthatcompetitionfaireristhatitreducestheinfluenceof‘morallyarbitrary’factors–factorsforwhichindividualsarenotresponsible–weshouldbecommittedalsotoprovidinggreaterequalityofopportunitybetweenthosewithdifferent levelsofnatural ability. After all, people aren’t responsible for that either. (Part 1’sdiscussionofdesertisalsorelevanthere.)Oneway of resisting the radical version of equality of opportunity is to reject

equality of opportunity altogether, perhaps by affirming a principle about self-ownership, like Nozick. Nozick is an honourable exception to my claim thateverybody endorses equality of opportunity. Being a political philosopher, ratherthanapolitician,heisreadytoacknowledgethathislibertariantheoryofjusticeisinnowayconcernedtoensurethatpeoplehaveequalopportunitiesofanykind.Onhisview,peoplecanhireanybody they like,onwhatevergrounds, sohedoesnoteven endorse theminimal version.This amounts to getting off the train before itleaves the station and is unlikely to appeal to thosewho support the conventionalconception.The conventional conception would not slide into the radical one if it were

argued for in a differentway. Instead of claiming thatwe should compensate forsocialdisadvantageonfairnessgrounds,wemightseektoreduce–oreliminate–the influence of social background for a different reason. There is a kind ofinefficiency that comeswhencleverchildren frompoor families find itharder toget to university than not so clever children from better-off ones. In economicterms, this kind of inequality of opportunity implies a sub-optimal allocation ofresources. The more level the playing-field, the less distortion or bias in theprocesses by which individuals are selected for education and jobs, the moreefficient the conversionofhuman resources intomarketable skills (andhence theproduction of things that other peoplewant produced).Making things harder forchildren of disadvantaged families implies squandering a ‘pool of ability’ fromwhichwecouldallbenefit.Thisargumenthas indeedbeeninfluential inmakingthecaseforstateactionto

improve the opportunities of those who would otherwise be held back by theirsocialcircumstances.Butit isacompletelydifferentargument.It tellsustoworryabout people having unequal chances due to social disadvantage only where andbecause their doing so is economically inefficient. The objection to inequality ofopportunityisnolongerthatitisunfairtoindividuals.Itisratherthatitiswastefulforsociety.Becauseitneglectsthisjustice-basedaspectoftheconcernforequalityofopportunity,thosewhoendorsetheconventionalconceptionareunlikelytofind

itattractive. (Unless, that is, it iscombinedwith theviewthateconomicefficiencymattersbecauseitmeansthattherewillbemoreresourcestodevotetothosewho,throughnofaultoftheirown,arebadlyoff.Inthatcasethereasontomakeoptimaluseofthepoolofabilityissothatwecangivemosthelptothosewhoneeditmost.Conventionalequalityofopportunityisherevaluedinstrumentally,asameansnotanend,butwhatitisameanstomightitselfbeamorallydesirable–perhapsevenafair–outcome.)Equality of opportunity, so innocuous on the surface, turns out to be highly

controversial. Part of its attraction is precisely that it seems less demanding thanequalityofoutcome. It seems to conflict lesswithother thingswehave reason tovalue. One often finds equality of outcome being rejected, while equality ofopportunityisheldupasobviouslyworthyofsupport.Butevenifthiswereright–attheleveloffundamentalprinciple–itwouldstillbeimportanttorememberthattheachievementof(greater)equalityofopportunitymightwellrequire,oronsomeviews even entail, (greater) equality with respect to outcomes. Let me end thissectionbyexploringsomeofthese.Some ways in which equality of opportunity has implications for equality of

outcomeapplyevenon theconventionalview. It isbecausechildrenareborn intohouseholdswithunequalamountsofresourcesthattheyhaveunequalopportunities.Childrenoftheadvantagedhavemoreandbetteropportunitiesthanchildrenofthedisadvantagedpreciselybecausetheyarechildrenoftheadvantaged.Soonewaytoequalize opportunities is to equalize starting-points. But a child’s starting-point –sayanaffluentmiddle-classhouseholdinaneighbourhoodwithgoodschools–isaparent’soutcome.Thismeansthat,ifwereallycareaboutequalizingopportunities,weneedtothinkaboutequalizingoutcomesalso.Sometakethislineofargumentasshowing the incoherence of equality of opportunity as an ideal. We start off bysayingthatwewantpeopletohaveequalopportunitiessothattheiroutcomesreflectnaturalabilityandchoicesratherthansocialcircumstance.Butinorderforthistohold also for their children, we end up having to deny that they be permitted toachieve unequal outcomes.Moreover, the very thing that people often choose toemploytheirabilitiesfor–theoutcomestheymightstrivetoachieve–ispreciselythe opportunity to give their children better opportunities than are available toothers!Thereisindeedaproblemreconcilingconventionalequalityofopportunitywith

respect for people’s choices aboutwhat to dowith their abilities.But that doesn’tmeanwehavegotthebalanceright.Evenifparentsstartedwithequalopportunitiesand,becauseofdifferingabilities andchoices, endedupunequal, itmight stillbejustified,forthesakeofequalityofopportunity,topreventsomeactionstheymighttake topass theiradvantageson to theirchildren.Sincewedon’t live ina societywhere it could plausibly be claimed that people’s unequal positions have indeed

arisensolelyasaresultoftheirabilitiesandchoices,thereisamplejustificationforsomeequalizationofoutcomesforthesakeofgreaterequalityofopportunity.Wehave already noted that policies aimed at levelling the playing-field bycompensatingchildrenfortheirsocialdisadvantage–suchastheprovisionoffreepre-schooling in deprived areas – costmoney. Thatmoney can only come fromthosewhohaveit.Takingmoneyfromthosewhohaveittospenditontheeducationof thosewho do not is redistribution of resources. Amore equal distribution ofresources, as between those born into unequally advantaged social backgrounds,may be – surely will be – required for the sake of conventional equality ofopportunity.Ontheradicalview,theconnectionbetweenequalityofopportunityandequality

ofoutcomeismuchstronger.Itisnotsomuchthatequalizingoutcomesmightbeanecessary means to the equalization of opportunities. It is rather that, on thatconception, the two kinds of equality amount to the same thing. To see why,remember that radical equality of opportunity seeks to correct for all unchosendisadvantages natural as well as social. Where this is achieved, differences ofoutcomecanonlyreflectgenuinedifferencesoftasteandchoice.(Ifthosedifferentoutcomes reflect different talents or family background or tastes and choices forwhich people cannot be held responsible – perhaps because they were not fullyinformed about the consequences then thatmeans that people did not really haveequalopportunity in the radical sense.)For example, somepeoplemaychoose towork longer hours thanothers, thereby earningmoremoney and endingup rich,whileothersmaychoosetotakemoreleisure,earningjustenoughtostayaliveandendinguppoor.Theywillthenbeunequalwithrespecttomoneyoutcomes.Butwillthey be unequal overall? No, they will have equal outcomes in terms of overallbundles of ‘incomeplus leisure’. It looks as if there is inequality here, but reallythere have just been different choices. Generalizing, we can say that as long aspeoplereallyaremakingachoice,andarefullyinformedaboutitsconsequences,equalityofopportunityamountstoequalityofoutcome.Somebodywhobelievesinequalityof outcomehasno reason toobject todifferencesof outcome that resultfromequalityofopportunity in the radical sense,because thesedifferencesaren’treally inequalities. If they do indeed result solely from people’s fully informedpreferencesandchoicesforwhichtheyaregenuinelyresponsible,thentheyarenotreallyunequaloutcomesatall.

Genderequality

Theprevioussectiontalkedalotaboutequalityofopportunitybetweenthosebornintodifferent social classes (conventional), andbetween thosebornwithdifferentnatural talents (radical).But ithardlymentionedanother factor thatmanyseeasacrucial aspectof anyegalitarianpolitical agenda: equalityofopportunitybetweenthose bornmale and those born female. (Ditto those born into different racial orethnicgroups,butI’mafraidlackofspacemeansI’mgoingtocontinuetoignorethem.)True,theminimalconceptionobjectstogenderdiscriminationatthepointatwhichpeopleareapplyingforjobs.Butwhataboutthemorecomplexprocessesthatleadmanytoregardtheminimalconceptionasinadequate?Althoughtheextentoftheinequalitydiffersmassivelyacrosstheglobe,andalthoughsocietiesliketheUSand the UK have seen a substantial reduction in inequalities between men andwomenover theyears, andalthough in somesocietiesgirls arenowdoingbetterthan boys in educational terms, there is still a sizeable pay gap and women aresignificantly less likely tomake it into top jobs.Onemight assume that feministswouldwantgirlstoenjoyequalchanceswithboysforemploymentandincome.Things are not that simple. As I mentioned earlier, some theorists who call

themselves egalitarian reject thiskindof focusondistributive issues, favouringa‘relational egalitarianism’ that is more concerned with eliminating oppressiverelationships.Feministsinthiscamparelikelytowantanendtopatriarchy(Greekpater=‘father ’,arche=‘rule’)–movingbeyondasocialorderinwhichmenhaveauthorityoverwomenwhoare subordinate to them.Theproblem is not thatmenandwomenhaveunequalchancesofgettinghigh-payingjobs.That’satbestarathertrivialsymptomofamuchdeeperconcern.Theproblemis thatmenhavehad thepowertostructurealloursocialinstitutions–family,economy,polity–inwaysthatsuitthem.Indeed,theverywaythatwethinkofourselvesandotherswhenitcomestogender–whatitmeanstoustobeamanorawoman,whatkindofbehaviourisand isn’t appropriate – is a social construction that reflects millennia of maledomination. (Someof thishappens in theveryprocessof learning language.Theclassic example here is that English contains many words for a sexuallypromiscuous woman, all with negative connotations, hardly any for a sexuallypromiscuousman,nearlyallofthemwithpositiveconnotations.)Andforsome,toworry about women’s ability to compete for top jobs is already to adopt adistinctively male perspective (competitive, ambitious, self-interested) on whatmatters.Genderequality,onthisview,involvesalotmorethanclosingthepaygap.I’d love to be able to cover all this in the few pages available. Instead, I’ll try

something more realistic. A frequent claim among feminist philosophers is thatmainstream(or,astheysometimessay,‘malestream’)politicalphilosophydoesn’thave the intellectual resources to accommodate or acknowledge their concerns.

Sometimes this comes as a critique of liberal political philosophy in general: thecapacitiesthatliberalscaresomuchabout–autonomy,rationality–aredistinctivelymale;whataboutcaringandcompassion?(I’llsayalittleaboutthecommunitarianaspectofthatcritiqueinPart4.)Butsometimesthefocusismorespecificallyonthe‘distributiveparadigm’.Thechargehereis thatwemiss importantfeaturesofoursocietythatarebadforwomenifweframetheissueindistributiveterms.Iwanttoshow how a suitably sophisticated understanding of equality of opportunity canaddress or incorporate at least some of the things that feminists are, rightly,concernedabout.Consider the distribution of opportunities for income. The data show that, on

average,womenearnconsiderablylessthanmen.Thisisworsethanitseems,asitleads towomen becoming economically dependent onmen,which in turn affectspower relationswithin the familyby increasing thecostof separation forwomenand making it more likely they will stay in an unhappy (or, worse, abusive)relationship.Menwhohavebecometheprimarybreadwinners,andwhocanexitatless financial cost to themselves, have more control over the terms of therelationship.Towhat extent canwe think of this as evidence of any inequality ofopportunity?When we are thinking about the contrast between rich children andpoorchildren,it’snaturaltoassumethattheytendtoendupwithbetterandworsejobsandpaybecausetheystartindifferentplaces–theyarebornintofamiliesthatyieldunequalopportunitiestodeveloptheattributesrewardedbythelabourmarket.But boys andgirls donot start in different places: girls are nomore likely to beborn poor than are boys. Could it be, then, that the pay gap, and often-ensuingdependence relationships, have nothing to dowith unequal opportunity and resultrather from the different choices made by men and women? Maybe women aremore likely to choose part-timework, or lower-paid full-time jobs, because theyare more compatible with other things they want from life – like looking afterchildren.Ifthat’swhatisgoingon,then,asnotedattheendoftheprevioussection,whatlookslikeaninequalityofoutcomemightnotbeoneafterall.In fact, it is well established that some of the pay gap persists even when we

comparemenandwomendoingequivalentjobs(hencethedemandfor‘equalpayforequalwork’).Thereisevidencealsothatsomeemployersarelesslikelytoofferjobstowomenthantosimilarlyqualifiedmen.Soitcan’tallbeputdowntowomenmakingdifferentchoices.Butweshouldquestionthesuggestionthatboysandgirlsstartoutinthesameplaceinamorefundamentalway.Muchoftheinequalitymayindeedbeduetowomenandmenmakingdifferentchoicesaboutwhatkindsofjobtodoandhowmuchtoworkatdifferentstagesintheirlives.Butthechoicespeoplemake reflect both their preferences (what theywant) and the options available tothem (what they can have). It’s the interaction between the two that generates thechoicesweobserve.Differentkindsoffeministemphasizedifferentelementsinthat

combination, but both can be regarded as ways in which women and men aredifferently,andunequally,‘placed’fromthestart.Onewaytoseethisistonoticethewayinwhichwell-paidfull-timejobsrequire

workerswhodonothave tospendmuchof their timelookingafterchildren.Theworldofwork isstillaman’sworld in thesense thatsuch jobs tend to take it forgrantedthatsomebodyelseisdoingwhateverchildcareneedsdoing(and,perhaps,careofageingparents).Ifweassumethatwomenaremorelikelytobedoingthatcaringwork,andthat’swhytheydon’tchoosetogoforthosekindsofjob,thenwecan see thatmen andwomenmay both be choosing, but they are choosing fromunequal opportunity sets. Men have the option of a full-time well-paid job andhavingtheirchildrencaredfor;womenhavetochoosebetweenthetwo,oftengoingfor thecompromiseofpoorlypaidand/orpart-timework that is compatiblewiththeir caring responsibilities. Women are making their choices from a menu ofoptionsthathasbeenstructuredbymenformen.Thismayseemtooquick.Supposewomenareindeedmorelikelytobedoingthe

‘carework’, and this explainswhy they are less likely tobe in full-timewell-paidjobs.Isn’tthatitselfachoice?Afterall,nobodyforceswomentohavechildren,andthereisnolawthatsaysitmustbethemotherwhocaresforthemifshedoes.Toseewhether women are really on thewrong end of an inequality of opportunity, wecan’t avoid the question ofwhy it is thatwomen tend to be the oneswho do thechildcare.Thereare,crudely, twoperspectiveson that.Ononeview,womenarenaturally

predisposedtowanttolookaftertheirchildreninawaythatmenarenot.Justasit’samatter of biology thatwomenbecomepregnant, carry the child to termandgothroughchildbirth,so is it thatwomenhaveanatural instinct tocarefor thechildthusproduced.Thisissometimescombinedwiththeviewthatwomenarebetteratitthanmen, so there’s an efficiency gain ifwomendo it.We can think of this as apreference ifwewant, but it’s not apreference they’ve chosen. It’s one theyhavewhethertheywantitornot.Onthisanalysis,itlookslikeagoodquestiontoask:whyshouldwomenendup

worse off than men – in terms of income and economic dependency – simplybecause they find themselves, for reasons beyond their control,wanting differentthingsfrommenandoperatinginasocietythatpenalizesthemforthatfact?(Noticetheoverlapherewiththeradicalconceptionofequalityofopportunitysetoutintheprevioussection.)Thesameappliesifwomenjusthappentobebetteratitthanmen–whyshould theybeworseoffbecauseof that?Afterall, it’snotas ifmendon’twanttohavechildren.They’rejustlesskeenon(orlessgoodat)actuallylookingafterthem!Fromthisperspectiveasensiblegender-egalitarianreformwouldbetochange the balance of economic rewards attaching to childcare (which womennaturallywanttodo)andworkoutsidethehome(whichismorecongenialtomen).

Or,perhaps, to reconfigurewell-paid jobs so that theycanbedoneby thosewhoalsohavedomesticresponsibilities.The alternative perspective holds that there’s no deep biological reason why

women rather than men should want to look after children, or be better at it. Ifwomendowanttodoit,thenthat’stheexpressionnotofanaturalinstinctbutofaculturalexpectation–partofthewayoursocietydefinesthesocialroleofmotherasopposedtofather.Abrotherandsistermaybebornintothesamefamily,butthatfamily may itself have different expectations of them and provide different rolemodels.Thisismostblatantintraditionalreligiousfamilieswheregenderrolesareverywelldefinedandaffectthekindofeducationmadeavailabletochildren.Intheextreme case, in cultures where girls are denied access to the skills needed tocompete in the labourmarket,wecan thinkof thisasdenying themevenminimalequalityofopportunity–thereisstraightforwardgenderdiscriminationintermsofaccesstoeducation.(Herewetouchontheconflictbetweenequalityofopportunityandparents’rightsovertheirchildren’supbringing.)Butgenderedexpectationscanbe less sharplydefined than that and still bevery real.And theyarebynomeansconfined to the family. In all sorts ofways, thewider society – peer groups, TVshows, films,adverts–quickly letsboysandgirlsknow that theyarenot startingfromthesameplaceintermsofhowtheywillberegarded,andtreated,byothers.(Such processes, of course, affect far more than attitudes to motherhood andchildcare.)Asfarasothersareconcerned,theirgenderispartofwhotheyare,andbecauseof the interactiveor ‘relational’way inwhichpeoplecome tounderstandthemselves,itveryquicklybecomespartoftheiridentity.Whoweareaffectswhatwe want – think about little boys’ and girls’ views about appropriate birthdaypresents to see how quickly this kicks in. So the very process by which ourpreferencesareconstructedisheavilyinfluencedbygendernormsandexpectations.Onthisview,whenwomendisproportionatelychoosetolookafterchildrenthey

aremakingthosechoicesonthebasisofpreferencesthatarenot‘natural’buthavebeen formed inaparticular,gendered,context.Manywomenchoose jobs thatarecompatible with their desire to fulfil what gender expectations have encouragedthem to regard as their – rather than men’s – responsibilities to others. (Men’spreferencesare,ofcourse,subjecttosimilarlygenderedinfluences,butthesetendto work in the opposite direction. Men are pushed towards better-paid full-timework,sometimesinvolvinglonghours,whicharefeasiblefor thosewithchildrenonly because someone else is willing to take on a disproportionate share ofdomesticlabour.)Thequestiontheniswhetherweshouldregardtheseprocessesbywhichpreferencesareformedandidentitiesconstructedasunderminingequalityofopportunity forwomen.One suggestion here is that someonewho has to buck asocialnorm,orrejectanaspectoftheiridentity,inordertoearnthesameasamanactually faces a different opportunity set from him. A man can comply with

gendered expectations and earn goodmoney; awoman has to choose one or theother.Thegender-egalitarianmoveherewouldbetochallengethenormsthatleadwomentodefinethemselvesascaregivers,andtoadjustmalenormssothatmenaremorelikelytoseethemselvesthatway.Or,perhaps,tomovethecultureawayfromtheideathatitisparentswhoshouldbedoingsomuchlookingaftertheirchildrenin the first place, promoting instead the merits of high-quality professionalchildcare. As you’ve probably noticed, both tacks are currently being pursued.(Anotherone,alreadyfamiliarinmanycountries,istogivewomenalegalclaimtosomeof theearnings thathaveaccrued,orwillaccrue, to theirchildren’s fathers.Thisispartlyintendedtogetattheproblemofeconomicdependencywhichmeansthatwomen don’t have equal opportunity to exit a relationship. That looks like asensiblemoveoneitheranalysisofthedifferentchoices.)That was indeed putting it very crudely. Of course there are sophisticated

accounts of why women tend to choose to care for children that combine bothperspectives, and some that appeal to other considerations. And I certainly don’tmean to suggest that everything feminists do or should want to say can be fullycaptured by talking about distributions. I haven’tmentioned awhole set of issuesaround pornography and the objectification ofwomen that are surely relevant torelationalegalitarians.It’splausiblethattheprevalenceofpornographyencouragesmen(andwomen)toobjectifywomen,toseethem(selves)assexobjects.Thiswillbeinimicaltorelationshipsbasedonmutualrespect,inwhichmenandwomentreateach other as equals. One doesn’t get very far in understanding that problem bytalkingaboutinequalityinthedistributionofopportunitiestoavoidbeingregardedasasexobject.Still,IhopeI’veatleastdonesomethingtoshowhowsomeonewhocaredaboutequalityofopportunitymightapproachsomekeyissuesaroundgender.

Equalityandrelativities:shouldwemindthegap?

Equalityhascomeunder fire frompoliticalphilosophersbecause it isnecessarilyconcerned with comparisons and relativities. To care that people have equalamountsofanygoodistocarethattheyhaveamountsequaltothoseofoneanother.Butwhyshouldwecareaboutthat?Whydoesitmatteratallhowmuchpeoplehaverelativetooneanother?Manyofthosewhothinkthattheybelieveinequality–includingthosewhothink

thattheybelievenotincompleteequalitybutingreaterequality–believeinitasameans,notasanend.Theyargueforamoreequaldistributionofresourcesandarefrustrated by governments’ unwillingness to make the case for redistributivetaxation.Butwhenyou ask themwhy, they talk about the importanceof relievingpoverty,oroffocusingresourcesonthosewhoneedthemmost,orofmakingsurethatallmembersofasocietyareabletoparticipateinitscommonlife.(Thislastisthe ‘social inclusion’ strand in centre-left thinking.) They do want a more equaldistribution of resources, but only because that more equal distribution is, as ithappens,thewaytoachievetheseothergoals.Tobesure,theycouchtheirthinkingabouttheseothergoalsintermsofpeoplebeingequalinsomefundamentalsense.It’s because all are morally equal that poverty, need and social exclusion are sounacceptable. But this use of ‘equality’ is the ‘everybody counts equally’ usementioned earlier.What it really means is that all citizens – those in poverty asmuchasanybodyelse–shouldhavetheirmoralclaimsrecognizedandacteduponbygovernment.Toseequitehowoddvaluingequalityis,contrastthefollowingtwosocieties,X

andY.Botharemadeupoftwoclasses,AandB.InsocietyX,membersofAandBbothhavenothing.InsocietyY,membersofAhave99,whilemembersofBhave100:

A BX 0 0Y 99 100

Whichsocietywouldyou–oranymemberofAandB–prefertolivein?Whichsocietyisthemoreequal?Theexampleisausefulstimulustoouranti-equalityintuitions,butitsmessageis

weak. Equality is not the only thing we value. We also value people havingsomethingratherthannothing.Bigdeal.Theinterestingquestioniswhetherthereisany reason to value equality at all. Is it of anymoral importancewhether peoplehaveequal–ornottoounequal–amounts?Whydorelativitiesmatter?Ourintuitioninthepreviousexamplemaybeinfluencedbythethoughtthatthose

insocietyXhavenothingwhatsoever.Theyare,wemightimagine,allstarvingtodeath.PerhapsitisaffectedbythesizeofthecontrastbetweensocietyXandsocietyY.99and100soundlikealotofstuff–certainlybycomparisonwith0.Perhapsitisinfluencedbythefactthat99and100areveryclose.SocietyYhassomeinequalitybutnotmuch.Morepurely to identifywhatwethinkaboutequality, tryadifferentexample:

A BX 20 20Y 20 40

NowsocietyXhascompleteequalitybetweenclassesAandB,buteverybodyhas20.(Suppose–togetridoftheanti-starvationintuition–that20isenoughtoliveon.)SocietyYhasinequality:classAhasthesameamountasitdoesinsocietyX.ButnowithasonlyhalfasmuchasclassB.Inabsoluteterms,classAhasthesamelevel of advantage in both societies. But in society Y it is worse off than – isdisadvantaged relative to – class B. To focus on the issue we’re supposed to bethinkingabout,don’tworryaboutwherethestuffcomesfrom–whomadeit,andwhether theymightnotdeserveorbeentitledto it.Supposethat, inbothsocieties,theamounts that the twoclasseshavearecompletelyamatterof luck. It’snot thatmembersofclassBareclevererorharderworkingormoreprudent(noreventhatthey had cleverer or harder-working or more prudent parents) thanmembers ofclass A. (In Nozick’s terms – discussed in Part 1– we’re talking ‘manna fromheaven’.)Thisisa‘brute’inequality–onethatisn’tjustifiedonothergrounds.Whichsocietydoyouprefer?IfyouthinkthatsocietyXisbetterinanyrespect,

thismightmeanthatyoureallydobelievethatequalityisvaluable.IfyouactuallypreferXtoY,thenyouarewillingtodeprivemembersofclassBinsocietyYoftheirrelativeadvantage,makingthemworseoffthantheywouldotherwisebe,andwithoutbenefitingmembersof classA, simply toprevent themhavingmore thanmembers of classA.Youwouldwaste – chuck away– those extra resources eventhoughdoingsowouldmakesomeworseoffandnobodybetteroff.Onecanseewhythosewhoargueforequalityaresometimesaccusedofengaginginthepoliticsofenvy.This connectionbetween equality andwastemay strike a chordwithparents of

twoormorechildren.Itsometimeshappenedthattherewassomeindivisiblegood(sittinginthefront,thelastsweet)thatcouldgotooneorotherofmytwo,butwithnoobviousreasonwhyoneratherthantheothershouldhaveit.Theywouldpreferthatneitherofthemshouldgetitthanthateitherofthemshould.TheywouldratherIthrow the thing away, or give it to some other child, than create an arbitraryinequality.Eachwouldrathernothaveitthanbebetteroffthantheother.Anticipatedenvy,spiteandirrationalguilt?Orsiblingaffection?(Mykidswerenotmovedby

myattemptstointroduceproceduralequality,orequalityofopportunity,bytossingacoin.Theywouldratherthrowthethingawaythanhaveanequalchanceofgettingit. This showed that they were silly – a conclusion supported by much otherevidence.Fortunatelyforme,theywerelesshostiletothesuggestionthattheytakeitin turns, which proved a more successful non-wasteful egalitarian strategy.)Children are notoriouslyobsessedwith equality and fairness, andSigmundFreud(1856– 1939), the Austrian founder of psychoanalysis, offers a fascinating– andsomewhat disconcerting – account of the infantile roots of such ideals in hiswritingsongrouppsychology.Roughly:oursenseofjusticedevelopsasareactionto early feelings of envy and jealousy. Discussion of his approach – which issometimestakentoimplythatpeopleparticularlyobsessedwithequalityandthelikewereparticularlyenvious infants–would, I’m relieved to say, takeus too farofftrack.IsaidthatthosethinkingsocietyXtobeinanyrespectbetterthansocietyYmight

reallybelievethatequalityisvaluable.ButitmightturnoutthatthereasonwhytheypreferXtoYgoeslikethis:‘Italldependsonwhatwe’remeasuring.Supposetheunitswe’re talkingaboutare resources.MembersofAmaybenoworseoff inYthantheywouldbeinXintermsofresources,but theywillbeworseoff inotherways.TheveryfactthatmembersofBhavemoreresourcesthantheydoisbadformembersofA–evenifitmakesnodifferencetotheamountofresourcestheyhave.So,reportinghowmanyresourcestheyhave,andsayingthattheyarenoworseoffinYthaninX,ismisleading.Allthingsconsidered,membersofAareworseoffinYthantheyareinX.Thishasnothingtodowithenvyorspite,orcuttingdownthetallpoppies for itsownsake.The reasonnot tohave resource inequality is that itmakesthingsworse,inotherways,forthoseonthewrongendofit.’Beforeweconsiderwhyorhowresourceinequalitymightbebadforthoseonthe

wrong end of it, notice that, if it has any force, this thoughtmight apply even tochoices between resource equality and alternatives where the worst-off class isbetter off , in resource terms, than itmight otherwise be.Consider the followingscenarios:

A BX 20 20Y 25 40

Noweverybodyisbetteroff,inresourceterms,insocietyYthaninsocietyX.ClassBis100percentbetteroff;classAis25percentbetteroff.Ifallwecaredaboutwereresources,wewouldsurelyhavetopreferYtoX.But,ifthereisanythingintheclaimaboutinequalitybeingbadfortheworseoffinotherways,itispossiblethateveninthiscasemembersofAmightbebetteroffinXthaninY.This thought is particularly relevant to the ‘trickle-down’ defence of economic

inequality.Astandardargumentholdsthatinequalityisjustifiedbecauseitpromoteseconomicgrowth, therebybenefitingeven thepoorestmembersofsociety.Ratherthandoingtoomuchinthewayofredistributingresourcestothosewhohaveleast,whichinvolvestaxingthemostproductiveinawaythatmayimpairtheirincentivetoproduce,wemustunderstandthattherealwaytohelptheworstoffistopromoteeconomicgrowth.Eveniftheirshareoftheoverallpieremainsthesame,perhapsevenifitgetssmaller,thepiewillbegrowingatsucharatethattheabsolutesizeoftheir piece will be growing. Witness how much better off, in absolute resourceterms,thoseofficiallyin‘poverty’aretodaythantheircounterpartswere20yearsago. Rather than ‘minding the gap’ between rich and poor, which is itself of noconsequence,weshouldbelookingattheabsoluteimprovementinthepositionoftherelativelydisadvantaged.Isthegapofnoconsequence?ThatispreciselywhatthepersonpreferringXtoY

denies.Inherview,thegapisbad.Notbadinitself–notbadforsomeintangiblemetaphysicalreason–butbadforthepeopleinthesocietywiththegap,oratleastfor those on thewrong side of it. The gap doesmatter because people’s overallwell-beingisaffectednotjustbytheamountofeconomicresourcestheyhave,butalso by the amount they have relative to others.Wemay be concerned solely tomake theworst-offmembersofsocietyaswelloffas theycanbe–andnotatallinterestedinequalizingtheextenttowhichpeoplearewellorbadlyoff.Butmoneyisn’t everything. Perhaps economic inequality does, over time, improve theeconomicsituationof theworstoff,as the trickle-downdefencesuggests.But thatdoesn’tmeanthateconomicinequalityimprovestheirpositionoverall.Itmaymakeitworse.Supposeitdoes.Inthatcase,ifweareinterestedinmaximizingtheoverallwell-beingoftheleastadvantaged,weshouldindeedworryabouttheeconomicgap.In Rawlsian terms, there may be maximin-type reasons to care about economicinequality.Whymight this be?Toexplain, consider three aspectsofwell-being forwhich

economic inequality might be absolutely bad: self-respect, health, and fraternity.(Thereareothercandidates,buttheseshoulddoasillustrations.)Perhaps the problem is this. Self-respect is a crucial component of people’s

overallwell-being.(Rawlssaysthatitisthemostimportantofhisprimarygoods.)But a person’s self-respect depends significantly on what she can do relative toothers, partly because that influences how she is regarded by those others. Forexample,asocietythatdeniescitizenshiprightstosomeofitsmembers–women,those belonging to a particular ethnic group – is denying them the possibility oftaking part in collective deliberation and, in so doing, publicly labelling them asinferior.Bothaspectsof thesituationare likely to lead toa lackofself-respect,anegative self-image of those excluded. But people’s capacity to take part in thecommon life of their community, and how they are regarded by others, both of

whichfeedthroughintoself-respect,dependnotonlyoncitizenshiprightsbutalsoontheireconomicpositionrelativetothoseothers.Iftheeconomicgapistoobig,those on the wrong end of it may find themselves excluded from activitiesparticipationinwhichiscentraltothewayasocietydefinesmembership,andfromwhich individualsderiveself-respect.Thiskindofargument iswhatmotivates theviewthatpovertyshouldbedefinedinrelativeratherthanabsoluteterms(e.g.,lessthanhalfthemedianincome).Whatmattersisnotjustthatallpeoplehaveenoughtoeat, nor iswell-being simply a functionof absolutematerial advantage. Itmattersalsothatwhateverpeoplehaveisenough,relativetowhatothershave,forthemtoparticipate in the shared life of the society, to be regarded as fellowmembers byothers, and hence to be self-respectingmembers of the society.This does not, ofcourse,requirecompleteequality.Butitmaygiveusareasontomindthegap.Forsome,thistalkaboutmembershipandself-respectmayseemabitnebulous.

Disease and death sound rather more rigorous and measurable. In recent years,medical sociologists have come up with the fascinating finding that economicinequality isbad for thehealthof thoseat thebottomof thedistribution.Wehavealways known, of course, that there is a strong association between economicposition and health. The poorer one is, themore likely one is to get ill, and dieyoung,andthemorelikelyoneistohavechildrenwhogetill,anddieyoung.Thissuggeststhatonewaytoimprovethehealthofthepoorwouldbetoimprovetheireconomicposition.Butitdoesnothingtoimplythatinequalityisbadforanybody’shealth. The research I have inmind has found,muchmore interestingly, that thehealthof thoseat thebottomof thesocialhierarchy isworse than thoseat the topjustbecausetheyareworseoffthanthoseothers.Controllingforabsolutelevelsofmaterialadvantage–lookingatsocietieswithawiderangeoflevelsofeconomicprosperityoverall–itseemsthatthosewhohaveleastcomparedtoothersintheirownsocietyare,forthatveryreason,likelytobemoreunhealthy.Itisnotclearwhythisshouldbethecase.Isitthattheexistenceofbetter-offothersmakespoorpeoplemorestressedandanxious,whichinturnaffectsmorbidityrates?Isitthatthosewhohave least aremore likely tobe subject to the authorityofothers, atworkand inrelationtostateinstitutions,andlackofautonomyisbadforone’shealth?Whateverthe precise mechanism by which it comes about, one can see how belief in thisassociation between inequality and illness might lead someone to argue that theeconomicgapdoesmatterafterall.Finally, and returning to thenebulous, there is the argument from fraternity or

community.Onthisview,economicinequalityisbadbecause–ortotheextentthat– itunderminesfraternalrelationsbetweenmembersofsociety.Evenif inequalitydoespromotegrowth,anddoes tendover time to increaseeverybody’seconomicposition(includingthatoftheleastadvantaged),itmayalsoleadtoastratifiedanddividedsocietywhosemembersliveindifferentplaces,pursuedifferentlifestyles,

sendtheirchildrentodifferentschools,andgenerallyhavelittleornocontactwithoneanother.Insuchasocietytherewillbenofeelingofsolidarityorcommunity,ofpeoplebeing‘membersoneofanother ’.Peoplemaybericherthantheywouldbeinamoreequalsociety,buttheywilllackasenseoftogethernessorcommunitythatisalso crucial for human well-being. This is different from the ‘self-respect viaparticipation’ lineofargumentbecause the idea isnot that inequalitymayexcludesomepeoplefrommainstreamsociety,withnegativeeffectsontheirself-image.Itisratherthatafragmentedanddividedsocietydeprivesallwholiveinit–richaswellaspoor–ofthegoodoffraternity.(Therichwill,ofcourse,bebetteroffinotherways,butasfaras‘livinginafraternalsociety’goes,theywillbeasbadlyoffasthoseatthebottom.)Becauseit invokesamorequestionableconceptionofwell-being,thisthirdline

of argument is (even) more controversial than the other two. One can deny thateconomic inequality affects people’s self-respect, or health, but one is unlikely todeny that, if it did, thatwould be a bad thing. The value of ‘living in a fraternalsociety’, on the other hand, is much more disputable. It might make sense tosacrifice some of the poor ’s absolute economic advantage for the sake of self-respect, or health, but would we really prefer a society in which economicinequalitywaskeptincheckforthesakeoffraternity–iftheresultwereasocietyinwhich the poorestwere poorer than they could otherwise be? (The answermightdependontheabsoluteeconomiclevelofthepoorest.Researchsuggeststhataboveacertainthresholdmoremoneydoesn’tmakepeopleanyhappier.Supposewhatwereallycaredaboutwashappiness.Inthatcase,allowinginequalitybecauseitmakesthepoorest richermakes senseonlywhile theworst off arebelow that threshold.Oncethey’reaboveit,considerationsoffraternitystarttolookmorecompelling.)One more complication with this invocation of fraternity. We are considering

how a concern to maximin, to maximize the absolute position of the worst offoverall, might have implications for the economic relativities (equality) that weshould be prepared to tolerate. In this context, it isworth pointing out thatRawlsregardsmaximinthinkingitselfasanexpressionoffraternity.Inasocietygovernedbythedifferenceprinciple,andknowntobegovernedbyit,allmembersofsocietyunderstand that any economic inequality that exists does so precisely because itcontributes to the well-being of the least advantaged. Suppose I am one of thepoorestmembersofsuchasociety,andIseeothersbetteroff thanme.InRawls’sview,itmakesnosenseformetowishthattheyhadless,oreventowishthatIhadsomeofwhattheyhave.Theveryfactthattheyhavemorethanmemustmeanthat,over time, I am going to be better off than Iwould otherwise be. If their havingmorethanmedidn’tworktomyadvantage,theywouldn’thaveitinthefirstplace.Sowhenasocietyendorsesandagreestoberegulatedbythedifferenceprinciple,itis institutionalizing the feeling of fraternity. Nobody wants to be better off than

anybody else unless their being so is helpful to theworst off. Iwill return to theoddityinthisviewlateron.Howcouldsomebodyelsebeingbetteroffthanmebehelpfultome?Iftheyreallywanttohelpme,whydon’ttheyjustgivemesomeofwhat they’ve got and I haven’t? For now, the point is just thatRawls presents thedifference principle as institutionalizing the value of fraternity. This doesn’tchallengethethoughtthateconomicinequalitymaybeinimicaltofraternalrelationsinasociety–becauseofthestratificationandfragmentationImentioned.Butitdoessuggest that economic inequality doesn’t have to signal a lack of fraternity.Inequalitiesjustifiedbythedifferenceprinciplemightbeconsistentwithit.

Positionalgoods

There are some goods for which it might not make sense to think in differenceprinciple termsatall.For them, theremaybenowaythat inequalitycouldtendtoimprovethepositionof theworstoff.Thesewillbegoodswhere theonlywaytogivemoretosomeistogivelesstoothers.Inthecaseofmoney,itisofcoursetruethat,atanyparticularmomentintime,thewaytooptimizethepositionofthepoorwouldbetoredistributewhattherichhaveuptothepointofequality.Butthiswouldbearathershort-termview.Abetterwaytohelpthepoorinthelongtermcouldbetopermitthoseinequalitiesthatservetoincreasethesizeofthepie.Theremightbesomegoodswherethiskindofthinkingdoesnotapply.Thinkaboutequalityofopportunityinrelationtotheeducationsystem.Suppose

some universities are better than others, and consider the distribution ofopportunitiestogetaplaceatoneofthebetterones.Couldanunequaldistributionofthoseincreasetheopportunitiesofthosewhohaveleastopportunity?Ifmiddle-classchildrenhaveabetterchancethanthosefromworking-classhomes, thenthelatterhaveaworsechancethantheformer.Itishardtoseehowthisinequalitycouldimprovethechancesoftheworking-classchildren.Becausethereisacompetitionfor places, one cannot givemore to somewithout giving less to others, and thatinequalitycannotleadtoanincreaseintheamountavailabletothosewhohaveless.Notrickle-down–orpie-expansion–storycanbetoldinthiscase.Theonlywaytoimprove the chances of working-class children is to reduce the chances of theirmiddle-class counterparts.This is a problem for politicians,whodon’t like to beseen to be making things worse for anybody. The great thing about economicgrowth is that it allows politicians to fudge distributive issues. While the pie isexpanding,everybodycanbegettingbetteroff.Thismayapplyinsomeareas.Butitdoesnotapplyinall.We can, of course, expand the number of places in higher education. The US

federalgovernmentdidexactly this in the1950sand1960s,andmorerecently theUK government has followed suit. Though this may increase the chances ofworking-class children getting to university, it won’t necessarily increase theirchances of getting to university relative to the chances of middle-class children.(Remember,we’reinterestedinequalityofopportunity.)Perhapstheexpansionwillbe disproportionately taken up bymiddle-class children.And itwon’t necessarilyincrease their chances of going to one of the better universities. But going to abetteruniversity– rather than justgoing touniversityatall–maybeparticularlyimportant.Here’swhy.Educationisafunnygoodbecauseithasbothintrinsicandpositionalaspects.In

someways,educationisvaluableintrinsically,withoutreferencetotheamountofitthat others have. My ability to understand Shakespeare, or to solve quadratic

equations,isgoodformeirrespectiveofhowmanyotherpeoplecandothesameor better. But in other ways – particularly when it comes to thinking about theeconomicreturntoeducationinthelabourmarket–whatmattersabouteducationisone’spositioninthedistributionofeducation,theamountonehasrelativetoothers.Education acts as a way of ranking people in the queue for better-or worse-rewardedjobs.Sowhatcountsisnotreallywhatonehasactuallylearned,itiswhereonestandsinthedistribution.Consideredasanintrinsicgood,itmakessensetoprefera25:30distributiontoa

20:20one.The leasteducatedhaveanabsolute levelofeducation that ishigher intheformerthanthelatter,theyhavemoreoftheintrinsicallyvaluablegood,anditlooks perverse to prefer a society inwhich everybody has less.But looking at itfromapositionalperspective,20:20doesnotlooksocrazy.Perhapsitisbetterforpeople’sclassbackgroundtomakenodifferencetotheireducationalachievements,fortheretobewhatIcalled‘conventional’equalityofopportunity,thantohaveaneducation system in which there is inequality due to class background – even ifworking-classchildrendoactuallyknowmoreinabsoluteterms.Totheextentthateducationisvaluedpositionally–sothatwhatmattersisnotpeople’sabsolutelevelbut howmuch they have relative to others –working-class childrenmight rathercompeteforjobsonequaltermsthanknowabitmorehistoryormaths.Applythisthoughttotheissueofprivateeducation.Whenthosewhocanaffordit

sendtheirchildrentoeliteprivateschools,theymaybeintendingonlytobuythingsthat are valuable intrinsically – Latin, lacrosse, whatever. They could quitereasonablysaythattheirchildrenlearningthosethingsdoesnothingtoharmthosechildrenwho do not learn them.Theymight even add that, since they are payingtheirtaxestowardsstateeducationbutnottakingupplaces,theiractofgoingprivateisactuallymakingthoseinstateeducationbetteroffthantheywouldotherwisebe.All thismightbe true ifwe thinkabouteducationsolelyasan intrinsicgood.Butthings look different when we consider the positional side to the story. Supposethose who can afford it going private does indeed release resources to the statesector, therebymakingstateeducationbetter than itwouldotherwisebe. Itdoesn’tfollowthatchildrenatstateschoolsarebetteroffoverallthantheywouldbeifeliteprivate schools didn’t exist. If going to such a school gives children a bettereducation than is had by those going to a state school, it gives them positionaladvantagewhere itmatters, in the competition for university places and jobs. Sostate-schoolchildren,even if theydoknowabitmore than theyotherwisewould,are still going to be worse off, relative to those who have been to the privateschools.This is why some people find private education more troubling than private

healthcare. There is an argument that people opting out of the British publichealthcare system, the National Health Service, improves – or at least doesn’t

worsen–thequalityofcareforthosewhoremaininit(byshorteningwaitinglists,releasingresources,etc.).Whateveronethinksaboutthatasanempiricalclaim,itisat least true inprinciple that somebody’sgettingbetterhealthcare thanmedoesn’treducethequalityofthehealthcareIamgetting–andcouldevenimproveit.Unlikeeducation, health-care doesn’t seem to have a positional aspect to it. (This isdifferentfromtheissueofwhethereconomicinequalityisbadforpeople’shealth.)So, even though healthcare – being a matter of disease and life and death – isprobably more important than is education, private education can seem moreobjectionable,tosomeonewithegalitariansympathies,thanprivatehealthcare.Thisisbecausesomebody’sgettingabettereducation thanmeautomaticallymakesmyeducationworse–inpositionalterms–thanitwouldotherwisebe.Insofar as goods have a positional aspect, then, the onlyway tomake sure the

worstoffhaveasmuchaspossible is togoforequality.Wemaybemotivatedbymaximin thinking, but we will be led to equality as the only way to realize it.Trickle-downthinkingdoesn’tapply.

Threepositionsthatlookegalitarianbutaren’treally

I’vealreadysaidquitealotabouthowpreciseorspecificequalityis.Herearethreepositions that might conventionally be regarded as ‘egalitarian’ but, on closerinspection,turnoutnottobe.

1Utilitarianism(oranyaggregativeprinciple)

Utilitarianismistheviewthatwhatmattersmorallyisutility,orhappiness,andthattherightactioninanysituationisthatwhichmaximizesthetotalamountofitthereis.(TheEnglishutilitarianJeremyBentham(1748–1832)talkedabout‘thegreatesthappiness of the greatest number ’.) The idea that what we should aim for is themaximizationofoverallutilitymightleadonetofavouramoreequaldistributionof resources.But itwill do this only on the assumption of diminishingmarginalutility(i.e.,thatpeoplegetlessutilityfromeachextraunitofresource).Itwillonlyimply complete equality of resources if we assume equal diminishing marginalutility.An obviousway to increase the amount of utility around is to redistributeresourcesfromthosewhoaregettinglessutilityfromthemtothosewhoaregoingtogetmoreutilityfromthem.Ifitistruethatthemoreresourcesyouhavethelessutilityyougetfromhavingmore,thenitwillmakesense,onutilitariangrounds,totakefromthosewhohavegota lotandgive to thosewhohavegot less.This isacommonintuitionunderlyingthecaseforredistribution.AfewmilliondollarsmustbeworthlesstoBillGatesthantheywouldbetothethousandsofpeopletowhomtheymightberedistributed.Itshouldbeclearthat,inthiscase,anyreductionininequalityisanaccidentalby-

product. One way of seeing this is to talk, rather fantastically, about a manphilosophers call the ‘pleasurewizard’.He is simply superb at turning resourcesinto utility, and goes on doing it at all levels of resources. If allwe really caredaboutweretotalutility,thenwewouldforgetaboutequalityandshoveallavailableresourcesinhisdirection.Thisthoughtappliestoallaggregativegoals.Toaimatmaximizing the total amount of anything, is, by definition, to have only anincidentalandinstrumentalinterestinthedistributionofthatthing(here,utility),orof whatever it is that produces that thing (here, resources). You will go withwhateverdistributionachievestheoverallmaximum.Thisisapointaboutaggregativev.distributiveconcerns.Itisimportanttokeepit

distinctfromaquiteseparateissuethatstandardlyarisesindiscussionsofequalityandutility.Theexampleofthepleasurewizardmaypersuadeusthatweshouldnotbe interested solely in the aggregate amount of utility. The obvious move is tobecomeinterestedinthedistributionofutility.Perhaps,wemightthink,weshouldorganize things so that people have equal amounts of utility. This is a genuinelyegalitarianposition.Whatwecareaboutequalityofisutility.Thisisn’ttheplacetogointotheproblemswiththisview,buthereareacoupleofclues.First,imaginetheoppositeofthepleasurewizard.Callhimthemiserablebottomlesspit.Dowereallywanttogoontakingresources–andutility–fromnormal,happypeopleuptothepoint where everybody else is as fed up as him? Second, what about expensivetastes? Suppose I get the same utility from beer and crisps that you get from

champagne and caviar. Equalizing utility means you get more money than me,whichseemscounterintuitive.Ourconsideredviewmaydependonwhetheryouareresponsibleforyourtastes.Ifnot,thenitwouldbeharshtocondemnyoutoalifeofunhappiness just becauseyouhadbeenbroughtup in suchaway thatyou neededmore resources thanme to be happy. (‘It’s notmy fault thatMummy andDaddyspoiledmesothatIneedchampagneandcaviartobehappy.’)Theviewthatwhatweshouldcareaboutequalizingisresources,ratherthantheutilitythatpeoplegeneratefrom those resources, supposes that people are responsible for their preferences.(‘If you’re less happy thanmewith your equal amount ofmoney, tough, changewhatmakes you happy.’) This kind of issue has generated an ‘equality ofwhat?’debateintheacademicliterature.Supposewecareaboutdistributiveequality,whatisitthatwecareabouttheequaldistributionof?Idon’thavethespacetogointoithere,butsuggestsomefurtherreadingbelow.

2Diminishingprinciples,prioritytotheworseoff,andmaximin

Weoften think that thosewhohave less of somethinghave a stronger claim to itthanthosewhohavemore.Thisiswhatmotivatesthecaseforchannellingresourcesto the leastadvantaged.But ithasnothing todowithequality. Instead, ithas todowith what the Israeli-British philosopher Joseph Raz (b. 1939) calls diminishingprinciples.Theseareprincipleswherethestrengthofthereasontogivesomeoneagooddependsonthedegreetowhichtheypossessthepropertythatqualifiesthemtohave thegood, and themore theyhave alreadygot diminishes the reason to givethemanymore.Thehungrierapersonis,thegreaterthereasontofeedthem.Butonceyouhave

fedthemtheybecomelesshungry,sothereislessreasontogivethemmorefood.Wegivebreadtothehungrierpersonnotbecauseofequality,butbecauseherbeingmorehungrymeansthatshehasastrongerormoreurgentclaimtothebread.Thesamemightgoforhealthcareandmoney,andallkindsofotherthings.Diminishingprinciplesmaywellleadustoredistributegoodsfromthosewhoseclaimsarelessto thosewhose claims aremoreurgent.But there is no thoughthere that equalitymatters.Razthinksthatreasonstodowithdiminishingprinciples,notreasonstodowithequality,accountforallourintuitionsinfavourofredistribution.

Ican’texplainitbetterthanRazhimself:

What makes us care about various inequalities is not the inequality but the concern identified by theunderlyingprinciple.Itisthehungerofthehungry,theneedoftheneedy,thesufferingoftheill,andsoon.Thefactthattheyareworseoffintherelevantrespectthantheirneighbourisrelevantbutitisrelevantnotasan independent evil of inequality. Its relevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their needmorepressing, theirsufferingmorehurtful,andthereforeourconcernforthehungry, theneedy,thesufferingnotourconcernforequalityiswhatmakesusgivethempriority.

Comparisonsmatter,butonlyasameansofidentifyingwhohasthestrongestclaim.Wearenotcomparingpeopleinordertoestablishequality.So far sogood (I hope).Butproperly tounderstand theview thatphilosophers

call‘prioritytotheworseoff’(or‘prioritarianism’),weneedonemoredistinction.Suppose it is indeed ‘thehungerof thehungry’, rather thanequality, thatexplainswhywe(should)givethempriority.Theobviouswaytounderstandthis issimplythatthehungrywillbenefitmorefromfoodthanthewell-fedwill.It’sbettertogivethefoodtothehungrybecausethatwillhavegreaterimpactontheirwell-being,onhowwellofftheyare.Nowthatisasensiblethought,andagoodreasontogivethehungryprioritywhenitcomestofood.Butit’snotwhattheprioritarianhasinmind.Theprioritarianclaimisnotthatweshoulddistributegoodsinwaysthatfavourtheworseoffbecause theywillbenefitmost. (That thought is abit like theutilitarianviewjustdiscussed.)Theclaimisthatweshouldfavourthemsimplybecausetheyareworseoff.Theworseoffpeopleare, themoreitmatters that theirpositionbe

improved.Theworseoffshouldhavepriorityevenif they’renotgoingtobenefitmore.Onelastpointunderthisheading.Rawls’sdifferenceprincipleisoftenregarded

as the flagship prioritarian view.Certainly his claim that inequalities are justifiedonlyiftheyworkovertimetobenefittheleastadvantagedisavariantof,andwasinlarge part the inspiration for, the general idea that the worse off should havepriority.Butit’sworthkeepinginmindquitehowspecificthedifferenceprincipleis.Iturgesustomaximizetheabsolutepositionoftheworstoff.Onecouldregardtheclaimsof theworstoffasparticularlyweightywithout thinking theywere thatweighty.Supposewehadtochoosebetweenpolicieslikelytoleadtothefollowingtwosocieties,XandY:

A BX 50 100Y 51 52

IfallwecaredaboutwasmaximizingthepositionofclassA,thenwewouldpreferY,eventhoughthatmakesitonlyslightlybetteroffwhilealsomassivelyworseningthe position of class B. This raises the same worries as the levelling-downobjection. So it’s important to see that the more general idea of ‘priority to theworseoff’leavesopenthequestionofhowmuchprioritytheyshouldhave.Takenliterally, thedifferenceprinciplegives theworstoffabsolutepriority,whicheventhosesympathetictoprioritarianthinkingmayfindimplausible.

3Entitlementandsufficiency

‘Allourchildrenhavearighttoaroofovertheirheads,threemealsaday,decenthealthcare,andaneducationthatwillpreparethemtoparticipateinthepoliticallifeof their society and equip them with the skills they need to compete in the jobmarket.’Claimslikethisareoftenmadeinthenameofequality,andsatisfyingthemmay require amuchmoreequal society than theonewe live in.But, as Ihope isclearbynow,theyhavenodistinctivelyegalitariancontent.Theyareclaimsoftheform:‘AllXsshouldhave–perhapshavearightto–Y.’We can connect this with the idea of sufficiency. What matters, it might be

thought, isnot thatpeoplehaveequalamountsofwhateverisvaluable,but thatallhave enough.As long as everybody has sufficient, the distribution – the fact thatsomehavemorethanothers–isnotimportant.Thereissomethresholdlevelthateverybodyshouldreach,butinequalityassuchisneitherherenorthere.Thisislikethediminishingprinciplesapproachinsofarasitmeansthatwehavemorereasontogivethingstothosewhohaveleast.Butitoperateswithacut-offpoint.Ratherthanpeople’sclaimsdiminishinggradually,asamoreor lesssmoothfunctionofwhattheyalreadyhave,thisapproachpositsasharpcut-offpointordiscontinuity,alevelofadequacywhich it is important toprovidebutbeyondwhichdistributionsdon’tmatter.(Wecouldimagineasophisticatedmixedviewwhichheldthatpeoplehavearighttosufficiency,sowehaveadutytoprovideoneanotherwiththat,butthatthereareothermoralreasonstogivethemmore,beyondthatthresholdlevel,inlinewiththeideaofdiminishingprinciples.)Makingsureeverybodyhassufficient,asafundamentalprinciple,may,ofcourse,

have implications for the equality of distributions. Perhaps giving everybodyenoughmeanstakingfromthosewhohavemorethanenough.Anditisimportanttosee that people can agree in endorsing a sufficiency approach while disagreeingsharply over what counts as sufficient. For some, it might be ‘enough’ thateverybody has shelter and basic subsistence. Others might have a much moredemanding conception of sufficiency (such as that in the first sentence of thissection).Clearly,thesewillhaveverydifferentdistributiveimplications.Goingwithasufficiencyview–ratherthanagenuinelyegalitarianone–impliesnothingabouthow ‘radical’ one is. One can endorse a radical conception of sufficiency.Whatmatters, philosophically speaking, is how one conceives the goal. Is it to givepeopleequalamountsofsomething,ortomakesureeachindividualhas(whateveroneconsiders tobe)sufficient?Moreover, recallingmydiscussionofwhetherweneedtomindthegap,itmightbethatone’sconceptionofwhatcountsassufficienthasamoredirect relation to issuesof inequality.Suppose itwere true thatpeoplecouldnothaveself-respectinasocietywitheconomicinequalitiesofacertainkind.Themereclaim thateverybodymusthaveself-respect–buildingself-respect into

one’snotionofwhatis‘sufficient’–wouldbeenoughtoruleoutthoseinequalities.

Equalitystrikesback

Equalityhasbeenunderthecosh,inthisdiscussionandintheworkofthepoliticalphilosophers onwhich it reports. Let’s end by looking atwhat can be said in itsfavour.First, we must bear in mind that a looser notion of equality, not to do with

equalityasadistributiveideal,underliestheseothernon-egalitarianprinciples.TheobviouscaseisRawls’sderivationofthedifferenceprinciple.Ifweask,‘IsRawlsanegalitarian?’,thestrictansweris‘No.Hepermitsinequalitiesiftheybenefittheworstoff and seesno intrinsicvalue in equality.’But recalling, fromPart1,howRawlsgeneratesthedifferenceprinciple,itiseasytoseethattheideaofpeopleasequaltooneanotherplaysacentralroleintheargument.Theoriginalposition,inwhich people behind a veil of ignorance choose principles to regulate thedistributionofbenefitsandburdensinsociety,ispresentedbyhimasmodellingthesenseinwhichcitizensaretobeunderstoodasfreeandequal.Itisbecauseweareallequalascitizens that justicerequiresus to thinkinwaysthatabstractfromourdifferencesintalentandsocialcircumstance.Thinkingthatway,saysRawls,wewillseek to maximize the worst-off position in society, choosing the differenceprincipleratherthanstrictequalitytogovernthedistributionofincomeandwealth.So, while it would be a mistake to describe Rawls as an egalitarian in the strictsense,itwouldbeverymisleadingtosuggestthatheisnotinterestedinequalityofanykind.His theory takes people’s equality as citizens as a fundamental premise.Something analogous applies in the case of all the other principles that lookegalitarianbutaren’treally.Second,evenifitdoesmakesensetoprefermaximintoequality,orevenifour

reasons for giving money to the poor rather than the rich are not reasons ofequality,wedon’thavetoabandonourintuitionthatthereissomethingwrongaboutinequalitiesdue tocircumstancesbeyondpeople’scontrol.Assume thatwehaveaproper all-things-considered measure of advantage that has taken into accountreasonswhythegapmightmatter.Itmay,onbalance,beperversetoprefer20:20to25:30,ifthatistheonlychoiceavailabletous.Whowouldbenefitfromadecisiontogofor20:20?Butiftheinequalitybetweenthosewhohave25andthosewhohave30hasnoindependentjustification–it’snot,forexample,theresultofthosewith30havingchosentoworkharder,butissimplyamatterofluck–wemaywellstillfeelthatwearesomehowpreferringasituationthat, thoughbetteroverall, isworseintheparticularrespectthatitisunfair.(Recall,frommydiscussionofradicalequalityof opportunity, that if the 25:30 gap were entirely due to people having madedifferent choices about how hard to work, wemight not want to regard it as aninequality at all. You cannot make a claim about the justifiability of inequalitysimplybylookingatthedistributionofparticulargoodsattimet.Youneedalsoto

know the process by which it came about. This is the way in which equality ofoutcomeandequalityofopportunitycancometobeequivalent.)Finally, let’s explore the difference principle inmore detail. Part 1 considered

three conceptions of justice: Rawls’s justice as fairness, Nozick’s view based onself-ownershipandentitlement,andadesertview.ThosewhoarekeenonequalitythinkthattheyhavegoodobjectionsbothtoNozickianlibertarianismandtothekindofconventionaldesertclaimthatholdsthatpeoplecandeserveunequalrewardsforexercising talents they are lucky to possess. But the difference principle, beingcloserinspirit,ismoreofachallenge.Howcoulditmakesensetopreferequalitytomaximin?Egalitarianscananswerbyturningthequestionround.‘OK’,theysay.‘Let’s supposewe do care, not about equality, but aboutmaximizing the absolutepositionofthosewhohaveleast.Weendorsetheprinciplethatjustifiesinequalitiesif they contribute to that goal. Now tell us how inequalities do, or even could,contributetoit?’Theyknow,ofcourse,howsomeoneinvokingthedifferenceprincipletodefend

inequality will reply: ‘Need for incentives … inequality crucial for economicgrowth…wehavetoproducebeforewecandistribute…abiggerpieincreasesthesize of everybody’s slice… look what happened under state socialism.’ This isfamiliarstuff.Thefundamentalideaisthat,unlesssomearepaidmorethanothers,peoplewillhaveno incentive towork inaproductiverather thananunproductiveactivity – or even to work at all. Differential market prices of jobs perform thecrucialfunctionofprovidingthemotivationforpeopletodojobsthatotherpeoplewant them to do. If everybody earned the same, thewhole systemwould collapseintoaninefficientmess.Soinequalityhelpstheworstoff.Notice, incidentally, thatmarketpriceswouldbeimportantevenifnobodywere

motivatedbythedesireformoney.Ifthemarketisworkingproperly,thosepricesaggregatepeople’spreferences, tellinguswhat it is thatpeople– taken together–want. This is what economists call the ‘signalling’ function of the market. Evencompletelyaltruisticsaints,concernedsolelytodowhateverothersmostwantthemto do, would need the price signal to tell themwhat that was. Themarket signalallocatesresources–includinghumanresources(peopleandtheirskills)–totheirmostproductiveuse.This is, inprinciple,quite separate from theway themarketdistributes money to people. Joseph Carens (b. 1945) has devised an explicitlyutopian system that separates the allocative from the distributive functions of themarket: there is a price signal (so people knowwhat is themost useful thing forthem todo), but everybody earns the same (sopeople don’t keep themoney theywouldhaveearnedinarealmarket).Theassumptionisthatpeople’sincentivesaremoral,noteconomic.Theywanttodowhateverotherswantthemtodo,notforthemoney,butbecausethoseotherswantit.Back to the real world, peopled by real people not egalitarian saints. As a

descriptionofthatworld,andapredictionaboutwhatwouldhappenifwegotridofeconomic inequality, the familiar account seems fairly accurate. People aremotivated by economic incentives, andwithout some inequality the systemwouldcollapse.Butlet’sthinkaboutitnotasadescriptionofhowpeopledobehave,oraprediction about how they would behave in response to an absence of economicincentives, but as a justification of inequality.Howdoes the justificationwork? Itappeals to the fact that people are selfishlymotivated by the desire for economicreward.Morespecifically,itassumesthatpeoplearenotmotivatedtomaximizethewell-beingoftheleastadvantaged.Iftheywere,theywoulddowhateverjobwas,inthe long run,mostbeneficial to the least advantagedwithoutworryingabouthowmuch they would get paid for doing it. Something funny must be going onsomewhere. There is something schizophrenic about an individual who claimssimultaneously to be concerned aboutmaximizing the advantage of theworst offand to require incentive payments to do what will in fact help them. ‘Because Irecognize,withRawls,thatitiscompletelyamatterofluckwhohaswhatleveloftalent, I don’t believe that I deserve to earn lots ofmoney. I agreewith him thatinequalitiesarejustifiedonlyiftheyhelptheworstoff.But,ifyouwantmetousemytalentsandbecomeCEOofalargecorporation,I’mafraidyou’regoingtohavepaymelotsofmoney.Otherwise,Isimplywon’tbeinducedtodothejob.’Thosedevisingataxpolicymustofcoursetakeintoaccountthefactthatpeople

are indeed self-interested in this way. If we endorse the difference principle, weshouldsetupwhatevertaxregimewebelievewillserve,overtime,tomaximizethepositionoftheleastadvantaged.Wemusttakepeople’smotivationsastheyare,anddowhatwecan toharness themso that theywork in the rightdirection.This isavery difficult job, especially given the global labour market, whereby some canthreatensimplytogoelsewhere if theydon’t like the taxregimeofanyparticularcountry. We should doubtless end up allowing people’s incomes to vary widely,rather than imposinga tax regimewhichensures that everybodyendsupwith thesame. Perhaps the inequalities that characterize the UK or the USA today arejustified given people’s selfish motivations. But the question at issue is whetherthosemotivationsarethemselvesjustified.Ifnot,theincentivesargumentdoesnotprovide a genuinely thoroughgoing defence of inequality. It shows, at best, thatinequalityisanecessaryevil.Imaybejustifiedingivingmoneytosomeonewhohas takenmy child hostage.But it doesn’t follow that the distribution of rewardsafterthattransferisajustifieddistribution.We are very specifically considering the difference principle justification of

inequality.Itisnot,inthiscontext,alegitimatemovetoappealtoself-ownershiporthekindofdesertclaimsupportedbypublicopinion.Manyofthosewhocommandabove-average salaries believe that they are justified on one or both of thosegrounds. In that case, the egalitarian response will be different (roughly: ‘No,

peopledon’townthemselvesinthesenserequiredtojustifythatkindofeconomicinequality.No, luckplaystoogreataroleforus tothinkthatpeopledeservewhatthey get in the market.’) But we are talking about people who justify inequalitypreciselyonthegroundthat ithelpstheworstoff,notforeitherof thosereasons.Theallegedincoherencecomesinassertingboththatoneendorsesthatjustificationandthatoneisoneselfjustifiedinreceivingincentivepayments.From an egalitarian perspective, those who demand incentive payments are

exploiting–blackmailing–therestofus.‘Wearetalentedpeople.Themarkettellsusthatthethingswecanmakeordoareveryvaluabletotherestofyou.Youwantus to use our talents?OK,wewill, but only if you pay usmore thanwhat otherpeoplearegetting.Otherwise,nodeal.’Becausetheyhavenotthemselvesendorsedthe difference principle, there is no incoherence here. Just extortion. Add inendorsement of the difference principle – ‘We believe that inequalities are onlyjustifiediftheyhelptheworstoff’–andwegetincoherentextortion.Evenfromthisperspective,somekindsofinequalitiesmightindeedbejustified

bysomeonewhosincerelyendorsesthedifferenceprinciple.Supposebeingabrainsurgeon,orCEOofabigcorporation,issostressfulthatthejobcanonlybedonewellbypeoplewhohaveajacuzziandlongholidaysandtheoddmidweekroundofgolf.Inthatcase,theirgettingthoseadvantagesmayindeedhelptheworstoff.WereI about to be operated on by a brain surgeon, Iwould hope she’d had a pleasantevening and sleptwell the night before. Some kinds of advantagemay simply befunctionalrequirementsfortheproperperformanceofthejob.Perhapstheefficientorganizationofproductioninafactoryorofficerequiressomepeopletobeabletotell otherswhat to do. Perhaps, in order fully to fulfil their intellectual potential,academicsneedlotsofautonomy,verylongholidaysandjobsforlife(worthatry).Thesearenotpureincentivepayments.Theyarenotexternaladvantagesthatbrainsurgeonsorsupervisorsoracademicsreceiveinordertoinducethemtodothejob.Theyare,wearesupposing,justwhatpeopleneedinordertodothejobwellinthefirst place. There’s no incoherence in endorsing the difference principle anddemandingthese.Iftrue,thereasonfortheseinequalitiesisnotthattheybenefitthepersondoingthejob,butthattheybenefittherestofus.Nobodyisholdinganybodytoransom.Some things that might look like inequalities aren’t really. Where work is

particularlyarduous,orstressfulorunpleasant,higherpayisbestregardedsimplyasthekindof‘compensatingdifferential’thatcameup,inPart1,inourdiscussionof desert. Peoplewhodounusually stressful jobsmay commonly, and rightly, beheldto‘deserve’higherpaythanthosewhodonot,butthisisnotagenuinedesertclaim,norajustificationofinequality.Itisacounterbalancingequalizer,anattempttosecureequalityallthingsconsidered.Similarly,itmaybethatsomejobsrequireanextensiveperiodof training,duringwhichpeopleearn littleornothing. In that

case,somelevelofhigher-than-averagepaymightbe thoughtofascompensationfortheearningsforgone.Inbothcases,thereisanelementof‘incentive’abouttheextraearning.Withoutabitmoremoney,peoplemighthavenoincentivetodonastyjobs,orjobswhichinvolvealotoftraining.Buttheyareequalizingincentives,notjustifications of inequality. Indeed, it should be clear that the kinds of unequalremuneration that would be justified on these grounds are going to look verydifferentfromthoseproducedbythemarket.Atthemoment,broadlyspeaking,themore pleasant or satisfying or interesting one’s job, the more one earns. Sincepeopletypicallyenjoyexercisingtheirtalents,theyhardlyneedtobepaidmore,asacompensatingdifferential,fordoingso.Thiskindofargumentwouldgivegreaterrewardstothosewhoselackoftalentcondemnsthemtoworkwithspecialburdens–suchasboredomorunpleasantworkingconditions.Uponcloseinspection,then,themaximin(ordifferenceprinciple)justificationof

inequalitylookslessstraightforwardthanitmightseematfirstsight.Ifwehavetochoosebetweenequalityandmaximin,aswedointherealworld,wemaypreferthelatter;25:40maybebetterthan20:20.Butwhydowehavetochoose?Whydoweneed inequality to get the worst off up from 20 to 25?Why can’t we divide theresources inourpreferredsocietyequally,opting for32.5:32.5 rather than25:40?Theansweris,mainly,thatotherpeopledonotbelieveinmaximin.Theybelieveinmaximizing the return on their natural assets. This looks inconsistent with thereasoning behind maximin thinking, which holds that such assets are morallyarbitraryandassuchcannotjustifyinequalitiesinrewards.Here we reach two closely related and quite general issues: (1) the relation

between people’s beliefs about the rules that should govern the structure of theirsocietyandtheirbeliefsabouthowtheycanjustifiablyactwithinthatstructure,and(2) theextent towhichit is legitimateforpeople topursuetheirpartial interests–notnecessarily theirownselfish interests; theymight include the interestsof theirfriends, families, etc. – rather than acting impartially. The position I’ve beenoutliningholdsthatitisincoherenttosay:‘IagreewithRawls.Thetalentedarejustlucky,and,for thatreason,weshouldsetuprulesso that inequalitiesonlyexist ifthey help the worst off. However, as an individual operating within a systemgovernedbythoserules,Iamjustifiedinexploitingmyowngoodlucktoearnasmuch money as the rules permit.’ Others disagree. For them, different kinds ofthinking are appropriate in different contexts. As a citizen, thinking about whatjustice requires at the structural level, Imust be impartial and not seek rules thatworktomybenefitjustbecauseIhappentobelucky.But,asaneconomicagent,itisperfectlyappropriateformetopursuemyownpartialinterestandtomaximizethereturn tomy own good luck.Different kinds of thinking appropriate in differentcontexts?Orplainoldhypocrisy?Otherssay thatwhilemaximizingmynarrowlyselfishreturntomyowngoodluckisunjustified,theremaybegoodmoralreasons

–saymylovingdesire thatmychildrencanfulfil theirapparentmusicalpotential(for which they need instruments and lessons) – forme to demand some above-averagereturntomywork,ifIcangetit.Inappropriatebiastowardstheinterestsofmychildren?Orproperparentalconcern?Suchquestionsarecurrentlyattractingagooddealofattention.Onethingisclear,anditreflectsafundamentaldifferenceofperspectivebetween

theacademicpoliticalphilosopherandthepractisingpolitician.Politicianstypicallysee themselves as in the business of devising rules thatwork aswell as they can,takingpeople–hypocritical,self-interested,partial,andalltherestofit–asgiven.Furthermore, politicians also have to get elected before they can enact theirpreferredrules,whichgivesthemfurtherreasontocompromisewiththevaluesandattitudesoftheirelectorate.Philosophershaveadifferentbrief.Theyofferreasonswhy people should think and act differently, better. Great politicians haveoccasionallymanagedtodosomeofthattoo.

Conclusion

On the one hand, equality is an uncontroversial starting-point for any politicalphilosophy – or political party – worth taking seriously. Whatever our otherdifferences,ascitizensweareequaltooneanother.Thestatemusttreatusasequals– takingeverybody’s interestsequally intoaccount,not regardingsomepeopleasmore important than others. This is the ‘egalitarian plateau’ on which nearly allpolitical debate is now conducted. On the other hand, a concern with equality isbizarre,perhapsevenperverse.Whycarethatpeoplebeequaltooneanother,ratherthan that they all have enough, or be as well off as possible? One source ofconfusion,then,isthedifferencebetweenequalityasadistributiveidea–todowithhowwell or badly off people are – and the kind of equality that asserts people’sfundamentally equal standing as members of the political community. But this isonlyonesource.Nowaddinthepracticalor‘realworld’partsofthestory,suchastheplausibleviewthatinequalitymaybeneededtoachievethedistributivegoalswehavegoodreasontocareabout.Nowonderpeoplegetconfused.‘Doyoubelieveinequality?’‘Well,yes,Ibelievethatallpeopleareequalinsomefundamentalmoralsense,so

thestateshouldbeequallyinterestedinthewell-beingofall itscitizens.But,no,Idon’t think itmakes sense to seek an equal distribution ofwell-being rather thanmaking sure that the worst off have as much as possible. However, I am fullysensitivetothewaysinwhichparticularaspectsofaperson’swell-being–saytheirhealth – may be affected by particular kinds of inequality. Moreover, for somegoods–wherethereisapositionalaspect–theonlywaytohelptheworstoffcouldbe todistribute thegoodequally.Ofcourse, inequality is functionallynecessary–especially given the global context inwhichwe operate. Butwe shouldn’t forgetthat,insofarasinequalityisneededtopromotethewell-beingoftheworstoff,thisisonlybecausepeopleareselfish.Wereweall saints, itwouldn’tbenecessary.Acertain amount of self-interested or partial behaviour is doubtless perfectlyreasonable,butnottheamountthatweseereflectedinsalarydifferentialstoday.’‘Answerthequestion,PrimeMinister.Doyoubelieveinequality?Yesorno?’Itwouldbenicetothinkthatpoliticians’reluctancetousethe‘E’wordresulted

from an appreciation of this kind of complexity. It would be nice, too, if morepoliticiansrealized thatargumentsforredistributivepoliciesneedhavenothing todowithenvyorlevellingdown–indeednothingtodowithdistributiveequalityatall – and everything to do with improving the lives of those whose lives mostdemandimprovement.

Furtherreading

The single most useful collection on equality is Matthew Clayton and AndrewWilliams(eds.),TheIdealofEquality(Macmillan2002),closelyfollowedbyLouisP. Pojman and RobertWestmoreland (eds.),Equality: Selected Readings (OxfordUniversityPress1997).Thesecontainmanyofthebest-knownandmostimportantpapersthatexamine,inmuchgreaterdepth,manyoftheideassurveyedhere.Joseph Raz’s views on equality are in The Morality of Freedom (Oxford

UniversityPress1986).Importantcontributions,criticalof‘luckegalitarianism’andarguingfortheimportanceofequalityasacharacteristicofsocialrelationships,areElizabethAnderson’s ‘What is thePoint ofEquality?’,Ethics (1999), andSamuelScheffler ’s ‘What is Egalitarianism?’,Philosophy and Public Affairs (2003). TheAnderson piece is also in Clayton andWilliams (eds.), Social Justice (Blackwell2004). Paula Casal’s ‘Why Sufficiency is Not Enough’, Ethics (2006) is a goodcritique of sufficientarianism. Ronald Dworkin’s Sovereign Virtue (HarvardUniversityPress2000)collectsinonevolumehisinfluentialarticlesarguingfrom‘equal concern and respect’ to ‘equality of resources’ (and against ‘equality ofwelfare’).Althoughonly the lastchapter isabout thequestion in its title,G.A.Cohen’s If

You’reanEgalitarian,HowComeYou’reSoRich?(HarvardUniversityPress2000)is as entertaining and provocative as that title suggests. The argument aboutincentivesismostaccessiblypursuedinhis‘Incentives,InequalityandCommunity’,whichisinStephenDarwall(ed.),EqualFreedom(MichiganUniversityPress1995).TheutopianmarketcanbefoundinJosephCarens’sEquality,MoralIncentives,andthe Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory (Chicago UniversityPress 1981). Thomas Nagel’s Equality and Partiality (Oxford University Press1991)elegantlyexplorestheconflictbetweenthosetwoideas.Debra Satz’s ‘Gender ’, in David Estlund (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Political

Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2012), and Will Kymlicka’s chapter on‘Feminism’ in hisContemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd edn,Oxford University Press 2002) are good short overviews. Susan Moller Okin’sJustice, Gender and the Family (Basic Books 1989) and Clare Chambers’s Sex,CultureandJustice:TheLimitsofChoice(PennStatePress2008)aretheplacestogonext.At the less philosophical end of the scale, John Baker et al.’s Equality: From

Theory to Action (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2009), Anne Phillips’s WhichEqualitiesMatter? (Polity1999).andAlexCallinicos’sEquality (Polity2000) areall stimulating reads. The adverse effects of inequality on health aremost easilyapproachedthroughTheSpiritLevel:WhyEqualityisBetterforEveryone(Penguin2010)byRichardWilkinsonandKatePickett.StuartWhite’sEquality(Polity2006)isanexcellenttextbook.

Part4

Community

TheFrench revolutionariesof1789were inspiredby theslogan ‘liberty,equality,fraternity’.Today, ‘fraternity’ – literally ‘brotherliness’ – is quaint andpoliticallyincorrect.‘Solidarity’–thegender-neutralequivalent–turnsthemindtowardstradeunionsandpicketlines.But‘community’isstillinfashion.Itiswarm,caring,andnobodyknowswhatitmeans.Thiscombinationofqualitieshashelpedittospawnitsown‘ism’:communitarianism,whichisacompletehotchpotch.(It’sonlyfairtosaythatpoliticalphilosopherslikemearesuspiciousofall‘isms’.Theyaremessythings,tendingtocombineideasthatchangeovertime,pullindifferentdirections,andcaneasilybemadetocomeapart.Fromourpointofview,itisanunfortunatefeatureoftheworldthatactualpoliticsinvolvesordinarypeople,whothinkintermsofuntidyandshiftingconstellationsofbeliefscalledthingslike‘conservatism’or‘liberalism’. How much easier and clearer everything would be if they were allphilosophers, affirming or denying discrete and precise propositions. Still,‘communitarianism’ really isunusually ill-defined,evenby the standardsofother‘isms’.)Recent talkabout ‘community’hasbeenof twodistinctkinds.On theonehand,

there has been an academic debate, in which the positions developed by liberalphilosophers,suchasRawls,havebeenaccusedbyotherphilosophers–especiallyMichaelSandel (American,b.1953),CharlesTaylor (Canadian,b.1931),MichaelWalzer (American, b. 1935) and Alasdair MacIntyre (Scottish, b. 1929) – ofneglecting the significance of community. This debate has covered a range ofcomplexphilosophical issues: conceptionsof the selforperson,whether the statecanorshouldseektobeneutral,whetherprinciplesofjusticeapplyuniversallyorareculture-specific,andsoon.Muchofthis‘communitariancritique’ofliberalismwasbasedonmisrepresentationandmisunderstanding.But fewwoulddeny that italso contributed a gooddeal to our understandingof some fundamental issues inpoliticaltheory.Alongsidethis‘philosophical’communitarianism,therehasbeensomethingelse:

‘political’ communitarianism.This is communitarianism as a politicalmovement,thekind–associatedprimarilywiththeIsraeli-AmericanAmitaiEtzioni(b.1929)–thatissuesmanifestos,proposespoliciesandtriestoinfluencepoliticians.Herethetalkisaboutresponsibilitiesbalancingrights, thedefectsofalitigiousculture, the

importanceofthefamily,theurgentneedtorebuildlocalcommunities.Thetargetisnotaphilosophicallymistakenconceptionoftheperson,oranythingsoabstractorabstruse. It is a culture of egoism, of individualism, of self-gratification.This, insomeversionsoftheargument,isclaimedtobeleadingtosocialdisintegrationandaworldinwhichatomizedindividuals,bereftofcommunalties, livemeaningless,alienated lives. Political communitarianism has had some success – if that ismeasuredbytheextenttowhichleadingpoliticiansappealto‘community’intheirspeechesandwritings.Forawhileitlookedasif‘community’wasgoingtobetheBig Ideawhich the centre-left had been looking for (as part of, or alongside, the‘ThirdWay’orthe‘stakeholdersociety’),butitisalsoinvokedby‘compassionateconservatives’ontheirright.The relation between these two ‘communitarianisms’ – philosophical and

political– iscomplex. It isnotanaccident that the twodevelopedsimultaneously;theyoverlapinsomeplaces,andpoliticalcommunitariansofteninvoketheideasoftheirphilosophicalcounterparts.Nonetheless,thedifferencesaremorestrikingthanthesimilarities.Noneof the leadingphilosophicalcommunitarianshassubscribedtoEtzioni’s‘communitarianplatform’,andsomehaveactivelydistancedthemselvesfrom it. It is often alleged – and sometimes accepted – that philosophicalcommunitarianism has no clear policy implications at all. In fact, the issues thatexercise political communitarians tend either to be philosophically ratherstraightforwardanduncontroversial (e.g., that rights shouldbebalancedbydutiesorresponsibilities)ortohavelittleornodistinctivelyphilosophicalcomponentatall (e.g., that community-based initiatives are the bestway to combat poverty andcrime).So,muchofthetimethetwoaresimplytalkingaboutdifferentthings.Confusing. To make matters worse, philosophical and political

communitarianismareeachmadeupofdiverseandsometimes inconsistent ideas.Sandel, Taylor, Walzer and MacIntyre argue against different targets. Some aimspecifically at Rawls, others are concerned with contemporary moral culture ingeneral. Some focus on liberalism’s conception of the self, others object to itssupposedneglectofcultural traditionsandpractices.Tobefair, itwasotherswhogrouped them together as ‘communitarians’. They are not keen on the label –thoughthisispartlybecausetheydon’twanttobeidentifiedwithcommunitarianismasapoliticalmovement.Politicalcommunitarianismisitselfsomethingofamixedbag.Insomeversions,

the community that matters is the state, a real community is one that treats itsmembers as equals, and equal membership has an economic dimension.‘Community’ is then invoked to defend the welfare state and the redistributivetaxation it implies.Others, such as advocates of the ‘Big Society’, are concernedrather with self-help groups, voluntary associations and local communities; thewelfarestate–impersonal,bureaucratic,fosteringacultureofdependency–isthe

problem, not the solution. Many invoke ‘community’ simply to express theelementary thought that people should care about others. Some hold the muchstrongerviewthatthe‘community’isalegitimatesourceofmoralauthorityinsuchaway that the government is justified in promoting particular ways of life (e.g.,familyvalues,heterosexualityratherthanhomosexuality).Mystrategy forgettingahandleon thismesscomes in twoparts.First, I show

that thosewhocouch theirpositions in termsof something theycall ‘community’typicallydosobycontrasting itwithsomealternative–sometimescalled ‘liberalindividualism’–whichispresentedasmorallyimpoverished,philosophicallynaiveand/or sociologically ill-informed. An opposition or confrontation is thus set upbetweenliberals,whocareaboutindividuals,andcommunitarians,whocareaboutcommunities. But this appearance of confrontation is misleading. Those whoendorseliberalismandareinterestedinthewell-beingofindividualscansaymostofwhat thosewho emphasize ‘community’want them to. The second part of thestrategy is to discuss some problems for liberals that survive this process ofclarification. Communitarian writings have done more than force liberalism tomakeexplicitthingsthatwerepreviouslytakenforgranted.Theyhaveraiseddeepandcrucialissuesthatremaincentraltothephilosophicalagenda.

Correctingmisunderstandingsandmisrepresentations

I’vegrumbledabouthowall‘isms’aremessycombinationsofdifferentideasthatchange over time and, thoughmembers of the same family, can be quite widelydivergent and sometimes incompatible. Liberalism is no exception. (For mypurpose – explaining how liberals need notmake themistakes ofwhich they areaccused–thisisanadvantage.Icanconcedethatsomeintheliberaltraditionmaybeguiltyascharged,whilepointingtootherswhoarenot.)Nonetheless,itishelpfulto identify a core claim at the heart of liberal theory, so here it is: liberals areprimarily concernedwith the freedomand autonomyof individuals.Recall, fromPart1,Rawlsattributingtopeopleinhisoriginalpositiona‘highest-orderinterestinthecapacitytoframe,reviseandpursueaconceptionofthegood’.Thoughtheydiffer inallkindsofdetail,what liberalshave incommon isaconcern toprotectand/orpromotesomethinglikethatcapacity.Ifthat’swhatliberalscareabout,it’seasytoseehowtheymightlookuninterested

in – or even antagonistic to – community. They are interested in individuals, notcommunities.Theythink thatpeopleshouldbefree tochoosefor themselveshowthey live, apparently without regard to whether the choices they make are goodones, thevaluesof theircommunity,orhowtheir freechoicesaffectothers.This,surely, is a political philosophy for egoists, one that sees people as out forthemselves, with little or no concern for anybody else. Those in the originalposition, choosing principles to regulate their society, are presented as ‘mutuallydisinterested’, concerned only for themselves. Here, it seems, is liberalism’svanguardtheoristacknowledgingthattheliberalstateisonetowhichpeopleagreesimplybecauseitsuitsthembest.AndtheRawlsianconstructionmakesexplicittwomorecore liberalmistakes: thatpeoplechoosetheirvalues,andthat theydosoinsomewaydetachedfromthecommunities–theculturesandsubcultures–inwhichtheyareraisedandlive.Howelsearewetounderstandtheoddlydisembodiedanddepersonalizedcontractors in theoriginalposition,motivatedaboveall toprotecttheirfreedomtochoosehowtheylive?Liberalism’semphasisonindividualfreedomseemstosetitonacollisioncourse

withthevalueofcommunity.Rawls’shugelyinfluentialarticulationofliberalideasappearstoconfirmthis.Athirdfactorleadinginthesame–mistaken–directionisthe confusion of liberalism as that is understood by political philosophers withsomething that became known as ‘economic liberalism’ or ‘neo-liberalism’. Thislatter–acorecomponentofthe‘NewRight’–isadoctrineabouttheimportanceofkeepingmarketsfreefromdistortion,regulationandstateinterference.Itcombinesempirical claims about the superior efficiency and productivity of marketmechanisms with moral claims about the importance of private property andindividualsbeingfreetoengageineconomicexchanges.(Thelatterwerediscussed

in Part 2.) The confusion of economic liberalism with liberalism in general isespeciallycommoninpost-communiststates.Itiseasy,there,tothinkintermsofacrude contrast between ‘communism’ (whichmistakenly believes in equality) and‘liberalism’ (which rightly believes in individual freedom). ‘Freedom’ is equatedwith ‘market freedom’, ‘liberalism’with the ‘liberalization’of themarket– i.e., ashiftfromstatecontrolandregulationto‘freemarkets’.Theresultisthatliberals,bydefinition,believeinalaissez-faireeconomy.Itisthosestatesthathavemosttogainfromaproperunderstandingofwhatliberalismdoesanddoesnotinvolve.(IntheUS, on the other hand, liberalism is normally identified with support for thewelfarestate.Itoldyoutheselabelswereproblematic!)Here, in roughly increasing order of complexity, are seven objections to

liberalismthatsometimesaremadeinthenameofcommunity:

1Liberalsassumethatpeopleareselfishoregoistic.2Liberalsadvocateaminimalstate.3Liberalsemphasizerightsratherthandutiesorresponsibilities.4Liberalsbelievethatvaluesaresubjectiveorrelative.5Liberalsneglectthewayinwhichindividualsaresociallyconstituted.6Liberalsfailtoseethesignificanceofcommunalrelations,sharedvaluesandacommonidentity.

7Liberalswronglythinkthatthestatecanandshouldbeneutral.

All of these objections are misplaced (though some are more misplaced thanothers).Let’sconsidertheminturn.Aswedo,trytobearinmindthatI’mnottryingto defend liberalism. I’m just trying to explain what is and is not implied byendorsementofthecoreliberalclaimidentifiedabove.

Objection1:Liberalsassumethatpeopleareselfishoregoistic

Politicianssometimesinvoke‘community’whentheywanttosaythatpeopleshouldcare about one another, not just about themselves. In contrast to the crude‘individualism’oftheNewRight–anethosallegedlycapturedbysloganssuchas‘greed is good’ or ‘there is no such thing as society’ – community means thatpeopleshouldn’tsimply lookout fornumberone.Rather thanpursuingunbridledself-interest, they should have a sense of solidarity with other members of theircommunity,identifyingwiththemsufficientlytobewillingtomakesomesacrificesfor their sake. Here, talk about ‘community’ is essentially code for talk aboutmorality. Morality requires that we act not simply as egoists, but recognize thatothersmayhaveclaimsonus.Whyspeakincode?Because,forpoliticians,talkingexplicitlyaboutmoralityis

dangerous. It is seen as preaching, as inappropriately high-minded. It is oftenequatedwith theprescriptionofaparticularandwell-specifiedconceptionofhowpeople should lead their lives.Peopledon’t likepoliticians telling themhow theyshouldlive,andpoliticiansareusuallykeentoavoideventheappearanceofdoingso.Sincepoliticiansmustjustifytheirpolicies,andsincealljustificationofpolicyisultimately moral justification, they resort to code. Which is where ‘community’comesin.(Alljustificationofpolicyisultimatelymoralbecausewheneverapolicyispresentedmerely technically,as simply themostpracticalorefficientmeans toachieveaparticularend,it isalwaysrelevanttoaskwhethertheendinquestionisitselfmorallydesirable.)Therearetwomisunderstandingsinallthis.Thefirstisheldbycommunitarians

whothinkoneneedstoinvoke‘community’totalkaboutmorality.Theyfailtoseethat,onanyplausibleinterpretation,liberalismisitselfamoraldoctrine.Itdoesnotendorsetheunrestrainedegoisticpursuitofindividualself-interest,buthasplentyofroomfortheideathatpeoplehavemoralclaimsagainstoneanother,someofwhich–thosethatentaildutiesonthepartofothers–thestatecanenforce.‘Individualism’(what matters is the well-being of individuals) or ‘liberal individualism’ (thefreedom and autonomy of individuals are essential to their well-being) are notegoism.Ifindividualsmatter,thenallindividualsmatter–notjustme.Icanpursuemyself-interestonlytotheextentcompatiblewiththemoralrequirementthatItreatothersjustly.Toendorseliberalismisnottoendorseacultureinwhichindividualsput thegratificationof theirowndesiresbeforeeverythingelse. It is toendorseasystem of rules and laws that constrain egoism precisely to ensure that all aretreatedwiththeconcernandrespectduetothemasautonomousindividuals.The secondmisunderstanding is held by thosewho see talk ofmorality as the

prescriptionofparticularwaysof life (heterosexual,monogamous,drug-free…).Themoralideaattheheartofliberalismispreciselythatpeopleshouldbefreeto

chooseforthemselveshowtheylive,aslongasthisisconsistentwiththeconcernandrespectforallindividualsdiscussedinthepreviousparagraph.(Whichimplies,amongst other things, similar freedom for others.) So liberalism is a moraldoctrine.Butitisathinmoraldoctrine.Itdoesnotnecessarilyspecifyanyparticularwayorwaysinwhichpeopleshouldlive(exceptthattheyshouldtreatoneanotherjustly). Communitarians are wrong to think that talking about morality impliesabandoningliberalindividualism.Politiciansandjournalistsarewrongtothinkthattalking about moralitymeans prescribing, or even endorsing, particular ways oflife.Invoking ‘community’may indeedbe an effectiveway tomotivate concern for

others, to couch claims that would look like preaching, or seem inappropriatelyprescriptive, if they were presented as ‘morality’. Philosophers are in favour ofanythingthatmakespeoplemorelikelytoactmorally.Buttheyarealsoinfavouroftheoretical clarity. ‘Community’ can serve as a rhetorical proxy for ‘morality’ aslong as it is understood that ‘community’ used this way is quite compatible with‘liberalindividualism’.

Objection2:Liberalsadvocateaminimalstate

Liberals agree in seeing the state’s job as that of protecting and promotingindividual freedom.Butdifferentstrandsof liberalismdisagreeaboutwhatcountsas ‘protecting andpromoting freedom’.For some, a liberal state is aminimal or‘nightwatchman’state.Itconfinesitselftothetasksofprotectingpeople’snegativerights – their rights not to be interfered with by others – and providing publicgoods,suchasstreetlightinganddefence.(‘Publicgoods’aregoodsthateverybodywantsand,oncetheyareprovided,everybodybenefitsfrom.Thestateisjustifiedinsupplyingthem,andforcingpeopletocontributetothecostsbecause,withoutthatelement of organized coercion, it’s rational for individuals to ‘free ride’ on thecontributionofothers,whichwould lead tono supplyof thegood–even thougheverybodywants it.) Inparticular,coerciveredistributionisnot justified.Ifpeoplewithpropertywanttogiveittothosewithout,that’sfine.Perhapstheyshould.Butitisnobusinessofthestatetoenforcesuchatransfer.Thisisthe‘libertarian’variantofliberalism,mostcoherentlysetoutbyRobertNozick(anddiscussedinPart1).Somepeopledon’tlikeliberalismbecausetheythinkitimpliesthiskindofstate.

To be a liberal is to be an advocate of laissez-faire economics and generally tofavour minimal state interference in the lives of citizens. As I mentioned, thismisidentificationisespeciallycommonineasternEurope.But not all liberals are libertarians. Rawls is notNozick.ARawlsian state is a

more thanminimal liberal state.Upholding liberal justice, enforcing those dutiesthatpeoplehavetooneanotherinvirtueoftheirstatusascitizenswithacapacityforautonomy, involves, for Rawls, more than protecting people’s negative propertyrights,providingpublicgoodsandcollectingthetaxesowedfortheirprovision.Itinvolves the state in the business of securing compliance with his principles ofjustice–notjusttheprotectionofthebasiclibertiesbutthedistributiveaspecttoo:fairequalityofopportunity,andthedifferenceprinciple.Treatingcitizenswiththerespectduetotheminvirtueoftheircapacityforautonomymeansmakingsuretheyhave a fair share of the goods necessary for its exercise. Different versions ofliberalism will imply different precise roles for the state – including differentdegreesof,andjustificationsfor,redistribution–andthereisnothingintheideaofastatefoundedontheprinciplesof‘liberalindividualism’thatlimitsitonlytotheminimal role advocated by libertarians. Theoretically, coherent liberals canperfectly well support a welfare state, and more. (Now that we’re talking aboutcommunity, and related ideas, recall – from Part 3 – that Rawls thinks that hisdifference principle provides an interpretation of the principle of fraternity: notwanting tohavegreater advantagesunless this is to thebenefit of otherswhoarelesswelloff.)

Objection3:Liberalsemphasizerightsratherthandutiesorresponsibilities

Themost common complaint from political communitarians is that we hear toomuch about rights and not enough about duties and responsibilities. Thismay betrue.Perhapspeopleare tooquick toassert rights againstothers, and too slow toacknowledge duties and responsibilities to or for themselves and others. PerhapsEtzioni was right to urge a 10-year moratorium on the coining of new rights.Perhapsalitigiouscultureisabadthing.But,ifthereisaproblem,liberalismisnottoblame.Asshouldalreadybeclear,thereisnothinginthatphilosophicalapproachthatdeniesthesignificanceofeitherdutiesorresponsibilities.In the case of ‘duties’, this is a simple matter of conceptual clarity – of

understandingwhat itmeans to say that somebody has a right to something. Theconceptual analysis of rights can get quite tricky – the American legal theoristWesley Hohfeld (1879–1918) identified four different ways in which the term ‘aright’isused–butformostpurposesitisasafeworkingassumptionthat‘AhasarighttoX’meanspreciselythatothershaveadutytoletAhave,ortogivehim,X.Remember theconnectionbetween justice, rightsandduties. IfAhasa right toX,thenit isnotsimplythecasethat itwouldbeniceforAtohaveX,oreventhatAought tohaveX.Tohavea right is tohavea justiceclaim, thekindofclaim thatimpliesdutiesonthepartofothers.A very influential approach to rights – that of Joseph Raz – defines rights as

follows:‘XhasarightifandonlyifXcanhaverightsand,otherthingsbeingequal,an aspect ofX’swell-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding someother person(s) to be under a duty.’ This contains two claims that go beyond thebruteideathatrightsentailduties.First,aclaimaboutwhatkindofthingitisaboutapersonthatgiveshimaright:anaspectofhiswell-being(otherwiseknownashis‘interest’).Second,aclaimabouthowtheinterestrelatestotheright:bycountingassufficient reason to holdothers under a duty.DoesAhave a right toX? InRaz’sview,weanswerthatbyconsideringwhetherA’sinterestinhavingXissufficienttohold another person (or persons) to be under a duty. Do I have a right to thatSteinway piano I’ve alwayswanted?No, because, though getting it would indeedcontribute to my well-being, the well-being contributed is not sufficient to holdanybodyunderadutytoprovidemewithit.DoIhavearightnottobemurdered?Yes,becausenotbeingmurderedcontributestomywell-beingtosuchanextentthatitdoesindeedgiveusreasontoholdothersunderadutynottomurderme.Stickingwiththeelementarythoughtthatlinksrightsandduties,seehowitmakes

anonsenseofthecommunitariansuggestionthatliberalismgoesonaboutonebutneglectstheother.Onthisanalysis,everytimewemakearightsclaim,onbehalfofourselvesorothers,wearesimultaneouslymakingadutiesclaim.Themorerights

peoplehaveagainstoneanother,themoredutiestheyowetooneanother.Therightsanddutiescome togetherornotatall.And thedutiesareowed to individuals.Wedon’tneedtoabandon‘individualism’infavourof‘community’totalkaboutduties.Thosewhoclaimrightssurelyrealizethattheyaretherebymakingaclaimabout

duties. Presumably the whole point of the rights claim is to demand that peopleprovidewhateveritisthatisbeingclaimedtobeamatterofright.It’spossiblethatsomepeopleurgerightsforthemselveswithoutrecognizingthattheimplieddutiesapplytothemalso.Butthatisjustinconsistent.ToclaimthatIhavearighttofreespeechbutnodutytorespectthefreespeechofothersis,intheabsenceofareasonwhyIamaspecialcase,clearlycontradictory.IfIhavearighttotrialbyjury–soothershaveadutytoprovidemewithsuchatrial–then,presumably,Itoohaveaduty to domy jury service whenmy number comes up. By the same reasoning,though the empirical claim linking the right to the duty raisesmore complicatedquestions,myclaimingarighttovotecouldimplyadutytodoso–ifmyturningouttovotewerenecessarytosustainthedemocraticsystemtowhichIclaimaright.Nothing I have said so far denies that some people are too quick to coin new

rights,tooreadytoregardas‘rights’claimsthatdonotreallyhavethatstatus.Thisisthegrainoftruthinthecommunitarianposition.Perhapsmanyoftherightsthatpeopleclaimarenotreallyrightsatall.Butthewaytodecidethatisnottoinvoketheconceptof‘community’.Itistothinkseriouslyaboutwhatrightsindividualsdoanddonothave.ThisiswhereanapproachlikeRaz’spaysoff.Ispeople’sinterestintheirreligionnotbeingblasphemedagainstsufficienttoholdothersunderadutynottoblasphemeagainstit?Thatdepends,forRaz,onhowharmfulblasphemyistopeople’swell-being, andwhether it is sufficiently harmful for us to judge, takinginto account the cost topeopleof their not being able to sayorwrite things theymightotherwisehavehadreasontosayorwrite,thatpeopleareunderadutynottoblaspheme. Do people have a right not to carry an ID card, not to be subject torandomdrugtestswhendriving,ornottoundergoanAIDStestwhenapplyingtobe a dentist? The answers are not straightforward. Nothing in Raz’s approach ismeant tosuggest that theyare.Butat leastheallowsustoseewhatconsiderationsare relevant.Communitariansmaybe right to reject someof theparticular rightsthatorganizationssuchasLiberty(intheUK)ortheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(in the US) assert. But if they are right, it is because people do not have theparticular rights and duties in question, not because there is anythingwrongwith‘liberalindividualism’.Similar points apply to responsibilities. Consider two issues where politicians,

undercommunitarianinfluence,havetalkedabouttheimportanceofpeopletakingonoracknowledgingresponsibilities: theresponsibilityof theable-bodied to takeworkwhereitisavailable(ratherthanjust‘scrounging’offstatehand-outs)andtheresponsibilityofparentstosupporttheirchildren(ratherthanrelyingonthestateto

doitforthem).IntheUK,thefirsthasresultedinchangestotherulesoneligibilityfor unemployment benefit and more stringent disability tests (essentially todistinguishtheidlefromthegenuinelydisabledunemployed).ThesecondproducedtheChildSupportAgency, a government agency that tries (andoften fails) to getparents, especially absent or estranged fathers, to contribute financially to theirchildren’s costs. In both cases the aim has been to redraw the ‘responsibilityboundary’between the individualand the state, toestablishadomain inwhich theindividualtakesresponsibilityfor(isheldtoaccountfor,takestheconsequencesof)heractions.Liberals have no problem believing that people should be responsible for the

outcomesthatresultfromtheirownfreechoices.Ofcoursealotdependsonwhatcounts as a ‘free choice’. How many options must be available for a person tochoose from? How much information about the likely consequences must thechooserhave?Andegalitarianliberalsaregoingtoemphasizetheextenttowhichpeoplearenotresponsibleforthebackgroundconditions(suchastheirplaceinthedistribution of natural talents) in the context of which they make their choices.Communitarians may be on to something when they bemoan a culture in whichpeople rely on the state to ameliorate outcomes for which they themselves areresponsible. Itmay be true that some strands in liberal thinking, by stressing theextent to which people are at the mercy of factors beyond their control, havecontributedtoaculturewhichistooreadytoletpeopleoffthemoralhook.Butitcan hardly be said that liberal political philosophy ignores the issue ofresponsibility.Quitethecontrary.Certainly liberals havenoproblemmaking rights dependon the agentmeeting

certain conditions (so that the rights are ‘conditional’). This is just a matter ofspecifying the right with sufficient precision. To say that people have a right towelfareisvague,andsuggeststhattheyhavesucharightirrespectiveofwhattheydo (ordon’t do),which encourages the thought that liberal rights-talk lets peopleoff the hook of taking responsibility for themselves. But it is straightforward tohold,forexample,thatthosewhoneedwelfareassistancethroughnofaultoftheirownhavearight to it,whereas thoseresponsiblefor theirownneedinesshavenosuchrightbutmustbeartheconsequencesoftheirownactions.Ofcourse,decidingwhoisresponsibleforwhatisextremelydifficult.Butthathasnothingtodowiththemistakenclaimthatemphasizingrightsmeansneglectingresponsibilities.

Objection4:Liberalsbelievethatvaluesaresubjectiveorrelative

TheAmerican poetRobert Frost (1874–1963) said that a liberal is someonewhocan’ttakehisownsideinanargument.Advocatesof‘community’sometimesclaimthatliberalstakevaluestobejust‘subjective’,amatterofindividualpreferencewithno objective criteria for deciding which are right or wrong. The emphasis onindividualfreedomofchoice, therespectforpeople’sownbeliefsabouthowtheyshouldlivetheirlives,isheldtoresultfromakindofscepticism.Onlyifnowaysoflifearebetterthananyothersdoesitmakesenseforpeopletochoosesuchthingsfor themselves. Imposing, or even encouraging, any particular values is asunjustifiedasimposingorencouragingaparticularflavouroficecream.Valuesarejustamatteroftaste,andthestatehasnobusinesspromotingtheonesithappenstoprefer.Liberals,itissaid,aremoralrelativists.(Andmoralrelativism,theviewthat‘anything goes’, is the source of many of our social problems: drugs, familybreakdown,etc.)Itshouldbeclearthatthischargeofsubjectivismorrelativismcannotstickasa

claim about allmoral values. In believing that individual freedom and autonomymatter, and that the state can enforce those justice-related duties we have to oneanother, liberalismcannotholdthatvalues ingeneralaremerelyamatterof taste.Somebodywho denies themoral significance of individual freedom ismaking amistake,notjustexpressingapreference.Fortheobjectiontogetahold,weneedatleast todistinguishbetweentwokindsofvalue:freedom,autonomy,rights, justice(which liberalsvalue,andbelieve themselves tobeobjectively right tovalue)andparticularways of life thatmight be chosen (which, itmight be thought, liberalsbelievetobeamatterofsubjectivetaste).This looks like the distinction that I mentioned when first pointing out that

liberalismis indeedamoraldoctrine.Isuggestedthenthatpoliticiansarewaryoftalkingaboutmoralitybecausesuchtalkisoften,mistakenly,regardedasinvolvingtheprescriptionofparticularwaysoflife.Withthisdistinctionclearinourminds,wemightwant to say that, though not subjectivist about values like freedom andjustice, theyaresubjectivistaboutwhat it is thatpeoplemight freelychoose todowiththeirjustshareofresources.Wouldthisberight?Confiningourselvesnowto‘conceptions of the good’ – philosophers’ term for views about what makespeople’s livesvaluableorworthwhile–must liberalsbelieve,with thehard-nosedutilitarianJeremyBentham, thatpushpin isasgoodaspoetry?Thata lifeplayingvideogamesisaswellspentasonegrapplingwithphilosophy?Theansweris‘no’.SupposeIamabsolutelyconvincedthatlifewithPlatois,for

everybody,objectivelybetterthanlifewithPlaystation.Thosewhodisagreewithmearenotjustexpressingadifferent,andequallyvalid,preference.Theyaremakingamistake. Does it follow that I should abandon my liberalism, renouncing my

commitmenttoastatethatupholdspeople’srightstochoosehowtheylive?NotifIalsothinkitvaluableforpeopletomakeandlivebytheirownchoices.Somebodywho correctly chooses Plato may have a much better life than somebody whomistakenlychoosesPlaystation.Butitbeingtheirownchoiceiscrucial.Astatethatfailstorespectthecapacityofpeopletochooseforthemselvescouldbedeprivingthemofanecessaryconditionfortheirlivesgoingwell.SoIcanquiteconsistentlyurge the state to leave them to itwhilehavingnodoubtswhatsoever that theyaregetting itwrong. Inmyprivate life,asan individual incivilsociety, Imaydevotemyself to spreading the word about how wonderful Plato is. But liberalism is adoctrine about the justifieduseof the state, about thepolicies that it canproperlypursue. My own views about how people should live can be regarded as quiteirrelevanttothatissue–howeverobjectivelyvalidthoseviewsmaybe.For some critics, this liberal response involves a kind ofmoral schizophrenia.

I’mabsolutelycertainofandcommitted to thevalueofPlato– forallmy fellowcitizens,notjustme–butI’msupposedtoignorethatfactwhenitcomestopolitics?ReplacePlatobyGod. Imagine thatyouarecommitted to the truthofaparticularreligiousdoctrine, adoctrine that suffusesyour entirewayof life,providingyouwithasenseofidentityandmeaning,withmembershipofaparticularcommunity.This liberal move tells you to bracket those religious views for the purposes ofpolitics. The worry about schizophrenia moves us in the direction of importantcommunitarianargumentsthatarediscussedlater.Thepointfornowisthatliberalsdon’thavetobesubjectivistorrelativistaboutvalues;theyjusthavetoprioritizethevalueofindividualfreedom.Ironically, perhaps, there is a significant strand of communitarian thinking

againstwhichtheworryaboutrelativismseemstobemuchbetterdirected.Thisisthe strand that emphasizes the importance of respecting a community’s values,traditions and shared understandings simply because they are those of thecommunityinquestion.Inphilosophicalterms,thisismostcloselyassociatedwithMichael Walzer, who urges that social justice requires us to distribute goods inaccordance with their ‘social meanings’. (Alasdair MacIntyre’s emphasis on thesignificance of socially defined roles for individual well-being is similar.)Suspicious of liberalism’s supposed pretensions to universality, and its apparentabstractionfromsocialandculturalcontext– thinkofRawls’soriginalposition–communitarians have insisted that theproperway to dopolitical philosophy is tointerpretandrefinethosevaluesandprinciplesthatareimmanentinthewaysoflifeofparticularconcretesocieties.Thisisindeedakindofrelativism.InWalzer ’sformulation,‘justiceisrelativeto

socialmeanings’.It’snotthatvaluesaresubjectiveinthesensethattheyaresimplyamatterof individual taste. Individualscan,on thisview,bewrongabout them.Butwhat they are wrong about is ‘the correct interpretation of their society’s shared

traditions and understandings’ or ‘the values implicit in their culture’s socialpractices’. Here we approach very difficult issues in meta-moral philosophy.(‘Substantivemoralphilosophy’istodowithwhatisrightandwhatwrong.‘Meta-moralphilosophy’–alsoknownas‘meta-ethics’–istodowiththestatusofmoraljudgements,whatwemeanwhenwesaythatsomethingisrightorwrong,andhowweknowwhichitis.)Happily,it’snotappropriateformetogointothemhere.Whatis worth noting is that communitarianism, in both its philosophical and itscommunitarianguises,sometimesasserts that the justificationofamoralvalueorprinciple consists, and can only consist, in appeal to the shared intuitions of thecommunitytowhomthevalueorprincipleinquestionistobejustified.Addtothisthethoughtthatdifferentcommunitiessharequitedifferentintuitions,andtheresultis a kind of social or cultural moral relativism. This is why some object tocommunitarian thinking because they take it to imply a kind of conservatism, arejectionofthepossibilityofaroleforpoliticalphilosophythatisradicallycritical.Wehave tobecarefulhere.Evencommunitarians likeWalzer think that there isa‘universal’ thinkindofmorality that is sharedby all, or nearly all, cultures.AndWalzer ’sownprescriptionsfortheUS,basedonhisinterpretationoftheir‘sharedmeanings’,certainlyqualifyas ‘radicalsocialcriticism’.But,overall, thiskindofrelativismismoreusuallyassociatedwithcommunitariansthanwithliberals.

Objection5:Liberalsneglectthewayinwhichindividualsaresociallyconstituted

Much philosophical communitarianism focuses on the conception of personsupposed to lie at the heart of liberalism. Encouraged in their suspicions by theshadowy, desocialized parties to the contract in Rawls’s original position, criticsclaim that liberals fail to recognize the extent to which individuals are ‘sociallyconstituted’,embeddedincommunalrelationsandformedasthepeopletheyarebythecommunitiesinwhichtheylive.Theliberalconceptionof thepersonasafreechooser of how to live her life is naively ‘individualistic’. It overlooks theindividual’sdependenceonthesocietyinwhichshelivesforherconceptionofthegood (and, indeed, for her conception of herself as an individual choosing aconception of the good). Sometimes this dependence – the priority of the socialmatrix– ispresentedasanempiricalclaimabout thesignificanceofsocializationprocessesfor theindividual’sself-identity.Sometimesit is themorephilosophicalideathatlanguageorthoughtisimpossibleoutsideasocialsetting.Eitherway,thecritiqueismisguided.Liberalsmaymakemistakes,buttheydon’t

make mistakes as obvious as these. How could anybody deny that people derivetheir self-understandings from the societies in which they live? What matters iswhether this does anything to knock the liberal insistence on the importance ofpeople being free to think about how they want to live, to live the life of theirchoice, and to change their mind (subject, of course, to the constraint that theyrespectotherpeople’sdoingthesame).Ifpeoplehadnochoice, if thefeelingthatwe decide how to live our lives were an illusion, then this would indeed be aproblem.Liberalswouldbeattributinghugeimportancetoacapacitythatpeopledonot in fact possess. But the fact that we choose from a set of socially definedoptions, and that, as individuals, we are undoubtedly subject to social influences(family, school, media) that lead us to choose some rather than others, does notestablish that reflection and choice are illusory. To be sure, when we criticallyreflect upon our lives, we do so while taking some things as given. Detachingourselves fromall our valueswould leaveuswithnobasis for judgement.But itstill matters that people are free to live a life they believe in, rather than beingrequiredtolivealifethatotherschooseforthem.Thefact that individualsaresociallyconstituteddoes indeedposechallenges to

the liberal. If people derive their understanding of who they are from theirmembership of particular groups, and if such self-understandings are integral totheir well-being, then those concerned with individual well-being may findthemselves caring about groups in ways that generate potential conflicts withindividual freedom andwith a strictly individualistic approach to justice. Perhapssomeculturalgroupsrequiresubsidyiftheyaretosurvive?Perhapstheirsurvival

dependsontheirbeinggrantedgrouprightsthatclashwithconventionalindividualrights?Wewilldiscusssuchissuesshortly.Herethepointisjusttoclearawaythemistakenideathatliberalssimplyfailtoacknowledgethesocialconstitutionoftheself.Indeed, it’s precisely because they do recognize the extent to which the social

matrix constitutes people’s identities that liberals are likely to care about theconditions under which beliefs are formed. Here there may well be a conflictbetween ‘liberal individualism’and ‘community’.Consider thedevoutly religious.Supposetheyproposetoraisetheirchildreninaclose-knitcommunity,sendthemtoreligiousschoolsandgenerallymakesurethattheyarekeptawayfromthoseofdifferentpersuasions.Canthestatepermitthis?Fortheliberal,theissueiswhetherdoing so adequately respects citizens’ capacity for autonomy. Liberals differ onwhat this implies. For some it is sufficient that people have the right to leave thecommunityinwhichtheywereraised.Forothers,thisisnotenough.Thestatemustensure that its future citizens have exercised their capacity for autonomy and thisrequiresthattheyshouldnotjustbeeducatedinto(indoctrinatedwith?)aparticularreligious view, but should be taught to think for themselves, and to have someawareness of the range of options available to them (including being taught theircivilrights).Quitehowmuchstateinterventionthisinvolvesisadifficultquestiononwhichliberalsdisagree.Therearemanybooks–andUSSupremeCourtcases–aboutit.Ingeneralterms,theproblemisthatofgettingthecorrectbalancebetweenrespecting the autonomy of parents (whose conception of the good may includeraising their children a certainway) andprotectingornurturing the autonomyofchildren.Thecommunitarian twist is that respecting theautonomyofparentsmaypresentitselfasrespectinga‘community’(hereareligiousgrouping).(Toseethatitdoesn’thavetopresentitselfinthisway,imagineeccentricparentswhorefusetoallowtheirchildrentohaveanormaleducationbecausetheywantthemtobesocialisolates.Herethereisno‘community’thatwouldbeoffendedbythestate’sdecisionto require those children to learn things their parents didn’twant them to. So theissueofwhatthestateshoulddotoguaranteetheautonomyofits(future)citizensisonlycontingentlyrelatedtothequestionofrespecting‘community’.)Whatevertheright answer in these cases, it should be clear that liberal concerns aboutsocializationandeducationarisepreciselybecausetheydoindeedacknowledgethepriorityofthesocialmatrix.

Objection6:Liberalsfailtoseethesignificanceofcommunalrelations,sharedvaluesandacommonidentity

Communitarianworriesabouttheliberalconceptionofthepersonsometimestakeadifferenttack.Ratherthanobjectingtoliberalism’ssupposedviewaboutthesourceof people’s conceptions of the good, they complain about the particular kinds ofcontentwhichliberalismallegedlyignoresandencourages.Herethechargeisthatliberalism builds upon and fosters a particular understanding of the individual’srelation to her community, seeing society as nothing more than a cooperativeventure for the pursuit of individual advantage. Conceptions of the good that arecommunalincontent,thatrecognizethatsocialbondsandrelationswithothersareintrinsicallyvaluable,aretherebydowngraded.Liberalsarealsoaccusedoffailingtogiveproperattentiontosharedvaluesandtheimportanceofacommonidentity.Contrary to thisobjection, thereare twocompatibleways inwhich liberalscan

accommodate the thought that communal relations are intrinsically valuable. Thefirstrequiresustorememberthatliberalismisadoctrineaboutwhatthestatecandoto, and for, its citizens. Since the state, in liberal theory, is essentially a meanswherebyfreeandequalcitizensmakeandhelpeachotherdothings,thisamountstosayingthatitisadoctrineabouthowpeopleshouldtreatoneanotherascitizens.Itisnotadoctrineabouthowpeopleshouldtreatoneanotheringeneral,intheirprivatelives, or asmembers of civil society (except where a way of treating another isinconsistentwithorunderminesthatother ’sstandingasafreeandequalcitizen).Soeven if it were true that liberal individualism conceived political activity and thestateinpurelyinstrumentalterms,thiswouldstillleaveplentyofroomforpeopletopursue communalvalues.The stateprovides a frameworkwithinwhichpeoplelive their lives.Those livesmaycentrally involvedistinctivelycommunalactivity,participationinsharedpracticesandvaluedmembershipofparticularcommunities.A‘liberalindividualist’doesnotthinkthatthestateshouldpreventpeoplelivingareligiouslife,alifeinanartisticcommune,alifedevotedtothecollectivepursuitofscientific truth,ora life inwhich theextendedfamilyplaysacrucial role.Nordoesshedenythatanyofthesearevaluablewaystolivealife–morevaluablethantheself-interestedpursuitofmoneyorindividualgratification.Sheisconcernedtoensurethatcitizensarefreetolivelivestheybelievein.Thoselivesmayperfectlywell be communal in content, involving membership of groups or associationsaimingatsharedends.But this picture of the liberal state as providing a framework within which

individualsarefreetopursuecommunalconceptionsofthegoodisonlypartofthestory. For liberals need not conceive political activity or the state in purelyindividualisticinstrumentalterms.Rather,theliberalstateitselfmightbethoughttorepresentorembodyaparticularunderstandingofpoliticalcommunity.Citizensof

aliberalstateshareacommonaim,andarejointlyengagedinitspursuit.Theaimisthat of creating and sustaining a set of social and political institutions that treatscitizens justly. Communitarians who accuse liberals of neglecting the idea of thecommongoodmissthepointthatliberaljusticecanitselfbeacommongood.Itisacommongoodwhenitissharedbycitizensandpursuedbythemtogether.Combinethis with the previous point, and we have a conception of the liberal state as acommunityofcommunities.Anoverarchingcommunity,foundeduponrespectfortheindividual,whichallowsitscitizenstoengageincommunal(religious,artistic,familial)activityinpursuitofthemoreparticularendsthattheysharewithothers.True, thereissomethingparadoxicalaboutthis idea.Thecontentof thegoodis

communal in the sense that it is somethingheld in commonby citizens. Its beingheldincommonisintegraltothatcontent.Asocietyinwhichsomecitizensdidnotshare the goal of sustaining a just society, but had that goal forced upon themagainst theirwill,wouldbeasociety inwhich thegoodwasnotachieved.But thecontent of the good is ‘individualistic’, in that it concerns the importance ofrespecting the rights of individuals to pursue the life of their choice, with a justshare of resources to devote to their individual, freely chosen, life-plan. Thecommon good is individualism (where that means ‘respect for the freedom andautonomyofallindividuals’,not‘theselfishpursuitofone’sowngratification’).Some variants of communitarianism hanker after a conception of the common

good that is thicker or stronger than this, one that is more communal and lessindividualistic. But we have seen that liberals permit individuals to pursuecommunalconceptionsofthegoodwithintheframeworkofjusticeprovidedbythestate.So, if there is tobeanyrealdisagreement,communitariansmustbearguingthatthestatecanitselfembody–actinpursuitof–valuesthatgobeyondrespectforthe freedom and autonomy of all individuals. For some liberals, however, it is acrucialfeatureofcontemporaryWesternsocietiesthatcitizensdisagreeaboutwhichparticular ways of life are valuable, with a range of different views seeming nomoreorlessreasonablethanoneanother.In Rawls’s terminology, developed in his second book, Political Liberalism

(1993),suchsocietiesarecharacterizedby‘thefactofreasonablepluralism’.Giventhis,andassumingthatthecoercivepowerofthestateisjointlyheldbyallcitizensequally, it seems illegitimate for some to get the state to favour their ownconceptionsofwhat isvaluable.That is, tomakethestatesectarian,nota toolforthe execution of a genuinely communal project. To be the latter, the state mustrestrictitselftothepursuitofthosevaluesthatareindeedsharedbyall.Theseareliberalvalues suchas freedom,equality,autonomyand justice.Understood in thisway,theliberalwhorecognizeswhatcitizensdoanddonotshare,andpermitsthestate to act only in ways that can be justified by appeal to common ground, isshowingmorerespectforthepoliticalcommunityasitactuallyisthanthekindof

communitarianwhoadvocatesathickerconceptionofpoliticalcommunity.Leavingpeople free to choose for themselves how they are to live is the expression ofpolitical community appropriate to contemporary circumstances. (The claim thatsuchvaluesareindeed‘commonground’is,ofcourse,problematic.Iwilldiscusstheproblemswiththisapproachlater.)In their private lives, people may define themselves in all kinds of ways –

heterosexual, Christian, artist, sport-lover – but, as members of the politicalcommunity, they coincide in regarding themselves as free and equal citizens. It isthis common identity that ismodelledbyRawls’s original position.Sowhen realpeopleregardtheclaimsofjusticeastrumpingtheirmoreparticularisticinterests,they are, in effect, treating their ‘citizenship identity’ – the identity they have incommon with their fellow citizens – as more important than their other, moreparticularistic and differentiated, identities. People are expected to be sufficientlyconstitutedby–sufficientlytoidentifywith–theiridentityas‘citizen’that,whenthedemandsofthatidentityconflictwiththedemandsoftheirotheridentities,theroleof citizen takes priority. So liberals do recognize the importance of a common,sharedidentity.

Objection7:Liberalswronglythinkthatthestatecanandshouldbeneutral

Theideathatthestateshouldbeneutralbetweenitscitizensisoftenassociatedwithliberalism.Itfitswiththeideaofthestateasanimpartialumpire,providingalevelplaying-field,afairframeworkwithinwhichtheindividualisleftfreetopursueherowngoodinherownway.Itisnotlegitimateforthestatetomakejudgementsabouthow people should lead their lives, even if those judgements are madedemocratically,forthatinvolvesthecommunityimposingitswillonindividualsina way that violates the requirement that they be treated with equal concern andrespect.Whenever thestatepromotes,ordiscourages,particularwaysof life, it isnot acting neutrally. So the British state, which discourages gambling (throughtaxation), encourages the arts (through subsidy) and gives special standing to theAnglican Church, is not, in this sense, a neutral state. Similarly, the US federalgovernment, despite its official commitment to individual freedom, deliberatelyencourages specific ways of life: it subsidizes national parks and the NationalEndowmentfortheArts,andencouragesreligiousactivitybymakingdonationstochurchestax-deductible.Bothcountrieshavetaxlawsthatsupportmarriage(thoughtheydifferintheextenttowhichtheyarebiasedinfavourofheterosexualmarriage,anareawherethingsarechangingfast).Oneobviousproblemis that it isn’tatallclearwhatkindofneutrality isbeing

claimedforaso-called‘neutral’state.Sinceitexplicitlypromotescertainvalues–such as individual freedom and autonomy – how can the claim to neutrality beanything other than a sham? To make good their claim, neutralist liberals willtypically invoke a distinction between (a) the individual’s capacity to choose andpursue her own conception of the good and (b) the conceptions of the good shemightchooseandpursue.Theyarenotneutralabout(a),buttheyareneutralabout(b).Indeed,insomeversions,it’spreciselybecausetheycaresomuchabout(a)thatneutrality about (b) matters. Since individual freedom and autonomy are soimportant, thestateshouldrestrict its role to thatofguaranteeingfairbackgroundconditions.Itshouldn’titselfencourageordiscourageanyparticularconceptionsofhowpeopleshouldlive.Sometimesthisisputasadistinctionbetween‘theright’and‘thegood’.Thestate

should uphold justice and people’s rights as citizens (which derive from theircapacity for autonomy) but it should not get more involved than it needs to inquestionsof‘thegood’(howpeopleshouldleadtheirlives).Recognizingthatevenatheoryofjusticedoesineffectpresupposesomeconceptionofhowpeopleshouldliveandwhatisgoodforthem,Rawlsputsthedistinctionasfollows:thestatemayactona‘thin’theoryofthegood,forthisisneutralinthesensethatitiscommongroundbetweencitizensanditappliessolelytothepoliticalsphere.Heacceptsthat

his liberalism involvesapolitical conceptionof thegood (or a conceptionof thepoliticalgood).But thestatemaynotactonparticularcomprehensivedoctrines–full-blown views about how people should lead their lives in general – that areendorsed by some but rejected by others of its citizens. For Rawls, members oftoday’s advanced societies disagree in their comprehensive doctrines. But theynonethelesscoincideinaffirmingthecoreliberalvaluesoffreedom(spelledoutinterms of the capacity to frame, revise and pursue a conception of the good) andequality. There is, for him, an ‘overlapping consensus’ on these distinctivelypoliticalvalues.Thesecanthereforebeworkedup–viaamodellingdeviceliketheoriginalposition–intoatheoryofpoliticaljustice.Thattheoryis‘neutral’,then,inthesense that itbuildson ‘commonground’. It appealsonly to reasons thatall insome sense share (and not to reasons grounded in particular and controversialdoctrinesaboutwhichpeoplereasonablydisagree).ThedifficultiesraisedbythisRawlsianapproachwillbediscussedlater.Fornow,

itisimportanttoseethatsomevariantsofliberalismarenotcommittedtoneutralitybetweenconceptionsofthegood(orcomprehensivedoctrines)atall.Itistemptingto think thata state that takesnoviewabouthow itscitizensshould live–beyondhowtheyshouldtreatoneanotherascitizens–ismore‘liberal’thanonethatdoes.On that view, the current US federal and British states are less liberal than theywould be if they refrained from subsidizing the arts or encouraging marriage.Though this has some intuitive appeal – and some liberalswould indeed endorsethisclaim– it isdangerous tosee itasamatterofdefinition,as if liberalismandstateneutralitynecessarilygotogether.Thereare two reasonswhy it isdangerous.The less importantone is thateven

Rawlsthinksthatsomestateactioninfavourofparticularcomprehensivedoctrinescanbejustified.Whatisnotjustifiedisforsuchconceptionstoinfluencestateactionwhere it involves constitutional essentials andmattersofbasic justice.As longasthose are in place, and in the appropriate sense neutral or ‘political’, peoplemayvoteforstatepoliciesthatfitwiththeirowncomprehensivedoctrines,andthestatemay act on the outcome. So a Rawlsian state can subsidize art galleries andmuseumsandnationalparks, if that’swhat itscitizensvotefor.What itcan’tdoisground its constitutional arrangements, or its conception of basic justice, in anyparticular comprehensivedoctrine. (It’sworthmentioning thatRawlshas changedhismindonthis.In1971,evensubsidizingartgallerieswasruledout.)Themoreimportantreasonwhyweshouldnotidentifyliberalismwiththeideaof

aneutralstateisthatdoingsowouldblindustokindsofliberalismthatdonotwantneutralityatall.Onsuchviews,nothingin the liberalpicture tellsagainst thestateacting to encourage its citizens to live valuable lives and discourage them fromliving worthless ones. It matters that people live autonomously, that they are themakersorauthorsoftheirownlives,ratherthanbeingsubjecttothewillofothers.

Butitalsomattersthatthelivestheylivearevaluableintheirownright.Themerefact thatsomebodyhaschosentoliveher lifeacertainwaydoesn’tmeanthat thatway of life is good, even for her. Choice, though necessary for individual well-being,isnotsufficient.Itmattersalsothatshemakesgoodchoices.Ifthestatecanhelpherchoosewell,thenitisjustifiedindoingso.This, in a nutshell, is the kind of ‘perfectionist liberalism’most systematically

developedbyJosephRaz.Inhisview,liberalismisnotessentiallyadoctrinewhichrestricts the state’s role to that of providing a level playing-field, avoidingjudgements about howpeople should live their lives. It is a doctrine that permits,and in somecasesmay require, the state tomakeandacton such judgements.Bysubsidizing(andinotherwaysencouraging)valuablewaysoflife,andtaxing(andin other ways discouraging) worthless or empty ones, the state can promote thewell-beingofitscitizens.Beingaliberalstate,itcannotforcepeopletomakegoodchoices, and it shouldn’t prevent them from acting on their bad ones. Butsubsidizing the arts is not forcing people into theatres and art galleries.Encouragingmarriageisnotrequiringpeopletogetmarried.Taxinggamblingisnotbanningit.To see the difference between neutralist and perfectionist kinds of liberalism,

consider the case of legislation in relation to sexuality. According to neutralistliberals,thestateshouldconcernitselfsolelywithjustice,leavingpeoplefreetoactsexuallyastheywish.Peoplecannot,ofcourse,harmothers,andtheprotectionofchildrenisalegitimateconcernofthestate.So,iftheybelievethat16astheageofconsentforhomosexualsexwouldbemorelikelytoharmchildrenthanwouldthesame age for heterosexual sex, they could argue for different ages on neutralgrounds.Whatneutralist liberalscannotdo isargue fordifferent treatmenton thegrounds that some kinds of sexual activity are intrinsically more worthy (ordepraved)thanothers.Asindividuals,wemayhaveviewsaboutthat.Perhapssuchviewsderivefromourreligiousbeliefs.Butthosebeliefsshouldbekeptoutofourthinkingabouthow,ascitizens,weshouldtreatoneanother.Somepeoplefinditoddthat Tony Blair, whose children were educated in Catholic schools, should havesupported lowering the age of consent for gay sex to 16. But even if Blair ’sreligiousviewswereofthekindthatregardedgaysexasworsethanstraightsex,hemight still think that those viewswere irrelevant to the political issue of how thestate should act. (In theUS, formerSenatorTedKennedyopposed restrictionsonabortion,despitebeingaCatholic.)Perfectionistliberals,ontheotherhand,thinkthatitisappropriateforustouse

thestatetogetoneanothertolivebetterratherthanworselives.If–anditisaverybigif–straightsexismorevaluablethangaysex,thenthestatemightbejustifiedinpromoting heterosexuality and discouraging homosexuality. It would not bepermissible for the state to seek to enforce abanonhomosexual acts.We’re still

dealingwithafundamentallyliberalperspective,andthatkindofbanwouldviolatecitizens’ autonomy. But, because, unlike the neutralist, she does not excludeperfectionistconsiderationsinprinciple,aperfectionistleavesmoreontheagendaforpoliticaldecision.Take another example: ‘family values’.Onemight promote such values on the

ground that it is intrinsically better for people to live their lives in stableheterosexual marriages than in alternative arrangements. This would be aperfectionistreason,andneutralistswouldregarditasinappropriatewhenitcomestodecidingstatepolicy.Buttheremightalsobeother‘neutral’reasonsforthinkingit legitimate for the state to encourage familyvalues.Perhapsother family formsaremorelikelytoharmthechildrenraisedinthem,ortoproducechildrenlikelytoharm others (e.g., by becoming delinquent). (Of course, there is going to bedisagreementaboutwhatcountsas ‘harm’,andaboutwhatcountsasevidence thatharm is caused.The point is not that it’s easy to decidewhether state support forfamily values can be justified on neutral grounds. It’s simply to bring out thedifference between two kinds of argument for such support.) Something similarapplies in the case of pornography. If – perhaps not such a big if this time –pornographyharmswomen,thentheneutralistliberalwillconsiderstatemeasuresagainstit.Whatshewon’tcountenanceisstatepolicydirectedagainstpornographyonthegroundthatitisinherentlydegradingorbadforthepersonconsumingit.Asan individual, I may think that those for whom the consumption of pornographyplaysacentralrolearelivinglivesthatarelessworthwhile,lessvaluableforthem,thanwouldbealifewithoutit.But–intheabsenceofharmtoothers–thatisnotareasonforthestatetotakeactionagainstit.Whathasanyofthistodowithcommunity?Afterall,theideathatthestatemay

bepermitted,orrequired,toactonperfectionistjudgementsaboutthevalueofwaysoflifefavouredbysomeofitscitizenshasnoinherentlycommunalcontent.(Onemight,ofcourse,addtheclaimthat‘communal’waysoflifearemorevaluablethan‘solitary’ or ‘individualistic’ ones. But nothing in the argument supposes this. Itcouldbeacceptedbysomebodywho thought that the lifeofahermitor reclusiveartist was valuable and worthy of promotion by the state for that reason.) Thisdiscussionofneutralityisrelevantbecauseitconcernstheproperrelationbetweenthepoliticalcommunityand the individual.Theperfectionist thinks it justified forthepoliticalcommunitycollectivelytomakeandactonjudgementsaboutwhatwillmake the livesof its individualmembersgobetterorworse.Theneutralist thinksthatsuchjudgementsshouldbeleftrathertoindividuals,withthestatemerelyactingtoprovideanappropriatelyimpartialsetofrulesandinstitutions.Inthisparticularsense, then, perfectionist liberalsmight be thought to bemore ‘communitarian’ –andless‘individualistic’–thantheirneutralistcounterparts.

Summary

This section correcting misrepresentations and misunderstandings sometimescommittedinthenameof‘community’beganwithsomeelementaryclarifications.Liberalism isnotadoctrineofegoism,nordoes it imply (bywhichphilosophersmean‘necessarilyimply’)aminimalstate.ThingsgotabitmoreinterestingwhenIpointed out that, despite what some communitarians have suggested, liberals areinterested in duties and responsibilities, need not believe that values are merelysubjective (not even values concerning the best way to live one’s life) and canperfectlywellaccommodatethewaysinwhichindividualsare‘constituted’–madetheparticular individuals theyare–bythesocialcontext,orcommunity, inwhichtheylive.Thefurthersuggestionthatsomeversionsofliberalismhavenoproblemaccordingsignificancetocommunalrelations,sharedvaluesandacommonidentitybroughtoutthesenseinwhichliberalismcoulditselfbeunderstoodasatheoryofthe ‘common good’. Finally, we moved closer to the frontier of currentphilosophicaldebateasIintroducedtheideathatliberalsneednotlimittheroleofthestatetothatofprovidingalevelplaying-field,aneutralframeworkthatleavestoindividualsalljudgementsaboutwhatmakespeople’slivesbetterorworse.Herethediscussionconnectedwiththeconcernsofsomecommunitarianswhoareconcernedtohaltwhattheydiagnoseasaprocessofmoraldecline.I have introduced two importantly different strands in liberal thinking:Rawls’s

‘political liberalism’ andRaz’s ‘perfectionist liberalism’.Rawls is the one sayingthat, at least in regard to constitutional essentials andmatters of basic justice, thestatemustrestrictitsroletothepursuitofthosevaluesinsomesensesharedbyall:thethinorpoliticaltheoryofthegoodwhichistodowithjustice,equality,freedom,autonomy.Thiskindof liberalism is ‘communitarian’ inseeking tobuildonlyon‘neutral’, common ground. Raz’s conception of liberalism does not realizecommunityinthissense.Aslongasitisindeedhelpingitscitizenslivebetterlives–livesthatarebetterforthemnotjustfortherestofus–thestateneednotconfineitself to this common ground; it may make and act on more controversialjudgements.Thisiscommunitarianinadifferentway.Herethepoliticalcommunitymay legitimately promote thewell-being of itsmembers evenwhere this takes itbeyondneutrality.I admitted, early on, that my attempt to defend liberalism from attacks by

communitariancriticswould takeadvantageof thediversity that liberalismshareswithallother‘isms’.ThereadermayfeelthatI’vegonesofarastocheat.Itistruethat I have allowed ‘liberalism’ to refer to twodifferent positions.But both thesedoctrines hold that the freedom and autonomy of individuals is essential to theirwell-being (the rough definition I offered at the beginning). So it is legitimate toinvokebothinordertocounterthechargethat liberalsneglect thesignificanceof

‘community’. In any case, despite their differences, both can be seen to regardliberalismasatheoryofcommunity,acommunityconcernedwiththepromotionofa common good, the good of a just society. A society whose members care notsolelyaboutthemselvesortheirfamilies,butabouttheautonomyofalltheirfellowcitizens,andwhoarepreparedtolimitthepursuitofself-interesttotheextentthatthedutiesowed to their fellowcitizens require it (e.g., byaccepting redistributivetaxation from the better off to the worse off), is a society characterized bysolidarity,fraternityandcommunity.

Outstandingissues

That is not, unfortunately, the end of the story. Stopping now would give amisleadinglyone-sidedaccountof things, suggesting that communitarian thinkinghas contributed nothing but error and confusion. In fact, as well as forcingclarification of what liberalism amounts to – or, rather, the variety of differentthingsitmightamountto–thecommunitariancritiquehasthrownupanumberofcrucialissuesthatremainunresolved.Communitarianshavesometimesbeenguiltyofuncharitableinterpretationsofliberalwritings.Butacharitablereadingofwhatcommunitarianshavetosaywouldseethemasraisingdeepandimportantquestionsthat are still very much up for grabs. (A charitable reading of a text is one thatinterprets it so as to make as much of it as true as possible. Especially wheresomebodydisagreeswithyou,itisusuallyagoodideatoseewhetherthereisanywayinwhichwhat,orsomeofwhat,theyaresayingcouldbetrue.It’slikelytobemore intellectually productive than the opposing strategy, which is exactly whatpoliticians are trained to do: they deliberately avoid whatever is good in theiropponents’argumentsandhomeinon–andrubbish–thebadbits.)

1Liberalism,neutralityandmulticulturalism

Recall our discussion of liberal neutrality.Not all variants of liberalismwant thestatetobeaneutralumpire,butsomedo.Aswesaw,thosewhodohavetodealwiththe obvious objection that a liberal state can’t be neutral about everything. Theytypically respond by admitting that this is indeed obvious and that the kind ofneutrality they are interested in is a specific kind of neutrality. Neutrality not onjustice,rights,autonomyandequality–whatRawlscallsathintheoryofthegood–butneutralityonthewaysthatpeoplemightchoosetolivewithinajuststate.Theysometimes add that of course their preferred state is not neutral in terms of theeffects it has on the different kinds of life that people might live. Expensivelifestyles, for example,whichmight thrive if therewere an unjust distribution ofresources,will tendtobelesspopularonceeverybodyhasonlyherfairshare.Sotoowillwaysoflifethatdependfortheirsurvivalonpeoplenotbeingproperlyfreeto reject them – those that can attract adherents only when people are denied aproper sense of the options available to them. But, neutralist liberals will say, itmakesnosenseforastatetopursueneutralityofeffect.Howcoulditpossiblytakeinto account the likely effects of its policies on all the different ways of lifeendorsedbyitscitizens?Rather,thekindofneutralityitisarguingforisneutralityofaimorjustification.Whatmattersisthatthestate’sreasonsforactionshouldnotbe a judgement about some ways of life being better than others, but should bereasonsthatareneutralbetweenthem(reasonssuchasthoseappealingtothevalueofindividualfreedomandautonomy).Willthisdo?Itseemssimplytoinvitethesamechallengeinanotherform.‘OK,’

theobjectionnowgoes,‘Iseethatyoudon’twantthestatetobeneutralonmattersof“theright”–orwhatsomeofyoucalla“thin”theoryofthegood.Iseethatyoudon’tclaimthatitcanbeneutralinitseffectsonhowpeoplechoosetolive.ButinthatcaseIdon’tseewhyyouthinkthisisneutralinanysensethatmatters.Whynotjust admit that it embodies a substantial and substantive set of values? Your talkabout“neutrality” isabitofrhetoricsupposedtopersuadeus thatyourstate isanimpartial arbiter, above the fray of competing visions of how society should beorganized.Butthatisadishonestwayofpresentingthings.’Neutralistliberalsarethuspresentedwithadilemma.Theycanstraightforwardly

arguefor the importanceof thevalues– individualautonomy,etc.– theyendorse.Ortheycantrytodefendsomeversionoftheirclaimtoneutrality.Iftheypursuetheformerstrategy, theyare ineffectacceptingthat thestatecannotpresent itselfasaneutral umpire. It must justify what it does by direct appeal to the claim that thevaluesitpromotesaretrue,orvalid,andthosewhodonotendorsethemaremakingamistake–amistakeofthekindthat,ifnecessary,warrantscoercivestateactiontocorrect it. Many liberals think that this is indeed the right strategy to pursue –

liberals should stand up for liberal values without hiding behind any claim tosignificant neutrality. But some,most notably Rawls, have tried to take the othertack.InRawls’sview,thefirststrategyisunacceptablebecauseitpresentsliberalismas ‘just another sectarian doctrine’. What should matter to liberals is that thecoercivepowerofthestate–beingpowerheldjointlybycitizenswhoarefreeandequal– isused,at leastwhereconstitutionalessentialsandmattersofbasic justiceareconcerned,onlyinwaysthatcanbejustifiedtothoseforcedtodowhatitsays.It’s not enough that liberal values be objectively ‘true’ or ‘valid’. If they are toinformstateaction,theymustqualifyas‘commonground’.Theymustbepartofthepolitical ‘overlapping consensus’ on which citizens can agree despite their otherdifferences.Do people coincide in affirming these political values? Many do. There are

indeedmanyreligiousbelievers,andadvocatesofothercomprehensiveconceptionsofthegood,whoholdthosedoctrinesinaliberalspirit.Theybelievetheirdoctrinestobetrue,butthosedoctrinesthemselvesaccordindividualfreedomandautonomysufficientimportanceforthemnottowantthestatetodenyitscitizensliberalrights.Ifall those livingsubject to theauthorityof the liberalstatehelddoctrinesof thiskind, thenRawls’s claim to be building only on common groundmight be valid.But,thoughmanydo,notalldo.Someofthosesubjecttoitsauthoritysubscribetodoctrinesinwhichindividualfreedomisoflittleornovalue,certainlynotvaluableenough for them to regard it as taking priority in cases of conflict.Consider thecase of SalmanRushdie,whose novelTheSatanicVerses was thought to ridiculeelementsoftheIslamicfaith.ProtectingRushdie’sfreedomofexpressionwasheldby some (by nomeans all) BritishMuslims to be less important than protectingIslam from blasphemy. Returning to an earlier example, consider the claims ofthose who want to raise their children in accordance with a particular religion,blissfullyignorantoftheotheroptionsthosechildrenmightmisguidedlychoosetopursueiftheyknewaboutthem.Mostliberalstaketheircommitmenttoautonomytorequirethemtoadvocateatleastsomestateintervention,inthenameofchildren’sautonomy. How does Rawls deal with the fact that some members of today’smulticulturalsocietiesdonotaffirmtheoverlappingconsensusonliberalvalues?His response is to say that they are ‘unreasonable’. It is reasonable to disagree

aboutcomprehensivedoctrines–Catholicism,Islam,utilitarianism,alifededicatedtoart.Thatispartlywhyitmattersthatpeoplebefreetochoosewhichofthemtopursue.Butitisnotreasonabletodisagreeaboutthepoliticalvaluesofautonomy,freedomandequality.Someonewhodeniesthoseisindeedoutsidetheoverlappingconsensus.But that is her problem. She is outside it because she is unreasonable.Theconsensusthatcountsistheconsensusofreasonablecomprehensivedoctrines.But thismeans thatRawls’s strategyofbuildingonlyoncommonground turns

out to benot that different from the first ‘standup and fight for liberal values’ –

strategy.Whenitcomestothecrunch,whenhecomesupagainstthosewhodonot,in fact, endorse liberal values in politics, he has to put them beyond the pale bydescribing them as ‘unreasonable’. That may be the right thing to say. But it ispushingthingsabit tosaythatandsimultaneouslyclaimthatthestateonefavoursbuildsongroundthatis‘common’tothedoctrinesendorsedbythecitizensitistogovern. To those who do not buy in to the overlapping consensus whosecomprehensivedoctrinesthemselvesinvolveadenialofthesupremeimportanceofliberal values in politics – even Rawlsian liberalism will look like ‘just anothersectarian doctrine’. This is why the multicultural nature of today’s liberaldemocracies,thefactthatthesocietiesweliveinarecharacterizedbysuchdeepandfar-reachingdoctrinaldifferences,posesamajorjustificatoryproblemforliberals–as,ofcourse,itdoesforeverybodyelse.Whathasanyof this todowithcommunity?Well,onestrand in thedefenceof

liberalismasitselfatheoryof‘community’dependedontheideathatitrecognizedthe significance of communal relations, shared values and a common identity.Recall the suggestion that citizens of a liberal state share a common aim and arejointlyengagedinitspursuit.Onceweacknowledgethepresenceofcitizenswhodonot share the aim, and experience the requirements of the liberal state as theenforced imposition ofmajority opinion, that happydescription looks rather lessapt.Forliberalswantingtoregardthestateitselfasacommunity,multiculturalismcan be a problem. It bringswith it the kind of incompatibility ofworld-view thatcannot easily be reconciledwith the idea of political community as the collectiverealizationofsharedvalues.Furthermore, the liberal state may itself be regarded as inimical to a more

particularistic or localized form of community. This will happen whenever thatstate’scommitmenttoindividualfreedomandautonomyrequiresittointerferewithacommunity’sownpreferredwayofdoingthings.Shouldmembersofareligionbepermittedtoraisetheirchildrenastheywish,protectingthemfromthespirituallyimpoverishedandgrotesquely sexualizedmassculture?Or is the state justified inprotectingtheautonomyofits(future)citizensbyrequiringthattheybeeducatedinsuchawaythattheyaregenuinely(notjustformally)freetoleavethatcommunityiftheywish?Canaculturalgroup–saytheFrancophonecommunityinQuebec–denyindividualslivingwithin‘its’citythefreedomtoadvertisetheirbusinessesinEnglish? Can Native American communities collectively decide to prevent theirindividual members from selling land to outsiders? Putting it in general terms,shouldwe tolerate groups that regard the survival and flourishingof a particularculture as more important than individual autonomy? Or should we uphold therightsofallcitizenstoreviseandquestiontraditionalculturalpractices?Forthosewhose primary focus is on the value of religious, ethnic, linguistic or culturalcommunities, theliberalstatemaylookmoreliketheenemythantheembodiment

of‘community’.Communitarianargumentsinpoliticalphilosophyhavefocusedonthemoraland

politicalsignificanceofgroupsorcollectives.Theyposedeepchallengestoviewsconventionally associated with liberalism. But it would be wrong to think thatliberals deny that significance altogether.One fruit of the communitarian critiquehasbeenanincreasedsensitivitytothewayinwhichindividualwell-beingdependsongroup-levelfactors,suchasculture.TheCanadianphilosopherWillKymlicka,for example, has argued that the very autonomy that liberals care somuch aboutdepends upon cultural membership, on individuals being brought up within areasonablyrichandsecureculturalstructure.Someoneraisedwithinacommunitythatiswitheringawaybeforehereyeslacksmeaningfuloptionsandwillbeunabletomake informedand reflective judgementsabouthowshe is to liveher life.Onthisview,liberalshavereasontohelpminoritygroups,suchastheInuitorFrenchCanadians,protecttheircommunity’swayoflifewheretheyfaceanunfairstruggleagainstthedominantculture.On the one hand, then, liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too

muchcommunity–frompracticesthatstifletheindividual’sfreedomtochooseforherself how she lives her life. On the other hand, liberals may acknowledge theimportance of cultural self-preservation and accord minority groups collectiverightsagainstthemajoritywherethatisrequiredbytheircommitmenttoindividualautonomy. The multicultural nature of the advanced democracies poses deepchallenges to the liberal framework,challenges that Ihavenomore thansketchedout here. Freeing liberalism from communitarian misunderstanding andmisrepresentationallowsustoseemoreclearlytheforceandsignificanceofthosechallenges,andtoconfrontwhatisgenuinelyvaluableincommunitarianthinking.

2Liberalism,thenation-stateandglobaljustice

The fact that today’s liberal democracies are multicultural, with citizens holdingdeeplydivergentvaluesanddoctrines,presentsoneproblemforliberaltheorythathasbeenputintofocusbycommunitarianwritings.Anotherproblemconcernsthescopeof liberalprinciples.Evenifstateswereculturallyhomogeneous,wewouldstillneedtoknowwhyliberalprinciplesofjusticeapplyonlywithinstatesandnotacrosshumanityasawhole.Leavingasidetheissueofmulticulturalism,adefenceofliberalismmightrunas

follows: far frombeinghostileor inimical tocommunity, liberalismcan itselfbeunderstoodasatheoryofcommunity.Itallowsparticular(religious,ethnic,artistic)communities to flourish within the framework of a state built upon respect forindividualautonomy.Moreimportantly,thestateitselfisacommunity:acollectiveenterpriseinwhichcitizensjointlyachievethecommongoodofajustsociety.Inaproperly functioning liberal society, we regard our ‘citizenship identity’ assufficientlyimportantthatwearepreparedtoactsolidaristically,pursuingourself-interestandourconceptionofthegoodonlytotheextentthatthisiscompatiblewithdoingjusticeto–respectingandpromotingtheautonomyof–ourfellowcitizens.People’s shared identity of ‘free and equal citizen’ must take priority over theirmoreparticularisticreligious,ethnicorcultural identities.Anditmusttrumptheireconomicself-interest:thosewhowouldbebetteroffwithoutitmustbewillingtoendorsehowevermuchredistributivetaxationisdemandedbyjustice.This ‘liberalcommunity’ responsecertainlyrefutessomeof themoreconfused

objections to ‘liberal individualism’. But the sophisticated communitarian isunlikely to be satisfied. In her view, this response cheats: it trades on a hiddenpremiseofjustthekindthatsheregardsasimportant–apremiseaboutthemoralsignificanceofparticularcommunities,abouttheimportanceofpeopleidentifyingwith their particular community. ‘True,’ she might say, ‘a liberal state can bepresentedasapoliticalcommunityinthewayyououtline,acollectiveenterpriseinwhich citizens jointly provide the common good of justice to one another. Butnothinginyouraccountsofarexplainswhythosewhohappentoliveinthesamestate – under the same political rules – owe justice to one another rather than toeverybodyelse.NordoIthinkitatalllikelythattheideaofliberalcitizenship,onits own, can motivate people to act justly. In both these ways, from both aphilosophical and a practical point of view, your story is not self-sufficient. Youmust be relying on some more particularistic claim about the moral andmotivationalsignificanceoftheparticularcommunityinwhichpeoplelive.’Theproblem,then,isthattheliberalargumentseemstodependontheimportance

oftheindividual’scapacityforautonomy.ItisthisfeatureofmyfellowcitizensthatI am required to respect and promote. But it isn’t only my fellow citizens who

possess thiscapacity.So too,presumably,doallotherhumanbeings. In that case,whydoIoweautonomy-promotingredistributivetaxationtodisadvantagedfellowBritsbutnottothestarvingoftheThirdWorld?Thereisatheoreticalgapbetweenthe abstract and universal terms of the liberal argument and its presentation as atheory of citizenship, applicable to relations between members of particularpoliticalcommunities.Hereweapproachfromanotheranglesomeoftheissuesbroachedattheendof

Part1(pp.48–54),whenItalkedaboutthedifferencebetween‘social’and‘global’justice.(Readerswantingtothinkseriouslyaboutthoseissueswoulddowelltogobackandconnectupthetwodiscussions.)Weneedtobecareful.Forastart, thoseliberalswhothinkthatweowemoreextensivedutiestoourfellowcitizensthanwedotootherhumanbeingswillprobablyacceptthatwealsoowesomedutiestothoseothers.Anadvocateofliberalcommunityatthelevelofthestateisunlikelytodenythathumanbeingsassuchhaveanyclaimsagainstoneanother.ShewillprobablyinsistonlythatIowemoretomyfellowcitizensthanIdotoothers.(Perhaps,inthecaseofforeigners,Iamobligedonlytorespecttheirnegativerightsandtohelptoavert extreme suffering,whereas Iowemembersofmyownpolitical communitycompliancewithmoredemandingdistributiveprinciples.)Itisalsoimportanttobeclear that some liberalsdo indeedextend the ‘liberalcommunity’argument to theworldasawhole.Theseare‘cosmopolitans’,philosopherswhothinkthatprinciplesofjustice,andconceptionsofcommunity,mustapplyglobally.Theymaykeeptheconcept of ‘citizenship’, but will radically alter its implications by talking about‘worldcitizenship’,demandingthatdistributivejusticeapplynotjustwithinexistingstatesbutacrosstheworldasawhole.It’s alsoworthmaking explicit that even cosmopolitans can accept thatweowe

somedutiestothemembersofourpoliticalcommunity,toourfellowcitizens,thatwedon’towetoeverybodyelse.Afterall,ascitizenswearecollectivelyengagedinthe process of governing ourselves, ofmaking laws, self-imposed constraints onwhatwe,asindividuals,mightotherwisechoosetodo.IfIamobligedtoobeythoselaws,thenpresumablytheobligationisowednottomankindasawhole,buttothosewho,withme,madethelaws,andaresimilarlyobligedtocomplywiththem.Thereare lots of reasonswhy somebodymight obey a law of their state. Because theydon’twant toget caughtbreaking it.Because they think it is the right thing todoanyway. (Mostpeopledon’tmurderothersbecausemurder iswrong,notbecausethereisalawagainstit.)Butsomepeoplesometimesobeythelawforthespecificreasonthattheybelievetheyoweittotheirfellowcitizenstodoso.Thereisalottobesaidaboutwhy theymightowe it to them.Achapteronwhatphilosopherscall‘politicalobligation’wouldsaysomeofit.Herethepointissimplythatthiskindofobligation– theobligation to obey the lawsof one’s state – if it exists, is indeedplausiblyowedtoone’sfellowcitizensandnottoanybodyelse.Cosmopolitanscan

acceptthis.Whattheydon’tacceptisthattherightsanddutiesofdistributivejusticeareclaimedagainst,andowedto,themembersofone’spoliticalcommunity.AsIsaid,weneedtobecareful.Nowlet’sgetbacktothoseliberalswhodothink

that, thoughweowesomeduties toallhumans,weowemoredemanding justice-baseddutiestoourfellowcitizens.Respectforthecapacityforautonomyonitsowncan’tbeenoughtoexplainthedifference.Theremustbesomethingmorallyspecialabout common citizenship,membership of the same state, that explainswhy theyowe each other more. On this view, it is membership of the same politicalcommunity – not the ‘community of humanity’ – that determines people’s moresubstantial rights against, and duties to, one another.Wedon’t havemuch troublewiththeideathatmembersofafamilyareinthekindofparticularisticrelationshipthatgeneratesspecialmoralities.Wefeelobligations tohelpourparents,childrenandsiblingsinwaysthatgobeyondthehelpweowetoothers.Bloodisthickerthanwater. Something analogous applies in the case ofmembership of the same state.Thebondsofcitizenshipareweaker,doubtless, than thosewehave toour family,butstrongerthanthosewehavetomankindasawhole.Buthowisthestate,thepoliticalcommunity,likeafamily?Andcantheabstract

anduniversalliberalidealsofautonomy,equalityandfreedomgeneratethekindofidentification with others, the sense of solidarity or community, that will indeedmotivate people to discharge the duties that liberals believe they owe to oneanother?Hereweturntowardsthesecondstrandinthecommunitarianobjection–thesuspicionthat, if‘liberalcommunity’is towork,ifpeoplearetobewillingtorestrainthepursuitoftheirself-interestforthesakeoftreatingtheirfellowcitizensjustly,theymustshareasenseofcommonidentitythatisricherandmoreinspiringthanthatofmere‘citizenofthesamestate’.Ifit’struethatIcareaboutmyfellowcitizensmorethanIcareaboutotherhumanbeings,that’snotbecausewesubscribetothesameabstractprinciples,andarejointlyinvolvedintheprojectofsustainingaliberalstate.It’sbecausemyfellowcitizensarealsomyfellowcountrymen(and-women). It is because they are British like me, with a shared language, sharedtraditions,acommonhistory, that theyare special tome– special in the requiredsensethatIidentifywiththemenoughtoaccepttherightsanddutiesthattheliberalstory tries toaccount formerely in termsofcommoncitizenship. It isoursharednational identity, our identity asBritish citizens, not the idea of citizenship in theabstract, that is needed to do themotivationalwork. (Of course, the idea that theBritishdohaveacommonidentity–and,totheextentthattheydo,whereitcomesfrom and how it is sustained – is itself controversial. In practice, communalidentities are multiple, overlapping, and constantly being reshaped, partly bypolitical developments – such as the European Union. The politics of collectiveidentityishugelycomplicated.Myaimhereissimplytolayoutthegeneralshapeoftheissueasitarisesinpoliticalphilosophy.)

Although it presents itself in universalistic and abstract terms, the idea of a‘liberal community’ is, the objection goes, premised on something moreparticularistic, something more like the family. As with the family, our sense ofourselvesasmembersofanationisbasedonabeliefinacommonhistory.Itgivesus a sense ofwhowe are.And it generates particularisticmoral ties.We identifywithour state,ourpoliticalcommunity,because,or to theextent that, it coincideswithournation. If ournation andour statedonot coincide,wemightwell try tochange things so that they did. (The conflicts in Europe since the collapse of theSoviet Union have been mainly about people who identify with one another asmembers of the same nation looking to make state and nation coincide.) On thecommunitarianaccount,then,theideaofa‘liberalcommunity’isnotself-sufficient.One cannot account for the special moral relationship, or expect people to bemotivatedasegalitarianliberalswantthemtobe,withoutinvokingaconceptionofcommunitythatgoesbeyondthebareideaofdoingjusticetoone’sfellowcitizens.People’sidentitiesmustbe‘constituted’bysomethingmoreparticularisticthantheabstract idea of ‘citizenship’. Which is the kind of thing communitarians weresayingallalong.Aswith everything else in this book, this is the beginning, not the end, of the

story. Some liberal theorists accept that social justice should be pursued withinparticular states, and that fellow citizens owe special justice-based duties to oneanother.Theymayalsorecognizethatachievingjusticewillnecessitatestateactiontopromoteasenseofpatriotism,counteringthedivisiveinfluenceofclass,cultureandall theother thingsthat tendtoencouragesectional thinking.Somepursuethecosmopolitan route. They accept that peoplemay feel closer to their compatriotsthantoforeigners,butthinkthatthisisafeelingthatoughttobetranscended.Justaspeople, though often tempted, should not show too much favouritism to theirchildren–avoidingnepotismandobservingprinciplesofequalityandimpartialitywhenfillingjobs,forexample–sotheyshouldnotallowthemerefactofcommonnationalitytoomuchweightintheirmoraldeliberation,perhapsnoneatall.Inanycase, isn’t nationality usually a myth – an ‘imagined community’ – constructed,sometimes deliberately, to foster a sense of common identity where none wouldotherwiseexist?Moreover,weallknowhowdangeroustheideaofnationhoodcanbe.(It’ssignificantthatrecentattemptstorevivethemoralsignificanceofthenationtalkabout‘nationality’not‘nationalism’.Contemporaryadvocatesofnationalityarevery keen to distance themselves from the fanatic excesses of ‘blood and soil’nationalism.)Notice,also,thatevencosmopolitanscanarguethatitmakessensefortheworldtobeorganizedintodiscretestates, thatsuchstatesworkbestwhentheycoincide with national groupings, and that members of such states may be bestplacedtohelponeanother.Thiswillbethecaseiftheyaccepttheimpracticabilityofasingle‘worldstate’,thinkthatthewaytogetclosesttoglobaljusticeisforeach

state to look after its ownmembers, and believe that thosewho share a commonnational culture are more likely to do so. Here, nationality, and the world beingdividedintoindividualstatesconstitutedbygroupsofcitizenswithsharedidentities,arevaluedinstrumentally–asameanstoadifferentgoal–notbecausepeopledoreally owe their fellow citizens, or their fellow countrymen (and -women),morethantheyoweanybodyelse.Whatgeneratesasenseofcommonidentity?Whatleadspeopletofeelthekindof

solidaritytowardsoneanotherthatisrequiredforthemtobemotivatedtotreateachother in accordance with the demanding principles of redistributive liberalism?Warsaregood.ItisnoaccidentthatsupportfortheBritishwelfarestatepeakedjustaftertheSecondWorldWar.There’snothinglikeawartobuildasenseofcommonpurpose,ofbeinginthesameboat,andtogeneratethekindofinteractionbetweenpeoplethatbreaksdowndivisivesocialboundaries.Asthatfeelinghasweakened–and as society has become more pluralistic and diverse, less culturallyhomogeneous–so thecase forsomekindofnationalorcivicservicehasgrownstronger. It is easynow for peoplenot to feel themselves tobemembersof theirstate, to identify essentially with more local and particularistic groupings –ethnicity, religion, lifestyle. Requiring them to devote a year of their lives tosomething conceived and presented as ‘national service’ – even if this weredischargedatthelocallevel–mightfosterinthemasenseof‘citizenshipidentity’.Thiswould,of course, restrict their freedom.Some liberalsmightobject to it onthose grounds. But liberals don’t just care about freedom, they care also aboutjustice.Ifpeoplewillbemotivatedtoactjustlyonlytowardsthosewithwhomtheyshare a sense of common identity, and if compulsory national service would beconducive to that sense, then the liberal should bewilling to accept the freedom-restrictingimplication.(Forthecosmopolitan,ontheotherhand,thepromotionofnationalorcitizenshipidentityislikelytoseemillegitimatelyparochial–partoftheproblem,notthesolution.)

Conclusion

Political communitariansmay feel that thisdiscussionhasmissed thepoint. It hasfocused on the dispute (or apparent dispute) between liberalism and itsphilosophicallycommunitariancritics.Ithasexplainedhowliberalismseesthestateas a community. And it has suggested a way in which this conception may beparasitic on a sense of common identity – arguably threatened by deep culturaldiversity–thattheliberaltendstoleaveoutofthestory.Forsome,thiswillallseemtooabstractandgeneral.Thekindofcommunity theyare interested in issmaller-scale, more particularistic and more local – the family, the church, theneighbourhood.Ihavesaidthatliberalismhasaproblemexplainingwhyweshouldcare especially about our fellow citizens rather than humanity as a whole. But itmightbeobjectedthatonlyanout-of-touchphilosophercouldthinkthatthatwastheproblem.Therealissueisthatthestateornationisalreadytoodiffuseanddistantfor people to feel a sense of belonging and fellow feeling of the kind that willpreventthemslidingintoindividualismofthewrong–alienated,egoistic–kind.On this view, the redistributive state justified by appeal to the idea of common

citizenship is not motivationally sustainable. For a time, after the war, there wasindeed,intheUK,asenseofnationalsolidarityandcommonpurpose,realizedin–andtosomeextentfosteredby–thewelfarestate.Butthatcouldn’tlast.Moreover,because it tookover thefunctionsof localandvoluntaryassociations, thewelfarestateunderminedthemoreparticularisticformsofcommunitythatarebetterable,inthelongrun,toprovidepeoplewithasenseofthemselvesasmorethanisolatedindividuals. The individual’s conception of herself as ‘citizen’ does indeed implymembershipofaparticularcommunity,but thecommunity it impliesmembershipof – the state – is too bureaucratic, impersonal and distant to counter thedisintegrationofsocietyintoindividuals,oratbestnuclearfamilies,seekingtheirownprivateself-interest,unhappybecausetheyfeelthattheirliveslackthesenseofmeaning and purpose that comes from involvement in political activity andparticipation inwhatpolitical theorists call ‘civil society’.Nationalpolitics is tooremotetobeofinterest.Politicsmustbereturnedtoitsproper,human,levelifwearetocombatgrowingalienationandapathy.Thiskindofcommunitarianwantsthereinvigorationofwhat the Irish conservativeEdmundBurke (1729–97) called the‘littleplatoons’,formsofcivilassociationbetweenthefamilyandthestate.Thatandthestrengtheningoflocalcommunities,therestorationofa‘senseofcommunity’inindividual neighbourhoods: community policing, community schools, communitypolitics,communitydevelopment,communityactivism.Fewwoulddenythevalueoftheindividual’ssenseofbelonging,ofidentification

withandattachmenttoothersbeyondherimmediatefamily.Butweareheremovinginthedirectionofempiricalquestions,betteransweredbythepoliticalsociologist

than the political philosopher. What kinds of belonging, identification andattachment are sustainable, underwhat conditions, and how do they relate to oneanother?Are theymutually reinforcing?Do peoplewho leave the private spheresufficientlytogetinvolvedinlocalcommunityinitiativestendalsototakethewiderviewmoregenerally?Inthatcase,theirmembershipofandparticipationinthiskindof community-based activity form no obstacle to theirmanifesting solidarity andfraternity at the level of the state also. Are local associations schools forcitizenship? Or do local and national community pull in opposing directions?Communityisaboutmembershipandinclusion.Butthatmeansitisalsoaboutnon-membership and exclusion. Local neighbourhoods are relatively homogeneous,bothculturallyandeconomically.Thoseofsimilarrace,religionandwealthtendtoliveclosetooneanother.Ifitdoesindeedmatter,asitmusttonationalpoliticians,thattherebeafeelingofcommonidentityacrossthecitizenryasawhole–sothatitmakessensetoarichCatholicinoneareathatsomeofthemoneysheearnsinthemarket be redistributed to an unemployedMuslim in another –wemust not losesight of the potentially divisive and unequalizing consequences of too muchemphasis on the local community, or on other identities that might tend to pullpeopleawayfromtheircommoncitizenship.Meanwhile,as‘globalization’gatherspaceandtechnologicaldevelopmentsmake

it easier to identify with people across the world, the idea that even the state ornationrepresentsa‘community’ofanygreatmoralsignificancecan itselfstart toseem out dated. If individuals are to transcend their particular selfish interests,taking thewiderviewandadoptingamoreother-regardingperspective, then it isthe ‘community of humanity’ that should be the proper subject of their concern.Indeed,formanyofmystudents,motivatedaboveallbyenvironmentalissues,that‘community’extendsnotonlybeyondtheirfellowcitizensorfellownationals,butalsobeyondtheliving.Itcompassesalsofuturegenerations.

Furtherreading

ShlomoAvineriandAvnerde-Shalit’s(eds.),CommunitarianismandIndividualism(OxfordUniversityPress1992)helpfullygathers together bite-sized chunks fromtheleadingprotagonistsintheso-calledliberal–communitariandebate.Itisthemostefficientwaytoreadmostofthekeyprimarytextsonthephilosophicalside.JohnRawls’spoliticalliberalism,andJosephRaz’sperfectionistliberalismaresetoutinPoliticalLiberalism(ColumbiaUniversityPress1993)andTheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford University Press 1986) respectively. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift’sLiberals and Communitarians (2nd edn, Blackwell 1996) provides chapter-lengthaccountsoftheirpositions,aswellasfullerdiscussionoftheotherissuestouchedon here. Their ‘Rawls and Communitarianism’, in Samuel Freeman (ed.), TheCambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press 2002), is a useful

overview.DanielBell’sCommunitarianismanditsCritics(OxfordUniversityPress1993)iswrittenasadialoguesetinaParisbrasserie,andiscorrespondinglyfuntoread.Onthepoliticalcommunitarianside,thekeytextisAmitaiEtzioni’sTheSpiritof

Community(CrownPublishers1993),whichincludes‘TheResponsiveCommunityPlatform’. Elizabeth Frazer ’s The Problems of Communitarian Politics (OxfordUniversityPress1999) isdifficult,butagreatattempt to integrateanddisentanglethe bewildering variety of things that get called ‘communitarianism’.http://communitariannetwork.orgtakesyouto‘TheCommunitarianNetwork’.WillKymlicka’sMulticultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics ofDiversity (OxfordUniversityPress2007) isanexcellentcollectionofessaysbyaleading philosopher of multiculturalism. Culture and Equality (Polity 2000), byBrianBarry,isanentertaininglyscathingcritiqueofmuchthatgetssaidinthenameof multiculturalism, and is itself subject to entertainingly scathing criticism bycontributors toMulticulturalismReconsidered (Polity 2002), edited byPaulKelly.Among Barry’s critics is Bhikhu Parekh whose Rethinking Multiculturalism:Cultural Diversity and Political Theory is well worth a read (2nd edn, PalgraveMacmillan 2005). DavidMiller ’sCitizenship and National Identity (Polity 2000)providessophisticatedbutcleardiscussionsofwhatitsaysit’sabout.

Part5

Democracy

Democracyreallyisthe‘motherhoodandapplepie’ofpolitics.Whoobjectstoit?Thefactthatallsortsofdoubtfulregimescallthemselvesdemocratictestifiestothemoralandrhetoricalforceoftheideathatpoliticalpowershouldbeinthehandsofthe people (Greek kratos = ‘power ’, demos = ‘people’; so, literally, ‘peoplepower ’).Indeed,theconventionalwisdomhasitthatit’suniversallyvaluable,goodforeverybody.Sogood,indeed,thatsomestateshavecometoregardexportingitasalegitimategoalofforeignpolicy.Meanwhile ‘democracy’hasbecomeratherbluntasan ideal,because it isoften

invoked as a catch-all term referring to any aspect of a political system, or of asociety,thatthespeakerthinksgood.Sometimes,ofcourse,thisattempttoprofitbyits rhetorical appeal is so blatant as to become ridiculous. There can’t have beenmany who agreed with the insistence of the pro-hunt lobby that the law to banhuntingwithhoundsdeprivedtheBritishpeopleofademocraticright.Perhapsthereis a right tohunt, andperhaps thegovernmentdidwrongnot to recognize it.Butwas that law,announced inamanifestoandcarriedbyamajorityof theHouseofCommons,undemocratic?OrthinkabouttheallegedrighttocarrygunsintheUS.Onemayacceptorrejectthatright,andone’sgroundsfordoingsomayormaynotinvoketheConstitution.Butit’shardtoseehowasocietythatallowsitsmemberstocarrygunsismoredemocraticthanonethat(democratically)decidesnotto.Thisuniversalreverencefordemocracy,andthistendencytocallallgoodthings

democratic, is rather ironic.Today it seemsobvious, amatterof simplecommonsense,thatdemocracyisagoodthing.Formostofhumanhistorytheoppositehasbeenthecase.Itwasobvioustoanyclear-thinkingpersonthatdemocracy,shoulditevercomeabout,wouldbeadisaster.Howonearthcouldanyonethinkitdesirableto give power to the people – to the unruly, ignorant, self-interested mob? Thepeople were poor, and there were lots of them. Any state foolish enough to putpowerintheirhandswouldquicklyself-destructasthewealthandcivilizationbuiltup over centuries by an aristocratic elite were destroyed in a short-term feedingfrenzybytheuneducatedmasses.Thathistoryshouldgiveuspause.Don’tworry.I’mnotgoingtotrytopersuade

readers that they don’t really believe in democracy after all. But, given thiswidespread and rather unthinking endorsement, it does seem appropriate to spark

someanti-democraticintuitions,ifonlytoclarifywhyexactlywewantit–andhowmuch of it we want. For some, the reason why the pessimists were wrong – thereasonwhydemocracydidnot lead todestruction– is thatwedon’t have all thatmuch of it. For others, though, the problem is quite the reverse. What needsexposing is excessive complacency about the extent to which Western ‘liberaldemocracies’realizethevaluesofdemocracy.Forthem,thediscussionthatfollowsmayrevealhowfarwearefromenjoyingmembershipofagenuinelydemocraticstate.Oneimportantissue–thescopeofdemocraticprinciples–willnotbeaddressed.

I explained in the introduction that this book would focus on politics in theconventionalsensethatlinksittotherelationbetweencitizensandstates.Thatfocuswillbe toonarrowforsome,and thereare indeed important issuesaboutwhetherdemocratic thinking should apply more widely. Within states, perhaps it shouldapplytoworkplaces,firms,families.Afullydemocraticsociety,perhaps,wouldseedemocraticvaluespermeatingourunderstandingsandpracticesoftheinstitutionsofcivil society.Beyond states, there has recently been a gooddeal of interest in theideaofglobalor cosmopolitandemocracy (analogous toglobalor cosmopolitanjusticediscussedattheendofPart1.)Policiesadoptedinonecountrycanhavehugeimpactsonmembersofothers(thinkaboutenvironmentalissues,forexample)andit’splausibletothinkthatdecisionsshouldbemadebyallthosewhoseinterestswillbeaffectedbythem.Sothereareobviouslybigandimportantquestionsaboutwhoexactlyconstitutesthe‘demos’in‘democracy’(including,incidentally,membersoffuturegenerationswhoaren’taroundtospeakforthemselves.)AlthoughIcan’tgetintothem,Ihopeatleastthatthischapterwillhelpreaderswhentheycometothinkabouttheseotherquestions.

Whatisdemocracy?

‘Ruleof thepeople,bythepeople,for thepeople.’ThedefinitionofUSPresidentAbrahamLincoln(1809–65)isagoodplacetostart–aslongaswe’reclearthatit’sthe‘bythepeople’bitthatisimportant.Allsystemsofgovernmentaregoingtobegovernment of the people; it is the people who are being governed. And, inprinciple, a benevolent dictator or an enlightened aristocracy could rule for thepeople.True,wemightthinkthosescenariosabitimprobable.Ademocraticregimeisperhapsmorelikelytorulefor thepeoplethanadictatorshiporanaristocracy,and thatmight be a good reason for preferring democracy.Butwhat one is thenpreferring ispreciselyruleby thepeople–apolitical system inwhich thepeoplegovernthemselves.If this is what democracy means, then one is immediately confronted by a

problem.Eventhosepolitiesthathavethebestclaimtocallthemselvesdemocraticcanhardlybeseenaspureexamplesofcollectiveself-rule.Whatreallyhappensisthateverynowandagainthereareelectionsduringwhichasubsetofthepopulationvotestodecidewhichmicroscopicallysmallsubsetofthepopulationisgoingtobemaking the decisions for the next few years. The winners of the election havetypicallyattractedonlyaminorityofthosewhoactuallyvote,andanevensmallerproportionoftheelectorateasawhole.Theseelectionshappeninacontextwheremuchof themedia is ownedbyawealthy elitewith clearpolitical interestsof itsownandwherepoliticalpartiesarefreetospendonadvertisingwhateverpeoplearewillingtogivethem.Isthiswayofgoverningreally‘peoplepower ’?Theobviousresponsetothisscepticismistopreachpracticality.Genuine‘ruleby

thepeople’mighthavebeenviableinsmallcity-states,wherecitizensreallycouldassembletodeliberatecollectively,andasequals,ontheircollectiveaffairs,butthesize and complexity of today’s politiesmake this kind of direct democracy quiteunrealistic. Few see any prospect of getting away from indirect or representativedemocracyandreturningpowertothepeopleinanythoroughgoingway.Thetimethatpoliticaldecision-makingwouldtake,andtheexpertisethatitwouldrequiretodoitatallwell,makethatanon-starter.Theissueonthepoliticalagendaishowtoget people to bother to vote once every four or five years. In that context, anysuggestionofamovetowardsmoredirectandegalitarianformsofdemocracy(atleast on the national scale) can look utopian. The citizens of ancientAthensmayhavebeenable toassembleanddeliberate,but theywereeffectivelygentlemenofleisure – it was women and slaves who did the work – and the issues theyweredecidingwerefarsimplerand less technical than thoseconfrontingcontemporarypolities.It’s important to keep principled considerations separate from feasibility

constraints.It’sespeciallysointhecaseofdemocracy,becauseit’ssohardtodo.Of

course,intheendwehavetogoforthebestrealizationofdemocracythatwecanget, the best that’s within our feasibility set. There will be a lot of disagreementaboutwhatisandisnotfeasible.Muchpoliticalargumentisaboutwhatcanbemadetowork(ratherthanaboutwhatwouldbegoodifitcouldbemadetowork).There’snothingwrongwiththat.But,whenwedopoliticalphilosophy,it’simportantnottoworryaboutfeasibilityconstraintstooearlyintheprocess,asitwere,importantnottolettheminterferewithourunderstandingofwherethevalueslie.Firstweshouldthink about democratic values and how, in principle, theymight best be realized.Thenwe should look at theworld andworkoutwhat kindof democracy ismostlikelytogetclosesttotheideal.The key point about ‘rule by the people’ is that it is a procedure for making

politicaldecisions.Itdirectsourattentionawayfromtheircontenttothewaylawsaremade–inparticular,towhomakesthem.Conceivingdemocracyasadecision-makingprocedureisagoodwayofkeepingclearaboutthevariousargumentsforandagainstit.Isitindeedgoodthatthepeoplethemselvesshouldmakethelawstheyare to live under? We can divide answers to that question into two kinds. Aprocedure can be valued instrumentally, because of the outcomes it is likely toproduce.Oritcanbevaluedintrinsically,foritsownsake,ongroundsindependentoftheoutcomesit tendstoproduce.Perhapsdemocracyisgoodforbothkindsofreason. Perhaps it tends to produce good decisions, or stable government, orenlightened citizens, and it respects people’s right to participate in collectivedecision-makingor is the fairestwayofdistributingpoliticalpower.Perhapsnot.Muchofthischapterwillbeexploringthesedifferentkindsofjustification.Regarding democracy as a procedure throws up a possible tension between

democracyandpoliticalphilosophy.Thephilosophertriestodeliverrightanswers,whereas the democrat wants us all to contribute equally to delivering an answer.That tension finds its clearest expression in Plato’sRepublic, where the father ofphilosophy explicitly rejects democracy in favour of rule by a philosopher-king.(That’s obviously a terrible idea. Plato (Greek, c.427–347 bc) thought that onlyphilosopherspossessedtheexpertisesafelytoguidetheshipofstate intoharbour.TheonesIknowhaveproblemsrememberingwheretheylefttheirbicycles.)Whatwe want, according to Plato, are wise political decisions, correct answers to thethornyquestionsthatconfrontevenrelativelysmallandhomogeneousGreekcity-states. But, for many, democracy isn’t about making wise political decisions. It’sabout the people making their own decisions. The legitimacy of law, for manydemocrats,dependsnotonitsbeingright,butonitsbeingaproperexpressionofwhat thepeoplewant,of thepopularwill–whetherornot thatwould standup tophilosophicalscrutiny.Herewearetalkingaboutthedifferencebetweencorrectnessandlegitimacy.And

oneimportantthingthatphilosopherstrytoofferisacorrecttheoryoflegitimacy.

What is it that makes democratic decisions indeed legitimate? What kinds ofresponsivenesstothepopularwillareinfactnecessaryorsufficientforalawtobejustified? These are unavoidably philosophical questions. The legitimacy of adecisioncan indeedbe independentof its rightness–but therecan stillbea rightansweraboutwhatmakesadecision legitimate.And,ofcourse,onecanperfectlywellhaveviewsaboutwhatmakesadecisionlegitimateandaboutwhatwouldbetherightdecisionforapoliticalcommunitytotakeonanyparticularissue.Mostofushavebothofthese.Sophilosophers,andeverybodyelse,canquitecoherentlyargueandvoteforaparticularoutcomeastherightanswerwhilealsoinsistingthatonlysomewaysofmaking suchdecisions are legitimate – and insisting that decisionsmade that way remain legitimate even if they are incorrect. The core issue indemocratic theory is why it is valuable that people, or ‘the people’, should beinvolvedinmakingtherulestowhichtheyaresubject.

Degreesofdemocracy

As away in, let’s think about the variousways inwhich the democraticness of apolitical system is a matter of degree. It’s tempting to think that either a state isdemocratic or it isn’t. In fact, however, exploring the different ways in whichdecisions, or states,might be less ormore democratic helpfully forces us to getclearonwhatwemeanwhenwetalkaboutdemocracyinthefirstplace.Onelessonthat some learn from theexercise is that, even thoughdemocracy is indubitablyagoodthing,theydonotwanttoomuchofit.Here, then,arefourdimensionsalongwhich itseemsthatsocieties,orpolitical

systems, or the decisions produced by those systems, can be considered less ormore‘democratic’.

1Directnessorindirectnessofthedecision

Decision-makingisdirectlydemocraticwhenthepeopleasawholevotedirectlyonthe issues under consideration. It is indirectly democratic when they vote forrepresentativeswhomakethedecisionsontheirbehalf.TheUSandtheUKoperatesystemsofrepresentativedemocracy.OccasionallytheUKholdsareferendumonaparticularissue,wherethematterisfelttobesufficientlyimportantorcontroversialto require a direct mandate from the people as a whole for the decision to belegitimate. Decisions made by referendum, where the people’s will is expresseddirectly, are in an obvious sense more ‘democratic’ than those made byrepresentatives.That isnot,ofcourse, tosay that theyarebetter inanyway.Theymay not be better decisions. Referendamay not even be a better way ofmakingdecisions.Buttheyareamoredemocraticway.Theindirectnessofadecisionlessenstheextenttowhichthepresentwillofthe

majority of the voters controls political outcomes, and the extent to which adecision is direct or indirect is itself scalar (‘scalar ’= ‘not all-or-nothing butadmittingofdegree’).Imagineapolitywheretheelectorateasawholevotesforanassemblywhichvotes foranassemblywhichvotes foranassembly…Themorelevels ofmediationbetween the people themselves and the decisions that emerge,thelessdirectlydemocratic,andthelessdemocratic,thesystem.It’s worth thinking about the relationship between ‘direct democracy’ and

‘participatorydemocracy’.Importantstrandsindemocratictheoryaresuspiciousofrepresentativegovernmentandinsistontheimportanceofagenuinelyparticipatorypolitical system, where the people as a whole engage in political debate and aredirectly involved in political decision-making – rather than merely choosingrepresentatives,whodecide thingson theirbehalf, every fewyears.Discussionofthisapproachtypicallyfocusesonitsfeasibilityratherthanitsdesirability.‘Well,itwould be nice if we could all assemble and deliberate and decide issues forourselves, but of course that’s completely impractical in the modern world. Theissuesarefartoocomplextobedecidedbyordinaryvotersandinanycasepeoplenowadaysjustdon’thavethetimetodevotetopoliticalaffairs.’But thereality is that,givenwherewehavegot towith informationtechnology,

directdemocracyisperfectlyfeasible.Itwouldnotbehardtoequipallhouseholdswith computer terminals through which all people of voting age could directlyregistertheirvotes.WecouldhaveanelectedParliamenttodebateissuesandframelegislation, but all proposed laws would be put to the people as a whole forendorsement. In effect, there would be a referendum on all decisions that arecurrentlymadeintolawbyrepresentatives.Callthis‘teledemocracy’.Suchasystemwould be amore direct form of democracy thanwe have at themoment. And itwould,ontheaccountofferedhere,bemoredemocratic.

Butwoulditqualifyasaparticipatorydemocracy?Thatisnotsoclear.It’squitepossible thatvoters ina teledemocracywouldget todecidedirectlywhat the lawsarewithoutanyparticipationinpoliticsbeyondtheclickingofacomputermouse.Theydon’tneedtobeinformedabouttheissues;theydon’tneedtohaveheardorengaged in any debate. They don’t need to have done any of the things typicallyregarded as important by theorists of participatory democracy. Of course, onemight hope thatmaking democracymore directwould also lead to its becomingmoreparticipatoryintheseothersenses.Givenagreatersayinpolitics,itisoftenargued,citizenswillbecomemoreinvolved,engagedandactive;currentlowlevelsof interest in politics are the result of the way decisions are made and can beexpectedtochangeover timeasordinarypeopleare trustedmore.Maybe.But theconceptual point stands: the directness of a decision-making process is a ratherformalproperty,tellingusnothingabouttheinputtodecisionsotherthanthatitisadirect expression of the people’s will. Advocates of participatory democracytypically want something more or other than direct democracy – they want anengagedcitizenrygettinginvolvedinpoliticsinwaysthatgobeyondregisteringavote.Distinguishing in this way between direct democracy and participatory

democracymaymaketheformerlessattractive.Ifitwouldindeedactasacatalystfor political involvement of other kinds, then perhaps moves towardsteledemocracywouldbeagoodthing.Buttakenonitsown,andgivencurrentlowlevels of political awareness,manywould be doubtful about themerits of such away of making decisions. I don’t trust ‘the people’ to use their interactive votewiselywhenchoosingbetweenwould-bepopstarsinTVshows;it’sgottoberiskyletting them make laws by similar means. Suppose the choice were between (a)genuine but short-lived participation in choosing representatives who then makelawsand(b)directvotesonlawsviacomputerterminalbycitizenswithlittleornoknowledgeorinterest.Thelattermaybemore‘democratic’,buttheformerwouldbebetter.

2Accountabilityofrepresentatives

Assumingwehave somekindof representative system–and remember that evenmyteledemocracyhasrepresentativestoframethelegislationonwhichweallvote–thereisanissueabouttheextenttowhichthoserepresentativesareaccountabletotheir electorates. At one extreme, we could imagine a system where allrepresentativesweresubjecttoimmediaterecall.Assoonastheydidanythingtheirconstituents didn’t like, those constituents could haul themback and replace themwithothersmoreresponsive to thepopularwill.Thiswouldgiveconstituents fulldemocraticcontrolovertheirrepresentatives.Therepresentativeswouldeffectivelybeturnedintodelegates,mandatedtovoteparticularways.Attheotherextreme,wecould imagine a systemwhere representativeswere indeed elected, but theywereelectedforlife.Onceinpost,theywouldhavecompleteindependence,andwouldbefreetodecideissuesastheysawfit,withoutanyfurtherdemocraticcheckontheirauthority.Thatprocedurewouldbemoredemocraticthanoneinwhichthereisnovote on who gets to make the decisions, but less democratic than one in whichrepresentatives are accountable to those who elected them. In between these twoextremes lies something like our current system, which we may think of asretrospectiverecall:votersgetthechancetocastjudgementontheirrepresentativesatelections,andthrowtherascalsoutiftheydon’tlikethem–electingadifferentsetofrascalsintheirplace.Here too we might not want too much democracy. A system in which

representatives act asdelegates,mandated tovote along lines fixed in advancebytheir constituents, or inwhich theyare subject to immediate recall (i.e., sackedassoonas theydoanything theirconstituentsdon’t like), isverydemocratic,butnotobviously very sensible. Formany, the reason to have representatives in the firstplace is that theyare likely tobe inabetterposition tomakegooddecisions thantheir constituents are. This was certainly the view of the Irish philosopher (andpolitician) Edmund Burke (1729–97). Addressing the voters of Bristol in 1774,Burkefamouslytoldthem:‘Yourrepresentativeowesyou,nothisindustryonly,buthis judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to youropinion.’ But why might one think a representative’s judgement likely to be anybetterthanthatofthepeoplewhovotedforhim?A conventional answer to that question holds that the whole point of

parliamentarydebate(fromparler,Frenchfor‘totalk’,soaparliamentisnotbadlytranslatedasatalkingshop)isthatittendstoyieldwiserjudgementsthanwouldbeachieved by the mere aggregation of pre-reflective preferences. Representativesmandatedtovoteacertainway,orliabletoberecalledassoonastheydepartfromtheirconstituents’wishes,arehardlygoingtobeengaginginacareful,disinterestedattempttofilteroutbadargumentsandactongoodones.OK,giventhewayparties

and political patronage works, one can be sceptical about the extent to whichexistingparliamentsfollowthiskindofdeliberativeideal.Butonewouldhavetobeextremely cynical about contemporary politics not to acknowledge any epistemicvalue in the kind of debate that goes on among representatives in parliamentarysystems.(‘Epistemic’=‘involvingknowledge’.)Doesthiskindofargumentforrepresentativegovernment,andagainsttoomuch

accountability, presume that representatives are inherentlywiser than, or in otherwayssuperiorto,theirconstituents?Notnecessarily.Itcouldsimplybethattheyaregiven the time to think about the issues and process relevant information.Representative government could be justified simply by appeal to the division oflabour. Many political issues are complicated and technical. Rather than haveeverybodydevote scarce time to thinkingabout them, itmakes sense to identifyafewhundredandpaythemtodothethinking,fulltime,forus.Takenonitsown,ofcourse,thisargumentsuggeststhatitwouldbeallrightforourdecision-makerstobe selected randomly. If the case for representativegovernmentwere entirely thatit’sefficient togive somepeople the specific jobofdoingourpoliticaldecision-makingforus,thenarandomcross-sectionoftheelectoratecouldbeexpectedtodothe job perfectly well. (Some have suggested that the British second legislativechamber,theHouseofLords,bereplacedbyabodyofthiskind.)Ifyouhavedoubtsabout that kind of selection procedure, that’s probably because you do in factbelieve that elected representatives are likely to be different from – better atdecision-makingthan–theaveragecitizen.

3Equality(ofopportunity)forinfluence

Apoliticalsystemismoredemocraticthemoreitscitizenshaveequalopportunityforpoliticalinfluence.Equalitywillreappearsoon,asacoredemocraticvalue,butwe can begin to get a sense of its centrality by noting that the degree to whichdemocracyitselfisachievedseemstodepend,inpart,ontheextenttowhichcitizensparticipateequallyinthemakingofpoliticaldecisions.Imaginetwosocieties,bothwiththesameinstitutionsofrepresentativegovernment,thesameelectorallaws,andeach respecting the democratic idea of ‘one person, one vote’. In one of thosesocietiesallcitizenshavebeeneducated toa levelwhere theyareable to read thenewspapers,tounderstandandassesstheargumentsputtothembythosecompetingforvotes,andtocontributetopoliticaldiscussioniftheywantto.Allalsohavejobsthat give them roughly equal amounts ofmoney and leisure. In the other society,half the population has acquired the education they need to make and weigh uppoliticalarguments,but theotherhalf is innumerateandilliterate.Thisdivision ismatched by jobs that yield very unequal amounts of money and leisure: half thepopulation earns a comfortable living from jobs that yield ample time off forpoliticalreflection,whiletheotherhalfworksallhoursjusttokeepthewolffromthe door. Both countries hold general elections at the same time.Which result ismoredemocratic?Ifsomearesopoorthattheyspendalltheirtimeworryingaboutwherethenext

mealiscomingfrom,whileothersaretrainedfrombirthtothinkaboutandstudypoliticalissues,andtodeveloptheskillsneededtopresenttheirviewsinacoherentandplausiblemanner,thentheyarehardlyabletoactasequalcitizensintheprocessof self-rule.Thepoliticaldecisions thataremadewillnot reflect theviewsof thepeopleasawhole–theywillreflecttheviewsofthatsubsetofthepeoplewhohavethetimeandenergyandskilltodevotetothem.Thosedecisionsarelessthanfullydemocratic.This is, of course, the beginning rather than the end of the story. Interesting

detailedissuesremain.Weknow,forexample,thatthereisasignificantcorrelationbetweenpeople’ssocioeconomicpositionandthelikelihoodoftheirvoting,and,intheUS,betweenthatpositionandtheirevenbeingregisteredtovote.Doesthisshowthatsocioeconomic inequality impactson theextent towhichpeoplehaveequalityofopportunitytovote?Notnecessarily.Itshowsthateconomicinequalitytranslatesintoequalityofpoliticalinput,but,takingthe‘opportunity’bitseriously,wehavetoadmitthepossibilitythatsomeofthosewhochoosenottovote(ortoregister)aredoingjustthat:choosing.Whenassessingthedemocraticnessofpoliticaldecision-makingalongtheequalitydimension,isitequalityofpoliticalinputthatweshouldbeinterestedin,orequalityofopportunityforinput?Andhowcanwetellwhentwopeoplehavereallyhadthesameopportunity?

There is also a more general question about whether we should conceivedemocratic citizenship in egalitarian or sufficientarian terms. (If you don’t knowwhat this means, look at pp. 131–2.) Does it really matter whether citizens haveequality,whetherofpoliticalinputorofopportunityforsuchinput?Oristherealpoint that all should reach some threshold level? Some theorists resist thesuggestionthatequalityunderstoodinastrictanddistributivesensehasimplicationsfortheextenttowhichapoliticalregime,orparticulardecision,canbesaidtobedemocratic.Rather,forthem,whatmattersisthatallhavewhatevertheyneedtoactproperlyascitizens–therequisitefreedoms,theeducationtoenablethemtoassessoptions,andsoon.Aslongasallhavethatthresholdof‘citizenship-goods’,thenthesociety can be said to be fully democratic. Others disagree. Equality really doescome into the story,because it really is important thatcitizensareableequally totake part in political decision-making.And political influence is to some extent apositionalgood.(Seepp.124–7.)Howinfluentialmyviewswillbedependsnotjustonmyinput,butonmyinputrelativetothatofothers.Ifonepartyhasverywealthysupporterswhocan fundbig advertising campaigns,while anotherhas to relyondonationsfromordinarycitizens,thenthelatterwillbelessinfluentialthanitwouldbeinamoreequalsituation.Reformsaimedatlimitingcampaigncontributionsinthe US should not be thought of as simply levelling down. Those with fewerpolitical resourcesat theirdisposal aremadebetteroff– theextent towhich theycan influence public debate is increased – when others are deprived of theopportunitytodrownthemout.(Rawlsthinkssomethinglikethis.Althoughheputspolitical rights like freedom of expression in his first principle of justice,whichsuggeststhattheycannotbetradedofffordistributivegoals,healsoinsiststhatthepoliticallibertiesmustbegiventheir‘fairvalue’,andrecognizestheimpactonthatvalueof theresourcesthatcitizenscanusetobackthemup.Rawlsis infavourofcampaign finance reform, and, more generally, has grounds for restrictinginequalitywhere thatundermines the fairvalueofpeople’spolitical liberties.TheUS SupremeCourt continues to hold that attempts to limit political contributionsviolatetheconstitutionalrighttofreedomofexpression,whileUSpoliticiansshownointerestinlimitinginequalityondemocraticgrounds.)

4Scopeofauthorityofdemocraticwill

However democraticallywemake our decisions –whether directly or indirectly,whatever the accountability of our representatives, and however equally orunequally citizens are able to influence the decisions that aremade – there is anissue about which decisions should be made by democratic procedures. Judgingwhatshouldbethescopeofdemocraticdecision-makingisaseparatematterfromthinkingabouthowdecisionswithinthatscopeshouldbemade.Onecouldbekeenon thoroughly democratic procedures, but think that they should apply only to anarrow range of issues. Or one could believe that a very wide range of mattersshouldbedecidedbydemocraticmeans,but insist that thosemeansshouldbe lessdemocraticthanotherswouldlike.The real issuehere is theproper scopeof politics.Whichmatters are ‘public’,

where that means something like ‘legitimately up for political decision and stateaction’,andwhich‘private’,amatterforindividualstodecideforthemselves?This,ofcourse, isahugequestion.Thepoint fornowissimply that the issueofwhichmattersshouldbedecideddemocraticallytypicallyarisesonlyafteronehasdecidedwhichshouldbedecidedpolitically.Sowemightwellthinkthataperson’ssexlifeisamatterfor themalone.Apolitydoesnothaveacollectivesexlifeof thekindthatwouldmake it appropriate to decide suchmatters politically. In that case,wewould not want decisions about who went to bed with whom to be decideddemocratically.Butthatwouldbebecausewedidnotwantthatissueonthepoliticalagenda at all. It wouldn’t be an argument against democracy in particular. Anddemocracy might still be the best way of deciding those matters that are indeedpublicorpolitical–wherecoordinationisrequiredorwhereweascitizenshavealegitimateinterestinregulatingoneanother ’sactions.Restrictionsonthescopeofdemocraticdecisioncanusefullybedividedintotwo

kinds.Somearejustifiedbyappealtotheidealofdemocracyitself.Supposethatthecitizenry of a state collectively decided to deprive some subgroup of the right tovote, or the right to stand for office, or the right to freedomof expression.Thatdecisionwould itself denymembers of that group those things that constitute theideal of democracy.Though thedecisionmight bemadedemocratically, itwouldnonethelessviolatedemocraticprinciples.Allowing itsmembers tovote,or standforoffice,orsaywhattheythinkaboutthepowersthatbe,ispartofwhatitmeansforastatetobedemocraticinthefirstplace.Todenymembersthoserightswould,ineffect,betodenythemmembershipofademocraticstate,andastatethatdeniedsomeofthosesubjecttoitslawstherighttoparticipateinmakingthoselawswouldthenceasetobeademocracy.Mosttheoristsholdthatdemocraticauthoritydoesnotextend to self-abolition – so the people cannot legitimately decide, even bydemocratic means, to deprive themselves of those rights that are constitutive of

democracyinthefirstplace.Butnotallrestrictionsonthescopeofthedemocraticwillderivefromtheideal

ofdemocracyitself.IsuggestedinPart1thattheremightbenothingundemocraticabout a polity’s deciding to deprive its members of freedom of sexuality (or ofreligion).Ademocraticdecision todeprivehomosexualsof theright tocampaignpoliticallyforchangesinthelawwoulditselfcontravenedemocraticprinciples.Butdepriving themof the freedom togo tobedwith their preferredpartners, thoughperhaps unjust, does not obviously violate democratic values. It’s not respect fordemocracythatrequiresustograntsexualfreedoms.Rather,thislookslikeacasewhere we are, rightly, limiting the sway of democratic values – preventing ‘thepeople’fromexercisingpowerinacertainareaoflifeonthegroundsthatthatareais,orshouldbe,‘private’.In an influential article called ‘Taking Rights Seriously’, the American

philosopher Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013) argued that the rights that individualsholdagainstdemocraticdecision-makingderivefromthesamevalue that justifiesdemocracy itself. Political decisions should be made by majoritarian democracybecause that is theprocedure that treatspeopleasequals.Everybody’spreferencesareregisteredequallyandtheoutcomefavouredbymostpeoplewins.(Yes,thisisagross simplification, but the basic thought holds across complications.) But, saysDworkin,thevalueofthestate’streatingcitizensequally–withwhathecalls‘equalconcern and respect’ – also justifies restrictions on the scope of majoritariandecision-making.Individualrightsagainstthedemocraticwillshouldbethoughtofasguaranteesthateachcitizenwillbetreatedasanequal.If,forexample,Iweretovotetobanhomosexualacts,Iwouldbetryingtoimposeonothersmyviewabouthowpeopleshouldlivetheirsexlives.ThatwouldbetoregisterwhatDworkincallsan ‘external preference’, and if the decision did indeed reflect the preferences ofpeople likeme, then itwould involve a kind of ‘double counting’. Since ‘doublecounting’ itself violates the principle of equality, the very reasonswe have to bemajoritarian democrats in the first place, reasons of equality, are also reasons togrant individuals rights against certain decisions that a majoritarian democracymightotherwisemake.Mostphilosophersthinkthatthisparticularargumentdoesn’tquitework.It’snot

clearthatwecancoherentlydistinguishpreferencesabouthowonelivesone’sownlife from ‘external’ preferences, nor that including the latter is really ‘doublecounting’. Still, the general idea – that restrictions on the scope of democraticauthoritymightbederivedfromthesamevaluethatmakesusdemocratsinthefirstplace–hasalotgoingforit.Evenifweacceptanargumentofthatkind,however,it’s not clear that it would be helpful to call those restrictions ‘democratic’. Wecould justify individual rights against democratic decisions by appeal to equality,and regardequalityas themain reasonwhydemocraticproceduresare legitimate

(where they are so), without abandoning the thought that those restrictions areindeedrestrictionsondemocracy.

Proceduresandoutcomes

Ihopethatconsideringthesefourdimensionsalongwhichapoliticalsystemmightbelessormoredemocratichastriggeredthethoughtthat, thoughdemocracymaybeagoodthing,onecanhavetoomuchof it. (Thesame,afterall, is trueofbothmotherhoodandapplepie.)Anentirelydemocraticpoliticalsystemwouldinvolveallcitizensdirectlydecidingeverything,anddoingsoonathoroughlyequalbasis.Surelysomemattersshouldnotbeon thepoliticalagendaatall.And, formattersproperlysubjecttopoliticaldecision,surelyitmatterswhatgetsdecidedandhowitgets decided, not just who does the deciding. This is shown by our aversion toteledemocracy, which misses out on some important parts of a good decision-making procedure, such as debate and deliberation. It’s indicated also by ourworriesaboutthedirectrecallormandatingofrepresentatives(ordelegates),whichwould give them little possibility of independent reflection. Many of us wouldprobablybewillingtotradeoffsomedemocraticnessofdecision-makinginreturnforbetterdecision-making.Itseemsthatmostofuscareaboutthecontentofwhatgetsdecided–atleastto

some extent. Thatmay seem obvious, but it is in fact perfectly possible to valueprocedures – and to regard themas producing legitimate decisions–ongroundsthat have nothing to do with the quality of the decisions they produce. To judgedemocratic procedures by reference to their output is to see those procedures asmeans rather thanends.But itdoes seem thatpartof thecase fordemocracy–asbetter than, say, rule by a wise elite – rests on values that are embodied indemocratic procedures themselves. Let’s explore this distinction betweeninstrumentalandintrinsicjustificationsofdemocracy.It’shelpfultothinkofdemocracyasessentiallyaprocedureformakingpolitical

decisions.Thequestioniswhetherdemocracyisagoodwayofmakingdecisions–or at least the best we’ve got. (Winston Churchill (1874–1965), British PrimeMinisterduringtheSecondWorldWar,famouslysaidthatdemocracyistheworstform of government except for all the others that have been tried.)What criteriashouldweusetoassessdecision-makingprocedures?Weknowthatwewantthebestwayofmakingdecisions.Butdoesthismeanwewantthewaythatwillmakethebestdecisions?For some, the answer is a straightforward ‘yes’. On their view, what makes a

decision-makingproceduregoodorbadispreciselythequalityofthedecisionsthatit tends toproduce. If itproducesgooddecisions, then it isagoodprocedure formaking decisions. If not, not.Thismakes a lot of sense.After all,we are talkingaboutproceduresformakingdecisions.Howelsearewegoingtojudgethem,ifnotbyconsideringhow likely theyare toget thosedecisions right?As theAmericanphilosopherRichardArneson(b.1945)hasputit:‘Democracy,whenitisjust,isso

entirelyinvirtueofthetendencyofdemocraticinstitutionsandpracticestoproduceoutcomes thatare justaccording tostandards thatareconceptually independentofthe standards that define thedemocratic ideal.’What’swrongwith teledemocracy,onthiskindofview,isthefactthatmakinglawsbygettingmillionsofuninformedpeopletoclickonacomputerscreenorviatheirinteractiveTVislikelytoresultinsome dreadful laws.A procedure that involves carefulweighing of the evidence,judiciousdeliberationamonginformedandengagedpoliticians,is,onthisview,abetterprocedurepreciselybecauseitismorelikelytoresultingooddecisions.But others think that we should evaluate procedures in a rather different way.

Ratherthanseeingthemininstrumentalterms,asmeanstoends,orintermsoftheirlikelyoutputorconsequences,weshouldevaluate them in termsof their intrinsicvalue–intermsofthevaluesembodiedintheproceduresthemselves.Ifdemocracyisgood, from thisperspective, that’snotbecausedemocracies tend tomakegoodlawsbutbecausethedemocraticwayofmakinglawsitselfrealizescertainvalues–suchasfairness,equalityorautonomy.This distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value can be confusing. To

clarify what’s going on here, let’s suppose equality to be a value intrinsic todemocratic procedures. This means that democratic procedures are intrinsicallyvaluable insofar as they treat people as equals, their views as equally worthy ofrespect,orsomethingalongthoselines.It’scrucialtoseethatwearestillgivingareasonwhydemocracyisintrinsicallyvaluable–inthiscaseit’sbecausethatistheprocedure that respects people’s equality as citizens. The fact that democracy isvaluable because it realizes or embodies the value of equality does notmean thatdemocracyisvaluableonlyinstrumentally,onlyasameansto theendofequality.Fordemocracytobeinstrumentallyvaluable,itwouldhavetobevaluedintermsofits consequences. But the equalitywe have inmind here is not a consequence ofdemocracy.It isnotsomethingthatdemocracytendstoproduce.Wedon’thavetowaittoseewhatresultsfromdemocracyinordertojudgethatitrealizesthevalueof equality. Democratic procedures embody or realize that value in themselves,intrinsically.Thesamegoesfor thevalueofautonomyorself-rule.Wecan judgethatdemocraticdecision-makingembodiesthevalueofself-rule,inawaythatbeingruledbyadictatorwouldnot,withoutknowinganythingaboutthelikelyoutcomesofdemocracyinaction.Although it’s important tokeep the twokindsofargumentdistinct, thecase for

democracy need not be based exclusively on either intrinsic or instrumentaljustifications.Thesamegoesforparticularspecificationsoftheideathatthepeopleshould rule themselves. There’s no incoherence in evaluating procedures formaking decisions in terms of both kinds of value, favouring thatwhich seems togivethebestoverallbalance.Thus,forexample,wemaythinkthatsomedegreeofequalityofopportunityforpoliticalinputisessentialtoalaw-makingprocedure’s

beingjustified,andfavourdemocracyoverrulebyawiseeliteforthatreason.Butwemayalsothinkitworthsacrificingsomeamountofequalityifdoingsoislikelytoproducebetterdecisions.Somethinglikethatmaybethetrade-offmadebythosewhopreferparliamentarydemocracytoteledemocracy.Notice that democratic decision-making has consequences other than the

decisions that get made. It may be a bit misleading to think of these otherconsequences as ‘outputs’, but theymaywell be relevant to the evaluation of theprocedurethatproducesthem.Some,forexample,havearguedfordemocracyonthegroundsthatbeinginvolvedinthemakingofpoliticaldecisionstendstodevelopcitizens’ intellectual and moral capacities. (John Stuart Mill famously claimedsomethingalongtheselines.)Orperhapsitismoreimportantthatthelawsthatgetmade are respected and complied with than that they are good in terms of theircontent.A not-so-great law that everybody iswilling to obeymight be better, allthings considered, than an otherwise great law that fails to commandwidespreadsupport. (Tocqueville runs thisargument inhisanalysis inDemocracy inAmerica(1835).)Thisiscertainlyanimportantconsideration,butbearinmindthatthesamethingcouldbesaid forabsolutemonarchy,where thepeopleasawhole regardedthatastheproperwaytomakedecisionsandcouldn’tbedoingwiththisdangerousandnew-fangledideaofdemocracy.Stabilityandcompliancemaybegoodthings,otherthingsequal,butotherthingsaren’talwaysequal.Sometimesinsurrectionorrevolutionarepreciselywhatisrequired.

Isdemocracyparadoxical?

According to a well-known article by the British philosopher RichardWollheim(1923–2003), there is a paradox at the core of democracy. It is, I think, easilyresolved–perhapsit’snotevenaparadoxatall–butoutliningandresolvingitisausefulwayofexplaining thedifferencebetweenadecision’sbeingcorrectand itsbeinglegitimate.Suppose I am a democrat. There is a vote on some matter – let’s say it’s the

questionofwhoshouldbetheMemberofParliamentformyconstituency.IvoteforMsWise.IdosobecauseIthinksheistherightperson(atleastofthosestanding)tobeourMP.Ilosethevote,andMrFoolishiselected.SinceIamademocrat,InowthinkthatMrFoolishistherightpersontorepresentmyconstituencyintheHouseof Commons. Have I changed my mind? Or do I somehow – and apparentlyincoherently– thinkboth thatMsWise is the rightpersonfor the joband thatMrFoolish is?This teaser– sometimes called thepuzzleof theminoritydemocrat–shouldn’tbe toopuzzling.There isnodeepparadox, since the twocandidatesare‘right’indifferentsenses.Beforegettingclearonwhattheyare,let’sdisposeoftheideathatwhathappens

isthatIchangemymindaboutwhichofthetwowouldbebetteratthejob.Sure,thefact that I lost thevotemight leadme tochangemymind. Imightnothavemuchconfidenceinmyownjudgement,andmightregardthefactthatmanyotherpeoplehadadifferentopinionfrommeasevidencethatmyowninitialviewwasmistaken.CertainlyI’vetakenpartinvoteswherethat’shappened–whereI’vebeenunsureastowhichwaytovote,andseenmybeingoutvotedasasignthatImadethewrongcall. But those have been rather special cases. They’ve been cases where I hadreasontothinkthatmyfellowvoterswereatleastaslikelyasIwastomakeagoodjudgement about the matter being voted on (e.g., on decisions about whom toappoint to jobs atmyuniversity).Where that’s the case, the fact thatone is in theminoritydoesindeedgiveonegroundsforthinkingonemadeamistake.(Moreonthislater,whenIexplainCondorcet’sJuryTheorem–whichshowsthataslongastheaveragepersonismorelikelytoberightthanwrong,themajorityisevenmorelikelytoberight.)ButI’veneverchangedmymindinanelectionformyMemberofParliament.Ihaven’tregardedmylosingthevoteasasignthatImadethewrongcall in those elections. Rather, I continued to argue for my preferred candidate,explainingtoanybodywhowouldlistenthatwe(i.e.,they)hadmadeabigmistake.No,theelementofparadoxarisespreciselywheretheminoritydemocratdoesnotchange her mind. Only then do we get the apparent conflict between twoincompatiblejudgements.Apparent, but not real. There are two distinct judgements involved here,

judgements on two different issues: correctness and legitimacy.MsWise remains

therightpersontobeourrepresentativeinthesenseofbeingthepersonwhowoulddothatjobbest.Thatistheissuewearevotingon,andmyvoteregistersmybeliefthatsheisthatperson.WhenIendorsethedemocraticdecision,myclaimisnotthatMrFoolishwas a good choice. It is that he is our legitimate representative. I amacceptingthattheproperprocedurefordecidingwhorepresentsusisademocraticvote.ThefactthattheprocedureselectedhimmeansthatheistherightpersontobeourMP–eventhough(Icontinuetothink)hewillbeterribleatthejob.Anoutcomeofaprocedurecanbelegitimate–onecanhavemoralreasontoendorseandabideby thatoutcome–simply invirtueof itshavingbeen theoutcomeofa legitimate(or,wemight say, legitimizing) procedure.And it can be legitimate in that sensewithoutbeingcorrectbyanyprocedure-independentstandardsofcorrectness.Theideathatadecisionmightgetitslegitimacyfromtheprocedurebywhichit

wasmade, even if it is, in fact, a bad decision, is familiar from sport.We knowperfectlywell that referees and umpiresmakemistakes, sometimes glaring ones;butwealsounderstand that there isgood reason tohavedecisionsmade thatway(rather than, say, by a vote amongst the players), and regard those decisions aslegitimateforthatreason.Thesamegoesforthedecisionsmadebyjuriesincourt.Juriesgetthingswrong.Innocentdefendantsarevictimsofmiscarriagesofjustice.Butaslongastheproperprocedurewasfollowed(nowitnesseswerenobbled,thejurywasn’trigged,theprosecutiondidn’tconcealcrucialevidence),thosedecisionsremainlegitimate.There’snothingparticularlytroubling,then,abouttheideathatdecisionsthatare

wronginonesensecanberightinanother.Itcanberighttoconvictsomeonejustbecauseajuryjudgedthemguilty,evenifthejurygotthatdecisionwrong.Butwhatisitthatmakesaproceduretherightkindtolegitimizeadecision?Inthesportsandcourtroomcase,itlooksasifwechooseourprocedureswithatleastoneeyeonthelikelihoodoftheirgettingthemright.Wedoinfactchangeourdecisionproceduresfrom time to time,whenwe judge that otherprocedureswouldbemore likely toissueintherightdecision.Crickethasintroducedathirdumpire,toadjudicaterun-outs and stumpings via a television monitor. Juries in the UK will no longeradjudicateon somecomplex fraudcases,where theyaredeemedunlikely tohavethe expertise needed to understand the issues at stake. It’s true that considerationsother than ‘tendency to produce the right answer ’ play into our assessment ofdecision-makingprocedures.(Inthesportingcase,wedon’twanttoslowthegamedowntoomuch.)Still,theirtendencytoproducebetterratherthanworsedecisionsis an important part of the way we judge the legitimacy of decision-makingproceduresintheseareas.Does the same apply to democracy? When I endorse Mr Foolish as my

representative,isthatbecauseIthinkthat,onthewhole,democracyisagoodwayofmaking good choices? ‘OK,’ I might think, ‘they’vemessed up big time on this

occasion. Still, generally speaking, democratic procedures tend to result in gooddecisions. That’s why I should regard this idiot as my legitimate politicalrepresentative.’ If I do think like this, then I am invoking an instrumentaljustificationofdemocracy.Iammakingitslegitimizingrolehangonabeliefaboutits(likely)consequences.Orismyreasonforregardinghimaslegitimateintrinsictothedemocraticprocedurebywhichhewaselected?Perhapsthemajorityviewislegitimatesimplybecauseallmyfellowconstituentsareequallyentitledtoasayinwho their representative is, andgoingwith themajority is thebestway to reflecttheirequalityofstandinginrelationtothatdecision.Thatwouldhavenothingtodowithanytendencyofdemocracytoproducegooddecisions.Again,wearebacktothedistinctionbetweenintrinsicandinstrumentaljustificationsofdemocracy.

Subjectivism,democracyanddisagreement

All this talk about ‘right answers’ and ‘mistakes’maybe troubling some readers.‘Yes,’ you might be thinking, ‘I can see that there may be right answers to thequestions decided by umpires or juries. I can see also that there might be rightanswers to technical political questions – about what policies will best achieveparticular aims (low inflation, efficient social services or whatever). But, as youtoldusinyourintroduction,politicaldecisionsaren’tjusttechnical.Theyarealso,at least implicitly, decisions about what aims we should be pursuing in the firstplace. That makes them, ultimately, moral questions. Are there really “right”answers to those? If not, how can itmake sense to talk about a political decisionbeingrightorwrong?’One aim of this book has been to highlight and challenge the prevalence of

subjectivismorscepticisminmuchcontemporarythinkingaboutmoral(andhencepolitical)issues.Manyofmystudentsendorse(orthinktheyendorse)somevariantofthisposition,holdingthatopinionsonmoralorpoliticalmattersareessentiallymattersofopinionorpreferenceonly.Many,itseems,believethatthemainreasonwhyweshouldhavedemocracyispreciselythattherearenorightanswerstomanypoliticalquestions.Allviewsaboutwhatthelawshouldbeareequallyvalid,sotheproper thing to do is simply to add upwhat people think. Indeed, so the thoughtsometimes goes, if there were moral knowledge about political matters, thendemocracywouldbeaverystrangewayofreachingit.Endorsingdemocracyasameans of making laws means treating each person’s view – educated anduneducated,wiseand thoughtless–asequallygood.And thatonlymakes sense ifthere’snothingforthemtoberightorwrongabout.This is a bit like the thought allegedly connecting liberalism and moral

subjectivism,whichIunmaskedinPart4:theideathatitonlymakessensetoallowpeopletochoosetheirconceptionofthegoodifnoconceptionsarebetterthananyothers. As in that case, one can’t be a subjectivist about all values andsimultaneously believe that democracy is the legitimate way to make politicaldecisions. Ifnomoral judgementsare trueor false,whatmakesdemocracymorelegitimate than dictatorship? That viewmust invoke somemoral claims: perhapsthatthere’ssomevaluetothepeoplerulingthemselves.Thisisacollectivevariantoftheliberalviewthatwhatmattersisnotsomuchthatpeoplechooserightlyasthattheychooseautonomously.And,likethatview,itisquiteconsistentwiththeideathatsomechoicesarebetterthanothers.Wecanperfectlywellbedemocratsevenifwedothinkthattherearebetterorworseanswerstopoliticalquestions,andevenifwedon’tthinkthatdemocracyisparticularlywellsuitedtoreachingthem.Democratsneednot, then,believethatallopinionsas towhat the lawshouldbe

areequallygoodanswerstothatquestion.Theymightbelievesomethingsimilarbut

cruciallydifferent,suchasthateverybody’sopinionabouttheanswershouldbefedinto the legislative procedure on equal terms.Opinions could be equally valid asinputstothelegislativedecisionwithoutbeingequallygoodanswerstothequestionofwhat lawwouldbebest.Thismightbebecauseallcitizenshavea right to takepartinthelaw-makingprocessonequalterms.Itmightbebecausethereisnootherappropriatelypublicorlegitimatebasisfordecidingwhichanswersarebetterthanothers.Whatever the specifics, the basic point is that there are more goods thanepistemic goods. So even if we believed that there was a right answer in anyparticular case, and even ifwe believed that it could be identified,wemight stillprefer a decision-making procedure that we thought less likely (than, say, thedecisionofmoralexperts)toproduceit.The fact that people usually disagree about which laws should be made is

certainlyofhuge significance for the issueofwhichdecision-makingproceduresare legitimate. But that significance is often misunderstood. It is not, as manybelieve,thatdisagreement– even deep and apparently interminable disagreement – proves that there is

nothing to be right or wrong about. That is a non sequitur. The fact that peopledisagreeaboutsomethingdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthere’snorightanswertothe question of which of them (if any) is right. Disagreement is significant notbecause it implies that any decision would be as good as any other, but becausethere’samoralproblem–aproblemoflegitimacy–inmakingpeoplecomplywithpolicies they disagree with. The state is a coercive agent. It uses its coerciveapparatustoforcecitizenstogoalongwithitsdecisions.Whathappens,ineffect,isthat one subset of the population imposes on everybody else its view about howthingsshouldbe.Theclaimthattheviewinquestionistherightonedoesnotjustifythatimposition.Why not? The answer has something to do with people’s equal standing as

citizens,asmembersofthepolity.Perhapstheideaofrespectformyfellowcitizensispartof the story.But ifwe thinkabout it thatway,weneed to treadcarefully. Ihaveverylittlerespectfortheopinionsofsomeofmyfellowcitizens.PerhapsI’marrogant,butI’mnotinclinedtoregardthefactthattheyholdviewsdifferentfrommineasstrongevidencethatI’mwrong.Nordoesourdisagreementleadme,inthescepticaldirection,todoubtthatthere’sanythingforustoberightorwrongabout.But,thoughfarfromrespectfuloftheirviews,Irespecttheirstandingasmyfellowcitizens. I accept that their views, however misguided, should feed into ourcollectivedecision-makingprocessesonequaltermswithmine.Thatisthefairwaytomakepoliticaldecisionsgivendisagreementbetweenpeoplewithequalstanding.Thedistinctionhereisbetweenrespectingtheirviews(whichIdon’t)andrespectingthemasequalmembersofourpoliticalcommunity(whichIdo).AfewpagesbackIcitedArneson’sinstrumentalapproachtothejustificationof

democracy.Forhim,torepeat:‘Democracy,whenitisjust,issoentirelyinvirtueof the tendency of democratic institutions and practices to produce outcomes thatare just according to standards that are conceptually independent of the standardsthatdefinethedemocraticideal.’JeremyWaldron(b.1953,inNewZealand)thinksthatthismissesthepoint:‘Anytheorythatmakesauthoritydependonthegoodnessofpoliticaloutcomes is self-defeating, for it ispreciselybecausepeopledisagreeaboutthegoodnessofoutcomesthattheyneedtosetupandrecognizeanauthority.’Knowingwhatwouldbetherightlawisquiteconsistentwithrecognizingthatothersdisagree inawaythatwouldmakeit illegitimateforyouto imposeyourviewonthem. The very fact that people disagree aboutwhat’s right, and yet all are to beruledbythelawsthataremade,meansthatweneedamechanismfordealingwiththat disagreement. That mechanism must itself be morally justified. Mostphilosophersholdthat,inoneformoranother,democracyissuchamechanism.

Thevaluesofdemocracy

So far I have talked in rather general terms about the distinction between thosevalues intrinsic to democratic procedures and those values that democraticprocedures might help to realize instrumentally. Now it’s time to be a bit moresystematicaboutthedifferentconsiderationsthatmightbeadducedineachcategory.Rememberthattheseareallvaluesthatareclaimedtotellinfavourofdemocracyunderstoodasaprocedure.Whatkindofdemocracyonefavoursislikelytodependonwhichof themone thinksdoes the justificatorywork. Ifyourmain reason forbeing a democrat is that democratic procedures respect citizens equally, then youmay want a different kind of democracy from those who favour it because theythink it tends to produce better citizens. If you value democracy because it yieldspolitical stability, then you will probably worry about different aspects of theprocedurefromthosewhocareaboutitsproducinggooddecisions.Ifyouthinkthatseveral – or even all – of these arguments have something going for them, thenyou’regoingtoendupwiththedifficultjobofdecidingwhichkindofdemocracyyieldsthebestoverallpackageofthesedifferent,andsometimesconflicting,values.

Intrinsic1:freedomasautonomy

Back inPart 2, I set out various conceptionsof positive freedom,oneofwhich Icalled ‘freedom as political participation’. If you haven’t read that, or don’trememberit,thenitwouldbeworthhavingalooknow(pp.69–73).ThebasicideaisRousseau’s,that‘freedomisobediencetoalawwegiveourselves’.Peoplelivingunderlawsthattheyhavemadeforthemselvesenjoyakindoffreedom(thekindoffreedom called autonomy – ‘self-rule’) not enjoyed by people whose laws weremadebyothers.This is soeven if the twosetsof lawsareexactly thesame.Thiskind of freedom is intrinsic to democratic procedures. We don’t need to knowanythingabout theirconsequences to say that theygivecitizens theopportunity torulethemselves.(Anotherwayofthinkingaboutthisvalueisintermsoftheideaoffreedom-as-non-dependence.Freedom,onthisview,meansnotbeingdependentonthewillofothers.Thoughdifferenttheoristsdeveloptheseideasindifferentways,and freedom-as-non-dependence has attracted quite a bit of attention recently, forourpurposesthesearesimilarenoughtobediscussedtogether.)The conception of freedom that is intrinsic to democratic procedures is very

specificandrathercontroversial.Wearenottalkingaboutthekindoffreedomthatmight,ormightnot,beallowedtopeoplebythecontentofthelawsthataremade.Aliberaldictatormightmake laws thatgranther subjects agooddeal of individualnegativefreedom.Perhapsshehasveryrelaxedviewsaboutwhatkindsofreligiousorsexualactivityaretolerable.Perhapsherviewsaremoretolerantthanarethoseof the greatmajority of her subjects. In that case, democratic law-makingwouldresult in less negative freedom for the individual than would be enjoyed underdictatorship.Of course, it’splausible thatdemocraticdecision-makingproceduresare more likely to secure negative freedom than are dictatorial ones. That mayindeedbeagoodreasontofavourdemocracy.Butifthatistheargument,thenit’sconsequentialist – and it invokes a different conception of freedom from the onewe’rethinkingaboutnow.Democracyisvaluedasameanstotheendoffreedom-as-non-interference. That is quite different from the claim that democracyintrinsicallyrealizesfreedom-as-autonomy(orfreedom-as-non-dependence).What should we make of that claim? Well, it’s a problem that the outvoted

minority do not rule themselves – at least not in any straightforward sense. ‘Thepeople’ as awholemay enjoy the power to determine their collective affairs, bycontrast, say, with dictatorial rule, or rule by a foreign power. (Nationalistmovements,seekingtothrowofftheyokeofcolonialrule,areoftenmotivatedbyasense that their ‘people’ have the right to self-determination.) But an individualmemberofa self-determiningnationwhohasbeenoutvotedonan issuedoesnotliveunderalawshegaveherself.Shelivesunderalawthatwasgiventoherbyherfellownationals.Thatmaybedifferent,morallyspeaking,frombeinggivenalaw

byarulingeliteoracolonialpower.Butdoesthedifferencereallyhaveanythingtodowithautonomy?Asfarastheoutvotedindividualisconcerned,sheisnotfreetofollowherownwill.Sheissubjecttothewillofothers.Thereis,ofcourse,ageneraltensionbetweenthelaworthestateandindividual

autonomy. That’s the tension emphasized by philosophical anarchists, who arguethat thevery ideaofauthority is incompatiblewithautonomy.Since the individualowesittoherselftodowhatshethinksisrightatalltimes,shecanneverbejustifiedindeferringtothejudgementofothers,andthestatecanneverberighttodemandher obedience. No kind of state, democratic or otherwise, can have legitimateauthorityovertheindividual.Nowtheissueofwhetherastatecanbejustifiedatallis, of course, a big question, and not one I’m going to venture into here. Ourquestionismorespecific:assumingthatstateauthoritycanbejustified,whatkindofdecision-making procedure best respects the autonomy of individuals? This issomethinglikethequestionRousseausetshimself:howcanweliveunderlawandyetbefree?Weknowthatthestatewillrequiresomepeopletodothingstheywouldnothave

chosentodo.It’sbecausepeopledisagreeaboutwhatshouldbedonethatweneedastate in the firstplace.So,unlesswego theanarchistic route,wemust accept thattherewillbemembersofastatewhoarenotgettingexactlywhattheywouldhavewanted.So the argument fordemocracy thatwe’re consideringnowcannot claimthatdemocracygivesallpeopleautonomyinthesenseoftheirneverbeingsubjectto the will of others. It must hold, rather, that, given the inevitable conflicts thatstates exist to manage, democracy is the decision-making procedure that bestrespectspeople’sautonomyoverall.Democracygivesmorepeoplemoreautonomythanwouldanyothersystem.That’sonewayofapproaching the issue.Here’sanother.Anoutvotedminority,

forcedtocomplywiththewillofthemajority,stillenjoyssomethingnotavailableto those living under a dictator: the opportunity to take part, on equal terms, inmakingthelawstheyliveunder.Thatopportunitydoesseemvaluable,andhelpfullyconceivedas avariantof freedom-as-autonomy (ornon-dependence), evenwhereoneisoutvoted.One’sopinionhasbeenfedintothedecision-makingprocedureonthesamebasisaseveryoneelse’s.Onehashadtheopportunitytopersuadeotherstovotedifferently.Onehasplayedafullroleinthemakingofthecollectivedecision.Thisissoevenforthosewhoaremembersofapersistentminority.It’ssometimesclaimed that majoritarian democracy is maximally consistent with autonomybecause, although everybody will be outvoted from time to time, the law ofaveragesmeans that the individual’s viewwill prevailmore often than not.Otherthingsequal,thatisindeedtrue.But,asweallknow,otherthingsareoftennotequal.It can easily arise that some subset of the population is outvoted time after time,hardlyeverseeingitsviewsmakeitintolegislation.Thesuggestionhereisthat,ina

democracy, even the members of that subset enjoy a kind of self-rule that theywouldnothaveifthelawsweremadebyadictatororaforeignpower.Thisargumentfordemocracyisunderthe‘intrinsic’headingbecauseitgivesus

reasontovaluedemocraticdecision-makingproceduresongroundsindependentofthecontentofwhatgetsdecided.Respectforpeople’srighttorulethemselvesdoesindeedlooklikeavaluethatmightproperlyconstrainthepursuitofrightanswersaboutwhatthelawis.Asnotedearlier,thereisaclearsimilaritytoacoreideaofliberalismhere.Itmattersnotsomuchthatpeoplechooserightlyasthattheychoosefor themselves. Democracy looks like the same idea applied to politics. Peopleshould individually determine their own individual affairs (liberalism), and theyshouldcollectivelydeterminetheircollectiveaffairs(democracy).Wemight,then,thinkofliberalismanddemocracyasfriends,ratherthanenemies.AsWaldronhasemphasized, the fact that liberalism and democracy emerged at roughly the sametime suggests that they share a common deep grounding, despite the superficialtensionsbetweenthem.Itisonlyaspeoplecometobeconceivedaspossessedofthecapacityforrationalself-determination,whichisrecognizedbyliberalrights, thatthey are conceived also as sufficiently rational to be capable of taking collectiveresponsibility for themselves,whichmakesdemocracy– rather thanmonarchyoraristocracy–theappropriatemechanismformakingpoliticaldecisions.This all looks plausible. Butwemust notmove too fast. The analogy between

liberalismanddemocracyisfarfromperfect.Whyshouldwethinkthatwehavearighttoanequalsayindeterminingthecoerciverulesthatsignificantlyaffecthowotherpeople live their lives? Itmay indeedbe thatwehavea right tocontrolourownlives–totheextentthatexercisingthatrightisconsistentwithrespectingitinotherpeople.Ifwewanttoscrewupourownlives,thatisourprerogative.Butwhythinkthatwehaveafundamentalmoralrighttoexercisesignificantpoweroverthelivesofothers?Ifthereareindeedgoodreasonstofavourdemocraticprocedures,itmightbethought,thenthosemustinvoketheclaimthatdemocracyisagoodwayofmaking good laws.One can think that people have the right tomakemistakesabouthowtheylivetheirownliveswithoutthinkingthattheyalsohavetherighttomakemistakesabouthowotherslivetheirs.

Intrinsic2:self-realization

The idea that there’s a kind of freedom achieved throughmembership of a self-governing political community is sometimes associated with the idea thatparticipationincollectivedecision-makingisanessentialpartofafullyflourishinghuman life.This thoughtalsocameup inPart2,when Inoted that some theoristshave equated freedomwith self-realization and have claimed that self-realizationconsists, at least in part, in involvement in the life of one’s polity. One of thedistinctivefeaturesofhumanbeingsistheircapacitytogettogetheranddecidehowtheywanttheircollectiveaffairstobeorganized.Antshaveextremelycomplicatedandwell-orderedpatternsof interaction.Beesareverygoodatbuildinghivesandgiving each other the low-down onwhere to find nectar.But non-human animalscannotreflectonanddiscusswitheachotherandcollectivelydeterminewhatrulesare to govern their interactions. That capacity is something specially human, andyou’renot fullyhumanunlessyoudo it.Man is apolitical animal. (InGreek, thewordfor‘private’isidios.InancientGreece,anyonewhoconcernedhimselfonlywithhisownaffairs,decliningtotakepartinpubliclife,wasdeemedanidiot!)Only in a democracy do all citizens get to participate fully in political life –

realizing their nature as creatures capable of political creation. This value, too,mightexplainsomeofourantipathytothemodelofteledemocracyoutlinedearlier.Peopleunthinkinglyclickingonacomputerscreenduringacommercialbreakarehardlyenjoyingthekindofself-realizationthathumanbeingsachievebysharingintheshapingoftheircollectiveaffairs.Itmatters,onthisjustificationofdemocracy,thatcitizensdeliberateabouthowthingsshouldbe.Onlythenaretheymakingfullandproperuseoftheirdistinctivelyhumancapacities.I’ll say a bitmore about the significance of deliberation soon.Here it’sworth

beingclearthatwe’retalkingnowaboutthekindofself-realizationthatisachievedintheveryactofparticipation.It’snotaconsequenceofthatparticipation.Thereisadifferent way of thinking about self-realization that makes it something peopleachieveprogressively,throughandasaresultofpoliticalinvolvement.Takingpartin politics is good for people, on this view, because it acts as an educational ordevelopmentalprocess,enlargingtheir intellectualandmoralpowers.This ideaissometimes invoked to suggest that really giving political power to the peoplewouldn’tbeasdangerousasitseems,sincetheveryexperienceofmakingdecisionstendstomakepeoplebetteratit.I’llleaveittothereadertoevaluatethatsuggestion.What matters, in our current context, is the kind of argument it is. It appeals todemocracy’sconsequences–itsbeneficialeffectsoncitizens.Trueorfalse,thatisdifferentfromtheclaimthatparticipatinginpolitics is itselfanessentialpartofaflourishinglifeforhumanbeings.

Intrinsic3:equality

Theidea thatdemocracyis the law-makingprocedure thatmostrespects theequalstanding of citizens is, formany, the very heart of the democratic ideal. Even ifthere are better andworse decisions,we disagree aboutwhich arewhich, andwedisagreeaboutwhichofus ismore likely tomake thosedecisionswell.Theonlyfairwaytodealwiththatdisagreementistogiveeverybodyanequalsay.Withtheexceptionofchildren,thementallyimpairedandcriminals(whoarewidelythoughttohaveforfeitedtheirclaimtoparticipateincollectivedecision-making),allshouldbeequalnotonlyintheirtreatmentbythelaw,butalsointheirinputtoit.We’vealreadyseen that the ideaofan ‘equal say’canbe interpreted invarious

ways,with less ormore radical distributive implications. That discussionwas allabout equality as a property of the democratic procedure, not of the outcomes itgenerates. Whether democracy produces egalitarian policies depends on whatpolicies people vote for.Certainly a significant strand of anti-democratic thoughthas worried that democracy would tend to result in more equality than the anti-democrats judged desirable. And for some it’s something of a mystery whydemocracyhasn’t led tomoreequality than ithas. (Domostof thepeoplebelievethat inequality is actually a good thing? Are they ideologically conned intoaccepting its inevitability?Dowenot in fact have thekindof procedural equalitythatwouldleadtomoreegalitarianoutcomes?)Aprocedurewithequalinputsmightbeexpected,other thingsequal, to lead tomoreequaloutputs thanaprocedure inwhichinputsarenotequal–assumingthatthosedoingtheinputtingcareaboutthewayoutputsaffect them.Butthisis justanempirical tendency.Conceptually,equalinfluence in making the law is quite consistent with that law leaving lots ofdistributiveinequality.Sofarsogood.Agenuinelyequalorfairproceduremaygeneratedistributively

unequaloutcomes.That’strue.Butsupposewethinkthatafairprocedurerequiresmorethanthatallhavetheformalrighttovote.Supposewebelieveitrequiresalsothatcitizensreallydohaveanequalopportunitytoinfluencepoliticaldecisions.Andsupposewethinkthatthisconditionissatisfiedonlywhenallareproperlyeducated,orwhen none suffers the kind of poverty that effectively excludes them from thepolitical process. (We might think that taking equality of political opportunityseriouslyhasevenmoreradicalimplications,butthiswilldotomakethepoint.)Inthat case, the maintenance of fair procedures itself sets limits on distributiveoutcomes.Apolitythatfailsproperlytoeducateallitsmembers,orallowssomeofthemtoliveinseverepoverty,iseffectivelydenyingitselfthepossibilityofmakingdecisionsbyfairprocedures.Ofcourse,intherealworld,politicaldecisionsaren’tmadebythatkindofprocedureinthefirstplace.Forsome,thismaybeenoughtorenderall suchdecisions illegitimate.But thepoint is thateven in the idealcase–

wherealldidgenuinelyparticipateincollectivedecision-makingonequalterms–the importance of sustaining proper procedureswould significantly constrain therangeofpossibleoutcomes.Thegeneral lesson is that themorecontentwebuildinto our specification of democratic procedures, the less we leave open todemocraticdecision.Ifdemocracymaynotlegitimatelyabolishitself,orundermineitsowndemocraticness,thensomeissues–thosethatconstituteapoliticalsystemasdemocratic–cannotthemselvesbeupfordemocraticgrabs.Atthelimit,wecouldcome upwith such a thick understanding ofwhatmakes a democratic procedurelegitimatethatwe’denduptakingnearlyeverythingofftheagendafordemocraticdecision.Leavingasidethatparadoxicalpossibility,noticethattalkaboutequalityofinput

leaves open the issue ofwhat form that input takes. Oneway of treating citizensequally is simply to give all their preferences equal weight in the process ofaggregationtoformacollectivedecision.Anotheristogivethemanequalchanceto influencecollectivedeliberation,bypresenting their reasons forpreferring thedecisions they prefer, and giving them equal opportunity to persuade everybodyelse. Herewe touch on a key fault-line that runs through democratic theory. Forsome, the basic idea of democracy is that the people get what they want. Theproblemisthatpeoplewantdifferentthings,andwhatweneedisalegitimatewayofcombining their different preferences into an overall decision. This approach,sometimescalleda‘socialchoice’approach,worriesabouthowbest toaggregateindividualpreferences. (Someworking in this traditionworrya lotaboutwhethertherecanindeedbelegitimate–fairornon-arbitrary–waysofaggregatingthem.)Othertheoristscomeattheissuefromaratherdifferentangle.Forthem,democracyis not about adding up what people want, it’s about collective deliberation.Democracyisnotmerelyameansofturningpreferencesintopolicies;it’sameansof transformingpreferences themselves.Throughaprocessofdemocraticdebate,argument, reflection, hearing other people’s point of view and responding toobjections, democracy can, and should, be awayof changing– and improving–people’sviews,notjustregisteringandcombiningthem.Thisapproach,whichhasbecome especially popular among theorists in recent years, favours ‘deliberativedemocracy’.On one view, democracy is like a market in which politicians and policies

respond to what people want. On another, it is – or should be – a forumwherecitizens deliberate together about matters of common concern. If we hesitate toembrace teledemocracy, thatmaybebecausewehanker after at least someof thelatter.Thatthepeoplemakethedecision,anddosoonequalterms,doesnotseemquiteenough.Whynot?Oneanswerwasofferedunderthepreviousheading.Ifit’strue that human beings achieve self-realization through collective debate anddeliberationabouttheircommonaffairs,thenonlytheforummodelproperlymakes

politicsanarenaforthatachievement.Anotheranswertakesusintothecategoryofoutcome-oriented justifications of decision-making procedures. Perhaps ourobjection to teledemocracy is fundamentally a worry about the quality of thedecisionsitislikelytoproduce.Givingallcitizens’votesthesameweightisindeedawayoftreatingcitizensequally.Buttheideaofequalrespectisvagueenoughtoleaveopenwhatbestcountsasrespectingthemequally,anditmaybethatthewaywechoosetodothatreflectsotherconcerns.Wemightthinkthatgivingallcitizensan equal chance to state their views, to respond to objections, to take part in thedeliberativeprocess,isawayofrespectingthemequallythatalsotendstoproducegooddecisions.We shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which political inequality has a

damagingimpactonthequalityofdecisions.Mostofthosewhoobjecttoitdosoonfairnessgrounds.Itdoesseemunjustthatcitizensaresounequalintheircapacitytoinfluencetheaffairsoftheirstate.Butinequalityofinputalsohasanegativeimpactonthequalityofpoliticaldeliberation.Theloudersomevoicesareabletoshout,themoreothervoicesaredrownedout.Politicalinfluenceisinlargepartazero-sumgame.Themorewe hear one argument, the lesswe hear the others. That’s not arecipeformakinggooddecisions.The democracy–equality relationship raises other issues that can get only a

mention here. One concerns the legitimacy of majority rule. There’s astraightforward connection between equality and majoritarian decision-making.Goingwiththemajorityviewseemsimpliedbytherequirementtocounteachvoteequally. The alternatives involve giving the minority’s votes greater-than-equalweight. Perhaps, however,we shouldn’t just add up preferences on a one-person-one-votebasis.Perhapsweshouldtakeintoaccounthowmuchpeoplecareabouttheissueunderconsideration.Weshouldfactorintheintensityofpreferences,andnotjust howmany people have them. Thatmight do something to protectminoritiesfromthetyrannyofthemajority,butit’snotgoingtohelpifamajorityreallywantstooppressaminority.Factoring in intensitycouldhelpwith lukewarmmajorities,but itdoesn’tavoid thedeepproblem.Better,perhaps,maybe themove, sketchedabove, that seeks to derive respect for individual rights, as trumps againstmajoritariandecision-making,fromthesameconcernforequalitythatjustifiesthatprocedureingeneral.Anotherissueconcernstheargumentsoverdirectandindirect(orrepresentative)

forms of democracy. It seems obvious that direct democracy embodies equalitymorefully thandoes indirectdemocracy. In theformer,allcitizensget tovoteonlawsdirectly.Inthelatter,theygettovoteonlyforrepresentativeswhomakethosedecisionsontheirbehalf.Thistwo-tieredaspectintroducesakindofinequality,andIsuggestedearlyonthatthiscanbethoughtofascompromisingthedemocraticnessof the system.All this is true inprinciple. Inpractice, however, it’s not absurd to

thinkthatoursystemofvotingforrepresentativesactuallydoesbetter,intermsofequality, than would a direct procedure for making decisions. If all issues weredecided by referenda, would people actually bother to vote? Some would. Anunrepresentative minority of political activists would doubtless devote their timeand energy to the business ofmaking laws.But that hardly seems a goodwayoftakingaccountofallcitizens’viewsequally.Forallitsfaults,asysteminwhichthepolity as awhole deliberates intensively every fewyears aboutwho shouldmakedecisions–andthoseelectedknowthattheywillhavetostandforre-electioninafew years’ time –may actually better embody equality of political influence thanwould a system that allowed the possibility of mass participation but actuallyconsistedofminorityactivistrule.(OK,givencurrentturn-outs,it’spushingitabitto suggest that national elections in the UK or the US count as ‘intensivedeliberationbythepolityasawhole’.Butyougettheidea.)Assoofteninpolitics,whatlooksjustifiedinprinciplemayturnoutratherdifferentlyinpractice.

Instrumental1:goodorcorrectdecisions

Let me turn now from values that might be realized intrinsically by democraticprocedures to those thatmight justify those procedures on instrumental grounds.First up is the suggestion that democracy is a good procedure formaking gooddecisions.A lot of relevant groundhas alreadybeen covered. I’ve challenged theideathatdemocraticproceduresmakesenseonlywhenthereisnorightanswer.AndIhopeI’veexplainedhowonecanregarddemocraticdecisionsaslegitimateevenifonethinksthattherearerightanswerstopoliticalquestionsandthatdemocracyisnotparticularlygoodatfindingthem.Formany,thequalityofdecisionsissimplybesidethepoint.Still, there are important strands in democratic theory that do appeal to

democracy’stendencytoproducerightanswers.OneisassociatedwiththeFrenchphilosopher and mathematician, theMarquis de Condorcet (1743–94). Condorcetshowedmathematically that if the average person ismore likely to be right thanwrongaboutsomething,thenthemajorityopinionisverylikelytoberightaboutit.Quitehowlikelydependsonhowmanypeopleareconsultedandhowmuchbetterthan random is the judgement of the average individual, but the probabilities getstartlinglyhighsurprisinglyquickly.(Forexample, if theaverageindividualhasa55percentchanceofbeingright,then399peopletakentogetherhavea98percentchance of being so.) From this perspective, then, democracy is a good way offindingthecommongood(orwhateverit isoneistryingtoidentify)justbecausethe laws of large numbersmean thatmany heads are better than one. There is awisdom in crowds that makes consulting them a good way of ascertaining rightanswers.(Wecameacrossthisideaearlier,whenIsuggestedthatbeingoutvotedonsomething might give one reason to change one’s mind – not just to accept thelegitimacyofthemajorityview.)Notconvinced?Ifso,thatmaybebecauseyou’renotwillingtograntthecrucial

premiss.Condorcet’sJuryTheoremworksifoneassumesthattheaveragevoterismore likely to be right than wrong. To be fair, Condorcet’s approach doesn’trequireustoassumethatallvotershavethislevelofcompetence.Wedon’tneedallour fellow citizens to have a better than 50 per cent chance of making the rightjudgement. We need only average competence over 50 per cent (and normaldistribution around that average). Still, it’s obviously open to question whethervotersareonaveragebetterthanrandom.Iftheyaren’t,thenCondorcet’stheoremwill immediately give grounds for rejecting democracy. If the average person ismore likely tobewrong than right, then the last thingyouwant to do is give thedecision to lots of people, as they are very likely to get itwrong.And there areotherproblemsinapplyingCondorcet’sindisputablemathematicstotherealworld.Oneisthattheresultrequirestheinputstobeindependentofeachother.It’sbecause

youareaggregatingindependentinputsthatmanyheadsaresomuchmorelikelytobebetter thanone.But inpractice itmaybe thatmanypeoplevoteasmembersoffactionsorparties,inwhichcasetheyarenotfeedingtheirownindependentopinioninto theprocedure. (Rousseauopposed factionson thegrounds that theyhinderedtheemergenceofageneralwill.SomeinterpretationsseehimasgesturingtowardsthisCondorcetianthought.)AnotherdifficultyisthatCondorcet’sresultappliesonlytodichotomouschoices–wherevotersarechoosingbetweenjusttwooptions.Mostvotinginrealdemocraciesismorecomplicatedthanthat.It’snotagoodobjectiontotheCondorcetianapproachtorejectthewholeideaof

rightanswersaltogether.Hismathsshowsonly that if therearesuchanswers,andtheaveragevoter ismore likely tobe right thanwrongaboutwhat theyare, thenmajoritiesareverylikelytobemorerightthanwrong.Still,applyingthatresulttorealdemocraticdecisions,andinvokingit todefendtheclaimthat thosedecisionsarelikelytoberight(andlegitimatebecausetheyarelikelytoberight),isfarfromstraightforward. Condorcet’s approach works if all votes can be treated asjudgementsonthesameissue.Butit’sunlikelythatvotersincontemporaryelectionsdo in fact see theirvotes in the samewayat all.When Ivote, I takemyself tobegivingmy opinion aboutwhich of the options on offerwould be best, all thingsconsidered, formyfellowcitizenscollectively (orsomethingpious like that).Butit’s hardly crazy to wonder whether my fellow voters are not registering ajudgementabout thatat all.Callmecynical,but I sometimessuspect that someofthemarevotingforwhicheveroptiontheytaketobeintheirownbestinterests.Inthat case, what is being aggregated by the voting procedure is not a set ofjudgements about the same issue at all. If so,we certainly cannot assume that thewinningoutcomeisalsolikelytobetherightone.Ifwe’rewillingtograntCondorcet’sassumptions,thenhisapproachdoesindeed

suggest thatdemocracy is agoodwayofmaking gooddecisions.His theorem isabouthow,giventhoseassumptions,wecanaggregateindividualviewsintoaviewmore likely tobe right thanany individual is.But there’sa secondwayof seeingdemocracyashavingepistemicvalue.Onthisperspective,thepointisnotsimplytoaggregateorcountviewsandappealtothelawsoflargenumbers.Democracyisadeliberativeprocedure.Throughdiscussion,reflectionanddebate,citizens’initiallyuninformedandpossiblyselfishviewsarechangedforthebetter–intojudgementsclosertothe‘rightanswer ’.We’vealreadycomeacrossthisidea,whendiscussingthedifferentwaysinwhichonemighttreatcitizens’inputequally.How does collective deliberation improve the quality of decisions? Well,

discussionanddebatearegoodwaysofgatheringgoodinformationrelevanttothedecision in question. Political decisions typically involve judgements aboutcomplicatedempirical issues,anddifferentpeoplewillhavedifferentviewsaboutthe likely consequences of any particular policy. The process of critical cross-

examination,ofempiricalclaimandcounter-claim, isavaluablemeansof siftingthroughtherelevantevidenceandcomingtoaninformedviewaboutwhatisindeedlikelytohappenifaparticularpolicyisputintoaction.Moreinteresting,perhaps,isthesuggestionthatdiscussioninthepublicforumimprovesthequalityofthemoralthinking that implicitly underpins political decisions. There can be sensible andrational debate about the relative importance of different values that might bepromotedorhinderedbythevariouspolicyoptionsonthetable.Indeed,somehavesuggested that collective deliberation encourages people to be public-spirited,motivated to pursue the common – rather than their own, particular – good. Theveryenterpriseofdefendingone’spoliticalviewsinthepublicforumrequiresoneto conceive and present them in terms acceptable to others. It just won’t do forsomeonetodefendapolicyontheselfishgroundsthatitwillmakeher(orpeoplelike her) better off.And even ifmany claims to be furthering the common goodstartoffashypocriticalordisingenuous,theveryrequirementtoframeone’sviewsinwaysthatpresentthemasgoodoverall,notjustgoodforoneself,graduallyaltersone’s perspective on politics. The idea that democratic procedures may tend toimprove the quality of political decisions has, then, both an informational and amoralaspect.Deliberationhelpsus todiscoverwhichare thebestmeanstowhichends,butitalsohelpsusworkoutwhichendsarebetterthanothers.The Condorcetian and the deliberative approaches posit quite different

mechanismsbywhichdemocracymight tend toproducegooddecisions, but theyarenotmutuallyexclusive.Condorcetsaysnothingabouthowindividualscometotheir political judgements. It is quite consistent with hismathematics that citizensshould formulate their views about how to vote through a process of debate andcritical reflectionwith one another (as long as each ends up voting forwhat shereallythinks,notsimplytoeingapartyline).Andalthoughthedeliberativeaccountmightpositunanimityastheideal–ifwetalkaboutitlongenough,we’llallendupagreeing – in any real-world situation there is bound to be some residualdisagreementandneedforavote.Sothere’snothingincoherentaboutaconceptionofdemocraticdecision-makingthatreapsthebenefitsofbothstories.Firstweeachtrytoworkout,throughcarefulreflectionanddebatewithoneanother,whatistheright thing to vote for. If the deliberative account is right, that process ofdeliberationwill tend to improve our judgements,making itmore likely that theaverage person is more likely to be right than wrong. Then we have a vote. Ifdeliberationhasimprovedourindividualjudgementssufficiently,thenthemajorityisverylikelyindeedtoberight.Sothishybridmodelisjustifiedonthegroundsthatittendstoproducerightanswers.Two final points about this kind of justification. First, the claim is not that

democracy is legitimate because it always gets the answer right. It’s justifiedbecauseitismorelikelytodosothanisanyotherprocedure.Itisinvirtueofthe

procedure, not the outcome, that the decision is legitimate; but what makes theprocedurelegitimateisitsepistemicvalue–itstendingtoproducebetterratherthanworse decisions. On this account, then, it is perfectly coherent to accept thelegitimacy of a democratic decision while believing it to be wrong. But itslegitimacydependsnotsimplyonitsemergingfromafairprocedure,oronethatrespects citizens’ capacity to rule themselves. (Those would be intrinsicjustifications.)Whatmakesitlegitimateisthefactthattheprocedurebywhichitwasmade is more likely to get it right than is any alternative procedure. Rousseauthoughtthataslongaseverybodywasgenuinelyvotingforthecommongoodthentheminority must simply havemade a mistake. (Actually Rousseau says variousinconsistent things, but this is certainly one of them.) That’s not quite right. Theminority might be right. The reason why the minority should abide by thedemocratic decision, on this epistemic account, is not that theymust havemade amistake. But nor is it that the decision emerged from a procedure justified onintrinsicgrounds.It’sthatthedecisionemergedfromtheproceduremostlikelytohavegotitright.Finally,thejustificationsofdemocracyconsideredunderthisheadingseeitasan

instrumentforproducingrightanswers.Rightanswersheremean‘answersthatarecorrect by standards independent of those that define the democratic ideal’. Thisapproach does assume that there are right answers in this sense. But it does notassume thatwecan identify thembymeansother thandemocraticprocedures. It’sperfectlycoherenttoregarddemocracyasagoodprocedureformakingdecisionswithout having any idea about what would be a good decision in advance of theprocedure.Whenpeople talk aboutdemocracyhavingepistemicvalue, theymeanprecisely that it can increase our knowledge, that it can be away of discoveringthings.It’snotsimplyawayoflegitimizingdecisionsthatwealreadyknew,orevencouldhaveknown,toberight.

Instrumental2:intellectualandmoraldevelopmentofcitizens

For some theorists, what’s good about people making political decisions forthemselvesisnotsomuchthattheywillmakegooddecisionsasthattheirmakingthedecisionswillmake thembetterpeople.A system inwhich lawsaremade forsome by others not only deprives those subject to those laws of the good ofautonomy or self-rule, it stunts their development. Just as children cannot evolveinto capable adults unless they are gradually given the opportunity tomake theirowndecisions,sonon-democraticsystemsareinfantilizing,deprivingadultsofthechance to develop their intellectual and moral powers. There is an importantoverlap between this justification and the previous one. Citizens who have beengiventheopportunitytodeveloptheirpowersandcapacitiesaregoingtobebetteratmakingpoliticaldecisions.They’llbelessselfish(that’sthemoraldevelopmentbit) and better at gathering and assessing information (that’s the intellectualdevelopment bit). But, analytically at least, we can distinguish the quality of thedecisions from thequalityof thepeoplewhomake them.This argument suggeststhatgivingpeopleself-ruleisthebestwaytohelpthemgrowup.Thisjustificationofdemocraticproceduresisalsorathersimilartotheintrinsic

onethatappealstoself-realization,totheclaimthathumanbeingsachieveakindofflourishing through the very act of participating in the political life of theircommunity. What we’re talking about under this heading is the consequentialistversion of that idea. The thought now is not that citizens achieve self-realizationimmediately, in theveryactofparticipating. It’s thatparticipation is conducive todevelopment; itacts,over time, tochangepeoplefor thebetter.This isnotonlyadifferentkindofclaim,analyticallyspeaking;it’salesssubstantialorcontroversialone also. The suggestion that democratic participation tends to have beneficialimpactoncitizens–andeventhatitmakesthemmorefullyrealizedhumanbeings–involves lessmetaphysicalbaggage than the idea that suchparticipation just is, initself,anessentialelementofself-realizationforhumanbeings.One featureof this justificationgives it an elementof paradox.Thebenefits to

citizens that come through participation cannot be achieved if those benefits aretheir reason, or at least their only reason, for participating. Suppose you meetsomeoneonherwaytoapoliticalrallyordemonstration.Youaskherwhysheisthere, and she says it’s because she thinks it will be good for her moral andintellectualdevelopment.Somethinghasgonewrong.Shehasreducedpoliticstotherealm of self-help and personal growth. There’s no problem, I suppose, in herbelievingthattheactivitywillhavethatbeneficialeffect,butitseemsveryoddforthat to be the reason thatmotivates her to go.Hermotivating reason ought to besomething to do with the content of the principle or cause for which she isdemonstrating.Citizensaresupposedtocareaboutoutcomes,yes;butthosearethe

policy outcomes they are arguing about or demonstrating and voting for, not theoutcome in terms of their own personal development. Indeed, since shewouldn’tactuallycarewhatthepolicyoutcomewas,someonewhotookpartinpoliticsonlyforthesakeofpersonaldevelopmentwouldnotbegettingmuchofit.Shewouldn’tbeseriouslyengagingwith theargumentsofothersor responsiblyexercisingheragency as amemberof her political community.Thebeneficial effects that comeunder this headinghave tobeby-products or side-effects of political engagementundertakenforotherreasons,soit’shardtoseehowthesein-processbenefitscouldplayamajorjustificatoryrole.

Instrumental3:perceivedlegitimacy

WhenmyfatherwasbeingtrainedasanofficerintheBritishArmy,hewastoldthatitwasmoreimportantthatheshouldmakeclearandconfidentdecisionsthanthatheshould get them right. (‘Nobody gives a damn what you decide, Swift. Just stopblitheringandbloodywelldecide.’)Itmatteredthathissubordinatesshouldregardhim as knowing what he was doing, and so be willing to follow his commands.Whatwouldbetherightorderifeverybodycomplieswithitcouldleadtodisasterifnobody does. Something similar applies in politics. It matters not only whatdecisionsaremade,butwhatpeoplethinkofthosedecisions.Decisionsneedtoberegarded as legitimate.Of course, there areways of getting people to obey lawstheyrejectasillegitimate.Statescanusethepoliceorarmytoenforcecompliance,and sometimes even democratic states have to do this. But that is expensive, andcan’tbesustainedforlongwithoutseriousmoralcostalso.It’savaluablefeatureofdemocracythatitsdecisionstendtobeperceivedaslegitimate.Ofcourse, thereasonswhydemocracymight tendtobeperceivedas legitimate

have a lot to dowith the reasonswhy itmight indeed be legitimate. Presumably,people are willing to complywith democratic decisions because they respect theprocedurethatmadethem,andpresumablytheyrespectthatprocedurebecausetheysee that it realizes equality, or autonomy, or self-realization, or tends to producegooddecisions.That’s true,but itshouldn’t leadus toblur thedistinctionbetweenlegitimacyandperceivedlegitimacy.Aregimecouldberegardedas legitimatebythosesubjecttoitevenifitwasnotinfactofakindwheretheyhadgoodreasontodo so. For many centuries, England was ruled by monarchs who claimed to beGod’srepresentativeonearthandtorulebydivineright.Manyofthosesubjecttotheir commandsaccepted that claimandobeyed for that reason.Thosekings, andtheir commands, had perceived legitimacy. But that legitimacy rested on theinculcationoffalsebeliefsinsuchawaythatwewouldnowwanttosaythat theirrulewasnot,infact,legitimate.Since most of us believe that democracy, at least in some form, could be

legitimate,thispointmayseemacademic.(That’s‘academic’inthepejorativesensethatcondemnsmyprofessiontotheelucidationofirrelevantniceties.)True,thereisa definite analytical difference between the legitimacy of democracy (which onsomeviewsderivesentirelyfromfeaturesoftheprocedureitself)anditsdecisionsbeing perceived as legitimate and complied with for that reason (which is aconsequenceofthatprocedure).Butifdemocracyisindeedlegitimate,andisrightlyperceivedasbeingso,what’sthebigdeal?Oneansweristhatweshouldn’tbetooquicktoassumethattheregimesweliveunderareinfactlegitimateordemocratic.Toshowthatdemocracycanbealegitimatesystemformakinglawsisnottoshowthat the systemwe in theWest call ‘democracy’ is indeed legitimate. Perhaps our

wayofmakinglaws,thoughdemocraticinsomerespects,isnotdemocraticenoughto be legitimate. Perhaps, for example, it lacks the kind of equality of politicalinfluenceonwhich true legitimacy in factdepends.Perhaps law-abidingpeople incontemporarydemocraciesarelikethemedievalsubjectswhoacceptedtheirking’sclaim that he had the right to rule them. Perhaps they too are wrong about theconditionsthatmustbesatisfiedbeforealawcanrightlyclaimlegitimacy.

Conclusion

Democracyisacomplexideal.Itstandsattheconfluenceofseveraldifferentvalues–anddifferentkindsofvalue–anditcanbeveryhardtoworkoutwhichisrelevanttowhat,orhowtocombinethem.Someclarityisgained,Ihope,byholdingfirmlytotheideaofdemocracyasaprocedure.Wecanthenfocusonthedifferentwaysinwhich procedures might be justified, intrinsically and instrumentally, and thedifferentconsiderationsthatcomeundereachheading.Butreadersshouldn’tworryif, having disentangled things analytically, they don’t immediately have a clearpictureofhowtofitthemtogether.Mostpeople’sviewsaboutdemocracy–whyit’sgood,whichkindisbest,howmuchofitwehave,howmuchofitwewant–turnout to be an intricate andmessymixture of different thoughts.We are inevitablybalancing different kinds of value: fair procedures against wise decisions,deliberation against the aggregation of preferences. And in assessing how much‘peoplepower ’wereallywant,hereandnow,wequiteproperlyhave to factor inreal-worldconsiderations,suchasinequalities inpolitical input,ormanypeople’slackingtheskillsneededtomakepoliticaljudgementsabouthugelydifficultissues.Everybodylovesdemocracy,andmostpeoplethinkwe’vegotit.Thatcanmake

democracyseemratherinnocuousorinnocent,lackingthecriticaledgeofsomeofthe other concepts discussed in this book. In fact, however, taking democracyseriously – thinking hard about why it’s valuable and what would be neededgenuinelytorealizethevaluesthatmakeitso–isanextremelydemandingagenda.Ifitreallymattersthatcitizensrulethemselves,andthatthedistributionofpoliticalinfluenceamongthembefair,thendemocracyitselfdemandsradicalchangestothewaywedothings.Ifgenuinelydemocraticproceduresproducegooddecisionsonlywhen citizens are skilled in the art of decision-making, then that increases thosedemands still further. Of course, democratic values, though important, are onlysome values among many. We may well want to limit the scope of democraticdecision-making,andbecontenttosacrificedemocraticvaluesinotherwaysalso,for thesakeofothergood things.But thosepoliticianswhoaresokeen to tellushow great democracy is are not wrong. It would be interesting to see them takeseriouslyitsimplicationsfortheirownsocieties.

Furtherreading

RobertDahl’sOnDemocracy(YaleUniversityPress2000)isashortandaccessibleintroduction to normative and sociological perspectives. For a fuller version ofDahl’s approach, try hisDemocracy and Its Critics (YaleUniversity Press 1991),engaginglywrittenasadialogue.RossHarrison’sDemocracy (Routledge1995) isusefulonthephilosophicalside,whileDavidHeld’sModelsofDemocracy(3rdedn,Polity 2006) is a clear, nicely organized guide to the different institutional forms

generatedbydifferentjustificationsofdemocracy.Atamoreadvancedandphilosophicallevel,therearesomeexcellentcollections

of academic papers on the issues covered here. Best overall for coverage andquality are David Estlund (ed.), Democracy (Blackwell 2002), and ThomasChristiano (ed.), Philosophy and Democracy: An Anthology (Oxford UniversityPress 2003). Both have very good introductions, and helpfully group the articlestheycontainunderheadingsindicatingthekindofpositionbeingarguedfor.Bothalsohavesomepapersondeliberativedemocracy,butthemostextensivecollectionon that approach is James Bohman and William Rehg (eds.), DeliberativeDemocracy:EssaysonReasonandPolitics(MITPress1997).For readers with the energy for more, the following books are particularly

important and/or interesting: David Estlund’s Democratic Authority: APhilosophical Framework (Oxford University Press 2009), Thomas Christiano’sThe Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits (OxfordUniversity Press 2008), Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement (OxfordUniversityPress 1999),AmyGutmann andDennisThompson’sWhyDeliberativeDemocracy?(PrincetonUniversityPress2004),andDanieleArchibugi’sTheGlobalCommonwealthofCitizens:TowardCosmopolitanDemocracy(PrincetonUniversityPress 2008). James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds (Little, Brown 2004)fascinatinglyexploresCondorcetianthemeswithoutmentionofCondorcet.

Conclusion

Since thisbookhasn’tmadeanargument, itcan’t reallyhaveaconclusion. Ihavenottriedtopersuadethereaderofaparticularposition.Rather,myaimhasbeentoset out, and clarify, the issues that arise when philosophers discuss some keypoliticalconcepts.Ofcourse,whatIcall‘clarification’hasanargumentativeaspecttoit.Iamarguingagainstthosewhohaveconfusedorvagueviews.Andsometimesa view clearly stated is immediately less plausible than it was when hazy. But,primarily, I’vebeen arguingagainst the confusionorvagueness, not against –orfor–anyofthesubstantivepositionsthatcomeinconfusedorvagueform.Thosepositionscanmoreclearlybeunderstoodandassessedwhenthatconfusionissortedout,orwhenwhatwasfuzzyhasbeenmademoreprecise.Thisisjustclearingthedecks,sothatusefulrelevantargumentcanbegin.Forexample,someofPart4triedtoshowthatmanycommunitarianobjectionstoliberalindividualismmisunderstandormisrepresentwhatitistheyareattacking.Thatwasan‘argument’ofakind.Buttheaimwasjusttogetabettersenseofwheretherealdifferenceslie,andwhatisatstakebetweenthosewhosubscribetothedifferentviews.If the book does have an overall message, it must be that this process of

clarificationisuseful.Thatitdoesindeedhelpustounderstandbetterwhatweandother people think about central moral issues in politics, and what we aredisagreeingaboutwhenwedisagree.NothingIcansayinthis‘conclusion’willhelpto persuade the reader of this. It’s too late for that now.Mydiscussions of socialjustice, liberty, equality, community and democracy will have made the case, orfailedtomakeit,already.I’vebeenquitecriticalofpoliticians.Theyuseconceptsinvague,impreciseways.

Theysometimes like itwhen it’sunclearwhatwordsmean,because then theycanfudge disagreements and appear to be on everybody’s side. They are reluctant toadmit that the policies they advocate, though justified overall, will make somepeopleworse off than the policies of their opponents. Theymisleadingly pretendthatallgoodthingsgotogether,sothatwedon’thavetomakehardmoralchoices.They go for theweakest parts of competitors’ arguments, and are quite happy toignore, if theycan, thebits thatmake sense.Theywill never admit that theyhavemade a mistake, or that they have changed their mind about anything. They can

neversay‘Idon’tknow’.Theyarepreoccupiedwithrhetoricandspin,ratherthanwithcontentor substance;whatmatters ishow thingssound,how theyplay to theelectorate,notwhattheyreallymean.Politicalphilosophers,bycontrast,hateitwhenthingsareunclearandwillharass

one another until vagueness is dispelled. They have no problem accepting thenecessityofdifficultchoices,orconcludingthatitisjustifiedtomakesomepeopleworse off – perhaps much worse off – than they might otherwise be. Theyunderstandthatintellectualprogressisachievednotbyeasyrepetitiousexposureofthe weak bits of their opponents’ arguments, but by painful and productiveengagementwithcogentcriticism.Beingcommittedtothepursuitoftruth,theyarehappytochangetheirminds,andtoadmittochangingtheirminds,whensomebodyshows themtheywerewrong.Theydon’tclaim tohaveall theanswers.Althoughapparently and self-indulgently obsessedwithwords, close inspection reveals theopposite:‘conceptualanalysis’isjusttheonlywaytogetatwhatpeoplemeanwhentheysaythings.Onceweknowthecontent,thewordsuseddropoutasirrelevant.Both thesedescriptionsare,ofcourse,stereotypes.Somepoliticiansdoactually

andexplicitlyconfrontthehardchoicestheytalkabout.Somepoliticalphilosophersarefamouslyreluctanttoadmitthattheyhavechangedtheirminds.(‘Butthat’swhatI was saying all along. Thanks for helping me to put it more clearly.’) Somepoliticians do accept that they have made mistakes. Some political philosophersignoreorevadethegoodobjectionsandmakeamealofthebadones.Nonetheless,the descriptions do, I think, capture genuine differences between the twoprofessions. Suppose this is so. The way I’ve put it could be summarized as‘politicalphilosophersgood,politiciansbad’.Butisthatfair?Afterall,thecriteriaIam using to assess them are those that philosophers judge to be important. Ifwethinkabout thecomparison from thepoliticians’pointofview, things look ratherdifferent. Politicians operate in an environment that imposes constraints farmoredemanding than those faced by political philosophers. The competitive andconfrontationalnatureofelectoralpoliticsmeansthatanyadmissionofignorance,change of mind, or acknowledgement that one’s opponents might have gotsomething right, will be seized on as incompetence, a ‘U-turn’ or evidence ofweakness.Theneedtowinvotes,andtopresentone’spartyastherepresentativeofthecountryasawhole,makesitdangeroustoconcedethatoneispreparedtomakeanybodyworseoffthantheymightotherwisebe.Theslightestslipwillbespunandexaggerated in the media. Moreover, politicians are expected to come up withconcrete policies, not just abstract ideas. Policies that will work if they areimplemented, and that have the popular appeal to stand a chance of beingimplemented.For,unlikephilosophers,politicianshavetogetelected.Thisrestrictstheir options. In terms of form, things must be kept simple. (Hence theirpreoccupationwithsound-bites,slogansandthecontinualsearchforthe‘BigIdea’

to lend a simplifying rhetorical unity to their position.) In terms of content, theymust not be too far removed from current public opinion. (Hence theirpreoccupationwithfocusgroups.)We should beware caricature. Political philosophers do consider the practical

implications of their work.Many explorewhat policieswould follow from theirphilosophical arguments in an idealworld, andmanygo further, takingonboardthe fact thatpoliticaldecisionshave tobemade inacontext that falls shortof theideal.Nonetheless, considerationofhowbest to realize thevalues theyargue for,given the real world as it actually is, may well raise questions that go beyondphilosophers’ expertise. The answers will depend on empirical information –detailedknowledgeabouthowtheworldworks–thatthepoliticalphilosophermaynotbeinagoodpositiontoacquireorjudge.Nordopoliticalphilosopherswanttogettooconcernedwiththesellability,thepopularappeal,oftheirconclusions.Forthem, that looks like unacceptable compromise. ‘Perhaps the truth just is toocomplicatedtobepackagedinsound-bites.Whyexpecttherightanswerstodifficultphilosophicalquestionstobereadilyintelligibletoeverybody?Whyexpectpeopleto agreewith our answers if they did understand them? Sowhat if, for example,ordinary people disagree with our belief that conventional desert claims aremistaken–abeliefwe’vethoughtaboutlongandhard?Iftheyarewrong,theyarewrong.Wearephilosophers,engagedinthepursuitoftruth.Youcan’texpectustotakepopularopinionintoaccountwhencomingtoourconclusions.’Fromthepolitician’sperspective, this is,puttingitpolitely,unhelpful.‘Someof

you philosophers say that top athletes don’t deserve to earn more than socialworkers.Supposeyou’reright.Unlessyoucantellmetheimplicationsforwhatmygovernmentshoulddo–hereandnow,notinanidealutopia–youarenohelpatall. And unless you can showme how to persuade voters that they arewrong tobelievewhattheycurrentlybelieve,we’dgetblownoutofthewatercomethenextelectioninanycase.Thatmeansnotjustpresentingvalidarguments,butpresentingtheminsuchawaythattheywillbeseentobevalid,whichmeansthattheymustbesimpleandaccessible.Oh,andwhileyou’reatit,rememberthateverywordwillbecarefullyexamined for thepossibilityof itsbeing twisted into something thatouropponentswouldlikeustohavesaid.’Itishardnottobesympathetictothisresponse.Politicalphilosophersinclinedto

grumble about the philosophical failings of politiciansmust take into account thequite different natures of the two enterprises. Philosophers can take a long-termview, aiming to changepublicopinion,notmerely to accommodate it.Politicianshave a more immediate agenda. While not leaving themselves at the mercy ofuninformed popular prejudice, they must, if they are to be successful, take theelectoratewiththem.Theymustalsohavearealisticsenseofwhatwillandwillnotwork, in terms of policy, given people as they actually are. To take a concrete

examplefromPart3,apoliticianconcernedtomaximizethepositionoftheworstoff must devise tax rates that are informed by knowledge about people’smotivational structures. It would be no good at all to set rates on the mistakenassumptionthatpeoplewillworkjustashardwhentheyaretaxedat80percentasat40percent.Buthowhardpeopleareprepared toworkatwhat ratesof tax isnotfixed.Itmaybegivenatanyparticulartime–andassuchbepartoftheinformationthat feeds in to the politician’s calculations – but it is not given for all time. Itdependsonpeople’sattitudestooneanother,totheirgovernment,totheirwork,andsoon.Thesearetheveryattitudesthatmoreabstractpoliticalphilosopherscanseektochange.Politics isnot awholly rational activity. Itwouldbenaive toexpect thecareful

expositionofclearargumentssimplytotriumphoveremotionandprejudice.Theremay well be good strategic reasons for politicians to do some pandering to thesentiments,confusionsandfalsebeliefsof those theywant tovotefor them.If,bydoingso,theygetelectedandmaketheworldabetterplacethanitwouldotherwisehavebeen, those strategic reasonsmay alsobemoral reasons.So I’mnot alwaysagainstpoliticianssayingthingsthatarevagueandmistaken.Sometimesthatmightbe the right thing to do. But that is an argument for saying vague and mistakenthings.Itisnotanargumentforholdingvagueandmistakenbeliefs.Whenitcomestothinking,clarity,precisionandtruthhavetobebetterthanthealternatives.Theremay be strategic reasons for politicians not to be too philosophically pure in thepositions theypresent tovoters.But that’sno reasonfor themtobeunclearaboutwhattheyreallybelieve,aboutwhatvaluestheyexpectsuchastrategytorealize,andwhytheyendorsethosevalues.Itmakessensetogoforadivisionoflabour.Thosebestsuitedtoabstractionand

precisionshouldpursuethem.Thoseadeptattranslatingabstractideasintoconcretepoliciesshouldworkonthat.Thoseskilledatsellingbothideasandpoliciestotheelectorateshoulddoso.Politicalphilosophersareluckyenoughtohavethetimetoworkthroughideascarefully,andcanmakemistakeswithoutlosingtheirjobs.Forthe division of labour approach to be effective, we must make the fruits of ourcollective efforts accessible to those – voters aswell as politicians –who do notenjoysuchluxuries.That’swhatIhavetriedtodointhisbook.

Furtherreading

Ifyou’vegottotheendofthisbeginners’guideyou’reprobablyreadyforthemoreadvancedtextbooksmentionedattheendofmyIntroduction(pp.9–10).Thosewiththe energy for state-of-the-art survey articles across the full range of politicalphilosophy should try D. Estlund (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of PoliticalPhilosophy (Oxford University Press 2012) and the Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy(http://plato.stanford.edu),whichisawonderful,free,onlineresource.

Index

abortion168Afghanistan68,79agentsandlibertyseeself,dividedalienation80–1,144,183AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion154anarchism214seealsoNozick,Robert

Anderson,Elizabeth141appropriationseepropertyArchibugi,Daniele231aristocracy,enlightened189Aristotle4,9,11,70Arneson,Richard203,211arts,publicfundingof20,164–5,166associationfreedomof18,26dutiesof51–3

Athens,ancient190Australia34,73authority,ofthestateseestate,authorityofautonomyandchildren84,160–1,173–4;seealsoeducationandlibertyseeliberty,asautonomy

Avineri,Shlomo185

Bahamas,holidaysin61–3,76Baker,John142Balmoral74,76,81Barker,Paul94Barry,Brian56,185basicliberties25–7Bell,Daniel185benevolentdictator189Bentham,Jeremy127,156Berlin,Isaiahix,xii,57–63,66–9,82–4,88–90,92–3BigSociety5,145Blair,Tonyix,57–8,61–2,69,83,93,168Bohman,James231Bolt,Usainxii,41–2,47,54Borgias,the19brainsurgeonsvs.nurses47–8

vs.poets26understress137seealsosurgeons,andfreedomofoccupationalchoice

Brighouse,Harry55Brooks,Thom56Burke,Edmund183,196

Callinicos,Alex142Cambridge,Universityof20campaigns,fundingofpolitical100,199,Campbell,Tom55Carens,Joseph135,142Carter,Ian93Casal,Paula141catallaxy21Catholicism168,174,184Chamberlain,WiltseeWiltChamberlainexample

Chambers,Clare142charitablereadingoftexts171charity14,16,22,50childcare112–15ChildSupportAgency154childrenchoicesmadeby44seealsoautonomy,andchildren;education

choice43–4,154seealsoconceptionsofthegood,framing,revisingandpursuing

Christianity25Christiano,Thomas231Churchill,Winston,203citizens,asfreeandequal24–5,30,38,97–8,133,140,161–4,173,177seealsodemocracy,andequalityofopportunityforinfluence;democracy,andrespect;equality,ofrespect

citizenshiprights100–2,121citizenshipseecommunity,senseof;nationalityclassbackgroundandlifechances104–9,124–6seealsoeducation

classwar95Clayton,Matthew55,141coercionseestate,ascoerciveapparatusCohen,G.A.xii,74–5,94,142ColdWar68commitment,strainsof26commongoodseesharedunderstandings;valuescommunism62,138communitarianismdefined143–6vs.liberalism31,143–64

communitydefined145–6imagined181liberal176–82priorityof158–61,169senseof149–50,176–82;seealsoindividualism;liberalism;values,shared

compensationseedesert

conceptionsofthegoodcomprehensivevs.political165–6,173–4framing,revisingandpursuing24–7,40,91,146,166ignoranceofseeveilofignoranceincommensurabilityof90

conceptsvs.conceptions13–14,59–60concepts,definitionof103seealsopoliticalphilosophyasconceptualanalysis;values,disagreementon

Condorcet,Marquisde222,231Condorcet’sJuryTheorem,206,222–6consensusseevalues,sharedconservatism,compassionate144constraintsseelibertycosmopolitanism49–53,178–82culturalgroupsseemulticulturalism

Dahl,Robert230–1Darwall,Stephen142Darwin,Charles5democracydegreesof192–202deliberative219–20,224–6anddevelopmentofcitizens226–8;seealsoMill,JohnStuartdirect192–5differentfromparticipatory193–5andsizeofthepolity190asutopian190anddisagreement208–11andeducation197,218,226–8andequality197–9,217–21andequalityofopportunityforinfluence197–9,217–21

democracy(cont.)andjustice17–19indirect192–3;seealsodemocracy,representativeinstrumentalvs.intrinsicvalueof191,202–5,211–29andliberalism216andlottery196–7paradoxof205–8proceduralvs.outcome-basedconceptionsof202–5rhetoricof187–8representativeandaccountability195–7andepistemicvalueofparliamentarydebates196andrespect210–11;seealsocitizens,asfreeandequal;equality,ofrespectscopeof188–9,199–202socialchoiceapproachto219andstability205andtensionwithpoliticalphilosophy191valuesof211–29;seealsoliberty,aspoliticalparticipation

dependence,cultureof95desertascompensation46–7,137–8asconsequentialistclaim47–8;seealsodifferenceprincipleandeffort42–4andjusticeseejustice,asdesert

aslegitimateexpectations45–6threeviewson42–4

de-Shalit,Avner185desiresfirst-ordervs.second-order87–8;seealsoself,dividedasobstaclestofreedom80–3andrationality86–8

dictatorship189differenceprincipleasassumingequalityofcitizens133defined26–7,54;seealsoequality;justice;maximinasexpressingasenseoffraternity123,151global49andincentives134–9,236objectionsto27–9andpositionalgoods124andprioritytotheworseoff130–1

diminishingprinciples129–30discrimination97–9,103seealsoequalityofopportunity,threeconceptionsof;oppression

disagreementseedemocracy,anddisagreement;values,disagreementondistributiveparadigm111domesticlabour114drugaddiction85,89,91Dworkin,Ronaldxii,73–5,94,141,201

economicliberalismseeNewRighteducationandautonomy66–7,83–4,160–1;seealsoautonomy,andchildrenanddemocracyseedemocracy,andeducationandequality20,103–7,124–5;seealsodemocracy,andequalityofopportunityforinfluencehigher48,124–5andliberty62,66–7,83–4aspositionalgood124–7privatevs.state-funded8,35–6,104,122,126–7

effortseedesertegalitarianplateau97–102,140egoismseeindividualismentitlementseejustice,asentitlementenvyandequality118politicsof95,118

epistemic,defined196equalitybeforethelaw99–101ofcitizenship99–101;seealsodemocracy,andequalityofopportunityforinfluenceandclass104complex101ascontroversial95–7,107,140anddemocracyseedemocracy,andequalitydistributionvs.respect97–9,140andeconomicproductivity96,119–20,134–5;seealsodifferenceprincipleandgender109–15andhealth121–2,140ofinfluenceseedemocracy,andequalityofopportunityforinfluence

andjustice35–6;seealsodifferenceprincipleandlibertyseecitizens,asfreeandequal;WiltChamberlainexampleandluckseeluck,andnaturalendowmentsvs.minimumthreshold99–101,131–2,140ofoutcome107–9,134procedural118,218relational98–9,110andrelativities116–24;seealsodifferenceprincipleofrespect98–9;seealsocitizens,asfreeandequal;democracy,andrespectofstarting-points108andwaste118

equalityofopportunityanddemocracy197–9,209–13andefficiency106–7vs.equalityofoutcome107–9andgender109–15global50andpositionalgoods124–7Rawls’sprincipleof25–6threeconceptionsof102–9

Estlund,David142,231,237Etzioni,Amitai144,151,185EuropeanUnion180expensivetastes128expression,freedomof18,173,199externalpreferences201eyelottery39

Fabre,Cecile55fairnessseejustice,asfairnessfamily5,104–5,108–9,110,114,179–80familyvalues145,168fear,asobstacletofreedom85,87feminism5,29,110–12Fichte,JohannGottlieb68Flikschuh,Katrin93Florence19focusgroups1,7,234‘forcedtobefree’67,82,84Frankfurt,Harry87fraternityseecommunity,senseof;differenceprinciple,asexpressingasenseoffraternityFrazer,Elizabeth185freewillseechoicefreedomseelibertyfree-riderproblem150Freeman,Samuel56,185FrenchRevolution143Freud,Sigmund118Frost,Robert155

Galilei,Galileo5gambling164,167gapbetweenrichandpoorseeequality,andrelativitiesGates,Bill55,128Geuss,Raymond10genderequality109–15

gendernorms114–15generalwill63,77,214geneticsseenaturalendowmentsglobalization184globaljustice,seejusticeGray,John55Gutmann,Amy231

happinessseeutilitarianismHarvard,Universityof31Harrison,Ross231Hayek,Friedrichvon20–2,32,54–5,58health,affectedbyinequalityseeequality,andhealthhealthcare36,62,78,126–7Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich68Held,David231heteronomyseeautonomyhierarchyseeequality,ofrespecthigherselfseeself,dividedHitler,Adolf58Hobbes,Thomas4–5,9,29,69Hohfeld,Wesley152HouseofCommons187,205HouseofLords197humanity,concernandrespectfor14hypotheticalcontract23,27,29–30seealsosocialcontracttheory

idealism68idealandnon-idealtheory7–9identityascitizen164,177,184national53,180–4

ideology,bourgeois80–1seealsopoliticalideologies

idlenessseeleisureincentivesseedifferenceprincipleincommensurabilityseeconceptionsofthegood,incommensurabilityof;values,incommensurabilityofindividualismvs.community144,146–8,160–1,177,183–4vs.self-interest29,148–50,161–3;seealsocommunity,senseof

inequalityseeequalityinheritancetax95institutionalconceptionofdesertseedesert,aslegitimateexpectationsintentionandresponsibility21–2invisiblehand21Islam68,173–4

jealousyseeenvyJuryTheoremseeCondorcet’sJuryTheoremjusticeandcharity14–15definitionsof11anddemocracyseedemocracy,andjusticeasdesert40–8,134,138

andduties13–16asentitlement31–40,58,75–6,131;seealsoNozick,Robertasfairness22–31,48,134;seealsoRawls,Johnasthefirstvirtueofsocialinstitutions12,14,16,19globalvs.national48–54,178–82globalvs.social48–54,178–2historicalvs.end-stateprinciplesof36andmarketoutcomes20–2,44–5,73–6;seealsoredistributivetaxationpatternedvs.unpatternedprinciplesof37–8andprizes45Rawls’sprinciplesof25–6retributive11

Kant,Immanuel4,36–7,67–9,82,86Kelly,Paul185Kennedy,Ted168KramerMatthew,93Kukathas,Chandran55Kymlicka,Will9,97,142,175,185

Labour,NewseeNewLabourlegalaid99–100Leftwich,Adrian10legitimacy,political,vs.correctness191–2,208–11legitimateexpectationsseedesert,aslegitimateexpectationsleisure29,109,190,197Leopold,David10Lessing,Dorisxii,45liberalismvs.communitarianism146–69defined146–8,170–1anddemocracyseedemocracy,andliberalismfreedomandequalityinseecitizens,asfreeandequalandindividualismseeindividualismasmoraldoctrine149–50politicalseeconceptionsofthegood,comprehensivevs.political;self,unencumberedrightvs.left31–2asatheoryofcommunity176–82universalvs.culture-specific144,173–4,176–82;seealsovalues,shared

libertarianismseejustice,asentitlementLiberty(organization)154libertyasabsenceofinternalconstraints69,84,85–8asautonomy65–9,70–1,80–91,160–1,176–9,212–16asbeyondpolitics69–73asdistinctfromothervalues62–3,77–8,92asdoingwhatonewants65–9effective61–5,69,78–80,83–4,99andequalityseecitizens,asfreeandequal;WiltChamberlainexampleformal61–5,69,80,99,175freedomofexpressionseeexpression,freedomoffreedomfromvs.freedomto58–60,64andgroups60,68andlaws70–3andmarkets61–2,73–82,92–3andmoney61–5,72–82;seealsoWiltChamberlainexample

moralizedconceptionof75–6negativeix,58–73,81–2,85asnon-domination71–2asnon-interference62–74andoptions66,83–4andpatternsseeWiltChamberlainexampleaspoliticalparticipation69–73,212–16positiveix,57–70,82–93priorityof27asrationality59,77,81–2,86–93;seealsoself,dividedandredistributivetaxationseelibertyandmoneyasself-realization80–1,84,216–17astriadicrelationseeMacCallum,Gerald

Lime,Harry19Lincoln,Abraham189Locke,John4,9,29,33,68,74–5,77,91lotteryanddemocracyseedemocracy,andlotteryeyeseeeyelotteryNationalseeNationalLotterynaturalseeluck,andnaturalendowments

lowerselfseeself,dividedluckanddesert41–5andnaturalendowments31,35,38–40,106seealsoself-ownership

MacCallum,Gerald59–60,62,65,69,71,74,92MacIntyre,Alasdair144–5,157Mandle,Jon56mannafromheavenseeproperty,initialacquisitionofmarketfreevs.plannedeconomy21,147andlibertyseeliberty,andmarketsoutcomesdefenceof40–1,47,147andjusticeseejustice,andmarketoutcomessignallingfunctionof135

Marshall,Gordon56Martí,JoséLuis94Marx,Karl4,9,68,80,93maximin26–7,120,123,127,133–4,138seealsodifferenceprinciple

McKinnon,Catriona10McLeod,Owen,56means,treatingpeopleas36meritseejustice,asdesertmeritocracy106meta-ethics158Mill,JohnStuartx,4,9,91,94,205Miller,David10,56,93,186minimalstateseestate,minimalmiserablebottomlesspit128moneyseeequality;liberty,andmoney;property;redistributivetaxationmonism88–9seealsovalues,incommensurabilityof

moralarbitrarinessseeluck,andnaturalendowmentsmoralphilosophy5–6,158MrFoolishandMsWise205–8Mulhall,Stephen55,185multiculturalism55,174–6,185–6murder16,54,71,152,179

Nagel,Thomas142nannystate95NationalHealthServiceseehealthcarenationalidentityseeidentity,national;community,senseofNationalLottery20nationalservice182nationality49–53,176–82NativeAmericans34,175naturalendowmentsascommonassets39ignoranceofseeveilofignoranceasmorallyarbitraryseeluck,andnaturalendowments

Nazism57,68negativelibertyseeliberty,negativenegligence22neo-liberalismseeNewRightneutralityofaimorjustificationvs.neutralityofeffect172ofthestateseestate,neutrality;state,perfectionism

NewLabourixseealsoBlair,Tony;socialexclusionandinclusion

NewRight20,30,147–8Newton,Isaac5Nietzsche,Friedrich19nightwatchmanstateseestate,minimalNobelPrizeforliterature45Nozick,Robert14–15,31–42,53–4,56,58,62,75,97,106,117,134,150–1

Okin,SusanMoller142oppression98seealsodiscrimination

originalposition23–31,38,54,133,146–7,157,159,164,166Otsuka,Michael94ownershipofothersseeslaveryofpropertyseepropertyoftheselfseeself-ownership

Oxford,Universityofix,20,57

Parekh,Bhikhu185parentingseeautonomy,andchildren;education;familyparks,publicfundingof164,166participation,politicalseepoliticalparticipationpaternalismseestate,paternalismpatriarchy110paygap110–15perfectionismseestate,perfectionismpersistentminorities214

personalaspolitical5Pettit,Philip93–4Phillips,Anne142Pickett,Kate142Plato4,9,156–7,191pleasurewizard128pluralism163seealsovalues,shared

poetry28,156Pogge,Thomas54–6Pojman,LouisP.56,141policyseepoliticalphilosophy,andpracticalpoliticspoliticallegitimacyseelegitimacy,politicalpoliticalobligation6,15,178–9politicalparticipationsufficientarianvs.egalitarianconceptionsof198–9seealsodemocracy;liberty,aspoliticalparticipation

politicalparties,fundingof100,198–9seealsodemocracy,andequalityofopportunityforinfluence

politicalphilosophyasconceptualanalysis3–4,7–8,10,103,232–3,236–7historyof4–5,9as‘intellectualmasturbation’6andpracticalpoliticsix–x,1–3,6–9,96–7,102,124–5,139–41,144–5,148–9,171,233–7principledconsiderationsvs.feasibilityconstraints190

assearchfortruth4–5assubsetofmoralphilosophy5–6tensionwithdemocracyseedemocracy,andtensionwithpoliticalphilosophypoliticiansseepoliticalphilosophy,andpracticalpoliticspolitics,defined5–6pornography115,168–9positionalgoods124–7,140,198positivelibertyseeliberty,positivepostmodernism4poverty22,35,54,60–3,100–1,116,120–1,218preferences,intensityof220externalseeexternalpreferences

prioritytotheworseoff129–31seealsodifferenceprinciple

procedureseedemocracy,instrumentalvs.intrinsicvalueof;democracy,proceduralvs.outcome-basedconceptionsof

primarygoods24,28–9,120privatesphere,andlibertyseedemocracy,scopeof;liberty,aspoliticalparticipation;public/privatedistinctionprizes45propertyinitialacquisitionof33–4andlibertyseelibertyandmarketsrectificationofunjustholdingsof33–5;seealsoredistributivetaxationrightto31,33–4,74–5,80–1,97voluntarytransfersof33–6,35–40

propertyrights,fullandabsolute38publicgoods,defined150public/privatedistinction199–200seealsodemocracy,scopeof

Quebec175QueenElizabethII74–6,81–2racismseediscriminationrationalselfseelibertyasrationality;self,dividedRawls,John7,12,14,19,22–32,34,38–44,49,53–7,73,91,106,120,123,130,133–4,136,139,

143–7,151,157,159,163–6,170–4,185,199Raz,Joseph129–30,141,152–4,167,170,185realinterestsseeself,dividedrealism8rectificationseeproperty,rectificationofunjustholdingsofredistributivetaxationandcommunity171,177,183asconsistentwithliberalism150–1,177anddemocracyseedemocracy,andequalityofopportunityforinfluenceandequality95–6,116,136andequalityofopportunity104,108–9andliberty73–82objectionsto21,31–3,36–7,150vs.redistributionofbodyparts39andutilitarianism127–9

referenda,asformsofdirectdemocracy193–4,221Rehg,William231relationships,dutiesof51–3

relativismseevalues,relativityofreligion18,25,59,79,98,103,153,173–5,184seealsoautonomy,andchildren;Catholicism;Christianity;Islam,multiculturalism

Renaissance19republicanism70–3,93–4seealsoliberty,aspoliticalparticipation

respectseedemocracy,andrespect;equality,ofcitizenship;equality,ofrespectresponsibilitiesseerights,andresponsibilitiesrightvs.good165–6,172Right,NewseeNewRightrightsdefined152anddemocracyseedemocracy,andrightsandduties152–4andjustice14–5,18topropertyseepropertyrightsandresponsibilities144,151–5

Rousseau,Jean-Jacques4–5,9,29,67–8,70–1,94,212,214,223,226Rushdie,Salman173

Sandel,Michael56,144–5Satz,Debra142scepticism4,155,190,209Scheffler,Samuel141choolchoice9–10SecondWorldWar182,203seatbelts77,92selfdivided67–9,77,80–1,83–5unencumbered158–61

self-interestseeindividualism

self-ownership31–3,38–40,54,97,106,134,136self-realizationseeliberty,asself-realizationself-respect111–14,122seealsoprimarygoods

Sen,Amartya10separatenessofpersons32–3,37,39sexismseediscriminationsexuality18,145,168,200Shakespeare,William125sharedunderstandingsseevalues,sharedsiblingrivalry118Skinner,Quentin73,94slavery,comparedwithredistributivetaxationseeredistributivetaxation,objectionstosellingchildreninto38

Smith,Adam21socialchoicetheoryseedemocracy,socialchoiceapproachtosocialcontracttheory23,27,29–32,67,71socialexclusionandinclusion116socialjusticeseejusticesocialmatrixseecommunitysocialism,state28,134socialization42–3,87,113–15,159–61seealsoluck,andnaturalendowments

society,asafairschemeofcooperation24,30,51solidarityseecommunity,senseofspheresofjusticeseeWalzer,Michaelstabilityseedemocracy,andstabilitystakeholdersociety144Stalin,Josef58stateauthorityof6,15,29,173,213–4ascoerciveapparatus6,15–16,163,173,210,215enabling62,78,83minimal35,56,150–1,169neutrality25,134,164–9;seealsostate,perfectionismpaternalism77–8,85–6,89perfectionism70,167–70,185;seealsostate,neutrality

stateofnature29,70Stears,Marc10Steiner,Hillel93strongevaluation87–8subjectivismandliberalism155–8anddemocracy208–11seealsovalues,relativityof

substantivemoralphilosophyseemoralphilosophysufficiencyseeequalityvs.minimumthresholdSupremeCourt,American160,199surgeons,andfreedomofoccupationalchoice40Surowiecki,James231Swift,Adam10,55,185Switzerland19

talentsseeluck,andnaturalendowments

Taliban68tax,inheritance95taxation,redistributiveseeredistributivetaxationTaylor,Charles79,85,87,144–5teledemocracy194–5,202–4,216,219–20Thatcher,Margaret20thinmorality150,165,170,172thinktanks6–7,32ThirdMan,The(film)19ThirdWay144Thompson,Dennis231Tocqueville,Alexisde4,19–20,205Totalitaria61–4totalitarianism58,61,82–3,85,88–9trafficlights,asconstraintsonfreedom79treatmentasequalsseeequality,ofrespecttrickledowneffect28,119–20,124,127seealsodifferenceprinciple;equality,andeconomicproductivity

unencumberedselfseeself,unencumberedunreasonableness174utilitarianism32,127–30,156utopianism7–9

valuesofdemocracyseedemocracy,valuesofdisagreementon1–2,13–14,16,102;seealsoconceptsvs.conceptions;politicalphilosophy,asconceptualanalysis

incommensurabilityof90relativityof155–8;seealsosubjectivism,andliberalismshared157–8,161–4,170,173–5

VanParijs,Philippe94veilofignorance23–31,38,133voting,compulsory73seealsodemocracy;liberty,aspoliticalparticipation;politicalparticipation

Waldron,Jeremy211,215,231Walzer,Michael101–2,144–5,157–8wayoflifeseeconceptionsofthegoodwelfarestateseeeducation;healthcare;redistributivetaxationWelles,Orson19Westmoreland,Robert141White,Stuart10Wilkinson,Richard142Williams,Andrew55,111WiltChamberlainexample37–8,40Wolff,Jonathan9,56Wollheim,Richard205WorldTradeOrganization54WorldWarIIseeSecondWorldWar

Zapatero,JoséLuisRodríguez94