Information and communications technologies in the two Koreas: Contrasts, commonalities, challenges

Information and Communications Technologies in

the two Koreas: Contrasts, Commonalities, Challenges

Global Economic Review, V 30, N 4, 2001, pp 51-67

Tim Beal

School of Marketing and International Business

Victoria University of Wellington,

PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand

Fax: +64 4 463 5231

Email:[email protected]

URL: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/beal.html

ABSTRACT

The contrast between the two Koreas in Information and Communication Technology

(ICT) is stark. The South is a world leader in ICT and South Koreans are addicted to the

Internet. The Internet scarcely exists in the North and few have access to it. Nevertheless,

despite internal and external constraints, the North has many of the attributes, and the

aspirations, of developed countries and ICT is a priority area. The North has carved out a

niche in computer animation and is pushing to develop software exports. Will it be able to

overcome current difficulties and dangers and join the digital revolution?

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1 INTRODUCTION

The international ‘digital divide’ is one of the major concerns of our time. As the latest

UNDP Annual Report says –

The information revolution is changing everything about the world we live

in, including the practice of development. ..//... Today, sub-Saharan Africa has

nearly 10 percent of the world’s population but only one-tenth of one percent of

global Internet connections. Half the world’s population has yet to use a telephone.

As technology makes up an ever-more important part of the global economy,

countries without resources are being left further and further behind.

ICT is now a basic component of development, not a luxury.(UNDP

2001a:12)

The percentage of the population having access to the Internet is often used as

convenient measure of ICT use, and the disparities between regions are marked. (UNDP

2001a:13)

Nowhere is the digital divide more pronounced, it would appear, than on the Korean

peninsula. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is one of the ‘most wired’ countries on earth and

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is scarcely ‘wired’ at all.

The DPRK has been in economic crisis since the beginning of the 1990s mainly

because of the collapse of its economic relationship with the then Soviet bloc, exacerbated by

a series of floods and drought. GNP fell by about 30% during the 1990s, and the economy is

beset by shortages of electricity, oil, fertiliser, spare parts, etc. There are continuing serious

deficiencies in supplies of foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and a wide range of daily necessities

such as soap. Malnutrition, especially amongst vulnerable groups such as children, is

widespread. Nevertheless, the DPRK must at the same time attempt to function and develop

as a modern economy, participating in international technological and market developments.

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Indeed, there are indications that the DPRK sees ICT far from being a luxury but as a major

driver of economic rehabilitation and growth, as well as a potentially leading source of

foreign exchange earnings.

ICT, besides being important in its own right, is a key component in a wide and

growing spectrum of economic activities so offers a good representation of the economy as a

whole. It also has interesting political and social ramifications which must be brought into

the picture. North and South Korea present very contrasting pictures in these as in other parts

of the economy, but there are commonalities as well as interconnections. It is impossible, in

a brief paper, to do more than touch on the very complex and often undocumented situation.

Moreover, the geo-political environment around the Korean peninsula is very turbulent and is

constantly shifting, sometimes in surprising ways.

2 REPUBLIC OF KOREA – A WORLD LEADER IN ICT

The Republic of Korea is one of the most highly ‘wired’ countries in the world and

does considerably better on most ICT indicators than might be expected of a country with its

level of GDP(Beal 2002:Fig 6). It sees ICT as one of its strategic strengths (Korea Herald

2002). In discussions of the ‘digital divide’ ROK is often mentioned as a benchmark. For

instance –

Technology is also unevenly diffused. OECD countries contain 79% of the

world’s Internet users. Africa has less international bandwidth than São Paulo,

Brazil. Latin America’s bandwidth, in turn, is roughly equal to that of Seoul,

Republic of Korea (UNDP 2001b: 3).

There are many ways to measure the ICT environment and, in contrast to the DPRK,

there is a plethora of statistical and other data about ROK. The evidence is compelling. For

instance it is claimed that in South Korea ‘half the population regularly accesses the

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Internet.’(SCMP 2001c). They also spend more time online than others, and about twice as

much as Americans (SCMP 2001b).

The Republic of Korea is the sixth largest ‘Internet country’ in the world, with some

22 million online in July 2001. In terms of the percentage of the population connected to the

Internet ROK is behind the Asian city states of Hong Kong and Singapore, and Taiwan, but it

is ahead of Japan, giving it the 4th

highest rate of connectivity in Asia and the 13th

in the

world.

On a wider front, the UNDP ranks ROK fifth in the world in its latest Technology

Achievement Index, behind Finland, the United States, Sweden and Japan but ahead of

Netherlands, Britain, France and Germany (UNDP 2001b:Table A2.1).

From this data it is clear that ROK is one of the leading countries in the world in ICT

use. There is not space to document other aspects, such as ROK’s production of ICT

hardware and chips, but it is widely accepted that the economy and society is particularly

technology-oriented. What of the DPRK?

3 THE DPRK ANOMOLY

It is estimated that the DPRK currently has a per capita GDP of roughly $1,000.

giving a differential between South and North of about 16:1 (CIA 2002). The ROK

Unification Ministry has a lower estimate of 12.7:1 (Park 2001). In any case the disparity s

huge. Countries with pc GNPs of about $1,000 tend to have low rates of literacy and of

industry share of GDP, which may be considered as two basic indicators of development.

For instance the literacy rates for Sudan, Mozambique, Chad and Burkina Faso, which are all

at the $1000 level, are 46%, 42%, 48% and 19% respectively. The respective figures for

industry share of GDP are 17%, 19%, 14%, 27% (CIA 2002). They all have very low rates of

Internet connectivity, ranging from 0.01% of the population in Chad to 0.08% in the other

three (Nua 2002). Within this framework the DPRK is a startling anomaly. Its literacy rate,

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at 99%, and industrial share at 42% are marginally higher than in the ROK, and at advanced

world levels. The DPRK’s forced march to prosperity and industrial progress may have been

derailed but many of the attributes and aspirations remain. It is important to bear this in mind

when examining the current situation of ICT in the DPRK and considering its prospects.

Similarly, whatever ROK has achieved in terms of ICT can be replicated, and perhaps

surpassed, in the DPRK if the circumstances are favourable. After all, up to the 1970s and

perhaps beyond the DPRK economy outperformed that of the ROK (Hwang 1993).

Much hinges on the geo-political environment and principally the policy of United

States.

4 INTERNET IN DPRK

The Internet, in the usual sense of the term, scarcely exists in the DPRK. The United

Nations aid agencies in Pyongyang, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) have email,

but not web access, via satellite.i The position regarding diplomatic missions is uncertain; the

British, for one, have complained about lack of Internet access (JoongAng Ilbo 2001e). The

DPRK until recently had six websites, all of them outside the country, either in Japan or

China –

Korean Central News Agency (www.kcna.co.jp/pk/)

Choson Sinbo (www.Korea-np.co.jp/korea)

People's Korea (www.korea-np.co.jp/pk)

DPRKorea Infobank (www.dprkorea.com)

Kumgansan International Group (http://210.118.120.201/kor/)

Tangun Homepage (www.tangun.co.jp/moviekr/) (Chosun Ilbo 2001e).

There are also a number of ‘pro-Pyongyang’ sites, though these tend to be ephemeral

(Cho 2000). The KCNA is the official news agency of the DPRK and so we have the unusual,

perhaps unprecedented, situation where a government’s major website is situated in a country

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with which it has no diplomatic relations. It was established 13 January 1997 (Cho 2000:14).

Its earliest files go back to 2 December 1996. ii

<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1996/9612/961202.htm>.

There have been a number of reports about a backbone network, linking government

ministries and research institutes. Cho (2000) referring to a report in the ROK newspaper

Hankyoreh of 15 March 1999, claimed that ‘North Korea has built an fiber optic network

between Pyongyang, Hamheung, and Nampo and also finished an Internet connection

experiment with Australia successfully with its own computer network and web

browser.‘(Cho 200:19) The network, called Kwangmyong [bright star] is administered by the

Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA) was established in 1997

‘to provide materials related with science and technology to people, universities and research

institutes of the DPRK’ (People’s Korea 2001b). The CSTIA provides ‘technological data-

searching, e-mail, website search and file transmissions services…//.. [and] various kinds of

foreign science magazines through the network.’ [emphasis added] (ibid). Kwangmyong

currently serves 1300 institutions and computers linked to it have increased 4.6 times over

two years to July 2001 (JoongAng Ilbo (2001b). Clearly CSTIA currently acts as a manual

gateway to the Internet, and this seems to be done through the existing landline

telecommunications system into China.

It is reported that the DPRK network will soon be linked into the international Internet

via satellite. In May 2001 the DPRK signed an agreement with Intelsat, the international

satellite telecommunications provider (Yonhap 2001b). In June 2001 the president of the

ROK company BIT computer announced that his company was involved with selecting a

south Korean system provider to implement an access system ‘within three months’ (Korea

Herald 2001d). BIT computer was also setting up a dedicated line called BitHotLine, short

for Business Information Technology Hot Line to facilitate ‘private level exchanges between

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business men in the two Koreas’, and provided ‘cyber education via its website

www.bitcampus.com’ (ibid). One major concern for the DPRK is, of course, security and

effort has gone into constructing a firewall (Lee Kyo Kwan 2001).

On 8 October 2001 a commercial Internet service called Silibank.com was launched,

and after an initial test service went into operation on 1 December (Smerdon 2001). ‘Sili’

means ‘real profit’ in Korean and the company, which is based in Shenyang, China is jointly

owned by Korean-Chinese and Chinese (Korea Times 2001a; Koh 2001). It appears to be

aimed at foreign businesses dealing with the DPRK. Users have to register, paying a fee of

US$100, on top off communication charges which vary with the size of the email sent.iii

An

8mb photograph would cost $300. Given the current difficulties of getting faxes through to

Pyongyang it would seem that this service, though expensive, would be attractive to anyone

needing to communicate with any frequency with the DPRK, even though it appears to

emails are transmitted only once every hour (or half-hour according to other reports), and

through existing international phone lines. It was reported early November 2001 that Silibank

had but 10 customers (NY Times 2001). Cost aside, Silibank’s success will depend crucially

on whether recipients in DPRK have access to email, and its linkage to the Kwangmyong

network. Currently outsider senders need ‘prior agreement with North Korean recipients.’

(Korea Times 2001b).

5 EFFECT OF SANCTIONS

However, focusing on the current state of the Internet in the DPRK would give a

misleading impression of its ICT situation, and ICT policy and practice. This must be seen

not merely against the general background of the economic crisis but also within the context

of the historical hostility of the United States and its allies, and the continuing effect of

sanctions and restrictions on access to international technology.

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During the Cold War the United States imposed its own sanctions and extended them

through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) (SIPRI

2002) which was superseded by the Wassenaar Arrangement for export controls for

conventional arms and for dual-use technologies in the mid-nineties.(Wassenaar 2002). Of

particular relevance is the continued labelling by the US Government of the DPRK as a

‘terrorist state’. This has far-reaching implications. On the broadest level it ‘compels’ the

government to veto DPRK membership of international financial institutions, hence

debarring it from loans. According to KOTRA the terrorism designation results in a number

of economically significant sanctions (Shin 2001) which feed their way through even to the

ROK of Kim Dae-jung and the ‘sunshine policy’.

For instance, the ROK bans ‘the export of computers with processors more advanced

than the Intel 80386 to the North’ (Lee Young-jong 2001). These sanctions, compounding the

general shortage of foreign exchange, mean that even the top schools (Korea Herald 2001c)

and institutes use out-dated equipment, although it is likely that more sophisticated

equipment is available in the military sector. For instance, the Korea Computer Center, ‘with

a research staff of 500, has only 80 Pentium computers including Pentium III’ (Chosun Ilbo

2001b). One report claims that the Pentium III computers are now ‘produced’ in Pyongyang

but it seems likely that this is really assembly of imported parts which will still be subject to

restraints (JoongAng Ilbo 2001a). A report in May 2001 said that 1,300 ‘up-to-date’

computers had been produced in February, but it is unclear whether this is a continuing

process (Yonhap 2001a). One estimate was that there were 100,000 computers in the country,

‘most of them 386 class’ (Chosun Ilbo 2001a). Another estimate, in January 2001, was that

there were slightly more than 3000 ‘desktops’ (Yonhap 2001a).

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6 PRIORITY GIVEN TO ICT

In contrast to this bleak background, DPRK policy statements give much emphasis to

ICT. Clearly, this is partly because of the defense implications (Kim Hee-sung 2001).

However, the priority given to ICT goes beyond that and given the centrality of

industrialisation in DPRK development strategy that should come as no surprise. Helen-

Louise Hunter recently argued that Kim Jong Il ‘has also put forward an intriguing new

theory of economic development based on developing high tech industries, rather than

conventional light industries a la the Chinese model’. ICT, and export-oriented high-

technology industries, form the basis of current DPRK economic strategy. She said that it ‘is

a plan that makes sense in terms of North Korea’s natural resources and obviously appeals to

Kim’s sense of the dramatic and superlative’. She suggests that Kim Jong Il has a

‘unmistakable fondness and fascination with modern technology, much as his father did, not

only for economic but for psychological reasons’ and points out that his background in the

movie industry would make him aware of Japan’s success with the Pokemon phenomenon

and Taiwan’s with special effects martial arts movies (Hunter 2001).

7 DPRK’S NICHE IN ANIMATION

Indeed, there have been a number of press reports about DPRK’s efforts to develop

animation and special effects for movies and this does seem to be an area where an

international niche market is being developed.

Some of these projects have been joint ventures with ROK companies (Korea Herald

2000; Korea Herald 2001a)). The film Sara-innun Ryonghongdul (titled ‘Souls Protest’ in

English) appears to have been a sole DPRK venture. The film, which concerned the

Ukishima Maru incident of August 1945 in which the Japanese ship carrying Koreans to

Japan sank claiming at least 549 lives by official Japanese accounts and many thousands

according to Koreans, who alleged that the boat had been deliberately scuttled (Chung Hye-

jean 2001). The DPRK film, which has been shown in Hong Kong, Moscow, and Seoul (at

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which scenes eulogising Kim Il Sung were censored out), was dubbed ‘the Korean Titanic’

because it introduced a fictional love story. It is a commercial film, rather than overtly

political one, and there are plans to distribute in Canada and Europe. It had a large budget by

DPRK standards, with some 10,000 extras. Significantly, it was claimed that it was ‘the first

north Korean film in which CG [computer graphics] technology developed by top engineers

and experts in the country was introduced’ (People’s Korea 2001c). According to a KOTRA

report it utilised a three dimensional computer image processing software ‘Hwangryong 2.0

developed by Kim Il-sung University’s Information Center (Nam Woo-Suk 2001a).

However, the main development seems to have been the production of animation for

foreign filmmakers, mainly French, Italian and Spanish, by the SEK studio. This variously

described as the Korea Joint Venture Animated Cartoon Company or the April 26th

Children’s Film Studio. A report in November 2001 claimed that “Our company, staffed

with highly skilled creators and equipped with high performance computers, is capable of

responding to any orders.” (People’s Korea 2000) A longer article in December 2001 gave

more details of the contractual arrangements with the foreign studies, which go back to 1985.

There are now 70 foreign customers. It was said that ‘The studio is actively promoting

collaborations, contract-basis work and technical exchanges with foreign enterprises in the

international cartoon films market and also in the international cartoon film

festivals.’(People’s Korea 2001f) It is not stated how much foreign exchange is earned but

the company has over 1000 artistic staff. It ‘computerizes the scanning, coloring of original

pictures and background, animation, editing, special effect and the composition of pictures’

and it claimed that its ‘animation work is highly regarded in Europe, noted as good as

Disney’s works.’(ibid)

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8 DEVELOPMENT OF SOFTWARE EXPORTS

Animation is perhaps currently the DPRK’s main software export, but it is not the

only one. The advertisement for the ‘1st Computer Software Expo of DPRKorea’ held in

Beijing in April 2002 lists a range of products (DPRKorea.com 2002).

DPRK software, jointly developed with the Japanese company Digiko Soft, was

exhibited at the World PC Expo 2001 in Japan, the first time in an international exhibition

(People’s Korea 2001e; JoongAng Ilbo 2001c) . Various lists of DPRK programs have been

published (People’s Korea 2001e; Nam Woo-Suk 2001a; Ri Sang Yong 2000) and a

chronology of software development has been compiled by Nam Woo-Suk (2001a).

The Japanese joint venture is by no means unique. DPRK companies seem to have

been very active in entering into various forms of joint venture, mostly with ROK companies,

though sometimes the JV is located in China (Nam Woo-Suk 2001b). DPRK software is well

regarded in the ROK (Kim Sang Taek 2001). The potential has attracted the interest of even

the largest companies; for instance ‘a Samsung official said it has come to light that the level

of software engineering and programming in the North is exceptionally high and that

Samsung is keen to tap into the rich manpower market.’(Korea Times (2000) )

KOTRA has identified four reasons for ROK companies to pursue these cooperative

ventures:

1. High-skilled, cheap, Korean speaking labour

2. Stability afforded by DPRK’s socialist system allows long-term planning and

projects

3. Commission-based processing of software does not require investment in

plant, or use of physical inputs

4. Establishing a position in ‘the infinitely potential North Korean market’ (Nam

Woo-Suk (2001b).

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From the point of view of the DPRK these ventures would seem to have two main

purposes. They give access to

1. Technology, expertise and infrastructural investment or aid.

2. International markets

The second reason is particularly significant because it is becoming clear that the

DPRK views ICT not merely as a core component of its domestic development strategy, but

also as a major source, perhaps the major source in the future, for foreign exchange earnings.

A Yonhap commentary, after reporting a talk on (North) Korean Central Broadcasting Station

on the growth of the global market for ICT, speculated that perhaps ‘Pyongyang has chosen

the information industry as a money-making option to replace its weapons

industry…’(Yonhap 2001a) The DPRK has often said that it views missiles exports

primarily as a business venture and has signalled its readiness to stop them if suitably

compensated (Kirk, Don 2001). Although the DPRK has made clear its eagerness to enter the

global ICT market, particularly software, it is uncertain what its prospects are, not what its

anticipations are (People’s Korea 2001e). However, a harbinger of things to come may be the

recent announcement that IT has replaced textiles as the major item in inter-Korean business

(Chosun Ilbo (2001d). The focus on software is likely to remain though ROK hardware JVs,

particularly those aimed at the China market, might take off. This DPRK emphasis on

software has interesting similarities with India. In India a concentration on higher education

and a neglect of primary education has resulted in low average literacy rates (52%) but a

large output of graduates, including ICT ones (CIA 2002). Relatively lacklustre economic

growth has mean that the supply of graduates has outstripped jobs. A large number went

abroad, to places like Silicon Valley. Others stayed at home and when the Internet enabled

software to be outsourced globally, India was able to deploy cheap, skilled and English-

speaking software programmers, in a process facilitated by diasporic links. In the case of the

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DPRK, the combination of a relatively good, science-focused and elitist education system on

the one hand, and a declining economy and restrictions on import of hardware and

components on the other, has produced a similar asymmetry. Significantly, the Korean

Diaspora is also large and may well play and important role; for instance, the email provider

Silibank can be considered a diasporic JV.

Some observers think that Kim Jong Il sees ICT as a way to ‘skip over’ capital-

intensive industrialisation (Hunter 2001). There is nothing unusual or surprising in this; ‘leap-

frogging’ over technologies is a well-established advantage of followers or late-developing

economies. It is likely, for instance, that there will be an emphasis on cellular

communications and wireless internet. Currently it is estimated that only 5% of (North)

Koreans have a phone and the costs of upgrading to advanced level using landline technology

would be enormous. It seems that DPRK will do what is being done elsewhere, China being

the major example, and develop mobile communications. It is reported that cellular phone

services were to be launched in Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone in February 2002, in a joint

venture with Loxley Pacific of Thailand (Chang. 2001). It is claimed that a cellular service is

operating in parts of Pyongyang currently and a public service will be launched in time for

the celebration of the late Kim Il Sung’s birthday on 15 April 2002 (JoongAng Ilbo (2001d).

9 ICT TRAINING AND POPULARIZATION

Major efforts are going into ICT training and the raising of public awareness.

Computer education is conducted at more than 200 high schools and colleges, and there is

specialist training at the leading universities, particularly Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek

University of Technology and Pyongyang Computer University (MoU 2001). Competitions

are held for schoolchildren and one in September 2001 had 600 contestants (KCNA 2001e).

These draw on the network of ‘children’s palaces’, which are centres of extra-curricula

training, of which the most famous are Mangyongae Palace of Students and Youth and the

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Pyongyang Palace of Students and Youth. There is also a specialist IT high school, Kumsong

First Junior High School, which has 600 children selected from around the country (People’s

Korea 2001d). The strategy seems to be an emphasis on the training of what are called

‘computer geniuses’ (KCNA 2001a). How far this is a rational focussing of scarce resources

on those most able to utilise them or a diversion of resources to the gifted (or privileged) at

the expense of a broad-based educational strategy is a matter of conjecture. However, is

claimed that ‘In the field of common education, program classes appeared at various

provincial senior middle schools no. 1 and a considerable portion of mathematical lessons is

devoted to computer education from the second year to the sixth year course at senior middle

schools. Computer education has thus been made a compulsory subject at all universities,

colleges and middle schools throughout the country.’(People’s Korea 2001a)

Seminars have been held to inform the top leadership about ICT and the ‘information

era’ (KCNA 2001c). Kim Jong Il himself is widely considered to be personally committed to

the emphasis on ICT (Hunter 2001). He is quoted as saying ‘If the 20th century was the era of

mechanical industries, the 21st century is the era of the information industry.’(MoU 2001) He

is said to kept in touch by email on his long train journey across Russia in August 2001

(Trifonov 2001). His eldest son, Kim Jong-nam, is considered to be in charge of the ‘IT

industry’ in the DPRK (Chosun Ilbo 2001c).

10 DILEMMAS AND CONSTRAINTS

However, it is debatable how far or fast commitment and aspiration by themselves can

drive ICT growth in the DPRK. Access to technology, capital and investment, international

markets and market expertise are all bottlenecks and the international geo-political

environment is the major determining factor. At the beginning of 2002 DPRK relations with

the United States and Japan are bad, and with the ROK they are uncertain. Whilst North-

South joint ventures can continue even when Pyongyang-Seoul relations are on hold, they are

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always vulnerable, as the Kumgangsan tourism venture illustrates (Beal 2001b). Symbolic of

both the promise and the vulnerability of joint ICT ventures was the announcement in

January 2002 of an games venture between the ROK company Hoonnet and the DPRK’s

Pan-Pacific Economic Development Association of Korean Nationalsiv

The project was to

develop software to enable online games from a website that ‘will be established and

administered from North Korea and will be accessible online.’(JoongAng Ilbo 2002) This

was launched in March 2002 and became the first DPRK-based international website (Korea

Times 2002; Korea Herald 2002). The irony of ‘Internet Lotto’ being the DPRK’s first

public venture into international e-commerce is profound, but it is consistent with attempts to

develop casino tourism (Beal 2001b). However, just as the Pyongyang authorities will keep

strict control over their side of things, so too has the southern partner had to have approval

from the ROK Ministry of Unification (Chosun Ilbo 2002). Ultimately politics is in

command.

Even if the international geo-political environment were to become benign and all

restrictions were lifted on the DPRK, what then? International loans, aid and investment

might flood in. Free of US restrictions, and with access to finance, the DPRK might be able

to import hardware, software and expertise. Joint ventures might export DPRK-made

hardware to the ROK, Japan and especially China, and software to niche markets

internationally. Would the DPRK then fully participate in the ‘global digital economy’?

Would it become a ‘wired society’ like the ROK? It seems unlikely. Some, such as Jung-

Yul Cho, argue that ‘this new communication technology will at least for some time, only

help to strengthen the power of the North Korean government rather than providing a

centrifugal force to the individuals to fight the tyranny.’(Cho Jung-Yul, 2000) Even if one

were to reject the partisanship and to counter argue that ICT is giving governments (and

corporations) everywhere the ability to increase surveillance and control even where the

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illusion of freedom is most advertised, especially since 11 September, it is clear that the

DPRK faces particular dilemmas.

It would appear that the strategy is to expand as quickly as possible the present

framework where scientific institutes, government departments, etc. are linked through the

Kwangmyong network. This facilitates the distribution of certain information through the

elite community and allows the dissemination of international material, mainly scientific,

which is brought in through controlled gateways. One can envisage this being expanded to

include ever wider parts of society, especially education and industry.

In the past, too, the importance of computerization was emphasized in north

Korea. But it was mainly for the purpose of introducing automation and

computerization to industries and enterprises. But now, the DPRK stresses the need

of “computerization of all areas of the people’s economy.”..//.. At the same time,

nationwide campaigns to draw people’s interest in this work is being accelerated in

real earnest. Newspapers are carrying articles to explain how to operate PCs and

report on the world situation in computer technology development. TV programs

dealing with computers were broadcast in the prime time.

Now, IT is not only for specialists but also for ordinary people (People’s

Korea 2001b).

One can see a determined effort (within the constraints of the current economic

difficulties) to bring ICT to the ‘ordinary people’ on a controlled and domestic basis. The

emphasis will be on social access – through schools, clubs and social groups – rather than

private. That makes sense given the state of the economy and may not become an issue for

some time. What, however, is an immediate issue is the question of international access and

communication. Despite talk of firewalls it is unlikely that the DPRK will have the resources

or expertise to allow efficient and open access to the Internet while screening out foreign

17

surveillance and cyberwar threats, hacker attacks and ‘objectionable material’ (Lee Kyo

Kwan 2001). That is the dilemma. It is not unique to the DPRK -counties around the world

from ROK, China (Hachigan 2001), Singapore, and even the United States face it in their

own particular way – but for the DPRK it is particularly difficult. The Taliban attempted to

solve the problem by banning the Internet (SCMP 2001a). That was no solution and anyway

is antithetical to DPRK strategy. The DPRK needs to embrace ICT, and effectively enter the

global economy, without being destroyed in the process, and that is perhaps the greatest

challenge facing it today.

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website,

<http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/common_bbs/notice_read.php3?board_id=20&pnum=899848

&cnum=0>

Chosun Ilbo (2001c) “Kim Jong-Il”s Eldest Son Heads the IT Industry in NK”, Chosun Ilbo, 24

April 2001 via KOTRA website


&cnum=0>

Chosun Ilbo (2001d) “IT Replaces Textiles in Inter-Korean Business Deals”, Chosun Ilbo, 10

September 2001 via KOTRA website,


&cnum=0>

18

Chosun Ilbo (2001e) “N. Korea Operating Six Homepages in Japan, China”, Chosun Ilbo, 14

December 2001, via KOTRA website,


&cnum=0>

Chosun Ilbo (2002) “Hoonnet Allowed to Develop Game Software with N.K.: Ministry” Chosun

Ilbo, 3 January 2002, via KOTRA website


&cnum=0>

Chung Hye-jean (2001) “Two Films Shed Light on 1945 Ship Tragedy”. Korea Times, 17 September

2001, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/kt_culture/200109/t2001091717180846110.htm>

DPRKorea.com (2002) “1st Computer Software Expo of DPRKorea” {advertisement on

dprkorea.com site, <http://www.english.dprkorea.com/notify.php>

Hachigian, Nina (2001) “China’s Cyber-Strategy”, Foreign Affairs 8 (2): 118

Hunter, Helen-Louise (2001) “Dreaming of High-Tech -- Subsisting on Hand-Outs”, Lecture given

to Institute for Corean-American Studies, Washington, D C, June 21, 2001,

<http://www.icasinc.org/s2001/s2001hlh.html>

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Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press

Intelsat (2001) “Intelsat Opens First Office in Africa”, Intelsat Press Release, 1 June 2001,

<http://www.intelsat.com/news/press/2001-10e.asp>

JoongAng Ilbo (2001a) “Pentium III and Celeron Computer are high in production in North Korea”,

JoongAng Ilbo, 19 May 2001 via KOTRA website



JoongAng Ilbo (2001b) “N.K. Introduces First Computer Network System”, JoongAng Ilbo, 23 July

2001 via KOTRA website,


&cnum=0>

JoongAng Ilbo (2001c) “North Dispatches Its Software Expert to Japan”, JoongAng Ilbo, 24

September 2001, <http://english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20010924110348&sid=E00>

JoongAng Ilbo (2001d) “Cellular phone service to launch in Pyeongyang in April”, JoongAng Ilbo,

14 December 2001, via KOTRA website,


&cnum=0>

JoongAng Ilbo (2001e) “UK envoy protests limitations in North”, JoongAng Ilbo, 31 December

2001, <http://english.joins.com/nk/article.asp?aid=20011231094520&sid=E00>

JoongAng Ilbo (2002) “North, South start cyber venture”, JoongAng Ilbo, 3 January 2002,

<http://english.joins.com/nk/article.asp?aid=20020103094422&sid=E00>

KCNA (2000) “Computer education strengthened in DPRK”, KCNA website, 20 December 2000,

<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2000/200012/news12/20.htm#7>

KCNA (2001a) “Training of computer geniuses brisk in DPRK”, KCNA website, 28 March 2001,


KCNA (2001b) “Kim Jong Il sends latest educational equipment to computer genius training

centers”, KCNA website, 31 March 2001,


KCNA (2001c) “National seminar on era of information industry”, KCNA website 6 May 2001,


KCNA (2001d) “Putting national economy on modern and information basis called for”, KCNA

website 17 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2001/200105/news05/17.htm#7>

19

KCNA (2001e) “National schoolchildren’s mathematical and computer contests”, KCNA website 6

September 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2001/200109/news09/06.htm#1>

Kim Hee-sung (2001) “North to Develop Software for Missile Guidance System”, JoongAng Ilbo, 4

December 2001, <http://english.joins.com/nk/article.asp?aid=20011204134447&sid=E00>

Kim Sang Taek (2001) “North-South Korean Economic cooperation in Telecommunications”, in

Choi et al, Perspectives on Korean unification and Economic Integration, Cheltenham, Edgar

Elgar, 2001, pp. 88-107

Kirk, Don (2001) “North Korea Refuses to Stop Arms Exports, Delegation Says, New York Times, 5

May 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/05/world/05KORE.html>

Koh Soo-suk (2001) “Silibank.Com Better Not Turn Out Flop”, JoongAng Ilbo, 5 November 2001,


Korea Herald (2000) “Hyundai Seeking to Produce Animation Film Jointly With NK”, Korea

Herald, 12 July 2000, <http://www.hk.co.kr/times/200007/t200007121728284011112.htm>

Korea Herald (2001a) “First animation project planned by South, North Korea”, Korea Herald, 3

February 2001,

<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2001/02/03/200102030020.asp>

Korea Herald (2001b) “Firm to produce animation with N.K partner”, Korea Herald, 16 April 2001,


Korea Herald (2001c) “Best school in North Korea using outdated computers”, Korea Herald, 7 May

2001, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2001/05/07/200105070046.asp>

Korea Herald (2001d) “Seoul to help North Korea build satellite-based Internet access system”,

Korea Herald, 28 June 2001,


Korea Herald (2002) “Korea to showcase IT during World Cup”, Korea Herald, 1 January 2002,


Korea Herald (2002) “N.K. to open Internet lottery site with S. Korean company”, Korea Herald 23

March 2002,


Korea Times (2000) “Info-Tech Firms Ready to Move Into N. Korea”, Korea Times, 15 June 2000,

<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/kt_tech/200006/t20000615184014451129.htm>

Korea Times (2001a) “NK Allows Citizens to Use e-Mail Services”, Korea Times, 1 November

2001, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/times/200111/t2001110119244340110.htm>

Korea Times (2001b) “NK Launches e-Mail Service”, Korea Times, 3 December 2001,

<http://www.hankooki.com/kt_nation/200112/t2001120316580341110.htm>

Korea Times (2002) “NK Opens Internet Lotto” Korea Times 22 March 2002,

<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/times/200203/t2002032218503640110.htm>

Lee Kyo Kwan (2001) “NK Nearly Ready to Access Internet”, Chosun.com, 27 November 2001,

<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200109/200109130208.html>

Lee Young-jong (2001) “Inter-Korea interest rate is cut”, JoongAng Ilbo, 21 December 2001,


MoIC (2001) Korea Internet White Paper, 2001, National Computerization Agency, Ministry of

Information and Communication, Republic of Korea, Seoul

MoU (2001) “North Korea’s promotion of information technology (IT) industry”, Ministry of

Unification website [ROK], 19 August 2001. <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/>

Nam Woo-Suk (2001a) “North Korea’s IT Industry”, KOTRA website, 3 January 2001,



Nam Woo-Suk (2001b) “Current status of Inter-Korean economic cooperation in the IT field, tasks

and future outlook”, KOTRA website, 25 May 2001,

20



Nam, W S, (2001) “Pentium III and Celeron Computer are high in production in North Korea,

JoongAng Ilbo, 19 May 2001 via KOTRA website,



NY Times (2001) “Website Offers Email Links to N. Korea” New York Times, 1 November 2001

Park Yoon-bae (2001) “South Koreans Earn 12.7 Times More Than Northern Counterparts”, Korea

Times, 20 December 2001,

<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/times/200112/t2001122017231140110.htm>

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November 2000,<http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/151st_issue/2000110802.htm>

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January 2001, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/154th_issue/2001012508.htm>

People’s Korea (2001b) “Computer Network Rapidly Expanding in DPRK”, People’s Korea

website, February 2001, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/156th_issue/2001022104.htm>

People’s Korea (2001c) “Korean ‘Titanic’ Amazes Moscow And Hong Kong Audience; To Be

Exported to West”, People’s Korea website July 2001, <http://www.korea-

np.co.jp/pk/165th_issue/2001072515.htm>

People’s Korea (2001d) “Strategic Plan for IT Revolution in DPRK”, People’s Korea website

August 2001, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/167th_issue/2001082504.htm>

People’s Korea (2001e) “DPRK to Enter World PC Market”, People’s Korea website October 2001,

<http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/168th_issue/2001100502.htm>

People’s Korea (2001f) “Korean-made Cartoon Films Win Popular Acclaim among Animation Film

Fan in Europe”, People’s Korea website December 2001, <http://www.korea-

np.co.jp/pk/173rd_issue/2001122606.htm>

People’s Korea (2001g) “Training of IT Specialists In Full Swing”, People’s Korea website,

December 2001, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/171st_issue/2001120202.htm>

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Industry of DPRK, People’s Korea website, November 2000, <http://www.korea-

np.co.jp/pk/152th_issue/2000112909.htm>

SCMP (2001a) “Taliban leader bans use of Net”, South China Morning Post, 27 August 2001

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SAR, 24 August 2001

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SAR, 19 December 2001, <http://technology.scmp.com/internet/ZZZKO9SYAVC.html>

Shin, Hye-Jin (2001) “Economic significance of North Korea’s designation as a terrorism-supporting

nation by the US: An obstacle to North Korea-US trade expansion”, KOTRA website, 2 May

2001,


&cnum=0>

Silibank.com (2002) website , <http://www.silibank.com/silibank/english/emailprice.asp>

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Institute (SIPRI) website, <http://cbw.sipri.se/cbw/ex-evolution.htm>

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2001, <http://www.feer.com/articles/2001/0112_27/p014region.html>

Stratfor.com (2001) “The truth about North Korea’s missile program”, Global Intelligence Update, 6

March 2001, <http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CC07Dg02.html>

21

Trifonov, Konstantin (2001) “Russia Trip Sheds Odd New Light on N. Korea’s Kim”, Reuters, 6

August 2001,

</http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010806/wl/russia_korea_north_dc_24.html>

UNDP (2001a) Annual Report “Partnerships to fight poverty”, United Nations Development

Programme, <http://www.undp.org/dpa/annualreport2001/>

UNDP (2001b) Human Development Report “Making New Technologies work for human

development”, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press,

<http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/>

Wassenaar (2002) Website of the Wassenaar Arrangement <http://www.wassenaar.org/>

Yonhap (2001a) “North Korea Produced 1,300 Computers in February”, Yonhap News Agency,

North Korea This Week, No 138, 17 May 2001,

<http://www.yonhapnews.net/news/20010517/4801000000200105171154549.html>

Yonhap (2001b) “N. Korea Subscribes to Intelsat to Become 145th Member Nation”, Yonhap News,

29 May 2001,

<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/20010529/2000000000200105291738452.html>

Yonhap (2001c) “Mobile Telecommunications Service to Begin in N.K. Next Feb.” Yonhap News

Agency, 26 November 2001,

<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/20011126/2000000000200111261449225.html>

i Private correspondence with WFP in Pyongyang

ii <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1996/9612/961202.htm>.

iii http://www.silibank.com/silibank/english/emailprice.asp

iv This is the organisation that runs the Beijing-based website < http://www.dprkorea.com/>

Information and communications technologies in the two Koreas: Contrasts, commonalities, challenges

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