ICR00004432 - World Bank Documents

Document of

The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004432

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

7884-BR

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$495 MILLION

TO THE

CENTRAIS ELETRICAS BRASILEIRAS

FOR AN

ELETROBRAS DISTRIBUTION REHABILITATION ( P114204 )

29 June 2018

Energy and Extractives Global Practice Latin America And Caribbean Region

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2017)

Currency Unit = Brazilian Real (R$)

R$ 3.3078 = US$1

R$1 = US$0.3023

FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANEEL Electricity Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica) AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure BRL Brazilian Real CEAL Eletrobras Distribuição Alagoas CEPISA Eletrobras Distribuição Piauí CERON Eletrobras Distribuição Rondônia CGU Federal Controller General's Office CMU Country Management Unit CMS Commercial Management System COIFEX External Financing Committee (Comissão de Financiamentos Externos) CPF Country Partnership Framework CSR Corporate Social Responsibility DEC Duration of Service Interruptions (Duração Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade

Consumidora) DisCos Distribution Companies ERP Enterprise Resource Planning ERR Economic Rate of Return FEC Frequency of Service Interruptions (Frequência Equivalente de Interrupção por

Unidade Consumidora) FM Financial Management FRR Financial Rate Return GDP Gross Domestic Product IASC Aneel Consumer Satisfaction Index Awards (Prêmios Indice do Aneel de Satisfação do

Consumidor) ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFR Interim Financial Report ILO International Labour Organization INAD Inadimplência (Delinquency Index) ISR Implementation Status and Results Report

LV Low Voltage M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIS Management Information System MTR Midterm Review MV Medium Voltage NCB National Competitive Bidding NPV Net Present Value PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PMO Project Management Office RGR Global Reversion Reserve (Reserva Global de Reversão) TCU Tribunal das Contas da União (Court of Auditors of the Union) ToR Terms of Reference TTL Task Team Leader UN Women United Nations Women

Regional Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon

Country Director: Martin Raiser

Senior Global Practice Director: Riccardo Puliti

Practice Manager: Antonio Alexandre Rodrigues Barbalho

Task Team Leader(s): Christophe de Gouvello, James Victor Pannett

ICR Main Contributor: Elisabeth Maier

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 5

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................5

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) .......................................8

II. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 9

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ..............................................................................................................9

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ........................................................................................9

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 21

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 21

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 23

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 23

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 24

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 25

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 26

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 28

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 33

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 33

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 36

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 60

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 62

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY AND EFFICACY ANALYSIS .................................................................... 63

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER, AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS 109

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ................................................................................ 113

The World Bank ELETROBRAS Distribution Rehabilitation ( P114204 )

Page 1 of 193

DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name

P114204 ELETROBRAS Distribution Rehabilitation

Country Financing Instrument

Brazil Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras Eletrobras

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO The Project development objective is to improve the financial and operational performance and the commercial management of the six DisCos by reducing electricity losses, increasing bill collection rates, and improving quality of service.


Page 2 of 193

FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing IBRD-78840 495,000,000 271,812,880 271,812,880

Total 495,000,000 271,812,880 271,812,880

Non-World Bank Financing Borrower 214,300,000 147,863,131 147,863,131

Total 214,300,000 147,863,131 147,863,131

Total Project Cost 709,300,000 419,676,011 419,676,011

KEY DATES

FIN_TABLE_DAT Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

03-Jun-2010 23-May-2011 28-May-2013 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 30-Jun-2015 142.58 Change in Results Framework

Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Financing Plan Change in Implementation Schedule Other Change(s)

30-Mar-2017 270.58 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Implementation Schedule

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Substantial


Page 3 of 193

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 28-Dec-2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0

02 21-Jun-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.24

03 10-Aug-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.24

04 01-Jan-2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.24


06 20-Feb-2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.64

07 25-Nov-2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.64

08 09-Jun-2014 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 56.06

09 05-Mar-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 143.81

10 28-Oct-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 143.81


12 20-Dec-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 271.81

13 16-May-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 271.81

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%)

Energy and Extractives 100

Energy Transmission and Distribution 22 Other Energy and Extractives 78

Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)


Page 4 of 193

Private Sector Development 17

Jobs 17 Job Creation 17

Urban and Rural Development 84

Urban Development 67 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 67

Rural Development 17

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 17

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Pamela Cox Jorge Familiar Calderon

Country Director: Makhtar Diop Martin Raiser

Senior Global Practice Director: Laura Tuck Riccardo Puliti

Practice Manager: Philippe Charles Benoit Antonio Alexandre Rodrigues Barbalho

Task Team Leader(s): Leopoldo Montanez Christophe de Gouvello, James Victor Pannett

ICR Contributing Author: Elisabeth Maier

The World Bank ELETROBRAS Distribution Rehabilitation (P114204)

Page 5 of 193

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. The Eletrobras Project was appraised in early 2010 and approved by the Board on June 3, 2010. Eletrobras, Brazil’s largest electric power utility and Latin America’s largest utility in terms of generation capacity, holds assets and capital in many Brazilian electric companies. It generates 37 percent (installed capacity is 42,080 MW),1 transmits 69 percent of Brazil’s electric supply,2 and owns six distribution companies (DisCos) in the North and Northeast regions. At the time of project appraisal, Eletrobras was suffering from very high average technical and nontechnical losses of 34 percent (2005 to 2008) compared to 13.5 percent for the Latin America and Caribbean Region.

2. The energy sector went through major policy reforms and privatization initiatives during the two decades before appraisal. In 1997, the six poorly performing local state-owned DisCos, which were not privatized, were transferred to the control of the federal state-owned power utility Eletrobras. Nevertheless, privatization of the six DisCos remained a strategic implicit goal of the Government and Eletrobras. These six DisCos3 distributed electricity to regions characterized by low population density, challenging geographic conditions (especially in the Amazonian region), and low per capita consumption, resulting in some of the highest electricity distribution costs in the country. Owing to these high costs and the high proportion of poor consumers, the DisCos received substantial financial support, due to the national policy for subsidies for low-income electricity consumers and fuel costs. For example, in 2007, while the average residential tariff in the North was US¢14.4 per kWh and the Northeast was US¢13.9 per kWh (after subsidies), the national average was US¢14.7 per kWh.

3. The six states in which the six DisCos are operating suffered from low quality of electricity services, measured through frequency of electricity service interruptions (Frequência Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade Consumidora, FEC) and duration of electricity service interruptions (Duração Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade Consumidora, DEC); for example, the FEC (number of interruptions) for Amazonas was 31, Eletroacre was 46, and Boa Vista Energia was 23; and the DEC (hours of interruption) for Amazonas wase 50, Eletroacre was 48, and Boa Vista Energia was 10.4 Compounding the challenges of weak operational performance and high service provision costs, the DisCos also had a history of low capacity and poor management, lack of commercial discipline, exacerbated by political interference by local authorities. The non-enforcement of payment for electricity, including from large consumers, and mismanagement have led to a downward spiral of underinvestment in basic maintenance and connecting new clients, leading to poor-quality services, for which consumers did not want to pay, and numerous irregular connections. This resulted in a pattern of extremely high average losses (technical and

1 Eletrobras. 2010. Sustainability Report, page 35. 2 According to Eletrobras’ 2010 Sustainability Report, the 2010 transmission system included 922 km of transmission lines, 2,568 MVA of transformation capacity at substations, and 1,000 MVAR of reactive compensation. Eletrobras companies also incorporated another 64 km of transmission lines through SPCs with the private sector. 3 (a) Eletrobras Distribuição Alagoas (CEAL) Company in State of Alagoas, (b) Boa Vista Energia in Roraima State, (c) CEPISA in Piauí State, (d) Eletrobras Distribuição Rondônia (CERON) in Rondônia State, (e) Eletroacre in Acre State, and (e) Amazonas Energia in the State of Amazonas. 4 Project Appraisal Document (2010); page 42.


Page 6 of 193

nontechnical) of about 34 percent for 2005–2008 (well above the 15 percent national average or the 13.5 percent weighted average for the Latin America and Caribbean Region). This was exacerbated by low bill collection rates with a residential payment default rate of 40 percent during the same period5 caused by manipulation of meters to show less than the actual consumption or by diverting power clandestinely and illegally. Consequently, the DisCos, on average, only received payments for less than 50 percent of the purchased power. Electricity service quality was not better. In 2008, the duration of interruptions per customer ranged from 15 hours (Eletroacre and BOVESA) to 87 hours (Amazonas), compared to 17 hours for the Brazilian average and 14 hours for the Latin America and Caribbean Region; the annual average number of interruptions per customer ranked from 15 (CEAL) to 93 (Amazonas), compared to 11 interruptions for Brazil and 13 interruptions, on average, for the Latin America and Caribbean Region. The poor service standards and unreliable electricity hindered sustainable economic development in the Amazonian region.6 Despite subsidies, the net balance recorded by the six DisCos represented a loss of US$244 million and US$349 million in 2006 and 2007, respectively.7 In terms of financial performance, the nearly bankrupt state DisCos recorded financial losses of R$1.4 billion in 2010 (equivalent to US$0.8billion). The transfer of the control of these DisCos from the local state to the federal state-owned Eletrobras eliminated the direct local political interference and created an opportunity for Eletrobras to fix these companies, which materialized in 2008 as part of the Transformation Plan for the Eletrobras system and the creation of a Distribution Unit (Diretoria de Distribuição), which included a unified governance for all the six DisCos.8 It is within this context that the World Bank has been requested to support the six DisCos with the Eletrobras Distribution Rehabilitation Project.

4. This highly complex project aimed to bring substantial financial, operational, and commercial improvements to the almost bankrupt DisCos in six poor states in Brazil by introducing best practices, new cutting-edge innovative technologies and performance-based project management processes, standardization of electrical network equipment, harmonization of technical standards, and standardization for the process of contracting technical services, among others, in an environment affected by both adverse geographical and climate conditions and political challenges. This evaluation examines whether this highly complex and innovative project achieved its anticipated objectives and provides lessons learned and recommendations for future similar operations elsewhere.

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

5. The desired change or the long-term outcome was better quality of electricity for the population in the six North and Northeastern states, which would indirectly improve their quality of life and socioeconomic situation, as well as privatization of the six DisCos. Thus, the project’s objectives were focusing on improving the financial and operational performance and commercial management of the six Discos. This was meant to be achieved by improving the quality of services, reducing electricity losses, and increasing bill collection rates. These outcomes were aligned with the outputs and activities, as described

5 World Bank. 2010. Project Appraisal Document. 6 World Bank. 2010. Project Appraisal Document. 7 According to Eletrobras’ audited consolidated financial statements for the years ended 2006 and 2007. 8 Of the six DisCos, Amazonas Energia is the only one for which political control was transferred back to the local state in 2015 because of the decision of the then Minister of Energy, Eduardo Braga, former Governor of the State of Amazonas, former Mayor of Manaus, and current Senator of the State of Amazonas; this translated into the replacement of directors initially appointed by the holding under the unified governance.


Page 7 of 193

in figure 1.

Figure 1. Project’s Theory of Change

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

6. The PDOs were based on the abovementioned theory of change. The PDO in the Loan Agreement was “to improve the financial and operational performance and the commercial management of the six DisCos by reducing electricity losses, increasing bill collection rates, and improving quality of service.” The PAD stated the same PDO formulation.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

7. The expected outcomes and indicators are closely tied to the PDO discussed earlier. The expected outcomes were (a) improved financial, (b) operational performance, and (c) commercial management of the six DisCos. The outcome indicators were (i) decrease in number and duration of service interruptions, (ii) lower total losses (technical and nontechnical), (iii) increase in collection rates, and (iv) institutional improvements in the DisCos. Indicator (i) assesses achievement of outcome (b), indicators (ii) and (iii) assess achievement of outcome (a), and lastly indicators (iii) and (iv) assess achievement of outcome (c).

Components

8. The project had two components, notably service quality improvement and loss reduction, which initially had US$475 million allocated and institutional strengthening, which had US$20 million allocated. Following the project restructuring in March 2017, when US$223 million was cancelled, Component 1 remained with US$260 million and Component 2 with US$10 million. Annex 3 provides a detailed table on


Page 8 of 193

cost by components, including counterpart funds.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

9. The PDO was not revised; however, the outcome target for the PDO indicator ‘collection rates’ was revised in June 2015 from 98 percent to 99.5 percent due to an agreed change in the methodology to calculate these values. In addition, the baseline for collection rates was revised as the data provided at appraisal were based on manual collection. Eletrobras requested revision of the rates to use correct data from the automated system. In April 2017, targets were revised for the PDO indicators for ‘total losses’, ‘duration of service interruptions’ for Amazonas and Boa Vista (from 19 percent to 36.99 percent and from 9 percent to 33.3 percent) and ‘frequency of service interruptions’ (from 16 percent to 16 percent [the restructuring paper did not reflect a change in the Results Framework itself regarding the target for this PDO-level indicator, even though it was mentioned in the text] and from 22 percent to 49.1 percent).

Revised PDO Indicators

10. The PDO indicators were not revised.

Revised Components

11. The components and project scope did not change, but the component cost did following the cancellation of US$223,187,120 IBRD funds in April 2017, notably the following: Component 1 reduced from US$475 million to US$260 million, and Component 2 reduced from US$20 million to US$11 million. However, owing to the large project savings, mainly due to a significant devaluation of the Brazilian real, the project used part of the savings to replace counterpart funds.

Other Changes

12. The project had two restructurings, in June 2015 and in April 2017, which included the following changes:

(a) Closing date extension from June 30, 2015, until March 31, 2017 (21 months) to allow for project completion and use of savings that occurred due to successful competitive procurement processes and currency depreciation of the Brazilian real against the U.S. dollar (because of depreciation, the amount available in local currency almost doubled); change in Results Framework (baseline values9 and target value of one indicator and adjusting target dates of all indicators10 as mentioned earlier); change in financing plan reflecting the reallocation of cost savings compensating for the borrower’s diminished volume of counterpart funds11 from originally US$214,300,000 to US$160,300,000.

9 Baseline values were modified in 2015 as Eletrobras was relying on automated updates rather than personal accounts, thus reducing a (positive) distortion in the actual values. 10 There was a slight oversight in the restructuring paper: while the closing date was extended until March 31, 2017, the end target date of the indicators was adjusted to March 30, 2017. 11 Counterpart funds dried up because the Government decided to suddenly extinguish the Global Reversion Reserve (Reserva


Page 9 of 193

(b) Closing date extension until December 29, 2017 (9 months); cancellation of US$223,187,120 due to savings from the currency depreciation from R$1.75 at appraisal against R$3.43 on December 5, 2016 (the total value of the loan in local currency remained almost unchanged, from R$866 million at appraisal to R$842 million after cancellation); change in component cost; reallocation between disbursement categories and implementation schedule; and changes to the Results Framework, as stated earlier.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication for the Original Theory of Change

13. The PDO did not change and the original theory of change remained relevant and was not affected by the changes to the Results Framework and the cancellation. On the latter, there was no impact as the cancellation was following cost savings, as explained earlier. All changes were formally approved through project restructurings.12

II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

14. The relevance of the PDOs is rated High. The PDOs are aligned with the current Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY18 to FY23, which was approved in July 2017, in terms of focus area 3 ‘inclusive and sustainable development’ providing ‘inclusive and sustainable urban services’, which the Eletrobras Distribution Rehabilitation Project supported by improving the quality of electricity services and decreasing the number and duration of electricity service interruptions in six of the poorest states, mostly urban areas. The project further aimed to address one of the risks identified in the CPF (page 50) regarding '“difficulties in attracting private investors.” The overall purpose of the Eletrobras Project was also to support the Government in improving the technical and financial situation of the six Discos and thus support their privatization in the future. At the beginning of 2018, Brazil’s Government made public the draft bill proposing to privatize Eletrobras.13 In March 2018, the Government formed a special congressional committee to analyze the proposed privatization bill,14 and there is an expectation that Brazil’s lower house of Congress will vote on the legislation to privatize state-controlled Eletrobras in 2018.15 Therefore, the project and PDO remain highly relevant.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

15. Efficacy is rated Substantial. The project had compound PDOs and, therefore, efficacy is assessed

Global de Reversão RGR)—a fund that was managed by Eletrobras. At project closing, due to currency devaluation, the counterpart funds were at US$196,900,914.37. 12 Those changes that were mentioned in the Aide Memoire or midterm review (MTR) were later not included in the restructuring and were thus not taken into account in the Results Framework. 13 Reuters, January 19, 2018. 14 Telesur, accessed on March 9, 2018 (https://www.reuters.com/article/eletrobras-privatization/brazilian-lawmakers-to-vote-on-eletrobras-privatization-in-april-maia-idUSL2N1QC100). 15 Reuters, “Brazilian lawmakers to vote on Eletrobras privatization in April,” February 22, 2018.


Page 10 of 193

for four separate albeit interrelated objectives: (a) operational performance, (b) commercial management, (c) financial performance, and (d) institutional improvements. Although, there were two project restructurings, the PDO, indicators, and scope stayed the same, despite the cancellation due to devaluation. Hence, there is no justification for a ‘split’ evaluation.

16. Despite an impressive series of external shocks against which the project showed high resilience (see annex 4) and the far higher implementation complexity (252 contracts instead of only 80 initially projected), the project did implement almost all the planned activities, exceeding the objectives in a couple of cases (for instance installation of grid improvement-related equipment in Alagoas and Acre). Because of the difficulties faced, implementation suffered delays, and results became observable only very late, mainly in the last 12 months or before project closing. However, the achievement of executing most, if not all, planned activities in all the six DisCos did reverberate very differently on the different sets of indicators, with a strong contrast between (a) operational performance improvements in certain DisCos and (d) institutional improvements in all of them on the one hand, which both demonstrated very substantial results and (c) financial performance, in particular losses reduction, on the other hand, for which initial analysis indicates modest results at best. However, as detailed in annex 4 and in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) section, the multiple exogenous shocks on the one hand and the high sensitivity of certain indicators to these shocks on the other hand required further analysis (and additional sources of evidence to complement the original indicators) beyond the evolution of the face value of these indicators to really capture and monitor the real contribution of the project with respect to the different outcomes. Regarding the exogenous shocks, their main impacts consisted of the following: the political earthquake of the impeachment of the President reverberated as multiple ‘after-shocks’ in the governance of the sector and Eletrobras in particular, directly affecting the implementation of the project; the regulatory shocks before and after the impeachment affected the overall paying consumer base of the DisCos, in particular, inducing the loss of a substantial share of the large, well-paying customers; the extreme climate events led to energy supply disruptions and huge increase of tariffs at a time the country entered the worst economic crisis in decades, directly affecting unemployment rates and the ability of the customers to pay their bills.

17. One additional complexity of this assessment derives from the number of DisCos—six companies covering six different states plus the Intelligent Metering Center and central Project Implementation Unit (PIU) located in the Federal District in Brasilia, expanding over more than 3,000 km—and thus the difficulty to provide a concise overall assessment for such a large project. Hence the more detailed annex 4.

18. Outcome 1: Improve operational performance of the six DisCos. The efficacy analysis of the project to achieve that outcome focused principally on the reduction of number and duration of interruptions (DEC and FEC), which are the key project outcome indicators in the Results Framework to monitor the quality of service. The analysis considered two main metrics: (a) overall improvement compared to baseline and target and (b) overall relative improvement between the time of actual intervention (that is, when equipment was installed) and project closure, taking into account the impacts of external factors.

19. The achievement of this outcome for all the DisCos was supported by various activities to acquire, install, and parametrize three types of devices. The installation of capacitators allowed for corrective reactive power, thus reducing overload, overheating, and multiple defaults that come as a consequence;


Page 11 of 193

automated reclosers that fixed most services interruptions, eliminating the need for service team interventions, which could then focus on and solve more serious issues; and the voltage regulators that corrected voltage drops along the lines, preventing considerable amount of work to reinforce transformers or lines. Despite these difficulties, the project was eventually able to install 98 percent of the equipment it intended to.

20. Improvement versus baseline and target value. The FEC and DEC were identified to measure progress toward improving operational performance. Two out of the six DisCos—Piauí and Rondônia—have surpassed the FEC targets from 33 to 15.2 (target 21) and 43 to 19.5 (target 28), respectively. The DEC target was surpassed by the DisCo Piauí from a baseline of 43 to 22.3 (target 26). All others did not meet the revised target, and the DEC and FEC for Boa Vista were lower than at baseline, which was attributed to the ‘Venezuela factor’ and the impact of the flooding (more detailed data in annex 4). When assessing the achievements merely against the identified indicator baselines and targets, the overall achievement of the operational performance would be modest because the baseline and the targets did not reflect the various external impacts the project had to face, which particularly affected the operational performance and its indicators. However, this plain interpretation would be misleading.

21. Improvement between time of actual intervention until project closing and impacts of external shocks. To correctly assess the effectiveness of the project, four external factors need to be taken into consideration: (a) incorrect initial definition of the baselines for four of the DisCos; (b) the continuous deterioration before the project could actually start the installation of the equipment; (c) 1 in 500-year flood and its lasting consequences for Rondônia and Acre; and (d) the Venezuela crisis factor for Roraima. Thereafter, the indicator values improved, which is evidence for a positive impact of project interventions. The graphs of individual DisCos in annex 4 demonstrate that they all have a collective trend of substantial improvement in their services, with the notable exception of Rondônia’s DEC due to floods.

22. Out of 12 indicators, that is the DEC/FEC for six DisCos, in 8 cases, the improvements in absolute terms between the time the project started to install equipment and the project’s closure date were greater than the anticipated improvements in the PAD: Alagoas (DEC and FEC), Acre (DEC), Piauí (DEC and FEC), Roraima (DEC and FEC), and Rondônia (FEC). In three cases the improvements were equivalent (Acre FEC); in one case it was less, but the target was almost achieved (Amazonas DEC, revised target was 37 and value achieved was 37.5 hours); in one case the improvement was substantial and started before installation of equipment by the project because the DisCos had a pilot project already going on (Amazonas FEC); and in one case, the results were strongly perturbated by floods, which made the DisCos initially achieve but eventually miss the target (Rondônia DEC).

23. In addition to the improvement of the DEC and FEC, the project delivered other results, which also contributed to the improvement of the operational performance of the DisCos.

24. Rehabilitation and construction of medium voltage (MV) and low voltage (LV) lines. As a small project subcomponent to upgrade the networks, Eletrobras rehabilitated and extended MV and LV lines with counterpart financing, which were monitored with intermediate indicators. Two issues arose during implementation: (a) the lengths of networks to be rehabilitated and constructed were overestimated at appraisal and (b) funding for this subcomponent came for the RGR fund, which was eliminated by the Government (see annex 4 on external factors affecting implementation). As a result, all states fell short of the intended targets for rehabilitated networks, whereby a total of 988.2 km of the planned 2,066.3 km


Page 12 of 193

of MV and LV lines was achieved. Regarding new MV lines, the project almost achieved its target with 1,015.69 km of the planned 1,112.49 km new lines constructed. At the individual DisCo level, Piauí actually exceeded its target. Annex 4 also shows the detailed achievements for each DisCo.

25. The shortfall for four of the states was a result of the cancellation of the RGR (regulatory shock), which funded the counterpart activities. During the first restructuring, it was agreed to complete these works using the project savings, but this was never implemented because of the Eletrobras board decision to suspend any new financial transfer from the holding to the DisCos, which resulted from the change of government and the Eletrobras president following the impeachment of President Dilma Roussef. Eventually the corresponding loan amount was cancelled following the second restructuring.

Table 2. New MV Lines and MV and LV Lines Rehabilitated or Upgraded

Length of MV and LV Lines Rehabilitated/Upgraded

Length of New MV Lines

Planned Achieved Planned Achieved ED Acre 312.0 265.0 ED Acre 55.700 46.00 ED Alagoas 380.0 209.4 ED Alagoas 360.00 355.69 ED Amazonas 690.0 222.0 ED Amazonas 122.00 115.10 ED Piauí 92.5 24.0 ED Piauí 158.00 169.54 ED Rondônia 559.0 235.0 ED Rondônia 383.00 302.36 ED Roraima 32.8 32.8 ED Roraima 33.79 27.00 Total 2,066.3 988.2 Total 1,112.49 1,015.69

26. In addition to the indicators identified in the PAD, the project had other tangible benefits that demonstrated a change in the operational performance of Eletrobras, because of the project, some of which were not intended at the start but which developed throughout the project life. These include project management and improved voltage levels. There is also some partial information on improved customer satisfaction in Amazonas.

27. Improved project management. Under Subcomponent 2.a - performance-based management, Eletrobras’ management decided to implement a proper project management method to execute this highly complicated project. They hired key staff who created project management standards for the organization, based on the PMBOK Guide of the Project Management Institute (PMI). A total of 1,833 employees, including 30 regional project managers, participated in 1,060 hours of training. The changes resulted in the project unit being awarded prizes by the Project Management Office (PMO) Academy, in partnership with the PMI, where they were placed first in 2014, as the ‘Most Admired PMO Leader’, and in 2015 the second and third ‘Most Admired PMO Leader’. The success in implementing the project management method under the project was such that Eletrobras is using this model to institute this methodology throughout all its subsidiary companies.

28. Improved voltage levels. Through the intermediate indicators, the project monitored the installation of voltage regulators and capacitors. In practice, this resulted in much improved electrical voltage level on the distribution grid. While this outcome was not monitored by the project, it is actually reflected in the evolution of the regulatory compensations paid to customers. From 2016 to 2017, this amount was reduced by around 50 percent from around R$440,000 to around R$$240,000 per month.


Page 13 of 193

29. Other impacts supporting operational performance. While it is not included as an indicator in the PAD, one aspect supporting the achievement of improved operational performance is improved safety of consumers. Although, no official data are available, the people living in houses and neighborhoods who were illegally connected, mainly due to the incapacity of the local DisCos to provide them a regular connection before the project’s interventions, have repeatedly stressed the severe safety issues related to illegal connections. Both people, in particular children and men performing the illegal connections, and appliances that broke down due to electricity overload were affected. Several cases of fires were reported to the World Bank team during field visits; all people interviewed signaled that they lost at least one appliance and that they personally knew of at least one case of death by electrocution when trying to establish an illegal connection. The regularization of whole areas, an essential condition for improving operational performance, enabled street lighting, a major safety improvement for women.

30. Customer satisfaction. Although customer satisfaction was not monitored as a specific indicator, it is worth noting that four out of the six DisCos received awards from the Electricity Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica),16 for customer satisfaction in the category of largest improvement Acre (2013/2014) and Alagoas (2014/2015) and for the North Region, Amazonas (2014) and Rondônia (2015 and 2016).

31. Conclusion. The overall rating of the operational performance objective is Substantial. Based on the original PDO indicators identified by the PAD, for both the DEC and FEC indicators, two of the six DisCos are rated High, two Substantial, and two Modest. In addition, one must account for the additional benefits achieved by the project, which also directly contributed to improving the operational performance. Thus, on balance, leading to a conclusion of significant improvement in the companies’ operational performance and a substantial efficacy rating for this objective.

32. Outcome 2: Improve commercial performance of DisCos. As indicated in the Theory of Change, several key activities of the project contributed to the improvement of both the commercial management and the financial performance, two essential subobjectives of the PDO. However, in the PAD, several of these activities are labelled as intermediate outcome indicators for improving the commercial management. For the sake of clarity, they are presented only under this section on commercial management. It is important, however, to note that improving commercial management itself eventually contributes to improving the financial performance.

33. Collection rates. All six DisCos achieved or even exceeded the target at some point during project implementation; however, none of them were able to achieve the common target of 98 percent at the end of the project. Three of the DisCos improved substantially by the end (Amazonas, Piauí, and Roraima) and the other three ended the project at around the same level as when they started. In some instances, the DisCos (Alagoas, Piauí, and Acre) achieved more than 100 percent, reflecting the ability of collecting back payments owed to the companies.

34. However, in particular for the latter years, this indicator was significantly affected by external shocks. The effects of the severe economic recession that Brazil experienced between 2014 and 2016 were strongly felt by the project. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fell by 9.2 percent during

16 Awards Aneel Consumer Satisfaction Index (Prêmios Indice do Aneel de Satisfação do Consumidor, IASC): list of awards received in customers satisfaction, environmental management, and corporate social responsibility (CSR).


Page 14 of 193

this period. This led to an overall increase in defaults of all payments, whereby 48.6 million people (23.6 percent of the Brazilian population) were late in paying their bills or repaying debt. Regarding electricity bills, nationwide, disconnections of customers due to payment defaults rose sharply from 1.2 million in 2012 to 15.2 million in 2015. Thus, while under normal circumstances the indicator is an appropriate measure for the performance of the DisCos, the external factors negated this indicator as a proper measure with respect to the target. However, with the improved performance of three of the DisCos and the non-deterioration of the other three, in the face of the extreme recession, it can be concluded that their collection rates would have been worse, in this scenario, were it not for the project’s actions.

35. Besides the shortcomings of this project outcome indicator, other intermediate indicators provide a more complete view of the achievements of the project with regard to that outcome.

36. Advance Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and substitution of obsolete meters. The AMI and the substitution of obsolete meters, which were monitored as an intermediate outcome indicator, have been essential to improve and shield the billing and revenues of the six DisCos. In addition to shielding revenues, the AMI considerably increases the productivity of the commercial function. The AMI system, which focused on the bigger consumers representing 50 percent of the consumption, allowed Eletrobras to measure the amount of electricity delivered by the distribution network and, through its Intelligent Metering Center based in Brasilia, compare it with what was billed to consumers. In this way, Eletrobras reduced the rates of electric losses—both those caused by failures in the system itself (technical losses) and those from improvised theft, illegal connections, and other frauds (nontechnical losses). The system also quickly flagged repeat offenders and took immediate action, thus now becoming a deterrent system.

37. While the Results Framework in the PAD did not refer to the number of meters, annex 4 of the PAD indicates that there were around 375,000. Eventually, the project replaced 312,951 consumer unit meters, representing 84 percent of the targeted customers. To further aid in the management of lines and identification of fraud or theft, 410 MV feeder meters, with telemetering capabilities, were installed.

38. The project overachieved in the number of AMI MV meters to be installed (on average, the target was exceeded by 77 percent), the reason being that the cost savings of a very successful International Competitive Bidding (ICB) process, which brought to Brazil a world-class consortium of technology leaders in this field, were allocated to increase the number of such meters, which covers larger clients and thus shields a larger portion of the billing envelope. With the telemetering capabilities of the AMI, failures or attempts to tamper with the meter immediately triggers alarms both at the local DisCo and centrally in Brasilia. In the first year of implementation in Rondônia, the number of routine repeat fraud offenders in the MV network decreased from 42 to 2.

39. However, regarding the implementation of the LV users, which by nature takes more time because of both the large number and the dispersion and the diversity of technical configurations, the contract was affected by exogenous factors, the first being that one of the local suppliers went bankrupt. This resulted in the need for extra implementation time to complete the installation of equipment. However, by this time additional external shocks also affected implementation. With the limited time to complete the contract within the project period, a more realistic number of LV users was discussed with the World Bank team and revised from 107,000 to 40,851.

40. Regarding new electronic meters to substitute obsolete ones, the goal was 268,738, of which


Page 15 of 193

259,625 (97 percent) were achieved. These electronic meters are also referred to as smart meters as they provide additional commercial functions (that is, immediate billing, detailed history and consumptions statistics, and options for time of use pricing), thus also improving the productivity of the commercial management.

41. Management information systems (MIS). The project had initially envisioned the purchase of new systems to aid the commercial management of the DisCos.

42. It was envisioned that the World Bank would finance a new commercial management system (CMS). However, during implementation, an analysis was conducted that concluded that the problems originally seen, which led to the assumption a new system was needed, was not because of the system per se but rather the poor quality of the data that was input into the system. This led to an adjustment of the scope of the subcomponent to be a full reregistration of the consumer base. The World Bank conditioned financing this full reregistration, using part of the project cost savings, to Eletrobras also conducting a training program for the commercial area, which was executed. By the end of the project, more than 3.1 million customers were reregistered, that is 70 percent of the estimated total. These DisCos are still continuing this activity using their own limited resources to complete it. This subcomponent of the project was significantly affected by the decision from Eletrobras Holding to halt all ongoing contracts for several months, at the time of the political shocks occurring in 2016, which eventually prevented completion of the reregistration. The reregistration enabled the DisCos to map out, in a very systematic way, the customers who were not properly billed and thus increase the billing base, including the recovery of past due payments due to broken meters, frauds, and other billing failures, turning the reregistration also into a major source of loss reduction. Under the MIS component, the project was also expected to implement a new unified Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. When the bidding documents were being finalized, Eletrobras Holding decided to implement the SAP ERP in all of its subsidiary companies, including the six DisCos. After an evaluation was conducted, demonstrating that the choice was justified from an economic point of view, it appeared that the World Bank’s procurement rules could not support the single source acquisition of the licenses. This, plus the recent expectation that future owners, after privatization, will bring their own ERP eventually led to the conclusion that this activity was not needed anymore and thus suspended.

43. Complementary indicator: regularization of illegal connections. Under this component, the project enabled the regularization of tens of thousands of irregular clients in areas with nontechnical losses greater than 50 percent, a major achievement in terms of commercial management, including providing many of them access to social tariff for which the company receives a direct compensation from the regulatory agency, thus also improving revenues. Despite the importance of this subcomponent both for the improvement commercial management and the financial performance, the Results Framework of the project did not include any related indicator. Overall, the project regularized 82,826 of the targeted 88,567 consumer units, that is 94 percent of the expected outcome. By this component, the DisCos have been able to aggregate 232,246 MWh of energy to their database, approximately US$70.5 million, as of December 2017. From the DisCos’ perspective, by regularizing these consumers, who generally had very poor illegal connections (for example, wire clothes hangers to LV lines), the actions also helped reduce the outages (DEC and FEC) and improve the voltage level of the lines. From the consumer perspective, the gains meant lowering the risks of being close to energized (and improvised) lines, reliable energy, a proof of residency which enables the consumer to access government social programs, improved self-esteem of the communities, which now are free of ‘spaghetti’ junctions of lines, and increased value of homes


Page 16 of 193

which now have regularized electricity services.

44. Conclusion. On balance, the outcome with respect to the improvement of the commercial management is rated Substantial. It is not rated High because of the difficulty to prove that in the absence of exogenous shocks, the collection rates’ targets, which were achieved at some point, would have been maintained until the end of the project. Although the targets regarding collection rates were not met, improvements were achieved in three DisCos and there are evidences that the project was instrumental in containing the impact of the payment defaults that affected all the DisCos in the country and many other commercial services. More importantly, the outcome of the reregistration, the AMI and substitution of obsolete meters, and the regularization of illegal connections have provided very substantial contribution to the improvement of the commercial management by fixing the customers database, automating the billing function, and improving the commercial relationship with clients, and thus ability to increase billing and collect additional revenues. The reregistration of consumers improved the consumer base and business practice, especially when verifying that almost 500,000 consumers were not even receiving their bills before the project’s intervention. The way the regularizations took place, and the results achieved through it, improved the image of the company with respect to the consumers.

45. Outcome 3: Financial performance. The Results Framework considered only one indicator for monitoring the improvement of the financial performance of the DisCos, that is, the reduction of losses for each DisCos. However, both the level of losses and the reduction of these losses result from a wide range of parameters and activities. As explained in the Theory of Change and in former sections, many activities implemented by the project had an impact on losses.

46. The reason is that losses work as a very broad spectrum ‘sensor’. As a matter of fact, losses are defined as the difference between the energy purchased by the DisCos and the energy paid by the customers, that is, the difference measured between entry point of a DisCos and its exit point. And the interval between this purchase ‘entry’ point and this sale ‘exit’ point actually contains all the activities—infrastructure construction, operation, maintenance, metering, customer management, billing, revenue collection, fight against fraud, and so on—and processes performed by a DisCo. Losses measured as a percentage of the energy purchased make them also dependent on the variation of these purchases, that is, the size of the market. An important assumption in using the variation of losses to monitor the efficacy of the project to improve the financial performance is, therefore, that the only impact on losses would result from the project and that all other drivers of losses remain constant. In the context of the multiple shocks endured by the DisCos during the project implementation, this core assumption was not verified. Therefore, a methodology based solely on the variation of the losses is by nature fragile and needs to be complemented by more precise measurements. Unfortunately, this became clear only late in the project physical implementation phase, when the installation of equipment finally ramped up and started delivering benefits but different from what was observed with the quality of service indicators, without improving the loss indicators.

47. The team first tried to conduct a benchmark analysis, comparing the evolution of the financial performance of the six DisCos to the performance of a control group of other DisCos. However, this avenue proved to be unsuccessful, in particular in establishing a proper control group. The main reason is the peculiarity of the market of these six DisCos, which were the only ones that could not be privatized: they are located in the poorest states (Piauí is the poorest state of the Federation) and four of them are in places with very low density, difficult climate, and isolated geography that is specific to the Amazonian


Page 17 of 193

region. All other DisCos also had a different history of investment and interconnection with the national system during the project period.

48. The alternative proposed here is to use the financial analysis of the project, which benefits result exclusively from the activities contributing to reduce losses, as a more precise measure, particularly because the future flow of revenue is a good indicator of the likely achievement of this objective (since the benefits were only realized once the delayed investments were made). As a matter of fact, as indicated in the introduction of annex 4, the efficacy of the project in contributing to improving the financial performance of the DisCos is by nature directly related to the efficiency of the project itself: the project can only contribute to improve the financial performance of the DisCos if it demonstrates a positive financial result by itself, which is a key measure of efficiency for this project.

49. This section, therefore, first presents a plain analysis of the “losses” PDO indicators and then a more nuanced analysis including the result of financial analysis as a proxy of the contribution of the project to improve the financial performance.

50. Loss PDO indicator. When analyzing the losses, the initial and plain conclusion is that none of the DisCos achieved their target in terms of reduced losses. However, as explained in the section on external shocks, a series of exogenous factors strongly affected this indicator. As explained earlier, the combination of severe recession and huge tariffs hikes increased the overall defaults of payments. Furthermore, the migration of large industrial customers to the free market also affected this indicator, as it reduced the baseline of well paying (and very large) customers and as such negatively affected the base for calculating losses. That is, the calculation is now based on a reduced base, in which a greater proportion are poor paying customers, mechanically increasing the value of losses expressed as a percentage of that base. However, even with these externalities, five of the six DisCos (Acre, Alagoas, Piauí, Roraima, and Rondônia) have lower losses at project closure—and four of those are on a decreasing trend. Roraima is also affected by the Venezuela factor, whereby service is unreliable (due to issues of supply coming from the neighboring country), thus conducive to nonpayments. Furthermore, as evidenced from the recovered energy (over 725 GWh recovered and aggregated) from the above components, were it not for the project, losses would have been even greater at the time of project closure.

51. Financial efficiency as a proxy of the efficacy of the achievement in terms of improvement of the financial performance. To use the financial analysis as a proxy of the efficacy of the project in contributing to the improvement of the financial performance of the DisCos, conservative assumptions were made regarding the likely benefits that the project activities will continue to deliver in the future.

52. Once a new meter has been installed, an illegal connection regularized, or a consumer added in the client database, then the corresponding additional energy that is billed is likely to continue to be billed for many years. Once an automated recloser has been installed, reducing both the DEC/FEC and thus the regulatory fines to be paid, this reduction continues for the lifetime of the recloser. The same applies for the regulators. Once a capacitor is installed and properly parametrized, it reduces the reactive power and the associated losses for the lifetime of the capacitor. This is especially important to be considered because most of the benefits started at the end of the project, after the corresponding activities were completed and equipment installed. Detailed explanation regarding the conservativeness of the assumptions regarding likely benefits are provided in annex 4. On the basis of these sole benefits, the calculation concludes that, in a 10-year period, the project was responsible for a possible net present


Page 18 of 193

value (NPV) of US$1.27 billion with US$360 million associated cost, which results in a financial rate return (FRR) of 46.2 percent, which is higher than calculated ex ante at appraisal (40.7 percent).

53. Conclusion. The overall rating for the financial performance of the project is Modest. While the loss reduction targets were not achieved, it is clear that this indicator was not appropriate to capture the contribution of the project to improve the financial performance. The project delivered multiple benefits to improve the financial performance of the DisCos, including several of which were reported in previous sections, as both the improvement of the operational performance and the commercial management do also contribute to improving the financial performance of the DisCos. This positive contribution is clearly demonstrated by the financial analysis (which reflects the full realization of the benefits from the delayed investments), although not at the scale of the challenge to substantially reduce the total losses as intended in the PDO, particularly in view of the difficult market and circumstances faced by these DisCos.

54. Outcome 4: Institutional improvements. As indicated in the Results Framework in the PAD, the monitoring of the contribution of the project to institutional improvements focused on the Introduction of Best Practices for Environmental and Social Management and M&E and Effectiveness of Social and Communication Programs.

55. Adoption of sound environmental and social practices. The results achieved by the project include the implementation of the same Environmental Management System in the six DisCos, based on Manuals for Standardizing Operational Procedures and other products, which reflect the introduction of best practice environmental and social management and were adopted in the six DisCos. All the six environment management teams received training organized by the central team with the support of the World Bank environment specialist and this is now standard practice within the six DisCos. Specific outputs are detailed in annex 4 and in the National Evaluation Workshop Report.

56. Social action and communication. As also detailed in the report of the National Evaluation Workshop organized for this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) (see annex 6), a full session of which focused on social communication, six communication teams in the six DisCos worked together under the coordination of a national coordinator to elaborate and implement consistent communication plans aimed not only at supporting the execution of the projects activities, in particular the campaign of regularization of illegal connections and re-cadastering, but also to promote a series of themes and best practices among users, such as fight against dangerous and illegal connections, safe and rational use of electricity, environment, citizenship, and gender equality. Nine communication campaigns were prepared and executed using multimedia support. An important social benefit resulted from the project, providing low-income customers access to the social tariffs and a proof of residency and thus access to government social programs, which has been a major achievement for social action.

57. Complementary indicator: Reverse logistics (recycling). During implementation, while supervising sites, it was noticed how old equipment, in particular, meters, were discarded in landfills as junk or thrown into warehouses. In response, as a means to reduce the environmental impact through the correct disposal of substituted meters, the project designed and implemented ‘reverse logistics’ auctions, whereby firms would be selected and paid to collect the disposed meters, separate them into their metering components (glass, iron, plastic, and so on), and process this material for recycling. With the assistance of the World Bank environmental specialist, the project developed a specific tenderbased on international best practice; a series of reverse auctions was then successfully conducted. This resulted


Page 19 of 193

in the DisCos being awarded the Chico Mendes Social Environmental Prize and green stamp for responsible social environmental management. As a consequence of the award received and the visibility thus gained, other DisCos in the country asked Eletrobras to share their successful experience and started to replicate it. In addition, because of the coordinated progress achieved by the six DisCos in both the areas of environment management and CSR, which includes social action and communication, the six DisCos accumulated a series of awards, which are detailed in annex 4.

58. Conclusion. The overall rating of the Institutional improvement is High. Based on the original PDO indicators identified by the PAD, the target was slightly exceeded. In addition, the additional benefits achieved by the project must be accounted for, in particular the introduction of innovative best practice, reverse logistics auctioning, which has now been expanded beyond the recycling of meters and is also adopted in areas of the holding and by other DisCos in the country, and the social benefits associated with regularization and reregistration activities.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

59. Based on the above analysis of the DisCos’ operational, commercial, and financial performance and institutional improvements, taking into account both the indicator achievements, the political, economic and climate impacts on the results, and additional indicators and evidences that substantiate the positive impact the project had on the DisCos, without which they would be in a much worse stage, the efficacy rating is Substantial. The project has achieved the improvement of operational performance and commercial management objective and is likely to achieve financial performance objective in the years to come. The Substantial rating is based on Modest rating for financial, Substantial rating for operational performance and for commercial management (almost High), and High for institutional improvements.

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

60. The efficiency is rated Substantial. At appraisal, the economic benefits were defined as savings for Brazil in spending on resources and emissions of greenhouses gases with an overall gain for the country. More specifically, the analysis focused on reduction of electricity generation due to lower technical losses and consumer demand, plus a reduction on resources use due to enhanced efficiency, calculating an economic rate of return (ERR) of 18.5 percent and an NPV of US$260 million at a 10 percent discount rate. Similarly, the ICR’s economic analysis considers that the economic value of quality improvement on reducing electricity operational interruptions could be assessed taking, as reference, the tariffs and consumed energy in MWh upon reducing the DEC indicator and increaseing constant electricity supply. The ERR at completion, with an estimated NPV of US$48,524 million, is 13.1 percent, based on a 10-year stream of benefits, which is lower than at appraisal but still good.

61. The financial analysis compares financial results from the PAD with partially realized results at completion applying the same discount rate and technical inputs. Owing to the late commissioning of the AMI system and Eletrobras’ internal issues related to the privatization process, some crucial benefit data are still missing. Notwithstanding, the calculated benefits are expected to gradually improve in the coming years.

62. The PAD’s financial analysis has four main sources: (a) higher revenues due to more efficient


Page 20 of 193

billing method, (b) lower electricity expenditures due to reduction in technical and nontechnical losses, (c) lower expenditure due to fewer customer claims and related field interventions, and (d) lower amounts of penalties paid by the DisCos for failure to accomplish standards on service quality. The total increased energy for which the DisCos receive revenue (that is, energy billed and collected) represents 13,880 GWh over the 10 year-period, which equals a total related financial revenue (that is, KWh x sales prices) of almost US$2.3 billion in 2010. A 10-year stream of benefits from the base case, considering the assumptions described earlier, results in an FRR of 40.7 percent and an NPV of US$1.38 billion at a 10 percent discount rate.

63. The financial analysis focused on a comprehensive disaggregated level of benefits by year and individual DisCos. The quantification of financial benefits encompasses activities under the following activities: (a) distribution network reinforcement, (b) implementation of AMI and maximize metered consumption, (c) modernization of MIS, and (d) additional benefits. Owing to the missing data, only those benefits of the subcomponents (table 4.11 in annex 4) were used, representing a conservative analysis. The considered and analyzed benefits were projected over a 10-year period, since the targets achieved will not only bring immediate returns but also income over a future period. Investment in metering equipment represents a big part of the project cost and typically has a useful life, around 10–15 years, which conservatively corroborates with the assumption of a 10-year projection period.

64. Thus, the NPV benefits in 2018 are US$1.27 billion with US$360 million cost associated in 2018, which results in an FRR of 46.2 percent, as shown figure 1, presenting alternative scenarios of time, including present value, 5-year projected, and 10-year projected value.

Figure 1. ICR Benefit, Cost, and FRR Results17

Note: Discount rate =10 percent.

65. Design aspects significantly contributed to enhance efficiency, including the cutting-edge AMI system and the implementation of the relisting of consumers, which allows Eletrobras to increase bill collection over time due to a bigger consumer database. Opting for ICB, a choice that Eletrobras initially 17 World Bank ICR Efficiency Analysis; see Annex 4


Page 21 of 193

resisted because of concerns related to after-sales maintenance services in particular in the case of the AMI, also contributed to the efficiency of the project, as all ICBs were successful in substantially reducing the expected cost: in the case of the AMI, the cost was reduced from US$130 million to US$94 million. However, the implementation of the AMI system was delayed and the relisting of consumers was only added later. Hence, this affected the NPV of the project due to overall implementation delays of one-and-a-half years.

66. While the FRR calculated in the ICR is higher than in the PAD, and the NPV is lower than in the PAD (ex ante analysis) and both are economically viable as they suggest positives results. It is important to note that the lower NPV reflects both lower benefits and reduced total cost in U.S. dollars due to exchange rate variation gains and savings achieved in successful ICBs. The analysis suggests a substantial project efficiency rating.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

67. The overall outcome rating is Satisfactory based on a High rating for relevance and Substantial ratings for efficacy and efficiency. Nevertheless, since the “Substantial” rating for efficacy is partially based on expected or likely achievement of the objectives (using both the analysis of the indicators and complementary evidence) a moderately satisfactory outcome rating is proposed as more appropriate in this case. It is important to add that the ongoing privatization of the six DisCos would confirm the very substantial contribution of the project.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)18

Gender

68. The project did not have a specific gender component, as it supported both genders as part of the overall population of the six states by providing improved electricity supply. During the MTR, the Workd Bank and PIU decided to add the monitoring of gender as part of the project beneficiaries to the project’s Operational Manual. Delays in execution of the relisting and finalizing of the regularization of clients prevented active use of this indicator during subsequent supervision. However, the known total of beneficiaries relisted 2,492,465 , ouf of which 1,164,352 (47 percent) are women listed as heads of households. Because women and girls tend to spend more time at home, they are likely to be more affected by improved electricity services, particularly for domestic chores. Furthermore, in the areas which were regularized, 54,027 (57 percent) of the 94,049 households were listed as having women as their heads, meaning greater social benefits and access to credit, among other benefits described earlier in the ICR.

Institutional Strengthening

69. Before project implementation, the Eletrobras project management team suffered because of low qualification of the staff and lack of project planning skills and methodology to monitor and implement projects. The project had substantial impact on (a) institutional strengthening by introducing a common performance-based management system, (b)strengthening the DisCos’ management of environmental

18 A video elaborated jointly by the World Bank with participation of Eletrobras representatives and local beneficiaries, which provides a global overview of the project and its benefits, is available at https://youtu.be/Hw4ePT3hCQo.


Page 22 of 193

and social processes, (c) providing support to community outreach with social action programs and community campaigns, and (d) strengthening project implementation and monitoring skills. With regard to outputs, the project has provided 1,000 training hours to 1,800 participants from the DisCos, trained 30 project managers, and financed 15 MBAs in project management. Seven PMOs were established both at the headquarters in Brasília and in the six states. Through the management software, the PMOs were better able to monitor project activities and produce high-quality reports. Capacity enhancement activities were implemented on the following topics: (a) MS project, (b) project cost, (c) risk management, (d) financial feasibility analysis, (e) efficient meetings, and (f) communication. All key staff—from Eletrobras Directors all the way down to individual project (contract) managers—were trained in project management, following PMI standards, thus changing the project management culture of the organization. The Acre Training and Research Center was not fully completed due to procurement delays and is not operational.

Contribution to Prepare the Privatization of the DisCos

70. As mentioned earlier (relevance of PDOs and Theory of Change), the Government is intending to privatize the six DisCos. As such, the improvements of future revenues and quality of service that resulted from the project improved the attractiveness of these companies to future private investors. Consequently, the Ministry of Mines and Energy has expressed interest in the project evaluation. This is an indication that the project’s overall strategic goal, that is, the privatization of the initially almost bankrupt and non-efficient DisCos, is very likely to be achieved in the near future.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

71. The project’s higher-level goal was to improve the quality of electricity service provided by the six DisCos to the population in the States of Acre, Alagoas, Amazonas, Piauí, Rondônia, and the City of Boa Vista, as a means to improve quality of life and foster economic growth. Before project interventions, the poor service standards and unreliable electricity provided by the DisCos were an obstacle to sustainable economic development in the Amazonian region. In addition, there was also a negative impact on businesses that already faced other challenges such as lower per capita income and a difficult geographical context due to the remote location and infrastructure access in the Amazonian region. Access to reliable and affordable electricity is vital for businesses, which would otherwise be obliged to rely on higher cost self-electricity supply through, for example fuel-based generators.

72. All population groups in the six states have benefited from the project through the reduction of electricity service interruptions, which indirectly had a positive impact on both households and businesses, which benefited by having a more reliable and inexpensive electric supply, which in turn may help increase private sector investment in the project-affected areas. Particularly, for the more remote areas, such as the Amazonian region, there appear to be socioeconomic benefits because improved electricity services help breakdown geographical isolation and increases opportunities for economic and social inclusion.19

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

19 Paula Borges da Silveira Bezerra, et al. 2017. “The Power of Light: Socio-economic and Environmental Implications of A Rural Electrification Program in Brazil.” Accessed June 1, 2018. http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7bdd/pdf.


Page 23 of 193

73. Regularization activities led to improved citizenship and by having a contract with Eletrobras, citizens could be informed on how to obtain social tariffs, which was also linked to Brazil’s social programs, such as Bolsa Familia. “We have thousands of consumers who are not registered, not listed. For many of them, it is as if they weren’t citizens at all because in Brazil an electricity bill, a water bill or a telephone bill are proof of legal address. So, becoming legitimate consumers of a power company offers them the ability to fully exercise their citizenship. This, more than anything is what justifies this program we are undertaking, to set everything in order to include our customers as citizens in the security, practical, economic and legal sense.”20

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

74. Eletrobras’ strong commitment and ownership during the preparation phase, from March 2008 to June 2010, was demonstrated by the financing and conducting of institutional studies on the internal organization and procedures of the DisCos, including the relationship between the DisCos and Eletrobras and a financial analysis for the optimization of the capital structure. The results were used to define the operational procedures and facilitated the preparation of the economic and financial analysis required by the World Bank.21 Furthermore, US$214.3 million counterpart funds were made available for this project.

75. The initial procurement capacity assessment did not capture the capacity needs required to successfully process 260 contracts, a far higher volume than originally foreseen (80 contracts) and initial reluctance to use ICB procedures for the AMI caused delays. In addition, the standard bidding procedures did not reflect the local market’s capacity. Tailoring them to the context of the market increased the risk of lower quality of bidders. Another issue at the preparation stage, which continued into the implementation phase, causing an initial two-year delay for the AMI contract, was the need to follow an ICB process, rather than a national competitive bidding (NCB) process. At the time, the Eletrobras team was against ICB (despite the contract value), due to concerns of having a company installing the technology and leaving without being available for maintenance. It took two years to convince Eletrobras about the ICB benefits, mainly because the Eletrobras management team changed and because Eletrobras realized that other earlier ICBs resulted in lower prices.

76. The need for time and resource-consuming massive relisting of consumers was not foreseen during preparation and, therefore, was not included in the initial design. In 2014, the team added the relisting of 3 million customers in six distinct DisCos, though one contract could not be completed due to procurement delays. The relisting led to an unforeseen tsunami of information for the entire distribution database to capture all the customers because of verification of status (residential versus commercial), level of income (eligible for social tariff or not), and so on. Had this been taken into account in the design, there would have been more comprehensive mapping of illegal connections and sufficient time to increase capacity to absorb the regularization of fraudulent customers.

20 Siemens. 2016. Interview with Eletrobras director Luiz Henrique Hamann. Accessed March 27, 2018. https://www.siemens.com/customer-magazine/en/home/energy/agility-in-energy/measuring-energy-use-as-consumer-advantage.html. 21 Aide Memoire, September 2009.


Page 24 of 193

77. Insufficient emphasis was put on change management processes and training at the preparation stage. Too much focus was placed on technical solutions and not enough on quality of data and change management and implementation of the new procedures associated with the new technology, which led to implementation delays. By the time the team decided to contract a consulting firm to redesign the procedures and implement change management, the counterpart funds for this activity were no longer made available following the regulatory reforms.22

78. At the negotiation stage, the Eletrobras President requested the World Bank to include the construction of the training centre in Acre (US$10 million). The World Bank management asked the team to accommodate this request, for which there was time to conduct the preparatory work. As a result, the preparation of this centre had to be done during implementation, which caused substantial delays and eventually, due to procurement delays and the death of the person who was leading this work, this Subcomponent 2.b was not fully implemented.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

79. An impressive series of external shocks, such as political turmoil, worst economic crisis in three decades, sudden suppression of the source of funding for counterpart funds, suspension of concession contracts, change of governance of Eletrobras, the firing of key PIU staff, severe currency devaluation, multi-centennial floods, and the Venezuela crisis affected the project negatively. In 2012, extinguishing of the RGR by the Government led to the unavailability of counterpart funds and consequently to reallocation of funds. This halted all activities funded by the counterpart funds for three years, until the first restructuring took place, when project savings covered those activities. The halt also affected the private sector in the project areas by (a) bankrupting some firms to closure and (b) causing those that remained operational to hike their prices for any future Eletrobras contract to mitigate their risk of a possible future ‘default’. The currency devaluation of over 50 percent, starting in 2014, led to the 2015 project restructuring, including a reallocation of funds and using the project savings due to the currency devaluation to compensate for the unavailability of counterpart funds. Furthermore, it also led to the cancellation of US$223.2 million during the 2017 project restructuring.23 The political turmoil in 2016 and the impeachment of Brazil’s President also led to the cancellation and nonrenewal of concessions, moratorium of fund transfers to the DisCos, and accelerated privatization plans. Adverse climate conditions, including a multiyear severe drought led to (a) depleted water reservoirs of Brazil’s main hydropower plants resulting in expensive thermal generation; (b) increase of electricity tariffs of more than 60 percent; and (c) migration of 176 industrial clients to the free market, which had better tariffs to offer. Floods in Acre and Rondônia in 2014/15, which were isolated for several weeks, affected the duration and frequency of service interruptions (DEC/FEC indicators). In addition, the economic recession (GDP of –10 percent), compounded by the political instability, led to an increase in illegal electricity connections and a surge of payment defaults. In the case of the state of Roraima, the ‘Venezuela factor’, which arose at the end of 2016, led to the deterioration of power supply from Venezuela to the Roraima DisCo, worsening service interruptions.

22 Eletrobras Holding Company decided to freeze counterpart funds to the DisCos in 2015, which meant that no new contracts could be signed. 23 The currency devaluation was the cause for the low U.S. dollaer disbursements; however, the Brazilian real disbursements were high.


Page 25 of 193

80. Procurement issues, particularly complex procurement24 of the AMI, led to implementation delays. Following the insufficient initial procurement capacity of Eletrobras to successfully procure the innovative new AMI technology, there were implementation delays of two years. In addition, regarding other contracts, there was low capacity of local firms and entry barriers for firms from other regions (small contracts, cartels).

81. Introduction of new innovative, efficient project management methodologies and practices helped deal with the very complex project with 260 contracts and six DisCos, which was beyond the capacity of the existing project management team. This was supported by the reassignment of qualified 30 new subproject managers and 1,833 employees who received 1,060 hours of training.

82. The Holding Company created an improved internal and external communication system in the six DisCos. To mitigate certain risks, such as citizens’ negative reaction to regularization, judicial actions against fraudsters causing delays, and political lobbying by large companies (penalty for large fees) press conferences and communication campaigns were organized. This methodology was then also introduced in the Holding Company.

83. At the same time, with the new technology and additional available data, the DisCos’ staff were overwhelmed by the number of irregularities, fraud, technical issues (defaults), and illegal connections. New innovative technology and 40 percent of losses were too much to deal with at once and caused delays.

84. Mitigation of environmental impacts of the meter replacement implementation was best practice and generated additional income for Eletrobras. Under Subcomponent 2.b, the project provided environmental capacity enhancement activities leading to the development of an efficient recycling system of old meters and material, which mitigated the negative environmental impacts of solid waste. Before the project interventions, old material was collected and stored in unorganized mountains of waste, which then were organized, cleaned, packed, and auctioned off to recycling firms. In 2014, 438,000 old meters and in 2015, 247,000 meters were sold through auctions. A total of 620,667 kgs of other material25 was recycled. The funds from the auctions were used for CSR projects.

85. The multiyear water crisis had a big impact on Brazil’s hydro sector26 which led to tariff increases of up to 80 percent. The depletion of water reservoirs led to an increase in generation cost by the dispatching of full-time thermal plants originally intended to operate as backups increasing the blackout risks and affecting the frequency and duration of service interruption. In addition, the DisCos’ financial resources were affected by having additional cost of US$30 billion for 2013 and 2014. The high tariff increases also resulted in customer payment defaults, further worsening the DisCos’ financial situation.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

24 ICB. 25 Glass, iron, aluminum, copper, plastic, and magnets. 26 The energy sector is based on 70 percent of hydropower.


Page 26 of 193

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

86. M&E design is rated Substantial. Many indicators proposed were required by the Brazilian regulator. The advantages of using indicators that are required by the regulatory agency are multiple. First, they come with strong incentives to be informed and used by the DisCos because they are used by the regulator to determine tariffs and penalties. Second, for the same reason, they are verified with scrutiny by the regulator. Third, the regulator regularly improves the associated methodology to inform them to integrate best practices, for instance automation, as this happened in the course of the project. This turned to be an excellent solution for measuring the quality of service, although the relevance of the DEC/FEC to measure the contribution of the project to operational performance was largely undermined in the specific cases of Roraima, because of the Venezuela crisis, and Acre and Rondonia at the time of the extraordinary floods.

87. However, certain indicators, presented mismatches with the scope of the project activities: this was the case of the loss reduction and the collection rate indicators. They reflected the assumption that the package of measures to be implemented by the project was comprehensive enough to address all loss drivers, which turned to not be true. Therefore, they were eventually too broad and thus too sensitive to exogenous factors to properly capture the contribution of the project, which ended up being diluted among other influences, which happened to be exacerbated by multiple crisis.

88. Another project outcome indicator was ‘Institutional improvements: adoption by DisCos of sound environmental management practices, improved M&E, and effectiveness of social action and communication programs.” First, it is challenging to measure this indicator as it includes various aspects and best practice is to have unambiguous indicators that are sufficiently precise to allow objective monitoring. In addition, the Results Framework in the PAD does not provide a baseline for this indicator, and further the arrangement for results monitoring (PAD page 43) does not mention “improved M&E,” nor does it offer baseline nor targets for M&E.27 All other PDO-level indicators had baselines, yearly and end targets, data collection methods, and reporting instruments and requirements. However, there were also no baseline data for the intermediate indicators in the PAD.

89. In total, the project had 26 PDO-level indicators and 42 intermediate indicators, which made the M&E design quite complex. However, because this project included six subprojects (six DisCos), it is comprehensible from the client’s perspective that they wanted to see how each DisCo was performing. Notwithstanding, in retrospect, it would have been advisable to reduce the PDO-level indicators. For instance, a posteriori, the indicator measuring the collection rates—already reasonably high —focused on a second order issue because their improvement would not lead to a game changer with respect to revenues. Additional indicators were identified during project implementation as indicated below in paragraph 94.

27 Furthermore, the formulation of the indicators in the Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) is different, notably shortened. Though, the meaning is the same. For the indicator ‘Institutional improvements: adoption by DisCos of sound environmental management practices, improved M&E and effectiveness of social action and communication programs’ the ISRs have a baseline included. However, the inclusion of the latter was not part of a project restructuring.


Page 27 of 193

M&E Implementation

90. M&E implementation is rated Substantial. The M&E system was sophisticated, and because the indicators were required by the regulator, the M&E implementation benefited from already having routinely informed data collection and analysis by the DisCos with verification by the regulatory agency.

91. In addition to the allocation of the resources by the DisCos to comply with this regulatory obligation, Eletrobras has demonstrated adequate staff and substantial commitment in its implementation by monitoring all works and project activities through regular field visits, working closely with the financial management (FM) team, which carried out inspections of the works before payments of installments were approved. This was especially important for all intermediate indicators related to physical implementation, that is, the installation of the AMI and the intermediate outcome indicators related to ‘upgrading distribution networks’, that is, km of lines, number of automated reclosers, voltage regulators and banks of capacitors installed, and the complementary indicator on number of connections regularized. This was in accordance with the performance-based management system.28

92. Eletrobras’ project management organized monthly meetings with the DisCos in the six regions to discuss M&E data (including additional indicators for their use) and implementation progress and analysis and propose actions where needed. For example, in these meetings, Eletrobras focused on the red indicators related to performance-based management and decided on a plan to improve performance. Data were collected and captured in the MIS, analyzed, and reported upon according to the M&E plan according to the reporting frequency stipulated in the legal agreement (every six months). The quality of biannual reports was sound and data were well presented and analyzed.29

93. There were, however, also a few shortcomings. An MTR was conducted from April 22 to May 3, 2013, and from May 21 to 28 May 2013. Among the MTR conclusions regarding the M&E arrangements were to add six core technical indicators and four social indicators, regarding household beneficiaries and gender. However, those were not added neither in the Operations Manual nor in the Eletrobras Progress Reports. Therefore, data were not reported on a systematic basis on those social indicators. In addition, the unit of measure was never adjusted, for example, all PDO-level indicators show ‘text’ as unit of measure, instead of ‘number’ or ‘hours’. Another minor shortcoming was related to the decision (Aide Memoire March 2017) to differentiate between external (‘Venezuela factor’) and internal causes for service interruptions, which was implemented but not formally reflected in the restructuring. Furthermore, the overly ambitious targets were not adequately adjusted because Eletrobras wanted them to be aligned with the required indicators and targets from the regulator.

94. Finally, it is important to note that several additional indicators were developed and monitored by Eletrobras, including for an essential project activity, that is, the regularization of irregular connections. Regarding the performance-based management (Subcomponent 2.a), the central PIU and local PIUs made a remarkable effort to develop a sophisticated and very efficient set of project management indicators and M&E practices, which happened to be essential for the success of the implementation of the many activities and contracts. However, those were not included through a formal project restructuring.

28 Under Component 2, PAD page 8. 29 Eletrobras, Relatório de Progresso, September 2013, September 2015, September 2017.


Page 28 of 193

M&E Utilization

The M&E utilization is rated Substantial.

95. Again, for being connected to strong incentives, mandatory regulatory indicators were not only informed but also used by the management to try to reduce penalties and thus track the implementation of the project activities, which contribute to this goal, for instance the installation of equipment to improve the DEC/FEC.

96. Because these regulatory mandatory indicators were already in place before the start of the project, they enabled monitoring the evolution before, during, and after the project. This happened to be especially relevant to monitor the evolution at early stages of the project, when things continue to worsen before the project can actually start delivering results. This enabled the detection of the deterioration of the baseline and eventually enabled a more precise assessment of the real contribution of the project and an adjustment of the targets, in particular to take into account exogenous shocks. This early use of the indicators compensates the fact that the results of the project came very late, thus not allowing the detection of issues like the inability to precisely monitor certain key project results, mainly its contribution to financial performance. Thus, the M&E data could have been more adequately used to adjust the too broad ambitious indicator targets on time, which could have had a more positive impact on the project results.

97. The additional indicators to monitor the regularization of connections were used to detect difficulties faced by the corresponding activities in the different DisCos and proactively look for additional areas for intervention. The additional indicators related to performance-based management were extensively used by the central and local PIUs.

98. The regular reporting on communication activities was used as a basis not only for supervision but also to entertain a substantial dialogue between the communication teams of Eletrobras, the DisCos, and the World Bank.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

99. The overall rating of M&E quality is Substantial based on the Substantial ratings for M&E design, implementation, and utilization. While the M&E was solid and effectively used by the DisCos for main indicators being regulatory ones, it was not rated High due to the lack of precision of certain essential indicators, in particular ‘losses reductions’, to monitor the project results precisely and set realistic targets; minor shortcomings were also noted in formalizing changes in the system.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

100. Environmental and social safeguards. Overall, there were no safeguards compliance issues. The safeguards ratings were mostly Satisfactory, except in early 2012, when the rating was downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory due to the need to strengthen the social and environmental team within the DisCos. However, the rating was upgraded to Satisfactory in November 2013. There were no adverse impacts related with physical and/or economic displacement and any interference with indigenous people. The project has also supported a successful initiative on reverse logistics.


Page 29 of 193

101. FM. FM was rated as either Moderately Unsatisfactory or Moderately Satisfactory. The primary reasons for the Moderately Unsatisfactory ratings were as follows: (a) the consolidated interim financial reports (IFRs), were being manually generated, using spreadsheets which resulted in various errors and inconsistencies; the World Bank had recommended the use of specific software or a system to consolidate the IFRs, which was never implemented; (b) concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of information being produced by the DisCos ERP’s; and (c) key FM staff shortages at both the central and DisCos level. The FM risk rating was initially considered to be Moderate but due to the points mentioned earlier, the risk rating was increased to Substantial in June 2015 (where it has remained since). However, this suboptimal management was compensated by a considerable volume of extra work to perform tasks and checks that an appropriate software would have automated. Three out of the five audit reports received to date were received on time, and all the audit reports expressed unmodified (that is, clean) opinions. Although the audit opinions were unmodified, the Federal Controller General's Office (CGU) consistently highlighted areas for improvement in the internal control environment, particularly at the DisCos. All IFRs received during the life of the project were considered acceptable but were generally received after the due date (but within 30 days). There were no instances of ineligible expenditures identified to date.

102. Procurement. In 2013, the project suffered from procurement delays, resulting in a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating. Delays were mainly due to (a) limited procurement capacity, including inability to prepare sound bidding documents, (b) delays in attracting bidders to North and Northeastern states,30 (c) compatibility of national and World Bank procurement rules for ICB, (d) complicated homologation process of new smart meters, and (e) reluctance to open the market to international companies due to perceived risk of maintenance discontinuity in remote regions and Eletrobras wanting to support the national companies. To overcome these delays, the Country Management Unit (CMU) and the World Bank reenforced supervision, which included a new field-based task team leader (TTL) and an engineering firm to assist the client with the very complex procurement packages. This support then led to successful three bids and a contract saving of 26 percent for the AMI contract of US$94 million. Other than that procurement was rated Moderately Satisfactory.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

World Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

103. Quality at Entry. The project was designed to address a major issue of some of Brazil’s almost bankrupt electricity DisCos suffering from financial, operational, and commercial issues. The design’s approach was strategically relevant, and applying a highly innovative new cutting-edge technology was adequate for an upper-middle-income country like Brazil. Regarding the objective of improving the operational performance, the design proved to be adequate, as it did also regarding the institutional improvements in the area of environmental and social management. Regarding the objective of improving the commercial management, adjustments of the initial design happened to be necessary, in particular, to include the major reregistration activity. Improving the financial performance was the area which demonstrated the principal weakness of the project design—or the overly ambitious target assigned to the project. Indeed, a posteriori, the target, with respect to loss reductions, did not seem achievable only

30 Specifically related to works, there was a lack of interest of foreign companies to bid in these remote areas due to the huge distances and higher cost of doing business, which was not sufficiently profitable for them.


Page 30 of 193

on the basis of the proposed activities, as detailed in the lessons learned and recommendation section.

104. Regarding the risk assessment, the World Bank team effectively identified risks, such as for example the DisCos’ low capacity to implement the project, in particular, regarding procurement. This was sufficiently mitigated despite delays that occurred. Political and other interference risks were also identified and did materialize, in particular, in the case of Amazonas,31 but the impact of the national political crisis could not have been foreseen. This is also the case with the currency depreciation, which reduced the U.S. dollar cost of the project and led to project savings, which of course could not have been predicted at entry.

105. While there were some shortcomings in the M&E design, the World Bank team effectively identified sound implementation arrangements, which proved to be resilient enough to the many external shocks, although the readiness for implementation appeared to be weak to deal with more complex than expected procurement processes to ensure swift procurement of the packages. This assessment should also acknowledge that this project pioneered the design and implementation of AMI at a large scale in developing countries.

106. Quality of Supervision. The World Bank team conducted 14 implementation support missions, and during each mission the team visited two states. Owing to budget constraints, the team could not visit all six DisCos in the six states during each mission. The fact that a new seasoned TTL was moved to Brasilia from July 2013 onward, supported by a junior energy specialist in Washington, was essential to intensify supervision and make it proactive to turn around the project, which, at that time, had been rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. It was essential to support day-to-day project implementation and address issues immediately. In six months, the disbursement rate, which was still at 0.3 percent after two years, started to move, and increased to 8.4 percent and the project was upgraded back to Moderately Satisfactory for implementation and, 18 months later, also for development objectives. Another critical proactivity supervision action was the assignment of a senior procurement specialist to work intensively with the client on very complex first-of–its-kind ICB process for the core AMI activity and solve the many procurement difficulties related to the isolated, low-competition Amazonian market. The World Bank AMI global expert joined supervision missions and an external specialized consulting firm32 was contracted to strengthen the World Bank’s capacity to review the evaluation processes of most complex bidding processes. A special monitoring tool was developed jointly to monitor and track the 254 contracting processes.33 The World Bank environment specialist brought international best practice on environmental management, helping develop first-of-its-kind in Brazil reverse logistics auctions. The local World Bank communication team worked closely with the Eletrobras communication teams to improve the social communication plans, and so on. In view of the numerous challenges and multiple exogenous shocks, the World Bank team went beyond usual supervision and teamed up with the central PIU team to find

31 In 2015, Minister Eduardo Braga, former governor of the Amazonas State and mayor of the city of Manaus, decided to reduce the control of the unified distribution directory that had been established by Eletrobras over the Amazonas DisCos, which eventually presented the worst results. 32 Engevix Engenharia, S.A., part of the Nova Engevix Group. 33 This tool, the ‘lista única’ is a complex Excel file which tracks all steps and due diligences associated with all contracting processes, registering history, and consolidating amounts progressively committed at different stages of the processes, ahead of actual disbursement, that is, for which tenders are finalized, for which procurement process is completed, for which contracts are signed, and so on. This tool was updated once every week and circulated to both the PIU and the World Bank team. This tool is now used in other World Bank projects.


Page 31 of 193

solutions and overcome obstacles, like for instance engaging in direct high-profile dialogue with the TCU to revert the decision blocking ICB results,34 with the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Comissão de Financiamentos Externos (COFIEX) for unlocking the approval process of the first extension and work out a solution to compensate for the extinction of the counterpart funds. Before the end of the project, the World Bank team and the PIU coorganized a series of evaluation workshops, three regional and one national, the latter with 70 participants, to discuss the difficulties faced and lessons learned, including the World Bank performance, which was unanimously praised by the participants (see Workshop Report in annex 6). The World Bank and Eletrobras conducted the MTR in April and May 2013 and reviewed progress toward the December 2012 action plan, which was negotiated at a high level with the Eletrobras Presidency and CMU management to address the severe implementation delays. The main MTR conclusion was that the project would require a project closing date extension due to the severe delays in implementation regarding the main bidding processes, in particular for the acquisition of the AMI, but that this would be conditioned to reaching the no-objection stage for the two main contracts totaling US$172 million, which was eventually reached. The project restructuring was completed only late June 2015 for a series of reasons:

(a) The World Bank team did not restructure the project earlier because the CMU wanted to cancel the project and the AMI contract signing was contingent on the project restructuring (AMI contract was awarded in February 2014 and signed in February 2015),35 hence there was no clarity in the amount of project savings or time needed to complete the contracts;

(b) The decision process on the Government’s side was cumbersome and required the World Bank to step in to facilitate internal discussions between Eletrobras and the Government. Once it was clear, the team was flexible to seize the opportunity of the cost savings that resulted from the currency devaluation and the successful ICBs to compensate the extinction of the RGR, the main source of counterpart funding, and for including complementary activities that would address weaknesses of the initial design, mainly the systematic reregistration of all 4 million customers and change management support.

107. Another conclusion of the MTR regarded the adjustment of the M&E: six indicators were requalified as core indicators in alignment with World Bank Energy Global Practice policy. It was also agreed that Eletrobras will include four additional indicators to monitor the number of beneficiaries and the proportion of women,36 which Eletrobras was eventually not able to monitor on a systematic basis.37 Finally, the baselines and the targets of some of the DEC/FEC indicators were adjusted to reflect the methodology corrections adopted by ANEEL.38

34 The Tribunal das Contas da União (TCU), the maior Federal audit, determined at some points that the PIU had violated national procurement rules regarding the way to take taxes into ICB evaluation, and the World Bank, including the country team management and the World Bank Legal Department, had to advocate at the highest level to demonstrate that the PIU had been compliant with the higher legally binding agreement to comply with the World Bank’s rules. 35 This delay is due to long and complex negotiations associated to this US$94 million contract, which involved ad hoc provisions regarding homologation procedures and complicate multistakeholder discussions related to import duties. 36 These four indicators were, however, not formally included in the ISR system, because the number of indicators was already considered too large. 37 As the number of customers, family members, and gender was not registered in the client database, Eletrobras could only provide rough estimates, which the reregistration helped improve. 38 Such adjustment was necessary to enable the project to continue to use the regulatory indicators.


Page 32 of 193

108. During the implementation phase, the World Bank team inspected works progression on the field in the six states and in the Brasilia PIU office and collected and filed the numerous evidences of the completion of works produced on a systematic basis by the Eletrobras on-site commissioning team.

109. However, after the first restructuring, the project was affected by the freeze of activities after the impeachment of the President, which led to a change of government, policy, and political agenda and governance of Eletrobras. The Eletrobras Board decided to not transfer more funds to the DisCos, and concessions contracts of the DisCos were not extended. The project could not commit funds anymore for new contracts, notably for the additional change management contracts that had been recommended by the World Bank team (terms of references [ToRs] were prepared and bidding process launched), which would have made the final phase of the project implementation more efficient. The World Bank team then faced a challenging implementation context and made continuous efforts to be responsive and proactive in this very volatile context. This included providing rationale and objective elements to the Eletrobras Presidency and to the Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Energy to maintain the PIU staff39 and unfreeze the main contracts that were essential to achieve the PDO; revising in detail all the ongoing contracts to adjust them to the new time line and the privatization prospects, including dropping or suspending several activities and incorporating new ones;40 and negotiating the amount of funds to be cancelled to allow for the completion of these key contracts.41

110. The main shortcoming of the supervision was the lack of proactivity at the early stage of the implementation and the failure to anticipate that some of the PDO-level indicators were not adequate and should be formally revised and/or completed, and corresponding targets adjusted downward, in particular, with respect to the indicators for the monitoring the financial performance, that is, the six regulatory loss indicators. Furthermore, the target for the ‘increase collection rates’ indicator was increased in 2015 as a trade-off in compensation of reallocation of savings to additional activities, which did not materialize to the expected extent.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

111. Quality at entry and supervision had minor shortcomings, such as the complex M&E design, overly ambitious targets, which were not adjusted during the project restructuring for the benefit of achieving the expected results. However, the World Bank proved to be proactive to bring in best practice innovation (that is, AMI, reverse logistics auctions, and so on) and addressing the main issues, including at the management level by engaging in high-level dialogue and moving the TTL to the field and strengthen the procurement support at the time it became clear that the project was derailing. The World Bank also demonstrated flexibility during implementation to adjust the project to the many severe shocks endured, conducting two restructurings, including a major cancellation of funds. Therefore, the overall World Bank Performance rating is Satisfactory.

39 The World Bank was only partially successful, as key PIU members were dismissed, which brought substantial disruptions in the late execution of the project. 40 New activities included the contracting of a task force of four high-level experts at the request of the Eletrobras Presidency, to fine-tune the selection of the activities to be maintained or dropped and ensure the most effective implementation of remaining activities to maximizing the added value of the project in view of the privatization of the DisCos. 41 Among the rationale provided, the team helped calculate (a) the cost of compensation fees that the DisCos would have to pay for early termination of ongoing works and services contracts and (b) the opportunity cost associated to the loss of expected benefits associated to the completion of these contracts.


Page 33 of 193

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

112. The risks to the development outcome is Modest. The main risk would be a tariff increase. As of the January 2018, Brazil has instituted a variable tariff rate (cheaper off-peak) in the national legislation. In addition, Brazil’s economy is recovering from its worst recession from 2016 to 2017 with GDP growth picking up to 2.2 percent this year and an anticipated 2.4 percent in 2019, decreasing unemployment and inflation, which is expected to have positive impacts on collection rates.42 Equally, the large 2015 electricity tariffs are not expected to be recurring going forward.43 Furthermore, because the AMI was only implemented in 2015, the benefits come to fruition mainly after project closing. The smart meters that were installed for the biggest consumers, such as hospitals, schools, hotels, business, and factories have improved maintenance and theft and management of voltage control. Therefore, additional loss reduction and better collection rates are expected. Consequently, these factors are very likely to contribute to improving the financial performance of the DisCos and thus suggest a modest risk to development outcome. However, in view of the current challenging circumstances, Brazil is facing slightly uncertain short to medium prospects, which may affect the full realization of project benefits.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

113. During the ICR mission in December 2017, the World Bank team conducted a series of evaluation workshops in Brazil where the following lessons and recommendations were discussed:

114. Introducing complex innovative cutting-edge technology was the right approach for a middle-income country like Brazil, which has the capacity to handle technical innovation with technical support from the World Bank. Despite the series of implementation challenges and external shocks described in this ICR, the project delivered measurable benefits, even if not sufficient to meet the ambitious target; the six DisCos would be in a severely worse financial, operational, and commercial situation as they are today, while the Eletrobras DisCos are being privatized. Similar projects should consider including the AMI system to contribute to improved financial and operational performance of the DisCo.

115. Sound database and regularization of customers need to be included in the initial project design, which are crucial steps to map out and address massive fraud in a systematic way. The project demonstrated that this is possible by providing considerable benefits for both commercial management and financial performance. However, the regularization of customers is costly and takes time. The recommendation is to incorporate massive relisting of electricity consumers in the design and prioritize it at the beginning of implementation.

116. The practice of fraud takes time to eradicate and the existing capacity of DisCos to correct irregularities, once they start to be more systematically detected, is not proportionate to the challenge. Interestingly, the project could break the culture of fraud for large MV clients: 100 percent of them were included into the AMI system and, since the number of fraudsters was limited, the instantaneity of detection and agility to respond turned the investment in frauds unprofitable: in Rondônia, the number of recidivists reduced from 28 to 3 after the installation of the AMI. However, such a feat could not be

42 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).2018. OECD Economic Survey of Brazil – Towards a more prosperous and inclusive Brazil. 43 Krznar, I and T. Matheson 2018. –“Investment in Brazil: From Crisis to Recovery.” Working Paper IMF.


Page 34 of 193

reproduced for the huge numbers of illegal connections on LV lines. First, the relisting led to a ‘tsunami’ of cases to be solved that the DisCos were not prepared to absorb at the pace required; second, the diversity of situations, including from a legal perspective (many times the DisCos are not allowed to intervene to fix issues in invaded areas) prevents the DisCos from responding in an agile manner. The recommendation is to scale up the effort of both regularizing and shielding the billing of LV customers, including providing legal support to unlock interventions in invaded areas, and boosting response capacity for a while to break up the vicious circle and culture of fraud.

117. Introduction of new complex innovative technology needs to be combined with timely change management processes and capacity enhancement on procurement and project management. At preparation, not enough focus was placed on change management because many internal processes became largely outdated in consequence of the introduction of the new technology, which also required new set of skills. The project initiated the use of the cost savings to implement such a complementary approach but could not complete the contracting on time before the freeze of investment determined by the Eletrobras Holding Company Board. The recommendation is to include a technical assistant on change management support early on in the project.

118. Need for reenforced close supervision and support with large, complex, and innovative procurement packages. Having a field-based TTL and procurement specialist with good understanding of the technical aspects and an engineering firm to assist with the complex procurement of the AMI helped alleviate implementation delays. For future similar projects, teams are advised to conduct a comprehensive capacity assessment and assist in filling capacity gaps early on by having a field-based TTL and a procurement expert to address ad hoc issues on time and avoid implementation delays. The team developed new tailored bidding documents for large AMI contracts, combining goods and information technology services, which did not exist before at the World Bank, which can now be used by new similar operations.

119. Given the substantial external factors the project faced, which affected financial and operational performance, it is crucial to adjust the Results Framework; in particular total losses reductions defined as a percentage of total energy is too broad an indicator, which is sensitive to too many external factors that are beyond the project’s control, to properly monitor the contribution of the project. For utilities that are already in bad shape, the situation tends to worsen first before the procurement phase is completed and the project can start delivering benefits. It is, therefore, important to adjust indicators, baselines, and targets to the real situation so that in due time the activities can realistically be implemented and deliver results.

120. As technology enabling the use of decentralized resources is maturing quickly, there might be an opportunity to change the current technological interface between the DisCos and poor and dispersed markets. The project has focused on improving the performance of a still conventional power distribution service, based on channeling imported power energy to the customer through the grid. As part of these markets is both dispersed and distant from generation sites, such a centralized solution is both expensive and vulnerable to climate-related events. Integrating new distributed generation technologies commensurate to small individual loads (that is, solar roofs) and advanced energy conservation and management can provide a more adequate, less centralized model to serve these atomized markets. The recommendation would be to undertake a context-specific analytical work on how to integrate these innovations in a way that would be sustainable for the local DisCos serving poor and


Page 35 of 193

dispersed markets.

121. It is probable that the current regulatory framework that applies to the DisCos in Brazil needs to be substantially revised. The current regulatory framework, which largely relies on benchmarking operational and commercial performances to set up tariffs, compensations (that is, for social tariffs), regulatory targets, and penalties is not adapted to some specifics of the Amazonian markets. This benchmarking uses a modeling of a standard DisCo, which might not allow taking fully into account the peculiar geography, climate, and socioeconomic characteristics of these markets. Therefore, it is not certain that even a well-managed DisCo can sustainably serve these very peculiar markets. The recommendation would be to undertake a comprehensive analytical work, which might lead to proposing an adjustment of the DisCo’s modeling used and revise and adapt some features of the current regulatory framework, in particular, to integrate the new technological options mentioned earlier.

122. Eletrobras has developed best practice environmental impact management by introducing an efficient and effective collection, packaging, and recycling system of old meters and materials by auctioning the material to recycling firms. The additional income was used for CSR activities. It is recommended that projects—not limited to the energy sector—that generate solid waste should take into account this recycling and auction system, which is best practice.

123. The pioneering nature of the project has resulted in a multiplicity of lessons. As a result of the project being the first, and largest, of its kind to be financed by the World Bank, the task team organized a series of workshops in four of the DisCos, plus Brasilia (where all DisCos were present), to capture, not only the project results, but the many specific lessons from each subcomponent executed under the project. These lessons are presented in annex 6.

.


Page 36 of 193

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improve the financial performance of the six DisCos

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Total losses: Amazonas Text 41 28 28 43.3

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): in %



Total losses: Eletroacre Text 26 15 15 22.6

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets):


Page 37 of 193



Collection rates: CERON Text 95.4 98 99.5 96

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): baseline was revised during restructuring in 2015 from 95.4 to 96.1 unit of measure: %



Collection rates: CEPISA Text 89.9 98 99.5 98.9

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017




Collection rates: CEAL Text 92.1 98 99.5 92.2

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017



Page 38 of 193



Collection rates: Boa Vista Text 86 98 99.5 91.3

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): baseline was revised during restructuring in 2015 from 86 to 85.7 unit of measure: %



Collection rates: Eletroacre Text 95.6 98 99.5 94

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017




Collection rates: Amazonas Text 87.7 98 99.5 91.3

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Jun-2015 29-Dec-2017



Page 39 of 193



Total losses: CERON Text 33 17 28.3

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 31-Oct-2016

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure: %



Total losses: CEPISA Text 36 22 22 28.8

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Total losses: CEAL Text 32 14 14 22.9

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017





Page 40 of 193

Total losses: Boa Vista Energia

Text 16 8 8 13.5

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 31-Oct-2016

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure: % Objective/Outcome: Improve operational performance of the six DisCos



Duration of Service Interruptions (DEC): Amazonas

Text 50 19 37 37.5

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure is hours baseline was revised in 2015 from 50 to 72



Duration of Service Interruptions (DEC): Eletroacre

Text 48 27 27 47.9

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure is hours baseline was revised in 2015 from 48 to 44.6


Page 41 of 193



Duration of Service Interruptions (DEC): Boa Vista Energia

Text 10 9 33.3 22.3

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Duration of Service Interruptions (DEC): CEAL

Text 21 15 15 20.7

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure is hours



Duration of Service Interruptions (DEC):CEPISA

Text 43 26 26 21.9

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 42 of 193



Duration of Service Interruptions (DEC): CERON

Text 38 30 30 33.2

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Frequency of Service Interruption (FEC): Amazonas

Text 31 16 16 26.1

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure: number baseline was revised in 2015 from 31 to 51.1



Frequency of Service Interruption (FEC): Eletroacre

Text 46 33 33 35.5

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 43 of 193



Frequency of Service Interruption (FEC): Boa Vista Energia

Text 23 22 49.10 38.9

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Frequency of Service Interruption (FEC): CEAL

Text 16 14 14 15.7

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Frequency of Service Interruption (FEC): CEPISA

Text 33 21 21 14.7

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): unit of measure: number baseline was revised in 2015 from 33 to 30


Page 44 of 193



Frequency of Service Interruption (FEC): CERON

Text 43 28 28 19.5

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Objective/Outcome: Improve the commercial management of the six DisCos



Effectiveness of social action and communication programs

Text No social action and communication programs

NA 70% of total consumers in survey areas are aware of messages

95% of total DisCos staff understand messages

The first two programs were evaluated in April 2014 with varying results. In terms of population aware of campaigns, the percentages were: Acre 41.8%, Alagoas 29.6%, Amazonas 21%, Piaui 32.3%, Rondonia 51.6% and Roraima 15%. Of these, the percentages that thoughtthe messages were clear are: Acre 94.1%, Alagoas 57.6%, Amazonas 76.1%,


Page 45 of 193

Piaui 74.4%, Rondonia 68.4% and Roraima 56.4%.The Campaigns were using all types of media (TV, radio, newspapers and outdoors), and the findings from the initial evaluation are being used to further customize the next campaigns to ensure the best medium is being used.

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Introduction of best practices for environmental and social management

Text Best practices not introduced

NA Manuals adopted in the six Distribution Companies

Manuals adopted in the six Distribution Companies

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 46 of 193

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Service Quality Improvement and Loss Reduction



Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: Amazonas Energia

Kilometers 0.00 690.00 690.00 222.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: Eletroacre

Kilometers 0.00 312.00 312.00 265.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: Boa Vista Energia

Kilometers 0.00 143.00 32.28 32.28

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 47 of 193



Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: CEAL

Kilometers 0.00 660.00 380.00 209.40

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: CEPISA

Kilometers 0.00 150.00 92.50 24.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: CERON

Kilometers 0.00 581.00 559.00 235.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 48 of 193



Length of new MV lines: Amazonas Energia

Kilometers 0.00 123.00 122.00 115.10

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of new MV lines: Eletroacre

Kilometers 0.00 47.00 46.00 55.70

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of new MV lines: Boa Vista Energia

Kilometers 0.00 27.00 27.00 33.79

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017





Page 49 of 193

Length of new MV lines: CEAL

Kilometers 0.00 360.00 360.00 355.69

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of new MV lines: CEPISA

Kilometers 0.00 158.00 158.00 169.54

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Length of new MV lines: CERON

Kilometers 0.00 383.00 383.00 302.36

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed automated Number 0.00 169.00 168.00 23.00


Page 50 of 193

reclosers: Amazonas Energia 01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed automated reclosers: Eletroacre

Number 0.00 151.00 150.00 25.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed automated reclosers: Boa Vista Energia

Number 0.00 23.00 22.00 5.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed automated reclosers: CEAL

Number 0.00 200.00 200.00 80.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017


Page 51 of 193




Installed automated reclosers: CEPISA

Number 0.00 386.00 386.00 31.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed automated reclosers: CERON

Number 0.00 40.00 40.00 50.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed voltage regulators and banks of capacitors: Amazonas Energia

Number 0.00 120.00 120.00 128.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 52 of 193



Installed voltage regulators and banks of capacitors: Eletroacre

Number 0.00 136.00 135.00 100.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed voltage regulators and banks of capacitors: Boa Vista Energia

Number 0.00 9.00 9.00 12.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installed voltage regulators and banks of capacitors: CEAL

Number 0.00 0.00 120.00 330.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): There was no original target Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Actual Achieved at


Page 53 of 193

Target Completion

Installed voltage regulators and banks of capacitors: CEPISA

Number 0.00 0.00 290.00 91.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): There was no original target



Installed voltage regulators and banks of capacitors: CERON

Number 0.00 0.00 98.00 100.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): There was no original target



Distribution lines constructed or rehabilitated under the project

Kilometers 0.00 3595.00 3595.00 2020.38

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Distribution lines constructed under the project

Kilometers 0.00 1096.00 1096.00 1032.18

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of new MV lines: Kilometers 0.00 122.00 122.00 115.10


Page 54 of 193

Amazonas Energia 01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of new MV lines: Eletroacre

Kilometers 0.00 46.00 46.00 55.70

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of new MV lines: Boa Vista Energia

Kilometers 0.00 27.00 27.00 33.79

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of new MV lines: CEAL

Kilometers 0.00 360.00 360.00 355.69

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of new MV lines: CEPISA

Kilometers 0.00 158.00 158.00 169.54

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of new MV lines: CERON

Kilometers 0.00 383.00 383.00 302.36

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Distribution lines rehabilitated under the project

Kilometers 0.00 2499.00 2499.00 987.68

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: Amazonas Energia

Kilometers 0.00 690.00 690.00 222.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of MV and LV lines Kilometers 0.00 312.00 312.00 265.00


Page 55 of 193

rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: Eletroacre

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: Boa Vista Energia

Kilometers 0.00 142.00 142.00 32.28

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: CEAL

Kilometers 0.00 660.00 660.00 209.40

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: CEPISA

Kilometers 0.00 115.00 115.00 24.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017

Length of MV and LV lines rehabilitated/ upgraded circuits: CERON

Kilometers 0.00 580.00 580.00 235.00

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017




Installation of AMI systems in each DisCo

Text AMI systems not installed

NA 100% of customer target

40,851 AMI systems installed

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 56 of 193

Component: Institutional Strengthening



Adoption and implementation of environmental and social guidelines across six DisCos

Text Environmental and social guidelines not adopted

NA Guidelines adopted in the six DisCos

Guidelines were adopted in all DisCos

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017




Implementation of a social/communication campaign

Text Social/communication program not implemented

NA Campaigns launched Communication campaigns were implemented

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017




UGP functioning and progress reports provided for project

Text No UGP NA UGP functioning UGP is functioning

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 29-Dec-2017 29-Dec-2017


Page 57 of 193




Full implementation of ERPs in the six DisCos

Text ERP not installed NA ERP implemented in the six DisCos

ERP is implemented in all 6 DisCos

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017




Full implementation of the CMS in the six DisCos

Text CMS not installed NA CMS implemented in the six DisCos

CMS is implemented in all six DisCos

01-Apr-2010 01-Apr-2010 30-Mar-2017 29-Dec-2017



Page 58 of 193

B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1 – Improve Operational Performance

Outcome Indicators

1. Decrease in the number of service interruptions; 2. Decrease in the duration of service interruptions; 3. Institutional improvements: adoption by DisCos of sound environmental management practices, improved M&E and effectiveness of social action and communication programs.

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Upgrading of distribution networks in the six DisCos a. MV and LV line rehabilitated; b. Installation of automated reclosers;

2. Installation of voltage regulators and banks of capacitors; 3. Adoption and implementation of environmental and social guidelines across six DisCos.

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

1. a. 988.2 km of the planned 2,066 MV and LV lines were rehabilitated, and 1,032.18 km of the planned 1,096 km of new MV and LV lines were constructed; 1. b. 1,465 of the planned 966 reclosers were installed; 2. 694 of the planned 772 voltage regulators and capacitors were installed; 3. For the socio-environmental guidelines, four executive reports, three manuals (Works, Hazardous Waste and Solid Waste), two informational handbooks as well as training and workshops were produced and conducted.

Objective/Outcome 2 – Improve Commercial Performance

Outcome Indicators 1. Increase collection rates; 2. Institutional improvements: adoption by DisCos of sound environmental management practices, improved M&E and effectiveness of social action and communication programs.


1. Installation of AMI systems; 2. Full implementation of CMS in the six DisCos; 3. Full implementation of ERP in the six DisCos. 4. Adoption and implementation of environmental and social guidelines across six DisCos.


Page 59 of 193


1. 12,475 of the planned 7,060 MV and 40,851 of the planned 103,000 LV consumer points had AMI meters installed; 2. During implementation, it was seen that the current CMS would not need to be replaced, but have the cadaster of consumers updated. At the end of the project 3,130,099 consumer points and 1,888,653 consumers were re-cadastered (re-listed); 3. The ERP was not purchased as Eletrobras elected to use SAP for their entire company. Owing to cost and conflict with procurement rules, and time, this was not achieved; 4. For the socio-environmental guidelines, four executive reports, three manuals (Works, Hazardous Waste and Solid Waste), two informational handbooks as well as training and workshops were produced and conducted.

Objective/Outcome 3 – Improve Financial Performance

Outcome Indicators 1. Reduction in Total Losses


1. Installation of AMI systems; 2. Full implementation of CMS in the six DisCos;


1. 12,475 of the planned 7,060 MV and 40,851 of the planned 103,000 LV consumer points had AMI meters installed; 2. During implementation, it was seen that the current CMS would not need to be replaced, but have the cadaster of consumers updated. At the end of the project 3,130,099 consumer points and 1,888,653 consumers were re-cadastered (re-listed);


Page 60 of 193

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role

Preparation

Leopoldo Montanez Task Team Leader

Pedro Antman Lead Energy Specialist

Karen Bazex Senior Energy Specialist

Frederica Rabello T. Costa Senior Procurement Specialist

Supervision/ICR

Christophe de Gouvello, James Victor Pannett Task Team Leader(s)

Luciano Wuerzius, Frederico Rabello T. Costa Procurement Specialist(s)

Miguel-Santiago da Silva Oliveira Financial Management Specialist

Alberto Coelho Gomes Costa Social Safeguards Specialist

Zelia Brandt de Oliveira Team Member

Michele Martins Team Member

Megan Meyer Team Member

Marcio Cerqueira Batitucci Environmental Safeguards Specialist

Adriana Jose Jacques De Moraes Team Member

Alexandre Takahashi Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation


Page 61 of 193

FY09 20.050 79,618.76

FY10 67.102 384,733.76

Total 87.15 464,352.52

Supervision/ICR

FY10 4.354 20,692.97

FY11 33.203 162,915.18

FY12 19.851 133,581.07

FY13 31.337 219,578.39

FY14 27.200 152,407.21

FY15 39.640 220,590.21

FY16 17.815 74,061.18

FY17 21.990 138,022.42

FY18 24.792 176,326.89

Total 220.18 1,298,175.52


Page 62 of 193

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Note: On the final counterpart funds: as part of the first project restructuring in 2015, counterpart funds were cancelled and the gap was filled by IBRD through reallocation of project savings due to devaluation and successful international bidding.


Page 63 of 193

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY AND EFFICACY ANALYSIS

Outcome 1: Operational Performance

1. This annex aims to describe in detail the efficacy and efficiency analysis supporting the ratings presented in this ICR. Since the improvement of the financial performance of the DisCos is one of the key outcomes of the project, the efficacy of the project in achieving that outcome is by nature directly related to the efficiency of the project itself: the project can only contribute to improve the financial performance of the DisCos if it demonstrates a positive financial result by itself, which is a key measure of efficiency for this project. Hence the presentation of both in the same annex.

2. Therefore, this annex is organized along the following sections and subsections:

I. Efficacy Analysis: Overview of achievements and need for a more detailed analysis

I.1 External Shocks Affecting Project Implementation and Benefits Measurement

Regulatory shocks

Extreme climate events and energy supply shocks

Political shocks

Economic shocks

I.2 Detailed Project Efficacy Analysis


Quality of service

Rehabilitation of lines

Complementary indicators

Project management.

Improved voltage levels

Customer satisfaction

Outcome 2: Commercial Management

Collection rates

AMI and substitution of obsolete meters

MIS

CMS

Reregistration of clients


Page 64 of 193

ERP.

Complementary indicator: number of illegal connections regularized

Outcome 3: Financial Performance

Loss PDO and intermediate indicators

Financial efficiency as a proxy of the efficacy of the achievement in terms of improvement of the financial performance

Outcome 4: Institutional improvements:

Environmental and social management practice

Social action and communication

Complementary indicator

Reverse logistics (Recycling)

Awards related to environment management and CSR

II. Efficiency Analysis

II.1 Economic Analysis

II.2 Financial Analysis

I. Efficacy Analysis: Overview of Achievements and need for a more detailed analysis

3. The achievement of the PDO of the project was monitored by three major sets of indicators which reflect three subobjectives of the PDO, related to (a) quality of service to measure the improvement of the operational performance, (b) revenue increase through the increase of bill collection to improve both the financial performance and commercial management; and (c) the reduction electricity losses. In addition, the main project outcome indicators indicated in the PAD also included (d) institutional improvements, mainly focusing on environment and social management practices. In a nutshell, the outcome of the project can be considered in overall Substantial for (a), Modest for (b) and (c), and High for (d) for the set of the six DisCos, with some variations between DisCos.

4. Despite an impressive series of external shocks against which the project demonstrated high resilience and the far higher complexity of implementation (252 contracts instead of only 80 initially projected), the project did implement, almost entirely, the planned activities, exceeding the objectives in a couple of cases (for instance installation of grid improvement-related equipment in Alagoas and Acre).

5. Because of the difficulties faced, implementation suffered delays and results became observable only very late, mainly in the last 12 months of the project and after the project closure. The achievement of executing most, if not all, planned activities in all the six DisCos did reverberate very differently on the two sets of indicators related to (a) quality of service and (b) revenue improvement (that is, loss reduction and collections rates).


Page 65 of 193

6. On the quality of service front, the activities delivered the expected results and the DEC/FEC indicators improved substantially. Regarding the revenue improvements, while the collection rates can be considered reasonably improved, the same cannot be said regarding loss reductions when compared to baseline: for five out of six DisCos, the gains provided were clearly insufficient to bring the level of losses close to the industry benchmark by the end of the project (the exception being Roraima/Boa Vista with losses oscillating around 12 percent only). Despite the losses having been reduced between 3.5 percent and 5.3 percent in absolute terms (with the notable exception of no improvement in Amazonas), losses remain above 22 percent and even unbearable at 43.4 percent in the case of Amazonas.

7. However, the picture changes substantially when the analysis compares final results with a more nuanced counterfactual scenario that takes into account exogenous shocks. In addition, because most of the benefits related to revenue improvements are likely to occur in the coming years, the analysis used conservative assumptions in the projections of such future benefits to properly assess the efficacy of the project on the financial performance objective.

8. Therefore, the shocks the project endured will be presented first and thena more thorough analysis of the performance of the project taking into account these exogenous shocks will be presented.

I.1 External Shocks Affecting Project Implementation and Benefits Measurement

9. The Eletrobras Project implementation suffered from a series of natural, macroeconomic, and exogenous shocks which substantially affected the political environment in which the project took place. Notwithstanding climatic shocks, such as historical floods in some states (2013–2014) and drought in other major areas of the country (2014–2015), the political context and government, and Eletrobras Holding decision making had a major impact on the project’s execution, restructuring, and ultimately, ability to measure results. These shocks can be divided into the following categories: (a) regulatory shock, (b) climate shocks resulting mainly in energy supply shocks, (c) political shock, and (d) economic shock. Some of these shocks affected, more specifically, the measurement of the operational performance of the project and most affected the measurement of its financial performance, principally its contribution to reduce losses.

10. A simplified time line of main events which induced these shocks is presented in figure 4.1. The main project milestones are also included.


Page 66 of 193

Figure 4.1. Time Line of Main Events

Regulatory Shocks

11. The two most significant regulatory shocks were (a) the adoption of the decree MP 579 and (b) the enabling of large customers to move to the free market for generation. These shocks affected the project’s ability to accurately measure the benefits delivered by the project in reducing nontechnical losses. The reasons for this are related to the impact that these shocks had on the overall paying consumer base of the DisCos and those causing significant disruptions to the tariffs levels. Furthermore, sectoral decisions hampered the DisCos’ ability to execute investments using their (counterpart) funding to implement some of the project’s activities.

12. MP 579.44 In 2012, the concession contracts for generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity were nearing their end, and the Government under Dilma Rousseff (who had previously served as Minister of Energy and Chief of Staff of the previous government) sought to change some of the rules instead of renewing the concession. This resulted, on November 9, 2012, in the Medida Provisória (MP) 579. Under the MP 579, concession contracts were extended and as quid pro quo capital costs related to already amortized generation and transmission assets were excluded for rate making purposes. The MP 579 also eliminated the so-called RGR—a levy charged to customers to build a fund to compensate concessionaires for the value of the non-amortized assets in case the concessions were to be terminated (if not extended). The Conta de Desenvolvimento Energético (CDE) also ended the so-called CDE, which

44 The MP 579 was subsequently converted into Law 12783 of 2013.


Page 67 of 193

was used to finance several social programs in the electric sector.

13. By terminating the RGR and CDE, the Government had cut off the main sources of counterpart financing that the DisCos had for investments, including Eletrobras’ subsidiaries, resulting in (a) suspension or cancellation of all ongoing contracts financed with counterpart funding and (b) no new investments with counterpart funding. The joint response provided by the World Bank and Eletrobras through the first restructuring has been to use the very substantial cost savings that have resulted from the devaluation of the local currency (see below) and the successful international bidding processes to compensate for the loss of part of counterpart funds. Meanwhile the suspension or cancellation of contracts had a significant impact on the works and services carried out by private sector companies and thus delays in implementing activities and thus the generation of the project results. Many of those companies went broke, for lack of payment, while for future World Bank loan-financed contracts, companies hedged their risk by significantly increasing bid prices.

14. Enabling large users to move to the free market. This shock refers to large consumers of electricity (the so-called free customers) making a decision to leave the incumbent utility and buying directly from new generators or marketers. The interconnection of the DisCos to the national grid created opportunities for competition which did not exist before, accelerating the migration of customers from the utility to new energy suppliers. While retail competition is usually desirable, it had no impact on the utility’s finances.

15. At the time of project approval, the DisCos were serving all consumers, large and small, and losses were calculated on that basis. With retail competition, many large consumers (>3,000 kW, or 500 kW if procuring from nonconventional renewables) started to be served by alternative suppliers.

16. While the uptake was slow at first, given the artificially low tariffs, as soon as the tariffs were increased in early 2015, small and medium enterprises started migrating to the free market. It should be noted that for the companies to make this move, they needed to demonstrate their financial soundness that is, no arrears. Thus, they were the good and reliable payers of the DisCos, while all other customers remained with the utility. Despite being a small number of customers, the volume of energy involved was expressive. In order of magnitude, the AMI component of the project involved 1 percent of all metered units (7,000 MV consumers) but accounted for 40 percent of the electricity consumed. By migrating to the free market, the positive effect of the AMI component was excluded from the project performance indicators.


Page 68 of 193

Figure 4.2. Migration of Large Customers to the Free Market - Total in MWh Equivalent for the Six DisCos

Extreme Climate Events and Energy Supply Shocks

17. Historical droughts and price hike. The reduction of the generation component introduced by the MP 579 initially lowered the overall tariff for the end users and created additional financial difficulties for DisCos. However, starting in 2013, the country experienced an extreme drought over four years, which severely affected the electricity production in many of the most important hydro plants. With 75–80 percent of the country’s generation coming from hydro plants, this resulted in significant shortfall, which had to be compensated with thermal generation. Brazil does maintain, as reserve capacity, expensive thermal plants. Because of the drought, the country was forced to use most of these thermal plants as baseload generation. Those additional costs were not immediately passed on to the end users. This situation continued for two years throughout the drought period, whereby tariffs were artificially held low. In the meantime, DisCos were financing the purchase of the elevated energy cost by borrowing from the capital markets, at market lending rates, to a point where a few of the DisCos almost collapsed. The MP 579, combine with a long drought and increased fuel costs resulted in a significant revenue shortfall, of about R$50 billion, for the DisCos which was accounted to be recovered in the future.

18. On January 1, 2015, after the reelection of President Rousseff, a new Minister of Finance took measures to make tariffs more cost-reflective and recover the revenue shortfall, in a relatively short time. While this stopped the financial bloodshed, it had an adverse effect for the consumers whose tariffs experienced a significant hike. This tariff spike occurred in the midst of the country’s worse recession on record,45 resulting in significant defaults and delayed in payments, as detailed further in the section on economic shock.

45 BBC March 7, 2017.

-

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

1,800,000

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

(MWh equivalent)


Page 69 of 193

Figure 4.3. Average Tariff Price for the Six DisCos

Historical Floods in the Amazonian Region and Interruption of Supply

19. In 2014–2015, Acre and Rondônia experienced a 1 in 500-year flood (noted as the worst on record) which cut off the states from the rest of the country for more than two months (63 days); this disaster had lasting consequences on the grid.

Figure 4.4. Rain Volume Received by Acre in 2014

Note: Line is average rainfall, bars are actual rainfall.

20. Furthermore, the geography of the states is characterized by distant localities where the


Page 70 of 193

identification of the fault on the grid, takes time (no cell phone/radio coverage, which required time-consuming multiple back and forth to the covered area to request the re-energization of the lines and thus verify that the problem was solved), contributed to a worsening of the DEC/FEC situation for those years. Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show pictures of the roads and company crew trying to navigate the area once the flood waters had receeded.

Figure 4.5. Status of Roads in Acre Following 2014 Floods46

Figure 4.6. Main Road Connecting Acre and Rondônia in April 2014 Following 63 Days in which the State Was Cut Off

46 Eletrobras photos


Page 71 of 193

Figure 4.7. The Main Road after Waters Fully Receded

Political Shock

21. In January 2015, President Rousseff started her second term as President of Brazil, following a contentious election in which she won by a slim majority, with 51.6 percent of the votes. The backdrop to the election, which also weakened her administration, was the corruption scandal of Lava Jato (Carwash), in which Federal Police were investigating US$22 billion worth of suspicious contracts from Petrobras in which grafts allegedly occurred between 2003 and 2010, a time when President Rousseff was the chair of the board of the company.

22. As the corruption scandal widened and well-known businessmen and politicians started going to jail, public pressure on the Government started mounting, with large national protests beginning in March 2015. The dissatisfaction with the Government opened a new front of investigation whereby the Executive Office was accused of ’fiscal pedaling’, that is, violating the Fiscal Responsibility Law, with criminal administrative misconduct and disregard for federal budget. This latter investigation culminated with the formal impeachment of Dilma on April 17, 2016, and her removal from office on August 31, 2016.

23. The effects on the project were significant. As public pressure mounted and the jailing of businessmen and politicians occurred, day-to-day governance of the country came to a standstill. Decision making was slow, at best, in particular in the energy sector, where the corruption scandal centered. This included a significant delay in the decision to renew or not renew the concessions of the DisCos, which expired in 2015. This meant that, further to already having been cut off from the RGR funds, the companies now operated without a concession contract, on an extension basis, and no access to public funding until a decision on their future status was made.

24. With President Rousseff impeached, Vice-President Temer took office. He inherited a country still going through the effects of the corruption scandal and, more critically, at the country’s worst economic recession (see below). As part of his initial actions, the entire leadership structure in the energy sector was changed. This included a new Minister of Mines and Energy, new president of Eletrobras, as well as change in the heads of the Eletrobras subsidiaries (for example, distribution). Furthermore, the executive branch was looking for immediate actions to curtail the recession and adhere to the Fiscal Responsibility Law. Thus, the Government sought action to cut expenditures.

25. This had two major effects on the project:

(a) An executive order prohibiting the hiring of retired public pensioners. In the case of the


Page 72 of 193

Eletrobras Project, this meant the immediate release of the project coordinator—who was fundamental in turning the project around after a rough start—the project’s deputy head, and the main engineer supervising the quality of service activities and overall project indicators, with no time allowed to hand over responsibilities to the new head of the project;

(b) The decision of the board of Eletrobras to not request the renewal of the concession of the six DisCos and opt for privatization of the distribution branch of the company (DisCos).

26. In opting for the privatization of the DisCos, in August 2016, the board of Eletrobras also determined that no further investments should be made in the company and that all existing contracts should be halted until further consideration. This included all the contracts financed under the World Bank’s loan, especially the AMI, the relisting, and the regularization of consumers, leading to a freeze of the project for several months. Eventually, in December 2016, only contracts signed before August 4, 2016, were allowed to continue. The impact of the stoppage included delays in implementation, preventing full completion by project closure (or privatization—whichever came first); the demobilization of contractors, which would in turn take time to remobilize preventing further results; and the demobilization of the PIUs whereby key personnel were released or reassigned within the company. The priority became to reduce expenditures and maximize the value of the DisCos for privatization. As a conequence, the board of Eletrobras decided to cancel the undisbursed balance of the loan, that is, US$223 million, which had been earmarked during the first restructuring.

Economic Shocks

27. The project was affected by two economic shocks: (a) significant devaluation of the currency and (b) economic recession. The exchange rate at project approval, in 2011, was R$1.75 to US$1.00. This remained relatively steady during the first three years of project implementation. However, by 2014, a combination of factors, including a change in the overall global commodity prices and a high fiscal deficit account, among other economic structural issues, led to a sharp devaluation of the currency, whereby the Brazilian real devalued from R$2.19 in June 2014 to R$3.98 in September 2015 (and even as high as R$4.09 in January 2016),47 before settling around the R$3.2 range, from July 2016 until project closure.

28. The exchange rate gain was a positive for the project in that the largest contracts were only to be contracted after 2014, meaning that the project effectively doubled the available funding in Brazilian reais. This is even more significant for Brazil where most contracts are nationally bid. This also helped the project by providing a source of funds to partially offset the loss of RGR funds (see section on regulatory shocks) and finance the counterpart activities. From a World Bank operational standpoint, this gave the impression, in U.S.dollars, that the project was not disbursing as fast as it should have been. Given the political shocks and policy decisions, discussed earlier, unfortunately most of these exchange rate savings were cancelled, and part of the planned additional gains did not materialize.

29. The economic recession, on the other hand, greatly affected the loss indicator of the project. The economy contracted 8 percent between December 2014 and March 2017, while at the same time unemployment rose 76 percent to 12.9 million unemployed persons. As a consequence, the frequency of payment default on every type of bill increased, and the number of Brazilians defaulting increased by

47 Bloomberg online.


Page 73 of 193

more than 20 percent from 2013 to 2017, from 50 million to 62 million. Electricity bills were no exception. On the contrary, the combination of economic downturn with the hike in electricity tariffs led to a much larger–than-usual default on electricity bill payments, as shown in figure 4.8.

30. Summary. Given the shocks, summarized earlier and looking at the time line figure, it is possible to see the correlation of the events with the fact that the loss indicator did not change significantly during the execution of the project. As of January 2015, the electricity tariffs rose significantly—the combination of use of thermal plants together with the recovery of and financing costs from the previous two years. This occurred at a time of economic depression, increasing the default payments. At the same time, the customer base, with which losses are calculated, shrank as a result of the policy changes enabling the move of large—and reliably paying customers—to the free market. Meanwhile, the project activities that focused on reducing losses only started getting implemented as of mid-2015. This lag prevented the effectiveness of viewing results, based on the original PDO indicator.


Page 74 of 193

Figure 4.8. Brazil’s Economy Recession 2014–2017 and Bill Payment Defaultsa

Brazil’s Economy Recession 2014–2017a

Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.

Brazil’s Unemployment Rate 2014-2017a

Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.

Number of Brazilians Defaulting on Bills (Credit Cards, Phone, Utilities, Loans, Financed Purchases)

Source : Nexo from Serasa Experian: https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2017/07/04/Inadimpl%C3%AAncia-atinge-n%C3%BAmero-recorde-quais-as-causas-e-as-consequ%C3%AAncia.

Number of Defaulting Electricity Customers Suspended (all Brazilian DisCos)

Source: Aneel, http://www.aneel.gov.br/indicadores-da-distribuicao; Inadimplência (Annexo VII REN 414/2010); inadimpência media e suspensão de froncimento.

Note: a. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2018. OECD Economic Survey of Brazil - Towards a more Prosperous and Inclusive Brazil.

02,000,0004,000,0006,000,0008,000,000

10,000,00012,000,00014,000,00016,000,000

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018


Page 75 of 193

I.2 Detailed Project Efficacy Analysis

31. The purpose of this section is to provide a more thorough analysis of the project ratings, with supporting arguments. The PAD simplifies the monitoring of outcomes of the entire project to six PDO indicators (DEC, FEC, losses, collection rates, introduction of best practice environmental and social management, improved M&E, and effectiveness of social action and communication program). However, each one is valid for the six DisCos, thus totaling 36 PDO indicators to be monitored. Similarly, the intermediate indicators (11) multiplied by the six DisCos total 66 intermediate indicators to be tracked. Even though there is an elevated number of indicators, they alone do not capture the progress of the outcomes intended by the project—improved financial, operational, and commercial management of the companies— and so other sources of evidence have been added to complement the original indicators. Furthermore, as seen earlier, the project suffered many exogenous shocks, that have affected the evolution of these indicators, thus requiring greater scrutiny in reviewing the performance and results achieved by the project to verify its efficacy. This section provides such an analysis to support the synthesis and ratings presented in the main text. Table 4.12 at the end of this annex provides the details of these ratings for each of the six DisCos (based only on the original indicators).

32. Despite the large number of indicators , as explained in the introduction of this annex, all these indicators eventually reflect four main project outcomes, the efficacy of which needs to be evaluated: (a) the improvement of the operational performance of the DisCos, mainly measured by the quality of service, (b) the improvement of their commercial management, (c) the improvement of their financial performance mainly through the reduction of electricity losses, and (d) the institutional improvements, mainly focusing environment and social management practices of these DisCos.

33. As also mentioned in the introduction of this annex, it is also important to note that having the improvement of the financial performance of the DisCos as an outcome, the efficacy of achieving it is by nature directly related to the efficiency of the project: the project can only contribute to improve the financial performance of the DisCos if it demonstrates itself a positive financial result, which is a key measure of efficiency for this project. Hence, several references to the result of the efficiency analysis are presented in the efficacy analysis.


Quality of Service

34. As a result of (a) the long delays to successfully complete the series of complex ICB processes to acquire the key equipment to improve the quality (these include reclosers, capacitors, and voltage regulators), involving solving issues related to import taxes and clearing customs, and then (b) the exogenous shocks that affected the execution of the contracts to implement this equipment, the quality of service observed at project conception continued to deteriorate, as both slow on-the-rise issues and frequency of incidents increasingly overcame the response capacity of the maintenance teams. MV feeders, MV/LV transformers, and LV lines became increasingly overloaded because of higher reactive industrial load and increasing number of illegal connections: this caused overheating of lines and fires, which in turn led to greater transformer failures (including explosions). Furthermore, the distance (length of lines) (especially now greater) was too long to carry the loads, resulting in voltage drops and thus poor service.


Page 76 of 193

35. Moreover, the number of incidents on the lines increased (trees, buildings, and other objects touching the lines which bend lower because of dilatation), leading to more frequent and longer interruptions as reclosers were not automated.

36. Despite the difficulties mentioned earlier, the project was eventually able to install almost all the equipment it intended to, that is, banks of capacitors, automated reclosers, and voltage regulators, including in a few cases exceeding the targets (see table 4.1) owing to reallocation of savings, while fewer equipment were eventually needed in other places (that is, bank of capacitors in Piauí’s DisCo). The installation of capacitators allowed for corrective reactive power, thus reducing overload and overheating, the automated reclosers eliminated most needs for service team interventions, which could then focus on and solve more serious issues, and the voltage regulators corrected voltage drops along the lines.

37. Thus, to observe the actual benefits brought by the project, it is important to precisely track the start of the equipment’s effective implementation.

Table 4.1. Number of Equipment to Improve Service Quality Effectively Installed

DisCos/States Planned Executed % Acre 337 407 121 Alagoas 566 635 112 Amazonas 488 452 93 Piauí 706 551 78 Rondonia 180 180 10 Roraima 47 47 100 Total 2,324 2,272 98

38. Figure 4.9 shows the detailed evolution of the Indicators for Duration (DEC) and Frequency (FEC) of outages in the six DisCos. These graphs present the baseline and revised targets of the project, together with the actual progression of the indicator. To analyze the effectiveness of the project, three measures were looked at: (a) overall improvement compared to baseline and target; (b) overall relative improvement between the value at time of the actual intervention (that is, when equipment was installed) until project ended; and (c) effects of external factors. The dotted triangles, in most graphs, are used as a visual aid to see the relative improvements the project delivered against these references.

Figure 4.9. Detailed Evolution of the Indicators for Duration (DEC) and Frequency (FEC) of Outages in the Six DisCos

Rating: Substantial

Rating: Substantial

Graphs 1 and 2: Duration and Frequency of Outages in Acre. Deterioration in the service after project


Page 77 of 193

interventions are due to unusual severe storms/floods.

Rating: Substantial

Rating: Modest

Graphs 3 and 4: Duration and Frequency of Outages in Amazonas

Rating: Substantial

Rating: Substantiala

Graphs 5 and 6: Duration and Frequency of Outages in Alagoas

Rating: High

Rating: High

Graphs 7 and 8: Duration and Frequency of Outages in Piauí

Rating: Modest

Rating: High

Graphs 9 and 10: Duration and Frequency of Outages in Rondônia. Deterioration in the service after project interventions are due to unusual sever storms/floods.


Page 78 of 193

Rating: High

Rating: High

Graphs 11 and 12: Duration and Frequency of Outages in Roraima. The increase in the DEC and FEC, particularly after 2014, is due to irregular supply from Venezuela.

Note: It seems that there was an issue with the Alagoas FEC data for 2013, which the World Bank ICR team could not clarify by the time this ICR was completed.

39. In analyzing the quality of service, most DisCos missed the initial target (with, however, a few exceptions in which targets were exceeded). However, this initial interpretation would be misleading. Actually, as figure 4.9 demonstrates, all six DisCos have a collective trend of improvement in their services with respect of both indicators, with only one exception (Rondônia’s DEC graph 9, which at face value, shows a slight deterioration). In many cases, the relative gains achieved by the projects after the equipment started to be implemented are actually larger than the difference between initial baseline and target. To correctly assess the effectiveness of the project, four external factors need to be taken into consideration: (a) incorrect initial definition of the baselines for four of the DisCos, (b) the continuous deterioration before the project could actually start the installation of the equipment, (c) 1 in 500-year flood and its lasting consequences for Rondônia and Acre, and (d) the Venezuela crisis factor for Roraima.

(a) Incorrect baselines. As outlined in the first restructuring paper, it was discovered that the original PAD baselines for the DEC and FEC for some of the DisCos were incorrect. The Brazilian regulator, ANEEL, decided in 2014, that is, after the start of the project implementation, to change their DEC and FEC accounting method and introduce a more reliable and stringent automated system, while up until then, it relied on manual reporting from the DisCo to the regulator. Furthermore, using this automated system, the regulator back-calculated the DEC and FEC for the DisCos. It was then demonstrated that the situation at the beginning of the project was in fact worse for three of the companies. In the case of Amazonas and Piauí, adjustments were being made to the software used to collect the DEC/FEC information during 2012–13/14, for which the numbers for these two states fluctuated downward during those years.

(b) The procurement of equipment (reclosers, capacitors, and regulators) was only finalized in 2013, thus the effects of the project would only be visible in the subsequent years. In many instances (Alagoas, Acre, and Rondônia) the situation worsened between the project start and equipment becoming operational. Thus, to properly assess the benefits of the project, the improvements compared the end of the project with 2013 rather than the project’s baseline.

(c) As noted earlier, in 2014–2015, Acre and Rondônia experienced a 1 in-500 year flood. Furthermore, the geography of the states, which is characterized by distant localities where


Page 79 of 193

the identification of the fault on the grid takes time (no cell phone/radio coverage, which required time-consuming multiple back and forth to the covered area to request the re-energization of the lines, and thus verify that the problem was solved), contributed to a worsening of the DEC/FEC situation for those years.

(d) Roraima (Boa Vista) is the only state in Brazil not interlinked with the national grid, and given its isolated location in the north of Brazil, the state imports most of its generation capacity from Venezuela.With the significant economic, political, and sectoral deterioration of the country over the last five years, the energy supply to Roraima has become unreliable and faulty. Unfortunately, these supply shortages are counted toward the DisCo’s DEC/FEC calculation.

40. Taking these factors into consideration, and as a means to try to be consistent, given the volatility of the numbers, during the last restructuring the World Bank and Eletrobras revised the DisCo’s targets to be in line with ANEEL’s targets,even if the now revised baselines meant a significantly greater improvement than what had been originally envisioned. While the final outcomes of the DisCos might have fallen short of their revised targets, the present assessment takes into consideration the deterioration of the quality of service and measured the overall improvement from before and after the project’s interventions took place. As such, the outcomes were assessed as detailed in the following paragraphs.

41. Acre (see graphs 1 and 2): Rating - Substantial. Similar to Alagoas, between the start of the project and the time when equipment started being deployed, in 2013, the DEC/FEC for Acre worsened. Thus, the improvements achieved in the field were 24.1 hours (from 72 hours down to 47.9 hours) for the DEC; 12 fewer interruptions (from 47.5 down to 35.5) versus the planned 17.6 hours (44.6 hours to 27 hours); and 12 fewer interruptions (45.2 to 33). Although the improvements were below the PAD’s expectations, the DisCo is still recovering from effects from the flood (see note and pictures) as the infrastructure is being returned to normal, but as seen in the indicators, the numbers show great improvement and continue trending to the intended direction.

42. Amazonas (see graphs 3 and 4): Rating - Modest. Amazonas was the most complex to assess. In addition to the abovementioned external factors, the PAD was not clear regarding the measurement of improvements. In practice, there is a clear distinction in the performance between Manaus (state capital) and the interior of the state (given the size, geography, vegetation, and so on) and the PAD alludes to this in its annex 1, where it describes the number of interruptions to be as high as 93 in the interior of Amazonas in 2008. However, the Results Framework of the PAD lists the interruptions as having a baseline of 31, which would be more consistent with being just Manaus. Furthermore, the focus of the activities of the project were on Manaus. However, the DEC/FEC that was monitored was for the entire state, to be consistent with the other DisCos, and when targets were reviewed for adjustment, the focus was on the state. This becomes even more relevant given the methodology to calculate the DEC/FEC changed (as described earlier).

43. Equipment was deployed in 2013, and the DEC/FEC at the time were 57.3 and 39.4 respectively. Given this, the overall DisCo DEC/FEC are on a declining trend but showed improvements of only 19.8 hours in duration (DEC) and 13.3 fewer (FEC) interruptions (versus the PAD target planned 31 hours improvement in duration, from 50 hours to 19 hours, and 15 fewer interruptions (FEC), from 31 to 16, and


Page 80 of 193

revised plan of 35 hours improvement in duration, from 72 hours to 37 hours, and 35 fewer interruptions, from 51.1 to 16). When looking at the DEC/FEC, for only Manaus (see figure 4.10), again, while the trend is decreasing, the improvements are substantial, that is, 21.6 hours in duration and 5.8 fewer interruptions, however less than initially foreseen.

Figure 4.10. DEC and FEC of Outages in Manaus48

44. Alagoas (see graphs 5 and 6): Rating - Substantial. The PAD envisioned an improvement of six hours in the duration (DEC), from a baseline of 21 down to a target of 15, and 2 fewer interruptions (FEC), from a baseline of 16 down to a target of 14. At project closure, the final DEC/FEC for CEAL were 20.8 and 15.7 and were thus short of the original targets. However, when equipment started being deployed, in 2013, the DEC/FEC had worsened and were, respectively, 36 and 22.3. Thus, the analysis should really use these numbers as a baseline to measure the impact of the project. In doing so, the improvements, in absolute terms, are 15.2 hours and 6.6 fewer interruptions—either at or greater than anticipated improvements in the PAD.

45. Piauí (see graphs 7 and 8): Rating - High. CEPISA was the only DisCo, irrespective of externalities, that surpassed the project’s targets.

46. Rondônia (see graphs 9 and 10): Rating - Substantial. As in the case of the DisCo in Acre, Rondônia also experienced strong effects from the 2014 flood (as seen in the spike in the 2015 numbers). As in all other DisCos, the overall situation changed between the project start till when equipment was deployed in 2013. The baseline for assessment would not be 31.8 hours for the DEC and 28.9 for the FEC but actually 38.9 hours of interruptions and 32.5 outages. Thus, the results of the project represent an actual improvement of 5.7 hours in the DEC (to 33.2 hours), versus the planned 1.8 hours (31.8 hours to 30 hours). Furthermore, the FEC achieved at closure (19.5) exceeded the planned target (28). This collective improvement would thus warrant a substantial outcome for the efficacy of the project.

47. Roraima (see graphs 11 and 12): Rating - High. As explained earlier in the external factors affecting implementation, Roraima experienced greater duration and frequency of outages because of poor electricity supply from Venezuela, which was not a cause of concern at the appraisal stage. To mitigate this measurement, as reported in the ISRs, while for consistency purposes the World Bank and Eletrobras monitored the DisCo’s overall DEC/FEC, it was possible to actually differentiate between

48 Data source of graphs: Eletrobras


Page 81 of 193

internal and external factors affecting outages. Thus, the project also measured the internal duration and frequency of outages which reflects the actual capacity of the DisCo to improve its own performance. When observing these internal numbers, Roraima DisCo, with final internal duration/internal frequency of outages of 7.3 hours/8.9 interruptions, exceeded the targets of 9 hours and 22 interruptions. This achievement becomes more impressive, when considering that as of 2016, the DisCo that originally only covered the city of Boa Vista (and for which the target was aligned to) now encompassed the entire state, including the interior, which by geography alone is more complex to manage outages.

48. Summarizing: Rating - Substantial. On balance, based on the two key indicators, the ratings for operational performance for the six DisCos were High (Piauí and Roraima), Substantial (Acre, Alagoas and Rondônia), and Modest (Amazonas).

Table 4.2: Summary of DEC/FEC PDO Indicator Ratings

In analyzing the operational performance, the project had additional indicators measuring the counterpart funded rehabilitation and construction of Medium Voltage (MV) and Low Voltage (LV) lines. This work contributed to improving the DisCos performance by reducing outages and improving line voltage levels. It also contributed to regularizing customers, which contributes to improving the commercial performance objective.

Rehabilitation and Construction of Lines

49. As a small subcomponent of the project to upgrade the networks, Eletrobras rehabilitated and extending MV and LV lines with counterpart financing and were monitored as intermediate indicators. With regard to the results planned/achieved, during implementation, it was observed that the planned targets were incorrect (in fact vastly overestimated in some cases) and thus revised at restructuring. The


Page 82 of 193

final numbers achieved were as shown in table 4.2

Table 4.2. New MV Lines and MV and LV Lines Rehabilitated or Upgraded

Length of MV and LV lines Rehabilitated/Upgraded

Length of New MV lines

Planned Achieved Planned Achieved ED Acre 312.0 265.0 ED Acre 55.7 46.00 ED Alagoas 380.0 209.4 ED Alagoas 360.0 355.69 ED Amazonas 690.0 222.0 ED Amazonas 122.0 115.10 ED Piauí 92.5 24.0 ED Piauí 158.0 169.54 ED Rondônia 559.0 235.0 ED Rondônia 383.0 302.36 ED Roraima 32.8 32.8 ED Roraima 33.79 27.00

Total 2,066.3 988.2 Total

1,112.49

1,015.69

50. The shortfall for all of the states, except new lines for Piauí, was because of the cancellation of the RGR which funded the counterpart activities. During the first restructuring, it was agreed to complete these works using the project savings/gains but it was never implemented because of the Eletrobras board decision to suspend any new financial transfer from the Holding Company to the DisCO, which resulted from change of government and Eletrobras president, as a consequence of the impeachment of President Dilma Roussef. Eventually, the corresponding loan amount was cancelled following the second restructuring.

Complementary Indicators

51. In addition to the indicators identified in the PAD, the project had other tangible benefits that demonstrate a change in the operational performance of Eletrobras, becasue of the project, some of which were not intended at the start but developed throughout the life of the project. These include (a) project management and (b) improved voltage levels (recycling). There is also some partial information regarding customer satisfaction.

Project Management

52. At the time of project design, general institutional project management within Eletrobras was poor, with major challenges, such as the following: (a) projects with poorly defined scopes, (b) budgets that could not be fulfilled, (c) absence of oversight mechanisms, (d) poorly qualified professionals in project management, (e) absence of a standardized project plan, and (f) improper assessment of risks. This was the backdrop of the institution that would eventually have to oversee this project which, in the end, covered 62 different procurement processes and managed over 260 contracts in six widely geographically dispersed areas.

53. The first two years of project implementation reflected this scenario. However, from 2012 to 13, Eletrobras’ management decided to implement a proper project management methodology to execute this project. They hired key staff who created project management standards for the organization, based on PMI’s PMBOK Guide. It became a simple methodology customized to the company’s requirement. This was quickly followed up with the training of all staff involved in the project, from assistants all the way up


Page 83 of 193

to company managers and directors, covering project management technical skills as well as behavioral. A total of 1,833 employees, including 30 regional project managers, participated in 1,060 hours of training.

54. As a result, the project (a) improved oversight of subprojects, (b) standardized the management of projects, (c) created knowledge management, whereby the DisCos were sharing experience between them, (d) had greater monitoring and control of all ongoing (sub)projects, (e) had greater support from company managers for these (sub)projects, and (f) implemented a continuous improvement process within the company. Furthermore, the changes resulted in the project unit being awarded prizes by the PMO Academy, in partnership with the PMI, where they placed first in 2014, as the ‘Most Admired PMO Leader’, and in 2015 the second and third ’Most Admired PMO Leader’. The success in implementing the project management methodology under the project was such that Eletrobras is using this model to institute this methodology throughout all its subsidiary companies.

Improved Voltage Levels

55. The PAD monitored, through the intermediate indicators, the installation of voltage regulators and capacitors. In practice, this resulted in much improved electrical voltage level on the distribution grid. While this outcome was not monitored by the project, it is reflected in the regulatory compensations paid to customers. Table 4.3 shows how between 2016 and 2017, when all equipment was deployed and energized, the level of compensations was significantly reduced for all the DisCos but ED Roraima, which suffered from serious supply issues due to the Venezuela crisis. This improvement is also aiding the companies’ financial situation, whereby there has been a reduction in compensations, which need to be paid when the voltage level is below the regulated limit. From 2016 to 2017, this amount was reduced by around 50 percent from around R$440,000 to around R$$240,000 per month (figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11. Evolution of Compensations Paid by the Six DisCos Due to Irregularities in Voltage Level


Page 84 of 193

Table 4.3. Number and Amount of Compensations Paid by DisCos Due to Irregularities in Voltage Supply to Customers

Customer Satisfaction

56. Customer satisfaction was not monitored as a specific indicator. However, it seems worth noting that four out of the six DisCos received awards from ANEEL,49 the regulatory agency, for customer satisfaction in the category of largest improvement Acre (2013/2014) and Alagoas (2014/2015) and for the North Region, Amazonas (2014) and Rondônia (2015 and 2016).

57. Conclusion. The overall rating of the operational performance objective is Substantial. Based on the original PDO indicators identified by the PAD, for both the DEC and FEC indicators, two of the six DisCos are rated High, two Substantial, and two Modest. In addition, one must account for the additional benefits achieved by the project, which are directly related to operational performance. On balance, this led to a conclusion of significant improvement in the companies’ operational performance and a Substantial efficacy rating for this objective.

Outcome 2: Commercial Management

58. As indicated in the Theory of Change, several key activities of the project contributed to the improvement of both the commercial management and the financial performance, two essential subobjectives of the PDO. For instance, the regularization of irregular connections, the substitution of obsolete or broken meters, the installation of the AMI, and the reregistering of customers, all these activities were as important to improve the commercial management as to reduce losses and thus improve the financial performance of the six DisCos. However, in the PAD, several of these activities are labelled as intermediate outcome indicators for improving the commercial management. For the sake of clarity, they are presented under this commercial management section. It is important, however, to note that improving commercial management itself eventually contributes to improving the financial performance.

59. In this section, the achievement related to the following indicators is discussed:

49 IASC, see table 4.11 which lists the awards received in customer satisfaction, environmental management, and CSR

# Compensations paid

Amount Paid (R$)

# Compensations paid

Amount Paid (R$)

ED Acre 40,763 2,487,163 2,941 113,982 ED Alagoas 6,690 140,984 429 4,582 ED Amazonas 8,865 4,003,963 10,152 2,643,998 ED Piauí 72,070 757,670 * *ED Rondônia 4,091 855,329 208 36,406 ED Roraima 3,209 99,905 2,467 244,424

2016 2017

* Information not avai lable from ANEEL


Page 85 of 193

The collection rate (project outcome indicator)

The implementation of the AMI and substitution of obsolete meters (intermediate outcome)

The implementation of the MIS, that is the CMS, including the reregistration of customers and ERP

The number of illegal connections regularized as a complementary indicator

Collection Rates

60. Table 4.4 shows the collection rates achieved by the project (intermediate outcome).

Table 4.4. Collection Rates Achieved by the Project

61. Unfortunately, none of the six DisCos were able to achieve the target of 98 percent at the end of the project. However, during implementation all six achieved or even exceeded the target at some point. Three of the DisCos improved substantially by the end (Amazonas, Piauí, and Roraima) and the other three ended the project at around the same level as when they started. In some instances, the DisCos (Alagoas, Piauí, and Acre) achieved more than 100 percent, reflecting the ability of collecting back payments owed to the companies.

62. However, in particular for the latter years, this indicator was significantly affected by external shocks (see section on shocks above). As highlighted in the March 2017 Aide Memoire, the effects of the economic recession that Brazil experienced between 2014 and 2016 were also felt by the project. The GDP per capita fell by 9.2 percent during this period and unemployment rose from 6.2 percent in 2012 to 12 percent (12.3 million people). This led to an overall increase in defaults of all payments, whereby 48.6 million people (23.6 percent of the Brazilian population) were late in paying their bills or repaying debt. Regarding electricity bills, nationwide, disconnections of customers due to payment defaults rose brutally from 1.2 million in 2012 to 15.2 million in 2015 (table 4.5). Thus, while under normal circumstances the indicator is an appropriate measure for the performance of the DisCos, the external factors negated this indicator as a proper measure with respect to the target. However, with the improved performance of three of the DisCos, and the non-deterioration of the other three, and as demonstrated by the economic analysis (see section on efficiency)—in the face of the extreme recession—it can be concluded that their collection rates would have been worse, in this scenario, were it not for the project’s actions.


Page 86 of 193

Table 4.5. Number of Defaulting Clients Disconnected

Year Number of Defaulting Clients

Disconnected 2012 1,277,237

2013 1,963,034

2014 12,373,216 2015 12,469,082 2016 15,230,080

2017 12,887,037 Source: Aneel, http://www.aneel.gov.br/indicadores-da-distribuicao; Inadimplência (Annexo VII REN 414/2010); inadimpência media e suspensão de froncimento.

AMI and Substitution of Obsolete Meters

63. The AMI system, which focused on the bigger consumers representing 50 percent of the consumption, allowed Eletrobras to measure the amount of electricity delivered by the distribution network and, through its Intelligent Metering Center based in Brasilia, compare it with what was billed to consumers. In this way, Eletrobras reduced the rates of electric losses—both those caused by failures in the system itself (technical losses) and those from improvised theft, illegal connections, and other frauds (nontechnical losses). The system also quickly flagged repeat offenders and took immediate action, thus now becoming a deterrent system.

64. The AMI deployment subcomponent, which included both the AMI per se and the substitution of obsolete meters by smart meters is complex to evaluate. Overall, the project fell slightly short of the PAD’s planned number of customers (84 percent), given the external shocks that have affected its implementation. The main reasons for this shortfall have been the decision to reduce the number of LV AMI meters to be installed from 100,000 to 47,911 and to keep some LV electronic meters as spare parts. However, it had a very significant positive impact, despite this relatively small shortfall. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the achieved results.

65. While in annex 3 of the PAD, Project Indicators, did not reference the number of meters, the text in annex 4 of the PAD totaled them to be around 375,000. This included the AMI metersand substituting other obsolete meters. The total contracted number of new electronic meters to substitute obsolete ones was 268,738, of which 259,625 (97 percent) were achieved. As for the AMI, during design, it was estimated that 11,000 MV and 107,000 LV units would be installed. This was based on a usage threshold, whereby the LV users would be consuming at least 600 kWh per month. During implementation the actual number was seen to be slightly lower, and the originally contracted amount was for 103,000 LV users.

66. The contract was signed in early 2015, bringing to Brazil a first-class consortium of international leaders in this technology. The successful international bidding process, which required a two-year cooperation between the World Bank procurement specialist and Eletrobras to develop a brand new bidding document package mixing goods and imformaton technology services, which did not exist in the World Bank and then became available worldwide, brought the cost from an initial estimate of US$130 million to US$94 million. The initial priority was given to the construction of the data center in Brasilia, to manage the AMI metering information, which became fully operational and was officially inaugurated in


Page 87 of 193

April 27, 2016, and the MV users. The project was awarded the first place in the ‘Metering Excellence Awards’ of the ‘Latin American Utility Week Award 2016’.

67. The project overachieved in number of MV meters to be installed (in average, the target was exceeded by 77 percent), the reason being that cost savings were allocated to increase the number of such meters, which covers larger clients and thus shields a larger portion of the billing envelope. Eletrobras was able to increase the number of MV users to 12,475.

68. Unfortunately, for the implementation of the LV users, which by nature takes more time because of both the large number and the dispersion and the diversity of technical configurations, the contract was affected by exogenous factors. The first was that one of the local suppliers went bankrupt. This resulted in the need for extra implementation time to complete the installation of equipment. However, by this time additional external shocks (outlined in corresponding section earlier) also affected implementation. The second was the political paralysis, followed by the decision to privatize the DisCos. The effects of these factors were that contract implementation was halted for three months, which also meant a demobilization of deployment teams and lengthy time to remobilize. With limited time to complete the contract within the project period, a more realistic number of LV users was discussed with the World Bank team and revised from 107,000 to the 40,851,which was achieved by project closure.

69. In total the 53,326 AMI consumer units account for 40 percent of the DisCo’s revenue.

70. Collectively, the substitution of meters and the AMI replaced 312,951 consumer unit meters, representing 84 percent of the targeted customers. To further aid in the management of lines and identification of fraud or theft, 410 MV feeder meters, with telemetering capabilities, were installed.

Table 4 6. AMI Meters’ Deployment for the Six DisCos


Page 88 of 193

Table 4.7. Substitution of Obsolete Meters by Electronic Ones for the Six DisCos

71. While the outputs have been slightly short of the target, the outcomes have not. By the end of the project, that is, only a few months after the installation of the meters, these activities have enabled the DisCOs to bill the equivalent of 208,101 MWh (approximately US$67 million recovered and aggregated energy) as of December 2016 for the substituted meters and 147,133 MWh (approximately US$33.5 million recovered and aggregated energy) for the AMI as of December 2017.

72. However, the benefits extend beyond the recovered energy. The new meters have enabled an improved billing system, whereby there is automation of bills as soon as the metering cycle is over, as opposed to the month delay to collect the information from field visits. Furthermore, with the telemetering capabilities of the AMI, failures or attempts to tamper with the meter immediately triggers alarms both at the local DisCo and centrally in Brasilia. In the first year of implementation in Rondônia, the number of routine repeat fraud offenders in the MV network decreased from 42 to 2.

73. Summarizing. Although this subcomponent fell slightly short in the total number of meters deployed, the commercial returns obtained exceeded the expected amount from a greater number of deployed MV meters. Furthermore, there are operational and commercial improvements because of the implementation of the AMI system; thus, on balance, the efficacy of this core subcomponent is rated Substantial.

MIS50

74. The project had initially envisioned the purchase of new systems to aid the commercial management of the DisCos and improve their performance in providing the necessary services to customers, as well as provide the necessary information for corporate management of the companies. There was also the expectation to update the customer database and geosynchronize their mapping (in Amazonas) in the system.

CMS

75. Regarding the CMS, it was envisioned that the World Bank would finance a new system. However, during implementation, the Eletrobras’ Directors for Distribution and the DisCos’ Commercial Management instructed the PIU that the companies should continue to use the current system, called AJURI. AJURI was originally developed by Eletronorte (a subsidiary of Eletrobras), and they continued to 50 Subcomponent 1.c in the main text of the PAD.


Page 89 of 193

provide assistance to the DisCos for their commercial management. While the World Bank initially opposed the continued use of the system, it was then agreed upon to have an independent consultant to evaluate the system.

76. The results of this analysis concluded that the problems originally seen, which led to the assumption that a new system was needed, was not a result of the system per se but rather the poor quality of the data that was input into the system. This led to an adjustment in the scope of the subcomponent to be a full reregistration of the consumer base, including all new consumersand recommendation to maintain a constantly updated client database. Thus, the World Bank conditioned financing this full reregistration, using part of the project cost savings, to Eletrobras to conduct a training program for the commercial area, which was executed.

Reregistration of Clients

77. The reregistration of customers brought additional benefits to the project, as it (a) regularized customers, bringing them into the paying database; (b) corrected errors on the type of customer (residential, commercial, or industrial), who have different tariff levels; (c) identified customers eligible for the social tariff benefits;51 (d) identified fraudulent customers, and (e) updated the cadaster of each home with the correct residents.

78. Table 4.8 shows the results achieved in reregistering consumer units and customers as a complementary indicator. This subcomponent of the project was significantly affected by the decision from Eletrobras Holding to halt all ongoing contracts for several months, at the time of the political shocks occurring in 2016 (see section on external shocks). This had two effects: it cut into the time needed to complete the works, plus there was a demobilization of contractors, which had to then be remobilized (once contracts could continue), taking up valuable time from project execution. Furthermore, in the cases of Piauí and Rondônia, both the DisCos had to rebid for contractors (Rondônia had to undergo three successive bids, illustrating the difficulty to conduct successful bidding processes for complex services in the Amazonian region), preventing them from completing the works. In all cases, owing to the demonstration of the benefits brought by reregistering, all the six DisCos decided to completing the reregistration, after the loan closed, with their own funding. It should be noted that the registration of consumers is still ongoing (as of the time of this ICR), as data are being entered into theCMS.

51 Customers who are registered to receive Federal Social Assistance and consume <220 kWh are eligible to receive a discounted tariff. The difference is paid by the Federal Government directly to the DisCo.


Page 90 of 193

Table 4.8. Output from the Reregistration Activity by December 2017

79. The outcomes of the reregistration have been the following: (a) 498,173 consumer units whose meters were not checked, by being in difficult locations, were brought into the system, (b) 160,718 consumer units have suspected fraud,52 (c) 6,492 had incomplete data in the AJURI system, and (d) 30,920 were illegally connected. Very importantly, the reregistration enabled the DisCos to systematically map out the customers who were not billed properly and thus increase the billing base, including the recovery of past due payments due to broken meters, frauds, and other billing failures, turning the reregistration into a major source of loss reduction. This amounts to approximately 266,157.5 MWh, equivalent to US$52 million.

ERP

80. This activity was added to the project because of a diagnostic study that showed that the ERP for Piauí and Alagoas was not adequate, as the system used by Amazonas was old (having been installed in 1997) and Rondônia did not have a proper one. An ERP is a non-utility-specific MIS that provides support for the execution of processes for a series of corporate functions (accounting, asset management, financial management, human resources management, and so on). The idea was that a single ERP would be purchased for all the six DisCos. During the initial stages of the project, procurement documents were being prepared for a bidding process and the companies started aligning themselves, whereby their architecture and databases were being cleaned up. Furthermore, workshops were carried out to define the requisite functional needs of each company.

81. However, in December 2013, when the bidding documents were being finalized, Eletrobras Holding decided to implement the SAP ERP in all its subsidiary companies, including the six DisCos. As such, the bidding process was halted until further evaluation of the situation could be concluded. At the request of the World Bank, a thorough study was conducted by Eletrobras, which concluded in the positive NPV of the corporatewide SAP solution. The World Bank and the PIU evaluated the possibility of financing the DisCos’ portion of the SAP licenses; however this would not have followed the Wordl Bank’s procurement guidelines and was thus dropped from the Procurement Plan. As reflected in the Aide Memoire of December 2016, the combination of the impossibility to use the IBRD resources and the more

52 The data for suspicion were only identified at the time of project closure, when commissioning the data. These processes are now entering the legal phase to confirm fraud and subsequent actions taken to recover the lost energy.


Page 91 of 193

recent perspective of the privatization (assuming that the new companies’ owners would have their own ERP) led to the conclusion that this activity was not needed anymore and was thus suspended.

82. Summarizing. On balance, when analyzing not just the outputs, but the outcomes, this subcomponent of MIS is rated Substantial.

Complementary Indicator: Number of Illegal Connections Regularized

83. The project also included another very important subcomponent53 to regularize illegal connections in areas with nontechnical losses greater than 50 percent. Under this component, the project enabled the regularization of tens of thousands of irregular clients, including providing many of them access to social tariffs for which the company receives a direct compensation from the regulatory agency, thus also improving revenues.

84. Despite the importance of this subcomponent both for the improvement of commercial management and financial performance, the Results Framework of the project did not include any related indicator. However, the World Bank and Eletrobras agreed to monitor the number of connections that were regularized. The project regularized 82,826 of the targeted 88,567 consumer units (see table 4.9).

85. Similar to the reregistration and smart meter deployment, this component was affected by external shocks. While this was a relatively late subcomponent to be executed, it was expected to be completed within the project time frame. However, the order to freeze all ongoing contracts totally stopped the execution of ongoing activities of this subcomponent for three months, causing a demobilization of contractors, which then required additional time to remobilize. Furthermore, the original executive order from Eletrobras Holding only allowed the continuation of existing contracts, with existing ‘service orders’, an internal formalization of field intervention request. Given the nature of this component, which addressed mostly informal communities, the service orders to be issued were on an as-needed/continuous manner. It was only on the June 5, 2017 (with only six months remaining in the loan and after the second restructuring) that Eletrobras Holding allowed for the execution of new service orders. During these last six months alone, approximately 18,000 consumer units were regularized.

Table 4.9. Number of Regularizations of Illegal Connections in Areas with Nontechnical Losses >50%

86. The financial results achieved for the DisCos by this component are that they have been able to aggregate 232,246 MWh of energy to their database, approximately US$70.5 million, as of December

53 Subcomponent 1.b (iv) in the main text of the PAD.


Page 92 of 193

2017. However, the gains go beyond the finances. From the perspective of the DisCos, by regularizing these consumers, who generally had very poor illegal connections (for example, wire clothes hangers to LV lines), the actions helped reduce the outages (DEC and FEC) and improve the voltage level of the lines. As the service improved, the general reputation of the DisCos improved with the general population, as a company that can regularly supply quality electricity. With the greater paying base, the local governments are also able to collect more taxes, which in turn are used to improve public services.

87. From the consumer perspective, the gains meant lowering the risks of being close to energized (and improvised) lines, reliable energy, a proof of residency which enables the consumer to access government social programs, improved self-esteem of the communities, which now are free of ‘spaghetti’ junctions of lines, and increased value of homes which now have regularized electricity services.

88. Summarizing. Taking into account the financial, social, and operational improvements the results obtained by this subcomponent are rated Satisfactory.

89. Last but not least, the substantial improvement of the quality of services associated with outcome 1 also provided important benefits to improving the commercial relationship with clients, including improving willingness to pay their bills, thus improving the overall commercial performance of the DisCos.

90. Conclusion. On balance, the outcome with respect to the improvement of the commercial management is rated Substantial. Although the targets regarding collection rates were not met, improvements were achieved in three DisCos and there are evidences that the project was instrumental in containing the impact of the payment defaults that affected all the DisCos in the country and many other commercial services. More importantly, the outcome of the reregistration, the AMI and substitution of obsolete meters and the regularization of illegal connections have provided very substantial contribution to the improvement of the commercial management by fixing the customer database, automatizing the billing function, and improving the commercial relationship with clients, and thus ability to increase billing and collect additional revenues. The reregistration of consumers improved the consumer base and business practice, especially when verifying that almost 500,000 consumers were not even receiving their bills before the project’s intervention. The manner in which the regularizations took place, and the results achieved through it, improved the image of the company with respect to the consumers. Furthermore, the fact that the DisCos are completing several activities with their own resources, in particular the reregistration, is significant in recognizing its importance. The project also put in place a training program by which this database is expected to be constantly updated. The only shortfall of component activities is the non-execution of the ERP. Even though actions were taken to execute this, ultimately an executive decision from the borrower’s management to SAP and then external shocks freezing investment in the DisCOs prevented this from occurring.

Outcome 3: Financial Performance

91. The Results Framework considered only one indicator for monitoring the improvement of the financial performance of the DisCos, that is the reduction of losses for each DisCos. However, both the level of losses and the reduction of these losses result from a wide range of parameters and activities. As explained in the Theory of Change and in former sections, many activities implemented by the project had an impact on losses, although the Results Framework allocated the corresponding intermediate indicators


Page 93 of 193

to the improvement of the commercial governance.54 The reason is that losses work as a very broad spectrum ‘sensor’. As a matter of fact, losses are defined as the difference between the energy purchased by the DisCos and the energy paid by the customers, that is the difference measured between entry point of a DisCos and its exit point. And the interval between this purchase ‘entry’ point and this sale ‘exit’ point actually contains all the activities—infrastructure construction, operation, maintenance, metering, customer management, billing, revenue collection, fight against fraud, and so on—and processes performed by a DisCo. Losses measured as a percentage of the energy purchased make them also dependent on the variation of these purchases, that is, the size of the market. Therefore, losses—and thus loss reductions—result from all the internal inefficiencies and all the external influences to which the activity and the market of a DisCo are subject. Loss reduction is, therefore, a very broad indicator, which scope is broader than the scope of the project itself. An important assumption in using the variation of losses to monitor the efficacy of the project to improve the financial performance is, therefore, that the only impact on losses would result from the project and that all other parameters which also influence losses remain constant. In the context of the multiple shocks endured by the DisCos during the project implementation, this core assumption was not verified. Therefore a methodology based solely on the variation of the losses is by nature fragile and needs to be complemented by more precise measurements. Unfortunately, this became clear only late in the project physical implementation phase, when the installation of equipment finally ramped up and started delivering benefits but different from what was observed with the quality of service indicators, without improving the loss indicators. This is a lesson learned, although too late to be corrected.

92. The team tried first to conduct a benchmark analysis, comparing the evolution of the financial performance of the six DisCos to the performance of a control group of other DisCos. However, this avenue proved to be unsuccessful. The main reason is the peculiarity of the market of these six DisCos, which were the only ones that could not be privatized: they are located in the poorest states (Piauíis the poorest state of the Federation) and four of them are in places with very low density, difficult climate, and isolated geography that is specific to the Amazonian region. All other DisCos also had a different investment history during the project period. Hence, the impossibility to establish and inform an appropriate control group. The importance of the specificities of these markets is also reflected in the lessons section.

93. The alternative proposed here is to use the financial analysis of the project, which benefits result exclusively from the activities contributing to reduce losses, as a more precise measure. As a matter of fact, as indicated in the introduction of this annex, the efficacy of the project in contributing to improving the financial performance of the DisCos is by nature directly related to the efficiency of the project itself: the project can only contribute to improve the financial performance of the DisCos if it demonstrates a positive financial result by itself, which is a key measure of efficiency for this project. This is particularly important in this case, since due to the delayed implementation of project supported investments, the benefits will only be fully realized in the future, and the revenue/financial projections reflect these benefits, demonstrating the likely achievement of this project objective.

94. This section, therefore, first presents a plain analysis of the loss PDO indicators and then the result

54 As a matter of fact, activities related to the improvement of the operational performance and the institutional improvements also contributed indirectly to the reduction of losses, although these contributions are less measurable than the contribution of activities related to the improvement of commercial management.


Page 94 of 193

of financial analysis as a proxy of the contribution of the project to improve the financial performance.

Loss PDO and Intermediate Indicators

95. Table 4.10 and figure 4.13 show the progress of the losses per DisCo.

4.10. Losses by DisCo

DisCo Baseline (%) 2015 (%) 2016 2017(%) *March/2018 (%)

Initial Target (%)

Revised Target (%)

Acre 26 23.3 24.3 22.6 21.30 15 19 Alagoas 32 25.2 26.7 24.1 22.00 14 20 Amazonas 41 40.4 43.2 43.3 44.15 28 35 Piauí 36 30.5 30.7 29.1 27.35 22 27 Rondônia 33 26.7 29.8 29.2 27.88 17 20 Roraima 16 12.9 12.4 13.3 14.28 8 10

Note: * Value annualized in March 2018.

96. When analyzing the losses, the initial plain conclusion is that none of the DisCos achieved their target in reduced losses. However, as explained in the section on external shocks, a series of exogenous factors strongly affected this indicator. As explained earlier, the combination of recession and tariff hikes increased the overall defaults of payments. Furthermore, the migration of large industrial customers to the free market also affected this indicator, as it reduced the baseline of well paying (and very large) customers and as such negatively affected the base for calculating losses. That is, the calculation is now based on a reduced base, in which a greater proportion are poor paying customers, mechanically increasing the value of losses expressed as a percentage of that base.

97. As visible in figure 4.12, all the six DisCos were affected by these migrations, with a temporary recovery in the case of Piauí.

Figure 4.12. Migration of Large Clients to the Free Market, Expressed in MWh Equivalent Per Year55

55 Source: Eletrobras


Page 95 of 193

98. However, even with these externalities, five of the six DisCos (Acre, Alagoas, Piauí, Roraima, and Rondônia) have lower losses at project closure—and four of those are on a decreasing trend. Roraima is also affected by the Venezuela factor, whereby service is unreliable (due to issues of supply coming from the neighboring country), and are thus conducive to nonpayments.

Figure 4.13. Evolution of Losses in the Six DisCos

99. Furthermore, as evidenced from the recovered energy (over 725 GWh recovered and aggregated) from the abovementioned components, were it not for the project, losses would have been even greater at the time of project closure.

100. Ideally, it would have been desirable to recalculate the counterfactual losses to estimate the relative improvement provided by the project, but the multiple variables to be taken into account and to be informed in a consistent way for the six DisCos at the same time made it impossible to be done in the time frame of this ICR.

Financial Efficiency as a Proxy of the Efficacy of the Achievement in Terms of Improvement of the


Page 96 of 193

Financial Performance

101. To use the financial analysis as a proxy of the efficacy of the project in contributing to the improvement of the Financial Performance of the DisCos, conservative assumptions were made regarding the likely benefits that the project activities will continue to deliver in the future.

102. Once a new meter has been installed, an illegal connection regularized, or a consumer added in the client database, then the corresponding additional energy that is billed is likely to continue to be billed for many years. Once an automated recloser has been installed, reducing both the DEC/FEC and thus the regulatory fines to be paid, this reduction continues for the lifetime of the recloser. The same applies for the regulators. Once a capacitor is installed and properly parametrized, it reduces the reactive power and the associated losses for the lifetime of the capacitor. This is especially important to be considered because most of the benefits started at the end of the project, after the corresponding activities were completed and equipment installed.

103. The conservativeness of the projection of the benefits is ensured in the following ways:

Not all the benefits were taken into account, some being too difficult to estimate rigorously for a long period; this is the case, for instance, of the loss reductions generated by the installation of the capacitors. This is also the case of the higher willingness to pay from customers because of both the improvement of the quality of services, the improvement of the social communication (for instance related to the physical dangers associated to illegal connections), and the access to subsidized social tariffs (the DisCos directly receive the difference between the cost and the social tariff as a subsidy paid by a sectoral fund).

The benefits were accounted only of a conservative estimate of 10 years for the lifetime of the equipment installed, that is, the meters and the new connections; the meters have a life expectancy of at least 10 years and the connections can last more than 20 years. In addition, the benefits generated by the reregistration can last far longer if the database is properly updated as this is good practice in the industry.

The future benefits were discounted using a discount rate of 10 percent.

104. The following are the five main sources of improvement of the financial performance:

The additional energy billed because of the regularization of illegal connections in areas of losses higher than 50 percent

The additional energy billed and the recovery of energy non-billed in the past becauseof the substitution of obsolete/broken meters by new electronic meters

The additional energy billed and the recovery of energy non-billed in the past becauseof the installation of the AMI

The additional energy billed and the recovery of energy non-billed in the past as a benefit of the corrective actions that resulted from the reregistration


Page 97 of 193

The reductions in fines and claims related to the evolution of continuity indices (DEC and FEC) and voltage-level compliance (Duração Relativa da Transgressão de Tensão Precária Equivalente [DRPE] and Duração Relativa da Transgressão de Tensão Crítica Equivalente [DRCE])

105. The projection in time of the likely benefits associated with these four activities is presented in figure 4.15.

Figure 4.14. Projections of the Main Likely Benefits of Loss Reducing Project Activities

106. On the basis of these sole benefits, the calculation concludes that, in a 10-year period, the project was responsible for a possible NPV of US$1.27 billion with US$360 million associated cost, which results in an FRR of 46.2 percent, which is higher than calculated ex ante at appraisal (40.7 percent—see section on efficiency analysis).

107. Conclusion. Although, the efficiency rating for the financial performance of the project is Modest, since the loss reduction targets were not achieved, it is clear that these indicators were not appropriate to capture the contribution of the project to improve the financial performance. The project delivered multiple benefits to improve the financial performance of the DisCos, including several of which were reported in previous sections, as both the improvement of the operational performance and the commercial management also contributed to improving the financial performance of the DisCos. This positive contribution is clearly demonstrated by the financial analysis, which reflects the full realization of the future benefits, although not at the scale of the challenge to substantially reduce the total losses, as implied by the outcome indicator, particularly in view of the difficult market and circumstances faced by these DisCos.

Table 4.3: Summary of Financial Performance PDO Ratings


Page 98 of 193

Outcome 4: Institutional improvements

108. For the sake of consistency with the Results Framework and thus the efficacy rating explanation, the analysis of the indicators related to institutional improvements are presented in this separate section. However, as indicated in the Theory of Change, the environment and social management can also be related to operational performance and the communication to commercial management.

Environmental and Social Management Practices

109. One of the project outcome indicators used to monitor the institutional improvement delivered by the project is the adoption of sound environmental and social practices. The results achieved by the project include Manuals for Standardizing Operational Procedures (Manuais para Normatização e Padronização de Procedimentos Operacionais na Área Ambiental das EDEs), which reflect the introduction of best practice environmental and social management and were adopted in the six DisCos. All the six environment management teams received training organized by the central team, with the support of the World Bank environment specialist and this is now standard practice within the six DisCos. Specific outputs include (a) reports (compiling and analizing procedures, socioenvironmental standard procedures, identification and consolidation of strengths and environmental best practices in the energy distribution sector, socioenvironmental procedures related to distribution) and (b) Manuals (management of solid waste, environmental manual for works and manual for managing hazardous waste).

Social Action and Communication

110. Another outcome indicator to monitor institutional improvement relates to ‘improved M&E and effectiveness of social action and communication programs’. As detailed in the report of the National Evaluation Workshop organized for this ICR (see annex 6), a full session of which focused on social communication, six communication teams in the six DisCos worked together under the coordination of a national coordinator to elaborate and implement consistent communication plans aimed not only at supporting the execution of the projects activities, in particular the campaign of regularization of illegal connections and re-cadastering, but also to promote a series of themes and best practices among users, such as fight against dangerous and illegal connections, safe and rational use of electricity, environment, citizenship, and gender equality. Biweekly coordination meetings were held; two training workshops took place; nine communication campaigns were prepared and executed using multimedia supports, including campaign-specific facebook pages and call-in numbers; and two ex post evaluations were conducted. The monitoring of customer satisfaction is now performed using the three indicators of the Associação Brasileira das Distribuidoras de Energia Elétrica (ABRADEE), including the index of customer approval, the


Page 99 of 193

index of satisfaction regarding quality, and the general satisfaction index.

111. An important social benefit that resulted from the project, in particular the regularization of irregular connections and the reregistration of customers (once regularized), has been providing low-income customers access to the social tariffs and a proof of residency and thus access to government social programs, which has been a major achievement for social action (see details in the previous section).

Complementary indicator

Reverse Logistics (Recycling)

112. The project design included the substitution of old meters and the introduction of best practices for environmental management. However, a connection between these two aspects had not been made. During implementation, while supervising sites, it was noticed how old equipment, in particular, meters, were discarded in landfills as junk or thrown into warehouses.

113. In response, to reduce the environmental impact through the correct disposal of substituted meters, the project created a ‘reverse logistics’ process, whereby the DisCos would properly dispose, count, and package meters. A reverse auction would take place for firms to collect the disposed meters, separate them into their metering components (glass, iron, plastic, and so on ), and process this material for recycling. With the assistance of the World Bank environmental specialist, the project developed a specific tender based on international best practice; a series of reverse auctions were then successfully conducted.

Figure 4.15. Before and after the Implementation of the Reverse Logistics Auction

114. The funds generated by the reverse auctions were then reverted to be used for social projects by the DisCos. Within the project, over 570,000 meters, equivalent to over two tons, were recycled in two reverse auctions. As a result, there are no more landfills in the DisCos; all discarded material is properly kept and packaged (which has freed up physical space in the companies) (see figure 4.15). Better still, this process is now both institutionalized within the DisCos, whereby a third and fourth auction have more recently occurred.

115. This resulted in the DisCos being awarded the Chico Mendes Social Environmental Prize and the green stamp for responsible social environmental management. As a consequence of the award received


Page 100 of 193

and the visibility thus gained, other DisCos in the country asked Eletrobras to share their successful experience and started to replicate it.

Awards Related to Environment Management and CSR

116. Because of the coordinated progress achieved by the six DisCos in both the areas of environment management and CSR, which includes social action and communication, the six DisCos accumulated a series of awards, as detailed in table 4.11(2013–2016).

Table 4.11. List of Awards Received in Customer Satisfaction, Environmental Management, and CSR

DisCos Awards

Acre 2014

• Prêmio IASC na categoria maior crescimento 2013/2014 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

2015 • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

Alagoas

2013 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Prêmio IEL de Estágio – Categoria Grande Empresa

2014 • Prêmio IEL de Estágio – Estagiário Destaque • Desafio Nacional Sebrae de Estágio • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

2015

• Prêmio IASC na categoria maior crescimento 2015/2014 • Selo de Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça • Prêmio IEL Melhores Práticas de Estágio – Categoria Grande Empresa • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

2016 • Prêmio IEL de Estágio - Estagiário Destaque • Prêmio Cier - Satisfacción del Cliente con la Calidad Percibida • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

Amazonas


2014 • Prêmio IASC na categoria Região Norte • Prêmio WEPS (Women’s Empowerment Principles) menção honrosa

2015

• Prêmio WEPS (Women’s Empowerment Principles) menção honrosa • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes

(Projeto de Miniestação de Tratamento de Resíduos em Novo Airão, P&D).

2016 • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes

(Energia +: Projeto de Logística e Manufatura Reversa de Medidores Obsoletos)

Piauí

2013 • Prêmio Abraconee 2º lugar na categoria Empresa de Pequeno & Médio Porte • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes

2014 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

2015 • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

2016 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Maior contribuinte ICMS do Estado do Piauí - referente ao exercício de 2015

Rondônia 2013 • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Selo Abrinq • Prêmio Abraconee


Page 101 of 193

2014

• Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Medalha Eloy Chaves • Selo Abrinq • Prêmio Ética nos Negócios

2015

• Prêmio IASC na categoria Região Norte • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Selo Abrinq • Prêmio WEPS (Women’s Empowerment Principles) • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

2016 • Prêmio IASC na categoria Região Norte • Selo Abrinq

Roraima 2015

• Prêmio Cier na categoria maior evolução • Prêmio Medalha Eloy Chaves 2º lugar pela gestão da segurança e saúde do

trabalho • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

117. Conclusion. The overall rating of the institutional improvement is High. Based on the original PDO indicators identified by the PAD, the target was slightly exceeded. In addition, the additional benefits achieved by the project must be accounted for, in particular the introduction of innovative best practices, reverse logistics auctioning, which has now been expanded beyond the recycling of meters and is also adopted in areas of the holding company and by other DisCos in the country, and the social benefits associated with regularization and reregistration activities.


Page 102 of 193

Table 4.12. Overview of Achievements - Detailed Ratings


Page 103 of 193

II. Efficiency Analysis

118. This annex section aims to describe the evaluation method of financial and economic benefits of Eletrobras distribution rehabilitation project in a comprehensive way and determine whether the arrangements for cost recovery were efficient in all levels.

119. Eletrobras Distribution Rehabilitation Project Long-run objective is to improve the quality of electricity service by the six DisCos to the population in the states of Acre, Alagoas, Amazonas, Piauí, Rondônia, and the city of Boa Vista as a mean to improve quality of life and foster economic growth. To achieve the long-term outcomes, the project worked to improve the financial performance, operational performance and commercial management of the six DisCos; therefore, the efficiency analysis can be measured by the qualification of the financial performance due to returns on benefited DisCos. Economic benefits are those associated with net savings in resources for the Brazilian society, while financial benefits concentrate in the DisCos’ cash flow and net income improvements.

II.1 Economic Analysis

120. In the PAD, the economic benefits are defined as savings for Brazil in spending on resources and emissions of greenhouses gases with an overall gain for the country. More specifically, the analysis focused on reduction of electricity generation due to lower technical losses and consumer demand, plus a reduction on resources use due to enhanced efficiency. Other benefits are pointed out but are not included in the calculations, such as reduction in CO2 emission and increase in electricity supply. A ten-year stream of benefits from the base case scenario, considering the assumptions described earlier, results in an ERR of 18.5 percent and an NPV of US$260 million at a 10 percent discount rate. The lack of data available for a broader analysis and the project main focus on upgrading financial performance of the DisCos led to focus the analysis on the benefits of network reinforcement and quality improvement in electricity distribution.

121. As argued in the PAD, the ICR analysis considers that the economic value of quality improvement on reducing electricity operational interruptions could be assessed taking as reference the tariffs and consumed energy in MWh upon reducing the DEC indicator (duration of interruption), that is, the additional and constant electricity supply. As in the PAD, it is supposed that with market equilibrium, the monetary value billed by the DisCos from improved service quality (Subcomponent 1.1) should reflect the benefit extracted by consumers at the same proportion. This is conservative as this does neither reflect the consumer surplus nor the additional value generated by businesses nor the losses and damages associated with service interruptions. A broader analysis of the value associated with the continuity and discontinuity of power supply in six different contexts, which are not well studied in the literature, would require a methodological and survey effort far beyond what could be undertaken under this ICR.

122. Therefore, using the same methodology as in the PAD, the economic analysis estimates an NPV of US$48,524 million with an ERR of 13.1 percent on a 10-year future period, which is lower than at appraisal, but is still good.

II.2 -Financial Analysis:

123. The financial analysis compares financial results from the PAD applying the same discount rate


Page 104 of 193

and technical inputs. Financial benefits are associated with income improvements and cost reduction in past and projected cash flow for all the six DisCos regarding aggregate level of consumers and energy demanded. Financial benefits also incorporate the quality upgrading on distributions services on a conservative approach. All the projections, estimations, and proxies hereafter presented will be disclosures throughout the document using Eletrobras administrative and financial control reports, and Aneel’s56 sector data. Owing to the late commissioning of the AMI system and Eletrobras’ internal issues related to the privatization process, there are still some crucial benefit data missing. Notwithstanding, the calculated benefits will gradually improve in the coming years.

124. Eletrobras distribution rehabilitation project financial analysis has distinct levels of benefits that will be examined together with their respective costs. Overall, the components of the financial analysis are measured in the context of (a) decrease of service interruptions; (b) reduced total energy losses; (c) increase in collection rate; and (d) institutional strengthening. More detailed project components here evaluated as follows:

(a) Network reinforcement and reduction on service interruptions. Reinforcement, focused on technical losses, and service interference. To evaluate the benefit of network quality, the reductions in fines and claims related to the evolution of continuity indexes (DEC and FEC) and voltage-level compliance (DRPE and DRCE) were analyzed.

(b) Replacement of existing metering systems. Replacement of broken or malfunctioning metering system in use for more than 15 years. The start date of this activity was not synchronized between the DisCos and varied between May 2013 and September 2014 and the benefits can be computed by the addition of recovered and aggregated energy.57 Altogether, this subcomponent is accountable for 208,101 MWh and US$67 million.

(c) Regularization of electricity supply. The component comprehends activities for regularization of electricity supply in LV networks, including installation of encapsulated networks and metering boxes aiming the reduction on frauds and energy theft. The increase of revenues due to higher billing of energy consumed by users was computed but not still properly collected. Regularization adds new aggregate energy in the system.

(d) Implementation of the AMI system. The objective of this activity is to yield a sustainable reduction of nontechnical losses (unmetered consumption) in electricity supply by the DisCos upon the implementation of the AMI system. The AMI benefits can be computed by the addition of recovered and aggregated energy.

(e) Updating of client's database. The activity is under is under the pillar of Modernization of DisCos MIS. Updating the client database and mapping of the distribution network. Based correcting and controlling frauds, energy theft, and other irregularities the activity recovered and aggregated energy.

56 Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (National Regulatory Agency). 57 Recovered energy is realizing past consumption not properly charged. Aggregate energy is the new and future energy.


Page 105 of 193

(f) Old equipment auctions. Large quantity of meters were being discarded in landfills, passed on as junk, or thrown in patios. With the help of the World Bank Group, Eletrobrás developed a systematic disposal process with auction. In 2015, the auction resulted in a gain of R$433,000 (aproximatly US$124,000 ).

125. Table 4.13 shows the subcomponents of the analysis.

Table 4.13. Financial Benefits Components and Subcomponents

Key Financial Benefits Component Action and results Benefit

Distribution network reinforcement

Reduction of duration of interruptions in electricity supply (DEC) derived from improved service quality

Reduction in fines and claims costs due to duration of interruptions in electricity supply

Implementation of AMI and maximize metered consumption

Replacement of old and broken metering systems

Regularization and billing of energy currently consumed energy

Implementation of AMI system

Higher electricity revenues due to (a) higher billing of amounts of energy consumed by users but not still properly collected and (b) new and aggregated energy measured in the system to be billed.

Modernization of MIS Updating and reviewing incorrect information on current client's registry

Higher electricity revenues due to client’s debt collection and billing

Reduction of expenditures and increase in revenues due to reduction on frauds and energy theft

Additional benefits One-time old and replaced metering equipment auctions

Income from old metering equipment auction

126. Benefits include mainly recovered and aggregated energy. Figure 4..61 shows the evolution of benefits and costs between 2011 and 2017. Most benefits only started atthe end of the project where the cost had stable and controlled growth.

127. For each nontechnical loss and irregularity detected in the field, there is accumulated calculated recovered energy, that is, past energy consumed but not properly billed. Recovered energy enters in only one period with the accumulated owned amount.

128. Aggregate energy corresponds to new incorporated clients and consumption. This aggregate energy not only benefits the present but also the future energy that will be added each year. To project the energy, a conservative approach is used just considering the same level of energy without the natural growth of demand and tariffs evolving at an average historical growth and inflation.58 Figure 4.17 shows

58 Tarifs projected with 6 percent historical compound annual growth rate, which also correspond to average past inflation.


Page 106 of 193

the projection of each component.

129. Figures 4.18 and 4.19 show the total NPV and FRR.

130. In the PAD financial analysis, the total increased energy for which the DisCos receive revenue (that is, energy billed and collected) represents 13,880 GWh over the 10 year-period, which equals a total related financial revenue (that is, kWh x sales prices) of almost US$2.3 billion in 2010. A 10-year stream of benefits from the base case, considering the assumptions described earlier, results in an FRR of 40.7 percent and an NPV of US$1.38 billion at a 10 percent discount rate.

131. This ex post analysis resulted in NPV benefits, in 2018, of US$1.27 billion with US$360 million cost associatedwhich results in an FRR of 46.2 percent, as shown in figures 4.18 and 4.19, presenting alternative scenarios of time, including present value, five-year projected and 10-year projected value.

132. While the FRR calculated in the ICR is higher than in the PAD, the NPV is lower than in the PAD (ex ante analysis), both are economically viable as they suggest positives results. It is important to note that not only benefits came short on expectation but also the total cost in U.S. dollars due to exchange rate variation gains and savings achieved in successful ICBs.

133. Design aspects significantly contributed to enhance efficiency, including the cutting-edge AMI system and the implementation of the relisting of consumers, which allows Eletrobras to increase bill collection over time due to a bigger consumer database. Opting for ICB, a choice that Eletrobras initially resisted because of concerns related to aftersales maintenance services, particularly in the case of the AMI, also contributed to the efficiency of the project, as all ICBs were successful in substantially reducing the expected cost: in the case of the AMI, the cost was reduced from US$130 million to US$94 millon. However, the implementation of the AMI system was delayed and the relisting of consumers was only added later. Hence, this affected the NPV of the project due to overall implementation delays of one and a half years.

134. The analysis above suggests a substantial project efficiency.


Page 107 of 193

Figure 4.16.Benefits and Cost by Year of Project

Figure 4.17. Benefits Projections - 10 Years

Figure 4.18. Benefits and Cost Accumulated and Projected

Figure 4.19. Financial Rate of Return


Page 108 of 193

Table XXX: Table 4.14. Synthesis of the Results of the Financial Analysis

Benefit Cost Analysis (USD thousands - 2018 present value) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027total benefits 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

(i) Service Quality Improvement and Loss Reductiona. Network Reinforcement - - - - 2,398.0 3,673.4 3,489.7 3,315.3 3,149.5 2,992.0 2,842.4 2,700.3 2,565.3 2,437.0 2,315.2 2,199.4

a.2 Reduction of claims and fines - - - - 2,398.0 3,673.4 3,489.7 3,315.3 3,149.5 2,992.0 2,842.4 2,700.3 2,565.3 2,437.0 2,315.2 2,199.4 b. Implementation of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and maximize metered consumption- 564.1 5,327.0 21,876.1 60,114.9 66,231.2 73,710.2 67,558.3 65,101.7 62,734.3 60,453.1 58,254.8 56,136.4 54,095.1 52,128.0 50,232.5

b.1 Replacement of existing metering systems - 564.1 5,327.0 19,315.1 22,912.6 19,338.0 19,651.0 18,936.4 18,247.8 17,584.2 16,944.8 16,328.6 15,734.9 15,162.7 14,611.3 14,080.0 b.2 Regularization of electricity supply - - - 1,600.4 32,625.5 36,251.7 36,731.5 35,395.8 34,108.7 32,868.4 31,673.1 30,521.4 29,411.5 28,342.0 27,311.4 26,318.3 b.3 Implementation of AMI system - - - 960.5 4,576.9 10,641.4 17,327.7 13,226.1 12,745.2 12,281.7 11,835.1 11,404.8 10,990.0 10,590.4 10,205.3 9,834.2

c. Modernization of Management Information System (MIS) - - - - - 51,946.5 50,166.1 48,446.8 46,786.4 45,182.9 43,634.4 42,138.9 40,694.7 39,300.0 37,953.1 36,652.3 C.1 updating of client's database - - - - - 51,946.5 50,166.1 48,446.8 46,786.4 45,182.9 43,634.4 42,138.9 40,694.7 39,300.0 37,953.1 36,652.3

(iii) Other benefitsb. Old equipment auctions - - - - - 174.2 - - - - - - - - - - IBRD Total Cost 708.62$ 64,421.01$ 47,792.62$ 92,547.09$ 154,880.00$

Total Benefits $ - $ 564.05 $ 5,326.95 $ 21,876.06 $ 62,512.95 $ 122,025.32 $ 127,366.06 $ 119,320.41 $ 115,037.58 $ 110,909.27 $ 106,929.88 $ 103,094.00 $ 99,396.41 $ 95,832.10 $ 92,396.24 $ 89,084.16 Benefit Cost Ratio 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.40

Total Net Income USD - 2018 PV (708.6) (63,857.0) (42,465.7) (70,671.0) (92,367.1) 122,025.3 127,366.1 119,320.4 115,037.6 110,909.3 106,929.9 103,094.0 99,396.4 95,832.1 92,396.2 89,084.2 NPV - 10 year projected $ 911,322.10 FRR 40.6%

Total Net Income BRL* (769.8) (84,695.4) (65,280.9) (143,368.7) (309,483.2) 366,941.2 421,301.5 434,156.9 460,430.8 488,298.2 517,856.1 549,207.0 582,459.9 617,730.5 655,141.4 694,822.6 NPV - 10 year projected $ 3,109,163.86 FRR 46.2%* BRL cas h flow takes into account changes on the exchange ra te of rea l i zed cost

Projections


Eletrobras - ICR.docx created by Jimmy Pannett last saved by Jimmy Pannett 6/27/2018 5:03:00 PM

Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 109/197

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER, AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Pág. 5 – Não tem referencia de data dos valores (DEC e FEC) apresentados:

Response from WB team: Referencia: Project Appraisal Document (2010), page 42 (o valor baseline por Amazonas foi corrigido de 21 para 31 (erro de digitação) 3. Comment from Eletrobras: Pág. 8 – Nossas considerações:

De acordo com documento “Aide-memoire Eletrobras supervision mission March 6-16 2017 - P114204 2017-05-01 16.25”, seguem as alterações (metas para dez/2017). Por que os valores de revisão de metas de perdas não foram inseridos no documento do banco? Somente os indicadores de DEC e FEC? Response from WB team: Obrigado, isso agora está refletido no documento

Response from WB team: Obrigado. 4. Comment from Eletrobras: No caso de DEC, houve modificação, mas não foi inserida a unidade correta (horas): Amazonas: 19,00 horas para 36,99 horas –valores OK no documento Roraima: 9,00 horas para 33,30 - valores OK no documento No caso FEC houve modificação, mas não foi inserida a unidade correta (vezes):



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 110/197

Roraima: 22,00 para 49,10 nº vezes- valores OK no documento Response from WB team: De acordo com o PAD (página 42), a linha de base era 23 e o alvo era 22. 5. Comment from Eletrobras: Pág 15 – Não identificamos a fonte da informação abaixo:

Response from WB team: A fonte é o relatório do Workshop de Encerramento do Projeto Energia+ preparado pelo Sr. Ariovaldo Stelle (não foi anexado ao ICR que foi circulado. Portanto, a avaliação do Eletrobras ainda não foi anexada tambem, pois os documentos são muito longos - mas vão ser incluído antes da publicação). 6. Comment from Eletrobras: Pag. 14: Texto incorreto: O termo FEC é repetido duas vezes. No Piauí é comentado que o índice FEC melhorou de 33 para 15.3, Para Rondônia, o valor correto é de 29,72(não é 43) para dez/2010, sendo que o valor final está correto. Continuando o texto, após comentar os índices de FEC, o texto menciona novamente o termo FEC, sendo que o correto seria mencionar o termo DEC, sendo que o mesmo passou de 28,22 horas(não 43) (dez/2010) para 19,17 horas (dez/2017), para o Piauí, de acordo com site da ANEEL: Response from WB team: Os valores de referência do PAD foram incluídos como referências no ICR; o segundo comentário foi levado em conta, mas os valores. Obrigada! Não obstante todos os seus comentários serão refletidos no ICR.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 111/197

7. Comment from Eletrobras: O texto a seguir pode ser reescrito, pois parece que está se referindo somente a Roraima, enquanto na verdade está se referindo a todas as EDE, o montante instalado de 100% de religadores, 76% de banco de capacitores e 97% de reguladores se refere a todas as EDE.

Response from WB team: Obrigado. Isso foi reformulado. 8. Comment from Eletrobras: Pág. 16: Não identificamos esse valores.

Response from WB team: De acordo com o relatorio do Sr. Ariovaldo:

9. Comment from Eletrobras: Pág. 30 à 59: Por que todos indicadores estão com as informações de 2016? (indicadores de DEC, FEC, perdas e outros índices): Response from WB team: Houve um problema no sistema e, portanto, não pôde ser incluído os dados do Decembro 2017 no ICR que foi circulado, mas serão corrigidos antes da submissão e publicação



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 112/197



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 113/197

ANNEX 6. Supporting Documents

WORKSHOP DE ENCERRAMENTO DO PROJETO ENERGIA+



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 114/197

A. SESSÃO DE ABERTURA

..................................................................................................................................... 03

B. INTRODUÇÃO

................................................................................................................................................... 04

C. TEMA 01: DIGITALIZAÇÃO DE REDES E QUALIDADE DE ENERGIA

.................................................................. 06

D. TEMA 02: REDUÇÃO DE PERDAS – INFRAESTRUTURA DE MEDIÇÃO AVANÇADA – AMI

............................... 13

E. TEMA 03: REGULARIZAÇÃO DE UNIDADES CONSUMIDORAS COM PERDA MAIOR DO QUE 50%

................. 21

F. TEMA 04: RECADASTRAMENTO E CADASTRAMENTO DE UNIDADES CONSUMIDORAS

................................ 24

G. TEMA 05: FISCALIZAÇÃO DO PROJETO ENERGIA+ PELA

ELETROBRAS........................................................... 30

H. TEMA 06: MODERNIZAÇÃO DO SISTEMA INTEGRADO DE

GESTÃO................................................................ 33

I. TEMA 07: LOGÍSTICA REVERSA E NORMAS DE GESTÃO AMBIENTAIS

........................................................... 35

J. TEMA 08: COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL

.................................................................................................................. 39

K. TEMA 09: SUPRIMENTOS

................................................................................................................................. 47

L. TEMA 10: PERFORMANCE OPERACIONAL

....................................................................................................... 51

M. TEMA 11: IMPACTOS EXTERNOS, PERTURBAÇÕES E EVOLUÇÃO DO PROJETO

............................................. 52

N. PERFORMANCE FINANCEIRA

........................................................................................................................... 53

O. TEMA 13: BANK PERFORMANCE

..................................................................................................................... 67



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 115/197

P. ENCERRAMENTO

............................................................................................................................................. 69



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 116/197

A. SESSÃO DE ABERTURA DO WORKSHOP

PALAVRAS DO DIRETOR DE DISTRIBUIÇÃO/PRESIDENTE EM EXERCÍCIO DA ELETROBRAS – LUIS HENRIQUE HAMANN

Fez uma abordagem positiva do Energia+, que com o apoio do Banco Mundial, direcionou recursos para a implantação de inúmeros projetos pelas Empresas de Distribuição da Eletrobras – EDE, que atuam numa expressiva área que remonta a 29% do território brasileiro, nos Estados do Acre, Alagoas, Amazonas, Piauí, Rondônia e Roraima.

Dentre vários outros comentários destacou que, pela Portaria 468 da ANEEL, foi estendido o prazo de vigência dos contratos das seis EDE, como prestadoras temporárias de serviços até 31/07/2018.

PALAVRAS DO GERENTE DO PELO BANCO MUNDIAL - CHRISTOPHE DE GOUVELLO

Solicitou, e foi feita, a auto apresentação de todos os participantes no evento, oportunidade em que se evidenciou, a convite, a participação de representantes do Ministério de Minas e Energia e do BNDES. Citou a importância da realização das reuniões já ocorridas nas cidades de Boa Vista, Teresina, Maceió e Manaus que culminam com a realização do Workshop de Encerramento do Projeto Energia+, em Brasília. Destacou sua participação nos primórdios do Projeto quando atuou na formulação do mesmo e do seu retorno mais tarde, dada a sua designação para atuar como Gerente do mesmo, em Brasília, representando o Banco Mundial. Considera que embora alguns impactos tenham ocorrido durante a execução do Energia+, incluindo mudanças na orientação política envolvendo o futuro das empresas, muitos ganhos foram alcançados, os quais contribuíram para atingir o objetivo principal do Projeto de melhorias na performance financeira e operacional das EDE.

Destacou a prorrogação da data de encerramento do Acordo de Empréstimo, após tramitação pela COFIEX e concordância da Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional – STN, passando-a para 29/12/2017, com um cancelamento parcial de US$ 223 milhões. Finalizando referiu-se sobre a importância da constituição do Escritório de Gestão de Projetos, que atuou de modo centralizado em Brasília e descentralizadamente em cada uma das seis EDE, acompanhando os principais projetos pela evolução dos indicadores relacionados a prazo, escopo, custo e aderência da metodologia. PALAVRAS DO CO-GERENTE DO PROJETO PELO BANCO MUNDIAL JIMMY PANNETT

Discorreu sobre a agenda do Workshop, estruturada em apresentações e debates que envolvem temas como qualidade de energia e digitalização de rede, sistemas de gestão comercial e corporativa, recadastramento de unidades consumidoras, evolução das inspeções físicas realizadas pela área de engenharia da Eletrobras, gestão ambiental, programas de ação social e comunicação, redução de perdas, implantação de infraestrutura de medição avançada, regularização de unidades consumidoras com perdas não técnicas superiores a 50%, processos licitatórios e contratações, implantação da metodologia de gestão de projetos, avaliação de impactos externos, perturbações e evolução do Projeto e da performance do Banco Mundial, contando no final com um resumo do workshop e seu encerramento.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 117/197

Na sequência, sob sua coordenação, foi iniciado o ciclo de apresentações dos temas acordados, e em cada um deles dedicado um tempo para debates e comentários. B. INTRODUÇÃO Para facilitar a leitura desta Ajuda à Memória, introduzimos abaixo o desenho orientativo que serviu de base para a constituição do Projeto Energia+, similar ao pensado em 2009, onde se retrata, num campo de forças, ações para melhorar a performance financeira e operacional das Empresas de Distribuição da Eletrobras - EDE.

Com base no cenário encontrado foram programados vários projetos (forças impulsoras) para superar as forças restritivas que tendiam a manter a situação crítica pela qual passavam as EDE, com baixa capacidade de investimentos para bem cumprir os contratos de concessão assinados com a Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica - ANEEL. Para sustentar as pretendidas melhorias foram incorporados também alguns projetos voltados para o fortalecimento institucional.

Neste contexto foram aprovados recursos financeiros que totalizaram US$ 709,3 milhões, disponibilizados pelo Banco Mundial (US$ 495 milhões) e pela Eletrobras (US$ 214,3 milhões).



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 118/197

Alguns requisitos para se efetivar uma análise da gestão das empresas de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil são os indicadores estabelecidos pela ANEEL, dentre os quais destacam-se aqui os principais:

Qualidade do Serviço – compreende a avaliação das interrupções no fornecimento de energia elétrica. Para tanto destacam-se os indicadores definidos no Módulo 8 dos Procedimentos de Distribuição (PRODIST):

o Indicadores de qualidade coletivos: DEC - Duração Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade Consumidora e FEC - Frequência Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade Consumidora;

o Indicadores de continuidade individuais: DIC – Duração de Interrupção Individual por Unidade Consumidora; FIC – Frequência de Interrupção Individual por Unidade Consumidora, DMIC – Duração Máxima de Interrupção Contínua por Unidade Consumidora ou Ponto de

Conexão; DICRI – Duração da Interrupção Individual ocorrida em dia crítico por Unidade Consumidora ou

Ponto de Conexão



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 119/197

Os limites dos indicadores DIC e FIC são definidos para períodos mensais, trimestrais e anuais. O limite para o DMIC é definido para períodos mensais. Para o DICRI o limite é para cada interrupção em dia crítico.

Os indicadores são apurados para interrupções maiores que 3 minutos, sendo admitidos alguns expurgos na sua apuração.

Quando os indicadores individuais de continuidade são transgredidos, a distribuidora deve compensar financeiramente o consumidor. A compensação é automática e deve ser paga em até 2 meses após o mês de apuração do indicador (mês em que houve a interrupção).

Qualidade do Produto – se refere à conformidade de tensão em regime permanente e as perturbações na forma de onda de tensão. Destacam-se neste quesito os indicadores coletivos DRPE e DRCE, obtidos a partir da campanha de medição amostral instituída pela ANEEL.

Os indicadores de tensão permanente são apurados trimestralmente, a partir de medições amostrais realizadas pelas distribuidoras em unidades consumidoras sorteadas dentro de sua área de concessão ou permissão.

Para cada unidade consumidora, a tensão é medida ao longo de uma semana, e são apurados os indicadores:

DRP – duração relativa da transgressão de tensão precária e DRC – duração relativa da transgressão de tensão crítica que expressam o percentual do tempo

no qual a unidade consumidora permaneceu com tensão precária e com tensão crítica.

A ANEEL estabelece limites para os indicadores de tensão em regime permanente: 3% para o DRP e 0,5% para o DRC.

Quando há transgressão destes limites, a distribuidora deve regularizar o atendimento e compensar financeiramente o consumidor. A compensação é automática e deve ser paga até que seja regularizada a tensão fornecida ao consumidor.

A partir dos indicadores DRP e DRC das unidades consumidoras, são apurados os indicadores coletivos, DRPE – Duração Relativa da Transgressão de Tensão Precária Equivalente e DRCE – Duração Relativa da Transgressão de Tensão Crítica Equivalente, que expressam a média dos indicadores individuais DRP e DRC.

Com estes apontamentos iniciais apresenta-se na sequencia os temas escolhidos para o workshop a e que subsidiaram também a confecção do Relatório Final do Projeto Energia+ a ser entregue após a Closing Date. TEMA 1: DIGITALIZAÇÃO DE REDES E QUALIDADE DE ENERGIA

Moderador: Dimas (Coordenador-Geral do Projeto Energia+ - Eletrobras) Apresentadora: Lenise (Eletrobras Amazonas)

OBJETIVO: Melhorar a continuidade dos serviços de fornecimento de energia elétrica, a flexibilidade operacional das redes de média e baixa tensão, dotando-as de automação pela instalação de religadores, a qualidade da energia pela inserção de reativos no sistema de média tensão mediante a aplicação de bancos de capacitores e reguladores de tensão, instalados também nas redes de média tensão nos centros urbanos e em sua periferia.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 120/197

EXECUÇÃO DO PROJETO

a - INSTALAÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTOS

De um total de 2.324 equipamentos adquiridos foram instalados 2.272 equipamentos. O gráfico e a tabela abaixo apresentam o perfil de avanço físico e financeiro.

Individualizando os três tipos de equipamentos tem-se o seguinte perfil de instalação:

EDE PREVISTO REALIZADO % REALIZAÇÃO PREVISTO REALIZADO % REALIZAÇÃOAC 337 407 121% 20.497.101,55 20.996.166,69 102%AL 566 635 112% 38.013.690,34 37.146.880,84 98%AM 488 452 93% 14.254.201,26 20.923.593,14 147%PI 706 551 78% 20.464.245,63 21.976.484,60 107%RO 180 180 100% 9.543.264,00 9.494.104,00 99%RR 47 47 100% 1.392.727,00 1.392.726,90 100%

TOTAL 2.324 2.272 98% 104.165.229,78 111.929.956,17 107%

AVANÇO FÍSICO DIGITALIZAÇÃO DE REDES QUALIDADE DE ENERGIA

AVANÇO FINANCEIRO

441

1.291 1.471

401

1.170

1.442 1.442 1.442 1.446 1.459 1.495 1.531 1.561 1.578

0 200 400 600 800

1.000 1.200 1.400 1.600 1.800

Total 2014 Total 2015 Total 2016 jan/17 fev/17 mar/17 abr/17 mai/17 jun/17 jul/17 ago/17

INSTALAÇÃO DE RELIGADORES TRIFÁSICO

Previsto Realizado



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 121/197

Na apresentação individual da EDAM, destacou-se que houve uma autorização do Banco Mundial para aquisição complementar de equipamentos visando também atender ao interior do Estado, uma vez que no desenho inicial do Energia+ somente a capital Manaus teve a previsão de tal processo. Para uma melhor visualização deste projeto, apresentam-se a seguir as instalações relativas ao Estado do Amazonas, segmentando capital e interior.

CAPITAL

Desafio: Instalar 333 religadores automáticos trifásicos, 25 bancos reguladores trifásicos de tensão e 130 bancos de capacitores nas redes de distribuição da Eletrobras Amazonas Energia.

b - ORGANIZAÇÃO PARA IMPLANTAÇÃO DO PROJETO

Estruturação do projeto no Escritório de Gestão de Projetos – EGP, com a utilização de metodologia de gerenciamento de projetos baseada no Project Management Institute (PMI);

Reuniões mensais de Informe de Progresso e monitoramento dos resultados segundo a metodologia gerenciamento de projetos coordenada pelo Escritório de Gestão de Projetos – EGP.

99

632

98

403 440 440 440 440 450 450 480

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Total 2014 Total 2015 Total 2016 jan/17 fev/17 mar/17 abr/17 mai/17 jun/17

INSTALAÇÃO DE BANCO DE CAPACITOR

Previsto Realizado

139

221

123

205 214 214 214 214 214 214 214

0

50

100

150

200

250

Total 2014 Total 2015 Total 2016 jan/17 fev/17 mar/17 abr/17 mai/17 jun/17

INSTALAÇÃO DE BANCO REGULADOR DE TENSÃO

Previsto Realizado



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 122/197

c- AVANÇO FÍSICO DA INSTALAÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTOS NA AME

EQUIPAMENTOS QUANTIDADE INSTALADOS % DE AVANÇO

Religadores 333 301 90

Banco de Capacitores 130 128 98

Reguladores de Tensão 25 23 92

TOTAL 488 452 93

d – DIFICULDADES ENCONTRADAS E SOLUÇÕES ADOTADAS

DIFICULDADES SOLUÇÕES

Atraso no Porto do Rio de Janeiro da liberação dos religadores adquiridos na Austrália

Contratação de empresa para realizar a liberação alfandegária

Qualidade inadequada de material para instalação dos equipamentos apresentado pela empresa contratada

Exigida a adequação do material conforme especificado em contrato – suspenso o contrato por dois meses para tanto

Inconsistências no fechamento dos projetos no Sistema de Gestão de Ativos

Reuniões com a contabilidade para dirimir as dúvidas existentes e com a OFM para sanar problemas encontrados no ERP

Falta de capacidade operacional para executar as etapas de parametrização e energização dos equipamentos

Criação de equipe dedicada para a execução de tais etapas

Falta de padronização de materiais/equipamentos elétricos e procedimentos de contratação de serviços

Criação de GT para padronização de materiais/equipamentos e definição de um padrão de contratação por unidade de serviço (US)

RESULTADOS OBTIDOS E IMPACTOS NO INDICADOR

A instalação de religadores automáticos de média tensão em redes urbanas radiais tem se demonstrado ser uma boa prática para a redução dos indicadores de frequência de ocorrência, principalmente quando estes são instalados nas fronteiras das áreas urbanas com as áreas rurais.

A posição estratégica dos religadores, baseada em estudos de coordenação da proteção, reduz o FEC interno conforme pode ser comprovado neste caso. A quantidade de religadores instalados estrategicamente é



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 123/197

preponderante na definição do quanto se quer reduzir de ocorrências na rede. Neste caso foi tomada como referência a baseline de FEC ocorrido em 2014 a fim de se quantificar a performance operacional da rede nos próximos anos.

As redes de média tensão podem, em algumas situações, apresentar variação nos valores de tensão de distribuição de energia. Para corrigir estas variações são instalados dispositivos reguladores de tensão em pontos estratégicos da rede com intuído de controlar as variações em torno da tensão padrão determinada pelo ente regulador (ANEEL).

Neste caso foram instalados reguladores de acordo com as recomendações dos estudos elétricos respeitada a topologia de cada rede elétrica de média tensão. Tais equipamentos foram suficientes para assegurar a regulação da tensão da rede com o apoio dos bancos de capacitores que foram instalados para dar suporte de reativo capacitivo definidos pontualmente pelos mesmos estudos elétricos. Este conjunto de equipamentos corretivos puderam dar às empresas da Eletrobras um perfil de tensão muito próximo ao regulatório.

O gráfico acima retrata o comportamento do indicador DEC, cuja meta não seria atingida se fosse considerado o Estado como um todo, ainda que tenha ocorrido melhoria em relação ao valor contemplado no PAD para o interior – 87. Quando considerada só a cidade de Manaus, contemplada originalmente no Energia+, verifica-se que a meta foi cumprida.

É de se realçar que só o interior do Amazonas representa 60% do DEC, onde existem muitos equipamentos antigos, que dada a sua obsolescência não estavam mais operando automaticamente. Ficou definido, por orientação do Banco Mundial, apresentar os resultados de DEC/FEC de Manaus separadamente ao interior.

e - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

O projeto de Digitalização de Redes e Qualidade de Energia foi uma grande fonte de aprendizado para as áreas de aquisição de materiais importados, instalação, parametrização e energização de equipamentos, bem como de controle do cadastro e de movimentações de bens e instalações do Setor Elétrico brasileiro. Aponta-se como necessário:

planejar o atendimento de futuros projetos, de acordo com a capacidade física das equipes de trabalho; envolver as áreas de contabilidade e tributos no momento da elaboração do edital de licitação e observar o

manual de contabilidade para tratar as contratações.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 124/197

f - SUSTENTABILIDADE DO PROJETO

Elaborar estudos de coordenação de proteção e alocação de reativos em redes de média tensão; Elaborar Plano de Operação e Manutenção – O&M, dos equipamentos; Promover a manutenção preventiva, corretiva e a reposição de equipamentos; Executar o acompanhamento dos indicadores de continuidade e qualidade de energia.

g - INTERIOR

Dada a necessidade de promover a troca de equipamentos obsoletos, com mais 30 anos de uso, e assim melhorar as condições operacionais no interior do Amazonas, foram adquiridos 120 religadores automáticos, que vem sendo instalados nas subestações elevadoras das usinas termelétricas, atendendo a 52 Sistemas Isolados da Região Solimões, Japurá, Metropolitana e Baixo Solimões;

Houve atraso na instalação destes equipamentos motivado pela necessidade de se reavaliar toda a carga local face à implantação de obras civis e ampliação de grupos geradores com os projetos 124MW e PIE’s;

Com o objetivo de se ter uma ação mais assertiva, evitando futuras correções, a um custo maior do que o orçado, além de afetar todo o planejamento aprovado pela Diretoria de Geração Distribuída, ao final de cada reforma/construção das subestações do interior são instalados os religadores;

Feitas as instalações iniciais programa-se continuar a instalação de religadores trifásicos nas regiões das calhas Juruá, Madeira, Purus e Alto Solimões.

A instalação dos religadores vem contribuindo para reduzir a FEC no interior do Amazonas, conforme gráfico a seguir:

BENEFÍCIOS

Evitar possíveis blecautes que atingiriam todos os consumidores ligados ao sistema; Ocorrer desligamento apenas do alimentador no qual ocorreu o problema, sem ocasionar parada de

usina;



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 125/197

Evitar a queima de geradores dos Grupos de Geradores; Executar manobras sem comprometimento do sistema; Obter maior confiabilidade do sistema e proteção mais eficiente das usinas; A instalação dos religadores permite um melhor planejamento do quantitativo de equipes para atuar

em campo.

h - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

Necessário melhorar o planejamento para a execução de serviços pois houveram dificuldades no início do projeto.

OUTROS DESTAQUES

Dado que os projetos executados no âmbito do Energia+ são de grande alcance e estruturantes para os processos das EDE, é de suma importância a formação de reserva técnica de alguns equipamentos fornecidos nestes projetos. Assim é necessário que a área de fiscalização da Eletrobras considere para efeito de pagamento, os equipamentos que estão sendo mantidos em almoxarifados como reserva técnica. Neste sentido a área gestora do Energia+ deve conduzir tratativas internas na Eletrobras para que tais equipamentos sejam considerados elegíveis para pagamento com recursos do financiamento, dado haver anuência do Banco Mundial quanto à esta elegibilidade;

Ressaltado que o atraso na entrega de religadores por demora nas liberações para transporte a partir do Porto do Rio de Janeiro, impactaram no preço final dos equipamentos dado o aumento dos custos de armazenagem. Além disto, atrasos no desembaraço redundaram em decréscimo no prazo de garantia de seis meses;

O cronograma de instalação e parametrização dos religadores também foi afetado pela ocorrência de eventos naturais – temporais e interrupção de serviços por obras do projeto de regularização. Quanto à parametrização detectou-se a falta de equipes na EDAM, demandando ajustes;

Foi informada a ocorrência de roubo de todos os tipos de equipamentos e materiais, notadamente cabos de aterramento. Discutiu-se qual seria a solução para tanto:



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 126/197

o Valer-se da comunicação social para informar que o fruto do roubo não tem valor comercial? o Desenvolver reportagem sobre casos concretos? o Realizar palestras? o Substituir por aterramento de aço, sem cobre? o Promover aproximação com forças policiais, sabendo que comunicação sozinha, polícia sozinha,

equipe técnica sozinha, não resolve, sendo necessária uma atuação em rede! o Criar unidades "antifurto/antifraude" para obter uma atuação coordenada mais eficiente?

Ficou evidenciada a necessidade de diferenciar DEC/FEC rural x urbano e interno x externo. Necessidade de se promover adequação dos itens de contrato de serviços ao manual de contabilidade; Sugere-se desmembrar a mão de obra dos outros componentes de preço ao invés de se ter um valor fechado,

global, de forma a pagar só o serviço que foi realmente executado. Na EDAM foi necessário compor um termo aditivo, fato que não ocorreu nem no Acre e no Piauí, graças a um melhor detalhamento prévio no edital, destacando o que seria equipamento e o que seria serviço.

Após a instalação dos Reguladores de Tensão Trifásicos e Bancos de Capacitores nas redes de distribuição, além de diversas melhorias no sistema, houve uma redução efetiva no número de reclamações de Nível de Tensão, conforme aponta o gráfico abaixo:

Em decorrência da melhoria dos indicadores DRCE – Duração Relativa da Transgressão de Tensão Crítica Equivalente e DRPE – Duração Relativa da Transgressão de Tensão Precária Equivalente, houve uma redução expressiva nos valores das compensações pagas entre os anos de 2016 e 2017, este último com informações até o mês de outubro próximo passado.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 127/197

i - PRONUNCIAMENTO DE OUTRAS EMPRESAS

ELETROBRAS ACRE

tendo sido proposto preço excessivo no item postes, tomou-se a decisão de fornece-los separadamente por meio de outro leilão já existente, com preço adequado;

de um número inicial de 212 religadores adquiridos, dada a existência de saldo no contrato de sub-empréstimo, foi autorizada pelo Banco Mundial a compra e instalação de mais equipamentos, chegando-se a um total de 282 unidades, fato que melhorou sobremaneira a gestão da operação do sistema elétrico;

Faltou prever no desenho inicial do projeto, religadores monofásicos para implantar na área rural.

ELETROBRAS ALAGOAS

houve uma invasão criminosa em almoxarifado da Empresa para roubar cobre, com depredação de equipamentos. Alguns foram recuperados, outros não. Diante desta ocorrência e com a aprovação do Banco Mundial, foram adquiridos 50 novos equipamentos, por meio de aditivo contratual, sendo reposto o quantitativo inicial;

foram registrados valores errôneos na baseline inicial do DEC, devidamente revisados. Foi contratada a empresa SINAPSE para realizar os estudos de alocação de reativos e com isto indicar a melhor localização para os equipamentos. O DEC foi reduzido em 40%, tendo sido cumpridas todas as metas da ANEEL.

ELETROBRAS PIAUÍ

quanto aos Bancos de Capacitores houve atraso na instalação e 60% deles estão sendo instalados por meio de equipes próprias até a data de encerramento do Acordo de Empréstimo;

dois benefícios configurados: primeiro com a instalação permitindo a divisão dos alimentadores com menor extensão, e segundo na automação do fornecimento;

são necessárias para a melhoria do sistema elétrico 15 subestações de 15-20MVA adicionais.

j - GANHOS ECONÔMICOS RELACIONADOS COM A MELHORIA NA PERFORMANCE DOS INDICADORES

A Eletrobras fará constar no Relatório Final do Projeto Energia+, uma análise relativa aos ganhos econômicos obtidos por uma maior energia faturada, pela redução dos custos operacionais e menor incidência de multas, fruto da melhoria na performance dos indicadores de gestão estabelecidos pela ANEEL.

TEMA 2: REDUÇÃO DE PERDAS – INFRAESTRUTURA DE MEDIÇÃO AVANÇADA - AMI Moderador: Christophe (Gerente do Projeto Energia+ - Banco Mundial) Apresentador: WENDELL ALVES FERREIRA - Eletrobras OBJETIVO – Promover uma redução sustentável das perdas não técnicas no fornecimento de energia elétrica nas seis EDE.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 128/197

ALCANCE ESPERADO COM OS PROJETOS


Na apresentação dos projetos integrados para a redução de perdas e melhoria de qualidade da energia elétrica, foi salientado que se declinou de contratar as etapas que previam ações em Condomínios.

a- DIGITALIZAÇÃO DE UNIDADES DE MÉDIA E BAIXA TENSÃO

Apresenta-se a seguir o seguinte cenário de realização:



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 129/197

b - SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE MEDIDORES OBSOLETOS

Este projeto foi concluído em fevereiro de 2017:

Contratado Realizado Contratado Realizado Contratado Realizado % PREVISTO REALIZADO % AC 360 604 1.735 1.735 2.095 2.339 112% 25.201.000 12.159.048 48%AL 1.827 2.144 4.766 4.766 6.593 6.910 105% 40.592.078 23.348.882 58%AM 0 3.690 19.861 19.861 19.861 23.551 119% 68.300.207 33.317.946 49%PI 1.863 2.567 3.654 3.654 5.517 6.221 113% 46.643.165 27.095.951 58%

RO 2.605 2.929 7.852 7.852 10.457 10.781 103% 44.684.663 26.127.908 58%RR 405 716 2.983 2.983 3.388 3.699 109% 25.311.856 8.305.491 33%

TOTAL 7.060 12.650 40.851 40.851 47.911 53.501 112% 250.732.969 130.355.225 52%

DIGITALIZAÇÃO DE UC DE MT E BT

UC de BT Total de UCAVANÇO FINANCEIROAVANÇO FÍSICO

EDEUC de MT Total de UC



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 130/197

AVANÇO FINANCEIRO SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE MEDIDORES OBSOLETOS

PREVISTO REALIZADO % REALIZAÇÃO

Acre 4.156.149 4.146.931 100

Alagoas 8.031.353 7.977.659 99

Amazonas 10.660.666 10.527.111 99

Piauí 23.064.733 22.617.202 98

Rondônia 19.980.430 19.095.051 96

Roraima 467.786 467.786 100

TOTAL 66.361.117 64.831.741 98

GANHOS ACUMULADOS COM A SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE MEDIDORES OBSOLETOS E RAMAIS DE LIGAÇÃO

EDAC ENERGIA (MWh)

AGREGADA RECUPERADA TOTAL 2014 2.817 678 3.495 2015 2.095 169 2.264 2016 1.942 174 2.116

CONSOLIDADO 6.855 1.021 7.876

EDAL ENERGIA (MWh)

AGREGADA RECUPERADA TOTAL 2014 994 459 1.453 2015 11.088 2.053 13.141 2016 7.240 1.493 8.733

CONSOLIDADO 19.322 4.005 23.327

Prev. Real % Prev. Real % Prev. Real % Prev. Real %AC 16.175 16.791 104% 3.155 3.514 111% 1.326 1.330 100% 20.656 21.635 105%AL 4.870 4.870 100% 0 0 - 19.321 19.323 100% 24.191 24.193 100%AM 22.551 30.714 136% 13.038 10.711 82% 4.780 5.015 105% 40.369 46.440 115%PI 110.328 111.219 101% 0 0 - 3.515 2.474 70% 113.843 113.693 100%RO 40.257 34.508 86% 18.431 9.856 53% 8.238 6.547 79% 66.926 50.911 76%RR 1.613 1.613 100% 1.119 1.119 100% 21 21 100% 2.753 2.753 100%

TOTAL 195.794 199.715 102% 35.743 25.200 71% 37.201 34.710 93% 268.738 259.625 97%

Bifásico TrifásicoMonofásicoEDE

SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE MEDIDORES OBSOLETOSAVANÇO FÍSICO

Total



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 131/197

EDAM ENERGIA (MWh)

AGREGADA RECUPERADA TOTAL 2013 201 1.272 1.474 2014 24.572 3.237 27.809 2015 7.735 4.249 11.984 2016 4.931 3.144 8.076

CONSOLIDADO 37.440 11.903 49.342

EDPI ENERGIA (MWh)

AGREGADA RECUPERADA TOTAL 2015 19.577 50.198 69.775 2016 18.969 16.245 35.214

CONSOLIDADO 38.546 66.443 104.989

EDRO ENERGIA (MWh)

AGREGADA RECUPERADA TOTAL 2013 289 1.971 2.260 2014 2.320 2.345 4.665 2015 3.408 162 3570 2016 9.462 742 10.204

CONSOLIDADO 15.479 5.220 20.699

EDRR ENERGIA (MWh)

AGREGADA RECUPERADA TOTAL 2015 1.620 210 1.830

c - TELEMEDIÇÃO DE ALIMENTADORES

Embora este projeto não traga resultados em termos de energia agregada e recuperada, constitui-se em importante avanço para as EDE, sobretudo em relação ao atendimento de obrigações regulatórias de medição de entrada e saída das subestações, bem como possibilita o conhecimento mais segmentado das perdas, permitindo assim melhor planejamento das ações de combate às mesmas, bem como do planejamento dos sistemas elétricos.

A execução do projeto de telemedição de alimentadores retrata a seguinte configuração:

EDE PREVISTO REALIZADO % REALIZAÇÃO PREVISTO REALIZADO % REALIZAÇÃOAC 20 0 0% 412.102 290.106 70%AL 192 190 99% 6.480.581 5.263.039 81%

AM 76 73 96% 1.690.360 1.687.383 100%PI 193 147 76% 6.416.759 5.906.373 92%

RO 120 0 0% 2.880.229 2.143.627 74%RR 0 0 - 0 0 -

TOTAL 601 410 68% 17.880.031 15.290.528 86%

TELEMEDIÇÃO DE ALIMENTADORESAVANÇO FÍSICO AVANÇO FINANCEIRO



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 132/197

d - ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE -AMI Sua implantação permite a execução e operações de medição remota, upload de arquivos, análise e processamento de dados, troca de informações com outros sistemas de informação e implementação de processos para combater perdas comerciais. PRINCIPAIS FUNÇÕES DO SISTEMA DE GESTÃO DA MEDIÇÃO - SGM

Coleta e Processamento Sincronizado de Dados; VEE (Validação Estimativa e Edição) em Tempo Real; Gerenciamento de funções e status de Dispositivos; Aprovisionamento automatizado de medidores; Automação do Processo de Gestão de PNT SGM; Mecanismo de Workflow; Painel de Controle Administrativo do Sistema; Relatórios de Desempenho.

PRINCIPAIS MARCOS DO PROJETO AMI

Assinatura dos Contratos

Implantação do CIM/CSR Telemedição de MT 12.500 UC

Telemedição de BT 40.851 UC

O&M Recorrente

02/2015 03 a 12/2015 10/2015 a 08/2016 08/2016 a 12/2017 12/2017 a 12/2020

Prev. Real % Prev. Real % Prev. Real %

AC 360 604 168% 1.735 1735 100% 25.201.000 12.159.048 48%AL 1.827 2144 117% 4.766 4766 100% 40.592.078 23.348.882 58%

AM 0 3690 - 19.861 19861 100% 68.300.207 33.317.946 49%PI 1.863 2567 138% 3.654 3654 100% 46.643.165 27.095.951 58%RO 2.605 2929 112% 7.852 7852 100% 44.684.663 26.127.908 58%RR 405 716 177% 2.983 2983 100% 25.311.856 8.305.491 33%

TOTAL 7.060 12.650 179% 40.851 40.851 100% 250.732.969 130.355.225 52%

EDE

AVANÇO FÍSICO AVANÇO FINANCEIRO (R$ x mil)MT BT



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 133/197

REDUÇÃO DE ESCOPO

Em julho de 2017 foram, por orientação da Eletrobras, reduzidos os volumes e valores de escopo do projeto AMI:

REDUÇÃO DE ESCOPO ACRE ALAGOAS AMAZONAS PIAUÍ RONDÔNIA RORAIMA TOTAL

QUANTIDADE CONTRATADA COM BT 8.322 17.151 34.439 14.977 16.172 12.188 103.29

QUANTIDADE COM REDUÇÃO 1.826 5.017 20.906 3.846 8.265 3.140 43.000

REDUÇÃO EM R$ MIL 9.414 15.533 11.912 13.531 9.479 11.203 71.072

e - ACOMPANHAMENTO DOS INDICADORES E METAS

Injetada Faturada Injetada Faturada Agregada Rec uperada

MWh % MWh % MWh %

Ac re 1 .234 .231 9 43.7 38 2 90 .4 93 2 3,5 4 1.42 4.17 0 1 .1 02 .2 23 32 1.94 7 2 2,61 1 .8 66 1.21 3 3 25 .0 26 22 ,8 2 0 ,2 2 1.4 26.40 8

Alagoas 4 .7 23 .5 45 3.5 6 4.56 5 1.15 8.98 0 2 4,54 4.82 2.71 0 3 .6 34 .1 05 1.18 8.60 5 2 4,65 6 06 613 1 .1 89 .8 24 24 ,6 7 0,0 3 53 5.27 5

Amazonas 10.3 92.4 42 6.2 98 .772 4.09 3.66 9 3 9 ,39 10 .3 71 .1 04 5.8 7 5.41 0 4 .495 .694 43 ,3 5 2 3.10 5 16 .3 35 4.53 5.13 4 4 3,73 0,38 18 .714 .674

Piauí 4 .72 9.26 1 3 .3 12 .2 76 1 .416 .985 2 9 ,9 6 5 .0 42 .3 98 3.4 8 4.76 6 1 .5 57 .6 32 30 ,8 9 2 0.18 6 5 .6 92 1.58 3.51 0 3 1,40 0 ,51 11 .3 82 .9 56

Rondôn ia 4 .0 00 .6 44 3.0 0 5.25 8 9 95.3 86 24,88 4.2 03.6 36 2.9 7 3.41 9 1 .2 30 .2 18 29,27 17 .155 4.19 1 1.25 1.56 4 29 ,77 0 ,51 11 .2 47 .6 34

Roraima 1.05 8.54 7 936 .407 12 2.14 0 11,54 1.1 56.2 16 1.0 1 2.79 8 1 43 .4 18 12,40 36 9 91 1 43.8 78 12,44 0,04 19 9.29 5

Consolidado 26 .138 .669 18.0 6 1.01 6 8.0 77.6 53 30,90 27 .020 .235 18.0 8 2.7 21 8.93 7.51 4 33 ,08 6 3.28 7 28 .1 35 9.0 28.9 36 3 3,42 0,34 4 3.50 6.24 2

Perdas (Efeito do Projeto)

MWh

EDE

ENERGIA - REFERÊNCIA SET 2 01 5 ENERGIA - REFERÊNCIA SET 20 17 RESULTADO DO PRO JETO - ENERGIA

Perdas Reais Perdas Reais Pontos Percentuais

R$MWh MWh

EDEBaseline

PADdez/12 dez/13 dez/14 dez/15 dez/16 set/17

Meta PAD

Acre 32,0% 21,0% 24,3% 23,7% 23,3% 24,3% 22,6% 19,0%

Alagoas 32,0% 27,0% 26,1% 24,8% 25,2% 26,7% 24,7% 20,0%

Amazonas 41,0% 39,1% 38,3% 37,6% 40,4% 43,2% 43,4% 35,0%

Piauí 36,0% 30,4% 30,0% 29,3% 30,5% 30,7% 30,9% 27,0%

Rondônia 33,0% 22,8% 24,0% 23,2% 26,7% 29,8% 29,3% 20,0%

Roraima 16,0% 12,3% 12,1% 11,7% 12,9% 12,4% 12,4% 10,0%

PERDAS (%)



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 134/197

f - BENEFÍCIOS DO PROJETO AMI

Melhoria no atendimento ao cliente, que passa a sair do atendimento com sua reclamação atendida; Melhoria do faturamento, com a obtenção de dados “em tempo real” com maior confiabilidade; Aumento da eficiência sistêmica com a redução de tempo no atendimento a problemas de deficiência técnica

de medição; Melhoria da qualidade do serviço prestado; Otimização do uso de ativos (Uso dos dados de medição pela equipe de planejamento); Redução de custos operacionais; Identificação de fraudes e/ou falha na medição, mediante regras pré-definidas e parametrizáveis; Disponibilidade de funções de corte e religação remotos e pré-pagamento; Proteção da receita. Plataforma para novas funções no futuro (Smart Grid);

g - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

DIMENSÃO GESTÃO

Em contratos com valores elevados e complexos como o deste projeto dispor de um gestor técnico e outro financeiro, bem como apoio jurídico dedicado;

Maior envolvimento das áreas afins com o projeto, dado a alteração de rotinas em muitos segmentos da empresa;

Maior participação das empresas na construção e consolidação das especificações técnicas do projeto. Que as propostas ressaltem no custo das licenças do SGM o valor em HH dos serviços de integração de

sistemas legados; Que para fornecimentos por subcontratados, os mesmos também apresentem as devidas comprovações

quanto a sua saúde financeira; Otimizar as condições contratuais de medição e faturamento de serviços quando de fornecimento por

consórcio; Incluir na contratação da solução o fornecimento de alguns equipamentos, materiais e serviços para

adequação do padrão de entrada e realização de inspeções (TOI); Dar mais prazo para implantar projetos complexos, notadamente para as atividades de integração de

sistemas; Disponibilizar contrato de apoio com maior abrangência quantitativa e de escopo; Na fase de análise de proposta, já conhecida a solução, solicitar ao vencedor do certame os volumes e preços

unitários de itens que a compõem, pois não havia a exigência deste detalhamento no momento de proposta.

DIMENSÃO TÉCNICA

Definir em contrato, no caso de uma solução em rede MESH, em até dois meses do início de sua implantação, que os pontos de sua composição poderão ser ajustados, estabelecendo quais prazos de implantação contratual deverão ser ajustados para atualização do RF Planning;

Estabelecer condições mais claras para o Acordo de Nível de Serviços (SLA) e a eventuais penalidades decorrentes de transgressões;

É desejável implantar um business intelligence/soft para automatizar o balanço, mapear as falhas de medidores e automatizar as ordens de serviço;

Com a implantação deste projeto surgem informações, não disponíveis no planejamento inicial, que permitem mapear melhor os diferentes segmentos de fraude, como o comercial trifásico, disfarçado como monofásico.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 135/197

Sugere-se, numa análise de cenários, calcular a energia agregada potencializada, verificar os percentuais de perdas devido a falhas técnicas, a fraudes e expressar os ganhos de faturamento anual;

Os dados tratados possibilitam também otimizar o planejamento das redes e o uso de equipamentos de correção;

Importante realizar uma análise comparativa sobre a evolução das perdas, a migração do mercado cativo para o mercado livre x balanço energético e ações de comunicação social para quebrar a cultura de fraude que tanto prejudica a rentabilidade;

Oportuno realizar um mapeamento das ocorrências vinculadas ao projeto de recadastramento e cadastramento de novas unidades e considerar para o futuro a realização da medição dos transformadores.

DIMENSÃO LEGAL

Houve consenso que faltou incluir no Energia+ uma dimensão judicial, pois somente com a criminalização de fraudadores evita-se a reincidência da fraude, que por vezes ocorre até no mesmo dia da correção;

Deve-se adotar uma ação política mais incisiva para que seja a criminalização de infratores nos desvios de energia seja uma realidade, pois as perdas vão além da resposta tecnológica. A maioria das fraudes, 70%, ocorrem com medidores, para os quais, face exigência de ser elaborado laudo, o que demanda tempo e atraso na recuperação da energia.

h - REDEFINIÇÃO DOS QUANTITATIVOS

Média Tensão: de março 2015 até agosto 2016 foi aditado um aumento de 7.000 para 12.660 as unidades a gerenciar;

Baixa Tensão: em agosto de 2017 houve uma redução de 103.000 para 43.000 unidades, contando com a recuperação judicial da subcontratada para fornecimento de medidores BT, mantendo-se 4.000 medidores em reserva.

Com a orientação superior para paralisar determinados projetos, o impacto especificamente nas atividades para a redução de perdas, foi mais amplo do que a própria paralização.

A introdução das bandeiras e consequente acréscimo nos valores das faturas de energia elétrica a pagar resultaram de um lado uma maior conservação da energia e de outro o crescimento das fraudes, com um faturamento menor e aumento das perdas.

É de se salientar que o indicador de perdas não é afetado pela migração dos consumidores livres, dado que o faturado dos consumidores livres é considerado!

i – ABORDAGEM CRÍTICA

O que fazer para assegurar que os ganhos potenciais sejam continuados e sustentáveis? O que é desejável para implantar desenvolvimentos adicionais? Qual a falha do projeto que fez com que ele não atingisse plenamente o objetivo pretendido?

No geral houve um erro inicial no desenho do projeto, fato que atrasou sua implantação. Outro aspecto foi não considerar como atividade pré-implantação os trabalhos de recadastramento e cadastramento de novas unidades, o que propiciaria um conhecimento mais profundo da situação e um melhor planejamento.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 136/197

Quanto ao não atendimento pleno dos resultados pretendidos, estes foram afetados sobremodo pela redução do escopo, além do que a maioria das ações só ocorreram nos meses finais de implantação do projeto. A gestão do projeto se ressentiu também com uma dedicação maior para executar a unitização dos investimentos.

j - OPORTUNIDADES DE MELHORIA

Incluir em cláusula contratual a aplicação do TOI - Termo de Ocorrência de Inspeção: Amazonas: dada falta da contratação do TOI, 400 irregularidades não foram formalizadas;

Para níveis de perdas altas, deve-se começar pelo recadastramento de unidades consumidoras. Tal serviço, não foi incluído no desenho inicial, sendo incorporado posteriormente no Plano de Aquisições e Contratações. Com isto, as informações estão somente sendo entregues no prazo final do Energia+.

TEMA 3: REGULARIZAÇÃO DE UNIDADES CONSUMIDORAS COM PERDA MAIOR DO QUE 50%

OBJETIVOS

Propiciar maior segurança no uso de energia com instalações corretas e mais confiáveis; Potencializar a diminuição das perdas de energia otimizando o fornecimento e evitando falta de energia; Promover a cidadania por meio da obtenção de comprovante de residência, permitindo que o cidadão possa

abrir conta bancária, obter crédito, entre outros benefícios.

a - PLANEJAMENTO DO PROJETO

A implantação do projeto foi iniciada por um planejamento de ações principais a serem executadas:

Mobilizar e preparar os agentes comunitários para atuarem como multiplicadores junto às comunidades beneficiadas pelo projeto;

Realizar mobilização porta-a-porta, em ação precursora, para “abrir caminho” aos profissionais da Eletrobras, conscientizar e apresentar a cartilha do Projeto de Regularização de Unidades Consumidoras;

Realizar mobilização informativa e de aproximação por telefone, para tratar da visita dos técnicos da Eletrobras;

Montar um banco de depoimentos com histórias positivas ligadas à regularização do fornecimento de energia;

Apresentar à população local uma Eletrobras eficiente, sustentável e próxima dos cidadãos; Montar um “mapa de fragilidades”, identificar focos de resistência e possíveis problemas objetivando

explicar aos moradores os benefícios da regularização; Captar imagens depoimentos da população durante o trabalho de conscientização dos agentes, no período

das obras e após a concretização das mesmas para compor documentários para divulgação futura.

DIFICULDADE SOLUÇÃO A ação de comunicação não pôde ser desenvolvida pela agência Escala pois, segundo a Secretaria de Comunicação da Presidência da República (SECOM), não contemplavam ações de publicidade, e sim de promoção.

A ação foi desenvolvida por empresa especializada em mobilização por meio de visitas aos moradores que iriam ser impactados diretamente pelas obras.

Ocorrência de consumidores clandestinos, sem dados cadastrais

Com a localização do poste e/ou transformador, a equipe de mobilização fez-se acompanhar de técnicos das EDE para chegar ao endereço correto

Cartilha não distribuída porque o início das obras aconteceu no período eleitoral federal, quando é proibido por lei fazer publicidade

O conteúdo da cartilha foi transmitido durante a abordagem porta a porta com os moradores



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 137/197

Desconhecimento de atendentes do Call Center e de eletricistas sobre o projeto e seus benefícios

Realizados treinamentos para os dois públicos

Com a falência da empresa de eventos SWOT, não ocorreram mais ações de mobilização porta a porta.

Foram desenvolvidos releases e concedidas entrevistas à imprensa a cada início das obras de regularização

b - EXECUÇÃO DO PROJETO

Comprovada a importância da integração de todas as áreas envolvidas no projeto para alinhamento das informações, objetivos e resultados esperados, foram realizadas várias reuniões envolvendo o gestor do projeto, as assessorias de comunicação, a área de publicidade da holding e a agência de publicidade. A linha criativa da campanha foi submetida para aprovação do gestor do projeto e das assessorias de comunicação das EDE;

A meta prévia era de regularizar 88.567 ligações de consumidores, quantidade que cresceu ao longo do tempo;

As deliberações da 165ª Assembléia de Acionistas da Eletrobras ocorrida em 22/07/2016 trouxeram impactos negativos na execução física do projeto dada paralização na emissão de novas ordens de serviços no período de 13/10 a 16/12/16, período de poucas regularizações, limitadas a ordens de serviços ainda pendentes de conclusão;

Em 05/06/2017 a Eletrobras emitiu a Resolução 402/2017 que autorizou suas distribuidoras a formalizar novos compromissos contratuais no âmbito do Energia+, sejam por aditivos ou por novos contratos.

EVOLUÇÃO DOS SERVIÇOS DE REGULARIZAÇÃO

AVANÇO FINANCEIRO

EDE PREVISTO (R$)

REALIZADO (R$)

REALIZAÇÃO %

Acre 13.502.941 2.399.639 18

Alagoas 35.341.754 37.071.886 105

Amazonas 82.976.409 59.921.259 72



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 138/197

Piauí 24.688.141 21.829.312 88

Rondônia 28.925.857 25.403.260 88

Roraima 1.538.982 717.106 47

TOTAL 186.974.084 147.342.461 79

c - RESULTADOS OBTIDOS

ALAGOAS

Com base no consumo característico dos consumidores contemplados no subprojeto em torno de 60,5 kWh por mês, o montante de energia que passou a ser faturado aumentou cerca de 7.979 MWh considerando todo o projeto. Tendo um preço de 1 kWh a R$ 0,87, temos uma receita total estimada de R$ 6.941.730,00. A tabela a seguir retrata a Energia Agregada em 2015, 2016 e 2017 (até agosto).

INDICADOR 2015 2016 2017 (ATÉ AGOSTO)

ENERGIA AGREGADA (MWh) 1.783 3.721 2.475

Redução de 53% no Número de Ocorrências após Conclusão das Obras - considerando o período de 12 meses antes e após a execução das obras de regularização e reforma de redes;

Redução dos indicadores de continuidade DEC, FEC, DRP e DRC - divisão de circuitos, redistribuição de cargas e mudança de redes nuas para redes isoladas (compactas);

Mais de 230 obras foram executadas - cerca de R$24 milhões em obras unitizadas; Cálculo de Revisão Tarifária - todo investimento unitizado impacta diretamente de forma positiva; Mais de 100 km em redes MT e mais de 180km em redes BT - reformas e construção de redes novas,

melhorando o fornecimento e distribuição de energia no sistema; Mais de 240 Transformadores - fornecimento, redistribuição de cargas e nível de tensão; Mais de 4.600 postes - reforma e construção no sistema de distribuição de energia do estado.

d - BENEFÍCIOS

Redução do DEC e do FEC; Redução de Custos Índice melhor na Satisfação dos Clientes - continuidade no fornecimento de energia; nível de tensão; Crescimento da rede de distribuição e da transformação; Melhor retorno dos investimentos; Aspecto Social Empresa/Cliente - satisfação do cliente; direitos garantidos; mais cidadania; Reflexo em outros contratos - diminuição na quantidade de deslocamentos de equipes operacionais e de

manutenção; Benefícios Indiretos - iluminação pública, segurança, pavimentação, agrega valor patrimonial.

e - DIFICULDADES E SOLUÇÕES

O contrato de execução de obras foi assinado com um consórcio, mas não foi constituída como pessoa jurídica. Com isso houve problemas quando foi necessário responsabilizar o consórcio por atrasos na



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 139/197

execução do objeto contratado. É um ponto de atenção que deve ser levado em consideração em novas licitações, pois limita as ações da contratante;

Houve um descasamento de 9 meses desde o início do contrato de execução de obras e o início do contrato de apoio e fiscalização, gerando dificuldades no acompanhamento das obras, retrabalho e outros transtornos durante a execução do contrato de obras. Tais contratos devem iniciar de forma conjunta, pois a qualidade da execução das obras e o adequado controle de informações do projeto dependem do contrato de apoio à fiscalização;

O fato da contratação de apoio à fiscalização ser por Unidade de Serviço (US), e não por “disponibilidade”, gerou grandes dificuldades de acompanhamento diante de um quadro de pessoal reduzido, já que a empresa fatura por produção. Na prática, esta modalidade de contrato não surtiu um bom efeito, pois limita a contratante em alguns aspectos da execução e fiscalização das obras, por exemplo, quantidade de colaboradores na equipe de apoio. É um ponto de atenção que deve ser levado em consideração em novas licitações, dado que um contrato por disponibilidade proporciona o acompanhamento integral da execução da obra e não apenas a fiscalização para medição dos serviços executados.

f - SUSTENTABILIDADE DAS AÇÕES DO PROJETO

Fiscalização ostensiva - programação periódica de equipes de fiscalização nos locais contemplados pelo PROJETO 5, visando o corte ou regularização de consumidores;

Serviços periódicos de manutenção - realização de manutenções preventivas; Conscientização e Informação - Programação periódica de visitas sociais às comunidades visando

conscientizar a população quanto ao consumo racional da energia elétrica. Exemplo: Projeto Luz do Saber;

Registra-se a conquista de um legado que é o apoio do Ministério Público e das prefeituras para as ações de regularização.

As prefeituras Lei da Grilagem tem mais instrumentos para efetivar desapropriação e constituir loteamentos. (Vide Lei 13.461 – desapropriação de áreas de interesse social - 5 anos).

g - PONTOS A CONSIDERAR

Faltou incluir no projeto a prestação de serviços em Linha Viva; Avaliação do Projeto em Rondônia – execução física vis a vis financeira; Evitar o descasamento da fiscalização e obras.

TEMA 4- RECADASTRAMENTO E CADASTRAMENTO DE UNIDADES CONSUMIDORAS

Moderador: Ariovaldo Stelle (Ex-Coordenador-Geral do Projeto Energia+ - Eletrobras) Apresentador: Albermar José de Oliveira Fortes - Coordenador Corporativo do Projeto OBJETIVOS

Ampliar a confiabilidade das informações cadastrais das unidades consumidoras e dos consumidores; Identificar oportunidades para melhorar os processos de atendimento aos consumidores; Melhorar a qualidade dos serviços prestados ao possibilitar intervenção certa no lugar certo.

Como resultado deste projeto espera-se:

reduzir as perdas comerciais;



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 140/197

aumentar a taxa de arrecadação; operar com custos operacionais competitivos; identificar oportunidades para a implementação de melhorias nos processos leitura, faturamento e

atendimento; incrementar maior qualidade e segurança na prestação dos serviços à população.

a - EXECUÇÃO DO PROJETO

CONTRATAÇÕES Em novembro de 2015 foram assinados todos os contratos de prestação de serviços:

EDE EMPRESA CONTRATADA INÍCIO DOS SERVIÇOS DE CAMPO UC (RE)CADASTRAR

Acre Control Construções Ltda Março/2016 251.000

Alagoas Multiempreendimentos Engenharia Consultiva Ltda Abril/2016 1.185.000

Amazonas Control Construções Ltda.

Março/2016

877.336

Piauí Multiempreendimentos Engenharia Consultiva Ltda 1.250.000

Rondônia CTAGEO Engenharia e Geoprocessamento Ltda 777.287

Roraima Cardoso & Pinheiro Ltda. 123.000

Em março de 2016 foram iniciadas as atividades de campo do recadastramento no Acre, Amazonas e Roraima. Em Alagoas no mês seguinte - abril. No Piauí e em Rondônia os contratos foram rescindidos por desistência das empresas vencedoras do certame licitatório.

Em junho e setembro/2016 foram iniciados os trabalhos de campo, respectivamente, em Rondônia e Piauí, via convocação das empresas classificadas em segundo lugar no certame licitatório;

EDE EMPRESA CONTRATADA INÍCIO DOS SERVIÇOS DE CAMPO UC (RE)CADASTRAR

Piauí JM Engenheiros Consultores Ltda. Setembro/2016 1.250.000

Rondônia Eletron Cadastramento Ltda. Junho/2016 777.287

Ocorreu dificuldade na conclusão do software a ser utilizado pelas empresas contratadas para atualização de dados no sistema de gestão comercial, o que provocou um atraso de mais de 6 (seis) meses na atualização dos dados cadastrados em campo no Sistema Comercial – AJURI. O assunto foi solucionado em meados do mês de julho/2016.

AVANÇO FÍSICO DO PROJETO EM CAMPO

EDE UCs A

RECADASTRAR

UCs

RECADASTRADAS

AVANÇO FÍSICO

(%)

CONSUMIDORES RECADASTRADOS

AVANÇO FÍSICO

(%)

Acre 270.084 258.557 95,73 158.758 58,78



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 141/197

Alagoas 1.184.976 1.098.748 92,72 300.703 25,38

Amazonas 877.336 899.748 102,55 572.793 65,29

Piauí 1.240.750 761.952 61,41 761.952 61,41

Rondônia NIHIL NIHIL NIHIL NIHIL NIHIL

Roraima 123.000 111.114 90,34 71.630 58,24

TOTALIZADOR 3.696.146 3.130.119 84,69 1.865.836 50,48



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 142/197

AVANÇO FÍSICO DE (RE)CADASTRAMENTO NO AJURI

EDE UCs CADASTRADAS UCs ATUALIZADAS AVANÇO FÍSICO

(%) CONSUMIDORES CADASTRADOS

CONSUMIDORES ATUALIZADOS

AVANÇO FÍSICO (%)

Acre 258.557 204.707 79,17 158.758 128.977 81,24

Amazonas 899.748 564.054 62,69 572.793 51.966 9,07

Alagoas 1.098.748 705.248 64,19 300.703 125.837 41,85

Piauí 761.952 623.017 81,77 761.952 623.017 81,77

Roraima 111.114 111.114 100,00 71.630 71.630 100,00

TOTALIZADOR 3.130.119 2.208.140 70,54 1.865.836 1.001.427 53,67

AVANÇO FINANCEIRO

EDE NOTAS FISCAIS

EMITIDAS/CONTRATADAS (R$)

VALOR TOTAL

CONTRATO (R$)

AVANÇO FINANCEIRO

(%)

Acre 1.681.865,75 3.059.485,74 54,97

Alagoas 7.722.488,37 9.123.831,77 84,64

Amazonas 6.294.188,57 9.744.500,00 64,59

Piauí 4.679.256,89 9.300.000,00 50,31

Roraima 1.024.124,41 1.274.998,78 80,32

APONTAMENTOS DO PROJETO DO RECADASTRAMENTO



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 143/197

Fora de Rota UC fora do setor/rota/sequência impossibilitando a coleta de leitura;

Suspeita de Irregularidade Apontamento do recadastrador de alguma suspeita visualizado na UC;

Tarifa Social Consumidor com direito a benefícios do Governo Federal – Detentor do NIS;

Clandestino

UC ligada em campo, mas fora da base cadastral da EDE.

UNIDADE CONSUMIDORA FORA DA ROTA

MONOFÁSICO BIFÁSICO TRIFÁSICO TOTAL

Fora de Rota 12.198 5.318 2.276

kWh Médio/Mês 135 327 1.051

Custo de Disponibilidade 30 50 100

kWh Médio/Faturar/Mês 105 277 951

kWh Agregado 1.280.770 1.473.117 2.164.552 4.918.439

R$ Tarifa Média sem Impostos

0,5700 0,5700 0,5700

Previsão de Retorno (R$) 730.038,90 839.676,45 1.233.794,69 2.803.510,04

Fonte: as informações de kWh médio e tarifa média foram obtidas na EDAM

Com base no total de UCs já atualizadas no Sistema de Gestão Comercial AJURI apontado como ‘’Fora de Rota’’, estima-se os seguintes percentuais para a identificação da classe de consumo: Monofásico - 61,63%; Bifásico – 26,87%; Trifásico – 11,50%.

a- QUANTITATIVO DE CONSUMIDORES QUE ACESSARAM A TARIFA SOCIAL DE ENERGIA ELÉTRICA – TSEE



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 144/197

Decorrente do projeto de Recadastramento de Consumidores e Unidades Consumidoras, temos a seguinte quantidade de acessos à tarifa social:

b - PONTOS RELEVANTES DO PROJETO

Padronização de Logradouros no Sistema; Melhoria do cadastro de medidores no Sistema; Melhoria do processo de leitura (rezoneamento); Apontamento de UCs demolidas, evitando faturamentos indevidos; Cadastro das coordenadas geográficas, facilitando a localização de UCs, principalmente em localidades

ribeirinhas no interior e em áreas rurais; Agilização dos serviços comerciais e atendimento; Identificação de consumidores com benefícios do Governo Federal; Criação e Atualização dos Mapas de Roteiro de Leitura; Mapeamento de locais que necessitam expandir rede de energia elétrica; Redução dos consumidores sem CPF/CNPJ; Apontamento de UCs com suspeita de irregularidades, contribuindo para a redução de perdas das empresas; Cadastro de e-mail do consumidor para entrega de faturas promove redução de reclamações e de custos no

LIES.

c - PONTOS CRÍTICOS DO PROJETO

Demora na conclusão do Módulo Recadastramento do Sistema de Gestão Comercial AJURI; Falta de experiência de algumas empresas ganhadoras do certame de licitação; Falta de projeto para a execução dos apontamentos do recadastramento; Alto índice de criminalidade nas cidades principais; Apoio mínimo das áreas de inspeções de algumas EDE quanto aos apontamentos do recadastramento; Parada do projeto por decisão da alta direção; Pouca divulgação nas mídias quanto ao objetivo do Projeto de Recadastramento; Falta de planejamento das ações que deverão ser desenvolvidas pós-recadastramento; Cancelamento do Projeto de Revisão e Padronização das Normas Comerciais; Diminuição da comunicação entre as EDE quanto ao Projeto de Recadastramento.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 145/197

Com a decisão de manter o AJURI foi necessário realizar uma homogeneização de procedimentos. Como cada empresa tinha o seu rol de ordens de serviço, foi criado um comitê gestor que criou uma lista única de ordens de serviço.

Os processos do AJURI foram homogeneizados, mas não os procedimentos do usuário. Para tanto foi lançada licitação com vistas à revisão, atualização e homogeneização dos procedimentos comerciais, a qual resultou em valor muito elevado. Quando do seu relançamento, em agosto de 2016, houve a decisão de suspender toda e qualquer nova aquisição no âmbito do Projeto Energia+.

Em março de 2016 foram iniciadas as atividades de campo do recadastramento, exceto no Piauí e em Rondônia, pois as duas empresas selecionadas desistiram dos serviços.

Novas licitações foram feitas, demandando atraso no cronograma inicial. Em Rondônia, como também a segunda empresa colocada desistiu, o novo processo só será concretizado em 2018, razão pela qual os serviços deverão ser cobertos com recursos próprios.

Os serviços são estruturados em três fases: cadastro do cliente, da UC e da medição. A cada passo, o sistema pode fazer críticas e promover a validação ou rejeição dos dados levantados. Uma vez feita a correção, o sistema pode incorporar as informações. As contratadas estão obrigadas a entregar os resultados nos mapas de roteiros de leitura.

O percentual da ocorrência de erros na primeira entrega foi de 30% no Acre, 13% em Alagoas, 23% em Amazonas e 7% no Piauí.

A situação atual registra o seguinte avanço:

Acre: 95%; Alagoas: 92%; Amazonas: 102%, dado o registro de uma quantidade adicional de 11.800 clandestinas e 1.800 sem rede na

porta. Foram agregadas 1.090 unidades com tarifa social e registrados mais de 347.000 apontamentos de irregularidades;

Piauí: 68% por enquanto – o pagamento só será feito quando a contratada entregar os dados dos clientes; Rondônia: desde o início do projeto ocorreram duas rescisões contratuais em decorrência das desistências

das empresas contratadas. Novo processo de convocação e contratação foi feito, recaindo sobre a Empresa a necessária cobertura financeira para a execução do projeto;

Roraima: encerrado com 90,34% pois não se conseguiu recadastrar o poder público e rural que havia ficado para o final, mas a empresa contratada não quis renovar o contrato. Assim a EDE decidiu utilizar seus profissionais para executar o recadastramento das UC faltantes, a maioria localizada na zona rural do município de Boa Vista.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 146/197



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 147/197

RECADASTRAMENTO DE UNIDADES CONSUMIDORAS

AVANÇO FÍSICO AVANÇO FINANCEIRO

EDE PREVISTO REALIZADO REALIZAÇÃO

(%) PREVISTO REALIZADO

REALIZAÇÃO (%)

Acre 243.000 236.264 97 2.920.613 1.044.791 36

Alagoas 1.184.976 1.106.159 93 8.699.002 6.297.754 72

Amazonas 877.336 903.417 103 9.744.500 6.802.815 70

Piauí 1.200.000 831.511 69 9.300.000 4.679.257 50

Rondônia 777.287 7.124 1 5.900.000 54.888 1

Roraima 123.000 110.932 90 1.274.999 1.024.124 80

TOTAL 4.405.599 3.195.407 73 37.839.113 19.903.629 53

Após 29/12/2017, mediante aditamentos de prazo nos contratos em curso, o que vier a ser executado será coberto com recursos próprios.

Manter a qualidade do cadastro é essencial para uma boa gestão comercial das EDE, ao que se associa a necessidade de promover treinamentos e desenvolvimento de pessoal de modo continuado.

c - CRITÉRIO DE PAGAMENTO PELOS SERVIÇOS PRESTADOS Para que se evite contratempos relacionados ao pagamento pelos serviços realizados é importante ajustar de pronto com a Eletrobras como se serão efetivadas as fiscalizações para atender aos compromissos assumidos com as empresas que tem atuado na implantação do projeto. Assim:

observadas as condições contratuais, os dados, após validados e incorporados ao sistema AJURI, possibilitam processar os devidos pagamentos;

como as atividades da etapa de atualização do AJURI são de inteira responsabilidade das EDE e não das empresas contratadas, estas não devem ser penalizadas por eventual atraso na execução das mesmas. Este entendimento foi validado pelo Banco Mundial.

Deve-se na continuidade do projeto, consolidar o percentual de clientes que já foram incorporados no sistema sem problemas e elaborar a projeção das energias agregadas e recuperadas, potencializadas pelo recadastramento.

TEMA 5: FISCALIZAÇÃO DO PROJETO ENERGIA+ PELA ELETROBRAS

Moderador: Christophe (Gerente do Projeto Energia+ - Banco Mundial) Apresentadores: Rudolph (UGP Eletrobras) e André Gustavo (Departamento de Inspeção Física de Obras -

Eletrobras) OBJETIVO

Atestar a execução física de obras referente aos equipamentos instalados e energizados, apresentados pelas EDE em cada Subcomponente do Contrato de Financiamento, a saber:



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 148/197

Digitalização e Qualidade de Energia; Digitalização de UC em MT e BT; Substituição de Medidores Obsoletos; Telemedição de Alimentadores; Regularização de UC em áreas com PNT>50%.

Na abertura da apresentação foram destacados os procedimentos da Eletrobras para a fiscalização e pagamentos dos prestadores de serviço, equipamentos e obras do Projeto Energia+.

Enquanto gestora dos recursos advindos da Reserva Global de Reversão – RGR, a área de engenharia fiscaliza a efetiva aplicação dos recursos da contrapartida;

Todos os recursos financeiros vinculados ao Acordo de Empréstimo são geridos diretamente pela Eletrobras; A Engenharia da Eletrobras vai a campo para fiscalizar o avanço físico antes de liberar parcelas para

pagamento. Tal procedimento, no entender das EDE, configura-se como de dinâmica lenta; Para conferir maior dinâmica às parcelas de adiantamento que historicamente eram de 30% do montante

do empréstimo concedido para cada EDE, entendida como baixa, a Diretoria da Eletrobras aprovou em 2016 sua alteração para 70% da execução financeira de cada projeto na base de faturas, ditando que após este percentual, a liberação dos demais pagamentos só serem possíveis depois da realização de fiscalização física;

Os pagamentos são feitos diretamente pela Eletrobras, para cada fornecedor, pois os valores não são repassados para as EDE.

Na sequência, forma abordados os critérios adotados para a fiscalização dos projetos, que são:

Com base no contrato e na planilha de quantitativos físicos, a Eletrobras elabora e envia às EDE, o Sistema de Cadastro de Projetos - SCP ou a planilha de quantitativos contendo as metas de cada Subcomponente;

As obras cadastradas serão inspecionadas em sua totalidade ou de forma amostral e devem apresentar suas características técnico-construtivas em concordância com as normas técnicas pertinentes e com seus parâmetros técnicos e quantitativos enviados à Eletrobras.

PROCEDIMENTOS DE INSPEÇÃO



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 149/197

DOCUMENTAÇÃO DA PASTA DE OBRAS

Cópia das plantas (as built) atualizadas referente aos equipamentos instalados contendo sua localização, identificação e características técnicas pertinentes;

Lista de materiais aplicados na obra; Relatórios de conclusão; Certificados ou laudos técnicos dos materiais e equipamentos empregados; Ordem de serviço das obras executadas; Histórico de Consumo (Subcomponente – 1.2.5); Outros documentos que julgue pertinente para aprovação da obra.

SITUAÇÕES QUE PODEM RESULTAR EM GLOSA

Rede ou equipamentos desenergizados; Impossibilidade de identificação e localização em campo das obras cadastradas; Impossibilidade de acesso às obras por deficiência logística do Agente Executor; Ausência de documentação para a caracterização das obras; Materiais ou equipamentos empregados com características técnicas ou configuração de rede inferior ao

informado.

EMISSÃO DO RELATÓRIO DE INSPEÇÃO E ESTÁGIO DE SUA EVOLUÇÃO POR SUBCOMPONENTE

EXECUÇÃO

Foram realizadas até então 23 visitas com a participação de 3 a 4 pessoas; O número de profissionais atuantes no Departamento passou de 25 para 12 atualmente; Além da amostra selecionada, o fiscal pode ampliar o trabalho dependendo do tempo disponível;



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 150/197

Para que seja atestada a execução física os itens pertinentes devem estar instalados e energizados; O Sistema Informatizado de Cadastro de Projetos – SCP, desenvolvido deve ser preenchido pelos gestores

dos projeto e retornados à Engenharia;

Neste momento, quando a evolução dos projetos se aproxima de 70%, surge a pressão sobre a engenharia para a liberação de pareceres, pois os fornecedores deixam de serem pagos até os itens fiscalizados chegarem à 30%, podendo, com isso, redundar na paralização dos trabalhos. Valores são glosados e não pagos, quando não se constata a energização de equipamentos e a ausência de sua documentação comprobatória.

O Banco Mundial solicitou que sejam preparados relatórios sobre as fiscalizações já feitas pela engenharia, e que cópias dos mesmos, por subcomponente, sejam arquivados no WBDocs.

QUESTÕES PENDENTES

Para efeito de pagamento é necessário dar um tratamento específico para equipamentos e materiais adquiridos e que estão em almoxarifado, uma vez que pelo procedimento atual a fiscalização não contempla tal possibilidade;

Estabelecer um planejamento da fiscalização até o fim do período de graça do empréstimo concedido de modo que o WB saiba se as EDE vão conseguir utilizar 100% do recurso destinado a pagar o avanço físico que será executado até 29 de dezembro de 2017;

Objetivando o uso de recursos do empréstimo para os pagamentos finais relacionados ao projeto de recadastramento e a não possibilidade da área de engenharia da holding de realizar um processo de fiscalização nesta atividade, obter junto à Diretoria da Eletrobras a dispensa da fiscalização de campo dada a existência de fartas evidências quanto ao trabalho desenvolvido baseadas no conjunto de fotos geo-referenciadas.

TEMA 6: MODERNIZAÇÃO DO SISTEMA INTEGRADO DE GESTÃO

Moderador: Ariovaldo Stelle (Ex-Coordenador-Geral do Projeto Energia+ - Eletrobras) Apresentador: Renan Taira – Eletrobras Rondônia

OBJETIVO

Melhorar a gestão empresarial em geral e a gestão comercial em particular.


a – PLANEJAMENTO INICIAL

Originalmente, no subcomponente “Modernização do Sistema Integrado de Gestão das Empresas”, foi incluída a aquisição de novos sistemas de gestão da informação, visando a melhoria do desempenho das atividades comerciais, necessárias para a prestação de serviços de distribuição de energia elétrica e para as demais funções corporativas.

Houve previsão também para a atualização de dados dos clientes, o mapeamento das redes de distribuição, a aquisição de equipamentos de computação e outras ferramentas exigidas para a implantação/operação de um sistema de gestão integrado.

Em resumo, as atividades elegidas para este projeto contemplaram a implantação de um Sistema Integrado de Gestão Empresarial – ERP, de um novo Sistema de Gestão Comercial de Energia e de um Sistema de Informação Geográfica para o interior do Estado do Amazonas.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 151/197

b - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE SISTEMA INTEGRADO DE GESTÃO EMPRESARIAL – ERP

A incorporação deste projeto no Energia+ baseou-se num diagnóstico que apontou que as empresas do Piauí e de Alagoas se valiam de um ERP que não as satisfazia - sistema OFM, que na Amazonas o sistema era arcaico – implantado em 1997 e que em Rondônia não se tinha nenhum sistema implantado.

Diante do desafio de implantar um ERP único para as EDE, incluindo, a Unidade Gestora do Projeto Energia + UGP dedicou-se à confecção de documentos para promover uma licitação com a celeridade possível. Em paralelo, as EDE se estruturaram para tanto, com destaque para a arquitetura e infraestrutura de base, sendo definida a necessidade de sanear os bancos de dados. Para tanto foram realizados vários workshops para a definição dos requisitos funcionais.

Contudo, em dezembro de 2013, quando a documentação para licitar estava praticamente pronta, a Eletrobras Holding, pela Resolução nº 914/2013, decidiu por implantar o SAP ERP em todas as empresas do grupo, incluindo as seis EDE. Com tal decisão tomada, a UGP recebeu a orientação de cessar o processo no estágio que se encontrava, sendo convocado o seu especialista no tema para participar do processo de implantação.

Diante deste novo cenário, o Banco Mundial, instado pela UGP, assentiu com a mudança de orientação, comunicando, no entanto, que as licenças SAP ERP não poderiam ser financiadas com recursos do Energia+, pois o processo de contratação não atendia às suas diretrizes. Contudo concordou em aprovar a liberação de recursos financeiros para contratar serviços de consultoria objetivando a implantação do SAP e eventualmente, a aquisição de alguns equipamentos que viessem a ser requeridos.

Observa-se que a decisão da Eletrobras, por envolver todas as suas empresas, tornou a atividade bastante complexa. Comparativamente à situação anterior, demandará mais tempo para a implantação, a um custo bem maior.

SITUAÇÃO ATUAL

Não houve evolução, no prazo requerido, com o que ainda não se tem um sistema de informação de gestão moderno e padronizado.

c - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE SISTEMA COMERCIAL

No que diz respeito à aquisição de um Sistema Comercial, por orientação do Diretor de Distribuição da Eletrobras e do Diretor Comercial das EDE, a UGP insistiu na continuidade do sistema comercial que vinha sendo utilizado, denominado AJURI, desenvolvido originalmente por profissionais da Eletrobras Eletronorte, que continuavam a dar assistência às empresas para uma boa gestão comercial. Tal orientação originou uma série de discussões técnicas com profissionais do Banco Mundial, chegando-se quase às vias de impasse.

Na busca de uma solução, foi contratado um consultor independente para avaliar o AJURI. Sua conclusão foi de que os problemas detectados não tinham sua raiz no sistema em si, mas na falta de qualidade dos dados nele internalizados. É de se ressaltar que tal constatação reforçou a necessidade de se promover um recadastramento geral e cadastramento de novas unidades, e manter atualizada toda a base de clientes.

Finalmente, após seguidas reuniões, diante do parecer do consultor de que o AJURI atendia a contento a uniformização e a padronização dos processos de negócios, bem como era aderente à regulação do setor elétrico brasileiro no que respeita aos serviços de comercialização de energia, o Banco assentiu com a proposta da Eletrobras,



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 152/197

condicionando-a à execução de um programa de treinamento e desenvolvimento para profissionais que atuam na área comercial, de sorte a não se ter solução de continuidade na sua gestão.

TEMA 7: LOGÍSTICA REVERSA E NORMAS DE GESTÃO AMBIENTAIS

Moderador: Márcio (Especialista na Área Ambiental - Banco Mundial) Apresentadora: Cynthia Chiarelli e Thiago Flores dos Santos OBJETIVO

Promover a mitigação dos impactos socioambientais decorrentes da implantação do “Projeto Substituição de Medidores Obsoletos da subcomponente Implementação de Infraestrutura de Medição Avançada do Projeto Energia+”;

Como objetivos secundários, a realização do adequado acondicionamento de materiais e equipamentos, a adoção de critérios construtivos adequados às condições ambientais e, por fim, a efetivação de ações de interação e comunicação acerca do projeto.

a - PLANEJAMENTO DO PROJETO

O projeto foi estruturado junto ao Escritório de Gestão de Projetos – EGP, com a utilização de metodologia de gerenciamento de projetos baseada no Project Management Institute (PMI), tendo a reunião de passagem ocorrido em maio de 2013, em Brasília/DF, com a presença da equipe do projeto.

VISÃO ANALÍTICA DO PROJETO COM INDICADORES DE DESEMPENHO



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 153/197

RISCOS MATERIALIZADOS NO PROJETO



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 154/197

b - BENEFÍCIOS

Menor volume de sucatas nas EDE (coletas mais ágeis a partir dos contratos de venda de resíduos do projeto); Maior organização dos resíduos no almoxarifado da empresa (melhoria no acondicionamento); Maior controle dos resíduos gerados e consequentemente da destinação efetiva desses bens inservíveis; Adequação da empresa à Agenda Ambiental da Administração Pública.

A partir dos resultados do projeto foi obtido em 2016 pela Eletrobras Distribuição Amazonas o “Selo Verde” na Categoria "Ação Socioambiental Responsável” e posterior recebimento do Prêmio Socioambiental Chico Mendes edição 2016.

Estes projetos foram implementados dentro do subcomponente “Fortalecimento da Capacidade Técnica e Ambiental”.

c - ORGANIZAÇÃO PARA IMPLANTAÇÃO DO PROJETO

1. Preparação do edital do leilão:



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 155/197

o Realizadas em 2013 visitas técnicas às empresas 3E Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Reciclados Ltda., Metrowatt Comércio e Manutenção Ltda. e Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz (CPFL), no Estado de São Paulo;

o Definidas as exigências para o edital do leilão, tais como: licença de operação para a cadeia de reciclagem emitida por órgão ambiental competente; ISO 14001; Cadastro Técnico Federal de Atividades Potencialmente Poluidoras e Utilizadoras de Recursos Naturais emitido pelo Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis – IBAMA; e, por fim, o Alvará de Funcionamento Municipal.

2. Realização do leilão e respectivos resultados: o No mês de junho de 2014 foi realizado o primeiro Leilão Corporativo n.º 03/2014, com a retirada dos

medidores até novembro de 2015, totalizando 438.942 unidades, gerando uma receita de R$ 396.772,00 – uma média de R$ 0,97/medidor.

o No 2º leilão, realizado em janeiro 2016, tiveram mais de 30 participantes. Para este leilão foi retirada a exigência da ISO 14000 como pré-requisito, o que foi compensado por uma fiscalização posterior. O preço obtido foi de R$1,58/medidor, envolvendo 620,6 t.

DADOS DE RECICLAGEM SÃO EVIDENCIADOS POR CERTIFICADOS DE DESTINAÇÃO FINAL!

3. Treinamentos do projeto; 4. Fluxo da Logística e Manufatura Reversa de Medidores de Energia Elétrica; 5. Melhoria do processo de acondicionamento de resíduos sólidos; 6. Acompanhamento da reciclagem; 7. Ações de comunicação do projeto - amplamente divulgadas na imprensa conforme marcos de divulgação

estabelecidos.

d - SUSTENTABILIDADE DAS AÇÕES DO PROJETO melhoria na metodologia para realização de leilões de materiais inservíveis das EDE, onde foram incluídos outros

lotes como medidores, transformadores, pneus e baterias; destinação social dos recursos – aprovada pela Diretoria Executiva das EDE - RES 144/2015 de 15/07/2015; inclusão do big bag como item para aquisição objetivando o acondicionamento dos medidores obsoletos; disseminação de boas práticas do processo e da metodologia utilizada com outras empresas do setor mediante

a realização de visitas técnicas e palestras na CPFL e COPEL; inclusão na matriz de habilidades dos empregados objetivando treinamento sobre o processo de manufatura e

logística reversa.

Abordada a realização de leilões que atenderam os critérios de logística reversa. O primeiro deles teve a participação de quatro empresas e envolveram mais de mil toneladas, obtendo-se um valor de R$0.97/medidor.

O assunto teve publicidade no Jornal El País da Espanha, ao ser feitas menções sobre o projeto.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 156/197

e - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

f - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE REDE SUSTENTÁVEL PARA FORTALECER O CAPITAL SOCIAL, DESENVOLVER OS TERRITÓRIOS E PROMOVER O CONSUMO CONSCIENTE

Realizada a 1ª. Oficina de Trabalho para Elaboração do Plano de Ação de Responsabilidade Social do Projeto Energia+, de 28 a 29/10/2014, possibilitou uma construção compartilhada para a definição dos eixos e temas para execução de dois projetos corporativos de responsabilidade social no âmbito do Energia+, devidamente alinhados com a Política de Responsabilidade Social da Eletrobras, Salvaguardas do Banco Mundial e Componentes do Projeto Energia+ e tem dois eixos principais:

1. Promoção da Cidadania: Capacitação de Lideranças Comunitárias; 2. Geração de Trabalho e Renda para Fomentar o Desenvolvimento Territorial por meio da Gestão Adequada

de Resíduos.

Consoante o Plano de Ação de Responsabilidade Social do Projeto Energia + foram aprovados dois TORs, respectivamente o Projeto Rede e o Projeto Sistema de Gestão Ambiental, ambos suspensos por causa de restrição orçamentária.

g - CRIAÇÃO E IMPLANTAÇÃO DO SISTEMA DE GESTÃO AMBIENTAL - SGA Foi implantado um sistema de gestão ambiental único para as seis EDE com o objetivo de promover um conjunto de ações articuladas, com a incorporação de uma Política Ambiental por meio da construção de procedimentos específicos; voltados para a Gestão Ambiental, a redução de lacunas na dimensão ambiental dos relatórios de sustentabilidade (GRI, ISE e DJSI) e dos relatórios do órgão regulador (ANEEL) e mitigação de passivos ambientais com consequente redução de custos.

MANUAIS PARA NORMATIZAÇÃO E PADRONIZAÇÃO DOS PROCEDIMENTOS OPERACIONAIS NA ÁREA AMBIENTAL



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 157/197

Elaboração de Manuais para Normatização e Padronização de Procedimentos Operacionais na Área Ambiental das EDE.

Foi identificada a necessidade de serem definidos procedimentos comuns às EDE para estabelecer e internalizar um padrão de boas práticas com relação ao Meio Ambiente. Buscou-se, desse modo, a melhoria do desempenho operacional delas e proporcionar uma maior conscientização dos seus colaboradores e, ainda, estabelecer um canal de comunicação com as comunidades para difusão das boas práticas, envolvendo, também, as empresas fornecedoras de equipamentos e serviços no processo de melhoria da qualidade ambiental.

PRODUTOS

Foram elaborados um conjunto de relatórios, manuais, propostas de cartilhas, treinamentos e workshops visando a normatização e padronização de procedimentos operacionais na área ambiental das EDE.

4 Relatórios Executivos 3 Manuais

Manual Ambiental de Obras Manual de Gestão de Resíduos Perigosos Manual de Gestão de Resíduos Sólidos

2 Cartilhas: Cartilha Educativa de Gestão de Resíduos Perigosos Cartilha Educativa de Gestão de Resíduos Sólidos

Treinamentos e Workshops Contratada consultoria para desenvolver de maneira participativa os manuais e padronizar os

procedimentos; Foram aprovados três manuais que envolvem a realização de obras (LT, LD e SE) e o tratamento de resíduos

sólidos e resíduos perigosos; Foram elaboradas cartilhas para os empregados como maneira de facilitar o acesso aos manuais; Plano de Divulgação e Implementação dos manuais: resolução de diretoria foi emitida; Reconhecimento CGU e das empresas Eletrobras (SCMA/GT5).

h - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS/LEGADO

Processo de Construção Compartilhada; Termos de Referência elaborados para futura implantação dos Projetos.

TEMA 8: COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL

Moderador: Christophe (Gerente do Projeto Energia+ - Banco Mundial) Apresentadora: Patrícia de Cicco (Coordenadora do Macroprocesso de Comunicação - Eletrobras) OBJETIVOS

Apoiar a implementação do Projeto Energia+, por meio da aplicação de instrumentos modernos e eficazes de comunicação externa e interna, visando divulgar e compartilhar informações entre os consumidores, a sociedade e os colaboradores das EDE;



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 158/197

Promover o suporte necessário para e execução de atividades relacionadas com a construção de uma consciência pública em temas como cidadania, meio-ambiente, combate a perdas, uso eficiente, seguro e correto da energia elétrica;

Colaborar para a mudança de comportamentos inadequados de consumo, preparar a opinião pública para as mudanças na relação com as EDE;

Multiplicar o impacto do Projeto Energia + especialmente em comunidades de baixa renda e reduzir riscos potenciais no uso da energia elétrica.

Para a implementação deste projeto foram realizados dois workshops com a finalidade de elaborar o Plano de Comunicação do Energia+, nas datas de 13 e 14 de junho e 9 e 10 de agosto de 2011 e um treinamento em Gestão de Crise e Imagem, Mensuração de Resultados em Comunicação e Comunicação Interna Estratégica para aprimoramento e nivelamento das equipes de comunicação.

De maneira participativa foram elaboradas as estratégias regionais, ações táticas de comunicação, e práticas de avaliação e apuração de resultados das mesmas.


Confecção do Plano de Comunicação; Contratação de agência de publicidade (ESCALA); Contratação de empresa de Eventos (SWOT); Reuniões quinzenais, via TV Lume, para planejamento, acompanhamento de ações, feedback e análise dos

resultados obtidos; Visitas para acompanhamento físico das ações; Acompanhamento das missões do Banco Mundial e inaugurações de subprojetos.

a - AÇÕES E CAMPANHAS PUBLICITÁRIAS

Campanha de Lançamento do Projeto Energia +: 06/2013; Campanha de Obras: 09-10-11/2013; Campanha de Combate às Perdas: 04/2014; Regularização de Unidades Consumidoras: 09/2014 AL; Encontro de Jornalistas: 04/2013 AM; 12/2013 AL e 08/2014 RO. Campanha de Novos Padrões de Entrada: 12/2013 1ª fase e 07/2015 2ª fase; Infraestrutura de Medição Avançada: 04/2016; Inauguração do Centro de Inteligência da Medição: 04/2016; Campanha de Recadastramento: 03/2016 AC, AM e RR; 05/2016 AL; 08/2016 RO (mídia suspensa no PI);

b - VÍDEOS E SPOTS PRODUZIDOS

Vídeo da Campanha de Lançamento do Projeto no Acre; Spot da Campanha de Obras no Acre; Vídeo da Campanha de Combate às Perdas em Alagoas; Vídeo da Campanha de Regularização de Unidades Consumidoras; Vídeo da Campanha de Recadastramento.

c - IMPRESSOS E USO DE MEIOS ELETRÔNICOS - Farto material produzido

d - INVESTIMENTOS EM PUBLICIDADE



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 159/197

e - CAMPANHAS

LANÇAMENTO DO PROJETO ENERGIA +: a Pesquisa de Recall da Campanha de Lançamento indicou que a memorização de elementos gráficos da mensagem foi baixa nas seis capitais pesquisadas. Em nenhuma cidade a taxa ultrapassou os 50%, confirmando o baixo nível de lembrança da divulgação.

OBRAS: a veiculação da campanha na mídia somente ocorreu em setembro de 2016 pela necessidade de produção de fotos dos investimentos nos Estados, somada à ocorrência de greve dos trabalhadores da Eletrobras.

NOVOS PADRÕES DE ENTRADA: com o atraso na publicação do banner e das novas normas nos sites das EDE devido a demandas da área de TI, o folder precisou ser modificado em virtude da alteração na data de entrada em vigor da nova norma. A publicação de anúncio em jornal sofreu considerável atraso porque a Secretaria de Comunicação do Governo Federal (SECOM), que já havia dado conformidade no plano de mídia, teve que rever o processo e dar nova autorização.

INFRAESTRUTURA DE MEDIÇÃO AVANÇADA AMI: realizados três encontros com Jornalistas.

RECADASTRAMENTO E CADASTRANEBTO DE NOVAS UNIDADADES

Atraso no processo licitatório para seleção do prestador de serviço no Piauí provocou a postergação na data de veiculação da campanha para 01/09/2016;

A veiculação da campanha de mídia em TV, rádio e internet no Piauí foi suspensa por determinação da Eletrobras em virtude da decisão tomada pelos acionistas durante 165ª AGE, no dia 22 de julho de 2016;

A Assessoria de Imprensa, para minimizar a ausência da publicidade, instalou cartazes da campanha nas lojas de atendimento e providenciou divulgação no site oficial da EDE e em sua fanpage no Facebook;

Durante o recadastramento foram divulgadas notícias na imprensa relatando assaltos a residências executados por pessoas supostamente trajando uniformes da Eletrobras. Em resposta foi informado que os recadastradores estavam uniformizados e identificados com crachás. Caso restasse alguma dúvida poderia ligar para o 0800 da EDE e assim confirmar a realização dos trabalhos no bairro ou região. Algumas EDE fizeram postagens semanais no Facebook informando os bairros onde os recadastradores estariam visitando as unidades consumidoras.

f - DESEMPENHO PELOS INDICADORES ABRADEE – ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE DISTRIBUIDORES DE ENERGIA ELÉTRICA

Total Mídia Produção/PesquisaCampanha de Lançamento 2.010.394,13 1.198.300,97 812.093,16Campanha de Obras 1.020.907,96 653.676,67 367.231,29Campanha de Perdas 765.820,16 611.837,80 153.982,36Campanha Padrão de Entrada - 1ª fase 191.602,23 183.763,75 7.838,48Campanha Padrão de Entrada - 2ª fase 183.974,38 96.588,02 87.386,36Campanha de Recadastramento 1.016.927,90 670.172,39 346.755,51Campanha de Regularização de Ucs 450.937,92 0 450.937,92Campanhas de Ações Diversas (Manuais e Relatórios) 107.140,94 0 107.140,94Campanha Perdas/AMI 28.708,98 0 28.708,98Pesquisa de Recall 760.275,00 0 760.275,00Campanha Uso Adequado 378.749,41 0 378.749,41Total: 6.915.439,01 3.414.339,60 3.501.099,41



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 160/197

(*) O IAOP é a diferença relativa entre o índice obtido na rodada atual de pesquisa e na anterior, ou seja, é a variação percentual em relação ao resultado anterior. Os índices são calculados com mais casas decimais do que as apresentadas, podendo haver diferenças de arredondamento no IAOP e na diferença entre 2017 e 2016.

g - RECALL DA CAMPANHA DE LANÇAMENTO

O objetivo central da pesquisa foi identificar o recall de campanha publicitária, ou seja, as lembranças da marca, do conteúdo e a compreensão das mensagens veiculadas;

A campanha ocorreu simultaneamente em Porto Velho, Rio Branco, Manaus, Boa Vista, Teresina e Maceió entre os dias 16 de junho a 22 de julho de 2013;

Nessa campanha publicitária foram utilizadas mídias em televisão, rádio, jornal e mídia externa (outdoor, busdoor, barco de som e exposição de faixas).

Amostra da pesquisa:

Os resultados da pesquisa de recall de campanha da Eletrobras indicam que a memorização da marca Energia+ é baixa nas seis capitais pesquisadas;

Em nenhuma cidade essa taxa ultrapassou os 50%, confirmando o baixo nível de lembrança da campanha Energia+;



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 161/197

A análise deve levar em consideração dois fatores que podem ter influenciado o resultado: • a distância entre a veiculação da campanha e a pesquisa de campo foi de cinco meses, tempo

suficiente para atenuar as lembranças da campanha; • a importância das campanhas de reforço.

A segunda etapa da pesquisa buscava identificar a lembrança da mensagem e a compreensão do conteúdo; O fato da marca não estar bem fixada na cabeça da população influenciou os resultados, visto que as

perguntas formuladas requeriam maior esforço de informação dos participantes; É importante que se diga também que a lembrança da mensagem está associada à compreensão da mesma.

Portanto, a fraca memorização do conteúdo é um dos motivos que levou o respondente a declarar que a mensagem não foi transmitida de forma clara.

h - RECALL DA CAMPANHA DE PERDAS

O objetivo central da pesquisa foi de avaliar a Campanha de Perdas veiculada pela Eletrobras, ou seja, avaliar a lembrança da campanha publicitária, do conteúdo e a compreensão das mensagens veiculadas;

A campanha ocorreu simultaneamente em Porto Velho, Rio Branco, Manaus, Boa Vista, Teresina e Maceió entre os dias 02 e 11 de abril de 2014;

Nessa campanha publicitária foram utilizadas mídias em TV e Rádio. Amostra da pesquisa:

i - RECORDAÇÃO

Contempla resultados obtidos nas 6 cidades que avaliou a recordação da campanha de perdas veiculada pela Eletrobras.

É possível verificar que Rondônia foi o estado que mais se declarou recordar a campanha, seguido pelo Acre. Já Roraima foi o estado em que menos se reconheceu a campanha, com apenas 15%.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 162/197

j - CLAREZA O conteúdo desta campanha era extenso e passado de forma rápida. Verificar que em todos os estados mais da metade das pessoas consideraram que a mensagem foi clara é um resultado bastante expressivo. Destaca-se ainda o resultado obtido no Acre onde 94,1% da população considerou a mensagem clara.

l - AVALIAÇÃO Assim como anteriormente, foram separadas as notas atribuídas por aqueles que viram e os que não viram a campanha. No Acre há o acréscimo positivo de 26% na nota e no Piauí 25% dos que a viram. Mesmo em Roraima, onde a nota praticamente não muda, percebe-se uma tendência positiva e essa pode não ter sido maior em razão da pior taxa de recordação.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 163/197

m - ENCONTROS COM JORNALISTAS

A realização de três eventos com jornalistas buscou:

Estreitar o relacionamento com a imprensa; Desenvolver ações visando a melhoria da imagem da empresa; Explanar, de forma didática o funcionamento do setor elétrico nacional e local, de forma a evitar ruídos na

comunicação; Esclarecer as dúvidas mais frequentes dos jornalistas sobre a empresa; Apresentar o Projeto Energia+ e seus objetivos.

LOCALIDADES MANAUS MACEIÓ PORTO VELHO

PERÍODO MAR 2013 DEZ 2013 AGO 2014

Nº DE PARTICIPANTES 48 36 59

INVESTIMENTO (R$) 27.415,00 10.954,00 20.710,00

n - PRÊMIOS CONQUISTADOS ENTRE 2013 E 2016

GERAL 2014 - 1º Lugar do Prêmio de Líder de PMO do Ano concedido pela Next Business em parceria com o PMI-

RJ 2015 - 2º e 3º Lugar do Prêmio de Líder de PMO do Ano concedido pela Next Business em parceria com o

PMI-RJ 2016 - Latin American Utility Week Awards 2016 - Categoria Metering Excellence Awards (Energia +)

ACRE 2014 • Prêmio IASC na categoria maior crescimento 2013/2014



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 164/197

• Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça


ALAGOAS

2013 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Prêmio IEL de Estágio – Categoria Grande Empresa

2014 • Prêmio IEL de Estágio – Estagiário Destaque • Desafio Nacional Sebrae de Estágio • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

2015 • Prêmio IASC na categoria maior crescimento 2015/2014 • Selo de Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça • Prêmio IEL Melhores Práticas de Estágio – Categoria Grande Empresa • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

2016 • Prêmio IEL de Estágio - Estagiário Destaque • Prêmio CIER - Satisfacción del Cliente con la Calidad Percibida • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

AMAZONAS

2013 • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça 2014 • Prêmio IASC na categoria Região Norte

• Prêmio WEPS (Women’s Empowerment Principles) menção honrosa 2015 • Prêmio WEPS (Women’s Empowerment Principles) menção honrosa

• Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes (Projeto de

Miniestação de Tratamento de Resíduos em Novo Airão, P&D). 2016 • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes (Energia +:

Projeto de Logística e Manufatura Reversa de Medidores Obsoletos)

PIAUÍ

2013 • Prêmio Abraconee 2º lugar na categoria Empresa de Pequeno & Médio Porte • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes

2014 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã 2015 • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

• Certificado Empresa Cidadã 2016 • Certificado Empresa Cidadã

• Maior contribuinte ICMS do Estado do Piauí - referente ao exercício de 2015

RONDÔNIA

2013 • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Selo Abrinq • Prêmio Abraconee

2014 • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Certificado Empresa Cidadã • Medalha Eloy Chaves • Selo Abrinq • Prêmio Ética nos Negócios

2015 • Prêmio IASC na categoria Região Norte • Selo Verde - Gestão Socioambiental Responsável Instituto Chico Mendes • Selo Abrinq • Prêmio WEPS (Women’s Empowerment Principles) • Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

2016 • Prêmio IASC na categoria Região Norte • Selo Abrinq

RORAIMA 2015 • Prêmio CIER na categoria maior evolução • Prêmio Medalha Eloy Chaves 2º lugar pela gestão da segurança e saúde do trabalho



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 165/197

• Selo Programa Pró-Equidade de Gênero e Raça

Na Eletrobras Alagoas, de 2013 a 2015, foi implementado um projeto para melhoria dos índices da Pesquisa ABRADEE seguindo a metodologia de Gestão de Projetos.

AtributosÍndice 2014

Índice 2015

Índice 2016

Índice 2017

Diferença (2017 - 2016)*

IAOP*

Índice de aprovação do consumidor 64,2 60,7 69,6 71,4 1,8 2,5%

IDAR - Fornecimento de energia 56,4 60,5 69,8 61,6 -8,2 -11,7%IDAT - Fornecimento de energia sem interrupção, ou seja, não faltar luz na sua casa

59,7 65,1 77,6 71,0 -6,6 -8,5%

IDAT - Fornecimento de energia sem variação de voltagem, ou seja, sem oscilações, sem ficar alternando luz forte com luz fraca na sua casa

54,4 59,2 65,8 55,7 -10,1 -15,3%

IDAT - Rapidez na volta da energia quando falta luz na sua casa (ou seja, o tempo que leva para a energia voltar, quando falta)

55,1 57,3 66,0 58,1 -7,9 -12,0%

IDAR - Informação e comunicação 50,0 60,7 67,1 59,3 -7,8 -11,6%IDAT - Avisar antecipadamente que vai faltar energia quando for fazer algum serviço de manutenção ou conserto na rede elétrica

34,1 48,3 44,2 50,3 6,2 14,0%

IDAT - Orientação para o uso adequado de energia, para não desperdiçar (economizar)

57,1 69,2 78,8 63,7 -15,1 -19,2%

IDAT - Orientação sobre os riscos e perigos da energia elétrica 58,4 68,9 75,7 62,1 -13,6 -18,0%IDAT - Esclarecimento sobre seus direitos e deveres como consumidor de energia elétrica

50,2 56,3 69,3 61,1 -8,2 -11,8%

Margem de erro: 4%

IAC

FE

IC



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 166/197

o - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

CAMPANHA DE LANÇAMENTO DO PROJETO Reduzir o tempo entre a veiculação da campanha e a Pesquisa de Recall; Importância das campanhas de reforço. Em Maceió e Manaus, cidades que não tiveram a divulgação

complementar da campanha de Obras, os índices de recall foram ainda mais baixos.

CAMPANHA DE PERDAS Necessidade de divulgação frequente de conceitos relacionados a furto/roubo, desperdício e segurança

conforme apontado na Pesquisa de Recall como os conteúdos mais recordados.

REGULARIZAÇÃO DE UNIDADES CONSUMIDORAS Realizar reuniões antes do início das obras entre a distribuidora e as lideranças comunitárias com o objetivo

de conscientizá-los a usar a energia de forma a evitar desperdícios porque com a regularização, os moradores começariam a pagar pelo consumo efetivo.

INAUGURAÇÃO CENTRO DE INTELIGÊNCIA DA MEDIÇÃO A coordenação das ações de inauguração entre a holding, as EDE e o Banco Mundial e a empresa Siemens

culminaram em um evento organizado, bem divulgado e rendeu futuras oportunidades de divulgação do projeto de Infraestrutura da Medição Avançada (AMI) em diversas plataformas de comunicação.

ENCONTRO COM JORNALISTAS Promover mais encontros com a imprensa uma vez que de forma geral os eventos realizados em Manaus

(AM), Maceió (AL) e Porto Velho (RO) foram bem avaliados pelos participantes no sentido de auxiliar na produção de reportagens com responsabilidade e isenção, evitando ruídos nas informações;

Mais rigor na especificação técnica dos produtos promocionais que constam da ata de registro de preços, com aplicação de sanções ao prestador de serviços porque produtos promocionais não puderam ser utilizados prejudicando a imagem da EDE frente ao seu público de relacionamento.

CAMPANHA DE RECADASTRAMENTO E CADASTRAMENTO DE NOVAS UNIDADES Comprovada a importância de integração de todas as áreas envolvidas no projeto para alinhamento das

informações, objetivos e resultados esperados. Foram realizadas várias reuniões envolvendo o gestor do projeto, as assessorias de comunicação das distribuidoras, o macroprocesso de comunicação da Diretoria de Distribuição, a área de Publicidade da holding e a agência de publicidade;

TEMA 9: SUPRIMENTOS/LICITAÇÃO Moderador: Ariovaldo Stelle (Ex-Coordenador-Geral do Projeto Energia+ - Eletrobras) Apresentadora: Diva Vasconcellos (Eletrobras Piauí) OBJETIVO

Adquirir, com prontidão e economicidade, bens, materiais, serviços e demais itens constantes no Plano de Aquisições e Contratações – PAC, aprovado pelo Banco Mundial, atendendo suas diretrizes e a legislação brasileira.

EXECUÇÃO DAS ATIVIDADES



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 167/197

O PAC, desde o desenho inicial do Projeto, sofreu alterações ao longo do tempo para introduzir ajustes motivados pela evolução dos projetos, por novas necessidades e pelo aproveitamento de sobras de recursos financeiros oriundos de ganhos em licitações, notadamente as de cunho internacional.

Assim, para uma projeção inicial de 80 contratos foram assinados 252, obtidos mediante análise e aprovação prévia do Banco Mundial, suportados por 71 processos licitatórios, aqui distribuídos por Método de Aquisição e Seleção do Banco Mundial:

MODALIDADE QUANTIDADE

NCB/CONCORRÊNCIA 08

CONSULTORIA FIRMA 07

CONSULTORIA INDIVIDUAL 11

LICITAÇÃO PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 08

NCB/PREGÃO ELETRÔNICO 33

SHOPPING 04

TOTAL 71

A tabela a seguir contempla a quantidade de contratos por EDE:

EDE QUANTIDADE

Acre 39

Alagoas 47

Amazonas 50

Piauí 45

Rondônia 42

Roraima 29



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 168/197

Total 252

Ao todo foram envolvidos 60 fornecedores de serviços e 11 consultorias.

a - ORGANIZAÇÃO DOS PROCESSOS LICITATÓRIOS E CONTRATAÇÕES

Todos os processos de licitação e contratação foram organizados em um dataroom localizado em Brasília para consulta presencial, todos eles digitalizados para acesso também via Escritório Virtual.

Outros documentos do Energia+ podem também ser acessados, tais como o Contrato de Empréstimo nº 7884/2011, as Diretrizes para Aquisições e Consultorias do Banco Mundial, os Planos de Aquisição e Contratação – PAC, o Manual Operacional 2011 e o Cadastro dos Fornecedores.

b - PROCESSOS LICITATÓRIOS – DESTAQUE PARA O PROJETO AMI

Elaboração de Edital para lançamento de uma licitação internacional objetivando a aquisição de uma solução envolvendo não só o fornecimento de equipamentos, mas também de toda a infraestrutura de hardware, software, mobiliários, medidores, etc, além da instalação de equipamentos, solução essa a ser apresentada pela empresa a ser contratada. Para tanto várias reuniões foram feitas com o Banco Mundial para ajustes no edital, de forma a não criar obstáculos para a participação de empresas sediadas em outros países;

Como se tratava de uma contratação inédita, o Edital foi elaborado a partir de um modelo de aquisição de software disponibilizado pelo Banco Mundial, devidamente adaptado ao modelo pretendido, contando com a efetiva participação da área técnica, conhecedora das especificidades do objeto e das qualificações a serem exigidas das empresas para execução do contrato, e do inestimável apoio do Banco Mundial dadas as suas peculiaridades;

Atraso na contratação do objeto dado problemas ocorridos na tradução do primeiro edital e dificuldade em reunir por diversas vezes a equipe técnica e a comissão de licitação para a preparação do projeto básico, edital, análise das propostas, emissão de parecer jurídico e chancela do processo.

c - LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

PROCESSOS PARA CONTRATAÇÃO DE OBRAS

Necessidade de elaborar uma nova metodologia para composição de custos, abrangendo todas as empresas interessadas, inclusive de outros países;

Processo de adaptação de modelos de edital do Banco Mundial à necessidade das EDE; Dificuldade em obter propostas com preços condizentes para os lotes da região norte do País; Revisão das exigências de habilitação de forma a não limitar a participação de empresas estrangeiras, como

por exemplo a apresentação do registro no órgão de classe; Ausência de empresas estrangeiras nas licitações, quiçá pela existência de diferenças regionais, em especial

a baixa densidade demográfica nos estados da região amazônica, aliada à dificuldade de acesso aos locais de realização das obras, fato que aumentou os custos de obras nestas localidades;

Necessidade de se ter equipe técnica, comissão de licitação e suporte jurídico em tempo integral para preparação dos Termos de Referência e Edital.

PROCESSOS PARA CONTRATAÇÃO DE SERVIÇOS

Contratações feitas por meio de licitação nacional, utilizando a modalidade pregão na forma eletrônica. O item mais questionado pelas empresas foi a não divulgação do valor estimado, obrigatório nas licitações



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 169/197

nacionais, mas inadmissível nas licitações do Banco. Não há comprovação, mas esse fato aliado à impossibilidade de negociação pelo pregoeiro pode ter contribuído para o fracasso de alguns processos;

Necessidade de se ter equipe técnica, comissão de licitação e suporte jurídico em tempo integral para preparação dos Termos de Referência e Edital.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 170/197

PROCESSO PARA CONTRATAÇÃO AMI

Trabalho com licitação mais complexa e detalhada, diferentemente das licitações nacionais; Colocar em prática as diretrizes do Banco para licitações, bem como conhecer os modelos de edital

utilizados; Licitação com exigências mais criteriosas para elegibilidade dos licitantes, bem como, os respectivos

instrumentos contratuais; Necessidade de se ter equipe técnica, comissão de licitação e suporte jurídico em tempo integral para

preparação dos Termos de Referência e Edital.

PROCESSO PARA CONTRATAÇÃO DE RELIGADORES

Adendo na Licitação dizia que os tributos seriam por conta do contratado. Instado por um dos concorrentes que não concordou com a contratação de empresa estrangeira para o fornecimento dos equipamentos, o TCU – Tribunal de Contas da União, pelo Acórdão nº 2238/2013 – recomendou que nas futuras licitações internacionais relativas à equalização de preços, dever-se-ia incluir na comparação de preços os impostos de importação e despesas aduaneira em detrimento das Diretrizes do Banco Mundial. Como esta recomendação colide com as diretrizes do Banco Mundial, a Eletrobras tratou por duas vezes do tema com o TCU e o Banco Mundial acionou a PGFN demonstrando que a decisão proferida pelo TCU inviabilizaria a manutenção ou concessão de novos empréstimos. Por sua vez a Advocacia Geral da União – AGU recomendou a suspensão do Edital para não contrariar a decisão do TCU, até um novo posicionamento do TCU. Novamente demandado, o TCU pelo Acórdão nº 1866/2015, pronunciou-se, citando que as Diretrizes do Banco Mundial não violam o princípio do julgamento objetivo e os demais princípios constitucionais aplicáveis às licitações, com o que a contratação pode ser efetivada. Como aprendizado de todo este encaminhamento, orienta-se para inserir texto nos editais que a equalização de preços de propostas é tratada com fulcro internacional, conforme aplicação das INCOTERMS. Outro aspecto que demandou várias ações, atraso e elevação de custo nestes equipamentos foi de que o edital não trazia de forma detalhada como se daria o desembaraço aduaneiro, o atendimento às especificidades tributárias e logísticas. Para tanto o Banco Mundial contratou a empresa MAP LOGISTICS para prestar consultoria e prestar os esclarecimentos devidos. Uma vez ajustada a responsabilidade das partes, foi contratada a empresa ALLMARE para prestar serviços aduaneiros às EDE.

É importante destacar o contínuo trabalho em equipe envolvendo o Banco Mundial e a Eletrobras para sanar dificuldades que foram surgindo no curso dos processos de licitação, contratação, aspectos tributários e logísticos.

d - BENEFÍCIOS

Diferentemente das modalidades nacionais, conhecimento adquirido em processos licitatórios mais complexos e detalhados, permitindo maior segurança jurídica;

Acuidade em relação aos processos, com permanente preocupação com elevados padrões éticos nos procedimentos licitatórios, com fito de coibir práticas corruptas e fraudulentas, condutas desonestas, ilegais,



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 171/197

desperdícios de recursos, de forma a atender a finalidade pública, bem como uma eficiente instrução e padronização de processos licitatórios;

Ganhos com a padronização de materiais e equipamentos, que redundou em facilidades para as licitações e contratações e expressiva redução de custos na gestão de suprimentos.

Sanados problemas comuns encontrados nos processos licitatórios possibilitou a padronização de procedimentos, fazendo com que o tempo de licitação fosse reduzido;

Trabalho proativo da Coordenação Especial de Licitação com a CGU – Controladoria Geral da União, responsável pelas auditorias no Projeto Energia+, trouxe tranquilidade quanto à boa execução dos processos licitatórios e contratações feitas com recursos do empréstimo concedido pelo Banco Mundial.

e - CRÍTICA

Na licitação internacional para aquisição de medidores digitais o Banco Mundial não concordou em aceitar o resultado por entender que a aquisição de um fornecedor com base no exterior possibilitaria a obtenção de preços unitários mais atrativos, o que não se revelou verdadeiro depois de realizado um segundo processo de licitação internacional. A não emissão do “Nada Obsta” no primeiro processo provocou atrasos na substituição de medidores obsoletos. f - AGRADECIMENTO Agradecimento pela atuação do Banco Mundial, na pessoa de Frederico Rabello, no processo de convencimento do TCU para emissão de novo Acórdão quanto à aquisição de religadores e pelo apoio em todos os demais processos de licitação e contratação.

TEMA 10: PERFORMANCE OPERACIONAL

Moderador: Jimmy Pannett (Co-gerente do Projeto Energia+ - Banco Mundial) Apresentador: Dimas

OBJETIVO

Melhorar a performance das Empresas de Distribuição da Eletrobras dada à constatação da falta de eficiência em gestão de projetos, ausência de equipamentos, de software, de padronização de relatórios e de processos e de acompanhamento pleno - desde a concepção ao término de projetos.

AÇÕES REALIZADAS

Efetivada a implantação de sete Escritórios de Gestão de Projetos, lastreados por um sistema de gestão baseado no Project Management Institute (PMI), associados à uma mudança de cultura dentro das empresas.

Foram propiciadas mais de 1.000 horas de treinamento para mais de 1.800 empregados, envolvidos 30 Líderes de Projeto, e propiciados mais de 15 cursos de MBA em Gerenciamento de Projetos.

Quatro profissionais obtiveram a Certificação PMP.

Foi criada, por orientação do Banco Mundial, uma “Lista Única”, que contemplou a gestão de 252 contratos, facilitando sobremodo a interação entre as partes.

RESULTADOS OBTIDOS



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 172/197

Sentimento de propriedade do Energia+ - não mais um projeto de Brasília e sim da EDE local; Mudança de cultura pela adoção de um sistema de gestão de projetos; Padronização de metodologias - não se tem mais dependência de um indivíduo, mas sim de um sistema; A expansão do Sistema permitiu que as UGPs gerissem outros projetos além do Energia+. Na EDE Amazonas,

por exemplo, a equipe gere 15 outros projetos e preparam outros dois; A UGP Central concentrou diversas informações, evitando-se assim a necessidade de contatar sempre as

EDE; Gestão relativamente fluída de 250 contratos, com informações, status e indicadores sempre atualizados.

LIÇÕES APRENDIDAS

Manter uma metodologia de Gestão de Projetos simples; Capacitação presencial mais benéfica do que cursos online; A contratação de consultoria especializada para elaborar diagnóstico e promover a capacitação de pessoal

ajudou; Manter vínculo da gestão de projeto com avaliação de desempenho; Importância do posicionamento organizacional do EGP na Presidência; Não formação da equipe completa do EGP no momento de implantação causou atrasos no início do projeto; Baixo engajamento inicial de partes interessadas causou atrasos e demandou a necessidade de “vender” a

idéia à cada diretoria local demonstrando resultados de projetos utilizando a metodologia vs sem a metodologia;

Registro de lições aprendidas deve ser feita ao longo do projeto e não apenas no final; Constantes mudanças na estrutura organizacional causam problemas na gestão de projetos; Prêmios concedidos pela PMO Academy em parceria com o PMI/Rio de Janeiro;

1º Lugar – Líder de PMO mais admirado do ano de 2014 2º e 3º Lugar – Líder de PMO mais admirado do ano de 2015

TEMA 11: IMPACTOS EXTERNOS, PERTURBAÇÕES E EVOLUÇÃO DO PROJETO

OBJETIVO

Conhecer todas as interfaces a que a implantação do Projeto Energia+ está sujeita, verificando a existência de restrições para o bom andamento das ações em busca do objetivo principal que é a melhoria da performance operacional e financeira das empresas de distribuição de energia elétrica da Eletrobras. CHOQUES EXTERNOS: A RESILIÊNCIA DO PROJETO

Regulatório: Extinção do RGR Monetário: 50% de desvalorização da moeda brasileira - Real Político: Impeachment da Presidente da República Energético: Seca histórica, Aumento das Tarifas Econômico: Recessão Histórica Regional: O fator “Venezuela”, Enchentes



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 173/197

TEMA 12: PERFORMANCE FINANCEIRA

Moderador: Jimmy Pannett (Co-gerente do Projeto Energia+ - Banco Mundial) Apresentador: Rudolph (Especialista em Finanças da UGP – Eletrobras)

OBJETIVO

Promover a gestão dos compromissos financeiros relativos ao Contrato de Empréstimo 7884-BR e dos 6 (seis) contratos de subempréstimos entre a Eletrobras e as seis EDE para viabilizar o repasse dos recursos captados.

CONCEPÇÃO COONTRATUAL DO ENERGIA+



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 174/197

Os contratos ECF-2904, ECF-2901, ECF-2903, ECF-2906, ECF-2905 e ECF-2902 são os de repasse realizados com os recursos do Banco Mundial, sendo conhecidos internamente na Eletrobras como contratos RO-BIRD. Os contratos ECF-2924, ECF-2922, ECF-2923, ECF-2920, ECF-278459, ECF-2921, ECF-2919 representam a maior parte da contrapartida da Eletrobras, com recursos da Reserva Global de Reversão – RGR (contratos RGR-Eletrobras). Por fim, os contratos ECF-3017, ECF-3012, ECF-3016, ECF-3014 e ECF-3015 são financiados com recursos ordinários da própria Eletrobras (contratos RO-Eletrobras) e representam a menor parte da contrapartida. Cada tipo de contrato financia uma determinada quantidade de subcomponentes (vide as cores similares dos contratos e seus respectivos subcomponentes na figura anterior). A figura abaixo detalha o valor orçado originalmente para cada um dos subcomponentes do Projeto e sua respectiva fonte de recursos. Vale destacar que no caso da Eletrobras a fonte RGR financia os subcomponentes 1.1.3 e 1.1.4 e no caso da fonte RO-Eletrobras os subcomponentes 2.1, 2.2 e 2.3. A fonte BIRD financia os demais subcomponentes do componente 1, bem como, todo o componente 2, ou seja, os subcomponentes 2.1, 2.2 e 2.3 são financiados por duas fontes.

DETALHAMENTO DO ORÇAMENTO INICIAL COMPONENTES, SUB-COMPONENTES E ATIVIDADES

FONTE DE RECURSOS

VALOR PREVISTO (US$ Mil)

VALOR PREVISTO*

(R$ Mil)

1. Redução de Perdas Totais e Melhoria da Qualidade do Serviço 671.885,88 1.175.800,30 1.1. Reabilitação e Reforço no Sistema de Distribuição AT, MT e BT 254.000,95 444.501,67 1.1.1. Digitalização de Redes BIRD 35.000,34 61.250,60

59 O contrato ECF-2784 foi concebido fora do escopo do Projeto Energia+. Entretanto, a pedido da Eletrobras, o Banco Mundial aceitou que o mesmo fizesse parte da contrapartida de RGR.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 175/197

1.1.2. Qualidade de Energia 22.099,73 38.674,53 1.1.3. Reabilitação e Reforma de Redes de MT / BT

ELETROBRAS 147.863,10 258.760,43

1.1.4. Obras no Sistema de Distribuição AT 49.037,78 85.816,12 1.2. Implementação de Infraestrutura de Medição Avançada 387.884,93 678.798,63 1.2.1. Digitalização de UC em Média Tensão

BIRD

34.737,26 60.790,21 1.2.2. Digitalização de UC em Baixa Tensão 179.820,00 314.685,00 1.2.3. Substituição de Medidores Obsoletos 10.336,79 18.089,38 1.2.4. Telemedição de Alimentadores 5.828,57 10.200,00 1.2.5. Regularização de UC em áreas com PNT > 50% 139.760,00 244.580,00 1.2.6. Digitalização de Condomínios 17.402,31 30.454,04 1.3. Modernização do Sistema Integrado de Gestão das Empresas 30.000,00 52.500,00 1.3.1. Sistema de Gestão

BIRD 12.500,00 21.875,00

1.3.2. Sistema Comercial 12.500,00 21.875,00 1.3.3. Sistema de Informação Geográfica 5.000,00 8.750,00 2. Fortalecimento Institucional 34.000,00 59.500,00 2.1. Unidade Gestora do Projeto e Consultoria

BIRD

7.000,00 12.250,00 2.2. Comunicação Social 2.000,00 3.500,00 2.3. Fortalecimento da Capacidade Técnica e Ambiental 1.000,00 1.750,00 2.4. Implantação do Centro de Excelência de Energia do Acre 10.000,00 17.500,00 2.1. Unidade Gestora do Projeto e Consultoria

ELETROBRAS 6.000,00 10.500,00

2.2. Comunicação Social 7.000,00 12.250,00 2.3. Fortalecimento da Capacidade Técnica e Ambiental 1.000,00 1.750,00

Total 705.885,88 1.235.300,30

É importante enfatizar que a Eletrobras firmou o contrato de empréstimo e seus compromissos com o BIRD em dólares, no e seu repasse para as distribuidoras foi realizado em reais, com uma taxa de câmbio predefinida de R$ 1,75/US$ - taxa média durante o ano de 2010, época em que foi assinado o contrato de empréstimo. Feita a conversão dos valores para reais com tal câmbio, os recursos oriundos do empréstimo com o BIRD totalizaram R$ 866,2 milhões e a contrapartida da Eletrobras R$ 344,6 milhões com recursos da fonte RGR – Reserva Global de Reversão e R$ 24,5 milhões com a fonte RO – Recursos Ordinários. As tabelas a seguir retratam os valores firmados em cada um dos contratos, o total por distribuidora (soma dos 3 contratos) e o total geral do Projeto. Pode-se verificar o valor financiado por cada contrato com a fonte RGR (subcomponentes 1.1.3 e 1.1.460), ou seja, os custos diretos, bem como o valor da contrapartida de cada uma das EDE, isto é, os custos indiretos. A soma dos custos diretos e indiretos representa o total dos investimentos.

60 O subcomponente 1.1.4. Obras de Alta Tensão existe somente para a EDPI e é representado integralmente pelo contrato ECF-2784/2009 (fonte RGR).



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 176/197

A tabela a seguir retrata os contratos financiados por recursos ordinários da Eletrobras (fonte RO-Eletrobras) e referem-se aos subcomponentes 2.1, 2.2 e 2.3, concernentes à Unidade Gestora do Projeto e Consultoria, Comunicação Social e Fortalecimento da capacidade técnica e ambiental, respectivamente.

CONTRAPARTIDA ELETROBRAS – COMPONENTE 2 (RO)

EDE ECF INVESTIMENTO TOTAL

R$ USD ACRE 3017/2012 2.450.000 1,400,000

ALAGOAS 3012/2012 3.675.000 2,100,000

AMAZONAS 3016/2012 7.350.000 4,200,000

PIAUÍ 3013/2012 4.900.000 2,800,000

RONDÔNIA 3014/2012 3.675.000 2,100,000

RORAIMA 3015/2012 2.450.000 1,400,000

TOTAL GERAL 24.500.000 14,000,000

GOVERNANÇA FINANCEIRA

Juntamente com a definição do arranjo contratual do projeto foi desenhada a operacionalização financeira do fluxo de desembolsos e seu posterior reporte ao Banco, ou seja, a governança financeira do Projeto, ilustrada pela figura abaixo:

ECFELETROBRAS

(R$)%

AGENTE EXECUTOR (R$)

%TOTAL

INVESTIMENTO (R$)

TOTAL INVESTIMENTO

(US$)

ACRE 2924/2011 25.354.460,00 90% 2.744.060,00 10% 28.098.520,00 16.056.297,14

ALAGOAS 2922/2011 75.597.280,00 93% 6.032.440,00 7% 81.629.720,00 46.645.554,29

AMAZONAS 2923/2011 60.179.180,00 89% 7.221.200,00 11% 67.400.380,00 38.514.502,86

PIAUÍ 2920/2011 15.181.020,00 92% 1.237.960,00 8% 16.418.980,00 9.382.274,29

RONDONIA 2921/2011 56.084.420,00 92% 4.803.850,00 8% 60.888.270,00 34.793.297,14

RORAIMA 2919/2011 4.022.890,00 93% 301.720,00 7% 4.324.610,00 2.471.205,71

TOTAL 236.419.250,00 91% 22.341.230,00 9% 258.760.480,00 147.863.131,43

PIAUÍ 2784/2009 82.401.036,84 96% 3.415.083,30 4% 85.816.120,14 49.037.782,94

TOTAL GERAL 318.820.286,84 92% 26.174.371,50 8% 344.576.600,14 196.900.914,37

EDE

CONTRAPARTIDA ELETROBRAS COMPONENTE 1 (RGR)



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 177/197

Existem na realidade dois fluxos de fundos no projeto, sendo o primeiro de recursos do BIRD para a Eletrobras e o segundo da Eletrobras para os fornecedores e as distribuidoras, aqui detalhados:

Fluxo de fundos do Banco Mundial para a Eletrobras: a Eletrobras realiza um pedido de desembolso ao Escritório do Banco Mundial em Brasília, que analisa o pedido e após aprovação faz o depósito numa conta exclusiva da Eletrobras para o Projeto Energia+ em Nova York, denominada de Conta Designada. Após os recursos ingressarem nesta Conta, a Eletrobras realiza um contrato de câmbio e transfere os recursos, convertidos em reais, para uma conta específica61, definida como Conta Operativa.

Fluxo da Eletrobras para os Fornecedores e as Distribuidoras: com o dinheiro depositado na Conta Operativa, a Eletrobras efetua os pagamentos aos fornecedores do Projeto Energia+62 em nome das distribuidoras63. Além disso, os recursos dos impostos (ICMS, ISS, FGTS, IPI, PIS\PASEP, COFINS, etc.) são repassados para contas específicas das distribuidoras para que estas possam efetuar o devido recolhimento junto às receitas federal, estadual e municipal. Em síntese, a cada 15 dias as distribuidoras encaminham borderôs de pagamentos (Anexo 1) à Eletrobras para pagamentos aos seus fornecedores que encaminha o valor dos respectivos tributos para as EDE. No caso dos contratos com recursos RGR-Eletrobras e RO-Eletrobras a dinâmica é mais simples. A Eletrobras encaminha um adiantamento de recursos diretamente às distribuidoras em contas específicas64 e estas operacionalizam os pagamentos junto aos fornecedores e seus respectivos recolhimentos de impostos, sem influências da Eletrobras num primeiro momento65.

No caso dos recursos RO-BIRD, em que a Eletrobras paga diretamente os fornecedores e repassa o valor dos impostos

61 No início do Projeto Energia+ a Conta Operativa era no Rio de Janeiro.Com a migração de todas as contas corporate do Banco do Brasil para a cidade de São Paulo, a conta específica do Projeto também migrou. Destaca-se que tal mudança não causou qualquer prejuízo ao Projeto, já que se tratou de alteração oriunda de processos internos do Banco do Brasil. 62 Em cada pagamento é debitado o valor correspondente do contrato de subempréstimo. Como contrapartida, gera-se um crédito da dívida do financiamento no mesmo montante à Eletrobras. 63 Todos os fornecedores que recebem pagamentos da fonte BIRD são pré-cadastrados na Eletrobras holding. 64 Deve-se destacar que cada distribuidora tem três contas específicas para o Projeto Energia+, uma para operacionalizar recursos RO-BIRD, outra para recursos RGR-Eletrobras e uma última para os recursos RO-Eletrobras. 65 Posteriormente a liberação de recursos à título de adiantamento a Eletrobras realiza uma inspeção financeira e uma física nos projetos. A inspeção financeira verifica o pagamento das notas fiscais, a movimentação bancária, a apropriação contábil e o recolhimento de impostos, sempre observando o escopo do Projeto. Por sua vez, a inspeção física é realizada por uma equipe da engenharia que verifica a instalação dos equipamentos, sua operacionalização e o atendimento aos consumidores.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 178/197

a serem recolhidos às EDE, eventualmente pode ocorrer da distribuidora atrasar o envio de algum pedido referente a um dado fornecedor, ou então a EDE pode arcar com as despesas de viagem de algum funcionário, referentes à implantação de algum subcomponente. Nessas situações a EDE pode solicitar o reembolso dos recursos em borderô posterior.

No que tange ao Fluxo dos Relatórios e Documentos, este se refere basicamente ao reporte de informações para o BIRD e a Eletrobras. Após 20 dias do encerramento de um trimestre as distribuidoras devem enviar prestações de conta de cada um dos seus 3 (três) contratos para a Eletrobras66 e, 25 dias após o encerramento do trimestre, as EDE precisam encaminhar seus IFR. As prestações de conta devem ser encaminhadas anteriormente porque expressam o detalhamento dos gastos efetuados nos subcomponentes, ou seja, por nota fiscal.

Por sua vez, como os IFR fornecem um resumo “fechado” dos valores gastos para cada subcomponente, esses podem ser enviados depois. Em suma, as prestações de contas dizem respeito à abertura dos gastos em um trimestre, para cada subcomponente, já os IFR se referem ao resumo do valor gasto em cada subcomponente.

Uma das missões da área financeira da UGP Central é analisar e corrigir, se necessário, as prestações de contas e os IFR das EDE. As prestações após a validação pela UGP Central são enviadas ao Departamento de Captação e Gestão de Ativos e Passivos Financeiros – DFFG, pertencente à Diretoria Financeira – DF.

Já os IFR são consolidados e enviados ao BIRD pela UGP Central em até 45 após o encerramento do trimestre. O BIRD então, após validar os IFR, confirma que os valores do mesmo podem ser inseridos no sistema Client Connection. Além disso, caso exista no IFR alguma solicitação de saque, o BIRD em Brasília processa e pedido e informa sua sede, que realiza o depósito na Conta Designada da Eletrobras.

É importante enfatizar que os recursos do BIRD se encontram blindados, pois ficam depositados na Conta Operativa do Projeto, que é de gerenciamento exclusivo da Eletrobras. Somado a este fato, existe uma segurança extra que é fruto de uma exigência contratual da Eletrobras para com suas distribuidoras. Em outras palavras, existem limites contratuais para que os recursos sejam liberados sem que haja um grande descolamento da execução física do Projeto. As regras, que dão segurança na aplicação dos recursos são:

As liberações ocorrerão a título de adiantamento para posterior comprovação da realização física dos projetos, desde que os valores sejam aprovados em todos os demais aspectos pela UGP Central;

Após o valor liberado acumulado alcançar 70% (setenta por cento) do valor total de um determinado Contrato, as parcelas subsequentes, feitas a título de adiantamento, somente poderão ocorrer mediante avanço físico informado ou aprovado pelas áreas de engenharia e demais áreas técnicas da Eletrobras e desde que a diferença entre o percentual liberado acumulado e o avanço físico não seja maior do que 40%;

Após o valor liberado acumulado alcançar 80% (oitenta por cento) do valor total do Contrato, as parcelas subsequentes, feitas a título de adiantamento, somente poderão ocorrer desde que a diferença entre o percentual liberado acumulado e o avanço físico não seja maior que 10%.

De maneira complementar ressalta-se que os recursos liberados, ou seja, debitados de cada um dos contratados pelas EDE no âmbito do Energia+ são devidamente inspecionados em duas frentes, o lado financeiro e o físico.

66 No caso da EDPI são prestações de contas de 4 (quatro) contratos, já que existem 2 (dois) contratos com a fonte RGR.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 179/197

Na abordagem financeira a Eletrobras envia uma equipe para realizar inspeções in loco em cada uma das EDE, verificando notas fiscais, boletins de medição, recolhimento de impostos, movimentação bancária, unitização de ODIs, etc. Na abordagem física a Eletrobras envia uma equipe de engenheiros para verificar se as obras foram efetivamente realizadas, os equipamentos devidamente instalados, os consumidores atendidos, etc.

Nos dois tipos de inspeções, se encontradas inconsistências, a Eletrobras fornece a possibilidade de ajustes/correções. Caso não seja possível, os valores ou obras/equipamentos são glosados.

EXECUÇÃO ORÇAMENTÁRIA

Sendo a Eletrobras uma empresa controlada pela União, a execução orçamentária do Energia+ segue as rotinas do setor público. De uma forma resumida são os seguintes os procedimentos exigidos pela administração pública:

Fixação: a despesa a ser fixada deve ser autorizada em Lei Orçamentária Anual (LOA). No caso das empresas estatais, estas encaminham à Secretaria de Coordenação e Governança das Empresas Estatais (SEST), do Ministério do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento e Gestão, todos os gastos previstos para o ano posterior, que após aprovados integralmente ou não, são publicados em Decreto Presidencial.

Empenho: é a reserva de valor para pagamentos de obrigações, sendo sempre obrigatório. Por exemplo, ao ser firmado um contrato deve ser realizado o respectivo empenho, ainda que o contrato seja pago de forma parcelada. O empenho poderá ser cancelado se o contratado não cumprir sua obrigação contratual.

Restos a Pagar: corresponde a valores que foram empenhados em um exercício financeiro, mas não foram inteiramente pagos, ou porque não foi concluída a obrigação ou porque não houve a liquidação. Tais valores não voltam para votação porque foram empenhados. Os restos a pagar são despesas extra orçamentárias. Exemplo: a administração realiza um contrato, as prestações não foram concluídas e o valor empenhado não foi totalmente utilizado. Esses valores passam para o ano seguinte como restos a pagar.

Liquidação: é o momento da fase de execução da despesa que tem por fim verificar o cumprimento da obrigação ou quando da obrigação já realizada para possibilitar o pagamento. Pagamento: é a entrega do valor ao contratado com a consequente extinção da obrigação por parte da administração pública.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 180/197

EXECUÇÃO FINANCEIRA

1ª Fase - com a assinatura do contrato de empréstimo 7884-BR em 24/02/2011 tiveram início as possibilidades de desembolsos. Os primeiros recursos a utilizados foram os dos contratos de contrapartida a RGR. As liberações ocorreram no início de 2012, conforme é demonstrado da tabela abaixo:

EDE Contrato Data de Assinatura Data da Liberação Nº R$

EDAC ECF-2924/2011 02/05/2011 16/02/2012 1ª 2.535.446,00

EDAL ECF-2922/2011 05/04/2011 27/01/2012 1ª 7.559.728,00

EDAM ECF-2923/2011 06/04/2011 02/02/2012 1ª 6.017.918,00

EDPI ECF-2920/2011 13/04/2011 19/01/2012 1ª 1.518.102,00

EDRO ECF-2921/2011 18/04/2011 13/01/2012 1ª 5.608.442,00

EDRR ECF-2919/2011 06/04/2011 23/01/2012 1ª 402.289,00

TOTAL 23.641.925,00

Como a Eletrobras já possuía experiência na gestão de fundos setoriais, os desembolsos da RGR atingiram o volume de R$ 166,5 milhões ainda em 2013. Por outro lado, no dia 03/05/2012, a Eletrobras realizou sua primeira internalização de recursos da fonte BIRD. Nesta data foi firmado um contrato de câmbio para trazer US$ 400,0 mil de sua Conta Designada em NY para a Conta Operativa no Brasil. Ao câmbio contratado de R$ 1,9245/US$ os recursos em dólares se transformaram em R$ 769,8 mil. Os primeiros pagamentos com esta fonte ocorreram no dia 13/11/2012 e foram feitos para dois consultores que prestaram serviços para as ED Alagoas, ED Rondônia e ED Roraima. Como tais desembolsos ocorreram no final de 2012, o ano se encerrou com R$ 109.407,60 desembolsados e documentados por essa fonte.

Por sua vez, com o “start” do Projeto, o fluxo de saques e de valores documentados com a fonte BIRD foi melhorando gradativamente ao longo dos meses de 2013, com os saques totalizando R$ 86,6 milhões em 31/12/2013 e o documentado mais de R$ 58,1 milhões. Ao mesmo tempo, em 2013, ocorreram liberações das primeiras parcelas dos contratos RO-Eletrobras, vinculadas ao financiamento do componente 2, totalizando mais de R$ 4,5 milhões. Verifica-se assim que o Projeto teve um início tímido. A partir do conhecimento mais acurado das Diretrizes de Contratações do BIRD pela equipe da UGP Central, o Energia+ começou a tomar corpo, com um crescimento relevante em termos de desembolsos. 2ª Fase - com a maturação do Energia+, o perfil de desembolsos com a fonte BIRD melhorou significativamente. Se até 31/12/2013 o tinha sido desembolsado R$ 58,1 milhões, esse valor se ampliou em mais de seis vezes, atingindo a marca de R$ 357,1 milhões até 30/06/2016. Se por um lado o Projeto vinha andando bem com a fonte de recursos do BIRD, o mesmo deixou de ocorrer com as



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 181/197

demais fontes. Com as incertezas trazidas pela Medida Provisória nº 579, de 11/09/2012, depois convertida na Lei nº 12.783, de 11/01/2013, a Eletrobras no início de 2014 determinou que os repasses contratuais oriundos da fonte RGR fossem suspensos. Tal medida impossibilitou que as distribuidoras recebessem as demais parcelas dos contratos RGR do Energia+. De um total de R$ 318,8 milhões, apenas R$ 166,5 milhões foram liberados, correspondendo a 52,23% dos recursos contratados com a citada fonte. Em decorrência da decisão da holding, a UGP Central realizou uma consulta ao BIRD quanto a possibilidade de utilização dos ganhos cambiais obtidos nas internalizações efetuadas da Conta Designada para a Conta Operativa. Como os contratos de subempréstimos foram efetivados a um câmbio de R$ 1,75/US$, com uma quantidade menor de dólares foi possível obter os reais necessários para fazer frente a todos os compromissos, ocorrendo sobra de recursos. A tabela a seguir informa as taxas de câmbio de cada um dos contratos de internalização dos recursos.

Trimestre Data da

Internalização Contrato

de Câmbio

Conta Designada

US$

Taxa de Câmbio

Conta Operativa BRL

Acumulado em US$

Acumulado em BRL

2ª TRIM/2012 03/05/2012 1º 400,000 1,9245 769.800,00 400,000.00 769.800,00

1º TRIM/2013 22/02/2013 2º 6.235.380 1,967 12.264.992,46 6,635,380.00 13.034.792,46

2º TRIM/2013 06/06/2013 3º 14.900.000 2,111 31.453.900,00 21,535,380.00 44.488.692,46

3º TRIM/2013 30/09/2013 4º 18.865.000 2,2335 42.134.977,50 40,400,380.00 86.623.669,96

2º TRIM/2014 15/04/2014 5º 14.421.000 2,234 32.216.514,00 54,821,380.00 118.840.183,96

4º TRIM/2014 21/10/2014 6º 18.222.000 2,475 45.099.450,00 73.,043,380.00 163.939.633,96

1º TRIM/2015 18/02/2015 7º 69.532.000 2,8438 197.735.101,60 142,575,380.00 361.674.735,56

1º TRIM/2016 07/01/2016 8º 78.000.000 4,042 315.276.000,00 220,575,380.00 676.950.735,56

3º TRIM/2016 11/07/2016 9º 50.000.000 3,302 165.100.000,00 270,575,380.00 842.050.735,56

O BIRD, ciente dos ganhos cambiais obtidos e das economias decorrentes de vários processos licitatórios, deu sua anuência para que o saldo não desembolsado dos contratos RGR fosse financiado com os recursos RO-BIRD, num total de R$ 152,3 milhões.

Se por um lado o BIRD concordou em financiar o saldo da contrapartida de RGR, por outro, o jurídico da Eletrobras não se mostrou disposto a realizar os aditamentos contratuais, pois em sua visão, as EDE já se encontravam com um elevado nível de endividamento. Ainda que tenham ocorrido várias reuniões com Diretoria Financeira e a Área Jurídica da Eletrobras para a busca conjunta de soluções, a visão do jurídico prevaleceu e os aditivos para a suplementação de outra fonte para os contratos RGR não foram efetivados.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 182/197

Tendo em vista a importância de efetivar o projeto de regularização de unidades consumidoras em média (MT) e baixa tensão (BT), as EDE deram prosseguimento a esse projeto com recursos oriundos de seus caixas. Um novo problema atrelado à contrapartida do Projeto surgiu com a fonte de recursos RO-Eletrobras. Após as liberações das parcelas dos seis contratos terem sido efetivadas para as EDE, a Eletrobras impediu que as demais parcelas fossem disponibilizadas até que a Cláusula 4ª, em seu item 4.1, fosse cumprida pelas distribuidoras. Tal cláusula, presente em todos os contratos RO-Eletrobras, é transcrita a seguir:

4.1. A liberação do crédito ficará sujeita à adimplência da BENEFICIÁRIA com o Contrato de Metas de Desempenho (CMDE), bem como a observância das regras de liberação de recursos especificadas nas Cláusulas 2ª e 3ª das “Condições Gerais dos Contratos de Financiamento e\ou Subvenção da ELETROBRAS”.

O contrato de metas de desempenho refere-se a um elenco de metas expressas em indicadores financeiros, operacionais e de serviços, a ser observadas pelas EDE. Os indicadores são ponderados gerando uma média global de desempenho para cada EDE, por ano. Se a EDE apresentar um indicador global nos limites estabelecidos para o ano, ela encontra-se adimplente junto ao CMDE. Caso contrário não. Como as metas estabelecidas foram muito audaciosas para os anos de 2014, 2015, 2016 e 2017, as EDE não cumpriram o CMDE, deixando de receber recursos da fonte RO-Eletrobras. Desse modo, as EDE procederam da mesma forma ocorrida com o fim da RGR, dando curso aos projetos do componente 2 com recursos próprios. 3ª Fase: - considerando a delicada situação financeira que a Eletrobras vinha passando desde o advento da MP-579/2012, bem como, os sucessivos prejuízos acumulados pelas seis EDE ao longo de diversos anos, a 165ª Assembleia de Acionistas da Eletrobras, em 26/07/2016 deliberou pela não prorrogação das concessões das EDE, determinando, a transferência de controle destas para até o final de 2017, nos termos do parágrafo 1º-A do Art. 8º da Lei nº 12.783/2013, com nova redação dada pela MP-735/2016, desde que, até a transferência das distribuidoras para o(s) novo(s) controlador(es), estas recebam diretamente da União federal ou através de tarifa, todos os recursos e remuneração necessários para operar, manter e fazer investimentos que foram relacionados aos serviços públicos da respectiva distribuidora, mantido o equilíbrio econômico e financeiro, sem aporte de recurso, a qualquer título, pela Eletrobras. A decisão emanada pela 165ª Assembleia de Acionistas incluiu os recursos da fonte BIRD do Energia+. Assim, a última e mais importante fonte de recursos do Projeto que estava até então em vigor foi suspensa. Assim, nenhum pagamento, a qualquer título, poderia ser realizado para as distribuidoras ou seus fornecedores no âmbito do Projeto. Em decorrência da enorme pressão que as EDE passaram a sofrer de seus fornecedores por não mais receber recursos RO-BIRD, elas passaram a requerer uma decisão formal do Diretor de Distribuição – DD da Eletrobras, quanto ao prosseguimento ou não do Energia+. Dessa forma, no dia 13/10/2016, o DD da Eletrobras enviou e-mail determinando que o Projeto fosse paralisado até segunda ordem. A UGP Central passou a realizar um levantamento sobre os custos das rescisões de todos os contratos do Projeto, ou seja, custos decorrentes de penalidades contratuais, lucros cessantes, ações trabalhistas em decorrência de responsabilidade solidária, etc.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 183/197

Além dos projetos já em andamento, com recursos aprovados e empenhados, terem que parar, numa estimativa preliminar, a Eletrobras teria um custo da ordem de R$ 140 milhões para realizar todas as rescisões. Contabilmente, as EDE deixariam de incorporar ativos em sua base e teriam que provisionar recursos para prováveis indenizações. Os ativos das EDE sofreriam perdas, os passivos aumentariam e os resultados de cada uma delas seriam impactos negativamente. Diante de tal cenário, a UGP Central realizou diversas reuniões com o DD e seus assistentes para explicar a situação calamitosa que estava por vir, já que os resultados das EDE entram nos demonstrativos financeiros consolidados da holding, impactando negativamente seus resultados globais. Assim, na 2074ª Reunião da Diretoria Executiva da Eletrobras, realizada em 05/12/2016, tendo como base o Parecer Jurídico contido no memorando PJEF-3948/2016 que concluiu que:

“A utilização dos recursos do Programa Energia+, nos parece estar limitada à data das PORTARIAS (Designação das EDE como responsáveis pela prestação de serviço público de distribuição), no sentido de que apenas despesas contratuais consumadas até 05 de agosto de 2016, ou cuja consumação tenha se iniciado até a mesma data, ainda que sua conclusão se dê em momento posterior, serão passíveis de reembolso por meio do CONTRATO, pois em ambas hipóteses tais despesas estariam, em nosso entender, sob a égide do ato jurídico perfeito, não podendo sofrer os efeitos da Assembleia que lhes foi posterior”

Diante do exposto, a Diretoria Executiva da Eletrobras aprovou:

1) A sequência dos subprojetos cujos contratos tenham sido iniciados antes de 04/08/2016 e os pagamentos decorrentes desta sequência;

2) envio de Carta ao Banco Mundial manifestando interesse quanto à extensão do prazo do Projeto Energia+

até 31/12/2017 ou para data em que venha a ocorrer a transferência do controle acionário das empresas, prevalecendo o que ocorrer primeiro, bem como informando que não executará o saque de US$ 224,426,620.,00 do valor que compôs o acordo de empréstimo, devendo novas medidas serem tomadas entre as partes para que se regularize a redução. A dilatação do prazo ainda dependerá de aprovação da Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais (SEAIN) e da Secretaria de Tesouro Nacional (STN);

3) contratação de consultoria externa objetivando uma ampla avaliação da prudência quanto à sequência

desses projetos/contratos, considerando o processo de transferência do controle acionário da EDE, de modo a contribuírem para a melhoria do valor destas empresas, propiciando reflexos positivos no processo de alienação das mesmas. Esta consultoria também apoiará na execução final do Projeto Energia+.

Uma vez retomado o fluxo de desembolsos, o Projeto Energia+ conseguiu atingir a marca de quase R$ 550,7 milhões (US$ 189,3 milhões) até 30/09/2017, 63,57% do previsto, com gastos em obras, equipamentos e serviços. Além disso, o montante de R$ 291,3 milhões (US$ 81,2 milhões) ainda se encontra na Conta Operativa do Projeto para fazer frente aos compromissos finais do projeto, com os fatos geradores limitados a 29/12/2017. Outro aspecto importante diz respeito à alteração e reestruturação dos subcomponentes do Energia+. Os subprojetos



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 184/197

Digitalização de Condomínios, Sistema Comercial e Sistema de Gestão foram cancelados, sendo incluídos dois novos subcomponentes: 1.1.4. Obras de Alta Tensão67 e 1.3.4. Recadastramento de Unidades Consumidoras. Vale também frisar que os valores dos demais subcomponentes foram revistos, de forma a refletirem seus desembolsos mais adequadamente. RESUMO DOS DESEMBOLSOS De acordo com o exposto no gráfico a seguir, pode-se verificar o volume de desembolsos do Energia+ com a fonte de recursos BIRD durante o período 2012-2017, bem como, o volume financeiro dos contratos assinados e dos valores sacados. Em termos financeiros o Projeto Energia+ se desenvolveu em duas etapas distintas, a saber: Na primeira, até o ano de 2014, observa-se um desenvolvimento ainda incipiente no volume de recursos sacados e desembolsados, assim como nos contratos assinados. A partir de 2015, principalmente com o resultado da licitação internacional do projeto AMI, a disponibilidade de recursos ampliou-se de forma substancial. É possível verificar que, mesmo sem novas contratações, o valor dos contratos assinados foi de aproximados R$ 780,0 milhões para um total de recursos já sacados de R$ 842 milhões, o que garante a integralidade da fonte para fazer frente a todas as necessidades.

Valores Sacados X Contratos Assinados X Valores Desembolsados

No gráfico abaixo se demonstra o fluxo de saques e desembolsos com a fonte BIRD, sendo possível constatar que até 30/09/2017 a EDE que mais se valeu dessa fonte foi a EDPI, com 80% dos recursos já empregados, seguida de perto pela EDAL e a EDRO, ambas com 72% de aplicação. Os desembolsos globais da fonte RO-BIRD atingiram 65% do sacado.

67 Não confundir com o subcomponente 1.1.4. Obras de AT (fonte RGR).

842,050,735.56 779,999,870.02

550,684,337.75

0.00100,000,000.00200,000,000.00300,000,000.00400,000,000.00500,000,000.00600,000,000.00700,000,000.00800,000,000.00900,000,000.00

201220132014201520162017

Val

ores

(R

$)

Valores Sacados (R$)

Contratos Assinados(R$)



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 185/197

Por fim, o gráfico abaixo considera o somatório de todas as fontes de recursos, RO-BIRD, RGR-Eletrobras e RO-Eletrobras. Confirma-se a EDPI como a EDE que mais aplicou recursos em termos proporcionais - 88% do previsto, seguida pela EDRO, com 86%. Os desembolsos globais representaram, até 30/09/2017, 74% do previsto para o Projeto com seu novo arranjo.

Utilização dos Recursos considerando todas as fontes

Em suma, pode-se afirmar que até 30/09/2017 o Projeto Energia+ conseguiu apresentar um grau de desembolsos com a fonte BIRD de 65%. Ao considerar todas as fontes de recursos, 74%. Tais números são expressivos, ainda mais se considerados todos os eventos que impactaram de forma negativa o ciclo



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 186/197

de vida do Projeto. OUTRAS CONSIDERAÇÕES Ainda que o Projeto não alcance sua plenitude, como as EDE utilizaram recursos próprios para continuar a investir nas obras em substituição à RGR, bem como de projetos que eram financiados pela fonte RO-Eletrobras, espera-se que o Energia+ possa atingir uma execução global próxima aos 80%. Tal estimativa é razoável, pois, do total previsto a ser aplicado pela contrapartida (RGR + RO Eletrobras), ou seja, R$ 369,1 milhões, até o final de setembro de 2017 haviam sido aplicados R$345,9 milhões, 93,72% do previsto. Estima-se utilizar pelo menos 70% dos recursos disponibilizados pelo BIRD, dada a paralisação de projetos e novas contratações decididas na 165ª Assembleia de Acionistas, que impediram o atingimento da integralidade das metas. Pode-se, contudo, afirmar que os resultados financeiros superaram as expectativas.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 187/197

A UTILIZAÇÃO DE RECURSOS BASEADA EM GANHOS CAMBIAIS E A INVERSÃO DE RECURSOS DA CONTRAPARTIDA A apreciação do dólar americano em relação ao real possibilitou executar muitos mais projetos do que havia sido planejado anteriormente. Tal visão pode ser obtida no tema suprimentos onde se apresenta o rol de contratações ocorridas. Por outro lado, nos projetos de contrapartida as EDE foram instadas a suportar com recursos próprios que corresponderam a aproximados R$ 108 milhões, fato que prejudicou a gestão financeira das mesmas.

CONTRATOS RO ELETROBRAS

Dado o não atingimento das metas propostas pelo Contrato de Metas e Desempenho (CMDE) estabelecido entre as EDE e a Eletrobras, houve restrição para novas liberações de recursos.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 188/197

CONTRATOS RGR

RES-084/2018 – APLICAÇÕES ATÉ 31/12/2016 MP-579 DE 11/09/2012

Não houve concordância em aditivar os contratos RGR ainda que o BIRD se dispusesse em financiar o saldo dos contratos. A preocupação recaiu sobre o já elevado nível de endividamento das distribuidoras. Pela resolução de diretoria RES-084/2018 as Aplicações de Recursos da RGR são válidas até 31/12/2016, corroborando com o que já havia sido decidido pela RES-672/2015 e DEL-153/2015.

PERFIL DE SAQUES E DESEMBOLSOS

Item Distribuidora Contrato1ª Liberação de Recursos

Data de Encerramento

do Crédito

Valor Contratado (R$)

Valor Liberado (R$)

Saldo (R$)Prestado

Contas***

1 EDAC ECF-2924-A/2012 16/02/2012 16/04/2015 25.354.460,00 12.675.829,62 12.678.630,38 25.836.124,19

2 EDAL ECF-2922-A/2015 27/01/2012 27/04/2014 75.597.280,00 30.409.917,33 45.187.362,67 39.007.609,85

3 EDAM ECF-2923-A/2012 02/02/2012 02/05/2014 60.179.180,00 25.074.660,67 35.104.519,33 54.720.476,10

4 EDPI ECF-2920-A/2012 19/01/2012 19/04/2014 15.181.020,00 6.619.149,38 8.561.870,62 18.156.188,88

5 EDPI ECF-2784-A/2013 31/08/2010 31/12/2013 82.401.036,84 64.921.932,97 17.479.103,87 67.894.570,80

6 EDRO ECF-2921-A/2012 13/01/2012 13/04/2014 56.084.420,00 25.604.903,76 30.479.516,24 64.633.939,51

7 EDRR ECF-2919-A/2012 23/01/2012 23/04/2015 4.022.890,00 1.206.867,00 2.816.023,00 4.616.608,35

* Aceito pelo DFI até a data de corte (fim do contrato). 318.820.286,84 166.513.260,73 152.307.026,11 274.865.517,68** A inspecionar.*** Atualizado até o 4º trimestre de 2016.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 189/197

TODAS AS FONTES POR EDE

RESULTADOS ATÉ O 4º TRIMESTRE DE 2017

R$ US$

SALDO A DOCUMENTAR 242.326.469,85 69,106,011.10

DOCUMENTADO 599.724.238,71 201,469,368.90

TOTAL 842.050.735,56 270,575,380.00

CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

O Projeto Energia+ conseguiu obter R$ 842 milhões com USD 271 milhões, vis à vis a meta de R$ 866 milhões com USD 495 milhões.

Até o final do 4º Trimestre de 2017, o Projeto conseguiu aplicar 78% dos recursos totais previstos (R$ 947 milhões dos R$ 1.211 milhões).

Todo o montante investido permitiu a melhoria dos indicadores de DEC, FEC e da arrecadação das seis EDE

TEMA 13: BANK PERFORMANCE

Moderadora: Lisa Maier (Oficial – Banco Mundial)

OBJETIVO

Avaliar a performance do Banco Mundial na implementação do Projeto Energia+.



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 190/197

Posicionamento do Rudolph (Finanças)

Excelente aprendizado pela adoção de uma nova dinâmica para a gestão financeira do Energia +; A solução adotada foi blindar os recursos externos com a gestão dos mesmos pela holding. Anteriormente

quando do repasse de recursos para as EDE, apenas abria-se uma conta específica para a gestão financeira pelas empresas. Como estas vivenciavam problemas na geração de caixa, os gestores utilizavam temporariamente recursos do empréstimo para pagar outros compromissos da empresa, repondo-os posteriormente, com o que não concordavam os órgãos de controle;

Assim, todo o encaminhamento de ordem financeira junto à Eletrobras foi feito pela Unidade Central Gestora do Projeto, suportado por encaminhamentos feitos individualmente pelas EDE;

Realçado que uma das exigências do WB foi a implementação de um sistema financeiro especifico, para o que se buscava utilizar o sistema SAP, o que não foi possível implantar por questões de ordem administrativa que motivaram atraso na implementação de um único sistema de gestão empresarial comandado pela holding. Assim, foram mantidos controles em planilhas Excel, que mesmo não sendo o ideal, possibilitou uma gestão de relativa segurança;

Não foi bem assimilada a manifestação do WB de rebaixar a nota de avaliação no tópico gestão financeira, pois ainda que não se tenha tido sucesso em implementar um sistema mais acurado, constata-se que a utilização dos recursos foi bem blindada, com o que se solicita uma reavaliação da nota.

Posicionamento do Ariovaldo

Ressaltou o ganho qualitativo que se teve quando o WB definiu que o seu coordenador do Projeto passaria a atuar diretamente em Brasília ao invés de em Washington, vindo somente em missão de supervisão periodicamente;

Tal decisão reduziu sobremodo sua preocupação com tensões iniciais de ordem técnica ocorridas entre as partes;

Destacou atitudes proativas, com encaminhamentos que, atendendo rigorosamente os preceitos do WB, proporcionaram soluções adequadas para que fossem atingidos os resultados planejados;

A convivência dos profissionais da UGP e das EDE com os profissionais do WB proporcionou um aprendizado progressivo, tanto de ordem técnica quanto administrativa, onde se destaca a experiência do mesmo em licitações internacionais;

Quando da emissão de Acórdão do TCU acerca de licitação internacional envolvendo a aquisição de equipamentos no exterior, com a qual a Eletrobras não concordava, foi fundamental para a mudança de posicionamento do Tribunal a participação ativa de representante do WB, que emprestou toda a sua experiência e credibilidade;

Destacada a colaboração ativa do WB quando da reunião com a COFIEX no processo de busca da extensão da data de término do Energia+, com ativa articulação junto ao MME;

Quanto às dimensões social e ambiental os requisitos solicitados pelo Banco possibilitaram decisões de gestão importantes para as empresas de distribuição, reforçando e gerando projetos importantes para a vida empresarial. Destaque para logística reversa, iniciada com medidores obsoletos e que podem ser ampliados para outros equipamentos;

Quando necessário avaliar previamente possíveis impactos ocasionados por linha de alta tensão em áreas indígenas, o Banco enviou um profissional para confirmar a inexistência de problemas. A experiência ocorrida em Alagoas foi aproveitada no Piauí e será aproveitada em outros empreendimentos, ainda que não financiados pelo Banco Mundial;

Pela experiência de ter trabalhado muito mais tempo nos ramos de geração e distribuição de energia elétrica, vivenciou quão mais difícil é atuar na distribuição, notadamente nas regiões norte e nordeste do Brasil, em empresas com baixo perfil de investimento dadas as carências de ordem econômico-financeira



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 191/197

As EDE somente puderam traçar um plano de prestação de serviços temporário com metas definidas pela ANEEL, no que tange ao DEC, FEC e perdas elétricas, devido ao aporte de recursos do Banco Mundial na aquisição e instalação de equipamentos capazes de melhorar a qualidade e a continuidade dos serviços.

Relembrou uma decisão de suma importância que foi a concordância do Banco Mundial para a utilização de saldos do financiamento para que fossem investidos em obras que haviam sido compromissadas como contrapartida e que com a impossibilidade de se utilizar RGR, tiveram obras descartadas da execução. Aplicados tais recursos destacou, como exemplo, a expressiva redução de perdas obtida com a construção da Linha Delmiro – Olho d’Água, em Alagoas, que proporcionou adequação no nível de tensão, aumento na confiabilidade e melhor gestão operacional.

Em resumo, não seria justo atribuir ao Banco Mundial no que tange ao Projeto Energia+ uma nota de avaliação que fosse diferente da máxima - nota 10.

Posicionamento do Paulo Lucena

Presença do TTL no Brasil foi fundamental; O Projeto foi um divisor de águas: antes e depois do Energia +; As empresas estão agora muito mais preparadas e estruturadas; Muitas dificuldades foram vencidas em função do alicerce (base) construído; Parceria muito frutífera: experiência internacionais trazidas e levadas pelo Banco; Nota 10.

Posicionamento da Diva - área de licitações e contratos e coordenação de informações para auditoria externa

Estendeu agradecimentos pelo aprendizado conquistado.

ENCERRAMENTO

Momento de agradecimentos pelo trabalho desenvolvido por todos os profissionais que enfrentaram com sucesso os desafios de um Projeto de tamanha complexidade, num ambiente colaborativo.

A sintonia profissional regeu ações que proporcionaram ganhos aos clientes e colaboraram para uma melhor performance das empresas!



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 192/197

PARTICIPAÇÕES

ACRE

EDINALDO MEDEIROS AMI, TELEMEDIÇÃO OTÁVIO RIBEIRO PROJETO 5, QUALIDADE KELLY LACERDA UGP / GESTÃO AMBIENTAL RICARDO CRUZ RECADASTRAMENTO DE UC’s ANDRE KLEIN SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE MEDIDORES OBSOLETOS

ALAGOAS

DOLLY RECADASTRAMENTO FERNANDO AMARAL PROJETO 5 DAVI OPERADOR CENTRO DE MEDIÇÃO, TELEMEDIÇÃO LUÍS HENRIQUE QUALIDADE E DIGITALIZAÇÃO, TELEMEDIÇÃO RONALDO MEDIDORES OBSOLETOS

AMAZONAS

AUREO ALBUQUERQUE PROJETO 5 - PNT LENISE PINTO QUALIDADE E MELHORIA DA DISTRIBUIÇÃO LUCIO ROSA ESCRITÓRIO DE GESTÃO DE PROJETOS CENTRAL MARCIO PAIXÃO UGP ALBERMAR FORTES RECADASTRAMENTO, COORDENADOR CORPORATIVO THIAGO FLORES JURÍDICO, AMBIENTAL - LOGÍSTICA REVERSA SHIRLEY VENTURA PROJETO RECADASTRAMENTO DE UC LUANA RIBEIRO ESCRITÓRIO DE GESTÃO DE PROJETOS ANDERSON NUNES EPG CENTRAL JEAN CUNHA PROJETO AMI

PIAUÍ

CRISTIANO CASTRO TELEMEDIÇÃO DE ALIMENTADORES CONCEIÇÃO NUNES PLANEJAMENTO, ESCRITÓRIO DE PROJETO DIVA LICITAÇÃO, CONTRATAÇÃO, AUDITORIA CGU MARCIO RECADASTRAMENTO, AGORA 70%

RONDÔNIA

SOCORRO LOGISTICA REVERSA RICELLY SANTIAGO AMI MARCELO MOLBECK PROJETO 5 GERSON LOBO DIGITALIZAÇÃO DE REDE PAULO LUCENA AMI RENAN MODERNIZAÇÃO SISTEMAS DE INFORMAÇÃO RODRIGO MEIRELES SINAPIS GRID

ELETROBRAS

ALEXANDRE BENJAMIN SUSTENTABILIDADE E MEIO AMBIENTE DANIEL BARAÚNA GESTÃO DE PROJETO DE DISTRIBUIÇÃO DIMAS NATAL COORDENADOR GERAL DO ENERGIA+ RUDOLPH FINANÇAS - UGP PATRÍCIA DE CICCO COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL PEDRO HENRIQUE GESTÃO DE PROJETO DE DISTRIBUIÇÃO ANDRÉ MEDIÇÃO

ELETRONORTE CYNTHIA CHIARELLI SOCIOAMBIENTAL GESTÃO CENTRAL MME GUSTAVO MASSILI

BNDES ALAIN

BANCO MUNDIAL

CHRISTOPHE JIMMY PANNETT LISA MAIER OFICIAL ARIOVALDO STELLE CONSULTOR



Printed 6/27/2018 5:16 PM 193/197

Resources

Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica, accessed on June 19 (http://www.aneel.gov.br/) Eletrobras 2010 Sustainability Report Eletrobras 2014 Sustainability Report Eletrobras 2016 Annual ReportEletrobras, Relatório de Progresso, September 2013; September 2015, September 2017 Eletrobras – World Bank (January 2017) ICR Workshop ReportIMF (2018); I. Krznar and T. Matheson; Working Paper - Investment in Brazil: From Crisis to Recovery. OECD (2018); OECD Economic Survey of Brazil – Towards a more prosperous and inclusive Brazil. Paula Borges da Silveira Bezerra, et al (2017); “The power of light: socio-economic and environmental implications of a rural electrification program in Brazil”; (accessed on June 1, 2018 http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7bdd/pdf) Reuters, January 19, 2018 Reuters, February 22, 2018 Siemens (November 8, 2016), Interview with Eletrobras director Luiz Henrique Hamann; (accessed on March 27, 2018 on https://www.siemens.com/customer-magazine/en/home/energy/agility-in-energy/measuring-energy-use-as-consumer-advantage.html) Telesur, accessed on March 9, 2018 (https://www.reuters.com/article/eletrobras-privatization/brazilian-lawmakers-to-vote-on-eletrobras-privatization-in-april-maia-idUSL2N1QC100) World Bank Project Appraisal Document (2010); Eletrobras Distribution Rehabilitation Project World Bank Aide Memoires World Bank Mid-term Review (2013) World Bank video on project: https://youtu.be/Hw4ePT3hCQo World Bank Implementation and Status Reports

ICR00004432 - World Bank Documents

Documents

Transcript of ICR00004432 - World Bank Documents