~ I ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ I ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~1 Ore ~ \ ~ 1~

CONSOLIDATION OF THE DIEM REGIME AND PRELIMINARIES TO THEFRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM, MAY 1955-APRIL 1956

~Summa r

The decisions respecting Vietnam reached at the Paris NATOMiniscerial Meeting by the United States and France, withBritish concurrence--namely, to give Diem full backing andgradually to eliminate the French militazy presence in Saign aigon--

e to several important initiatives by Diem. QuestioningFrench sincerity in what had been determined at Paris, Diemtried unsuccessfully to convene the foreign ministers of thethree powers in Saigon in order to make their commitment morebinding through South Vietnamese participation as an e u 1

ourth party in their deliberations. Diem then set about arrang-ing for the deposition of Bao Dai as Chief of State and theinstallation of himself as President of the Republic of Vietnamwhile at the same time inducing the French to acczedi. t a full-fledged ambassador to Saigon. Finally, Diem launched whatdeveloped into desultory and then stalemated negotiations withthe French regarding the terms under which the French Expedi-tionary Corps would leave Vietnam; for lack of progress on thediplomatic front, the French unilaterally repatriated the Corpsand dissolved their military establishment in Saigon. With thedeparture of the French, the British, after obtaining the supportof the United States, prevailed upon the Diem government to drawup a statement pledging South Vietnamese observance of the mili-tary and political provisions of the Geneva Accords.

12 V' ~P1 f 1 -P C fin ~Sai on as a Follow-~u to the Paris Talks

Immediately upon the conclusion of the tripartite talks inParis, the Diem Government formally proposed, in approaches madein both Saigon and Paris on May 13, that a quadripartite (U.S.-U.K.-France- Vietnam) conference be held in Saigon to arrive atincreased mutual understanding. No date was specified for theopening session. l

1From Saigon, tel. 5249, May 13, 1955, limited official use;from Paris, tel. 4964, May 13, 1955, secret.

~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~0 ~ \ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~0Y 00~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.S ~~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0. .0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ K ~

vi&~L.iiUVll LDulles first learned about this ro os

Poreign Mini. t An s er, ntoine Pinay, on the follawin da wi Vi i ti h Il

iState Treaty. According to D 11

nec on with the signing of the A se ustrian

Dulles himself thought it might have merit. 1ing to u les, Pinay favored thee idea, and

The suggestion for such a four-power meetin aoriginated within Diem's official fYork Times c

Ngo Dinh Nhu, for some time Nh h d fn ge nating in the mind of Diern' bem s rother,

in a conversation early in Ma . 0ome ~ u had first mentioned the matter

Wintrebert, Acting French H h C

n y. On the other hand M'ichel

Chargd in Saigon, Randol h A. Kiddc ig ommissioner, informed the American

originated with Nguyen Huu Ch b ho p . er, an May 19 that thee idea

uu au, brother-in- law of Madame Nhat this time Minister-Delegate t th

arne u ando e Presidency, in which

capacity he was one of Diem's ri. i 1 dto Wintzebert, Chau envisaged the quadrilateral me

m s pr nc pa advisers. Accordi ng

e of tre gth i D'en ng iem s internal aliticcially vis-h-vi th Hs e ao Hoa sect.

p al position, eape-

Di ' br thDiem s brother, Ngo Dinh Luyen, South Vietnam's rovinAmbassador in Euro e maintp, n ained contact with the American

nam s roving

Embassy in Paris on the subject. On M 14ormportance of this initiative for Vi tnam'

n ay, he stressed the

position and pointed out te s intern ta ional

(1) kout that the proposed conference should

) make clear that Vietnam was no 1oz have decisions regarding Vietnam m d

onger prepared to acce t

ation (2ie am ma e without its paztici-

defep

' n, ( ) give consideration to South V' tnu ietnam s role in

and 3 cnding a vital link in the Free W ld d fee or e ense perimeter,

an ( ) causidez strategy to be pursued b S hrespect to elections under the G

y out Vietnam witith'e eneva Accords. In the next

From Vienna, tel. DULTE 44, May 14 1955 secret.0 0

2F rom Saigon, tel. 5377, May 20, 1955 secret.3Prom Saigon, tel. 5368, May 19, 1955 secret.

4From Paris, tel. 4979, May 16, 1955 secret.

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

~ 1 ~ ~~ s ~~0 0~ 0 ~ 0

eee

:"LVSIFIEll

few days, Luyen emphasized that the Vietnamese Governmentattached great significance to havin[ the conference takeplace at the Foreign Mini. ster level.

French officials indicated to the American Embassy inParis, on May 14, that the French Government was prepared toaccept Diem's proposal, but that it favored holding the confer-ence at the Ambassadorial rather than Foreign Minister level. 2

Within the week, French officials expressed the opinion that aquadrilateral conference in Saigon could be used to present tothe Vietnamese Government the comson views of the United States,the United Kingdom& and France on the start of consultationsbetween North and South Vietnam on July 20, 1955, to prepare theway for nationwide elections a year later, as set forth in theGeneva settlement. 3

Washington, however, displayed a marked lack of enthusiasmfor the Vietnamese proposal. While seeking additional infor-marion as to what Diem hoped to accomplish by such a conferenceand what the agenda would be, the Department instructed theEmbassy in Saigon, on May 19, to point out to Diem that, inlight of the understanding of support for Diem worked out atthe tripartite talks just concluded in paris, the conferencemight have a limiting effect on freedom of action of bothVietnam and the United States. The Department stated thatthe United States, having established the principle of flexi-bility at the Paris talks, "would be disinclined to engage ina conference in Saigon which might restrict our independentaction by reason of multilateral understandings. " The Depart-ment added that, if there were particular subjects which Vietnamwanted to take up with the French or the United States, it wouldbe better to do so on a bilateral rather than a multilateral

From Paris, tels. 5035 and 5076, May 18 and 20, 1955,both secret.

2From Paris, tel. 4967, May 14, 1955, secret.

From Paris, tele. 5080 and 5104, May 20 and 23, 1955, bothsecret. The Department instructed Ambassador Dillon, on May 27,to avoid being drawn into three-power consultations based onthe assumption of developing a common U. S.-U.K. -French policy forfour-power talks in Saigon.

0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 01 ~:~ !* ~ s ~s~ ed@ ~ ~

~ 0 ~ 1 ~ \ ~ OO~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~ s ~ ~ ~ I it 4 ~ ~ ~

I,ii.t,~slE(9

basis. Following a meeting with I%em on May 21, the Chargg1

replied that neither Diem nor Chau had fully reflected on thepoints made by the Department. 2

Kidder had a meeting with Chau two days later, at whichthe latter outlined the following possible subjects for dis-cussion at the quadrilateral conference: (1) common policyagainst the Viet Minh and clarification of the attitudes of thethree Western Powers concerning consultations and elections underthe Geneva Accords; (2) military relations with France and theUnited States, including a possible "military treaty with Franceand a tie-in to Manila Pact"; (3) discussion of elections for theNational Assembly and, possibly, the problem of the future ofBao Dai; and (4) general support of the three Western Powers forthe Vietnamese Government's reform program. 3

After receiving these Vietnamese views as to a suggestedagenda for the proposed conference, the Department instructedAmbassador Reinhardt (newly arrived at his post, on May 26) tostress to Diem that Washington continued to feel that anindependent United States policy, rather than joint U. S.-U.K. -French action, might be "of more help to sovereign Vietnam".Washington reiterated that its freedom of action would bediminished if the conference were held with the idea ofattempting to achieve a common policy and that it was in Diem'sinterest to handle outstanding issues with France on a bilateralbasis. The Department also suggested that a four-power con-ference at the Ambassadorial level might be held after aNational Assembly had been formed and that Diem, having thusreceived popular backing, would be in a strong position atsuch a conference, which might take up the question of con-sultations and all-Vietnamese elections under the Genevasettlement.

To Saigon, tel. 5140, May 19, 1955, secret.

2From Saigon, tel. 5403, May 21, 1955, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 5428, May 23, 1955, secret.

4To Saigon, tel. 5265, May 27, 1955, secret.

~0 ~ \ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ Sl ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ I~ ~ 0

The Prench Foreign Ministry indicated to the AmericanEmbassy in Paris on June 1, however, that it believed it wasurgent to ger. the Saigon conference under way in the immediatefuture as a means of tackling the question of consultationsand elections. The following day, Ambassador Dillon reported.1that the guai d'Orsay had indications that Diem was pushingless actively than theretofore for a four-power conference,and the Ambassador reinforced this with the information that,according to the British Embassy in Paris, the BritishAmbassador in Saigon had similarly noted Diem's slackeninginterest. in a conference.

Confirmation of the decline of Vietnamese enthusiasm alsocame from Saigon. Ambassador Reinhardt reported on June 2 that,when he had brought up the question of the four-power conferencein a conversation with the Veitnsmese Poreign Minister, the latterhad expressed the view that solution of the problem of mi. litaryand political relations with the French had first priority.Following a conversation with Diem two days later, Reinhardtinformed the Department that, although Diem was not pressing foran early meeting, it was clear that he wished to use the proposaL,for the conference as a "lever" on the French to force regular-ization of the status of the French Expeditionary Corps in Viet-nam as well as to obtain a definition of the nature of the Manilapact comnitment to the defense of Vietnam against the Viet Minh, 4

At a meeting with Diem on June 7, Reinhardt outlined theUnited States position on elections under the Geneva settle-ment. This position was that consultations between North andSouth Vietnam should be held and that Saigon should insist onguarantees for free elections. At this meeting, Diem coamentedthat he believed French support for his government was half-

Prom Paris, tel. 5275, June 1, 1955, secret.2

Prom Paris, tel. 5283, June 2, 1955, confidential.3From Saigon, tel. 5601, June 2, 1955, secret. .4From Saigon, tel. 5643, June 4, 1955, secret. For a

detailed account of Diem's attitude with respect to the proposedfour-power conference, see tel. 5677 from Saigon, June 6, 1955,secret.

~ \ F0 ' ~ 0 ~ OS~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ \ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~

~ tO ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~40 ~ ~ ~ 0~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~

~ ~ 0 ~ ~0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ \ ~ ~ 0

"fgs f AwalI")I"p

Is )gf 'Vill ILU~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~

hearted, and that the British had not cossaitted themselvespublicly to him. He explained that one of the objectives of thepz'oposed four-power conference would be to give the legal govern-ment of Free Vietnam the benefit of public and full support ofthe othez three participants. Hhen Reinhazdt commented thatmoving into the problem of elections immediately after a four-powez conference would give the Viet Minh an excellent propagandaweapon, Diem replied that. a conference would not be necessary aslong as the three powers had an agreed policy of support of theDiem Government. l

Zh ~Dt ' f E D

Having decided that there was no longer an imnediate needfor a four-power conference to brighten his international image,Diem turned his attention to strengthening his position at home.He felt insecure as long as Bao Dai remained Chief of State. Thequestion posed was how and when to depose the former Emperor.

Shortly after the Geneva Conference, both Washington andParis had come to general agreement that Bao Dai would eventually'have to go at such time as Diem had convened a National Assembly t

which could assume the former royal powers. The two capitalshad agreed that. , in the interim period, Bao Dai could serve use-fully as a symbol, for he represented legitimacy, had the powerto appoint the Prime Minister, and was willing to accept advice.As long as Bao Dai brought his influence to bear in support ofDiem as Prime Minister and did not interfere appreciably ingovernmental operations, in the view of the United States andFrance, he played a useful role in the anti-Coszsunist strugglein Vietnam. The United States made it clear to the French,however, that its agreement to the temporary retention of BaoDai as Chief of State of Vietnam was predicated on the assumptionthat the former Emperor would not return to Saigon--out ofdeference to Diem's wishes in the matter.

Though restive under the nominal restraint Bao Dai repre-sented, Diem did not make an issue out of his sovereign's strangeposition until the spring of 1955 when, following the outbreak of

1From Saigon, tel. 5711, June 7, 1955, secret.

From Pari. s, tel. 366, July 27, and to Paris, tel. 1138(1245 to Saigon), Sept. 28, 1954, both secret.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~

~r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

I)4VI g I g 4 ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4~0 ~ \ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 4 ~I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ 1

hostilities between Diem and the Binh Xuyen set in April, a"People's Revolutionary Committee" called for the deposifdonof Bao Dai. " During the political turmoil, Diem asked, inSaigon and in Washington, whether he could expect full andimmediate Vnited States support should he depose Bao Dai andform a new government with the full support of the Diem andthe Army. 2 Washington advised against such action. The Depart-ment instructed General Collins in Saigon on May 3 to suggestto Diem that reliance on the Revolutionary Committee to deposeBao Dai could set a precedent and open the way for a later re-moval of Diem by the same or a similar group, including the Viet-Minh. The Department pointed out that authority over the Viet-namese Army was the crucial factor and that Diem might considercarefully how Bao Dai might serve to consolidate Diem's authority.The Department added: "To proceed with proposed action beforeDiem is assured of solid backing of Vietnamese people might opendoor to greater confusion, set government adrift in uncontrollablecurrents, and lead to ultimate Viet Minh triumph through subversionand infiltration. "&

Collins, who, prior to receiving the Department's instruc-tions, had already made similar representations to Diem on apersonal basis, & conveyed the Department's position officiallyto Diem on May 4. Collins stated that the overthrow of Bao Daiby the Revolutionary Committee was a highly dangerous procedureand cited the case of Kerensky during the Russian Revolution of1917. Collins again urged Diem to use his influence to restrainthe Revolutionary Committee and to await the election of aNational Assembly which might properly represent the will ofthe people. Collins came away from this conversation with she

From Saigon, tel. 4948, May 1, 1955, secret.

2From Saigon, tel. 4985, May 1, 1955, secret; memorandum byYoung (PSA) of conversation with Tran Van Chuong, VietnameseAmbassador, May 2, 1955, confidential.

To Saigon, tel. 4867 (3921 to Paris), May 3, 1955, secret.Paris, likewise, was opposed to deposition of Bao Dai by revolu-tionary means (from Paris, tel. 4820, May 5, 1955, secret).

From Saigon, tel. 5047, May 4, 1955, secret.

~ ~1~ ~ ~ ~ ~

'viBCi. HUUII lLIJI

~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 1 ~ ~

gP])gq8r,

the impression that Diem would exercise a moderating influenceon those demanding the deposition of Bao Dai at that time. 1

At the beginning of June 1955, shortly after he arrived inSaigon, Ambassador Reinhardt reported that it looked as if Diemwere determined to deal with the Bao Dai question before conveninga National Assembly and might resort to a referendum. At the.2end of the month, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Vu Van Mau,told Reinhardt that a Cabinet decision might be forthcoming soonon holding a referendum to depose Bao Dai..3

Washington was somewhat disturbed and instructed Reinhardtto explain to Diem the pitfalls of such action. The Departmentpointed out that the deposition of Bao Dai by other than alegislative fozum was a potential danger to Free Vietnam and mightcause trouble; that action by a National Assembly would be acceptedas an expression of national sentiment and not as actions o afcli ue which could be easily attacked; and that, if Diem's cabinetc ique w

II ld"simply votes deposition and attempts to carry it out, it woube in "no more sound a legal status than Revolutionary Committee,w c a ahich has already so voted. " The Department added that the oppor-'

tt nity for competitive rump committees to vote the removal ofudDiem or adopt resolutions favoring the Viet Minh or the sects woul

be greatly enhanced. The Department concluded that, in such anevent& the outcome would be determined by comparative militarystrength rather than by the existing legality of the Governmentan ad th t the United States "would have grave difficulty in making

!f4effective its aid and support under those circumstances.

Reinhardt made his representations to Diem on July 5. diemstated that there was no question of the Government's actingb decree on the subject of Bao Dai but that there was a greatdeal of pressure in political circles for him to take some aetio

y en

and that a referendum seemed the best way to meet the situation.Diem also said that, until the Bao Dai question had been resolved,it would be impossible to develop a healthy political climate.

1From Saigon, tel. 5054, May 4, 1955, secret.

2From Saigon, tel. 5609, June 2, 1955, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 6041, June 29, 1955, secret.

To Saigon, tel. 8, July 1, 1955, secret. .

~ 0 F 0 ' 0 ~ F 0'~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~I ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ tt ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 0~ t ~

~0 ~~ ~

ne) &cRfB

~ 0 ~ \ ~~ ~ ~~ tot4 0 ~F 0' ~ ~

mme ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~0 ~ 00

Reinhardt conmented to the Department that he was not entirelyconvinced by Diem's assertion that he himself was not really ina hurry but that others were pushing him very hard. l

The idea of handling the Bao Dai issue by referendum con-tinued to be held strongly by Diem and his immediate entourage. 2

On September 7, Diem made clear to Alexandre Raymond Crepault,outgoing Canadian political representative on the InternationalControl Commission, his determination to hold such a referendum. 3A fortnight later, Pham Dang Lam, Director of Politi. cal Affairsof the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry& told an officer of the AmericanEmbassy that the date of October 23 had been set for the referendumso that the results might be known before the Quadripartite ForeignMinisters meeting in Geneva. He said that the announcement tothis effect would be made soon. 4

In a private conversation on September 26, Diem toldReinhardt that the referendum would be held on two questions:(1) deposition of Bao Dai and (2) designation of Diem as Chiefof State with the mission to organize a democratic regime. Healso indicated that this referendum would be followed by a secondreferendum in November to approve a draft constitution and by-elections, possibly late in December, for a National Assembly.Reinhardt commented to the Department that, since Diem wasdetermined to proceed with this program, it was unlikely thatthe United States could bring about any modification withoutthe exertion of the greatest pressure. 5 The Department, albeitreluctantly, accepted this program and concurred in Reinhardt's

1From Saigon, tel. 47, July 5, 1955, secret.2From Saigon, tel. 494, July 29, 1955, secret.

3From Saigon, tel. 1155, Sept. 8, 1955, confidential.

From Saigon, tel. 1366, Sept. 22, 1955, secret. The Depart-ment had announced, on August 11, that the meeting of the ForeignMinisters of the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, andFrance, would convene at Gene~a on October 27 (Department of StateBulletin, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 301).

5From Saigon, tele. 1468 and 1483', Sept. 28 and 29, 1955,both secret.

~e 0~ 0 ~ ~ ~ Prao %t ~ ~ woo oo~ ~ ~ '~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ J ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~„„,.„:;(Uir~

judgment that the proposed steps were preferable in the absenceof any national legislative body, constitution, or settlementof the Bao Dai problem. &

The date on which the referendum on Bao Dai would be heldwas announced officially on October 6, after a Government-inspired (ress campaign against the Chief of State had beenlaunched. So far as Washington was concerned, there was nodoubt that Diem would win in the referendum and that the UnitedStates would recognize the new government. The United Statesposition was explained to representatives of the British,Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand Embassies in Washingtonon October 19.4 The British Foreign Office indicated to theAmerican Embassy in London on the same day that Britain wouldlikewise recognize the new government. & The French position wasthat there was no need for a new act of recognition, for thereferendum did not constitute a change in regime but only inpersonality. 6

Bao Dai exprcsscd his criticism of the referendum and ofDiem's actions in a note delivered to the French Governmentand to United States, British, Indian, and Soviet representatives~in Paris on October 13.7 Bao Dai followed this up by a decree

ITo Saigon, tel. 1192, Oct. 6, 1955, secret.2From Saigon, tel. 1578, Oct. 7, 1955, limited official use.

3To Saigon, tel. 1339, Oct. 18, 1955, secret.

Memorandum by Kattenburg (PSA) of conversation among Wade(New Zealand), Joy (British), Rowland (Australian), and McCardle(Canadian)Embassies , Oct. 19, 1955, secret.

5From London, tel. 1578, Oct. 19, 1955, secret.6To Paris, tel. 1527, Oct. 19, 1955; from Paris, tel. 1918,

Oct. 20, 1955; both confidential. The Quai d'Orsay since Julyhad regarded Bao Dai "as just another political refugee in Prancewi. th [the] distinction that he is sti. ll legally Chief of State ofVi.etnam until legal action is taken in Vietnam either to deposeor replace him" (from Paris, tel. 378, July 26, 1955, secret).

7From Paris, tel. 1721, Oct. 13, 1955, confidential.

~4~ ~~ ~

of October 18, withdrawing civil and military powers from Diemand removing him from the Prime Ministership. 1 This actioncaused some concern to the Department. 2 The French Embassy inNashington informed the Department on the 19th that Paristook the position that Bao Dai's dismissal of Diem was an in-ternal Vietnamese affair. The Department issued a statementon October 20 stating that it continued to support the Govern-ment of Free Vietnam under Diem, that the referendum was a purelyinternal matter, and that it was not commenting on personalities,for such action "would appear as involvement in Free Viet-Nam'sinternal affairs. "

The outcome of the referendum was a foregone conclusion.According to the Vietnamese Foreign Office, 98.2/ of those par-ticipating voted for Diem as Chief of State, as against 1.17for Bao Dai. .5 The initial conclusions of the American Embassyin Saigon were that the referendum proved a resounding successfor the Diem Government and that the results of the referendummade it unlikely that Bao Dai would be able to play a signifi-cant role in the future. 6 Subsequently, however, the Embassycharacterized the referendum as "in one sense a travesty on

tdemocratic procedures", for all propaganda had been under thecontrol of Diem's forces, and the other side had not beenpermitted to make its case. &

After the Vietnamese Foreign Office had informed theAmerican Embassy, on October 26, of the outcome of the refer-endum and the elevation of Diem to the office of Chief. of State,

1From Paris, tel. 1853, Oct. 18, 1955, official use only.

To Paris, tel. 1524 (1357 to Saigon), Oct. 19, 1955, confi-dential,

To Saigon, tel. 1358 (2144 to London, 1527 to Paris),Oct. 19, 1955, confidential.

4To Paris, tel. 1549, Oct. 20, 1955, unclassified.

Prom Saigon, tel. 1849, Oct. 26, 1955, confidential.

6From Saigon, tel. 1846, Oct. 25, 1955, secret.

7From Saigon, deep. 146, Nov. 29, 1955, confidential.

Ambassador Reinhardt, under instructions, replied that the UnitedStates Government looked forward to maintaining friendly re-lations with the new Government of Vietnam. In a press releaseissued the same day, the Department stated that it was glad "tosee the evolution of orderly and effective democratic processesin an area of Southeast Asia which has been and continues to bethreatened by Communist efforts to impose totalitarian control. "

Pursuant to the scenario prepared in advance, Diem, in2

his new capacity, received the Diplomatic and Consular Corps,as well as Vietnamese functionaries and notableS& at the palaceat 4:00 p.m. , the same day. The French Ambassador, HenriHoppenot, was personally attending his first official governmentfunction since his arrival in August. The British Ambassador,Hugh S. Stephenson, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, in asympathetic speech, congratulated Diem on the assumption of theoffice of Chief of State. Stephenson pointedly said that thefriends of Vietnam would watch with greatest interest theestablishment of a constitution and of democratic institutions.Diem, in reply, committed himself to the establishment of aconstitution and the election of a National Assembly before theend of the year. &

On the evening of October 26, the Vietnamese Foreign Officesent the American Embassy a copy of a "Provisional ConstitutionAct" issued by Diem which entered into force immediately, pro-claiming the State of Vietnam a Republic with Diem as President.The elimination of Bao Dai as a factor on the political scenein South Vietnam was thereby complete.

IDepartment of State Bulletin, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 760. OtherMissions in Saigon were also sent similar notifications. Beforereceiving the official notification of the new order of things,the Department, in response to a question at the dai. ly pressconference on October 24, had prematurely stated that it recog-nized Diem as the Chief of State {to Saigon, tel. 1436, Oct. 25,1955, confidential).

From Saigon, tel. 1836, Oct. 25, 1955, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 1855, Oct. 26, 1955, official use only.

4From Saigon, tel. 1857, Oct. 27& 1955, unclassified.

~ ~ F 1'~4 ~ ~ ~~ I ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~

~ 0~ ~~ ~~ ~

ti 1 7 balll'hC i I.to the State of Vietnam

Another of the moves made by Diem to build up the prestigeof his government was to persuade the French to send to Saigona full-fledged ambassador accredited to the State of Vietnam only.An opportunity to bring this about came when& upon receipt ofnew instructions from Paiis reflecting the decisions of Vietnammade at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, General Ely resigned asCommissioner-General in something of a huff, feeling that hecould not, in true conscience, carry them out. Ely departedSaigon on June 2, leaving his political deputy, Michel Wintrebert,responsible for the ccnduct of relations with the Diem govern-ment and General Pierre Jacquot in command of the French Expedi-tionary Corps. l

To succeed Ely, the Quai d'Orsay selected Henri Hoppenot,French Permanent Representative at the United Nations and named

I7

him 'French Ambassador on Special Mission to the Associated Stateswith residence in Saigon". The Saigon Government objected tothis title, for it wanted Hoppenot accredited only to Vietnam.The French feared that such a designation might be interpretedas meaning "all Vietnam" and encouraged Hanoi to make approachesto Hoppenot. They therefore devised the title "Ambassador-in-Residence at Saigon" and urged the United States to influenceDiem to accept it. While recognizing the validity of the Frencharguments and the strength of French feelings about the Hoppenotappointment, the Department of State took the position that itwas preferable for the United States not to become involved inthis issue. 3

In consultation with Vietnamese representatives in Paris,the French then worked out a new formula which read:

Paul Ely, Mdmoires, vol. I, L'Indochine dans la tourmente(Paris, 1964), pp. 316-317; from Saigon, tel. 5402, May 21, andtel. 5599, June 2, 1955, both secret.

2From Saigon, tel. 5753, June 10, 1955, secret; from Paris,tel. 5528, June 17, 1955, confidential.

3From Paris, tel. 5601, June 21, and to Saigon, tel. 5595(4603 to Paris), June 23, 1955, both secret.

!$7'il 2~j: . gd5a.~ 0~ 0~ ~~ ~D ~

"Hoppenot, Ambassador of France, is appointed Ambassadoron Special Mission. He is entrusted with the functionsof High Commissioner of the French Republic near theState of Vietnam. "

The Saigon Government repudiated its envoys, taking particularumbrage at the title "High Commissioner". I It demanded thatHoppenot (1) be styled "Ambassador to the State of Vietnam"(2)

I( ) have no jurisdiction over the French Expeditionary Corps ndimit himself to civil-diplomatic functions, and (3) have no

op an

duties outside Vietnam. French officials were disturbed by thisdevelopment and considered the Vietnamese demands as inadmissi. bleinterference in French internal affairs and as an infringementof French sovereignty, besides being a breach of faith on thepart of the Vietnamese Government. 2

The issue was finally resolved with the acceptance by boththe French and the Vietnaraese of the formula which stated:It~DHr. Hoppeuot, Ambassador on Extraordinary Nissi. on, is namedHigh Commissioner of the French Republic to the State of Viet-

11 I 1 1 I d f DI. I II ZO 1 u I IHoppenot s appointment, and Hoppenot, in his capacity as High

I .3Commissioner to the State of Vietnam presented his letters ofcredence to Diem on August 16, thereby bringing to an end theoffice of Commissioner-General of France in Indochina. 4

0~1* ~Ld1 DI I I f 1French ~Hi h Command in Vietnam

Concurrently with his efforts to obtain a semblance of gulldiplomatic recognition of Vietnam by France, Diem undertook tonegotiate the future status of the French Expedi. tionary Corpsin Vietnam and sent his adviser, Nguyen Huu Chau, to Paris in

From Paris, tel. 27, July 2, secret, tel. 37, July 5, confi-dential, and from Saigon, tel. 119, July 10, 1955, secret.

2From Paris, tel. 183, July 12, 1955, secret.3From Saigon, tel. 312, July 20, and from Paris, tel. 338,

July 22, 1955, both confidential.

4From Saigon, deep. 68, Sept. 6, 1955, limited official use.

~ 0 F 1' ~ 0 ~ ~ W ~ F 0 ' ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ F 0 ' ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

iirv&s. ~i', MJune 1955 for this purpose. In a letter delivered to Chau onJuly 2, Premier Faure indicated the French Government's willing-ness to discuss the i.ssue and suggested that the details beworked out by negotiating teams of experts. Equipped with thisletter, Chau thereupon returned to Saigon. 1

Accordingly, the Vietnamese Government organized a dele-gation headed by Deputy Minister of Defense Tran Trong Dung,and including Chau, Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, and GeneralNguyen Don of the Vietnamese General Staff, which flew to Parison August 12 for military talks scheduled to open on the 17th.The talks no sooner began than they broke down over the SouthVietnamese demand, which the delegates privately admitted theyknew would not be met, for a letter from Premier Faure to Diemstating that (1) the French Expeditionary Corps, within the SEATOframework, was prepared to stand with South Vietnam in defenseof the Free World and (2) France recognized the right of SouthVietnam to seek and determine conditi. ons for the unification ofVietnam. Nhu went so far as to tell American Embassy officialsin Paris that, i.f the French were not prepared to make such acommitment to the Deim Government publicly, the Vietnamese wouldblame them for the breakdown of the talks. & Chau talked in E

terms of asking the French to withdraw the Expeditionary Coupsaltogether.

The French Foreign Ministry informed the American Embassythat it would be impossible for the French Government to givewritten assurances of the nature desired by the Vietnamese andthat France, as a signatory of the cease-fire agreement, couldnot agree to use the Expeditionary Corps in support of a poH. cyopenly opposed to the Geneva Accords. Premier Faure did senda letter to Diem, however, under the date of September 21, statingthat France was prepared to begin negotiations on the transfer ofpowers and responsibiliti. es to the Vietnamese High Command. Theletter also made clear that the French were ready to begin

IFrom Pari. s, tel. 27, July 2, 1955, secret.

From Saigon, tels 694 GIld 732 Aug 10 and 12& 1955,secret.

3From Paris, tele. 1115 and 1259, Sept. 10 and 19, 1955,secret.

~ 0 ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ yq ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 4 ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ 0

tJikuLhuhll

~~c.: . .f5 kPQII:II:~.:..: ii

4 Aikido lf Iconv ac .ons on e' terms of withdrawal of the ExpeditionaryCorps and to give consideration, if the Vietnamese requestedit, to the possible retention of a residual force in SouthVietnam. 1

Washington took the position (and instructed the Embassyin Paris to pass the word to the Vietnamese delegation) thatcomplete withdrawal of the Expeditionary Corps would create adangerous vacuum if carried out before the Vietnamese had becomesufficiently trained and experienced to assume French militaryresponsibilities. 2 These instructions reached Paris a bi. t late,for the Vietnamese delegation, on its own authority, had immediatelypronounced Faute's letter to Diem unsatisfactory in that it failedto provide the desired assurances. Nhu went so far as to saythat the only alternative was to negotiate with the French thedeparture of the entire Expeditionary Corps. 3

Embassy Paris reques ted fresh instructions, and the Depart-ment replied that, since the Vietnamese had adopted their standwithout benefit of advice from the United States, there waslittle point in offering them American views. Furthermore, theDepartment stated, if the French should attempt to secure Americpintervention in the negotiations with the Vietnamese, the Embassyshould beg a hands-off poli. cy.4

The French, too, became balky, contending that they couldnot possibly give Diem the assurances he wanted and that theywould not predicate their policy in Vietnam, or anywhere else,on support of any given individual. The Faure government in-formed the American Embassy, however, that it was prepared tzproceed with the military talks at such time as the Vietnamese

From Paris, tele. 1277 and 1357, Sept. 19 and 23, 1955,secret.

To Paris, tel. 1105 (977 to Saigon), Sept. 21,, 1955, secret.

3From Paris, tel. 1336, Sept. 22, 1955, secret,

To Paris, tel. 1161 (1025 to Saigon), Sept. 24, 1955,secret.

should ask that they begin. " Chau, under instruction fromSaigon, called Faure's bluff by delivering to him, on October 5,a Letter requesting the French to set a date for opening thetalks. Faure told Nhu and Chau that the talks could not beginuntil the two French officers arrested back in August foz attempt-ing to set off explosives in downtown Saigon had been turnedover to French custody. 2 Diem recalled Nhu on October 15 andChau and the remaindez of the Vietnamese delegation on the 18th.

The French in Saigon admitted that the case of the twoofficers was but a pretext to cover Paris' reluctance to enternegotiations at that time. Such a confession set machinery inmotion to get things off dead center. The British Ambassador,Hugh Stephenson, cabled London to bring pressure on the French.At the request of Ambassador Reinhardt, French High CommissionerHenri Hoppenot recommended to Paris that the French propose anearly, specific date for starting the talks. Finally, the Depart-ment of State urged the French Embassy in Washington to lend itsinfluence with Pari.s, for, though not directly involved, theUnited States would be affected by the outcome of the negotiations.

The French continued to procrastinate. At the same time,without any agreement with the Vietnamese Government, they werepulling the Expeditionary Corps out of Vietnam at a very rapidrate--indeed, the pace was so swift that officials in both Parisand Saigon acknowledged that there would soon be nothing tonegotiate about. 4

There was, however, the matter of the turn-over of Frenchmilitary properties to the Vietnamese. Ambassador Reinhardtgot the impression that the French were working up an enormousbill to present the Saigon authorities in order to have a stronger

From Paris, tel. 1470, Sept. 30, 1955, secret.2From Paris, tele. 1575 and 1591, Oct. 6, 1955, secret.

From Saigon, tele. 1799 and 1832, Oct. 23 and 25, 1955,secret; to Parks, tel. 1704 (1467 to Saigon), Oct. 27, 1955,confidential.

4From Paris, tel. 1986, Oct. 24, 1955, secret; from Saigon,tel. 1984~ Nov. 5, 1955, confidential,

iillULligP~jrjk):. ', ' .np-!:.

position at such time as negotiations began. The Vietnamese,on the other hand, realizing that the Prench would eventuallyhave just to abandon their bases, were in no hurry to agree on'terms

In exasperation, the South Vietnamese Government on January 19,1956, formally requested the withdrawal of the entire French Expedi-tionary Corps. On March 19 the French notified the InternationalControl Commission of agreement reached with the Vietnamese onthe pull-out of all French combat troops by April 15 and of all"ancillary" forces by June 30. At the request of the British,the French agreed to postpone until April 28 the dissolution ofthe High Command and the return of General Jacquot to paris--the British did not w'ish this action taken until the pendingtalks with the Russian Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference hadbeen concluded. 2

While getting rid of the Expeditionary Corps, the Vietnameseasked for the retention of a small French training cadre. Parisand Saigon settled for 9 officers to be assigned to the VietnameseArmy School, 60 officers and 2SO noncommissioned officers forair training, and 8 officers and 11 noncoms for the Navy. 3 f

As of the end of the year, final negotiations on militaryproperty questlone were still in abeyance. The chief stumblingbloc was the desire of the French to keep their naval arsenalin Saigon and their installations at Cam Ranh Bay. With respectto the remaining properties, as Prench Defense Minister Bourg'hs-Maunury told the National Assembly in late July, "the instal-lations which have been ceded to the Vietnamese have been se,until now with reservations of our rights. "&

Prom Saigon, tel. 2258, Nov. 27, 1955, secret.

2Prom Saigon, tel. 3826, Mar, 20, tel. 3998, Apr. 2, andtel. 4067, Apr. 7, 1956, all secret; aide-mdmoire, British Embassy,Washington, Mar. 24, 1956, confidential.

Memorandum of conversation among Ministers Lucet and Millet(French Embassy), Sebald (FE), and Kocher and Kattenburg (SEA),Apr. 9, 1956, secret.

4Prom Saigon, tel. 4068& Apr. 7, 1956, secret; from Paris,desp. 288, Aug. 14, 1956, secret.

~I ~ 1~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0

f ~«4~i2"~.

fan%

gA fP -0 so ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ 1 LIE ~ 1 ~ ~I ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0

4)iv i'll IE,U

Declaration of Intent To ~Uhold the GenevaSettlement

The break-up of the French military establishment in Vietnamraised the obvious question as to who, on the non-Communist side,would thenceforth be guarantor of observance of the cease-fire.As early as November 1955, the British sounded out the UnitedStates about the possibility of persuading the French and SouthVietnamese Governments to arrive at sn agreement by which Saigonwould formally take over French responsibilities under the GenevaAccords--at least the military provisions thereof. Barring suchagreement, the Bri.tish suggested, Diem might i.ssue a statementto the effect that, while he did not consider his governmentbound by the 1954 agreements, he would be prepared, in the inter-ests of his nation and of peace in Southeast Asia, to ask theVietnamese High Command to assume the functions exercised by theFrench. The British feared that, i.f no statement were made, theFrench might propose reconvening the Geneva Conference, whosedecisions might cause irreparable damage to the position of South,Vietnam and of its leader. l

To determine the feasability of making an approach to Diemalong the lines suggested by the British, the Department ofState explored with the American Embassies in Paris and Saigonthe possibility of zeducing the number of military functions theVietnamese might be asked to take over from the French. TheDepartment asked specifically if the Joint Armistice Commissionmight not be abolished. 2 Ambassador Reinhardt replied fromSaigon that termination of the Commission would probably requireunanimous action to amend Article 41 of the Cease-Fire Agree-ment, and he doubted that the Viet Minh and Poles would assent.Reinhardt also gave his opinion that the Vietnamese should notbe asked to replace the French on the Joint Armistice Commissionbecause the Viet Minh were "only too eager to get the Vietnameseinvolved in direct negotiations. "

From London, tel. 1941, Nov. 10, and tel. 1999, Nov. 15,1955, both confidential.

2To Saigon, tel. 1743 (1992 to Paris, 2809 to London),Nov. 18, 1955, secret.

~ I I~I ~~ ~ I

~ ~ ~ I ~~ ~ ~ ~~I ~ I~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~F 0 ' ~ ~ ~I ~I ~ ~ ~ 0 ' ~ ~ I

Reinhardt expected the Diem government to favor continuingthe provisions of the cease-fire without, however, assuming anyformal responsibilities, either military or political. TheVietnamese took the position that, since it had been the Frenchand not the South Vietnamese who had signed the Cease-Fire Agree-ment, the Saigon authorities could not juridically replace theFrench, even though failure to do so might result in the' with-drawal of the International Control Commission and referral ofthe matter to the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen. The Vietnamesehad expressed a wi. llingness to provide logistic and securitysupport for the ICC but not the maintenance costs. Therefore,Reinhardt argued, in view of Diem's readiness to cooperateinformally, pressure should be brought to bear on the French(rather than on the Vietnamese) to maintain the status Suo untilsuch time as it would be appropriate to terminate the functionsof the Control Commission. &

In Paris, Ambassador Dillon called on South VietnameseForeign Minister Vu Van Mau and discovered that, with regardto the question of Vietnamese assumption of military responsi-bilities under the Cease-Fire Agreement and the problem ofproviding security for the ICC, Mau discounted their importance.The Foreign Minister maintained that the military provisions -ofthe armistice arrangement had been carried out. He saw nofurther need for the Control Commission and, in fact, went sofar as to say that an early "fold-up" and departure of the ICCwould not be regarded by the Vietnamese as an "unfavorabledevelopment". 2

From London, Ambassador Aldrich reported the view of thyBritish Ambassador in Saigon that it would be undesirable to '

ask the French to retain formal responsibility for enforcementof the cease-fire because (a) withdrawal of the French Expedi-tionary Corps from Vietnam would make it impossible for theFrench to perform this function, (b) such a role assigned tothe French would amount to infringement of Vietnamese sovereignty,and (c) an arrangement of this kind would not relieve the WesternPowers of their own responsibilities. The Foreign Office stressedthis last point, for it was of the opinion that the Western

1From Saigon, tel. 2206, Nov. 23, 1955, secret.2From Paris, tel. 2510, Nov. 23, 1955, confidential.

~I~ ~

~ I

~I~ I~ ~ IS ~ I 00 00 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~

~ ~~ ~~ ~

~0 ~ ~I ~ ~ 41+e eo ~ oo~ ~ ~ ~ ~ OV 5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ .~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ir ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ II ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~s toe eo tea ~ ~ oo 1p]3gp ~ eo ~ oo

'""LA~SIHEDcontrol U. S. military personnel in Vietnam. The Department wastherefore inclined to agree with the thoughts about the Com-mission which Mau had conveyed to Dillon in Paris. 1

The Embassy in Paris went along with the Department. Am-bassador Reinhardt in Saigon, on the other hand, took vigorousexception. He reported his opinion that the Department's evalu-ation of the situation seemed to forecast an "important departurefrom the U. S. position to date". He pointed out that, during

fthe previous six months, often at the Department s suggestion,he had urged the Vietnamese Government to comply with the minimumrequirements of the cease-fire and to hold consultations withthe Viet Minh on elections in order to retain the presence andgood-will of the International Control Commission and the supportof international opinion--particularly British, Prench, andIndian.

Di.sputing the Department's feeling about the Geneva Accords,Reinhardt maintained that the articles of the Cease-Fire Agree-ment relating to the demarcation line (and particularly Article 10,which called for enforcement of the cease-fire) were among the"most important remaining provisions with respect to Vietnam'ssecurity". Recalling the Department's own statement that theControl Commission was of use as an "international body which

o ld be a neutral observer already on the spot in case of Viet1 eMinh aggression, " Reinhardt reminded the Department of the va ue

to the United States, in terms of Asian opinion, of the verdicthanded down in 1950 labelling North Korea as the aggressor,rendered by an on-the-spot U. N. commission which included Indianrepresentatives.

Reinhardt concluded that it was essential that, prior toJ 1 1956 the United States, in consultation with the Viet-u y

t allnamese and other friendly interested powers, work out a mutua yacceptable solution to provide for continuing supervision of the17th parallel and the cease-fire. He suggested that such asolution could be reached outside the framework of the Genevaagreements and implemented by an international body other thanthe ICC. 2

To Saigon, tel. 1901 (2154 to Paris, 3097 to London), Dec. 2,1955, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 2441, Dec. 10, 1955, secret.

At this point, the Geneva Co-Chairmen entered the picture.They had met in Geneva on November 14 to consider communicationsfrom the Governments of North and South Vietnam, Communist China,and India, and the Fourth Interim Report of the Control Com-mission. On December 20, the Co-Chairmen addressed letters toall of the other participants in the 1954 Geneva Conference andto the States members of the ICC in which they noted with concernthat the implementation of certain provisions of the Genevaagreements was unsatisfactory. They emphasized that they regardedthe work of the ICC in Vietnam as "an important contribution tothe preservation of peace in South-East Asia", and they deploredany obstruction of the Commission's activities. The Co-Chairmensolicited the suggestions of the addressees regarding ways toimprove the carrying-out of what had been agreed upon at Geneva. l

On January 26, 1956, the Chinese Communists replied to theCo-Chairmen's letter and proposed reconvening the Geneva Confer-ence {expanded to accoamdodate representatives of the three Statesserving as members of the International Control Commission) forthe ostensible purpose of getting consultations under way be-tween Saigon and Hanoi to arrange for the reunification of Vietnamthrough nati. onwide elections. The Chinese response led to aconsiderable amount of diplomatic activity in Washington, London,Ottawa, and Saigon designed to create conditions under whichall parties to the Geneva Accords could accept the status Suowithout having to fall back on the Geneva Conference.

In conversation with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloydin Washington on January 31, Secretary Dulles interpreted theChinese Comnunists'. note to the Geneva Co-Chairmen proposingthe reconvening of the Geneva Conference as being meant to cloaka broader purpose than the question of elections in Vietnam.Dulles suspected that Premier Chou En-lai had in mind a high-level conference for the negotiation of a regional Asian pact,the neutralization of Southeast Asia, and such matters. Lloydagreed with Dulles' appraisal of the Chinese note and suggestedthat the United States and the United Kingdom awai. t Soviet

DRBII BIB. hI I I. hdd-dh'Conflict, 1945-1965 (Cmd. 2834), pp. 114-115.

To Saigon, tel. 2563, Jan. 27, 1956, secret.

reaction to Peking's proposal as well as that of the otherrecipients. Dulles expressed himself willing to "stall alongon that basis. "1

Following intensive talks with the Canadians in Ottawa, theBritish submitted to the United States an aide-mdmoire, datedFebruary 13, on the subject of a possible approach to Diem topresuade the Vietnamese Government to assume certain undertakingsthe Bri.tish (and, presumably, the Canadians) considered necessaryif a new Geneva Conference or a crisis in July were to be avoided.Specifically, the British wished Diem to issue a statement which,without mentioning the Geneva Accords, would commit the VietnameseGovernment to (a) respect the armistice demarcation line and keepits troops out of the demilitarized zone, (b) refrain from theintroduction of additional mili. tazy personnel and equipment,(c) refuse to join any military alliance (e.g. , SEATO) or topermit the establishment of foreign mili. tary bases, and (d) re-place the French on the Joint Armistice Commission and facilitateICC supervision of the execution of commitments (a), (b), and(c).

When informed of the British proposal, Ambassador Reinhardt&

in Saigon reported that, since the Vietnamese themselves hadsuggested to him the possibility of a Government declarationwhereby South Vietnam would assume responsibility for "certainclauses" of the cease-fire, separate American and Britishapproaches along the lines set out in the U.K. aide-mAmoizemight solve the immediate succession problem, provided that thePrench, and the Canadians and Indians in the ICC, could be dissuadedfrom urging the Geneva Co-Chairmen to seek a formal solution„acceptable to all interested parties. But, to the astonishment ofWashington and London, the Indian Chairman of the InternationalControl Commission, Atvar Singh, disputed both the wisdom of andthe need for a South Vietnamese statement. A declaration specify-ing the clauses of the cease-fire the Saigon Government wouldwillingly implement would probably compel the ICC to seek fromthe Co-Chairmen a revision of its terms of reference. A step ofthis kind would give the Viet Minh an excuse to claim that theCease-Pire was being unilaterally amended and therefore to demandan early reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Singh told Am-

bassador Reinhardt that he believed no formal action by the

4o Saigon, tel. 2652, Feb. 3, 1956, secret.

~0 F 0 ' ~1~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 '~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~I~ Ot

- "'1-=""'-"IFIB~N ~ 4~ N\ 44'~ ~ ~ NN NN ~ ~ N N\ ~ '

Co-Chairmen would be necessary--either concerning, the successionissue or the continuation of the ICC--and that even failure ofthe South Vietnamese to r'eplace the Prench on the Joint ArmisticeCommission might simply be treated as a violation of the Cease-Fire to be dealt with "by the usual exchange of correspondence". 1

The Government of India communicated its views more formallyin a note of February 23 to the Geneva Co-Chairmen. New Delhipointed out that it was unreasonable and impractical for thestates comprising the ICC to continue to serve indefinitely withundefined responsibilities. It was equally apparent, the Indiannote observed, that the withdrawal of the Co55x55ission without somepolitical settlement might well. lead to a conflict inside SouthVietnam "and in all probability between the two zones. "

It was also clear, the Indian note continued, that generalelections for the reunification of Vietnam, could not be held byJuly 1956, even if both parties agreed to enter into negotiationsas a result of intervention by the Co-Chairmen. It followed,therefore, that arrangements for the continuance of the armisticeand its supervision had to be made. The agreement of the twoparties, of the supervisory powers, and of all the Geneva Confer-ence powers had to be obtained to eEEtend the functions of theInternational Control Commission if peace were to be maintained.This required the urgent attention of the Co-Chairmen, for, afterJuly 1956, the position of the Commission might become untenable.

The letter from the Indian Government noted that SouthVietnam had reaffirmed, in its letter of October 7, 1955, tothe British Co-Chairman, its adherence to the principle ofelections, provided these were absolutely free and conductedunder all the guarantees necessary for a really democrati5Evote. The Indian Government noted also that the North Viet-.2

nsmese authorities had requested, in their August 17, 1955,message to the two Co-Chairmen, that they take "all necessary

1From Saigon, tel. 3357, Feb. 19, and tel. 3375, Feb. 20,1956, both confidential.

25 'll m EN l. 44 El 4'

Nl. l954-1960 Oiistorical Office Research Project No. 833)9 p. 30.

measures" to guarantee the implementation of the Geneva Agree-ments. India considered that in these two declarations and

1also in the requests of the Communist Chinese. and the NorthVietnamese for a new conference there was a basis for action.In the Indians' view, it would be reasonable to ask the Chineseand North Vietnamese to await the results of an early meetingof the Co-Chairmen. The Indian Governmeu. t concluded that,prior to the "final and inevitable step" of calling a largeconference, the Co-Chairmen had to take a new initiative toresolve the situation. India therefore suggested a meeting ofthe Co-Chairmen with the least possible delay.

Up to this point in the discussions about the successionproblem, the United States had been largely a listener and ob-server. However, when, on February 18, the Sovi.et Union com-municated to London its support of the Chinese Communists'proposal for reconvening the Geneva Conference, the Britdshaddressed another aide-mdmoire to Washington in an attempt toget the United States off dead center. The Department of StateAnally agreed to commit itself to paper and, on February 29,delivered to the British Embassy an aide-mdmoire in which theU. S. Government was described as agreeing in principle that ameeting of the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen on Vietnam waspreferable to reconvening the Conference itself. It was theunderstanding of the United States that the meeting of the Co-Chairmen would be held off until April and would be conductedas informally as possible. Washington hoped that the Britishwould defer a reply to the Russians until after the Vietnamquestion had been discussed at the SEATO meeting in Karachi inearly March and following Secretary Dulles' talks with Diem inSaigon.

With respect to what might be worked out, the Departmentbelieved it inadvisable for the South Vietnamese Government toassume responsibility for only "certain clauses" of the Cease-Fire Agreement, for such limited liabi. lity "would in effect

1See ibfd. , p. 27.

To Saigon, tel. 3060, Mar. 8, 1956, confidential.3Aide-mdmoire, British Embassy, Washington, Feb. 25, 1956,

confidential.

amount to a Vietnamese proposal to place the armistice in anew framework outside Geneva. " Unless the Ccmmunist sideraised a fuss over Vietnam, the Department felt it better tocontinue existing arrangements rather than to take on thedelicate and complex task of fozmulating and seeking agreementon a new modus vivendi. . Finally, the Department wished itknown that the United States did not believe that a new confer-ence on Vietnam would help towards a practical or desirablepolitical settlement in the near future. l

On his way to the SEATO meeting in Karachi, Briti.sh ForeignSecretary Lloyd stopped off in New Delhi and learned from PrimeMinister Nehru that the Indian Government was disposed to pre-serve the International Control Commission, provided the Viet-namese Government cooperated with it and took over de facto thefunctions of the French High Command, "no matter how informally".Nehru's assurances helped clear the way for the British to replyto Moscow's note of February 18, and Secretary Dulles concurredwith the draft Lloyd showed him in Karachi.

Accordingly, by a note dated March 9, the British informedthe Soviet Union of their agreement "that steps should be takento facilitate the operations of the International SupervisoryCommission" in Vietnam. The British expressed doubt, however,that the conference proposed by the Chinese and supported bythe Russians "would necessarily provide the quickest or mostsatisfactory means of reaching agreement. " They suggested thatit might be "appropriate that the two Co-Chairmen should meetto discuss the situation" after having sought "further clari-fication of the views of the other countries concerned"--aprocedure which "would be in conformity with the views of theGovernment of India, which holds the chairmanship of the Inter-national Commission. "3

1To Saigon, tel. 2961 (4925 to London), Mar. 1, 1956,conf iden tia1.

2From Karachi, tel. SECTO 10, Mar. 7, 1956, secret.

3D t ~Rlti Bite. hl I l. h IdChina Conflict, 1945-1965 (London, HMSO, 1965, Cmnd. 2834),p. 120,

OO ~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~1~ ~ 4

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ a e a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ \ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~0 0 ~ 0 ~ ~I ~ ~ 1

liIBSSIF8

lih~ut. kudlrlrliWhile the British prepared for the meeting of the Co-Chairmen,

Secretary Dulles called on Nehru and learned of his concern overDiem's attitude respecting the armistice arrangements. Nehruthought that the South Vietnamese Government, having inheritedthe French position, should assume the liabilities as well asthe advantages of this change, including the armistice obligations.Dulles said that he did not believe the principle of inheritanceapplied in that way, for Diem had explicitly and repeatedlystated that he did not and would not accept the Armistice Agree-ment. He felt, however, that Diem would abide by the principalterms. l

Dulles then proceeded to Saigon, where on March 14 he hada two-hour discussion with Diem about, among other matters, thesuccession problem. Dulles said that to forestall a GenevaConference which the United States and the United Kingdom didnot want and to assist the British in their coming talks withthe Russians it would be helpful if Vietnam would concern itselfwith finding a formula to give some indications of practicalcompliance with the armistice. The Secretary also pointed outthat Vietnam had a duty to its friends to make known its intentionsbefore the Co-Chairmen met in London. Summarizing the views ofLloyd and Nehru, he urged Diem to give sympathetic considerationto something similar to the declaration suggested by the British.

Diem stated that Vietnam was cooperating and would continueto cooperate wi. th the ICC to keep the peace and that Vietnamhad no intention to resort to force, permit the establishmentof foreign bases, or enter military alliances. The Secretarycautioned Diem against assuming commitments for an indefini~period, pointing out that Vietnam might wish ai some later timeto enter SEATO although such a step was not feasible at thattime. Diem referred to the ICC as a safeguard for Vietnam andacknowledged the correctness of the view that a declaration byVietnam would facilitate maintaining the status Suo. He didnot conmit himself further, however.

Loose though Diem's pledge to Dulles was, Chau affirmed toBritish Ambassador Stephenson in Saigon that a South Vietnamesedeclaration on the armistice provisions would be made. The

From New Delhi. , tel. SECTO 40, Mar. 10, 1956, secret,

Prom Saigon, tel. 3759, Mar. 15, 1956, secret.

~I I~ 1 ~ 1~ ~ ~~ e ~ 0 e~ ~ t ~~ 0 \ ~1 ~ 1

~eOIRe ~ oo ~ ta~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ OO ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ I~ ~0 4 ~ ~ 4 \ F1' ~ 1

liKIX&iflN

~ 0 ~ \ ~ oI ~ ~ Io ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ WTP- ~*~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ellin% ~'}L ghe je '" &)1 $~ d,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oee ~ ~ ~ oo ! qg. ~ ~ ) o~s

Asia. nlJ& l ILUquestion of content and timing immediately arose. American andBritish officials in Saigon agreed that i.t was important for theUnited States and the United Kingdom to see the precise languageof the proposed Vietnamese declaration to forestall its beingso watered down as to be of little use, With respect to tiadng,the Department of State was of the view that imnediate publi-cation of a Vietnamese declaration might cause a barrage ofCommunist propoganda, perhaps making the declaration ineffectiveas a bargaining tool for the British by the time of their rnid-April meeting with the Russians. If the declaration were madepublic after the meeting of the Co-Chairmen, it might appearto be the result of pressure by the Geneva Powers and thereforeharm Diem domestically. To the Department, therefore, it seemedbest for the Vietnamese to issue the declaration just before themeeting of the Co-Chai. rmen.

The Department also felt it would be useful to keep thedeclaration "in diplomatic channels" for possible amendment, butthat there was no reason why the British should not keep theGovernments of India and Canada informed of the progress ofnegotiations, "revealing by stages additions to [thel draft"which the Vietnamese were "willing to buy. " Regarding thedeclaration's substance, the Department felt that the Embassyat Saigon might attempt to persuade the Vietnamese Governmentthat any reference in the declaration to reunification be phrasedi.n terms of "under free conditions" rather than "by free elections".The Department also cautioned the Embassy that the British wouldprobably want a fairly specific Vietnamese commitment againstjoining alliances. l

The succession question became more critical when, onMarch 19, Ambassador Hoppenot informed the Interne'tional ControlCommission of France's decision to close out the High Commandeffective April 15. In some alarm, the Government of Indiaaddressed a note to the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen, onMarch 23, in whi. ch it pointed out that "neither the French authori-ties nor the Viet-Mam authorities have made any proposals as tothe manner in which the [International Control] Commission couldcontinue to supervise the Cease-fire Agreement after the with-drawal of the French High Command. " The note continued:

1From Saigon, tel. 3813, Mar. 19; to Saigon, tel . 3187,Mar. 20, 1956; both secret.

~e~ ~~ ~

~0

~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ot ~ ~ 0~ lj a ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

: -: ':::::-"-"-~i:)~1/8

~.'~lf&lNtif0~I F 0 ' ~ 0 F 0' ~ ~ as ~I ~ ~ ~ F 0 ' 4 ~

"Although the South Viet-Namese authorities have promisedto give practical co-operation and to take over responsibilityfor the security of the Commission from the 1st April onwards,they are not prepared to assume the legal obligations of theFrench High Command, as successors of the French Power in SouthViet-Nam. In the circumstances, the Commission views withserious concern the prospect of having to supervise an agreementwhich will cease to have any legal basis since one party to theagreement--the French High Command--will have disappeared. Itis clear that the Commissi. on will not be ahle to hold the SouthViet-Nam accountable, unless it accepts the full residuaryobligations undertaken by the French High Command. "

The Indian Government requested the Co-Chairmen to "considerthe situation as early as possible and, in any case, before the15th of April, 1956, with a view to resolve the legal lacunaand to enable the Commission to discharge the functions entrustedto i.t by the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. "1

In immediate response to the Indian note, the British ForeignOffice instructed its Ambassador in Paris to attempt to persuadethe French Government to postpone until June the dissolution ofthe High Command in Vietnam in order that the Geneva Co-Chairmenmight have adequate time in which to work out a solution to theproblem of the succession. Even though the French had madeknown a two-week delay (i.e. , until April 26) in closing out theHigh Command, the British considered it impossible to meet withthe Russians on the issue of the succession prior to the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit, scheduled for Apri. l 18. While sympathetic tothe French desire to withdraw their troops and shed the burdenof responsibility in Vietnam, the Foreign Office suggested th'atthe Ambassador point out that, wi. th a satisfactory declarationby the South Vietnamese Government, the French might continueto serve as intermediary with the ICC through the cosmander ofthe French aux'. liary forces which were to remain in Vietnam untilJune 2

From Sai.gon, tel. 3813, Mar. 19; to Saigon, tel. 3187,Mar. 20, 1956; both secret.

To Saigon, tel. 3231, Mar. 24, 1956, secret; aide-mdmoire,British Embassy, Washington, Mar. 24, 1956.

~ I ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 4 ~ ~ ~

~iidPI((ging

In addition to appealing to the French, the Bri. tish ForeignOffice instructed Ambassador Stephenson in Saigon, as the latterinformed the American Chargd, Daniel V. Anderson, on the 25th,that it was imperative that the Vietnamese Government make adeclaration of intentions respecting the succession in view ofthe French decision on dissolution of the High Comaand, theIndian Government's note to the Co-Chairmen, and, most 'important,the danger that the Franco-Vietnamese political talks, "stillpending, may complicate rather than solve [thej succession issue. "As Anderson continued in his cabled report to the Department onhis talk with Stephenson:

"It will be recalled that French already know generalterms of earlier four-point British draft declaration

and that British believe, and we concur, thatattempt to clear declaration with French prior itsissuance may result in Franco-Vietnamese wrangling andpossibly no dec. lazation at all. "

Anderson reported that he agreed that the Vietnamese declarationshould be made promptly in order to forestall the possibilityof unilateral French action--i. e. , refusal to agree to theBritish request for postponement of the dissolution of the HighCommand. l

At the time that the Indian Government had sent its noteto the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen, it had made it known thatthe proposed declaration on the succession would be acceptableif it specifically coranitted the South Vietnamese Government tothe principles of (I) supervision of the Demilitarized Zone(2) supervision of the cease-fire provisions regulating theentry of military personnel and material at ports, airfields,and frontders~ (3) prohibition of the establisment of militarybases end alii. ances, and (4) reunification through free elections.Such a declaration, if acceptable to the Co-Chairmen, wouldbe sufficient to continue the work of the International ControlCoszaisslon. If the Co-Chairmen accepted the declaration, theSoviet Foreign Minister should "sell" it to North Viet-Nam asthe most that could be got out of the Southern regime. Theregime in the North should then make a similar unilateral

1From Saigon, tel. 3894, Mar. 25, 1956, secret.

~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s , z]' j~ ~ 1 ~ 4 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ * ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f~ 0 ~ 11 ~I ~

~o ~ \ ~ ~ o ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~o Ooo oo ~ ~ ~ ~ o

~ ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ o~ ~ ~ ~ o \ ~~ ~ $ga ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~

declaration, after which the Co-Chairmen would "take note" ofboth declarations in a formal communication to the Geneva Con-ference and Supervisory Powers. &

On March 26, George Parthasarathi, the new Indian Chairmanof the International Control Commission, gave Anderson in Saigonsome additional views of the Indian Government on the proposedSouth Vietnamese declaration. He expressed understanding ofSouth Vietnam's reluctance to agree to become successor to a"colonialist power for responsibilities incurred against Viet-nam's wishes. " However, having asked the Prench ExpeditionaryCorps to withdraw, Vietnam had no choice, as a sovereign nation,but to assume responsibility for the cease-fire. If the Saigonregime failed to do so, the International Control Commissionwould have no legal basis for continuing to operate in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese should avoid making any reservations in theirdeclaration, Parthasarathi cautioned, for the Co-Chairmen wouldneed leeway in whi. ch to work out a modus vivendi during the mid-April discussions. Amendments to the South Vietnamese under-taking could always be suggested once the succession crisis hadpassed. t

To increase the chances of Uiet Minh acceptance of the modusvivendi, Parthasarathi continued, the South Vietnamese declarationshould attempt to keep alive Viet Minh expectations concerningelections by expressing South Vietnam's regret that genuienlyfree elections were not possible at that time but indicating thatthe question might be reviewed in a year or two. Parthasarathiadded that the ICC would be willing to abolish the liaisonmissions, which were not required by the cease-fire agreement'.As a result, the Vi.et Minh liaison mission, always opposed bySouth Vietnam, could be dissolved. In return, the ICC wouldrequest South Vietnamese agreement to moving its headquartersto Saigon.

Parthasarathi concluded by saying that the ICC could notassume responsibili. ty from the Prench for the Joint ArmisticeCommission, for the ICC's functions were only supervisory; itcould not police the Demilitarired Zone and issue passes to cross

To Saigon, tel. 3230, Mar. 24, I956o secret.

~t 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~I ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~I~ ~ 0

'Pf $(gjf0

the line. Parthasarathi therefore thought the best solutionwould be to avoid raising the JAC question for at lease severalmonths

Evidence of continued foot-dragging by the Saigon Govern-ment with respect to its promised declaration on the successionwas produced by Si.r James Plimsoll& the Australian Undersecretaryfor Southeast Asia, when he reported to Anderson a conversationhe had had on March 24 with President Diem, Secretary to thePresidency Chau, and Foreign Minister Mau. Diem had requestedthe Australian Government to intervene with the French to obtainlogistic support for the ICC and to ask them "to be more reason-albe. " He had declared that the Vietnamese Government was pre-pared to cooperate with the ICC, avoid the use of force, respectthe demarcation line, and prevent the establishment of foreignmilitary bases in fzee Vietnam. He had made no mention, however,of elections or military alliances.

Chau had intervened to say that theIndian position thatSouth Vietnam should express willingness to assume the "oblige-tions" of the cease-fire was unacceptable. Mau informed Plimso11.'

that the Vietnamese declaration might be forthcoming in aboutten days but that the sense of urgency had diminished in lightof the French decision not to dissolve the High Command untilApri. l 28. Plimsoll told Anderson, however, that the AustralianGovernment believed the Vietnamese declaration should be madeready "soonest" in ordez to have the maximum propaganda impactand to appear to be the result of pressure following the Indiannote to the Co-Chairmen. 2

A new note of urgency was sounded when the British ForeignOffice on March 27 instructed Stephenson in Saigon to pressfor the Vietnamese declaration as a means of strengtheningBritain's hand in the forthcoming negotiations with the Russians,to encourage the French to defer dissolution of the High Commandbeyond April 28, and to persuade the International Control Com-mission to remain in Vietnam. Stressing the fact that theirown four-point proposal represented the minimum acceptable toall parties, the British stated their preference for a public

From Saigon, tel. 3917, Mar. 26, 1956, secret.2Prom Saigon, tel. 3900, Mar. 26, 1956, confidential.

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ I~ 0 ~ ~ ii&B

~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ I~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ lac ~ ~ ~ ~ s „- s

;, ':='-ll4HUU

declaration by Vietnam whi. ch could then publicly be endorsed bythe Western Powers and, hopefully, by India before the two Co-Chairmen met ou. April 18. If the Vietnamese prefered tofurnish private assurances, the Foreign Office was prepared toaccept these in the form of a reply to the Co-Chairmen's noteof December 21, provided it contained the full text of thedeclaration and was prepared in time to be circulated in confi-dence among the Geneva Conference Powers prior to the Co-Chaizmen's meeting. l

The Department of State assented to having Anderson supportin both British and Vietnamese circles in Saigon the principleof a declaration by Vietnam. It suggested, however, that, whilethe United States could help promote the British draft of thedeclaration, Anderson might "leave sufficient leeway to allowfor possible later U. S. support of some or all points of aprobable Vietnamese counterdraft. "2

For lack of cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese, theBritish continued to receive negative replies from the Frenchrespecting continuation of the High Command in Vietnam beyondthe April 28 date for its dissolution. In their negotiationswith the Saigon Government, the French had failed to detectany conciliatory gestures on the part of the Vietnamese insuch form as a request for retention of French training unitsor the offer of facilities to supply French forces in Laos orthe French naval units in the Far East. The failure of theVietnamese to make any concrete offers or requests arose fromthe fact that the Saigon Government was sharply divi. ded on theissue: the Secretary to the Presidency favored asking theFrench to leave certain military personnel in Vietnam; theForeign Minister took the position that the "French must do theasking

Ambassador Stephenson's representations in Saigon finallypaid off. On March 31, the day on which Ambassador Reinhazdtreturned to the Vietnamese capital following a Tokyo meeting

1From Saigon, tel. 3923, Mar'. 27, 1956, secret.2To Saigon, tel. 3302, Mar. 30, 1956, secret.

3To Saigon, tel. 3303, Mar. 30, 1956, secret.

~ 0 ttt ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0

eo ~ oo oe ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ I ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0

Chapter IV

VALIDATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN VIETNAM AND RESOLUTIONOF THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM, APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1956

~Summa

As the date approached on which, according to the GenevaConference Final Declaration, electi. ons were to be held through-out all of Vietnam with a view to reunification, the Geneva Con-ference Co-Chairmen canvassed the other Geneva participants todetermine their wishes. Most of the respondents agreed thatconditions suitable for genuinely free elections in Vietnam didnot prevai. l. The Co-Chairmen therefore tacitly agreed to post-pone the elections sine die in return for a South Vietnamesepledge to uphold the substance of the Armistice arrangements.Explicit in this arrangement were the retention and continuedfunctioning of the International Control Commission and SouthVietnamese assumption of French responsibilities under theGeneva Accords.

British Efforts To Secure a Firmer Southri e ~Rt hCease-Fire and the ICC

On March 30, 1956, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivereda note to the British Embassy in Moscow in which, after itemizingthe various respects in which the Geneva Accords had not been imple-mented, the Soviet Government took up and supported the suggpstionearlier made by Communist China, North Vietnam, and Poland thata new conference on Indochina be convened to meet the need "oftaking urgent measures to avert a possible frustration of theGeneva Agreements in Viet-Nam. " The Soviet note continued:"However, taking into account the point of view of the BritishGovernment and also the proposal of the Indian Government, asexpressed in their letter of 21 February, l the Soviet Govern-ment do not object to the preliminary discussion by the Chair-men of the Geneva Conference on Inde-China of the question ofpossible measures to guarantee the implementation of the GenevaAgreements in Viet-Nam, including the question of summoning a

1see ante, p~ 136

~ t ~0 ~ ~ 4 0~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ 1 ~ ~ ~~0 COO 4% ~

new conference, bearing in mind that this will help them morequi. ckly to reach agreement concerning the susmoning of the above-mentioned conference. " The Soviet note went on to propose thatthe Co-Chairmen meet in London "wi. thin the next few days". Forthe purpose of the meeting, the Soviet Government authorizedAndrei A. Gromyko First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, tobe its spokesman.

Finally armed with the Vietnamese declaration on the problemof the succession, the British Government replied to the Sovietson April 5. It agreed to the proposed earlier meeting of theCo-Chairmen, suggesting April 11 as the date, and stated that theMarquess of Reading, Minister of State for Forei. gn Affairs, wouldrepresent the Foreign Secretary in the talks.

The British had some misgivings, however, about the validityof the Vietnamese declaration as an instrument to persuade theIndians and Canadians to continue to serve on the InternationalControl Commission and to dissuade the Russians from demandinga new Geneva Conference. Under instruction from the Forei. gnOffice, therefore, Ambassador Stephenson called on PresidentDiem, on April 6, to suggest that the Saigon Government mightbe willing to .issue a statement reading: "The Government of Viet-.nam, although not considering itself bound by or under anycompulsion because of the agreement on cessation of hostilitiesin Vietnam, neveztheless intends in effect to fulfill the residualconditions of the existing armistice which it is the duty ofthe International Control Commission to supervise. " Stephensonindicated that such a statement need not be made public butthat it might be shown in confidence to the Canadian and IndganGovernments and, if necessary, to the Soviets.

Diem agreed to consider the British proposal. He pointedout, however, that one of the principal objections to Vietnam'sassuming responsibilities from the French under the GenevaAccords was membership in the Joint Armistice Commission, abody on which Vietnam had no intention of being represented. 3

1I o~Rl 1 BtihI 1 1 h id-Chl.Conf I i ct, 1945-1965(Cmd. 2834; London, HMSO, 1965), pp. 121-123.

2Ibid. , p. 123.

3From Saigon, tel. 4059, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.

~ 1 ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~

0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ \ ~I ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~

:.. :-.-: . .--' --:1- '-'"I.KSIREO~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ ~ 0

Stephenson explained that the French, while unwilling to postponedissolution of the High Command, had offered to act as inter-mediaries between the Government of Vietnam and the InternationalControl Commission and to continue to serve on the Joint Com-mission. l The Saigon Government gave evidence of reluctance tohave the French represent it on the Joint Commission, and Am-bassador Reinhardt reported his doubt that the French offerwould "weigh heavily in the balance. eg

Indeed, the United States itself was reluctant to back upthe British proposal to the Diem Government. As the Departmentof State informed Embassy Saigon on April 6, the implicationin the British draft statement that Diem was tied down to the"Geneva structure probably entirely unpalatable to Diem andcounter-productive our owa interests. "3 Reinhardt reported hisagreement that the United States "should not hasten to supportBritish ddmarche, particularly since underlying purpose, whichis to obtain Canadian and Indian acceptance of Government ofVietnam's declaration as sufficient basis for continued existenceInternational Control Coarnission, may possibly be achieved with-out additional assurances being sought from Diem"4

Even before the original Vietnamese declaration had beendrafted and delivered to Stephenson in Saigon on April 3, PrimeMinister Nehru, in a foreign affairs address before the IndianParliament on March 29, had alluded to the difficulties of thesuccession in Vietnam, declaring that, if the InternationalControl Commission were terminated, only trouble could result.He stated that India did not wish to leave the Comnission andthat theze were hopeful signs that South Vietnam might acceptthe obligations flowing from the Geneva Accords "and thus makei.t easier for us to function. "

on ly.

To Saigon, tel. 3377, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.2From Saigon, tel. 4080, Apr. 7, 1956, secret.3To Saigon, tel. 3377, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.

From Sai.gon, tel. 4080, Apr. 7, 1956, secret.5From New Delhi, tel. 2153, Apr. 2, 1956, official use

~ ~ ~0 ~ 1~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 1~ \ ~ \

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4

Chapter IV

VALIDATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN VIETNAM AND RESOLUTIONOF THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM, APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1956

~Summer

As the date approached on which, according to the GenevaConference Final Declaration, elections were to be held through-out all of Vietnam with a view to reunification, the Geneva Con-fezence Co-Chairmen canvassed the other Geneva partici. pants todetermine their wishes. Most of the respondeats agreed thatconditions suitable for genuinely' free elections in Vietnam didnot prevail. The Co-Chairmen therefore tacitly agreed to post-pone the elections sine die in return for a South Vietnamesepledge to uphold the substance of the Armistice azraagements.Explicit in this arrangement were the retention and continuedfunctioning of the International Control Commission and SouthVietaamese assumption of French responsibilities under theGeneva Accords.

British Efforts To Secure a Firmer Southvi t c ta ~Rt hCease-pi. ze aad the ICC

On March 30, 1956, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivereda note to the British Embassy in Moscow in which, after itemizingthe various respects in which the Geneva Accords had not been imple-mented, the Soviet Government took up and sapported the suggpsti. onearlier made by Communist China, North Vietnam, and Poland thata new conference on Indochina be convened to meet the need "oftakiag urgent measures to avert a possible frustration of theGeneva Agreemeats in Viet-Nam. " The Soviet aote continued:"However, taking into account the point of view of the BritishGovernment and also the proposal of the Indian Government, asexpressed ia their letter of 21 February, l the Soviet Govern-ment do not object to the preliminary discussion by the Chair-men of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China of the question ofpossible measures to guarantee the implementation ot the GenevaAgreements in Viet-Nam, including the question of summoning a

1See ante, p 136.

~0 ~ 1~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ i ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ gR 0

'III'&i katrtLU

new conference, bearing in mind that this will help them morequickly to reach agreement concerning the susmoning of the above-mentioned conference. " The Soviet note went on to propose thatthe Co-Chairmen meet in London "within the next few days". Forthe purpose of the meeting, the Soviet Government authorisedAndrei A. Gromyko First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, tobe its spokesman.

Finally armed with the Vietnamese declaration on the problemof the succession, the British Government replied to the Sovietson April 5. It agreed to the proposed earlier meeting of theCo-Chairmen, suggesting April 11 as the date, and stated that theMarquess of Reading, Minister of State foz Foreign Affairs, wouldrepresent the Foreign Secretary in the talks. 2

The British had some misgivings, however, about the validityof the Vietnamese declaration as an instrument to persuade theIndians and Canadi. ans to continue to serve on the InternationalControl Commission and to dissuade the Russians from demandinga new Geneva Conference. Under instruction from the ForeignOffice, therefore, Ambassador Stephenson called on PresidentDiem, on April 6, to suggest that the Saigon Government mightbe willing to .issue a statement reading: "The Government of Viet-nam, although not considering itself bound by or under anycompulsion because of the agreement on cessation of hostilitiesin Vietnam, nevertheless intends in effect to fulfill the residualconditions of the existing armistice which it is the duty ofthe International Control Commission to supervise. " Stephensonindicated that such a statement need not be made public butthat it might be shown in confidence to the Canadian and IndganGovernments and, if necessary, to the Soviets.

Diem agreed to consider the British proposal. He pointedout, however, that one of the principal objections to Vietnam'sassuming responsibilities from the French under the GenevaAccords was membership in the Joint Armistice Commission, abody on which Vietnam had no intention of being represented. &

ID~R1 t BikhI I I. h*?d-ChtConflict, 1945-1965(Cmd. 2834; London, HMSO, 1965), pp. 121-123.

2Ibid. , p. 123.

3From Saigon, tel. 4059, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.

~ 0 ~ I~ ~I ~ ~ ~ 1 U I ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~I ~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

4~gMLAuStephenson explained that the French, while unwilling to postponedissolution of the High Cossaand, had offered to act as inter-mediaries between the Government of Vietnam and the InternationalControl Commission and to continue to serve on the Joint Com-mission. l The Saigon Government gave evidence of reluctance tohave the French represent it on the Joint Commission, and Am-bassador Reinhardt reported his doubt that the French offerwould "weigh heavt. ly in the balance. "g

Indeed, the United States itself was reluctant to back upthe British proposal to the Diem Government. As the Departmentof State informed Embassy Saigon on Apri. l 6, the implicationin the British draft statement that Diem was tied down to the"Geneva structure probably entirely unpalatable to Diem andcounter-productive our own interests. "& Reinhardt reported hisagreement that the United States "should not hasten to supportBritish dAmarche, particularly since underlying purpose, whichis to obtain Canadian and Indian acceptance of Government ofVietnam's declaration as sufficient basis for continued existenceInternational Control Coamission, may possibly be achieved with-out additional assurances being sought from Diem"4

Even before the original Vietnamese declaration had been t

drafted and delivered to Stephenson in Saigon on April 3, primeMinister Nehru, in a foreign affairs address before the IndianParliament on March 29, had alluded to the difficulties of thesuccession in Vietnam, declaring that, if the InternationalControl Commission were terminated, only trouble could result.He stated that India did not wish to leave the Commission andthat there were hopeful signs that South Vietnam might acceptthe obligations flowing from the Geneva Accords "and thus makeit easier for us to function. "5

on ly.

To Saigon, tel. 3377, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.2From Saigon, tel. 4080, Apr. 7, 1956, secret.

To Saigon, tel. 3377, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 4080, Apr. 7, 1956, secret.5Prom New Delhi, tel. 2153, Apr. 2, 1956, official use

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

~ 1~ ~ ~ tO ~~ ~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ O ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

~ O ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

lNPLSIFIM

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The Director of the Indian Department of Foreign AffairsM. J. Desai, informed Ambassador Cooper on April 9 that theIndian Government had not yet reached a decision on the accept-ability of the South Vietnamese declaration. Desai expressedhis own view that. the declaration represented a statement ofgood will without, however, any definite commi. tments to theInternational Control Commission. He made known his concernthat requests by the ICC for South Vietnam to act or desistfrom action would depend upon assurances by the United Kingdomrather than on obligations assumed by the Government oaf Vietnam.Desai suggested that the Saigon Government might acknowledgeits responsibilities as successor to the French or specify tothe ICC the obligations it was prepared to accept in the areasoutlined in the declaration. In the latter a~ant, the referenceto elections should mention a time-limit--one of perhaps twelvemonths--at the end of which the question would be reviewed. l

On the same day that Cooper and Desai discussed the mattersdescribed above, India's roving Ambassadoz, V. K. Krishna Menon,brought up the question of the Vietnamese declaration withForeign Secretary Lloyd in London. Menon told Lloyd that thedeclaration did not go far enough. He gave it as his opinionthat the North Vietnamese would agree only to a firm SouthVietnamese commicment to assume the obli'gations of the GenevaAccords and that they would accept a postponement of nationwideelections only if the South Vietnamese proved willing to seta new date for holding them. He suggested the convening of a"miniature Geneva Conference" to be attended by representativesof North and South Vietnam, the two Geneva Co-Chairmen, and thethree members of the International Control Commission. Nhe~Menon made the further, surprising suggestion that he be pezszlttedto sit in on the first meeting of the Co-Chairmen in London onApril 11, his proposal was firmly rejected by both Reading andGromyko. Menon was then reported to have left the Foreign Office"in somewhat of a huff".

Menon then .took his case to the French on April 12. Inthe light of Nehru's remarks before the Indian parliament at theend of the preceding month, the Fzench Foreign Office put little

1From New Delhi, tel. 2211, Apr. 9, 1956, secret.2To Saigon, tel. 3432, Apr. 12, 1956, secret; from London,

tel. 4599, Apr. 12, 1956, secret.

~0 ~ \ ~ ~ 1~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 1 ~~ ~ ~~0 ~ 1~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~ ~0~ ~ ~ ~~ f ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ \ ~0~ ~ 4

~ ~ ~ -s e k'I'll

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~I ~ ~4

stock in Menon's claims respecting the inadequacy of the SouthVietnamese declaration. It did agzee with Menon, however, thatit would be useful if Di.em could be persuaded to accept theprinciple of a review by the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen ofthe question of nationwide elections in 1957, in view of thefact that the Saigon Government would not be bound to followthe recommendations of the Co-Chairmen even if the latter shouldcall for elections.

Under instruction from the Poreign Office, the British Am-bassadors in Washington, Ottawa, Paris, and New Delhi attempted,on April 7, to gain support for the British proposal that theDiem Government elaborate on its April 3 declaration. TheBritish Government wished also to be able to tell Gromyko thatthe four countries approached considered the proposed revisedVietnamese declaration an adequate basis for maintaining thecease-fire and continuing the International Control Commission.

The Department of State informed the British on April 10that the United States could not support them in their newdemands on Saigon. Department officers informally handed toBritish Embassy representatives a confidential statement whichread as follows:

"The United States Government regards the Vietnamesedeclaration [of April 3J as a great step forward in terms ofthoughtful statesmanship and as evidence of the VietnameseGovernment's desire to cooperate with the free world in main-taining peace. The United States Government considers that theVietnamese Government's expression of willingness to continupeffective cooperation with the ICC, to assure the security of'the Coaanission members, and to facilitate in all possiblemeasure the accomplishment of the Cossaission's mission of peaceshould enable the ICC to continue its task of supervising thearmistice in Viet-Nam"

The Canadian Ministry of External Affairs communicatedits views on the original Vietnamese declaration to the AmericanEmbassy in Ottawa on April 10. The Canadians found the declaration

1Prom Paris, tel. 4775, Apr. 13, 1956, secret.

To Saigon, tel. 3402, Apr. 10, 1956, confidential.

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~I~ ~ 0

unsatisfactory, for it did not accept either de azure or de factoresponsibilities under the Armistice Agreement. Thus, when theFrench High Command became dissolved, the Canadians argued, therewould no longer be a responsible party in the south. Further-more, they did not believe that the Indians, Russians, or V~etNinh would accept the declaration. The Canadians were thereforesupporting the British attempt to obtain a confidential supple-mentary statement from the South Vietnamese Government. l

As reported to the Department of State by Ambassador Dillonon April 13, French Foreign Office spokesmen considered the Viet-namese declaration of April 3 as "not bad" and expressed pleasantsurprise that the Vietnamese had been willing to go so far. Theydoubted that much more could be extracted from Diem and belie~edthe declaration should be useful to the British in their currenttalks with the Russians. However, the French indicated theythought publication of the declaration by the Vietnamese onApril 6 had been a tactical mistake. The declaration might havebeen produced duziug the British-Soviet talks as a "great achieve-ment and the best that could be obtained. " In spite of this,the French felt that something could be worked out in London,using the declazation as a basis.

In a nota handed to British Ambassador Stephenson on April 10,the South Uietnamese Government clarified the meaning of someof the phraseology employed in its April 3 declaration. Britishattention was invited in particular to the phrases "will upholdexisting conditions of the present state of peace" and "will tothe fullest extent possible facilitate the accomplishment ofits mission of peace. " By these phrases, the Government of- .

Uietnam stated, it meant to cooperate with the ICC in copingwith the following remaining problems: (1) supervision of thedemarcation line; (I) supervision of ports and airfields, as wellas all frontiers of Uietnam, to prevent the introduction of armedforces, military personnel, war material, and munitions; (3) lib-eration of prisoners of war; (4) complaints about reprisals,sabotage, and property destruction; and (5) deactivatiou of theJoint Armistice Commission with the dissolution of the FrenchHigh Command. 2

To Saigon, tel. 3411, Apr. 11, 1956, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 4105, Apr, ll, 1956, secret.

1. ... ..1

. ..~.. '.'LkSSII:IN

~0 000 ~ ~ 000 ~~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~

~bAli. l 0 Pf to liC0 0 d 10 uuo

While the British Government, as Co-Chairman of the GenevaConference, sought a firmez South Vietnamese commitment respect-ing the upholding of the Geneva Accords on the eve of meetingwi th its Russian counterpart, the matter of the future function-ing of the InternationaL Control Commission undez its existingmandate--a question with which the Geneva Co-Chairmen wouldinevitably be seized--was raised by the North Vietnamese. Wheninformed by the International Control Commission of France' sformal noti. fication of intent to dissolve the French High Commandin Indochina on April 280 the authorities in Hanoi took thisoccasi.on to present their views on the South Vietnamese declara-tion of April 3. In a lengthy letter to the ICC dated April LO,General Vo Nguyen Gi.ap, the North Vietnamese Hinister of NationalDefense, descri. bed the South Vietnamese declaration as "unsatis-factory". Both France and the Government of South Vietnam, Giapcontended, were co-responsible for implementing the cease-fireand the Geneva Conference Declaration in toto. With the pend-ing withdrawal of the French and the refusal of the Saigon Govern-.ment to accept the Geneva Accords, he continued, a situation wasdeveloping in which the ICC would be unable to continue to functionaccording to its mandate Giap therefore urged the convening ofa new Geneva Conference.

With similar concern, but from a somewhat different pointof view, at the time that it explained its support of Britishefforts to secure an additional statement from the South Viet-namese Government on the future of the armistice arrangementg,the Canadian Hinistry of External Affairs set forth its views 'toAmerican Embassy officials on the future of the ICC in Vietnam.The Hinistry foresaw a lengthy period of consultation betweenthe British and the Soviets and, possibly among the other GenevaConference powers on the entire Cease-Pire machinery. During thisperiod of negotiation, the Canadians stated& the InternationalControl Commission could be expected to carry on its work on anad hoc basis--an arrangement agreeable to the Canadian Govern-ment, provided the Indian and Polish Governments also agreed.

1From Saigon, tel. 4138, Apr. 13, 1956, secret. In report-ing the content of the Giap letter, Ambassador Reinhardt inSaigon recommended that the ICC "take a stand" on Giap's positionand request the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen to act promptly.

~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~00 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ ~ ~

~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0

~0 ~0 ~ ~ \ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 F 0 ' ~ 0 ~

~ F 0 ' 0 ~~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~0 ~ ~ 0 „'Lhddi'HE0

~ \~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 40 ~~ ~ 0 ~~y ~ ~ \ ~

~ ~~ ~ ~~ tt ~~ ~ ~~1~ ~ ~

a ~ ~ ~~ 1 ~ ~ ~

~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ 0 ~

~ 0~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 0 UNCLASSIFIED

The Ministry also said that, during the period of ad hoc opera-tion of the ICC, the Saigon Government should cooperate sndpermit completion of some of the "stalled investigations" ofcease-fire violations in order to convince the Indians that itwould be possible to make the armistice work despite the obduracyof South Vietnam on the question of legal responsibilities. Inthe Canadians' view, the Vietnamese should never refuse to takeaction requested by the ICC merely on the grounds that SouthVietnam was not a party to the cease-fire agreement and there-fore not bound by its terms. 1

Nhen the Reading-Gromyko talks got under way on April 11,the Co-Chairmen had before them two papers for consideration.One was the South Vietnamese note of April 3 tv the United King-dom whi. ch, Reading told Gromyko, the British Government con-sidered as constituting acceptance of the substance of theprincipal continuing provisions of the Cease-Fire agreement. inVietnam. The British thus believed that the South Vietnamesenote provided an adequate basis for maintaining the cease-fireafter the dissolution of the French High Command on April. 28 andfor continued supervision by the ICC.

The second item on which the Co-Chairmen had to act was acommunication from the International Control Commission, trans-mitted to the British Foreign Office by the Indian High Commissionin London on April 9, which included the text of a letter ofApril 3 to the ICC from the French High Commissioner in Vietnam.The French confirmed that, pursuant to a request by the Govern-ment of South Vietnam on January 19, the French High Commandwould cease to function as of April 28. The French offezed, - .

however, to continue logistic support of the ICC up to June 30.On the basis of the information received from the French, theICC requested of the Geneva Co-Chairmen "the necessary directionto the Commission".

To Saigon, tel. 3411, Apr. 11, 1956, secret.

"Proposal by Her Ma)esty's Government sent to Mr. Gromykoon April 13", confidential, de1ivered to the Department of Stateby representatives of the British Embassy, Washington, April 13,1956.

3Note No. 262, British Embassy, Nashington, April 19, 1956,confidential.

"::':%NCLASSIHEO

On Apri. l 19, the Co-Chairmen addressed a message to theChairman of the International Control Commission (as well as toall members of the Geneva Conference and the remaining supervisorypowers) stating that the Co-Chairmen were "considering the situ-ation which has arisen in Vietnam in relation to the Geneva Agree-ments". In reply to the Commi. ssion's request for directionsthe Co-Chairmen's message continued, "they wish strongly toexpress the view that the fact that the Co-Chairmen are now con-sidering the situation should not affect the work of the Inter-national Supervisory Commission in Vietnam, which should remainin being and continue its normal activiti. es. "1

The Co-Chairmen's letter brought differing reactions fromthe various interested parties. On April 25, the Canadian Embassyreported to the Department of State the views of its Governmentand those of Poland; Embassy Saigon reported the reactions ofIndia, France, and South Vietnam. The Canadian Government pro-posed that the International Control Commission should proceedon the assumption, following French withdrawal from Vietnam onApril 28, that the whole fabric of the armistice agreement inVietnam remained in force and act as if the Government of Viet-nam had in fact agreed to take over French responsibilities. tOttawa also suggested that the Canadian member of the ICC shoulddo what he could to prevent the Commission from becoming pre-occupied with the anomalies of the situation and from trying tosolve too many anticipated troubles in advance. In the Canadians'view, the Commi. ssion should consider i.ts job as the strictlypractical one of assisting the parties to maintain the armistice.

As reported by the Canadians, the Poli.sh Government had,suggested a conference among representatives of North and SouthVietnam, the three ICC Powers, the United Kingdom, and theU, S.S.R. in order to find an "acceptable solution" to the problemof supervising the armistice following French withdrawal--a"miniature" Geneva Conference of the kind earlier proposed byKrishna Menon. The Polish member of the ICC had given theCanadian member the impression, however, that hi. s Governmentwould agree to continue to serve on the Commission afterApril 2S and accept an ad hoc working arrangement if no betteralternative presented itself. &

Ibid.2To Saigon, tel. 3583, Apr. 25, 1956, secret.

DHC!.ASSIFH

As expressed by its representative on the ICC, the IndianGovernment viewed the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen's letterof April 19 as of little help to the Control Commission, forthe ICC could not continue its normal activities after April 28,as requested by the Co-Chai. rmen, unless there was a second legalparty to the cease-fire, which party should be South Vietnam.Parthasarathi contended that the Commi. ssion could not correspondwith the Saigon Government regarding implementation of specificarticles of the Geneva Accords as long as South Vietnam insistedthat it was not bound by them--a position Foreign Minister Nauhad repeated on April 19.

Aware of the Indian viewpoint, the French in Saigon expressedwillingness to continue the liaison duties wi. th both the ICCand the Joint Armistice Commission after April 28 and even beyondJune 30 for an indefinite period if the South Vietnamese Govern-ment and the Viet Minh were agreeable and if the Co-Chairmenmade the request to the French. The French would then operatevis-k-vis the ICC and the JAC on the basis of the GenevaAgreements and with the Government of Vietnam on the basis ofVietnamese commitments to be made to the French similar to thosecontained in Saigon's declaration of April 3 to the British.

In return for continuing their liaison duties, the Frenchexpected a cooperative attitude on the partof the South Viet-namese Government in providing the French with military facilitiesin Vietnam. French officials in Saigon frankly stated to Am-bassador Reinhardt that they would not and could not politicallyrefuse a request by the Co-Chairmen for some continued Frenchassistance after April 28, but that French willingness to existwould be conditioned by South Vietnam's reaction to the Frenchrequest for facilities: "If the Vietnamese treat us as enemiesrather than allies, we will naturally be less enthusiastic abouthelping them with the Geneva agreements. "

Reinhardt reported that recent conversations with Viet-namese officials revealed that the Government of Vietnam preferredthe dissolution of the Joint Armistice Commission but might pos-sibly agree to the French continuing liai. son with the Viet Minhtemporarily if the Co-Chairmen oz the ICC deemed it necessary.The Saigon Government definitely preferred, however, to take overfrom the French the liaison responsibilities with the ICC as soonas possible. &

From Saigon, tel. 4282, Apr. 25, 1956, confidential.

~ ~ 1 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 F 0' 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t1 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~

~ o~ ~~ ~

~ ~

,-. ::,-:. ..:::..-...::::,:..::::. WPUISSlF0In light of the reactions of the various interested parties(France and Vietnam, in particular) to the Co-Chairmen's requestthat the ICC continue to function beyond April 28, the American

and British Ambassadors in Saigon conferred on April 25. Theyagreed that Stephenson would approach Vietnamese Foreign MinisterMau to determine whether the Saigon Government wished the Co-Chairmen to ask the French to continue thei. r liaison functions'wi. th the ICC for a bzief period beyond April 28 (a service whichwas not to be construed as a continuation of the French HighCommand) and their liaison with the Joint Armistice Commissionfor an indefinite period uncS. 1 some othez arrangement could beworked out. Reinhardt and Stephenson considered the Indianarguments against having the ICC deal directly with the VietnameseGovernment, but they believed that these arguments both could andshould be subordinated to the apparent wish of Vietnam to conductits own liaison with the ICC . The two Ambassadors agreed thatconsent by all parties to having France continue the Joint Azmi-.stf ce Commission would be desirable, for the Commission couldthen undertake to effect amendments which the Vietnamese wishedto have made in certain of the Armistice protocols--in particular,those on the Demilitarized Zone, arms imports, and the Viet Minh;liaison mission. "

Ambassadob Stephenson then coordinated his approach to theVietnamese with the Canadian and Indian members of the ICC, and,on April 27, D, M. Johnson of Canada had the first interview withForeign Minister Mau. Johnson pointed out to Mau the proceduralproblems the ICC would face after the Fzench withdrawal on April 28.He stressed the need for the Vietnamese to have the Indians ontheir side, and he therefore zeccmmended that the Saigon Govern-ment avoid making statements to the full Cosmission rejecting '

outright the Armistice protocols, for to do so would place theIndian Chairman in a difficult position. Mau replied that hisGovernment considered the protocols in the same light as theprovisions of the cease-fire--Vietnam had not signed them and wastherefore not bound by them, but nevertheless considered them asa part of the "eccisting conditions" which the Vietnamese Govern-ment had accepted in the April 3 declaration. Mau stated furtherthat his Government would like to establi. sh direct liaison withthe ICC as soon as possible and to see the JAC dissolved. Pending

From Saigon, tel. 4282, Apr. 25, 1956, confidential.

.. ... .. ... ,~,.. . , liFMSlflMoo eel ~ ~ ~ ~ eO eo ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ oa ~ \ ~

dissolution, Vietnam would agree, if both Co-Chairmen so requested,to have the French participate in the JAC temporarily until someother solution was found.

Reinhardt and Stephenson then called on Mau, prior to thelatter's interview with Parthasarathi, and recommended that, inhis discussion with the Chairman of the ICC, Mau not be drawninto a detailed discussion of Vietnam's intended implementationof its April 3 declaration. Both Ambassadors pointed out thatthe Polish member of the ICC was obviously interested in gettingthe Foreign Minister to make statements which could be usedagainst the Vietnamese Government. Accordingly, both urged Maunot to fall into a trap and that, in his talks with CommissionChairman Pazthasarathi, he stick to the general position andrefrain from interpreting in detail the term "existing conditions".

Reinhardt reported to the Department that his and Stephenson'sadvice apparently "bore some fruit. " According to the ICC Chair-man of the Saigon Office, Avtar Singh, Parthasarathi's talk withMau went smoothly. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister had provedto be a "paragon of reasonableness". Parthasarathi had felt,however, that Mau's assurances needed to be expressed to the Co-Chairmen rather than to the ICC. 1

As the date set by the French for dissolution of the HighCommand in Vietnam came and passed, the International ControlCommission became fully occupied with a debate on the questionof its own survival. By April 30& as reported by Reinhardt fromSaigon, the Commission had yet to reach agreement on the textof a reply to the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen's letter of - .April 19 requesting it to continue i.ts normal activities until asolution to the French withdrawal had been found.

On April 30, the Co-Chairmen sent a second letter to the ICCstating that, not having been informed to the contrary, theyassumed that the ICC would continue to operate. The ICC reachedthe tentative conclusion that it would have to inform the Co-Chairmen that the Commission could not continue without specificoperating instructions from the Co-Chairmen2 and subsequently sotold them in a letter of May 2.

1From Saigon, tel, tel. 4323, Apr. 28, 1956, confi. dential.

2From Saigon, tel. 4344, Apr. 30& 1956, confidential.

~I 0 ~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ ~ P~ 0 ~ 4 ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 I le ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~

~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ \ ~ ~ 0

ilKLhSSIFIE0

The result of these vazious exchanges of views was that thetalks between the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen, represented bythe Marquess of Reading and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko,which had opened in London on April 11, terminated on May 8 withthe issuance of a series of letters. Two identic communicationswere addressed to the authorities in Saigon and Hanoi expressingconcern about "the present situation in relation to the fulfilmentof the Geneva Agreements in Vietnamf where the implementation ofthe political provisions of the Geneva Agreements has not yetbegun. " The communications pointed out that no consultationsconcerning the holding of elections had yet taken place and thatthis constituted a threat to the fulfilment of an important pro-vision of the Agreements. The Co-Chairmen urged both sides toprevent any future violation of the military provisi. ons of theAgreements and to insure the implementation of the politicalprovisions embodied in the Final Declaration. To this end, bothparti. es were invited to transmit to the Co-Chairmen "as soon aspossible, either jointly or separately, their views about thetime required for the opening of consultations on the organisationof nation-wide elections in Vietnam and the time required for theholding of elections as a means of achieving the unification ofVietnam. "1

A third letter, addressed to the Government of France, notedthe French announcement of the dissolution of the High Commandon April 28. The Co-Chairmen stated that this action had createdproblems for the ICC, but they expressed confidence that bothparts of Vietnam would cooperate. They invited the French todiscuss these problems with the Government of South Vietnam inorder to reach agzeement on an arrangement which would facilitatethe tasks of the ICC and the Joint Armistice Cofuffission. TheCo-Chairmen asked that, until such arrangements had been agreedupon, the French Government preserve the status ~uo. 2

tfl dthGR~:D*~tf hDf l. ~ t R t f H ~H'* G

d h G f h D f. f S S t fl. ~fhl' H tdin London in ~Ari1 and ~Ma 1956 March 30-~Ma 8 1956 (Cmd. 9763),pp. 10-11.

2Ibid. , p. 12.

WL'MSIFIEO~S ~ \ ~ ~ S ~ H ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~S ~ \ ~ ~ G ~

~ ~ DG ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ DE ~ D H AD ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ H ~~ AS HD ~ ~ ~ G ~ ~ ST ~ ~

~ \ ooo ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ e ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~e ooo oe eel

~ ~o \ ~ ~ ooo ~~ ~ e \ ~ ~ ~:o ' Z62'' o~ ~ oo ~o ~ ~ ~

~ \ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ o ~ ~o NCf@li0

The Co-Chairmen also sent a letter to the International ControlCoaxnission, acknowledging receipt of its communication of May 2,and expressing the "hope that the International Supervisory Com-mission will persevere in their efforts to maintain and strengthenpeace in Vietnam on the basis of the fulfilment of the GenevaAgreements on Vietnam with a view to the reunification of thecountry through the holding of free nation-wide elections in Viet-nam under the supervision of an international commission. " TheCo-Chairmen recognized that the dissolution of the French HighCommand had created difficulties for the ICC. They expressedtheir confidence, however, that "the authorities in both parts ofVietnam will show effective cooperation and that these difficultieswill in practice be removed, " They concluded thei. r message bysaying that, if the Commission should encounter any problems whichcould not be solved "on the spot, the Co-Chairmen would be grate-ful to be informed, so that they may consider whether any furthermeasures are required to facilitate the work of the Commission. "1

Finally, the Co-Chairmen sent messages to the remaining GenevaConference Powers informing them of the Co-Chairmen's appeal tothe ICC.

In what the Department of State recognized as having been"relatively difficult negotiati. on with the Soviet Union", 2 theReading-Gromyko talks had resulted, in the opinion of the BritishForeign Office, in "binding over the gap caused by the dissolutionof the French High Command. " The British admitted, both in Wash-ington and Saigon, that inserting the reference to nation-wideelections in the Co-Chairmen's messages to North and South Viet-nam and to the ICC was the price they had had to pay to preventRussian insistence on convening a new Geneva Conference. As theDepartment interpreted the situation, the British had not been

sanguine enough about South Vietnam to risk a possible ma/orexplosion in bargaining hard with the Soviet Union on the issue. "3

Ibid. , p. 11.2To Saigon, tel. 3749, May 11, 1956, secret.

3Memorandum by Kattenburg (SEA)(British Embassy), Young and Kocherfrom Saigon, tel. 4442, May 9, 1956,May 11, 1956, secret.

of conversation among Youde(SEA), May 9, 1956, confidential;secret; to Saigon& tel. 3749,

~o ~ o ~ ~ o~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~o ~ o ~ ~ ~

I%',5%IIB~ ~ ~o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~o ~

UNGLASSIHEDAs reported by the Department to Embassy Saigon on May 11,

the United States felt that the United Kingdom and the SovietUnion had emerged from the London talks "as the institutionalizedarbiters of the implementation of the Geneva Agreements in Viet-nam". The Department put as favorable a construction as it couldon the actions of the Co-Chairmen, pointing out that the "immedi tec adanger of a new conference had been averted, that more time hadbeen gained in which to strengthen South Vietnam, that the armisticewas being preserved, and that i.t was unlikely that nationwideelections would be held in 1956, for the Co-Chairmen had not seta new date for pre-election consultations between North and SouthVietnam or for the elections themselves.

At the same time, the Department noted "several unfortunateaspects" in the letters which the Co-Chairmen had sent out. Themessages continued to stress the "old Geneva Agreements", bywhich South Vietnam refused to be bound, and ignored Saigon'sdeclaration of April 3. The Co-Chairmen had given the ICC amuch stronger mandate to implement the political provisions ofthe Final Declaration. The stress on elections would probablyprove "highly unpalatable" to the South Vietnamese. Finally, the'.Saigon Government was unlikely to agree for very long to continu-&ation of French liaison with the ICC and JAC and was equally un-likely to accept French obligations under the Geneva Agreements. l

Ambassador Reinhardt reported from Saigon his belief thatthe Indians, while not happy about the results of the Londontalks, would accept them on the grounds that the Co-Chairmenwere "the principals in this affair". ~ From New Delhi, theAmerican Chargd, Frederic P. Bartlett, reported that M. J. Desaiof the Indian Ministry of External Affairs had told him that heregarded the situation in Vietnam following the meetings in Londonas "fairly satisfactory" for the time being. Desai observed, how-ever, that the maintenance of the armistice would depend uponwhether the Vietnamese Government would in practice permit theICC to carry out its duties in South Vietnam; otherwise the ICCwould be unable to do so in North Vietnam because the principleof reciprocity had to be preserved. He stressed that this pointwas absolutely vital to the continued operation of the ICC.

1To Saigon, tel. 3749, May 11, 1956, secret.

%rom Saigon, tel. 4461, May 11, 1956, secret.

st~ 4~ ~~ 0~0

~ 1~ 4 ~ ~~ ~ ~'\ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~0 ~ Ol OO ~

~ ~~I~~ ~~ ~

~e et~ ~ ~ ~ 0

~ t ~ ~se ei ~ '~

~ ~ Ol~ ~

~ ~~ ~ 4 ~

~awe~4~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 0 Nt'&&SS&Re

Desai assumed that Diem would delay answering that portionof the Co-Chairmen's letter concerning the holding of electionsas long as possible and that, when he did reply, he would ineffect reiterate that the Vietnamese Government favored freeelections, but that condi. tions were not ripe for a frui. tful con-sideration of such elections. Thus the electi. on issue would bepostponed for the time being. l

The French Government made an interim reply on May 14 tothe Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen's message of May 8 and professeditself ready, as the Co-Chairmen had requested, to use its goodoffices and discuss with the Co-Chairmen problems that mightari. se with the Government of South Vietnam, Thi. s offer was madewith two reservations, however: (1) the French Government feltit could not accept new responsibi. lities pecularly its own, and(2) its good offices would be exercised in the framework ofeffective cooperation with the Government of South Vietnam; thesegood offices would stop if such cooperation was absent. 2

In its reply of May 22 to the Co-Chairmen, the Saigon Govern-ment reaffirmed its desire for peace and pledged itself, although:not bound by the Geneva Agreements, to seek practical solutionsto the extent that these were compatible with its policy of peaceand the "imperatives of its sovereignty". Vietnam repeated itsdetermination to respect the demarcation line and the DemilitarizedZone, pointing out that there could be no menace to peace by aGovernment which had reduced considerably the size of its armysince 1954 and which had caused the withdrawal of the FrenchExpeditionary Corps. The Vietnamese also stated that the ICCdeserved effective cooperation, and they envisaged "reinforcing"existing cooperation "still further in the future".

With regard to elections, the Government of Vietnam said itconsidered that really free general elections constituted ademocratic means of attaining reunification but that "the absenceof all liberties in North Vietnam renders the problem of electoraland pre-electoral arrangements one to which no practical considera-tion can be given for the moment. "

1From New Delhi, tel. 2514, May 17, 1956, secret2Noble Frankland, ed. , Documents on International Affairs,

1956 (London, Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 723.

llKLASSIHEO~ \ ~ 0 ~I ~

~ y ~ 0 ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ Jo ~~ ~ ~ 4~ \ ~0% 04

~ ~~ e ~~ ~ OO~ ~ ~~ e 0 ~

~ y ~ ~ ~ & ~ ~0'~~ ~J6$ ~ ~ ~~,I 5a. ~ o ~

e ~ ~ ~ ~ '~~ O ~ * ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~

0~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~

&~G~ Rllflkll

Ambassador Reinhardt reported that the Vietnamese reply hadbeen drafted by Foreign Minister Mau, assisted by Diem's brotherNgo Dinh Luyen, at that time Vietnamese Ambassador to GreatBritain, and reflected efforts of Bri.tish Ambassador Stephensonand himself to have it as positive as possible. Reinhardt hopedthat the reference to "reinforcing" cooperation with the ICCwould prove especially helpful in reassuring the Indians.

From London, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the reactionto the South Vietnamese answer to the Co-Chairmen's message wasone of relief, since the Foreign Office considered the reply couldhave been much worse. The Foreign Office deplored the degree offirmness with which the Saigon Government repudiated the GenevaAgreements and would have preferred a "vague bow" in the directionof elections rather than a deliberate attack on the Viet Minh'slack of democracy. In general, Aldrich reported, the ForeignOffice considered that Diem's best course should be to ignorethe legalities of the Geneva Agreements and accept quietly theprinciples behind them.

The ICC replied on May 27 to the Co-Chairmen, and stated itwould persevere in the efforts to maintain peace in Vietnam,would inform the Co-Chairmen of any obstacles or difficultiesencountered, and would continue to deal with the parties on thebasis of the status Buo "until the arrangements that will facilitatethe work of the International Supervisory Commission and of theJoint Commission in Vietnam' had been put into effect. 3

The North Vietnamese authorities adopted a hard line in thai. rreply of June 4 to the Co-Chairmen on implementation of thepolitical provisions of the Geneva Conference Final Dec&aration.They urged the Co-Chairmen to persuade the Saigon Government toenter into the pre-election consultations called for in the FinalDeclaration. "If the South Vietnam authorities continue to adopta negative attitude towards consultations and general elections, "the North Vietnamese reply concluded, "the Government of the

"From Saigon, tel. 4599, May 24, 1956& confidenti. al.2Prom London, tel. 5674, June S, 1956, conf identi. al.Prom Saigon, tel. 4763, June 7, 1956, secret; enclosure to

Bri.tish Embassy Note No. 401, Nashington, June 20, 1956, confi-denti. al.

Democratic Republic of Vietnam will ask the two Co-Chairmen toconvene a new Geneva Conference to discuss the question of theimplementation of the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam. " The Hanoiauthorities agreed, however, that, until the political provisionsof the Geneva Accords had been carried out, it was essentialthat the Inteznational Control Commission continue its functions.

r hU * D F ~A* fM P hRes onsibilities Under the Geneva Accords

In response to the request of the Geneva Co-Chairmen, theFrench and South Vietnamese Governments addressed themselves onceagain to the problem of negotiating the de facto assumption bythe South Vietnamese of responsibilities carried out by the Frenchunder the Geneva Accords. As reported by the American Embassy inSaigon, on the subject of liaison with the ICC the South VietnameseGovernment definitely wished to deal directly with the Control Com-mission. They had told the French that Vietnam would take overFrench liaison responsibilities within one month from the date ofFrench agreement to pay ICC cash expenses. The takeover wouldmean that Vietnam would replace French officers in the liaisonmission in Saigon and those attached to the fixed and mobile teamsin South Vietnam. They would not replace the French attached toteams in North Vietnam nor in the French liaison mission in Hanoi. ,which would be terminated. With the Vietnamese takeover from theFrench, all Viet Minh liaison officers in South Vietnam would berequired to leave. The French response had been favorable to thisvi.ew.

With regard to logistic support, the South Vietnamese Govern-ment was willing to supply liaison personnel and military staff tosupervise logistic support and quarters for the ICC, provided thequarters were Vietnamese-owned. South Vietnam was unwilling, how-ever, to make any cash outlay for food, servants, transportation,or rental of living quarters. The Vietnamese argued that theywould appear "successors" if they assumed French financial re-sponsibilities oz zequested French aid in writing. In reportingthese divergent vi. ews, Ambassador Reinhardt expressed his beliefthat the French might eventually agree to pay the costs "i.fpackaged deal re ICC liaison and JAC materializes. "

Trankland, ~0. cit. , pp. 726-728

%&I.ll%l/B

~g ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~i ~~ ~ ~ ~ya F 0' ~ '~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~~ 0 ~~ ~

~o oe~ ~

~ ~a ~

~ 0 ~ 0

~ ~~ ~~ ~ 0~ ~~ oee

~0 ~ ~ I~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~I ~ IO

Concerning the Joint Armistice Commission, South Vietnamwas willing to have the French continue sezving on this Com-mission but would not formally request them to do so for fearof the implication that the Vietnamese were legally responsibleand the French were merely their representatives. The Frenchfor their part, were willing to continue on the JAC, providedthere was no implication that France was a legal party. TheFrench insisted that the South Vietnamese Government requesttheir "good offices" in writing and give assurances that Viet-nam would cooperate effectively with the French officer on theJAC. Since the Saigon Government had reJected this proposal,the French were seeking some other formula and were currentlytrying to persuade ICC Chairman Parthasarathi not to insist onclarification of the legal responsibility, provided a practicalsolution was found.

Reinhardt stated further that the French did not believethe JAC could be eliminated because the continuation of both theICC and the JAC was the price the Briti.sh had pai. d the Russiansin the Reading-Gromyko talks for agreement not to press for Julyelections. The French also pointed out that the ICC itselfinsisted that it was responsible only for supervising the imple-mentation of the Geneva Agreements, whereas the JAC was the bodyresponsible for the actual implementation of the cease-fire andcould not be eliminated without destroying the armistice.Reinhardt said he believed this was the "line" of the IndianChairman of the ICC, Parthasarathi, but that the real reasonsagainst eliminating the JAC might well be Viet Minh pressures toretain it and Indian reluctance to terminate the only body whichthe Indians considered offered the best possibility of estab1ish-ing contact between the North and the South.

Reinhardt then described the situation regarding patrol ofthe Demilitarized Zone. He said that the JAC was responsible forpatrol, investigation of incidents, and issuance of' passes toenter the DMZ or to cross the 17th parallel. Howevez, the Frenchand Viet Minh on the JAC had not been permitted in either half ofthe DMZ for many months. According to Reinhardt, the JAC had be-come only a forum for discussing the problems of the Zone; itsability to patrol it was "nil". 1

1Prom Saigon, tel. 4830, June 12, 1956, secret.

In discussions with the French in Saigon in rnid-June, BritishAmbassador Stephenson learned that Paris continued to refuse topay the costs of maintaining the ICC whenever the VietnameseGovernment took over liaison functions with the ICC; the FrenchGovernment also refused to participate in the JAC unless theSouth Vietnamese requested such participation in writing.Stephenson had then suggested to London that Secretary Dullesbe asked to discuss the situation in his forthcoming talks withFrench Foreign Minister Pineau and, in support of the Bri.tishposition, point out that the Co-Chairmen's May 8 notes actuallymet the desire of France to be released from the cease-fire re-sponsibilities. As a great Power, France could afford to accept,without any loss of prestige, the "slightly equivocal" situationwhich might result from continuing to pay the ICC costs, andparticipate in the JAC without a written mandate from the Viet-namese. The Government of Vietnam, on the other hand, could notafford to adopt an equivocal position with respect to the GenevaAgreements because of the sensitive internal political situation.Therefore, the British urged the French to adopt a more sympatheticattitude and to reconsider their position in the interests of allparties concerned.

t

In a conversation with the Second Secretary of the AmericanEmbassy in Saigon on June 26, the ICC Chairman, George Parthasarathi,expressed the opinion that there would probably be a crisis in theICC shortly unless the Viet Minh received satisfaction respectingeither the cease-fire arrangements (the South Vietnamese takingresponsibility from the French, including representation on theJoint Armistice Commission) or a political settlement (setting adate for general elections). He thought that the Viet Minh wouldnot be willing to lose out on both points since they were alreadyresentful at having lost all else they had won at Geneva. Partha-sarathi said that, officially, he had 'to support the Geneva Agree-ments, but he realized, unofficially, that "elections could notbe held now. " In the meantime, he warned, some method had to befound to reduce the tension between North and South Vietnam. Hethought the only solution seemed to be "neutralization" of Vietnam,guaranteed by the major powers. 2

From Saigon, tel. 4887, June 16, 1956, secret.

From Saigon, enclosure to desp. No. 393, June 26, 1956,confidential.

ui bl~djiflg.~0 IO ~ ~ 0 OI ~ ~ \ i0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ 1~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The French had already, on June 20, made known to the Britishtheir own counterproposaL to Ambassador Stephenson's suggestion.The French proposed to show to the Vietnamese their reply ofMay L4 to the Co-Chairmen's letter of May 8 (including the reser-vations contained therein) and request a written acknowledgmentfrom the Vietnamese saying, at least, that they had "no objection"to the French reservations. No mention would be made by eitherside of the responsibilities each would assume under the termsset forth in the French reply. The French would then inform theCo-Chairmen that, with respect to their own responsibilitiesunder the cease-fire, Prance would cooperate in the continuedfunctioning of the ICC and would furnish personnel for serviceon the JAC . They would add that they had discussed these arrange-ments with the Vietnamese Government, which had posed no objection.

In discussing this approach with the American Chargd in Paris,French Foreign Office officials expressed the hope that it wouldbe acceptable to the South Vietnamese and to the Co-Chairmen, forthe French reply appeared to meet the points made in the latter'sNay 8 letter. They acknowledged that it was uncertain whetherthe Prench proposal would satisfy the ICC and the Viet Minh. The'Poreign Office gave assurance that Prance would continue to"advance" funds for maintenance of the ICC without requiring awritten request from Vietnam that this be done, hoping to reachagreement later with the Vietnamese on the matter of futurefinancing of the Commission. l

As reported by Ambassador Reinhardt, any final Franco-Vietnamese understanding would be contingent on solution of thequestion of financial support of the ICC, and the French wishedto resolve this issue through a secret bilateral agreement withthe Vietnmnese pledging the latter to reimburse Prance for itscash advances to the ICC. The Vietnamese contended that such anarrangement could be concealed neither from the French nor theVietnamese National Assemblies; they also continued to object topaying the local costs of the ICC lest they appear to be "suc-cessors" to the French. With respect to the JAC, however, theFrench were prepared to agree to provide personnel from July 1,1956, onward until such time as the tasks of the JAC were assumedby the ICC.2

From Paris, tel. 6080, June 21, 1956, confidential.2

From Saigon, tel. 5020, June 27, 1956, confidential.

Added impetus for some kind of Franco-Vi tnetnamese agreement

a reed witon the succession problem came when, on Jul 11 hn u y, t e Bri.tishagree with the Soviet Union, af ter what Ambassador Aldrichdescribede as considerable coszsendable stalling", to the publicrelease on July 15 of the replies to the Co-Chof Ma 8. The

o e o- airmen s messageso y . e British Poreign Office sent messages to the Frenchand Vietnamese Governments urging them to dthe future

sen an agree reply ondt e uture of the ICC and the JAC prior to July 15. As the Bri.tishtold Aldrich, the French and Vietnamese replies were not to bepublished with the other messages to the Co-Ch i b 1

lace the Brit'p ace the British in the position of being able to contend thatsubstantial progress was being made in complying ith th Cw e o-

airmen s desires and that the parties could not be blamed forinaction on the elections question in view of the shortness oftime. l

It was not until July 23, however, that the French and Viet-namese finally and officially exchanged notes, dated July 14, onthe succession. By this exchange, the French agreed to continueto pay the local costs of the ICC in Vietnam, subject to a laterapportionment of the costs. They also agreed that, as long asit was necessary to have the JAC, they would continue to erveha body, provided the South Vietnamese extended the necessary

cooperation. The Vietnamese, for their part, agreed to establisha iaison mission with the ICC, replacing the French, sometime be-tween July 15 and August 15. Because they did not consider them-

underselves a party to the Geneva Agreements, however the w ldy wou notun ertake to contribute to the local expenses of the ICC. Re-specting the JAC, the Vietnamese agreed to extend the same privilegesto the French serving on that body as they did to administraeivepersonnel at the French Embassy in Sai.gon, and they guaranteed theirfreedom of movement and security in Saigon, Toursne, Dong-Ha, andthe Demi1itarized Zone. 2

that becIn mid-August, the Vietnamese informed Ambassador Rei h dt

a , ecause of administrative and fiscal problems, South Viet-n ar

bilit fnam had postponed until August 31 the assumptio f f 11

ty or liaison with the ICC. A financial problem had arisen

From London, tel. 177, July 11, 1956, secret.2Prom Saigon, tel. 287, July 24, 1956, and British Embassy

Note No. 518, Nashington, Aug. 13, 1956, both confidential.

~ \ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~ 0

~ \ ~ ~ ~~ ~ e~ ~ I~~ ~ ~~ ~

~ y ~ 1~ ~

~ ~~ ~

~ \ ~ 0

gLKSSIHE0~ ~~ ~~ os~ ~~ ~ 0 ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~1~ 4 ~

from the fact that the French had agreed to advance funds forICC local expenses in two installments (two million pi.asters forSeptember, and six million in a lump sum for the following threemonths) but had made no commitments for the following year. Withregard to the financial "pool" for the expenses of the ICC (towhich the United Kingdom, Prance, the Soviet Union, and Chinawere committed to contribute equally), during the two years since1954 Prance had contributed funds averaging 10 million pias tersa month and had become a creditor nation. Since June of 1956,however, the French had refused to make any further advances,and these were currently being made by the Indian Government. l

While not a factor in delaying final resolution of thesuccession problem, acceptance of the results was threatenedwhen, on August 21, the North Vietnamese Defense Minister, GeneralGiap, sent a letter to the ICC Chairman complaining that Franco-Vietnamese liaison arrangements were incompatible with the GenevaAgreement and the Co-Chairmen's May 8 note. Ambassador Reinhardtreported. that the Giap letter appeared to be a "new item in oldseries standard complaints against GVN for alleged non-imple-mentation Geneva Agreement. " He said that, in the opinion ofthe Embassy, the Giap letter was a propaganda document full ofinaccuracies, offering little new, and that it therefore was un-worthy of consideration. However, he stated that, according tothe British, the Indians on the International Control Commissionseemed inclined to support Giap's thesis and to interpret theLetter as the North's refusal to "accept validity present arrange-ments. " The Canadians opposed this view, saying that any inter-pretation was beyond the Commission's competence and could bemade only by the Co-Chairmen. Reinhardt said that the Embassyagreed with the Canadian position. The Indians had cabled NewDelhi. for instructions, and the British in Saigon were suggestingthat the Poreign Office instruct their Embassy in New Delhi. tosupport the Canadians. 2

Despite North Vietnamese objections, the final transfer ofresponsibilities for Liaison with the ICC and representation onthe JAC occurred on September 12 when Colonel Bertrand, Chief of

From Saigon, tel. 564, Aug. 16, 1956, confidential.2From Saigon, tel. 692, Aug. 27, 1956, confidential.

the French Liaison Mission& and Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, Chi. ef ofthe Vietnamese Mission, signed the final minute providing forthe transfer in accordance with the terms of the protocol signedon July 14.1

Even as the de facto transfer took place, the ICC decided tosend the Giap letter of August 21 to the Geneva Co-Chairmen.Reinhardt reported that the transmittal letter, dated September 14,contained a lengthy review of French-Vietnamese liaison arrange-ments, along with comments which were described by the Canadiansas undesirable but aot as bad as they had feared. The operativeparagraph of the ICC letter stated that the French claimed nofurther direct or special responsibilities for the carrying outof the Geneva Accords and that South Vietnam was prepared toprovide "effective cooperation" while refusing to inherit Frenchresponsibilities. The ICC then called the attention of the Co-Chairmen to the fact that the North Vietnam authorities hadobjected to the Franco-Vietnamese agreement on the grounds that,until the Prench transferred their responsibilities to the Govern-ment of Vietnam& the French continued to be bound by them. TheICC maintained that the North Vietnamese contention placed theCommission in a "difficult position".

Embassy Saigon commented that the ICC 's action was based onthat part of the May 8 aote of the Co-Chairmen which requested thatthey be informed of any difficulties encountered in order to con-sider whether further measures were required. The ICC had thusgone on record that difficulties had been encountered, and it hadrequested further iastructions. The Embassy felt that the SaigonGovernment "could, if necessary take strong legalistic stand" onits compliance with co-chairmen May 9 [sic] note, but we considerpreferable let Giap letter and Commission's latest plaint veg-etate. "2

use.IProm Saigon, tel. 890, Sept. 13, 1956, limited official

From Saigon, tel. 991, Sept. 21, 1956, confidential. Thefull text of the ICC letter of Sept. 14 to the Co-Chairmea isprinted ia Appendix A of the Seventh Interim ~Re ort of the Inter-

1C 1 1 f ~StldC I ViSNEER' 1, ~ Ea ASEil 30, LS57 (Vietnam No. 2 (1957)) Cmnd. 335(London, 1957), pp. 2 1-23.

!JNCl ASSiFlEIP:::::::::-:::::::-:::'::::The ICC replied to Giap on September 14, informing him that

the Commission had asked the Co-Chairmen for new directives forits future work but that, pending further instructions, the ICCwould "discuss with" the PAVN Mission in the North and the GVN

Mission in the South. In a second letter to Giap on the same day,the ICC referred to French willingness to resume, on an informalbasis, their role in the Joint Armistice Commission's operations,and requested the North Vietnamese regime& without prejudice toits position concerning French responsibili. ties under the GenevaAgreement, to inform the French when the JAC could meet. TheEmbassy commented: "Thus Franco-GVN liaison arrangements havegained official, de facto, if perhaps only temporary, recognition. ""This appears give more reason"& the Embassy's cable continued,"for Co-Chairmen to stall on Commission's September 14 note sothat this temporary solution, as have many others, might becomepermanent. " Reinhardt thought that the North Vietnamese and theRussians were "obviously aware" of this, and he surmised thattheir next step (or lack of one) might measure the importancethey attached to the ICC s continued presence and functioning.l 1

From London Ambassador Aldrich informed the Department thattthe British Foreign Office had decided to wait for a Soviet

initiative on the ICC note of September 14 to the Co-Chairmen.The Poreign Office had recalled that the Russians had never re-plied to a United Kingdom note of July 31 expressing willingnessto meet as long as the agenda was not limi. ted to the electionsissue. The Foreign Office, Aldrich said, believed that a Sovietinitiative would not come for "a week or two" because the Russianswere occupied "with Yugoslavia and Suez problems". Nhenever aSoviet response was received, the Foreign Office said, the Ftitishplanned to suggest that the Co-Chairmen "take note" of the ICCmessage of September 14 and ask the ICC to continue as before,referring to the Co-Chairmen any practical difficulties that mightarise. 2

"Fram Saigon, tel. 992, Sept. 21, 1956, confidential.

Prom London, tel. 1781, Oct. 1, 1956, secret.

Chapter V

THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL MEkNS FOR AMERICAN REPLACEMENT OF FRENCHMILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINING SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED

FORCES, 1955-1956

o~ki k th ~ct f th T~ Eau ts~~ ~. (~zmj

The South Vietnamese demand of January 18, 1955, for thewithdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps from Vietnam andrapid. French compliance with this request had, by the end of 1955&reduced the size of the FEC from its pre-Geneva settlement figureof 185,000 to 30,000 with the remainder scheduled to departearly in 1956. This drastic reduction in armed forces to defendVietnamese territory south of the 17th parallel was to bebalanced by an increase in the size of the South VietnameseArmy from 100,000 to 150,000 msn. The ques/ion early aroseabout the training of the additional 50,000.

In accordance with the Ely-Collins Memorandum of Understandingof December 13, 1954, the U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group(MkAG), organized in September 1950 to supervise the distributionof American military supplies and equipment to French Union Forcesfighting the Viet Minh, had taken on the responsibility of sharingwith the French the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces.There had been established undez' MAAG a Training Relations Instruc-tion Mission (TRIM), a combined Xfanco-American organization tucoordinate training advice to the Vietnamese Army previously givenseparately bv MkAG and the French training mission. Reduction ofthe FEC brought with it a corresponding reduction in the Frenchcomplement in TRIM, placing that much more responsibility on MAAG

for training the Vietnamese, or, as the Department of Defensedescribed the situation, these developments made "difficult,not impossible, the accost)lishment of the mission assigned tothe Chief, MkAG Vietnam. e

1See ante, pp. 54-58.

Wetter from Gordon Gray (Assistant Secretary of Defensefor International Security' Affairs) to Halter S. Robertson(Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), Sept. 27,1955, secret.

~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~as ate ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ tl ~~ + ~ ~ ~~ I ~ 0

~ ~ 0 ~ 4 ~~ ~ ~ ~

I:LsslflE0

~ o ~ o ~ ~ o ~ 4&~~ ~ eo ~ eo~ o ~ ~ ~ o efglpl+4 ~ ~ ~~ ee ~ e eo« ~ ~ ~ ~

In these circumstances, the Department of Defense attemptedto prevail upon the Department of State either to remove theceiling "imposed on the MAAG by the Department of State's inter-pretation of the Geneva Accords" in order to match the accel-eration of training of the Vietnamese forces (and also to providea cover for CIA personnel) or to authorize the use of "temporaryduty training teams" which would serve the same purpose, & Inits reply, the Department of State was careful to point out thatits interpretation of the caLling on MAAG derived from theincontrovertible language of Article 16 of the Agreement on theCessation of Hnstilities in Vietnam, which specificaLly stated:'%1th effect from the date of entry into force of the presentagreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforce-ments and additional military personnel is prohibited. " TheDeparhnent observed that the International Control Commission,the authority charged with investigating apparent breaches ofthe Cease-Fire,

«would presumably be made aware, perhaps by theC~sts, of the presence of U.S. military pezsonnel in Viet-Nam in excess of 342 [the strengthof MAAG as of the date of entry into force of thecease-fire on July 21, 1954Jo The United Statesdoes not have competence to authorize that theestablished ceiling for military personnel be exceeded.However, this doss not, in our view, prevent theutilization oi' civilian personnel in MAAG forappropriate purposes, «2

Under continuing pressure from the Department of Defense,however, and in view oi' the rapid withdrawal of French TRIMpersonnel, the Department oi' State in mid November 1955 requested

views of Embassy Saigon oil the p?acticality of the UnitedStates' "proceeding soon to send additional MAAG personnel"at least to the extent of filling the gap left by French with-drawals, and as to how this might be accomplished «with ndnirmmrepercussions«. 3 The Embassy firmly upheld the Departalent's

llhLd.

Letter from Robertson to Gray, Oct. 20, 1955, secret.

3To Saigon@ tele 1741@ Novo 18« 1955« secrete

strict interpretation of Article 16, citing the several assur-ances the United States had given members of the ICC jointlyand severally that the 342-msn level of MAAG would not beexceeded and Indian and Canadian objections to having Americanpersannel replace the French in TRIM. Furthermore& the Embassyobserved that, according to the French, the ICC was ~ to"tighten control on personnel and equipment from Vietnam understress of certain ammbers" as the Poles and Indians shiftedtheir interest fram Articles 14(c) and (d) of the Cease-Fire(cancerned wLth reprisals and transfer of populatians betweentones) to Articles 16 and 17, The Embassy saw no object1an,however, to replacing some of the mflftazy in NAAG with civilianpersonnel. &

As reported to Embassy Saigon, Secretary Dulles decided,on January 19, 1956, not to accede to an increase in MAAG andnot to discuss such a step with the British (as bad earlier beensuggested by the Embassy). Instead, the Secretary proposed toexplore the feasibility of other ways and means of achieving U.S:objectives, "despite assumed limitations on number U.S. mLLLtary z

personnel, " such as (1) greater use of civLlian personnel(including military in civilian status), (2) contracts withbusiness firms for MDAP redistribution assistance, and (3) explor-ation with the French oi' the possibLLity of attaching FECelements or individuals to MAAG and additional French to TRIMfor specified periods As a palliative to the Departzsent ofDefense, Dulles proposed that NAAG be kept at a full activestrength of 342 at all times, bringing in additional personnel(and exceeding + ceding) to replace ind1viduals an medicaloz' travel 3Awzvoi

Dulles' tentative deciaLon was offset by a Sauth Vietnameserequest that NAAG be increased to 1200 or 1300 men. This bfd,embodied fn a memorandum handed by Foreign KnLster Mau toAmbassador Refzdzardt on January 24, was supported by the content1onthat South Vietnam, as a fully independent state, needed to haveits armed farces trained rapidly. The South Vietnamese arguedthat the spirit of Articles 16 and 17 of the Cease-Fire agreement

1Fram Saigon, tel, 2255, Novi 27, 1955, secreti

2To Saigan, tel. 2503~ Jan. 23, 1956, secret

MI.ASSII:IEO

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ii ii ~ iii ~ ii ~ ii~i ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ i

~ 0 0 ~ 0 *~ 0 ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ * 00 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 'Qggf

9 NSIJ:lewas designed exclusively to prohi!XLt an increase of militarypotential on both sides of the demarcation line, Ki.th thewithdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps, the nd, litary potentialbelow the 17th parallel had been reduced considerably from whatit had been at the time the Cease-Fire was signed0 Thus~ inthe view of the South Vietnamese, an increase in American train-ing personnel could hardly be interpreted as violating the Cease-Fire which neither the United States nor South Vietnam had signed.

In sending thLs information on to Washfngtnn, Reinhardtcommented that, as he had prevt. ously reported, the Indian andCanadian members of the International Control Commission hadindicated that it was highly unlikely that the ICC would interpretthe Cease-Pire as permitting replacement of de~ Frenchtroops by Americans in South Vietnam, "or, for that matter, anexchange of Viet Minh troops for Chinese in North Vietnam. " TheAmbassador stated that, to date, the ICC had maintained thatan increase of military forces in either sons was not a violatiop,of the Geneva Accords so lang as these forces were not imported. l

The urgency of the need for same additional American personnelin Vietnam was stressed by Secretary of Defense Wilson tu aJanuary 31 letter to Secretary Dulles, wilson pointed out thatthe United States had lost control of approximately 4100 million-worth of MDAP material in South Vietnam He added that, contraryto the Collins-Ely agreement of 195k, the French were makingunilateral decisions respecting what equiImmnt was to be returnedto the United States, "carefully sorting out the useful, . service-able items for their own use, and returning the excess andsalvage " MLlson wrote: 'Iwe know of no valid reason wby U.S.personnel should not be allowed to enter French military storageareas to participate in these determinations. " MLth the withdrawalof the bulk of French forces, MLison stated, "adeqaLge logisticcapahLLLty in Free Vietnam no longer exists, " and, should hostil-ities break out in mid 1956, there would be no .logLstic capabilitywhatsoever 2

Prom Saigon, tel. 2977, Jan. 24, 1956, secret.2Excerpts and paraphrases iu memorandum from Robertson (FE)to Murphy (G), Feb. 2, 1956, secret.

There ensued a high-level meeting of Defense and Stateofficials on February 2, as a result of which Secretary Dullesconceded that the necessity of protecting MDAP material badcreated an "extrao~ situation in respect to our self-imposed restraints under the Geneva Accords. " He thereforeproposed to approach the British, Canadians, and French tomplore with them the possibility of sending additional U, S.military personnel to Vietnam on a temporary basis solely forthe purpose of recovering snd preserving equipment which wasbeing lost because of the French withdrawal and the lack ofVietnamese logistical capability. To make this proposal moreacceptable, Dulles suggested to Embassy Saigon that the addi-tional forces be ignited to 350, that it be specifically under-stood that they would remain in Vietnam temporarily, that theyconstitute what might be known as the "Temporary EquipasntRecovery Mission" (TERM), and that they operate under (but notas a formal part of') MAAG. The group might be supplemented by1,000 Filipino and/or Japanese technicians. &

Embassy Saigon described the Dulles plan for TERM as f"ingeniousv and observed. that it might prove acceptable to theICC in view oi' the fact that TERM's mission would be 11srLtedto removing military equipment from Vietnam with a time-limiton its opmations, provided that the United States would agreeto keep the ICC fully informed of the movements and activitiesof TERM's personnel. MAAG complained, however, that TERM wouldnot solve its difficulties in disposing of the MDAP materielin Vietnam thxough processing and returning to the United Gbatesall excess equipment and through preserving and giving instruc-tion in the use of that equipment turned over to the South Viet-namese To accomplish its mission MAAG contended, a basic~of 740 American military technicians would be required,a figure 48 above the total of 692 contemplated with the additionof TERM, Even more would be needed if the French withdrew allof their 232-man complement from TRIM and if the French Air andNavy training missions were discontinued, 2

1To Saigon, tel. 2705, Feb. 9, 1956, secret.

From Saigon, tel 3268, Feb 13, 1956, secret

~i ~0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ i

Attes ts To Sell TERM to Britain, Canada,

On February 25, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy handed th' eBritish, French, and Canadian Ambassadors notes describing theproposal to send TERM to Vietnam, urgLng the French to retaintheir training mLssions, and offering to intercede with theDiem Governamnt to obtain better conditions under which theFrench might continue to help train the South Vietnamese arNmdforces. l The French replied with alacrity and same asperity.In a note delivered by Ambassador Couve ds Murville to Dulles onFebruary 28, the French contended that the despatch of additionalAmerican military personnel to Vietnam would contravene Article4 of the Geneva Conference Final Declaration as well as Article16 of the Cease-Fire. They pointed out that the United Stateshad taken no exception to the latter article at the time cfsignature and had hitherto abided by its terms,

On the question of re~ French training personnel, the"French observed that the withdrawal of their forces frcea Vietnam ~

was the result of a decision of the Vietnamese Governnmnt, whichhad asked that this withdrawal be carried out "in the shortestpossible time" ~ %bile the French Government intmded to with-draw all its forces, it would be p~d to study the possibilityof maintaining 1,000 troops in South Vietnam for cne year,provided (1) the United States abandoned TERM, which was invlolatd. on of the Cease-Fire signed by the French High Command,and (2) the Vietnamese Government declared (later specif5. edas"formally and in writing") that the retention of French personnelwas not at variance with its request for the withdrawal ofFrench forces and would not prevent dissolution of the FrenchHigh Command "which is ~iso facto the consequence of the wi.hh-drawal. "

The French took particular umbrage at the American offerto intervene mLth DLem, a proposal they described as "bothuntimely and super'. uous". "Even had it been otherwise&" theFrench note observed, "the conditions in which the step hasbeen submitted to the French Government would have preventedthe latter from agreeing to it."2

These notes were based on a meserandum from Sebald (FE)to Murphy (Q), Feb. 23, 1956, secrete

2To Saigon, tel. 2950, Feb. 29, 1956, confidential.

"''-'ILASSIFIED

Equally vehement was the language used by Renh Nassigli,Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry& in his talkwith Ambassador Dillon on February 28. The French Government,Nassigii said& objected to the American offer to intervene wLththe Vietnanw&se Government to secure its permLseLon for the reten&tion of French forces. "In view of the rei'usal of the UnitedStates to be of any help to the French with the Diem Govern-ment over the past year, v Massigli declared, as paraphrasedby the Embassy& "it was adding insult to in3ury to make sucha proposition at this time. "

With respect to the introduction of TERN, Nassigli statedthat the French "could simply not understand wby the U.S. waswilling to run such a serious risk of provoking a crisis inSouth Vietnam when so little was at stake. " According to Frenchi'igures, Nassigli said, of the 270,000 tons of American andFrench military equipment in Vietnam at the time of signatureof the Cease-Fire, only 10,000 tons remained, and the bulk ofthis would be removed within the next month. Nassigii informedDillon that the French "would hold firm to their position thatthey could not allow any of their personnel to remain in Indo-china for the purpose of caring for this equipment unless theU.S. gave up its plan of sending additional U.S. militarypersonnel. v J.

The upshot of these outraged French protests in Washingtonand Paris was agreement between the two sides to recheck theirrespective figures on the amount of NDAP material still inVietnam, It was also agreed that the whole matter would bediscussed by Dulles and Foreign Minister PLneau at the forth-coming SEA'lQ Ministerial Meeting in Karachi. Respecting theAmerican offer to intervene with Saigon in France's behalf,Murphy explained to Roland de Margerie, Director-General ofthe French Fereign Ministry, on February 29, that the offer"had been simply one of friendly assistance should they [theFrench] desire it and that the absence of such an offer might

From Paris& tel 3916& Feb 29& 1956& secre'tt

~~ UIICLIISSIFIED

~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ \ ~ tt 00

~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~0 ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0g ~ ~

~ ~0

~ 0 ~ 00 ~ ~ 0~ a ~ ~ ~ ~~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~

UtICLASSIFIEIj

have led to allegations in France I that J we [the Americanst wereseehing to replace the French military. "&

British and Canadian reactions to the Dulles TERN proposal,c~cated to the Department of State on February 28 andMarch 1, respectively, were not especially encouraging. TheBritish, as did the C~s, felt that the political reper-cussions from the introduction of TERN would be deplorable andmight geopardise the chances of reaching a satisfactorymodus vivendi in Viet-R~ an ob3ective to which eve~~ese sliouuMe subordinated. Both strongly suggested that,before taldng any action~ the United States consult with theGovernment of India. The Canadians also proposed that theUnited States do its utmost to persuade the French to retaintheir training missions in Vietnam; if necessary, these couldbe supplemented by American civilian technicians. 2

In light of ths views expressed and suggestions made byFrance, Britain& and Canada, Secretary Dulles discussed the TERN,proposal with French Foreign Minister Plneau on March 7 in thecourse of the SEATO Ministerial Meeting in Karachi. Pfneauagreed that the United States should control and maintain theMDAP equipment which had been turned over to the South Vietnamese,but he stated that the introduction of additional American mLlitarypersonnel for this purpose would be in violation of the Cease-Fire, leaving as the only alternatives American civilians orFrench military personnel retained at the request of the SouthVietnamese Government. As matters stood, Pineau observed, theretention of even the small French training missions for theVietnamese Air Force and Navy (220 and 70, respectively) wouldbe conditional on specific demand by Saigon, for the antd. -French atmosphere created by the l?lcm Governnmnt had made theposition of the French virtually "impossible" ~

Dulles contended that TERN, composed of 350 American militarypersonmel in civilian clothes, wouuld not be inconsistent withthe Geneva Accords, for the fighting strength of troops in

1From Paris, tel. 3935, Feb. 29, 1956, secrst.To Saigon, tel. 2981 Nar. 2, 1956, confidential.

~~ ~ ~ ~ \~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~~y ~ OO ~ +

~ ~ e ~~ 0 ~~ 0 ~ ~~ o ~

~y ~ \~~ ~

~ ~ ~~ 0 ~~ ~

~e ~ ~ 1

~ oo ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ gs ~ te

IIIICLIISSIFIEII

~t ~ I~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ ~ I~

~ ~~ e

~ ~~ ~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ 00 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~

~ I ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ IO WCLNSlFIEB

Vi.etnam would not be augmented. He cited the value and condition,of and the need to slavage the MDAP equipment, as well as thedifficulties connected with sending new materiel to Uietnsm of atype already there. InformLng Pineau of his intention to discussthe situation with Nehru~ Dulles said that, unless there werestrong Indian ob]ection, the United States would proceed withTERM and would hope for French cooperation to the ecrtent ofretaining some 1,000 personnel in Uietnem. If the indians objected,the United States would have to reconsider "what line to take«. l~Develo anents ~Leadin to the Introduction of

TERM Without ICC A~ro«~

On March 10~ Dullee proceeded from his talks in Kazachi withPineau to New Delhi where he revealed to Nehru what TERM involvedand mcpressed the hope that the proJect would have ths approval of'the Indian Government and the Indian Ch~ of the InternationalControl Commission. R India's favorable reaction was communicatedby ~ J. Desai~ former ICC C~ and, currently Common-wealth Secretary in the Indian Foreign Ministry~ to AmbassadorCooper in New Delhi and transmitted by the latter to SecretaryDulles in Saigon on March 13. The Government of India did notconsider the TERM proposal inconsistent with the Geneva Accordsif its purpose was to reduce the volume of armament. Desaistated that there was a precedent for the introduction of addi-tional personnel into Vietnam for a lied. ted time and purpose~for a Chinese Communist «cultural mission«had earlier enteredNorth Vietnam for a short time, after having given notice tothe IGC. Desai expressed the view that TERM~s operations shouldbe conducted under the supervision or with the cognizance of theICC. By way of procedure, Desai suggested that the AmericanAmbassador in Saigon request the French, as ths original recipientsof' the MDAP equipment« to notify the ICC about TERM« its purpose~number of' personn«G. , snd approximate dates of' entry and exit. TheICC would then check on the entry and axit of personnaL andreceive notification of the exit dates and inventory of equipment.The ICC would not check the equipment in exLt against inventoriesexcept in the cases of equipment being replaced. 3

1From Karachi~ SECTO 21, Msr. 8, 1956~ secret.

BFrom New D~, SECTO 40, Mar. 10, 1956, secret.

3From New Delhi, tel. 1999 (to Saigon, tel. 48), Mar. 13, 1956.

Ambassador Cooper subsequently warned the Department that hewas not certain how fully informed Desai had been about the fullimplications of TERM—i.e., that Desai was not completely apprisedoi' the total number and nationality of TERM personnel, the lengthof stay, the volume of equipment to be shipped out of Vietnam,and American operations respecting what, was to be left behind.According to Cooper, Desai «did not consider that TERM was intendedas a training mission. «Cooper recommended: "In view of thestrong feeling of the Government of India respecting the GenevaAgreement and the ICC position ln Vietnam~ I suggest that the U. S.initial position in informing the Government of India, if deemedappropriate~ should be mact and comprehensive. «1

Qn the basis of the relatively favorable reaction fromNew Delhi, Secretary Dulles approved, on March 23, a recommenda-tion of the Department~s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs that(1) the Department of State provide India with any additionalinformation required with respect to TERM; (2) the Departmentinform India that it would authorize the French sndjor Viet-namese to supply the required notifications to the ICC; (3) theSecretary authorize the Department of Defense to despatch TERMpersonnel ~ately, in civilian clothes; and (A) the Depart-ment inform the British~ Canadian, and Vietnamese Governments of thedecision to proceed with TERM. The Bureau hsd supported its re-commendation with its belief that the Department of Defenseunderstood TERM~a mission to be to supervise the recovery andshipment back to the United States of all excess MDAP equipment,snd to assist in improving the logistic capabilities of Vietnamto preserve the equipment in the hands of its armed forces.Sub)sot to this understanding~ and assuming the retention of 1',000French military technicians for equipment redistribution and ofcertain French air and naval training and maintenance personnel,the establishment of' TERM would satisfy the ~ personnelobgectives of ths Department, of Defense M Vietnam "at least forthe immediate future«. Under these circumstances, Defense wouldaccept the ICC notification and supervisory procedures. 3

1From Nsw Delhi, tel. 2078, Mar. 22, 1956, secret.2The Bureau s recommendation had read «in uniform" Secretary1

Dulles altered the phrase to read»in civilian clothes".

3Memorandum from Sebs1d (FE) to the Secretary, Mar. 23, 1956,secret.

:.:-.-:-~:"""'AMl:P~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~II ~

Under instruction from the Department of Stats, AmbassadorCooper informed Desai in New Delhi, on April 2, of the details ofTERMf

without�

» however» di acus sing the training funct iona it mightperform, which» according to the Department» were»in fact who11yancillary to the main task of saving equipment. «1 Desak madetwo suggestions in reply, In view of the fact that, the lii'e of,the ICC would legally expire in July in the absence of electionconsultations between North and South Vietnam or of extensionby the Geneva Co-Chairmen, the ICC, would be competent to authorizethe opezation of TERM for a twelve-month period. Desai thereforeproposed that the United States inform the ICC that a preliminarythree months would be required before the length of TERM's servicecould be determLned. Secondly, and more important» Desai urgedthat TERM be made up of non-uniformed personnel» lest the Polishmember of the ICC suspect it of being a training mission,

Desai told Cooper that it would be difficult for the ICCto approve TERM. He added, however» that, , on the basis of thefacts given, »India would approve» and, it wouEd be put through". 2

During a visit in Washington in late March, Foreign Minister '

Pearson gave Canada's blessing to TERM. Armed with Indian andCanadian approval, Ambassador 12lllon in Parks approached theFrench, who offered to serve as intermediary between the UnitedStates and the ICC if so desired. Dillon expressed appreciationfor the helpful spiri. t in which the French offer had been madebut gave it as his view that» if the Vietnamese were wilj1ng» itwould be preferable for the Vietnamese Government to perform thefunction of intermediary with the ICC in view of the facts that(a) the relationship between the French and the ICC would beanything but clear following dissolution of the French High Commandin Vietnam and (b) a relationship of sorts hsd been created betweenthe South Vietnamese Government and ICC by the fez»acr~a note ofApril 3 to the British Co-C~ of the Geneva Conference. 3In light of these ciz cumstances, Dillon suggested that it might bebetter »kf the anomalous French role [vks-a-vks the ICC$ were not,perpetuated. »4

To New Delhi, tel. 2409, Mar. 28, 1956, secret,2From New Delhi, tel. 2/+17, Apr. 2, 1956, secret.3See ~ante pp. 146-14.8.

4From Parks» tel. 4.583» Apr. 4, 1956, secret.

On April 5, the Department of State informed the British»French» Canadian» and Australian Embassies of the intention toproceed with TERM immediately. A similar notification was sentto Embassy Saigon. l Ambassador Reinhardt promptly inquired whetherTERM was to be despatched prior to official presentation of theplan to the ICC, for it was his understanding that India wouldsupport TERM in the ICC but expected the United. States to waituntil the Commission had decided "at least by a ma)ority« thatTERM did not violate the Cease-Fire before launching the project.Reinhardt warned against presenting the Comad. ssion with a fait

«»2

A similar nots of caution was sounded by Ambassador Cooperin New D»Ghi. He declared that, any implementation of TERM beforeits subsd. ssion to the ICC for approval «will be certain to matethe Government of India's support mors difficult. «Cooper there-fore urged "that no !TERM] personnel be actually despatched untilthe ICC has completed its consideration of the proposeI. «3

Ambassador ~dt in Saigon broached the TERM proposalto Psrthasarathi» the Indian Chairman of the ICC» on April 8»and received much the same comments which Cooper had obtainedfrom Desai. Psrthasazathi underscored his belief that the intro-duction of TERM personnel in civilian clothing would make iteasier to obtain approval of the ICC» and he urged Reinhardt toprovide the ICC with full information about the number of peopleinvolved in MAAG and TERM in order to meet any complaints by theHanoi regime. 4

Ambassador Cooper laid stress on what he believed to be thebasis for India's obliging response to TERM—namely, that Indiaexpected the United Stames to follow procedures acceptable tothe ICC Cooper recommended that the United States adhere to

1To Saigon» tels. 3362, Apr. 5, and 3375» Apr. 6» 1956,confidential.

2From Saigon» tel. 4058, Apr. 6, 1956, secret.

3From New Delhi, tel. 2205, Apr. 8, 1956, secret.

4From Saigon» tel. 4096, Apr. 9, 1956» confidential.

that the V

ICC r~uirements. He reported that Desai had prpropos p howeverp

TERM te nlted States not apply to the ICC for appr al f

un ll after the London meeting of the Geneva Co&hairmen. iapprov of

In light of 811 the comments received to date, the Departmentsof State and Defense sent a joint communicatl t Embaand the Chief of MAAG, on April 12, indicating that TERM personnelwould not begin to arrive ln South Vietnam until Ma 9 h

[Internatlg both Departments considered a "reasonable time for

International Control] Commission consideration» of the intro-duction of TERM. Furthermore~ the arrivals of TERMs o TERM personnel were

l*™ger,with the full complement not be achieved until

Departments 8August. Mith respect to notification of the ICC h bo

s agreed to keep this to a minimum "as decided by thee , owever, both

Ambassador after consultation with the Chief of MAAG~» for

militar actneither Department would»countenance Commi ice o ss on control of V.S.

s t, " Thary ac lvltles ln Vietnam once the personnel

po . e question of whethez civilian cl thi to bsonn are on the

c o ng was to be wornby the mLLltary personnel comprising TERM would be decided the

the eChief of MAAG~ the Chief of TERM and the Amba . ng

e mise ol' TERM, the Department of Defense had finally agreed tothe figure of 350 which, when added to MAAGIs 342 would bring th

l~~ n letnam to 692. In return, however,

total of 7 0e Department of State gave in to Defense's d~ f

o 4 ~ with the understanding that no more than 692 wouldSe s 01' a graIxl

be present ln Vietnam at, any one time. 2

On April 20, the Department urged Ambassador Relnhardt topresent the TERM project lzmediat~ to the ICC»thr

elect~ whether or not consideration by th fuii 0ous eo 8, " ough channels

could be obtained at once. The Bepartment declared itself "moste OImod. ssIon

anmious fo1' the Commission t 8 app1'oval I t, Mas ncrement of [TERM] personnel may arrive on that date. » The

steps taken by the Geneva Co-Chairmen ln London had vi edon convinced the

time to come. 3par that the functions of' the ICC would be ntln ede con u for some

1Prom New Delhi, tel. 2221 Apr. 10 1956 tsecre ; see ante»

To Saigon~ tel. 3430~ Apr. 12, 1956~ confidential.

oTo Saigon, tel. 353I+~ Apr. 20, 1956~ secret

Reinhardt hsd already, on the 20th, delivered' a note on TERMto the Saigon Government for transmittal to the French which readas i'ollows:

"The Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs ofVietnam presents its compliments to the High CommLssariatof the French Republic and has the honor to inf'orm it thatit has been apprised by the Embassy of the United Statesof ths wish of the American Government to send to Vietnama temporary military mission composed of 350 Americanmilitary personnel entitled TERM (Temporary EquipmentRecovery Mission).

«The Mission in question will be responsible forsupervising recovery of materiel resulting from Americanmilitary aid and foz outshipment from Vietnam of surplusof this materiel.

»Arrival in Saigon of the fizst contingent ofpersonnel of this mission is scheduled for the fizsthalf of May 1956.

"The Embassy of the United States has stressed theurgent need. to protect and preserve large quantities ofmateriel of American origin which would otherwise passbeyond the possibility of recovery, and surplus ofwhich should be outshipped from Vietnam In view ofthe task assigned to the mission which the AmericanGovernment proposes to send to Vietnam, and also takLnginto account that the number oi' American militarypersonnel in Vietnam employed within the MAAG frame-work has never exceed the figure of 342 (sent in July1954)~ the Vietnamese Government plans to give itsconsent to the arrival of this mLssion.

"The Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs wouldappreciate it if the High CommLssariat would be kindenough to transmLt the preceding information to theInternational Control Commission. el

On the following day, in accordance with Washington's instruc-tions~ Reinhardt urged the French to present TERM to the ICCwith despatch. 2 Unfortunately, however, the ICC was ln no

1From Saigon, tel. 4243, Apr. 23, 1956, confidential.

2From Saigon~ tele. 4228 and 4238~ Apr, 21~ 1956~ seciet,

position to take any action on 'ARM at that time, for~ despitethe extension of its mandate authorised by the Geneva Co-Chairmen~with the imminence of the dissolution of the French High Commend,the Commission questioned its right to function and» as reportedby Reinhsrdt, , was »now fully occupied with debating the questionof its own survival. » Reinhardt therefore again urged theDepartment, not to present the ICC with a fait acco~ and askedthat »the arrival of TEAM personnel be delayed until the ICChas e.cted. »l

The Department, of Defense accordingly agreed. to delaydeparture of the first installment of TERM personnel alreadys.ssembled on the Nest, Coast, with the understanding, however,that Embassy Saigon would do al3. it could to obtain speedyconsideration of the TERN pro]ect by the ICC. 2 In talks withSecretary Dulles in Paris on May 6, in conjunction with the NATO

Ministerial Meeting~ British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloydagreed with the American view that the delay in the despatch ofTERM could not be extmded beyond the end of May. .3

Ambassador Reinhardt encounterecl further difficulties in hisefforts to »sell» TERM to the ICC. The French authorities in Viet-,nam. had transmitted the text of the U. S.-South Vietnamese note onTERN to the ICC on April 25. The Indian Chairman of the ICC,Parthasarathi, told Reinhardt that he feared the note placedtoo much emphasis on the »military» nature of TERM's mission.He therefore proposed a revised text to read as follows:

»A temporary technical ordance mission of theUnited States Government proposes to visit Vietnam forthe purpose of selecting American military materiel tobe shipped out of Vietnam. The mission in questionwould be composed Sg 350 United States personnel.

"It is the belief of the Government of the UnitedStates that such a mission should begin operating atthe earliest possible date, and consequently it ishoped that the first contingent might arrive in Vietnambefore the end of' May 1956.»

From Saigon» tel. /+34/+, AIu . 30» 1956» confidential.

To Saigon~ tel. 3647, May 1, 1956, confidential.

3From Paris, SECTO 30, May 6, 1956, secret.

Reinhardt pointed out to the Department that, in view of the factthat the Polish member of the ICC had receiv'ed a copy of theoriginal nots, the Indian revision would only serve. to makematters worse when the two versions were compared. He had there-fore asked the Indian and Canadian representatives on the ICC toreview the possibility of considering the original note only. &

The Department displayed some impatience with this new setof «delays and complications« and informed Reinhardt that it wasquite willing to accept the Indian revision~ with certain modi-fications, «if ICC approval seems assured thereby. « The Depart-ment's modification of the Indian revision read as follows:

«As the International Control Commission is aware,a temporary technical ordance mission of the UnitedSt t Government, composed of 350 United States personnel,proposesoses to visit Viet-Nam for the purpose of selectingt-American military materiel for recovery and for ou-shipment from Viet-Nam of surplus such materiel. It isthe belief of the Government of the United Statesthat such a nd. ssion should begin operating at theearliest possible date, andy consequentiyp the Governmentof' Viet-Nam is giving its consent to the arrival of thefirst contingent oi' this personnel before the end ofMay 1956.«

The Department went even further by propssing that the ICCnsider either note "as it sees fit as long as the [TERM] projectcons er e er

«is not disapproved and personnel start entering in May. ThDepartment instructed Reinhardt to inform the Indians, Canadians,and Vietnamese that~ since the United States had accepted thesubstance of the Indian revision, it was assumed that, the ICCwould act on TERM fmmecUately~ for American personnel «will inany case begin arriving in Viet-Nsm before the end of May. "2

On May 15, Parthasarathi informed Reinhsrdt that the sendingof a revised note to the ICC was still desirable. He pointedout that the ICC was in the process of developing new procedures

1Prom Saigon, tel. 4/+21, Mav 7, 1956, secret.

To Saigon~ tel. 3725~ May 9~ 1956~ secret.

~ C~ ~ «e ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~

~oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~0 1~ « ~ ~ «5

on the basis of its mchanges with the Geneva Co-Chairmenl andwould soon resume its meetings, permitting it to consider TERM.He asked that the arrival of TERM personnel in Vietnam bedelayed until mid-Zuns —a delay which Reinhardt explained wouldbe impossible. 2

The new note on TERM, dated May 15, was delivered to theICC on the 20th. The ICC informed the French Liaison Mission~on the 26th, that the TERM project was under consideration onthe basis of the two notes of April 21 and May 15 and askedthat the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry be informed that the "mili-tary entry of these military personnel should not be effectedbefore the decision of the Commission is communicated to it. "3On May 28, Reinhardt informed the Department that South Viet-namese Foreign Minister Mau proposed to reply to the ICC that~because of the close timing involved, it would not be possibleto hold up the arrival of the first contingent of TERM, scheduledto reach Saigon on the 30th. 4

As a consequence of these developments, at a high-levelmeeting in the Department of State on May 28, it was decided notto ask the Department of Defense to impose a further delay on thedespatch of TERM. Most, of the participants agreed that the UnitedStates had already given the ICC more than ample time to considerthe TERM prospect. The meeting proposed to send a summary historyof the TERM negotiations to the American Embassies in New Delhiand Ottawa to aid the latter in exp' to the Indian andCanadian Governments why the United States felt impelled toproceed with TERM prior to ob~ final Commission approval. 5

See ~ante N. 157-158, 160, 162, and 165.

From Saigon~ tel. /+503, May 15~ 1956~ secret.

From Saigon, tais. /+556 and 4621, May 20 and 26~ 1956,secret

Prom Saigon, tel. 4643, May 28, 1956, secret.

5Memorandum of conversation among Murphy (G), Bennett (G)~Robertson (FE), Sebald (FE)~ Young (SEA), and Kattenburg (SEA)~May 28, 1956, secret.

IIll.63lfliOn Nay 29~ Parthasarathi in Hanoi informed Reinhsrdt in

Saigon that the ICC would begin its consideration of the TERMpro]ect on the following day and that, as a result of preliminarydiscussion, it appeared likely that the Comnd. scion would giveits ~us approva1. Vith this pcospect in view, Parthasarathiagain urged that TERM's arrival be postponed until mid- June, lestthe Connnission's expected decision be feopardfsed. i

Direct Irdian reaction to the American decision to proceedwith TERM prior to ICC approval was registered by Desai in HewDelhi in a talk with the American Charge cn May 30. Desaiindicated that the entry of TERM into Vietnam might be consideredlegs1, provided «control and supervision of these personnel byan ICC fixed team will be observed. « He took exception, however~to the American contention that TERN hsd been approved by India~for, as Desai was careful to point out« only the ICC itself couldtake such a step. He warned that the «Communists will of courseallege that the ICC is being flouted ... by the United StatesGovernment, but this will be for propaganda. «2

In response to an aide-mhnofre submitted by AmbassadorMerchant on May 30, the Canadians expressed some concern thatthe TERM issue should be the first question for the ICC to takeup under its new nmndatefrom the Geneva Co-Chairmen. Hhilehoping that the TERM operation «would go through smoothly«~ withno complications f'or the United States dr the ICC, the Canadiansreconnnenc1ed that, Washington continue to heed the Indians~ forthe crux of the matter of introducing TERM would be Indian reactiont ht «1 fE 0, «Mdb f it~11. k1th~P th th1had proved reasonable up to that point, he was, in the Canadiarts'belief', increasingly sub)cot to guidance from New Delhi, and thiswould be significiant if the Indians (particularly Krishna Nenon)should react angrily to the unilateral American action. 3

On Nay 31~ the ICC info' connnunicated to the UietnameseGovernment and the American and British Embassies in Saigon theconditions it wished to impose on TERMcs operations. These

From Saigon~ te1. 464H, Nay 29~ 1956~ secret,

2From Hew Delhi, tel. 2655, Nay 30~ 1956, confidential.

3From Ottawa~ tel. 438~ Nay 30, 1956, confidential.

~0 ~ I~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

SSIFIN

pout of Vietnam and that its activities will not extend

HNL'lAincluded the understanding tha TERM's mission would be

"solely to select war materiel and military equipmentbelonging to the United States Government for ex ort

to other duties and functias the maintenance and preand military equipment in

ons of a military nature, suchservation of war materielSouth Vietnam. "

In addi. tion, the Commission reof American military personnelpostings and functions, probabdate of entry. If satisfied w

mission would agree to the entinspection teams might check ainformation supplied by the Unnamese Government would submitICC regarding progress of work,estimated as nece

quested data on the total numberwith their names and designations,

le duration of stay, and expected1th this information, the Com-

ry of TERM, provided that (I) ICCctual arrivals against the priorited States; (2) the South Viet-fortnightly statements to the

change of postings, and timee

mal decrsion "without further delay

ssary for completion of TERM s mission, (3) thICC might review TERM's mission after three months; and (4) theCommission be allowed to conduclt spot checks to satisfy itselfthat the conditions laid down were being respected. The Com-mission requested, an immediate (eply to enable it to reach af' II

The ICC's conditions werethis communication was not foPrench Military Mission to theThis circumstance gave the Depatime in which to make suggestioreply to the Commission. The ta message sent to Reinhardt inpointed out that to meet all ofrequirements "would only inviteeventual emasculation of all U.in Vietnam. " The message stresstrive to maintain a balance beserving the armistice and (2) sconnection with the question ofby the ICC, State and Defense sGovernment might wish to state

~mbodied in a message dated May 29;rmally delivered, however, by the

Saigon Government until June 6.rtments of State and Defensens respecting a South Vietnamesewo Departments Jointly composedSaigon on June 8 in t+ich it was

the ICC's conditions andlater interference with MAAG and

S. military and police programssed that American policy "shouldtween two ob]ectives": (I) pre-trengthening South Vietnam. Inspot inspections of TERM activities

uggested that the South Vietnamesethat it would not ... allow

IProm Saigon, tel. 4687, Nay 31, 1956, confidential.

~ \~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 0

W(5~~ ~ ~ yy I \0 ~ I~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0~ ~ ~

~ II,'I.ASSEEB~ ~I~ ~ 0' ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 4 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ + F 0 ' 0 ~

~ ~ F 0 ' ~I ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ \ ~ ~~ & ~0 ~ 0 ~ Sei

~ ~ ~ ~~P ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ OO ~0

inspection by the Commission where it was informed that a similarright of inspection had been denied the Commission in NorthVietnam or where such inspection impedes the functioning of TERMpersonnel ul

In its reply of June 8 to the ICC's message of May 29, theSouth Vietnamese Government declared that the first objectiveof TERM would be to locate, i.dentify, and examine Americanmateriel still in Vietnam before deciding which items might bein excess of Vietnamese military needs and subject to shipmentback to the United States. A minimum period of three monthswould be required for TERN to determine the dimensions of itstask. Successive arrivals of personnel, not to exceed 350,would be reported to the ICC in advance "insofar as possible".ICC teams would be allowed to take note of facts derived fromaircraft manifests whi. ch would be communicated to the ICC uponrequest. The Vietnamese Government pointed out that, becauseof the wide geographic distribution of American materiel inVietnam, TERM personnel would be obliged to make frequent movesand their exact functions would change from time to time; theiroperations would remain, however, within the general frameworkof the mission as already described to the ICC. 2

In the meantime, TERN had already begun to arrive in Saigon.Two plane-loads of personnel touched down on May 30. Though notifiedthe previous day of the fli.ght schedule, the ICC representativeswitnessed the arrival of the second plane only, for the first onelanded ahead of its ETA. Because of lack of coordination amongthe several South Vietnamese ministries involved, the ICC wasdenied the examination of the manifests of either aircraft. 3

In a lengthy discussion with Reinhazdt in Saigon on June 16,Parthasarathi complained that TERN had been brought in withoutICC approval and that the ICC had been denied its minimal inspec-tion rights. He then urged that South Vi.etnam and the UnitedStates faci, litate the ICC's approval of TERN by supplying theCommission with the simple statement that TERN's purpose was toinventory and ship out American materiel from Vietnam and that

1To Saigon, tel. 3992, June 8, 1956, secret.

Rrom Saigon, tel. 4790, June 9, 1956, secret.3Rrom Saigon, tel. 4765, June 7, 1956, confidential.

~ t ~ 0 ~ ~ +~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ i ~~ ~ ~ ~~1 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~

1%',L1%1FIEIj

~ o ~ e ii ++ I I I ~ ~~ \ ~ ~ y~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ I ~~ ~I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ f ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~ ~ oa ~ ~~0 ~ 1

the ICC would be provided periodic notifications of the 'where-abouts of personnel and be granted the right of inspection andspot checks. From this standpoint, Parthasarathi said, theSouth Vi.etnamese communicati. on of June 8 to the ICC had provedunsatisfactory. Reinhardt expressed his doubt that South Viet-nam, as a newly independent nation, would wish "to go all theway in meeting the Commission's wishes. "&

Earlier in the month, Reinhardt had informed the Departmentof State of his view that, in any future communications withIndi. a and Canada, as two of the three countries composing theICC, care should be taken to "avoid any reference to our advisoryrole with the Government of Vietnam on ICC matters, particularlyon specific problems. " He had made this suggestion in light ofthe fact that South Vietnam would become increasi. ngly responsiblefor drafting its replies to messages from the ICC. As Reinhardtput it, "the Embassy does not wish to become unduly involved asa go-between or bear the brunt of ICC criticism for any unsatis-factory atti. tudes the Government of Vietnam may in the futureadopt toward the ICC."2

Proof of the growing independence of South Vietnam i.n itsdealings with the International Control Commission came onJune 27 when the Saigon Government replied to an oral requestof the previ, ous day by Parthasarathi for additional informationabout TERM in order that the ICC might cope with a complaintlodged by the authorities in Hanoi. Reinhardt had reported hisopinion that Saigon would not add anything to its June 8communication to the ICC "at least until recei. pt of a furtherwritten query from the ICC."3 Contrary to Reinhardt's estimaJe,South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Mau informed the ICC that, as of thatdate, only a portion of the total of 350 TERM personnel hadarrived in Vietnam and that, in view of the urgency of the taskof ehecki. ng American materiel, NAAG had transferred to TERMadditional technical personnel from its own staff "to performthis purely technical job" . Mau transmitted a list of TERM

1From Saigon, tel. 4884, June 16, 1956, secret.

2From Sai.gon, tel. 4790, June 9, 1956, secret.

From Saigon, tel. 5005, June 26, 1956, confidential.

0 ~ ~ \ ~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ NLhSSf(EO

:.3 1'Pa.~ ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~

~ 00 0 ~0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~4

personnel, including the technical personnel loaned by MAAG. Hestated that there would be no objection to the ICC'itself with e

e s acquaintingt the work of TERM "with the prior concuzrence of the

Vi.etnamese authorities responsible for the base visited" b ICCi.nspection teams. l se s te by ICC

Following what Reinhardt descri. bed as this "surprisinglyforthcoming" letter from the South Vietnamese Government

ich Pazthasazathi called "very satisfactory", there ensuednearly a month in which the ICC Chairman attempted to obtainthe Commission's unanmious approval of TERM or, short of that,to soften the negative Polish reaction in order to discouragethe Polish member from sending a strong mi. nority report to theGeneva Co-Chairmen. Reinhazdt told the Department of State thate felt i.t advisable to let Parthasarathi "move at his own

pace without further prodding from us ~

Jul 2Parthasarathi's efforts met with but moderatmo crate success. On

u y 3, the ICC addressed a message to the Government of SouthVietnam to make the following points:

(1) The ICC regretted the entry of TERM while thequestion of its approval was still under consideration.

(2) The Commission understood that TERM would beused for no other purpose than that stated in the Vi.etnameseGovernment's letters of June 8 and 27--i.e. , to sort out andcatalog American military equi. pment in order to return thesurplus to the United States —and requested confirmation ofthis understanding,

(3) The ICC requested the names of actual TERM per-sonnel (as separate from the MAAG personnel on loan to TE1QQ

'

and a li.st of personnel "likely to enter Vi.etnam", to enableICC teams to control their entzy.

(4) The Commission requested "further details" con-cerning TEW (designation of each person by name, rank, dutystation, and function) ~

(5) The ICC asked for fortnightly reports of TERM

activiti. es and progress of its work.

1From Saigon, tel. 5044, June 29, 1956, confi. dential.

2From Saigon, teil 279, July 23, 1956, confidential.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0

~ 0 ~ 0~ 0~ ~~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 1~ ~ 1 ~ 0 ~

~ ~ 0 a0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ \ ~ \ ~ 0~ ~ ~ Af /6f ~ ~ \ ~ ~~11 ~ 1~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 1 ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ F 1' ~ 0 IlklilNItlE

(6) The Commf. ssion noted South Vietnam's agreementto spot checks of TERM's operations by ICC mobile teams anddeclared it would notify the French Liaison Mission wheneversuch checks wez'e to be made.

(7) Finally, the ICC asked that "pending the finaldecision of the XCCA which will be conveyed to the FrenchLiaison Mission on receipt of a reply to this letter, nofurther introduction of TERM personnel should take place. "I

The Department of State urged that the Vietnamese reply tothe ICC be conciliatory in tone without, however, departingsubstantially from what had been conceded in the June 27 letter.It also took the position that further approaches to Mew Delhi.and Ottawa to change the ICC's stand on TERM would be fzuitless 2

Because of the ICC's position, the Saigon Government delayedits reply, The Vietnamese Foreign Office drafted a response inconsultation with the American Embassy. Tn September, afterlearning that all TERM personnel had arrived in Vietnam, Saigonconsidered sending off its August draft to the ICC thenchanged its mind. Thusf the fact which emerged from these.3prolonged exchanges between the Government of South Vietnamand the International Control Commission was the introductionof TERM without ICC approval.~ff f Alf ~fIM 1 ffUnder MAAS

The prospective establishment of TERN, coupled with thedissolution of the French High Cnmmind in Vietnam, raisedproblems of a bilateral nature between the United States and'France respecting the training of the 5L,OOO men to be added tothe South Vietnamese forces to offset the loss of the departin gFrench troops0 On April 23, 1956, representatives of theFrench Embassy called at the Department of State to impart theFrench Government's decision to seek an "entirely new agreementon the respective French and U. ST roles in training piet-Hamforces" to replace the fly-Collins minute of understanding ofDecember 1954. I The French wished to know (I) whether American

IFrom Saigon, tel. 309, July 25, 1956, confidential.

To Saigon, tel 302, Aug. I, 1956, confidential3Prom Saigon, desp. 181, Dec, 17, 1956, confidential.

See ante,

~ \ ~ 00 ~ 0 ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ \ ~0 0 ~0 ~ ~ 0 ~~0 0' \ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~

~

~lpga

~ 0 0 0 ~ ~~ 00 ~ * ~ ~ 0~ 0 0 ~

~ 0~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~ 0~~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~

interests in retaining French training missionso as expressedby Dulles to Pineau at Karachi, l envisaged French participationin whatever body was devised to suceed TRIM; (2) whether theUnited States proposed that TBIM would cease to exi.st onApril 28 (the day of the dissolution of the Fzench HighCommand); and (3) what form the successor body to TRIM wouldtake. The French expressed the belief that, id order properlyto operate their training missions, they would have to have avoice in the over-all programming of military training-howeverit was handled by TRIM's successor. 2

In point of fact, on April 28, Lieutenant General SamuelWilliams, Chief of MAAG in Vietnam, issued an order terminatingTRIM and establishing in its place a Combat Arms Training andOrganization Division (CATO) under his own command. This movewas followed by apparent French acceptance of the establishmentof an "Advisory Directorate Coordinating Group" to be headed byGeneral Williams and staffed by one French, one South Vietnamese,and one American representative (in addi. tion to General Wi.lliams). 3It subsequently devel. oped, however, that the French much preferzedhaving a South Vietnamese zepzesemtative chair the AdvisoryGroup, contrary to the wishes of President Di.em, who demandedGeneral Williams by name as head of the Group. 4

Matters came to a head in mid-August when President Diemdiscussed with French Ambassador Hoppenot a draft decree settingup a Committee for the Instruction of the Vietnamese ArmedForces The Committee, to serve under the direction of theSouth Vietnamese Minister of Defense, was to consist of a Presidentof the Committee would have two functi. ons: (1) carry out tgeinstruction program laid down by the Minister of Defense and'(2) verify the condition of the materiel placed at the disposalof the Vietnamese Armed Forces foz their instruction and training.The Committee itself would make suggegtions respecting trainingwithin the framework of the program. The draft decree thenspecifically designated General Williams as President of theCommittee.

18ee ante, pp, 181-182.

To Saigon, tel 3582, Apr. 25, 1956, secret.3From Saigon, tel. 4395, May 5, 1956, secret.4From Saigon, tel 433, Aug. 4. , 1956, secret.

~ 0 ~0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~00 ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~

0 ~ ~ 0~00 1 0~ ~ ~~0 ~ 000~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ F 0 ' ~

~ 0 ~ 4 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 0

~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~

~ ~~ ~

~ 0~ 0~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~0 ~ ~ ~

~0 ~ 0 ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 4~ \ ~ ~ 0

The French naturally obJected to the desi. gnation of'iPllliams as Presidentd for this action placed them in a"subordinate position". It was at Diem's insistence, however,that ':H.lliams had been named: he outranked all othez militazypeople and. represented the country .zhich provided the overwhelmingbulk of the materiel. & Nonetheless, the French Foreign Officedelivered to the American Embassy in Paris an aide-memoire on

August 14 "very strongly obJecting to (Diem's) draft decree".The aIde-memoirs pointed out, that it had been Secretary Dulleswho, at the SEATO meeting in Xarachi on 11srch 7, had asked, thatthe French retain their training missions in Vietnam -- a recuest,subsequently backed up by the Government, of Vietnam. From theFrench point, of view, the dzaft decree, while technically aVietnamese administrative measuz e, bore marks that the "composi-tion and Presidency of the Committee (could not have) been decidedwithout American militazy representatives having been consulted. "The aide-memoire concluded that, the Fz ench Government could notagree to subordinate the activities of the French training missionsto an American .resident of the proposed Committee and +Mt, ifa new formula could not, be found, the French Government "will beobU. ged to renounce maintaining 'ts instruction missions inVietnam 42 f

Informed of' the French obJections to the Vietnamese draftdecree, Embassy Saigon responded immediately that, the Embassyhad not been consulted about its contents before thay had beenrevealed to the French, although President Diem had told AdmiralRadford during the la.tter's visit to Saigon on July 26 of hisintention to name Gene al '. /illiams Presiden+ of' the proposedCommittee. The powers given the Committee and f.ts Pz'esident frereentirely the concept of the Government of Vietnam. The desig-nation of' a committee to supervise the training of the VietnameseArmed Forces represented a compromise on the part of Diem, whohad originally thought, in terms of having a single officer incharge of' training. For its part the Embassy had never supportedthe idea of bringing the French traf. ning missions under Americancontrol and had, in f'act, consistently pressed the Governmentoi Vietnam to retain +the French missions, 'zilch Diem was (and~t111 I ) 1 t 1, 1~ d. "1

From Saigon, tel. 536, Aug. 13, 1956, secret.2From Paris, tel. 788, Aug. z40 1956, secret; deep. 296,

Aug. 16, 1956, secret.3From Saigon, tel. 5670 Aug. 16, 1956, secret.

~ 4~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 0

~ 0~ ~0~ ~~0 ~~ tt~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~0 ~ ~ 00 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~4 ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ 0

~t ~ t~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~t ~ ~ t ~~ \ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ o- - ~ ~t ~ tt ~ ~ ttt a1 @t tt

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ F o ~~t t ~ t ~ t t ~ \ ~ ~ ~t ~ t \ t

t ~ ~~ ~ ~ t

~ ~ t ~~ ~

4 t ~ ~ t ~

The French in Saigon then considered two alternatives:(1) acceptance of' an Amer'can President of the proposed committee,provided the French ommittee member was allowed to take up anydifferences directly with President Diem or his representative,or (2) designation of the Vietnamese committee member as committeePresiden, . NAAG objected to the second alternative on the g oundsthat the whole purpose of setting up the committee was "to olacethe &ief of NUkG in an overall supervisory position in a manne"which, it is hoped, will prove palatable to the French. "

with reference to the possibility that the French mightwithdraw their training missions altogether, NAAG estimated thatan additional 71 American military personnel would be requiredto replace the French instructors (68 for the Vietnamese AirForce and 3 for the Navy), increasing the total combined strengthof NAAG and T&Z to 763. The Embassy commented that, in viewof the fact that the IGC had yet to give its approval to TERN, it1ms difficult to conceive a way in which the Government of Vietnamcould secure the Gomnd. ssion's permission for Perican replacementsof the French, should this contingency arise.

tAs matt'ers turned out, President Diem let his draft decree

establishing a Gommittee for tge Instruction of the VietnameseArmed, Forces faU. in abeyance. & In any event, the need for suchan arrangement was negat, ed in the following year when theVietnamese Government, asked the French to withdraw all theirmilitary instructors.

1This figure did not include the 48 additional troops replacingindividuals on medical or travel leave; see ~, p. 176.

2From Saigon, tel. 761, Sept. 1, 1956, secret, .

3From Saigon, tel. 1580, Nov. 9~ 1956, confidential.

~t \ ~t ~t ~ os~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ t ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ t ~ os ~ t ~

~/gal t ttt tt~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~t tt ~ t ~ t ~ t ~ ~ to ~ t

-200-

~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 00 ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ 0 0 ~ F 0 '~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 F 0' ~ 0 F 0 ' ~ ~

~0 4 ~~ ~

4 ~~ ~

~4 \ ~

~ F 0 ' ~ F 0' \ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ 4 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ F 0 ' ~ 0

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIESIN VIETNAM, JULY 20, 1954 (EXCERPTS)*

CHAPTER IIIB B 1 d 1 f f B~f ~M'1'

P l, i, d41. 1. ~M'1'B

Article 16

With effect from the date of entry into force of the presentAgreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforce-ments and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units andgroups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnelon a temporary duty basis and the return to Flet-Nam of individualpersonnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outsideViet-Nam shall be permitted undez the conditions laid down below:

(a)Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article).and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for FrenchUnion troops stationed north of the provisional militarydemarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the presentAgreement, during the withdrawal period provided for inArticle 2.

However, under the heading of individualmore than fifty (50) men, including officers,any one month be permitted to enter that partnorth of the provisional military demarcationtemporary duty basis oz to return there afterof leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

personnel notshall duringof the cdufntzyline on ashort periods

(b)"Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groupsof personnel by other units of the same gchelon or bypersonnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do theiroverseas service there;

(c)The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion--orthe corresponding dchelon for air and naval forces;

Text taken from American ~Forei n ~Polic , 1950-1955: BasicDocuments, pp. 750-764. The preceding chapters of the cease-fireagreement have been omitted because they were generally complied with.

~0 ~0 ~ ~0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 F 0' ~ 0

~ 0~ 4 4 04 00~ 4 ~ 0 4~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~0 ~ 0

~ ~ ~~ 4 ~~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ 0

~ 0 ~ 0 ' 000 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ *

~ ~ ~~0 ~ \ ~ ~ 0

-201-0 ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ 00 ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~~ D ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ 0 D ~ ~0 ~ '~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ 00~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~~ 0 ~ 0~

(d)Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided,however, that in any one quarter neither party shall intro-duce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) membersof its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e)Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article)and groups of personnel, and the individual personnelmentioned i.n this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Namonly through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below;

(f)Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the Inter-national Commission at least two days in advance of anyarrivals or departure of units, groups of personnel andindividual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on thearrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel andindividual personnel i.n or from Viet-Nam shall be submitteddaily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-menti. oned notifications and reports shel'1indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure andthe number of persons arriving or departing;

t

(g)The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams,shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groupsof personnel and the arrival and departure of individualpersonnel as authorized above, at the points of entryenumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 17

(a)With effect from the date of entry into force of the presentAgreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforce-ments in the form of all types of arms, munitions and otherwar material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces ofordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, isprohibi. ted.

(b)It' is understood, however, that war material, arms and muni-tions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or usedup after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on thebasis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similarcharacteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and

munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troopsstationed north of the provi. sional military demarcation linelaid down in article 1 of the present Agreement, during thewi. thdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between theregraup~. so@as.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ' ~ 0 ~

~ \ 00~ 0

0 0~ ~

~0 ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~

~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ \ ~~ ~ ~ 0~0 ~0 ~ ~0

~ ~ .-0 N-o~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~~ 0~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~F 00 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ J~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0

(c)The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposesprovided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be intro-duced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enum-erated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitionsto be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only throughthe points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;

(d)Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laiddown in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction ofwar material, arms and munitions of all types in the form ofunassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited.

(e)Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the Inter-national Commission at least two days in advance of anyarrivals or departures which may take place of war material,arms and munitions of all types.

In order to Justify the requests for the introductioninto Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (asdefined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacementpurposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shallbe submitted to the Joint Commission and the InternationalCommission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of theitems so replaced;

(f)The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams,shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted inthe circumstances laid down in this Article, at the pointsof entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 18

With effect from the date of entry into force of the presentAgreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibitedthroughout Viet-Nam territory.

Article 19

With effect from the date of entry into force of the presentAgreement, no military base under the control of a foreign Statemay be established in the re-grouping zone of either party; thetwo parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do notadhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resump-tion of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ \ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~

Ar'ticle 20

0CC

93

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel andreplacements of materi. al are fixed as follows:

--Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line:Laokay, Langson, Tien-yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;

--Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line:Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

CHAPTER VI

Joint Commission and International Commission for~tt ' d 0 I ' d' -lt

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on thecessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and super-vision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, theexecution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two partiesa Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

3l. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number ofrepresentatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shallhold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number ofwhich shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties.The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officersfrom both parties. Their location on the demarcation line betweenthe re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilsttaking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

COCe (t

0 000

Ooo 00 Coll 0 0o c 0 0 eeo e e eec0 0 0 D d0 00 6

oo eo0 C

0 t!0 6

00

0 000 eo0 C6 !too

0 Otto 000 0 0 0ee e o0 0 DD OC0 06

~ 0 ~ 1 1~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~

-204-~ 0 ~0 ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~0 ~ ~

~ ~

~ ~ \ ~ 01~ 0 ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ F 0 ' ~ 0

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the followingprovisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam forall regular and irregular armed forces of the twoparties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-groupingzones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the partiesto execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between themfor the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the applica-tion of these provisions, and shall endeavour to solve such disputedquestions as may arise between the parties in the course of executingthese provisions.

34.. An Internati. onal Commission shall be set up for the control andsupervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement. 'onthe cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed ofrepresentatives of the following States: Canada, India, and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobileinspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointedby each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall belocated at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong,Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Ouinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon,Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a laterdate, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of oneof the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agree-ment between the International Commi. ssion and the command of theparty concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall bethe regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, thedemarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarizedzones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the rightto mdve freely and shall receive from the local civil and militaryauthorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment oftheir tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposaldocuments needed for supervi. sion, summoning witnesses necessary forholding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement ofthe inspection teams, etc. . . . ). They shall have at their disposal

~0~ ~~ ~~ 0

~ \ ~ 0 ~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~00 ~ 0

~ ~ 0 ~ ~ \ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ o 0 ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~0 ~ ~ 0

~ 0 I

such modern means of transport, observation and communication asthey may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above,the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the partyconcerned, carry out other movements within the limits of thetasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsibile for super-vising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions ofthe agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the tasks ofcontrol, observation, inspection and investigation connected withthe application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessationof hosti. lities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the twoparties, effected within the framework of the re-groupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regroupingareas, snd also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war andcivilian internees.

t

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along allfrontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions ofthe agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulatingthe introduction into the country of armed forces, militarypersonnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and warmaterial.

37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of theinspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible eitheron its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission,or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigationsboth documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commis-sion the results of their supervision, their investigation and theirobservations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reportsas they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them bythe Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams,the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an i.ncident orconsiders that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violationthe International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study

09 000 ~ 00 0 e 0o 0 00 ee 0 o 000 OCC

occ 0 0 0 oo0 0 00 ee ~ ~ 0C0 0 DO 00

0 90c cee 000

0 00 00C 0 C 00 Oe 0 00 000

~1 ~ 1~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~ ~1

0~ ~ ~~ ~ 00~ ~ ~F 1' ~ ~

-206-~1 ~ 1 ~

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~0 0 ~ ~

~0~ 0 ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ 00

the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shallinform the parties of the measures which should be taken for thesettlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal ofthe threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement onthe interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisalof a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the dis-puted question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to theparties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall beadopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained inarticle 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall bedecisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendatioris con-cerning amendments and additions which should be made to the pro-visions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam,in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement.These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When deal'ing with questions concerning violations, or threatsof violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities,namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect themovements provided foz in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the partiea. ofthe regrouping zones, territorial waters, oz air space ofthe other party;

the decisi. ons of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommenda-tion of the International Commission, the parties concerned or theCosasission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity inthe cases provided foz in article 42, it shall submit a majorityreport and one or more minority reports to the members of theConference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of theConference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

~ \ ~ \ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 '~ ~ 0 ~ 1~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~~ 0 000 ~ 0 ~ 0

~1 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 010

~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 0

~ \ ~I~ 01~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~I ~~ ~ ~ ~~t ~0 ~ ~I

~ ~ %07a~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 10~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 1~ ~ ~ I~ ~ 0

~ ~~ 0~~ ~~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ 10

~ ~ 0 ~ 1~ ~ ~ 0

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time ofthe cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it shouldbe able to fulfil the tasks provided for in article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control inViet-Nam shall act in close co-opezation with the InternationalCommissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall beresponsible for co-. ordinating their work and for relations betweenthem.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control inViet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions

for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regardto the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progres-sively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adoptedunanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the secondsub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours(Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in Frenchand in Viet-Namese, both texts being equally authentic.

~ ee ~~ ~ s ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

~ \ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ s 44 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~

~ 0 ~

D

~0 0 ~ 1 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0

~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

-208-

APPENDIX B~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ \ ~ 0 ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Final Declar'ation Xssu'h8 4t' thg UUhdiusion of the8 C M 5& Vttts C~ Rt

Final Declaration, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the GenevaConference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-Chinas inwhich the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republicof Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, theState of Viet-Nemp the Union of' Soviet Socialist Republ. Cs, , theUnited Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes nots of the agreements endinghostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing inter-national control and the supervision of the execution of' theprovisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending ofhostilities in Cambodiap Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference ex-presses its conviction that the execution of the provisions setout in the present declaration and in the agreements on thecessation of hostilities will permit Cambodiap Laos and Viet-Namhenceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty,in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of' the declarations made by theGovernments of' Cambodia and of' Laos3 of' their intention to adoptmeasures permitting all citizens to take their place in the nationalco~typ in particular by participating in the n5nCt generalelections, which, in conformLty with the constitution of each of'these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955,by secret ballot and in conditions of' respect for fundamental,freedoms.

The Conference takes nots of the clauses in the agreement,on the cessation of hositiities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the intro-duction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel aswell as oi' all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also

Text taken from American F~orei P~o1i ~10-1~: Basicg&~cume~nt pp. 785-787.

Doc IC/44/Rev. 1; reprinted in R~eort, on Indochina Resort of8 t VRR tt 0404 S~t 01 1 t Vt. t C~ 411 Ct 45~1954 S t 8 &g RMt1 C~tt 9 1t, 851Gong. , 2d Sess. ), p. 27.

3Doc IC/45/Rev. 1; reprinted ibid55 p. 28.

~0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ i ~ 0 0 ~

~ ~ 8I~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~

~ 0 ~ 0 ~

0 ~ 00 ~ ~~ 8 ~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 8 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ \ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~0 ~ ~ 0

~ i21k 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~F 0 ' ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 00 0 ~ ~

~ ~ 0 ~ 00 ~ ~0~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0~

as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In orderto ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace hssbeen made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for freeexpression of the national will, general elections shall be heldin July 1956, under the supervision of' an international commissioncomposed of representatives of the Member States of the InternationalSupervisory Commission, & referred to in the agreement on the cessationof' hostilities. Consultations will be held on this sub]set betweenthe competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of' the agreements on the cessation of'hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and ofproperty must be most strictly applied snd must, in particular, alloweveryone in Vist-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes tolive.

9. Ths competent representative author1ties of the Northernand. Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laosand Cambodia, must not permit any individus1 or collective reprisalsagainst persons who have collaborated in aqy way with one of theparties during the war, or against members of' such persons' tfamilies.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Govern-ment of the French Republic2 to the eff'ect that it is ready towithdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periodswhich shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in thecases where, by agreement between ths two parties, a eertainmumbarof French troops shall remain at specified po1nts and for aspecif'ied time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the FrenchGovsrnment3 to the effect that, for the settlement of all the problemsconnected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace inCambod1a, Laos and Vist-Nam, the French Government will proceedfrom the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty,

1The member states are Canada, India, and Poland.

Doe IC/48/Rev. 1; R~ort on I~~QDL, p. 29.

3Doe IC/49/Rev. 1; reprinted ibid. , p. 29.

~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 00 ~ ~0 ~ ~ 0

0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 00~ oz ~ ~ ~'~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~0 ~ S 0

~ ~ ~ ~ 0

~ 0 ~ 00 ~ 00~ ~ 0 0 ~ ~~ ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0

~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ 0

\ ~ ~ 0~ 00~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ \ 0~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~0 ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~~ ~0~~ ~ ~~ 0~ ~ ~

-2 11-~ \ ~ 0

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~

AD %0 ~ F0 ' ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ 0

unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam,each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect thesovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorialintegrity oi' the abovementioned states, and to refrain from anyinterference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult oneanother on any question which msy be referred to them by theInternational Supervisory Comnd. ssion0 in order to study suchmeasures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements onthe cessation of' hostilities in Cambodia, , Laos and Viet-Nam arerespected.

~0~ ~~ ~~ ~00

~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ 0~ 0 ' ~ 0 0

0 ' ~~ 0

'~

~ 0 ~ ~ 0 \ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ I 0 ~ ~ ~0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ~

~ 0 ~ ~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ \ 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 0 ~ ~0 ~ ~ 0

-2 12-

~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 1 4 ~ ~ 0 4 I ~ ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ 1

STATEMFBE MAIR BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE OF VIETNAM(FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO) AT THE FINAL SESSION OF

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA~ JULY ZL~ 19541

Mr Chairmanf the Del egat ion of the State of Viet-Nam when ittabled its proposa1~~ saw an armistice without a partition, evenprovisional, of Viet-Nsm through disarmament of all belligerentforces after their withdrawal into perimeters as lizd. ted aspossible and by the establishment oi' a provisional contro3 bythe United Nations on the whole of the territory, while the re-establishment of order snd peace would enable the Vietnamesepeople to decide its fate through free elections.

The Delegation of the State of Viet-Nam protests against thefact that its proposal has been rejected without an examination, aproposal which is the only one to reflect the aspirations of theVietnamese people. It requests urgently that the demilitarizationand neutralization of the Catholic communities, the Bishophrics ofthe Delta in North Viet-Nam be at, least accepted by this Conference.

It solemnly protests against the hasty conclusion of theArmistice Agreement by the French and Vietminh High Commandersonly, whereas the French High Command does command Vietnamesetroops only through a delegation of powers given by the heed ofthe State of Viet-Nam, whereas especially many provisions of thisAgreement are of a nature to be seriously detrimental to thepolitical future of the Vietnamese people.

It further solemnly protests against the fact, that this Armi-stice Agreement abandons to Vietminh territories some of which arestill occupied by Vietnamese troops and which are, nevertheless,fundamental to the defense of Viet-Nam against a greater Communistexpansion, and results practically even in depriving the State ofViet-Nam from its right to organize its defense by other meansthan by the maintenance of the foreign army on .its territory.

1The Geneva Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, Eighth PlenarySession, Indochina Phase~ July ZL, 1954, USVerbMin/8, pp. 347-348.

On May 12~ see ibid. , USVerbMin 3, pp. 9O-IO6.

~I ~0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ st ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ 0

est ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 4~ ~0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ 1 4 ~

~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~1 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~ It ~

~ J~ ~~0

~1 ~ 1~ ~ 0 ~~ % ~ 4 ~0 ~ C ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ \ ~ Ot ~ 0 ~

~ ~F 0 '

-2 13-~0 \1 ~ 444 ~ ~0 ~ ~ 0

~ W ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ I ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~~1 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0

It also solemnly protests against the fact that the FrenchH5.gh Command was pleased to take the right without a preliminaryagreement of the Delegation of the State of Viet-Nam to set thedate of future elections, whereas we deal hare with a provisionof an obviously political character. Consequently, the Govern-ment of the State of Viet-Ham requests that this Conference notethat it does protest solemnly against the way in which theArmistice has been concluded and against the conditions of thisArmistice which have not taken into account the deep aspirationsof the Vietnamese people.

And the Government oi' the State of Vlet-Mam wishes the Con-ference to take note of' the fact that it reserves its full freedomof action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamesepeople to its territorial unity, national independence, and freedom.

~0 F 0 ' ~ 0 F 0 ' ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o0~ ~ \ ~ ~ \ ~

~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ F 0 ' ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ ~ I ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~1 ll ~ ~I~ 4 ~I ~ ~

~ 0 0 ~ \ ~ 0~ ~ e ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ e~t 0~ 0 Ot

~ ~~ e o~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ 4~ 0~, ~

-214-~ k 40 ~ 1' ~

'APPPM0 ~0 ~ 4 ~

\ 1' ~ ~ 1

STATEMENT NADE BY THE REP~ATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES(UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER BEDE% SMITH) AT THE

FINAL SESSION OF THE GENEVA COMP+WOE ON

INDOCHINA, JULY 21' 1954

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to goinin a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However,the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its positionin these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devoteits efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with theprinciples and purposes of the United Nations takes note of theagreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between(a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the PeoplesArmy oi Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Commandof the Peoples Army of Viet-Nsm; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Commandand the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nsm and of paragraphA1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the GenevaConference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaidagreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threator the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with theobligation of members to refrain in their international relationsfrom the threat or use oi' force; and (ii) it would view anyrenewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreementswith grave concern and as seriously' threatening internationA1peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerningfree elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear itsposition which it has expressed in a decZaration made in Washingtonon June 29~ 1954, 2 as fo11ows:

In the case oi' nations now divided against theirwi11~ wV shall continue to seek to achieve unitythrough free elections supervised by the United Nationsto insure that they are conducted fairly.

Text taken from American ~Forei n Frolic ~0-~: Basice t pp. 7%-788.

The so-called "Potomac Charters issued by President Eisenhowerand British Prime Mad. ster Eden; text ~ib d. , p. 1707.

H ~ \ ~ ~ 0 ~I~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ I~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 1~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~\ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ i ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~I ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ I~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~0 ~ 1~

-2 15-

~ 0~ ~0 ~~ ~~0

0~ 0 ~ 00 ~0 ~ ~0 ~D ~ 0 ~0

~ ~~ ~ 1~~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~

~ ~ \0 0

~ ~~0 00

~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ 0~ 00 ~ 0

~ ~ 10 ~ ~ ~ ~ 01 ~ ~1 ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

With respect to the statement made by the representative of'the State of Viet-Nam, l the United States reiterates its traditionalposition that peoples are entitled to determine their own futureand that it will not Join in an arrangement which would hinder thf. s.Nothing in its declaration )ust made is intended to or does indicateany departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia,Laos and Viet-Mam to play their part~ in full independence andsovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enablethe peoples of' that area to determine their own future.

1See kppenRLx C, above.

~0 000 0 ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ 0 ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~

~ ~~ ~~ \ ~~ ~

~0 ~ 0~ ~

~ ~~ ~

~0 ~ 0

~ ~~ ~~ ~ 0~ ~0 ~ 1~

~ ~ 0 ~ 0~~ ~ ~ '~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ '~~ 0~ ~ ~ '~

~ \ 044 44 '4~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ 4~ ~ 4 ~ 4 ~ 4~ 4~ ~ 4 ~ ~ 4~4 4 ~ 4 ~ \ ~ 4 ' ~ 4

-216-~4 ~4 ~

4 ~ ~

~4 ~ 4 ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 4 ~ ~ 4 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ 4 ~ ~ 4

FBENCH-UNITED STATES AGREEMElgl ON RECOUERX OF MDAP EQUIPMENTIN INDOCHINA (Collins-Rly Minute of UnderstancU. ng),

DECEMBEP 1 19541

1. Pursuant, to paragraph 2 of the exchange of notes between.the United States and French Governments on January 5, 1952, andpursuant to paragraph 41 of' the memorandum of understanding ofNarch 1, 195443 the Commissioner General of France in Indochina andthe Chief of the United States MLlitary Assistance Advisory Groupin Indochina will consult as soon as possible to establish proceduresfor the return to U. S. control of United States financed militaryequipment and materials which are no longer required for the purposesfor which originally made available. Such equipment and materialsinclude those provided in. accordance with the Mutual Defense Assist-ance agreement of December 23, 1950,4 and uncler the program coveredby the memorandum of understanding of March 1, 1954, as we11 asunder inter-governmental contracts pursuant to the so-called Lisbonprograms

2. That portion of the above military equipment and materialswhich it is determined by French and U. S. representatives (EMIFT-MAAG level) are no longer required for the purposes for whichoriginally made available should be offered for return to theUnited States Government or for such disposition as may be determinedby the United States Government, and will be daLivered by the Frenchmilitary authorities to designated shipping points,

1From Saigon, tel. 1793, Nov. 10, 1954; To Saigon, tel. 2023,Nov. 184 1954, both secret. This agreement on the recovery of NDAP

equipment and the one which follows on training of the UietnameseArmed Forces appear to be the only issues between the United Statesand France which Generals Collins and Rly resolved f~y byminutes of underst~, Other matters at issue, handled lessformally, were (1) strengthening the Diem Government, (2) resettle-ment oi' refugees and displaced persons, (3) land reform, (4) electionof a National Assembly, (5) American financial and econond. c aid toVietnam, and (6) American financial support of the French ExpeditionaryCorps.

2TZAS 2606; 3 UST 4559.3TIAS 2447; 3 UST 2756.4Attachment to Operations Memorandum from Paris, Nar. 3, 1954,

confidential.

~4 ~ \ ~ ~ 4~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 4 ~~ ~ ~~ 4 ~ 4 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ 4

~4 4 ~ ~~ 4 ~

~ ~ ~~ ~

~4 ~ ~~ 4~ ~ 4

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 4 ~ ~

~ 4

~ ~4

I ~ ~6 ~

~ 6~ ~

-217-

APPENDIX F

JODIT RECOMMENDATION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS

RELATIVE TO TEE ~RATION AND TRAINING 0$ AUTO-NOMOUS VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES (Collins-Ely

Minute of Understanding) 4DECEMSER 13, 19541

I. The undersigned consider as desirable the adoption bythe Government, of Viet Nam of the provisions of Annex»A»attached hereto relative to the initial structure of Vietnameseforces as they' should be organized on 31 December 1955.

2. This force structure would be attained by reduction ofthe strength oi Vietnamese Armed Forces 'based, as far s.s possible,on discharge of the least effective personnel, until the structuredefined in Annex »A» is achieved. Some adjustments could be madein the rate oi' reduction in the light of the political and economicsituation in Viet Nam.

3. The undersigned consider that the direction of a programin the fields of organisation and training of autonomous VietnameseArmed Forces in order to be effective should be entrusted to asingle authority; and that, as far as they are concerned. , fullresponsibility for the assistance to be accorded to the Governmentof Viet Nam in the organization and training of' these Armed Forcesshould be assumed by' the Chief of the United States M. A. A. G. on12 February 1955 under the overall authority of the Co~sr-in-Chief.

4. American personnel would than be maintained concurrentlywith French personnel as advisers and instructors of VietnameseArmed Forces. As the effectiveness of these Armed Forces increases,the number of French and American advisers and. instructors would beprogressively reduced.

Encl. 2, deep. 413 from Saigone June 27, 1957, confidential.

444

a e44

444 ea

44 ~ 6 46

44 ~

44

a4

4 4C

'4

C4 4 4 4

C 4 4 4" 4 CC 44 4 4

~ 0 ~1~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 ~ 0 ~ ~0 0~ 1

~ ~ ~1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 11~~10++ggQ 0 ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 00 ~ 1~

-2 18-

5. The undersigned agree that the above provisions ought,to be applied in conformity Mth existing agreements.

6. The present recommendation sill be valid subject toapproval by the United States Government of a progress ofdirect aid to the State of Vlet Nam.

~0 0 ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ e ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 1~ 1~ ~

0 ~eel0 0

~ \ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 1~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ \ 00 00 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0~ 0 ~ \ ~ 00

-219-

&RO&OBEII lIORCR ENBIB &OR &BIZ VIEN ERR 10R CI 1~6STRENGTH

Armed Forces HeadquartersTerritorial Divisions (3)

Per Div:Div Hq & Sp Trps at,900

Split among 3 Div:13 Security RegtHq at 20039 Security Bns at500

Field Divisions (3 at8,450)

Airborne RCT (1)Army TroopsComg TroopsSchools and CampsPipelineReduced Pay Trainees

2& 50024, 500

25, 3503&700

13,9504,0005&0005,000

10,000

4,000

10&iC IBEI.... 94,000 4, 000

Hq and Svc ElementsOperating Vnits (1)

2 Ln Sqn1 Trans Sqn

1,0002, 000

150

TOTAL AIR FORCE. .... 3,000 150

~ 0 F 0' ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 00 ~ 0

~ i ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ F 0 ' ~ ~~ ~ 0 0 ~

~ 0i ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ \~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~ \ ~ eo ~ o ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~e ~o ~ oo ~ ~

~ ~ ~e ~ ~ e ~ ~ e ~

~ ~ ee oe ~ ~ e»e ~ ee

-220-

ACTIVITX' CIVIL'

Hq Staffs and ServicesTraining SchooiShips Crews

700/+00

1,900

250

TOTAL %IVY. .... 3,000 250

TOTAL ASAED FORCES. .... 100~000 4~400

(I) During second year add 1 Ftr Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1,000 men

~e ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ e ~ e ~ ~ o

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~e ~ o ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ o ~ ~ ~~ \ ~ o ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ o ~ ~ o~

~0 0~I ~ »~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ot ~~ ~ ~ ~~1 ~ \ ~ OO

~ ~~ » ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ea ~ ~

-22 I-

yp+Q j fo ~ \

LIST OF PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT»

Achilles, Theodore C. , Deputy Chief of Mission,American Embassy, Paris

Aktal, J'. K. , Minister, Indian Embassy, Washington

Aldrich, Winthrop W. , American Ambassador to the U. K.

Anderson, Daniel V. , Counsellor and Charge d' Affaires,American Embassy, Saigon

Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam

Bartlett, Frederic P. , Deputy Chief of Mission,New Delhi

Berard, Armand, Diplomatic Counsellor, Office of thePrime Minister, France.

Bonnet, Henri, French Ambassador to the U. S.

Bonsai, Philip W. , Director, Office of Philippineand South East Asian Affairs, Department of State

Bun Hoi, Prince, South Vietnamese Ambassador-at-Large,with principal responsibility for Africa

Buu Loc, Prince, former Prime Minister of South Vietnam

Caccia, Sir Harold, Deputy Under Secretary, British ForeignOffice, 1954-1956; British Ambassador to the U.S.,1956-1961

Cheyson, Claude, former deputy political adviser to theFrench High Commissioner in Indochina» trouble-shooterfor the French Government in South Vietnam

Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the »Chinese People's Republic»

Each individual in this list is identified. in the capacityin which he appears in the narrative; in instances of severalcapacities, dates are provided.

~0 \ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~0 tO

~ ~ tt ~ 1~ ~ ~

ace ~ ~~ ~ ~

~ ee es

~ ~~ ~~ \ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ 4

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ OO ~

~ 0 ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~0 000 00 ~ 0 '

~ 0 0 '0224 ~~ DD ~ ~ ~ 0~~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~~ D 0~ 0 ~ ~ ~

~ 00 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ' ~ 0

Collins, General Joseph iawtonf Special Representative of thePresident of the United States in South Vietnam

Cooper, John Sherman, American Ambassador to Indis,

Couve de Nurville, Jacques Nsurice, French Ambassador tothe U. S.

Crepault, Alexander Raymond, Canadian Representative on theICC in Vietnam

Daridanf Jean, Deputy French High Commissioner in Vietnam,1954; Deputy Director of Political Affairsf FrenchForeign Officef 1955; Special Assistant to theFrench Foreign Ninisterf 1956

Desai, Nanilsl J0 f Commonwealth Secretary, Indian Ninistryof Foreign Affaizs, 1954, 1955-1961; Ch~ of theICC, Vietnam, 1954.-1955

Diiionf C. Douglas, American Ambassador to France

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eden, Sir Anthonyf British Foreign Secretary, 1951-19550British Prime Ninisterf 1955-1957

Eisenhower, Dwight, DDf President oi' the United States

Ely, General Paul, French Commissioner-General and Commanded'in-Chieff French Union Forces in Indochina

Fauz'sf Edgarf Prime KLIli star of Fl'ance

Gromykof Andrei A0f First Deputy Foreign Mnister of theU. S.S.R.

GI aves f Sir Hubert, Briti eh Ambassador to South Vietnam,1954.-1956; Nird. sterf British Embassy, fftashingtonf 1956-

Grsyf Gordonf Assistant Secretary of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs

~0 ~ 0 ' \ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0

~ ~~ 0 ~~ ~

~0 00~ ~

~ ~~ ~

~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ \ 0 ~ 0 ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0

0 ~ 000 \0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~ ~~0 F0 ' ~ \ ~ 0 '

-223-~ ~ ~ \ ~ at

~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~~00 ~ ~ ~ 0~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ 0~ ~ 0 0 ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ 0 ~~ ~0 ~ ~ 0

Heath, Donald R. , American Ambassador to South Vietnam

Ho Ghi Minh, President of' the "Democratic People's Republicof Vietnam»

Hoover, Herbert C. , Jr. , Under Secretary of State

Hoppenot, Henri, French High Commissioner in South Vietnam

Ho Thong Mlnh, South Vietnamese Minister of Dei'ense

Jacquot, General Pierre, Commander-Chief, FrenchExpeditionary Corps~ Indochina

Johnson, David Moffat, Canadian Representative on the ICG,Vietnam

Kidder, Randolph A. , Deputy Chief of M.ssion, Saigon

LaChambre, Guy, French M'lnister for the Associated States

LaForest, Henri, French Minister for the Associated States

Lai Van Sang, Director of the National Police and Surete,South Vietnam

Laniel, Joseph, French Prime Minister

Le Van Vien, leader of the Binh Xuyen Sect, South Vietnam

Lloyd, John Selsyn Brooke, British Foreign Secretary

WcArthur, Douglas II, Counsellor, ' Department of State

Ma~, Harold~ British Foreign Secretary

Msgsayssyp Ramous President of the Philippines

Mansfield, Michael J., U. S. Senator from putana

14Lrgerie~ Roland de, Director-Gener»1~ French Ministry of'Foreign Affairs

~0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

0 0 ~~0 ~ 0 ' ~ 0 ~

~ ~ ~ 0~ 0 ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~~ 0 ~

~ tt ~

t ~~ ~~ 0 ~~ ~~ ~ 0 ~

~ 0 ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ t ~ 0

~ I ~ I~ ~I I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~I ~ ~ 10~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~I 100 00 ~I~ ~ ~

~f 424k ~I~~ ~ I

~ ~ ~ I~~ ~ ~ ~~I ~I ~ ~

~ ~I~ ~I~ I ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ I ~ ~~ I~ ~ ~I

Massigli, Renef Secretary-Generalf French M.nistry of' ForeignAffairs

Mend%a-Francef Pierre, French Prime Minister

Menon, V. K. Krishna, Indian Roving Ambassador

Merchant, Livingston T00 Assistant Secretary of State forEuropean Affairs, 1953-1956; American Ambassador toCanada, 1956-

Miietf Pferref French Minister, Counselor of' Embassy,. Nashington

ldznphyf Robert D. , Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs,Department of Stats

Nehru, Jawahsrlalf Prime Mird. ster of India

Ngo Dinh Diem, Prime Minister of' South Uistnam, June 17f 1954-October 24f 1955; President of the Republic of Vietnam,October 26, 1955-

Ngo Dinh Luyen, South Vietnamese Roving Ambassador

Ngo Dinh Nhu, Political Counsellor to the President ofSouth Vietnam

Nguyen De, Chief of' the Imperial Cabinet under SouthVietnamese Chief of State, Bao Dai

Nguyen Huu Chauf M.nistar-Delegate of the South UietnamesePresidency

Nguyen Van Hinh, General, Chief of Staff', South Vietnamese

Nguyen Uan Tamf, former Vietnamese Prime M.rd. ster

Ngngen Van Xuanf former Vi.etnamese Vice Prime M.nist sr andPrime Ifflni ster

Psrodi, Aleomlndref Secretary-General, French M.nistry of ForeignAffairs

~ \ ~I~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~~ I ~ ~0~ ~I~ ~ I

~ 00 ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~

~ ~I~ ~

~ II ~

~ ~ ~ ~ I~~ '~ I ~ ~

~ ~I ~ ~ ~ I ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~I ~ ~ \ ~ ~ I

~o ~ oe ~ e e ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ etc~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~o eee ~e ~ e ~ ~ ~

~.)$5e. ee ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ee~ e ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~e ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~

~e eo ~ ~ ~ eel ee

Parthassrathi, George B.e Chairman of the ZCC, Vietnam

Pearson, Lester B., Canadian M.nister of Foreign Affairs

Pham Dang Lam, Directox' of Political Affairs, South Vietnamese

Pham Huy Quet, forms?' Vietnamese M.nister of Defense

Pham Van Dong, North Vietnamese Prime Minister and M.nisterfor Foreign Affairs

Pinay, Antoine, French Foreign Minister

Pineau, Christian, French Foreign M.nister

Plimsoll, Sir James, Undersecretary for Southeast. Asia,Australian M.nistry of Foreign Affairs

Reading, Marquess ofx British M.nister of State fox' ForeignAffairs

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, American Ambassador to South Vietnam

Robertson, Walter S., Assistant Sec?'etary of Stats for Far EasternAffairs

Roux, Jacques, Director, Far Eastern Section, French ForeignM.nistry

Sainteny, Jean, French Delegate-General in North Vietnam

Sebald, Willian J, , Deputy Assistant Secretary of State forFar Eastern Affairs

Singh, Avtar, Chairman of the Saigon office of the ZCC, Vietnam

Spendetre Sir Percy, Australian Ambassadox to the U. S.

nsexxx Sdr Hugh S., British Ambassador to

Tesenas du Nbncel, Robert, French M.nister forStates

South Vietnam

the Associated

~eo~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ o ~~ ~ ~e ~ ~ eo ~ e

~ e ~ ~ ~~ ~~ oe ~~ ~ ~~ ~

~e ~ ee ~

~ ~~ ~

~ ~ ~

~ ~ e ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

X~ o ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

~ oo ~ ~ ~e ~

~ e~ ~~ ~~ ~~ o

~ 0 000 ~ 0 ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ 0 00 ~ ~ 000~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e~0 000 oe 00 ~ 0

00~5-00~ ~ 0 0

~ ~ ~ ~0~ ~ ~ ~

~0 0~ ~ ~

0 ~ 000 00~ ~ ~ ~~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ 0~ 0 ~ 0

Tran Trung Dung, South Vietnamese Deputy Minister ofDefense

Tran Van Chuong, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the U. S.

Tran Van Do, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister

Tran Van Don, Genera1. , Chief of the South VietnameseGeneral Staff

Tran Van Huu, former Vietnamese Prime Minister

Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Minister of Defense

Vu Van Mau, South Vietnamese Foreign 14fLnister

Williams, Lieutenant General Samuel, Chief, U. S. MilitaryAssistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam

Wilson, Charles E. , Secretary of Defense

Wintrebert, Michel, Acting French High CommLssioner, SouthVietnam

Young~ Kenneth Tao Director, Office of Philippine and SoutheastAsian Affairs, Department of State

~0~ 0~ '~

~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ 00 ~ ~ ~

~ ~~ ao~ ~

e

~ ~ 0~ ~

~ ~~ ~

~ \ ~ 0

~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *~ ~ 0