Modern Philosophy Notes
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Notes and Sample Questions Preliminary Examinations Modern Philosophy 2008 Rationalists: Descartes 2 Leibniz 38 Spinoza 48 Empiricists: Locke 54 Hume 64 Political Philosophy: Machiavelli 70 Hobbes 71 Locke 72 Rousseau 83 Rawls 84 Moral Philosophy: Hume 95 Kant 100 Mill 109 1
Transcript of Modern Philosophy Notes
Notes and Sample QuestionsPreliminary Examinations
Modern Philosophy2008
Rationalists:Descartes 2
Leibniz 38
Spinoza 48
Empiricists:Locke 54
Hume 64
Political Philosophy:Machiavelli 70
Hobbes 71
Locke 72
Rousseau 83
Rawls 84
Moral Philosophy:Hume 95
Kant 100
Mill 109
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Aesthetics:Hume 117
Kant 118
Descartes Meditations
Discuss the metaphysical implications of Descartes’ doctrine of freedom of the will, especially as this relates to the power of cognition. Be sure to include something about the nature and function of judgment, as well as the representational capacity. In this context, is the ultimate relation between infinityand finity actually cognitive? If not, show how the concept of the cognitive is limited by these considerations. If so, show how how the concept of the cognitive is enlarged by these considerations. (Spring 1997)
What is Descartes’ argument for the distinction between mind and body? Evaluate this argument with reference to alternative conceptions of the mind-body relationship.
Modern philosophy begins with a rejection of the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion ofsubstantial forms. How do rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz maintain the idea of substance known through reason without this idea? Discuss in particular the importance of the definition of substance as that which is “conceived through itself and not another” and so is “self-caused” (causa sui). (Fall 2003)
Introduction and Letter of Dedication:
2 Goals: (n.b – Descartes says both can be achieved via Revelation – he citespassages)
1) Prove existence of God by natural reason
2) Prove the immortality of the soul- Do this by proving that the body is distinct from the
soul
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Synopsis:
Key Points:- Pg. 13 (of the Latin – Adam/Tannery edition) – method of
geometerso [Mathematization of nature - Why would the method of geometry
apply to God and the immortality of the soul?]- Pg. 13 – Everything we understand clearly and
distinctly is true- Pg. 14 – All substances are by nature incorruptible- Pg. 15 – Mind – pure substance / body – has accidental
propertieso This is mind/body dualism
Meditation I
Concerning Those Things that can be Called into Doubt
Method of doubt [Individually experimenting with doubt as the first step on the road to truth- An individual method - no interlocutor needed - in fact, an interlocutor would get in the way]
17 - Errors of youth- Descartes had many false opinions he took to be true- Proceeded to build upon these false opinions- “I realized that once in my life I had to raze
everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to establish anythingfirm and lasting in the sciences.”(18)
- To do this - withdraws into solitudeo [Note that the method works best in solitude - not a community
effort]- Need not prove old opinions wrong, but merely that
there is some reason for doubt- Must doubt every opinion which is not completely
certain and indubitable- Must reject every opinion of which I have some reason
for doubt
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- 18 – No need to doubt each and every opinion I have/have ever had – only the foundations
o If the foundations crumble, that which they support will follow
1 st Step: Certainty of the Senses: (18)
I tend to believe what I receive through the senses- But – Sometimes the senses deceive- Do not trust anything that has deceived you, even once- Not in significant things- May provide problems such as mirages or a bent stick in
the water- But not in significant things like that I am sitting
here, writing, etc.- How could I deny my hands and body are mine?- But the insane do this [n.b. – Foucault/Derrida debate based
here]- This would be a poor model - I would myself appear
insane
2 nd Step: Dream-Like Deception: (19)
However – I am completely deceived in dreams- When I dream, I experience the same things insane
people experience when awake- There are no definite signs by which I may distinguish
being awake from sleeping- For sake of argument: assume, as if I were dreaming,
what I perceive is false- What I perceive, even in this state, is not entirely
novel- Must be based upon what I have seen when awake – are
odd combinations of these- Even if entirely novel - must appear in colors I have
seen while awake
All I perceive has: (even in this state)- Extension
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- Quantity- Time- Place- Etc.
Mathematical (and physical) truths are still operative
3 rd Step: Deception of a God: (21)
Opinion of long-standing: There is a god who can do anything and who created me
- Since God can do anything, suppose he were to make it such that there were no earth, heaven, extended things etc., but make these things appear to me as they do now
- How would I know they were not real?- Suppose God has made it such that I believe 1 + 1 = 2
when in fact 1 + 1 = 3 – i.e. God has Himself deceived me
- Suppose everything said here about God is fictitious- I must have been created by fate, chance, or some other
way than by God- But - I am imperfect - my capacity for being deceived
and mistaken indicate that I am not perfect- It is possible I am so imperfect that I am always
deceived- Thus - I must admit there is nothing that I once
believed to be true which I cannot doubt- Must not just doubt what I had believed, but consider
it false- To do this - imagine an all-powerful, evil God
4 th Step: Evil Genius: (22)
Suppose a supremely powerful and supremely clever evil genius who directs all his efforts at deceiving me
- Evil genius deceives me such that all external things are as real as my dreams
- I do not even have arms, hands, flesh, but am deceived to believe I do
- I must withhold assent to anything, so that I can avoid
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being deceived- But - That is too much to ask - I will inevitably fall
back on my old opinions
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Meditation II
Concerning the Nature of the Human Mind: That it is Better Known than the Body
Goal: One certain thing (24)“I will accomplish this by putting aside everything that admits of the least doubt, as if I had discovered it to be completely false. I will stay on this course until I know something certain, or, if nothing else, until I know for certain that nothing is certain.”
– Nothing is certain – Perhaps this is the one certain thing?
Suppose:- Everything I see is false- Then - what is true?
Is God the one certain thing - that which is true?– God, who instills doubts in me?– But – I could be the author of my own thoughts
Am I something? Am I anything?- Not body – I have no certainty that I have a body- Nor senses - no certainty that I have any senses- Then, Do I not exist?
Do I exist? (25)- “Doubtless I did exist, if I persuaded myself of
something”- But - Suppose there is a supremely powerful deceiver who
is always deceiving me- If he is deceiving me, he is persuading me of something- Namely, that what he puts before me is true- If he is persuading me of something, there is no doubt I
exist- “And let him do his best at deception, he will neither
bring it about that I am nothing so long as I shall think that I am something.”
- Therefore - “this proclamation ‘I am, I exist’ is
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necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind”
- [This is a performative demonstration: It is the act of saying or thinking “I exist” which demonstrates my existence]
What am I, that exists? (25-28)
Method: Examine what I previously thought- I have a body - arms, hands, face, etc.- I have a soul (power of self-motion)
o But - not sure what my soul consisted of- Had no doubt what my body was
o I thought I knew it distinctlyo Capable of being enclosed in an exclusive spaceo Capable of being perceived by the senseso Capable of being movedo Not capable of self-movement
- But, again, what if I am being deceived?- “I am, I exist” does not seem to tell me anything about
my body- Further, it is possible it is only true when I utter it
- i.e., when I am thinking- Thus - only when I am thinking am I certain I exist- Therefore - I am a thinking thing- Still cannot be certain I have a body
What is this “I” whom I know?
Can I use my imagination to gain self-knowledge? (27)- To imagine is to contemplate a shape or image of a
corporeal thing- But – these things are susceptible to doubt- They could be like dreams- Therefore – I cannot use imagination to gain self-
knowledge
What can I say, with certainty, I am?A thing that:
- Thinks
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- Doubts- Understands- Affirms- Denies- Wills- Refuses- Imagines- Senses
The “I” that imagines is the same “I” that doubtsThe “I” that doubts is the same “I” that sensesUnity of the “I”
However- It still seems corporeal things are more real than I am- “I” seem mysterious to me- But - “I am, I exist” is certain- Whereas what I perceive or imagine is still in doubt
What are bodies, or the corporeal things I sense and/or imagine?Example: One particular body - a piece of wax: (30)
- Has certain qualitieso A particular scento Hard and coldo Easy to toucho Etc.
- Now - I bring the wax close to the fireo The scent vanisheso It gets biggero Becomes soft and hoto I can hardly touch it
- Question: Does the same wax remain?o It must - No one denies thiso i.e., stuff just don’t disappear
- What was it that made me understand this body to be “wax”?
o Not the scent, size, hardness, etc. - as these have all changed
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o Rather - It is “a body that a short time ago manifested itself to me in these ways, and now does so in other ways.”
- What remains when we remove everything that does not belong to the wax [i.e., those things that change]?
o It is extendedo It is flexibleo It is mutable
- What does it mean to be flexible and mutable? - Can my imagination tell me?
o i.e., it changes shape from round to square to triangle
o But I cannot imagine all possible variationso Imagination cannot tell me what it means to be
flexible and mutableo Same with extensiono Therefore: I perceive the wax through my mind
alone- Perception of the wax is not:
o A seeingo A touchingo An imagining
- “It is an inspection on the part of the mind alone” (31)- But - I can still err in this inspection
o Example - If I look across the street and see men across the square
o How do I know they are men and not automatao Through my mind alone - Through my faculty of
judgment
So - What am I, who perceives this wax so distinctly?So far:
- I know I am a thinking thing- I doubt everything except the existence of my mind- I know myself with greater certainty than the wax- I perceive myself more distinctly and evidently than the
wax- The fact that I perceive the wax tells me I exist- I could be deceived that this is wax before me, but not
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that I see it- What applies to the wax applies to everything external
to me- Nothing could be more easily and more evidently
perceived than my own mind
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Meditation III
Concerning God, That He Exists
Can I take the manner in which I know these things for certain, and posit a general rule as to how I know anything for certain?
- First instance of knowledge - “I am a thinking thing”- This is a certain clear and distinct perception of what
I affirm- But this can only be called true if I can be certain
that everything I perceive clearly and distinctly is true
- It seems I can say that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true
- But - what about things that are doubtful, but appear before me clearly and distinctly?
- Any external object - Appear to me clearly and distinctly, but could be doubted - optical illusions, dreams, etc.
- No doubt - the ideas are in me- But - How may I conclude that these ideas conform to
something outside of me, or even that anything exists outside of me?
- What about truths on the order of mathematical truths?- They also seemed clear and distinct- I only doubted them because of the possibility of an
evil genius- Thus - If I am to gain any certainty about ideas which
appear to me clearly and distinctly, I must investigate:
- Whether there is a God- If that God can be a deceiver
To do this properly - group thoughts into classes - ask where truth and falsity lies in each:
Images, Volitions/Affects, Judgments:
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Images of thingsi.e. - What the faculty of imagination doesWhen taken alone - cannot, properly speaking, be
considered falseWhat I imagine is what I imagine - no room for falsity
Volitions/Affects - seem to me to be more than mere likenessAgain - No room for falsityI will what I will - no true or false here
JudgmentsMust be where truth and falsity residePrinciple and most frequent error - “I judge that the
ideas which are in me are similar to or in conformity with certain things
outside of me.”Since judgments refer to something beyond me, there is
room for error
Ideas- Some appear innate, others outside me (adventitious),
others made by me- Our concern - those outside me - these are the ones I
make judgments about- Why do I judge ideas outside me to conform to things
existing outside me?- I seem to have been taught so by nature- But - it seems to me these ideas can go against my will- It seems, whether or not these ideas conform to
something outside of me, that at least some of them originate from outside of me
Light of Nature vs. Natural (spontaneous) Impulses:- If I know something by the light of nature, it cannot be
doubtedo i.e., I doubt, I am
- This is the most trustworthy of faculties- If I know something by natural impulses, they often
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drive me to make poor choices- They are not very trustworthy- If I know something outside of me by natural impulse, I
should not trust it
Ideas do not depend upon my will?- Even if they do not depend upon my will, it does not
follow that they proceed from things external to me- I may form these ideas through some as yet unknown
faculty
Even if these ideas proceeded from something external to me,it does not follow that they are the same as I represent them
- Sun appears as the size of my fist- But astronomy tells me its a wee bit larger
THUS - It was not a well-formed judgment which made me believe in external things, but a blind impulse
Now - Descartes takes another route towards his belief in anexternal world:
A hierarchy of ideas:- When we consider ideas a modes of thought, they are
equal- They all seem to proceed from me in the same manner- When one idea represents one thing, and another idea
represents another thing, we have room to discuss theirdifferences
- “Unquestionably, those ideas that display substances to me are something more, and, if I may say so, contain within themselves more objective reality than those which represent only modes or accidents”
- “the idea that enables me to understand a supreme deity,eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things other than himself, clearly has more objective reality within in than do those ideas throughwhich finite substances are displayed.”
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There must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as there is in the effect of that same cause
- An effect can only get its reality from its cause- If the effect possesses reality, so must the cause- Thus:- Something cannot come into being out of nothing- That which is more perfect [real] cannot come into being
from what is less perfect [real]- “true not merely for those effects whose reality is
actual or formal, but also for ideas in which only objective reality is considered”
- A stone cannot exist unless it is put into reality by something that has as much or more reality than the stone
- The idea of a stone cannot be placed in me unless it placed in my by something that has at least as much reality as the stone
- The idea - needs no more formal reality than what it borrows from my own thought
- But - Particular ideas which present particular objective realities must have at least as much formal reality as the objective reality contained in the idea
- If we assume something is found in the idea which is notits cause, then the idea gets something from nothing
“The formal mode of being belongs to the causes of ideas, atleast to the first and preeminent ones, by their very nature”
- One idea can perhaps issue from another- But no infinite regress is allowed- We must eventually reach a first idea whose cause is a
sort of archetype that contains formally all the reality that is in the idea merely objectively
- Thus - my ideas may not reach the perfection of the things from which they are drawn, but they cannot contain anything greater or more perfect than those things
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“If the objective reality of any of my ideas is found to be so great that I am certain that the same reality was not in me, either formally or materially,”
- “and that therefore I myself cannot be the cause of the idea”
- “then it necessarily follows that I am not alone in the world”
- “but that something else, which is the cause of this idea, also exists”
So - Are there any ideas of which I am certain the same reality is not in me?
- I have ideas of myself, God, corporeal and inanimate things, animals, angels, other men
- As for other men, animals and angels - they could easilybe derived from the ideas I have of myself, God and corporeal things
- So we are left with myself, God and corporeal things- Corporeal things
o Nothing in them so great I cannot imagine them to have originated from me
- Myselfo I cannot have more or less reality than myself
- Godo Is there anything in the idea of God that could
not have originated from me?o God - “a certain substance that is infinite,
independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything that exists - if anything else exists”
o “the more carefully I focus my attention on them, the less possible it seems they could have arisen from myself alone”
o “Thus, from what has been said, I must conclude that God necessarily exists”
- I am finite - the idea of infinite substance could not have arisen from me - it must have arisen from something which is actually infinite
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o Cannot perceive the infinite through the negation of the finite
o For the infinite contains more reality than the finite
o The perception of the infinite is prior to the perception of the finite
- Thus - my perception of God is prior to my conception ofmyself
o How could I perceive my own defects if I had nothing greater to compare myself to?
o “whatever I clearly and distinctly perceived to bereal and true and to involve some perfection is wholly contained in that idea”
o Thus - “of all the ideas that are in me, the idea that I have of God is the most true, the most clear and distinct.”
- But - perhaps all the perfections I am attributing to God are really in me, at least potentially - such that they do not yet assert themselves and are not yet actualized?
- After all - I see my knowledge being gradually increased- why can’t it be increased to infinity? And thus I would have all the perfections of God?
Nothing potential in God- This gradual increase is proof of my imperfection- My knowledge can never be infinite - it can always be
increased- God’s knowledge is actually infinite - nothing can be
added to his perfection- Further - If God did not exist, from where do I derive
my own existence?- From myself or my parents or something else less perfect
than God?- Myself?
o If I got my being from myself, I would have all the perfections I can imagine
o Further - how is my existence sustained? From myself?
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But if I had such a power, I would surely be aware of it
I’m not - so I cannot be the cause of my sustained existence
o If I’m not the cause of my sustained existence, I cannot be properly be said to be the cause of my existence
- A being less perfect than God?o We end up in an infinite regress - we must ask
what caused this finite being and so ono But an infinite regress is not admissible here -
as I am dealing not only with the cause of my existence, but also of my sustained existence
o Several partial causes concur to bring me into being?
o But God’s unity is part of his perfectiono We end up with the same regress
- My parents?o Could not be the cause of my sustained existenceo “I have no choice but to conclude that the mere
fact of my existing and of there being in me the idea of a most perfect being, that is, God, demonstrates most evidently that God too exists.”
How did I receive this idea of God?- Not from the senses- Not from me- Must be innate in me (just as the idea of myself is
innate in me) - The fact that God created me makes it likely he made me
in his image and likeness- And that he intended me to perceive this likeness by the
same faculty by which I perceive myself
God not a deceiver- If God was a deceiver he would have to have some defect- But it is precisely the nature of God to have no defects
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Meditation IV
Concerning the Truth and the False
Question of this meditation: Where does error come from?- God would not deceive me- Deception or trickery is an indication of imperfection- God has no imperfections- Therefore - God would not deceive me- Objection - the ability to deceive seems to indicate
cleverness or power- Response - The will to deceive attests to maliciousness
or weakness
Regarding the faculty of Judgment- Like everything else, it is a faculty I received from
God- Since God does not wish to deceive me, it seems he would
provide me with a faculty by which I can never make a mistake, if I use it properly
- It seems to follow from this that I never make a mistake- But - Experience tells me I do make mistakes- I seem to exist in a sort of middle ground between God
(pure existence) and nothingness- On the one hand, since I was created by God, there is
nothing in me which would lead me to be deceived or in error
- On the other hand, since I am imperfect and thus participate in nothingness, or non-being, it is not surprising that I make many mistakes
- Therefore, “error as such is not something real that depends upon God, but is rather merely a defect”
- I make mistakes, not because my faculty of judgment is faulty, but because it is not infinite
- But - error is not pure privation, but rather a privation or lack of knowledge that I ought to possess
- God could have created me such that I never err- But - God always wills what is best
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So, Why is it that I err? or Why is it that it is best (as God always wills what is best) for me to be capable of error?
- I should not be surprised that God brings about things, the reason for which I do not understand
- Since I am finite, the causes of many things escape me- “For this reason alone the entire class of causes which
people customarily derive from a thing’s ‘end’ I judge to be utterly useless in physics”
- “It is not without rashness that I think myself capable of inquiring into the ends of God”
- In judging the perfection of the works of God, we shouldlook at the whole universe taken together, not just a single creature
- Error in the singular may contribute to the perfection of the whole
Error depends upon the simultaneous concurrence of two causes:
- My faculty of knowing (intellect)- My faculty of choosing (will)
Through intellection I merely perceive ideas, about which I make judgments
- Thus, the intellect properly viewed cannot be in error- But - it need not contain all possible ideas - as does
God’s intellect- My faculty of willing does not appear to be any greater
than God’s- Both cases - to will is to affirm or to deny- The more inclined I am towards one choice or another,
the freer is my will- “Were I always to see clearly what is true and good, I
would never deliberate about what is to be judged or chosen. In that case, although I would be entirely free, I could never be indifferent.”
- Thus - My faculty of judgment is not the source of my errors
- It is perfect in its kind
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So what is the source of my errors?
- “Since the will extends further than the intellect, I donot contain the will within the same boundaries; rather, I also extend it to things I do not understand.Because the will is indifferent to such matters, it easily turns away from the true and the good; and in this way I am deceived and I sin.”
- Error lies in the act whereby I will illegitimately- I err in this way, not only about things I am incapable
of understanding, but also concerning things I do not yet possess clear and distinct knowledge of
General Rule:- “If I hold off from making a judgment when I do not
perceive what is true with sufficient clarity and distinctness, it is clear I am acting properly and am not committing an error.”
- “But if I were instead to make an assertion or a denial,then I am not using my freedom properly”
- Even if, in doing so, I happen to choose the truth, I amstill at fault
- For “a perception on the part of the intellect must always precede a determination on the part of the will”
- Thus - The essence of error is “the privation . . . present in this operation insofar as the operation proceeds from me, but not in the faculty given to me byGod, nor even in its operation insofar as it depends upon him”
May I complain that God did not give me a greater power of understanding? No:
- To not understand many things is the nature of a finite creature
- Rather, I should thank God, who owes me nothing, for theunderstanding he has given me
- God is not complicit with my error- He has not given me error, but the freedom to give or
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withhold judgment about things that are not clear and distinct
- But God could have given me freedom of choice and clear and distinct perceptions of everything
- Return to part/whole argument
Again - General rule: “I should never judge anything that I do not clearly and distinctly understand”
- By focus and repetition, I can make such abstaining fromjudgment a habit
Conclusion: I will attain truth “if only I pay enough attention to all the things that I perfectly understand, andseparate them off from the rest, which I apprehend more confusedly and more obscurely”
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Meditation V
Concerning the Essence of Material Things, and again concerning God, that he exists
Before enquiring if there is a world outside of me, I shouldexamine my idea of these material things in the world I perceive to be outside of me
I am able to distinctly imagine geometrical and other mathematical things
- My ideas of geometrical and mathematical objects are clear and distinct
- “although, in a sense, I think them at will, nevertheless they are not something I have fabricated; rather they have their own true and immutable natures.”
- i.e., the properties of a triangle do not depend on my mind
- It is irrelevant to say I got the idea of a triangle from my sense organs presenting me with triangle-like bodies
- I can also imagine other figures which the senses could never present to me
Now … Can I base an argument for the existence of God from the fact that I am able to clearly and distinctly perceive the real properties of a thing merely by examining my idea of them?
- My idea of God - a supremely perfect being- No less an idea within me than mathematical ideas- Part of this idea of God is that it always exists- This is no less clear and distinct than mathematical
proofs- The existence of God should have the same certainty as
mathematical proofs
Possible objection: Since in other matters I can separate essence from existence, I can do so in the case of God
- But - this is separating the property of containing
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lines from the idea of a triangle
Another possible objection:- Not being able to separate God’s essence from his
existence does not prove his existence - it only provesthat we can call nothing God except that which exists
- But - In the particular case of God, whose essence is inseparable from his existence, existence must follow from the mere idea
- This is not something I impose upon the idea of God, butthe only way to conceive of the idea of God
- Since existence is a perfection, the existence of a supremely perfect being must follow from the idea of such a being
- Only in the case of God does existence belong to an idea’s essence
- Thus - There can only be one God- God must have existed from eternity and will endure for
eternity
“As far as God is concerned, if I were not overwhelmed by prejudices and if the images of sensible things were not besieging my thought from all directions, I would certainly acknowledge nothing sooner or more easily than him”
“I also observe that certitude about other things is so dependent upon this, that without it nothing can ever be perfectly known”
“For I am indeed of such a nature that, while I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot help believing it to be true”
- But - I cannot always focus my mental gaze as to perceive clearly
- When I turn my mental gaze away from the clear and distinct, doubt may emerge
But - Once I perceive that:- There is a God
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- Everything depends upon him- He is not a deceiver- I can no longer doubt anything I have seen clearly and
distinctly is true- “And not just of this one fact, but of everything else
that I recall once having demonstrated, as in geometry”- “The certainty and truth of every science depends
exclusively upon the knowledge of the true god”
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Meditation VI
Concerning the Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body
Final step in Meditations: Do material things exist
As shown in Meditation V, then must exist insofar as they are an object of mathematics, as I can perceive the latter clearly and distinctly.
- God is able to bring about everything I can perceive clearly and distinctly
- The fact that my faculty of imagination allows me to imagine material things tells me they exist
- For imagination is “simply a certain application of the knowing faculty to a body intimately present to it, andwhich therefore exists.”
Distinction between Imagination and Pure Intellection:- When I imagine a triangle, I can call up an image in my
mind’s eye- I understand it, not just as a three-sided closed
figure, but can picture it in my mind- When I think about a thousand-sided figure, while I can
understand that it is a thousand-sided, closed figure, I cannot picture such a figure in my mind’s eye
- Thus - “I am manifestly aware that I am in need of a peculiar sort of effort on the part of the mind in order to imagine, one that I do not employ in order to understand.”
Imagination is not required for my own essence- That is, my essence is to be a thinking thing, or a mind- While I require a faculty of understanding to be a
thinking thing, I do not require a faculty of imagination
- That is, imagination adds nothing to a thinking thing- Therefore, the power of imagination must follow from
something distinct from me
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- “And I readily understand that, were a body to exist to which a mind is so joined that it may apply itself in order, as it were, to look at it any time it wishes, itcould happen that it is by means of this very body thatI imagine corporeal things.”
- Intellection - Turns towards the mind and looks at the ideas that are in it
- Imagination - Turns towards the body and intuits in the body something that conforms to an idea either understood by the mind or perceived by sense
- “Since I can think of no other way of explaining imagination that is equally appropriate, I make a probable conjecture from this that a body exists.”
- At this point - only a probability- Can’t get from the idea of corporeal nature to corporeal
nature itself
I can imagine things like odors, sounds, tastes, pains, etc., but not distinctly
- I seem to have perceived them by way of the senses, fromwhich they came to imagination
- I must see if the senses can provide me with a reliable argument for the existence of corporeal things
Method:- Review what I had previously perceived by the senses and
thus believed were true- Ask why I later called them into doubt- Determine what I must now believe about them
Previous beliefs derived from the senses- I had a body with several parts- I understood this body to be part or the whole of me- This body was one among many other bodies- These other bodies can affect my body in good or bad
ways- Pleasure and pain told me what was a good idea and what
a bad idea in regard to these other bodies- I also had internal sensations - hunger, thirst, etc.- I also had emotions (affects) mirth, sadness, anger,
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etc.- Besides geometrical properties of external bodies, I
sensed tactile properties, hardness, heat, etc.- I sensed lights, colors, etc., from which I was able to
distinguish the earth, sky, seas, etc. from one another- “Now given the idea of all these qualities that
presented themselves to my thought, and which were all that I properly and immediately sensed, still it was surely not without reason that I thought I sensed things that were manifestly different from my thought, namely, the bodies from which those ideas proceeded”
- “For I knew by experience that these ideas came upon me utterly without my consent, to the extent that, wish asI may, I could not sense any object unless it was present to a sense organ. Nor could I fail to sense itwhen it was present.”
- Since these ideas were even more vivid that those I could deliberately call up in myself, it seems impossible that they could have come from myself
- Since the ideas a perceived by sense were more vivid than those I came up with myself, I conclude that thereis no idea in the intellect that did not originate in asense organ
- This is why I thought my body belonged more to myself than any other
- I could not be separate from it in the same way I could from other bodies
- I felt pain and pleasure only in it- Why should what happens in the body affect the mind?- Only if I had been taught this way by nature- “For there is no affinity whatsoever, at least none that
I am aware of, between this twitching in the stomach and the will to have something to eat, or between the sensation of something causing pain and the thought of sadness arising from this sensation.”
Previous Doubts about the evidence of the senses
- External Illusions - Optical illusions and the like
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- I determined that it was my judgment which was in error- Internal illusions - phantom limb, etc.- Again - judgment in error- Dream-like deception- Evil genius- My conclusion - I must hold my judgment of an external
world in doubt
Return to these with the 2nd through 5th meditations in mind- “I know that all the things I clearly and distinctly
understand can be made by God such as I understand them”
- If I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another, that is enough to be certain that these things are different from each other
- For if I can distinguish them apart, then they can be separated (at least by God)
- I know I exist and that my essence is entirely to be a thinking thing
- Therefore: “because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, insofar as I am merely a thinking thing and not an extended thing, and because of the other hand I have a distinct idea of a body, insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinctfrom my body and can exist without it.”
- I have the modes of thinking called sensing and imagining
- I am able to clearly and distinctly understand myself inmy entirety without these modes of thinking
- But - I cannot at all understand myself with only these modes of thinking
- That is - these modes of thinking cannot operate apart from “a substance endowed with understanding in which they inhere, for they an act of understanding in their concept.”
- Thus - They are different from me as modes of a thing- They are modes - modalities - of me- I also have other faculties beyond sensing and imagining
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- e.g. The power of movement - which also modes of me- These modes must exist in a corporeal substance - not a
substance endowed with understanding- Because a clear and distinct understanding of them gives
them extension but not understanding- I have a passive faculty of sensing, which I could not
use unless I also active faculty of producing or bringing about the ideas of sensible things
- But this passive faculty of sensing cannot be in me, as it is not an act of understanding
- Further, I sense things against my will- “Therefore the only alternative is that there is some
substance different from me, containing either formallyor eminently all the reality that exists objectively inthe ideas produced by that faculty”
- This substance must be either a body or God- God is not a deceiver, so they must not come from God- Thus - they must be bodies, i.e., corporeal things- Therefore, corporeal things exist- They may not exist precisely as I sense them- “But at least they do contain everything I clearly and
distinctly understand”
The nature of bodies- “By means of these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst
and so on, nature also teaches not merely that I am present to my body in the way a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with it, so much so that I and the body constitute one single thing”
- This is why I, who am only a thinking thing, perceive pain when my body is injured
- Otherwise, I would perceive my damaged body in the same way a sailor perceives his damaged ship
- By nature - my body tells me what should be pursued and avoided
- But - it is not infallible, and- It is my mind alone which knows the truth about anything- “I might regard a man’s body as a kind of mechanism that
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is outfitted with and composed of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a way that, evenif no mind existed in it, the man’s body would still exhibit all the same motions that are in it now except for those motions that proceed either from a command ofthe will or, consequently, from the mind.”
Distinction between the mind and the body- “Now my first observation here is that there is a great
difference between a mind and a body in that a body, byits very nature, is always divisible. On the other hand, a mind is utterly indivisible.”
- Cannot distinguish any parts within the mind- My faculties of willing, sensing, etc. cannot be called
parts because it is the same minds that wills, senses, etc.
- But - it is easy to divide my body into parts- “This consideration alone would suffice to teach me that
the mind is wholly diverse from the body, had I not yetknown it well enough in any other way.”
- “My second observation is that my mind is not immediately affected by all the parts of my body, but only by the brain, or perhaps even by just one small part of the brain, namely, by that part where the ‘common’ sense is said to reside.”
- This part of the brain “reports” the activities of the body to the brain
- “the nature of the body is such that whenever any of itsparts can be moved by another part some distance away, it can also be moved in the same manner by any of the parts that lie between them, even if this more distant part is doing nothing.”
- That is, I can feel the same pain when I correctly feel pain in e.g. my foot as I feel when the nerve bringing “foot pain” to the brain incorrectly interprets intermediate pain
- “Since any given motion occurring in that part of the brain immediately affecting the mind produces but one sensation in it, I can think of no better arrangement
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than that is produces the one sensation that, of all the ones it is able to produce, is most especially and most often conducive to the maintenance of a healthy man.”
“The nature of man, insofar as it is composed on mind and body, cannot help being sometimes mistaken”
- Again, sometimes the body’s reports are in error or can be misinterpreted
- But - most of the time, the both are correct- Further, I can use my other senses, my memory, etc. to
check my body’s reports
What about dream-like deception?- “dreams are never joined by the memory with all the
other actions of life, as is the case with those actions that occur when one is awake.”
- Thus - I can tell the difference by dreams and waking life by the continuity of actions of waking life and the discontinuity of actions of dreams
Descartes’ Objectives:- To prove the existence of God by natural reason- Did this twice- To demonstrate the immortality of the soul by showing
that the soul and body are distinct (use discourse also?)
- He has shown the distinction between soul and body- Has shown that the soul can exist apart from the body
Wrap-Up
Goals:- To prove the existence of God by natural reason- To demonstrate the immortality of the soul by showing
how it is distinct from the body
Method:- Geometrical
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- Method of doubt
Key Conclusions:- “I am, I exist” is true every time I say it or think it- I am a thinking thing- My very idea of God tells me God must exist- My idea of God tells me he is not a deceiver- All that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true- Error occurs only when I make judgments about things
that I do not clearly and distinctly perceive- I can rely on mathematics truths which I clearly and
distinctly perceive- I infer from the fact that I possess a faculty of
imagination that the objects it manipulates, i.e., bodies, exist
- Otherwise, imagination is redundant - and God creates nothing which is not perfect
- I have a body to which I am uniquely and exclusively related
- But - I am a thinking thing - I am distinct from my body
- Thus - mind/body dualism- Therefore - my soul can exist apart from my body- And - My soul is eternal
Descartes – Principles of Philosophy Part One – The Principles of Human Knowledge
Metaphysical, Methodological, and Epistemological Points
Substance - Two distinct senses of “ substance ” - 1) Non-Dependent: “By substance we can understand nothing other
than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, namely God” (§51)
o Uncreated thinking substance = God
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- 2) Dependent (on God): “In the case of created things, some areof such a nature that they cannot exist without other things, while some need only the ordinary concurrence of God in order to exist. Wemake this distinction by calling the latter ‘substances’ and the former ‘qualities’ or ‘attributes’ of those substances” (§51)
o Two types of dependent substance (§52)o 1) Corporeal substanceo 2) Mind, i.e., created thinking substance
- Mental and corporeal substance are not initially known bytheir existence but through their principle attributes (§52–53)
o Mental : thought Two modes of thought: “the perception of the
intellect and the operation of the will” (§32)o Corporeal : extension o “Thought and extension can be regarded as constituting the
natures of intelligent substance and corporeal substance; theymust then be considered as nothing else but thinking substanceitself and extended substance itself – that is, as mind and body” (§63)
o Thought and extension may also be taken as modes of a substance
E.g., one mind can have many different thoughts(§64)
o Definitions of modes, qualities, and attributes: §56
Innate Ideas – Self, God, “Common Notions”- Self
o Thinking, and a self that thinks, cannot be doubtedo “Thinking is to be identified here not merely with
understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness” (§9)
o The actual sense/awareness of seeing/walking relates to the mind
o The mind is better known than the body (§11) o “Free Will” is also self-evident (§39)
“The supreme perfection of man is that he acts freely” (§37)
“Making a judgment requires not only the intellect but also the will” (§34); judgment involves free choice
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- God o 1) “The existence of God is validly inferred from
the fact that necessary existence is included in ourconcept of God” (§14), etc.
o 2) The idea of a necessary, eternal, perfect being had to come from somewhere; nothing comes from nothing, etc. (§18–25)
o God preordained everything (§40) Descartes is befuddled by the problem of free
will in spite of determinism but he sure feels free (“close awareness”) (§41)
o God is not corporeal and neither did God “will the evil of sin” (§23)
“Evil” is not a thingo “Preconceived opinions prevent the necessity of the
existence of God from being clearly recognized by everyone” (§16)
o There is no certainty without knowledge of God (§13)o “We pass from knowledge of God to knowledge of his
creatures by remembering that he is infinite and we are finite” (§24)
We want to track causes, and God is first cause(efficient)
God’s reasons cannot be known; stop pursuing final causes (§28)
- Common Notions o I.e., “axioms” or “eternal truths,” e.g., nothing
comes from nothing (§48–50)
Sensation, Perception, and Sense Perception- 1) Sensation
o Awareness via the five senses and includes emotions and appetites
o Thought is identified with sense-awareness (in addition to perception) (§9)
o Sensations arise “from something that is distinct from our mind” (Part II, §1)
o Sensations, emotions and appetites may be clearly known (§65)
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o As long as we don’t affirm or deny the reality of what we sense, then sensation cannot be mistaken (§13)
- 2) Perception o Awareness of extension, i.e., body, matter, space,
etc. We know things such as size and shape in a very
different way from the way we know colors, pains, etc (§69)
There is only a “conceptual” distinction between number, quantity, space and matter (Part II, §8)
“A conceptual distinction is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible” (§62)
o Perception never errs o Duration, order, and number are modes, i.e., affects
or modifications “We should regard the duration of a thing simply as a
mode under which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist…. And similarly we should not regard order or number as anything separate from the things which are ordered and numbered, but should think of themsimply as modes under which we consider the things in question” (§55–56)
Duration is a mode of corporeal substance, i.e., a thingexists and endures, and time—as the measurement of movement—is a mode of thought (§57)
Number (“in the abstract or general”) and universals aremodes of thought (§58)
o Motion Understood as local motion and as a mode of
extension (§65) “The matter existing in the entire universe is…one and
the same…. All the variety in matter, all the diversity of its forms, depends on motion” (Part II, §23)
- 3) Sensory Perception o The combination of sensation and perception
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o “As a result of sensory stimulation we have a clear and distinct perception of some kind of matter, which is extended in length, breadth and depth, and has various differently shaped and variously moving parts which give rise to our various sensations of colors, smells, pain and so on” (Part II, §1)
Knowledge, Error, and Method - Causes of Error
o First, error results from the preconceived opinions of our childhood (§71)
First, as infants and tots, we take everything to be mental substance
Later, as children, we take everything to be corporeal
o The second cause is that we are habituated to believe our preconceived opinions (§72)
o The third cause is poor memory (§73)o “The fourth cause of error is that we attach our
concepts to words which do not precisely correspond to real things”
I.e., we get caught up in language—and sometimes even in abstract or unreal concepts—not in things; we lose sight of substance(s) (§74)
o Sensation occasionally errs, so it isn’t trustworthy(§4), and what is doubtful should be considered false (§2)
o God is not the cause of errors (§29, 36)o The will, though it can prevent error, often is the
cause (§31, 42) “The scope of the will is wider than that of the
intellect, and this is the cause of error. Moreover, theperception of the intellect extends only to the few objects presented to it, and is always extremely limited. The will, on the other hand, can in a certain sense be called infinite ” (§35)
We choose to assent to things that can be doubted
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o Error arises in false judgment, in our assenting to what’s doubtful (§1, 6)
o “We fall into error only when we make judgments about things which we have not sufficiently perceived” (§30, 33, 43); “misuse of judgment” and false memory (§44)
Errors: with respect to God, negations; to ourselves, privations (§31)
Errors are not thingso Error thus results from our action, not our nature
(§38)o We err because we aren’t following the proper method
(§42)- Method in the Principles
o Doubt preconceived notionso Assent only to what we clearly and distinctly
perceive. o The rules to philosophize correctly: §75
- Clear and Distinct Perception o Everything we clearly perceive is true (§30, 43)o Clear: “I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is
present and accessible to the attentive mind” (§45)o Distinct: “I call a perception ‘distinct’ if, as
well as being clear, it is so sharply separated fromall other perceptions that it contains within itselfonly what is clear” (§45)
- How we obtain knowledge/clear and distinct ideas o First, understand that everything is rooted in the
existence of God: “Corporeal substance and mind…needonly the concurrence of God in order to exist” (§51).
o More broadly, philosophy and science is rooted in theology (§25, 29, 76)
“If God happens to reveal to us something about himself or others which is beyond the natural reach of our mind – we will not refuse to believe it, despite the fact that we do not clearly understand it” (§25)
“The natural light is to be trusted only to the extent that it is compatible with divine revelation” (§29)
o Of Substance
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Don’t mistake sensation for perception and viceversa; it amounts to mistaking one substance for another! (§54, 68)
“We can easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, one of created thinking substance, and the other of corporeal substance, provided we are careful to distinguish all the attributes of thought from the attributes of extension. We can also have a clear and distinct idea of uncreated and independent thinking substance, that is of God” (§54)
Knowledge of the modes of thought and extension(§64)
“We shall arrive at the best perception of all these items if we regard them simply as modes of the things in which they are located” (§65)
o Of Sensation Sensations are clearly known when we judge them
as being purely mental, as modes of thought andnot extension (§66)
Neither, e.g., is pain located in the body, noris light in the sun (§67)
- Correct Judgment o This is how to make a true judgment of a sense-
perception: “we perceive something in the objects whose nature we do not know, but which produces in us a certain very clear and vivid sensation which wecall the sensation of [x]” (§70)
o “As long as we merely judge that there is in the objects (that is, in the things, whatever they may turn out to be, which are the source of our sensations) something whose nature we do not know, then we avoid [and guard against] error” (§70)
o Rules for philosophy: §75
Notes – Discourse on Metaphysics
[Note: My comments in [brackets] and italics]
Past Questions: (all from History of Metaphysics exams)*Present Spinoza’s arguments for why there must be only one substance and its nature must be infinite. Why did Leibniz not
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accept this view and how does his concept of substance differ? (Fall 1998 & Spring 1999)-Leibniz’s conception of a monad may be seen as a metaphysical version of a geometrical point. Compare the conceptions of monad and point. Does either exist? Why is that question important? (Fall 2001)-Compare the conceptions of God in Spinoza and Leibniz, focusing specifically on the concepts of freedom in each. (Spring 2000)-Modern philosophy begins with a rejection of the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of substantial forms. How do rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz maintain the idea of substance known through reason without this idea? Discuss in particular theimportance of the definition of substance as that which is “conceived through itself and not another” and so is “self-caused” (causa sui). (Fall 2003)1. On the Divine Perfection, and That God Does Everything in the Most Desirable Way
God – An absolutely perfect being- We have an insufficient notion of what this means- There are several different perfections in nature- God has all of them together and in the highest degree
A perfection- That which is not capable of a higher degree of perfection- Numbers are thus not perfections- Power and knowledge are perfections
God – acts in a perfect manner both metaphysically and morally- The more we know about God’s works, the more we will
discover that they are excellent and in complete conformity with what we might have desired
2. Against Those Who Claim That There is No Goodness in God’s Works, or That The Rules of Goodness and Beauty Are Arbitrary
- [Descartes] Works of God are good solely because God made them
- Leibniz – Against this viewo If this were so, God would not have had to declare his
works goodo God’s works carry his mark of perfection
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o To say God’s works are in good by any rule of goodness(by only be virtue of the will of God) is to destroy all of God’s love and glory
Why praise God if he is equally praised in doing the opposite?
How is God just if his will takes the place of reason?
All acts of will presuppose a reason for willing
The truths of geometry, justice, goodness etc. are the effects of God’s intellect, not his will
3. Against Those Who Believe That God Might Have Made Things Better
- As a lesser evil is relatively good, a lesser good is relatively evil
- To act with less perfection is to act imperfectly- Moderns – This safeguards God’s freedom
o “to believe that God does something without having anyreason for his will – overlooking the fact that this seems impossible – is an opinion that little conforms to his glory.”
4. That the Love of God Requires Our Complete Satisfaction and Acquiescence With Respect to What He Has Done Without Our Being Quietists As A Result
Loving God is a disposition to will what God wills- We must be truly satisfied with everything God does for us
through his will- We must not be quietists – we must act in accordance with
what we presume to be the will of Godo This is to contribute to the general good
5. What the Rules of the Perfection of Divine Conduct Consist In, and That the Simplicity of the Ways Is in Balance with the Richness of Effects
The finite mind is incapable of knowing in detail why God’s choices make the universe most perfect
However – We can make some general remarks- “the most perfect of all beings, those that occupy the least
volume, that is, those that least interfere with one
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another, are minds, whose perfection consist in their virtues.”
o Thus – principle aim of God – happiness of minds- God’s means – Simplicity- God’s ends – variety, richness, abundance- These must be in balance with one another
6. God Does Nothing Which is Not Orderly and It is Not Ever Possible to Imagine Events That Are Not Regular
What passes for extraordinary is only extraordinary with respect to some particular order established among creatures
- Nothing completely irregular ever occurs in the world- We could not even imagine the completely irregular
7. That Miracles Conform to the General Order, Even Though They May Be Contrary to the Subordinate Maxims; and about What God Wills or Permits by a General or Particular Volition
Miracles are as much with the order as are natural operations- Nature – Only God’s custom- God can dispense with the order of nature if he has stronger
reasons
Actions evil in themselves- Become good only by accident- The course of things corrects such evils are replays them
with interest- God permits these evil things to happen, although he does
not will them
8. To Distinguish the Actions of God from Those Of Creatures We Explain the Notion of Individual Substances
Actions and Passions – Belong properly to individual substances
Individual Substance – “when several predicates are attributed toa single subject and this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance.”
- But – This is a merely nominal explanation- All true predication – has some basis in the nature of
things- When a proposition is not an identity, the predicate must be
virtually contained in the subject
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- To obtain a perfect notion of the subject is to know that the predicate belongs to it
- To know an individual substance “is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us todeduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed.”
- Accident – “a being whose notion does not include everythingthat can be attributed to the subject to which the notion isattributed.”
Example: Alexander- “from all time in Alexander’s soul there are vestiges of
everything that has happened to him and marks of everything that will happen to him and even traces of everything that happens in the universe, even though God alone could recognize them all.”
9. That Each Singular Substance Expresses the Whole Universe in Its Own Way, and ThatAll Its Events , Together With All Their Circumstances and the Whole Sequence of ExternalThings, Are Included in Its Notion
- No two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in number
- All substances is a lowest species [??]- A substance can begin by creation and end only by
annihilation- A substance is not divisible (into two)- One substance cannot be created from two- The number of substances does not naturally decrease or
increaseo Although they are often transformed
- “every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe, which each one represents in its own way”
o Each substance “expresses, however confusedly, everything that happens in the universe, whether past,present, or future – this has some resemblance to infinite perception or knowledge.”
10. That the Belief in Substantial Forms Has Some Basis, but That These Forms Do Not Change Anything in The Phenomena and Must Not Be Used to Explain Particular Effect
- Consideration of forms adds nothing to physics
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- But we cannot obtain knowledge of first principles without formal knowledge
11. That The Thoughts of the Theologians and Philosophers Who Are Call Scholastics AreNot Entirely to Be Distained
12. That the Notions Involved in Extension Contain Something Imaginary and Cannot Constitute the Substance of Body
- Bodies have substantial forms, although these make no changein them (???)
- Size, shape, motion – contain something imaginary and relative to our perception
o Thus – these qualities cannot constitute any substance- But “the souls and substantial forms of other bodies are
entirely different from intelligent souls, which alone know their actions.”
13. Since The Individual Notion of Each Person Includes One and for All Everything That Will Every Happen to Him, One Sees in It the A Priori Proof of the Truth of Each Event, or, Why One Happened Rather Than Another, But These Truths, However Certain, Are Nevertheless Contingent, Being Based on the Free Will of God or of His Creatures, WhoseChoice Always Has it Reasons, Which Incline Without Necessitating
“Everyone grants that future contingencies are certain, since Godforeseens them, but we do not concede that they are necessary on that account.”
- Necessary – A conclusion that can be deduced infallibly froma definition or notion
- Contingent – Necessary only ex hypothesi – accidentally (as itscontrary does not imply a contradiction
Are these actions predetermine?- “whatever happens in conformity with these predeterminations
[avances] is certain but not necessary, and if one were to do the contrary, he would not be doing something impossible in itself, even though it would be impossible [ex hypothesi] for this to happen.“
First degree of human nature – Man will always do (although freely) what appears to be the best
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14. God Produces Various Substances According to the Different Views He Has of the Universe and through God’s Intervention the Proper Nature of Each Substance Brings It About That What Happens to One Corresponds to What Happens to All the Others, without Them Action Upon One Another Directly
God preserves substances and “even produces them continually by akind of emanation, just as we produce our thought.”
“The result of each view of the universe, as seen from a certain position, is a substance which expresses the universe in conformity with this view, should God see fit to render his thought actual and to produce this substance.”
- Since God’s view is always true, our perceptions are always true
- It is our judgments, which come from ourselves, that deceiveus
“the perceptions or expressions of all substances mutually correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons or laws it has observed, corresponds with others doing the same.”
- But they are expressions are not perfectly similar- It is enough that they are proportional- God alone is the cause of this correspondence- Thus “one particular substance never acts upon another
particular substance nor is acted upon by it . . . “o “. . . if we consider that what happens to each is
solely a consequence of its complete idea or notion alone, since this idea already contains all it predicates or events and expresses the whole universe.”
o Nothing can happen to use except thoughts and perceptions
o Our future thought and perceptions are merely consequences of our preceding thoughts and perceptions
o If I could consider distinctly everything that happensor appears to me at a certain time, I could see everything that will happen or appear to me
15. The Action of One Finite Substance On Another Consists Only in the Increase Degree of Its Expression Togther with a Diminution of the Expression of the Other, Insofar as God Requires Them to Accommodate Themselves to One Another
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A substance expresses everything – thus it becomes limited in proportion to its more or less perfect manner of expression
- The substance which passes to a greater degree of perfectionexercises its power and acts
- The substance which passes to a lesser degree of perfectionsshows its weakeness and it acted upon
- Every action of a substance which has perfection involves some pleasure
- Every passion some pain
16. God’s Extraordinary Concourse is Included in that Which Our Essence Expresses, for this Expression Extends to Everything. But this Concourse Surpasses the Powers of Our Nature or of Our Distinct Expression, Which is Finite and Follows Certain Subordinate Maxims
God’s actions which do not follow his subordinate maxims are properly called miraculous.
- God’s miracles cannot be foreseen by the reasoning of any created mind, no matter how enlightened.
- Everything occurring according to the subordinate maxims canbe understood
17. An Example of a Subordinate Maxim or Law of Nature; in Which It Is Shown, Againstthe Cartesians and Many Others, That God Always Conserves the Same Force but Not The Same Quantity of Motion
18. The Distinction between Force and Quantity of Motion Is Important, among Other Reasons, for Judging That One Must Have Resource to Metaphysical Considerations Distinct From Extension in Order to Explain the Phenomena of Bodies
Force – Something different from size, shape and motion- [Cannot be explain via the modern (Cartesian) conception of extended
substance]- To explain force, we must have recourse to forms- Thus – “the general principles of corporeal nature and
mechanics are more metaphysical than geometrical”
19. The Utility of Final Causes in Physics
- God always intends the best and most perfect- Thus – We must seek the principle of all existences and
natures in the final cause
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- Objection: this is to claim we can know God’s endso Response: We are safe so long as we limit ourself to
affirmations that extend God’s designs- [Argument from design]
o By seeing the structure of animals, we recognize the wisdom of their author
o “For the effect must correspond to its cause; indeed, the effect is best recognized through a knowledge of the cause.”
20. A Noteworthy Passage by Socrates in Plato Against the Philosophers Who Are Overly Materialistic
[Where Socrates ridicules Anaxagoras for introducing Nous but not making use of it]
21. If Mechanical Rules Depended Only on Geometry Without Metaphysics, the Phenomena Would Be Entirely Different
22. Reconciliation of Two Ways of Explaining Things, by Final Causes and by Efficient Causes, in Order to Satisfy Both Those Who Explain Nature Mechanically and Those Who Have Recourse to Incorporeal Nature
Way of efficient causes- Deeper and more immediate and a priori- But – more difficult when it comes to details
Way of final causes- Easier- Of use in finding truth which would be difficult to discover
through efficient causes
Example: Refraction – Use of final causes led to what might have been impossible to explain through efficient causes (but now can be explained, having been discovered through final causes)
23. To Return to Immaterial Substances, We Explain How God Acts on the Understanding of Minds and Whether We Always Have the Idea of That About Which We Think
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Example of improper use of ideas – “ontological argument” – only proves God exists if he is possible – In order to properly say wehave an idea of something, we must first be certain it is possible [this is not clear to me]
24. What is Clear or Obscure, Distinct or Confused, Adequate and Intuitive or Suppositive Knowledge; Nominal, Real, Causal, and Essential Definition
Confused – “When I can recognize a things from among other thingswithout being able to say what its differences or properties consist in”
Distinct – When what those differences or properties consist in can be explained
Adequate – “everything that enters into a distinct definition or distinct knowledge is know distinctly, down to the primitive notions.”
Intuitive Knowledge – “my mind understands all the ingredients ofa notion at once and distinctly
Nominal – “when one can still doubt whether the notion defined ispossible”
Real – “when the property makes known the possibility of the thing”
Causal – When the proof of the possibility is a priori, the definition is both real and causal
Essential – “when a definition pushes the analysis back to the primitive notions without assuming anything requiring an a prioriproof of its possibility, it is perfect or essential.”
25. In What Case Our Knowledge Is Joined to the Contemplation of the Idea
26. That We Have All Ideas In Us; and Of Plato’s Doctrine of Reminiscence
“our soul always has in it the quality of representing to itself any nature or form whatsoever, when the occasion to think it presents itself.”
- This quality of the soul is properly the idea of the thing
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- This idea is always in us, whether we think it or not- Nothing enters our mind from the outside- We cannot be taught that of which we do not already have the
idea in our mind- Thus – Plato is right – so long as we don’t agree with his
doctrine of pre-existence
27. How Our Soul Can Be Compared to Empty Tablets and How Our Notions Come Fromthe Senses
None of our notions come from external senses, although in everyday life it is often convenient to speak as if they do
28. God Alone Is the Immediate Object of Our Perceptions, Which Exist Outside of Us, and He Alone Is Our Light
God is the only external cause acting upon us- We have ideas of everything in our soul only
29. Yet We Think Immediately Through Our Own Ideas and Not Through Those Of God
This is because thinking of these ideas involved both the passivepower of being able to be affected by them and an active power – “a power in virtue of which there has always been in its nature marks of the future production of this thought and dispositions to produce it in its proper time.”
30. How God Inclines Our Soul Without Necessitating It; That We Do Not Have the Right To Complain and That We Must Not Ask Why Judas Sins But Only Why Judas the Sinner IsAdmitted To Existence in Preference to Some Other Possible Persons. On Original Imperfection Before Sin and on the Degrees of Grace
Our will always tends toward the apparent good- “God determines our will to choose what seems better,
without, however, necessitating it.”- “Therefore the soul must guard itself against deceptive
appearances through a firm will to reflect and neither to act nor to judge in certain circumstances except after having deliberated fully.”
Is then God to blame if a soul does not use this power, which is assured from all eternity?
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- No – The soul cannot foresee such an act – It does not know it is determined to sin unless it is sinning already – Before the act, it still has the power not to sin
But if this is so, why is it assured that this man, who has the power not to sin, will sin?
- “otherwise he would not be this man. For God sees from all time that there will be a certain Judas whose notion or idea(which God has) contains this free and future action.”
Then why would God allow e.g. Judas to exist?- God has found it good that he should exist – his sin will
be, in the overall sequence of things, derive a greater good– “this sinner is included in the most perfect among all possible sequences.”
But – God is not the cause of evil- Men are, even prior to original sin, originally imperfect
o This is what makes them liable to sin or capable of error
31. On the Motives of Election, on Faith Foreseen, On Middle Knowledge, on the Absolute Degree and That It All Reduces to the Reason Why God Has Chosen For Existence Such a Possible Person Whose Notion Includes Just Such a Sequence of Graces and Free Acts; This Puts an End to All Difficulties at Once
[more on the same issue]
32. The Utility of These Principles in Matters of Piety and Religion
[more on these issues – plus – immortality of the soul – the body/soul distinction – effects of body on soul]
“it is impossible that changes in this extended mass called our body should do anything to the soul or that the dissolution of this body should destroy what is indivisible.”
33. Explanation of the Union of Soul and Body, a Matter Which Has Been Considered as Inexplicable or Miraculous, and on the Origin of Confused Perceptions
[On the correspondence between the actions and passions of the soul and body]
Perceptions of our senses:
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- Must contain some confused feeling- If several perceptions come together such that none of them
stands out, the soul can only perceive them confusedly
34. On the Difference between Minds and Other Substances, Souls or Substantial Forms,and That the Immortality Required Includes Memory
Substances other than minds also express the whole universe, but are not self-aware, hence cannot access necessary and universal truths
- “But the intelligent soul – knowing what it is – having the ability to utter the word “I,” a word so full of meaning – does not merely remain and subsist metaphysically, which is does to a greater degree than the others, but also remains the same morally and constitutes the same person.”
- The nature of the immortal soul includes memory and knowledge of the self
35. The Existence of Minds and that God Considers Them Preferable To Other Creatures.That Minds Express God Rather than the World, But That the Other Substances Express the World Rather Than God
36. God Is the Monarch of the Most Perfect Republic, Composed of All Minds, and the Happiness of this City of God is His Principle Purpose
37. Jesus Christ Had Revealed to Men the Mystery and Admirable Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven and the Greatness of the Supreme Happiness That God Prepares for Those Who Love Him.
How does Descartes account for the possibility of error in the Meditations? (January 2003)
I. Let us consider the possibility for error in the form of a narrative. We will begin with the experience of our upbringing, proceed to Descartes’ method, and end with a coherent picture of the possibility for doubt, which eachof these three exemplify.
II. Experiences of Childhood. Error arises from our inability to identify mental and physical distinctions.A. Earliest experiences were all internal. That is, we
really existed as functions of pleasure and pain. We
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did not posit an external world. Instead, we merely experienced sensation without judging them. Our experience was entirely mental. This experience leadsto erroneous presuppositions.
B. Next experience of childhood is that we externalize all of our experiences. We are enticed by our sense-perception of certain objects, our moms, and we are attracted to them. They, those externalized attractions, cause our body to move in their direction. Similarly, scary things, our neighbor’s dog, repel us. We consider that cause of our movementaway from the dog as externally present. We hold ontothese experiences and make false judgments from memory.
C. Language creates error for us. We equate words with concepts and then we presume that the concepts apply to real things. We store concepts using words. We think that the word horse applies to a substantial form of horse that is the cause of the neighbor’s horse being a horse.
III. Doubt. A. Because of these early preconceived notions, we could
be wrong about a lot of things. Therefore, let us methodically doubt their existence.1. My senses sometimes deceive: there is error.2. Dreams deceive me. There is error there.3. What am I? I have no certainty that I have a body.
I could be in error.B. I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am the thing
that thinks. Certainty.C. But since I doubt, I am imperfect. Knowledge is more
perfect than doubt. I have an idea of perfection. I have an idea of a perfect being. I have an idea of perfect being who necessarily exists. God exists.
D. Mathematical ideas are certain. Or are they? Could God deceive me? God cannot be an evil deceiver. Somethings are clear and distinct. God. Me. Mathematical truths.
E. Objects of sense-perception. Example of wax. What doI perceive distinctly? Its extension.
F. Two substances. Mind and Body. IV. Where is error?
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A. Perception never errs. I introspect on the part of mymind, and when I perceive, I perceive substance as extended.
B. Sensation is internal. When we think that it is external, we err. Like in childhood, when I posit that the book is red, and that the quality of redness is in the external world, I err. I am attributing a mental substance, red, to an extended substance, whichis not red, but a geometrical structure.
C. When my will outruns my intellect, and I make judgments not about clear and distinct ideas, I err.
What is Descartes’ argument for the distinction between mind and body? Evaluate this argument with reference to alternative conceptions of the mind-body relationship.
I. Errors of Childhood give us preconceptions which lead to falsehoods.A. Earliest experiences were all internal. That is, we
really existed as functions of pleasure and pain. We did not posit an external world. Instead, we merely experienced sensation without judging them. Our experience was entirely mental. This experience leadsto erroneous presuppositions.
B. Next experience of childhood is that we externalize all of our experiences. We are enticed by our sense-perception of certain objects, our moms, and we are attracted to them. They, those externalized attractions, cause our body to move in their direction. Similarly, scary things, our neighbor’s dog, repel us. We consider that cause of our movementaway from the dog as externally present. We hold ontothese experiences and make false judgments from memory.
C. Language creates error for us. We equate words with concepts and then we presume that the concepts apply to real things. We store concepts using words. We think that the word horse applies to a substantial form of horse that is the cause of the neighbor’s horse being a horse.
II. Therefore, methodically doubt the existence of all that is not clear and distinct.
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A. Because of these early preconceived notions, we could be wrong about a lot of things. Therefore, let us methodically doubt their existence.4. My senses sometimes deceive: there is error.5. Dreams deceive me. There is error there.6. What am I? I have no certainty that I have a body.
I could be in error.B. I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am the thing
that thinks. Certainty.C. But since I doubt, I am imperfect. Knowledge is more
perfect than doubt. I have an idea of perfection. I have an idea of a perfect being. I have an idea of perfect being who necessarily exists. God exists.
D. Mathematical ideas are certain. Or are they? Could God deceive me? God cannot be an evil deceiver. Somethings are clear and distinct. God. Me. Mathematical truths.
E. Objects of sense-perception. Example of wax. What doI perceive distinctly? Its extension.
F. Two substances. Mind and Body. Cogitans and Extensia.III. Cogitans: Idealist: BerkeleyIV. Extensia: Materialist: HobbesV. Functionalist: James, DeweyVI. Phenomenologists: Merleau-Ponty
A. Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what weare looking for, otherwise we would not be lookingfor it.
B. Intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally again we should not be searching (PP 28).
C. The demand for a pure description excludes equallythe procedure of analytical reflection on the one hand, and that of scientific explanation on the other" (PP ix). Only by avoiding these tendencies,according to him, can we "rediscover, as anterior to the ideas of subject and object, the fact of mysubjectivity and the nascent object, that primordial layer at which both things and ideas come into being" (PP 219).
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D. We are our bodies, and that our lived experience of this body denies the detachment of subject fromobject, mind from body (PP xii).
E. We are in an embodied state of being where the ideational and the material are intimately linked.
F. The world is not an object the law of whose makingI have. It is the natural setting and field for all thoughts and perceptions. We are compounded ofrelationships with the world.
G. Descartes misinterprets quality as an element
LeibnizIntroduction:
Problems with Perapatetic and Scholastic concept of substantial forms:
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- Each kind of substance was said to have a special entity which constituted the reality and the specific differenceof that substance independently of the relation of its parts.
- Basal entities explained differences in substances. - But also accidental forms of hardness were beings
different from the bodies in which they were found. - Schoolmen adopted divisions among substantial forms that
became minute and got in the way of determining real causes. Gravity and lightness as two substantial forms.
Descartes helped found the new physics on the principle thatthere is nothing in the body which is not contained in the mere conception of bodies, which is extension.
Modern science follows this line, reducing the number of occult qualities as far as possible explaining all the phenomena in terms of motion, making the problems those of mechanics, change of position, form, motion.
Is mechanicalism the final word? Are the principles of mechanicalism mechanical? This is a metaphysical question. Metaphysics asks what is a force? Leibniz is the prime mover of the doctrine of dynamism.
I. Epistemology: 1. Whatever we know, we know only in part. 2. At any given moment there is in us an infinity of
perceptions.3. The degree to which we understand these perceptions is
proportionate to their level of distinctness. 4. This distinctness is in part the ability to differentiate
one perception from other perceptions. 5. All created substances differ on a scale of relative
distinctness of perceptions. a. At one end of the scale is a bare monad, a particular
perspective on the totality of relations of the universe without any awareness of such a perspective.
b. Further down the scale are animals and humans, which differ in regard to the distinctness of their perceptions. While animals are aware to a degree, that is, they can know where to find food and when another animal is attacking them, they cannot apperceive, or reflect.
c. The synthesis of perception and reflection composes human thought. Furthermore, understanding or
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intellection only comes when distinct ideas are reflected upon. The distinct ideas are among the infinite set of relations that compose the universe. Confused perceptions are the product of a finite creature’s representation of this infinite set of relations.
6. The difference between confused and distinct perceptions a. Distinctness is a function of definability, the
ability to break something down into constituent parts. Leibniz thought that sensory qualities such ascolor and smell lacked distinctness because he was notable to define their relationship to the perceiver as clearly as in other perceptions. He did not deny the existence of a relation, but since he could not reflect on it as distinctly as upon others, those qualities remained confused perceptions.
b. If we can reflect upon a relation inherent in a perception, it possesses a greater degree of distinctness. However, distinct perceptions also differ in kind from confused ones because they stem from the intellect alone. The two sources of knowledge, our senses and our reflection bring about two different types of knowledge, perception and intelligence.
7. Through sensation, we perceive particulars. 8. Through reflection, we discover universal or eternal truths.9. How can humans decipher the reality of sensory phenomena?
Perceived things qualify as real if we can apply to them ourdistinct ideas and therefore discover their intelligible essences.
10. And what are these eternal truths that inhere in the relations that humans reflect upon? The success of the natural science in understanding the spectrum of colors… depends in our establishing a correlation between our ideas of sensory qualities and ideas graspable by the intellect—those different wavelengths of light. Perceived through the senses, color remains a confused perception, but it is understood through an application of these ideas graspable by the intellect.
11. What are these distinct universals, these divine ideas? Leibniz: “Can it be denied that there is a great deal that is innate in our minds, since we are innate to ourselves, so to speak, and since we include Being, Unity,
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Substance, Duration, Change, Action, Perception, Pleasure, and hosts of other objects of our intellectual ideas?”
II. God: 1. Ontological definition of God. The existence of God follows
from the definition or idea of that God. He is infinite, without negation, and without contradiction.
2. Cosmological definition of God. The very existence of contingent things begs their cause. An examination of the series of changes caused by hypothetical necessities does not turn up a sufficient reason for the aggregation of thosechanges. Therefore, one must turn to metaphysical necessities, “from whose essence existence springs”, in order to explain existence itself.1
3. The principle of sufficient reason a. Applied to changes in the world. No fact can be real
or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus andnot otherwise. This sufficient reason for existing possibilities is God: Without God there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but nothing would be possible.
b. Applied to God’s creative will: God must always act for a reason, and as a consequence, there must be a reason for everything. This characterizes the world created as the best of all possible worlds.
4. The principle of perfection a. The maximum principle that furnishes the mechanism of
God’s resolution of the problem of a creation choice among the infinite, mutually exhaustive systems of compossibles.
b. In the possibility of essence itself, there is a need for existence. All of the possibles strive toward existence in proportion to the amount of essence or reality they include. This amount of reality is theirperfection. Leibniz calls this perfection a “quantityof essence.”2
c. God maximizes the perfection in his creation accordingto a principle of determination, which ensures that
1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. “On the Ultimate Origination of Things” in Philosophical Writings by Leibniz. Translated by Mary Morris, (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, LTD., 1934), 33.2 Ibid p.34
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the greatest effect should be produced with the least expenditure.3
d. When God applies his “divine mathematics”4 to his creation, it results in a world simplest in hypothesesand richest in phenomena.
e. The principle of perfection defines God as a unityand disallows a dualistic God free to create a world less perfect or containing less reality. Godcannot contain a contradiction.
III. Substance. 1. Reaction to Descartes’ two forms of substance
I. thinking substance II. extended substance.
2. Leibniz rejected extended substance. I. The continuum of extended substance, consisting of
length, area, volume, and motion to name a few, is made up of divisible parts. Those parts, too, are infinitely divisible.
II. Descartes believed that bodies were extended, butthat their qualities were not; they were the product of the interaction of mind and body.
i. Leibniz determined that extended substance presupposes extended qualities.
ii. Descartes never said what individual parts that made up extended substance were.
iii. Cannot create extended substance out of non-extended substance, the synthesis of genuine individuals and extension remained impossible.
iv. Extended substance is inert, but a world of inert, extended substance is less perfect thata world reducible to active individual substances.
v. A monad is active, contains in it the source of all its activity, and cannot be altered by the action of any other substance.
vi. Extension cannot serve to give the reason for the changes which take place in bodies.
vii. Form, position, motion should all emanate froman internal principle
3 Ibid p.344 Ibid p.34
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viii. Extension cannot be substance. It presupposessubstance. There must be a subject that is extended.
ix. Substance implies a unity. No compound is a unity. Must be indivisible. Extension implies divisibility.
x. Solidity and weight are not modifications of extension. Both come from force.
xi. Being exists insofar as it acts.xii. Matter is ideal. God does not know matter
through the senses.xiii. Space is not real. It is ideal.
3. Active and individual substance 4. The individuating principle must be internal to the
substance itself. “What makes substance a different from substance b shouldn’t… concern a relation between a and b, since a would be what it is even if there were no b and b would be what it is even if there were no a.”5
5. Substance has a numerical unity. Nothing having less than anumerical unity can combine with another individuating principle such as a formal unity to create a numerical unity. If the mind creates a certain universal form, the mind, which in the end is the individual substance, cannot depend on that form to be an individual.
6. Reduction of an individuating principle to the concept of the individual itself.
7. Leibniz’s logic of subject-predicate forms. I. necessary truths. To determine a necessary truth, one
must establish that the finite predicate is present inthe subject.
II. contingent truths. To determine a contingent truth, one must prove that the predicate, though infinite, is present in the subject. Only God, who isinfinite, is capable of this process of analysis of the infinite predicates. “Even when a proposition is not identical, that is, when the predicate is not expressly contained in the subject, it is still necessary that it be virtually contained in it…This being so, we are able to say that this is the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being, namely, to afford a conception so complete that the
5 Ibid p.28
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concept shall be sufficient for all the understanding of it and for the deduction of all predicates of whichthe substance may become the subject.”6
8. The complete concept theory.9. The complete independence of a monad, brought to its logical
end, ensures that independent substance will be the source of its own activity. A monad is independently defined or individuated.
10. The internal source of a monad’s activity is appetition, its changes in its perceptual state.
I. Appetition is the tendency of a perception to give wayto a new perception.
II. Its perceptual state is not altered externally. III. Any apparent alteration of a substance by another
must be analyzed in terms of their internal states relative to each other.
IV. Perception is the representation of external variation in internal variation.
V. The change in perspective is the activity of an individual substance, and the monad itself as an entelechy, serves as the source of all internal changes in perspective.
11. The nature of perception and internal relations.I. If all predicates are contained at least virtually in
the subject, then a monad is always pregnant with its future. “Every present state of a simple substance isa natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future.”7
II. This causal self-sufficiency of a monad is the consequence of it being its own source of action or principle of change.
III. A monad is dependent upon no other monad but God,who possesses the essence of every perspective at all times.
IV. In the perfect notion of an individual substance,considered in a pure state of possibility by God
6 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Discourse on Metaphysics. Edited and translated by George Montgomery. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1995. p. 137 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Monadology. Edited and translated by George Montgomery. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1995. p.256
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before every actual decree of existence, there is already whatever will happen to it if it exists.
12. Since the monad is its own source of action or perceptual change and since the monad is independent of all others, save God, it persists through time.
13. Being is perception. Since the beginning of our existence, it could truly be said of us that something wouldhappen to us, these predicates were laws contained in the subject or in the complete concept of us, which makes us what we are, which is the basis of the connection between all of our different states.
14. The identity of substance persists through internal change in perspective because that perspective is entirely unique.
15. The monad is inimitable because of the identity of indiscernibles. This asserts that no two monads have an identical set of relations to the whole, since if it did, itwould just be the same monad.
16. On what does a monad have a perspective? A monad is aunique perspective on the totality of its internal relations.
17. The universe and all individual substances in it were internally related or “connected.” There is a connection among the different states, and for this reason, the presentis pregnant with the future. This holds for things in general, and in each particular substance through the relation of all its states, which are enclosed within each other.
18. Every monad expresses the entire universe.19. Every monad is contingent upon all others without
disregarding the independence of each monad. 20. Each monad depends upon the existence of the totality;
each monad expresses the whole by its very existence, since its action is simply a measure of its change in its own perspective on the whole.
21. God is simply a monad without a particular perspective; in other terms, God is a monad with infinite perspective.
22. The finite perspective of each monad is its being. 23. External relation is illusory: “You will not, I
believe, admit an accident that is in two subjects at once. Thus I hold, as regards relations, that paternity in David is one thing, and sonship in Solomon another, but the
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relation common to both is a merely mental thing of which the modifications of singulars are the foundation.”
24. The monad is a perception. That perception is non-extended, individual, independent, active, and persistent; it is pregnant with its future, and it expresses both God and the entire universe.
IV. Leibniz’s ethics: 1. The principle of pre-established harmony:2. God’s sufficient reason for creating this world, rather than
other competing possible worlds, was that it contained the greatest amount of reality or possible existence in its essence.
3. That free act of creation is a necessary truth. 4. All truths that stem from that act are contingent upon it.
In this sense, laws of nature are contingent truths. 5. They hold because they fit into God’s creation; they are not
independent of God’s creation.6. God established this harmony of the world in its creation. 7. The principle assures that the actual world is a seamless
causal system. 8. Humans can discover the laws because of the pre-established
harmony between mind and body, a special case of the generalprinciple of pre-established harmony.
9. Our understanding of sensory phenomena relies on our reflection upon the intelligible relation among the divine ideas that are the standards of human thought.
10. Because of the principle of pre-established harmony, we can choose the best or most rational project. Although God included in his creation the conditions that will lead us to choose one thing over another, the actual choice is ours. “For absolutely speaking, our will as contrasted with necessity, is in a state of indifference, being able to act otherwise, or wholly to suspend its action, either alternative being and remaining possible. It therefore devolves the upon the soul to be on guard against appearances, by means of a firm will, to reflect and to refuse to act or decide in certain circumstances, except after mature deliberation.”8
11. The best of all possible worlds is the most rational of all possible worlds.
8 Discourse on Metaphysics p. 49
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12. The human ability to reflect and deliberate is a gift of God and mirrors his choice to create this world, the mostrational of all possible worlds.
13. Humans, like God, are free to choose the most rationalat all times.
14. Free will is also a function of our finitude; we are limited by our very being, our perspective on the totality of internal relations.
15. We should reflect on the divine ideas that hold our perspective in check in order to choose the most rational inorder to understand the world and consequently God’s will.
16. The scientific method is one such act of reflection, which assures that the rational account of those relations will be the same from the perspective of all monads, with the perspectival character in check.
17. The study of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics is another mode of reflection. These are manifestation of the divine order of things.
18. Leibniz’s ethical prescription for humans, a synthesisof our knowing and our being, is to freely choose to participate in the divine gift of reason.
Monadology: The Monad
- The monad is the simple atomic substance (1).- There has to be simple substances because there are
composites. And a composite is nothing but an aggregate of simple substances (2). Notice that this is the same argument forthe existence of atoms.
- The monad does not have extension, form, or divisibility (3). All these things would require a compound (it seems) and thus cannot be an attribute of a simple substance. (Extension, form and divisibility seem to go hand-in-hand here. That is, anything that is extend has form, further anything extended can be further divided, thus it cannot be the simplest substance.)
- “The Monads have no widows, through which anything may come in or go out” (7). That is, the Monad is its own solitary existence, nothing can effect it (except God) nor can it effect another monad. All internal changes are caused either by the monad itself or by God. This is consistent Spinoza’s insight that one substance cannot be the cause of another.
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-All existing things have qualities. And since we can empirically see different qualities in the world we can deduce that simple substance must have different qualities. Further we can also claim, based on our understanding of substance, that every monad, as a being, is different from every other. No two beings can be exactly the same (8-9).
The Manifoldness of the Monad-Change is also a fact that must be admitted. Thus, Monads
as the simple substance must be subject to continuous change. But since we have already shown that Monads cannot effect each other then the change must be internal (10-11).
- But what is it the changes in the Monad? Leibniz suggestthat there must be a manifoldness (variety) in the Monad which changes. There must be a multiplicity in the unity of the Monad.Change takes place by degrees. This means that something in the Monad changes while something else remains the same. Thus, even though the Monad has no parts it must be “a plurality of conditions and relations” (12-13).
Perception, Apperception (Consciousness), and Appetition- The secret revealed: The multiplicity in the Monad is
Perception. This of course should not be confused with consciousness. There can be perception without consciousness. It is the Cartesian mistake to conflate the two which leads them to believe in crazy things like the separation of body and soul and the possible death of the soul (14, those wacky Cartesians).
- Appetition (desiring) is the action of change in the internal principle of the Monad (15).
-16?- Perception is not a mechanical function. There is nothing to the Monad
but pure perception (and the change of perception). (17)- Each Monad (here L. introduces the term Enthelechies, but
I have no idea what it means) has a certain amount of perfection.They are internally self-sufficient leading Leibniz to describe them as “incorporeal Automatons” (18).
Soul-Monads are not souls. Souls have more distinct perceptions
and have memories (19).- Perception in Monad’s is vague and cloudy. Analogous to
being stunned (20-21).
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- “Every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future (22).” [I think this might tie inwith his principle of Sufficient Reason that is, the Subject contains the predicate.] This establishes a connection between all of a Monad’s perceptions (23).
- Thus, if we are to be more than the mere stupor of the monad there must be something more to us (24).
Memory- Memory imitates Reason. It is present in all animals
(26).- Two things can lead to the development of a memory: Either
an extremely intense perception or the repetition of the same perception. Think of watching some one die or becoming familiar with the face of your mother (27).
- A shout out to empiricism (28). [a posteriori knowledge]- But of course men are different then the animals, “The
knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God.This is what is called in us the Rational Soul or the Mind” (29).
Sufficient Reason- Reflective Acts: We come to know being, substance, simple,
composite, material things, and God through the Reflective Acts (30).
- Principle of Contradiction: Basic logic, two contradictory statements cannot both be true. One is false the other true (31).
-Principle of Sufficient Reason: All existing facts and true propositions have a sufficient reason for being as it is and not other wise. Since Leibniz will have trouble with causality the Principle of Sufficient Reason will take its place. It will be the main epistemological ground. However we cannot know all the reasons for things (32).
- Two Kinds of Truth: 1. Truths of Reason which are necessary and can be discovered through analyzing a truth in to simpler ideas and truths until the primary is reached (a priori knowledge, the subject must be shown to contain the predicate). 2.Truths of Fact are contingent (i.e. their opposite is possible)(33). - Truths of Reason can be reduced to Axioms and Postulates that need no proof (35).
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- The Principle of Sufficient Reason can also be applied in the same regressive manner to Truths of Fact. Here the principlefunctions like physical cause (eg. Z caused X and X caused Y etc.) The analysis of contingent truths into its causes is seemingly infinite. As Leibniz brilliantly puts it, “There is aninfinity of figures an of movements present and past, which enterinto the efficient cause of my present writing, and in its final cause there are an infinity of slight tendencies and dispositionsof my soul, present and past” (36).
God – A Cosmological Proof (a posteriori)- Given that every contingent fact can be explained by
another contingent fact and the detail and regress will be infinite, it is impossible for any amount of science to reach theprime reason. Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason must be outside of the sequence. And since this sufficient reason is outside of the sequence it is not the “first cause” it is the explanation of the system as a whole (37). [Note that while Leibniz uses the term “infinite” he seems to do so with trepidation. He seems to be acknowledging the fact that the regress seems infinite but even if it is not it would be impossible to know all contingent facts, since every moment thereis an unfathomable new amount being created.]
- God is the necessary substance, the ultimate reason for things. The details of the changes of the sequence exist in God as mere potentiality (?) (38).
-“…there is but one God, and this God is sufficient.” God is the sufficient reason for all the universe’s details (39).
- Naturally, God is absolutely perfect. The required God list: Unique, universal, necessary, pure sequence of possible being, incapable of limitation, contains as much reality as possible, in God perfection is absolutely infinite (40-41).
- All created things come from the perfection of God. Imperfections come from come from the limited nature of other substances (monads). It is in the imperfections that things are different from God (eg. Tendency towards inertia must be an imperfection) (42).
God – An Ontological Proof (a priori)- God is also the source of all essences. “In other words
he is the source of whatever is real in the possible.” Leibniz is clearly making a distinction between existence and essences. Essences are possibilities or eternal truths. But, these
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possibilities have to be based upon something that is actual. This actuality is the necessary God “in whom essence includes existence or in whom possibility is sufficient to produce actuality” (43-44).
- Thus, if God is possible then he necessarily exists (ontological argument). And since God knows no bounds or negation then his possibility cannot be contradicted. Therefore God is possible and must necessarily exist (45).
- Eternal truths are dependent upon God to exist, but they are not dependent upon his will (as Descartes held). Instead, necessary truths are the inner objects of the Understanding of God (46).
The Relation between God and the Monads/ Mediation and the Illusion of Casulity
- Monads are created derivatives of the unity of the simple substance. They come directly from the fulgurations of God from moment to moment. But, they are limited by the limited creaturesthat accept them (47).
- In God there is: power – source of everything; knowledge –contains details of the ideas; will- changes or produces things in accordance with the greatest good. These are infinite and perfect. In the Monad there is the corresponding: subject or basis, perception, and appetition. These are imitations of perfection (48).
- Perfected things act. Imperfect things are acted upon. When a monad has a distinct perception it is acting; when it has a confused perception it is passive (49). Further, A thing is more perfect than another when the first thing gives an a priori reason for what happens in the second – the predicate is contained with in the subject. (50).
- God is Mediator between the Monads. Each monad is internallysecure as a substance. All monadic relations are ideal. It is only through the ideas of God that one monad can have an effect upon another. Leibniz calls this the primal regulation by which all monads become dependent upon each other in the mind of God (51).
- God sees reason to connect created things (monads). The relationship between them is both active and passive depending upon the point of view. That is in one created thing we have a reason for another created thing, this is active. The relationship is passive when the reason for a thing is found in another. In the phrase “A is responsible for B” we see that B is
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the predicate of A. A contains the reason from B and is therefore active. From B’s point of view we have passivity, its reason lies in A (52).
The Greatest Possible Universe and the Monadic Mirror- There are an infinite number of possible universes in the
ideas of God. Unfortunately only one of them can exist. Furtherthere must be sufficient reason for this one to exist over all the others (53 – remember that everything except God has a sufficient reason).
- The criteria for existence is the amount of perfection with in that universe. The greater the proportion of perfection the greater the claim it has on existence (54).
- The Greatest Good: through is wisdom God knows it, through his goodness he chooses it, and through his power he creates it (55).
- All things have a relationship to one thing, and that one thing has a relationship to all things. This is true for each and every monad. Thus each monad is a “perpetual living mirror of the universe” (56).
- There are an infinite number of monads. Each monad has its own perspective of the one universe. There are thus an infinite number of universes each of which are aspects of the oneuniverse (57).
- This combination of infinite universes with the one leads to the greatest amount of variety (infinite) with the greatest order (one universe created by one mind). This is the greatest possible perfection (58). This is universal harmony in which each substance expresses all the others through there relationship with them (59).
- This is not to say that the monads can perceive everything, if that were so then they would be God. No they are limited by there differentiation and the distinctiveness of thereperspective (60).
The Living Universe- All space is filled, thus all matter is connected. This
means that each action elicits responses from every body in the universe. If one could see from all perspectives it would be clear that in one action we could tell what is happening every where and what has happened and what will happen (61).
- Each monad is a representation of the whole universe, but it more distinctly represents the body of which it is a part.
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This is the soul. The body represents the universe through connection to the plenum; the soul represents the universe by representing the body (62).
- A body with a monad is a living being (all things are living), and if it has a soul it is an animal. Since the universe is ordered and each living being is a representation theuniverse then every living being must be ordered. Thus the living being must be organic (63).
- Difference between Machine and Organism: It is for Leibniz a distinction between the natural and artificial. Organisms are machines in all of its parts ad infinitum. Each part of an organism is a machine and each part of that machine isa machine, etc. An artificial automaton is not a machine in itsparts (64).
- “There is a world of created things, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest particle of matter” (66). “There is, therefore, nothing uncultivated, or sterile or dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, save in appearance” (69).
- Clarification: The dominating entelechy in animals is called a soul (70).
- The soul does not have a specific amount of matter attached to it. Indeed, all bodies are in flux with parts continually passing in and out. The soul changes the body by degrees. It can never be without all the organs at once. There are no bodiless spirits however. God is the only one without a body (71-72).
No One Ever Really Dies (NERD)- There is never absolute generation or death. All living
things develop from sperms that carry the things entelechy. Thusit is not created, it already is. If this is the case then animals cannot really die either since its parts still exist. Thus not only is the soul indestructible, but the animal as well (73-77).
- It is the peculiarity of rational animals that as spermatic animals they have ordinary sensuous souls but after human conception they develop rational attributes (82).
Preestablished Harmony- Following this line of thinking, Leibniz asserts that the
soul and the organic body follow separate laws, but they are fitted together because of the preestablished harmony between all
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substances. They are harmonious because they are representationsof the same universe (78).
- Souls follow the law of final causes or desires, ends, and means. Bodies follow the laws of efficient causes or motion.Final and efficient causes are in harmony with each other (79). Bodies and souls act as if the other did not exist. But yet it seems that one is influencing the other. This is a response to Descartes problem (80-81).
City of God- Here Leibniz changes terms between souls and spirits.
While souls are general mirror of the universe, spirits are also images of God. Thus they have the capacity to know the system ofthe universe and to even imitate it through artificial means (83).
- In this means spirits can have a social relationship with God. Father – Children. Prince – Subjects (84).
- City of God: The totality of spirits. The most perfect state possible under the most perfect monarch (85). It is a moral world within the natural one. Of course it is the most noble and divine of God’s works. Its reality consists of the Glory of God because God couldn’t have glory if no one was there to give it to him. Finally God knows goodness through his relationship with the divine city (86).
- There is another harmony between the physical realm and the moral realm. Because of this all things progress towards grace (87-88).
-Two views of God: God the Architect and God the Law-Giver in harmony. Thus all sin will be rightly penalized (89)
- The final consequence of this is the fact that under a perfect government no good action will be unrewarded and no bad action will be unpunished (90).
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Spinoza
(Look at Spinoza as an extension of Descartes’ metaphysics in Principles of Philosophy). I. Descartes on Substance: That which depends on no other thing
for its existence.a. One thing can properly be called a substance, God,
immaterial and infinite. b. Substance does not apply univocally to God and other things
(as the Schoolmen thought).c. God is ontologically independent.d. God qualifies other finite substances.e. Some finite substances need only God’s concurrence and
ongoing creativity to exist. These have semi-independent status. Both are finite substances, infinite in number.1. Minds (res cogitans) immaterial2. Bodies (res extensia) material
II. Descartes on Attribute: (53) Principle property of a substance
a. Minds have the fundamental property of thought. All particular thoughts presuppose thought.
b. Bodies have the fundamental property of extension. All particular shapes presuppose extension in breadth, depth, and length.
III. Descartes on Mode: (56) Affections or modifications of substance.
a. Thought includes the modes of understanding, imagination, sensation
b. Extension includes the modes of shape, position, motion.IV. Spinoza on Substance: Part I. Def. 3
a. In itself- ontologically independentb. Conceived through itself- epistemologically independent,
self-explanatoryc. Only God or Nature makes it into the category of substance.
Substance Monism.d. No two substances share the same property.
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V. Spinoza on Attribute: Part I. Def. 4- fundamental, essentialproperty
a. No interaction between attributes; therefore, no mind-body problem.
b. Each attribute is self contained. c. Infinitely many attributesd. Two are known to us.
1. Thought- psychological explanation2. Extension- physicalistic explanation
e. Attributes are like languages, explanatory systems.VI. Spinoza on Mode: Part I Def. 5-
a. Ontologically dependent b. Epistemologically dependentc. Modes are expressions of God’s powerd. Modes are under the influence of other finite modes
VII. Ethicsa. Help us be less reactive, passive, distracted by other
finite modesb. More expressive of God’s power, active
VIII. Goda. Source of all things natura/ naturans (nature/ naturing)b. That which follows from the source natura/ naturata (nature/
natured)c. God’s existence follows from his essence
IX. Necessitya. This is the only possible worldb. No alternativesc. Our imagining states to be different are due to our
ignorance of how things really are.X. Freedom
a. If freedom depends on alternative possibilities, then there is no such freedom
b. But freedom is the core idea of Spinoza’s system.c. Real freedom is acting from the necessity of one’s nature as
an expression of God’s power.d. If we reflect that, we are freee. If we go from one glittering distraction to another, we are
unfree.f. Freedom entails physical health and mental health
XI. Epistemology Part II Proposition 4 Scholium 2 3 grades of knowledge
a. Opinion/ imgagination/ sense knowledge.1. Garbage
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2. like doxa in Plato’s divided line3. imagistic4. fragmentary and confused.
i. Fragmentary because only a small part of a much bigger picture, like a few words on a page in an entire novel.
ii. Confused because it is literally a fusion of the sense organ and the external stimulus. Our sense-based ideas are tainted by the apparatus, but most of us are ignorant of the filter.
b. Reason- knowledge of generalsc. Intuition- understanding of how particulars are subsumed
under the generals
I. Spinoza’s Argument for Substance Monism (1p14)
A.Prop 14: There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God.
B. (1) God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def.6).
Def. 6 - By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
C.
D. (2) God necessarily exists (by Pr.11).
Prop 11: God, or substance of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
Axiom 7: If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.
Prop 7: Existence belongs to the nature of substance. Cor. Prop 6: Hence it follows that substance cannot
be produced by anything else. For in the universe there exists nothing but substances and their affections, as is evident from Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5. But by Pr. 6, it cannot be
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produced by another substance. Therefore substance cannot be produced by anything else whatsoever.
Axiom 1: All things that are, are either in themselves or in something else.
Def. 3: By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thingfrom which it has to be formed.
Def. 5: By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else.
Def. 1: By that which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involved existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as existing
E.
F. (3) If there were any substance but God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God.
G. (4) Therefore, two substances of the same attribute would exist, which isabsurd (by Pr.5).
H.
II. Spinoza’s Argument for 1p5
A. (a) If there were several distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference of attributes or by a difference of affections (by Pr.4).
Prop 4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of the affections of the substances
o Axiom 1: All things that are, are either in themselves or in something else
o Def. 3: By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not
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require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed
o Def. 5: By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in somethingelse and is conceived through something else
o Def 4: By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence
B.
C. (b) If they are distinguished only by a difference of attributes, then there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute.
D.
E. (c) Substance is by nature prior to its affections (by Def.3 and Def.5). Def. 3: By substance I mean that which is in
itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to beformed
Def. 5: By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something elseand is conceived through something else
F.
G. (d) Therefore, a substance is not in and cannot be conceived through its affections (by (c), unstated).
H.
I. (e) Therefore, if by a difference in their affections, one substance cannot be conceived as distinguishable from another substance.
J.
K. (f) Therefore, 1p5: in the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.
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III. Leibniz on Spinoza’s argument for 1p5
A. “I reply that there seems to be a concealed fallacy here. For two substances can be distinguished by their attributes and still have some common attribute, provided they also have others peculiar to themselves in addition. For example, A may have the attributes c and d, and B the attributes d and e” (Loemker, vol.1, p. 305).
B. (5) If another substance could be conceived, it would have to be conceived as existing (Pr.7), which is absurd (by 3 & 4).
C. Prop 7: Existence belongs to the nature of substance.
o Cor. Prop 6: Hence it follows that substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in the universe there exists nothing but substances and their affections, as is evident from Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and5. But by Pr. 6, it cannot be produced by another substance. Therefore substance cannot be produced by anything else whatsoever.
Axiom 1: All things that are, are either in themselves or in something else.
Def. 3: By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed.
Def. 5: By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else
Prop 3: When things have nothing in common, one cannot bethe cause of the other
o Axiom 5: Things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through each other; that is, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other
o Axiom 4: The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of the cause
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Prop 4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of the affections of the substances
o Axiom 1: All things that are, are either in themselves or in something else
o Def. 3: By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed
o Def. 5: By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else
o Def 4: By attribute I mean that which the intellectperceives of substance as constituting its essence
D. (6) Therefore, no substance can be or be conceived external to God.
What is Spinoza’s distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans? (Fall 2002 & January 2003) What is the significance of this distinction?(January 2003) What problem is it supposed to resolve? Does it? (Fall 2002)
How might Spinoza’s criticisms of final causality and free will provide a basis for his metaphysics of substance? (January 2002)
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Present Spinoza’s arguments for why there must be only one substance andits nature must be infinite. Why did Leibniz not accept this view and how does his concept of substance differ? (Fall 1998 & Spring 1999)
Leibniz’s conception of a monad may be seen as a metaphysical version ofa geometrical point. Compare the conceptions of monad and point. Does either exist? Why is that question important? (Fall 2001)
Compare the conceptions of God in Spinoza and Leibniz, focusing specifically on the concepts of freedom in each. (Spring 2000)
Modern philosophy begins with a rejection of the Aristotelian-Scholasticnotion of substantial forms. How do rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz maintain the idea of substance known through reasonwithout this idea? Discuss in particular the importance of the definition of substance as that which is “conceived through itself and not another” and so is “self-caused” (causa sui). (Fall 2003)
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Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Bk I: 1-2; BK II:1-8, 21-(23, 32-33).
BK I, Chapter 1. No Innate Speculative Principles.
1. Locke is most likely arguing with the following figures: More,Hale, Cudworth, and especially Descartes. He sets out to prove that one can attain certainty without innate ideas. It would be absurd to assume that certain ideas would be innate when we possess the faculties for their development—sight is used as an example. Why would one have the faculty of sight but at the same time have things that are already seen within the mind?
2-3. The idea that there are principles that all men take for granted as certain is often used as evidence for the existence ofinnate ideas. --But, agreement on principles does not prove them innate.
4-5. Also, there are not even principles that all men assent to. For instance, children and idiots know nothing of innate ideas, and it makes no sense to say that ideas are imprinted upon the soul but in some cases are not known—what else could be meant by imprinted? “If they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can
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they be innate? If they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown”?
6-7. It is usually argued that all men discover the innate ideas when they reach the capability to reason. This means: 1) as soon as men come to use reason, they access innate ideas. Or: (2) By using reason they discover innate ideas. If (2) is correct it means that both the maxims and the theorems of mathematicians would equally be innate, both being truths discovered by reason.
9. It is false that reason discovers them. If reason discovers innate ideas, this is like saying that reason should be used to discover what one already knows, since innate ideas are innate. This is saying that one knows something and does not know it at the same time, which is absurd.
12-14. If (1) is true then children know things like: “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time”,at the moment they learn how to reason. Experience will tell us that this is patently false. (It will later be made clear that ideas are considered to be innate are formed in the same manner as other ideas). Also, if (1) is true, this does not prove that the ideas are innate. Is something like speech innate? No, it is learned.
16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having a clear idea of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness. Also,self-evidence is not the same thing as innateness. If it was, everything that is self-evident would be innate, and this begs the meaning behind the terms required before they can be judged innate or not.
20. What are considered to be innate ideas require a longer time to be understood than self-evidence. For instance, to say ‘Red isnot Blue’ is understood much easier than ‘that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time’. The latter requires a well-developed understanding—it is not immediately known. It is more general which makes it further frombeing innate, since it requires abstract synthesis and conceptions, etc.
21. ‘Assenting to propositions at first hearing and understandingtheir terms’ is no proof of innateness. It only proves the
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contrary since one must first be introduced to these propositionsin order to give assent to them. This means that innate ideas areweaker than they are after they are proposed for assent—this doesnot lend the argument for innate ideas much credibility, and alsomakes them unfit for foundational knowledge.
22. If it is argued that understanding has implicit knowledge of innate ideas that is not explicit until their first hearing, thisonly means that the mind is capable of understanding them and notthat they exist in the mind to begin with.
23. The argument of ‘assenting on first hearing’ rests on the assumption that nothing new is learned on this hearing. This is not true. The terms in question have to first be learned. The ideas that they relate to are learned (that they stand for certain ideas, etc.). “We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connection with one another; and then topropositions made in such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceivein our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent”(57).
24-26. Summary of the former arguments.
27. A further argument: if certain ideas are innate they should appear most where they tend to be found the least. Children, idiots, and savages should display the ideas most often since education and custom have not molded their native intellects, butthis is not the case. These people know only what they have most to do with a child—his nurse; a savage—hunting, etc (general propositions and maxims are not popular among savages).
BK I, Chapter 2. No Innate Practical Principles.
1.There are no innate practical principles. Practical principles require reasoning and discourse in order to determine their truth-value. There are no practical principles that seem as clearas the previously mentioned and supposed innate speculative principles. Also, many people are ignorant of them.
2-3. Take justice as an example. Thieves obviously do not accept this idea as an innate practical principle. While they uphold justice with one another for convenience, they rob and kill
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others. Thus, they do not seem to assent to such principles, unless they do not care about transgressing them. But it seems that justice is not an innate practical principle since there seems not to be universal assent to it.--But can’t people assent to innate practical principles and thencontradict them in action? (1) Denying them in action disproves universal consent to them. Because; (2) Innate practical principles do not terminate in contemplation but lead to action. And, action (1) often contradicts them as something universally assented to.
4. Any moral idea can be called into question, and therefore, requires a proof, which means that it cannot be innate, since an innate idea would not require further proof than its presence in the mind.
5-6. Self-interest causes men to adhere to a number of given practical principles, and the subjective goals and validity of these differ widely. Thus, these principles are not innate, because they are not universally assented to.
7-8. “Men’s actions convince us that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle. For example: ‘To do as one would be done to’, is more commended than practiced.--Conscience is not proof of an innate practical principle. If this were so, contraries would be innate practical principles since some men advocate practical principles that others shun.
9-11. Locke does some cultural anthropology here by giving us examples of transgressions of supposed innate practical principles by peoples of the world. If these were innate, it is difficult to understand how they could be disregarded so often and easily by other cultures and even various individuals of the same culture. It is clear that people of different cultures, nations, etc. contradict each other, because all hold different moral maxims to be true.
12-13. Objection: Some may say that the breaking of a rule is notan argument that the rule is not innate.Locke’s reply: What is meant by an innate practical principle? Either: (1) It is a principle that excites all men to action; or:(2) It is a truth implanted upon the minds of all men.
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--(1) has been disproved by examples of men not acting on such principles. (2) Implies duty. For example, it is the duty for a parent to take care of their child. However, this presupposes ideas of law, reward and punishment, etc. which shows that dutiescannot be imprinted upon the mind, since they must be made true by reinforcement. A duty requires something to enforce it.--Innate practical principles would have to be enforced by God, and it is not likely that people would defy him so easily and so often. But, they seem to all of the time, which requires people and institutions to enforce them.
14. “Those who maintain innate practical principles do not tell us what they are.” (It is no wonder that they are doubted).
15-17. Lord Herbert’s five innate ideas—Locke thinks that the mind does give assent to these ideas as undeniably clear; he doesnot think that this proves them innate, because: (1) there may bemore innate principles than this, but how many? Did God make all ideas innate? (2) Principles like: ‘Virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God’ are vague. What is meant by virtue, etc.? If we are not clear about such a term, how could the above principle be an innate practical principle that is supposed to guide our lives?
18-19. Certain of these innate practical principles are not very practical (that is, they are useless). For example, “virtue is the best worship of God” really means: “that God is most pleased with the doing of what he commands.” This is a useless maxim if one doesn’t know what God commands. Likewise, other innate principles that Lord Herbert insists upon are equally worthless.--Also, it is unlikely that God would stamp ideas upon the mind that are made up of questionable and unclear terms.
20. Objection: Isn’t it possible that custom and education have obscured innate principles until they are completely covered overin the mind? (1) If this were true, children and idiots would have best access to innate practical principles, since they have not been corrupted by custom and education. (2) if this were not true, there would be a lot of evil people running around, since everyone would know these principles and so many people would do contrary things anyway. Locke says to take our pick.
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22. How do people come by these principles if they are not innate? “These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety they have anopinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident and innate truths.”
23. Also, we tend to give the most validity to our oldest thoughts. Likewise, the oldest thoughts cannot be traced back to a source since we have forgotten their origin. Thus, we conclude that they must have been put there by something other than by people, customs, etc. and that they are therefore innate.
24-26. These principles are then taken upon trust to be correct and useful as a foundation to build our thoughts upon. Men even grow to worship these foundations and never realize that they arefull of errors because they have not taken the time reflect upon them. Since they do not have the time, desire, or temperament to reflect, they take up second hand principles and do not require them to be proven.---Any idea can be taken up as an innate idea in this manner. “Ifit be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without examination, I know not what may notbe believed, or how anyone’s principles can be questioned.”
BK II, Chapter 1. Of Ideas in General, and their Original.
1.How do men come by their ideas? This book will show how they originate without any reliance upon innate ideas, the doctrine ofwhich, Locke feels he has disproved.
2-4. All ideas come from experience. “Our observation employed either, about external objects, or about internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.” Thus, all ideas come from what Locke refers to as sensation and reflection.
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5. External objects lead to ideas of sensible qualities. The mindgives the understanding about its operations. If one looks into one’s own mind, they will find that these are the only sources oftheir ideas.
6. Children serve as good evidence of this. They obviously learn by degrees. Their eyes and their ears take in many things as soonas they are able and provide them with mental materials.
7. As can be witnessed in children, “men are differently furnished with ideas of sensation and reflection according to thedifferent objects they converse with.”
8. Ideas of reflection come later. Children need to develop theirability to reflect upon the ideas of sensation. (Some never even do this adequately by their adult years).
9. The first ideas come with the first perceptions. To ask when the first idea happens is to ask when the soul comes into being, because they will begin to exist at the same time.
10-19. This is a discussion about whether or not the soul thinks while a man sleeps. The point is that he is trying to prove that ideas cannot exist without prior sensations.
20. The stock of one’s ideas is enlarged by compounding them and reflecting upon them. Also, the ability to remember, imagine, andreason gets better in this way.
21. An infant in the Mother’s womb certainly doesn’t have ideas since it does not make use of its senses. It also does not perceive and so does not think.
22-23.. As a child grows, he is supplied with more ideas through sensation. The mind gets better and better at “enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas and reasoning about them.”--What is sensation? It is “such an impression or motion made in some part of the body as [produces some perception] in the understanding.”
24. What are the ideas of reflection? “These are the impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from
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powers intrinsical and proper to itself, become also objects of contemplation”—these latter are ideas of reflection.
25. The understanding is passive in accepting simple ideas.
BK. II, Chapter 2. Of Simple Ideas.
1. Simple ideas cannot be broken apart in order to reveal constitutive ideas.
2. Simple ideas come from sensation and reflection. Complex ideasare made of simple ideas. They cannot be destroyed once in the understanding. They also cannot be made at will free from experience: “I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which hadnever affected his palate’ or frame the idea of a scent he has never smelt.”
3. “Only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable.” These being: sounds, tastes, smells, sights, and tangible things.
Chapter 3. Simple Ideas of Sense.
1. Ways that ideas find their way into the mind:a) by sense onlyb) by more senses than onec) by reflection onlyd) by all the ways of sensation and reflection--a) by ideas of sense only: Locke says that the most considerable of these are by touch, such as heat and cold, and solidity.
Chapter 4. Idea of Solidity.
1. The idea of solidity is communicated by touch. We receive thisidea more constantly than any other. What is it? “That which hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved one towards the other, I call solidity.” A better word might be “impenetrability”.
2. We conceive of solidity as filling space. “This idea of it, the bodies which we ordinarily handle sufficiently furnish us with.” But it is not space, since space is the absence of bodies.
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3. Solidity is not the same thing as hardness. “Solidity consistsin repletion, and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses: but hardness, in a firm cohesion of partsof matter, making up masses of considerable bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure.”--Locke says that we have distinct ideas of space, solidity and hardness. If we really want to know what solidity is, he tells usthat we can a squeeze a ball between our two hands, trying to join them together. The resistance constitutes solidity.--Simple ideas are as experience teaches them to us, and if we try to simply clarify them with words, we are as bad off as if wewere trying to teach a blind man to see colors in his mind.
Chapter 5. Of Simple Ideas and Diverse Senses.
(b) [from above]. The ideas we get by more than one sense are: space or extension, figure, rest, and motion. We come across these ideas by seeing and through touch.
Chapter 6. Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.
(c) [from above]. “The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the forgoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward, upon itself, and observes its own actions about the ideas it has,takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be objectsof contemplation as any of these received from foreign things.” These are: perception (thinking) and volition (willing). Locke calls these understanding and will, respectively. These also havemodes like: remembrance, discerning, reasoning, knowledge, and faith, etc.
Chapter 7. Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.
1. (d) and (e) [from above].These are: pleasure or delight, pain or uneasiness, power, existence, and unity.
2. Pleasure or pain can come from either sensation or reflection.They are accompaniments of ideas, and placed in us by God.
3. Pleasure and pain act as motivations or deterrents of our actions. They do the same for our thoughts.
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4-6. Pleasure and pain act as safeguards. Pain especially deters us from danger. They both can be had in degrees, the ultimate pleasure to be found in God, and he gives pleasure so that he maybe witnessed.
8. The idea of power comes from the realization of our ability tocontrol our thoughts and bodies.
9. The idea of succession comes from the observation that our thoughts follow upon one another.
Chapter 8. Some Further Considerations of Our Simple Ideas of Sensation.
1-6. A discussion of how privations do not lead to ideas—not veryimportant.
8. Locke defines idea as “Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding.”A quality is: “the power to produce in us the ideas as they are in the thing”.
9. Primary Qualities: These are solidity, extension, figure, motion/rest, and number. These things cannot be separated from anobject no matter how many times it is divided. These produce simple ideas in us but exist whether or not we have ideas of them.
10. Secondary Qualities: These do not exist in objects but are the result of the primary qualities producing sensations in us. They include: colors, sounds, taste, etc.(There is also a third category containing things like warmth, which exists, in the fire and in us).
11-12. How do bodies produce ideas in us? “It is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have in them in us.”
13-14. How are secondary qualities produced? Tiny particles act upon our senses and produce smells, colors, etc. these particles come from primary qualities.
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15. Ideas of primary qualities resemble the object, secondary do not.
17. Primary qualities can be called real qualities, because they alone exist in the object.
18-20. Examples of primary and secondary qualities.
21. Locke gives an example of sticking both hands into the same pool of water. Both hands may feel different temperatures. The water cannot be both hot and cold. One hand may have particles that move faster in it as it touches the water and therefore it may be felt as hot. (Berkeley uses this example to disprove secondary qualities).
23. 3 Qualities:a) Primary- in object whether perceived or not.b) Secondary- Ideas of sensation produced by insensible primary
qualities.c) Power- Primary qualities with the ability to change other
bodies. For example, the sun can blanch a candle.
26. Primary qualities can operate on our bodies and produce ideasthat are secondary immediately perceivable or secondary mediatelyperceivable. The former are the primary qualities acting upon oursenses directly; the later is their ability to change another object from what it had been into something different which givesus a certain idea. For example, the sun can warm us directly in order to give us the idea of warmth, but it can also melt a candle, which communicates the same idea.
Chapter 21. Of Power.
1. The idea of power comes from the realization that things can be changed by other things. This includes the changes that we ourselves can effect.
2. Power is two-fold. It is active and passive. The former has the ability to make a change and the latter to receive a change. Locke makes it clear that this chapter is only about how we come to have the idea of power, but he ends up talking about a lot of different things, and at bottom this chapter is about free-will.
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3. Power is a simple idea that plays a part in making more complex ideas.
4. The mind receives the idea of power much more clearly through the reflection on the mind’s own operations than physical bodies.
5. The mind has the powers of will and understanding. Will is thepower that allows the mind to think a thought as it pleases or tomove some part of the body. It can be voluntary or involuntary. Understanding is the power of perception. Perception is the act of understanding, and it is divided into three parts:a) perception of ideas in the mindb) perception of the signification of signsc) perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas(The last two constitute understanding).
6-8. The ability to begin or end a thought or action gives rise to the ideas of liberty and necessity. Man’s ability to think ornot or move or not gives him the idea that he is free or not (liberty or necessity). Liberty cannot exist without thought or the ability to will (volition), but thought and volition can exist without liberty.
9-10. Example of the above claim: Someone walking across a bridgewhich caves in has no liberty but has the ability to think and will. Since he cannot stop the motion of the bridge, he has no liberty. Liberty ceases where one’s ability to do something (whether thought or action) or not to do something is taken away,the latter being reflective of compulsion.
13. Agents with thought and volition are considered free agents. Those without are considered necessary agents.
14. Does man have free will? A will cannot be free, because volition and liberty both belong to agents and not to the will proper. Thus, the question is a bad one. The better question is whether or not an agent is free, and if he has the power of volition, then he is.
17. It is wrong to call the will a faculty and this leads to problems. People begin to think of it as a separate agent rather than a power that the agent has. Thus, they assign it freedom or
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necessity. But this as absurd as calling dancing a faculty and asking whether or not it is free.
18. Powers do not act upon each other. For instance, thinking does not act upon choosing nor does choosing act upon thinking just as dancing does not act upon singing, etc.
19. Powers are relations and not agents. The agent operates them and is therefore free to do so or not.
21. Again, the proper question is whether or not a man is free. And in so far as he can make an action, he is free.
22-23. But, Locke believes that when philosophers ask whether or not the will is free, they really mean to ask whether or not a man is really free to will. So really what’s going on here are semantic errors.---Locke believes that a man is free to act or not, but he cannotcontrol what he wills, since this is closest to preference and this cannot be controlled. Also, Locke points out that ascribing freedom to the will leads to an infinite regress, since for a will to be free, it must be free to will, which requires that itsfreedom was willed and not determined, ad infinitum.
24. Thus, liberty for Locke is the ability to execute what has been willed. We do not decide whether or not to will things but only whether or not to do what has been willed.
27-28. Locke thinks that many debates like this can be avoided ifpeople get clear about what they are talking about. Again he defines freedom and volition.
Freedom- The ability to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.
Volition- An act of the mind directing its thoughts or productions of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it.
29. What determines the will? The short answer is the mind. The mind wills one thing or another depending upon how uneasy it is with a present preoccupation.
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30. Even though Locke has defined the will as type of preferring,it should not be confused with desiring. Will and volition are only concerned with actions. Desire may be concerned with many different things that run contrary to volition. A man may have pain in his feet and desire them to be soothed. But, this may move the pain elsewhere, so he does not will it.
33-34. Desire (in terms of uneasiness) determines the will. We desire things and this leads to volition, which can either end inaction or be stopped. Thus, desire springs the agent towards action.
35-36. Action is not always aimed at some good but always to avoid uneasiness. A drunk may know that it is better for him not to drink, but he will drink so as not to avoid the uneasiness of not drinking. This is because the removal of pain is always the first step towards happiness.
41. The greatest uneasiness determines the will.
42-43. What moves desire? Happiness. Happiness is the easing of all misery, which is the utmost pain. Pleasure and pain are produced in us by outside bodies. Those that produce pleasure, wecall good. Those that produce pain we call evil. Happiness = the enjoyment of pleasure free from uneasiness.
47. The will does not rest until all uneasiness is removed. It ispossible by consideration for a remote and magnificent good (loveof God) to raise uneasiness and move the will. In this way various goods can be sought and used to help influence our desires.
48. The greatest uneasiness does not always determine the will, even though he already said that this was the case. The mind can suspend the execution of desires. This ability allows the human being to avoid acting too precipitously; he can examine possibilities and choose to act or not. This is free- will (hencewe are not slaves of desire). This allows us to view the good or evil of the actions we may choose. “It is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination.” The judgment of the understanding determines the action, and this is in our power.
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49. This is not contrary to our freedom, but instead, it enhancesit. The further we are removed from our ability to examine and suspend actions, “the nearer we are to misery and slavery.”
55-56. Why do some people do evil? This is because people find happiness in different things, and for them these are good but for others they are evil. “Men may choose different things, and yet all choose right; supposing them only like a company of poor insects; whereof some are bees, delighted with flowers and their sweetness; others beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands, which having enjoyed for a season, they would cease to be, and exist no more forever.”
57. A good summary of Lockean free-will.
59. But how do men pursue what makes them miserable; Locke pointsout that some do this by their own admission. He holds that all men really do aim at being happy. To get at this question, he decides to examine all the uneasiness that determine the will.a) Some uneasiness comes from bodily pain b) Some come from wrong judgments about a remote good
60-61. In the present mean knows exactly what he prefers, but he often is wrong about a remote good. Our wrong judgments are always about a future good or evil.
63-65. How do we come to be wrong about them? First, good and badare simply pleasure and pain. These are pleasures and pains of the present, but they are also connected to foresight of the future.---We make wrong judgments (about happiness) when we compare pleasures or pains of the present with those of the future. For instance, ten glasses of wine brings pleasure in the presence, but if we hold that it will in the future, we are sorely mistaken.66-67. What are the causes of us judging amiss? It is the narrow constitution of our minds. We cannot think of the pleasures of the future when we are involved in the pleasures or pains of the present. For instance, I may enjoy wine so much presently that itpushes away the consequences from my mind. Or, I may be in great pain and can only think of soothing it. Also, the pleasures or pains of the future easily outweigh what is far off and somewhat vague and unpredictable.
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68. We also misjudge the consequences of present actions, especially since we have a difficult time seeing what will be in the future. This is due to ignorance and inadvertency.Ignorance- When one makes a judgment without informing himself aswell as possible.Inadvertency- This is when one overlooks what he already knows.70. Another reason judgments of happiness go amiss is simply thatmen often are wrong about what is necessary to their happiness and consequently they take things to be that are not so. Often times people also judge some distant happiness to not really be happiness, because in obtaining it they may have to endure some misery.
71. Can men change the pleasantness or unpleasantness that accompanies certain actions? Yes. In some cases this can be done by consideration and in others custom and habit is necessary. Thus, we can take on certain actions that we may not like, because we consider some greater future consequential good and these can become habitual. This can be done with physical and mental actions.
73. Recapitulation.*Liberty- A power to act or not, according as the mind directs.*Will- A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances.*Uneasiness- That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to a change of operation.*Desire- Accompanies uneasiness.
74. Locke closes the chapter by discussing action. There are two types:a) motionb) thinking--action is better understood as a power that can be either active or passive. It is active when the agent instigates it and passive when it is instigated from without. Locke makes this distinction in order to correct the mistake of assigning every action the status of an active power. This mistake is inherent ingrammar. We say I see, or, I think, etc. But often these are onlypassive powers and not necessarily active powers.
Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
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I. Section I: Of the Different Species of PhilosophyA. Two Concerns of Moral Philosophy
1. Man as active. Here, philosophers appeal to our sentiments to make us revere virtue.
2. Man as a reasonable being. Here, philosophers proceed from particular instances to general principles until they arrive at original principleswhich bind human curiosity.
B. Two types of philosophy:1. Easy and obvious philosophy2. Accurate and abstruse philosophy
C. Three natures of man:1. Reasonable- science2. Sociable- company3. Active- business4. The mixed man, intelligent, yet sociable is the
most perfect character.D. Abstract philosophy will serve as the means to an
inquiry into human understandingE. What are the goals of the inquiry?
1. Reject the most uncertain part of learning2. Order and distinguish the tasks of the mind3. Undermine the foundations of abstruse philosophy
which seems to have serve as a shelter to superstition
II. Section II: Of the Origin of the IdeasA. Two classes of perceptions
1. Dull perceptions- thoughts or ideas2. Lively perceptions- impressions3. Thoughts are the result of impressions
B. By finding the origin of their impressions, we may eliminate unfounded philosophical jargon. This is thecriterion of meaning with which Hume hopes to show that most theological and metaphysical disputes are about unverifiable matters of fact and hence meaningless.
III. Section III: Of the Association of IdeasA. Three principles of association or connection of ideas
1. Resemblance2. Contiguity
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3. Cause or Effect4. Causality is the most instructive
B. Unity of Action1. Example- an epic poem: a microcosm of the unity of
action in all thoughts. Its events are connected closely and more intently resulting in enlivened passions and imaginations.
2. This strong connection of events facilitates:a. The passage of thought or imagination from one to
anotherb. The transfusion of passions and preservation of
affections
IV. Section IV: Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations ofthe UnderstandingA. Two operations of the Understanding
1. Relations of ideas- geometry, algebra, (a priori)2. Matters of fact- (a posteriori)3. Hume asserts that the contrary to a matter of fact
is possible as long as it does not produce a contradiction. Therefore, Hume wants to investigate the nature of evidence (beyond our senses or memories) of the existence of matters of fact.
B. General Propositions concerning cause and Effect (which supersedes senses and memory)1. Knowledge of cause and effect is not attained by
reasoning a priori, but arises entirely from experience of constant conjunction of objects
2. The influence of custom makes us think we would understand cause and effect without having experienced them.
3. Every effect is a distinct event from its cause. 4. (Is the principle of cause and effect a reflection
of the mind’s innate structure, or a mere habit acquired from experience of constant conjunction?)
5. Knowledge of ultimate causes eludes us because we lack experience and observation
C. Reasoning concerning matters of fact are founded on a relation of cause and effect
D. Reasoning concerning that relations are founded on experience
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E. Conclusions from experience are not founded on deductions, either demonstrative or moral.
F. Conclusions about cause and effect, specifically the conformity of future to past must be based on a just inference, but not on deduction. The inference is a supposition that needs to be proven, but cannot be proven.
V. Section V: Skeptical Solution to these DoubtsA. The constant conjunction of objects learned from
experience produces an inference of conformity of future to past
B. A principle of human nature, custom, produces a beliefthat allows us to act on matters of fact. This relation of custom to belief is an operation of the soul.
C. The sentiment of belief is a more intense conception than one of the fictitious imagination, and the mannerof conception of the sentiment of belief is a result of customary conjunction of the object with something present in the memory or senses.
D. This process seems to from a sort of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas.
VI. Section VI: Of ProbabilityA. Ignorance of real causes impels us to believe in
chance, which does not existB. Degrees of probability are proportionate to occurrence
in the past and are therefore governed by the previously outlined inferences based on constant or inconstant conjunction of objects.
C. (To say that there are real causes of everything that occurs is to say that “conjunctions” exist among all sorts of events. But how constant must the conjunction be for us to call it a causal connection?)
VII. Section VII: Of the Ideas of a Necessary ConnectionA. Natural philosophy is more clear and less ambiguous
than moral philosophy1. The obstacle of natural philosophy is the length
and complexity of inferences
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2. The obstacle of moral philosophy is the obscurity of its ideas, like energy and force and necessary connection
3. Therefore we must fix the definition of these termsB. The origin of ideas lie in impressionsC. The clear definition of “necessary connection” comes
from an investigation of the impression from which it came.1. Power to cause is not evident in the external sense
impression2. It might be the product of an internal impression
based on the power of the willD. This idea cannot be foreseen in the cause but only
inferred from experience1. We do not know the circumstances in the cause (the
power by which we produce the idea or action) that enables us to produce the effect)
2. We cannot account for the variations in the self-command we believe in
E. When philosophers scrutinized their ignorance of the reason that causality is not infallible by reflecting on experience, they have recourse to attribute causality to an original intelligent principle of a divine being 1. But the attribution of omnipotence to God is as
flawed as its attribution to will2. Since we do not acquire an idea of it through the
impressions from which all ideas spring, we must reject this conclusion
F. Again, all reasonings concerning matters of fact are based on a supposition of cause and effect based on the experience of all like cases
G. Two definitions of cause1. If the first object had not been, the second object
could not be2. An object followed by another, and whose appearance
always conveys the thought to the other.3. Example of the sound following the vibrations of a
string on an instrument.H. Hume claims that customary transition from one object
to its usual attendant is applicable to moral philosophy
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VIII. Section VIII: Of Liberty and NecessityA. Idea of necessity
1. matter is actuated by a necessary force2. every natural effect is precisely determined but
its cause so that no other effect could have resulted from it.
B. But beyond the uniformity of constant conjunction of objects and the resultant inference of causality, we have not idea of necessary connection because we have no original impression of it.
C. If necessary connection is as defined above, its debate is moot.
D. This definition of necessary connection is applicable to human nature (the constant conjunction of motives and actions)
E. Seeming irregularities and uncertainties are the result of “the secret opposition of contrary causes” (irregular events do not disprove the laws of nature; we just have not discovered all of the laws)
F. Every action relies so heavily on others’ actions, andevery man always uses experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others because allmankind has agreed upon this definition of necessary connection.
G. If philosophers agree with Hume’s definition of necessary connection as the inference drawn from the constant conjunction of objects, they cease to object to the doctrine based on the ideas of free will.
H. Liberty, defined as the power of the will, when opposed to necessity, not constraint, is the same as chance, which does not exist because Hume has proven that nothing exists without a cause.
I. Hume is going to prove that his doctrines of liberty and necessity are consistent with morality and essential to its support
J. If you disagree with Hume on the necessary connection of motives and actions, then the independent action ofmurder is so fleeting and transient that it is separated from a man’s character and cannot be used toprove his depravity.
K. One sound objection: If necessary connection be a sound doctrine, then we must trace cause back to the Creator and attribute to Him the criminal character
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evident in criminal actions. Two parts to the objection1. Such actions cannot be criminal because the Deity
that made them possible is good. In response to this, just because speculative philosophers (Leibniz) have invented systems that maintain that individual criminal acts are part of a greater goodin the best of all possible worlds, why cannot the human mind attribute a distinction of good and bad within such a system
2. Or the deity must be bad; but this is too difficultfor human reason to deal with…
IX. Section IX: Of the Academic or Skeptical PhilosophyA. What is a skeptic?
1. Recommends universal doubt to question opinions andprinciples and the faculties by which we attain them
2. questions original principles3. skepticism meant to keep us honest about what we
took for grantedB. Some skeptics question the reliability of the senses
1. Some believe that the external world does not existindependently of our sense perception
2. But by reason we realize that the representations in the mind of the table in front of us getting smaller as we retreat from it corresponds to a table that does not change its size independently of us
C. How to solve this problem?1. Cannot solve it using experience which is based on
sense perception2. Cannot solve it by saying that our senses are as
infallible as God because they are fallible and He is not
3. We must solve it by asserting that one cannot thinkof an idea of a concrete object without having onceperceived it.
D. Skeptical objections to abstract reasoning concern:1. space- example of infinite divisibility2. time- example of infinite number of real parts in
succession
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E. But the skeptics must be skeptical of their own skepticism
F. Can any good arise out of skepticism?G. All sound philosophers should carry with them a degree
of doubt and modestyH. Mitigated skepticism might beneficial if it limited
itself to common life and experienceI. Quantity and number are the only proper subjects of
science and inquiryJ. All other arguments are matters of fact. These are
incapable of demonstration because of the lack of contradiction inherent in their opposite, non-being. Their proof relies only on a question of cause and effect taught only by experience.
K. Divinity has a foundation mostly in faithL. Morals are a question of sentimentM. To test a school of metaphysics, one must ask two
questions:1. Does it contain abstract reasoning concerning
number and quantity?2. Does it contain experimental reasoning concerning
matters of fact?3. If not, dismiss it.
Hume notes that, when we imaginatively exercise our understanding, our minds are guided by seven philosophical or “reasoning” relations, which are divided as follows:
Principles of reasoning concerning relations of ideas (yielding demonstration): (1) resemblance, (2) contrariety, (3) degrees in quality, and (4) proportions in quantity or number
Principles of reasoning concerning matters of fact (yielding judgmentsof probability): (5) identity, (6) relations in time and place, and (7) causation
Explain in detail David Hume’s view of causality. Does it imply a positivist construal of generalization? Explain. (Fall 2002)
Explain Hume’s position on causal relations, indicating why he is often interpreted as a skeptic. (Fall 1993 & Spring 2000) Discuss whether it
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is possible to defend Hume against the view that he is a skeptic in thisregard. (Spring 2000)
I. Hume calls himself an academic skeptic, but not a Pyrrhonian skeptic. The latter questions the faculties by which we know what we know so as to excessively question our own experience and leads to no durable good. Hume’s academic skepticism differs because it questions concepts previous philosophers have taken as innate and reveals their formation from our experience. One of the central concepts whose nature and origin Hume seeks to uncover is causality.The goals of his inquiry are to reject the most uncertain part of learning, order and distinguish the tasks of the mind, and undermine the foundations of abstruse philosophy which seems to have serve as a shelter to superstition
II. Two classes of perceptionsA. Dull perceptions- thoughts or ideas B. Lively perceptions- impressions, simple and complex
(blue, hard…)C. Thoughts are the result of impressionsD. By finding the origin of their impressions, we may
eliminate unfounded philosophical jargon. III. Three principles of association or connection of ideas
A. ResemblanceB. ContiguityC. Cause or EffectD. Causality is the most instructive
IV. Causal relationsA. (Not occasionally caused by God)-MalebrancheB. Causality is found by reasoning concerning matters of
fact, not relations of ideas. C. Causality is not found in experience because there is
no impression of it. Rather there is an impression of:1. contiguity in time and space2. the cause is prior to the effect3. they are constantly conjoined in our experience of
them.C. Knowledge of cause and effect is not attained by
reasoning a priori, but arises entirely from experience of constant conjunction of objects
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D. The influence of custom makes us think we would understand cause and effect without having experiencedthem.
E. Every effect is a distinct event from its cause. F. Knowledge of ultimate causes eludes us because we lack
experience and observationG. Reasoning concerning matters of fact are founded on a
relation of cause and effectH. Conclusions from experience are not founded on
deductions, either demonstrative or moral. I. Conclusions about cause and effect, specifically the
conformity of future to past must be based on a just inference, but not on deduction. The inference is a supposition that needs to be proven, but cannot be proven.
J. The constant conjunction of objects learned from experience produces an inference of conformity of future to past
V. All knowledge of cause and effect is only probable, not certain.
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Machiavelli
I. Machiavelli as the first modern thinker A. Rejection of traditional Christian conception of
virtue B. Advice manuals for rulers: win over Fortuna with
classical Roman virtuesC. The good man is the political man D. Do honor, modesty, and mercy make a great prince?E. Significance of sheer power in political life F. Successful prince has to cultivate different virtues G. Machiavellian virtue: virtù
1. Not any particular moral virtue 2. A skill or capacity for flexibility, ability to
adapt oneself to the times and to fortune II. Ways of establishing principalities
A. Leaders who acquire power solely through virtù B. Leaders who rely in part on fortune C. Don’t rely on the good will of others D. Control your own arms E. Leaders who acquire power through wickedness F. Virtù cannot be equated with viciousness
III. Importance of military art/good arms IV. Moral standards in politics
A. Having conventional virtues v. reputation/appearance of having them
1. Generosity and miserliness 2. Mercy and cruelty 3. Integrity/keeping promises
B. Political actions should be judged by their effects, not by their intrinsic rightness
1. Negative constraints on actions 2. Positive goals guiding actions
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Hobbes
A. The purpose of the state is to protect the people, their lives, and to preserve order
B. Its origins arise from the problems of the state of nature, which Hobbes equates to war.
C. In this state everyone has an equal right to do anything they want, to steal and kill.
D. Liberty in this state is negative, the absence of external restraints.
E. The only law is the law of self-preservation, the first law of nature.
F. The second law of nature is to bind with others’ in contractG. In these contracts, you give up your rights mutually and
freely.H. The social contract is the free and mutual laying down of
the natural rights to a third party, who is the sovereign, who is strong, and can maintain order by fear and punishmentof transgressions that occurred in the state of nature.
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I. The leviathan imparts retributive justiceJ. The sovereign is outside the contract. K. The monarch is the most expedient form of the leviathan.
Locke
Key Points:
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- Unlike Hobbes, Locke’s “state of nature” is different from the “state of war”
o “State of nature” – State of perfect freedom ruled by the laws of reason
Every man has right to enforce laws of reason, including the right to punish and to seek reparations
o “State of war” – The illegitimate use of force, which announces one is not ruled by the laws of reason
- Distinction between liberty and licenseo Liberty – Grounded in man’s possession of reason
- Natural liberty – does not deny that some men have just precedency
- The end of law – to preserve and extend freedom- No freedom without law- Slavery – The state of war continued between a lawful
conqueror and a captive- Property
o Initial property – one’s own bodyo From this property arises property obtained through
labor One obtains property by mixing one’s labor with
what nature has provided But – Can only possess as much as he can use –
will not spoil Property rights – derived from the laws of reason Enclosure – a right derived through labor
Increases the general stock of mankind- Money – Allows for accumulation which will not spoil – and
hence is an incentive for accumulation- Political authority and parental authority are entirely
distinct- The first society is that of marriage – later extended to a
household with servants and/or slaveso This is not a civil society
- Civil Society – Each member gives up their natural right to punish transgressors of natural laws to the community at-large
o Goal: The preservation of property The power of the society does not extend further
than what is necessary to protect the property and peace of society
o No absolute monarch can be a member of civil society
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They are always in a state of natureo Authority – goes to the majorityo Three powers (branches) of government – legislative,
executive and federative- The dissolution of government
o Dissolution from without – foreign conquesto Dissolution from within
When the prince sets up his arbitrary will in place of the laws, hinders the legislature from meeting in its due time, changes the manner of election, or delivers the people into a foreign power, the legislative is changed (and the government dissolved)
When the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves
Preface:
- Goals – Justify the 1689 Revolution and answer Robert Filmer- Nice Quote: “That cavilling here and there, at some
expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book.”
Chapter One:
- The right to political authority cannot be determined by tracing the line of Adam
- The power of a magistrate is not the same as the power of father over children, husband over wife, master over slave
- Political power – “a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all lesser penalties, for the relation of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defenseof the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.”
Chapter Two: Of the State of Nature:
State of perfect freedom – state men are naturally in- They may order their actions and dispose of the possessions
and persons as they see fito No dependence on the will of any other man
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- A state of equalityo All power and jurisdiction is reciprocalo Creatures of the same species and rank, with the same
advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, are equal amongst one another
o This equality is evident in itself – [cites Hooker]- A state of liberty
o But not a state of license Man has no right to destroy himself or any
creature in his possessiono The state of nature is governed by a law of nature
Reason teaches the law of nature Everyone bound to
Preserve himself As much as he can, preserve the rest of
mankind
Execution of the law of nature (punishment):- Everyone in a state of nature has the right to punish
violators of the law of nature, to the degree necessary to restrain the offender of obtain reparations from him
o The right to punish foreigners – grounded in natural right to punishment
- Reparationso Due only to the injured party
- Restrainto Can go so far as the destruction of the offendero Each transgression to be punished to the degree of
severity that will cause the offender to repent and terrify others from doing the like
Objections:- This means we will be our own judges – we will never be
partial – confusion and disorder will followo Response: Everyone’s actions answerable to the rest of
mankindo Besides, the state of nature is better than absolute
monarchy, in which all of mankind is only answerable to one man
- Did a state of nature every historically exist?o Response:
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All rulers of independent governments are in a state of nature (with each other?)
We can find examples in the Americas- [Hooker citation omitted]
Chapter Three: Of the State of War:
State of war:- A state of enmity and destruction- Declaring by word or action, a sedate, settled (not a
passionate, hasty) design on another man’s life- The other may take the declarer’s life- Others may join in the defense, if it be just and reasonable- Because – law of nature:
o Man’s being to be preserved as much as possibleo If all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent
as to be preferredo Why – The declarer of war is not under the rule of
reason, but of force and violence- One who attempts to get another in his absolute power has
declared war on him- For this reason, it is lawful to kill a thief who uses force
o He who uses force may take away my liberty, and everything else
Difference between a state of war and a state of nature:- Man living together, according to reason, without a common
superior, is properly a state of nature- Force, or the declared design of force, with no common
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is a state of war
Between those in society – When the actual use of force is over, the state of war ceases Between those in a state of nature – The state of war, once begun, continues until the aggressor offers peace or otherwise redeems the injury
Men join in society- To avoid a state of war
Chapter Four: Of Slavery:
Natural liberty of man:
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- To be free from any superior power on earth- To not be under the will or legislative authority of man- To have only the law of nature for his rule
Liberty of man in society:- To be under no other legislative power, but that
established, by consent, in the commonwealth- To be not under the domination of any will, or the restraint
of any law, but what the legislature shall enact- Reminder: Liberty, in either state, is not license
Slavery- No man can enslave himself to anyone by his own consent- But – If a man has committed an act by which he has
forfeited his life, he may delay his death through being enslaved
o If this life is unbearable, he may refuse service and draw death upon himself
- State of slavery – The state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive
- But – Once a compact is made, the state of war and slavery ceases
Chapter Five: Of Property:
Earth – given to mankind in general (known both by reason and revelation)
- God –Gives men property to make the use of for the advantageof life, convenience, etc.
- Land – originally possessed in common by all
1st Type of Property- Every man has a property in his own person
o Only he has a right to it- The labor of his body is properly his
o “Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is hisown, and thereby made it his property.”
- A man has a right to the property acquired by his labor, as long and there is enough, and as good, left in common for others
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- [Sneaks in wage-labor?]: “the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut; […] become my property , without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them our of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.”
o [See Chap. 6, Sec. 54 below deals with inequality in the state of equality]
Objection – People will then make as much as possible their property
- “The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, also does bound that property too.”
- “As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in; whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.”
Property – terms of the earth itself (as opposed to the fruits ofthe earth)
- Acquired in the same way- As much land as a man can labor upon and use is his property- “He by his labor does, as it were, inclose it from the
common.”o [Thus, Locke provides a justification for the vast enclosure of the
commons for raising of sheep, etc – but, he is assuming there is enough land left for those shut out to work upon and enclose their own land.]
- Exception – Land left common by compact [i.e., the state of England leaves certain land in common – such land cannot be enclosed without consent]
- Enclosure (in general, private property in land), while privatizing a particular piece of land, increases the general stock of mankind
o E.g. 10 acres in England v. 10 acres in America
On Labor:- “Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it
may appear, that the property of labour should be able to overbalance the community of land; for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing.”
- “the improvement of labour makes a far greater part of the value.”
- Labor puts the greatest part of value upon land
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- Materials of nature and the earth – in themselves, almost worthless
Prior to money- It was foolish to hoard up things only to let them spoil- “the exceeding of the bound of his just property, not lying in the
largeness of his possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it.”
Invention of money- Introduces, by consent, larger possessions, and a right to
them- Keeps without spoiling – naturally allows for accumulation- Gives a reason for enlarging one’s possessions- “men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession
of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor.”
Chapter Six: Of Paternal Power:
- It would make more sense to speak of “parental” power than “paternal” power, as both the mother and father have power over children
Equality- “That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to
understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give mena just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance and benefits other, to pay an observance to those whom nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due.”
- Equality – “that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.”
- Children – not born in this full state of equality – but they are born to it
o Parents – have jurisdiction over them- Law of parental authority – a law of reason
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Liberty/Law/License- “Law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as
the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no further than is for the general good of those under that law.”
- “The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.”
- “where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is,to be free from restrain and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do as he lists.”
- Liberty – grounded in man’s possession of reason
Parental authority – ends when child becomes of age- Common mistake – confusing parental authority with political
authority
Chapter Seven: Of Political or Civil Society:
First Society – Between man and wife- In time – Master and servant come to be added- Husband – Power over the wife- Wife – Power to separate
Master and Servant and Slave- Servant – A freedman sells himself to another for a time- Slave – Obtained through a just war
Political Society – only exists when every one of its members hasgiven up their natural power to enforce the law to the community
- “Those who are united in one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society with one another.”
- Commonwealth makes laws and punishes “for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society.”
o This is the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society
- “Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of thelaw of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society.”
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- Absolute Monarch – inconsistent with civil societyo Every absolute prince is still in a state of natureo But – the purpose of civil society is to avoid the
evils of the state of natureo “No man in civil society can be exempt from the laws
of it: for if any man may do as he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be notperfectly in a state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society; unless anyone will say, the state of nature and civil society are one andthe same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.”
Chapter Eight: Of the Beginning of Political Societies:
- When men agree to form a government, they agree to submit tothe determination of the majority
o [no concern for minority rights / tyranny of the majority]
Objection: No historical instances of a social contract:- This should not be surprising – for government precedes
literacy – we would have no records of such an agreement- [examples omitted]- First rulers – tended to be military folk
o “It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end[i.e., to secure themselves against a foreign force], and chuse the wisest and bravest men to conduct them in their wars, and lead them our against their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.”
- There are many cases of government growing out of the family– into monarchy
o But- “they never dreamed of monarchy being Jure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age.”
o Rather – “all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people.”
Objection: Men cannot form a social contract, for this would violate the one they have with the government they were born under
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- The compact of the father does not bind the son- The son can’t inherit his father’s property without agreeing
to be subject to the commonwealth which the property is under, but he may go elsewhere, to live in a state of natureor to be a subject of another commonwealth
- Tacit Consent – Anyone who possesses or enjoys any part of the dominions of any government is consenting to that government’s laws
o But submitting to the laws does not make one a member of that society
- Explicit Consent - “Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact.”
Chapter Nine: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government:
Chief end – Preservation of property
Things wanting in the state of nature:- An established, settled, known law – allowed by common
consent to be the standard of right and wrong and common measure of all controversies
- A known and indifferent judge- Power to back and support the sentence when right
Men give up their power to do what they see fit by the law of nature and the power to punish crimes in order to avoid these things wanting in a state of nature
- But – “the power of the society or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure everyone’s property.”
- “whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not be extemporary decrees.”
- “And all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety and public good of the people.”
Chapter Ten: Of the Forms of a Common-wealth:
- Perfect Democracy – the whole community employs the power ofmaking laws, and appoints the officers who execute the laws
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- Oligarchy – The power of making laws is put into a few select hands and passed on to their heirs or successors
- Monarchy – The power of making laws is put into a single hand and passed on to his heir or successor
o Hereditary Monarchy – A monarchy which is passed on toheirs
o Elective Monarchy – A monarchy where the monarch only has the power to nominate a successor
- There are also compound and mixed forms of these governments- Commonwealth – “any independent community” (need not be a
democracy)
Chapter Eleven: Of the Extent of Legislative Power:
The first and most fundamental positive law of commonwealths – establishing a legislative power
Legislative- Supreme power of the commonwealth- But – Not absolutely arbitrary power
o Cannot have more power than the people had in the state of nature
o “It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.”
o No extemporary arbitrary decreeso Judges are known and authorizedo Cannot take away property from a man without his
consento Cannot tax without consent
Taxation without consent invades the fundamental law of property
o Cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands
Chapter Twelve: Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Common-wealth:
Legislative power – “that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it.”
- Need not always be in session
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- And if it is always in session – temptation to use the powerfor private advantage
Executive power – The enforcement of the laws- Must always be in power
o This is why the executive and legislative powers oftencome to be separated
Federative power – “the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transaction, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth.”
- Usually united with the executive power- It would be unwise to place the federative and executive
powers in distinct hands
Chapter Thirteen: Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Common-wealth:
The community is always the supreme power – in terms of why they agreed to form a government
- But - While the government exists, the legislative is the supreme power
The executive has the power to assemble and dismiss the legislature
- But this does not give it authority over it- It cannot use this power to threaten the safety of the
people- “The use of force without authority, always puts him who
uses it in a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders himliable to be treated accordingly.”
Prerogative – “a power, in the hands of the prince, to provide for the public good, in such cases, which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct.”
- Just prerogative – When this is done for the good of the people
Chapter Fourteen: Of the Prerogative:
“Prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule”
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If not to the public good – the people can appeal to heaven
Chapter Fifteen: Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, Considered Together:
[nothing new here]
Chapter Sixteen: Of Conquest:
Conquest never erects a new government- Although sometimes it makes way for a new government
Unjust conqueror:- “he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title
to the subjection and obedience of the conquered.”- Even after many generations – the first conqueror can never
be said to have a title to the land of the country, or the decedents of the conquered
o The subjected may shake off the ruler’s tyranny
Lawful conqueror:- No power over those that conquest with him- Only power of those who assisted, concurred or consented to
the unjust force used against him- He is perfectly despotical in power over those he overcomes
o But not to their possessionsChapter Seventeen: Of Usurpation:
Usurper – by definition never has right on his side- has possession of what another has right to- Refers to a change in persons
o If it were also a change in government, it be tyranny- Has no right to be obeyed
Chapter Eighteen: Of Tyranny:
Tyrant – exercises power beyond his right for his own private advantage and not for the good of those under it
- King – makes the laws the bounds of his power and the good of the public
- Tyrant – gives way to his own will and appetite
Chapter Nineteen: Of the Dissolution of Government:
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Distinction:- Dissolution of the society – The society is “the agreement
that everyone has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and to be one distinct common-wealth.”
o Usually – The society is dissolved by foreign conquest In such a case – they return to a state of nature
and can try to enter some other society- Dissolution of the government
o The dissolution of the society means the government cannot stand
Dissolution of the government from within:- When the legislative is altered
o Legislative – “This is the soul that give form, life, and unity to the common-wealth: from hence the severalmembers have their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion . . . for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were the keeping of that will.”
“therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows.”
In such a case “everyone is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and other usurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation.”
- Ways a government can be dissolved (assuming an executive hereditary monarchy, with an assembly of hereditary nobilityand an assembly of representatives from the people – [i.e., the English form of government]):
o When the prince sets up his arbitrary will in place ofthe laws (which are the will of society) the legislative is changed
o When the prince hinders the legislature from meeting in its due time, the legislative is altered
o When the prince changes the manner of election, the legislative is altered
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o When the prince delivers the people into a foreign power, the legislative is changed (and the government dissolved)
- When the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves
o “men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.”
- “There is, therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust.”
o Contrary to the trust – i.e., invading the property ofthe subjects or attempting to make themselves masters
o When the prince or legislative does this, they forfeittheir power
Objection: Then people will always be in rebellion”- “People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as
some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in they frame they have been accustomed to.”
- People will deal with the greatest mistakes in the ruling part [e.g., Nixon – Watergate / Clinton – B.J.] without rebelling
- But – a long train of abuses [e.g., Failure to deport Richard Simmons] – when they are threatened with worse than a state of nature or pure anarchy [e.g., Ice Capades] – the people cannot help but rouse themselves and restore the government to its true purpose
- Further – this power to provide for their safety anew is thebest fence against the people’s rebellion
Objection: This leads to civil war and other problematic situations
- “If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be chargedupon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades the neighbors”
o [Mentions “passive obedience” – “passive disobedience” never occurred tohim?]
Objection: All resisting of princes is rebellion
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- Even advocates of absolute monarchy allow for cases in whichmonarchs forfeit their kinghood and become like other men who have no authority
o When they endeavour to overturn the government, with the purpose of ruining the kingdom and commonwealth
Neglect of the public good is sufficient evidenceof such design
o When they make the commonwealth dependent upon a foreign power
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Rousseau
A. The purpose of the state is to promote the common goodB. The general will is the direction towards this goodC. The common good is not the sum of private interestsD. The state overcomes the obstacles in the state of
natureE. The state of nature does not include property, but
people still want to protect their persons and their goods.
F. Property is a function of civil society and lawG. There is no war in the state of nature because war is
over propertyH. The common good preserves individual freedomI. However, individual freedom is viewed from the
perspective of the common good. J. The general will cannot err and is sovereign. It
directs toward the common good.K. The common good places public interests over private
interests.L. The general will balances the forces of private
interests.M. People free to act with the common good in mind,
having given up their rights to the common whole, feelsympathetically toward each individual because they represent the whole.
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Rawls
§15: PRIMARY SOCIAL GOODS AS THE BASIS OF EXPECTATIONS
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1) How are we to estimate expectations of goods to be distributed?
a) Utilitarianism tries to measure expected utilities by acardinal measure of representative individuals which presupposes a correlation of the “scales of different persons” (78). This raises all sorts of problems concerning interpersonal comparisons. And Rawls is notsure that the average happiness needs to be maximized.
b) The Difference Principle solves some of the problems ofinterpersonal comparisons:
(a) Only need to identify representative individual from the least advantaged group; therefore, only ordinal judgments (which determine order by a comparison of amounts but not specific amounts) of well-being are required. Problems of making cardinal judgments (which determine amounts) are avoided.
(b) It simplifies interpersonal comparisons by measuring only the expectations of primary goods. Primary goods- “Things which it is supposed a rational man wants” (79). (e.g. rights, liberties, opportunities, and income and wealth)
(c) A theory of the good (Chapter VII) accounts for primary goods. That happiness achieved by a rational long term plan, a satisfaction of a rational desire.
c) How do we determine the index of goods?
(1) What would a rational representative individual in the least advantaged group want moreof? (80)
(2) This criterion does not concern the particular results of having these goods. The
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criterion is at higher level of generality, the conditions for happiness.
§16: RELEVANT SOCIAL POSITIONS
1) Need to identify very basic social positions to use as starting places, which can then be generalized and aggregated (82)
i) Each person taken from two perspectives:(a) Equal Citizenship(b) That defined by distribution of wealth and
income(c) Representatives of the first perspective are
the representative citizen and the principle ofequal liberty and fair and equal opportunity apply (83)
(d) Representatives of the second perspective arethe social positions and more problematic
1. Least advantaged can be seen from three perspectives (83)
i. Family and classii. Natural endowmentsiii. Luck
2. How to choose (84)i. An unskilled workerii. A level of wealthiii.
(2) Priority of relevant positions over particular circumstances (e.g. free trade v. protectionism and the particular interest groups that stand to benefit) (85)
§17: THE TENDENCY TO EQUALITY
1) Two principles express an egalitarian conception of justice
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2) Despite objections, the principle of fair opportunity does not lead to a meritocratic society (86).
i) Difference principle means undeserved inequalities deserve redress.
(a) Principle of redress is balanced by the common good.
(b) Difference principle would allocate educational resources so as to redress undeserved inequalities (87)
(c) Difference principle regards the distributionof natural talents as a common asset, such thateveryone should benefit from them. This prevents institutions from being unjust becauseof the distribution of natural talents.
(d) One’s starting place is not just or unjust. What society does with these neutral starting places determines justice (87).
ii) Difference principle expresses conception of reciprocity (88). (e.g. given two groups of unequal prior advantages, only one of which can be maximized, we would not choose to maximize that of the advantaged. And maximizing the weighted mean between the two would benefit the advantaged class twice over.)
(a) The fortunate are not entitled to advantages gained through cooperative enterprises not governed by the difference principle.
(b) The notion of desert with respect to the character that enables the cultivation of attributes is problematic as it depends on undeserved circumstances (89).9
9 Do you agree with Rawls that thinking “we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic?” That is, if we grant that we do not deserve that which our birth (into a race, gender, class, and certain level of aptitude and talent) grants us, do we not deserve the character that
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iii) Difference principle provides for an interpretation of the principle of fraternity (90).
(a) The example of a family not maximizing the sum of advantages
(b) Fraternity has a place with democratic theory(given Rawls’ system) where it has not previously had one.
iv) The democratic interpretation of the two principles will not lead to a meritocratic society (91).
(a) The less fortunate would never want to reducethe talents of others.
(b) Therefore, the distribution of natural assetsis a benefit to individuals and To all (92).
§18: PRINCIPLES FOR INDIVIDUALS: THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS
1) The purpose here is to explain the meaning of the principles for individuals.
2) The diagram on page 94 indicates the order in which the principles would be acknowledged in the original position.
i) The lines do not indicate that one set of principlesis derived from the other, but that one set of principles presupposes another.
ii) For instance, principles for individuals presuppose just institutions because justice as a social nature.
enables us to make the most of those circumstances? (Because we do not deserve the family or education which formed our character).
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3) To determine the concept of right, we need principles to go under the each concept falling under the concept of right. So in addition to principles for institutions, weneed principles for law of nations (not discussed much) and for individuals (discussed here §18-19)
i) “The concept of something’s being right is the same as […] the concept of its being in accordance with the principles that in the original position would be acknowledged” (95).
ii) If this understanding of rightness as fairness fits our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium, then we can eliminate previous notion of right which were problematic (95-96).
iii) Therefore, Justice as fairness and rightness as fairness explicate the concepts of justice and right(96).
4) The requirements of the principles of fairness are obligations not natural duties (96). The obligation for an individual is to do his part and follow the rules of the institution if…
i) The institution is just (by satisfying the two principles).
ii) Either the individual entered into the institutionvoluntarily or benefited from its opportunities (96).
5) Obligations…
i) Arise from voluntary actsii) Their content is defined by the institution (into
which one voluntarily entered)iii) Are owed to definite individuals who are also in
the cooperative arrangement (97).iv) (e.g. public office)
§19: PRINCIPLES FOR INDIVIDUALS: NATURAL DUTIES
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1) Natural duties are both positive (duty to help others) and negative (duty NOT to hurt others).
2) Natural duties differ from obligations based on the abovethree criteria. They …
i) Do not arise from voluntary actsii) Their content is not defined by the institution iii) Are owed to individuals regardless of their being
in a cooperative arrangement with you (97).iv) These are important with respect to the laws of
nations (98)
3) The principles of natural duties
i) Although derived from a contractarian point of view,do not rely on consent
ii) Those that hold for individuals would be acknowledged in the original position (99).
4) Natural duties and obligations can overlap. They are not mutually exclusive (100).
5) Natural duties are more fundamental than obligations. 6) Furthermore, those more privileged are more likely to
enter into obligations which bind them to a just scheme (another sense of noblesse oblige) (100).
7) Permissions
i) Some permissions are morally indifferentii) Some permissions fall under a class of
supererogatory acts, those which go beyond duties anobligations.
iii) This concept of justice, as opposed to a classicalutilitarian view, does not require these supererogatory acts (101).
Chapter III. THE ORIGINAL POSITION
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§20: THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT FOR THE CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE
1) Some review of the nature of the original position.
i) Considered an equilibrium by analogy to free markets(103).
ii) Purely hypothetical.iii) An attempt to account for our moral judgments and
explain our having a sense of justice (104).iv) The principles would be accepted play a requisite
part in our moral reasoning.v) It is an attempt at a purely deductive “moral
geometry,” but it falls short as it is “highly intuitive throughout” (105).
2) There are various contract theories and various conceptions of the initial situation. He will compare these throughout the work (105).
§21: THE PRESENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES
1) Those in the original position are free to choose betweendifferent conceptions of justice.
i) Device used: Start with a list of given conceptions.ii) Compare them in pairs.
2) List of conceptions (107).
3) Each argument for the two principles is relative to the list of alternatives chosen (109).
§22: THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF JUSTICE
1) The circumstances of justice are the normal conditions which make cooperation possible and necessary (109).
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i) There exist both a conflict of and an identity of interests.
ii) This entails objective conditions (e.g. moderate scarcity, a common geographical area, relatively comparable mental and physical powers among individuals. Etc…)
iii) The subjective conditions entail that individuals have different conceptions of the good, some altruistic, some egoistic, and individuals have different life plans.
iv) Assumption that in the original position, the people are aware of the conditions (110).
2) Question of whether or not the individuals are responsible to third parties, as in their descendents (111).
i) Motivation assumption: individuals are heads of families and have a desire to further the well beingof their immediate descendents.
ii) Motivation assumption: “parties agree to principles subject to the constraint that they wish all preceding generations to have followed the very same principles” (111).
3) The parties in the original position are mutually disinterested (112). They are not willing to sacrifice their interests to others. Therefore, the original position cannot be a community of saints (112).
§23: THE FORMAL CONSTRAINTS OF THE CONCEPT OF RIGHT
2) The principles should be general (113).3) The principles should be universal. The two are distinct
conditions (114).4) The principles should be public and known to all (115).5) The principles should impose an ordering on conflicting
claims (115).
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i) Ordering should be transitive (if A is more just than B and B more just than C, then A is more just than C).
ii) This rules out physical combat as an ordering device because that can be intransitive. (A defeatsB in a battle, and B defeats C in a battle, and C then defeats A in a battle).
6) The principles should be final.7) These five principles rule out the listed variants of
egoism (116).8) The significance of egoism philosophically is not as an
alternative conception of right but as a challenge to anysuch conception (117).10
§24: THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
1) In the original position the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance.
2) What they do not know (118):i) Place in society, class or social status ii) Natural talents, levels of intelligence or
physical abilityiii) One’s conception of the goodiv) The particulars of one’s life planv) Special features of one’s psychology, as in aversion
to risk or tendencies to be optimistic or pessimistic.
vi) The particular circumstances, economic, political,and cultural of their own society
3) What they do know (119):i) They understand political affairs and principles of
economic theory in general.ii) General facts about the principles of justice.
10 Given what we read concerning ethical egoism, do you agree with Rawlsthat egoism is not a conception of right, but a challenge to any conception of right?
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4) The notion of the veil of ignorance raises several difficulties:
i) Makes it difficult to grasp what the original position actually is.
ii) “The evaluation of principles must proceed in terms of the general consequences of their public recognition and universal application it being assumed that they will be complied with by everyone.To say that a certain conception of justice would bechosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberations satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion” (119-120).
5) Characteristics and methodological value of the veil of ignorance:
i) Not to be thought of as a general assembly of everyone.
ii) Rather, the original position should be able to beadopted at any time. It is a theoretical perspective (120).
iii) Everyone is equally rational, so that if one person selected at random could be convinced of the principles of justice, then everyone would be convinced.
iv) Ignorance allows for the possibility of unanimity of decision.
v) No one can hold out for their own interest and no interested coalitions can form (because they do not know their interests) (121).
vi) Ignorance corrects for the arbitrariness of the world in all its particular contingencies (122).
What is the primary purpose of the State? In putting forward your own position, compare and contrast it to three of the following: Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx.
i. PlatoA. The purpose of the state is to embody justice
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B. What is justice? Giving everybody his due. Justice is the proper governance of human appetitive and spirited natures (both collectively and individually) by reason.
C. State ruled by the best, most knowing, aristocracy or philosopher king
D. Why? King know the forms, the Good, the TrueE. Each member of the state serves its purpose and functions
with the health of the whole in mind.F. The human psyche has three dominant natures, each
corresponding to its mythical metal, class of citizens, formof government and virtue
i. Appetitive—bronze—farmers and craftsmen—democracytending toward tyranny—moderation
ii. The appetitive individual runs from next to next,is disobedient, does not distinguish between pleasures, and his psyche is under internal revolt.
iii. A democracy values freedom over obedience to the point of rebellion, pursues wealth to the point of impoverishing the masses, which leads to civilwar, and it allots positions without reference tomerit, it assigns equality to unequals.
iv. However in a well governed and balanced psyche and city, this class demonstrates moderation
b. Spirited—silver—guardians—timocracy—couragei. The spirited individual lacks culture and reason,
but loves honor and offices. ii. The timocracy is characterized by contentiousness
and covetousness of honor.iii. However in a well governed and balanced psyche
and city, this class demonstrates the virtue of courage
c. Rational—gold—philosopher kings—aristocratic meritocracy—wisdomi. The philosopher pursues the Good and employs the
faculty calibrated to achieve it, reason. He is trained in music and mathematics, understanding harmony and proportion. He governs and employs his appetites and passions toward the achievementof the good. He remains focused on the realm of Ideas, which are unchanging.
ii. The aristocratic meritocracy is characterized by the proper education of the ruling class, and the
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proper employment of each class of citizens each according to their abilities and each according to their needs. Everyone receives his due and mind his business.
iii. In a well governed and balanced psyche and city, this class demonstrates the virtue of wisdom.ii. Aristotle
A. Fundamental Purpose of the State is to make possible the good life
B. To develop the conditions for the possession of the good life
C. Only in the state can a man live the good life.D. Outside of the state man is a god or a beast.E. Good life is happiness. F. Activity in accord with virtueG. Virtue in individuals and in stateH. Institutional means to achieving this purpose include the
i. material, geographical1. Population- not too big, not too small2. self-sufficient3. near water source
ii. Inhabitants of the polis1. women- perpetuation of population, marriage laws,
practical purposes2. slaves by nature, by convention 3. workers, craftsmen- purpose- material needs, food4. citizens
iii. MachiavelliA. The purpose of the state is to preserve itself (in the
Prince)B. The means by which it does is the maintenance of orderC. Order is maintained by applying the proper virtue in the
given situationD. win over Fortuna with classical Roman virtuesE. Machiavellian virtue: virtù
i. Not any particular moral virtue ii. A skill or capacity for flexibility, ability to adapt
oneself to the times and to fortune F. Moral standards in politics
i. Having conventional virtues v. reputation/appearance of having them
1. Generosity and miserliness 2. Mercy and cruelty
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3. Integrity/keeping promises ii. Political actions should be judged by their effects,
not by their intrinsic rightness iv. Hobbes
1. The purpose of the state is to protectthe people, their lives, and to preserve order
2. Its origins arise from the problems ofthe state of nature, which Hobbes equates to war.
3. In this state everyone has an equal right to do anything they want, to steal and kill.
4. Liberty in this state is negative, theabsence of external restraints.
5. The only law is the law of self-preservation, the first law of nature.
6. The second law of nature is to bind with others’ in contract
7. In these contracts, you give up your rights mutually and freely.
8. The social contract is the free and mutual laying down of the natural rights to a third party, who is the sovereign, who is strong, and can maintain order by fear and punishment of transgressions that occurred in thestate of nature.
9. The leviathan imparts retributive justice
10. The sovereign is outside the contract.
11. The monarch is the most expedient form of the leviathan.
v. Locke1. The purpose of the state is to protect
the natural rights i. lifeii. libertyiii. property
2. The state of nature is when everyman is a judge and protector of his own natural rights. It is not a state of
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war. There are rights in the state ofnature
3. State of war4. State of slavery5. State of Civil society-
i. Giving up your own power to serve as judge in your own case.
ii. Establishing civil government to legislate, execute laws, and manage foreign policy.
6. Dissolution of the Governmenti. The government deprives the people of life,
liberty, property. The government cannot exercisemore power over the people than they gave it.
ii. Taxation without consentiii. Not allowing the legislative to meetiv. Interfering with courts
vi. Rousseau1. The purpose of the state is to promote
the common good2. The general will is the direction
towards this good3. The common good is not the sum of
private interests4. The state overcomes the obstacles in
the state of nature5. The state of nature does not include
property, but people still want to protect their persons and their goods.
6. Property is a function of civil society and law.
7. There is no war in the state of naturebecause war is over property
8. The common good preserves individual freedom
9. However, individual freedom is viewed from the perspective of the common good.
10. The general will cannot err and is sovereign. It directs toward the common good.
11. The common good places public interests over private interests.
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12. The general will balances the forces of private interests.
13. People free to act with the common good in mind, having given up their rights to the common whole, feelsympathetically toward each individualbecause they represent the whole.
How does Locke respond to the Hobbesian theory of the state and find a basis for right, justice, and law? What are the essential features of the state for Locke? In what ways can a people tell if they have in factreturned to the “state of nature”? (Fall 2003)
According to Locke, what is the fundamental purpose of the state? To what extent does his theory emphasize different primary institutions as key factors in achieving the purpose of political society (e.g. citizen,education, sovereignty, representation)? (Fall 1995)
With regard to Locke, contrast the role of the citizen in relation to the “ideal” state. (Fall 1992)
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Discuss the idea of justice in three of the following: Plato, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Rawls. Which of these seems best to you and why? (Fall 2003)
What is the function of revolution in relation to the state for three ofthe following: (a) Machiavelli, (b) Hobbes, (c) Locke, (d) Hegel, (e) Marx? (Fall 1990)
A key problem in political theory is “who polices the police?’, i.e., what constraints are there for those to whom power is given. Contrast two answers given two this question from the following list and evaluate: Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Marx, Mill, Dewey. (Spring 1997)
Compare and contrast the views of three of the following on the nature, origin, and purpose of the State: Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes,Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Mill, and Dewey. With which author do you most agree? Why? (Spring 1998, Fall 1999 & 2003)
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Briefly describe the general idea behind the social contract theories ofRousseau, Locke, and Hobbes, indicating the ways in which these thinkersdiffered. Then provide an assessment of social contract theories based on the work of one of the following: Dewey, Arendt, Rawls, King, Habermas.
Outline over Hume’s Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
I. Section I: Of the General Principles of MoralsA. Is morality a question of reason or of sentiment?
1. If morality only assents to human reasoning, it loses practicality
2. Morality in its final determination of vice and virtue is a question of sentiment
3. Therefore, reason and sentiment usually concur withregard to morality
B. Let us investigate the origin of morals by analyzing the mental qualities that compose personal merit
II. Section II: Of BenevolenceA. Benevolent actions are estimable
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B. They transfuse themselves so as to call forth the samefavorable sentiments in others
C. The happiness of society is the circumstance displaying the praise of any beneficence man1. private happiness- family, parents, kids2. public happiness- all of society
D. Their beneficence is usefulE. We praise utility in animals, machines, occupationsF. Utility is the origin of the worship of the sun,
fertility, ancient religious objectsIII. Section III: Of justice
A. Utility is the sole source of justice1. If everyone is provided for, there be no concept of
justice 2. If everyone is in a state of want, justice as a
concept dissipates3. Therefore, justice is a product of the
circumstances that demand utilityB. When there is a circumstance of a relationship of
natural dominance and servitude, as with men and animals, Europeans and Indians, men and women, justiceuseless and therefore absent from the relationship
C. Justice, derived from reason alone, not taking human sentiment into account, can be impractical and can result in laws such as perfect equality of property
D. In this sense, justice seems analogous to religious superstition, which is arbitrary and irrational
E. But justice has in its interest the welfare of societyF. Is justice derived from our reflection or usefulness,
or is it a natural instinct?G. It seems that custom and necessity bring about justice
in all societies and that is a result not of an instinct to make minute political and social distinctions, that hat I necessary and reasonable beings have founded that virtue in order to support society.
IV. Section V: Why Utility pleasesA. How shall the influence of utility be accounted for
and how can we deduce from the principles of utility those of human nature?
B. Three ideas concerning the origin of morality:
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1. Some skeptics think that it is a utilitarian invention by politicians in order to incapacitate the ferocity of human nature
2. Or virtues and initially amiable so men like being virtuous
3. Or men initially see the benefits of virtues so they try to practice them
C. Although we praise morality when its effect serves us well personally we are conceptual enough to approbate it even when tis effect serves an adversary
D. But virtue is defined as such by those served by its utility
E. Some philosophers assert that self-interest and love of public virtue are the same 1. But morality continues to exist even when self and
public interest are opposed2. Hume says happiness other than speculative or
sensual is sociala. Examples: evil man, robbed of his inheritanceb. The theater its social collective happinessc. History even I n the far removed history of
Thucydides we empathize3. Conclusion: one’s propensity to empathize is
proportionate to his ability to make moral distinctions of vice and virtue
F. Hume asserts that everyone to some degree weighs the feelings of others when choosing to act. “The principle of humanity has authority over our actions.”
G. Everyone can differentiate between the sentiments aroused by:1. self and public interest2. public interest close to us and public interest
distant to usH. Everyone has a level of affectation corresponding to
public welfare1. Good is publicly beneficial2. Bad is publicly pernicious
V. Section IX: ConclusionA. Personal merit consists of mental qualities useful to
the person himself or to others1. personal: knowledge of one’s profession2. public: being honorable, humane
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3. Conclusion: monkish values of celibacy and self-denial are therefore vices
B. There exists an innate ability in every human to prefer public utility
C. Avarice and ambition, under the category of self-love,are too narrow and not comprehensive enough to serve as the foundation of moral theory
D. Our personal virtues and vices are defined by their correspondences to the public approbation or censure
E. Those qualities deemed virtuous are pleasurable to us as well
F. We must inquire into our obligation to moral approbation
G. The sole trouble with this philosophy is that it asks of people to consider the greater happiness
H. Virtue, although it appeals more to reason, brings about a higher level of happiness than vice does.
VI. Appendix: Concerning Moral SentimentsA. Howe fare does reason or sentiment enter into
decisions of moral distinction?1. Reason enters into considerations of the utility of
moral distinctions, especially regarding justice2. Sentiment enters into our preference of what is
useful (virtue)a. example of crime of ingratitude- rests on
sentimentb. when reason runs out, sentiment continuesc. A mistake of fact is determined by reason; one of
right by sentimentB. Ultimately approbation or censure by the public is
determined by sentiment and affectionC. Difference of reason and taste- the latter has a
productive faculty which serves as the basis for the judgment of morality
VII. Appendix II: Of self-loveA. Hume refutes the idea that regard for public welfare
is illusory and is actually a form of self-love in twoways:1. By asserting that the sentiment produce by virtues
remains valid and still determines its morality, its preference over other forms of self-love
2. By citing examples of natural selflessness in mothers
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B. Hume cites two selfish motives for action and proposesa third1. bodily wants lead to the desire of food2. mental passion lead to the desire of fame, power,
or vengeance3. “some original frame of our temper” leads to a
desire for others happiness”VIII. Appendix III: Further Considerations with regard to
justiceA. Virtues such as humanity and benevolence have in view a
single object.B. But justice has in view the object of the whole society and
arise form the system create by the society although particular instances within the system may be individually pernicious
C. Convention, that is, the custom of utility becoming the precedent, usually determines justice
D. If reason is natural to man, and justice is the exponent of reason, justice is natural
E. However, when arguing a case, two lawyers may use reason to make an analogy to a preceding case. Ultimately, it is a question of taste, of the sentiment invoked in the judge or jury that determines the right or wrong.
Hume's Moral Theory
Summary
Hume's moral theory appears in Book 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature (1740) and in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In bothof these works, his theory involves a chain of events that beginswith the agent's action, which impacts the receiver, which in turn is observed by the spectator. To begin with the agent, for Hume, all actions of a moral agent are motivated by character traits, specifically either virtuous or vicious character traits.For example, if you donate money to a charity, then your action is motivated by a virtuous character trait. Hume argues that somevirtuous character traits are instinctive or natural, such as benevolence, and others are acquired or artificial, such as justice. As an agent, your action will have an effect on a receiver. For example, if you as the agent give food to a starving person, then the receiver will experience an immediatelyagreeable feeling from your act. Also, the receiver may see the
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usefulness of your food donation, insofar as eating food will improve his health. When considering the usefulness of your food donation, then, the receiver will receive another agreeable feeling from your act. Finally, I, as a spectator, observe these agreeable feelings that the receiver experiences. I, then, will sympathetically experience agreeable feelings along with the receiver. These sympathetic feelings of pleasure constitute my moralapproval of the original act of charity that you, the agent, perform. By sympathetically experiencing this pleasure, I therebypronounce your motivating character trait to be a virtue, as opposed to a vice. Suppose, on the other hand, that you as an agent did something to hurt the receiver, such as steal his car. I as the spectator would then sympathetically experience the receiver's pain and thereby pronounce your motivating character trait to be a vice, as opposed to a virtue.
That, in a nutshell, is Hume's theory. There are, though, some important details that we should also mention. First, it is tricky to determine whether an agent's motivating character traitis natural or artificial, and Hume decides this one virtue at a time. For Hume, the natural virtues include benevolence, meekness, charity, and generosity. By contrast, the artificial virtues include justice, keeping promises, allegiance and chastity. Contrary to what one might expect, Hume classes the keyvirtues that are necessary for a well-ordered state as artificial, and he classes only the more supererogatory virtues as natural. Hume's critics were quick to point out this paradox. Second, to spark a feeling of moral approval, the spectator does not have to actually witness the effect of an agent's action upona receiver. The spectator might simply hear about it, or the spectator might even simply invent an entire scenario and think about the possible effects of hypothetical actions.
Third, although the agent, receiver, and spectator have psychologically distinct roles, in some situations a single person may perform more than one of these roles. For example, if I as an agent donate to charity, as a spectator to my own action I can also sympathise with the effect of my donation on the receiver. Finally, given various combinations of spectators and recipients, Hume concludes that there are four irreducible categories of qualities that exhaustively constitute moral virtue: (1) qualities useful to others, which include benevolence, meekness, charity, justice, fidelity and veracity;
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(2) qualities useful to oneself, which include industry, perseverance, and patience; (3) qualities immediately agreeable to others, which include wit, eloquence and cleanliness; and (4) qualities immediately agreeable to oneself, which include good humor, self-esteem and pride. For Hume, most morally significant actions seem to fall into more than one of these categories.
Hume's Moral Theory in the Treatise
The first and most detailed account of Hume's moral theory is in Book 3 of the Treatise, titled "Of Morals." This Book itself is in three parts, the first of which wrestles with the nature of a spectator's moral approval. Hume begins Part 1 considering whether moral distinctions are derived from reason. Specifically the question concerns whether our moral approval is (a) a rational judgment about conceptual relations and facts, or (b) anemotional response. Hume believes that it is an emotional response. To make his case he criticises Samuel Clarke's rationalistic account of morality, which is that we rationally judge the fitness or unfitness of our actions in reference to eternal moral relations. Hume presents several arguments against Clarke's view, the most famous of which is an argument from arboreal parricide: a young tree that overgrows and kills its parent exhibits the same alleged relations as a human child killing his parent; if morality is a question of relations, then the young tree is immoral, which is absurd. Hume also argues thatmoral assessments are not judgments about empirical facts; for any immoral action that we examine, we will never find a fact that we call "vice". In this context Hume makes his point that wecannot deduce statements of obligation from statements of fact. Since moral approval is not a judgment of reason, Hume concludes that it must be an emotional response. Specifically, a spectator's moral approval is a type of pleasure that we experience when considering an agent's qualities. Based on his theory of the passions in Book 2 of the Treatise, Hume explains that this pleasure produces additional feelings of love or pride within the spectator.
In Part 2, Hume examines the nature of justice and injustice. He begins arguing that justice is an artificial virtue. For Hume, virtues are the motives that lead to an agent's action. By examining what motivates us to act in certain ways, we can thereby
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determine the nature of a virtue, specifically whether it is natural or artificial. As to the nature of justice -- particularly justice relating to property ownership -- Hume considers some possible natural motivations for justice, such as self-love, public interest, and private benevolence. For various reasons these all fail as explanations and Hume concludes that our sense of justice is not naturally grounded, but artificially derived from education and human convention. Like Hobbes and Pufendorf, Hume describes how our sense of justice emerges withinprimitive societies and develops within more advanced societies. Hume argues that we depend on society to survive and, being motivated by self-love, we want to advance society. To this end, we train ourselves to respect each other's acquired possessions and to view the stability of possessions as a necessary means of keeping society intact. Slowly, this gives us a sense of common interest, a regard for rules, and a sense of confidence in the consistent behaviour of others. This process, then, is the basis of justice as well as the notions of property, right, and obligation. Hume notes that single acts of justice are commonly contrary to public good; however, our experiences tell us that the public good is served when we follow justice as a rule.
Hume continues in Part 2 by describing how more complex social rules and institutions develop from our initial sense of justice.The three main rules of justice that emerge are those of the stability of possessions, transference by consent, and performances of promises. Although these rules are inventions, Hume follows the vocabulary of the natural law tradition and refers to these as laws of nature. Governments emerge as tools to both protect us in our agreements and to force us to make some agreements for our common end. Just as we invent the rules of justice to help serve our desire to live in a peaceful society, we also invent the civil duties that constitute political allegiance as well as the international laws of diplomacy. Paralleling the obligations of international law, Hume notes how women's obligations of chastity emerged. To justify the labour involved in supporting a family, men must believe that their children are their own. To assure this, society imposes rules of chastity on women, and, once established, we rigidly apply the rules even for women past child-bearing age.
In Part 3, Hume discusses the components of natural virtues. Humeimplies that purely natural virtues are those that (a) are not
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artificially instilled in the agent, and (b) are naturally approved of by the spectator. However, he notes that all virtues have the second of these natural components, including artificialvirtues such as justice. That is, a spectator is naturally predisposed to sympathetically approve of any course of action that is useful or agreeable to the receiver. From the spectator'sstandpoint, the only difference between natural and artificial virtues is that every act arising from natural virtues may bring about a spectator's sympathetic pleasure. By contrast, acts arising from artificial virtues bring about sympathetic pleasure only to the extent that they reflect a general scheme of advantageous action. Hume continues by describing how we sympathetically approve of all virtues because of either their utility or their immediate agreeableness. He focuses particularlyon self-esteem, generosity, and love. He argues that natural abilities, such as genius, wit, and cleanliness, are also virtuessince they are either useful or immediately agreeable.
Kant – Metaphysics of Morals
Preface
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Divisions of Rational Knowledge:
Material - Concerned with some objectFormal - Concerned with the form of the understanding and reason itself and with universal forms of thought - not concerned with objects
Formal Knowledge:Logic - Formal philosophy
Material Knowledge:Physics - The science of the laws of natureEthics - The science of the laws of freedom
Divisions of Philosophy:Empirical - Founded on experiencePure - Founded entirely on a priori principles
Pure Philosophy:Logic - Formal philosophyMetaphysics - Limited to the determinate objects of the understanding
2-Fold Metaphysics:Metaphysics of Nature - Physics - The laws according to which everything does happenMetaphysics of Morals - Ethics - The laws according to which everything should happen
Divisions of Ethics:Practical Anthropology - The empirical part of ethicsMorals - The rational part of ethics
Key issue - Division of ethics between practical anthropology and morals- The empirical part of ethics (i.e., practical anthropology)
should be carefully separated from its rational part- Goal: “working out for once a pure moral philosophy that is
wholly clear of everything which can only be empirical and can only belong to anthropology”
- “the ground of obligation here must therefore be sought not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but be sought a priori solely in the
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concepts of pure reason”- Anthropos - Not the only (possible) rational being
“all moral philosophy rests entirely on its pure part”- The study of humans cannot tell us anything about moral laws
Cannot derive an ought from an isGoal of the Grounding:
- “seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality”
Method of the Grounding:- “we proceed analytically from ordinary knowledge to a
determination of the supreme principle and then back again synthetically from an examination of this principle and its sources to ordinary knowledge where its application is found”
First Section
Only a good will is good without qualification- “There is no possibility of thinking anything at all in the
world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will.”
- Character - how the will happens to use the gifts endowed it by nature
- “a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of being even worthy of happiness.”
The end or consequence of action has no bearing on the will’s goodness
- “A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself.”
- “Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither augment nor diminish this value.”
Why is it the good will which is good without qualification and not happiness?
- If by nature happiness were the end, the will/reason is ill-equipped for this task
- “And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason
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devotes itself to the aim of enjoying life and happiness, the further does man get away from true contentment.”
- “existence has another and more worthy purpose, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private private purpose of men must, for the most part, defer.”
- “inasmuch as reason has been imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, its true function must be to produce a will which is not merely good as a means to some further ends, but is goodin itself.”
Duty:What is not duty
- All actions useful for a good end, but contrary to duty- Lying, cheating, etc.- Actions in accordance with duty, but to which men have no
immediate inclination, but performed out of some other inclination
- Pay taxes to avoid penalties - Actions in accordance with duty and to which men have an
immediate inclination, but the inclination itself (though inaccordance with duty) was not out of duty itself, but out ofselfishness
- One does not commit suicide because one loves one’s lifeWhat is duty
- Actions in accord with duty but contrary to one’s immediate inclination
- Examples- To preserve one’s life is a duty- Most have an inclination to do it, but not out of duty, but
for selfish reasons/- But to preserve a life of adversity and sorrow can be duty,
if one wished for death but preserves life without loving it- If one finds pleasure in benefiting others, this action is
not from duty and thus has no moral worth
Three propositions of moral duty: 1) An action must be done from duty to have any moral worth 2) “An action done from duty has its moral purpose, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined.”
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The end/consequence has no bearing on the morality of an action 3) “Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law.”
- “[A]n action done from duty must altogether exclude the influence of inclination and therewith every object of the will. Hence there is nothing left which can determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, i.e., the will can be subjectively determined by the maxim that I should follow such a law even if all my inclinations are thereby thwarted.”
What kind of law can determine the will to be good without qualification, good without reference to any intended effect? (1st statement of the categorical imperative):
- ”Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that might arise for it from obeying any particular law, there is nothing left to serve the will as principle except the universal conformity of its actions to law as such, i.e., I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”
Example: Lying when in distress- I have to ask if I would really be satisfied if my maxim were
to hold as a universal maxim for everyone- In this case, I would will that lying would be acceptable to
get out of inextricable difficulties- This would be to universally will lying - Such a universal willing would destroy all promises, as none
would be believed if lying were universally willed- Thus, I cannot will lying even when in distress
All of these principles enumerated in this section are accessibleto ordinary human reason:
- “thereby do we show that neither science nor philosophy is needed in order to know what one must do to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous.”
Advantages of practical judgment over theoretical judgment- “ordinary understanding in this practical case may have just
as good a hope of hitting the mark as that which any philosopher may promise himself.”
- It seems philosophy gets in the way of ordinary understanding
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But - it is easy to lead ordinary, practical judgment astray- Thus - on practical grounds we must go outside the sphere of
practical judgment to obtain clear instruction on the sourceof its own principles
- That is, we must critically examine our reasonSecond Section
Method- Discovering principles of morality- “For when moral value is being considered, the concern is not
with the actions, which are seen, but rather with their inner principles, which are not seen.”
- Issue - not whether we can find examples of actions spurred purely by duty, but whether reason, independently of experience, commands what ought to happen
Rational beings- Moral law applies to all rational beings as such, not just
human beings- Inferring from experience merely tells us about human beings,
not just rational beings as such- Moral law must be derived a priori- Method: “we must follow and clearly present the practical
faculty of reason from its universal rules of determination to the point where the concept of duty springs from it.”
The will:- “Everything in nature works according to laws”- “Only a rational being has the power to act according to his
conception of laws, i.e., according to principles, and thereby he has a will.”
What are these laws?
They are imperatives:Imperative - The formula of a command (of reason)Command (of Reason) - “The representation of an objective principle insofar as it necessitates the will”
Two Imperatives: Hypothetical and Categorical
Hypothetical Imperative - “represents the practical necessity of a possible action as a means for attaining something else that
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one wants”If we want to accomplish X, we should follow the hypothetical imperative of XDoes not give us a law, but how to proceed to obtain a certain end
Categorical Imperative - “one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without reference to another end.”
- This is a law - it must be followed regardless of one’s end- Or, rather, it must be one’s end
ExamplesGeneral imperatives of skill
- Does not tell us whether to end is good or not, but merely that this is how it is to be achieved
- Happiness (which is generally supposed as actual end for all human beings)- “A hypothetical imperative which represents the practical necessity of an action as
a means for the promotion of happiness is assertoric”- Skill in the choice of means to one’s happiness may be called prudence- But prudence, as a means towards happiness, is still a hypothetical imperative,
because it is an action commanded not absolutely but as a means to a further purpose
Imperative of morality- A categorical imperative- Concerned only with the form of the action and the principle
from which it follows- “what is essentially good in the action consists in the
mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may.”
Another way to divide the necessitation of the will:- Rules of skill [technical]- Counsels of prudence [pragmatic]- Commands (laws) of morality [moral]
Again why happiness (under counsels of prudence) cannot be a moral end:- “In brief, he is not able on any principle to determine with complete certainty
what would make him truly happy, because to do so would require omniscience. Therefore, one cannot act according to determinate principles in order to be happy, but only according to empirical counsels”
- Imperatives of prudence - not commands at all, counsels of reason(29)
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Only the categorical imperative provides a practical lawAll other imperatives only provide principles
Method for getting at the categorical imperative:- See if “the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not
also supply us with the formula containing the proposition that can alone be a categorical imperative.”
- Beside the law, the categorical imperative contains- Only the necessity that the maxim should accord with the law- Since the law contains no condition that can restrict it- There remains the universality of a law as such -- one to
which the maxim on an action should conform- This conformity to the universality of a law as such provides
us with what is necessary for a categorical imperative:- “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law.”- All imperatives of duty can be derived from the categorical
imperative- This can tell us the meaning of a concept of duty:- Universal imperative of duty (aka. categorical imperative):
“Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law.”
Duties:- Preserve one’s own life- Keep your promises- Cultivate your natural talents- Work to benefit others
When we transgress duty:- We do not will that our maxim become a universal law- Rather - we will that the opposite of our maxim become a
universal law- And we are making an exception for ourselves alone- Thus, even when we transgress the law, we are still
acknowledging the categorical imperative
A duty can only be expressed through categorical imperatives, notthrough hypothetical imperatives
We have yet to prove a priori that there in fact is an imperativeof this kind
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Once again - we derive this reality from the study of rational beings, not the special condition of human beingsOnce again - fuck the empirical
How to study the will of rational beingsIs the categorical imperative a necessary law?
- If so, it must already be connected with the concept of the will of a rational being in general
- To find this out, we must enter the metaphysics of morals- That is, we study what ought to happen, rather than what
does happen- Thus - our concern is with objectively practical laws- Not an issue of taste- Rather - “the concern is with objectively practical laws, and
hence with the relation of a will to itself insofar as it isdetermined solely by reason.”
- Again - screw the empirical
Study of the will of rational beings- Will - “a faculty of determining itself to action in
accordance with the representation of certain laws”- Can only be found in rational beings- End - “what serves the will as the objective ground of its
self-determination”- If the end is given by reason alone, it is equally valid for
all rational beings- Means - “the ground of the possibility of the action, whose
effect is an end.”- Incentive - “the subjective ground of desire”- Motive - “the objective ground of volition”- Subjective ends - rest on incentives- Objective ends - depend on motive valid for every rational
being- Formal practical principles - abstract from all subjective
ends- Material practical principles - founded upon subjective ends,
and thus upon certain incentives- Material ends are merely relative- Cannot provide any universal principles- Can only ground hypothetical imperatives
Suppose there was something whose existence has in itself absolute worth
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- It would be something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws
- “In it, and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative.”
- “Man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”
- “He must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end.”
- “Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on naturehave, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things.”
- Rational beings are called persons- This means that their nature has marked them out as ends in
themselves- This means they are entitled to respect
Practical imperative:“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as anend and never simply as a means.”
Practical imperative tested on the four examples [omitted]
Principle of the autonomy of the will:- Kingdom of ends- Kingdom - a systematic union of different rational beings
through common laws- Laws determine ends as regard their universal validity- If one abstracts from person differences and private ends,
“then it will be possible to think of a whole of all ends insystematic connection”
- This whole of all ends in systematic connection is the kingdom of ends
- One belongs to the kingdom of ends only when he legislates universal laws and subjects himself to universal laws
- “morality consists in the relation of all action to that legislation whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible.”
- Only under a condition of morality can a person be an end in himself
- That is, only insofar as he is a legislating member of a kingdom of ends
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Freedom/Autonomy- Freedom only possible within a kingdom of ends- Freedom is the grounding of the autonomy and dignity of all
humans and rational beings- Autonomy of the will exists when we “choose in such a way
that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law.”
- Heteronomy of the will - when we don’t do this- Upshot - only by willing in accord with the categorical
imperative do we act freely
The Ethics of Immanuel Kant (from Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals)
Rational Knowledge
Material philosophy Formal philosophy- logic
objects of necessity objects of freedomphysics ethicstheory of nature theory of moralslaws about how things happen laws about how things oughtto happen
Logic can have no empirical part.
Natural and moral philosophy have an empirical part
Ethics
empirical part rational partpractical anthropology morals proper
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Kant seeks to clarify between practical rules and moral laws
Practical rules are relative, changeable, affected by the environment.Moral laws are absolute.
“Morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption… forit is not sufficient to that which should be morally good that itconform to the law; it must be done for the sake of the law.”
Duty: an action that must be done from duty = a motive, dutifulness
deontological – from dein- to bind, an ethics which is binding and a function of motiveteleological- from telos- end or purpose, an ethics which is a function of outcome
The parallel structure of Kant’s epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of education:Epistemology:Sense perceptions A priori categories Ideas of Reason,Constructed under of the understanding, Soul, God,Immortality, The a priori forms quantity, quality, Freedom…Of intuition, relation, substanceSpace and time concepts of the understanding…
Unity, essence, causality, nature
Ethics:Determinations the categorical Moral principal Of the inclinations ought… serving asuniversal lawOf the world of treat all men as ends,
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Sense… never as mere meansActions accordingTo ends
Philosophy of Education:Physical:DisciplineMental:Inferior faculties- Superior faculties:Sensation Understanding: Reason:Imagination (knowledge of the (the powerof understanding Memory general) of the connection between Specifics Judgment: the general and the specific)
(application of the general to the specific)
Moral Culture:Mechanical constraint Moral constraint Understanding universalAbsolute and Voluntary and laws of moralityPassive Obedience Active ObediencePunishment? Duty
TruthfulnessSociablenessMaxims- The dignity of mankind
Practical Education:Utility, ease Laws of duty:Teaching the beauty and to oneself
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Order of Nature to others Relation ofmoral law to God
Outline on John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism
I. Logica. Deduction: general to specific; foundations of
mathematics… Mill says are the products of metaphysical analysis. Example of deduction, categorical syllogism.
b. Induction: specific to general; scientific method, experimentation. Example. Vitamin C and the common cold.
i. For, Mill, collect economic data, draw conclusions, make policy
ii. Concerning women, we cannot know truths about women a priori; instead we must discover them through experience, and we cannot discover their
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capacity for all that men can do, unless as a policy, we let them do it.
iii. Ethics? Our moral faculty is REASON. Mill is notonly attacking Kant, but also Hamilton, who argued that instinct and intuition are our moral faculties, that moral decision-making was foundedprimarily on perception, a sensitive faculty.
1. Intuitive school- holds that moral judgmentderives from a priori first principles, butit never lays out what they are.
a. Kant, who Mill respects, does lay out such a universal principle, the categorical imperative
b. But his deductions toward specific action of right and wrong fail to prevent immoral action because his concern is contradiction, not consequences.
iv. Inductive school-1. Mill- happiness principle, utilitarianism.2. Whatever can be proven to be good, must
contribute to something good, which is not provable.
a. medical art is good because it contributes to health; health is good,but not proven good
b. musical art is good because it contributes to pleasure in others; giving pleasure to others is good, butnot a provable good.
c. So goodness as provable is a mean, notan end.
II. What is Utilitarianism? Chapter 2a. Reference to Epicurus and Bentham, both philosophers
who espouse utility as an ethical principle. Both arecommonly misunderstood.
i. The misunderstanding is an elevation of pleasure above utility on the one hand… that the school istoo hedonistic.
ii. And an elevation utility above pleasure as being too dry
iii. However, usefulness includes agreeableness. Utility and pleasure go together, not apart.
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b. Greatest happiness principlei. Increase pleasure, decrease pain.ii. Good is the means to increase happiness or is
pleasurable in itself.c. Attack on Epicureans and Utilitarians…
i. Pleasure as an ideal lends itself to hedonism.ii. The attackers are unethical because they assume
that the only pleasures we have are animalistic, eating, sex, going to the bathroom, staying warm.
iii. Are there not higher, intellectual pleasures thanthese? Pleasures which separate us from the animals?
d. How do we determine a hierarchy of pleasures?1. quality over quantity2. If we would prefer it over an unlimited
quantity of another pleasure.ii. Even though higher beings are capable of greater
pain, we would still prefer to be higher beings. Why? Love of liberty, power, excitement? Dignity.
iii. (20) Better to be a dissatisfied human than a satisfied pig, a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool.
e. Why do we choose lower pleasures over higher ones?i. Incapable of seeking higher ones.ii. “Capacity for noble feelings is a delicate plant…
killed by a want of sustenance” (20).iii. (22) The world is a gainer by a nobler character…
f. What does Mill assert concerning excitement and tranquility?
g. What conditions contribute most to an unsatisfactory life?
h. Mill believes in the power of humans to improve life, to make progress.
i. (28-29) The project is to induce people to feel that the happiness of the individual is incompatible with the unhappiness of the whole. That promoting the greater good by habitual action will induce in them a sentiment of happiness.
j. Mill’s reaction to the attack that he has set up a system that is too lofty for society: He understands that we do not usually have the greater good as our motive, and that we usually do not act out of duty.
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Rather, the motive does not matter, the consequence does (30).
k. Mill responds to an attack that utilitarianism leaves men cold and unsympathetic because they look only at consequences and not at the virtues from which they emanate. Actions are not judged right or wrong because a good or bad man does them; instead good actions are the best proof of good character.
l. Utilitarians differ with respect to the rigidity of applying the standard (32).
m. As to the attack that utilitarianism is godless, Mill suggests that God want the happiness of his people, and therefore it is profoundly religious. Or that whatever God has dictated in scripture as moral prescriptions must fulfill the utilitarian standard.
n. As to the attack that utilitarianism is an immoral doctrine because it values expediency, Mill writes that it does not value expediency insofar as it elevates the individual interest of the agent above the happiness of others, but it does allow the principle of utility to weigh conflicting utilities.
o. As to the attack that utilitarianism asks for too muchtime in reflecting on the consequences of action before the action, Mills draws two analogies.
i. First, that we do not say the same of Christianity, that its precepts ask that we reread the entire New and Old Testaments in an effort to live out Christian morality.
ii. Nor do we reread the Nautical Almanac before we sail.
iii. Much like Kant, Mill reminds us that the principle of utility is a first principle, but there are many secondary principles. Analogy (36).
p. As to the attack that people will see in a breach of arule more utility than in its observance, Mill states that utility is not the only creed that has been used as a justification for wrongdoing.
III. Chapter 3: Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility.a. What are its sanctions?b. People go into the world and hold dear the sanctions
of morality (i.e. not to rob or steal), but they
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rarely understand the principles, which support that sanction. The superstructure seems to stand better without its foundation than with.
c. Internal and External Sanctionsi. External: hope of favor or fear of displeasure,
from our fellow men or from God.ii. Internal:
1. A sense of duty, a feeling in our mind of pain when we violate that duty. The essence of conscience is when that feeling is associated with a general form of the sense of duty and not a particular case of it. This feeling is complicated with all sorts of associations, but whatever the sources of conscience, the feeling of remorse is what constitutes it.
2. The ultimate internal sanction is the feeling in our own minds.
3. Can’t this sanction work with the principlebeing the greatest happiness of others? Can’t it be cultivated that we feel remorsewhen we do not act to induce happiness in others?
4. And it does not matter whether the moral prescriptions stand in another objective reality or not, even if when they are believed to be, they induce a stronger feeling.
5. Disobeying or ignoring or silencing one’s conscience is not limited to utilitarians. People can silence their consciences even if they believe that the subjective feelingin their mind comes from outside their mind.
6. Even if they are innate and intuitive, if they include the principle of utility in them, there is no difference between the schools.
d. Mill believes that moral feelings are acquired, not innate.
e. The general happiness of others is a powerful natural state.
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f. The social state is a natural one. As society advances we become more a part of a body, and we learnthat we must look after everyone’s interests.
g. Strengthening society, social ties, and equality in government will make men feel that of course, others’ interests must be protected.
h. This feeling can have the force of religion if it is taught as such.
i. The conviction that it would not be well to be withouta feeling for others’ happiness is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality.
IV. Chapter 4: Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utilityis Susceptiblea. First principles are incapable of proof (49).b. Happiness is the only end in itself in determining the
object of our desire.c. All other things are desirable as means toward that
end.d. Each person desires his own happiness and therefore
the aggregate happiness is a desired end. But is it the principle and only end as the utilitarians would have it? (50)
e. Is virtue an end? And the avoidance of vice and end? f. Utilitarians hold that virtue is desired, but it is
solely desired as a means to an end, the greatest happiness. However, utilitarians hold that the mind disinterestedly desires virtue so much so that, as a psychological fact, it treats virtue as an end in itself, and this is good insofar as it contributes to the principle of utility. (51)
i. musicii. health Both are means to the end, and part of the
end themselves.g. Virtue is not alone in this category
i. Love of money, which has no intrinsic value.ii. fame
iii. Power. Each is an end to happiness, but they become treated as ends in themselves. They becomeassociated with the end psychologically (52). What was an instrument to gain happiness becomes associated as an end in itself.
h. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole, and these are some of its parts (53)
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i. Virtue is the same. It produces pleasure and preventspain, and therefore it is desired as an end, and seen as good in itself.
j. To think of something as desirable and as pleasant is one and the same thing. (54)
k. Desire and will are different phenomena. Desire precedes will, but often, by force of habit, we desirethings only because we will them. (55)
l. Therefore, how do we strengthen the will by habituation to be virtuous?
m. Only by making virtue desirable as a pleasure and an absence of pain. (56)
n. That which is the result of habit cannot be presumed intrinsically good. But wishing the purpose of virtuerequires the force of habit. The state of the will ought to be cultivated into habitual independence, andtherefore the state of the will is a means to a good, happiness.
V. Chapter 5: On the Connection Between Justice and Utilitya. Justice as an obstacle to the principle of utility.b. It has a clear perception and a powerful sentiment
(57)c. Just because it is a natural feeling does not make it
the sole criterion of conduct.d. Is justice intrinsically peculiar to all things just,
or is it a combination of other qualities? Is it primary or derivative? (58)
e. What are the common attributes or attribute of that which is just?
f. Is the power of the sentiment a product of our generalemotional constitution, or is it an inexplicable, special provision of Nature? (59)
g. Let us examine its common attributes by examining it in the concrete.
i. It is unjust to deprive someone of his legal rights.
ii. Rather, after clarification on (60), he amends this to mean that it is unjust to deprive someoneof his moral rights.
iii. Third, it is just that a man gets what he deserves, good for good, evil for evil. (61)
iv. Fourth, although not absolute, it is unjust to break faith with someone.
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v. Fifth, it is just to be impartial, although the application of this rule is really an exception to the normal cases where showing partiality to family and friends is OK. When it is not, it is really a different form of depriving someone of his rights. (62)
vi. Last, equality as a possible essence of justice, but Mill elaborates as to its exceptions. (63)
h. Difficult to determine what binds these examples together, so Mill looks at the etymology of the word justice.
i. Comes in most languages from a form of the law.ii. Hebrews and Christians from a Supreme Being
iii. Greeks and Romans, knowing that laws came from men, knew also that they were fallible, included in the concept adherence to laws that ought to beand breaking laws that ought not be. But the concept of law still played a role in the concept. (64)
iv. Furthermore, legal constraint is still a generating idea in the notion of justice. (65)
i. But the idea that one should be punished for unjust behavior does not differentiate it from immoral behavior. This just differentiates between duties, which we feel we can exact from someone and preferred behavior that we do not feel is binding. (66)
j. Mill claims that what differentiates justice and morality in general is that there exist a right of someone else involved in cases of justice. He does this by referring to other ethical theorists’ differentiation between perfect and imperfect obligations. (66-67)
k. Is the feeling which accompanies the idea attached to it by a special dispensation of nature, or could it have grown up out of the idea itself; or does it originate in a consideration of expediency?
l. The sentiment does not come from a consideration of expediency, but whatever is moral in it does. (68)
m. The two ingredients in the sentiment of justice are both natural
i. self –defense ii. sympathy
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n. It is natural, like all animals to defend ourselves and our offspring. As humans we have a broader view of sympathy and we can sympathize with our entire tribe, state, or with all of humanity. (69)
o. However, the sentiment to seek to defend is not moral.What is moral is to subordinate our social sympathies,to wait on them and obey their call.
p. When we have the feeling of justice, we are thinking of an individual case, but we are moral insofar as we think that injustice should be punished only if it benefits the whole society. Here, Mill amends Kant’s categorical imperative (69-
q. (70) Justice- i. a rule of conductii. a sentiment which sanctions the rule- desire to
punish, gives justice its energyiii. entails someone’s rightsiv. Once the sentiment is widened to include the
benefit of all humanity, justice derives its morality
r. right in the injured person i. a hurt ii. and a right to punish the injurer
s. All rights are to be defended by society. (71)t. Defense of the rights are to ensure security, a
utility. The sentiment of the necessity of the defense of rights gathers the force of a moral necessity. (72)
u. If this account of justice is wrong and it has nothingto do with utility, then it is difficult to see why the feeling changes depending on the light in which itis regarded.
v. (75-76) Different conceptions of just distribution ofwealth; either to the talented and hard working go thespoils, or from each according to his abilities and toeach according to his needs.
w. (76) Different conceptions of just taxation, flat, progressive, or regressive.
x. (77) Justice founded on utility, the most binding, is a class of morals which concern human well-being more nearly and are of a more absolute obligation, and the idea of a right to be defended and punished gives it this sense of absolute obligation.
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y. (82) All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment…
Discuss Aristotle’s concept of happiness (eudaimonia) as the basic criterion of human excellence or virtue (arête). Be sure to present the key features of how Aristotle believes this is realized, what relation it has to character, and why it takes a complete lifetime. Critique thisapproach from one of the following positions and argue which is superior, in your judgment: Hume, Mill, Nietzsche, Dewey. (Spring 1997)
Discuss Aristotle’s idea of “happiness” (eudaimonia). Why does he believethat this is the foundational concept in ethical theory? Contrast what he means by happiness with hedonism’s concept. Then discuss Kant’s criticism of “happiness”, and argue whether this affects Aristotle’s approach or not. (Fall 1995)
Discuss Spinoza’s view of the emotions and the nature of human bondage. How does knowledge transform the passions? Can the mind freely choose toliberate itself? If so, is Spinoza really a determinist? (Fall 1995)
According to Spinoza, what is the significance of the desire for self-preservation? (Fall 1995)
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Compare and contrast Hume and Nietzsche on the role of “benevolence” and“utility” in ethics. Analyze each position in terms of what you considerits strong and weak points, and argue for your own view. (Fall 1996)
Did Kant satisfactorily resolve the questions Hume raised about knowledge in ethical matters? (Fall 1998)
Give the three versions of the categorical imperative, and discuss theirdifferent formulations. Then discuss the connection between freedom and reason in Kant. In your view, does Kant’s ethics ultimately depend on a metaphysical view of what constitutes a person? (Spring 1997)
Explain how, for Kant, values can be at one and same time objective and free. (Spring 1995)
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Discuss Kant’s critique of traditional morality.
According to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, what is the relation between happiness and virtue? Is morality in any way based on a conception of happiness?
Discuss the moral status of superogatory actions from a Kantian perspective. (Fall 2000)
Evaluate Kant’s critique of utilitarianism. Do his criticisms apply equally to Mill’s version? Give your own analysis of the deontological utilitarian debate, why it has persisted, and what might constitute a resolution of it. (Spring 1997)
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Does Mill’s utilitarianism allow for the deliberate punishment of the innocent? Why, or why not? If so, does this render it indefensible as a moral theory? Why, or why not? (Fall 1999)
What is in your view the strongest objection to Mill’s utilitarianism? Why is it the most forceful? Is it answerable? (Fall 1997)
Present as clearly as you can the main objections to Mill’s utilitarianism. (Fall 1994)
Give your assessment of the relative merits and problems with Mill’s version of utilitarianism. (Fall 1990)
Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste”
1. The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature.
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2. There can be diversity in the internal frame or the externalsituation to create disagreement between individuals. Examples- Socrates ill, healthy, wine, sour, sweet. (Internal). Cultural prejudice (external). There exists a variety in points of taste
3. Judgments of taste are a function of sentiment. 4. Experiences of beauty and those of deformity5. Experiences of virtue are analogous to beautiful experiences6. We have aesthetic experiences and we build the multiple
instances up into a general rule by comparison.7. Sentiment is not wrong. But it is relative to prejudice.
Custom, culture, and prejudice can cloud our aesthetic judgments.
8. People with highly delicate faculties of taste are few9. Practice improves one’s delicacy of taste10. A critic must be free from all prejudice.11. Beautiful works of art must be created considers the work
apart from any individual, peculiar circumstances.12. It is difficult for us to for us to admire works different
from our own culture in time and place.13. Good sense checks the influence of culture and prejudice on
the work and on our taste14. Principles are universal, nearly the same in all men, but
few are qualified to judge their own sentiments as the standard of beauty
15. It is more difficult to find universal agreement with respect to systems of philosophy than those of taste
16. Aristotle and Plato may overtake each other but the beauty of Virgil’s and Terence’s poetry is timeless. Cicero’s rhetoric is more timeless than his abstract philosophy
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Kant’s Critique of Judgment
The Critique of Judgment is a systematic work that strives to
unite the separate worlds of natural necessity and freedom.
Judgment mediates between understanding and reason through its
relation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. When judgment
serves reason or understanding, it lends determinate form to
experience by subsuming particulars beneath a priori concepts.
However, judgment has its own independent transcendental
principle that determines, through the power of feeling, our
subjective ability to judge form according to concepts. This
transcendental principle is disclosed in the examination of
aesthetic and teleological judgments. In aesthetic judgments of
taste and sublimity, the form of an object is taken as the ground
of a pleasure that is both universal and subjective. While
these judgments make universal claims, they are purely subjective
in the sense that they engage form on the basis of the pleasure
accompanying an object’s representation without reference to
concepts. It is the subject in terms of her feeling, rather than
the object, that is disclosed in judgments about the beautiful or
sublime.
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In aesthetic judgments of taste, we have the sensation of a
form’s purposiveness for our power of understanding. These
judgments enliven us through the pleasurable feeling of the free
play between understanding and imagination, which is necessary
for cognition in general. Furthermore, they elevate us to an
awareness of the shared nature of our mental powers and thus the
possibility of communication not through concepts, but through a
communal sense (Gemeinsinn). The commonality of mental life
grounds the subject in humanity and in turn makes judgments of
taste universal. Aesthetic judgments about the sublime provide a
displeasure taken in the incomprehensibility of that which is
absolutely great. At the same time, these judgments involve a
pleasure in the disclosure of the subject’s inner capacity for
reason.
Reflective Judgment
Within the Kantian system, the separate powers of the human
mind include cognition, the power of desire and the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure.11 Each of these powers presents the
world differently as it works with imagination. Cognition and
desire determine objects while the power of feeling determines
the subject. Kant states that in the case of feeling,
The presentations themselves are bases merely for preserving
their own existence in the subject, and in so far are
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1987) 394 (in Hackett) / 206 (Akademie text).
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considered (merely) in relation to the feeling of
pleasure.12
The power of cognition has a priori concepts in the
understanding, while desire has its a priori ideas in reason.
The feeling of pleasure and displeasure has an independent a
priori principle in reflective judgment. Reflection can
determine the subject’s ability to judge form, while determinate
judgment can determine a form through a concept or idea.13 When
it determines the object rather than the subject, judgment
functions in the service of understanding and reason.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes between a
priori and a posteriori synthetic judgments. It is through the
former that we have insight into the categories and forms of the
intuition, as well as the general principles of mathematics and
the natural sciences. In a posteriori synthetic judgments, sense
data allow us to expand general concepts (including the
categories) into more specific ones (i.e., concepts with more
“determinations”).14 In order to have an a posteriori synthetic
judgment, I require a concept of the understanding. I also
require an intuition, in which sense data are structured
according to time and in most cases space. It is the work of
imagination that unites intuitions with concepts according to the
transcendental schema. All schemata present concepts in terms of
a linear sequence of time. This is because time is the only form
of intuition that applies to any perception whatsoever. In
12 Kant, 395/206.13 Kant, 399/211.14 Werner S. Pluhar, “Translator’s Introduction” to Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Judgment (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) xxxv.
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synthetic a posteriori judgments, the imagination “apprehends”
the manifold given in perception and schematizes it according to
a concept, thus bringing it under a universal. In this way,
imagination ‘exhibits’ concepts through the intuition so that
they are presented successively in time.15 The result is a
judgment determining the attributes of an object. Synthetic a
posteriori judgment is the same thing as experience because it
determines objects as they are in terms of appearances. On the
other hand, determinate judgments of reason are judgments of what
“ought” to be done. Thus, they give rise to moral objects rather
than objects of empirical knowledge. The moral law is our higher
power of desire, just as understanding is our higher power of
cognition. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that reflective
judgments make claims with necessity. This indicates that they
are in some sense universal, in the manner of determinant
judgments. If reflective judgments have universal validity, then
they too must be made on the basis of some a priori principle.
Kant reveals this principle in the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgment.
Rudolph Makreel argues that Kant’s examination of aesthetic
judgment is an attempt to reconfigure the problem of form,
particularly as it is laid out in the first Critique. There the
imagination’s function is to make experience possible according
to formal conditions, as was shown. Kant now concerns himself
with the question of how the imagination refers our perceptions
to the formal laws of understanding and reason in general, and
how we then determine our own subjective capacity for judging
perceptions according to those laws. He begins by drawing a15 Pluhar, xxxiv.
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distinction between reflective judgment and determinate judgment
as it is presented in the first Critique. This distinction is
especially significant for the examination of aesthetic judgments
of taste. There, aesthetic judgment is presented as a power that
engages “not the raw material provided by the senses, but what
has already been synthesized by the cognitive faculties.”16
Furthermore, instead of imposing “a priori form on the matter of
sense,” this type of judgment “coordinates ‘natural forms’ that
can be discerned by comparing the contents of experience.”17 This
indicates a major distinction between cognitive and aesthetic
judgments, according to the manner in which the imagination works
with each.
In the first Critique, an object of determinate judgment is
one that has been schematized according to the categories and
presented in linear time. An object of aesthetic reflection
involves schematization, but does not involve the application of
a concept.18 Accordingly, the crucial distinction is that
determinant judgment always gives rise to an object of knowledge
while aesthetic imagination gives rise to an object that lends
itself to being known. In other words, aesthetic judgment
provides us with an object of possible knowledge. Kant says that
aesthetic judgment determines whether or not a perception is
apprehended by the imagination such that it generally accords
with the presentation of a concept.19 Furthermore, he states that
16 Rudolph A. Makreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990) 59.17 Makreel, 99.18 Makreel, 59.19 Makreel, 56.
182
this function of judgment is necessary for even the most ordinary
of experiences.20
In the first Critique, judgment is logical in the sense that
it gives rise to knowledge according to the laws of
understanding. It does not function according to an a priori
principle of its own. However, judgment does exercise an
independent transcendental principle in aesthetic reflection.
This principle is called the indeterminate concept of nature’s
purposiveness for our determinate power of judgment. An
indeterminately purposive form is one that lends itself to being
judged by us. The form must possess a certain indeterminate
regularity that we require in general in order to match an
intuition with a concept.21 In aesthetic judgment, the
imagination begins with the particular in the indeterminate form
of an intuition and searches for a concept that matches it.
Aesthetic imagination is then analogical, rather than logical.
Our experience of purposiveness is judged according the power of
feeling; we feel pleasure when the imagination presents a form
that lends itself to determinate judgment. That is why
reflective judgment is said to determine the subject, rather than
the object.
Aesthetic and teleological judgments are based in judgment’s
indeterminate concept of subjective purposiveness, and both play
a role in mediating the separate worlds of understanding and
reason. I have a teleological judgment when I represent an
object, with respect to its form, as fulfilling an end or purpose
of nature. Teleological judgment unites understanding and reason
20 Kant, 293/159.21 Pluhar, lvi.
183
because it allows us to present nature as an actualization of
ends, in accordance with the demands of reason, without violating
natural laws. This means that teleological judgment is objective
in the sense that it judges an object according to its
fulfillment of a purpose or end and does not simply take the
object as a ground for subjective feeling. In order to show to
show how the transcendental principle of judgment mediates the
separate worlds of nature and freedom, it is methodologically
necessary to demonstrate its independent activity from both.
Kant calls the examination of aesthetic judgment a part of the
critique “that is the propaedeutic to all philosophy” because
through it, we disclose “the judging subject” with respect to the
a priori principles of his mental powers, “no matter what their
use may be (theoretical or practical).”22 As a propaedeutic, the
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment does not complete Kant’s system.
However, it does reveal the independent principle of judgment
that mediates the worlds of cognition and desire within the life
of the subject. In other words, it reveals the unification of
cognition and desire within the subject insofar as the conditions
for determinate judgment are disclosed in the subjective life of
feeling. While the restriction is provisional, this makes
possible a discussion of subjectivity and system within the
bounds of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.
Aesthetic Reflection in Judgments of Taste
In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant is primarily
concerned with judgments of taste. This type aesthetic judgment
is especially useful for the disclosure of judgment’s independent22 Kant, 35/194.
184
principle. A judgment of taste is a judgment about the beautiful
and above all about the beautiful in nature. If I say that a
rose or a sunset is “beautiful,” it seems that I am speaking of
beauty as a special property that I ascribe to objects. However,
beauty is clearly not a property in any objective sense. Apart
from my own judgment, beauty is nothing at all. I pronounce an
object “beautiful” on the basis of a subjective feeling.
Kant renders this dilemma in terms of a special
problematic for critical philosophy: In judging an object as
beautiful, I require everyone else to make the same judgment as
well. However, my liking for the object is not based on any
concept. It constitutes a judgment based in subjective feeling,
and yet that feeling is not identical to the sensation I have in
judging the agreeable (since then it would be idiosyncratic) or
the good (and hence based on a concept). The question is this:
How can judgments of taste be both universal and subjective?
Kant argues that the solution to this problem compensates the
critical philosopher “by revealing to him a property of our
cognitive power which without this analysis would have remained
unknown.”23 This property is that of judgment’s independent
principle, which judgments of taste are particularly useful for
disclosing. When we judge an object as beautiful, “we use
imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to refer
the presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or
displeasure,” giving rise to a judgment based in feeling.24 This
is what makes a judgment of taste reflective.
23 Kant, 57/213.24 Kant, 44/203.
185
In the Analytic of the Beautiful, which shall remain the
focus of the ensuing discussion, Kant gradually reveals the role
of reflection in judgments of taste through a series of “moments”
based on quality, quantity, relation, and modality. Thus, he
appeals to the logical functions of judgment as they appear in
the first Critique to guide him here.25 These moments respectively
reveal judgments of taste as disinterested, universal, purposive
for the power of determinate judgment, and subjectively
necessary. Accordingly, those four moments reveal the
universality of these judgments but establish them as fully
subjective in the sense that they refers to feeling.
The quality of an aesthetic judgment of taste is
disinterestedness. The “disinterest” I experience in judging the
beautiful is what makes my judgment subjective because my liking
for the beautiful is a pleasure referred to the subject, rather
than the object. Kant explicates this idea through a series of
distinctions drawn among the forms of liking that we have for the
beautiful, the agreeable and the good. In judging the agreeable,
I refer the object to my own inner state to the extent that I am
affected by it.26 Thus, the object is liked inasmuch as it is
gratifying. In judging the good, an object is gratifying to the
extent that it is good, whether directly (for its own sake) or
indirectly (for the sake of something else). Despite the
differences between the agreeable and the good, “they are always
connected with an interest in their object.”27 In order for a
judgment to be subjective, and hence based on judgment’s
independent principle, it must be referred solely to the Subject’s25 Kant, 43/203.26 Kant, 49/207.27 Kant, 51/209.
186
feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Still, the question remains:
how can judgments about beauty be simultaneously subjective and
universal? Kant will now show not only that we do make such
judgments, but how we make them.
The quantity of these judgments is expressed in their
universality. If judgments of taste were based on an equation of
beauty with the good, then they could be made with reference to a
concept. Clearly, this is not the case because we cannot
discover any objective measure of beauty. But if judgments of
taste were based on agreeableness, it would be possible to uphold
the claim that “everyone has his own taste” and this would
prevent us from maintaining the universality of such judgments.
Judgments of taste would be merely idiosyncratic. That they are
not is proven by the fact that we demand the assent of others in
judging an object as beautiful. There must then be some basis of
universality in these judgments that is not based in logical
concepts. Yet, the universality of judgments about the beautiful
must remain one that is subjective insofar as such judgments
refer to the subject’s inner sense of pleasure in apprehending
beautiful forms. What is it, precisely, that makes judgments of
taste universal? Kant answers this question in the third moment,
that of relation.
The relation expressed in a judgment of taste is purpose.
Judgments of taste are made on the basis of an object’s
“purposeless purposiveness,” and it is this kind of purposiveness
that makes them both subjective and universal. The universality
of judgments of taste cannot come from concepts, as has been
shown. Kant now argues that it must come from the beautiful
object’s general compatibility with the universal laws of the
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understanding which we subjectively judge as pleasurable.
Beautiful objects are purposeless in the sense that they are not
determined by the will, but purposive to the extent that they
lend themselves to being cognized. Purposeless purposiveness is
then embodied in the principle of reflective judgment. In the
case of an aesthetic judgment of taste, the object’s purposeless
purposiveness makes it compatible with concepts and “quickens”
our cognitive powers in a manner that sustains cognition in
general.28 This “quickening” of our powers results from the
harmonious play of imagination and understanding.
Kant describes this harmony as one of the imagination’s
capacity for apprehension and the understanding’s ability to
exhibit a presentation in terms of concepts.29 He says that
imagination, in the case of aesthetic judgment, is the mere
apprehension of an object’s form without reference to a concept.30
The harmonious play of imagination and understanding in judgments
of taste refers to a specifically reflective capacity of
imagination, where imagination is no longer simply schematic. In
the “free play” of our cognitive powers, imagination is not
subordinate to the understanding. Rather, it is coordinated with
understanding.31 Makreel’s interpretation holds that the
imagination functions in a “free conformity” with the laws of
understanding, meaning that it “explicates possibilities left
open by that framework” without violating the framework itself.32
In other words, imagination has a hermeneutic function unique to
28 Kant, 67/222.29 Kant, 413/224’.30 Kant, 26/186.31 Makreel, 46.32 Makreel, 47.
188
it in the case of aesthetic judgments of taste: Rather than
logically interpreting experience, it interprets particular forms
analogously by specifying their compatibility with the concepts
of understanding. This is what is meant by the harmonious play
of understanding and imagination. We naturally experience this
harmony as pleasant, so that in reflective judgment, the mutual
play of our powers is referred to an inner sense of pleasure that
arises from it.
The modality of aesthetic judgments of taste is subjective
necessity. We demand universal assent for judgments of beauty,
even though these judgments are made on the basis of a rule
stemming from the principle that feeling serves itself in
reflective judgment. This rule states that beautiful forms are
judged beautiful with respect to their purposiveness for our
mental life. The fact that we judge beauty according to such a
rule implies that we speak in a universal voice and establish
that the inner process by which we judge beauty is a priori the
same in everyone. Kant argues that the attunement of our mental
powers, as well as the feeling of this attunement, “must be
universally communicable while the universal communicability of a
feeling presupposes common sense.”33 The justification of this
claim will round out Kant’s argument that judgments of taste are
both universal and subjective by providing a key insight into
subjectivity. Whenever we judge something beautiful, we demand
that everyone holds the same opinion even though we base this
opinion in feeling rather than on concepts. Therefore, we regard
this feeling as common rather than private. Kant will argue
that mutual play of our cognitive powers is the same in every33 Kant, 240/363.
189
individual, giving rise to a common sense in which all subjects
share.
Reflective Aesthetic Judgment in the Experience of the Sublime
For Kant, judgments about the sublime constitute another
kind of reflective aesthetic judgment. Kant’s examination of
these judgments focuses on the sublime in nature, where the
experience of the sublime is one of absolute greatness. There
are two kinds of sublimity for Kant. One is the mathematical
sublime, in which greatness is experienced in terms of magnitude.
The other is the dynamical sublime, in which greatness is
experienced in terms of power or might. Both experiences of the
sublime involve the activity of the will and contain moral
dimensions. In judgments of taste, the imagination was discussed
in relation to understanding in its ability to specify certain
concepts. In judgments about the sublime, the imagination is
discussed in terms of its limited capacity for comprehension.
The feelings of pleasure and displeasure involved in this
limitation reveal the form of the subject in terms of his moral
capability.
Our experience of the sublime, like that of beauty, raises
the problem of subjective universality. Kant argues that
judgments of the sublime, like judgments of taste, are
subjectively universal and therefore based on judgment’s
independent principle. He states that “a pure judgment of the
sublime” has “no purpose whatsoever of the object as the basis
determining it.”34 This is crucial, because in order for a34 Kant, 109/253.
190
judgment of the sublime to be aesthetic, it cannot be “mingled
with some judgment of understanding and reason.”35 Kant employs
the same method used in the Analytic of the Beautiful in order to
prove the reflective aesthetic nature of judgments about the
sublime. For the sake of briefness, I focus on the relational
moment of these judgments, which Kant expresses as a special kind
of subjective purposiveness. This emphasis establishes the
aesthetic basis for these judgments and distinguishes them from
judgments of taste.
Kant first explores the aesthetic nature of these
judgments in his discussion of the mathematical sublime. Here,
he begins by arguing for a specifically aesthetic dimension to
our experience of magnitude. Numbers lend absolute given measure
or form to a magnitude. While they present a relative standard
through which to compare various magnitudes, we possess an
intuitive sense of magnitude existing prior to numerical
comparison. This is illustrated in the difference between saying
something is large and saying that it is absolutely large. To
make the latter claim is to say that something is “large beyond
all comparison.”36 When we say that something is absolutely large
we do not relate the object to any principle of cognition.
Rather, we relate it to our reflective power of judgment. In
order to determine how large something is, we require a definite
magnitude or standard of measure with which we can compare it.
But in simply judging an object as “large” or even “small,” Kant
says that we have no basis for comparison lying outside our own
standard of sense.
35 Ibid.36 Kant, 248/370.
191
The subjective universality of these aesthetic judgments is
based in the principle of reflective judgment. However, that
principle is expressed differently in judgments of sublimity than
it is in judgments of taste. While our liking for natural beauty
is based on a purposiveness of form, our liking for the sublime
is based in a negative pleasure aroused by a
“contrapurposiveness” of form.37 This is true in the case of both
the mathematical and dynamical sublime. It is only “in its chaos
that nature arouses our ideas of the sublime, or in its wildest
and most ruleless disarray and devastation, provided it displays
magnitude and might.”38 Accordingly, the contrapurposiveness of a
sublime object lies in the fact that it is simply too large or
too powerful for us to take in. It is “contrapurposive for our
power of judgment, incommensurate with our power of exhibition,
and as it were violent to our imagination.”39 In other words, the
object fails to match the universal conditions necessary for us
to judge it determinately. In judgments of taste, we sense the
purposiveness of nature for human cognition and this sensation is
one of pleasure. In judgments about the sublime, we search for a
principle by which to determine an object but fail. This failure
produces in us a feeling of displeasure. However, that
displeasure becomes the basis for a pleasure that is quite
different from what we experience in judgments of taste. The
identification of this pleasure requires a preliminary discussion
of imagination’s regress in judgments about the mathematical
sublime.
37 Kant, 99/245.38 Kant, 99-100/246.39 Kant, 99/245.
192
The imaginative regress in these judgments arises from a
negation of the mind’s mathematical or linear form of time. Kant
argues that mathematical apprehension, which involves the
understanding, can proceed toward infinity. The aesthetic
imagination does not possess this sense of magnitude. Rather,
there is a maximum point of magnitude beyond which aesthetic
imagination cannot go.40 In other words, there is a limit upon
aesthetic imagination’s ability to take in numerical magnitude.
When the imagination’s capacity to intuit simultaneously a
series of units reaches its limit, aesthetic comprehension
encounters the immeasurable and the feeling of the
sublime.41
This feature of mental life is explicable in terms of a
distinction that Kant draws between the functions of imagination.
Our mathematical cognition of an object involves imaginative
apprehension. This function of imagination is directly tied to
cognition, where concepts are matched with the forms of
intuition. In order to “apprehend” a magnitude, we piece it
together unit by unit in a temporal succession. By contrast, we
“comprehend” a magnitude when we try to judge it as a whole. In
comprehending a magnitude, we all at once grasp that which is
successively apprehended.42 The comprehensive function of
imagination suggests that we can stop the forward flow of time in
order to intuit an object holistically.43 This “annihilation” of
time signifies an “instantaneous” form of comprehension in which
40 Kant, 26/90.41 Makreel, 70.42 Makreel, 74.43 Makreel, 72.
193
an object is grasped “all at once.”44 This allows the
comprehensive imagination to grasp an object as a unity rather
than a multiplicity.45 It appears that we require imaginative
apprehension as well as comprehension in order to judge an object
mathematically, but it is the comprehensive function of
imagination which truly reveals the subjective nature of such
judgments.
The comprehensive function of imagination is tied to reason,
which “demands totality for all given magnitudes, even for those
we can never apprehend in their entirety.”46 The mathematical
sublime invokes an absolute limit upon the comprehensive
imagination. There is a sense of displeasure which arises from
this limitation, and yet the limitation itself is in accord with
the demands of reason. Although the mind is unable to
comprehend the sublime form, it strives to do so anyway. This
awakens in us an awareness of our rational capacity, which
strives toward that which transcends the bounds of sense. That
realization, through which we gain a sense of our inner moral
nature, is prompted by the regressive movement of imagination as
it withdraws from a contrapurposive object and fixes upon the
form of the subject himself. In this movement, “the subject’s
own inability uncovers in him the consciousness of an unlimited
ability which is also his,” namely the power of reason.47 In the
face of that which is absolutely large, I retain my uniquely
human power of reason which transcends and therefore elevates me
44 Makreel, 74.45 Makreel, 76.46 Kant, 26/111.47 Kant, 27/116.
194
above nature. The positive pleasure undergone in judgments of
mathematical sublimity consists in this realization.
While the mathematical sublime discloses the activity of
reason as a striving beyond the actual, the dynamical sublime
reveals the possibility of moral freedom. A judgment of the
dynamical sublime is defined as an encounter with might which has
no power over us.48 Kant says that when we judge nature as
dynamically sublime, we “present it as arousing fear.”49 However,
we can only form judgments of dynamical sublimity when we are
free from fear. If I am in immediate danger, then my judgment is
necessarily related to the object rather than my own subjective
response to nature. I can only judge nature as dynamically
sublime provided that I am in a safe place.
Like the mathematical sublime, the dynamical sublime reveals
to us “an ability to judge ourselves independent of nature.”50
Further, Kant says that these judgments have the power to
“elevate” the imagination by calling fort our strength, even as
they reveal our physical weakness.51 This elevation appears to
consist in our realization that we need not succumb to natural
phenomena even when they possess the power to annihilate our
bodies. We can in fact resist that temptation, which arises from
the feelings of impotence and fear. This realization of
independence accords with moral freedom, which presupposes the
ability to carry out the moral law even in the face of great
difficulty. Thus the dynamically sublime, like the
mathematically sublime, involves a negative pleasure in the sense
48 Kant, 28/119.49 Ibid.50 Kant, 262/121.51 Kant, 262/121.
195
that it arouses in us an awareness of and appreciation for our
own power of reason. There is a displeasure involved in the
realization of our physical impotence in the face of nature, but
also a pleasure aroused in the disclosure of moral freedom which
belongs to the domain of reason.
In concluding his discussion of the sublime, Kant argues
that judgments of sublimity require a certain degree of moral
cultivation. “In order for the mind to be attuned to the feeling
of the sublime, it must be receptive to ideas.”52 If I am to form
an appreciation of the sublime, I must be able to take pleasure
in that which is contrary to my own interests. Because it defies
my capacity for comprehension, I experience a sublime object as
oppositional with respect to my own ends. We take pleasure in
beautiful objects because we experience them as absolutely suited
for our power of judgment. By contrast, judgments of the sublime
force us to overcome a resistance to our mental powers. Thus,
they demand a pleasure taken in that which lies beyond immediate
interest or requirement. In order to take pleasure in the
sublime, I must be able to take pleasure in the dictates of
reason. I must have cultivated an inner joy in the effort to
ascend toward a standard that surpasses the given in empirical
reality.
-To what extent is Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Part I, a response to Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste”? Explain.
52 Kant, 29/ 124.
196
I. Kant’s Critique as a whole should not be read as a response to Hume’s philosophy of aesthetics in Of the Standardof Taste; however, his analytic of the beautiful can be viewedthat way.II. Hume
a. Judgments of taste are a function of sentiment.b. Sentiments are relative.c. Beauty does not inhere in the object judged as
participating in the form of beauty.d. But are judgments of taste entirely relative?e. Internal and external distinctions create the
relativity and diversity in judgmentf. In order to cultivate our delicacy of taste, we have
to habituate ourselves and work at overcoming culturalprejudice.
g. Beautiful works of art must be created considers the work apart from any individual, peculiar circumstances.
h. It is difficult for us to for us to admire works different from our own culture in time and place.
i. Good sense checks the influence of culture and prejudice on the work and on our taste
j. Principles are universal, nearly the same in all men, but few are qualified to judge their own sentiments asthe standard of beauty
k. It is more difficult to find universal agreement with respect to systems of philosophy than those of taste
l. Aristotle and Plato may overtake each other but the beauty of Virgil’s and Terence’s poetry is timeless. Cicero’s rhetoric is more timeless than his abstract philosophy
m. The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature. Kant would agree but Hume does not go far enough. Transition…
III. Hume has correctly stripped away much of the external influences that impede a universal standard of taste, such as cultural prejudice, but not enough to achieve universality and necessity. Analogy to epistemology and ethics. Four moments of the analytic of the beautiful.a. Quality- disinterested liking- object not merely
agreeable; not desired; not useful.b. Quantity- universality
197
c. Relation- Purposiveness (purpose without a purpose); something is just right about the beauty of a redbud, but it is not instrumentally valuable in this mode. Insofar as it is, it is not a judgment of beauty
d. Modality- NecessityIV. Critique of judgment in general. Give a critique of the
power of judgment when it is not being governed by the understanding and reason, 1st and 2nd critiques. Much broader focus than art criticism
-How would Hume answer the question “what is art?” (Fall 1991)
-Discuss the concepts of beauty and judgment in Part I of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. (Fall 1997)
198
-Discuss the four moments of the beautiful in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Does this view lead to a “formalistic” concept of art? Is that good? (Fall 1996)
-Explain the difference between the good and the beautiful for Kant. (Fall 2000)
-With regard to Kant, explain how the good can be identified withthe beautiful. (Fall 1994)
199
-For Kant, how are individual norms involved in the relationship between ethics and aesthetics? (Fall 1998)
-For Kant, what relationship could exist between aesthetic experience and religious experience? (Fall 1998)
200
