37758 - World Bank Documents

37758VOL. 2

EXPERIENCES WITHAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

IN TROPICAL AFRICA

VOLUME II

THE CASE STUDIES

by

John C. de Wilde

assisted by

Peter F. M. McLoughlin, Andre Guinard,Thayer Scudder, Robert Maubouche

Published forThe International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

by The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland

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Copyright ©) 1967

by The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Library of Congress Catalogue Card No. 66-28504

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

I

KENYA

1. INTRODUCTION ................................. 3

Lines of development ................................. 3The focus of investigation ............................. 5

Land tenure reform .................................. 5The background .................................... 5Spontaneous land enclosure and consolidation ................ 7Initiation of consolidation in Central Province ............... 8Procedure in land consolidation and registration .............. 9Progress in the Kikuyu districts ........................ 12Land reform elsewhere ............................... 13Restrictions on land transactions ........................ 15The effect of land reform ............................. 16

Agricultural extension and education ....................... 16Farm layouts and plans .............................. 17Farmers' training centers ............................. 19Other educational influences ........................... 21

Agricultural credit .................................... 22Commercial bank credit .............................. 22Government credit ................................... 22

Market organization ................................. 24Marketing of particular products ....................... 24Marketing of general produce .......................... 27The role of cooperatives .............................. 28

Some general observations ............................. 29Progress in African agriculture ........................... 30

2. THE EXPERIENCE IN NYERI DISTRICT .......... 33

Introduction ......................................... 33

Ecology .......................................... 33

Population pressure and labor migration .................. 35

The Kikuyu inhabitants .............................. 39

The progress achieved ................................ 40

Coffee ........................................... 41

Tea ............................................ 47

Dairying ......................................... 49

Less successful farm ing activities ....................... 52

The impact on employment .............................. 55

The factors in development .............................. 56

Land reform ..................................... 57

The role of farm credit .............................. 60

The role of cooperatives .............................. 65

The role of government field staff ....................... 68

Neglected areas of development ........................... 74

Inadequate development of the largest and smallest holdings. . 74

The plight of the smallholder .......................... 75

Conclusions ........................................ 81

MAP. Nyeri District ..................................... 34

3. THE EXPERIENCE IN MACHAKOS DISTRICT ..... 84

Introduction ........................................ 84

Ecological factors .................................... 84

Crops and cropping patterns ............................. 87

Population pressures ................................... 89

The search for land ................................. 90

Labor migration ................................... 90

The people ......................................... 91

Government development efforts ........................... 92

Soil conservation .................................... 93

Efforts to improve crop husbandry ....................... 99

Development of cash crops ........................... 104

Resettlement and irrigation ........................... 109

The livestock problem .............................. 111

Conclusions . ....................................... 117

M AP. M achakos District .. ........................... 85

4. THE EXPERIENCE IN CENTRAL NYANZA DISTRICT 121

Introduction .................. 121

Ecological factors ................................... 122

Demographic pressures ................................ 124Labor migration and agriculture ....................... 127

Characteristics of Luo and Luo society .................... 129Traditional society ................................. 130Land fragmentation ................................ 131Exposure to modernizing influences ..................... 132Political consciousness .............................. 132

The record ......................................... 132Improvements zn crop husbandry ....................... 1 36Cash crops ...................................... 137Irrigation ........................................ 145Animal husbandry ................................. 147Land consolidation, enclosure and registration ............. 149

Conclusions . ....................................... 153

M AP. Central Nyanza District .................... I ....... 123

5. THE EXPERIENCE IN THE DISTRICTS OFBARINGO AND ELGEYO-MARAKWET ............. 157

General background .................................. 157Population and land resources ......................... 157Physical description ................................ 159Limitations of data ................................ 161Differences in progress and change ..................... 161

The Marakwet division ............................... 162The Elgeyo division .................................. 165

Occupation of the plateau and enclosure .................. 166Development following enclosure ....................... 167Features of Elgeyo farming ........................... 167The role of credit .................................. 169

Lembus Forest and South Baringo ........................ 169Factors in comparative progress ........................ 170Development of individual holdings ..................... 170

The Tugen Hills ................................... 172Factors inhibiting change ............................ 172The land problem: fragmentation and consolidation ........ 173

The grazing areas ...... ............................ 174Bush clearance .................................... 175Grazing schemes ................................... 177Destocking ....................................... 179Reaction to grazing and livestock controls ................ 181Possible approaches ................................ 183

Concluding remarks .................................. 186

MAP. Districts of Elgeyo-Marakwet and Baringo .............. 158

6. SOME REFLECTIONS ON SETTLEMENT SCHEMES. 188

Introduction ........................................ 188

Settlement procedures ................................. 190

Purchase of land for settlement ........................ 190

Responsibilities for organization and planning ............. 190

Types of settlements .................................. 191

High- and low-density schemes ........................ 191

Yeoman farms .................................... 192

Large farms ...................................... 193

Financing of settlement ................................ 194

Loan terms ...................................... 195

Repayments ...................................... 196

Staffing and supervision of settlement schemes ................ 197

Extension work ................................... 198

The role of cooperatives ............................... 199

Range of activities ................................. 200

Cooperative ranching ............................... 200

Efect of settlement on production and employment ............ 203

The pattern of production ............................ 203

Farm output and profitability ......................... 205

The increase in employment .......................... 211

Farm efficiency and settler selection ....................... 212

Criteria of settler selection ........................... 212

The need for different types of settlement ................ 213

Some other problems .................................. 215

The problem of mechanization ........................ 215

The pattern of settlement ............................ 217

Conclusions .. ................................ 218

7. OBSERVATIONS ON SOME IRRIGATION SCHEMES 221

Introduction ........................................ 221

Perkerra ........................................ 221

Mwea- Tebere .................................... 221

Planning and research ................................ 222

Operation of the schemes .............................. 224

Management organization and staffing .................. 224

Selection of tenants ................................. 225

Housing and settlement ............................. 227

Division of farming operations between management andtenants ........................................ 228

Mechanical land preparation ......................... 228Charges for management supplies and services ............. 231

The results ........................................ 231Production and income .............................. 231Use of paid labor by tenants ......................... 234Disposal of tenant income ............................ 236Tenant cooperation and discipline ...................... 236

Intensification of production ............................ 239Concluding remarks .................................. 240

II

OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1. MALI: THE OFFICE DU NIGER - AN EXPERIENCEWITH IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE ........... .... 245

Introduction ........................................ 245The organization of the Office .......................... 248

The administration ................................ 249Development work ................................. 250Settlement ....................................... 252Industrial and commercial operations .................... 256Agricultural production .............................. 257

Irrigation and drainage problems ........................ 262Intensiflcation of production ............................ 264

Intensification techniques ............................ 264Reasons for the limited success of intensification ............ 270

Some other problems .................................. 278Mechanization .................................... 278The farming enterprises of the Office ................... 283Coordination of foreign aid ........................... 286

Conclusions ........................................ 287

MAP. Irrigated Areas of the Office du Niger .................. 247

GRAPHS.

I. Number of Settlers ................................ 293II. Area Sown to Rice and Cotton ....................... 294III. Output of Rice and Cotton ......................... 295IV. Yields of Rice and Cotton .......................... 296

ANNEXES.

1. Data on Rainfall ................................. 297

2. Charges Levied by the Office ......................... 2973. Cultivated Area and Production of the Various Sectors in

the Office du Niger ............................. 2984. Total Population Settled (June 1960) ................. 300

2. MALI: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEASANT COTTONPRODUCTION BY THE CFDT ..................... 301

Introduction ........................................ 301

Agriculture south of the Niger .......................... 301Ecological and social conditions ....................... 301

Pattern of farming ................................. 304Means of assistance .................................. 307

Development of extension services ...................... 307

UTnite's de culture .................................. 309Communal fields .................................. 311Seasonal agricultural schools .......................... 312Sales of equipment and supplies ....................... 314

The new techniques .................................. 317The CFD T program ............................... 317

Land preparation .................................. 318

Manuring ....................................... 319

Improved varieties and date of sowing ................... 322

Care of the cotton .................................. 323Spraying ........................................ 324

Cotton production .................................... 325Ginning and marketing .............................. 325

Area and yields ................................... 326The production sectors .............................. 328

Conclusions ........................................ 331

MAP. Cotton Area in Mali ............................... 302

ANNEXES.

1. Output Marketed by the CFDT ..................... 334

2. Rainfall in Sikasso ............................... 3343. Rainfall in Baroueli .............................. 3354. Rainfall in Koutiala .............................. 3355. Rainfall in San .................................. 336

3. REPUBLIC OF CHAD: THE WORK OF THE BDPAIN THE BOKORO AREA .......................... 337

Introduction ........................................ 337Agriculture in the Bokoro area .......................... 337

Physical characteristics and human aspects ............... 337Econom ic activity .................................. 341

The BDPA operation ................................ 347Extension staff .................................... 348Community action .................................. 350Other activities ................................... 360

Conclusions ........................................ 362

MAPS.

Republic of Chad .................................... 338Climate and V,egetation of Baguirmi ...................... 339Sub-prefecture of Bokoro .............................. 348

ANNEXES.

1. 10-Year Rainfall Distributions at Bokoro .............. 3662. Areas Tilled with the UTse of Draft Animals ............ 3663. Summary of BDPA Activities in the Whole of Chari-

B aguirm i ........................................ 3674. Extension of the BDPA Operation in Chari-Baguirmi ..... 367

4. UPPER VOLTA: THE AGRICULTURAL EXTENSIONPROGRAM OF SATEC IN THE MOSSI COUNTRY ... 369

Introduction ........................................ 369Agriculture in the Mossi country ........................ 369

The physical and human milieu ....................... 369The economic setting ................................ 371Previous experiences with agricultural extension ............ 373

SA TEC's program .................................. 374The organizational structure .......................... 375The methods and objectives .......................... 379Introduction of animal-drawn cultivator ................. 380

C onclusion ......................................... 388

MAP. Zone of Operations of SA TEC in Upper V"olta ........... 370

5. IVORY COAST: THE PROGRAM OF ANIMATIONRURALE IN THE BOUAKE REGION .............. 391

Introduction ........................................ 391

Agriculture in the Bouake' region ........................ 391

Physical and human factors .......................... 391

Economic activity .................................. 395

Means of assistance ................................ 399

CIDR's activities ................................... 402

The preliminary action near Bouake .................... 403

Operations of the zone for rural development .............. 404

The role of CIDR ................................. 405

Conclusions ........................................ 411

MAPS.

Rainfall in the Ivory Coast ............................ 393

Principal Tribes in the Sub-prefectures of the Central Department. 394

Soil Map of the Environs of Bouak ..................... 395

6. TANZANIA: AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTIN SUKUMALAND ............................. 415

Introduction ........................................ 415

Sukuma society and economy ............................ 416

Directions of development .............................. 418

Demise of the Ten-Year Development Scheme ............... 419

Expansion and controlled resettlement ..................... 420

Controls on livestock ................................. 421

The attempt to associate livestock and agriculture ............ 425

The fate of efforts to intensify crop production .............. 426

Adaptation of cultivation practices to variations in conditions. . . 428

Extensive cotton cultivation ......................... 430

Experience with early planting .......................... 430

New efforts to intensify ............................... 431

The fertilizer program .............................. 433

The Agridev pilot schemes ........................... 434

The group mechanization schemes ...................... 437

Need for properly diiferentiated approaches ................. 441

Changing institutional and organizational factors ............ 443

The role of cooperatives ............................... 444

The Lint and Seed Marketing Board ..................... 448

Concluding Remarks ................................. 449

M AP. Sukumaland ...................................... 416

INDEX ............................................ 451

Yii

I

KENYA

1. INTRODUCTION

The development of African agriculture and animal husbandry inKenya received real impetus only after World War II. Previously,most of the agricultural development had taken place in the so-called"scheduled areas" where some 7.2 million acres were reserved forEuropean farmers. In the so-called "non-scheduled areas," totalingabout 33 million acres, the African population was largely engagedin agriculture and herding for subsistence purposes.

Lines of development

The foundations for the development of African agriculturewere laid during the Ten-Year Plan of 1946 to 1955. In 1954 theSwynnerton Plan was adopted to accelerate the pace of this de-velopinent over the next five years, but within a framework offifteen-year targets. Since the lines of development stressed by theSwynnerton Plan have remained basically the same, they might bebriefly described.

For the areas of higher agricultural potential, the plan stressedintensification of agriculture through the planting of cash crops,previously grown primarily by Europeans, and through mixedfarming featuring improved cattle for dairying. The phasing of theprogram for development of cash crops was envisaged as follows(in terms of acres planted):

Crop 1953 1958 1963 1968

Coffee 4,000 18,000 43,000 71,500Pyrethrum 1,300 12,000 30,000 48,000Tea 35 2,000 6,000 12,000Pineapples 3,000 10,000 18,000 25,000Sugar Cane 200 10,000 25,000 45,000

Apart from these crops, increased attention was also to be given tothe production, for the market, of cotton, maize and pulses, rice,

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TROPICAL AFRICA

oilseeds, tobacco, fruits and vegetables. Mixed farming and dairying

were to be developed by stressing the importance of grass leys and

fodder, adequate disease control and upgrading of cattle through

improvement of native Zebu types and, in limited areas and under

strict conditions, the introduction of European-type cattle.While the objective was to develop "commercial" farming by

Africans, it was emphasized that this should be reconciled with the

maintenance of subsistence farming, i.e., basic food self-sufficiency

for each farm, at least until African farmers obtained a large enough

income from their cash crops. The danger of excessive specialization

was to be avoided so that farmers would be protected against the

consequences of market depressions, pests and disease or their own

failures to cope with "difficult" crops. Moreover, development was

to be carefully controlled, with proper insistence on good cultural

practices and planting of crops confined to ecologically suitable

zones. While Africans were to be encouraged to form and operate

cooperatives, Government boards and agencies were to retain

responsibility for controlling and regulating development, including

marketing.For the semi-arid pastoral areas, the Swynnerton Plan envisaged

increasing production through a combination of measures including:

(1) limitation of stock to the carrying capacity of the land; (2) pro-

vision of regular market outlets so as to discourage overstocking;

(3) controlled rotational grazing; and (4) extension of available

grazing and facilitation of rotational grazing by the development

of water supplies and eradication of the tsetse fly.To achieve these objectives, the plan provided for: (1) a substan-

tial expansion of the field staff of the agricultural and veterinary

departments, with emphasis at least initially on more European

staff; (2) greater attention to the development of training institutes

for farmers and to education in agriculture in the regular schools;

(3) more ample funds for agricultural development, including

credit for individual farmers and cooperatives; and (4) above all,

a campaign to promote land consolidation and enclosure, followedby the issue of land titles, so that farmers would be encouraged to

invest in the development of their land and use titles as the basis for

obtaining more credit, and so that the more progressive farmers

would be enabled to buy more land from those who were incapable

of developing their own holdings.Beginning in 1962, this plan for the development of existing

African areas has been supplemented by a program for the settle-

ment of Africans on farms which, with the advent of independence,Europeans have been willing to sell to the Government. This pro-

4

Kenva: Introduction

gram, covering about 1.25 million acres of land, has in recent yearsabsorbed a large proportion of the staff and money available foragricultural development. It has consisted of both so-called "high-density" settlement with small holders who are basically subsistencefarmers, and of "low-density" settlement with larger holdings thatwould enable farmers to produce a considerable surplus for themarket.

The focus of investigationIn analyzing Kenya's experience with agricultural development,

we were not concerned with the development of African farming asa whole. We basically confined our attention to the way in whichvarious interrelated aspects of the development of agriculture andanimal husbandry, as embodied in the overall program, haveworked out in four specific areas. These areas are: (1) Nyeri District,(2) Machakos District, (3) Central Nyanza District and (4) theBaringo and Elgeyo-Marakwet Districts. While African agricultureis characterized by great diversity, the four areas represent theprincipal types of ecological and human environmental conditionsencountered in the country, and illustrate the various problems anddifficulties which arise in connection with agricultural development.In examining the experience with development in these areas, wehave analyzed the measures and institutions employed, the degreeof response obtained and the factors which have conditioned thisresponse. We have primarily confined our study to the developmentof land that was traditionally reserved to Africans (i.e., the "reserves"or the former "non-scheduled" areas). However, the results andproblems of settlement on erstwhile European farms have beenbriefly examined in a separate paper. Two irrigation schemes havealso been singled out for separate treatment.

This chapter is basically an introduction to the case studies thatfollow. It is designed to provide a framework for the specific studies;to give some general background information; and to set forth-and comment on-some of the principal factors which have con-ditioned development in Kenya.

Land tenure reform

The backgroundAs already indicated, reform of land tenure was considered by

Swynnerton as an essential prerequisite to agricultural improvement.Most agricultural officers had long believed that land enclosure,land consolidation and the issue of land titles were necessary to give

5


a real impetus to land development by progressive farmers. The

land tenure problem, however, was extraordinarily complex and

differed from tribe to tribe and even within a single tribe. In many

areas there had been a trend towards "individualization" of rights

to land even in the absence of machinery to acquire or register

titles. This had been due to a number of factors: increasing pressure

on the land; a growing interest in planting tree crops; a desire to

protect cultivated plots against damage by roaming cattle; and a

trend toward more permanent housing. The extent to which indi-

vidual rights to land had developed varied widely. Even where there

was individual ownership, including rights of inheritance and sale,

communal rights to graze idle land or to graze the crop residues on

land following the harvest were still generally recognized. Moreover,

rights to dispose of land were still circumscribed to varying degrees

by community control exercised in some cases by the head of the

extended family or in other cases by clan or lineage elders. Thus,

among the Kikuyu, the head of the extended family, or Muramati,

usually had the right to veto the alienation of land to strangers or

admission of tenants (ahoi) on family land. While the right to sell

land had become gradually accepted among the Kikuyu, in two

Kikuyu districts-namely Fort Hall and Nyeri (the latter only

until 1952)- this right was subject to redemption, i.e., the person

who "sold" the land had the right to redeem it on return of the

original consideration for which he parted with his land and on

payment of compensation for any improvements the buyer had

made. Among some tribes, such as the Luo, the right of inheritance

was recognized, but the not right to sell. In a few tribes the custom

under which the elders of a lineage group or clan assigned culti-

vation rights still prevailed, and the land reverted to the group

when it was no longer being used or upon the death of the holder.

In many areas, particularly those where population density was

high and land was heterogeneous in quality, fragmentation had

become a serious problem. This was true, for example, among the

Kikuyu and the Luo. A number of practices and conditions had

contributed to this fragmentation. In some cases land was acquired

by clearing separate pieces as and when the family's needs increased.

Within each family, whether extended or nuclear, the arable land

tended to become progressively subdivided. It was the custom, for

example, to allot various plots for cultivation to the wife or wives

of the head of the family and among the wives of the sons of one or

more marriages. This practice was generally coupled with the

custom whereby the male head of the household reserved a plot

of land for himself which his wife or wives usually tilled, but whose

produce was his own to enjoy. Wives were generally expected to use

Kenya: Introduction

the produce of their own plots to feed their own families. A furthercause of fragmentation was subdivision upon inheritance, particu-larly since each parcel was usually divided more or less equallyamong the male heirs. Ecological diversity-caused by the brokennature of the country and diversity of soils and moisture conditions-frequently brought about additional fragmentation so that everycultivator might grow various crops on land most suitable for each.Finally, there was the practice of giving land to friends for cultiva-tion; such cultivators or tenants enjoyed the use of land in returnnot for cash rent but for allegiance, services or occasional gifts.These were called ahoi among the Kikuyu and jadak among the Luo,and had only a right of usufruct which could not be transferredto others. They generally had either no land or too little land oftheir own. Fragmentation tended of itself to increase the number ofsuch tenants, because land owners found it frequently too onerousto take care of fragments remote from their homesteads and fre-quently lent these to others.

In general, Kenya was in various stages of transition from a typeof land tenure which vested rights in some kinship or residentialgrouping and gave every member of that group assured rights tocultivate some land, to a system under which individual rights hadcome increasingly to prevail over the rights of the group and/or itsmembers. During this transition, the traditional authority of lineageor clan elders over allocation of land and land disputes was becomingprogressively weakened. At the same time the volume and costlinessof litigation over land had greatly increased, particularly in thoseareas characterized by growing pressure of population on land.

Spontaneous land enclosure and consolidationBefore the Government initiated its own land tenure reform,

there were spontaneous movemnents in this direction in a number ofareas and among various tribal groups. Where land was not frag-mented some of these movements siimply took the form of landenclosure, i.e., of enclosing a holding or parts of a holding with afence or rather a live hedge as evidence of an individual's right tothat land and as a means of preventing others from trespassing onthis land. Thus, an enclosure movement developed in the KerichoDistrict among the Kipsigis, a tribe which had been semi-pastoraland had no concept of individual ownership and inheritance of land.It was initiated in the 1930's and 1940's by younger elements amongthe Kipsigis, largelv in defiance of the kokwet' elders, and stemmedprimarily from the growing. trend to produce maize for European

' The elders of the kokwet, a group of people living in a certain locality,exercised the traditional authority over land.


farmers who bought it as part of the rations for their African labor

force. More and more Kipsigis found it profitable and convenient to

grow maize for some years in succession on the same land and turned

to ox plowing so as to plant larger acreages to maize. In order to

safeguard their rights to cultivate maize on the same land and to

keep their neighbor's cattle out of the cropped area, they began to

enclose their land with hedges. Incidental to this enclosure, which

was later encouraged by Government officers, disputes over land

were frequently settled. Until recently, however, the Kipsigis evinced

little or no interest in formalizing their claims to land by demanding

registration and issue of land titles. By the early 'fifties virtually all

Kipsigis land had been enclosed. A similar enclosure movement

took place among the neighboring Kisii tribe, although at a some-

what later date and slower pace. In the 'fifties the Elgeyo also

enclosed spontaneously virtually all of the higher land in the Elgeyo

Division of the Elgeyo-Marakwet District.

Among the Kikuyu, where there had been a considerable evolution

towards individualization of land rights, there was a growing de-

mand for the issue and registration of land titles, largely as a means

of protection against costly and constant land litigation. The de-

mand for consolidation was less strong, probably because of fear

by many people that they would lose in the process of land exchange

and consolidation. Nonetheless, several chiefs in the Nyeri District

initiated voluntary consolidation movements in their own locations

during the 'forties.

Initiation of consolidation in Central Province

For a long time the Colonial Government of Kenya was reluctant

to promote land tenure reform and was inclined to strengthen

rather than to weaken community control over land. There were,

however, local efforts to bring about land consolidation which were

encouraged and supported by agricultural officers. The outbreak

of the Mau Mau rebellion among the Kikuyu in the early 'fifties

brought the problem dramatically to the fore. Mau Mau itself was

largely inspired by the deep-seated land hunger felt by the Kikuyu,

many of whom had been obliged to leave their own over-crowded

reserves to seek employment on European farms and in the cities.

Increasingly, individual Government officers, and later the Govern-

ment, began to look upon land tenure reform as a promising measure

to deal with Kikuyu discontent. It was hoped that land consolidation

and registration, followed by a vigorous program of farm develop-

ment, would effectively counter the political agitation among the

Kikuyu by establishing a class of prosperous farmers who, in turn,

8

Kenva: Introduction

would employ on their holdings most of the landless Kikuyu. Withthis primary political inspiration, the Government decided at theend of 1955 to carry out a vigorous and rapid land reform concen-trating upon the Kikuyu districts of the Central Province. A "favor-able climate" for carrying out such a campaign had been createdby the emergency proclaimed in 1952. This had resulted in thedetention of virtually all of the Kikuyu leaders who otherwisewould have been likely to oppose any government-inspired attemptto deal with the all-important land problem. Moreover, the redis-tribution of land involved in consolidation had become easierbecause, in the campaign against the Mau Mau, all of the Kikuyuhad been removed from their isolated homesteads and settled inhastily established villages. Finally, the emergency made it possiblefor the Government to obtain both the funds and the staff necessaryfor the land reform campaign.

Procedure in land consolidation and registrationBy 1957 the land reform campaign in the Kikuyu districts was in

full swing. The procedure applied was one that had been evolved bytrial and error in various pilot projects initiated in the Kikuyudistricts by Government officers before the Government had identi-fied itself officially with the movement. The Native Land TenureRules officially approved by the Government in October 1956,in effect validated the procedure already being applied in theCentral Province. The procedure was further codified and modifiedin the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance, 1959 and againby the Land Adjudication Act of 1963. The steps involved in theland consolidation and registration procedure are set forth below.It should be noted, however, that this exposition is necessarilysomewhat schematic and does not take full account of the differencein methods followed by the officials in charge of the campaign ineach district, or of the great variation in the problems encountered.With this reservation, the steps may be outlined as follows:

1. Land reform was applied only in particular areas where theDistrict Commissioner had ascertained in open meetings, or barazas,that the majority of the local people wanted it. In that event, thearea of application was proclaimed an "adjudication area" and anadjudication officer, usually the District Commissioner, was ap-pointed. Each adjudication area was divided into a number of "ad-judication sections" which, in the Central Province, usually were thesame as an administrative sublocation comprising about 500 to1,000 landowners.

2. In announcing the formation of an adjudication section, the

9


adjudication officer gave notice simultaneously of the intention to

settle land titles and fixed a period of not less than six months,

during which all persons claiming rights in land within the section

had to present their claims in person or through representatives

according to native law and custom. Wide publicity was given to

this notice by announcements in public meetings, over the radio

and in the vernacular press, and through communications to various

Government organizations such as the railways, the army, the police

and even to all people in prisons and detention camps.

3. To decide on all the land claims presented in each adjudication

section, the District Commissioner appointed a committee of no

less than 25 local Africans which included the elders who were

traditionally competent in land matters. To each of these committees

was assigned an executive officer, usually a District Officer, who

was in principle only to advise and assist the committee. The com-

mittee then proceeded to determine all land rights within the

adjudication section. The fragments of land were indicated on the

ground by the claimants or their representatives and measured by

teams of "measurers" (not professional surveyors). When the com-

mittee had decided who were the rightful owners of all the fragments,

the details of such plots, their location and area were recorded in the

"Record of Existing Rights." This Record included all the relevant

information on the number and size of each owner's fragments;

details on rights which did not amount to full ownership; and on

land which was in use for public purposes. If the committee was

unable to reach a decision, the matter in dispute was referred to an

arbitration board consisting of five or more members and selected

from a panel of local Africans.4. The Record of Existing Rights, as compiled from the decisions

of such committees and arbitration boards, was then kept open for

inspection for a period of 60 days during which objections could

be lodged. If the objection was to a decision of the committee, it

was referred back to the committee for a second decision which,

however, was then subject to confirmation by the adjudication

officer. If the objection was against a decision of an arbitration

board, it was settled by the adjudication officer assisted, but not

bound, by the arbitration board. When all the objections had thus

been resolved, the Record of Existing Rights was declared final.

5. The next step was to reconcile the total area of the land in the

adjudication sections, as recorded in the Record of Existing Rights,

with the area of the section as determined from base maps which

were, as far as possible, derived frorm aerial photographs. Following

this comparison, the area of each fragment as recorded in the register

10

Kenya: Introduction

was adjusted by the so-called "reconciliation factor," which wasdetermined by dividing total acreage as derived from the map bythe total of all plots as measured on the ground. Experience showedthat this difference should not be more than about 5 percent; andif it was more this, was an indication that measurements needed tobe checked again.

6. Following the last step, the committee determined how muchland within the section was required for additional public purposes,including roads of access and community facilities. The amount ofland required for this purpose was then made available by applyinga uniform percentage cut to the land of all landowners, as recordedin the Record of Existing Rights.

7. The committee then provided each man with a consolidatedholding equal to the area of the total number of his fragments afterapplying the reconciliation factor and the percentage cut. The con-solidated holding was then demarcated on the ground by Govern-ment staff, in the presence of members of the committee and theadjoining landowners. As far as possible the holdings were consoli-dated around the largest fragment or around the fragment withpermanent improvements or tree crops. In siting the consolidatedland holding, the committee tried to provide each person with thedifferent types of land that he previously possessed. This meant,for example, that in the Kikuyu districts the consolidated holdinggenerally ran from the top of the ridge to the bottom of the valley.In general, it was the plan that smaller holdings-i.e., those of lessthan three acres-should be sited near the village where it wasoriginally expected (contrary to later actual developments) thatthe owners of such holdings would continue to reside. In practice,however, this proved impossible, partly because there were too manysmall holdings and partly because there was a universal desire tohave access to water in the valley. In effect, therefore, many verynarrow holdings running up and down hill were laid out.

8. The details of each landowner's consolidated holding wereplaced in an adjudication register with reference to a map of thesection. This adjudication register, when completed, was kept openfor inspection and an additional period of sixty days was allowed forobjections. The latter were resolved by the adjudication officersitting with the committee.

9. The final step was the registration of the title which thenbecame tantamount to a freehold title, although its transfer was,as will be noted, subject to certain restrictions. The area of eachholding recorded in the register was that as determined on theground and shown by the boundary lines put on base maps. It was

11


decided, however, that the area would have to be finally determined

by aerial survey. Each landowner was requested to plant live hedges

on his boundaries and once these had grown sufficiently to be

recorded on aerial photographs, the area was "flown." The final

area of each holding was then computed from aerial photographs.

This in itself necessitated many corrections in the area of holdings

as originally entered in the register. Thus, in Nyeri District, the

cadastral plans, based on these aerial photographs, showed that

something like half of the holdings were larger and the rest smaller

than indicated by the original data on areas entered in the register.

Progress in the Kikuyu districts

By the end of September 1958, the process of consolidation in

Kiambu had been completed and, by mid-1959, consolidation had

been completed in the Nyeri District. In Fort Hall, the third Kikuyu

district, consolidation was not fully completed even by 1965. The

steep nature of the terrain, the shortage of good land, strong vested

interests in maintenance of communal grazing, deep-seated sus-

picions among the people and the high percentage of landowners

absent elsewhere in Kenya all combined to create special technical

difficulties and to foment resistance to land reform in Fort Hall.

Moreover, cumulative deficiencies and abuses in carrying out the

land reform forced a decision in 1960 to redo much of the work

already completed. On the one hand, many landowners had evi-

dently withheld part of their land for measurement in the expecta-

tion that consolidation would later be undone; and, on the other

hand, many landowners had persuaded or bribed clerks to record

non-existing fragments or exaggerate the area of existing fragnments.

The work since 1960 has had to proceed more slowly owing partly

to the time-consuming task of getting the necessary popular co-

operation and, more recently, to shortages of funds and staff. By the

end of 1964 consolidation and registrations were about 60 percent

completed.The complexity of the task was great. In Nyeri, for example, it

involved the measurement of some 250,000 fragments and the

demarcation of over 43,000 consolidated holdings. In Kiambu,

about 420,000 fragments were measured and consolidated into about

50,000 holdings by 98 committees having 2,750 members and aided

by a staff of 14 senior officers, 500 "measurers" or surveyors and

1,000 laborers; and in the process there were set aside 1,860 miles

of roads, 285 primary and secondary school sites, 225 church sites,

110 cemeteries, 85 social centers, 47 tea and coffee nurseries, 93

cattle spraying sites and 110 permanent villages. The work involved

12

Kenya: Introduction

was considerable and was accomplished at a remarkably low costwhich apparently averaged not much higher than £1 per acre forthe three Kikuyu districts. 2

On the whole, it was possible to get this work done within arather short tine in the Kikuyu districts largely because "rough andready" measures were used and excessive refinements eschewed,and because popular resistance to these drastic measures was at aminimum during the Mau Mau emergency. There was no attempteither to ensure uniform treatment for the various problems thatarose. We have already mentioned that small holdings were some-times sited near the village, but even more frequently laid out asnarrow strips from ridge to valley. Village land was also variouslytreated. In Kiambu, village land was not regarded as land set asidefor public purpose and anyone who obtained a quarter acre allot-ment in a village had this allotment counted against his overallland holding. The same course has been followed in Fort Hallsince March 1964, although prior to that time village land had beenput under a trusteeship of the District or County Council, as it hadin Nyeri. More important, there were widespread differences withrespect to the persons in whose name land was registered. In manycases, the land was registered in the name of the oldest male memberof the family. In other cases, however, it was registered in the nameof his sons or one of his sons, and even in the names of infant sons.There were actually a few cases where land was registered in thename of a woman, although women under customary law are reallynot supposed to own land. There was also a difficulty with respectto the siting of the consolidated holding of people whose aggregatefragments constituted a very large acreage. In such cases it wassometimes impossible to give them consolidated holdings in a singleplace without displacing rnany other landowners over a considerabledistance. Thus, contrary to the intention of consolidation, such land-owners were frequently given land in two different holdings. Con-versely, where land holdings were small, relatives often registeredtheir land as a single holding, sometimes under a form of co-pro-prietorship, largely for the purpose of evading the original require-ment that owners of less than three acres continue to live in villages.

Land reform elsewhereIn the other districts of Central Province to which the Government

carried its consolidation and land registration effort, special prob-

2 The figures in this paragraph are derived from an (as yet) unpublishedmanuscript by M. P. K. Sorrenson entitled Land Consolidation and Registrationin the Kikuyu Country of Kenya.

13


lems were encountered. In these districts, clan jurisdiction over

land was still strong, although occupation rights were individual.

In two of the administrative divisions of Embu District there were

no special problems. The land occupied by each clan was fairly well

defined. The procedure was, first, to adjudicate any disputes among

the clans as to the boundary of their respective lands, and then to

carry out an exchange of fragments and consolidation within each

clan land unit. However, in that part of the district where a con-

siderable amount of coffee had been planted during the 'thirties,

the problem was extremely complicated. There was no clear-cut

clan land any more, because in the rush to grow coffee, clan bound-

aries had been "jumped." Moreover, this part of the district was

very crowded, making it difficult to provide land by way of compen-

sation. In the end, the committees in the adjudication areas evi-

dently decided that a number of clan members could not be allocated

land, but would have to be housed in permanent villages and left

to find work as laborers for African farmers or work as traders and

artisans.In Meru District the problem was even more difficult, partly

because the Mau Mau emergency regulations were never applied

there. Also councils of elders, known as the Njuri and found at all

levels from the extended family group up to that of the district, had

been reluctant to recognize the principle of individual ownership.

In the process of settling Meru District, the clans had staked out

claims to land in the various ecological zones ranging from the low-

lying area bordering the Tana River to the lands far up on the

slopes of Mount Kenya. The most favored ecological zone, however,

had become the zone which was suitable for the planting of coffee,

to which the Meru had taken enthusiastically as early as the 'thirties.

This zone had accordingly become extremely crowded and land

holdings had become very much fragmented. It proved well-nigh

impossible to consolidate coffee land because of the reluctance of

each of the coffee growers to surrender any part of his planting,

and the fact that "villagization" had never been enforced as in theother districts of the Central Province. Attempts to provide compen-sation in either the lower or the upper ecological zone of Meru

District did not meet with favor. It was only during the early 1960's,when tea development began in the higher ecological zone, that

it seemed possible to resolve the compensation issue and get on with

consolidation in the coffee zone.Elsewhere in Kenya the land reform movement was much more

modest in scope. Among the Kalenjin tribes, including the Kipsigis,the Nandi, the Elgeyo and the Tugen, fragmentation was not a serious

14

Kenya: Introduction

problem except in certain areas. There the land reform movementlargely took the form of voluntary enclosure. The Government gavevarying degrees of support to these enclosure movements and inparticular sought to couple with it adequate measures to ensuresoil conservation, access roads and water supplies for livestock.In the areas inhabited by the Luo, where fragmentation was aserious problem, an early governmental attempt to initiate landconsolidation met adamant opposition. As shown in the subsequentcase study on Central Nyanza, it is only in recent years that volun-tary movements of consolidation have made some limited headwayamong the Luo. Among the Kamba, little or no land consolidationand registration appears to have taken place, as will be indicatedin the case study on the Machakos District. The Colonial Govern-ment apparently did not have as strong a political interest in aggres-sively pushing land reform as it had among the Kikuyu; and it isonly since the attainnment of self-government and independence thatKenya's own political leaders have shown interest in acceleratingland enclosure and consolidation.

Reliable and up-to-date information on the total amount of landenclosed and consolidated appears difficult to obtain, owing to thestate of the records and the fact that much of the results have notbeen formally carried to the point of registration. By mid-1965about 1.5 million acres were reported to be registered, and approxi-mately the same number of acres had been consolidated and de-marcated prior to registration. This total of 3 million acres repre-sents only about 10 percent of all the land, but as much as 22 percentof the good agricultural land,3 in the "non-scheduled" areas. Inaddition, some land has been informally enclosed or consolidated.

Restrictions on land transactions

Where land titles were issued, these were not transferable withoutrestrictions. The Land Control (Special Areas) Ordinance, 1959(later replaced by the almost identical Regulations of 1961) laiddown the conditions under which land could be transferred. Ingeneral, these restrictions were intended to prevent land trans-actions that might reduce holdings below what was assumed to bean economic size. Thus, all land transactions had to be approved bya Land Control Board appointed for each administrative division.Appeals could be taken to the Provincial Board which also couldgive directives to the Divisional Land Control Boards and reservecertain approvals for themselves. Directives of the Provincial Land

3Land which in Kenya bears the classifications A to B(1) inclusive.

15


Control Board, framed in consultation with agricultural officials,laid down the minimum size below which a holding could not bereduced by any land transfer. These sizes were fixed by ecologicalzones. In Central Province, the minimum fixed for the so-called"High Bracken" Zone was 12 acres; in the "Kikuyu Grass" Zone,8 acres; in the "Star Grass" Zone, 6 acres; and in the "Grass-Woodland" Zone, 10 acres. Since consolidation had shown, forexample, that in Kiambu and Nyeri Districts around 75 percent ofthe holdings fell below these minimum restrictions, it limitedseverely the number and scope of land transactions. The provisionagainst the subdivision of holdings also applied to inheritance. Incase the owner of a piece of land died, the African courts were todetermine the heirs, taking into account any expressed wishes of thedeceased. Where the holding was already less than the minimumsize, the court had two options. It could determine that a number ofheirs, no larger than five, could inherit the property as co-proprietors;or it could decide to leave the land to one heir with provision forcompensating the other heirs. The provision for compensation couldbe registered either in the form of a charge or mortgage on theproperty, or in the form of a restriction which meant that if theland were ever sold, the proceeds of sale would be distributed amongall the heirs. The procedure of land foreclosure in the case of failureto pay debts secured by a mortgage was also hedged about with anumber of safeguards.

The effect of land reformThe impact of land reform, its relevance to the development of

agriculture and animal husbandry, and the difficulties and problemsit has encountered will all be discussed in the individual case studies.The above is therefore intended solely to provide the general factualbackground.

Agricultural extension and education

Apart from land reform, the Swynnerton Plan emphasized theimportance, among other things, of expanding the field staff ofthe agricultural and veterinary services as a means of achievingagricultural development. Unquestionably there was a considerablebuild-up of these services for some time, although that in theveterinary field lagged behind the rate of increase in the agriculturalservice. With the advent of independence there were severe lossesof professional personnel, particularly in the veterinary service,which have proved difficult to replace. While the staffing of field

16

Kenya: Introduction

services has generally compared favorably with that elsewhere inAfrica, this does not mean that it has been adequate to cope withthe vast problem of farmer education. As of 1963 the "average"Assistant Agricultural Officer (an officer with diploma training),who was in immediate charge of the field service in a division (partof a district), was expected to cater to about 8,000 farm families.Under him, the Agricultural Instructor was supposed to look afteran average of about 1,200 farmrers and the lowest-ranking AssistantAgricultural Instructor after some 500 farmers. The agriculturalfield staff has had responsibility for animal husbandry as well asagriculture; the veterinary staff has been charged with diseasecontrol and prevention and animal breeding, including artificialinsemination.

Farm layouts and plans

Under the Swynnerton Plan one of the major activities of thefield service was to be the planning of enclosed or consolidated farmholdings. While thousands of farmers laid out their own holdingsfollowing consolidation, the Department of Agriculture promotedtwo principal types of plans by way of demonstration. For the smallerland holdings which, however, were still sufficiently large to permitthe planting of cash crops, it was expected to provide a simple plancalled a farm layout. Apart from siting a homestead and anybuildings that were necessary for the development of the holding,the farm layout was to provide a rough pattern of land use for theholding, taking into account the slope of the land and the need forsoil conservation. The idea was to reserve the area of the holdingwith a slope less than 20 percent for food crops; to devote the areabetween 20 percent and 35 percent to permanent cash crops; and toallocate the area with a slope of over 35 percent to permanent grassor trees. The other type of plan was the so-called farm plan. This wasa much more sophisticated land use plan for the holding. In additionto siting the homestead and the permanent cash crop areas, thisplan was to provide a system of crop rotation, say, over a seven-yearperiod, that would maximize the yield of the holding. The plan wasalso to lay down a schedule for the phased development of theholding. Farm plans in general were to be provided for the largerholdings and for the more experienced and progressive farmers.

Actually, the number of farm layouts and farm plans that hasbeen prepared has always been a tiny proportion of the total numberof holdings. By the end of 1963, for example, less than 40,000 farmlayouts covering around 420,000 acres had been prepared and thenumber of farm plans that had been completed was extremely

17


small-about 5,400 covering about 95,000 acres. Basically it was in-

tended to supply these planning services only for progressive farmers

who had a sufficiently large holding and needed capital for develop-

ment. However, the scale on which they were provided seems never

to have come up to expectations; the number of layouts and plans

prepared dropped markedly from 24,257 and 4,074 respectively

in 1960 to 4,398 and 843 in 1963. One of the primary reasons for

this rather modest performance appears to have been the shortage

of competent staff and the growing realization that much of the

planning activity was doomed to ineffectiveness without the

requisite staff. In a memorandum of August 1961, the Chief Agri-

culturist of Kenya pointed out that it took an Assistant AgriculturalInstructor about one to two days to prepare one farm layout and

that he could hardly be expected to give continuing supervision

to more than 50 farm layouts. Actually this Instructor was expected

to cover about 500 farm families and, in addition, perform a variety

of other work. As for farm plans, the Chief Agriculturist indicated

that a more experienced Agricultural Instructor needed one week

to draw up one of these. Here, even more than in the case of a

simple farm layout, considerable work was required to help the

farmer carry it out. Since 1963 the preparation of farm plans has

virtually ceased.In Kenya, as elsewhere, the relationship between the size and

nature of the field staff, on the one hand, and the methods employedin working with the farmers, on the other hand, has been of crucialimportance. In the past two principal methods have been used to

promote better farming and animal husbandry. One was the en-

forcement of rules or bylaws-sometimes issued for the country

as a whole and sometimes approved under some administrativepressure by African District Councils-laying down the conditionsunder which crops could be planted or improved livestock kept,

or specifying the soil conservation practices to which the farmer

was expected to adhere. One of the important tasks of the field

service was to ensure that these rules or bylaws were observed. Thesecond method of operation was to concentrate advisory serviceson the "progressive" farmers, i.e., those who were willing to carryout the recommendations of the Department of Agriculture. Overtime, both these methods of operation came to be questioned. Withthe approach of independence, it was no longer feasible, by andlarge, to rely on the enforcement of regulations which in large parthad always been politically unpopular. In other words, it was

necessary to shift from direction and regulation to advice and per-

18

Kenya: Introduction

suasion. This, in itself, apparently implied the employment of alarger staff. The concentration of agricultural services on the pro-gressive farmers also proved to have drawbacks, partly becausethose receiving assistance were often considered unduly favored andpartly because this approach tended to neglect the smaller farmerswho needed help in raising their food subsistence output so thatthey could devote part of their land to the growing of cash crops.However, limitations of staff made it difficult to multiply contactswith individual farmers. This dilemma was at least partially resolvedby the group approach. In the field this has involved a considerablereliance on field days, when improved practices are explained anddemonstrated to groups of farmers. Above all, it has entailed thedevelopment of organized instruction of both men and womenfarmers at the so-called Farmers' Training Centers.

Farmers' training centersThese Centers have been developed over recent years to give

short-term courses, generally one to two weeks in duration. Origi-nally there was some experimentation with an institute that wouldgive farm families the opportunity for practical training on a smallholding during an entire year, but this was soon abandoned, pri-marily because it could at best hope to train only an infinitesimalpercentage of farmers. The Fariners' Training Centers (FTC's), onthe other hand, have been able to give a large number of courseseach year and to attract active farmers who could not be expectedto be absent fronm their holdings for more than a few weeks.

As of the end of 1963 there were 24 FTC's in operation and underconstruction. Included in this number were six sponsored by theChristian Council of Kenya. The rest were under the Ministry ofAgriculture, except for two established by the Ministry of Settlement.Their total capacity was 1,267 beds. Government FTC's actuallyin operation accommodated 12,389 "students" in 1962, and 13,804in 1963 for a total number of 100,327 and 109,269 student-daysrespectively. The number of student-days in 1961 was only 77,396,but the rapid increase was arrested in 1963 because some of thefacilities were being reconstructed with a view to their expansion.

While the FTC's were primarily designed to educate farmers,they also give refresher courses to Ministry of Agriculture fieldpersonnel and some special courses for the staff of cooperatives andpersonnel of other Government agencies. Of the 13,804 participantsin 1963, 10,457 were farmers and 1,741 field personnel of the Minis-try of Agriculture.

19


Each FTC not only has dormitory and classroom facilities but

also a farm. The farms range in size from 50 acres to 2,500 acres,

although only two are actually over 350 acres. The Treasury insisted

that this farm should serve not simply to illustrate and demonstrate

various practices and types of crop and animal husbandry, but also

to contribute to the support of the FTC by the sale of produce. In

actual fact there appears to be little evidence that commercialfarming can be effectively reconciled with the teaching function.

The teaching personnel is detailed to the FTC's from the regular

staff of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of

Veterinary Services, usually for a period of two to three years.

The principal is normally an Assistant Agriculture Officer or Live-

stock Officer, and the teachers are Agricultural Instructors and

Veterinary Assistants. One or two women instructors are made

available for teaching home economics. Owing to the method of

selection, the instructors in agriculture and livestock have no special-

ized teaching competence, but they do, on the other hand, have the

advantage of practical field experience.Of the 509 brief courses offered to farmer participants at Govern-

ment FTC's in 1963, 253 were devoted to general agriculture, 78

to animal husbandry, 42 to tea pruning, 26 to coffee culture, 8 to

poultry, 7 to cotton and 5 to pyrethrum. This illustrates the wide

range of instruction, including both general and specific subject

matter. For women, who numbered almost 40 percent of the farmersattending in 1963, home economics was also included, though only

as part of courses which in other respects were the same as those for

men.In some of the case studies, we shall have occasion to discuss both

the strong and the weak points of the FTC's and the problem of

integrating their work more effectively with that of the field serviceof the Ministry of Agriculture. In general terms it may be said here

that they have been a very useful way of supplementing extension

work in the field. Both men and women have welcomed the oppor-tunity to attend and have gladly paid the attendance fees rangingfrom Sh 1 to Sh 2.50 per day. Most of them derive some stimulusand some practical benefits from the classroom instruction anddemonstration, although the usefulness of the courses could probablybe enhanced considerably by a number of improvements, Thosewho attend generally display a more than average receptivity tochange, for although they are selected by agricultural extensionpersonnel, the very fact that they take the trouble to go to the FTC

and pay the necessary fees indicates some desire for progress.

20

Kenya: Introduction

Other educational influencesAgricultural extension, as supplemented by the work of the FTC's,

obviously has not been the only educational influence at workwhich has conditioned agricultural progress in various parts ofKenya. The rapid progress in formal education can hardly beignored. From 1955 to 1964 the number of pupils in primary schoolsrose from 432,678 to 1,014,719, and the total in secondary schoolsfrom 9,997 to 35,921. Formal education has by no means benefitedjust the urban communities, but has, as will be noted later, beenan important leavening factor in the rural areas. By stiinulating agreater awareness of opportunities and a desire for inore income, ithas led to a considerable amount of investment in commercialfarming. Some degree of formal education has also obviously beenquite indispensable to the development of cooperatives.

Apart from formal schooling, there have been other factors atwork which have broadened horizons and promoted receptivity tochange. By far the most important of these has been labor migration.This type of migration in search of emnployment opportunities haslong been significant among certain tribes in Kenya. There is littledoubt that the contacts and experience acquired by labor migrantshave enhanced the desire for progress. However, as we shall haveoccasion to point out subsequently, the impact of labor migrationon African farining has been markedly varied. The effect has beenstrikingly favorable when the labor migrants worked on Europeanfarms in Kenya and later returned to their own farms in areaswhere ecological and other factors were such that they were able todraw on their work experience to start commercial farming ontheir own. The European farms in Kenya have thus played quite animportant role in bringing about better African farming. Kenyawas one of the few tropical African countries where, owing to favor-able ecological conditions and government encouragement, Euro-peans settled and took up farming. In 1962, before the initiation ofa programn to purchase European farms for settlement by Africans,there were 3,606 large European (and some Asian) farms totaling7,701,400 acres; large-scale agriculture, together with forestry,provided employment for nearly 250,000 Africans. The greatmajority of the laborers and families ernployed were Kikuyu, andit is no coincidence that the Kikuyu, whose own lands were for theinost part well-suited to the mixed farming practiced by manyEuropeans, are amnong those Africans in Kenya who have made thegreatest strides in agriculture and animal husbandry. The Europeanfarmrers in Kenya had developed certain crops and certain farmningpractices which could be and were adopted by Africans. The

21


Europeans' crop and animal husbandry was in part the outgrowthof their own experience. However, an important contribution was

also made by government research and experimental stations. In

fact, agricultural research developed on a substantial scale and

yielded significant results, largely because, for a long time, it served

the needs of the European farmers who were the pioneers in com-

mercial farming and the principal contributors to farm exports.

Agricultural credit

The Swynnerton Plan envisaged that more credit be made

available to African farmers for the development of cash cropping

and animal husbandry. Credit for African farm development and

African cooperatives was provided from three sources: commercial

banks, the Government Budget, and funds provided by the World

Bank and the United States Government.

Commercial bank creditCommercial bank lending to African farmers developed only as

African land was registered and titles were issued so that land could

be used as a security. Such credit has been made available primarily

to the larger African farmers who not only could offer land as secu-

rity but had some regular income that could also be pledged for

payment. Information on the total volume of commercial bank

lending is not available, but in the Central Province, the only area

where it assumed real significance, the total lent in the years 1955 to

1963 inclusive is reported to have been £437,115. However, the

amount of commercial bank credit for this purpose is now tapering

off to some extent, and, as we shall indicate in the case study de-

voted to agricultural development in Nyeri District, the earlier

expectation that commercial banks would be an increasingly im-

portant and effective agency in the continued financing of African

agriculture has been by no means fully realized.

Government creditGovernment funds for agricultural credit were controlled initially,

up to mid-1959, by the African Land Development Board (ALDEV)

and later, by the Board of Agriculture (Non-Scheduled Areas)which was subsequently renamed Board of Agriculture (Small-

Scale Farms). Repayments on loans from such Government fundswere returned to the Treasury. The only revolving fund was that

set up by the International Cooperation Agency of the U.S. Govern-ment which amounted initially to £100,000 and was subsequently

raised to £125,000.

22

Kenya: Introduction

The actual administration of loans was rather complex. Loanswere issued at the district level. Most of the funds available foragricultural credit were borrowed by the African District Councilfrom the Central Government for terms of between 10 and 20 years.In such cases, the District Agricultural Committee made loans fromthese funds on the basis of recommendations of the District Agri-cultural Officer. In four districts, the Central Government madegrants and loans available to specially constituted Joint LoanBoards. These Boards, too, mnade loans available on the recommen-dation of District Agricultural Officers. Interest rates generallyvaried between 5.5 percent and 6.5 percent and the term of repay-ment was usually less than five years. Loans to cooperative societieswere for 4, 6 and 10 years, depending on the purpose of the loan.

The data on Government loans to African farmers point up twofacts. One is the modest amount of credit made available to indi-vidual African farmers. Thus, in the three-year period 1960/61 to1962/63, only around 6,000 loans, totaling slightly over £400,000,were made. From 1948 to mid-1964 the total amount of loans issuedwas £597,485. The other feature of this credit operation is theconsiderable amount in arrears. Thus, as of mid-1964, only 42.5percent of the principal that had fallen due on loans issued in sevendistricts had been repaid. In some cases, apparently loans eitherhave not contributed a sufficient increase in farm income out ofwhich payments of principal and interest could be made, or haverequired repayments before the higher incoine accrued. In mostcases, however, the poor record of repayment has simply been dueto an unwillingness to pay, attributable partly to a misunderstandingof the nature of agricultural credit, and to the lack of clearly definedresponsibility and institutional organization for the collection ofpayments.

Since September 1963, the provision of agricultural credit hasbeen centralized and institutionalized in the Government-ownedAgricultural Finance Corporation which has taken over administra-tion of most of the existing loan funds. This Corporation makes loansboth to farmners and cooperative societies. Loans to individualfarmers are made up to a period of five years and a total of £500,and at an interest rate of 6 percent. As under the old system,applications continue to be forwarded by the local agriculturalstaff together with a recommendation. Loans must have the approvalof the District Agricultural Committee and, for amounts over £250,of the Regional (Provincial) Agricultural Board. Credit is given onlyfor the development of a holding, which excludes the financing ofland purchases. The actual collection of loan payments is handled

23


by the same staff that is charged with collection of taxes, but the

Corporation has instituted a more rigorous control of collection and

has thus improved the rate of repayment.The funds available for lending to African farmers have never

been equal to the demand. There is a yearly allocation among

regions and districts, and within each district, among its divisions.

Thus credit has been severely rationed, and this in turn has often

necessitated arbitrary cuts in the size of individual loans to amounts

which are really inadequate to achieve the purposes for which

credit is extended.

Market organization

Since marketing is always an important aspect of agricultural

development, it will be useful to outline in brief the operations of the

marketing organizations which exist for the principal products pro-

duced by Africans for the market. Most of these marketing organi-

zations were originally developed to serve the European producers

who first developed commercial farming and livestock raising.

Africans have become participants in these marketing arrangements

largely as cooperative societies which collect and bulk products and,

as in the case of coffee, carry out initial processing. In general,

marketing in Kenya is closely controlled and regulated, largely for

the purpose of providing the producer with a stable market and of

protecting him against possible abuses by private traders.

Marketing of particular productsCofee. The market for coffee, Kenya's principal cash crop, is

controlled by the Coffee Marketing Board which buys all parchment

coffee; arranges for its final milling and curing by the Kenya

Planters' Cooperative Union; and sells the entire crop at auctions

to licensed dealers in Nairobi who represent overseas buyers. The

ultimate payout to producers, including African cooperative societies

is determined by the realizations at auctions. Aside from the Mar-

keting Board, there is a Coffee Board which is concerned with the

general problems of the coffee industry, including licensing of pro-

duction, research and maintenance of standards of production and

processing, and also operates a liquoring department for the classifi-

cation of coffee.Tea. A special organization, formerly called The Special Crops

Development Authority and now the Kenya Tea DevelopmentAuthority, is charged with the promotion of tea cultivation by

African growers. It establishes and manages nurseries to provide

tea stumps against cash or deferred payment to such growers. It

24

Kienva: Introduction

also controls and supervises small holders' tea planting and culti-vation, buys green leaf and manufactures tea, either in its own fac-tories or in factories belonging to tea estates, and arranges for thesale of tea by auction in the world market. For tea there is also anorganization corresponding to the Coffee Board.

Pyrethrum. Production of pyrethrum is regulated by quotas allo-cated to the larger individual growers and, in the case of smallgrowers, to cooperative societies. Deliveries within quota limitationsare paid at a predetermined price while deliveries in excess ofquotas are normally penalized by a lower price. Such quotas aredesigned to keep prices at a remunerative level for the producers.Until mid-1964 there was a single Pyrethrum Board which licensedproduction, bought all the pyrethrum flowers, processed them andsold powder and extract on the world market through its own salesorganization. Since that date, responsibility for processing has beenentrusted to a mixed company and that for marketing to a specialPyrethrum Marketing Board.

Cotton. The Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board purchases lintand cottonseed from private ginners at prices set, on its advice, bythe Minister for Agriculture, who also determines the prices to bepaid by ginners to growers. Cotton lint from the old Nyanza Prov-ince is sold through the agency of the Uganda Lint MarketingBoard and that from the old Coast Province is sold by tender inNairobi. The Board uses its trading profits for promoting cottonresearch and development, including the maintenance of a fieldstaff which is supposed to operate under the direction of the DistrictAgricultural Officer in cotton-growing areas. It also operates aPrice Stabilization Fund to reduce fluctuations in prices paid togrowers.

Maize. All maize other than that consumed on the farm andbartered or sold locally direct to consumers must be delivered to theMaize Board at a price which is fixed in advance of the sowingseason by the Minister for Agriculture. Prices are supposed to beset at a level which would ensure a volume of production sufficientto cover domestic consumption at all times. Since maize outputfluctuates considerably from year to year, substantial surpluses mustbe exported from time to time, resulting in losses which are primarilymet from a cess levied on marketed maize, This system keeps thedomestic price of maize comparatively high, but it is justified by thecontention that, if the country had to import maize, the landedprice, including transport, would be considerably in excess of thatpaid for Kenya maize by the Board.

Livestock and Meat. Livestock for slaughter, other than pigs, are

25


sold to local butchers and the Kenya Meat Commission at prices,

based on cold dressed weight, fixed by the Minister for Agriculture.

The Kenya Meat Commission, a statutory organization, operates

four abattoirs for the production of meat and a variety of canned

meat products. Frozen meat is exported, generally at a loss, which

is recovered on the sale of products in the domestic market. A special

African Livestock Marketing Organization operates within the

domestic market in order to buy native cattle at floor prices and

ensure a market for inferior animals which traders have not been

interested in buying. Until recently, it operated two field abattoirs

to process inferior animals which could not be moved on the hoof,

but these abattoirs have now been closed owing partly to the losses

sustained, and partly to lack of staff. Animals still bought by ALMO

are now all delivered to the Kenya Meat Commission for slaughter.

Pigs are bought by the Pig Industry Board, another statutory

organization which also licenses and regulates production. They are

processed into bacon, ham and other products by the Uplands

Bacon Factory (Kenya) Ltd., and a considerable part of the output

is sold abroad.Dairy Products. The Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC),

functioning both as a cooperative and as a limited company, pro-

vides extensive facilities for the marketing of milk and the manu-

facture of milk products, including butter, ghee, cheese, condensed

milk and powdered milk. Originally founded by European farmers,

it now includes also African farmers, organized for the most part

into local dairy cooperatives. Deliveries of milk to the KCC takes

place under a rather complicated quota system administered jointly

by the Dairy Board and the KCC. Quotas for delivery of milk

destined for sale as fresh milk (Pool I milk) are accorded to individual

large producers and local cooperative societies who can demonstrate

their capacity to deliver good quality milk for this purpose even

in the dry season. Failure to meet such quotas results in penalties.

All holders of such a quota also have a quota for milk destined for

manufactured milk (Pool II milk), but the price for such milk is

lower and there is no obligation to deliver the full quantity of the

quota. Deliveries in excess of the quota, however, fetch a still lower

price. The KCC accepts unlimited quantities of cream for conversion

into butter and ghee, and the price paid for such deliveries translated

into whole milk is the lowest. Until a few years ago, when the fresh

milk market stopped growing, quotas were given free of charge to

those who could demonstrate their capacity to deliver a stable

supply throughout the year. Since then, African farniers on new

settlement schemes started on former European farms have been

26

Kenya: Introduction Property of the Internatioral Banke

for Reconetruction and Developmerequired to buy qoutas from existing holders at a price which wasfixed by the Kenya Dairy Board at Sh 200 per gallon. The KCCundertook to finance the purchase of such quotas by deducting theprice from payments made on milk deliveries. Other African farmersor cooperatives have continued to receive free quotas in proportionto the development of the market for whole milk. Payments formilk and cream are made on delivery, but these are supplemented bysubsequent payments, the size of which depends on the pricesrealized by KCC on its sales. Up to 1958, the payouts for butterfatand milk were determined by the sales prices of the products madefrom them, but since the drop of world butter prices in 1958, thepurchase price of whole milk has been slightly reduced to supportthe price paid for butterfat. A small cess levied by the Dairy Boardon milk sales and turned over to KCC has also helped to subsidizethe export of butter to some extent. In the domestic market KCCsells at wholesale. The wholesale and retail price of milk is fixed bythe Dairy Board. Prices for dairy products in Kenya are apparentlycomparable to those abroad. In the year 1963/64, KCC sales wereabout £4,600,000 of which £2,135,000 were in the export market.Nearly 30 percent of the whole milk was sold in neighboring coun-tries. Most of the exports, however, consisted of butter and gheewhich were sold in a large number of countries, principally theUnited Kingdom.

Marketing of general produceWhile the principal farm products have been handled by country-

wide marketing organizations, a wide variety of miscellaneouscommodities have not enjoyed an organized market. In the oldNyanza and Central Provinces, there were marketing boards towhich African producers were supposed to sell their market sur-pluses of such products as dried peas and beans, millet, sorghum,groundnuts, etc.; these boards were being replaced by a NationalBoard in mid-1 964 at the time of our field survey. Yet these agencieshave not in general been equipped to handle perishable produce,including fresh vegetables and fi-uit, which can in theory be producedin large quantities and in great variety under the wide range ofecological conditions prevailing in Kenya, but which are difficultto market. The domestic market for such produce is very narrow andprices have, accordingly, fluctuated widely with even small changesin supply. The Horticultural Cooperative Union, of which a fewindividual Africans and a number of African cooperatives aremembers, sells fresh produce at auction in Nairobi on behalf of itsmembers and has successfully pioneered the export, partly by air, of

27


some fruits and vegetables, but its total annual turnover as of 1964

was only about £400,000. Three privately-owned canning plants

have been established in Kenya and one of these was approach-

ing an annual export volume of £800,000, principally in the form

of canned pineapple, by the first half of 1964, and another was also

exporting canned pineapple. Coinmercialization of this type of pro-

duce has been handicapped not only by the limitations of the mar-

ket, but also by the difficulty of organizing production by small

African farmers in such a way as to ensure an adequate and reliable

supply and satisfactory quality. Inadequate and ill-located pro-

cessing facilities and insufficient output have together constituted

a vicious circle that has thwarted the development of many types

of farm products for which Kenya is otherwise well suited.

The role of cooperatives

As already indicated, African cooperatives have played an in-

creasingly prominent role, particularly in marketing and processing.

The African cooperative movement did not really receive any

Government impetus until the introduction of the Swynnerton

Plan in 1954, but thereafter it grew very rapidly. As of the end of

1962, there were 574 primary African marketing societies with a

total membership of 223,105 and a turnover in 1962 of £4,415,808.

Coffee societies accounted for the greater part of the membership

and nearly 83 percent of the value of the turnover in 1962. The

primary societies were organized as of the end of 1962 into 25 unions.

In 1964, a nationwide federation of cooperatives was formed.

The growth of cooperatives has been greatly aided by the insis-

tence of the Government that all coffee growers join cooperative

societies before obtaining permission to plant coffee, and by the

fact that African farmers could not obtain quotas for the marketing

of pyrethrum, or for the marketing of milk beyond limited local

sales, without joining cooperatives.

The role which cooperatives have played in the development of

African agriculture will be discussed in some of the subsequent case

studies. Here it need only be noted that the mushroom growth of

cooperatives has undoubtedly created problems. Management and

accounting have often been seriously deficient, owing to the shortage

of competent people and a reluctance to pay adequate salaries to

staff. Standards of probity in handling funds have sometimes left

something to be desired. The very fact that societies had a monopoly

on the handling and processing of a crop, such as coffee, has often

been a disincentive to the improvement of efficiency and the reduc-

tion of costs. This has created a tendency among some of the larger

28

Kenya: Introduction

African coffee growers to leave cooperatives and to band togetherfor the establishment of coffee factories. There have also beenfrequent complaints that societies have had little or no interest in theimprovement of standards of cultivation and quality of the cropthey handled. In recent years it has also been difficult for theGovernment's Department of Cooperative Development to trainand maintain sufficient staff for advising and supervising coopera-tives. On the whole, however, the progress of the cooperativemovement has been remarkable.

Some general observationsThe above information on marketing organizations has been set

forth as part of the background against which the development ofAfrican agriculture must be considered. We made no attempt toanalyze and make some judgment on the operations of the manyagencies concerned with mnarketing. However, sorne general com-inents may be hazarded. It seemed to us that the existence of mar-keting organizations which had, in the first instance, been developedfor European producers has helped the African farmers to "breakinto" the market. There is little doubt that many of these organiza-tions have done a useful task in pioneering the development ofmarkets, particularly those abroad. In general they appear to havebeen efficiently managed. On the other hand, there may well besome reason to re-examine these marketing arrangements at thepresent stage of Kenya's agricultural development and, in particular,to determine how well suited they are to the needs of African pro-ducers who have been contributing a growing proportion of themarketable supplies. In many respects, these marketing organiza-tions are so elaborate and complicated that they may become diffi-cult to administer effectively as European participation in theirmanagement diminishes. There appears to be a need to reconsiderthe continued use of price maintenance in the domestic market forthe sake of subsidizing exports. In some cases, such as butter andmeat, this has been justified as a measure to promote the develop-ment of an adequate market volume. In other cases, such as maize,it has been prompted by a desire to ensure self-sufficiency. Formaize it might be desirable to determine whether the funds requiredto subsidize the export of periodic surpluses might not be betteremnployed to keep the price of domestic sales at a level which wouldnot give all African farmers an incentive to continue producingall their maize requirements, irrespective of the suitability of theirland for the growing of this crop.

29


Progress in African agriculture

A brief examinationi of the progress made by African agriculture

is now in order. In some respects, this progress has been notable.

The gross value of output marketed by the African sector has risen

from an average of £5.5 million in 1955 and 1956 to £11.6 million

in 1963, and an estimated £14 million in 1964; the increase would

undoubtedly have been somewhat greater had it not been for a

decline in the prices of some commodities. The most striking

successes have been achieved in the expansion of coffee and tea.

The acreage planted to these two crops by 1963-69,400 for coffee

and 8,430 for tea-exceeded the Swynnerton Plan targets by 61

percent and 40 percent respectively. The voluine of tea produced

rose from 12,900 lbs. in 1957 to 981,000 lbs. in 1963. In terms of

the number of farmers and the amount of income involved, the

development of arabica coffee production has been the most impor-

tant. By the end of 1963, 199,035 Africans were growing coffee.

Deliveries of clean coffee by African cooperative societies increased

from 780c.5 tons in 1955/56 to 8,701.7 tons in 1962/63, and produc-

tion is expected, on the basis of already existing acreage, to rise

further to 36,562 tons by 1967/68. The quality of the coffee produced

has compared favorably with that of the European planters. The

proportion of African-grown coffee falling in the first three grades

averaged slightly over 50 percent up to 1960/61, but in the three

subsequent years it was significantly lower, reflecting a decline in

the standards of crop husbandry and processing.There has been a notable increase also in African-grown pyre-

thrum, although the acreage in 1963-15,400 acres-fell almost 50

percent below the Swynnerton Plan target, partly because there

had been a sharp cutback in production since 1961/62 owing to

market factors. As for other crops, it should be noted that the

acreage planted to pineapples by 1963 was only about 3,300 as com-

pared with 25,000 envisaged by Swynnerton. African production

of cotton and sugar cane has not increased markedly; the rise

in sisal output has been modest. As for food crops, the most marked

progress has been achieved in rice output, primarily owing to the

Mwea-Tebere Irrigation Scheme, and in the production of "English'

potatoes. The marketable surplus of maize and pulses, which are

basically subsistence crops, has shown no particular trend.In the realm of animal husbandry, the most notable development

has been the adoption of dairying, based on European-type cattle,

by a growing number of African farmers in the higher-altitude and

higher-rainfall zones. The nuinber of "grade cattle" on African

farms is probably close to 60,000 today; the amount of milk sold

30

I;enva: Introduction

by African farmers is estimated to have reached 5.5 million gallonsin 1963, of which nearly 4 million gallons were sold to the KenyaCooperative Creameries. The latter estimated, early in 1964, that itwas probably drawing milk supplies from no less than 7,600 Africanfarmers through their cooperatives. The fact that many farmers havebecome capable of the rather sophisticated standards of managementrequired in the case of grade cattle is encouraging. It is noteworthy,for example, that many farmers keeping grade cattle now acceptthe idea, traditionally so alien to the African, that grass leys orfodder crops must be put in to supplement natural grazing. Thisdoes not meani that management is not in imaniy respects deficient.Case studies of farmers keeping grade cattle show a wide range inmilk yields. Control of disease by spraying or dipping is ofteninadequate. There is also a w idespread reluctance to cull unproduc-tive bull calves.

While irnproved animal husbandry is practiced by a considerablenumiiber of farmers in such Kikuyu districts as Nyeri and Kiambu,in Kenya as a whole, the vast majority retain unimproved nativecattle whose productivity, both in terms of beef and of milk, remainsvery low. The Government has made considerable, though notvery successful, efforts to improve grazing. It has also providedbetter marketing facilities for native cattle, and it is obvious fromthe increase in the number of African cattle marketed over the yearsthat there has been a response to market incentives. However,the quality of native cattle sold for slaughter remains extremelypoor. Data from the KMC show that the cold dressed weight ofAfrican cattle averages over 35 percent less than that of cattlebought from European farmers. During the four-year period 1960to 1963, the proportion of cattle which had to be condemnedaveraged 2.9 percent for cattle bought directly from Africans by theKMC and as high as 5.2 percent for African cattle bought throughALMO. For cattle bought from European fariiers, on the otherhand, the proportioin condemned was only 1.4 percent.

The progress that has undeniably been made has, as vet, leftuntouched the great majority of African farmers and pastoralistswho still, on the whole, produce little more than what is requiredfor their bare subsistence. It is also noteworthy that the developmentof production for the market by the larger or more progressivefarmers has apparently not taken place at the expense of produictionfor subsistence. In other words, cash cropping has in large partbeen grafted on to a subsistence economy. Except in parts of theCentral Province, notably Kiambu District, there appears as yet tobe little or no specialization of output among farrners. At the same

31


time, the standards of cultivation of subsistence crops have not been

greatly improved. The ensuing studies will discuss the extent of

progress achieved and analyze the critical factors that have deter-

mined tlhe degree and limitation of development.

32

2. THE EXPERIENCE IN NYERI DISTRICT

Introduction

Nyeri is one of three districts-the other two being Fort Hall andKiambu-inhabited by the Kikuyu. It comprises the four admini-strative divisions of North Tetu, Mathira, Othaya and South Tetu.'The district has an area of 312 square miles, excluding the extensiveAberdare National Park and the forest reserve. For the settledarea, the 1962 census gave a population of 254,566, indicating anaverage density of 816 per square mile. From 1948 to 1962 thepopulation increased by 39.1 percent, or by 2.4 percent annually.

The district lies just south of the equator and is bordered on thewest by the Aberdare range and on the northeast by Mount Kenya.The altitude diminishes gradually from the northwest and northeastto the southeast. The population is concentrated in an area lyingbetween roughly 7,500 ft. and 4,000 ft. (see Map). The topographyis generally characterized by a sequence of ridges and valleys, withfarm holdings usually running from the top of the ridge to thebottom.

EcologyEcological conditions in the district are amonig the most favorable

in Kenya. The land can be divided into four principal ecologicalregions, ranging from the wet High Bracken Zone to the loweraltitude, drier Grass-Woodland Zone. The best ecological areas-the Kikuyu Grass and Star Grass Zones-comprise 62.7 percentand 13.9 percent of the total land (see Table 1). The natural grassin the last two zones provides excellent grazing.

Most of the district has a temperate climate. Rainfall is generallyadequate and fairly reliable. It ranges from 35 in. and 40 in. in

' The district was enlarged in 1963 by the addition of the Kiene Division, aformer European farming area now in process of settlement with Africans.However, all the data in this study refer to the old, pre-1963 district.


NYERI DISTRICT

Settled area

0 0 3 511mtr Isohyets

-50ttJt. Altitude In feet

MARCH 19A IhRD-16StRI

the southeast to 70 in. and over in the southwest. The rainfall is

distributed over two seasons-the heavier "long rains" of March-

May and the lighter "short rains" of the closing months of the year.

The district is also well provided with streams. About 30 percent

of all farms are said to have a boundary on water, and another

20 percent have a spring or other natural water supply at or near

the boundary. Piped water is supplied to 639 holdings, and over

1,000 holdings have received loans for installation of "roof catch-

ment" water supplies.

The least favored areas are the Grass Woodland Zone which

occupies 45 percent of South Tetu Division and the High Bracken

Zone which covers portions of Mathira and Othaya Division. The

34

Kenya: Nyeri District

TABLE 1: LAND CLASSIFICATION BY ECOLOGICAL ZONESAND USE (acres)

GrassHigh Kikuyu Star Wood-

Division Bracken Grass Grass land Total

North Tetu 1,920 49,280 5,760 - 56,960Mathira 10,240 42,880 10,240 - 63,360South Tetu - 12,160 12,800 19,840 44,800Othaya 16,000 24,960 - - 40,960

Total 28,160 129,280 28,800 19,840 206,080of which:

1. For public purposes 2,110 9,700 2,160 1,490 15,460 ( 7.5%)2. Not arable 5,630 19,390 3,600 2,980 31,600 (15.4'%c)3. Arable with soilconservation 7,600 29,740 5,760 3,470 46,570 ' l

4. Flat arable 12,820 70,450 17,280 11,900 112,450 (54 .

SOURCE: Central Region Agricultural Policy and Development Proposals,1963-70.

High Bracken Zone is generally too cold for more than one crop,and in the Grass Woodland Zone the second rains are often tooscanty to permit double cropping. In the southeastern part ofSouth Tetu, the soils also tend to be sandier and less fertile.

The district is suitable for a wide range of crops and livestock.Natural conditions are ideal for the development of dairying as partof mixed farming. In the higher altitude areas, tea and pyrethrumcan be grown; in the middle altitudes, arabica coffee; and in thelower altitudes, pineapples. A wide range of fruits and vegetablescan also be cultivated. The principal food or subsistence cropsgrown are maize and pulses, supplemiented by English potatoesand sweet potatoes. The sample agricultural census of 1960/61indicated that the first two of these accounted for 76 percent of thetotal acreage planted to "temporary" or seasonal crops, while allfour occupied almost 92 percent of the cultivated acreage. For thedistrict as a whole, the area in temporary crops durinig the shortrains is only about 15 percent less than that sown in the long rains.

Population pressure and labor migrationAs is often the case, favorable agricultural conditions are associated

with high population density. According to the 1960/61 sampleagricultural census, the average holding supported 6.23 people on4.27 acres. The comparison with the other densely populatedKikuyu districts is shown in Table 2. The uneven distribution ofland snakes the population pressur e iiiore acute. For example,

35


TABLE 2: POPULATION AND LAND

Average No. of Persons Supported Land per Personper Holding Supported (Acres)

LandPlanted

Average to

Size of Adults Tempo-

Holding Juve- Arable rary

District (Acres) Males Females niles Total Land Crops

Nyeri 4.27a 1.38 1.89 3.96 6.23 0.34 0.59

Fort Hall 3.61 1.49 1.82 3.25 6.57 0.23 0.40

Kiambu 5.15 2.16 2.70 5.59 10.45 0.21 0.36

All Africanareas6 8.42 1.71 1.83 3.92 7.45 0.40 0.50

'It should be noted that the size of the average holding shown by this sample

census is smaller than that shown by the comprehensive statistics given in

Table 3.blncluding only those in which a sample census of holdings was conducted.

SOLuRCE: Kenya African Agricultural Sample Census, 1960/61.

the census cited indicated that 30.8 percent of the holdings was less

than 2.5 acres and accounted for 12.1 percent of the total farm

area, while 72 percent was less than 5 acres and included 48.8 percent

of the total area.2 More recent statistics obtained from the Land

Registrar's office in Nyeri show that 44.7 percent of all holdings

falls in the category of less than 3 acres which is generally considered

to be adequate only for subsistence farming (see Table 3).

The pressure of population on land accounts for a high degree of

labor migration. The Kikuyu in Nyeri, like those in Fort Hall and

Kiambu, were hemmed in by European farming areas on the one

hand, and by other crowded African areas on the other. Their only

resource, apart from intensifying agriculture in their own areas,

was to seek employment opportunities outside. Labor migration and

permanent einigration developed well before development of agri-

culture in the Kikuyu districts really began in the early 'fifties. In

1948, for example, the census showed that almost 28 percent of

Nyeri Kikuyu, including both sexes, was living outside the district

Similar figures are not available from the 1962 census.3

2 In Fort Hall and Kiambu Districts, 44.8 percent and 40.6 percent of the

holdings respectively were less than 2.5 acres and comprised 18.6 percent and

9.3 percent of the total area of all holdings; in these two districts the proportion

of holdings less than 5 acres was 78.5 percent (with 44.3 percent of the total area)

and 61.4 percent (with 25.3 percent of the total area) respectively.3The advance report of the 1962 census does give data on the number of

Kikuyu living outside the Nyeri, Fort Hall and Kiambu Districts, but does not

indicate the district of their origin.

36

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS BY SIZE

AverageAcreage Number of Holdings in Acreage Categories of

Total Holdings per --Division Number Acreage Holding 0-1 1-3 3-7 7-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 Over 30

Mathira 13,928 61,620 4.42 2,032 4,450 5,713 1,056 467 112 57 41- North Tetu 11,640 54,334 4.67 1,337 4,089 4,453 1,015 500 137 79 30

South Tetu 9,902 43,694 4.41 909 3,422 4,415 737 290 81 38 10Othaya 7,637 40,305 5.28 619 2,413 3,039 895 417 144 90 20

Grand Total 43,107 200,223 4.64 4,897 14,374 17,620 3,703 1,674 474 264 101Percentage of Total 11.4 33.3 40.9 8.6 3.9 1.1 0.6 0.2

SOURCE: Office of the Assistant Land Registrar, Nyeri, 1964.


The remarkable development of agriculture in Nyeri between

these two census years has apparently reduced the rate of labor

migration, even though it remains high. One indication of labor

migration is the disproportion between adult males and adult

females in the district, for a considerable percentage of labor mi-

grants leave their families behind.4 In 1948 the number of adult

males in Nyeri was 34.6 percent less than the total of adult females,

but by 1962 this percentage had declined to 29.4 percent.

It should be noted, however, that the sample agricultural census

of 1960/61 indicated that 35 percent of all holdings in Nyeri was

still farmed by someone other than the "owner," i.e., by wives, other

relatives, friends, etc. The very fact that such holdings comprised

31.5 percent of the area indicated that "absentee" farm operation

was by no means confined to the smallest farsns. In fact, quite a

few Kikuyu with well-paid jobs or profitable business enterprises

in the cities, particularly Nairobi, have considerable land holdings

which are managed by others or sometimes almost wholly neglected.

Evidence points to considerable landlessness, although its exact

extent is difficult to determine. The large proportion of Kikuyu

living and working outside the old "reserve" consists partly of those

who have no land at all and have more or less permanently expatri-

ated themselves, and partly of those who have left their holdings

temporarily in charge of others as indicated in the preceding para-

graph. Even among those resident in the Kikuyu districts some

proportion is probably landless. In 1962 there were in Nyeri 51,728

male adults, but only 43,107 holdings. On the face of it, this differ-

ence does not seem significant, particularly considering the inclusion

in the first total of people in non-agricultural employment and of

young men who normally get land of their own only after they are

married. Yet the disparity becomes more marked when account is

taken of the fact that a considerable percentage of the holdings is

farmed by the wives of men working outside the district, and hence

not counted by the census as part of the district's population.'

I This tends to be true of migration to the urban areas only. Where Kikuyutook up employment on European farms, they generally brought their families.Thus, in the Rift Valley, which is largely a European farming area, the sex

ratio among Kikuyu in 1962 was about the same as that for the Kikuyu popula-

tion as a whole.I A former European agricultural officer, who conducted a field investigation

in one of the locations of Nyeri, came to the conclusion that between 30 percentand 40 percent of the adult males were landless. See K. K. Sillitoe, "LocalOrganisation in Nyeri," East African Institute of Social Research, Conference Paper,

July 1962.

38

Kenya: Nveri District

The Kikuyu inhabitantsThe Kikuyu are the largest tribe in Kenya and one of those

which has had the longest and most intimate contacts with Europeansand their civilization. These contacts caime from the early Christianmissions established among the Kikuyu, from the comparativeproximity of the Kikuyu area to Nairobi, and from the settlementof European farmers around the Kikuyu reserves. As their own landbecame progressively more crowded, particularly in the light of thelow standard of prevailing husbandry, an increasing number ofKikuyu sought work in the cities and on European farms.

The broadening of horizons and the competition for employmentopportunities experienced in the outside world appear to have in-creased the desire for education. The Kikuyu seem to be the mostliterate and best-educated tribe in Kenya. We were impressed by thegreat sacrifices people often make to educate their children. InNyeri, for example, around 80 percent of all children of school ageis probably attending primary and intermediate schools. Bothpractical and formal educationi and experience have increasedreceptivity to change and innovation. Most labor migrants foundemployment on European farms. There they saw, for the mostpart, natural conditions similar to those in their home district.They found European farmers making money from imported Euro-pean breeds of cattle, from coffee, pyrethrum and tea. Many of themwere thus enabled to see the opportunities for commercial farmingin their home district. In talking with progressive farmers andtravelling through the Kikuyu districts, we noted again and againthe impact that this experience eventually had on the developmentof agriculture and animal husbandry. We would ernphasize "even-tuallv," because the effect was not immediately apparent and mani-fested itself only as the Government itself initiated a vigorousprogram of developing African agriculture and gave it an additionalfillip by pushing through a program of land consolidation andregistration .

A few additional remarks about the Kikuyu inhabitants may bein order. Originally KikuylU meni considered themselves primarilyherders and warriors, leaving agriculture to their women, and thereis some indication that their interest in employment on Europeanfarms was initially prompted in part by the opportunities it affordedto keep herds of livestock-primvmarily goats-for which their owncrowded reserves no longer had sufficient room. Whatever "live-stock complex" the Kikuyu maya originally have possessed has nlowlargely disappeared, except amiong some of the older men. Kikuyunow largely look upon livestock simlply as a means of livelihood,

39


and marriage dowries are generally paid in cash rather than in

livestock. The men, by now, have become seriously interested inagriculture as a source of cash income and no longer scorn agri-

cultural work. The production of food or subsistence crops, however,is still left to the women, who also fetch water and gather fuel andare expected to share the work on commercial crops. In fact, mostof the work still devolves on the women, who continue to occupy a

subordinate position in Kikuyu society.Individualism has become progressively more marked among the

Kikuyu. Though kinship ties as such remain important, lineage

groups and clans do not appear to play a significant role any more.

Similarly, the traditional Elders' Councils, which were recruitedfrom the current "ruling" generation in each territorial unit, no

longer exercise much authority. Land has long been regarded asindividual property which could be sold as well as inherited, and

the formal issuance of titles under the post-war land consolidationand registration program was, in a sense, the culmination of a trendtoward individualization of tenure which had long been manifest.

The progress achieved

The most striking phenomenon in Nyeri, as indeed in Kiambuand, to a lesser extent, in Fort Hall, has been the great progressachieved in agriculture and animal husbandry since the early 'fifties.

It is the primary task of this paper to examine the extent of thisprogress and the factors which have brought it about. At the same

time, it will be shown that in many respects progress is still limited,and the reasons for such limitations will come in for scrutiny.

The extent of the advance in commercial agriculture is shownstatistically in Table 4. Data for commercial crop production arenot given for years prior to 1956, for it is only by the mid-'fifties thatdevelopment rapidly accelerated. The value of recorded exports of

agricultural and livestock products from the district, which averaged£171,000 in 1950 and 1951, rose to around £220,000 by 1956 and

1957, but by 1963 had more than doubled to a figure of £489,948.6It should be noted, moreover, that the latter figure greatly under-states the rate of development in recent years, largely because onlya small proportion of the coffee and tea planted has matured up tonow and partly because coffee prices have declined since the mid-'fifties.

The three commercial farming activities that have made the most

6 See Table 4. In 1964 the value of recorded exports from the district rosefurther to £524,285.

40

Kenya: NVyeri District

progress are coffee, tea and dairying. Pyrethrum has lagged, andthe production of pineapples has never really caught on. Nor hasthere been any marked recent increase in the output and sale ofvegetables and potatoes, for which the district would seem to bewell suited.

CoffeeThe growing of arabica coffee has undergone the most striking

development. For a long time the Government inhibited Africanpeasant coffee cultivation in the Kikuyu districts, for fear that pestsand diseases might spread to coffee plantings of nearby Europeanfarms and plantations. After slow development in the early 'fifties,a rapid expansion of acreage took place from 1954 in line with theSwynnerton Plan emphasis on cash crops for Africans. In 1963, thelast year before the International Coffee Agreement became effec-tive, the acreage virtually doubled. All growers were required tojoincooperatives, and plantings were regulated by the Department ofAgriculture which initially also supplied the seedlings-a task laterentrusted to the cooperatives. By the end of 1963 the number ofgrowers had increased to 22,512. This represents slightly more thanhalf of the total number of consolidated holdings in Nyeri. Thisproportion may, however, be somewhat exaggerated if, as seemslikely, a portion of previously consolidated holdings has in fact againbecome subdivided and, thus, may support more than one coffee"planter." As of the end of 1963 the "average" area of coffeeplanted per grower was 0.59 acres (322 trees).

The marked drop in coffee prices from the mid-'fifties until 1963obviously did not diminish enthusiasm for coffee growing. This isnot surprising, in view of the fact that studies of a number of coffeefarms by the Farm Economics Unit in 1962/63 and 1963/64 showedthat coffee is a highly remunerative crop by comparison with anyother alternative except, perhaps, for dairying in some circum-stances. Thus, studies by the Farm Economics Survey Unit7 showedthat the coffee "enterprises" included in the survey had been able,on the average, to recoup all previous costs incurred by the fourthyear after planting and were yielding an income in excess of currentannual costs by the third year (see Table 5). The surplus of currentincome over cash expenditures' on mature coffee averaged £170

I Farm Economics Survey Unit, Some Economic Aspects of Agricultural Develop-ment in Nyeri District, 1962 (Repcrt No. 21, 1964). Unpublished and preliminaryresults of the 1963/64 study were made available to the Mission.

8 It should be noted that "costs" or "expenditures" exclude compensation forfamily labor or any element of interest on labor and cash invested during theinitial years when coffee was not yielding any income.

41

TABLE 4: DEVELOPMENT OF CASH CROPS AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Co2feeTotal acreage 1,019 1,453 1,806 2,311 3,022 3,960 6,867 13,531

Of which matured n.a. n.a. 344 746 1,019 1,470 1,824 2,329

No. of growers 3,406 4,780 5,683 6,703 7,886 11,025 15,469 22,512

Exports of coffeeTonnage 92 87 210 47 290 552 692 1,088

Gross value (£) 44,600 49,847 81,563 157,899 168,556 200,663 209,084 280,190

Percentage of clean coffee infirst three classes 49.4 21.3 11.0 25.6 50.2 40.0 46.6 32.1

TeaTotal acreage 327 391 466 549 826 1,015 1,333 1,709

i No. of growers 4,020

Output of made teaTonnage - 5.5 22 55 93 111 135 200

Gross value (1) - 2,700 7,000 25,547 18,680 48,060 57,666 44,700

PyrethrumTotal acreage n.a. n.a. 427 812 935 1,905 1,658 1,302

No. of growers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,779 n.a.

Exports of dried flowersTonnage 29 27 28 37 89 112 126 189

Gross value (£) 7,446 7,338 7,102 10,322 24,390 33,051 40,160 34,025

PineapplesTotal acreage 27.7 41.4 83.2 86.0 86.0

ExportsTonnage 0.5 0.25 75.0 87.0

Gross value (£) 16 8 504 522

Exports of selected other agricultural produce

OnionsTonnage - 32.5 29 41 13 23Gross value (£) - 401 649.50 1,845 557 690

Fnglish potatoesTonnage 22 143 16 44 56 166Gross value (£) 350 224 197 546 700 1,660

I"egetablesTonnage 1,500 819 495 678 760 161Value (£) 18,600 7,485 5,544 14,916 16,720 1,932

Livestock products-exportsMilk-gallons 76,394 82,658 96,060 ? 113,370 205,150 256,000 735,500-value (£) 9,549 9,166 5,854 12,500 11,337 22,294 25,138 55,164; Hides-no. 7,404 6,221 39,762 8,493 7,592 8,624 14,328 20,216-value (£) 1,268 8,294 23,457 3,397 5,694 6,468 14,328(?) 17,737Skins-scores 14,850(?) 1,806(?) 8,093(?) 1,222 1,187 1,464 1,829 2,385-value (£) 9,594 13,795 13,150 4,888 3,561 4,391 5,489 7,743Pigs-porkers-no. 6,564 6,841 5,110 1,326 942 761 1,050 1,655-baconers-no. - - - - - - - 35-value (£) 31,358 35,868 49,500 6,260 1,865 4,508 5,545 12,600Poultry-birds-no. 10 370 810 1,026 1,430 3,014 3,198 3,997-value (£) 3 123 242 205 285 604 640 700Eggs-dozens 5,849 13,230 3,330 3,330 5,188 13,737 12,000 14,800-value (£) 350 1,653 410 330 311 1,373 1,200 1,850

Value of total exports of agriculturaland livestock products (£) 219,343 224,885 252,028 241,593 294,940 330,678 389,669 489,948'Including Mbuni or dried coffee cherry.SOURCE: Annual Reports of District Agricultural Officer; also Central Region, Agricultural Policy and Development Proposals 1963-1970.

TABLE 5: SELECTED DATA FROM FARM ECONOMIC STUDIES

Annual Labor InputExcess of Cash Income over Current Expenses (Sh)6

Hours per Acre or CowTotal Cost of Per Hour of Per Hour of

No. of Acreage Percentage Paid Labor Per Cow or per Acre Family Labor All Labor-

Enter- of Enter- per AcreType of prises prises Male Hired or Cow For Cumu- For Cumu-

Enterprise Covered Covered Total Labor Labor (Sh) For Year Cumulative Year lative Year lative

- Dairying4A- 1962/63 29 111.5 655 58 51 54.87 389.00 - 1.06 - 0.67 -

1963/64- 49 210.2 358 n.a. 45 26.92 449.88 - 1.50 - 0.90 -

Cofee1st year

1962/63 11 7.78 1,734 69 67 192.82 -642.32 -642.32 neg. neg. neg. neg.

1963/64 17 12.82 1,371 n.a. 80 251.11 -581.30 -581.30 neg. neg. neg. neg.

2nd year1962/63 10 7.05 576 41 65 77.30 -96.05 -738.37 neg. neg. neg. neg.

1963/64 14 7.39 679 n.a. 52 79.19 -93.44 -674.74 neg. neg. neg. neg.

3rd year1962/63 9 4.79 1,322 50 56 128.66 279.35 -459.02 0.48 neg. 0.34 neg.

1963/64 11 4.68 1,667 n.a. 77 214.36 232.20 -422.54 0.59 neg. 0.27 0.03

4th year1962/63 10 4.48 1,773 50 48 156.47 1,865,53 762.32 2.02 0.33 1.14 0.36

1963/64 14 6.28 1,680 n.a. 48 221.54 1,626.30 1,183.76 1.86 0.76 1.10 0.36

Mature (5th yr.)1962/63 12 7.93 1,933 51 61 243.18 3,420.67 4,827.18 4.54 1.58 1.89 0.771963/64 46 38.57 1,395 n.a. 63 232.79 2,150.16 3,333.92 4.16 1.61 1.77 0.64

Tea1st year

1962/63 10 2.61 3,727 64 59 422.76 -665.76 -665.76 neg. neg. neg. neg.1963/64 4 2.23 2,655 n.a. 70 494.83 -746.31 -746.31 neg. neg. neg. neg.

2nd year1962/63 9 3.60 1,684 44 71 235.97 -238.47 -904.32 neg. neg. neg. neg.1963/64 10 3.00 918 n.a. 47 82.35 -82.35 -828.66 neg. neg. 0 neg.

3rd year1962/63 7 1.50 2,187 30 26 107.13 -135.80 -1,040.03 neg. neg. neg. neg.1963/64 9 4.23 665 n.a. 31 42.73 -42.73 -871.44 neg. neg. 0 neg.

4th year1962/63 6 3.54 2,284 10 63 247.93 -29.75 -1,069.78 neg. neg. 0.09 neg.1963/64 6 1.41 2,006 n.a. 13 55.32 201.26 -670.18 0.11 neg. 0.13 0

Mature (5th yr.)1962/63 9 11.67 1,809 12 78 256.21 798.87 -270.80 2.07 neg. 0.58 0.091963/64 14 13.21 1,944 n.a. 59 220.94 971.68 301.50 1.22 0.07 0.61 0.15

'Data for 1963/64 are given in terms of livestock units and are therefore not strictly comparable with that for 1962/63.bExpenditures include no allowance for interest on capital invested or for income foregone during the immature stage of the crop.'In this case outlays on hired labor are included in cash income before the latter is divided by the total number of hours of both family and hired

labor employed.SOURCE: Farm Economics Survey Unit.


and £165 per acre for the 1962/63 and 1963/64 sample farms

respectively and yielded a return of Sh 4.54 and Sh 4.16 respectively

per hour of family labor devoted to coffee. While the farmers covered

by these studies were regarded as "progressive" or better than

average, there is little doubt that even the "poorer" farmers found

coffee-growing attractive.9

The more progressive farmers spray their coffee and apply some

fertilizer. According to reports of the District Agricultural Officer,

outlays on fungicides, insecticides and fertilizers rose from Sh 104,784

in 1959/60 to Sh 384,753 in 1962/63. Originally spraying was done

largely by teams employed by the cooperative societies, but such

spraying teams have been abandoned, except in South Tetu, because

farmers found individual spraying much more effective. We noted,

however, that the proper maintenance of sprayers is a chronic

problem. We encountered some farmers who had bought one

knapsack sprayer after another because they were unable to main-

tain them properly or to have them repaired.

Our own observations and the testimony of others confirm the

existence of wide differences in coffee husbandry among Nyeri

farmers. Pruning is often neglected or poorly done. Many farmers

do not mulch their coffee very well, partly because plots of Napier

grass originally established to provide mulching material, have, in

more recent years, been diverted to the feeding of cattle. Spraying

is often not done with sufficient frequency or neglected until there

is a serious outbreak of pests or disease. Yields accordingly vary

widely among farmers. One study indicated that in a single random

sample of six farmers, production of clean coffee per acre picked

averaged 10.68 cwt. in 1962/63, but varied from a low of 4.42 cwt.

to a high of 17.96 cwt.'0

Farmers appear to find it difficult to maintain high standards of

cultivation consistently. In part this may be due to the fact that

output does not always fall immediately as a result of neglect. Many

9 It is interesting to compare the findings of the Farm Economics Survey Unit

with those of another study made by a student at Makerere University College

in Kampala. This study focused on 12 farms selected by random sampling in

Mathira Division. Of these, six were below and six above 5,600 ft. in altitude.

All costs were covered, including family labor and manure, both valued at

opportunity cost. Costs during the first two years and capital equipment costs

in the third year were regarded as establishment costs, to which 20 percent

interest, compounded annually, was added during the three years, to give a

figure for total capital investment. On this basis, average income per acre of

mature coffee was about £65 and £70 respectively for the two groups of farms,

or 49 percent and 58.6 percent of the capital investment. See Christopher H.

Karue, Peasant Coffee Production in Mathira, Nyeri, Kenya (typescript, 1965,

Makerere University College).i0 See the study of Karue cited in the preceding footnote.

46


farmers also seem to consider their income from coffee quite ade-quate, even though the yields are well below what could be obtainedwith better husbandry entailing more effort and expenditure.Indeed, coffee seems particularly attractive because it can yield acomparatively good income without inuch effort. Initial establish-ment does require considerable labor, but much of that may behired. Once coffee starts to bear, inost of the labor is needed forpicking, and that, too, can usually be done by paid workers earninglow wages."'

Tea

Tea growing has proved very popular in the higher reaches of thedistrict. First planted in 1950, the acreage expanded steadily to 549in 1959 and has since increased at an accelerated pace, reaching1,709 acres by the end of 1963. At that time the number of growers-4,020-was less than a fifth of the total of coffee planters, and theoutput of tea, which matures more slowly than coffee, had a totalvalue of less than one-fifth of that of coffee.

Compared to coffee, the development of tea growing has requiredmore organization and management. The collection and transportof the plucked tea must be efficiently and promptly handled ifsevere losses are to be avoided, and tea factories require more in-vestment and technical know-how than the rather simple installa-tions used for the pulping, washing and drying of coffee. At first theorganization and regulation of the tea industry was the responsibilityof the Department of Agriculture, but since 1960 an autonomousGovernment agency, known first as the Special Crops Authorityand now as the Kenya Tea Development Authority, has been incharge of these functions. Thus, the KTDA is responsible for thesupply of tea stumps, the licensing and supervision"2 of individualgrowers, the operation of leaf collection and buying centers, and themanufacture and sale of tea.

Originally there was some fear that the growing of tea on manyscattered individual plots would be a failure or would lead, in anyevent, to the production of low-quality tea. In 1956 the Department

11 The study of coffee farms made by the Farm Economics Survey Unit in1962/63 indicated that in the first year the labor input per acre of coffee was1,734 hours per year, of which 67 percent was provided by hired labor. In theensuing two years labor inputs were, of course, lower, but on mature coffee itaveraged 1,933 hours per acre annually, of which 909 hours were devoted topicking and transporting of coffee berries. On miature coffee acreage 61 percentof the work was again done by hired labor.

15 It should be noted, however, that the field or extension officers of KTDAoperate under the general direction of the District Agricultural Officer in eachcase.

47


of Agriculture actually experimented with the planting of tea inblocks of 10-50 acres, pooling land for this purpose. It is noteworthy,however, that this venture did not prove successful. Since theparticipants did not live on their tea holding, many of them did notgive it the necessary care. Other participants did not tend theirtea properly because they did not own that part of the "pooled"land on which they had planted it. The hope that the task of super-vision and extension would be made easy was not fully realized,because the participants were seldom found on their holdings at thesame time. The experiment was therefore abandoned, and all teahas since been planted on individual holdings. This practice seems tohave been quite compatible with the production of high-quality tea.

Farmers have responded readily to the opportunity to grow tea;we noted that the rate of planting almost everywhere would havebeen much greater if the KTDA had been able to supply moreplanting material. Although tea is not generally as remunerative as

coffee, it is undoubtedly the most profitable crop for those areaswhich can grow tea. The 1962/63 and 1963/64 studies of the FarmEconomics Survey Unit revealed that farmers tended to break evenon their tea, in terms of current annual cash income and expenditures,by the fourth year. By the end of the fifth year their cumulative cash

income approached or slightly exceeded their cumulative past expen-

ditures, excludirxg any allowance for interest or for income oppor-tunities foregone. Their current net income in the fifth year after

planting averaged about £40 per acre for those included in the1962/63 sample and nearly £49 per acre for those in the 1963/64sample (see Table 5). These income levels provided a return of

slightly over 1 Sh per hour for family labor devoted to tea. In termsof opportunity costs, these returns are quite attractive, particularlyconsidering the fact that tea yields per acre and net income peracre generally continue to increase for some years.'3

13 A Makerere University College student made a study of 16 farmers inMathira Division who had mature tea and arrived at the following relationships:

Current Cash IncomeLess Expenditures

No. of Age of Tea Yield in Green Leaves Per Man-day ofFarmers Planted per Acre (lbs.) Per Acre Family Labor

Average Range (Sh) (Sh)

5 5 4,071 3,367-4,749 1,447 12.304 6 4,617 4,142-4,983 1,601 13.703 7 5,641 4,824-6,010 1,973 15.703 8 5,388 4,160-7,720 1,757 13.401 9 7,029 7,029 2,845 11.20

48


It is interesting to note that a considerable number of farmerswere willing to incur substantial net cash outlays over the first threeor four years'4 for the sake of such eventual profits. Tea also hascertain other attractions to the farmer. While plucking must be donewith care and regularly, tea production is much less subject to thehazards of disease and insects than coffee. Variations in yields amongtea growers are generally less marked because there is not so muchdifference in standards of crop husbandry. Tea growing also affordsmore even year-round employment."5 We found an almost uni-versal desire among farmers to plant more tea.

DairyingIn many respects the most remarkable phenomenon has been the

rapid development of dairying with cattle of European breeds,principally Guernsey and Jersey. We have already noted thatnatural conditions-a temperate climate, excellent indigenousgrasses and good water supply-favored this development except inthe drier and hotter portions of South Tetu, where the proportionof indigenous cattle kept is the highest.

Dairying with European breeds developed under close control ofthe Department of Agriculture which permitted the keeping of"grade" cattle only on "registered" holdings. Owners of suchholdings were required to have fencing and paddocks, sufficientgrazing and fodder crops for their cattle and facilities for sprayingor dipping, and to have their cattle inoculated regularly and in-seminated artificially. In addition, male calves were to be castrated

The author of this study considered that the farms with eight-year old plantingswere atypical because two were owned by old farmers who were obviously badmanagers and that the single farmer with a nine-year old planting, who wasexceptionally good, could hardly be held to be representative either. He felt,however, that the first three groups of farmers indicated a correlation betweenage of planting on the one hand and yields and returns on the other. Theaverage yield of tea on all the farms in 1962 and 1963 was said to be 4,939 lbs.as compared with 3,578 and 3,614 lbs. for the farms with mature tea acreageincluded in the 1962/63 and 1963/64 studies of the Farm Economics SurveyUnit. Owing to the comparatively lower yield, the latter studies showed a smallercurrent net cash income per acre. See John Njukia, Smallholder Tea Productionin Mathira Division of Nyeri District 1964 (typescript, 1965).

14 The Farm Economics Survey Unit studies found that, after allowing for acredit of Sh 840 for tea stumps, net cash outlays per acre peaked at Sh 1,069.78in the fourth year for farms surveyed in 1962/63 and at Sh 871,44 for farmssurveyed in 1963/64.

15 According to the findings of the Farm Economics Survey Unit study alreadycited, labor inputs per acre for mature coffee in 1962/63 were well below 100hours in half of the 12 months and between 210 and 384 in the other 6 months.For mature tea, labor inputs per acre were between 132 and 189 hours in 9 of 12months, below 100 hours in 2 months and 285 hours in I month.

49


or slaughtered. Grade cattle could be imported only under proper

veterinary control.The number of registered grade cattle holdings rose from 345 at

the end of 1960 to 1,505 by the end of 1963. There is little doubt,

however, that the actual number of people keeping grade cattle is

much greater, for many cattle have been acquired outside the

regulations. The total number of grade cattle in the district is said

to have approached 8,00016 in 1964. The number of artificial

inseminations, which was only 737 in 1957, rose to 3,571 in 1963

and 2,368 in the first five months of 1964. Most of the milk is sold

through cooperative societies which increased the volume of milk

handled from 113,370 imperial gallons in 1960 to 735,500 gallons in

1963 (see Table 4) and an estimated 1,110,000 gallons in 1964.

The adoption of commercial dairying involves many revolutionary

changes in traditional animal husbandry, and it testifies to the

receptivity and adaptability of the Kikuyu that these have, on the

whole, readily accepted the changes involved. Except for a number

of "roadside graziers," people keep their cattle on their holdings and

generally rotate their grazing among a number of paddocks.

There is now remarkably little resistance to artificial insemination

or the castration or slaughter of male claves. Supplementary feeding

with sweet potato tops, Napier grass and crop residues is widely

practiced, and many progressive farmers even buy some concentrates

and fodder.'7 Average daily milk yields obtained by a number of

"better" farmers surveyed by the Farm Economics Survey Unit

were around 350 imperial gallons in 1962/63 and 455 gallons in

1963/64.All this does not mean, of course, that there are no problems and

difficulties. Inadequate amounts of milk are frequently set aside for

the rearing of calves. Too little fodder is still being grown. Many

farmers appear to be unable to recognize when a cow is in heat, so

that even though daily insemination services became available in

the whole district in 1963, the number of "repeat" inseminations

during the first five months of 1964 was still almost 23 percent of

the total. In general the calving rate is too low. The integration of

agriculture and animnal husbandry has encountered a number of

'5 This estimate appears high, particularly when compared with the numberof inseminations. The estimate does, of course, include immature cattle, but

it is not entirely clear whether it includes cattle in the settlement schemes.17 The Farm Economics Survey Unit found that 29 such farmers with an

average of 111.5 each cows spent on the average Sh 68.40 per cow on concen-

trates, fodder and minerals during 1962/63 and that similar expenditures per"livestock unit" in 1963/64 averaged Sh 38.28 for farmers with 210.2 livestock

units.

50


obstacles. Not much manure is produced by cattle because farmersgenerally find it more advantageous to keep their cattle grazing inpastures throughout the night. There is not a very regular and fre-quent rotation of grass and arable in accordance with the recommen-dations of the Department of Agriculture. In large part this appearsto be due to the difficulty of breaking grassland, particularly Kikuyugrass with its matted rhizoinatous root system. Since oxen andtractors are not generally available and their use would, in anyevent probably be uneconomic with the prevailing topography andsize of holdings in the district, only the jembe or hoe is used to breakland. Most of the testimony seems to indicate that it takes 1.5 to2 man-months to break an acre of grass. Under these conditionsthere is a strong temptation to leave land permanently under grassand to continue cropping the same piece of land year after year,despite declining fertility.

In the higher areas of the district, dairying is frequently associatedwith tea, and sometimes with pyrethrum production, and at some-what lower altitudes coffee-growing and dairying are often associa-ated. We found most farmers anxious to increase the number oftheir grade cattle and others, who still had only native cattle,desirous of acquiring grade cattle. The principal iinmediate obstaclesto a more rapid increase in such cattle were the shortage of funds forfencing, equipment and cattle and the considerable increase in theprice of grade heifers and cows which had taken place over recentyears.

Dairying has a number of attractions. Apart from the cash income,it has produced a considerable quantity of milk for farm consumnp-tion. Probably about a third of the milk is consumed on the farmwith consequent improvement in diets."8 Dairying also makes pos-sible better utilization of available labor around the year. The cashincome so far has been quite substantial. Studies by the FarmEconomics Survey Unit disclosed that a number of the more pro-gressive dairy farmers had averaged a net cash income of Sh 389per cow in 1962/63, and that another group in 1963/64 had aver-aged Sh 450. These returns were equivalent to Sh 1.06 and Sh 1.50respectively per hour of family labor devoted to cattle (see Table 5).The costs did not include any return on capital investment orservice on loans contracted for the development of dairying, but thebenefits, on the other hand, omitted the sales value of progeny inexcess of that required for reproduction or replacement of the original

18 This was the finding of the Farm Economics Survey Unit for the average ofprogressive farmers studied in 1962/63 and 1963/64.

51


cattle. Profitability inevitably varies greatly in accordance with therelationship of the farmer and his cooperative to the market, i.e.,on the proportion of fresh milk that can be sold in relation to thatfor butterfat. Limited evidence indicates that, at recently prevailingprices and costs, dairying may be about as profitable as both tea andcoffee when the value of home consumed milk is taken into account,and the cost of capital investment is calculated on a comparablebasis.'9 It was evident from our own observations that the farmersthemselves generally considered dairying to be a profitable occu-pation.

Less successful farming activitiesOther commercial crops or livestock activities have had much

less success. The increased prevalence of blight and wilt and thediscouragement created by sharp fluctuation in market prices haveinhibited the commercial production of "English" potatoes, forwhich conditions in Nyeri are otherwise quite favorable. However,it was evident from our encounters with a number of growers thatpotatoes can be a very profitable crop if certified seed are used andpotatoes are sprayed. Production and marketing of vegetables havealso failed to develop on a large scale. Here, the principal difficultieshave been the lack of specialized advice available to growers and thecomplex problems involved in organizing production, marketingand processing on an adequate scale. In general, one can say thatthere have been, up to the present at least, less difficult or easieralternatives to these crops. Pyrethrum, pineapples and pigs have hadsome, but not spectacular, success.

Pyrethrum. Pyrethrum, a perennial that is generally left in theground for three years, grows well in the upper region of the coffeezone and in the tea zone. It is obvious, however, that farmers havegenerally found this crop much less attractive than either coffee ortea or cattle, at least in recent years. This is confirmed by studies ofpyrethrum farmers made by the Farm Economics Survey Unit inboth 1962/63 and 1963/64. These showed that pyrethrum gave amuch lower return both per acre and per unit of labor. Such resultsappear to have been partly due to poor husbandry. The density ofplanting is often too low and the method of drying is such as tolower the pyrethrum content of the flowers. We had the impressionthat the agricultural service and the Pyrethrum Board had givencomparatively little attention to improving the yields of pyrethrum

19 This conclusion may be drawn from a limited number of comparisons madeby the two Makerere University College students already cited, namely JohnNjukia in his paper Smallholder Tea Production in Mathira Division of Nyeri District1964 and Christopher N. Karue, Peasant Coffee Production in Mathira, Nyeri, Kenya.

52


which, at about 200 lbs. of dried flowers per acre, seemed to beonly half of what could be attained. The production and dissemi-nation of improved planting material has also apparently failed toreceive adequate attention. However, the most discouraging factorin recent years has been the unfavorable market situation. Forsome time the Pyrethrum Board greatly increased the volume ofproduction licensed, but a miscalculation in the market forced it tocut back licenses heavily in 1962/63 and 1963/64. In 1962/63 theBoard not only reduced its price on pyrethrum flowers deliveredwithin the quota, but bought the large output in excess of the quotaat less than one-third of the quota price. Many pyrethrum growersin Nyeri found their gross income per acre reduced by about one-half. Apparently no new pyrethrum at all was planted in 1963/64.The experience of certain other African pyrethruin-growing areassuggests, however, that the competitive position of pyrethrumvis-a-vis other crops could be improved with higher yields andbetter drying, particularly if the recent rise in prices can also bemaintained.

Pineapple. Pineapple has been the least successful of the cash cropspromoted by the Department of Agriculture. It has been recoin-mended primarily for the drier, warmer portions of South TetuDivision. Acreage, however, has remained small and static overrecent years. Where farmers had tried dairying as well as pineapples,we noted that they considered dairying much more profitable.Similarly, where pineapples were tried in areas that could alsogrow coffee, the latter gave much better returns per acre and perlabor unit than pineapples. Studies by the Farm Economics SurveyUnit have shown that it actually costs snore to establish an acreof pineapples than an acre of coffee, particularly if the recoin-mended amount of fertilizer is used.20 Aggregate yields per acre

20 Eight farmers studied by the Farm Economics Survey Unit in 1962/63showed an average expenditure per acre of pineapples at the end of the firstyear (i.e., before any fruit was harvested) of Sh 1,532.66. When farmers in thesecond and third year after planting were included in the sample, it appearedthat over three years the cumulative net return was actually negative. It wasassunmed, however, that all the fariners used a heavy dose of fertilizer in theinitial year and kept their pineapples only three years before replacing them,in accordance with recommendations by the Department of Agriculture. Asimiiilar study carried out in 1963/64 came out with much more favorable resultsbecause (1) the farmers establishing pineapples for the first time and includedin the sample did not use fertilizers, and (2) the sample of farmers covered in-cluded a number who had kept their pineapples into the fourth year. Thisstudy could not take account of the ultimate impact on yields of the failure touse fertilizer, but it did appear to show that it was definitely advantageousfor farmers to keep their pineapples for a fourth year, during which currentexpenditures were almost negligible compared to the income from the harvest.

53


during the two to three productive years have also been far below

what seems attainable-10 tons or less, instead of 20 tons. An

additional handicap has been the cost of transport. The two can-

neries which absorb most of the pineapples are situated 70 miles

and 100 miles away-at Thika and Machakos respectively-and

the growers have been unable to organize transport efficiently.

In the adjoining district of Kiambu, pineapple production seems

to have been much more successful, not only because growers are

closer to the canneries, but also because they appear to have profited

more from the advice from the nearby Horticultural Research

Station at Thika. Although South Tetu growers are less favorably

situated, those who do not have coffee as an alternative cash crop

should still find it attractive in principle to produce pineapples.

It is by no means clear why production on a more significant

scale has not developed. One of the reasons may be the comparative

lack of attention to this crop by the extension service; another

reason may be the difficulty of getting the farmer, even when he

has no ready alternatives, to adopt a new cash crop entailing high

establishment costs and not yielding him an immediate and striking

return for his efforts.Pzgs. Pig-keeping was long encouraged by the Department of

Agriculture. Indeed, many reasons appeared to indicate that this

would be economic and attractive. Pigs are generally considered

to be efficient converters of feed into meat, and they can be fed at

least partly on crop residues and skim milk which otherwise might

go to waste. Pigs, moreover, could be sold readily as porkers or

baconers to the European-operated Uplands Bacon Factory.

For a while pig production developed rapidly, with exports from

the district reaching a peak of £49,500 in 1958. However, a great

increase in total pig production in Kenya, coupled with a sharp

decline in sales to the United Kingdom, brought about a collapse

in prices which profoundly discouraged output. Although prices

rose substantially and steadily during the four-year period 1960 to

1963, production and sales of porkers and baconers by African

farmers in Nyeri have recovered very slowly (see Table 4).

A study of a number of "pig farmers" by the Farm Economics

Survey Unit suggests that pig-keeping has not, in fact, been very

profitable for many of them. Of 29 pig-keepers studied in 1962/63,

eight had losses without taking into account any compensation

for their own family labor. Those who kept sows and sold their

offspring wholly or largely as weaners evidently showed the poorest

results. However, it was by no means clear whether those who fol-

lowed this practice did so owing to poor management or to the lack

54

Kenya: ANyeri District

of financial means to feed their pigs to maturity. At the same time,other farmers were evidently able to make a satisfactory profit."

The impact on employmentDespite the limited successes with certain types of "cash" farming

activities which we have just emphasized, the overall progress indeveloping commercial agriculture has been remarkable. This de-velopment has had interesting effects on the employment of farmlabor. For one thing, it has tended to alter the traditional divisionof labor between men and women. Whereas men formerly confinedthemselves largely to herding, they now generally do part of thelabor on cash crops and dairy farming. However, even though mennow do considerably more agricultural work, most of the laborburden still falls on women. They are required to work on cash cropsin addition to the tasks for which they remain exclusively respon-sible-the production of subsistence crops, the fetching of fuel andwater and all the other household tasks.

Another impact of development on farm employment has beenthe increasing amount of hired labor used. The tendency of Africanfarmers to devote a significant proportion of rising incomes to theemployment of outside labor is a phenomenon that we have fre-quently observed. In Nyeri we noted it in our visits to farms; ithas been demonstrated by concrete data gathered by the FarmEconomic Survey Unit in its studies of individual coffee, tea anddairying enterprises. Table 5 shows the high proportion of hiredlabor generally used on such enterprises in 1962/63 and 1963/64.Since labor input figures were gathered for each type of crop oractivity, rather than for the farm as a whole, it is difficult to establishto what extent this employment of labor is made necessary byseasonal peaks in the farmn's entire labor requirements and by thetotal size of the farm. There is little doubt, however, that some of theexpenditure on hired labor could, if necessary, be avoided both bymore efficient use of labor and by fuller employment of availablefamily labor, particularly of male labor. In any event, the dispositionto hire workers has had the salutary effect of distributing morewidely the money income derived fronm commercial farming activi-ties. It has given employment, albeit at low wages,2 2 to a consider-

21 See Farni Economic Survey Unit, Some Fconomic Aspects of AgriculturalDetvelopment in Nyeri District 1962.

22 We found the monthly cash wages of "permanent" farm laborers wereSh 30-40 for women and Sh 40-50 for rnen, plus usually some food. Casualworkers are normally compensated by the task. The Farm Economic SurveyUnit estiniated average hourly compensation in Nyeri at Sh 0.25 for men, Sh0.21 for women and Sh 0.15 for children.

55


able proportion of people who are either landless or have holdings

insufficient to support a family.How much paid employment has been created by the develop-

ment of cornmercial farming is difficult to estimate. If one extrapo-

lated the data on hired labor obtained for the farm enterprises

surveyed in 1962/63 to the entire district acreage of coffee and tea,

classified by date of planting, and assumed 2,000 work hours to be

equal to one work year, then one would conclude that the cultivation

of coffee and tea together gave rise in 1963 to a paid employmnent

of 7,900 man- (or woman-) years. On a similar basis, one might

estimate that the approximately 8,000 grade cattle (equivalent,

perhaps, to 4,400 grade cows) provided paid employment amounting

to 735 man-years. However, this total of around 8,600 man-years

would probably be a substantial overestimate, since the average size

of the "enterprises" covered by the Farm Economics Survey Unit

appears to be considerably greater than the average for the district

as a whole. Yet, even if the volume of paid employment is only half

that total, it would still be quite significant, particularly since the

number of people receiving some cash wage income would be much

larger, owing to seasonal employmiient peaks as in coffee picking. 23

The employment generated has probably helped mostly in supple-

menting the income of people on small holdings. The extremely

low wages paid by African farmers have hardly been very attractive

to able-bodied young men seeking full-time employment.

The factors in development

The factors that have been responsible for the development of

commercial agriculture will now be examined. Two of the most

important factors have already been mentioned, but need to be

recalled. One of these is the favorable ecology, which requires no

elaboration. The other is the receptivity of the Kikuyu-developed

by their longer contacts with the outside world and the experience

acquired in labor migration, particularly in their work on European

farms-all of which has bred an awareness of the importance of

education and an appreciation of money income and the oppor-

tunities for earning it. We must still assess some of the other factors-

land tenure changes, agricultural credit, cooperatives and Govern-

23 In recent years there appears to have been a growing shortage of casual

labor for picking, at least at the low rates of pay that have prevailed. Thus, in

Mathira Division we were told that in 1963 farmers had paid up to Sh 2 per

debi (35 lbs.) for coffee picking in the competition for workers and that the

coffee cooperative had accordingly passed a ruling that no member should pay

more than Sh 0.85 per debi!

56

Kenya: ANyeri District

ment agricultural services apart from credit. At the same time,broader aspects of some of these subjects will be discussed.

At the outset it should be stressed that none of these factors wouldhave sufficed of itself to initiate and maintain the pace of develop-ment. For example, the favorable ecology of Nyeri would not havebeen sufficient without the experience and earnings acquired throughlabor migration; the two together needed the accelerator of a moreactive Government program to promote agriculture and land reform.

Land reformThe impact of land consolidation and registration, which was

completed in Nyeri by the end of 1959, has been the subject ofconsiderable controversy. An objective appraisal is difficult, par-ticularly since one must rely to some extent on imnpressions ratherthan on firm data. The social aspects will be discussed briefly beforecoming to the effect on output.

Social Implications. It has often been said that the land reformevicted many people from the land and aggravated the unequaldistribution of land. Although there is no statistical evidence on thissubject, it is probably true that a numnber of ahoi lost their right tocultivate a piece of land in the process of consolidation. These ahoiwere friends or relatives who were given a patch to cultivate at theowner's pleasure, without, however, acquiring any permanent rightsto it. This practice of "lending" land was fairly widespread when alandowner had many scattered fragments, some of which he andhis imnmliediate family could not cultivate. When these fragmentswere consolidated into a single holding, all of which could be con-veniently farmed by the owner's family, there was obviously lessinclination to leave land in the hands of ahoi. This does not meanthat all ahoi were deprived of land to cultivate. Many registered land-owners work outside the district, and it is still their practice to leavetheir holdings in the hands of their wives and other relatives or even,occasionally, their friends.

There was probably some degree of concentration of land owner-ship in the course of consolidation. We were impressed by the num-ber of people we met who had bought a large portion of the fragmentswhich were subsequently consolidated into a single holding. Manyof the more knowledgeable and enterprising landowners anticipatedan acceleration of development and a rise in land values followingconsolidation and, therefore, bought all the land they could, pre-sumably at the expense of those who were less well off or failed tounderstand the imuplications or potentialities of land reform. It isalso quite likely that at least some of the people who were absent

57


from the district while land reform was being carried out lost their

land, even though a determined effort was made to notify everyone,

including those detained under the Mau Mau emergencyregulations,

of the procedure for validating their rights. Where land is short, as

in the Kikuyu districts, it is obviously aliuost impossible to consoli-

date and determine rights to land without leaving a considerable

number of people with a sense of grievance.Favorable Effect on Development. We have little doubt that consoli-

dation and registration have considerably promoted the develop-

ment of land. It is significant that we found hardly any landowners

who had any desire to undo the reform, even though many people

originally entertained serious misgivings and quite a few had

voiced discontent with the exchange of land parcels that was an

inevitable feature of consolidation. More specifically, we believe,

froin testimony received, that consolidation has encouraged fuller

use of land. Before consolidation, the average holding probably

consisted of six to eight fragments,2 4 somne of which were often quite

far from the owner's house. A few fragments were often inadequately

tilled or neglected and left in bush. After consolidation, the entire

acreage was generally used. Moreover, the greater attention paid

by people to their consolidated holdings seems to have had a favor-

able effect on yields.2 5

24 This was the finding of a 1950 survey made as part of that year's FAO-sponsored world agricultural census. Another study made more recently of 100

consolidated holdings revealed the following regarding their previous degree of

fragmentation:1. On 18 holdings of up to 4 acres each, the number of fragments ranged

from 2 to 22, with the majority consisting of 4 to 6 fragments and 3 having 10 or

more fragments; the average size of the fragments ranged from 0.15 to 1.50 acres.

2. On 24 holdings between 4 and 8 acres, the number of fragments ranged

from I to 24, with 12 having 10 or isiore fragments; the average size of fragments

varied from 0.27 to 6.8 acres.3. On 31 holdings between 8 and 12 acres, the number of fragments was from

1 to 25, with 11 having 10 or more fragments; the average size of fragments

ranged from 0.35 to 11 acres.4. On 13 holdings between 12 and 16 acres, 10 had 10 or more fragments and

the average size of fragments varied from 0.36 to 3.54 acres.5. On 8 holdings between 16 and 20 acres, 4 had 10 or inore fragments and

the average size of fragments ranged from 0.85 to 6.43 acres.

6. On 6 holdings between 20 and 30 acres, 3 had 10 or inore fragments and

the average size of fragments was from 0.87 to 12.7 acres.

See W. Odongo Omamo, A Comparative Study of Consolidated Holdings in Nyeri

District in the Central Province of Kenya (British East Africa), with a View to Popular-

izing Consolidation in Other Parts of the Country (M.Sc. Thesis, University of the

Panjab, 1959).25 The comparative study of consolidated holdings in their first, second, third

and fourth year following consolidation and covering 29, 19, 21 and 31 farms

respectively, showed a progressive increase in the yields of maize, potatoes,

cabbages and beans. See Oinamo's thesis cited in the preceding footnote.

58


Land reform appears to have brought about some increase incash crops and particularly in tree crops. Consolidation probablyhelped the small landowner in particular to release some land forcash crops; the registration of land, by resolving disputes about land,presumably made it possible to plant tree crops on land whereownership or boundaries had previously been in doubt. It shouldbe emphasized, however, that cash crop development began wellin advance of land reform and has proceeded rapidly even in areaswhere land has never been consolidated and registered. Landreform simply added somewhat to the area that could readily andsecurely be developed for cash crops. This was impressed upon usin the neighboring district of Fort Hall, where land reform was stillproceeding. There, coffee had usually been planted on the largestfragment and, where consolidation had taken place around thatfragment in the last few years, it was evident that additional newcoffee had frequently been put in.

The most significant impact of consolidation has been on thedevelopment of dairying with grade cattle. Dairying of this typerequired the enclosure of grazing land so that grade cattle could besafeguarded against the tickborne diseases carried by native cattle. Itis noteworthy that the first spontaneous movement to consolidate andenclose land developed in North Tetu Division, where a nuinber ofKikuyu who had worked as herdsmnen on European farms wantedto start keeping European types of cattle. Their initial attempts toenclose land led to many disputes and also to a conviction thatcattle could not be effectively and economically grazed and man-aged on a number of isolated fragmients. Under these circumstances,the first "informal" consolidation was carried out in the late 'fortiesunder the leadership of a Location Chief. Elsewhere, this type ofland reform generally lagged uiltil it was carried out and completedby the Government in the late 'fifties. It was therefore only with theadvent of the 'sixties that dairying by African farmers began todevelop rapidly.

The Danger of Renewed Fragmentation. The question necessarilyarises whether land consolidation is likely to be permanent in faceof the continued population pressure and the consequent tendencyto redivide holdings. In principle the law prevents this. Holdingscannot be reduced by sale, gift, inheritance or any other forin ofsubdivision below a certain minimiiumii size which, in accordancewith the recommendations of the Departmaent of Agriculture, hasbeen fixed at 6, 8, 10 and 12 acres respectively for the Star Grass,Kikuyu Grass, Grass Woodland and High Bracken Zones. Sales, giftsand subdivisions must be approved by the Divisional Land Board,

59


and all transactions with respect to land must be entered on the land

registry before they are legally valid. It must be admitted, however,

that these safeguards have not been wholly effective. In fact, there is

considerable evasion, partly because there is widespread ignorance

of the requirements of the new system of land registration and, above

all, because the African tradition that everyone is entitled to some

land dies hard. For example, over the four-and-a-half year period

ended June 1964, only 187 "successions" or transfers by inheritance

were officially registered in the district. The Assistant Land Regis-

trar estimated in 1964 that perhaps 2,000 holdings were still regis-

tered in the name of the deceased; it is likely that at least a portion

jf these holdings have in fact been subdivided. Moreover, it is legal

to register land in the joint name of up to five co-proprietors, and

although it is intendec. that such holdings should be farmed as

units, their cultivation is probably often shared among two or more

of the co-owners. All in all, it is generally agreed that the number

of people using land is considerably greater than the total of regis-

tered landowners. Some observers fear that the progressive divergence

between land use rights that are developing in fact and those which

are officially recognized in the land register may eventually create

a considerable amount of renewed conflict. Under existing law, of

course, claims to land and land use cannot be legally enforced,

unless they are in accordance with the land register. However,

pressure to alter the law in this respect could become strong if the

land rights, as incorporated in the register, were less and less in

conformity with reality. At present there is often no strong incentive

to register land transactions, except when land must be mortgaged

for a loan or when a buyer of land insists on registration as a legal

confirmation of his purchase. In the end, it may prove necessary to

relax somewhat the restrictions on transfer and sub-division.

It is doubtful, however, that redivision or fragmentation has

already assumed such dimensions so as to jeopardize further agri-

cultural development. An adverse effect may be difficult to avoid

in the long run unless (1) the pressure to share land is minimized

significantly by nonagricultural employment and settlement oppor-

tunities on other land, and/or (2) production on existing land is

intensified so that people can be supported on holdings of an average

size below that now obtaining.

The role of farm credit

It has often been held that the land titles created by official

registration of land made it possible to extend, on the basis of mort-

gages, the credit essential to agricultural development. The validity

60


of the proposition must be examined against the background of therole of credit as a whole.

It is a striking fact that farm loans did not play a major role inpromoting development until recent years. The Farm EconomicsSurvey Unit has observed: "The development that has taken placehas obviously been largely achieved with finance provided by thefarm operators themselves, both from their earnings from farmingand from incomes derived in the nonagricultural sector." 26 Thegreat expansion of coffee production was achieved virtually withoutcredit, except that advanced for the building of some coffee factories.Earnings from coffee have in fact helped to finance the developmentof other crops and of dairying, either directly or by servicing loanscontracted for these purposes. Income from non-agricultural jobsor businesses has also been used extensively to finance farm develop-ment, as more and more people became aware of the opportunitiesafforded by commercial agriculture. It is evident that people haveshown a considerable capacity for saving once they recognized theprofit potentialities of agriculture.

Since 1959, however, agricultural credit has played a much moreprominent role. Three factors appear to have been primarily re-sponsible for this. One was the readiness of Governm1ent to providefunds for agricultural credit, particularly once land reform had beencompleted. Another was the entry of commnercial banks into thebusiness of lending to farmers after it became possible to mortgageland as a security for such loans. Finally, the large investmentrequirements of dairying created a considerable demand for capitalwhich fariiers themselves could not fully meet . 27 The greater partof loans extended to farmers over recent years seems, indeed, tohave been for the purchase of grade cattle and dairy equipment andfor the construction of fences and cattle sheds.

The J'olume of Credit. The development of lending is shown inTable 6. It should be stressed that the figures in this table do notinclude all credit extended for agricultural purposes. It excludes,for example, credit to cooperative societies, including loans forprocessing facilities, as well as seasonal credits extended by coopera-tives to their memiibers, such as the advances normally made bycoffee cooperatives for fertilizers, fungicides and insecticides. The

26 See Some Economic Aspects of Agricultural Derelopment in .Vyeri District 1962.27 The average initial investment requirement, including the cost of a cow in

calf, appears to have been between £60 and £65 for an acre of land developedfor dairying. See Karue, Peasant Coffee Production In Mathmra, Nyerz, Kenya andA'jukia, Smallholder 7ea Production in .Mfathira Dirision of Nyeri District.

61


TABLE 6: EXTENSION OF CREDIT TO AFRICAN FARMERS BY

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND COMMERCIAL BANKS

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Loans from government fundsNumber 3 333 327 334 137

Total Value (Sh) 9,700 397,774 439,031 235,000 206,800

Loans by commercial banksNumber - 88 83 156 ?

Total value (Sh) - 440,000 389,920 342,300 545,262

TotalNumber 3 421 410 490 ?

Value (Sh) 9,700 837,774 828,951 577,300 752,062

SOURCE: Annual Reports of the District Agricultural Officer.

figures also omit the credit for tea stumps made available in recent

years by the Kenya Tea Development Authority.

Table 6 discloses that, over the five-year period 1959-1963, loans

snade from various government funds numbered 1,134, for a total

amount of £64,415. The average amount per loan was about £57.

Over the same period commercial bank lending totaled £85,874.

Data on the cumulative number-327-and average size-£179-

are available only up to the end of 1962. Considering the fact that

there are 43,107 holdings in all and 18,939 holdings of over three

acres each, it is evident that only a small fraction of farmers have

received loans.Mortgages and Loan Repayments. Virtually all of these loans appear

to have been made against mortgages. According to information

supplied by the Land Registrar's Office in Nyeri, the total amount

of lending against mortgages by mid-1964 was £164,104, of which

£81,860 represented commercial bank loans. This would seem to

confirm that the formal determination and registration of titles to

land has greatly facilitated agricultural credit. Indeed, there is

little doubt this was initially the case. Commercial banks in par-

ticular were induced to loan only by the possibility of getting a

pledge of land as security. More recently, however, there has been a

growing realization that a mortgage does not by itself provide a

very effective guarantee of the repayment of loans.

Loan repayments have not in actual fact been very satisfactory.

According to the report of the District Agricultural Officer for 1962,

the collection rate on government agricultural loans in the district as

a whole that year averaged only 52 percent, ranging from a low of

20 percent in South Tetu Division to a high of 73 percent in Othaya

Division. In 1963 the District Agricultural Committee temporarily

suspended the granting of further loans in South and North Tetu

62

Kenya: Ayeri District

Divisions in a partially successful attempt to combat defaults. Bythe end of March 1964, arrearages on Government loans amountedto £11,444, including £1,592 in interest, which probably rep-resented a significant reduction in defaults.

While data regarding defaults on loans made by commnlercialbanks are not available, it was clear fromn our conversations with anumber of bank managers that their experience with agriculturalcredit had been rather disappointing and that they were, accordinglyinclined to curtail the volume of such lending. Arrearages have beenconsiderable. In practice it has proved virtually impossible toforeclose a mortgage. Not only is it tirne consuming to obtain,through the courts, an order for the sale of mortgaged land, butwhen land is actually put up for public sale, other farmers arealmost invariably afraid to bid for fear of incurring popular antagon-ism. For the most part commercial banks now lend only to those whohave a regular source of income from salaries, the sale of milk orcoffee, etc., which can be pledged in advance to the service of theloan. In addition, the rnaturity of comnmercial bank loans has beenreduced-by one bank, for example-from three years to one year,with a provision for possible renewal at the end of the curtailedperiod.

The original hope that the commercial banks would become anever larger source of credit for African farmiers has not, by and large,been realized. The commercial banks have generally found thisbusiness too costly and too risky. Nor are they well equipped orstaffed to handle farm loans. They do not have sufficient staff todetermine whether a given loan will really increase the farmer'soutput or whether the loan is actually used for the purposes forwhich it was given.

Experience in Nyeri, as well as in other districts of Kenya, demon-strates that the agricultural extension staff must screen applicationsfor credit and ensure that disbursements are in accordance withloan terms. In this respect, the existing procedure, as it was operatingin Nyeri, appeared to be quite satisfactory. Loan applications aretransmitted with a recommendation by the Assistant AgriculturalOfficer of the Division to the Divisional Agricultural Comiumnittee.No loans can be made without the approval of this Committee orthe District Agricultural Coinmittee, both of which consist notonly of administrative and Agricultural officers, but also of farmers.The actual loans are made by the Agricultural Finance Corporation,which is now responsible for the administration of all agriculturalcredit except that granted in connection with the settlemnent offormer European farms.

63


The Agricultural Finance Corporation also often insists on

mortgages as security. It is apparent, however, that repayment

depends primarily on careful screening of loan applications and on

continuous attention to the problem of collecting payments. The

previous unsatisfactory payments record was not significantly due

to debtors' incapacity to repay, but rather to a growing conviction,

strengthened by experience, that they really did not have to repay.

Before the Agricultural Finance Corporation was established, loan

collection, like tax collection, was left exclusively to the already

overburdened adininistration. Loan records were not always com-

plete and up-to-date, and debtors were often not pressed for pay-

ment. Today the administration is still responsible for collection,

but the Agricultural Finance Corporation has assigned at least one

officer to each of the inore important districts, in order to ensure

that the administration really discharges this responsibility. Pro-

visionally at least, these measures produced a notable improvement

in collection.2 8

We do not mean to suggest that land consolidation and registration

have not facilitated the extension of credit. They have made it

easier to determine the assets of the borrower and, in particular,

to assess his capacity as a farmer. The possibility of getting a mort-

gage has not, however, significantly enhanced the security of a loan.

The Demand for Credit. We have already noted that there has

obviously been considerable development without agricultural

credit in the past. We also encountered a number of farmers in

Nyeri, as indeed we did in other districts, who were obviously citing

the lack of credit simply as an excuse for failure to exert themselves.

Nonetheless, we reached the conclusion that insufficient credit had,

to some extent, slowed up development over recent years. On the

basis of both our own observations and the testimony of agricultural

staff, we concluded that the rationing of credit necessitated by a

shortage of funds, was denying credit to farmners who appeared to

be capable of using it effectively. Under the system in force, each

district and each division in the district has had to restrict its lending

to an annual quota,2 9 which has been considerably smaller than the

effective demand for credit. Rationing has had certain unfortunate

28 We were informed, for example, that the amount in arrears collected in

Nyeri during June 1964 alone was £1,532, or a little over 10 percent of the

cumulative amount in arrears at the end of March 1964. In the adjoining

district of Fort Hall, we learned that an AFC officer had been instrumental in

increasing loan payments, which had totalled only Sh 13,565 during the first

four months of 1964, to Sh 23,122 during May-June 1964.

29 This quota was Sh 224,000 for 1963/64, as compared with average annual

government lending of Sh 293,610 in the three-year period 1961-1963.

64


consequences. Apparently it often results in a reduction of individualloans to an amount less than that which is really required to acconi-plish the purposes of the loan. In other words, the available fundsare spread over too many loans. It has also made it necessary todisqualify a number of applicants, on the ground that these couldget credit from commercial banks. Thus, in March 1964, it wasdecided that government credit would not be extended to farmershaving either two grade cows, or one acre of bearing tea or coffee,or employment bringing in more than Sh 200 per month. In fact,by no means all such farmers were likely to get credit from coinmer-cial banks, in view of the latters' tendency to curtail lending foragriculture.

Credit for Land Purchase. Government credit has been available forthe development of a holding, but not for its purchase. Yet we werevery much impressed by the nunmber of progressive farmers who hadbought a large part, or even all of their holding, usually prior toconsolidation. The purchase of land has in itself usually been areflection of interest in the development of farming; those who hadinvested their own money in land, instead of merely inheriting theirland, seemed for the most part more determined to make their farmpay. Development of land might therefore be accelerated, if purchasewere facilitated by the extension of credit. This should, however,be done in such a way that the buyer would still have to pay aconsiderable proportion of the purchase price out of his own re-sources. To what extent the availability of finances would stimulatebuying is uncertain. In recent years the number of sales has notbeen high. Over the four-and-a-half years ended June 30, 1964,1,413 "transfers," which include gifts as well as sales, were registeredin Nyeri; in the first half of 1964, two of the four Divisional LandBoards approved 132 sales. While unwillingness to sell land isundoubtedly a limiting factor, it is possible that more land maybecome available for sale if additional opportunities for settlementon former European farms develop, particularly to the extent thatsettlers are not confined to the landless and are required to give upany other land they own. The introduction of a land tax that wouldbear most heavily on undeveloped land might also encourage salesor, conversely, discourage the purchase of land for purely speculativepurposes.

The role of cooperativesFarmers' cooperatives have played an important role in assisting

the transition to a inore commercial or market-oriented agriculture.They provide the marketing link between individual farmners and

65


large, national marketing organizations; do a certain amount of

processing; and supply some requisites of production and certain

services. While still susceptible to considerable improvement, the

cooperatives in Nyeri, as well as in the district of Kiambu, appear

to be among the most advanced in Kenya. In large part, this is

probably due to the comparatively high level of sophistication among

the Kikuyu.As of 1963 there were 51 cooperative societies; a number of these,

however, were moribund. The most active and important are the

coffee, dairy and pyrethrum societies. The coffee societies convert

coffee cherries into parchment coffee, which is then bagged and

sent to the Kenya Planters' Cooperative Union in Nairobi. The

dairy societies collect and sell their members' milk, either directly

or through their union. The pyrethrum societies accept deliveries of

pyrethrum flowers, dry them and bulk them for despatch to the

Pyrethrumi Board. There are a numilber of primiary pig societies,

although virtually all of the active cooperative work is done by the

North Tetu Pig Breeders' Cooperative Union with which they are

affiliated. There is only one pineapple cooperative society, which

confines itself to the sale of its members' crops to the canneries.

The primary coffee and pyrethrum societies are organized in the

Nyeri Marketing Union; all but two of the dairy societies have

joined in the Dairyman's Cooperative Union, and the pig societies,

as already indicated, have their own union. The function of these

unions differ. The Nyeri Marketing Union is wholly a supply and

servicing union. It buys in bulk certain supplies, such as fertilizers

and insecticides and other farmers' requisites, including fencing

material, corrugated iron sheeting, etc., for the primary societies who

in turn sell these to their members against cash, except in the case

of fungicides and fertilizers, which may be sold on short-term credit

recoverable out of deliveries of coffee cherries. The Marketing Union

also pays for a field staff of 23 agricultural instructors who are

assigned to the constituent societies but actually work under the

control of the Divisional Assistant Agricultural Officer on the im-

provement of the crop. Finally, this union provides bookkeeping

services for all but one of its member societies, either by seconding

bookkeepers to the societies or doing the bookkeeping at its own

headquarters. The Dairymen's Union, on the other hand, was estab-

lished primarily to handle and market milk on behalf of its member

societies. It operates a small but rather modern dairy in Nyeri,

where it receives morning milk from the societies, sells some of it

locally and the balance to the Kenya Cooperative Creameries,

partly as fresh milk and partly as cream. The Pigbreeders' Union

66


maintains a breeding herd of sows to supply weaners to its members;keeps a small group of stud boars; makes bulk purchases of feedconcentrates and other supplies for resale to pig keepers; and collectsporkers and baconers for shipment to the Pig Industry Board'sfactory at Uplands near Nairobi.

The cooperatives have managed to finance most of their own plantand equipment. This has been particularly striking in the case of thecoffee societies who have managed to finance the 26 coffee factoriesexisting in 1964 entirely out of their own commissions and sharecapital, except for the first three for which loans were obtained fromthe old African Land Development Board.

An important area in which cooperatives have failed to operatesuccessfully has been the organization of production and marketingof potatoes, vegetables, fruits and other produce of this character.A number of so-called Farmers' Societies were established to handlesuch produce, but have failed to operate effectively. The need forsuch societies is great, particularly to serve the interests of the smallerfarmers, but it is evident that their successful operation requiresconsiderable organizational and managerial skill, not only to organ-ize production on an adequate scale but also to cope with the con-siderable market risks. Societies of this type are likely to requirecareful nurture, guidance and supervision by the Government'scommunity development, agricultural and cooperative services.

Standards of Management. It was not possible to assess with anycare the efficiency of existing cooperative societies within the tirnewe had available. However, the coffee societies, which probablyaccount for approximately three-quarters of the turnover of allcooperatives in Nyeri, appear on the whole to operate with com-mendable efficiency. Their processing costs, which were around fourEast African cents per pound of coffee cherries in 1962/63 (rangingfrom a low of 3.4 cents for the North Tetu Society to a high of 4.4cents for the Mathira Society), and their marketing costs, in aboutthe same amount, do not on the whole appear excessive. In 1962/63the proportion of total sales proceeds retained by societies forexpenses, reserves, etc., ranged from 20 percent to 23 percent.

In discussions with the manageinent committees and staff ofcooperatives, we encountered a rather frank recognition of a numberof weaknesses and the need for improvement. Bookkeeping oraccounting is one of the principal and most critical deficiencies.More and better bookkeepers are needed. This requirement is allthe more acute because the staff of the Department of Cooperativesis itself inadequate to supervise and audit the cooperatives' accounts.Although occasional brief courses have been held for coffee factory

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managers and secretary/managers of cooperatives, additional and

more intensive training of cooperative personnel at all levels is

required. Our attention was drawn particularly to the need to

provide at least some indoctrination or training of newly-elected

members of the managemiient committees of cooperatives. Many of

such members are comparatively uneducated and unprepared to

deal with the problems they face. They tend sometimes to oppose

and override the more considered and better informed opinions

of the employees of the cooperatives.Cooperatives and Farm Credit. By and large, however, the manage-

ment of cooperatives in Nyeri compares favorably with that observed

elsewhere in Kenya and, indeed, in tropical Africa as a whole.

In fact, it seemed to us that probably some of the cooperatives had

reached a stage of development where they might gradually assume

some responsibility for the administration of farin credit. Except

for some seasonal credit for supplies and a very small credit operation

of somewhat wider scope started by the Mathira Coffee Cooperative

the cooperatives are not yet engaged in extending credit to individual

farmers. In some respects, however, cooperatives would appear to be

a potentially useful means of administering farm credit. We have

already noted the problem of payment in the past administration

of agricultural credit, and, in that connection, the inadequate

security provided by a mortgage on land. Through their control

over the sales proceeds of those products they market on behalf of

their members, the cooperatives have, in principle, an effective

means of recovering any credits extended through them. The

cooperatives may also help to develop amnong farmers a sense of

collective responsibility for the admninistration of agricultural credit.

On some settlement schemes in Kenya, we noted, for instance, that

cooperatives had assuined effective responsibility for the collection

of loans extended by Governmnent. The possibility of initiating a

credit operation on a small scale, through one of the better managed

cooperative societies or unions, might well be considered. It would

need to be preceded by the training of some staff in loan administra-tion. In developing such a credit scheme, even on a pilot basis, care

would need to be taken to ensure that the cooperative organizationhad itself a definite stake in the operation, by some such deviceas requiring it to match government loan funds or to meet defaults

on individual loans out of its own resources.

The role of Government field staffWe now come to a consideration of the role which the Govern-

ment's agricultural and veterinary field services have played in

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development. Until the early 'fifties, the agricultural field servicewas neither particularly effective nor very popular. During the'forties the emphasis was almost entirely on mechanical methods ofsoil erosion control such as narrow based terraces, bench terraces,etc. These measures undoubtedly did much to arrest the rapiddeterioration of soils that was taking place on the ridges and slopesas the result of prevailing farming practices. They were, however,unpopular, both because they were enforced and because they werenot accompanied by an active program to promote other improve-ments that would make farming profitable. Once the Governmentfocused its major attention on the development of commercialfarming, receptivity of advice and direction increased, and it becameeasier to incorporate soil conservation as part of a new and profitablesystemn of land use.

Since the early 'fifties, the agricultural service has done notablework. Agricultural officers were amnong the earliest proponents ofland consolidation and gave reliable help in carrying it out. Theagricultural service provided the planting mnaterial and guidancenecessary to the introduction of cash crops. In some cases it insistedon certain safeguards, such as the planting of coffee on properlyconstructed bench terraces-a practice which, incidentally, was,on the whole, readily accepted because it was associated with sucha profitable crop. The successful introduction of grade cattle anddairying would have also been virtually irnpossible without thecareful controls and guidance provided by the agricultural services,or without the disease prevention measures and the rather efficientartificial insemination service organized by the Veterinary Depart-inent.

Some > ... . In the past, the work of the extension staff hasbeen highly concentrated in terms both of activities and of the num-ber of farmers contacted. Extension agents have had regular contactswith only a small fraction of the farmers of the district. Theiractivities have been primarily confined to a few cash crops andgrade cattle. In the past this concentration has largely been necessary,owing to the need for immediate results and the limitations in thequality and numbers of extension staff. However, for the future orien-tation and expansion of the extension effort, it is important to notesome of the areas which have been comparatively neglected. Thusthe large nuimber of small landholders has been almost completelyuntouched. Within the field staff, there seem to have been few peoplewith specialized knowledge of certain activities-poultry, pig-keeping,vegetable raising, for instance-which the small landowners mightfind it profitable to pursue. We shall revert to this special problem

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of the small landowners. Another area which has been comparativelyneglected is the production of food crops, which has hardly improved

and remains at a low level of efficiency. Perhaps most striking has

been the lack of success in improving the standard of managementof the farm as a whole. Cash crops and grade cattle have been

grafted on to existing farming systems which otherwise have re-

mained largely unaltered. The adoption of commercial agriculture

has come without significantly disturbing the pursuit of farm self-

sufficiency in food, which tends to interfere with the most efficientutilization of resources.

There has, however, been some emphasis on farm plans and farmlayouts which might be said to reflect a concern with the develop-ment of the farm as a unit. Both of these approaches to the planning

of land use on the farm have already been noted in the introduction

to these case studies in Kenya agriculture. Originally, the most

sophisticated farmers were to be provided with detailed farm planswhich were to take them, in three stages into a seven-year rotation,with four years of grass and three years of arable. This type offarm planning, howevet, was abandoned in 1961, presumablybecause it was too complicated and too time-consuming. The agricul-tural service persisted, however, with the simpler form of land useplan or farm layout. By the end of 1963, 6,272 layouts covering a

total of 39,056 acres had been prepared. Although these layoutsaccounted for about a quarter of the total number of holdings over

three acres in size, it is somewhat doubtful that the time devoted tothem was well invested. Apparently many farmers applied for thembecause they were and still are, with only one exception,30 pre-requisites for loans. Most farmers evidently pay little or no attentionto their layouts. The report of the District Agricultural Officer for1962 characterized about 60 percent of them as "backward" or"abandoned." It seemed to us that many of them were too schematicand limited to have much relevance to farm improvement.

The overall improvement of husbandry and farm management,which has become increasingly important, can hardly be achievedby formal farm plans and layouts. What appears to be required is adeepening of the training and broadening of the orientation of theextension staff.3" As yet the staff has little grasp of farm management

30 The exception covers credits for keeping poultry and pigs on small holdingsof three acres or less, for which layouts are not made in any event.

31 It seemed to us that the number of staff was not the primary problem.As a matter of fact, the ratio of one extension worker to around 400 farmers inNyeri is not so unsatisfactory, particularly as measured by staffing scales thatobtain generally in tropical Africa. We noted a tendency of the staff to keepworking with a limited number of "progressive" farmers, even though they oftenno longer had anything significant to communicate to thenm.

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and economics. The extension agents dealing directly with thefarmers are seldom able to illuminate for them what choices theyhave in the total use of their land and what the implications andconsequences of such choices might be. Better staff training is notthe only answer. Farm management and farm economic studiesmust be prosecuted to provide much of the information and analysisthat will enable the extension service to focus its work more effec-tively.

Farm Management Studies and Agricultural Extension. We have alreadymentioned the work of the Farm Economics Unit in Nyeri. Up tothe present, this has been confined to the determnination of costs andreturns experienced by a number of so-called "progressive" farmersin growing certain cash crops or in keeping pigs and grade cattle.Even within these limitations they have provided some usefulexplanations of the comparative lack of progress in some cash cropsand in certain types of pig-keeping. However, their scope and useful-ness could be greatly extended. There is need to study the operationsand results of representative farmers with holdings in varying sizecategories, in order to bring to light the principal problems theyencounter and the variations in their performance. These differencesin performance, which are so striking, are particularly crucial to thefuture orientation and focus of extension work. To deterrnine inwhat respects or in what areas certain farmers lag behind others isto point up the particular things which need to be given moreemphasis in extension work. To relate performance to the farmer'seducation or background, his participation in particular types oftraining or his access to credit or other means of finance is to produceperhaps, useful conclusions regarding the types of people mostreceptive to innovation, the degree of response to training and theeffectiveness of credit. There miust obviously be much closer co-operation between extension staff and those carrying out farmmanagement studies. The former imst help in determining areas ofinquiry, and they should in turn get considerable assistance fromthese studies in evaluating the effectiveness of their work anddetermining the extent to which efforts need to be reoriented.

The Farmers' Training Center. As in many other districts in Kenya,the agricultural extension work in the field has been usefullysupplemented by short courses of more formal instruction which,in Nyeri, have been conducted at the Waimbimgu Farmers' TrainingCenter. At this FTC, the teaching staff, apart from the principal,consists of four male Al's who are responsible for instruction in cropsand animal husbandry and also have certain responsibilities forthe maniagemenit of the Center's farm, and of two female Al'swho teach home econonmics. The Center's farm consists of 203


acres, grows a wide variety of crops, keeps grade cattle, poultry andpigs and includes a special demonstration holding or plot of 4.95

acres where most of the actual demonstration to course participants

takes place.Brief courses are given not only for farmers, but also for agricul-

tural and community development staff and for cooperative staffs.

Some indication of the scope is given by listing the courses (all of

one week's duration unless otherwise indicated) scheduled for 1964:

For farmers (men and women): 5 courses in general agriculture(2 weeks each); 2 each on coffee, pig-keeping, and poultry;1 each on dairying and on maize and potatoes.

For women: 2 courses in home economics.For men and women: 1 adult literacy course (2 weeks) conducted

by the community development staff.For Government employees: 2 for agricultural extension workers;

1 for both agricultural extension and community developmentworkers; 3 (including 1 of 2 weeks) for community developmentstaff.

For cooperative staff: 1 course for coffee society field assistantsand another for coffee society factory managers.

We found general agreement that the farmers' courses were useful

in stimulating interest and in teaching or demonstrating one or two

specific things which participants could apply on their farms. Peoplewho come to take these courses voluntarily and pay a weekly fee

of Sh 15 are, of course, predisposed to learn something. However, itis uncertain just how useful they find the instruction. We found thatthe teaching staff at Wambugu and also at the Fort Hall FTC had

little or no means of evaluating the effectiveness of their work.

The staff is given no opportunity to pay random visits to formercourse participants in order to see whether they are practicing what

they have been taught and, if not, what has prevented them from

doing so. Nor is there adequate liaison between the teaching staff

and the agricultural staff in the field. There is a lack of systematicfollow-up by field staff, particularly in the period immediately

following the end of a course when the participants are often eagerto make some improvement and to try something new on theirfarms. Apparently little or no attempt is made by the field staff toreport to the FTC their impressions of the practical effect of instruc-

tion.Some broadening of the curriculum might be worthwhile.

Apparently little or no attention is now given to the teaching ofelementary maintenance and repair of simple equipment, such as

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sprayers for coffee and cattle. The waste of resources caused bypremature discarding of such equipment struck us forcibly in Nyerias well as in other areas. Another subject that might well be givenprogressively more stress is overall farm management. While theteaching and demonstration of particular practices and methods willremain important, many farmers in Nyeri have reached a stage ofdevelopment where they must become more aware of possible in-creases in the efficiency with which they manage their labor andtheir land. As yet, too few farmers think in terms of possible alterna-tive uses of these resources. For example, for the great majority ofcultivators, it is a novel idea that the production of food for homeconsumption might be quite costly when the possibility of incomefrorn an alternative cash crop is considered. We found that somefarmers had obviously profited from keeping some account of theiroutput, sales and expenses. Instruction in the keeping of elementaryrecords and accounts might thus be made available to those farmerswith an education sufficient to absorb it.3 2

We found staff morale at both the Nyeri and Fort Hall FTC's aserious problem. Agricultural instructors assigned to these FTC'sand given responsibility for both teaching and part of the FTC farmoperations have had to work much harder than when they areassigned to field duty. However, they get no more compensation,but incur higher expenditures, particularly for housing. At the sametime the teachers fear, whether rightly or wrongly, that they may beignored for promotion while detailed to the FTC. The consequencesof bad morale on the quality of teaching would seem to warrant themodest cost of remedial action. The actual failure to do somethingabout these grievances illustrates the inflexibility of personnel pro-cedures and of methods of personnel compensation, which are oftena serious handicap to the effectiveness of Government agriculturalservices.

The relationship of the FTC's farm and farming operations to theFTC's educational role is another problem that has not been resolved.The farm is supposed to serve the dual purpose of providing theFTC with a source of income and to provide the FTC with themeans of demonstrating particular crops or particular methods ofcrop and anirnal husbandry. These two purposes have been difficultto reconcile in practice. The FTC farms in Nyeri and Fort HallDiistricts both are much larger than would be required solely for

32 Where farmers themselves cannot keep accounts, their school-going children,miight be able to do so. In fact, arithmetic might be brought closer to people'sexperience by teaching it partly in terms of its applicability on the farm.

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demonstration purposes. It is difficult under any circumstances for

a government department to operate a commercial farm profitably,

but it becomes even more difficult when the staff in charge of the

operation must divide its time between teaching and farm manage-

ment. It seemed to us that the staff tended to perform one or both of

these functions inadequately. The farms do not, in fact, appear to be

making a significant contribution to the financial support of the cen-

ters. It might therefore be better to reduce their size to the minimum

strictly required for demonstration purposes. It would then have to

be determined how the farm operation might best be organized to

support the teaching function-whether, for example, the farm

should be managed directly by the staff in such a way as to demon-

strate the growing of a wide variety of crops and the keeping of

difficult types of livestock, or should be divided into a few demon-

stration holdings of varying sizes which would illustrate, as far as

possible, the best ways of managing typical farms.33

Neglected areas of development

Some of the limitations of Nyeri's agricultural development de-

serve to be discussed at greater length. The amount of land that has

been developed for commercial farming (including livestock) to

date is probably no more than 25,000 to 30,000 acres, or up to 15

percent of the total acreage of all farm holdings in Nyeri. Measured

by achievements elsewhere in tropical Africa, this is undoubtedly a

considerable accomplishment, but measured by the potentialities of

an area that is naturally favorable to agriculture, it falls far short of

what might ultimately be expected. In general only around 10

percent of the total farmers have really developed their holdings,

and the great bulk of the agricultural land is still devoted to poor-

yielding subsistence crops. It is surprising also that, despite the

population pressure, a considerable amount of land remains totally

unutilized. We saw evidence of this almost everywhere. In Othaya

Division alone there were said to be 15,000 acres of idle land,

principally in the High Bracken Zone, and in South Tetu Division

over 50,000 acres were reported to be in lantana bush.

Inadequate development of the largest and smallest holdings

One of the reasons for this limited development is the nature and

distribution of land ownership. Progress has been largely confined

33 It must be conceded, of course, that demonstration holdings on government

farms will never be considered by farmers as typical, in the sense of reproducing

exactly the conditions under which an individual farmer has to work his own

farm.

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to the middle-sized farms, those ranging frorn 3 or 4 acres to 10 or15 acres. These are largely farmed by resident owners who may alsohave some non-agricultural occupation or business, but who dodevote much or all of their time to farming. It is on this category offarmers that the extension service has concentrated almost ex-clusively. On the other hand, it is the small holdings, at one extreme,and the large holdings, at the other extreme, that have remainedthe least developed. In both of these categories there is considerableabsentee ownership. The small holding of less than three or fouracres has generally been unable, under traditional farming practices,to support a family fully. A large proportion of their owners accord-ingly leave their land in the hands of wives, other relatives, or friendsand are more or less permanently in some form of paid employment.Among the larger landowners are a considerable number of peoplewho derive a good income from salaried employment, trade, orother business, and who have acquired or retained land for specula-tive purposes or for security. Sometimes this land is entirely neglectedor left to be cultivated by others who usually grow only subsistencecrops. Sometimes a portion is developed, but in the absence ofcontinuous or frequent supervision by the owner, the standard ofhusbandry is in most cases rather low.

The continued existence of idle or inadequately used land in adensely populated area has begun to strike a number of Africans,both inside and outside the Government, as anomalous. There issome disposition to take advantage of the fact that land is nowofficially registered to change the system of agricultural taxation.The present system of taxing marketed agricultural output inevitablybears most heavily on developed holdings. Some have, accordingly,suggested the consideration of a tax on land, with some differentia-tion of rates by principal categories of land classified in accordancewith potentiality, and with exemptions for the smallest landholdings.Land taxes of this type, payable by the registered owner, mightalso have the ancillary advantage of providing an incentive toupdate the land register which, as indicated elsewhere, is losingtouch with reality.

The plight of the smallholderThe problem of what to do with the small landowner is, however,

the most acute. Holdings of less than three acres represent 45 percentof the total and, if those between three and four acres are included,60 percent. They probably account respectively for 26 percent and37 percent of the total farm area. Many of these holdings are charac-terized by soil exhaustion caused by continuous cultivation without

75


significant resort to fallowing or, alternatively, the use of fertilizeror manure.

These smallholders have been left virtually untouched by theagricultural development of the district, except insofar as they were

able to benefit from the increased opportunities for wage labor

afforded to members of their families on the larger developing farms.The agricultural extension service, not unnaturally, concentratedon the larger holdings which had more immediate developmentpotential. Government policy did not generally encourage smallfarmers to break out of the bind of exclusive subsistence croppingfor fear of exposing them to market risks. In the development of tea,where large numbers of farmers, including many with small holdings,were anxious to share in the potential benefits by planting at leasta small plot to this crop, the KTDA is even now seeking to limit thenumber of new planters by enabling existing growers in the firstinstance to increase their plantings to 0.75 acres. Farms of less thanthree or four acres have not qualified for farm layouts, which, as wehave seen, are necessary in order to obtain credits for all purposesexcept the keeping of poultry and pigs. Nor have the smallholdersbeen able to acquire larger holdings to any significant extent. Forinstance, they have not been elegible for the settlement schemes onformer European farms because the so-called "high-density"schemes are in principle reserved for the landless, 34 while the "low-density" schemes require an investment on the part of the settlerwhich the small man can hardly afford.

The problem of the smallholder poses a serious issue in terms ofthe objectives of government policy. This issue is as much politicalas it is economic and may be put in the form of a question. ShouldGovernment seek simply and almost solely to maximize total output,or should it seek primarily to extend the benefits of progress to thegreat majority of people even at some sacrifice of increases in totalproduction? We shall discuss the problem on the assumption thatthe latter objective will be given some weight.

Land Purchases and Sales in Relation to the Smallholder. An effectiveattack on this problem might entail a number of approaches. Onewould be designed to reduce the number of excessively small holdingsby enabling their holders to acquire land on settlement schemes, orto purchase an addition to their holdings from a pool of land that

34 Some small landowners apparently try to sell or give away land in orderto become "landless" and therefore eligible for a settlement plot, and it isinteresting to note that during the first half of 1964, the North Tetu and OthayaLand Boards disapproved 20 sales or gifts which were apparently made withthis purpose in mind.

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might be set up by requiring all those who do get plots on settle-ment schemes to sell any land they may previously have had. Theavailability of credit to finance such purchases would, as alreadyindicated, seem to be essential for this purpose. Conversely, it mightbe suggested that it should be made possible for the larger farmersto buy up small holdings without restrictions, on the ground thatsuch farmers have better means and, in many cases, also moreenterprise to develop land. At present, alienation of such land isimpossible without the approval of the Divisional Land Board,which can approve sales only if it is convinced that there is no otherclaim on the land, and, above all, that the transaction would notimpoverish the owner's family or would not unduly increase theland holdings of the buyer. Removal of such restrictions might, ofcourse, produce an undesirable degree of concentration of landownership. The alternative might be to create some sort of statutorybody authorized to acquire uneconomic holdings and, through aprocess of exchange and consolidation, to create more viableholdings which would then be sold to qualified farmers who have noland or insufficient land.3 5 While this would have the disadvantageof adding to the number of landless people, there would be an off-setting increase in the demand for hired labor on the more produc-tive farms.

Productivity of the Small Holding: Specialization vs. Subsistence. Anotherapproach is to devise a combination of measures and policies calcu-lated to increase the productivity of the small holding. This couldbe achieved only by enabling the small farmer to go in for commer-cial agriculture, at least to some extent. In turn, this would requireeither an increase in the yield of foodstuffs grown for home consump-tion, thus permitting the release of some land for commercial farming,or specialization of production, entailing the progressive abandon-ment of self-sufficiency in food in favor of production for the market.A combination of both of these would, of course, be possible. Wehave already mentioned the comparatively low yields and standardsof husbandry prevailing in the production of subsistence crops.Agricultural officers have estimated that, in theory at least, thepresent subsistence crops could be grown on half the acreage. Possi-bilities for raising the yields of these crops do indeed exist. Forexample, the widespread adoption of hybrid maize could greatlyincrease the yield of maize, which remains the staple of the Kikuyudiet. It is only recently that hybrid maize has been demonstrated

35 In France, state organizations known as Societes d'am6nagement foncier etd';quipment rural have been established for this purpose.

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on some scale. Its general adoption would undoubtedly entail arather profound transformation of existing methods of cultivation,since the yield potential of hybrid maize cannot be attained withoutplanting in pure stands or without the use of fertilizer or manure.

We have stressed that, up to the present, commercial farming hasdeveloped essentially as a graft on subsistence agriculture. In viewof the traditional attachment of the African farmer to security,it was quite necessary initially to reconcile introduction of cashcropping with continued production for subsistence. However, atthe present stage of development in Nyeri and the other two Kikuyudistricts, additional progress depends in part on introducinggradually more specialization in production, i.e., on acceleratingprogress toward a market agriculture. The "market" in this sensemeans not only the foreign market and the urban market in Kenya,but also the exchange of farm products among the farmers them-selves. Subsistence agriculture must now yield gradually to greaterspecialization and exchange, for as long as it continues to be a goal,it will interfere seriously with the more efficient utilization of re-sources. Land cannot be effectively utilized as long as a certainproportion must always be set aside for the production of subsistencecrops, irrespective of the suitability of the land for such crops andany consideration of the alternatives. At the same time it is unlikelythat significant improvements can be made in the diets of the ruralpopulation, until farmers have the opportunity to vary and diversifytheir consumption by exchanging products among themselves.

The beginnings of a break with the traditional goal of farm self-sufficiency can be discerned. We met a number of farmers who werecurtailing their subsistence production and some who were evengiving it up entirely, usually for the sake of extending the landdevoted to dairying. These were people with larger farms or withsupplementary sources of income, who were less afraid of the riskinvolved in greater reliance on the market economy. Among smalllandowners, we saw little or no evidence of such a tendency, althoughin North Tetu Division we were told that a number were convertingtheir own farms entirely to dairying while renting an acre or twoelsewhere for subsistence production.

The transition to specialized production for the market at theexpense of self-sufficiency is difficult for all farmers, but may besomewhat easier for the larger farmers, who can afford to take therisk, because they already enjoy a significant cash income fromfarming and may also have some non-agricultural income. Farmerswith less than three or four acres will be inclined to cling to thesecurity that subsistence production gives them. If some degree of

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specialization in production and exchange among farmers is to begradually fostered, it is essential that (1) certain types of commercialfarming activities specially suited for the small holdings be encour-aged; (2) steps be taken to ensure that the market can supply atreasonable prices basic foodstuffs formerly produced on each farin;and (3) women as well as men be given a stake in commercialfarming.

Farming Activities Suitable for the Small Holding. The more profitabletree crops such as coffee and tea are also suitable for small holdings.A quarter of an acre of mature coffee or tea, for example, need notinvolve the use of any paid labor and could easily yield, on thisbasis, a net current income of Sh 1,000-1,250 or Sh 250-300respectively. Admittedly, further coffee development is now in-hibited by the International Coffee Agreement. However, smallholdings could still benefit widely from increased tea planting,particularly if existing policies governing such tea planting weremodified. Modification would add somewhat to the difficulties ofsupervision and perhaps entail some sacrifice in quality, but itwould bring about a wider sharing of the benefits of tea development.Small tea gardens, which can be tended without the help of paidlabor, would also presumably be in a better position to withstandan eventual reduction in tea prices.

Small-scale dairying with one or two grade cows may not beimpossible for the srnall holding between two and four acres. Moreparticularly suited to small holdings are poultry, pig and vegetablefarming. There are, however, a number of requirements for theirsuccessful promotion. One is the need for more staff with specializedknowledge who can back up the work of the general extension staff.Another is organization of production and marketing, which isespecially important in the case of vegetables. Production must beorganized on an adequate scale, initially through closely supervisedcooperatives, to make regular and economic supplying of the marketpossible, whether for canning or for export as fresh produce. Themarket for all these products cannot, of course, be rapidly expanded,but apart from the opportunities afforded by a decline in the outputof European farmers in Kenya, there are sorne possibilities fordeveloping exports. 36 A concerted attack on the interrelated prob-

36 For example, the manager of the Horticultural Cooperative Union inNairobi, which has done pioneer work in developing the export of potatoes tothe Persian Gulf area and of fresh produce to Europe during the Europeanwinter, expressed the opinion that both types of exports can be further expandedand that there has actually been a shortage of potatoes for export. Similarly, astudy of the poultry industry has disclosed that considerably more eggs couldbe exported to the Gulf area and Middle East.

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lems of increasing production, expanding processing facilities andmarketing will, in many cases, be necessary.

In some cases it may prove possible to raise the yields of foodcrops, which small holdings are already growing, to a level thatwould permit the sale of some portion to the larger farmers who mayno longer be growing all their food. The potentialities for substantialincreases in the current yields of such crops as potatoes and maizeundoubtedly exist.

Development of some commercial farming on small holdings couldtake place only if present restrictions on credit expansion wererelaxed. The extension of credits for development of such holdingswould undoubtedly entail more risk and would have to proceedwith considerable caution. In the first instance, it might be confinedto farms where both husband and wife are resident and one or bothhas evinced enough interest in development by attending an FTCcourse.

Security and Reliance on the Market. The farmer's own concern withsecurity appears to be the greatest obstacle to the curtailment ofsubsistence farming. One aspect of this problem is the uncertaintyabout the terms on which food will be available in the market place.There are often very sharp fluctuations in the prices of foodstuffs,owing both to weather conditions and to the thinness of the market.Adherence to food self-sufficiency on the farm not only restricts thedevelopment of demand, but it also produces very irregular suppliesto the market, since these flow into the market, not so much inresponse to changes in demand, but as the result of adventitioussurpluses in output. In other words, the market demand and supplyof foodstuffs would be more stable and better balanced if farmersbought more of their requirements from each other. It is undoubtedlydifficult to establish the confidence in the market necessary toachieve this objective. There must be a careful study of the possibilityof using existing or new marketing devices in such a way as toguarantee the availability of staples at set prices, at least until themarket volume reaches such dimensions as to produce a reasonablystable equilibrium between supply and demand.

Crucial to the breakdown of the traditional adherence to sub-sistence farming is the relationship of man and woman. The wifeor wives of farmers are responsible for the feeding of the household.For the most part, they do not regularly share in the income derivedfrom commercial agriculture, which the men consider their preroga-tive. The male head of the household may provide money for schoolfees and, occasionally, for clothing and other household needs, butthere is no assurance that money will be regularly forthcoming for

80


food. Relationships between husbands and wives are graduallychanging, expecially among more sophisticated people, but theyhave not progressed to a stage where the women have confidencethat food for their families can be bought regularly with moneysupplied by their husbands. Women therefore continue to regardthe cultivation of their own food plots their primary concern andremain the greatest protagonists of subsistence farming.

Changes in this attitude can come about only slowly, as men andwomen both realize that all income from the holding should beregarded as family income to be shared to meet the needs of thefamily as a whole. This realization may come through a variety ofways: work among women by community development workers andhome economics teachers; increasing discussion among men andwomen at FTC's; greater focus both by field extension workers andFTC's on farm economics and the fostering of understanding byboth men and women that subsistence farming may mean a realsacrifice in income; the establishment and spread of women'sorganizations; and the leadership of political leaders in promotingan understanding of this problem. In many respects, the progressiveemancipation of women and their attainment to true partnershipwith men is the key to continued evolution toward a market agri-culture and the higher standard of living it brings.

Conclusionts

The development of commercial farming in Nyeri has in manyrespects been quite remarkable. Coffee, dairying and tea have de-veloped rapidly, with pyrethrum, pig-keeping and pineapplestrailing well behind. Cash incomes have risen markedly and therehas been a considerable increase in farm employment. The lastdecade and a half has demonstrated the capacity of the farmers toinnovate, particularly when the incentives have been substantial.This capacity to absorb change is evidenced particularly in thetransformation of traditional methods of animal industry whichhas attended the introduction of modern dairying.

The most important factors in this development have been favor-able ecological conditions and the responsiveness of the inhabitantsto change. Nyeri is favored by a good climate and basically goodsoil which has, however, suffered from too much continuous culti-vation. The Kikuyu inhabitants are among the best educated in thecountry and have been stimulated by prolonged contacts withEuropeans, including, particularly, European farms in Kenyawhich brought home to the African the possibility of making moneyfrom agriculture.

81


Other factors have played a significant role in stimulating de-velopment. Land consolidation and registration made possiblefuller utilization of land, facilitated to some extent the expansion of

cash cropping, and, above all, created the conditions indispensablefor the introduction of dairying with European types of cattle.The Department of Agriculture and specialized agencies like theKenya Tea Development Authority have provided valuable direc-

tion and facilities, once government efforts were oriented to the

development of cash cropping by Africans. Farmers' cooperativeshave played a constructive role in providing facilities for handlingand processing certain farm products and in linking individualfarmers and nation-wide marketing organizations. Farm credit wasnot a particularly significant factor in initial development, whichwas largely financed by farmers from their own resources. In the'sixties, however, it has become increasingly essential and is now a

bottleneck in development, especially since the earlier hope that

commercial banks would provide an ever-growing volume of credit

to farmers is not being fully realized.It should be noted that this development, however impressive in

many ways, has apparently involved only around 15 percent of thefarm area and 10 percent of the total number of farmers. Land is

by no means as intensively farmed as the population pressure wouldappear to dictate. Land is still primarily devoted to subsistenceproduction, which remains at a low level of efficiency. The high

proportion of small land holdings of less than three or four acres hasbeen largely unaffected by the development of commercial agri-

culture. There is still a surprising amount of idle land, particularlyon the largest land holdings which tend to be neglected by absentee

landowners.The experience of Nyeri raises the question whether development

can be considered truly successful until the larger part of the popu-

lation shares in its benefits. The development of the last fifteen years

has greatly widened the gap between the still small minority of

progressive farmers and the balance of the population. Since thisgap is increasing rather than diminishing, a special effort wouldseem to be essential to disseminate agricultural progress morewidely and, in particular, to devote more attention to the problemsof the numerous smallholders. To some extent, the latter may beassisted by giving them opportunities to acquire land which theypreviously have not enjoyed. The most important problem, whichreally affects virtually all farmers, is how to wean them graduallyfrom adherence to inefficient subsistence farming and induce them tospecialize in production for the market. This implies a selection of

82


commercial farming activities best suited for the small farmer andsupplementing existing extension personnel with people having thespecialized knowledge necessary to promote some of these activities.It also necessitates special efforts to coordinate development ofproduction, marketing and processing. Above all, specialization mustbe reconciled with the need of security. Greater emphasis on farmmanagement and economics can make people aware of the economiccost of devoting land to comparatively inefficient subsistencecrops, but people must be shown that they can safely rely on themarket for sale of their products or the purchase of those foodstuffsthey do not themselves produce. Women, in particular, will con-tinue to insist on subsistence farming until the men are graduallypersuaded that cash income from farming is family income and notincome which they have the exclusive right to spend as they wish.

We were interested in checking to what extent our findings inNyeri also applied to the adjoining Kikuyu districts of Kiambu andFort Hall. In terms of progress, we found that Nyeri occupied aposition between the other two districts. Kiambu, which extends tothe threshold of Nairobi, has undoubtedly the most advancedagriculture. There, we visited some farms which were completelyspecialized for the market and represented the most progressiveAfrican farming we witnessed in tropical Africa. Critical factors inthis development have undoubtedly been the proximity of the largesturban market in Kenya and the stimuli provided by close contactswith both the European urban and farming community. Incomesearned in nonagricultural pursuits have probably gone more largelythan anywhere else into the purchase and development of agri-cultural land.

On the other hand, Fort Hall has lagged notably behind theother two districts. It is said to be the area from which the Kikuyuspread, perhaps leaving behind the more conservative and tradition-bound elements. Compared to Kiambu and Nyeri, the districthas been more isolated. Natural conditions, too, have not been sopropitious to agriculture, since a large percentage of the land is toosteep for cultivation. The greater conservatism of the inhabitants,the very high degree of absenteeism on labor migration and thegreater scarcity of arable land in relation to population have allcontributed to serious delays in the consummation of land reformwhich was still not completed as of 1965. Yet there has been signifi-cant progress even here, though at a considerably slower rate, andthe continuing problems are different in degree rather than in kindfrom those of Nyeri District.

83

3. THE EXPERIENCE IN MACHAKOS DISTRICT

Introduction

Like Central Nyanza and Baringo, the District of Machakos haslong posed serious problems to those concerned with the develop-ment of agriculture and animal husbandry. This district, which lies tothe east and southeast of Nairobi, has been characterized by periodicdroughts and food shortages, by serious soil erosion, by overstockingand overgrazing, and by extensive methods of agriculture whichappear incompatible with a comparatively severe pressure of popu-lation on available land. The last few decades have witnessed re-peated government efforts to improve conditions through soilconservation and development of water supplies, general improve-ments in crop and animal husbandry and introduction of cash crops.Some limited successes have been achieved. For some time consider-able progress was made in soil conservation, but in recent years therehas been substantial retrogression. In the better and higher areas thecultivation of fruits and vegetables and, above all, of arabica coffee

developed, and in the lower and drier areas, the production of sisaland, more recently, of cotton. Yet standards of agriculture have

remained very low over most of the district; virtually no improve-ment has taken place in animal husbandry. The Kamba who inhabit

the district have often been reproached for their lack of interest in

agriculture and their unresponsiveness to government efforts tochange them.

Ecological factors

The unfavorable ecology of much of the district is undoubtedlyone factor responsible for this limited progress. The distribution

of land by principal ecological zones is given in Table 1. Of thetotal area of the district-6,040 square miles'-only a little more

I Approximate area after the boundary revision of 1963; previously the area

was about 5,790 square miles.

84

Kenya: Machakos District

-- - - , A A H A K . JS

4 .,,... . f

E ,, r :

(..Gr' s -Zns w .. --,

an vegetables , , and2 ,a,re mos sutal fo imrvd exti cate

r !

., 4pi1 %-' ;g* <j

I- §-|-i A w

.. -L A1, .. , . ;I

A-II.

A, t'

, ,

- ' - t -

than~: 10 pecn fal int th desl poulte Kiuy an-SaGras ons hih hveananua ranllo 30 in. ormoeThs

tand veetabesand fares mnosth desuitbl forpimproed, exotic canSttle

85


Within these two zones lie the four principal hill masses of the district

which rise to well over 6,000 ft.-Iveti-Mitaboni, immediately

east-northeast of Machakos Town, the capital of the district;

Kangundo-Matungulu, farther to the north of Machakos; and

Mbooni and Kilungu, southeast of Machakos. The soils in these

ecological zones vary considerably, but are generally deep and of

fairly good structure.Of intermediate value for agriculture is the Grass Woodland Zone

which covers only a little more than one-third of the area of the two

zones mentioned above. Rainfall averages about 25 in. to 30 in. and

is usually not sufficient for more than one crop per year. Soils tend

to be rather poor and easily eroded.The balance of the district-about 85 percent-falls into the

Acacia/Combretum and Acacia/Commiphora Zones. These are

the lower, drier areas of the district, most of which normally gets a

rainfall of less than 20 in. per year. Most of the latter zone is virtually

uninhabited, owing to scanty rainfall and the lack of permanent

streams and underground water resources. Rainfall fluctuates

sharply, however, so that reasonably good food crops can be harv-

vested occasionally. Sisal is about the only possible cash crop, but

cotton can be grown in some portions. Basically, these drier areas

can be used only for extensive ranching, although constant bush

encroachment, tsetse fly infestation and lack of water make grazing

impossible in many places. Thus the area that can actually be used

in the two zones is far below the theoretical potential of almost

three million acres as given in Table 1.The "data" given in Table 1 were the only ones available but

should be treated with considerable reserve. It is doubtful, for

example, that the information is really sufficient to permit an

accurate correlation between population and ecological zones. The

indicated differences in population density between the Kikuyu and

Star Grass Zones and also between the Grass Woodland and Acacia/

Combretum Zones seem rather suspect. We have already mentioned

that the figures on the "usable" area in the drier regions are of

doubtful significance. In general the table reflects the imprecision

and inadequacy which, in our view, characterize much of the

information on Machakos and made it difficult to make an accurate

appraisal of the potentialities and problems of this district.

The district has a bimodal rainfall pattern. In contrast to other

parts of Kenya, however, the most reliable rains are the so-called

"short rains" of October-November. The "long rains," which

usually last from mid-March to the end of May, are insufficient

over virtually all of the lower areas of the district save in exceptional

86


TABLE 1: POPULATION, LAND AVAILABILITY AND LAND USE BYECOLOGICAL ZONES

Population Density

Area UsableAcres

Popula- Total Usable per perEcological Zone Rainfall tion' Sq. Mi. Acresb Sq. Mi. Person

1. Kikuyu Grass 35" plus 46,868 211.00 110,733 222 2.32. Star Grass 30" plus 137,538 440.63 248,163 563 1.83. Grass Woodland 25" plus 31,567 233.00 134,208 135 4.24. Acacia/

Combretum 20" plus 231,607 1,343.83 774,046 172 3.35. Acacia/

Commiphora 15" plus 64,652 3,811.15 2,214,659 17 34.2

Total 512,232 6,039.61 3,481,809 85 6.8

"Excluding that in townships.bArea claimed to be available for use or development after deducting from the total land

area the following percentages for roads, hills, forests, etc.: Zone 1, 18 percent; Zone 2,12 percent; Zones 3, 4 and 5, 10 percent.

SOURCE: District Agricultural Officer, Machakos, 1964. The DAO included a separateecological zone characterized by black-grey clays and acacia/melliphera, but we haveincorporated this in the Acacia/Commiphora Zone in deference to the more acceptedclassification.

years. In the lower areas, in fact, rainfall in both seasons tends to beerratic in terms of both its total and its distribution over time. Muchof the rain tends, in effect, to be wasted because too much frequentlyfalls during a few high-intensity storms or during a season when theentire rainfall is, in any event, insufficient to mature a crop.

Crops and cropping patterns

The African Agricultural Sample Census of 1960/61 indicatedthat only about 325,000 acres, including some 15,000 acres undertemporary fallow, were being cultivated. Since that time the culti-vated area has presumably continued to increase. How much of thisarea is cropped during both rainy seasons appears to be largelyunknown. The sample census showed that the area cropped duringthe "long rains" in 1960/61 was about the same as that in the "shortrains." However, this may well have been an abnormal year.Following the severe drought of 1959/60, people may have plantedan unusually large acreage during the "long rains." Since the latterare frequently insufficient to mature a crop in all but the hill areas,many people are normally disinclined to risk cropping during thisseason, particularly if they had a fairly abundant harvest during the"short rains." Some crops, like pigeon peas, may be planted duringthe "short rains" but are carried over into the subsequent cropseason.

87


Crops are planted in pure stand on only about 25 percent of the

cultivated land. On the rest of the land, mixtures of two or more

crops are grown. This accounts for the fact that the total acreage of

all crops greatly exceeds the total area under crops (see Table 2).

TABLE 2: MACHAKOS DISTRICT-CROP ACREAGE 1960/61(thousands of acres)

By Crops

First Second1. Temporary crops Cycle Cycle Total

Maize 235.3 234.3 469.6Pulses 216.0 184.1 400.1Millet 26.2 44.3 70.5Sorghum 18.2 16.8 35.0Arrowroot 21.5 8.9 30.4Cassava 16.9 7.6 24.5Sugar cane 1.8 3.8 5.6Vegetables 0.9 0.5 1.4Others 1.5 1.6 3.1

Aggregate acreage of crops 538.3 501.9 1,040.2Total acreage under crops' 277.2 277.3 554.6

2. Permanent cropsBananas 8.4bOther fruit 1.0Coffee 1.3'Sisal 8.1Wattle 3.7

Total 22.53. Total acreage under crops, 293.0 293.1 570.4

'The figures for acreage under crops are substantially lower than those for theacreage of all crops since the latter include double and even triple counting offields which are planted with two or more mixed crops during the same season.

bIncluding 6.7 thousand acres mixed with other crops.'The area under coffee has increased significantly since 1960/61.

SOURCE: Kenya African Agricultural Sample Census, 1960/61.

By far the most popular of the crop mixtures is maize and pulses,

principally beans and pigeon peas. Farmers evidently believe that

mixed cropping yields a higher output per acre than planting in

pure stands. Mixed cropping produces a denser vegetative cover,

reducing somewhat the burden of weeding, and apparently uses to

greater advantage the moisture and nutrients in the soil. Above all,

the mixing of crops in the same field is designed to reduce the risks

in the lower rainfall areas. Describing the cropping pattern in one

such area, one observer has written: "A multitude of crops, many

of them quick-maturing, hardy and drought-resistant, are sown in

88


what appears to have been a fit of temporary insanity. Seeds areall thrown together and worked into large dryland clearings thatare virtually unmappable. Here is a list of crops from one field:Maize, beans, cowpeas, groundnuts, red millet, sorghum, castor,bulrush millet, cassava, pumpkins, calabashes, and pigeon peas.Six kinds of millet are grown here. The great number of crops,mixed sowing, placement of fields far apart-all are attempts toreduce the risk the individual takes. Care is taken to plant before orwith the rains; indeed the second planting is done amongst standingunharvested crops from the grass rains. This second crop is usuallya forlorn hope."2

Except in the high potential areas, yields are generally very low.Moreover, they vary markedly from season to season in accordancewith climatic conditions. Thus the average yield of maize, whichoccupies about half the cropped area, may range from less than onebag (200 lbs.) per acre in a poor year to five bags or more in a goodyear. The production of maize, the staple food, is often insufficientfor the district's requirements. In the period 1943 to 1963, the districthad to import maize in fifteen years, and seven of these years wereconsidered severe famine years.

Population pressures

In relation to the actual or potential agricultural and livestockoutput, the population seems very high. While the 550,779 people(nearly all Kamba tribesmen) recorded by the 1962 census indicatesan average density of only 95 per square mile,' 36 percent of thepopulation is concentrated on 8 percent of the area-namely thatcomprising the six Locations which are of the greatest agriculturalimportance. These Locations together have a population densityof 421 per square mile; two-Matungulu and Kangundo-have 525and 608 people per square mile. In some Sub-Locations there aresaid to be 1,600 people per square mile.4 In general the land shownby Table 1 to be available in the four ecological zones likely toreceive more than 20 in. of rain per year would seem adequate, butmuch of this land is in fact unsuitable for agriculture because it isbadly eroded or rocky. The population in the dry Acacia/Commi-

2 Philip W. Porter, "Environmental Potentials and Economic Opportunities-A Background for Cultural Adaptation," American Anthropologist, Vol. 67, 1965,No. 2, pp. 418-419.

3The boundary changes of 1963 increased the population to 571,600.Philip W. Porter, "Environmental Potentials and Economic Opportunities-

A Background for Cultural Adaptation," American Anthropologist, Vol. 67 (1965),No. 2, p. 415.

89


phora Zone is sparse, but it must live very largely from livestock for

which grazing is often inadequate.

The search for land

Under the conditions sketched above, many people have moved,

over the recent past, in search of better opportunities. Within the

district there has been a marked population movement toward the

more prosperous coffee-growing areas such as Kangundo-Matungulu

on the one hand, and the drier but more sparsely populated areas,

on the other hand. Whereas the district's entire population grew

by an estimated 54 percent between 1948 and 1962 (or by 194,234),

that of Kangundo-Matungulu increased 76 percent (+33,462).

In the Southern and Central Divisions, the rise was 75 percent

(+49,776) and 79 percent (+36,996) respectively; in the Yattas

of the north and northwest, it was as much as 257 percent (+ 17,909).

Since 1962 this movement to the less-populated areas of the south

and the Yattas has continued, stimulated undoubtedly by the favor-

able rains which these normally dry areas have experienced in

recent years. We ourselves saw and heard striking testimony of this

restless search for land to cultivate and to graze. We fear that the

resulting uncontrolled bush clearing, particularly in water catch-

ment areas, will have serious long-term consequences for the already

insufficient water resources of these areas.

Labor migration

To many people, employment opportunities outside the district

have seemed more attractive than those in the district. Thus the

labor migrancy rate among adult males has been high. The 1962

census indicated that 23.4 percent" of the adult males were absent

from the district; the proportion among able-bodied males between

16 and 45 years of age was undoubtedly much higher. In many

Locations the labor migrancy rate was between 40 percent and 50

percent. Interestingly enough it was lowest-19.1 percent and 20

percent respectively-in the two Locations of Matungulu and

Kangundo where coffee growing had developed rapidly since the

I More specifically, the census showed that there were 23.4 percent fewer

adult males in the district than would be expected in accordance with the sex

ratio among the Kamba. The number of adult males in the district was 73.6

percent of the number of adult females, but considering the fact that males in

the Kamba population as a whole were only 95.2 percent of the total number

of females, we have estimated absenteeism among adult males at 23.4 percent

rather than 26.4 percent. These percentages exclude adult male Kamba living

outside the district with their families.

90


mid-'fifties; and the rates for these two areas were the only oneswhich apparently showed a drop by comparison with 1948.6

Many Kamba have found employment in the Governmentadministration, the police and the army. Work in urban, nonagri-cultural pursuits has evidently attracted them most. The greatmajority of labor migrants live in Nairobi and its peri-urban areasand in the urban areas of Naivasha-Nakuru and the coastal region.It seems that comparatively few have worked on European farmsand thus acquired a knowledge of more progressive methods offarming and animal husbandry, which they might have founduseful after returning home during their later years.

Labor migration among the highland Kamba is probably dueprimarily to the shortage of land, while that among the lowlandKamba may well be due to the limited and rather risky incomethat can be derived from agriculture and animal husbandry. In anyevent, labor migration has left agriculture largely in the hands ofwomen and the older men, who are often disinclined to change ordo not command enough labor to do all the necessary work in atimely and effective manner. The resulting labor shortage is aggra-vated by the existence of a considerable number of "floaters" amongKamba youth who are disinclined to any work except for an occa-sional day of casual labor.

The people

There have been few recent published studies on the socialorganization and attitudes of the Kamba who inhabit not onlyMachakos but also the adjoining Kitui District. The Kamba, whoare Bantu-speaking and ethnically closely related to the Kikuyu,appeared to have occupied their present area within the last threehundred years. At first they settled only the tops of the hills, denudingthese of forest in the process of clearing the land for crops. Beginningearly in the present century they rapidly spread into the lowergrasslands as the pastoral Masai, who had used these for grazing,were restricted to a smaller area.

According to legend, the Kamba were originally shifting culti-vators and traders. Their trading activities developed as a result oftheir strategic position between the upland tribes of Kenya, on theone hand, and the coastal Swahili, on the other. It was as a result oftheir trading and contact with the Masai that the Kamba are saidto have developed their present deep attachment to cattle. Wealthin land and in cattle are both highly prized.

6 For that year the proportion of adult males absent from Matungulu andKangundo was 31.1 percent and 28.2 percent respectively.

91


Kamba culture and society appear to be somewhat amorphous,lacking in clearly-defined, precise rules of conduct and in organi-zational structure.7 Practices and customs vary considerably amongdifferent communities and localities. Kamba tend to be ratherindividualistic and suspicious of all authority. They have never hadchiefs, apart from those appointed by the British, and their ownindigenous organizations have been loosely structured and lackingin authority. Thus the councils of elders at the community level donot have sufficient power to enforce compliance with their decisions,so that the ultimate responsibility for punishing unseemly behavioris often left to the supernatural.

Kamba land law varies in accordance with the scarcity of landand its method of acquisition. Though there may once have beensome control over land at the clan level, this has apparently dis-appeared with the dispersal of clans. Today there are usuallyseveral clans represented in each community. In the densely popu-lated Kikuyu and Star Grass Zones, land seems to be controlled byindividuals and can be bought and sold. Land there is of great valuefor cash crops and there is, accordingly, much litigation over con-flicting claims and boundaries. Whereas such disputes were formerlydealt with by clan elders at the community level, today they areapt to reach the Government court system. Elsewhere land iscontrolled by individuals or by localized extended kinship groups(lineages), depending in part on the length and method of occupa-tion. Most of the land in the low-rainfall areas seems to have beenopened up and cleared for cultivation by individual pioneers whothereby acquired virtually absolute ownership rights.8 There is alsoindividual grazing land, but it is apparently the practice of theinhabitants of a local community to pool a part of such land in acommunal grazing area. As elsewhere in Kenya, land is generallydivided among the married sons of the wife or wives, though theeldest son may receive a larger portion.

Government development efforts

Government efforts to improve agriculture and livestock havefocused-with varying degrees of emphasis at different times-on

I See S. C. Oliver, "Individuality, Freedom of Choice, and Cultural Flexi-bility of the Kamba," American Anthropologist, Vol. 67 (1965), No. 2, pp. 421-428.

8 According to Penwill, Kamba Customary Law (London, Macmillan and Co.Ltd., 1951), unclaimed land was known as weu. From such land pioneering,individuals have gradually taken holdings for building a homestead for culti-vation and for grazing. Once new land is actually brought under cultivation,title to it is perpetual. This is in contrast to demarcated grazing land to whichthe individual or his representative retains title only so long as the land is used.

92


(1) soil conservation and water supply, (2) better methods of crophusbandry, (3) introduction of cash crops, (4) resettlement, and (5)control of grazing and improvement in animal husbandry. Althoughthese efforts began as early as the 'thirties, they reached a peak inthe middle 'fifties in terms of both personnel and funds allocated.During the latter period particularly, the whole program involveda quite extraordinary mobilization of human resources undergovernment direction and, in some degree, of government pressure.Beginning in 1960, with the progressive advent of independence,the Government found it necessary to relax the pressure, withadverse effects on the limited successes that had been previouslyachieved; at the time of our visit in 1964, the district was just be-ginning to recover from this reaction and awakening to somerealization that it should again work in the directions outlined above,but with greater reliance on self-help.

Soil conservationThe Machakos District is generally regarded as the classic

example both of the devastation that can be caused by soil erosionand of the rapidity with which badly eroded land can be rehabili-tated with proper measures. The increasing population, shiftingcultivation without attention to soil conservation, overgrazing andrecurring droughts, made the Machakos District a "problem area"at an early date. The district was prey to repeated famines beginningin 1909. By 1935 the district has become so denuded and eroded thata committee was set up to formulate and carry out a plan to recon-dition the African farming areas. Although in the years 1937 to1944 a considerable amount of terracing and grass planting wascarried out and measures to encourage the making and use ofcompost and of manure had some success, the deterioration wasevidently not arrested and famines became increasingly frequent.The worst famines occurred in 1943 and 1944 when relief feedingon a large scale had to be carried out.

Following the War, the Government again turned its attention tothe rehabilitation of the district under the auspices of a new "re-conditioning" committee formed in 1944. However, the abortiveattempt which the Government had made in 1938 to destock thedistrict by compulsory sales now apparently caused the Kamba toview all reconditioning plans with keen distrust. Reports werecirculated that newly rehabilitated land would be turned over toEuropeans; that large numbers of Kamba would be compelled towork on European farms as a measure of population relief; and that

93


severe cuts would be enforced in the number of cattle to which the

Kamba were so attached. The first attempt in 1946 to introduce a

mechanical soil conservation unit into the district met adamant

popular resistence, with people throwing themselves in front of

tractors to prevent them from working. The first rehabilitation

scheme, the Matungulu Betterment Scheme, met the same fate.

Gradually, however, resistence was converted into cooperation, or

at least acquiescence, with the help of vigorous propaganda, practical

demonstrations and, above all, the leadership of some dynamic

district administrative and agricultural officers.

The Program. Soil conservation through the construction of

narrow-base terraces and bench terraces was the heart of the pro-

gram. This was considered vitally important not only to prevent the

washing away of topsoil, but, above all, to conserve every bit of

moisture in areas suffering from deficient and irregular rainfall.

The construction of terraces was supplemented by the planting of

grass and by manuring which, in turn, was facilitated by the con-

struction of cattle bomas. New terraces were closed to livestock until

grass cover was re-established and for this interval some relief

grazing was provided in other areas, or cattle owners were required

to stall feed their cattle on crop residues. The construction of terraces

and dams was done largely by communal work groups equipped

with hand tools. However, a mechanical unit did some of the heaviest

work, particularly where machinery could be effectively deployed.

In each of the eight Locations, demonstration gangs under a locally

trained leveller and a foreman were organized to demonstrate

proper methods of working. The whole effort was under the control

and direction of "Betterment Teams" consisting of representatives

of the various government services concerned.

Substantial progress was made. The total area protected by soil

conservation works reached a peak of 103,000 acres in 1958. The

maximum area planted to grass in any year was 56,940 acres in

1955 (see Table 3). Many reports testify to the startling recovery of

areas that had been badly eroded and denuded. It proved impossible,

however, to keep the people under sufficient pressure to sustain the

effort. Beginning in 1958, the construction of narrow-base terraces

fell off sharply, with the number falling into disrepair exceeding

new construction thereafter. New bench terrace construction also

fell off sharply beginning in 1960. From 1959 to 1962, the number

of miles of narrow- and broad-bench terraces built declined from

3,661 to 1,492. Toward the end of 1961 the area protected by

effective terracing had dropped to 66,000 acres or less than a quarter

94

TABLE 3: PROGRESS WITH SOIL CONSERVATION, FARM IMPROVEMENT AND WATER SUPPLY

Soil Conservation Better Farming Practices Water Supply

SubsurfaceDams Built with Dams,

Grass- Hedge & Roofed Capacity RockTerraces (miles) drainage Boundary Cattle Catch-

Ways Grass Sisal Sheds Pad- Bush Over Under ments and"V" Narrow- Planted Planted Planted Built docking Clearing 1 Mil. I Mil. Boreholes

Year Type based Bench (No.) (Acres) (Miles) (No.) (Acres) (Acres) Gals. Gals. Installed

1955 179 2,760 802 298 56,940 761 4,610 - - 7 3 31956 83.5 1,590 1,443 136 15,959 308 5,588 - - 1 4 21957 126 1,932 1,575 56 10,632 354 2,458 96,985 - 0 5 381958 - 1,088 2,671 30 4,176 198 2,617 4,067 - 0 7 391959 - 978 2,683 118 20,385 115 1,781 12,398 25,710 3 12 581960 - 726 1,056 - 2,540 287 740 2,577 16,062 3 35 361961 - 519 722 - 1,607 642 116 2,041 6,146 5 17 521962 - 873 619 - 176 175 60 1,500 2,521 0 0 21963 - 115 287 - 105 246 33 3,949 2,310 0 0 48

SOURCE: The District Agricultural Officer, 1964.


of the cultivated area.9 A considerable part of this retrogressionwas caused by lack of maintenance of narrow-base terraces. Thereis little doubt, however, that the whole soil conservation effort has

had an important residual effect, even in areas where terraces have

fallen into varying states of disrepair.Afforestation and Water Supply. The soil conservation effort was

complemented by afforestation and the provision of water supplies.The afforestation of steep slopes and catchment areas was on arather modest scale. By the end of 1962 only 10,290 acres on themajor hill features had been reafforested, as compared with an

original goal of 60,000 acres. Although afforestation could have

played an important role in retaining and controlling subsoil

moisture under the kind of rainfall conditions prevailing in Macha-

kos, the Forest Department was apparently not as intent on achievingits target as some of the other government services and was contin-

ually short of staff and funds.Much more was achieved in the field of water supply for both

the human and livestock population. This work was carried out

by the former African Land Development Board. In the period

1946 to 1962, it constructed 52 large dams, 269 small dams, 226

subsurface dams (barriers across "sand rivers" which carry sub-

surface water supplies), 22 bore holes, 6 piped water schemes and3 rock catchments (methods for catching and storing rainwater

runoff from large areas of bare rock). These projects were presum-ably valuable not only in creating much needed water supplies,

but also in preventing soil erosion by controlling and storing runoff.

The major dams were built by a mechanical unit which worked in

the district from 1952 to 1957; smaller dams were built by ox scoop

and manual labor. Unfortunately, quite a few of the dams subse-quently became dry during the worst drought years and even today

some 500,000 acres in the district, or one-seventh of the area, are

virtually devoid of population owing to lack of water.A special effort was made to encourage farmers to install roof

catchments, i.e., corrugated iron roofs with gutters and tanks inwhich to store the runoff. Relatively few farmers could afford these,but roof catchments have demonstrated their value in overcomingwater shortages in those areas where cheap wells are impossible.

The Role of Self-help. During recent years there has been a generalletdown in the self-help effort in all these fields. In large part this was

probably a reaction against the rather unrelenting pressure which

I J. F. Peberdy, A Study of Some Aspects of the Machakos District Economy (mimeo-graphed memorandum, September 1961), p. 4.

96


the Government applied to the people. True, the whole effortcannot be said to have rested wholly on compulsion, even thoughfines and even prison sentences were at times meted out. Thereseems little doubt that, for a time, a considerable measure of popularsupport or compliance was mobilized for the rehabilitation campaignwith the help of meetings (barazas) and practical demonstrationsand under the stimulus of able and dedicated European staff.Initially all able-bodied adults were called upon to work two daysper week at the direction of administration-appointed chiefs andheadmen, although such a turnout was never fully achieved orenforced. From 1956 onward communal work groups of this typegradually gave way to the voluntary and traditional self-helpgroups, such as the clan-based Mwethya through which peopletraditionally assisted each other in certain farm tasks, or the localNgwatanio which generally worked on community projects. Thelatter types of self-help groups were promnoted, among others, bythe Government's Community Development Staff.

Yet people apparently did feel under considerable pressure toparticipate; when this pressure relaxed with the gradual advent ofindependence, the accumulated resentment produced a markedreaction against all communal effort, all the more because manypeople were also convinced that the Government would now doeverything. It was only in 1963 that self-help action began to reviveagain, although this time it has been directed less to soil conservationand the like than to community projects such as the building offeeder roads, schools, community and youth centers, etc.

For many people, terracing and similar work apparently involvedtoo much effort and control. Soil and water conservation undoubt-edly helped to irnprove yields and to increase the effectiveness ofmanure and fertilizer. However, there was probably a tendency torelax as soon as some improvement was experienced, perhaps partlybecause the women had to do much of the work involved in bothsoil conservation and farming. Moreover, the land, even thoughrehabilitated, did not offer the attractive farming opportunities thatwere available, for example, in Nyeri. In this connection, it isnotable that there was a much greater and continued interest inbench terracing in the higher hill areas, where this work could bedirectly associated with the introduction of a new and profitablecrop such as coffee.

Finally, it seems that the retrogression after 1959 was linked alsoto a diminution in Government staff. Table 4 shows, for the moreimportant categories, the number of staff employed in agriculturaland conservation work. Since the mid-'fifties, when a peak was

97

TABLE 4: MACHAKOS DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL STAFF AND EXPENDITURES ON AGRICULTURE

Number of Staff, 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964

Agricultural officers 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1

Assistant agricultural officers 4 8 9 8 12 16 16 16 14 14 12 6 5 5Senior technical assistants - - - - - - - - - 2 2 2Reconditioning officers 2 - - - - - - - -- - - -

Assistant soil conservationofficers - 2 3 2 1 1 1 - -

Sisal development officer - 1 1 - - - - - - - - -

Agricultural instructors 40 47 50 52 51 82 62 60 n.a. 63 58 56 55 65

Assistant agricultural instructors 47 198 ? 212 220 256 232 222 210 192 195 162 142 101Veterinary assistants - 3 - 20 20 - - - - - - - - -

1o Veterinary scouts' - - - - 23 27 - - - - - - -

OD Assistant surveyors - 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - - - - - -

Junior survey assistants - - - - - - 6 -

Levellers 137 ? 27 25 26 26 10 - -

Total 232 262 ? 323 333 409 357 301 ? 272 266 227 205 174

Expenditures on agricultural ex-tensions, soil conservation,etc.b (S) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 83,954 75,307 53,075 39,824 36,625 33,248 22,459 22,855 23,308 ?

'Only for selected types of personnel and excluding the regular staff of the Veterinary Department. In 1964 the latter had a district staff consisting

of 1 Veterinary Officer, 1 Livestock Officer, 13 Veterinary Assistants and 23 Veterinary Scouts.bFigures for expenditures are taken from the annual reports of the District Agricultural Officer. Their scope and comparability could not be veri-

fied.SOURCE: The District Agricultural Officer, 1964.


reached, the number has fallen off considerably. A similar trend isdiscernible for expenditures.

Efforts to improve crop husbandry

While the soil conservation campaign was proceeding, efforts toimprove crop husbandry and to introduce new crops were alsobeing made. These efforts, however, suffered greatly from an inade-quate appreciation of the problems, the lack of a clear-cut develop-inent philosophy and the shortage of trained staff.

The struggle against soil erosion was conceived of and fought as abattle. It required good organization and a lot of staff trained in thetechnical rudiments of soil conservation. The same techniques andstaff proved, however, to be much less well equipped to deal withthe improvement of agriculture, which required patient efforts todiagnose what the farmers' problems were in various areas; to devisethe proper solutions of these problems; and to persuade the farmersto adopt them. There never appears to have been sufficient apprecia-tion of the differential population pressures on the land and theirimplications for the development of agriculture and animal husban-dry. The emphasis was largely on individual, isolated improveinentsin agricultural practices, which failed to take account of the problemof farm management as a whole or of the limitations within which theindividual farmer was operating. To this day, as will be indicated insubsequent pages, the whole developrnent effort has been plaguedby lack of reliable data.

The top agricultural staff, until recently almost all European,has never really had the resources and numbers to make the detailedinvestigations essential to the formulation of proper prescriptions.They were largely compelled to operate on an emergency basis.The subordinate and African staff was, for some timie, quite large,but trained in hardly anything but soil conservation work. Even now,judging from our own more recent observations, the quality of thestaff in direct contact with the farmer-i.e., the Assistant Agricul-tural Instructors and Agricultural Instructors-seems to be amongthe lowest in Kenya. On our visit to the district, we were informedthat only 22 out of 53 who had recently been examined after partici-pation in a refresher course had passed with a grade of 50 percent orbetter. The AAI's appeared to be somewhat better than the Al's,because they had practical experience of farming, but neitherseemed capable of diagnosing the problemns of farmers or of trans-miitting such a diagnosis to their superiors. Nor did they seem toreceive much guidance on methods of doing extension work.

99


In the past the staff seems to have concentrated too much on afew individual farmers. Often these were chiefs and headmen whowere not emulated because their special position and means seemedto put them in a class apart from the other farmers. Moreover,individuals who were singled out for attention and developmentinto progressive farmers tended to become too isolated and exposedto envy and even ostracism.

In recent years-perhaps more as a result of staff shortages thanby design the emphasis has shifted to working with groups, pri-marily through meetings and field demonstration days. This typeof work has been usefully supplemented since August 1961 by theMachakos Farmers' Training Center. During 1962 and 1963 thisCenter gave 58 short-term courses for 1,755 participants of whomthe great majority were farmers, both women and men. While thisCenter has done much valuable work, its curriculum and staffinghave suffered from the same deficiencies that we noted in Nyeri andFort Hall. Integration of the work of the Machakos Center with thatof agricultural extension in the field also apparently left somethingto be desired. For instance, the principal agricultural officers of thedistrict had evidently never evaluated the Center's curriculum andteaching methods. Nor was there any systematic follow-up of stu-dents once they had returned to their own farms.

Against the background of these preliminary observations, weshall now examine some of the specific efforts to effect improvementsin crops and cultivation practices.

Early-Maturing V'arieties. The very short cropping season imposedon most of the district by the rainfall pattern, made it important toadopt early-maturing food crops and to practice early planting andtimely weeding. Originally, farmers had grown principally milletand sorghum, which mature more quickly than maize, but these hadlargely gone out of cultivation because they were particularly sus-ceptible to bird damage, were rather low yielding, and had to belaboriously pounded into flour (rather than mechanically ground)before they could be used for food. Since the longer-maturing maizethat has supplemenited them was much more susceptible to droughtsor shorter rainy seasons, efforts were made to introduce quicker-maturing maize varieties-at first "Taboran" and later "Katumanisynthetic," named after the Katumani Research Station nearMachakos Town which has been in operation since 1956. However,these varieties have characteristics which have prevented theirready popularization. While they give yields superior to that of localmaize when rainfall is poor, the local maize has higher yields when

100


rainfall during the season exceeds 11 in." Taking good years withthe bad over a sufficiently long period, the improved varieties dogive a greater output. Unfortunately, this has been difficult todemonstrate to farmers because their introduction in recent yearscoincided with a time of abnormally good rainfall. It was alsodifficult to prevent the admixture of the new seed with that ofindigenous maize or the quick deterioration of seed attendant inplanting the new maize adjacent to the old maize.

Early Plantinlg and Its Difficulties. Experiments and trials haverepeatedly demonstrated the marked effect on yields of early plantingin most of the district.'" Sowing of grains in the dry before the adventof the rains is, in theory, the best practice. In fact, however, farmershave found this difficult to do, owing to shortages of labor, imple-ments and oxen. The lack of reliable data we encountered almosteverywhere made it hard to appreciate the seriousness of theseshortages. Although some estimated that 50 percent to 60 percentof the land was plowed with oxen rather than prepared by hoe,accurate information, particularly for each area, could not readilybe obtained. It was evident, however, that where land was cultivatedby the hoe, it was seldom possible for a farmer to plant all his orher crops in time. We found that the period of arduous land prepar-ation tended to run into and even overlap with the subsequentperiod of weeding, the two together constituting a bottleneck whichmade for poor standards of cultivation in most cases. Where oxplowing was practiced, oxen sometimes had to be shared or hired,leading to late plowing of at least a portion of the area.' 2 In anyevent, after the dry season the oxen were seldom strong enough toplow land before the rains had softened it. This difficulty was all

10 See R. H. Bennison, The Principles of Afaize Husbandry for Areas of LouW andUnreliable Rainfall in Kenya (mimeographed; undated).

11 Dowker's experiments in 1960 showed that sorghum yields were 1,500 lbs.per acre when planted in the dry before the rains, but only 1,100 lbs. and 700lbs. respectively when sown four days and seven days after the rains. Similarly,work by Bennison at Katunmani during the short rains of 1959/60 and 1960/61indicated that yields of Taboran maize fell frorm 1,761 lbs. and 1,362 lbs. whensown in the dry to 1,049 lbs. and 851 lbs. respectively when sown six days afterthe first heavy rains.

1" Of 16 farmers in Masii Location on whom Judith Heyer obtained recordsin 1962/63, only one planted before the rains, and he did so, not because he wasconvinced that this was desirable, but only because that was the only tine hecould get the plow and oxen he shared with others. Among the reasons for notplanting early were (1) hardness of the ground, (2) weakness of the oxen owingto poor grazing, and (3) the necessity for replanting, requiring more seed, if therains failed after planting in the dry. See Judith Heyer, Seasonal Labour Inputsin Peasant Agriculture (mimneographed, 1964).

101


the greater because the heavy moldboard plow used is generallyrecognized to be unsuitable for most of the conditions in Machakos.

Another factor inhibiting early planting has been the lack of

proper crop rotations, although the Katumani Research Station has

been working on this problem in recent years. Rotations that would

preserve soil fertility with a minimum use of fallow would ease the

task of land preparation, for fallow land is much harder to break

than cropped land. Moreover, wherever land is cropped twice in the

year, the selection of a proper crop sequence is important in avoiding

overlapping of the agricultural operations of the two seasons. The

harvesting of the late crops, such as pigeon peas, of one season can

and does delay the preparation of land for the next season's crops.

Early and effective weeding also encounters difficulties. Few

farmers weed their crops well and in time. As indicated, the plantingand weeding labor bottlenecks tend to merge into each other. If

farmers carried out every operation at the time indicated by agri-

cultural officers to be necessary for optimum yields, they would in

effect have to cope with a number of insurmountable labor peaks.

They therefore spread their labor over a longer period of time,

planting and weeding some crops early and others late.'" In this

way, many evidently believe they get a larger total return for their

labor than if they tried to achieve high yields per acre. The Depart-ment of Agriculture has ernphasized, with considerable justification,

that planting of crops in pure stands would, in some cases, producemuch better results. Yet here too weeding tends to be a bottleneck.In such cases, weeding could conceivably be facilitated by inter-rowcultivation with an implement. Our observations appeared to

indicate, however, that only a small proportion of farmers possessed

a cultivator, although some appeared to use a plow for turning in

weeds between rows.The Production and Use of Manure. The production and use of manure

has been one of the recommendations given the greatest stress by the

Department of Agriculture. Probably not much more than ten tons

of chemical fertilizer is used in the district annually, and that pri-

marily in the form of nitrogen on coffee. Repeated trials with ferti-lizer nitrogen on food crops have indeed shown rather poor anderratic responses; experiments have apparently indicated that soil

nitrogen is more effectively conserved through particular croprotations, in which crops with a fairly high demand for nitrogenfollow fallow or crops (especially quick-maturing ones) with a

"Judith Heyer has also made this observation with respect to the farmersincluded in her survey in Mlasii Location. Ibid.

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comparatively low consumption of soil nitrogen. While responses ofmaize to phosphate have been more definite and reliable, they havehardly been spectacular. 14 Manure, on the other hand, appears tohave a more marked effect on yields.

Although farmers appreciate the value of manure and do usesome, the difficulties of producing and applying it in large quantitiesseem to have been largely overlooked by agricultural officials.When there are in fact very few ox carts in the district, the task ofgetting the necessary litter for manure making and of conveyinganywhere from three to ten tons of manure'5 to the fields for everyacre planted becomes extremely labor demanding. The labor in-volved may be particularly burdensome in view of the absence ofmany of the able-bodied men.

The Labor Implications. In general it seemed to us that the agri-cultural service has largely ignored the labor implications of itsrecommendations. The Government never appears to have under-taken any farm management studies to determine for typical con-ditions what labor was available; how fully it was used at varioustines of the year; and how labor bottlenecks could be relieved byjudicious modification of cropping patterns or introduction ofsuitable implements or better means of transport. On the other hand,agricultural officials have frequently castigated farmers for beingindolent. The very fact that some farmers have shown that they cancope with their work effectively lends some substance to this charge.At the same time, the typical farmer undoubtedly does have difficultywith seasonal labor peaks even though underemployed for much ofthe season. Thus a private survey of 16 farm units in Masii Locationdisclosed that 13 had a period or periods during which 100 percentor more of available labor was used.' 6

The Problem of Implements. There has been little official recognition

14 See R. H. Bennison, The Principles of Maize Husbandry for Areas of Low andl nreliable Rainfall in Kenya. The use of 100 lbs. of double superphosphate pro-duced a virtually constant increase of 200 lbs. of maize (grain) per acre under awide variety of rainfall conditions and a wide range of yields.

15 The "standard recommendations" on various crops, issued for the guidanceof agricultural staff by the District Agricultural Office, recommend the appli-cation of five tons of manure per acre of cotton and ten tons per acre of potatoes.For maize, 100 lbs. of double superphosphate per acre is recommended. In theabsence of fertilizer, presumably at least three tons of manure would be requiredfor maize.

16 In this survey, labor was considered to be used at 100 percent capacitywhen emnployed six days per week and eight hours per day. All labor, includingthat not purely agricultural, was counted, though half of the time devoted tomarketing was deducted as a "social" activity. See Judith Heyer, SeasonalLabour Inputs in Peasant Agriculture.

103


of the critical importance of implements. In fact, a scrutiny of nine

consecutive annual reports of the District Agricultural Officer over

the years 1955-1963 reveals no mention of the problem whatsoever."'Yet, judging from interviews, we would say that many fariners are

definitely concerned about the problem. It seems to us that more

trials could have been undertaken to test the utility of the cultivator,

both for land preparation and inter-row weeding, or of the "nail"

or "chisel" plow for land preparation. Similarly, more attentionmight have been given to the development and production of an

economical, durable ox cart. Finally, the feasibility and economics

of tractors might have been explored more thoroughly. In the

Makueni settlement we found about 12 tractors in use for plowing

and, to some extent, for maize grinding and transport. Most of

these had been acquired by small groups of farmers who shared their

use and did some contract plowing at the rate of Sh 40 per acre.

There is some question whether in fact tractors can be operated at

reasonable cost and still be amortized, but it would be desirable, in

any event, to investigate what the actual experience with tractors

has been. Some farmers clearly appeared to be quite satisfied with

tractor cultivation.

Development of cash crops

The development of cash crops concentrated on fruits, vegetables

and coffee in the hill masses and on sisal and, more recently, cotton

in the lower and drier areas.Fruits and Vegetables.The cultivation of fruits and vegetables has de-

veloped primarily owing to the nearness of the district to the Nairobi

market and the existence of two canneries-one at Machakos and

the other at Thika-operated by Kenya Orchards and Kenya

Canners respectively. The district's exports of this type of garden

produce rose from a two-year average of about £12,000 in 1950-

1951, to a six-year average of £63,000 in 1957-1962, with a peak of

£85,961 in 1959. In the years 1959-1962 a fluctuating amount,

17 In an appraisal of the development potential of the district during theperiod 1964-70, the District Agricultural Officer recognized that the moldboardplow in use was not a very suitable implement and required, for plowing beforethe rains, a tractive effort greater than that which could be supplied by badlytrained and underfed oxen. At the saine time, he suggested that there were suffi-cient able-bodied adults to prepare 330,000 acres of land each season with the

hand hoe before the rains. This suggestion seemed to ignore the high labormigration rate, the difficulty of working land in the dry by hoe, and the conflictbetween the labor requirements for land preparation and those for other tasks,including harvesting of some of the previous season's crops. Where crops are

grown two seasons a year, the time available for land preparation is usually

quite restricted.

104

Kenya: Af achakos District

averaging around £9,000 annually, has been taken by the canners.' 8

The latter have provided seed and advice in a number of cases undercontracts with growers.

Several factors have imipeded the further development of outputwhich, during recent years, seemis to have attained a plateau.One is market uncertainty. The market for fresh produce is verynarrow and unstable, and the canners also have difficulties at timesin selling their products at home and abroad. The other is the lackof care devoted to the growing, picking and grading of these crops.The continuous attention these crops require is frequently irksomieto the cultivator, particularly when he has an alternative crop whichis less demnanding.

Colfee. Such a crop is coffee, which has developed rapidly sincethe mid-'fifties in the hill masses of Kangundo-Matungulu, Mbooni,Iveti-Mitaboni and Kilungu-Mukaa. Planting and pulping wereregulated closely by the Departrnent of Agriculture under CoffeeRules which required that all planters belong to cooperatives; thatcoffee be grown on terraces; and that certain standards be observedwith respect to spacing, manuring, mulching, pruning and wind-breaks. The planting of coffee started in the early 'fifties, and in 1957the first coffee was pulped. By 1963, 4,750 acres had been plantedwith 2.6 million trees, and production had risen to 477 tons of cleancoffee and 112 tons of "buni"' or dried coffee beans. The gross valueof coffee sold in 1963 was about £145,000, equal to £120 per acreof coffee in bearing. With more coffee trees mnaturinig, sales in 1964rose further to about £340,000.

The history of coffee development demonstrates that the Kambafarmer readily responds to really profitable opportunities to use hisland. It has not, however, been altogether without problemns. Theclose supervision exercised over both cultural methods and factoryprocessing until 1960 was instrumenital in maintaining the qualityof coffee at a high level. The district actually had a larger portionof its output classified in the first three grades than any other district.However, when the Department of Agriculture relaxed its controlunder political pressure in 1960 and turned over primary responsi-bility to the growers' cooperatives, a rapid decline in quality tookplace. The proportion of coffee in the first three grades declinedfrom 75.03 percent in 1959, to 41.8 percent, 43.6 percent and 34.2percent in the three ensuing years. By 1963 it had sormewhat re-covered to 54.84 percent. One cooperative lost a substantial amount

18 See Table 5. Official figures indicate a sharp drop in exports in 1963, butthis may be due in part to incoinplete data.

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TABLE 5: MACHAKOS EXPORTS OF LIVESTOCK, AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS (in £)

1955 1956 1957 1958

Units Value Units Value Units Value Units Value

Agricultural productsVegetables-mixed (tons) 795 44,564 566 31,653 809.3 45,342 394.6 22,097

Fruit-mixed (tons) 139 6,234 144 6,444 453.1 18,699 292 13,802

Vegetable and fruit deliveries toKenya canners, Thika (tons) 360 5,645 391 5,096 180 3,192 117 2,637

Kenya orchards, Machakos (tons) 12.4 209 56 2,225 9.25 642 61.8 4,215

Strawberries (tons) 49 3,977 10.6 1,190 13.9 1,875 0.6 86

Oranges (tons) 1.8 26 - - - - 16 338

Coriander (90 lb. bag) 953 1,930 112 378 52 175 207 698

Onions (180 lb. bag) 1,110 4,995 2,645 14,283 3,875 20,925 4,231 22,847

Pigeon peas (200 lb. bag) - - - - 162.4 243 6,258 20,745

Maize (200 lb. bag) - - - - 69,371 100,538 19,187 30,488

Millet (200 lb. bag) - - - - 1,030 1,390 129 201

Grams (180 lb. bag) 355 1,438 17 76 107 481 63 232

Beans (200 lb. bag) 21 150 - - 190.4 409 162 255

Sorghum (180 lb. bag) - - - - 40 41 - -

Cow peas (180 lb. bag) - - - -

Coffee-Clean (tons) - - - - 22.5 10,220 67.87 30,485

-Buni (tons) - - - - 2.0 358 18.79 2,735

-Total (tons) - - - - 24.15 10,578 86.66 33,220

Castor seed (180 lb. bag) 4,966 11,173 1,327 4,777 1,077 3,769 417 1,459

a Cotton-AR (bales) - - - - - - - -

C' -BR (bales)-Total (bales) - - - - - - -

Wattle (tons) 1,188 18,453 874.5 11,897 1,900 23,426 1,200 12,000

Honey (lbs.) 6,476 389 3,464 198 510 28 510 28

Beeswax (lbs.) 817 164 623 136 304 66 302 66

Sisal (tons) 258 5,847 826 23,128 82.7 4,962 40 2,400

Other - - - - - 1,194 - 1,154

Livestock productsFowls (thousand head) 124.9 24,871 ? 11,571 65,332 4,899 110,854 24,942

Eggs (dozen) 31,090 2,868 9,715 6,420 15,866 1,903 39,888 4,787

Ghee (36 lb. tin) - - 347a 1,735 421 2,105 421 2,105

Total agricultural and livestock products 132,961 121,207 246,982 188,308

LivestockLive cattle (head) 5,331 39,983 6,372 47,790 11,299 84,742 7,122 53,413

Hfides (No.) 21,739 17,391 33,336 26,669 24,759 19,807 30,287 24,229

Total 27,070 57,374 39,708 74,459 36,058 104,549 37,409 77,742

Live goats and sheep (head) 1,112 1,112 15,056 15,056 9,649b 9,726b 4,777b 5,013b

Skins (No.) 93,583 22,292 150,367 35,487 101,420 23,348 105,640 50,450

Total 94,695 23,404 165,423 50,543 111,055 33,074 110,417 55,463

Total livestock 80,777 125,000 137,623 108,878

Total all products 213,738 246,207 384,605 297,186

Units Value Units Value Units Value Units Value Units Value

Agricultural productsVegetables-mixed (tons) 956.75 53,578 784.7 43,943 733 31,629 1,406 35,650 1,038 23,276Fruit-mixed (tons) 513 22,982 195.4 8,754 444.4 10,909 755 22,650 518 8,285Vegetable and fruit deliveries to

Kenya canners, Thika (tons) 201.25 5,543 347.5 7,831 196.3 2,294 716 7,997 ? ?Kenya orchards, Machakos (tons) 26.5 2,057 60.7 3,010 69.1 2,220 155 6,258 ? ?

Strawberries (tons) 2.5 280 - -Oranges (tons) 54 1,521 - - -Coriander (90 lb. bag) 243 820 177 597 389 583 457 1,142 - -Onions (180 lb. bag) 33 178 - - - - - 1,779 4,649Pigeon peas (200 lb. bag) - - - - 27 94 1,708 4,270 3,976 6,982Maize (200 lb. bag) 866 1,299 - - - - 66,693 100,839 229t170 265,985Mlillet (200 lb. bag) - - - - - - - 3,192 3,844Grams (180 lb. bag) 256 944 456 1,681 477 1,550 1,660 4,980 2,463 7,458Beans (200 lb. bag) 44 94 36 77 30 90 283 919 6,877 13,319Sorghum (180 lb. bag) - - - - - - - 3,583 6,595Cow peas (180 lb. bag) - - 84 2,540 - - - - 734 530Coffee-Clean (tons) 90.5 40,463 157.5 55,668 129.8 44,845 287 100,450 437 142,025

-Buni (tons) 28 3,052 40.3 3,135 31.4 1,256 48 2,400 112 3,374-Total (tons) 118.5 43,515 197.8 58,803 161.2 46,101 335 102,850 549 145,399

Castor seed (180 lb. bag) 561 1,963 974 3,409 914 1,919 3,821 8,215 7,097 16,981a Cotton-AR (bales) - - - - - - - - 241 7,687

-BR (bales) -- - - - 200 2,409-Total (bales) - - - - 481 10,096

WN'attle (tons) 1,658 16,582 1,676 16,338 1,643 15,937 2,016 21,470 1,898 19,079Eloney (lbs.)Beeswax (lbs.) -Sisal (tons) 1,458.2 65,386 4,143 283,153 6,176 440,640 1,344 92,256' 3,317 289,363Otther - 1,730 - 2,015 - 40 - 1,904 - 10,373

Livestock productsFowls (thousand head) 121,007 27,226 86,376 19,435 55,881 8,382 66,582 13,316 ? ?Eggs (dozen) 32,486 3,898 22,265 2,671 23,530 8,397 30,382 3,038 ? ?Ghee (36 lb. tin) 782 3,910 525 2,652 336- 1,176 356 1,246 ? ?

Total agricultural and livestock products 253,497 456,725 580,684 414,810 843,310Livestock

Live cattle (head) 9,199 70,628 11,769 93,473 20,694 156,969 9,929 99,918 1,875 18,750Hides (No.) 43,958 35,266 30,885 24,708 21,092 4,834 19,614 14,373 22,417 16,813

Total 53,157 105,894 42,554 118181 4T1,786 161,803 29,543 114,291 24,292 34,563Live goats and sheep (head) 10,174 10,174 23,387 23,387 40,255 40,255 25,866 25,866 11,714 11,714Skins (No.) 121,200 29,937 101,360 25,044 72,920 14,710 65,088 10,895 82,912 13,800

Total 131,374 40,111 124,747 48,431 113,175 54,965 90,954 36,761 94,626 25,514Total livestock 146,005 166,612 216,768 151,052 60,077Total all products 399,502 623,337 797,452 565,862 903,387

-Four-gallon tin. bIncludes 14 pigs valued at £91 in 1957: 43 pigs valued at £379 in 1958.'This appears to be an understatement, including only the sisal processed and sold by the Machakos factory. SoURcE: Annual Reports of the District Agricultural Officer.


of money; the managemnent of all cooperatives deteriorated markedly.This retrogression may have been partly due to a natural reaction

against the paternalistic control of the Department of Agriculture,

but it was probably more largely caused by a tendency of farmers

to try to get by on the least amount of work and a disinclination on

the part of officers and staffs of the cooperatives to insist that their

members maintain quality standards. It is noteworthy that, by 1964,

the cooperative which had experienced the most grievous drop in

quality was finally enforcing better standards by rejecting poorly-

graded coffee beans.

Sisal. Coffee can be grown in only a limited area of Machakos

and expansion of the planted acreage even there is inhibited by the

quota limitations of the International Coffee Agreement. The

extensive dry areas of the district have had to rely primarily on sisal

as a cash crop. The agricultural staff has consistently encouraged

the planting of sisal in hedgerows, which have the additional advan-

tage of stabilizing the soil. A brushing and baling plant was opened

by the African District Council in 1952. Decortication of the sisal

leaf, however, has always posed a problem. Usually this is the wo-

men's task, and it is done by drawing the leaves between two fixed

panga (machete) blades. A more efficient hand decorticator has

never been developed; the use of mobile mechanical raspidors or

decorticators by contractors or cooperative groups has not been

promoted effectively. Since decortication has been considered a

woman's job and women have many conflicting claims on their

time, production of sisal has, in the past, generally languished in

years of good crops and suddenly spurted in times of drought. In

recent years, however, this cyclical production pattern appears to be

changing, for output has been well maintained even in good crop

years (see Table 5). In 1963, for instance, sisal, valued at £289,363,

became the most important export crop of the district; in 1964 the

value of sisal exports shot up to over £800,000. These exports were

undoubtedly made possible by the earlier sisal planting campaign.

The immediate impulse, however, problably came in large part from

the rise in sisal prices during the early 'sixties. Whereas the European

price of sisal per long ton averaged about £82 per ton in the seven-

year period 1953-1959, it maintained an average of approximately

£100 in the next three years and rose steeply to £144.8 in 1963.

It is probable that, with the drop in prices which began in 1964 and

reached £94 by March 1965, the incentive to cut and decorticate

sisal has sensibly diminished.' 9

"' At a European price of £990-1OO per ton of brushed and baled fiber, the

Machakos farmer would probably get Sh 0.30-0.35 per pound of decorticated

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Cotton. The most promising and rapidly developing crop in recentyears has been cotton. It was first tried and abandoned as a failuremany years ago, but renewed efforts to grow it, beginning in late1960, have so far been rather successful. In 1963/64 the total areaunder cotton was already 3,552 acres. In the Makueni settlement,we observed some quite good cotton and an apparent tendencytoward rapid expansion of the acreage. On the whole, however,yields are still not very high. In 1963, the average yield from 1,500acres was apparently about 350 lbs. of seed cotton, and nearly halfof the cotton harvested (441 bales valued at £10,096) was secondgrade. The value of recorded cotton shipments from the districtrose to £10,096 in 1963 and £18,054 in 1964.

Resettlement and irrigation

Originally it was expected that resettlement within the districtwould be one of the few means of relieving overpopulation in thedistrict. To this end, the Makueni Settlement Scheme was carriedout in the southern part of the district. The settlement area com-prised some 50,000 acres of tsetse- and game-infested bushlandwhich had a rainfall of 20 in. to 30 in. Clearance operations wereinitiated in 1945, and the first people were settled on holdings of20 acres in 1948/49. Ultimately, 2,250 settlers, comprising withtheir families about 12,000 people, were accommodated on farmsranging in size from 20 acres to 60 acres. The cost, exclusive of thesalaries of supervisory personnel, averaged £149 per settler.

Until 1957, settlers during the first year were given free rationsand their five acres of arable land were plowed for the first time, alsofree of charge. Beginning that year, however, the Governmentcharged each settler £15 and also £10 for plowing. It is not clearhow and over what period settlers managed to pay these charges.In 1960 an annual rate of Sh 10 for water supply was also charged,but apparently few have paid it.

The clearing of land was left to the communal and individualefforts of the settlers; during the period 1955-1960, around 36,000acres were reported to have been stumped and, in some cases, re-stumped. There has, however, been constant trouble with bush

fiber. At a rather optimistic yield of 1,000 lbs. per acre, gross output would beSh 300 to Sh 350 per acre. Since it is said to require about 127 man-days oflabor just for cutting and decorticating this quantity, the return to labor wouldbe between Sh 2.38 and Sh 2.76 per day. While this does not seem to be a veryhigh return, the lack of alternative opportunities for cash income, particularlyduring the slack part of the agricultural season, would still appear to leavesufficient incentive for some production.

109


enroachment and consequent tsetse fly infestation. The holdings

were probably too large to permit adequate bush control.2 0

Originally, settlers were expected to abide by specific rules re-

garding the maintenance of specified numbers of cattle, the culti-

vation of fodder for stall feeding of livestock, etc., but since 1960,

enforcement of these rules has lapsed. It was our impression, however,

that the standards of crop husbandry were somewhat better in

Makueni than in the other dry areas. In 1964, 500 of the farmers

were already growing cotton, and most of them were reported to be

dusting their cotton and manuring at least part of their cotton fields.

A similar number had formed a cooperative for the transport of

produce to Nairobi. The farmers on the whole also appeared to be

better equipped than those elswhere.In Kenya, the Makueni Settlement has been considered by many

experts to have been an expensive and unnecessary measure, in

view of the more impressive results at lower cost said to have been

achieved by the reconditioning of existing settled areas. Although,

the Makueni Scheme was undoubtedly much more expensive than

it need have been, it has proved to have certain potentialities which

are now only being realized. Moreover, it can also be seen now that

reconditioning and development of the old areas has not provided a

sufficient answer to the growing population pressure. We found

ample testimony to this in the spontaneous and largely uncontrolled

movement of considerable numbers of people into Kikumbulyu

Location in the south and the Yattas in the north.

Limited Irrigation Development. As yet, little has been done to

relieve the shortage of good, well-watered land by exploiting the

possibilities of irrigation. The year 1959 witnessed the completion,

at a cost of £324,982, of the so-called Yatta Furrow which, apart

from supplying some supplemental water for the grazing areas of

North Yatta and the Yatta Plateau, was supposed to provide 39

cusecs of water for irrigating an area of approximately 1,900 acres.

Up to the present, however, no land has actually been developed

for irrigation, apparently in part because the Government feared

that the people involved would not accept the discipline necessary

to irrigated agriculture. In the district, there are a few small areas

under irrigation, but apparently no thorough survey has ever been

undertaken to determine what the total potentialities for irrigation

might be.

20 According to estimates supplied to us by Mr. L. H. Brown, former ActingDirector for Agriculture, 6-8 man-days per acre are required to control re-

generating bush. For a holding of 30-40 acres, this would require 180-320 man-

days of labor per year.

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Kenya: AIachakos District

A visit which we made to the small Kyai Irrigation Scheme

illustrates, however, the kind of problems that may be encountered

and must be resolved. The Kyai Scheme, consisting of about 100

acres divided into one-acre plots, illustrated quite a number of

mistakes and deficiencies. Part of these stemmed fromn the poor

selection of plotholders. All but 20 of these lived two or more miles

away from their holdings, either because they had other occupations

to which they gave most of their attention or because they had

farms in the bush on which they were residing. Water on the scheme

was very short because people lived too far away or had too many

other occupations to irrigate around the clock, as they had originally

been expected to do. Moreover, water was being wastefully used inbasin irrigation instead of furrow irrigation. Supervision was being

provided by an ill-trained Agricultural Instructor who obviously

knew little about irrigation techniques. At the time of our visit,

only about a third of the area appeared to be planted to a variety

of fruits and vegetables. Marketing difficulties were being experi-

enced even though the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line was not far

away. An Asian merchant, who originally came to buy produce,

had ceased to come, apparently because the volume of produce

available for purchase was too uncertain-in relation to his transport

costs. Repeated efforts to organize the growers into a marketing

cooperative were reported to have failed, although a few of thegrowers were apparently doing some marketing also for others.

One man did market his own produce in Nairobi, but his marketing

expenses absorbed all but Sh 87 of his monthly gross of Sh 267!

We received many confusing and sometimes contradictory ex-

planations of the virtual failure of this scheme. It seemed to us that

both a proper diagnosis of the problems had not been made and

that it would really not require much time to make one as a pre-

requisite to a program designed to remedy the principal defects.

We mention this, not because the Kyai Scheme is in itself important,

but only because it is illustrative of many situations in Machakos

where responses have proved inadequate. A thorough effort to

determine the precise reasons for this lack of response has never

been made.

The livestock problem

Government attempts to deal with the livestock problem of the

district have been the least successful. Basically these efforts havefocused on (1) improvement of grass cover and regulation of grazingwithin the settled areas; (2) institution of grazing schemes providingfor rotational grazing and control of cattle numbers; and (3) intro-

111


duction of better breeds and imuprovements in animal husbandry.Underlying these measures were assumptions that existing cattlewere largely unproductive and excessive in number by comparisonwith available grazing. The control of cattle numbers was soughtnot only by regulations, but also by efforts to stimulate inarketing.However, by 1960 virtually all government controls and regulationspertaining to livestock had collapsed. Since then, efforts have beenconfined largely to rather fruitless attempts to introduce improvedstock.

The Lack of Reliable Information. We have already mentioned theimportance which Kamba attach to cattle. As is so often the case,numbers are stressed more than quality. Both the milk and mneatyield of native cattle are very low. Standards of husbandry aregenerally poor. Disease control is still extremely deficient. Only atiny fraction of the cattle are sprayed or dipped against tick-bornediseases; outbreaks of hoof and mouth disease are by no meansinfrequent and interfere with marketing. Trypanosomiasis is preva-lent in a number of areas.

We found it by no means easy, however, to obtain a real apprecia-tion of the nature and magnitude of the livestock problem and of thereasons for the difficulties encountered by the Government in dealingwith it. Reliable data on the number, ownership and productivityof cattle was hard to obtain. Thus there appear to be no comparablefigures that would enable one to determine at what rate livestocknumbers really have been increasing over time. A census in 1960indicated that there were around 222,000 cattle in the African areasof the district, and an estimate for 1963 gives 251,000, of which 84percent were said to be in the drier areas that usually have a rainfallof less than 30 in. The 1960 census seemed to show that only oneout of three taxpayers had cattle, but since there is often more thanone taxpayer per family and cattle are frequently entrusted to others,it is difficult to determine whether many people are without cattleand what the variation in the size of herds may be. However, if oneassumes that there are about six persons per family, the 1960 datawould indicate that the nuimber of cattle owners in Masii, Wamunyu,Iveti, Mbooni and Nzawi Locations were only 45 percent, 66percent, 66 percent, 53 percent and 55 percent respectively, of thetotal number of families.

It has often been alleged that there are large "cattle barons" andthat the latter have been primarily responsible for opposing grazingand livestock controls. In the drier areas, it is quite probable thatmany people rely primiarily and even almost wholly on livestockfor their livelihood. The larger livestock herders appear to be always

112

Kenya: Alachakos District

searching for grazing and apparently account, according to thetestimony we received, for much of the trespassing or poaching thattakes place, for instance, on the cooperative Koma Rock Ranch andthe District Council Simba-Emali Ranch.

How productive cattle are at existing standards of livestockmanagement is also difficult to answer. There is little doubt thatmilk yield is extremely poor, and the quality of both the live animalsand the hides that are sold is very low. However, statistics on theexport of cattle and cattles hides from the district do not appear tosupport the often repeated assertion that Karnba are reluctant tosell or slaughter their cattle and are priinarily intent on increasingtheir numbers. For the 13-year period 1950-1963, for example,these figures seem to indicate an average annual offtake of 15 percentor 17 percent, depending on whether one derives the percentagefrom the number of cattle shown by the 1960 census or that givenin the 1963 estimnate. However, these export figures are said toinclude an unknown quantity of cattle imported, in the first instance,from the old Northwest Frontier Province. Moreover, there is amiarked annual variation in the takeoff. In general, the number ofcattle slaughtered and sold alive is roughly correlated with rainfalland pasture conditions. When grazing is short, the offtake tends tobe high, while good pasture conditions cause people to increase theirherds and keep thein off the market.22 Thus the variations on thedisposal of cattle apparently have the effect of stabilizing totaliiicoine from the farm. They indicate also how important cattleare as a means of saving.

The evidence about the rate of offtake can only be characterizedas conflicting. Those who claim that the Kaamba obstinately clingto their cattle cite the frequent complaints of livestock officers thatauction miarkets established to facilitate the offtake of cattle, havehad to be closed because so few cattle were offered for sale. Also, theSiimba-Emiiali Ranch, which the African District Council establishedin 1955 to buy yearlings in the district for fattening and subsequentexport, has always been far from achieving its original target ofpurchasing 3,000 cattle yearly.22

21 The sale and export of live cattle follows inore quickly on droughts than thesale of hides, which naturally lags soinewhat behind slaughterings.

22 This ranch, which was started primiiarily to facilitate destocking, is reportedto have purchased about 3,500 cattle or an average of 1,750 per year duringthe two drought years 1959 and 1960. Thereafter, however, purchases droppedto only 9 in 1961 and 524 in 1962, both of which were good rainfall years. In1963, 1,893 cattle were bought, but almost all had to be purchased outside thedistrict in order to keep the ranch stocked.

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Grazing Controls and Grazing Schemes. Within the settled areas, theGovernment's soil conservation program was partly successful inrestoring grass cover, which was, indeed, one of its principal objec-tives. The occasional closure of grazing grass to livestock also hadsome effect, although the controls were often evaded by movingcattle to unclosed areas, thus causing overgrazing there.2 3 However,attempts to control the number of stock seemed to have been almosta total failure. A 1955 district bylaw made it possible for stockcontrol to be applied to those Locations where local councils re-quested it. Although a number subsequently did make such a request,the working out and application of controls appear to have been toodifficult. In any event, there was hardly sufficient staff and knowl-edge to assess stocking capacity for various areas, taking intoaccount water supplies, ecological conditions and the year-to-yearvariations in rainfall.

Outside the settled area, where there was little or no cultivation,grazing schemes were tried. The most important of these schemeswere in the Yattas-North Yatta, an area of 240,000 acres, and theso-called Machakos Yatta, an area of 160,000 acres on the YattaPlateau beyond the Athi River. These grazing schemes were operatedby the Veterinary Department, although that in the North Yattawas taken over by the Agriculture Department in 1959.

The North Yatta was ostensibly reserved to the Kikuyu, but, sincethe latter did not take to this dry country, Kamba graziers infiltratedand soon outnumbered the Kikuyu. It had long been a practiceamong the larger Kamba stock keepers to keep cattle not immedi-ately required for meat or milk on the Yatta, where they were lookedafter by wage-earning herders. The natural increases were usuallybrought back to the reserve so that the Yattas, which were originallyintended to provide for relief grazing, quickly became a means offurther increasing the total number of livestock. Controlled grazingwas therefore initiated, not only to make more effective use of thegrazing land in the Yatta but to prevent this land from being asource of overstocking.24

Beginning in 1950, each of the Yattas was divided into a numberof enormous paddocks which were to be grazed in rotation and

23 The 1956 report of the District Agricultural Officer stated, for example,that people in Kibauni Location had been taking in "hordes" of cattle, againstreceipt of grazing fees, fromn adjoining Locations where many grazing areas hadbeen closed.

24 For the background of the grazing schemes we are indebted to a memoran-dum by R. H. Brown of the Kenya Veterinary Department, A Survey of theGrazing Schemes Operating in Kenya (undated, but probably about 1960).

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Kenva: Machakos District

each of which was to have its own water supply. The number ofgraziers and the number of livestock that could be grazed was con-trolled by licenses, with the stipulation that any natural increase inlivestock had to be sold and not brought back into the reserve.Annual grazing fees of Sh 6 per adult head of stock, raised in 1955 toSh 9, were charged to defray the cost. Serious difficulties wereapparently encountered in providing perennial water suppliesthrough dams and bore holes. To some extent this was relieved by theconstruction of the 37-mile Yatta Furrow which, as already indicatedwas finished in 1959.

At best these schemes functioned only imperfectly. Variousaccounts of their evolution provide somewhat conflicting evidence.The ten stock units (with five sheep and goats counting as one stockunit) to which each licensee was limited probably provided only ascant livelihood after paying grazing fees, district taxes and, perhaps,school fees. However, the licensees evidently managed to eke outsome sort of living with the help of a bit of cultivation. The principalsource of trouble was grazing by outsiders. The goal of reservingthe areas to people permitted to settle there permanently was neverachieved. A determined attempt, beginning in 1957, to expel fromthe Yatta Plateau stock belonging to some 495 absentee ownersapparently failed more or less completely. In North Yatta, a censustaken in 1959 disclosed there were 725 unlicensed stock owners ascompared with 1,058 licensed ones.

Under these conditions there was considerable overgrazing, withperennial grasses largely displaced by annual grasses and some areasalmost completely denuded of grass. Lack of grass, which serves as atinder for fires, made it difficult to carry out the necessary burning tokeep down the bush. Attempts to combat bush by settling peoplewho were allowed to keep only small stock that were expected tobrowse on bush seem also to have failed. Bush infested by tsetse flyhas enroached steadily, occupying, according to the latest estimate,over 100,000 acres in the North Yatta.

Such controls as still existed collapsed in 1960 and 1961. Pressureof Kamba politicians was evidently the immediate cause of thisbreakdown, but the more basic reasons are difficult to discern sincedata are unreliable, and a thorough analysis of the problems hasnever been undertaken. Insufficient staff undoubtedly made itextremely hard to provide the necessary degree of supervision andcontrol. At best, however, it would have been difficult to resist the"invasion" of stock and people from the rest of the district. Thisinvasion was itself a response to growing pressures of population whowere seeking opportunities to cultivate some land and graze their

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stock. We have already alluded to the large increase in the popula-tion of the Yattas from 1948 to 1962. At the time of our visit, theinflux was continuing at a rapid rate. According to the last officialestimate, made in 1964 in connection with the framing of a develop-ment plan, there are now said to be about 5,500 families (probablymaking a total population of at least 33,000) with some 45,000stock units in the Yattas; it might be added that these figures aresubstantially less than those that were indicated to us during ourbrief visit to the area.

Livestock Improvement. In the settled areas, attempts have beenmade over recent years to upgrade stock by the introduction ofSahiwal crosses and European-type cattle. The latter were encour-aged primarily in the Star Grass Zone of the hills. Every effort wasmade to insist that the owners acquire sprayers or build dips inorder to protect these cattle against the ravages of East Coast Fever.Progress, however, has been extremely slow. By 1962 there wereonly 151 Sahiwal and Sahiwal crosses, including calves, in thedistrict. The number of grade cattle (European types) in the districtwas only 80 in 1962 and 147 in 1963. Disease control was largelyneglected by the owners. Thus, 15 grade cattle were reported tohave died in 1962 and 46 in 1963, most of them from East CoastFever. Although a number of Kamba did work on nearby Europeandairy ranches and were thus enabled to become familiar with themanagement of grade cattle, the proportion of Kamba who hadthis experience was lower than that among the Kikuyu.

During our visit in 1964 there were signs of growing interest ingrade cattle by the Kamba in the hill masses. In many respectsthese hill areas seemed to us well suited for a coffee/grade cattletype of farming. By this time, however, the past experience withpoor cattle management had caused the Department of Agricultureto insist on such rigid requirements that apparently few farmers couldcomply with them. Nearly all farmers, for example, required a loanfor the acquisition of grade stock, construction of cattle sheds anddips, dairy equipment, fencing, etc. However, under the loan regu-lations laid down by the Department, no farmer could even beconsidered for a loan until he had complied with a whole series ofrequirements which in themselves necessitated considerable invest-ment.

Land Enclosure in Relation to Animal Husbandry. One reason for thedifficulties encountered in the effective introduction of grade cattlehas been the failure of enclosure to make significant progress. Unlessand until farms with appurtenant grazing land are fenced withwire or cattle-proof hedges, other cattle cannot be kept out and

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disease cannot be effectively controlled. Enclosure itself is bound upwith consolidation.

There never has been any survey of holdings in Machakos todetermine the seriousness of fragmentation. Such evidence as isavailable indicates that it is quite acute in the hill masses which arethe most heavily populated. Some consolidation has proceededunofficially, particularly in Kangundo-Matungulu, through ex-change and purchase of land. However, in these hill areas there isapparently considerably more fragmentation for ecological reasons;that is, farmers have fragments on various parts of the slope to takeadvantage of variations in soils and other ecological factors. Mostpeople in the hill masses are now said to want land registration andeven some degree of consolidation as long as ecological considerationsare respected. In 1964 the Government reportedly decided in prin-ciple to begin land adjudication and registration on this basis, atleast to the extent that staff limitations permitted. This should fa-cilitate the enclosure of land and the keeping of improved cattle.

For the drier areas, however, individual land enclosure andgrade cattle are evidently not the answer. In view of limited suppliesof water and the large amount of grazing land required for even amodest amount of cattle, individual ranches would have to beextremely large. Past experience shows that government-imposedgrazing schemes are likely to be resisted. First of all, there needs tobe a demonstration that a lower ratio of cattle to grazing land willactually produce a higher income per acre. Secondly, the numberof cattle must presumably be allowed to fluctuate from year to yearso as to enable people to "save" cattle for sale during years of harvestfailure. Thirdly, people need to be convinced, with the help oftheir own political leaders, that some control over livestock isnecessary to prevent overgrazing. The controls must rest on popularrecognition of their need and popular participation in their enforce-rnent. Perhaps they will take the form of cooperatively-administeredgrazing and ranching schemes. In this connection, it will be inter-esting to watch the experience of the cooperative ranching ventureswhich have been established in the last few years on former Europeanranching land in Machakos.2 5

Conclusions

The record in Machakos has not been one of unmitigated failure.The partial rehabilitation of land resources, coupled probably with

25 For a brief discussion of these, see the subsequent "Some Reflections onSettlement Schemes."

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some improvements in agricultural practices, has enabled the dis-

trict to cope more effectively with the problem of feeding its growing

population. In the higher areas coffee has provided a growing

source of cash income; in the drier areas sisal planting has given

people some insurance against crop failure and enabled them to

earn substantial cash income when sisal prices are high. Here and

there other signs of progress may be noted. By and large, however,

the record has been disappointing. Development has encountered

many difficulties.Owing to limitations of data, we found a definitive analysis of the

reasons for the comparatively slow progress of Machakos District

to be very difficult. The lack of success may be attributed partly to

the unfavorable ecological conditions and the rather high population

pressure in relation to the agricultural potential. As in Central

Nyanza, many of the more enterprising males have found employ-

ment opportunities outside the district more attractive; this ten-

dency to seek jobs elsewhere has deprived Machakos agriculture of

initiative and manpower. Labor migration brought the Kamba

primarily into contact with urban life rather than with European

farms, and the conditions and experience of such farms were, in

any event, probably not very relevant to the agricultural and

livestock problems of much of Machakos.European agricultural officers have often claimed that the Kamba

make progress and exert themselves only when they are put under

some pressure. It is possible that the dangers of soil erosion could

not have been effectively combatted without a campaign involving

some pressure. It may also be true that the Kamba, like many other

African farmers, are not disposed to make a very great effort unless

there is a substantial incentive in terms of immediate profits. On

the other hand, some doubts have been thrown on the past methods

of handling the Kamba. For example, a recent investigation has

led one anthropologist to the conclusion that the "Kamba are not

resistant to change unless the change is phrased in terms of coercion;

indeed, in many areas they welcome it."2 6 If this judgment is sound,

the virtual mobilization of the Kamba in the agricultural rehabili-

tation and improvement campaign of the 'fifties could have en-

gendered deep-seated and long-lasting reactions, entailing unfavor-able consequences which outweighed the temporary or partialsuccesses achieved. It is undeniable, however, that the Kamba did

permit their natural environmaent to deteriorate so seriously that

drastic intervention, involving some degree of compulsion, appeared

26 S. C. Oliver, Ibid., p. 424.

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Kenva: Machakos District

to be necessary. It is also possible that this intervention and otherefforts to raise the standard of agriculture and animal husbandrymight have been more successful had it not been for the politicalagitation attendant upon the achievement of Kenya's independence.In any event, the failure to produce the desired responses calls forfurther investigation of the motivations, problems and reactions ofthe Kamba themselves.

The extent and implications of the demographic pressures andpopulation movements in the district have hardly been studied. Yetit is evident that population pressure was primarily responsiblefor the failure of the grazing schemes and grazing controls; it ispopulation pressure, together with unreliable and erratic rainfall,that apparently argues strongly in favor of exploring and developingany potentialities for irrigation that may exist. There may well beserious obstacles to using the water of the Yatta Furrow for irrigation,but it seemed to us that at least a pilot project to explore the prob-lems would have been worthwhile.

In many other respects, the data and analysis essential to theprosecution of intelligent agricultural and livestock policies haveoften been lacking. While much good work has been done to developwater supplies, there is still insufficient knowledge of undergroundwater resources. There is no general soil map for the district, exceptfor a detailed one for the northwestern part. The Katumzani Re-search Station has done useful work in developing new varieties andexperimenting with new crop rotations, but, owing to its locationand the unavailability of other sites, the results are not applicableto the more extensive and drier parts of Machakos, where morereliable farming systems are still to be devised. As a minimum,trials would need to be laid down in different areas, but the shortageof land may make this difficult. Although cotton appears a promisingcrop in many areas of Machakos, no research on cotton, focusingon the particular conditions of these areas, has been carried on.

In preceding sections of this study, we have expatiated at lengthon the inadequacy of information on the number, distribution andproductivity of livestock, all of which seems to us essential in deter-mining responses to various measures for the control and improve-ment of stock. Even more in agriculture, there have been failures incollecting and diagnosing data. Recomninendations for early plantingand weeding and for manuring have been made without full under-standing of the problems which the farmers have in carrying theseout, particularly considering the limited equipinent and labor attheir disposal. The experience with agricultural development inMachakos affords a striking deinonstration of the need for carrying

119


out studies on a representative sample of farms in different areas ofMachakos. After ascertaining, in every case, what recommendationsthe extension service has been making to the farmers, it would benecessary to determine how relevant the extension advice was andwhat problems it posed to the farmers. The availability and use oflabor resources and of tools, implements and draft animals wouldhave to be ascertained and compared with the demands inherent inthe extension recommendations. Reactions to specific measures,such as the production and use of manure, the application of ferti-lizer, early planting, the introduction of cattle, land enclosure, etc.,would need to be systematically probed. Differences in the perfor-mance of farmers, and the reasons for such differences, would haveto be brought to light. All this would greatly assist in a properappreciation of the problems and their possible resolution.

It can, of course, be argued that there are many other districtswhere development has proved less intractable, where the develop-ment potential is greater, and people have proved more responsive,and that, accordingly, it is more worthwhile to concentrate on these.Yet Machakos District has a substantial population and, so long asthere are no rapidly increasing opportunities for alternative employ-ment, a special effort to determine what can be done to developthe agricultural and livestock resources of the district may well benecessary.

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4. THE EXPERIENCE IN CENTRAL NYANZA DISTRICT

Introduction

The District of Central Nyanza, lying to the east and north ofLake Victoria's Kavirondo Gulf, has long been regarded as a"problem area" with respect to agricultural development. Agri-cultural and livestock officers assigned there usually found themselvesfrustrated in their attempts to bring about a significant measure ofimprovement. Possibly as much as 90 percent to 95 percent of theagricultural output-consisting principally of sorghum, millet,maize and cassava-is grown purely for subsistence; attempts to getpeople to produce inore cash crops such as cotton have had littlesuccess until recently. The district's large livestock holdings, con-sisting principally of unimproved native cattle, frequently overtaxavailable grazing and contribute comparatively little to the casheconomy. Methods of both crop and animal husbandry have re-mained generally at a low level. The repayment record on agri-cultural loans has been extremely bad; in 1963 the district's JointLoans Board suspended the issue of loans because more than 90percent of the payments due were in arrears. Attempts to inducepeople to consolidate and enclose their land as a prerequisite todevelopment have been strongly resisted. Similarly, efforts to interestthem in irrigation have met almost universally with a negativeresponse.

Our inquiry in Central Nyanza sought the reasons for this lack ofprogress. At the same time, it took into account and tried to assessthe causes of certain changes for the better which appear to havebeen taking place in the last few years. Some signs of improvementhave indeed become evident. There appears to be a greater interestnow in agricultural development. Some progress is being made inexpanding and improving the cultivation of cotton, especiallythrough "group farms" organized by kinship units. Farmel-s arebecoming more receptive to land consolidation and enclosure and,in lesser degree, to rneasures to improve their cattle. The possibilityof irrigating portions of the plain around the Kavirondo Gulf seemsnow, in principle, to be welcomed rather than opposed.

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In probing the factors conditioning development of the district,

we addressed ourselves to a number of questions. What has been the

effect of ecological conditions and demographic pressures? How have

the characteristics and society of the Luo who inhabit the district

affected development? How effectively have the government services

been organized and directed to cope with the problems of agricul-

tural and livestock development? We realize that definitive answers to

all these questions cannot easily be given. In the absence of con-

clusive evidence, we can only advance what we hope will be con-

sidered reasonable hypotheses.

Ecological factors

There is little doubt that the natural agricultural potential of the

district is limited, particularly in relation to a rather dense popula-

tion. Ecologically, the district may be divided into three zones

(see Map):

1. The Lake Shore Savanna ranges from 3,700 ft. to 4,000 ft. in

altitude and includes the extensive Kano Plains, to the east of the

Gulf, and a long belt, to the north of the Gulf, which gradually

widens toward the west. The larger part of this-the East Kano

Plains and the Uyoma Peninsula (Uyoma Location)-is character-

ized by deep, alluvial, mbuga soils which, although more fertile than

other soils in the district, are difficult to drain and to work. A span

of six oxen is generally used to plow these soils. Moreover, the East

Kano Plains are susceptible to flooding by the streams coming down

from the Nyando Escarpment. The rest of the Lake Shore Savanna-

all to the north of the Gulf-has predominantly brown friable clay

soils which have a lateritic horizon and are generally poor. Parts of

this area, particularly Asembo, Sakwa and Uyoma Locations, are

infested with the tsetse fly. The whole of the Lake Shore Savannasuffers from a rather irregular rainfall that ranges from 30 in. to

40 in., with the western portion generally getting less than the Kano

Plains. While there are two rainy periods-the "short rains" of

October-December and the "long rains" of March-July-the"short rains" are seldom sufficiently reliable and adequate to support

a crop.2. The Star Grass Zone comprises the area between 4,500 ft. and

5,000 ft. The quality of its soil, which consists principally of latosolic,dark red friable clays, is quite variable. Rainfall-generally 60 in. to

70 in.-is the highest in the district and is sufficient to support double

cropping. Natural pasture conditions are quite good. Arabica coffeecan be grown, though conditions are not ideal for this crop. While

122

Kenya: Central Nyanza District

°. - CENTRAL NYANZA DISTRICT/ o T HI UGENV -

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characterized by probably the most favorable ecological conditionsin the district, this zone is also the most densely populated. More-over, it is only a small portion of the district. It consists of (1) a verylimited area on the Nyabondo Plateau in South Nyakach Location,which is south of the East Kano Plains; and (2) a larger areacentering around Maseno and comprising principally North Gemand the higher parts of Kisumu Locations.

3. The "Intermediate" or "Higher Rainfall" Savanna falls, as its namesuggests, between the zones mentioned above with respect both toaltitude and rainfall. Although rainfall is more reliable than in theLake Shore Savanna, its soils, consisting primarily of red or brownfriable clays, tend to be less fertile. Portions of the area are suitable

123


for robusta coffee, but bananas are the more widely grown "tree"

crop. The greater part of this zone lies in the western-northwesternpart of the district, and some of the higher northwestern parts are

still infested with tsetse.

Large portions of the district, particularly those in the west and

part of the Nyabondo Plateau, suffer from a dearth of underground

water resources. Especially in the dry season, people and cattle often

have to go long distances for water.It is obvious that natural conditions in Central Nyanza offer less

attractive opportunities for profitable cash cropping and animal

husbandry than the highlands of Elgeyo-Marakwet or the Central

Province. Some high-value cash crops, such as tea and pyrethrum,

cannot be grown at all. Arabica coffee can be produced only in

very limited areas, much of which are marginal for this crop, al-

though robusta coffee can be grown over a wider area. Conditions

are not ideally suited for exotic or grade cattle, which generally

thrive best at altitudes of 5,500 ft. and over. In the Lake Shore

Savanna and Intermediate Zones, groundnuts, cotton and sisal

are the principal cash crop possibilities, but the first has a very

limited market, and the latter two require a considerable amount

of labor in relation to output. Rice and sugar cane can be profitable

crops in portions of the Kano Plains. The rainfall pattern is such

that only a little over 10 percent of the crop land is double cropped.

Demographic pressures

Despite this rather modest agricultural endowment, the pressure

of population is very great. With a population of around 624,000

and a land area of approximately 1,700 square miles, the average

density is 370 per square mile.' There are, moreover, great vari-

ations in density ranging from well over 600 per square mile to less

than 200. The least populated are the Sakwa and Yimbo Locations

to the west, as well as the East Kano Location to the east; the most

crowded are the areas around Kisumu and in the Star Grass Zone

(see Table 1). Differences in density are due not only to ecological

factors, but also to historical accidents arising out of the settlement

of the area. The land was settled by clans and lineage groups within

clans, and the amount which each eventually obtained depended

largely on the vigor with which it pushed its claims against those

of rival groups. The relatively low population density of the East

I The 1962 census recorded a population of 664,133, but boundary adjustments

in 1963 reduced both the number and the area.

124


TABLE 1: CENTRAL NYANZA DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS (1962)

Population Proportion ofDivision Location Tot Per Adult Males

Sq. Mi. Awayb

Ukwala East Alego 39,820 369 35.6West Alego 36,001 39.6Busonga 6,331a 47.6Bunyala 24,975- ' 301 26.9Samia 28,916&) 29.2North Ugenya 52,985 469 35.9South Ugenya 12,407 574 41.7

Total 201,435 373 35.3

Maseno Seme 48,067 399 29.4South Gem 29,364l 515 37.4North Gem 47,190 34.5

Total 124,621 463 33.3

Nyando North Nyakach 22,4181 373 37.2South Nyakach 29,058J 33.0East Kano 52,220 293 25.3

Total 103,696 328 30.0

Bondo Uyoma 24,348 286 35.2Asembo 26,344 470 40.6Sakwa 28,034 174 33.2Yimbo 10,208 139 38.7

Total 88,934 237 36.6

Winam Kisumu 49,595 606 19.1West Kano 52,967 507 18.9Kajulu 8,996 651 26.3Miwani 10,363 ? -189.8cKisumu Town 23,526 ? - 58.4,

Total 145,447 - - 1.7,

Grand Total 664,133 391 27.0

.Made part of the Western Region in 1963.bPercentages in this column indicate the degree to which the number of the

adult male population is inferior to the adult female population. The actualabsenteeism among adult males in Central Nyanza is slightly lower consideringthe fact that the total male population among the Luo is only 95.8 percent ofthe female population.

'Percentage by which adult males exceed adult females. These areas attractmale labor from the rest of the district and elsewhere.

SOURCE: Kenya Population Census, 1962; population density figures are de-rived from data on area given in S. H. Ominde, Land and Population in the W1'esternDistricts of Nyanza Proivince, Kenya (doctoral dissertation, University of London,1963).

125


Kano Plains-a little over 200 per square mile-seems to be partly

due to the fact that this area was long an arena of conflict among the

Luo, Nandi and Kipsigi tribes.The only official data regarding the type, amount and distribution

of land for this population are those collected by the African Agri-

cultural Sample Census of 1960/61. These indicated that only about

43 percent of the land was used for cropping.2 Nearly all of the

remainder was in "uncultivated pasture," part of which presumably

could be made arable (see Table 2). The amount of cropped land

TABLE 2: LAND USE IN CENTRAL NYANZA

Acreage Percentage(000's) of Total

Total arable, 337.0 42.8In temporary crops 313.1 39.7In temporary fallow 23.9 3.0

In permanent crops 204b 0.3Uncultivated pasture 420.6 53.4Forest 8.1 1.0Bush 0.6 0.1Other 19.0 2.4

'Area devoted to "temporary" or seasonal crops, including the portiontemporarily fallow.

bAccording to more recent data supplied to us in Kisumu, the total area in"permanent crops," principally coffee and bananas, had risen to 12,000 acresby 1964.


(including limited double cropping) was reported to average 3.25

acres per holding. However, many of the holdings were

extremely small. Thus 31.5 percent of the holdings, occupying 6.9

percent of the total farm area, was less than 2.5 acres, and 58.7

percent of the holdings, comprising only 23.3 percent of the total

farm land, was less than 5 acres (see Table 3).

2 It should be noted, however, that S. H. Ominde came to the conclusion,

after examining aerial photographs taken in 1947 and 1948, that somewhat over

half of the land was cultivated (i.e., in crop or in temporary fallow). There were

wide differences in the percentage of land under cultivation, ranging from 21.7

percent and 25.1 percent of the Sakwa and Yimbo Locations of Bondo Division

to between 65 percent and 85 percent in three of the four Locations of Ukwala

Division, in North and South Gem of Maseno Division and Uyoma Location of

Bondo Division. See Ominde, Land and Population in the Western Districts of

Nyanza Prozvince, Kenya.

126


TABLE 3: SIZE, DISTRIBUTION AND FRAGMENTATION OFHOLDINGS IN CENTRAL NYANZA

Number of holdings (000's) 107.4Total acreage of holdings (000's) 787.7Average size of holdings (acres) 7.34Proportion of holdings by size groups:

1. Under 2.5 acres -of total holdings 31.5-of total area 6.9

2. 2.50-4.99 acres -of total holdings 27.2-of total area 16.4




6. 15 acres and over -of total holdings 12.5-of total area 44.5

Fragmentation:Average number of parcels per holding 2.84Average acreage per parcel 2.59Number of holdings consisting of

I parcel 40.62 parcels 21.7

3-4 parcels 24.25-6 parcels 13.37-8 parcels 3.99 or more parcels 3.6


Labor migration and agricultureIn some areas of tropical Africa, increasing pressure of population

on land has been conducive to progressive intensification of agri-culture. That this has, for the most part, not occurred in CentralNyanza seems largely due to the fact that many males among theLuo inhabitants have found employment elsewhere which appearedattractive by comparison with the limited opportunities for earninga living from agriculture within the district. Thus the labor migrancyrate has long been very high. Some labor migrants find employmentin the district, as in Kisumu and on the Asian sugar farms of MiwaniLocation, but by far the greater part work outside the district. The1962 census showed that the number of adult males in the districtwas only 73 percent of the number of adult females (see Table 1);after allowing for the fact that there is some over-all preponderanceof females over males in the Luo population as a whole, this indicatesthat about 24 percent of the male adults was earning some sort of alivelihood outside the district.3 The rate is as much as 40-50 percent in

Exclusive of those living outside the district together with their families.

127


a considerable number of Locations and Sub-Locations, particularlythose of the Lake Shore Savanna and Intermediate Savanna Zonesof the western and northwestern part of the district. Labor migrantsundoubtedly remit, in the aggregate, a substantial amount of money

to their homes, so that the resident population is by no means aspoor as the state of agriculture in the district would indicate. 4 The

earnings of labor migrants help greatly in the payment of taxes andschool fees.

The absence of so many of the able-bodied males, though a

reflection of the limited agricultural opportunities, has made itvery difficult to develop the agricultural potential that does exist.

We certainly found farmers complaining frequently of their inabilityto carry out all their farm operations with the labor at their disposal.In this connection, it should be noted that the figures on percentagesof adult male absenteeism understate the gravity of the labor prob-lem, for this absenteeism is almost entirely concentrated in the age

group of 15 to 45 years. It is this group which normally would domuch of the heavy farm labor.

The lack of sufficient manpower means that not enough new land

gets cleared and that land preparation gets delayed. Both landclearance and ox plowing are traditionally men's work. While some

women do plow, the majority find it necessary, in the absence of

their menfolk, to have their plowing done by a contractor, whoseldom does the job in time. For the labor migrant, the land isprimarily a place where he leaves his family and which is the anchorof his security when he returns, frequently after many years. Duringhis absence he is anxious primarily to maintain his rights in landand is often slow to accept changes such as land consolidation and

registration, which, in his view, may jeopardize these rights. Themen who remain are frequently the less enterprising or the older whoprefer to retain the traditional methods of cropping and livestockkeeping.

The types of employment found by labor migrants have also had

certain implications for the district's agricultural development.Unlike the Kikuyu, the Luo of Central Nyanza did not find, intheir immediate vicinity, European farming areas to which theywere naturally drawn. They have worked in considerable numbers

I We were unable to obtain any specific data on remittances. However, asurvey of Elgon Nyanza District, done by Marco Surveys of Nairobi, showed thaturban workers who were away from that district remitted on the averageSh 30-40 per month, but that 40 percent of them also received food parcels fromtheir home area. (See AID Survey: Elgon Nyanza, Nairobi: Marco SurveysLimited, August 1962, Vol. I, p. 41.)

128


on the large tea plantations of the adjoining Kericho District, butsuch employment has given them no experience of immediaterelevance to the agriculture of Central Nyanza. The same may besaid of the experience of the comparatively small proportion ofmigrants who have worked on the mixed European farms of theRift regions, where the ecological conditions were quite differentfrom those of Central Nyanza. The majority of Luo labor migrantshave been employed in the cities and by the railways, the army,the police and other government services. All this does not mean thatlabor migrants returning to Central Nyanza have failed to make anycontribution to the development of agriculture. Indeed, we foundthat the more progressive farmers were often those whose receptivityto change had been enhanced by their work experience and whohad, perhaps, also accumulated some savings for subsequent in-vestment in agriculture. However, the extent to which people returnto their farms for the purpose of earning a living, rather than ofsimply retiring, tends to depend on the relative attractiveness ofagricultural opportunities in the district, on the one hand, and ofjob opportunities outside the district, on the other. Since 1960 thereappears, indeed, to have been some shift in the relative attractivenessof the two. Opportunities for wage employment have either declinedor been comparatively stable, while there has been a greater aware-ness of the potentialities of agriculture, particularly of such cropsas cotton and sugar cane. At the same time, the advent of indepen-dence has brought about a gradual abandonment of the undiscrimi-nating political opposition to agricultural development that charac-terized the past. As yet, it is too early to determine whether thisshift is significant or lasting.

Characteristics of Luo and Luo society

The Nilotic Luo account for approximately 90 percent of CentralNyanza's population. During the present century, the Luo havebecome primarily an agricultural rather than a pastoral people.However, there is still a strong secondary dependence on animalhusbandry and, along the lake shore, also on fishing. Moreover,despite a continuing shift in emphasis toward agriculture, a stronglivestock tradition remains characteristic of the Luo and greatlyaffects their outlook. Cattle have long been considered a source ofsecurity and influence and have been the primary means of paying"bride price." In general, there is a tendency to slaughter or sellcattle only in emergencies, on very special occasions, or for specific cashneeds. The emphasis has always been on number rather than onquality. At the same time, there is a great reluctance to disclose the

129


number held. Thus, the African Agricultural Sample Census of

1960/61 was unable to arrive at a meaningful estimate of the number

of cattle; to this day the unreliability of information on livestock

makes an intelligent appreciation of the problems facing the district

exceedingly difficult.The social and ideological emphasis on livestock has also meant

insistence on the unqualified right to graze livestock anywhere excepton land actually cropped. In turn, this has entailed opposition toland enclosure that would curb this right and that would make

possible more effective control of cattle diseases. The very fact that

the younger and more active men have been away from the districthas greatly diminished the challenge to the traditional method of

using land for an extensive type of livestock keeping.

Traditional societyTraditional methods of land use appear to be linked in turn to

the continued existence of a rather strongly traditional society, in

which the elders still exert considerable influence. The Luo have no

traditional chief or chiefs, although the British appointed chiefs and

sub-chiefs or headmen for administrative purposes, and this practicehas been continued- since Kenya became independent. The tribe is

broken down into sub-tribes, clans and various segmented lineagegroups, each of which has its own land. The prevailing terminologymakes no clear-cut distinction between various lineage "segments,"

for the term jokakwaro, which is most commonly applied to a kinship

group, may be used to designate a lineage comprising anythingfrom two to as many as ten or twelve generations.5 The lineage

elders sit in judgment on land disputes and may invoke powers ofmagic in support of their authority. The bonds within the jokakwaroremain quite strong, and mutual aid in agricultural operations suchas clearing of land is still widely furnished by communal workgroups. The rights of the jokakwaro in land are supreme, in the sensethat no land can be alienated to anyone outside the lineage groups.Though the jokakwaro retains residual rights to land, members maygrant use rights to outsiders known as jadak (singular, jodak) with theapproval of the relevent authorities within the lineage. Over timesuch rights have been passed on to the sons of jadak, though they,like their fathers, can be displaced under certain circumstances in

accordance with customary law.Luo custom did not permit the sale of land-i.e., its transfer

s This view is contrary to that expressed by Gordon Wilson in his monograph,

Luo Customary Law and Marriage Customs (Nairobi, Colony and Protectorate of

Kenya, Government Printing Office, 1961). It is, however, confirmed by more

recent field research by William L. Sytek, a social anthropologist now at the

University of Chicago.


against a consideration-but it did allow permanent transfer of rightsin land. However, selling of land did become a practice to someextent on the Nyabondo Plateau and in certain areas adjoiningland occupied by Bantu tribes; in more recent years there has beenconsiderable buying and selling in areas where land consolidationand registration has been initiated.

Land fragmentationWithin the jokakwaro, the practice of dividing land holdings among

the male descendents of each household has contributed greatly toland fragmentation in Central Nyanza. The African AgriculturalSample Census of 1960/61 showed that there was an average of2.84 parcels per holding and that 62 percent of all holdings werefragmented. No less than 45,000 holdings, or 42 percent of the total,were fragmented into more than three parcels, ranging up to nineparcels and over (see Table 3). The causes of this fragmentationapparently have been largely the same as those that operated in theKikuyu Districts. There is, first of all, the division of the holdingsbetween the male head of the household, who retains the usufructof a portion, called his "mondo," and his wife or wives (there is stillconsiderable polygamy among the Luo). The land tilled by eachwife is further divided among her married sons, and the mondo is alsosubdivided, upon the death of the holder, among his sons, or thesons of his junior wife.6 A surviving widow also retains a plot forcultivation until her death. Another important factor in fragmen-tation is the practice of borrowing or lending land. That of givingthe use of land to jadak has already been mentioned. Even amongmembers of the same jokakwaro, however, land may be lent orborrowed to obtain a patch that is particularly suitable for a certaincrop. Finally, marked variations in soils, micro-climate and degreeof exposure to natural hazards such as floods, also have greatlycontributed to the number of parcels of land which each farmerwants to have.7

See Wilson, Luo Customary Law and Marriage Customs.The implications of this have been graphically described as follows: "Some

men have pieces of land scattered over distances of several miles, perhaps halfa dozen in all, and totalling only ten or twelve acres. Some of the land may lieclose to a river, some on thick decomposed laterite soil, some on a stony hillside,and some on dry sandy soil where the rainfall averages far less than on the richland. One piece may yield two harvests each year, another only one. Desirefor equal shares and often jealousy by one brother that another may get abetter piece of land has led to the scattered plots being divided, and once dividedthere are no legal means whereby those pieces can be reunited other than by anagreement which may demand the active support of all the members of thesubclan." Michael Whisson, Change and Challenge: A Study of the Social and EconomicChanges Among the Kenya Luo (Christian Council of Kenya, Nairobi, 1964),pp. 86-87.


Exposure to modernizing influencesLineage groupings have remained important, in spite of the

modernizing influences to which the Luo have been exposed during

their periods of labor migration and of the relatively high degree of

education that they have achieved. In part this is probably due to

the fact that the administrative divisions were laid out on the basis

of lineage. It is probable also that the availability of outside employ-

ment opportunities to the young and vigorous made possible the

preservation of traditional institutions and values which otherwise

might have changed more rapidly. The various stimuli to which

labor migration exposed the Luo may well have resulted in in-

creasing their interest in education. We noted that very often school

fees were paid from the remittances of labor migrants. Next to the

Kikuyu, the Luo appear to have the highest degree of education in

Kenya. Probably somewhat over half of the male children are in

primary and intermediate schools.

Political consciousnessTheir exposure to formal education as well as the manifold

experiences of labor migration did make the Luo politically con-

scious. Together with the Kikuyu, they were among the leading

protagonists of Kenyan independence. While only a few were

involved with the Kikuyu in the so-called Mau Mau rebellion, the

politically-conscious Luo found it easy to make common cause with

the conservative and traditional Luo in opposing all efforts of the

Colonial Government services to change agriculture, animal hus-

bandry and land tenure. Thus, throughout most of the 'fifties, there

was an unremitting and unqualified political opposition to even

well-conceived measures of agricultural development.With the advent of independence, the adamant political resistance

to change has gradually given way to open political support of

government efforts to improve agriculture. This new factor, together

with some diminution of employment opportunites outside the

district, has helped to create, at least temporarily, an environmentmore favorable to agricultural development.

The record

Against the background of the factors mentioned above, we now

turn to an evaluation of the Government's efforts, both past and

present, to promote agriculture and animal husbandry. In the main,

these government efforts have continued to focus on (1) improve-ments in cultural practices, particularly early planting, line planting

and proper spacing, and the use of fertilizers and manure; (2) the

132


introduction of cash crops and their proper cultivation; (3) theawakening of interest in irrigation; (4) improvenments in livestock,particularly through more effective disease control; and (5) encour-agement of land consolidation, enclosure and registration as astimulus to interest in agricultural development.

In the aggregate, these efforts have had little effect, at least untilrecently. This is evident from the rather static volume of agriculturaland livestock produce marketed in the district (see Table 4)8 andfrom the purchases in Central Nyanza by the Nyanza ProvinceMarketing Board (see Table 5). However, it seems useful to deter-mine in what respects and for what reason each of these effortsproved deficient.

Before discussing the particular efforts that have been made,some observations on certain more general problems might be inorder. One of these relates to the agricultural service. On the whole,we found that the quality of agricultural extension personnel com-pared favorably with that in other areas of Kenya which we visitedThe principal handicap of the staff was the comparative lack ofuseful advice that it could communicate to the farmer. There hassimply not been a body of tested and practical agricultural improve-ments that could be applied to the farming conditions prevailingin Central Nyanza. Whereas the higher regions of Kenya haveprofited both from the experience of European farmers and from theresearch carried on by stations originally established for theirbenefit, there has not been sufficient applied research focusing onthe problems encountered in the various ecological zones of CentralNyanza. The potentialities of this district are, as already indicated,limited by comparison with some areas in Kenya, but they havenever been fully explored by properly directed research.9 Nor hasthere been an adequate preliminary diagnosis of both the technicaland human problems by such means as soil and farm managementsurveys. Some illustrations of these deficiencies will be given insubsequent pages.

Another problem is that relating to markets. We found thatextension personnel had little or no knowledge or appreciation ofmarketing conditions. Farmers have often been encouraged to growcrops for which there was, at best, only a limited market. This has

I The sharp increase in 1963 was due to a largely temporary increase, underthe stimulus of high prices, in the cutting of sisal.

I It must be admitted, however, that it would have been very difficult to findland for research stations, even had the financial resources been available.The difficulty of getting land also frustrated for many years the initiation of apilot irrigation project.

133

TABLE 4: QUANTITIES AND VALUES OF AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS, MARKETED FROM THE AFRICANAREAS (PARTLY ESTIMATED)

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Units ofQuan- Quan- Value Quan- Value Quan- Value Quan- Value Quan- Value Quan- Value Quan- Value

Crops tity tity £ tity £ tity £ tity £ tity £ tity £ tity £

Bananas Tons - 28,000 73 412 50 700 40 400 1,000 6,000 1,000 6,000Cassava Tons - - 24 218 186 1,250 64 500 1.5 - 57 717Coffee Tons - - - - 2 150 8 400 8 650 30 3,090Castor seed 180 lb. - - - - - - - - - - - -Cotton lint 1000 lb. 3,363.5 102,350 4,250.2 86,967 5,740.8 120,912 7,189.6 158,102 3,949.7 100,310 4,019.6 92,128 5,904.0 147,300Groundnuts 180 lb. 2,681 10,240 2,493 9,871 242 870 314 1,069 2,602 9,925 3,976 15,556 1,775 6,980Maize 200 lb. 7,042 9,827 2,713 3,521 9,977 13,811 13,243 17,415 34,306 46,305 15,195 21,653 5,096 7,423Pulses (beans) 200 lb. 4,866 10,267 1,598 3,278 341 578 1,278 2,177 1,942 3,860 830 1,202 1,055 1,674Rice paddy 160 lb. 36,325 57,848 54,496 98,200 27,288 49,147 40,701 69,599 36,454 58,240 1,957 2,998 4,438 6,829Sim-sim 180 lb. 40 160 24 100 61 234 23 1,100 10 400 30 1,500 39 1,400Sisal Tons - - - - - - - - - - 577 45,000 4,127 322,000Sorghum 200 lb. 21 18 1,029 794 9,073 6,533 8,478 7,000 7,392 6,000 2,498 2,500 1,333 986Sugar cane Tons - - - - - - 700 1,500 1,173 3,000 2,600 6,000 4,171 9,800Grains (green) Tons 24 922 10 393 42 1,619 124 4,000 541 14,000 - - 46 1,208

Livestock productsGhee Tins 166 743 67 258 102 445 208 728 91 300 - - - -Eggs Gross 2,184 1,887 1,308 1,622 1,297 1,147 1,284 6,334 690 737 1,138 1,393 1,100 1,120

Total 194,262 233,004 195,926 271,124 244,377 196,580 513,527

'Excluding livestock and hides and skins.SOURCE: District Agricultural Office. The data in Tables 4 and 5 show some serious discrepancies which hardly seem susceptible of explanation on the basis of the

difference in the time period (calendar year as against fiscal year) employed. The discrepancies are one more illustration of the difficulty of obtaining reliable statisticalinformation.

TABLE 5: PRODUCE PURCHASED IN CENTRAL NYANZA BY THE NYANZA PROVINCE MARKETING BOARD

1960/61 1961/62 1962/63

Price Total Net Price Total Net Price Total NetLbs. Bags per Bag Purchase Bags per Bag Purchase Bags per Bag Purchase

Commodity per Bag Purchased (Shs.) Price (£) Purchased (Shs.) Price (f) Purchased (Shs.) Price (9)

Maize 200 31,921 32 50,993 18,956 35 37,912 8,823 37 16,278Beans 200 2,238 42 4,702 1,231 37 2,269 1,082 38 2,081Capsicum ? - - - - - - 7 50 17Cassava 125 1,149 13 733 22 18 20 523 16 429Castor seed ? 233 50 581 604 50 1,519 618 43 1,319Grains ? 270 51 690 35 46 80 425 55 1,175Groundnuts 180 2,349 91 10,628 3,206 95 15,189 4,269 89 18,945Maize (undergrade) 200 - - - 25 28 35 - -Millet 200 - - - - - - 680 35 1,193Rice paddy 160 36,454 36 65,381 2,049 37 3,804 5,111 37 9,533Sim-sim 180 2u0 69 692 707 88 3,168 180 91 822Sorghum 200 7,786 22 8,486 936 28 1,290 2,802 26 3,615Sunflower seed ? - - - 4 20 4 7 20 7Ghee Tins 91 92 419 - - - - -Eggs Gross 704 20 713 5,016? ? 797 817 19 791

Total 144,018 66,087 56,205

SOURCE: Annual Reports of Nyanza Province Marketing Board.


been particularly true of perishable fruits and vegetables, includingbananas, citrus, etc. For less perishable produce, there was alwaysthe possibility of selling to the Nyanza Province Marketing Board,"0

a statutory board replaced in 1964 by a produce board operatingthroughout Kenya; for cotton, coffee and sugar cane, there werespecial marketing arrangements. However, poor roads have been anobstacle to the marketing of many crops.

Improvements in crop husbandryIn this field, little progress has been made as yet. This is particu-

larly true of early planting and the use of fertilizers and manure.These practices generally do raise yields, but their adoption hasencountered serious difficulties.

Lack of sufficient labor and the shortage and unreliability of workoxen are the important factors in tardy land preparation. In general,it would seem that a district with large numbers of cattle shouldfind it possible to use oxen universally in such a way as to facilitatetimely planting. Actually, there is an insufficient number of trainedoxen. In part this seems to be due to a traditional preference forbulls over oxen and to failure to train adequately such oxen as areavailable. However, the distribution of cattle as well as oxen is farfrom uniform. In the higher areas, the land is often so crowded thatit provides little or no room for livestock. In the Bondo and UkwalaDivisions of the western parts of the district, tsetse is a serious barto the keeping of livestock. Even in areas where large numbers oflivestock are kept, the distribution among individual farms isoften extremely uneven.' 1 We found it impossible to establishaccurately the extent to which land was plowed by oxen in differentareas. However, it was our impression, based on questioning offarmers and agricultural staff, that from two-thirds to three-quartersof the cropped land was actually prepared by hand in all regionsexcept the Kano Plains, where ox plowing was almost univer-sally practiced. There was some evidence, also, that contractorsdid a considerable portion of the plowing and that they were almostinvariably late in plowing part of the land. Finally, we were struckby the delays attributed to illness ainong oxen. At the time of theplowing season oxen are usually in their weakest condition becausethey have just survived the dry season. Again and again farmers re-ported to us that their oxen had fallen ill or died at a critical time.

0 For a record of the Board's purchase, see Table 5.11 This was indicated, for example, by a livestock count carried out in Seme

Location in 1963.

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Utse of Manure and Fertilizer. The value of manure is widely appreci-ated and many farmers who have cattle do use some manure. Butthe production and distribution of adequate amounts of manuremeet with numerous difficulties. While livestock is generally keptin a boma or corral at night, the production of adequate quantitiesof properly-rotted manure requires considerable litter and in thedry season even water. In all of the district, there were almost noox carts to provide the necessary transport, including that ofmanure, to the fields. Manure is generally taken to the fields eitherin baskets or in wheelbarrows, and fragmentation of land has madeit difficult to manure parcels far removed from the homestead.Under these conditions only a small proportion of the cropped areais manured, and even that portion usually receives an inadequateamount.

The use of chemical fertilizer is still quite rare. The agriculturalstaff has at times supplied fertilizer for trials, and some farmershave used it with success. It seemed to us that there were two princi-pal obstacles to the more general use of fertilizer. One has been theinability of those farmers who use it successfully to get a continuingsupply. The extension service was not organized or authorized tosupply fertilizer on a continuing basis, and the amount of fertilizerused was not sufficient to interest coimmercial distributors. The otherobstacle is attributable to the lack of attention given to working outsuitable variations in fertilizer recommendations in the light of themarked diversity of soils found in Central Nyanza. We foundextension workers everywhere recommending the same dosage,irrespective of soil type.

We noted that the percentage of farmers who had adopted someimproveinents, such as manuring or fertilizing, was still very small.A considerable proportion of the more progressive farmers we didsee were people who had had some formal education or outsidebusiness experience, particularly teachers, chiefs and sub-chiefs,veterinary or agricultural assistants, shopkeepers and the like. Afew had worked on European farms and others had been able tosave some money as labor migrants. Most of the progressive farmershad some other income which apparently enabled thern to investmodest sums in their farms or to assume the risks of innovation.

Cash cropsCoffee. The planting of coffee has always been strictly regulated.

Arabica coffee was permitted generally only in areas above 4,700 ft.in altitude, and robusta coffee at altitudes between 4,000 ft. and4,700 ft. The Department of Agriculture also insisted that the holding

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on which coffee was planted be consolidated; that the land be

benched; that the planting holes be of certain dimensions; and that

certain other requirements as to spacing, manuring, mulching, etc.

be met. Comparatively few farmers could meet all these require-

ments. By the end of 1963, only about 250 acres of arabica and

around 160 of robusta coffee had been planted by approximately

1,300 growers. Total production, in terms of buni or dried cherries,

was only 70 tons. Plantings were so scattered and small that it was

difficult to justify coffee factories. Before late 1964, when two fac-

tories were finally completed, there was only one "unauthorized"

hand pulper working.In retrospect, we have some doubts about the wisdom of the rather

restrictive government regulations concerning coffee. We realize, of

course, that these were designed to prevent soil erosion and to ensure

proper standards of cultivation. In Nyeri and even Machakos, we

have noted that insistence on terracing and proper planting was

both effective and useful. However, the Kikuyu and Kamba were

more inclined to accept these conditions because many of them

knew at first hand or learned from others how profitable European

farmers had found coffee-growing. On the other hand, the Luo of

Central Nyanza were apparently much less aware of the income

potentialities of coffee and were therefore easily discouraged by the

regulations of the Department of Agriculture. Moreover, our obser-

vations led us to the conclusion that they had, in fact, restricted

planting without contributing significantly to better husbandry.

Much of the coffee we saw was unsprayed or insufficiently sprayed.

Most farmers did not have sprayers. The slow rate of planting made

it difficult to achieve a volume of output sufficient to justify a coffee

factory, and the consequent sale of coffee as buni greatly lowered the

return to farmers. It seemed to us that insistence on consolidation,

as a prerequisite to coffee-planting, may have put the cart before

the horse. It might have been better to have permitted coffee-

planting without such strict pre-conditions. Much more coffee

would probably have been planted and this, in turn, would have

drawn attention to the value of land and greatly stimulated interest

in land consolidation, enclosure and registration."2 It was also

doubtful wisdom to confine the two types of coffee too strictly to

certain ecological zones. Ecological considerations alone should not

12 If consolidation does not start until long after coffee-planting, the latter

may make consolidation more difficult, as in Meru District in Kenya. On the

other hand, experience with profitable coffee-growing, on one fragment, often

helps to create demand for consolidation of a holding around that fragment in

order that more coffee might be planted.

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govern. Even though a particular area may not be ideal for coffee

ecologically, it may still be advisable to plant coffee when the latter

yields the farmer a much better return than any other alternative

crop.Rice. Rice used to be an important crop in the Kano Plains, but

in recent years floods and the rising water level of Lake Victoria

have seriously damaged embankments and canals and severely

curtailed production.' 3 While production of rice on a large scale

may have to await the initiation and completion of concertedmeasures for proper flood control, irrigation and drainage, we saw

some evidence indicating that more modest steps to raise output

could be taken in various localities by improving canals, improvising

weirs, etc.Sisal. Over recent years, the agricultural service has been modestly

successful in encouraging the growing of sisal, particularly in the

drier and poorer soil areas in the western part of the district.

Farmers were urged to plant their boundaries with several rows of

sisal as part of a campaign to enclose their land. As in the case of

Machakos District, this enabled farmers to take advantage of the

sharp upturn in sisal prices during 1962 and 1963. In the latter year,

when prices reached their peak, the value of exports of sisal froin

the district exceeded that of any other commodity, but in the follow-

ing year it dropped again sharply in response to a price recession.

Normally, however, the lack of equipment for decorticating sisal

has been a handicap. The sisal produced must be decorticated

laboriously by hand by drawing the leaves between the blades of

two fixed pangas (machetes), and there is a reluctance to perform this

time-consuming labor unless prices are very high or there is an

urgent need for cash that cannot otherwise be satisfied. In one case,

a farmer, who was interested in production on some scale, had

managed to rent a mechanical raspador for a few months. Yet he

had been unable to get from the agricultural service any guidance

about where to purchase a machine of his own!Cotton. Cotton has long been the most important cash crop of the

Lake Shore Savanna and Intermediate Savanna Regions."4 Yet its

output, although fluctuating markedly from year to year, showed no

distinct upward trend until recently. Cotton was grown by some12,000 farmers on small scattered plots where cotton was often

sown mixed with other crops. The recommendations regarding

13 Purchases of paddy in Central Nyanza by the Nyanza Province MarketingBoard dropped from 36,454 bags in 1960/61 to 2,049 bags in 1961/62 and 5,111bags in 1962/63. (See Table 5).

14 The exceptional sisal exports in 1963 have already been noted.

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timely sowing, thinning, insecticide treatments and proper sortingat harvesting, were generally ignored. Average yields were perhapsbetween 200 and 300 lbs. per acre. Food crops and cotton competedwith each other, both during planting and weeding, for the limitedamount of available labor and, frequently, of work oxen. Underthese circumstances, food crops were almost invariably given priority.

Group Cotton Farming: In the last few years, however, interest incotton cultivation has notably increased. As already indicated, thishas apparently been due to some decline in employment opportuni-ties outside the district and to the cessation of political oppositionto agricultural development. The greater interest in cotton hasbeen manifested, above all, in joint or group cultivation schemessponsored by jokakwaro, usually under the influence of younger menwho, in the past, would have been working as labor migrants.These group farms are the result of spontaneous self-help. They werefirst started for the growing of sugar cane, but within the last twoyears, they have been directed primarily to the production of cotton.By 1964, we were told, there were 35 such cotton farms in SakwaLocation, 10 in Seme Location, and 36 and 8 respectively in EastKano and West Kano Locations.

These group-farming schemes vary considerably in size andmethods of operation. Those we visited ranged, in area, from 6.25acres to 27 acres and, in number of participating families, from 5 to51. All of them are characterized by a pooling of land and coopera-tion in carrying out some of the agricultural operations. Within thejokakwaro not all the members invariably participate, for the oldermembers, particularly those with cattle, often oppose setting asidean area for cotton at the expense of grazing. Some of the groups haveset up a capital fund out of which contractors are hired to plow theland and laborers are engaged for weeding. In other groups someof the members contribute oxen and plows to prepare the land. Insome cases all of the work is carried out communally, but a morefrequent practice is to make each participant responsible for his orher own plot once the land has been prepared. While a few of thegroup farms were established primarily for the purpose of raisingmoney to support certain social welfare activities within the jokakwaro,most of them have arrangements to share the proceeds among themembers.

We were, on the whole, rather impressed with these group farms.While the standards of cultivation varied considerably, they werealmost always far superior to those practiced on individual scatteredplots. The pooling of land has facilitated the task of land preparationwhether by oxen or by tractor. The group schemes have tended to

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Kenya: Central Nvanza District

reverse the priority previously given to food crops. The land on thegroup farms is generally prepared first and planted first. There is acertain cooperative and collective discipline which ensures a greatertimeliness and a better standard in many of the agricultural opera-tions involved. The cotton grown on these schemes is nearly alwaysdusted with insecticides and receives more manure. The groupfarms have been a means to test the improved methods of cottoncultivation without risk to the participants, because the latter couldand, in fact, did often retain their own cotton plots outside thescheme. The experience with group farming apparently shows thatin a traditional society it is often easier to introduce new methodsthrough group action than to have them pioneered by individualswho may thereby become the objects of envy and censure by others."oFinally, these group cotton farms have undoubtedly permitted amore economical employment of the government extension staff.More frequent advice and guidance can be given.

We are not suggesting that the group farms will overcome all theobstacles to a rapid expansion to cotton production or that they willeven become a permanent feature of the agricultural scene inCentral Nyanza.m" Problems will arise in their operation. Unless

15 Another instance of the importance of the group approach among the Luowas given to us by William L. Sytek, a social anthropologist who worked for sometime among the inhabitants of the Nyabondo Plateau. In this area he noted anenthusiastic response when the Department of Agriculture offered to providehybrid maize and fertilizers to about 100 farmers whose land had been consoli-dated. Previous efforts to work through individual "progressive" farmers hadelicited only limited response.

16 It is interesting to note that another type of group farming, which waswidely tried in the old Nyanza Province during 1947-1954, ended in failure.Farmers were induced to pool all their land in a given drainage area, and thewhole was then laid out in a series of contour strips separated by drainage ways.The contour strips with the greatest slopes were reserved for housing and farmbuildings, tree crops and grazing, while the flatter strips were each reserved forthe cultivation of various annual crops in rotation. Each participating farmerhad his own holding, including a share in all the contour strips, but he wasrequired to farm his land in accordance with the decisions of a committee repre-senting the group. Among the Luo there were at one time 24 such groups witha total of 540 members. Various authorities have attributed their eventualcollapse to (1) farmers' disillusionment with the cessation of the substantialassistance, such as plowing services, which the Government initially gave theseschemes; (2) lack of cooperation and mutual trust among the members; and (3)a mistaken notion that the practice of mutual help which members of a kinshipgroup frequently give each other on their individual farms could be extendedto joint management or supervision of farming operations. See William E. Allan,The African Husbandman (New York, Barnes & Noble, 1965) pp. 432-436;Great Britain, Colonial Office, The British Territories in East and Central Africa1945-1950 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 73; and HughFearn, An African Economy-A Study of the Economic Development of the NyanzaProm'ince of Kenya (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 201-202.

141


manure and fertilizer are used constantly to maintain fertility, landwill have to be "regrouped" periodically to ensure a continuationof the group schemes; this may be difficult where land is ratherscarce and where tensions exist within the jokakwaro. The bonds thathold the kinship unit together may progressively weaken under the

impact of individualism and thus eventually cease to provide auseful framework for cooperation. There is little doubt, however,that, for some years at least, they will be an important instrumentalityin improving the production of cotton. To the extent that they

demonstrate the profitability of better inethods of cotton growing,they may well encourage an increasing number of individual farmersto emulate these methods on their own holdings.

Problem of Land Preparation: Mechanization: Among the con-tinuing difficulties of cotton cultivation in Central Nyanza is that ofland preparation. The pooling of oxen and plows for group cotton

farms may not meet with continuing support if, as we noted in atleast one case, this entails an actual curtailment of the acreage pre-

pared for food crops. Land preparation is undoubtedly a seriousbottleneck in the extensive areas where there are insufficient oxen or

where, as in the Kano Plains, all land must be plowed three times andthere are only limited periods when the soil is neither too dry nor toowet for plowing by oxen. Although only a few tractors are in use atpresent, there is a widespread interest in the employment of tractorsas a means of achieving more rapid and thorough, as well as moretimely, preparation of land. Data obtained on the cost of contractplowing did not indicate a great difference between tractor and oxplowing, particularly considering the superior and more timely land

preparation achieved with the tractor."7 A number of group farms

were resolved to set aside a portion of their profits for the eventualpurchase of a tractor.

While the mistake of initiating mechanization on a larger scaleshould be avoided, it might be well to facilitate the purchase oftractors and implements by group farms'8 or by individuals who

wish to do contracting. This could be done by government financingof, say, three-fourths of the cost.19 The Farmers' Training Center at

17 The cost of three plowings, as reported to us, was generally Sh 75 whendone by oxen and Sh 95 when done by tractor.

18 Since the group farms have taken the form of legal cooperatives in only afew cases, they would probably need to be constituted as credit societies whosemembers would be collectively and individually responsible for service of anyloan.

1" We understand that the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board decided,in 1964, to sponser a new credit program that would permit about 10 percentof Kenya's total cotton acreage in 1965 to be plowed and cross-plowed mechani-cally.

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Maseno could hold courses to train drivers in operation and elemen-

tary maintenance, and dealers might be induced to establish a

tiraining course for mechanics. We noted a keen desire for this kind

of training among cultivators in the Kano Plains. A modest programof this type would make it possible to test the feasibility and eco-

nomics of mechanization. The risk would not be very great andwould be shared by the cultivators and the Government.

Need for Research: A number of other problems have to be re-solved before the production of cotton in Central Nyanza can be-come truly successful. One relates to the limitations of the research oncotton that is being carried out at the Kibos Research Station.This station does no breeding work of its own, but confines its workto the testing of varieties grown elsewhere. Moreover, its researchprogram does not sufficiently stress the need to study cotton prob-lems in the wide variety of ecological conditions that prevail in thedistrict, or to take into account the actual conditions under whichfarmers must grow their cotton. It seemed to us that either insuffi-cient research had been carried out to determine optimum plantingtimes or that the results of this research had not been effectivelycommunicated to the field staff. We found that the Department ofAgriculture was actually recommending sowing in July-August,while the extension staff of the Cotton Lint and Seed MarketingBoard was advocating planting in January and early February.In 1964, agreement was reached that on the Kano Plains at least,the earlier planting date gives better results, on the average. In theIntermediate Savanna Zone, where rainfall is higher and character-ized by greater bimodality, the argumnent continues, with the fieldstaff often having no confidence in their own recommendations.This continued controversy contributes to the staggering of plantingdates, which, in turn, iiakes it difficult to cope with pests and dis-eases effectively or to determine a suitable date for the opening of

buying posts.Provision of Supplies and Equipment: Still another problem is that

of supplies and equipment. We noted that there was frequent uncer-tainty about the terms and times of delivery of cotton dust bythe Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board. Even more important,

the rather primitive, bellows-type dusters made available to thefarmers by the Board were largely ineffective, even though they didhave the mnerit of cheapness. Dusting had to be done very early inthe morning when there was still dew on the leaves, and the typeof duster made it possible to cover only a very small area during thislimited tiine. On the basis of observations in other cotton-growingareas it seemed to us that knapsack sprayers would be much inore

143


effective where water is available and that more efficient dusterswere required elsewhere.

Sugar Cane. It was the African sugar cane growers rather than thecotton growers who pioneered the group farming technique. Whilemany African farmers have long grown a little cane for sale in localmarkets, primarily for "chewing," the commercial production ofsugar in Central Nyanza was confined, until the late 'fifties, toAsians in Miwani Location. The Asian-owned Miwani sugar millcan process about 1,000 tons per day and operates an estate of16,000-17,000 acres, from which it draws about two-thirds of itscane requirements. Individual Asian farmers also grow cane for thefactory or for jaggery mills which some of them own.

In recent years cane is one crop which, together with cotton, hasaroused some interest among Africans in the possibilities of remuner-ative farming. By 1963, eight African cooperative societies had some1,000 acres under cane, and by the following year, the number ofsocieties had grown to eleven, with others in the process of formation.The completion of a new sugar mill should permit African farmersto expand greatly their output, which, in 1963, had a market valueof nearly £10,000 (see Table 4).

The grouping of land to provide a block of 100 acres or more forcane cultivation by the members of a cooperative society has haddistinct advantages. It reduces the cost of both land preparationand of cane transport to the mill. Owing to the nature of the soiland the type of land preparation required, tractors have usuallybeen employed on contract to do the necessary two plowings, twoharrowings and one trenching at an aggregate price of Sh 185 peracre. Group or block farming is also made easier, owing to the factthat cane, which produces one crop plus two ratoons at 18-20 monthintervals, stays in the field a minimum of five years.

Transport appears to be the paramount problem for African canegrowers at present. Part of this problem is due to dependence fortruck transport on Asian growers who, quite understandably, lookto their own needs first. The acquisition of trucks by groups ofcooperative societies may resolve this part of the problem. It is,however, the state of the roads and tracks that is primarliy respon-sible for the high transport charges that absorb Sh 12- 17 of the Sh 47(Sh 42 plus usual year-end bonus of Sh 5) which growers receivefor their cane at the factory. All-weather roads are essential for thetransport of cane. The development of roads and of actual caneproduction does not seem to have been coordinated effectively bythe authorities concerned. We visited one society that was onlyseven miles from the factory, but which had to transport its cane

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Kenya. Central Nvanza District

over a much longer distance of inadequate track at a cost of Sh 17

per ton because a long projected road had never been built. In this

particular case, as in other cases, repeated flooding in recent years

had also aggravated the transport problem.

There is still need for considerable improvement of crop husbandry

by African cane growers. One crop plus two ratoons can easily yield

a total of 1 00 tons per acre, but such a yield is not yet being attained

by most Africans. The latter, for example, do not treat their cane

against smut, or apply fertilizer. Yields also suffer from inmproper

drainage and lack of supplementary irrigation. Though supplemen-

tary irrigation could apparently be accomplished in a few areas by

rather simple diversion works, it is not normally practised and has,

in any case, been impeded by the flooding of recent years. We had

the impression that many of the leading African cane growers were

aware of the need for more sophisticated husbandry, but felt that

road and transport problems were iimportant and required prior

attention.As in the case of the group cotton farms, it is the younger men

who, in the past, would have been away as labor migranits that have

been particularly active in cane production. They have made a

start in realizing the potentialities for development of cane growing,

but will need help in a number of respects if they and others are

to be permanently attracted to farming. This help is primarily

required in providing good roads, transport and cultivation equip-

ment, and also in planning and carrying out local works for irrigation

and drainage. At present there is no research station devoted to

sugar cane, although research could apparently make important

contributions to improvements in varieties, disease control and crop

husbandry. 2 0

Irrigation

The recent experience with group cotton and cane farms has

drawn special attention to the potentialities of the Kano Plains,

particularly in contrast to the earlier stress put on the higher altitude

areas. However, development of the Kano Plains has been handi-

capped, on the one hand, by unreliable rainfall and periodic

droughts and, on the other hand, by occasional floods. Successive

governments have long realized that in principle the potential of

this large area could be greatly enhanced by proper drainage and

irrigation. Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners made a preliminary

20 At present the Sugar Research Officer at Kisumu can only conduct trialson private (principally Asian-owned) sugar estates.

145


study of the possibilities which was published in 195621 and whichindicated that some 30,000 acres could be irrigated, primarily forthe production of rice and sugar cane.

During the Colonial regime, however, all proposals for irrigationwere suspected and stoutly resisted by the African political oppo-sition. With some difficulty about 50 acres were acquired in 1958 foran experimental irrigation farm. However, it was only on the achieve-ment of independence in 1963 that opposition gave way to acceptanceof irrigation, and it was possible to secure a 500-acre plot for initia-ting a pilot scheme. At the same time, the Government began tocast around for assistance in making the necessary definitive studiesand eventually initiating construction of the irrigation scheme.

Implications of Irrigation. In our journey across the Kano Plains,we generally found enthusiastic support for irrigation among thefarmers. However, we detected little or no realization among thesefarmers, and even among the local officials, of the many problemsinvolved. In a way, the technical problems of crops and crop rota-tions, water requirements, etc., will probably prove the easiest toresolve, though this may well require 6-10 years of experimentation.The human and organizational problems, however, will be crucial;in this respect, we were struck by the ignorance of what irrigationmay entail in terms of changes in land tenure and land use, workhabits, and even patterns of settlement.

The successful introduction of irrigation into an already ratherdensely settled area is, of course, far more complicated and difficultthan the irrigation and settlement of an area that is comparativelyuninhabited. It will be necessary to obtain information aboutexisting land rights in the area likely to be affected. The exact natureof these rights and the extent and distribution of farm holdings bysize will have to be ascertained. Such existing rights will then haveto be reconciled with, or adjusted in some way to, the requirementsof an irrigation system. Land will need to be exchanged in theprocess, and some may even have to be surrendered, to ensure thatan irrigated holding does not exceed that which the family cancultivate intensively. It is conceivable that the present practice ofliving on individual homesteads may have to be abandoned in favorof village settlements.

The Problem of Land lUse. The eventual land use pattern will be animportant factor in determining not only the size of irrigated hold-ings, but also the actual acceptance of irrigation by the people in-

21 Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, Kenya Nile Basin Jt'ater Resources Survey(Nairobi, Kenya Government, September 1956).

146


volved. It will be necessary to determine, for example, to what extentprovision will have to be made for the cultivation of traditionalsubsistence crops along with high-value cash crops. Inclusion of suchfood crops may not result in maximizing production, but experiencewith other irrigation schemes in many parts of Africa shows that thepossibility of producing a secure food supply tends to be a significantfactor in attracting people to irrigation. A similar problem ariseswith respect to the place to be given to livestock, which still playssuch an important role in the lives of people on the Kano Plains.If provision is to be made for livestock-keeping within the scheme,this would obviously entail revolutionary changes in existing animalhusbandry, probably including the production of fodder or theinclusion of grass leys in the rotation.

If plans for irrigation are to proceed, it seems to us vitally impor-tant that all the problems and implications be fully and frankly dis-cussed with the people involved at every stage. Otherwise there is aserious danger that the popular support that now nominally existswill prove quite illusory. People must be gradually prepared tounderstand and accept the revolutionary changes which irrigationwill bring in their lives. To this end there must be a continuing"dialogue" between farmers and their organizations (traditionaland cooperative), on the one hand, and the political leaders and allthe government services involved, on the other hand.

Animal husbandryTraditional Livestock Keeping. While recent years have witnessed a

more positive attitude toward the improvement of agriculture, thereare, as yet, few signs that traditional methods of livestock keepingare changing. Although, as already indicated, reliable data on thenuinber of livestock are lacking, there were estimated to be 272,000cattle, 300.000 sheep and 200,000 goats in the year 1962. The cattlethat are kept require a lot of land for grazing without apparentlyadding much to output. While our interviews with farmers gave usthe impression that cattle were not regularly marketed, they wereevidently sold when there were particular needs for cash, such asschool fees, which could not otherwise be met. Their production ofmilk, however, seemed to be negligible. Moreover, the incidence ofdisease and the morality rate are high. Again and again we wereimpressed by the number of cattle deaths reported to us by farmers-deaths due to tick-borne diseases, liver fluke, trypanosomiasis and,above all, undiagnosed ailments. Poor disease control was not pri-marily due to the undoubted shortage of veterinary staff, but to thedisinclination of conservative livestock-keepers to submit to inocula-

147


tions and vaccinations until there is an actual and serious outbreak of

disease. Although some of the more progressive farmers spray their

cattle against tick-borne diseases, this practice is largely ineffective,as long as the cattle are not kept separate from the vast majority

of unsprayed beasts roaming over grazing and fallow areas.Improved Breeds. There are as yet only a handful of the substantially

more productive European-type cattle in the district, even in the

Star Grass Zone, where the environment would seem to favor them.Some livestock experts believe that, for the areas outside the StarGrass Zone, the Government should have devoted much more

effort to upgrading the local Zebu stock. In their view the experienceof the Livestock Research Center at Maseno has indicated that across between the Sahiwal and Zebu breeds yields well and would

do better than the usual European breeds under the averagemanagement and conditions prevailing in these areas. Whatever

be the merits of this contention, it is clear that the Department ofAgriculture and the Veterinary Department have both been disin-

clined to introduce either European breeds or improved crosses,

unless more effective control over disease and better grazing con-

ditions could be assured.The Problem of Communal Grazing. In the long run, the increasing

pressure of population on land may well bring about a growingrealization that livestock-keeping in the traditional manner and in

large numbers can no longer be maintained. Such a realization maycome more quickly if such crops as cotton and cane can be developedin such a way as to provide a secure source of income. This does notmean, however, that livestock could not have its proper place,

particularly in providing tractive power, meat and milk. Ourprevious observation that people should be encouraged to try tractorcultivation on a limited scale in some areas does not reflect a belief

that all efforts to bring about a closer association of agriculture andanimal husbandry should be given up. It is by no means certain thatchemical fertilizers alone will provide an adequate answer to thesoil fertility problems of most of Central Nyanza, or that mechani-zation of cultivation will be suitable for more than a limited area.Admittedly the achievement of mixed farming, providing for thecultivation of fodder and the production and use of manure, willrequire a fundamental transformation of the attitudes of people.It will involve a concerted effort on the part of numerous governmentservices, including not only those directly concerned with agricultureand livestock, but also those concerned with community develop-

ment and land reform. In this connection changes in existing landtenure seem particularly important, for it is difficult to envisage

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Kenva: Central Nvanza District

that there will ever be an adequate incentive to reduce the numberof cattle and to manage that number better until present communalgrazing practices are abandoned and land is enclosed.

Land consolidation, enclosure and registration

The attitude toward changes in land tenure has indeed undergonea marked alteration during recent years. The Government's earlierattempts-in 1956 and 1957-to initiate and press for such changesas a prerequisite to agricultural development met with adamantresistance. The methods of land tenure reform employed by theGovernment among the Kikuyu, seemed to many Luo to have thecharacter of "punitive measures" and aroused the fear that they,like the Kikuyu, might be required to live in villages. There was awidespread suspicion, fostered by Luo politicians, that consolidationand registration were only the prelude to the alienation of land toEuropeans. Many "right holders" undoubtedly felt that in the pro-cess of consolidation and registration their rights would be extin-guished. This was apparently true of some of the jadak and of themany people absent from the district. In addition, many of theelders feared that consolidation and registration would diminishtheir powers and would bring about the sale of land which is con-trary to Luo custom. Finally, the larger cattle owners, who werevery influential, opposed land enclosure because it would restrict thegrazing to which they had access.

"Self-Help" Consolidation. Following its retreat after this initialfailure,22 the Government deliberately refrained from pushing landtenure reform. It made it clear that it would act only where andwhen there was a genuine demand for consolidation and registration.Gradually its policy took the form of encouraging "self-help"groups, which were considered to be in accord with Luo tradition.Thus, communal work groups were formed in many administrativeSub-Locations to encourage better farmers and, as a means toimproved farming, land consolidation and enclosure. Such groupswere assisted by African advisors in the pay of the Government andby local agricultural officers. The officers of the newly-organizedcommunity development service were the liaison between the self-help groups and the rest of the district staff. Gradually the districtofficers took over a greater amount of control and direction, thoughgenerally the African "headmen" took the lead uinder their guid-

22 The early efforts were also somewhat deficient in that they failed to providefor access roads.

149


ance. The jokakwaro was used as the unit for initiating consolidation

and enclosure. The idea was that the elders of the jokakwaro should

first fix the boundaries with the adjacent land units, and thensettle individual rights within the unit and arrange for land ex-

changes and consolidation of holdings. Government officers providedtechnical guidance and tried to ensure provision for access roads,cattle paths, etc. As an incentive, district health supervisors alsoassisted these self-help groups to provide for much needed water

supplies, in the form of protected springs and roof catchments.

Wherever consolidation was completed, agricultural officers wereexpected to prepare farm layouts to encourage better land use.

Progress, however, was slow, though the African District Councilwas persuaded in 1959 to pass a resolution supporting land consoli-

dation. By the end of that year, only 1,998 holdings had been con-solidated and 1,342 holdings had received farm layouts. It was

evident that farm layouts in particular were regarded not as a meansto better farming, but simply as possible proof of ownership thatcould be useful in land litigation. The interest in land tenure reform,moreover, was still so scattered that the Government, in the interest

of economizing staff, had to concentrate on the areas which offered

the best prospects of rapid progress.The slow rate of progress was probably due, in part, to certain

misconceptions on the part of Government officers. One of these

related to the self-help group. Among the Luo, it was the practice to

call together a local group or saga to help in carrying out certainspecific tasks such as the building or plastering of a house. Such agroup was paid with food and beer and had no continuity or fixedmembership. It was quite different from the government-initiatedself-help groups which were expected to function regularly and havea determinate membership; the Luo were therefore not alwaysreceptive to this new form of self-help. The other misconceptionrelated to the jokakwaro, whom the Government intended to be thebasis of the self-help groups. It was generally assumed that the

jokakwaro was a definitely delimited lineage segment of a certaindepth and therefore of more or less the same size. Actually, thejokakwaro might in sonme cases go back only a few generations andinclude but 5 or 6 people, or in other cases go back as many as 7generations and comprise 70 to 80 people. Thus Governmentofficers found themnselves confronted with the unexpected difficultyof working with groups of disparate size and social cohesion.

Gradually, the demand for land consolidation and issue of titlesincreased, prompted, perhaps in part, by the fear that the districtwould be left behind the rest of Kenya and the hope that land

150


titles would automatically mean government loans. With the adventof self-government and independence, moreover, the former hostilityof Luo politicians to land reform diminished and was graduallytransformed into support. In the last few years, the very limitedstaff available to the Government to assist land consolidation andregistration has apparently been the principal bottleneck. Early in1963, for example, financial stringency compelled the dismissal of90 percent of the staff engaged in consolidation work, and, althoughsubsequently the staff was again increased, the shortage of personnelhas remained a limiting factor. In 1963 the District Commissionercould report that the movement toward land tenure reform wasreally taking hold.

Formal Adjudication. Although considerable informal and prepara-tory work on land consolidation and enclosure has gone on and iscontinuing, it was only in 1963 that the Land Registration Ordinancewas first applied in the district and that the final process of adjudi-cation and survey precedent to the issue of land titles could thus beinitiated. Six adjudication areas, each covering a Sub-Location andcomprising the lands of a number of jokakwaro, were declared. Bymid-1964 the rights to about 5,500 acres of land, including 840farms, had been fully adjudicated, but the first titles were not issueduntil 1965.

There is little doubt that land consolidation, enclosure andregistration could now proceed much more rapidly if it were not forlack of staff. Wherever we travelled in the district, we found wide-spread agreemnent with land tenure reform in principle, even thoughthere was often some hesitation about the possible way in which itmight work out in practice. Up to the present it has been mostpopular in the higher areas, such as the Nyabondo Plateau andparts of the Maseno Division. In these areas, there has been intensivepropaganda and preparatory work over a number of years. They arealso characterized by heavy population pressure, which tends tocreate a desire to eliminate any insecurity about land rights, andthey apparently have fewer large stock owners who would opposeenclosure. The wish to end costly litigation over land rights has ap-parently been an important factor. It is noteworthy that the averageannual number of land cases brought to the division courts of thedistrict increased from 422 to 792, or by 88 percent between thefour-year periods 1956-1959 and 1960-1963.

Opposition from some sources appears to have abated. Experiencehas shown, for example, that the jadak have often been left undis-turbed. This does not mean that they have obtained title to theirland (although even this has happened occasionally), but rather that

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they have been allowed continued use of the land.2 3 In a number of

cases, the opposition of the larger livestock owners has been neutral-

ized by excluding grazing land from individual enclosure and regis-

tering it in the name of the County Council as trustee for the

jokakwaro. In a sense, of course, such a procedure vitiates one of the

primary objectives of enclosure, but it may be significant that, in

two cases where this procedure has been followed, the members of

the jokakwaro now want to subdivide the grazing land.

Continuing Difficulties. The above discussion should not conceal

the fact, however, that actual progress has been extremely modest

and that, while much of the former opposition to land reform has

disappeared, there is not in most cases a strong, well-motivated

demand for consolidation and enclosure. The link between land

enclosure and profitable land development has not yet been firmly

established, as it was, for example, in the Kikuyu districts of Kenya

where the development of profitable dairying was intimately

associated with the consummation of consolidation and enclosure.

Thus, there is still a tendency in some cases to regard land reform as

a measure taken at the behest of Government. A few adjudication

committees have insisted that Government pay them for their work,

even though elsewhere in Kenya this work had always been con-

sidered as voluntary and unpaid,2 4 and in two areas farmers prevailed

on the Government to employ paid labor for planting hedges to

demarcate the new boundaries of their holdings. Similarly, we

noted that quite a few farmers expressed themselves in favor of

registration only because of an illusory notion that this would lead

automatically to easy access to agricultural credit. Clearly, the

movement for land reform will increase in strength and scope only

as people can and do realize the potentialities of agricultural develop-

ment. Land enclosure and registration are virtually worthless unless

the enclosed land can really be developed in a remunerative fashion.

In the Kano Plains, where considerable development potential

exists, it would seem useless to proceed with land reform except as an

integral part of irrigation development and planning, at least as

long as irrigation remains a serious possibility. In the Lake Shore

Savanna and Intermediate Savanna Zones of the western part of

23 The actual treatment of the jodak has reportedly depended on a variety

of factors such as the length of his residence, his character and behavior, and

the closeness of his kinship with the jokakwaro.24 WVilliam L. Sytek, the social anthropologist who did considerable field work

on reaction to land consolidation on the Nyabondo Plateau, has pointed out to

us that the adjudiction committees in this area do have to spend a lot of time

resolving the extraordinarily large number of claims to land.

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Central Nyanza, there are serious obstacles. Not only is the agri-cultural potential limited, but the enclosure of grazing land isimpeded by the lack of water supplies. Cattle often have to be drivenmiles for water, just as the women travel long distances to fetch waterfor household use. It is interesting to note, however, that somethought is now being given tentatively to the possibility of actuallyregrouping people in small settlements so that the task of bringingthem water and other community services might be facilitated. It isrecalled that not so long ago-before the coming of Pax Britannica-people did live in villages rather than on scattered individual home-steads. However, as far as we are aware, the Government is not yetencouraging the development of sentiment in favor of regrouping insettlements.

Conclusions

Central Nyanza is one of the districts in Kenya where littledevelopment of agriculture and animal husbandry has taken place.While the natural agricultural potential of Central Nyanza does notcompare unfavorably with that of most of tropical Africa, the districtdoes not offer the favorable opportunities to grow lucrative cashcrops or develop dairying as do some of the highlands of Kenya.Floods and droughts have tended to inhibit agriculture in certainareas, such as the Kano Plains, where other conditions are favorableto agriculture. Moreover, during the 'fifties the politically-inspiredopposition to the development ineasures of the Colonial Govern-ment contributed to the failure to recognize the opportunities thatdid exist and the need to take certain steps to develop them.

Under these conditions, the able-bodied males among the Luowere more interested in seeking employment elsewhere in Kenyaand even in Uganda and Tanzania. While some of the labor migrantsacquired experience and capital which enabled them to becomeprogressive farmers upon their return to Central Nyanza, the de-velopment of agriculture has been, on balance, adversely affectedby the high rate of labor migration. In the absence of a considerableproportion of the most vigorous and enterprising males, the districtwas left largely in the hands of the women and the older men who,respectively, were primarily interested in subsistence agricultureand a traditional, extensive form of animal husbandry. The exodusof the younger men appears to have made it possible to preserve thestructure of the traditional tribal society and some of the authorityof the elders. While a portion of the population has satisfied itsrising aspirations by wage employment, those left behind have been

153


deprived of much of the labor resources necessary for adequate and

timely land preparation, planting, weeding, manuring, etc.

Mistakes and deficiencies in government policies and services

concerned with agriculture have accounted, to some extent, for the

lack of significant progress. In the higher areas of the district, an

earlier and more marked interest in agriculture might well have

been awakened if the Government had not been so restrictive in its

licensing of coffee-growing. While the agricultural extension staff

we met in the district compared favorably with that anywhere in

Kenya, the content of the advice it sought to communicate to the

cultivator was not very impressive. There are no European farming

areas close to Central Nyanza which could serve to illustrate the

possibilities of profitable commercial farming; the types of crops,

rotations and other practices that had been developed for the

European mixed farms in Kenya could not in any event be readily

adapted to the different ecological and other environmental con-

ditions of Central Nyanza. Yet in the district itself, there has been

insufficient research to develop concrete and practicable extension

recommendations for the wide variety of conditions encountered in

the district. Thus, conflicting advice has been given on the important

question of planting dates for cotton, and uniform, standardized

advice is given about fertilizing despite the wide differences in soils.

Another conspicuous deficiency is the comparative lack of atten-

tion given to providing the farmers with the supplies and equipment

they need for the improvement of their output. Where commercial

farming is in its initial stages but must be developed, we are per-

suaded that government services must be effectively organized not

only to advise, but also to supply the farmer. Actually we found that

coffee farmers seldom had sprayers or fungicides; that the supply

of dust to cotton farmers was rather unreliable and the cotton dusters

used almost wholly inadequate; and that it was often difficult for

farmers to procure fertilizers, even when persuaded of their efficacy.

We also noted many instances of inadequate contact and coordin-

ation between related government services. In areas where watersupply was critically deficient, agricultural extension workersapparently did not know whether the water problem had been

studied and what efforts could be made to relieve the situation.

Road and agricultural development have not been fully coordinated.

Up to the present, planning for irrigation in the district has not

yet enlisted the cooperation of all the government services which

must be concerned if adequate attention is to be given to the psycho-

logical and social as well as the technical aspects.It seemed to us, too, that there was insufficient understanding

154


of the difficulties and limitations under which the farmer is actuallyworking. While extension workers in direct contact with farmershave some grasp of these problems, they appear unable to diagnosethem clearly and communicate this diagnosis to their superiors. Theextension service seems to have largely concentrated on individualimproved practices without fully realizing in practice that thesewere difficult to adopt in isolation. For example, there has beenlittle appreciation of the problems of land preparation and timelyplanting, because of the shortage of able-bodied labor as well asof trained oxen. Early planting could hardly be practiced withoutearly land preparation; oxen could not be used for timely plowingunless they were both available and better fed; and improved feedingof oxen was hardly possible in the absence of fodder crops on whichlittle or no research had even been done. Nor has the possibilityof tractor cultivation in certain areas been actively explored. Ingeneral, the interrelationships of the various problemns were notsufficiently taken into account.

In recent years there are signs that some progress in agricultureis being made. The more constructive attitude toward agriculturaldevelopment which independence has engendered has in part beenresponsible. Another factor has been some decline, at least for atime, in the number and attractiveness of employment opportunitieselsewhere. As a consequence there is greater interest in the possi-bilities of agricultural development, particularly by a still limitednumber of younger men. Much of the former opposition to landconsolidation and enclosure has disappeared, and some progress isnow being made in effectuating land tenure reform. On the KanoPlains the former opposition to irrigation has given way to nominallyenthusiastic support, although it is evident that few people under-stand as yet the revolutionary changes that irrigation would entailin land tenure, land use and methods of work. Two crops-cottonand sugar cane-appear to be undergoing notable development.It is particularly interesting that expansion and improvementin the cultivation of both these crops have been sponsored by thetraditional jokakwaro kinship unit, primarily under the influence of itsyounger members. The group farms formed by the jokakwaro havegenerally evidenced higher standards of husbandry, particularly forcotton, than those attained by individual farmers. Whether thisform of traditional organization will be more than a transitionalmeans to agricultural development is difficult to say, but the groupfarms do appear in any event to be demonstrating that cotton canbe grown profitably.

One can hardly conclude at this time that the development of

155


agriculture will now proceed apace. While recent experience hasdemonstrated certain possibilities in this field, particularly on theKano Plains, the ecological limitations and the substantial popula-tion of the district must be kept in mind. If agriculture is to becomelastingly attractive to Luo interested in cash income, the limited

successes of recent years will need to be vigorously followed up. Inparticular, special efforts will be needed to overcome the more im-portant deficiencies of the government services which should be

effectively working for the promotion of agricultural development.

156

5. THE EXPERIENCE IN THE DISTRICTS OFBARINGO AND ELGEYO-MARAKWET

General background

Population and land resourcesThe two neighboring Districts of Baringo and Elgeyo-Marakwet

lie just north of the Equator and are separated from each other bythe Kerio River, which flows toward the north and whose valley,attaining a width of about ten miles and falling below 3,500 feet, isbordered on the east by the Tugen Hills of Baringo and to the westby the highlands of Elgeyo-Marakwet.

According to the 1962 census, Baringo, with an area of 4,004square miles, had a population of 130,035, and Elgeyo-Marakwet,1,009 square miles in area, had 160,961 inhabitants. These figuresindicate a population density of 32 per square mile in Baringo andof 160 per square mile in Elgeyo-Marakwet.

Both districts are inhabited by Nilo-Hainitic peoples. In Baringo,most of the population consists of Tugen (103,190), though there are20,272 Pokot or Suk in the north and a sprinkling of Njemps (4,192)in the center. In Elgeyo-Marakwet, the north is inhabited by Mara-kwet (65,052) and the southern half by Elgeyo (90,966). All thesepeople belong to the Kalenjin language group. Their economiesvary from a primary emphasis on agriculture to an almost totalreliance on livestock. Though a high valuation is placed on apastoral way of life in both districts, the actual economy is primarilya response to local ecological conditions. For example, the Tugen inthe Kamasia or Tugen Hills are primarily agricultural while thosein the lower and drier areas are predominantly herdsmen. Similarly,the Pokot (sometimes called the East Suk) of Baringo are pastoralistsbecause they occupy land suitable only for stock herding; anotherbranch of the Pokot in the higher regions of West Pokot District isprimarily agricultural. Frequently there is considerable exchangeof hides and meat for agricultural produce among the herding andfarming branches of the same tribe.'

1 For a discussion of pastoralism, see A. H. Jacobs, "African Pastoral Nomads,"Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1965).

157


DISTRICTS OFELGEYO-MARAKWET AND BARINGO

A ,

,, An°I' I / ' N ) TI/

W Li .2 <1 n

,A i A, -A P ' Ay

t9C4' t .. i 1 z

;~~ ~ nJ -! ,1

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NLI A1E Li ; 4 (fi

-- t.

None of these peoples have engaged in labor migration to a large

extent, although, as we shall see later, there are important differences

among them in this respect. Elgeyo-Marakwet appears the moredensely populated, but the pressure of population and livestock onavailable land resources in Baringo is actually much greater. Climaticand soil conditions are generally more favorable in Elgeyo-Marakwet.Table 1, taken from data in the Agricultural Gazeteer of Kenya,

158

Kenya: Baringo and Elgeyo-Marakwet Districts

TABLE 1: LAND RESOURCES(square miles)

Elgeyo-Baringo Marakwet

Suitable for agriculture:

1. Very high potential 120 4032. High potential - 853. Moderate potential 733 -

Total 853 488

Suitable for grazing:

1. Good to moderate 815 3432. Low potential ranching 1,430 -

3. Pastoral and poor quality ranching or wild life 715

Total 2,960 343

shows that it has a much larger proportion of agricultural land thanBaringo where land suitable for agriculture is also predominantly oflower quality. While most of Elgeyo-Marakwet has a fairly well-distributed annual rainfall of 40" to 50", at least half of Baringo hasa rainfall of only 20" to 30" and even the area with 30" to 40" ofrain suffers from periodic droughts. Baringo has barely been able tofeed itself and has developed little commercial farming. Its principalexports are livestock, hides and skins from ranching areas which havesuffered severe deterioration from erosion and bush enroachment.About three-quarters of Baringo is suitable only for grazing. Thedistrict does have some limited, high-potential areas which areirrigated or can be irrigated, but these are rather remote frommarkets.

Physical description

The two districts together may be said to be shaped like a U withthe open end facing north and the closed end, south (see Map). Thewestern side of the U is constituted by Elgeyo-Marakwet, which isroughly 80 miles from north to south. It is a long, narrow districtwhich greatly widens out to the north. Throughout its length it ismade up of (1) the floor of the Kerio River Valley, which rangesfrom two to four miles in width (up to the river) and from 3,500 ft.to 4,000 ft. in altitude; (2) the ledges and escarpment rising fromthe valley to the top of the escarpment, which has a height of about8,000 ft. in the south, drops to approximately 6,000 ft. in the middleand increases to well over 8,000 ft. in the northern part inhabited bythe Marakwet; and (3) the uplands, which comprise a fairly narrow

159


belt in the south and middle and broaden suddenly into the muchwider and higher forests and grasslands of Marakwet in the north.At the northern edge of the district, these uplands reach their highestpoint in the Cherangani Hills, which rise to over 10,000 feet.

At the bottom of the U Baringo begins with the so-called LembusForest, an area which varies in altitude from 7,000 ft. to 8,500 ft. andfrom which some comparatively good agricultural land has beenexcised for settlement on individual holdings. To the east and north-east of the Lembus Forest lie the more extensive and level SouthBaringo Plains, at an altitude between 5,000 ft. and 6,000 ft. Muchof this area is heavily eroded, with rather thin and rocky soils andmuch Acacia-Leleshwa bush. Though primarily suitable for grazing,a portion-probably between an eighth and a quarter-is arable; therainfall, which is highly erratic but averages 30 in. to 40 in. per year,makes it possible to produce a good maize crop about half the time.Thus much of the area which was devoted to communal grazing hasbeen progressively divided into individual holdings during the lastdecade.

North of Lembus Forest and jutting like a high salient into thesurrounding Rift Valley floor lie the Tugen Hills which form the"backbone" of the eastern end of the U. They range generallybetween 6,000 ft. and 8,000 ft. in altitude and, because of theirmoderate climate and rather high rainfall (40 in. to 50 in.), are oneof the most important agricultural areas in Baringo. The Hills arerather rugged, however, and offer very few extensive areas forcultivation. In times past, when the Masai and their herds rangedover the lowlands to either side of the Hills, the Tugen were confinedto the hill masses, but with Pax Britannica and increasing populationthey moved down the slopes into the valleys.

The top of the Hills, like the high country in Elgeyo-Marakwet,is called the mosop, while the slopes and ledges to each side are calledthe kurget, and the valley, the soi. To the west the Hills slope rathergently down to the almost uninhabited Kerio River Valley; to thenorth gradually to the lowlands inhabited by the East Pokot andtheir herds; and to the east, for the most part quite steeply, to thebroad expanse of dry, bush-infested Rift Valley floor which lies atan altitude of 3,000 ft. to 5,000 ft. and, except for a small irrigationscheme, can be used only for grazing. This latter area is, above all,the problem zone of Baringo, where land and grazing has tendedconstantly to deteriorate under the pressure of livestock numbers andwhere grazing control schemes have been tried with but limitedsuccess.

160

Kenva: Baringo and Elgeva-Marakwet Districts

Limitations of data

A number of factors have handicapped both districts. One hasbeen the remoteness of all but the southern portions of both districts,and the inadequate communications which have reinforced it andalways made the marketing of fresh and low-priced produce exceed-ingly difficult. Another is the comparative neglect of both areas bythe Government until the last two decades. It was only after WorldWar II that agricultural staff were assigned to the two districts,and although an excellent and devoted agricultural officer thenserved for a long time in each district, the quality of the Al's andAAI's has not really been adequate in the light of the complexproblems that had to be faced. Above all, both districts have beenhandicapped by serious insufficiencies in the basic data essential tothe framing of proper development policies. Neither was coveredby the sample agricultural census of 1960/61. There is little or noreliable information on the number and size of land holdings andthe patterns of land use in various parts of the district. The data onecological conditions are only fragmentary and frequently con-flicting, and it is seldom possible to relate them to available infor-mation on livestock numbers and population so that the areas ofsevere pressure on land can be more precisely defined. There isalso considerable ignorance concerning livestock and the importanceof the role they play in the tribal societies and, more specifically,in the economies of the two districts.

Differences in progress and changeThis lack of reliable information seriously handicapped our study,

particularly in view of the limited amount of field work we could do.Nevertheless, the wide range and challenging nature of the problemsand, above all, the sharp differences in the rates of progress amongthe tribes and various parts of the two districts impelled us to pursuean inquiry which we hoped would yield at least some tenablehypotheses, even if no definitive conclusions. In this inquiry, wefocused primarily on the factors that had apparently influenced therate of the development and degree of receptivity to change.

Some indicators of the overall progress achieved in agricultureand animal husbandry are given in Table 2. It shows the strikingdifferences between Baringo and Elgeyo-Marakwet. The latter hasgone ahead much more rapidly in the adoption of grade cattle aswell as of improved sheep for wool and has also developed the pro-duction of such cash crops as potatoes, pyrethrum and wheat. Butthe table does not reveal the wide disparities in progress withineach district. In Elgeyo-Marakwet, for instance, there are great

161


TABLE 2: PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY 1963

Elgeyo-Marakwet Baringo

Improved livestock

Grade sheepNumber 7,000 322Annual wool clip (tons) 12 ?

Grade cattleNumber 2,000 587Annual milk output (gallons) 415,000 100,000

Cash crops

PotatoesAcres 2,000 -

Output (tons) 8,000 -

PyrethrumAcres 2,000 84Output (tons) 200 ?

CoffeeAcres 550 166Output (tons) ? 1.25

WheatAcres 2,000Output (tons) 1,000

Value of recorded exports of agricultural and livestock products £275,000 £137,000'

'For the year 1962.SOURCE: District Agricultural Reports.

differences between the Elgeyo and Marakwet and, within each ofthese tribes, between the people living on the escarpment and thosesettled in the highlands. The Marakwet appear to have been muchless susceptible to change thanthe Elgeyo; and the adherence totraditional crop and animal husbandry among the farmers of bothtribes on the ledges and slopes of the escarpment has long been thedespair of agricultural officers. Within Baringo there have also beendifferences. For example, progress in the Lembus Forest and SouthBaringo areas seems to have outstripped that in the Tugen Hills.It is to these differences that we shall be addressing ourselves as weexamine, in turn the various regions of the two districts, beginningwith the Marakwet Division.

The Marakwet Division

The Marakwet Division consists of five Locations, of which two-Cherangani and Lelan-are situated in the highlands of the west,and three-Endo, Sambirir and Moiben-cover predominantly theKerio Valley floor and the ledges and slopes of the escarpment.

162


However, all of the latter, and particularly Moiben, include someof the plateau to the west of the escarpment.

For the most part the Marakwet have continued to cling to theescarpment. The Cherangani and Lelan Locations have remainedrelatively empty. In 1962, for example, the number of Marakwet inthese two Locations totaled only 7,197, or a little over 11 percentof the entire Marakwet population of the Division. People on theescarpment are largely self-sufficient, tilling subsistence crops such asmillet, sorghum, maize and cassava and keeping livestock, primarilysheep and goats. Land holdings generally run up and down hill,including land at different levels to provide some diversity of con-ditions and crops. Pressure of population has apparently broughtabout progressively more cultivation of the upper and steeper slopes,which have been terraced for this purpose. It seems also to have ledto an increasing degree of fragmentation, the extent and seriousnessof which is, however, largely unknown. A few decades ago escarp-ment land used to be left for ten years under bush fallow after threeyears of cultivation, but the fallow period is now said to have beenreduced to only five years. Overcrowding, declining soil fertilityand concern for soil erosion have prompted agricultural officers tourge repeatedly that about half the prople be taken off the escarp-ment and that the land released in this way be afforested. Yet it isnot clear whether or where the people would move. The Marakwetof the escarpment do not appear to be highly motivated to altertheir present way of life. They have as yet evinced little interest ineducation, and their social structure would seem to be highlytraditional and authoritarian in character, with considerable powersreserved to the elders of the oret (clan) and kokwet (locality).

The lack of progress among the Marakwet is probably due, atleast in part, to their physical isolation and remoteness. Compara-tively few have broken out of this isolation and acquired experiencesand contacts with more advanced peoples and modernizing in-fluences. Descending to the Kerio Valley floor, they met a harsh,dry climate and encountered only nomadic pastoralists such as theEast Pokot or Turkana. Movemenrt onto the highlands in the westwas difficult because of the height of the escarpment wall and theintervening forests which separated them from the more opencountry of the Cherangani and Lelan Locations where grazing wasavailable and some crops could be cultivated. Moreover, for theMarakwet of the escarpmnent, migration to these higher areas withtheir relatively cold, moist climate involved a much sharper changeof habitat than in the case of the Elgeyo, who generally moved ontoa plateau which was considerably lower. In this connection, it is

163


interesting to note that in Moiben, which is the most southern of theMarakwet Locations and where the escarpment wall is lower, alarger proportion of the population seems to have moved to thehigher areas of the Location.

Compared to the Tugen and Elgeyo, the Marakwet have thelowest labor migration rate. As a result of their relative isolation,they have been less anxious to raise their standard of living, and itis possible also that their ability to supplement their farming on theescarpment with some irrigated agriculture in the Kerio Valley mayhave given them a greater degree of security. In any event they werefar from European farming areas; the closest of these was in Trans-Nzoia District to the west of the Marakwet Division and beyondLelan and Cherangani. The 1962 census disclosed only about 1,000Marakwet in the five main European farming districts, and of these759 were in Trans-Nzoia. Thus the Marakwet hardly had the labormigration experiences and contacts with other farming and animalhusbandry practices which, in many other parts of Kenya, haveproved such a stimulus to progress.

The isolation of Marakwet has affected development in stillanother way. In some respects the Kerio Valley can be said to be amore natural area of expansion for the Marakwet than the highplateau. The northern part of the Kerio Valley is the most fertile,but it can only be cultivated with the help of irrigation. Indigenoussystems of irrigation, which bring water from some distance up theescarpment through a rather intricate set of furrows and aqueducts,irrigate some 2,500 to 3,000 acres of the valley floor, though no oneappears sure of the exact area. The largest of these schemes, whoseorigin is obscure, is around Tot in Endo Location, where perhaps1,800 acres are under irrigation from 13 furrows taking water fromthe Embobu River. Two other areas in Sambirir and MoibenLocations are fed from the Embamon and Arror Rivers respectively.The irrigation water of each furrow is owned by a clan or group ofclans and its distribution is controlled by clan committees dominatedby elders. It is said that 10,000 acres could be developed for irri-gation, although in the absence of a thorough survey, this can otilybe considered as a rough estimate. However, the economic use ofeven the present irrigated area poses a problem. As long as the laborused for furrow construction and rnaintenance need not be compen-sated, the water can be used even for susbistence crops. However, assoon as monetary outlays are necessary, markets for the producemust also be found. This situation arose when, beginning in 1959,the Department of Agriculture intervened to ensure better use ofirrigation water which was being wasted by flood irrigation of the

164


fields. It sought to replace this with furrow irrigation, but this

necessitated plowing and ridging with a tractor furnished by the

Department. In 1964, about 300 acres were treated in this way.

Plowing and ridging charges, however, were Sh 12.50 per hour

without counting depreciation, or around Sh 40 per acre, and it

has proved difficult to market enough produce to meet these culti-

vation costs. Although some grain, including maize, which has

become the principal crop under irrigation, is apparently sold to

nearby pastoralists, there is only a limited market for such sales.

Unfortunately, it is very costly and cumbersome to transport any

significant volume of produce for sale in the distant population

centers of Kenya, since it must first be evacuated by a steep and

tortuous road up the escarpment and then carried over long distances.

Chillies are a type of crop which can bear such transport costs, and

a few acres have indeed been grown. Yet a range of crops which can

be grown and marketed in significant quantities has still to be

developed.Once the Marakwet leave their traditional and isolated environ-

ment, they do seem to be receptive to progress. Marakwet farmers

who have moved to the highlands of Moiben Location are growing

pyrethrurn and potatoes, and keeping grade sheep and grade cattle.

Although Elgeyo who had migrated northward were apparently

the pioneers in taking up modern sheep ranching with Corriedale

sheep in Lelan and Cherangani Locations (in 1962 there were 1,190

Elgeyo in Cherangani Location as compared with 5,507 Marakwet),

many Marakwet have followed their lead, have established home-

steads and are now responding to the advice of Government agri-

cultural and veterinary staff. The introduction of wool sheep stimu-

lated many Marakwet to enclose land for sheep ranching, particu-

larly in Lelan, and by 1964, an official land registration team was

at work in the Location. By the end of 1963, the number of grade

sheep in the Marakwet Division had reached 5,300.

The Elgeyo Division

Like the Marakwet, the Elgeyo were originally confined to the

escarpment, since the plateau margin was largely forested and the

upland grazing land was periodically used by the Masai. But they

were never so isolated as the Marakwet. Only a rather narrow band

of plateau separated them from the District of Uasin Gishu, where

European farmers were growing wheat and pyrethrum and keeping

European types of cattle. To the south they were not far from

Nakuru, the heart of the European farming country. While the

labor migration rate among the Elgeyo has been far lower than

165


that of many Kenyan tribes, the number of Elgeyo living outside thedistrict in 1962 was nearly seven times as high as that of Marakwet,and in Uasin Gishu alone 7,193 Elgeyo were counted.

While the Elgeyo still clinging to the escarpment are said to bevirtually as traditional and conservative as the Marakwet, a muchhigher proportion of the tribe has moved onto the high plateaucountry of the Irong and Mosop Locations where they have showna capacity for rapid change. Thus in 1962, these two Locations had62 percent of the population as compared with 38 percent for SoyLocation, which covers almost exclusively the escarpment and lowcountry.

Occupation of the plateau and enclosureThe mobility and change among the Elgeyo impressed us as one

of the striking phenomena of Kenya's development in the last twodecades. Initially the land in the higher reaches of the Divisionwas used only for communal grazing of stock which could no longerbe kept all year on the escarpment. The young men detailed to guardthe clan herds by the elders, who themselves remained in theescarpment, gradually began to clear patches in the forest for foodcrops, primarily maize. Others who returned from wage employmenton European farms or in the district's sawmills joined them instaking out land, particularly as they were unable to find land onthe escarpment. Also, as more stock invaded the plateau and compe-tition for grazing began, there was a progressive tendency to enclosegrazing land too, first only for dry-season grazing and then moreextensively. Enclosure, which began only in the late 'forties, wasvirtually completed in all of the highlands by the close of the 'fifties.It took place usually in the face of the strong resistance of clan andkokwet elders who wanted the land reserved for communal grazingand begrudged its use for crops.

This spontaneous enclosure movement was not necessarily a veryorderly or rational process for taking up land. The Department ofAgriculture welcomed the enclosure movement as providing anecessary incentive to agricultural development, but felt impelledto insist on some safeguards and a certain degree of order. Beginningin 1955 it intervened in Chepkorio-a part of Mosop Location-with "skeletal planning," which provided needed soil conservationworks such as cutoff drains and terraces, set aside land for accessroads, and re-aligned farms where necessary. In 1958 an officialteam moved into this area to formalize the enclosure through theregistration of land and issue of titles. In subsequent years skeletalplanning and registration were extended also to Irong Location.

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At the time of our visit in 1964, three land registration teams wereworking in the district and were hardly able to cope with the demandfor registration. However, skeletal planning, particularly in the formof soil conservation works, had been given up, partly because therewas no longer any trained staff to do it, and partly because it hadproved difficult to collect the fees necessary to defray the cost.

Development following enclosureIn some areas in Kenya where land was spontaneously enclosed,

such as among the Kipsigis in the Kericho District, enclosure wasnot immedately followed by much development. Although the rateof progress has greatly quickened in recent years, it used to be saidthat Kipsigis had enclosed "nothing" with their boundary hedges.In Elgeyo, however, development seems to have followed moreclosely upon enclosure. The close proximity of European farms andthe leadership given by the District Agriculture Officer probablyaccounted partly for this difference. The most important reason forthe difference, we surmise, is the fact that the Elgeyo who enclosedemancipated themselves at the same time from the traditionalcontrols of clan and kokwet elders. In general the more conservativeand traditionally-oriented people were left on the escarpment,while the more energetic, younger and progressive men took over thehighlands.

In a sense, the Elgeyo who took up farming on the plateau provedalmost excessively responsive to new opportunities. Thus when thesettlement and purchase of European farms became possible, some900 to 1,000 Elgeyo farmers abandoned their farms to take upallotments on settlement schemes or to buy, individually or possiblywith others, European farms on their owI initiative in 1962 and1963. They had hardly exhausted the production possibilities oftheir existing farms before they were ready to "graduate" to newopportunities. Their farms could have been readily bought by othersremnaining in the area or willing to leave the still overcrowdedescarpment, but we noted that the unavailability of credit for landpurchase prevented such a transfer. These farms therefore had beengenerally left to indifferent caretakers who did not have a permnanentownership interest to spur them to make their best efforts.

Features of Elgeyo farmingSeveral features of farming on the Elgeyo Plateau or mosop struck

us. It seemed that there was considerably less disparity in farmingstandards than we found in other districts. To be sure, there weregood and bad farmers, but the difference between them did not

167


appear to be so great. This may well have been due to the fact that

they all started afresh in the same environment and approximately

the same circumstances at about the same time.

Another characteristic has been the graduation from the hand hoe

to the tractor, without any intervening stage of ox-drawn cultivation.

The Elgeyo were never trained to use the ox, since conditions on

the slopes and ledges of the escarpment were hardly conducive to ox

plowing. Thus when they surmounted the escarpment wall, it was

natural for them to adopt the method of cultivation of their Euro-

pean neighbors, all the more because breaking the heavy grassland

was a difficult task. Some farmers own their own tractors, but snore

use contract services. A portion, of course, still continue to use the

hoe. On the wheat lands of Irong, a few Elgeyo farmers even own

combines. 2As already indicated, the chief commercial farming activities

developed on the Elgeyo uplands have been the production of

"English" potatoes, pyrethrum, wheat and milk. The growing of

potatoes, which was generally the crop first taken up, seems to have

fallen off in recent years, largely because farmners were discouraged

by wide fluctuations in prices. Pyrethrum developed rapidly after

1959/60. One cooperative we visited raised its annual deliveries

from 47,811 lbs. in 1959/60 to 420,093 lbs. in 1962/63, but there

was a setback in 1963/64 because so much of the previous year's

production has been in excess of the quota and had fetched low

prices. Wheat-growing has developed almost wholly in Irong

Location, where we noted that a relatively few big African farmers

had as much as 1,000 acres under wheat.

In recent years, dairying has developed rapidly, aided undoubtedly

by the excellent natural pasture on mnuch of the plateau. While the

2,000 grade cattle reported to be in the district in 1963 were a very

small percentage of the total number of cattle, the proportion is

fairly high on the plateau and would undoubtedly have been higher

if prices for European-type cattle had not increased so sharply in

recent years, and if more credit has been available. Within a few

years, sales of milk (fresh and as cream) to KCC quadrupled,

exceeding 100,000 gallons in 1963. A much larger volume is sold

locally and consumed on the farm. Four cooperatives handle the

marketing of milk, operating their own milk collection routes and

delivering milk to the KCC plant at Eldoret.

We would not suggest, of course, that the Elgeyo are exemplary

2 In mid-1964, we were told, there were 44 tractors and 4 combines owned

by Africans in the district.

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farmers. In many respects their standards of crop and animalhusbandry leave much to be desired. Milk yields are still below whatthey could be. There has been a reluctance to get rid of bull calvesand steers. While artificial insemination had rapidly caught on, apolitically-inspired campaign had brought about the suspension ofAl services early in 1964. Six months later, however, many farmerswere pleading for resumnption of Al. The cooperatives which haverapidly grown up to handle pyrethrum, milk and wheat have sufferedconsiderably from poor management. The lack of interest in edu-cation among the Elgeyo until rather recently has probably beenprimarily responsible for this. In the last decade, however, theElgeyo of the mosop have shown a rapidly increasing appetite foreducation, and it may be expected that the resulting improvement ineducational standards will ultimately be reflected in the manage-ment of cooperatives. Yet, while recognizing all these deficiencies,we were struck by the rapid acceptance of change among the Elgeyoonce they escaped from the environment which had inhibited pro-gress on the escarpment.

The role of creditOne final observation must be made about the agricultural

development that has taken place and that is the relatively smallrole played by agricultural credit, at least in its initial stages. Wehave had occasion elsewhere in Kenya to remark on the capacityof the more enterprising farmers to finance themselves. In Elgeyowe noted repeatedly that some farmers had acquired money fordevelopment from trading activities. More often, however, they hadfirst accumulated some cash from growing potatoes. In many casesthe next step had been to take up pyrethrum, and the profits frompyrethrum had then been used for the acquisition of grade cattle.Only in recent years has credit assumed any significance. In 1962,173 loans totaling £12,530 were issued in the district, primarily forthe development of dairying, and in 1963 the total was apparentlysomewhat over C20,000. In the last few years the need for financinghas undoubtedly exceeded savings and available credit, especiallybecause dairying entails a rather heavy investment in stock, fencingand equipment.

Lembus Forest and South BaringoThe Lembus Forest and South Baringo areas are the most pro-

gressive in Baringo, although it should be stressed that this is only bycomparison with the rest of the district. These two areas had 420 ofthe 587 grade cattle reported in Baringo as of the end of 1963-

169


242 in Lembus Forest and 178 in the South Baringo Plains (the

latter two figures are probably under-estimates). In 1963 three

dairy cooperative societies were organized-one in Lembus Forest

and the other two in South Baringo3-and began selling milk and

cream to the KCC. In Lembus Forest some pyrethrum is grown and

a small number of grade sheep are kept. In both areas the registra-

tion of individual land holdings has made considerable progress.

Development, as of 1964, was only in its infancy, but it seemed to be

on the point of accelerating rapidly.

Factors in comparative progress

The two areas are ecologically different, as already indicated. We

have grouped them together here because they are both showing

progress, and we believe that this has been largely because they are

less remote than the rest of Baringo and adjoin the European

farming area of Nakuru District. The Tugen have not in the past

shown a high labor migration rate, but Nakuru is the only district

which has attracted a significant number of them (3,684 according

to the 1962 census). The southern portion of Baringo has had the

closest contacts with European farsns in the adjoining parts of

Nakuru and has also had the best access to markets. South Baringo

is the only area of Baringo where ox plowing, and, more recently,

tractor plowing are practiced to a significant extent; both these

practices may be attributed to the example set by European farmers.

Development of individual holdings

The demarcation and registration of individual holdings, to which

we referred earlier, had been completed or was in process for about

132,000 acres by mid-1964. A total of 1,670 farms aggregating

92,000 acres had already been registered. In Lembus Forest, the

more favored ecological area, the holdings average around 23 acres,

but in the South Baringo Plains, the average is 50 acres or over and

the range in size is considerable, owing to variations in the quality

I A dairy belonging to one of these cooperatives was visited in June 1964.

We noted that the number of members had risen to 75 from the original total

of 30 in July 1963, but that there had been no corresponding increase in de-

liveries of milk. Evidently many small producers were selling directly to local

consumers. Instead of recognizing this as a challenge to develop the local market,

the cooperative management deplored and condemned this "violation of cooper-

ative discipline."

170

Kenya: Baringo and F -, .- lr, if., f t Districts

of the land. In one area-Kisokoni-holdings vary in size from 65to 200 acres. It should be stressed that this land registration does notinvolve consolidation. In Lembus Forest, which was originallypartially occupied by squatters, it has entailed primarily the allot-ment of land among claimants to settlement. In South Baringo ithas involved the division into individual farins or ranches of landwhich was formerly devoted to communal grazing and which earlierhad been in large, controlled grazing schemes. This land was dividedlargely in response to the pressure of the graziers and in the hope thatindividual ownership would provide a better incentive to develop-ment, including bush clearance and more effective control of grazing.However, some authorities have had reservations about this process,owing to the belief that much of this land, with its rather poor andshallow soils and its marginal and erratic rainfall, had best be leftin grazing schemes, all the more since division into individual farmsinvolved costly investment in water supply and fencing.

While a final verdict on the individual holdings of the SouthBaringo Plains can hardly be passed, there are some indications itmay be favorable. A number of holdings are being intelligentlydeveloped, and we have already noted the promising beginningsof dairying. We were told, too, that there had been a considerableincrease in the area under cultivation. The latter could, however,be a doubtful advantage. In this part of Baringo, where probablyonly 10 percent to 15 percent of the land is arable and soils are poor,excessive cultivation leading to erosion and soil exhaustion couldquickly become a danger. The Department of Agriculture has longadvised farmers in South Baringo to plant early, to use early-maturing crop varieties and to apply manure or a hundred-weightof superphosphate per acre. More recently the planting of farmand field boundaries with sisal has also been counseled. These wouldseem appropriate recommendations, but they have not yet beenadopted on a significant scale. The practice of ox plowing and theincreasing use of tractors (of which there were about 30 in SouthBaringo in 1963) may well help to promote early planting, but theyalso create the temptation to cultivate excessive acreages. In Baringosuch short-maturing grains as sorghum and millet have long agogiven way primarily to maize, and, while there are quick-maturingvarieties of maize, such as Taboran, their yields, as we noted inMachakos, have not been very attractive. The use of significantquantities of fertilizer may well hinge on more extensive demon-stration as well as assured and timely distribution. For sisal, theprincipal difficulty remains the lack of a cheap, small decorticatingmachine.

171


The Tugen Hills

While the Elgeyo and Marakwet moved in varying degrees from

the escarpment to the generally more favorable uplands, the Tugen

have apparently moved down from the Hills to less attractive escarp-

ment and lowland areas as population increased. Even today,

probably three-quarters of the Tugen still live in the upper portion

of the Hills. Although they live in a more favorable ecologicalenvironment than the Elgeyo and Marakwet of the escarpment,

they have not made much more progress. By 1963 there was only a

little pyrethrum grown. There were less than 200 grade cattle and,

despite years of effort by the agricultural staff, only 150 acres ofgrass leys had been established. Although the first coffee trees had

been planted in 1954, there were but 127 acres of coffee by the end

of 1963 when further planting was stopped as the result of the

International Coffee Agreement. Similarly, only 117 loans totalling

£7,8154 had been made in the entire Tugen Hills up to the end of

1963, and only 197 farms5 had received layouts.

Factors inhibiting change

Probably the isolation and comparative inaccessibility of the

Tugen Hills have been the principal factors in this lack of progress.

The Hills are rugged and the roads serving them are impassable for

a considerable part of the year. Poor roads, for example, have

apparently prevented the production of seed potatoes, for which

there is said to be a considerable potential. It is also significant that

the only cooperative dairy in the Hills does not deliver either fresh

milk or cream to KCC, but converts its milk into ghee. While

distance and poor communications have always made marketing a

big problem, they have, above all, minimized contacts with the

outside world which would have provided the incentives for progress

and a better knowledge of possible alternatives. We sensed that inrecent years this isolation has broken down. The Tugen have demon-

strated much more interest in education,6 and an increasing number

are seeking ways and means to improve their incomes. In large part

this awakening seems to have manifested itself primarily in a searchfor non-farming pursuits, such as trade, or for opportunities to

I This was out of a total of 221 loans, for an aggregate sum of £15,875 in all

of Baringo District.I For the whole of Baringo there had been 448 layouts for farms, with a total

of 17,303 acres.I In all of Baringo, 4,100 boys and 1,700 girls were attending 70 schools in

1963, but this still represented probably less than 20%/c of those of school-going

age.

172

Kenya: Baringo and Elgevo-Marakwet Districts

acquire farms on settlement schemes or to participate in groupbuying of European farms.' In some part, however, there is also agrowing interest in better farming in the Hills, particularly bypeople who have been active in trade, have worked on Europeanfarms, or have had some sort of government position or wage laborexperience. Thus the great majority of the more progressive farmerswe interviewed proved also to have another occupation.

Certain other factors probably contributed to the stagnation untilrecently. One was the original preoccupation of agricultural person-nel with soil conservation and the levying of fines for violation ofsoil conservation measures. Soil conservation was undoubtedlyimportant in the Hills, but it tends to have little appeal unless peoplecan simultaneously be shown the means for using their land re-rnuneratively. In the early years, at least, the field staff had little orno training in anything but the construction of terraces. It was noteasy to find profitable crops for this rather remote area. More mighthave been done to stimulate the production of seed potatoes, sincethe Tugen Hills were still free from bacterial wilt. Perhaps moreintensive promotion of arabica coffee in the Hills might also havebeen possible. It is true that conditions in the Tugen Hills werehardly ideal for coffee, but it may still have been more remunerativethan alternative crops, particularly since its value is high in relationto transport costs. The rather stringent requirements on whichthe Department of Agriculture insisted for coffee planting may wellhave discouraged quite a large number of farmers among a popula-tion which, in any event, was not highly motivated and had littleor no direct experience of the income potentialities of coffee-growing.

The land problem: fragmentation and consolidationOn the face of it, the size of the land holdings in the Hills would

appear to be adequate for development. It has been estimated thatthe average holding is probably in the neighborhood of ten acres,which would seem ample, particularly by comparison with thesize of land holdings in, say, Nyeri of the Central Province or Region.But the land is much less fertile than that in the Central Region.Probably less than a quarter is arable and that is highly fragmented.Normally a man's holding apparently consists of land on the mosopand kurget, or in the kurget and soi. This type of "ecological fragmen-tation" has been compounded by inheritance. Judging from infor-mation supplied by agricultural personnel and interviews with

I At the time of our visit we were told that 15 such groups had been or werebeing organized and that four or five were already buying European farms.

173


farmers, it is not at all uncommon for one farmer to have eight or

more fragments. Unfortunately the exact extent and seriousness of

fragmentation has never been studied. 8 How much it has impeded

development is thus by no means clear. There is some evidence that

the lack of consolidation and enclosure has complicated the task

of bringing in grade cattle and even of protecting crops against

damage by livestock.9 It has certainly made it more difficult to get

permission to plant coffee and to obtain loans.Prior to 1964 there was only a limited amount of "do-it-yourself"

land consolidation in the Hills, and although a land consolidation

team has started working in the Hills since that time, the total area

affected has not been significant. In the last few years there has

undoubtedly been a growing sentiment in favor of consolidation.For example, seven out of eight admittedly rather progressivefarmers that we interviewed on one spot expressed a desire for

consolidation. At the same time, however, there is evidently a fear

of the practical implications of consolidation. There is so little good

land and land varies so much in quality that people are afraid that

consolidation may in practice prove disadvantageous to them.

All in all we had the impression that recent years had stirred

people to want more development after a long period of comparative

isolation and stagnation. At the same time there was an uncertainty

about the directions of development. The Tugen Hills seemed to us

an area where it is necessary first to make a careful diagnosis of the

problems on the spot and then to devise some means of tackling

them more effectively. Certainly more needs to be known about the

distribution and use of land holdings, the different types of soils,

the practical difficulties standing in the way of consolidation and

the kinds of commercial farming that might be developed in the

light of the potentialities of the land and the possibilities of the

market.

The grazing areas

The most severe problems have been posed by the lower and

drier grazing areas, which comprise by far the greater part of the

I Since completing our field work in 1964, we have been informed that thefirst land consolidation team sent into the Hills has completed its first registerof existing land rights which showed that 250-300 people owned altogether about600 fragments. Since approximately 40 percent of the farmers were reported to

have only one piece of land, the rest had on the average around four fragments.I We were told of one instance, for example, where farmers were cooperating

to enclose adjoining patches of land for maize growing so that the maize couldbe protected against livestock. One of the participants reported, however, that

delays in effecting this joint enclosure had caused tardy planting of maize.

174

Kenva: Baringo and Elgeyo-Mfarakwet Districts

land in Baringo. They are the source of Baringo's almost onlyexports-livestock, hides and skins-but they are also the scene ofsome of the worst land degradation resulting from uncontrolledgrazing of stock. A few years ago L. H. Brown, who was longprominently identified with the Department of Agriculture, aptlycharacterized the situation in a memorandum entitled "TheDevelopment of the Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya" (pp. 16-17):

Baringo District has in fact reached an "over-grazing endpoint" where most of the grass and the topsoil has already goneover large stretches of the country, and the ground is blanketedwith thornbrush, largely useless to man and beast alike, whichcannot be eradicated without the expenditure of large sums ofmoney . . . This tragic situation has not been caused by overstock-ing alone. In Baringo, and in similar situations on the Elgeyoescarpment, and the lower slopes of the Cheranganis in WestPokot, it has also been aggravated, over a long period of time, byshifting cultivation on steep slopes with shallow soil without anyeffective soil conservation measures. This has resulted in thereplacement of potentially productive tallgrass Combretum-Terminalia savannah with dense useless bush and nearly bareground, dominated in many areas by the uneatable shrubDodonaea viscosa. Land in a 35-40 inch rainfall, once capableperhaps of supporting a stock unit to 4-5 acres, is now scarcelycapable of carrying a stock unit to 20 acres, a deterioration of300 percent. In the drier parts of the district, with a 20-25 inchrainfall, land once capable of supporting a stock unit to 10 acresis now scarcely capable of supporting one to 30-40, again adeterioration of 200-300 percent. The general overall degree ofdeterioration in Baringo District is of the order of 300 percent,has occurred chiefly within the last fifty years or so, and is moresevere than any deterioration of range recorded in, for instance,the United States in similar rainfall.

There have been many and protracted attempts to deal with thissituation including (1) bush clearance, (2) grazing control, and (3)destocking. These measures have by no means been confined to thedriest parts of Baringo lying between 3,000 ft. and 5,000 ft. Grazingcontrol was first begun on the South Baringo Plains, and destockingextended to the entire area inhabited by Tugen and Njemps.However, we shall deal briefly with all these in this section.

Bush clearanceOne of the most intractable problems has been bush clearance. In

grazing areas, bush is normally kept down by periodic fires, but afairly good stand of grass is needed to generate the "hot burn" that

175


will curb bush. With overgrazing, particularly in drought years, the

grass virtually disappeared, and the resulting steady encroachment of

bush compounded the difficulties of regenerating grass cover. The

bush does not, of course, need to be cleared completely. Selective

clearing to permit grass to grow is sufficient, particularly since many

species of acacia bush have some feed value for cattle. Even so, no

really effective methods have been worked out.

In principle it would seem possible for the people themselves to

do some clearing by hand, aided only by the ax and the machete.

Whether they could clear enough land would depend on the thick-

ness and heaviness of the bush. Some trials conducted among the

Pokot in the early 'fifties are reported to have demonstrated that one

man could clear two acres per week or 100 acres per year of suffi-

cient undergrowth and bush to permit regeneration of grass cover. 10

Such an area might then be capable of carrying 10 to 15 stock units

which in turn might support two to three people.11 It should be

noted, however, that these trials were on a small scale, and that expert

opinion and evidence controverting this conclusion can also be cited.

In Machakos District, for example, we were told that in the Yatta

grazing areas, which had also suffered severely from bush encroach-

ment, as many as 20 to 25 man-days would be required to clear an

acre of bush-infested land for grazing. More investigation on this

crucial point is unquestionably necessary. At present, however, there

is certainly no conclusive evidence that one family can do all the

necessary work without outside help, particularly if the bush is

thick, and considering the fact that labor must also be available

for herding and, where possible, to grow some cash crops. Once

the bush has been thinned sufficiently to permit grass to grow, the

herder and his family probably could do enough clearing to maintain

the grazing land.It may be questioned also whether the graziers have had sufficient

interest or incentive to do the clearing themselves. Given their

short-term horizon, they may well have found it easier to let the

grazing deteriorate gradually and to adjust themselves in some

measure to this situation by shifting more largely to the keeping of

goats and sheep, which can support themselves more readily by

browsing. Moreover, in the absence of a permanent, exclusive

interest in a particular grazing area, it seems hard to conceive that

15 This included only clearing the worst of the undergrowth, leaving thetrash on the ground to prevent grazing for at least nine months and thus givingthe grass a chance to regenerate.

" See the discussion below about the number of stock required per person.

176

Kenra: Baringo and Elgevo-Marakwet Districts

any family will devote a lot of work to clearing grazing land whichmay well be used by others. Under these conditions nothing shortof a massive clearing campaign carried out by the people undergovernment direction appears likely to succeed.

The Government itself has in the past undertaken to cope withthe bush problem. Various methods of bush clearance were tried-ring-barking, bulldozing, the use of Holt bush breakers-and then,at times, to reseed areas with grass, but "solutions" have neverbeen found. The technical means were at hand but they haveproved too costly. Bush clearance, combined with reseeding atgovernment expense, appears to have been uneconomic in the lightof the rather small return per acre that can be obtained on dryrange land which at best has an extremely limited livestock-carryingcapacity. Moreover, experience in Baringo has apparently illustratedtime and again the difficulty of conserving the benefits of bushclearance unless conditions permit firm and continuing control overgrazing and the active participation of graziers in keeping bushunder control.'2

Grazing schemesGrazing controls were instituted as early as 1930. In South

Baringo grazing rules were applied to specified controlled areas forwhich maximum permissable stock numbers were laid down,branding and culling of stock were required, and from which goatswere generally excluded. This attempt at control failed, however,apparently because there was never enough staff to enforce com-pliance; there was no regular market for excess stock; and recurringdroughts led to frequent trespassing on the controlled areas. Begin-ning in 1946, some 50,000 acres of Crown Land in southeasternBaringo were developed as a rotational grazing scheme to relieveovergrazing in other areas, but this scheme also proved largelyunsuccessful. In the 'fifties, beginning in 1954 and continuing untilthe early 'sixties, a whole series of grazing schemes were established,many of which have since been divided into individual holdings(see Table 3).

Around 225,000 acres of land were ultimately developed intograzing schemes, although the maximum area under grazing control

12 L. H. Brown has observed, in the memorandum already cited (p. 17):"Effective bush clearing in Baringo could cost t3-£5 per acre, £1,920-£3,000per square mile on a total of nearly 2,000 square miles, or something like £4-£6million for the whole district. Such an expenditure would be far in excess ofwhat the land is now worth, and, if it were not followed up with continued soundmaintenance, the position would merely recur."

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TABLE 3: ROTATIONAL GRAZING SCHEMES ULTIMATELY PUT

INTO EFFECT IN THE BARINGO DISTRICT

Number of

Stock Units,

PerPer Grazier

Acreage, Graziers" Scheme (average)

1. South Baringoa. Kisokonb formerly 14,500 87 860 10b. Kiptuinb f Esageri 13,600 197 1,946 10c. Kilombe 13,205 100 1,000 10

2. Perkerra Catchment'a. Gobat (Cobat South) 16,800 267 1,680 6b. Kimoset (Gobat North) 16,200 208 1,157 5.5c. Radad 25,000 211 1,250 6d. Perkerra 16,750 333 1,333 4e. Cheberen 19,000 351 1,200 3.4

3. Mugerina. Molo Sirwel abandoned 10,000 103 522 5b. Mugerin j in 1962 17,325 249 1,175 5c. Mukuyuni-Kabimuib 8,800 187 676 3.5

4. Solai Bordera. 01 Kokwe 9,500 144 658 4.5b. Ngandalel 11,700 186 800 5c. Kisanab 5,000 31 240 8

5. Kabarnet Schemes (Kerio,Churo, 01 Arabel, etc.) 30,000 944 2,992 3.2

'Statistics on acreage, graziers and stock sometimes vary between documentsas boundaries and densities changed over the years of operation.

bSubsequently converted to individual holdings.'Attempts currently under way (1964/65) to examine possibility of turning

these five schemes into individual ranch holdings.SOURCE: Baringo District official documents.

in any one year was never that great. As of the end of 1963, or early

1964, there were still 120,000 acres under some degree of control.

Each grazing scheme was usually divided into four paddocks,

each grazed for a period of four months, so that every paddock

could in turn be rested for a year in order to give the grass a chance

to recover. The boundaries of the schemes and paddocks had to be

demarcated, but fencing was not needed, since it has always been

the practice to herd livestock. The major investment requirement

was in water supplies, since each paddock had to have an assured

water supply. It has been estimated that in Baringo some £83,000

had been invested in water supplies by 1964-most of it apparently

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for grazing schemes-and 94 waterholes and dams were ultimatelydeveloped. Communal dips for the cleansing of stock also had to beprovided. The development costs, said to have averaged about Sh 10per acre, and the maintenance outlays were supposed to be defrayedby grazing fees which were initially fixed at Sh 6 per stock unitannually but later apparently were raised to Sh 12.

On each scheme livestock were branded to control numbers.Grazing guards were initially provided to control poaching byoutsiders, but the idea was that the improvement in grazing con-ditions resulting from control would develop a keen interest amongthe graziers themselves to police the scheme. In order to develop asense of responsibility and participation among the graziers, acommittee of graziers was organized for each scheme, and thiscommittee was to help enforce the regulations, including the propergrazing rotation, and to provide the liaison between graziers andthe Government officers administering the controls.

There is little doubt that grazing schemes were instrumental inregenerating grass cover in a number of instances, although in othercases the bush enroachment and erosion had become so bad thatrecovery was barely perceptible and easily interrupted. Grazingcontrols commanded little support and encountered much popularand political opposition. Some grazing schemes (Mugerin) had tobe abandoned completely, owing to constant obstruction and failureto cooperate; a few never got beyond the planning stage; and onmany others the controls have been greatly relaxed and in somecases have become purely nominal in the 'sixties. We shall discusslater the possible reasons for opposition to these schemes, butfirst we shall deal briefly with the complementary and more generallyapplied destocking measures.

Destocking

For the grazing scheme areas disposals were to keep the number ofstock units at a fixed figure. In many cases, however, the stocksurplus in these areas was simply shifted to uncontrolled grazingland. This rendered even more acute the need for a general overallreduction of stock numbers which livestock and agricultural officershad long thought excessive given the visual evidence of bush en-croachment and disappearance of grass cover over much of Baringo.A stock census conducted in the period December 1956-July 1957among the Tugen and Njemps (i.e. excluding the Pokot) indicatedthat there were about 245,000 stock units, including some 138,000cattle and the balance sheep and goats, five of which were considered

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one stock unit.'3 These were reported to be owned or "held" by10,050 people, which implied that there were, on the average,circa 24 stock units and nearly 14 cattle per owner or holder. Afterallowing for areas considered to be too steep for grazing, there weresaid to be only 1,185,788 acres of grazing for this number of stock,or a little less than 5 acres per unit. Since 10 acres to 15 acres wasregarded as the minimum to support one stock unit, a substantialsurplus appeared to exist. The Baringo Rules Committee, set up bythe authorities to deal with grazing matters, accordingly workedout a destocking program involving the controlled disposal of about130,000 units over a five-year period 1959-1963. For 1959, an initialcompulsory "destocking quota" of 24,000 was fixed. The Chiefsand Location Councils were made responsible for apportioning thisquota among individual livestock owners, and all sales had to takeplace in official sales yards or auction markets attended by aDistrict Officer and Livestock Officer. Arrangements were made forsuch markets as well as livestock routes and holding grounds. Afield abattoir, which had been established at Marigat in 1956 by theVeterinary Department's African Livestock Marketing Organiza-tion, stood ready to buy inferior stock which regular traders declinedto buy.

It is difficult to evaluate this destocking program. In 1959 itseemed to have been effective in greatly increasing marketings. Inthe three preceding years sales of stock on the hoof for export fromthe district averaged about 5,350 cattle and somewhat over 18,000sheep and goats, making altogether nearly 9,000 livestock units.In 1959 sales rose to around 14,000 cattle and 35,000 sheep andgoats, or some 21,000 livestock units. In addition, the equivalentof some 30,000 livestock units were exported in terms of hides andskins, reflecting, presumably, local slaughter and livestock losses.It was likely that there was a substantial reduction in stock evenafter taking into account the natural increase in herds and flocksduring the year. In 1960 the total number of livestock units sold onthe hoof came to about 15,000, and sales of hides and skins repre-sented apparently another 40,000 units. This, however, was a yearof severe drought when livestock sales and losses would normallyhave been high. In fact it was agreed in August of that year thatcompulsory destocking could be lifted for the balance of the yearbecause of the drought. At the beginning of 1961, compulsory

1" In this paper the standard ratio of 5:1 is used for converting small stockto livestock units, although L. H. Brown has argued rather convincingly in thememorandum previously cited, that a ratio of 10:1 or 15:1 would be morerealistic.

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destocking was formally withdrawn, and the political climate inthis and the next few years was clearly such that an unpopularmeasure like destocking could not be reinstituted. In these yearsstockowners evidently concentrated on reconstituting their holdings,which had been decimated not only by the drought but also by arinderpest epidemic. In the three-year period 1961 to 1963, exportsof livestock on the hoof averaged only about 8,000 units per year,while exports of hides and skins dropped to an annual average ofapproximately 21,000 in terms of stock units.

Technically it was not easy to set up and carry out a sounddestocking plan. Assuming that the census had given reasonablyaccurate information on the number and composition of livestockherds and flocks and that the surplus could be determined in thelight of range carrying capacity, it was still necessary to have fairlyreliable information on the natural rate of increase, i.e., the repro-duction rate and the mortality rate among calves, lambs and kids.The destocking quotas could be fixed with regard to the "surplus"as of a given moment, but disposals under these quotas had to besupplemented by marketings to take off the natural increase. Since,however, data on the rate of increase were largely speculative, itwas not easy to determine what the total annual takeoff would needto be. Moreover, for effective destocking, it was obviously necessaryto see that marketings did not substantially shift the sex ratios amongthe remaining livestock holdings. But it was in practice difficult tocarry destocking controls so far as to specify the proportion of malesand females that had to be sold. A disproportionately high proportionof male stock may well have been sold in order to preserve as manycows as possible to maintain the supply of milk and assist in a rapidreconstitution of herds.

Reaction to grazing and livestock controlsIn retrospect it seems clear that destocking, stock limitation and

grazing controls have not been very effective. The very real problemof protecting the livestock carrying capacity of dry range land and,at the same time, ensuring graziers an adequate livelihood has notyet been satisfactorily resolved. Certainly the measures outlinedabove have encountered a great deal of resistance and obstructioneven though they were initiated by a benevolent Government anddesigned to help the people. While some of the opposition may wellhave been prompted by a desire to condemn the Colonial Govern-ment and all of its works, there are undoubtedly more fundamentalreasons for the resistance. In the absence of a thoroughgoing sociolog-ical and economic investigation of the motivations of the pastoral

181


people involved, one can only venture some tentative assessment of

these reasons.First, it seems difficult for a pastoral or semi-pastoral people to

accept the idea that livestock numbers should be kept fixed, irrespec-

tive of fluctuations from year to year in rainfall and grazing con-

ditions. They appear to be accustomed to these wide fluctuations,

increasing their livestock holdings rapidly when grazing is good and

selling off substantial numbers or suffering losses when drought

conditions develop. They do not readily grasp the meaningfulness

of the "average" conditions in the light of which the livestock or

range management expert determines carrying capacity.

Secondly, poaching on grazing schemes was always a serious

problem, apparently because the participants in these schemes often

did not have a sufficient interest in keeping other livestock out. The

moment there was a marked disparity between grazing conditions

inside and outside the schemes, poaching tended to develop on a

considerable scale. It is possible that the scheme graziers in many

cases had stock outside the scheme as well as inside the scheme.

Government officers who established the grazing schemes were

primarily interested in limiting the number of livestock rather than

the number of graziers. There was probably a pressure to admit to

each scheme an abnormally large number of graziers, in recognition

of the grazing rights they may at times have exercised in the area.

In any event, the average number of stock units alloted per grazier

seems abnormally low. As is shown in Table 3, it was 10 in the South

Baringo schemes, where ecological conditions were most favorable,

but in the drier and more difficult areas such as Mugerin, Perkerra

Catchment and the northern part of Solai border, the average

ranged between 3.5 and 6. These figures are greatly at variance

with those disclosed by the livestock census of 1957 and previously

cited. This census, for instance, indicated that the average number

of stock units per holder or owner in a typical South Baringo Loca-

tion (Perkerra-Keben) was 23 and that the typical number in North

Baringo was around 20 (though with a higher proportion of sheep

and goats). There would seem to be presumptive evidence that the

family of the scheme grazier had a considerable number of stock

outside the scheme, and, if this were true, there would be a strong

temptation to bring in the other stock of the family or of relatives

whenever grazing was much poorer outside the scheme.

Thirdly, there has apparently been a growing desire on the part of

the semi-pastoral Tugen to become more sedentary without having

to move their stock over a vast grazing scheme from one paddock to

another. This seems to have been one of the major factors behind

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the growing demand for the replacement of grazing schemes byindividual holdings even in the drier areas.

Finally-and this appears most important-the evidence suggeststhat stock reduction and grazing controls were resisted because,even before these controls, the number of stock may well have beenfar from adequate to ensure a minimum livelihood. In other words,while stock numbers may greatly exceed the carrying capacity ofavailable range land, they probably are far from sufficient to supportthe people living in the dry grazing areas of Baringo on an adequatesubsistence basis, let alone at their present level of expectations.In the absence of verified, reliable data on customary diets, minimumdietary requirements and the productivity of livestock, it is difficultto be dogmatic on the adequacy of livestock numbers. L. H. Brown,however, has built up an elaborate case, based on certain assump-tions about existing livestock-population ratios, dietary needs, live-stock reproduction and survival rates and livestock yields, that "thestock population must for some time have been at one and the samemoment barely able to maintain the human population and exces-sive for the carrying capacity of the land."' 4 One may cavil at someof the assumptions and calculations underlying this conclusion anddispute the magnitude of the disproportion between livestock andpopulation, but there is a strong presumption that the conclusion iscorrect. Allan, for example, has analyzed the evidence marshalledby a number of investigations on the diets and livestock holdings ofpastoral peoples in East Africa and has suggested tentatively thatthe minimum number of animals required per head of populationin a pastoral economy may be about six livestock units.' 5 Thisestimate may still be above "rock-bottom" requirements, but itpoints to the probability that the number of livestock in the drierportions of Baringo where no cultivation is possible is barely sufficientto support the population.

Possible approaches

It is evident that the exact nature and magnitude of the problemposed in the range lands of Baringo needs further investigation beforeit can be determined which approach or combination of approachesto the problem is most appropriate. In theory, three approaches

" See his memorandum, "The Development of the Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya,"p. 17.

'5 Allan, The African Husbandman, pp. 302-309. On page 307, Allan showsthat of six East African pastoral peoples, the Turkana, with an average of 6.5stock units per head of population, apparently have the lowest number of live-stock.

183


would seem possible, namely (1) individual ranches or holdings,

(2) large cooperative ranches with upgraded stock, and (3) removal

of part of the population (and stock) to other areas.The division into individual ranches appears to be the recent

trend. We have already noted that most of the grazing land in

South Baringo, including Solai Border in the southeastern corner of

the district, has been converted to individual holdings. While indi-

cating that there are some signs that this process has provided an

incentive to development, we have reported that the final verdict is

not in. Many agricultural and range experts fear that when the

good rains of recent years are almost inevitably succeeded by

droughts,'" experience will demonstrate the "solution" provided by

individual holdings to have been illusory, even in many parts of

South Baringo.More recently, however, the clamor for individual holdings has

been extended to grazing schemes in much drier areas such as Gobat

and Perkerra, and surveys preliminary to their division have appar-

ently been taken. There are naturally even stronger misgivings about

this development on technical and economic grounds, and the

objections have been well stated by L. H. Brown:

If an area of 10,000 acres with a carrying capacity of 10 acresper stock unit is taken, and the costs of developing it, either as one

unit of 10,000 acres or 20 units of 500 acres, under the sameminimal methods of management, are calculated, it is found that

the development cost per acre is four to five times as great in the

case of small ranches as in the case of the single large unit. Given

that the methods of management in each case involve perimeterfencing, five paddocks to provide a minimum of control, watersupplies in each paddock, a dip, and a minimum amount ofnecessary buildings, the cost per acre works out at about Sh 10 ona 10,000 acre holding, and Sh 40-50 or even more on the smallranches of 500 acres. In both cases the ultimate gross return per

acre which is to be expected is about Sh 9-10 under optimummanagement. In the large unit therefore, Sh 10 per acre has to be

spent to gain an annual gross return of Sh 10, but in small ranchesSh 40-45 per acre must be spent to achieve no greater return.

It is therefore economically ludicrous to suggest developmentof Kenya's range land in such very small units, except possiblyon the very best range land with rainfall approaching 30" perannum, where the gross return per acre would be higher.t"

16 WVe have been unable to assess the impact of the 1965 drought, which

occurred after the completion of our field study."7 "The Development of the Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya," pp. 33-34.

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The possibility of cooperative ranches concentrating on theraising of improved livestock is suggested by the initial experienceof the Ministry of Lands and Settlement with the development ofsuch ranches, particularly the Koma Rock Ranch, in former Euro-pean areas of Machakos. We have commented on this experienceelsewhere. "8 Thus, on the Koma Ranch, the low-quality stockcontributed as capital in kind by the "shareholders" is being sup-planted by much higher-yielding, upgraded Boran stock. If theexisting low-yielding stock in Baringo range areas could be similarlyupgraded, there would no longer be quite the same justification forcontending that the number of animals is insufficient for the popu-lation, since this contention assumes low levels of productivity andofftake. Since the nutritional requirements of upgraded cattle arehigher, fewer animals could, of course, be supported on a givengrazing area, but this could presumably be more than offset by thehigher productivity of the cattle. Moreover, if the participants couldbe made to feel a permanent interest in their cooperative ranch, theymight be more prepared than in the past to use more of their ownlabor to clear and control bush and otherwise improve grazingconditions. Cooperative ranching with upgraded cattle wouldpresumably be feasible only if the participants were able and willingto put all their livestock into the scheme, if this livestock could berather quickly replaced by improved animals, and if a number ofcows sufficient to provide minimum requirements of milk could begrazed continuously near the homesteads of the participants. Acareful sociological, economic and technical study would obviouslybe necessary to determine whether these and other essential condi-tions could be met. Even with upgraded animals it is quite possiblethat the grazing areas required are such that the grazing rights ofpart of the population would have to be sacrificed to provide atolerable living for the balance.

The latter points to the probability that the problem cannot besolved without moving at least some of the population. The develop-ment of more irrigation is the obvious possibility that would need tobe investigated. Near Marigat, to the southwest of Lake Baringo,there is the 1,500-acre Perkerra Irrigation Scheme which we discusselsewhere,"9 but the economic and technical feasibility of its exten-sion by the construction of a storage dam still has to be surveyed.In the Baringo part of the Kerio Valley there is a small indigenousirrigation of about 100 acres in operation, and the possibility of de-

18 See the section, "Some Reflections on Settlement Schemes," pp. 188-220.19 See the section, "Observations on Some Irrigation Schemes," pp. 221-241.

185


veloping others may be worth investigating. There is also said to be

some potential for low-level pump irrigation from Lake Baringo,

near which there is reported to be some good alluvial land. Costs, of

course, may well prove excessive in relation to the production and

marketing potcntialities. The remoteness of these areas from markets

creates a specially difficult problem. The checkered history of the

Perkerra Irrigation Scheme illustrates this problem, although the

development of onions as a commercial crop seems finally to have

put this scheme on its feet.

Concluding remarks

This rapid survey of the problems and developments in the neigh-

boring Districts of Elgeyo-Marakwet and Baringo has unquestion-

ably suffered from a serious inadequacy of reliable data. It has,

however, pointed up the wide differences in response to change

among the Kalenjin-speaking peoples of the area and suggested

that these differences are due to the complex interplay of a number

of factors relating, among other things, to variations in the op-

portunities open to them. Both the Elgeyo and Marakwet have

progressed markedly, to the extent that they have left their original

homes on the escarpment and the confines of their traditional so-

ciety for the more favorable and freer environment of the uplands.

In each case they were given timely assistance by agricultural offi-

cers, which enabled them to seize more readily the opportunities of

their new environment. The Marakwet have made less progress than

the Elgeyo, probably in large part because they have been much

more isolated and because the highlands available to them have

been less accessible and of lower potential.

As a whole, progress in Baringo has lagged considerably behind

that of Elgeyo-Marakwet. It appears, however, that the southern

portions of Baringo have made somewhat greater progress than the

rest of the district, partly because ecological conditions are more

favorable, but above all because these areas have been less remote

and more exposed to contacts with the rest of Kenya, particularly

the nearby European farming areas. On the other hand, relative

inaccessibility and isolation has hindered progress in the Tugen

Hills. The stirrings of change have become evident there, too, in

recent years, but they have come at a time when overcrowding and

land fragmentation, together with the lack of opportunity for further

coffee development, constitute serious impediments to progress. It is

conceivable that the Tugen might be making rapid progress in the

Hills today if, like the Elgeyo and Marakwet, they had recently

moved from the less attractive lowlands into the uplands. For the

186


Tugen, however, the Hills have been their traditional home andmany of them have had, over time, to come down from the Hills intothe less hospitable low-lying and dry-range lands where they havefound it difficult to eke out an existence from their livestock. Thedeterioration of Baringo range land under the pressure of cattle andsmall stock is uncontested. In the past, stock limitation and controlledgrazing schemes have been tried to restore the degraded range land,but although partial and temporary improvements have beenrealized, the problem of establishing viable ratios between the peopleand their stock, on the one hand, and the land, on the other hand,has not been resolved, and many of the controls have broken downin face of popular resistance. We have examined some of the prob-able reasons for the past resistance and failures and indicated thatthere is at least a presumptive case that the chronic overstockingand overgrazing has been owing not so much to ignorance and un-reasoning obstruction of controls, but rather to excessive population.The sociological, technical and economic causes of past failuresneed, however, to be carefully studied. Here again, as in so manyother parts of tropical Africa, we could only conclude that more factsmust be brought to light and analyzed in an effort to obtain a betterunderstanding of the problem and the possible approaches to itssolution.

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6. SOME REFLECTIONS ON SETTLEMENT SCHEMES

Introduction

In the preceding case studies we have had occasion to point out

that European farms in Kenya have stimulated improvements in

African farming by pioneering certain crops and types of animal

husbandry which have been adopted in increasing measure by

Africans with labor experience on such farms. Beginning in 1962,

opportunities to adopt or adapt such European farming practices

have also been created through the settlement of Africans on farms

which the Kenya Government bought from Europeans with the

financial assistance of the U.K. Government. By mid-1965 nearly

1.2 million acres of former European-owned land had been pur-

chased for the ultimate settlement of approximately 34,000 families;

about 735,000 had actually been settled by some 24,000 familes.

We have not pretended to make an extended study of this settle-

ment program. We visited a number of settlement schemes of differ-

ent types, partly to determine in what way settlement had been

integrally related to the agricultural problems in the old African

''reserves" and partly to acquire a better understanding of the

particular problems that have arisen in carrying out the settlement

program. We did not concern ourselves with the justification of the

program, and particularly with the question of whether the financial

and personnel resources devoted to its execution would, if employed

elsewhere, have made a larger contribution to production.' The

program was in any event conditioned by political as well as eco-

nomic considerations. Its basic concern was not with the maximiza-

tion of output, but with the accommodation of more Africans on the

land that was previously owned by Europeans.

l The Kenya Government has had increasing reservations about the economicsof the settlement program and has, as a matter of fact, decided to curtail itdrastically. In a fundamental policy statement issued on April 27, 1965 underthe title of "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya,"it said: "We have to consider what emphasis should be given in future to settle-ment, as against development, in African areas. The same money spent onland consolidation, survey, registration and development in the African areas

1 g

Kenya: Settlement Schemes

However, the paramount objectives of giving Africans more landand putting more Africans on the land have had to be reconciled asfar as possible with the need to maintain and even increase thecontributions which the European farms selected for settlementhad been making to commercial production and exports. In a broadsense, therefore, settlement has had to be conceived as an effort tointensify production-as a program which made it possible to applymore labor per unit of land area by creating a denser pattern ofland settlement and at the same time to provide this labor with thecapital and other means required for its effective employment. Itwas the effectiveness of the program in increasing both employmentand production that primarily interested us.

At the outset, however, it should be noted that the possibilitiesof using the settlement program to relieve population pressure on theland were seriously circumscribed by tribal considerations. Thedegree of demographic pressure varies widely throughout Kenya.We have noted that it was particularly high in the Kikuyu Districtsof the Central Province, in the Kamba District of Machakos, andthe Luo District of Central Nyanza. On the other hand, in the RiftValley Province where most of the European farm land was located,African lands were on the whole less crowded. There were over-populated areas, such as in Baringo and on the Elgeyo-Marakwetescarpment, but these do not present, in terms of the numbers ofpeople involved, quite as serious a problem as those previouslymentioned. Given the tendency of major tribes or groups of tribesto regard certain areas as their zone of influence or settlement,it has proved impossible to use European farm land solely for therelief of the most overpopulated areas. For example, Kikuyu couldnot be settled on farms in the Rift Valley Region, and while certainboundary adjustments were made to add some land available forsettlement to the Central Province, the effect of this was offset bythe loss of employment that many Kikuyu experienced on thosefarms which remained in the Rift Valley Region and were openedto settlement by other tribes.

would increase productivity and output on four to six times as many acres andbenefit four to six times as many Africans. It therefore follows that if our re-sources must be used to achieve maximum growth, we must give priority in thefuture to development in the former African areas (para 82) . . . The presentpractice of spending a large proportion of the Government budget on the settle-ment and development of a limited acreage in former European areas shouldbe phased out and future funds channelled to the development of the greatpotential of the African areas (para 102)."

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Settlement procedures

Purchase of land for settlement

The various steps involved in the complex task of land settlement

will be quickly reviewed. First is the selection and purchase of the

land. Ideally this should have been dictated solely by the suitability

of land for farming by Africans and by the location of land in

relation to the areas experiencing the most acute population pres-

sures. In practice there has been a compromise with certain other

considerations-the need to accommodate regional and tribal

interests, and the limitations on the availability of land. The first

of these led to a purchase program that tended to broaden the

participation in settlement beyond those groups which suffered the

most from a shortage of land. As for the second, the right type of

land has not always been available for purchase at the right location.

Land that should be farmed rather intensively to produce a combi-

nation of subsistence crops, cash crops and dairy produce, was recog-

nized to be most suited for settlement by African farmers, while land

of marginal fertility and rainfall that could be used only for extensive

ranching or agriculture and involved considerable risk was considered

to be least suited. Often, however, there was not sufficient suitable

land available contiguous to the "zone of influence" of the tribe that

was to be accommodated. Thus the Kikuyu had to accept a con-

siderable area of poor land on the Kinangop, and the Kamba also

had to content themselves with land of much lower value.

Responsibilities for organization and planning

Settlement is the legal responsibility of the Settlement Fund

Trustees, a statutory body consisting of the Ministers of Finance,

Agriculture and Settlement, which also retains title to the land until

the settlers have discharged all their financial obligations. The

actual work is carried out by the Department of Settlement within

the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and in cooperation with other

Government agencies. The Department has been charged not only

with settlement, but also with the farming of the land in the period

intervening between its purchase and settlement. The Department

of Agriculture has been responsible for planning each scheme in

accordance with certain specifications as to the types and sizes of

settlement plots to be provided. This has involved the preparation

of a layout on a contour map to a scale of 1 :2500 or 1: 5000. Pro-

vision is made for roads, soil conservation works such as cut-off

drains, water supplies where necessary, trading centers, etc. Sur-

veyors then lay out the scheme on the ground in accordance with

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the plan, and the Soil Conservation Service of the Department ofAgriculture constructs the roads and soil conservation works anddemarcates the plots.

The size of the plot depends on the nature of the land and theincome target to be reached by the settler. The Department ofAgriculture roughly classifies the land in three categories, with thetotal stated in terms of "first class arable" equivalent. Every settle-ment scheme usually has several types of plots; for each of thesethe Department of Agriculture prepares a farm budget or planreflecting the potentialities of the soil and climate and designed toenable the settler to produce sufficient food for the family and attaina stipulated net income target. These farm budgets are intended notas an inflexible plan, but as a guide. Once the settlers are selected,their actual settlement and subsequent supervision is the responsi-bility of Settlement Officers working under the Department ofSettlement and assisted by agricultural, veterinary and cooperativepersonnel detailed to them by other Government departments.

The magnitude of the planning involved and the speed with whichit has had to be carried out have made some mistakes inevitable. Ina number of cases we noted that plans had been drawn up withoutsufficient knowledge of local conditions. Land classification hassometimes made insufficient allowances for variations in soil fertility,topography and micro-climate. Farm plans have at times madeprovision for types of crops (e.g. pyrethrum) or livestock (e.g.,wooled sheep) which, compared to others, the settler did not findeconomically attractive. On a number of schemes inadequateadvance provision was made for water supplies for both householdand livestock consumption. In general, however, it appeared to usthat the planning and preparatory work had been remarkably wellorganized, particularly considering the limitations of staff and time.

Types of settlements

High- and low-density schemes

There have been two principal types of settlements-"high-density" and "low-density." High density settlements have been farmore numerous and have been designed for the primary purpose ofaccommodating the landless and unemployed. The size of farms hasbeen rather small, calculated with a view to enabling the settler toachieve a net income of £25 in addition to subsistence and afterdeducting service on the loans contracted for both the purchase anddevelopment of the land. Since this type of settler is presumed tobe poor, he has not been required to contribute any capital. Low-

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density schemes, on the other hand, have been devised to provide

opportunities for the more commercially oriented farmers. Many

feared that the high-density schemes would lead to excessive pre-

occupation with subsistence farming and that the standard of

farming on such schemes would suffer, owing to the emphasis on

recruiting needy settlers rather than competent settlers. Thus the

farmers for low-density settlement were to be recruited not primarily

on the basis of the settlers' own needs, but rather on the basis of the

requirements of the economy for an increase in marketable output.

The size and potentialities of their holdings have been determined

so as to produce a net cash income of £100 after allowing for sub-

sistence and meeting financial obligations. Applicants were supposed

to be selected for their farming and business experience. Whereas

selection of high-density settlers has been left to the Provincial

political authorities, the final judgment of the qualifications of the

low-density settler has been reserved to the Settlement Administra-

tion. Each applicant has been required to put up capital of his own

in a minimum amount which originally was £50 and was then

raised to £100.By far the greatest proportion of the settlements have been of the

high-density type. By mid-1965, for example, 20,606 of the total of

23,917 plots settled were on high-density schemes.

The formal distinction between these two types of schemes has

been progressively narrowed. Part of this has been due to the raising

of the £25 target income on the high-density schemes. For schemes

initiated in the Rift Valley Province, the target was increased to

£40 as early as 1962/63; in the ensuing year two provinces initiated

settlements with £70 target. Quite apart from the effect of this action,

the distinction between the two types has, in many respects, not

been clear-cut in practice. Within some schemes, there have been

considerable differences in the potentialities of plots. Moreover,

as we shall explain later, the types of people settled and the results

achieved have not been so markedly different as was originally

expected.

Yeoman farms

Aside from the two principal types of settlements, there have been

three other ways in which Africans could acquire European-owned

farms. One was through the transfer of farms which were bought

with U.K. Government Funds from Europeans who were "com-

passionate cases" in the sense that they could no longer farm their

holdings for reasons beyond their control and were also unable to

sell their farms at a fair price. In the years 1962 to 1964, 161 farms

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totaling 127,686 acres were bought in this way, and all but 20 werein fact transferred to African farmers. The second method of acqui-sition was through the so-called "assisted owner" scheme, whichalso falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Lands and Settle-ment. Under this scheme European farmers were permitted todivide their own farms into rather large holdings which would becapable of yielding their African purchasers a net income of £250.The purchase and development of the land was financed by theSettlement Fund Trustees. In this way, a still larger type of Africancommercial farm, a "yeoman" farm, was to be established. However,only a limited number of holdings of this type, totaling 52,175 acres,were established in 1961 and 1962.

Large farmsThe third way in which Africans have been able to obtain Euro-

pean farms has been through purchase financed not by the Settle-ment Fund Trustees, but by the Land and Agricultural Bank ofKenya. This Bank, an official institution, can finance 60 percent ofthe purchase price of land up to a total of £20,000 and may financeas much as 80 percent if the Government guarantees the difference,as has usually been done for African buyers. However, in order toensure that the buyer has the means to meet not only the balanceof the purchase price but also part of the cost of farm development,the Bank has insisted that loan applicants have liquid assests equalto half of the purchase cost. The purchaser may apply to the Agri-cultural Finance Corporation for a development loan in an amountequal to the liquid assets he has left over after paying his share ofthe cost of the land as well as the legal fees and stamp duty. TheLand and Agricultural Bank charges 6i/2 percent interest on its loanwhich must be repaid over twenty years without any period of grace.

Applications for loans have come from individual Africans,partnerships, limited companies and cooperatives. Headmen orforemen on European farms and African businessmen and tradershave apparently predominated among the applicants. In some cases,farmers on settlement schemes have banded together to buy a largeEuropean farm with the help of the Bank. Cooperatives have beenformed to buy land jointly and have received a number of loansfrom the Bank for this purpose. To the extent that they have notbeen a simple prelude to the subsequent division of the land amongthe members, the cooperatives have really partaken of the characterof limited companies who have invested in a farm operated by amanager designated by the "shareholders." The cooperative formhas been chosen only because it is more costly to establish a limited

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company. In the 3 years 1963 to 1965 Africans acquired 393,158

acres of European land in this manner.2

The purchase of large individual farms by Africans has often

been followed by a marked drop in output and income. The manage-

ment of these farms has generally been beyond the capacity of the

purchasers. The transition from small-scale to large-scale agriculture

has been much too abrupt. Beginning in 1965 the Land Bank has

accordingly been giving more attention to the agricultural experience

of the applicant, and the Government may eventually require that

purchasers attend special schools for training, the first of which was

opened in June 1965. Special extension workers have been provided,

partly with foreign assistance, to work with large-scale African

farmers. In 1965 the Government also decided that large mixed

farms should usually be subdivided before being sold to African

farmers. Finally, the government has threatened to invoke its power

to take over mismanaged farms.

Financing of settlement

The settlement schemes have entailed financing on a large scale

far beyond anything previously undertaken in the established African

farming areas. All the settlers, accordingly, have had to carry a

considerable debt burden. First of all, there is the obligation to pay

for the land over a period of thirty years. Even though the land is

sold to settlers at a price only two-thirds of that paid by the Govern-

ment to European farmers, the cost is still considerable. For one

low-density settlement, the typical range was from Sh 4,000 to Sh

7,000 (£200 to £350) for plots varying in size from 26 to 61 acres;

on one high-density scheme, it ranged from Sh 1,500 to Sh 5,000

with the average about Sh 2,500. Low-density settlers have obtained

a loan for 90 percent of the price at which they have bought the

land; high-density settlers have had a loan for the full amount. In

addition, all have been lent money for developing their land. For

the low-density scheme previously mentioned such development

loans averaged Sh 4,200 to 5,000 per plot; for the high-density

scheme the total was Sh 2,000 per plot. Altogether, the Settlement

2 During these years the Bank also continued to finance land acquisition by

non-Africans. In 1963, the Bank financed the purchase of 469,854 acres, and 39

percent of the purchasers were Africans. In 1964, the purchase of 306,470 acres

was financed, and 80 percent of the borrowers were Africans. Since Africans have

tended to buy smaller farms, the proportion of the total acreage bought by

Africans was substantially smaller than the percentage of African borrowers

from the Bank.

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Fund Trustees extended £3,069,000 in development loans by mid-1965.3

Loan terms

Originally there were many different development loans. Usually,as a minimum, there were (1) 15-year loans for such purposes asfencing and buildings, (2) 10-year loans for the purchase of live-stock, and (3) 5-year loans for "crop establishment," which coveredsuch costs as initial cultivation of land, fertilizers, seeds, etc. Whenloans on still different terms for various special purposes were added,the loan structure was often excessively complex, complicating thetask of loan administration and baffling the settlers. Accordingly, adecision was made in 1963/64 to simplify the structure for newsettlers. Loans to develop holdings are now given only for a standardperiod of 10 years, irrespective of the purpose for which the loanmoney is spent. The moratorium on principal payments for thefirst three years, which was incorporated in earlier loans for bothland purchase and development, has also been omitted. The interestrate of 6Y2 percent has, however, been retained.

The Settlement Officer on each scheme has been responsible forsupervising the disbursement of loans. Basically, disbursement hasbeen authorized only against vouchers covering the purchase ofapproved services and supplies. This has not meant, of course, thatall borrowed money was necessarily well spent. We had the impres-sion, for instance, that some of the lending to high-density settlersfor crop establishment has been unnecessary and wasteful. For manysettlers, this type of credit offered too easy a temptation. In somecases farmers spent part of such a credit for fertilizers, the use ofwhich they then discontinued in the following year. In other casesthe credit has been used two years in a row to pay for mechanicalland preparation and even planting. The employment of loans tofinance annual crop production was facilitated by the fact that suchloans need to be repaid only over a longer period and that, to makeloan administration simpler, the Settlement Fund Trustees havemade debtors responsible for loan service only as and when successiveunits of Sh 500 each have been drawn.

I The amount refers to total estimated expenditures on development loans.In addition there were expenditures of £11,399,000 for the purchase of landand appurtenant assets and £4,016,000 for administration, making a total of£18,484,000. See Kenya, Department of Settlement, Annual Report, 1964-1965,p. 45.

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Repayments

It is not surprising that a large portion of the loans is in default.

Although some of the defaults represent only tardy payments, the

seriousness of the payments situation is indicated by the rise in the

proportion of overdue payments from 36.5 percent in mid-1964 to

56.4 percent in mid-1965 and 61.6 per cent at the end of 1965. This

was, in large measure, due to an increase in the amounts due from

£162,073 in mid-1964 to £898,296 at the end of 1965. For the

settlers who were given a three-year moratorium on principal

payments, the debt service peak will be reached only in the fourth

or fifth year following settlement. It is conceivable therefore that

the proportion of defaults will rise still further.

The proportion of payments overdue on the low-density schemes

has been considerably lower than on the high-density schemes.4 The

primary reason for this is undoubtedly that the average low-density

settler has been a better manager and farmer and has thus been able

to achieve a higher yield per acre.' There have, however, been other

factors contributing to the poor repayment record of the high-

density settlements. It has undoubtedly been more difficult to gener-

ate a sufficient cash surplus on the high density settlements. Part

of this may be the result of the greater risk involved in farming a

smaller holding. For a small farmer, for example, the death of a

single cow may well be a decisive factor in his capacity to meet a

loan installment. Part of the difficulty may also have been caused by

over-lending. Because the high-density settler was not expected to put

up any capital of his own, he was loaded with a disproportionate

debt burden and was generally not sufficiently provident to resist

the temptation to utilize all the credit available to him.

Finally, part of the difference in the repayment record between

these two types of settlements has probably been due to an adventi-

tious circumstance, which has had nothing to do with the type of

settlement. In analyzing development experience in a number of

districts in Kenya, we have already had occasion to point out that

the extent of repayment of credits has by no means been wholly

determined by the farmer's capacity to pay and that their sense of

obligation to repay has always been an important factor. For exam-

ple, the Kikuyu settled on high-density schemes have had a rather

poor repayment record even when they were doing well as settlers.

I At the end of 1965 it was 33.1 per cent compared to 67.1 per cent for the high-

density schemes. Similar figures have not been made available for mid-1965.

I Partial results of a 1964-65 economic survey of settlement schemes revealed

that the gross farm output per acre laid out averaged £5.6 per acre on 9 low-

density schemes and £2.8 on 12 high-density schemes.

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Although the Kikuyu have learned much from their contact withEuropean farming, they have also been the tribe who felt mosthemmed in by European settlement. When the take-over of Euro-pean farms began on the advent of independence, many Kikuyu,and particularly those who had long worked on these farms, con-sidered that the land should belong to them by right. They thus feltno strong obligation to pay for it. It is interesting to note in this con-nection that, on the schemes as a whole, those settlers who were em-ployed on the land when it was still European-owned tend to havethe highest rate of default even though they have shown themselvesto be above-average farmers. Such settlers apparently consider thatthey are entitled to the land.

In a limited number of cases the Department of Settlement hassuccessfully entrusted collection of payments to the cooperative onthe scheme, paying the cooperative a commission of 1 percent.Since most of the settler's sales must go through their cooperative,the latter have the means to deduct any payments due the SettlementFund Trustees. This practice appears to have encouraged a senseof collective responsibility. Moreover, it helps to prepare the coopera-tives to assume the task of loan administration, which the SettlementOfficer now discharges, but for which other provision must be madewhen the Settlement Officer ceases to function.

Staffing and supervision of settlement schemes

As already indicated, each settlement scheme is directed by aSettlement Officer who is expected to be both the administrator andthe chief extension officer. The task of finding able officers for allthe schemes, which by mid-1965 had already increased to 158, hasbeen a formidable one; it is not surprising that there has been agreat variation in quality and performance. To get the necessarynumber of people, the net has had to be cast wide. Active and retiredofficers from other Government departments, former Europeanfarmers and farmers' sons, and a few individuals obtained on techni-cal assistance programs have served as settlement officers. TheEuropeans originally recruited have been progressively replaced andsupplemented at a rapidly increasing rate by hastily-trained Africans,who accounted for 70 percent of the settlement officers by mid-1965.Any visitor to the settlement schemes can quickly discern widedifferences in the capacity and interest of the Settlement Officers,and in the degree in which they have won the confidence of thesettlers. In most cases, too, the turnover among these officers hasbeen such as to impair continuity of administration and supervision.

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Extension work

The extension staff which works under the direction of the Settle-

ment Officer on each scheme consists typically of 1 Al, 2 AAI's,

1 Veterinary Assistant and 2 Veterinary Scouts, and a Cooperative

Inspector or Instructor who usually covers several schemes. The

number of such staff has been adequate in principle, particularly

considering the fact that the number of settlers per scheme has

averaged between 300 to 350 and that extension coverage in the

erstwhile reserves has been much less dense. The staff, however, has

frequently suffered from a lack of direction, since many of the

Settlement Officers have no experience of agriculture or of extension

work and most of them have been so preoccupied with administra-

tive detail, particularly loan administration, 6 that they have had

insufficient time to supervise their extension staff. The veterinary

staff has lacked assistance from professionally qualified veterinarians

or veterinary surgeons of which there has been an acute shortage

in all of Kenya. We found, for example, that a complex of three

schemes on which there were 2,800 grade cattle and 600 wooled

sheep received a visit from a veterinary surgeon only once a week.

The extension work carried out on the settlement schemes has

been basically the same as that elsewhere in Kenya. There has been

no insistence that settlers attend training courses before taking up

farming on their plots. 7 Originally, the Settlement Administration

organized several "area" teams, consisting of one senior and one

junior AAO and several Al's who travelled around the various

settlement schemes giving hastily-improvised instruction courses of

two or three days. This apparently did not prove to be particularly

effective and soon gave way to reliance on the regular FTC's for

short-term training courses. However, in view of the general de-

mands on the FTC's, the latter have seldom been able to hold

special courses designed specially to meet the requirements of settlers

I The experience with the administration of settlement schemes illustrates thatinadequate attention to the training of lower staff often brings about uneconomic

utilization of professional staff at higher levels. The lack of trained bookkeepersand clerks in this instance made it necessary for Settlement Officers to concernthemselves with details of loan administration, which diverted them from muchmore essential tasks. In 1964/65 the Department of Settlement provided a slight

measure of relief for Settlement Officers by establishing an "Administrative Arm"

of 2 travelling officers who, through weekly visits to the schemes, were to assume

such duties as the issue of local purchase orders and of letters of credit againstdevelopment loans. Probably more help has been provided by the assignment,

beginning in 1964/65, of U.S. Peace Corps workers to assist Settlement Officers.I It should be noted, however, that the Margoli-Bunyore settlers on Mautuma

Settlement were required to attend a week's course in cattle management at a

nearby Farmers' Training Center before being allowed to buy grade cattle.

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or to accommodate a sufficient number of settlers in their regularcourses. In some areas where FTC's did not exist or were too remote,Settlement has taken steps to establish additional facilities. Thus itset up one FTC of its own on an experimental farm and collaboratedwith the Christian Council of Kenya in establishing two others.

The Department of Settlement was originally supposed to retainthe administration, including the direction of extension, on eachsettlement scheme for a period of only two and a half years afterthe start of settlement. Thereafter, this responsibility was to betransferred to the Department of Agriculture, to which the agricul-tural extension staff was also to revert. At this stage, the intensivesupervision and direction of the settlement was to stop. However, by1966 it had been virtually agreed to extend the period of super-vision to five years.


Each settlement scheme normally has one cooperative engaged ingeneral marketing, although a few which have taken over a signifi-cant amount of coffee land also have a special coffee cooperative. Intheory, membership in cooperatives has not been compulsory forsettlers, but in practice it has been necessary to belong because onlycooperatives have been able to get the marketing quotas which arenecessary to sell such farm produce as pyrethrum and milk. Bymid-1964, settlement scheme cooperatives already had 10,703 mem-bers even though the first one was founded only in October 1962.The total turnover of these cooperatives in 1963/64 reached£248,659; their share capital was £87,442, supplemented by bor-rowed capital amounting to £224,474.

The usual problems have attended this rapid growth of coopera-tives. It has often been difficult to get good committees selected,sometimes because the settlers on the scheme did not know each otheradequately, and sometimes because the level of education amongthe settlers was very low. It was our impression that in cases wherethe committee was intelligent and educated enough to realize thevalue of good and well-paid staff, the standard of cooperativemanagement was on the whole rather satisfactory. By and largethe cooperatives on the low-density schemes probably have a some-what better record than those on high-density settlements. Thisappears to be due in part to the existence of larger marketablesurpluses, which has enabled the cooperatives to achieve an adequateturnover more quickly. Another factor has been the higher level ofeducation and business experience that tends to characterize thelow-density settlers. It should be noted, however, that the tribal

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origin of the settlers also determines the extent of formal and prac-

tical education and experience. As we have pointed out previously,

the degree of "exposure" to education in the widest sense of that

word has differed widely from tribe to tribe. Thus the level of

cooperative management on some of the high-density schemes has

compared fairly well with that on low-density schemes.

Range of activitiesMost of the cooperatives have been acquiring valuable experience

in a wide range of activities. One of the largest ones-that on

Ainabkoi settlement which in mid-1964 employed 32 people under

a manager paid Sh 450 per month-had among its functions (1)

the marketing of milk and cream, pyrethrum, potatoes, oats and

wool; (2) the sale of farmers' requisites including cattle feed, cattle

medicines, fencing wire, corrugated iron sheeting, milk cans, ferti-

lizers, etc.; (3) the operation of eight cattle dips; (4) the management

of an artificial insemination scheme; and (5) most recently, the

collection of loan payments due to the Settlement Fund Trustees.

In some cases cooperatives have also taken over responsibility for

the operation of newly-established water supply systems on the

schemes. In still other cases they have assisted in setting up means

for scheduling and paying contract tractor services for their members.

The degree of efficiency with which these activities have been

carried out has varied greatly. According to the Department of

Settlement's report for 1963/64, the costs of Settlement cooperativesranged from 10 percent to 28 percent of their turnover with most of

them around 20 percent. The high proportion of costs to turnover,

which characterized most cooperatives, was undoubtedly partly due

to the low volume of operations during the first year of operation. In

part, it can be attributed also to the lack of experience which one

would hope could in time be overcome. The Department of Settle-

ment has established a special unit to train committee members of

the cooperatives once they are formed.

Cooperative ranchingCooperatives have been organized predominantly to provide

certain services for settlers. In a limited number of cases, however,cooperative farming and ranching have been tried. Cooperativeoperation has seemed particularly appropriate for ranching. To be

sure, the Settlement Administration has been interested primarily intaking over and settling land that could be utilized for mixed farming.However, we have already pointed out that it has been necessary in

some cases to acquire ranching land, either because this was the only

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land available near areas where land for settlement was in greatdemand, or because it formed part of a larger tract which was takenover. Whenever it seemed undesirable to take the risk of convertingsuch ranches into general farm land, the proper way to settle thisland under continued ranching posed quite a problem. Past experi-ence did not encourage the establishment of grazing schemes alongthe lines tried in the past. At the same time, the subdivision of largeEuropean ranches into smaller African ranches seemed uneconomic,because it meant the investment of considerable sums in fencing andwater supply for each holding. Under these circumstances, coopera-tive operation appeared to be a possible approach.

Two illustrations of this approach may be cited. One is thetreatment of ranch land constituting part of the Sabatia SettlementScheme. This land was actually divided into 8 holdings of 200 acreseach. With the exception of comparatively small pieces required byeach settler for a homestead and some subsistence crops, all of theland was pooled for operation as a cooperative ranch. The pooledland was divided into 5 unfenced blocks for rotational grazing. Inthis particular case, however, the initial allocation of the land asindividual holdings has apparently whetted the appetite for indi-vidual control as well as ownership. In any event, it was reportedthat cooperative ranching had not proved particularly popular inthis case and that the participants were likely to insist on individualoperation if and when they managed to get sufficient money tofence their own land.

Another cooperative ranch-Koma Rock in Machakos District-started on a somewhat different footing. Here, an initial proposal todivide a 36,000 acre ranching area into sixty 600 acre individually-owned ranches was rejected as uneconomic. From the very first,therefore, the ranch was organized on a cooperative basis. A coopera-tive of 60 members was established to own and operate the ranch,and these were selected from over 1,000 applications received from5 locations in Machakos District. One of the initial qualificationsfor membership was the ability to contribute Sh 7,000 in kind(livestock) and in cash, with a minimum of Sh 1,000 in cash.Unlike at Sabatia, individual ownership of the cattle contributedwas not retained. Each member of the cooperative was given a"residential plot" of 20 acres on which he could live, grow somecrops and graze a maximum of 2 dairy cattle. However, by the endof May 1964, when we visited the scheme, only 4 members hadactually taken up such a plot even though the cooperative wasalready 14 months old.

The cooperative was able to use part of the share contribution in

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cash as well as a 15-year loan of £29,300 from the Settlement Fund

Trustees for the purpose of buying additional cattle. Under the

guidance of a Settlement Officer who was very competent in ranch

management, the cooperative agreed to replace the somewhat un-

productive native Kamba cattle largely with Boran cattle upgraded

with some Sahiwal blood. By May 1964 the herd had been increased

to 2,310 matures (of which 881 were Boran females and 20 Sahiwal

bulls) and 565 immatures. The ranch already appeared to be making

a book profit, although poaching by illegal squatters was creating

a serious disease problem and threatening the eventual expansion

of the ranch herd to the full potential theoretically possible on the

grazing land available.8

Two observations should be made about the operation of this

ranch. One pertains to the problem of securing good management

on a continuing basis. In this case, the initial success of the scheme

was in large part due to the Settlement Officer who had, in fact,

apparently exercised much of the managerial authority of the

African who was the nominal manager. It was therefore not yet

clear whether the African manager would be able to provide the

necessary efficient direction in the long run and whether the eleven-

man cooperative committee who constituted the "board of directors"

would exercise its responsibility for maintaining and supporting good

management without dissension and divided counsel.The second observation relates to the "cooperative" character of

the scheme. In essence, the scheme can hardly be said to be a test

of true cooperative ranching. The organizational form resembles a

limited company more than a cooperative. As already indicated,

only a few members of the cooperative reside on the scheme. The

shareholders might be best characterized as African capitalists. Our

own inquiries disclosed that most of them were comparatively well-

off coffee farmers. Others were civil servants and businessmen. It

was obvious that virtually all of them looked upon this ranching

venture as a potentially profitable business in which they wanted to

invest some capital. It was interesting to note, in this connection,

that many of the members had raised part of their capital contribu-

tion by soliciting funds from relatives and friends. Counting these

"shadow partners," there were probably around 260 investors in

this cooperative. We were told that the same thing was true of

another cooperative ranch, the Lukenia Ranch. This observation

8 We were told that the squatters, who evidently felt they had been unjusti-

fiably overlooked in the selection of cooperative members, had repeatedly

broken down fences and had spread East Coast Fever which had caused 235

deaths in the ranch herd during the past year.

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about the cooperative character of these schemes is made not todisparage them, but only to point out that their operation does notafford a test of the cooperative approach which features cooperativecontribution of labor as well as capital.

Nlore recently "high-density" ranches have also been establishedin cooperative form by Settlement; these are likely to prove a moreadequate test of cooperative operation since the members are ex-pected to reside on the ranch and to contribute their labor as wellas their capital. In Machakos District there are three of thesecooperatives, the first of which is the Konza Ranch. This ranch of30,000 acres was turned over to a cooperative of 150 members inmid-1964. People who had previously been employed on the landcomprising the ranch were in this case given priority in becomingmembers of the cooperative. Each was required, however, to put upSh 2,000 in cash as share capital. All members were to live on four-acre residential plots within the confines of the ranch and to con-tribute, in rotation, the labor required on the ranch.

Effect of settlement on production and employmentWe now come to the impact of settlement on production and

employment. As we have seen, it was hoped that settlement wouldbe attended by an increase of both agricultural output and employ-ment, and that the volume of produce would be maintained andeven raised. As yet, the brevity of experience with settlement andthe lack of comprehensive and comparable records on the pre-and post-settlement period make definitive conclusions impossible.Yet there are indications that the objective can be achieved, eventhough it is still impossible to determine in what measure.

The pattern of productzonFrom the very beginning attempts were made to have the settle-

ment schemes produce for the market much the same type of cropsand animal products that the European farms had been producing.In some respects these attempts have been successful. For instance,the Settlement Administration has insisted, in large part successfully,that the settlement farms be stocked with "grade," or at leastimproved, cattle rather than comparatively unproductive nativecattle. This has involved regular spraying or dipping of cattle, arti-ficial insemination, the sale or castration of bull calves, improvedmilking, higher standards of sanitation essential to the marketing ofmilk and cream, etc. These practices have involved quite an adjust-ment, particularly for those settlers who came from areas which hadno experience with European types of cattle or with the production

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of dairy products for the market. On a number of schemes there has

been considerable resistance to the Settlement Administration'sattempts to exclude native cattle, particularly when the grade cattle

that could be bought with available loan funds did not fully utilize

grazing land, or when settlers could bring their native cattle from

the farms they had in the reserves. However, steady pressure by the

Settlement Administration, including delays in disbursement of

development loans until native cattle were reduced and eliminated,has had its success. Already by the end of 1964/65, 62,714 head of

dairy cattle were owned by settlers, and settlers' cooperative societieshad in that year achieved sales of dairy produce totaling £350,782.

It is not known just how these figures compare with presettlement

data, but it is possible that African farmers will eventually be able

to attain and even surpass the output of dairy produce of their

European predecessors. There has been a growing appreciation on

the settlement schemes of the value of grade cattle and the contri-

bution which dairy produce can make regularly to cash income.

On the other hand, a poor record has been made in the productionof pyrethrum. Thus pyrethrum deliveries by settlement cooperativesocieties have fallen far short of their quotas. This apparently poor

performance has, however, been due largely to factors beyond the

control of the settlers. First of all, the initial years of the settlementprogram coincided with a period of depressed pyrethrum prices

which made the cultivation of this crop comparatively unattractive,as we have already noted in discussing the development of agricul-ture in Nyeri. Secondly, pyrethrum plantings on the European

farms taken over had often been neglected during the period when

the sale of these farms was pending and also during the transitionalperiod just prior to settlement. Finally, when the European farmswere subdivided for settlement, the existing large acreages in pyre-

thrum had to be abandoned in large part and replanted in much

smaller plots on individual holdings. Where pyrethrum had to beplanted anew, this meant a complete sacrifice of yield during the

first eight months; this factor, as well as the comparatively unattrac-tive return from pyrethrum in some cases,9 caused farmers to give

9 A sampling study of five settlement schemes was carried out in 1963/64under the auspices of the Farm Economics Survey Unit. On the two whereecological conditions are favorable to the growing of pyrethrum, this cropyielded a much lower return to all the labor expended on it than any otherfarming activity. Thus on Ainabkoi East the return per work hour (in EastAfrican cents) was 31 for pyrethrum, 42 for potatoes and 103 for cattle. OnMweiga the return was only 13 for pyrethrum as compared with 104 for cattle.These relationships may, of course, change over time.

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this crop a lower priority than food crops. The year 1964/65 wit-nessed a considerable improvement in production, since totaldeliveries apparently amounted to 57 percent of aggregate quotas ascompared with only 26.6 percent in 1963/64.

What other effects settlement will have on the previous patternof production is as yet difficult to determine. Wheat has been animportant crop on many European farms. Where this crop has beengrown on farms purchased for settlement, it has usually beenintroduced also into the farming plans proposed for settlers. It maybe doubted, however, that wheat, which can generally be producedmost efficiently on a large fully mechanized farm, is an ideal cropfor settlers. As for coffee and tea, the production of these does notyet seem to have been greatly affected by settlement. In large partthis is due to the fact that substantial blocks of land planted tocoffee or tea have not been taken over. Large and specialized coffeeand tea farms do not, indeed, lend themselves readily to the type ofsettlement which has been carried on in Kenya and which is mostsuitable for mixed farms combining subsistence and commercialfarming. There have been sizable blocks of coffee trees on some of themixed farms purchased for settlement, and in such cases it has oftenbeen difficult to subdivide this coffee acreage and associate with eachof the resulting plots the requisite acreage for annual cropping andgrazing that would together make it a readily manageable settlementfarm.

Farm output and profitabilityIn examining the actual and potential effect of settlement on

total agricultural output and employment, it must be noted at theoutset that much of the European farming in Kenya has not beenvery intensive. Most European farms have been very large. A censusof such farms in each of the years from 1961 to 1963 disclosed thatabout 90 percent of their area was in holdings of 1,000 acres andover, while well over 50 percent was in holdings of 5,000 acres andover. The census taken in March 1963 showed that of the totalof 7,318,700 acres, only 657,300 acres (about 9 percent) were intemporary crops, 471,600 acres (6.4 percent) in permanent crops,and 239,000 acres (3.3 percent) in grass leys. Undoubtedly a con-siderable portion of European-owned land has been suitable onlyfor extensive farming or ranching. At the same time, it is also truethat the size of the holding has often diminished the need for in-creasing yields and that lack of sufficient capital has in many casesalso prevented the European farmer from intensifying his produc-tion. Land which the European thought suitable only for ranching

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was frequently regarded by the African, in the light of his alternative

opportunities, as quite suitable for cropping.Since actual settlement began only toward the end of 1962 and

some years will obviously be required before settlers can attain their

maximum output, no definitive judgments on the ultimate pro-

ductivity and profitability of settlement farms can as yet be made.

In 1963/64 an initial attempt was made under the auspices of the

Farm Economics Survey Unit to sample farm production and

profitability on two low-density schemes-Ainabkoi and Keben-

and three high-density schemes-Mweiga, Ndalat and Mau Tuma.'0

In each case the farmers covered were only in the first full year of

settlement and could therefore hardly be considered to have achieved

their peak output.Table 1 gives the principal facts disclosed by this survey for the

first four schemes for which data were generally comparable. This

table, however, gives no comparison with pre-settlement estimates.

Attempts have been made to derive these from annual returns made

by the previous European farmers. On this basis the following

comparative figures, in terms of shillings per acre were compiled

by the Farm Economics Survey Unit of Kenya's Economics and

Statistics Division:

Ainabkoi Keben Mweiga Ndalat

Pre-settlement

Gross output 99.60 84.05 111.00 84.09Sales 92.20 70.71 104.61 77.77

Post-settlement (1963/64)

Gross output 122.15 124.01 220.00 109.32Market output 100.16 95.27 157.81 67.11

Some comment on these estimates should be made. "Market output"

in the post-settlement figures includes not only actual sales, but also

some increase in the value of stored crops and of livestock other

than that due to purchases. This seems justifiable, since some of the

output which inevitably goes into "inventory" during the first full

year of production will in subsequent years be available for sale,

or, as in the case of livestock, yield products for sale. However, the

figures on pre-settlement should be treated with considerable

reserve. The Economics and Statistics Division is reported to doubt

their reliability. Presettlement production may in fact be signifi-

10 The results of this survey, except for the Mweiga Settlement, have been

published. See K. H. Clough, Some Fconomic Aspects of Land Settlement in Kenya

(Egerton College, June 1965).

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cantly underestimated. The margin of error may be large enough tocover the indicated difference between post-settlement "marketoutput" and pre-settlement "sales." However, it is certainly notimpossible to achieve some surplus over pre-settlement gross outputeven after a year of settlement, and this surplus may eventually besubstantial. Table 1 tends to show that there is a considerable po-tential for further improvement, particularly among the farmers whoshowed the lowest profits.

The profits shown in Table 1 for the sample farms are calculatedexclusive of loan service and without imputing any value to thesettler family's own labor. They are stated as a percentage of invest-ment, including the cost of the farm as paid by the settler and thevalue of subsequent capital investment. In these terms, averagefarm profits on the farms surveyed on the four schemes ranged from14.4 percent to 19.8 percent. These profit rates, reflecting "account-ing" profits, by no means indicate that sufficient cash surpluseshave been generated to meet loan service. In fact, the survey dis-closed that the cash surplus was not sufficient for loan service on theNdalat Scheme and that it would need to be increased considerablyon all schemes in order to meet the peak loan service in the fourthand fifth year, after the initial three-year moratorium on paymentsof principal had expired.

How far these tentative findings that emerged from the farmeconomics survey of the four schemes might be valid for the otherschemes as well is a moot question. Anyone visiting a number ofthese schemes is made quickly aware of the differences among them,particularly in the quality and initial performance of the settlers.Comparisons of pre- and post-settlement production will also vary,depending on the degree of development achieved on the Europeanfarm or farms prior to settlement. While it is not easy to generalize,such testimony as we have heard and such evidence as we haveseen incline us to believe that, in the aggregate, it should not bevery difficult for the settlement schemes to surpass the previousgross output of the European farms that have been taken over."Preliminary and partial results of an economic survey of settlementfarms in 1964-65 showed that on 20 settlement schemes average grossoutput per acre of £3.6 still lagged behind estimated pre-settlementproduction of £4.2 per acre. For 9 low-density schemes, however,the average 1964/65 output was £5.6 as compared with a presettle-

11 This statement should not be interpreted as reflecting our view that settle-ment schemes are likely to prove economically justified. It is obvious that anyincrease in output will be very costly in relation to the large sums that have beenand are still to be expended on settlement schemes.

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TABLE 1: FARMING PATTERNS AND RESULTS ON FOUR SETTLEMENT SCHEMES, 1963/64

Mweiga Ndalat Keben (Lessos) Ainabkoi EastAverage of Average of Average of Average of

17 17 15 15 15 20 14 21Farms Farms Farms Farms Farms Farms Farms Farmswith with with with with with with with

34 Highest Lowest 30 Highest Lowest 35 Highest Lowest 35 Highest LowestFarms Profit Profit Farms Profit Profit Farms' Profit' Profit' Farms' Profit' Profit'

1. Farming system

Acreage of farmsFood crops

Maize 0.89 1.12 0.66 2.9 2.9 3.0 4.7 6.3 3.5 2.0 2.7 1.5English potatoes 1.24 1.23 1.25 1.3 1.4 1.3

o Beans 0.97 0.96 0.98Miscellaneous 0.69 0.43 0.94 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.0

Subtotal' 3.79 3.74 3.77 2.9 2.9 3.0 5.2 6.9 4.0 4.4 5.1 3.8

Tree cropsb 2.6 1.2 3.6Pyrethrum 0.46 0.40 0.51 1.21 0.7 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.3Grazing 3.64 3.28 3.99 15.7 15.3 16.0 17.3 15.4 18.6 29.1 30.7 28.0Other 0.51 0.47 0.54

Grand Total 8.40 7.89 8.81 18.6 18.2 19.0 23.7 23.0 24.2 37.7 39.1 36.7

CattleNo. Livestock units (L.U.) 2.12 2.24 2.0 4.1 4.8 3.4 7.0 8.2 6.0 8.5 10.1 7.3No. of cows 1.89 1.94 1.82 2.9 3.5 2.4 5.3 6.4 4.5 6.9 8.1 6.1Grazing acreage per L.U. 1.71 1.63 1.81 3.8 3.2 4.7 2.5 1.9 3.1 3.31 2.97 3.61

11. Capital invested (Sh.) 6,263 6,471 6,056 6,674 6,965 6,384 12,128 11,549 12,563 11,603 12,363 11,097

Ill. Farming resultsOutput (Sh.)

Consumed on farms 518 607 430 782 954 610 681 943 485 829 1,097 650Otherc 1,316 2,036 595 1,259 1,973 542 2,258 3,326 1,458 3,776 5,273 2,778

Total 1,834 2,643 1,025 2,041 2,927 1,152 2,939 4,269 1,943 4,605 6,370 3,428Per L.U. (Sh.) 383 567 188 306 438 158 281 386 167 358 441 288Costs before loan service (Sh.) 655 541 770 698 721 673 1,170 1,095 1,226 2,386 2,756 2,140Profit before loan service (Sh.)Per farm 1,179 2,103 255 1,343 2,205 482 1,769 3,174 717 2,219 3,614 1,288Per acre 141 266 29 72 121 25 75 138 30 59 92 35Percentage of capital invested 18.8 32.5 4.2 20 32 8 15 27 6 19 29 12

IV. Labor used per farm

HoursTotal 2,867 1,489 2,429 6,410o Hired 863 183 1,403 3,496

c Expenditured (Sh.) 224 208 239 73 74 72 559 442 647 694 743 661Output per work-hour (Sh.)All laborGross 0.64 1.37 1.21 0.72Netg 0.49 0.95 0.95 0.45Family laborNeth 0.59 1.03 1.74 0.76

'Excluding acreage in crops during second cropping season.6Tea on Keben settlement; tree plantations on Ainabkoi East.'Including marketed output as well as value of increase in harvested crops and livestock but excluding livestock purchases.dExcluding labor for capital expenditure except in the case of Mweiga, where they are not likely to have been significant in relation to the total.'Actually plots, for in a number of cases one farmer has more than one plot.fIncluding established tea of 17.5 acres on 3 of 27 farms (as distinct from 35 plots).eNet income without accounting loan service or wages as costs.hNet income without accounting loan service as a cost.SOURCE: Farm Economics Survey Unit.


ment figure of £3.8; and in a few years the settlement schemes as awhole may well surpass pre-settlement output.

At the same time it is quite probable that the cash margins of

many settlement farms on a significant number of schemes will prove

insufficient to cover loan service. An increase in the efficiency of"low-profit" farmers could, however, obviate this possibility. Forexample, Table l points up the great difference between the averageefficiency of the farms surveyed on the four schemes when thesefarms are divided into two groups, those with the highest and those

with the lowest profits per acre. This difference could presumablybe considerably narrowed in a number of ways-by properly directedagricultural extension work; by proceeding vigorously against

settlers who have neglected their holdings; and by selecting settlers

for future schemes with greater care.Most settled farms are not yet intensively worked. In many cases

a greater degree of intensification could be achieved if more familylabor were used and, particularly if the adult males in the familywere prepared to work harder. The modest labor input by settlers'families has been disclosed by the sample survey already cited andis revealed in Table 2. Considering that there are usually at least

TABLE 2: FAMILY LABOR INPUT ON SELECTED SETTLEMENTSCHEMES

(in work hours)

Total Family Labor Adult Male Labor

Entire Daily Entire DailyYear Average, Year Average,

Settlement schemeAinabkoi East 2,914 9.71 1,049 3.5Keben 1,027 3.42 692 2.3Ndalat 1,305 4.35 541 1.8Mweiga 2,004 6.68 n.a. n.a.

'Calculated on the basis of 300 work days per year.SOURCE: Clough, Some Economic Aspects of Land Settlement in Kenya.

two adults per family, quite apart from one or two children whomay be able to work, the average daily number of hours workedby all members of the family is rather small. Women and children domost of the work-usually between 50 percent and 60 percent, buton Ainabkoi East as much as 82 percent. Adult males contribute verylittle labor, ranging from a daily average of 1.8 hours on Ndalat to3.5 hours on Ainabkoi East. In the latter area, where the labor inputdoes not vary greatly during the year, considerable expenditures on

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hired labor could undoubtedly be saved if male farmers were pre-pared to work harder. In Ndalat a wider seasonal variation in laborutilization was noted, but even at the peak of the season, the amountof family labor used was only about six hours per day. Yet thesample of Ndalat farmers spent on the average Sh 286 to havetheir land plowed by tractor. In Keben also family labor did notseem to be fully employed at any time of the year, even thoughconsiderable hired labor was used.

With more family labor the cropped area could be increased orcultural practices improved so as to raise yields. More labor couldalso be usefully devoted to proper pasture maintenance and improve-ment. We noted this particularly in the course of a visit to the Ainab-koi settlement area.

The increase in employmentThere is no doubt that the settlement schemes are directly sup-

porting a number of people considerably greater than in the pre-settlement period. The gross increase in employment comes from thefamilies settled and from the labor they hire to help them in workingtheir holding. To obtain the net increase, the number of familiesemployed on the European farms prior to settlement must, of course,be deducted. The data for an accurate calculation of this sort arenot yet available, but a reasonably valid estimate can be made.For instance, approximate figures on eight settlement schemesindicate that the number of families settled may well exceed by 25percent the families previously employed by European farmers.In addition, there is a considerable amount of hired labor. As wehave seen in some of the preceding case studies, the African farmergenerally has a high propensity to employ labor. Table 1 gives thetotal hours of labor and those contributed by hired labor on thesample of farms surveyed on four settlement schemes. As might beexpected, the amount of hired labor and the proportion to the totalwas lower for the two high-density schemes which, in view of thesize of the farm, can rely more largely on family labor. On the low-density schemes the number of settlers may well be smaller than thenumber of families employed in the pre-settlement period, but thisis more than offset by the amount of hired labor used by the settlers.

The employment of so much hired labor is not an unmixedblessing, particularly when it serves not so much to raise output as todispense the adult males in the settlers' families from working.Excessive expenditures on labor obviously make it more difficultfor settlers to make their loan payments. Table 1 indicates that thecash outlays on labor are significant for three out of four of the

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settlement schemes covered. Only for Ndalat is the outlay negligible,

and that is only because, in this case, there is a correspondingly

larger expenditure for contract tractor cultivation.

Farm efficiency and settler selection

Table 1 also reveals differences in farm performance and efficiency,

both as between settlements and between groups of farmers on each

settlement. The difference between efficient and inefficient farmers

on each settlement seems the more striking, particularly since

Table 1 understates the wide range in efficiency by "averaging" the

more efficient and the less efficient farmers each as a group. We

have already noted that the Farm Economics Survey Unit has

demonstrated the existence of such a great disparity also in its studies

of African farms elsewhere. Unfortunately, none of these studies

have thrown much light on the reasons for this variation in efficiency,

and, particularly, on the extent to which these differences are related

to the background and experience of the farmers. In the settlement

schemes it is particularly important to explore this relationship, for it

may well be that improvements in the selection of the settlers can do

much to better the performance of the schemes.

Criteria of settler selection

We have already alluded to the differences in criteria which are,

at least in theory, applied in selecting settlers for high-density and

low-density schemes. There is little doubt that the emphasis on

landlessness and lack of employment in settling the high-density

scheme has sometimes resulted in recruiting unenterprising and

discontented settlers who have not done well. On the other hand,

"landlessness" has not necessarily meant lack of farm experience.

In fact, on a considerable number of high-density schemes the ma-

jority of "landless" settlers has been the families who had been work-

ing there previously as laborers on the land when it was still Euro-

pean-owned;12 thid type of settler has often managed better than

the average, owing to this previous experience. Even the unemployed

in Kenya, as indeed in other African countries, have usually retained

a close association with land and are usually not devoid of some

agricultural experience. For the larger farms of the low-density

schemes, it has undoubtedly been desirable to insist on settlers who

had some capital and the experience necessary for the management

12 Families which had worked on the European farm for four years were

indeed given priority in settlement provided they belonged to an "eligible"

tribe.

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of such a holding. The possession of capital is usually evidence ofsome enterprise, and its investment in a settlement farm gives thesettler a greater stake in his land and may help him to avoid anexcessively burdensome debt. On the other hand, experience hasshown that a man with capital often has a business or an occupationwhich pays well, and he may therefore acquire a settlement plotwithout living on it or without giving sufficient attention to farmingit properly. We noted that farmer absenteeism was more markedon low-density schemes and that some of the most neglected farmsbelonged to businessmen or Government employees who wereoccupied elsewhere. In a number of cases such people have managedto obtain two or more settlement plots on a scheme without reallyfarming any of them adequately."3 At the same time, those settlerswho have had some broadening experience, whether in business orother occupations, and have managed to earn and save money oftenturn out to be the most progressive and efficient farmers, providedthey either live on their farms or check frequently on the manage-ment of their holdings.

The need for different types of settlementIt would seem idle to argue the relative merits of high-density and

low-density schemes. High-density schemes do not necessarilymaximize the number of people on the land, and low-density schemesdo not always maximize output. Experience suggests that there are"good" and "bad" schemes in both types of settlement, when resultsare judged by their capacity to increase both production and em-ployment. The settlers on low-density schemes have on the averageproved to be of higher quality, owing to the greater care exercisedin their selection, the insistence on a larger capital contribution bythe farmers themselves and, possibly, to better staffing of suchschemes. On the other hand, there was undoubtedly a limited supplyof good farmers and managers capable of operating larger farms.Under the conditions prevailing in Kenya it seemed justified to pro-vide farms of varying sizes and potentialities in any large scalesettlement effort. There was some merit in adjusting the types ofsettlement opportunities to the existing wide range of farming andmanagerial skills (including the ability to manage efficiently bothfamily and hired labor) as well as the wide range in the degree ofneed for land.

13 In the samiiple survey of settlement farms in 1963/64 it was found that onKeben all of the six farmers having more than one plot each were in the groupwith the lowest profits per acre. On Ainabkoi East all but one of the nine farmerswith more than one plot fell in this saine group.

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It has been our impression that most farmers in Kenya are

capable of managing only rather small farms. At the same time

there is the minority of really good farmers who have demonstrated,

by their enterprise and accomplishments, their capacity to "gradu-

ate" to larger holdings. The number of such people, although

growing, should not be exaggerated. The traditional appetite for

more land often exceeds the ability to manage it effectively. In our

study of Nyeri we have noted that the medium-size farms tended to

be the best, and the larger holdings were often comparatively

neglected or badly managed. On almost every settlement scheme,

one tends to find farmers who are already yearning for a larger

farm even though they have only recently settled their existing

farms and are by no means fully utilizing their land.

Considering the extent of the population pressure on land in

certain parts of Kenya, it is difficult to ignore need as a criterion

in the selection of most of the settlers. We have already noted that

tribal considerations greatly limited the possibility of using settlement

to relieve such pressures. However, even within the framework of

these considerations, settlement and the need to relieve land

shortage in the erstwhile reserves have not been effectively co-

ordinated. In the Kikuyu districts a large percentage of farmers have

submarginal holdings, so that one or more members of the family

have to eke out a living by accepting permanent or occasional jobs.

Yet such people have not generally met the criterion of "landless-

ness," and it is noteworthy that the divisional land boards in Nyeri

District have disapproved land sales which such small holders

proposed to make in an effort to qualify as "landless." In provinces

or regions which have experienced less land pressure, there has

generally been no insistence on absolute landlessness even in

qualifying settlers for high-density schemes. There, the practice of

"graduating" from a holding in the reserves to a larger settlement

farm has given rise to another problem. Since it is generally impos-

sible to sell the old holding, it is entrusted to a caretaker who often

mismanages or neglects it. In the Elgeyo Division of Elgeyo-

Marakwet District we found, for example, that a considerable

number of the most progressive farmers had abandoned their farms

in favor of still larger ones on settlement schemes. There were

farmers in the Division who were anxious to buy these holdings,

but they did not have sufficient means to do so.

Thus in the crowded agricultural areas, settlement could have

been more effective as a means for relieving land shortage by recruit-

ing a portion of farmers with submarginal holdings for settlement

and by requiring them to sell their old holdings in such a way as to

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make these available for supplementing some of the remaining un-economic farms. Similarly, in areas where land may not be acutelyscarce but where farmers are "graduating" to bigger settlementfarms, it would have been useful to have required the sale of the oldfarms and to have assisted able and willing buyers with some formof financing. By linking the purchase and financing of land in thesettlement areas with the disposal and financing of land in the oldreserves, the development of both areas might have been more effec-tively coordinated. At the same time the settler who had sold his oldland would have had more ready capital to develop his new farm.

Some other problems

The problem of mechanizationSettlement has posed an interesting issue with respect to mechani-

zation of cultivation. On European farms land preparation has beenalmost entirely mechanized and the production of such a crop aswheat was mechanized at all stages, from plowing to harvesting.On the other hand, nearly all the Africans were accustomed to worktheir land either by hand or with oxen. Initially, virtually all settlershad several acres broken and plowed for them by tractor, with thecost defrayed out of that portion of their loan earmarked for cropestablishment. This work was done either by the Settlement Ad-ministration, with tractors and implements taken over from theEuropean farmers, or by contractors who have been largely Euro-pean but have included a growing number of Africans. Mechanizedland preparation in the first year seemed a logical step to ensuretimely planting of crops. This has been particularly true in thoseareas where grassland had to be broken and hand-breaking was atime-consuming process taking, for example, lip to two man-monthsper acre in the Mweiga settlement area. The real problem, however,has been whether continued use of machinery after the first year iseconomically desirable.

It is evident that a large number of settlers, having once enjoyedthe convenience of mechanization, have continued to rely on it. Afew of these have bought tractors of their own, but the rest use con-tractors. Some of the schemes were settled by farmers accustomedto the use of animal traction, so that oxen and ox plows have beenbrought in from the old reserves to do plowing. On a few schemesthere has been a partial reversion to the use of the hoe by people,like the Kikuyu, who have long practised hand cultivation. To alarge extent, however, mechanization appears to have become apermanent feature of settlement farming.

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Where settlements have been established on wheat-growing areas

and settlers are expected to continue growing wheat as the principal

cash crop, mechanization would indeed seem to be essential. For

example, on the Elgeyo Border and Kaptagat settlements, which are

largely devoted to wheat, farmers evidently find it possible to engage

a contractor to plow, harrow, fertilize, seed and harvest wheat at a

total cost of Sh 135-145 per acre. This still leaves the farmer with a

balance of Sh 90-100 per acre if his yield averages 6 bags per acre.

However, the farmer himself contributes little or nothing except the

land which the Government has enabled him to buy on easy terms.

He may still get a return from his land on this basis, but it is not

clear that mechanized wheat production is the best use of his land.

In any event, the cost of production must have increased by com-

parison with that of his European predecessor. Since wheat is now

grown on a large number of comparatively small fields, the increased

travel time of tractors and implements has, according to reports,

raised the cost of mechanical operations appreciably. Wheat growing

would not seem to be ideally suited to small farms. The superior

economics of large-scale production might have been preserved,

either by selling the large wheat farms as a unit to such Africans as

might have been able to nmanage it, or by insisting that the land, if

apportioned among a considerable number of settlers, be pooled in

such a way as to facilitate the mechanized growing of wheat in large

blocks.For crops other than wheat, the merits of continued mechaniza-

tion are less obvious. On some schemes the alternatives are tractor

or hoe; on others, tractor or oxen. The comparative economics needs

to be decided in the light of a number of factors, e.g., the heaviness

of the soil; the importance of timeliness in land preparation; the

existence of critical peaks in the employment of farm labor; and

factors that might critically affect the rate of tractor utilization,

such as the prevalence of two-season cropping and the proportion

of farmers willing and able to employ tractors in any given area.

The saving of labor should not enter into the decision unless this

labor has a more econornic alternative employment at the time.

The comparative merits of mechanical and animal traction are, of

course, affected by another consideration, namely the alternative

employment of grassland used for the grazing of oxen. Where such

grazing can be employed to maintain dairy cattle, it is obviously

necessary to compare the net value of the livestock output of the

acreage required for plow oxen with that of savings in cultivation

costs resulting from ox plowing. A thorough analysis of the compara-

tive costs of various methods of land cultivation would seem to be

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useful in determining future settlement policy and, particularly, indeciding to what extent Government should provide credit foracquisition of tractors by farmers and contractors.

The pattern of settlementIn general, settlement has not been utilized as an opportunity to

experiment with new methods of production or settlement. To besure, it has been the vehicle of introducing a portion of the settlersto types of crops and animal husbandry and to methods of cultivationwith which they had little or no previous acquaintance. But all thesehad already existed on the European farms before, and the principalconcern of settlement has apparently been to replace a small numberof European farmers with a relatively large number of African farm-ers and, in the process, to disturb as little as possible pre-existingpatterns of production and methods of cultivation. Among otherthings the pattern of scattered African homestead settlement hasbeen combined with retention of most of the features of land utiliza-tion that characterized the European-owned farms. There wereundoubtedly strong reasons for adhering to the normal pattern ofsettlement. In principle the farmer can look after his holding and hisstock better when he lives on his farm. The congregation of livestockin villages also may be conducive to the spread of disease. Then, too,there is the undoubted preference of the farmer himself for livingon his own farm rather than in villages. Yet, one is still inclined towonder in retrospect whether it would not have been possible toexperiment with small village settlements, particularly on a few ofthe high-density schemes where farms were rather small and thedistance between a village residential plot (including, presumably,space for a small garden and livestock stable) and the rest of theholding might not have been an obstacle to efficient farming. Thegrouping of farm houses could have facilitated the task and reducedthe cost of providing water supplies and other services on the settle-ments. It might even have made contacts between extension workersand farmers somewhat easier; the introduction and supervision ofcattle dipping or spraying in small village settlements could perhapshave reduced rather than increased the danger of disease. There was,to be sure, the unhappy experience with "villagization" in theKikuyu districts. The abandonment of the villages into which theKikuyu were grouped during the Mau Mau emergency has oftenbeen cited as confirming the unwillingness of Kenyan Africans tolive in such villages. Yet this experience appears hardly to havebeen a true test, given the conditions under which village living wasmade compulsory and the inadequate planning and facilities of the

217


villages. On the Mwea-Tebere irrigation scheme, as we shall note sub-

sequently, settlers found the superior income afforded by the scheme

such that they were willing to accommodate themselves to the re-

quirement of living in villages.

Conclusions

In these comments we have been concerned not with the wisdom

of purchasing European-owned farms and settling them with Afri-

cans, but only with the effectiveness of the organization and methods

used in the settlement program and the results achieved.

For Kenya it was important that settlement be carried out in such

a way as to increase employment in agriculture and, at the same

time, to raise as far as possible the levels of production. The experi-

ence with settlement is too brief and the evidence too fragmentary

to warrant definitive conclusions about the impact on production

and employment. Indications point to the likelihood that pre-

settlement output can and will be exceeded. In part this is simply

due to the fact that many European farms were not very fully de-

veloped; some of the areas selected for low-density settlement were

particularly underdeveloped. By sirnply putting more people on the

land and letting them produce enough for their subsistence as well

as for the market, it has in many cases not been too difficult to exceed

previous output. Africans have responded rather readily to the op-

portunities to adopt more or less the same pattern and methods of

production that prevailed on the European farms. The settlements'

marketing cooperatives have even provided the same links with

nation-wide marketing organizations that European farmers had.

However, production on the settlements could be much higher. On

many settlements the farmers themselves could work harder to raise

their output. More rigorous screening of settlers and eviction of

more who neglect their holdings would help. The agricultural ex-

tension work could also be organized more effectively with the

objective of narrowing the existing disparity between good and poor

settlers. In the past, settlement extension workers have often had

little effective direction, partly because they have been cut off from

the Department of Agriculture and partly because the Settlement

Officers have been too preoccupied with the minutiae of settlement

administration or have had little or no experience of extension.

There is little doubt that the land that has been settled now sup-

ports considerably more people than before. The number of settlers'

families exceeds, on the average, the number of African families

previously employed by the European farmers, and the settlers are

themselves, in many cases, using considerable and even excessive

218


amounts of hired labor. It is not improbable that African employ-ment on settled land surpasses pre-settlement employment byaround 50 percent. This does not mean that the settlement programhas effectively utilized the potentialities for relieving the overcrowd-ing and shortage of land evident in certain parts of Kenya. In largepart, tribal and regional considerations have prevented the use ofmuch European land to relieve, for example, overcrowding in theKikuyu districts and in Machakos. Even where limited possibilitiesfor this existed, the insistence on landlessness prevented the settle-ment of owners of submarginal holdings and the use in turn of theirland to alleviate to some extent the plight of remaining smallholders.In fact, the opportunity of relating settlement more intimately tothe development needs of the old reserves has not been fully utilized.In the provinces or regions where Africans have not suffered fromacute land shortages, the transfer of African farmers to settlementschemes has in some instances impaired output in the old establishedAfrican areas. This has been due, at least partly, to the lack of anymeans of financing the sale to other Africans of farms which settlershave left behind in the old "reserves."

It is difficult as yet to make a very meaningful comparison of theeffectiveness of high-density and low-density settlements in raisingoutput and agricultural employment. On the average the low-densitysettlements have unquestionably fared better, largely because thesettlers have been better selected and have not been so overburdenedwith financial obligations. Yet there are good and bad schemesamong both types of settlements. The differences in efficiencyamong settlers in each scheme are in many cases more marked thanthe differences in the average standards of production and husbandryamong the schemes as a whole. Unfortunately, there has been nosystematic attempt to determine to what extent variations in effi-ciency are correlated with the previous experience and backgroundof the settlers. More careful selection of both high-density and low-density settlers would undoubtedly have produced better results.Strict insistence on continuous residence on settlement farms wouldalso have helped. On the settlements as well as elsewhere in Kenya,we have noted wide differences in the inanagerial ability of farmers.Experience would suggest that when settlers must be selected in thelight of both their capacity and need, the types and size of settlementholdings should also reflect this difference in managerial skill. Todetermine in advance what people are likely to display the bestinanagerial skills is undoubtedly difficult, but the task might havebeen made easier if there had been more farm management surveysthroughout Kenya, and these surveys had tried to determine the

219


identifying characteristics of the farmers who had achieved the best

results.Since the Settlement Administration supervises the schemes for

only a brief period, the need for responsible cooperative organization

of settlers is particularly important. The degree of success achieved

by settlers' cooperatives so far inevitably varies substantially and

tends to be strongly influenced by the previous education and ex-

perience of the settlers. Some of the cooperatives have done well

and have extended their responsibility beyond marketing to the

operation of cattle dips, artificial insemination schemes and water

supply facilities, and in some cases, even to the collection of payments

on settlement loans. On many settlements, however, there is little

evidence of any feeling of collective responsibility for the successful

operation of the scheme.

220

7. OBSERVATIONS ON SOME IRRIGATION SCHEMES

IntroductionWe examined two irrigation schemes in Kenya not with a view to

making an exhaustive retrospective appraisal, but rather for thepurpose of obtaining an impression of the principal problems facedby both management and farmers. One of these schemes-Mwea-Tebere in Kirinyaga District can be characterized as successful,but the other-Perkerra, in a rather remote part of Baringo District-has barely begun to show some promise, after many extremelydisappointing years.

PerkerraAs of 1963/64 there were about 1,500 acres under irrigation at

Perkerra. Of this total, about 320 acres were under "basin" irrigationand the balance under "furrow" irrigation. The tenants numbered349, including 300 having 4 acres and the rest, 1 acre. The cashcrop is onions, of which 349 tenants produced about 1,200 tonswith a gross value of £31,370 on 416 acres. The tenants grow irri-gated maize, principally for subsistence, and keep a considerablenumber of cattle, partly on irrigated Star Grass pasture. While manyof the tenants now earn a good income, the scheme went throughmany difficult years and the Government continues to incur sub-stantial deficits in operating it. In 1963/64 current expenditurestotalling nearly £30,000 exceeded income from water rates andother charges for services by £16,500.

Mwea- TebereOn Mwea-Tebere, located about 60 miles northeast of Nairobi,

approximately 5,000 acres of heavy, rather impervious black clay("black cotton") soil are under irrigation, exclusively for the pro-duction of rice. The paddy yield per acre-an average of 2.35 tonsin 1962 and 1963-is very high (see Table 2, p. 232). Each tenantgets 4 acres of "black" rice land and is also permitted to grow othercrops, principally maize and beans, on an allotment of unirrigatedreddish-brown lateritic "red soil" land. In 1963 the 1,340 tenantsaveraged an income of Sh 2,812 from rice after paying the scheme

221


management for all charges and services, and the scheme manage-

ment's revenues exceeded its current (i.e., noncapital) expenditures

by about £69,000.1Mwea-Tebere has not had the checkered history that charac-

terized the evolution of Perkerra. From the beginning it was possible

to grow a highly lucrative crop-rice-the more so because the

combination of moderate temperatures and high degree of insolation

made for unusually high yields. It was possible to devote the entire

irrigated area to the cultivation of rice, partly because the tenants,

though previously not accustomed to either producing or consuming

rice, found this cereal a quite palatable food, and partly because

the rainfall was sufficiently high to permit the cultivation of such

traditional crops as maize on the unirrigated "red soils" of the area.

Planning and research

Both schemes were started in the early 'fifties with the initial

purpose of giving constructive employment to Kikuyu who had been

detained under the Mau Mau Emergency Regulations. The timing

of their start was determined by the availability of this labor and

not by the completion of any prior studies of the technical and

economic feasibility of the projects. Both schemes have therefore

suffered from a lack of adequate preparatory work, although the

consequences of this have been much more severe for Perkerra than

for Mwea-Tebere.At Perkerra there was little or no advance technical planning. A

few trial irrigation plots were laid out on the right bank of the

Perkerra River in 1952, but the work on the main project on the left

bank began in 1954, on the basis of hastily improvised plans. Al-

though 20 cusecs of "run-of-the-stream" water were supposed to be

available, there was not much knowledge about the reliability and

distribution of this supply, let alone the water requirements for

various crops. It was only in 1959 that a new survey indicated that

water might be sufficient for 2,400 acres of crops in the long rains

and, at most, 1,200 acres in the short rains.2 In retrospect this lack

of hydrological data has not been a real handicap, since the slow

I The scheme's annual report for 1963 gives revenue as £122,803 and recurrent

expenditures as E53,631. The latter do not include interest on capital or certain

staff expenditures which are paid directly by the Ministry of Agriculture and

which may amount to around £16,000. The revenue may also include a small

amount from sale of capital assets. However, there is, no doubt, a considerable

surplus of current incomle over current expenditures.2 It should be noted that, except for a very preliminary survey in 1962/63,

there has not been a study of the possibility of storing water upstream in order to

increase the reliability of irrigation and the area under irrigation.

222

Kenya: Irrigation Schemes

rate of agricultural development has not yet nmade water a criticallylimiting factor. More serious has been the development of part ofthe area-320 acres-for basin irrigation. Much of this area is nowabandoned or used only for mnaize, because it has become badlyinfested with nut grass (cyperus rotundis). This infestation has ap-parently been greatly encouraged by the fact that water in muchof the basin-irrigated area remains standing too long in the absenceof proper levelling and re-levelling every second year.3 Basin irriga-tion has certainly proved poorly adapted for the cash crops thatcan be grown on the scheme.

At Perkerra no attempt was made to determine, by prior researchand a pilot project, what cropping pattern would be technicallyfeasible and economically attractive. There was no adequate soilsurvey, and a research station with 65 acres of irrigated land wasestablished well after the project was begun. This station has un-doubtedly done useful work in experimenting with a number ofcrops as well as with cattle and pasture management. In many cases,however, crops were "tried out" on tenants before there was rea-sonable assurance that they could succeed. In other words, croppingon the scheme has primarily evolved through trial and error on thetenants' own holdings; it was not until 1960 that onions, which arenow credited with "saving" the scheme, were first tried and quicklydemonstrated their potentiality. Before that, many crops were intro-duced and failed, frequently causing tenants to abandon their hold-ings. Tomatoes, for example, were grown on a considerable scaleduring 1956, 1957 and 1958, but at that time the damage inflictedby blight, mildew and eelworm was such as to make this crop acomplete failure. Although onions have proved a success, experi-mental work on a limited number of other crops, including bananas,tomatoes and cotton, has been continued. This work has been on arestricted scale, since the scheme has not had a research officer forsome time, but it is interesting to note that more recent trials indicatetomatoes with a yield of about 18 tons per acre could now be suc-cessfully grown. At the time of our visit in 1964, consideration wasbeing given to having plots of one-third of an acre of tomatoes grownby 32 tenants in the 1964/65 season. Cotton can also produce goodyields.

On the other irrigation scheme, a small pilot irrigation projectwas established in 1951.4 In 1954, when it was decided to proceed

I Up to the present the only effective way found to eliminate nut grass is deepplowing and desiccation, followed by a dense vegetative crop as beans.

I Even before that year-namely, in 1949 rice trials had been started in theNguka swamp.

223


with the main irrigation scheme, the experimental work was only

in its initial stages. However, it had been demonstrated that rice

could be successfully grown on the black soils during the "short

rains" season when temperatures and sunlight were clearly adequate

for the achievement of good yields. At the same time no proved

techniques had been developed for cropping and irrigating the red

soils. After a while it was therefore necessary to suspend the develop-

ment of irrigation works on such soils. Since then, the scheme's re-

search farm has apparently concentrated largely on the problems

of the red soils. A rapid turnover in research staff has been a con-

tinuing and serious handicap. The most promising results have

actually been achieved not on the research station, but by six

tenants who have been experimenting, under the direct guidance

of an Assistant Agricultural Officer, with the growing of such crops

as onions, tomatoes, beans and cabbages on red soils irrigated partly

by overhead irrigation.

Operation of the schemes

Management organization and staffing

Both schemes are under the central Government's jurisdiction

and are staffed and organized in essentially the same way. A brief

description of the organization at Mwea-Tebere should suffice.

Under the manager at headquarters there is an AAO in charge of

construction, transport and workshops, and another in charge of

research. Each of the two sections 5 into which the scheme is divided-

Nguka (Mwea) and Tebere, with 2,620 and 2,345 cropped acres

respectively in 1963-is under the direction of an AAO. He heads

a staff of 4 field assistants, 1 head water guard and 5 water guards.

The latter are responsible for the operation of the irrigation network

under the guidance of the AAO. The field assistants, each of whom

is in charge of approximately 600 acres or 150 tenants, supervise

the day-to-day work, ensuring, above all, the timeliness of all the

work for which the tenants are responsible. Since field assistants need

to know only the one crop, they have been selected not so much on

the basis of any previous agricultural training as on the basis of

leadership qualities. The smallest area within the block is the unit

which is served by a single water intake and may range from 32 to

320 acres, depending on the topography. In each unit there is a

"head cultivator," a man who is selected from the tenants and is ex-

pected, against payment of a monthly allowance of Sh 30, to help

I Since our visit a third section, Thiba, has been added.

224


the extension staff organize communal work groups for such tasksas cleaning out feeders and drains, to set the pace in initiating allagricultural operations and to try any new techniques that havebeen devised.

The organization for the Perkerra scheme is, of course, muchsmaller. There the manager has had to look after the research farmand has been assisted by only one AAO who, in addition to beingin charge of the field work, has had to keep an eye on the workshop.

A serious handicap of both schemes has been the lack of financialand administrative autonomy-a deficiency which was recognizedby a decision taken in 1965 to establish an autonomous IrrigationBoard to operate irrigation schemes on behalf of the central Govern-ment. The management of such schemes is very much akin to abusiness operation, with a wide range of activities, including or-ganization of production, operation and maintenance of machinery,procurement of supplies, marketing, etc. Experience at MIwea-Tebere and Perkerra, and, indeed, with similar schemes in othercountries, demonstrates that these operations can be carried outefficiently only by delegating extensive authority to management,enabling the latter to deal flexibly with a wide range of matterswithin the framework of broad policies and expenditure authoriza-tions. One particular area in which experience has shown managerialdiscretion to be necessary is the recruitment and determination ofconditions of employment of personnel. Inflexible salary and wagescales, for example, have often inade it impossible to keep or recruitvital personnel, particularly for machinery maintenance. At Mwea-Tebere they have prevented the payment of sufficient overtime andincentive bonuses to tractor drivers, resulting in a serious loss of staffmorale. Poor maintenance and lower labor productivity apparentlyaccounted for the fact that the number of acres worked per tractordeclined substantially from 1962/63 to 1963/64.

Selection of tenantsThe method of selecting tenants differs somewhat on the two

schemes. At Perkerra tenants are chosen by a Tenants' AdvisoryCommittee which is chaired by the District Commissioner and in-cludes, besides the Mlanager of the scheiiie, four Tugen and threeNjemps. Landlessness is not a qualification, and indeed a large pro-portion, if not all, of the tenants have farms or businesses elsewhere.We were unable to obtain any information on the criteria governingthe selection of tenants, and the manager disclaimed knowledge ofany criteria that might be applied. At Mwea-Tebere only landlesspeople are in principle admitted as tenants.

225


On both schemes place of residence or tribal affiliation plays a

significant role in selection. On Perkerra tenancies were to be ap-

portioned equally among members of the Tugen and Njemps tribes,

but, since Tugen were more interested in becoming tenants, their

proportion to the total reached 70 percent in 1964. A decision was

then made to redress the balance by restricting selection in the

future to Njemps. Similarly, at Mwea-Tebere, tenants were initially

selected from the population of the entire Central Province. Begin-

ning in 1963, however, tenants have been selected only from the

Gichugu and Ndia of the Kirinyaga District. The restriction of

recruitment to the local district appears to magnify the dangers of

frequent absenteeism among new tenants.

These methods of selection, stressing both the need for land and

tribal affiliation, obviously do not necessarily result in getting the

best type of tenant for either scheme. Yet careful recruitnment would

seem to be particularly necessary, since the management can get

rid of bad tenants only in exceptional circumstances.' Although

tenancies are ostensibly annual, they are in fact automatically re-

newed and tenants can even transmit their tenancy to a nominated

heir.In view of the wide differences in performance of tenants, it is

particularly desirable to determine whether the percentage of culti-

vators achieving superior results could be increased by improving

methods of selecting tenants.7 At the time of our visit in 1964 no

study had been made on either scheme to find out what types of

people make the best tenants. It is important to establish whether

the superiority of certain farmers is linked in some way to their area

of origin, the extent of their formal education, their previous experi-

ence of particular occupations or of business, etc. In the absence of

careful study it is difficult to form definitive opinions about the ele-

ments in a colonist's background that might have an important

bearing on his performance. It is possible that previous farming

experience might be the least important, particularly considering

the fact that the cash crops on both Perkerra and Mwea-Tebere

were entirely new and that irrigated agriculture was quite different

from that any tenant was likely to have practised previously. On

I At Perkerra, however, a tenant is first tried out on a holding of one acre and

is given a four-acre holding only if he appears qualified.

I This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the Government might not

regard it politically and socially desirable to give at least a portion of tenancies

to needy people, even though these might not be potentially the most productive

farmers. However, any such decision would then be based on a fuller knowledge

of its cost in terms of lower output.

226

Kenya. Irrigation Schemes

the other hand, formal education, travel and exposure to outsideinfluences in previous job experiences might well, as we discoveredelsewhere in Kenya, have had an importalnt bearing on his receptiv-ity to new methods and on the level of his aspirations and, therefore,his willingness to work hard. Similarly, previous job or businessexperience may have determined the extent to which he had becomeaccustomed to regular and disciplined labor or had learned to man-age effectively the labor resources of his family and even of others.In this connection it may be of some significance that, among tenPerkerra tenants whom we interviewed briefly and who were ap-parently considered to be fairly "progressive," there was only oneman who had been a farmer all his life. All of the others had had-and a few still had-other job or business experiences, includinigoperation of a tea shop, working for the Department of Agricultureor as a European farm laborer, and employment as a teacher, apolicernan, a chief, etc. We also noted that the Perkerra tenants hadmnuch more education than the average Tugen and Njemps, since60 percent was said to have completed the fourth standard. AtNlwea-Tebere we were unable to ascertain, in the brief time at ourdisposal, whether there was also a considerable diversity of back-ground among tenants which inight have a bearing on their per-forinance as farmers.

Housing and settlementThe extent to which Government must provide housing on new

irrigation schemnes has always been a matter of controversy. AtPerkerra it was once proposed to build housing for all tenanits be-cause such a large proportion were living off their holdings and notpaying sufficient attention to them. However, there was apparentlynever enough rmoney to carry out this policy. In the last few yearsthe attractiveness of onion-growing has induced an increasing num-ber of tenants to build their own houses, with the scheme manage-ment providing only transport for building materials. At MIwea-Tebere free housing was provided for tenants until 1960. Since thattime tenants have had to build their own houses. In 1963 the schememanagement made arrangements with a commnercial bank to financethe construction of new houses with loans of £50 each, repayableover three years from crop proceeds. Such loans were used for thepayment of mnaterials, which were purchased in bulk by the schemnemnanagement. The latter also provided skilled labor to advise onconstruction and laid down housing standards.

Oin irrigation schemnes the settlement of colonists in villages usuallyfacilitates mor- efficient use of irrigated land, quite apart from the

227


benefits in terms of better community services such as water supply

education, etc., which this type of settlement may bring. However,

in countries like Kenya, where farmers are accustomed to live on

their own holdings, village settlement involves quite a social change.

For this reason, it is interesting to note that the tenants at Mwea-

Tebere have somehow accommodated themselves to living in the

18 villages of the scheme. While this accommodation is reported to

be unenthusiastic, the comparatively high income that a tenant can

earn has evidently made it possible to get sufficient tenants in spite

of the requirement of village settlement.

Division of farming operations between management and tenants

On each scheme the management provides certain services for

the tenants. Apart from rotating the availability of irrigation water,

the management is responsible for all land preparation-in Perkerra,

of land used both for onions and maize; in Mwea-Tebere, only of

land devoted to rice. At Perkerra the management sets aside and

irrigates land for onion nurseries, but each tenant is responsible for

planting and maintaining his own nursery. In Mwea-Tebere, rice

nurseries are the full responsibility of each tenant. Originally, four

tenants with 16 acres of rice shared a common nursery of one acre,

but this type of communal responsibility proved unworkable and

was replaced in 1961 by new arrangements, under which each tenant

was required to plant a nursery of one-sixth of an acre on his own

land. On the Perkerra scheme the management is responsible for

regular, mechanical spraying of onions against thrips and blast;

at Mwea-Tebere the management also carries out such spraying as

is occasionally necessary, particularly when nurseries become in-

fested with leaf miner and cutter caterpillars. On both schemes

transplanting, weeding and harvesting are left wholly to the tenant.

Finally, the management makes available to the tenants certain

supplies such as fertilizers and bags, and some services, such as

transport. Tenants are not obliged to use fertilizers except on rice

nurseries and, in accordance with a recent decision, also on onion

nurseries.

Mechanical land preparation

Both schemes rely on mechanical land preparation. As of mid-I 964

the Perkerra scheme management had a fleet of 10 tractors, of

which 7 were used for cultivation, 2 for spraying and I for develop-

ment work. We were told that tractors were employed on two shifts

aggregating 10.5 hours per day. A high rate of utilization prevailed

because cultivation was staggered; tractors were used for land prepa-

228


ration in both seasons, and the spraying of onions had to be doneonce every 10 days.

The experience with land preparation on Mwea-Tebere has beenparticularly interesting because the scheme has abandoned com-pletely its original reliance on aninmal traction in favor of tractorcultivation. Up to 1960 land preparation was the responsibility ofthe tenants and was done with ox-drawn implements. The manage-ment maintained a pool of oxen and implements for this purpose.Land was plowed in the dry with a mouldboard plow which had tobe drawn by no less than four oxen because of the weakness of theanimals and the hardness of the soil. After the land was flooded to adepth of four inches, it was "puddled" by drawing a tineless levellingboard across it. In 1960 mechanical cultivation was first tried on1,575 acres, and the management considered the advantages somarked that this type of land preparation was quickly extended tothe whole scheme.

The equipment and methods of operation used on Mwea-Tebereappear to have been an outstanding success. As of 1964, the manage-ment was using a fleet of eleven Massey-Ferguson "35" tractorsequipped with hydraulically mounted 52-inch rotavators. Thisequipment has shown excellent capacity to operate in the wet with-out bogging down, provided that the paddies are not flooded to adepth greater than four inches and for a period of no longer thanabout 72 hours before the land is worked. The use of rotavators hasnot only resulted in superior land preparation, but has had the ad-vantage in easing the strain on tractors through their partially self-propelling action.

Tractor cultivation oni Mwea-Tebere has had two principal bene-fits compared to ox-drawn implements. rhe first is the greaterthoroughness of land preparation. With the rotavator it is possibleto put the land in an optimum condition for cropping in one opera-tion and in one season. With animal cultivation, on the other hand,it apparently took three years before land could reach its full yieldpotential; for this reason the full water rate was not charged untilthe third season. The second, and even more important, advantageis that it has greatly improved the timing of agricultural operations.As long as each tenant was responsible for preparing his own land,the management found it impossible to ensure that all the necessarywork in a given area was finished at a particular time. There wasconstant danger of operations slipping out of season. With tractor-drawn rotavators, land preparation in a given block could not onlybe accomplished quickly and in a single operation, but could becompleted at the same time so that all subsequent agricultural

229


operations could be properly synchronized. This, incidentally, facili-

tated greatly the task of agricultural extension and supervision be-

cause, prior to each operation in a unit or block, all the cultivators

could be convened for the necessary advice and guidance essential

to that particular operation.

The cost of mechanical land preparation has been quite reason-

able. Data on the performance of the tractors and costs are given in

Table 1. Depreciation was reckoned on the basis of a maximum of

TABLE 1: TRACTOR PERFORMANCE AND COSTS ATMWEA-TEBERE IN 1963/64

Performance

Acres per operating hour 0.59Acres per tractor per day 4.42aAcres per tractor per season 500Operating hours per tractor per season 843

Unitary consumption

Fuel (gallons) per acre 2.05Operating hours per acre 1.69Man-hours per acre

Drivers 2.33Supervisory and other 1.44 3.77

Costs (shillings) per acre

Fuel, oil and lubricants 7.74Spares 4.62Labor 4.05Transport of staff, watchmen, etc. 0.98

Total direct cost 17.38Depreciation 7.59Workshop wages and overheads 4.36

Total of all costs 29.34

15.5 acres in 1962/63.SOURCE: E. G. Giglioli (former Manager of the Scheme), "Mechanical Culti-

vation of Rice in the Mwea Irrigation Settlement," East African Agricultural and

Forestry Journal, January 1965.

5,000 hours of operation-a figure which was said to be justified by

the condition of the oldest tractors in 1963/64. Since the operating

hours per tractor that year were 843, this was equivalent to a life of

six years, which would also seem to be reasonable when age as well

as number of hours of operation are considered a factor in the

calculation of depreciation rates. It should also be noted that the

number of operating hours per tractor in 1963/64 was below normal

because of the poor driver morale previously mentioned and the

230


heavy vegetative cover produced by abnormally heavy rains. Withoperations staggered over several months and the tractors workingblocks successively, in rotation, a performance of 1,000 hours pertractor annually is possible.

Charges for management supplies and servicesThe charges levied on the tenants to compensate management

have differed markedly between the two schemes, largely becausethe earlier, unfortunate experience of Perkerra did not provide afirm or reliable basis for such levies. At Perkerra an all-inclusivewater rate of Sh 300 per acre was imposed initially in 1957, but thissoon proved impossibly high, in view of the inability to find a goodcash crop. Even though the rate was reduced to Sh 200 and part ofthis was remitted on basin-irrigated land infested with nutgrass,little was collected until onions were demonstrated to be a remunera-tive cash crop in 1961. Thereafter the management also imposed acharge of Sh 200 per acre of onions in order to pay for the onionseed, insecticides and spraying services provided. However, a chargefor plowing was never made. Altogether, the payments made by thePerkerra tenants fall considerably short of the annual costs incurredby management. All attempts to persuade the tenants to pay prop-erly itemized charges for all the services and supplies furnished bymanagement have met with resistance. Since the most efficienttenants could probably pay charges fully covering all costs, thepresent level of charges, which basically reflects the situation whenthe scheme was much less productive, may be said to keep the moreinefficient cultivators in production.

On the other hand, at Mwea-Tebere it 'has apparently been possi-ble from the very beginning to relate charges to specific services orsupplies furnished. Apart from the water rate of Sh 200 (formerlySh 100 in the first year of tenancy), which is supposed to cover thecost of supplying water and at least part of the overhead costs of thescheme, the management levies charges for land preparation, seed,fertilizer, bags, etc.; as already indicated, its total revenue wellexceeds its current expenditures, including maintenance and de-preciation but excluding interest on the capital investinent.

The results

Production and incomeOn Mwea-Tebere the evolution of output and income has been

very satisfactory. Table 2 shows that the acreage under rice in-creased from 1,231 acres in 1959 to 4,965 in 1963. Total paddy pro-

231


duction during this period rose from 25,002 160 lb. bags to 167,474,

with average yields mounting from a level of 1.44 long tons to 2.35

tons. The scheme not only produces a surplus for the Government,

but has given its tenants a much larger income than they previously

enjoyed. Apart from the value of subsistence output on their "red

soil" allotments and of the rice retained for their own consumption,

the tenant farmers have an average income of about £140 from

sales of paddy after deducting all payments to the scheme manage-

ment. The proportion of tenants getting yields of 25 or more bags

per acre rose from only 4 percent in 1959 to 94 percent in 1963. Yet

there are still significant differences in performance. From Table 2

it will be noted, for example, that in 1963, 26 percent of the tenants

TABLE 2: MWEA-TEBERE: RICE-PRODUCTION, YIELDS AND

INCOME

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Short-rains crop

Acres cropped 1,231 3,281 4,958 4,973 4,965

Output of paddy (bags')Total 25,002 79,760 149,998 159,812 167,474

Average per acre 20.31 24.31 30.25 32.14 33.73

Percentage of tenants byyield categories

0- 5 bags, 1 0 5 05-10" 12 1~

10-15 " 30 6.5 1 I15-20 " 37 19 6 3

20-25 " 16 29 14 8 5

25-30 " 3 28 26 24 20

30-35 1 12 27 30 32

35-40 " 0 4 18 25 29

over 40 " 0 1 7 9 13

Average net income6per tenant (Sh) 2,180 2,606 2,854 2,721 2,812

Long-rains crop

Acres cropped 0 0 0 30.71 252

Output of paddy (bagse)Total 537 4,183

Average per acre 17.49 16.60

Average net income5

per tenant (Sh) 1,635 1,620

No. of tenants at beginningof the crop year ca. 310 819 1,242 1,243 1,242

,Of 160 lbs.bExcluding paddy retained by the farmer and cash outlays on labor.

SOURCE: Annual Reports of Mwea Irrigation Settlement, supplemented by

Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture.

232


had yields of less than 25 bags per acre, while 42 percent were ableto get 35 or more bags.

At Perkerra the results have been much less satisfactory. In thebeginning it was difficult to recruit and keep enough tenants, eventhough land elsewhere in Baringo was overcrowded in relation to itspotential. By March 1958 the number of tenants had been raisedby a special effort to 241, but only 71 of these stayed for the nextyear, when the total number of tenants was 120. Because less thanhalf of the area could be colonized, the rest reverted temporarily tobush. However, since 1960, when onions were first tried, progresshas been rapid. The initial problems with pests-primarily thripsand blast-appear to have been effectively countered with spraying,and the area and production have increased rapidly, as indicatedbelow:

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64

No. of acres of onions 62 300 416Gross sales of onions £1,682 E11,530 £31,370No. of tenants 129 326 349

While average yields are about 3 tons per acre, quite a few tenantsget 4 to 5 tons.

We found that the records on individual tenants were, unfor-tunately, not kept in such a way as to permit a ready appraisal of thegross and net income of the tenants. In 1962/63, 40 percent of thefarmers with 4-acre tenancies were reported to have earned overSh 3,000 after deducting charges due to the management; a similarproportion of those with 1-acre tenancies were said to have earnedmore than Sh 1,000 on the same basis. One tenant's income wasestimated to have exceeded Sh 7,000. Even a cursory inspection ofthe records confirmed that some tenants are making very high in-comes measured by the standards in that area, and also that thereis a tremendous variation in performance among tenants. Perhapsabout 30 percent of the tenants are doing rather poorly.

Cash income from onions has come to dwarf the more traditionalsubsistence cultivation and livestock-keeping in which the tenantsstill engage. Provision had to be made for the growing of maize onirrigated land because rainfall in that part of Baringo is insufficient.Maize is grown in the first half of the year; onions in the second half.For each farmer the scheme management plows 2 acres to be sownto maize. Evidence on the average yield of maize, which is sown onabout 800 acres of the scheme, was typically conflicting, with themanagement claiming that it was 10 bags per acre and the tenants,whom we interviewed, reporting that, with declining soil fertility,

233


they were getting only about 6 bags.8 In any event, quite a few

tenants were producing maize in excess of their own requirements

and, since they were outside the zone where deliveries and prices

were controlled by the Maize Board, they were able to sell this

surplus at attractive prices to nearby pastoralists.Since colonists for the Perkerra scheme were drawn from the

Tugen and Njeinps tribes to whom livestock was traditionally very

important, some provision had to be made for keeping livestock on

or near the scheme. A special grazing area within the scheme was

set aside for raising beef cattle. About 60-80 tenants participate,

paying an annual fee of Sh 20 per beast for grazing and a weekly

spraying. The rest of the tenants simply keep their cattle in and

around the scheme, wherever the land is not being cropped and

affords some grazing. Attempts to restrict each tenant to 6 cattle

have failed, for most of the farmers were said to have 10 to 20 beasts,

apart from small stock. Most of the tenants have been able to up-

grade their cattle by using the scheme's Sahiwal bull center where

cows can be serviced for Sh 8.

Use of paid labor by tenants

The indications of tenant incomes given above made no allowance

for expenditures on labor. Such expenditures are in fact considerable.

Early in 1964 the Farm Economics Survey Unit conducted an in-

quiry into this subject on Mwea-Tebere, using a random sample of

66 farmers. The investigation indicated an average cash outlay on

labor of Sh 1,032 per farm during the year 1963/64. This approxi-

mated 25 percent of the gross value of the rice produced and was

nearly 40 percent of the average payment tenants received for their

rice, after deducting management charges of Sh 1,315.09 and a

County Council cess of Sh 191.88. Even so, the average net cash

income of these farmers was still Sh 1,605 or about £80, a sum

considerably in excess of average African farm income in Kenya.

At Perkerra considerable labor is also employed, although no

study has been made of its extent. Hired labor is primarily used for

the transplanting, weeding and lifting of onions. From interviewswith a number of farmers, we gathered that annual expenditures on

labor tended to cluster around Sh 300 per tenant. This may average

25 percent to 30 percent of payments received by tenants for onions

after deduction of the water rate and management charges.

I The nianagement's estimate is probably the inore accurate, since the farmners

may well have been inclined to avoid the impression that they were producing

much maize surplus to their requirements for fear that they would be compelled

to sell to the Maize Board at much lower prices.

234


The study undertaken on the Mwea-Tebere scheme by the FarmEconomics Survey Unit tried to establish whether there was anycorrelation between labor inputs and yields. However, no meaning-ful relationship between the two was revealed. The effect of laboron output evidently depends not so much on the total amount oflabor used, as on how hard each laborer works; on how effectivelythe farmer organizes his work and manages the labor resourcesavailable to him; and on the way the farmer times his work.9

The high employment of labor observed on Mwea-Tebere doespoint, however, to three significant conclusions. One we have alreadybrought out in discussing agricultural development elsewhere,namely that the development of small holdings brings about a notinconsiderable increase in employment. This is certainly of someadvantage to a country like Kenya which has suffered and is suf-fering from unemployment. Thus, on 35 farms it was found that anaverage of 95.7 work days per acre was contributed by paid labor.If this amount is assumed to be representative for the entire 5,340acres cropped in 1963/64 and if 250-300 work-days are accountedequal to one work-year, it may be said that the development ofMwea-Tebere has created the equivalent of full-time employmentfor 1,703 to 2,044 persons, quite apart from the settlers and theirfamilies. The second conclusion is that it may well have been im-possible to allot as much as four acres of transplanted rice to eachtenant, if it had not been for the availability of casual labor fromnearby densely populated rural areas to cope with the peak laborrequirements for transplanting and harvesting. By far the greaterpart of the paid labor was indeed employed on these tasks. 1' Finally,the third conclusion is in the form of an observation we have madebefore, namely that the income-elasticity demand for labor is high.

I Variations in yields are probably caused by differences in the quality of thesupervision and of the work of the tenant at successive stages in production.For example, yields may suffer in the nursery stage from poor control of waterand lack of protection against bird damnage; at transplanting, by loss of seedlingsand bad application of fertilizers; during growth, by poor water control andweeding; and at harvest, by late cutting, resulting in shattering.

10 In the Nguka and Tebere sections, the highest number of days worked onthe average by family labor was 78 in September, which presumably was the peakmonth for transplanting. At that time 101 paid workers were also employed.If the average number of adults in Nguka and Tebere families-3.22 anld 3.64respectively-had worked as many as 25 days during the month, family laborcould have contributed 80 to 91 days, which would still have been substantiallybelow the total labor input of 179 days. On the other hand, in January, whichapparently was the peak month for harvesting, family labor accounted for only58 days of the total of 184 days worked in all. This presumnably reflects the factthat men tend to think harvesting, apart from the cutting of grain, women'swork.

235


In other words, when incomes rise there is a tendency for farmers to

use a substantial portion to hire labor in order to enable the farm

family itself to enjoy more leisure. Thus, while hired labor is un-

doubtedly necessary to meet peak work loads, available evidence

indicates that the total amount used during the year is well above

what would be required if family labor were fully utilized, and even

to some extent above what is needed during peak periods.

Disposal of tenant incomeFor most of the tenants at Mwea-Tebere and, more recently, also

for a considerable portion of those at Perkerra, irrigated farming has

meant a sudden and very marked increase in cash income, by com-

parison with that previously enjoyed. The disposal of this income-the extent to which it is used for improvement of the living standard

of the entire family and for saving-is a matter of some public con-

cern. No studies of the way in which cash incomes are being spent

on the two schemes have as yet been made. In view of the suddenness

of the increase in income and the fact that the head of the household

traditionally regards cash income as personal rather than family

income, it was not surprising to hear reports of frivolous expenditures

of no lasting value and, particularly, of substantial expenditures on

drink. Nonetheless, there appears also to be a considerable interest

in saving and in spending part of income on education, at least in

Mwea-Tebere. On this scheme the tenants have financed their own

schools; at the time of our visit in July 1964, they had all recently

contributed Sh 50 toward the construction of a secondary school.

Half of the tenants were reported to have bank accounts, and a

thrift society officially licensed in March 1964 already had £8,000

on deposit by July. The scheme management has taken an interest

in stimulating savings in various ways, including the device of mak-

ing payments for rice through a bank in an effort to encourage

tenants to keep back accounts. Both the management and a social

worker active on the scheme were drawing the attention of women

to the income earned by men from rice and thus indirectly stimu-

lating an interest in spending this income more largely for the benefitof the family as a whole. We were unable to determine whether therewas also a trend at Perkerra toward the more constructive use of

cash income. It was noteworthy, however, that there were not even

postal savings available to the Perkerra tenants.

Tenant cooperation and disciplineThe successful operations of both schemes have depended on the

adherence by both management and tenants to a fairly rigid scheduleof operations. Agricultural operations cannot be permitted to get

236


out of season; nor can farmers in a particular area be allowed to getout of step with each other in such a way as to upset the land prepara-tion or irrigation schedule. Does experience in these cases indicatethat the African farmers have been willing to accept this discipline,which must in many respects seem irksome, for the sake of the higherincome that can be earned from irrigated agriculture?

Persuasion is, of course, the principal means of getting the farmersto accept discipline. The field assistant and the head cultivators areprimarily responsible for inducing farmers to time and synchronizetheir operations properly. The field staff has meetings with the culti-vators just prior to every operation in order not only to get the workstarted, but also to indicate how it ought to be done. There is also aformal organization in which tenants and management are bothrepresented and which can serve as a forum for airing problems oras a means of communicating information or instructions. Thus atMwea-Tebere, each section has a Tenants Liaison Council whichmeets monthly under the chairmanship of the AAO and consists ofan equal number of nominated and elected tenants. These Councilselect representatives to a Central Advisory Committee which ischaired by the manager and can discuss matters affecting the schemeas a whole.

Experience seems to have demonstrated, however, that an ulti-mate legal sanction is necessary. Beginning in 1960 tenants havebeen required, as a condition of their tenancy, to subscribe to a setof regulations, the latest revision of which is known as the Trust Land(Irrigation) Rules, 1962. Violations give rise successively to warn-ings"t and, ultimately, prosecutions. Punishment may consist offines and imprisonment, though prison sentences have never beenmeted out. Evictions may take place only if the tenant is convictedof some criminal offense, entailing six months or more of imprison-ment; if he deserts; or if he has been repeatedly guilty of badhusbandry.

Table 3 shows the number of actions taken on Mwea-Tebere toenforce compliance with the Irrigation Rules. In the three yearsended mid-1963, there were only 19 evictions, of which 12 were forbad husbandry and 3 for desertion. The types of offenses which gaverise to warnings and fines indicate that management must keep up aconstant pressure to get tenants to carry out their work punctually.

11 Warning letters are issued after verbal admonitions have failed and usuallygive a deadline for corrective action. At Mwea-Tebere they are issued by theAAO in charge of the section on the complaint of a Field Assistant. When atenant has a long history of bad farming and a warning letter is intended as aprelude to eviction proceedings, the Manager issues the letter.

237


TABLE 3: WARNINGS AND PROSECUTIONS AT MWEA-TEBEREUNDER THE IRRIGATION RULES

1960/61 1961/62 1962/63

Subject of Warning Warn- Prose- Warn- Prose- Warn- Prose-

or Prosecution ings cutions ings cutions ings cutions

Water discipline 37 20 11 29 14 4

Absenteeism 23 4 38 9 15 3

Maintenance of holding 21 - 110 7 85 23

Failure to comply withagricultural instruc-tions 11 9 57 6 9 18

Bad husbandry - - 34 - 17 -

Other 3 1 33 3 5 7

Average fine (Sh) 30 54 59

No. of evictions 6 5 8

SOURCE: Annual Reports of Mwea Irrigation Settlement.

For example, the disproportionately large number of warnings and

prosecutions for failure to maintain holdings and to follow agri-

cultural instructions show that land was not adequately prepared

prior to the agricultural season by proper cleaning of drains and

feeders, repairs to bunds, levelling of land, etc., or that the spreading

of fertilizer, transplanting or weeding was not done in time. Other

sources of difficulty have been absenteeism and infractions of "water

discipline." At Mwea-Tebere these offenses are said to be particu-

larly frequent among the tenants of the Nguka section who came to

the scheme from a nearby area and, accordingly, are often tempted

to pay repeated visits to their home even at the sacrifice of their

duties as tenants.Absenteeism has been a particularly acute problem at Perkerra.

Tenants have been inclined to keep occupations or farms they had

elsewhere before receiving a tenancy on this scheme. Here a natural

initial distrust of a novel type of irrigated farming was, of course,

greatly reinforced by the early failures of the scheme. Only as onions

became established as an attractive cash crop have more and more

tenants begun to live at Perkerra. Even so, less than 60 percent of

the tenants had their own houses on the scheme by 1964.

Although tenants undoubtedly do chafe somewhat under the close

supervision and discipline, the attractions of a high cash income have

been such at Mwea-Tebere that virtually no tenants have left the

scheme. At mid-1963 over 60 percent of the 1,340 tenants had been

there five years or more. Even at Perkerra, tenant turnover, which

238


for some years was extremely high, has virtually ceased to be a prob-lem now that onions are bringing in a good cash income.

Intensification of productionOn both schemes there is some possibility for expanding the irri-

gated area. At Perkerra this possibility is apparently very limiteduniless facilities for the storage of water prove, upon investigation,technically feasible and economic. At Mwea-Tebere the existingheadworks, main canals and the available supply of water are saidto be adequate to irrigate 15,000 acres or almost three times thepresent area. Inevitably the prior question arises whether the areaalready under irrigation is being utilized as effectively as it shouldin the light of the investment already made and the limited amountof good and usable land in relation to the needs of the population inboth areas.

On neither scheme does the land appear to be fully utilized. InPerkerra, where in principle a minimum of 1,200 acres can be irri-gated and planted twice a year, only about 800 acres were sown tomaize in the first half of the 1963/64 crop year, and 349 acres ofonions were planted in the second part of the year. In Mwea-Tebere,land is for the most part used only during the short-rains season,Iying fallow in the long-rains season.

However, the fuller use of land apparently encounters a numberof difficulties, which we were unable to explore adequately. AtPerkerra there were plans to raise the onion acreage to 700 or 800and to persuade tenants to double crop maize on the balance of theirrigable and developed land. It was not clear, however, whetherthe aspirations of existing tenants for higher incomes would be strongenough to induce them to make the additional effort, particularlyunder conditions where the returns to the extra labor involved mightbe less than the average return to labor enjoyed in the past. Thereseemed indeed to be sorne possibility of declining returns to labor,since the price of maize in the local market and the price of onionsin the broader Kenya market appeared to be quite vulnerable toincreases in supply. In the past the price paid for Perkerra maize hasbeen comparatively high, but the market is confined almost entirelyto the pastoralists of the surrounding region. Onions have beeninarketed by the Perkerra mnanagement through the Nairobi Horti-cultural Cooperative Union, but prices have shown marked fluctua-tions, and since Perkerra is already said to account for half of theonions reaching the market, prices may well be very sensitive toadditional supplies. Recent trials indicate that tomatoes could begrown as a second cash crop, but a market could only be found

239


through the establishment of a canning factory. One firm has indeed

been reported prepared to establish a cannery, but on condition

that the growing of at least 200 acres of tomatoes be guaranteed.

Cotton could also be grown profitably, but until the possibility of

extending the entire cropped acreage through effective water stor-

age is confirmed, sufficient production to warrant the establishment

of a ginnery probably cannot be assured.

In Mwea-Tebere it is interesting to note that attempts in recent

years to grow two rice crops have so far not been conspicuously

successful. Table I shows that in 1962 and 1963, 30.7 and 252 acres

respectively were planted in the long rains. The yields, however,

were only about half of those achieved in the preceding season.

Moreover, it was found that the land which was planted to rice

during the long rains of 1962 and produced 17.5 bags of paddy per

acre, yielded 9.75 bags less in the 1963 short rains. Double cropping

therefore produced a net increase of only 7.75 bags and, after de-

ducting the cost of 5 bags per acre, gave the tenant a meagre return

of 2.65 bags for his extra labor. The decline in yield is generally

attributed to the probability that nitrification is impeded because

the land is not sufficiently dried out between the two seasons. Further

trials and experimentation might make it possible to overcome this

decline in yields, but it is conceivable that many tenants would still

be reluctant to work the year around for the purpose of raising in-

comes which they already consider quite satisfactory. The manage-

ment has also found it extremely difficult to carry out all the

operations essential to extensive double cropping. To cultivate the

land in both seasons requires rigid scheduling of all operations

which, under existing limitations of staff and machinery, the man-

agement has found virtually impossible to ensure. The marketing

of large additional quantities of rice might also pose a problem. In

the past, marketing has been facilitated by curtailment of imports

which, in terms of milled rice, went down from an average of 16,553

tons in 1957 and 1958 to one of 9,575 tons in 1962 and 1963. The

decline in imports was virtually equal to the milled equivalent of

paddy marketed from Mwea-Tebere in 1963.

Concluding remarks

The experience with these two schemes confirms the importance

of adequate technical planning and of prior investigation of feasible

and economic cropping patterns, first through research and then

through testing in pilot projects. It demonstrates also the need for

close supervision and discipline in carrying out all necessary agri-

cultural operations in a timely fashion. In this type of closely sched-

240


uled operation mechanized cultivation has played a useful role.Farmers on such irrigation schemes have to accept a degree ofdiscipline and even a change in their living patterns which is oftendifficult for them to accept. Experience shows, however, that theywill accommodate themselves to such changes as long as they canenjoy a much higher income than they have had before and whenthey are subjected to a considerable amount of managerial pressure,supervision and guidance. Nonetheless, performance among farmerstends to vary widely; if, in the process of further development, pro-duction is to be maximized, it seenms important to identify the reasonsfor variations in performance and to determine whether performancecan be improved by changing the methods of selecting tenants. Inthis connection it should be noted that the intrusion of tribal con-sideration in the selection of colonists often seriously affects thepossibility of maximizing output. Finally, it should be noted that thesuccess of such schemes depends on a management capable of dealingwith a wide variety of operations-operation of machinery, procure-ment of supplies, organization and guidance of farmers, marketing,etc. The effective discharge of such operations can be ensured onlyif the management enjoys a considerable measure of autonomy.

241

II

OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1. MALI: THE OFFICE DU NIGER-AN EXPERIENCE WITH IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE

IntroductionThe Office du Niger is an agricultural undertaking in Mali (form-

erly French Sudan) devoted to the irrigated production of cotton andrice on a large scale. From the Markala barrage, located on theNiger River more than 300 kilometers downstream from Bamako, asystem of canals permits the irrigation of some 50,000 hectares ex-tending 100 kilometers and more to the east along the Niger and tothe north.

The origin of the Office goes back to 1919 when a study missionnoted the failure of dryland cotton cultivation in this northern partof the Soudanian zone and concluded that the flood waters of theMiddle Niger were remarkably well adapted for the irrigation ofcotton. Various pilot projects were carried out during the 'thirties,particularly in the irrigation of almost 3,000 hectares in the Bagui-neda Plain near Bamako. The colonization of this area with morethan 6,000 people was considered such a success that a program forthe general development of the Middle Niger basin was approved in1931. Nearly one million hectares were to be irrigated. This vastarea which was virtually uninhabited was to be settled by transferringfarm families from the more heavily populated regions of UpperVolta and the Soudan. Rice was to be their subsistence crop andcotton their cash crop. In this way there was to be created in theheart of West Africa "an island of prosperity" which was to growspontaneously as the necessary hydraulic and agricultural develop-ment work was completed.

A French public enterprise, the Office du Niger was created in1932 in order to carry out the development work and to proceed withthe settlement of the population. By 1945 the development of theinfrastructure beginning with Markala had been virtually com-pleted; and more than 20,000 persons had "colonized" some 22,000hectares in two different regions of the Central Delta.' The produc-

1 Up to 1960 the Office du Niger managed also the Baguineda sector. In orderto facilitate a comparison of the present situation with that of the past, thestatistical data presented in this study excludes Baguineda.

'AC


tion of 22,000 tons of paddy on 85 percent of the irrigated area had

surpassed the output of seed-cotton which was only around 1,500

tons. It seemed at the time that expansion had been too rapid and

that it was necessary to stop further extensions in order to improve

the areas already under irrigation and to raise the output of the

crops being cultivated. This "pause," which sought to increase

production solely by raising yields, did not last long, for in 1948 the

Office resumed its development work in a new sector. Instead of

assigning the new irrigated land to farmers, the Office chose to farm

it directly, resorting for this purpose to the mechanization of a

number of agricultural operations. Beginning in 1950 the develop-

ment of new land for colonization was also resumed with the creation

of a fourth sector in the far north of the Office. In 1962 the Office du

Niger comprised more than 45,000 hectares of irrigated land on

which a population of 37,000 persons produced 41,000 tons of paddy

and 7,000 tons of seedcotton. That year its administration, until

then in the hands of the French, was turned over to Mali. In 1964,

the Office du Niger had almost 50,000 hectares under irrigation, a

population of about 33,000 persons and a production of 43,000 tons

of paddy and more than 9,000 tons of seedcotton.

In twenty-five years the Office du Niger has therefore not achieved

the development that was originally expected. The hydraulic in-

frastructure which had been designed with a view to the develop-

ment of several hundreds of thousands of hectares today irrigates

only 50,000 hectares. Moreover, the cultivation of rice and cotton

under irrigation continues to encounter technical and economic

difficulties. The administration, which includes almost 2,500 perma-

nent employees is disproportionate to the output obtained and to

the active agricultural population which it is responsible for serving.

It is perhaps this disproportion between the original goal and the

actual accomplishment that provides the fundamental explanation

of the great instability in the policy of the Office and of its unsatisfied

search for a technical, economic and human equilibrium.

The Office du Niger has always been anxious to realize its initial

ambition to create an island of prosperity. However, conditions in

the Office have been such as to make it difficult to reconcile the

interests of the peasants and the financial responsibilities of the

Office as an enterprise. Living conditions in the Office have never

really attracted the farmers; the comparatively enviable income

obtained by the settlers went hand in hand in certain regions with a

progressive increase in indebtedness to the Office. The latter has

always had to be subsidized in order to finance even its current

operations. The Office has thus never been capable of amortizing or

246

Mali Republic: Irrigated Agriculture

fC ..........IRRIGATED AREAS

OF THE 0 ...OFFICE DU NIGER s -°o

(1960)

-Pll...........PI.A.

R0.Js ..... ,.'.....

0 10wAS '''"'"'~~.,.... ' 5b.."X."..

s gL oS er E. st E U R

q-q

/A

-- 4--,

earning a return on the public capital invested in the enterprisewhich in terms of CFA francs of constant value amounted, in 1960,to about 44 billion ($175 million).2

The Office du Niger has continually sought to improve this situa-tion by shifting back and forth between direct farming with wagelabor and family farming by settlers, by altering the relative em-

2 This can be regarded only as a rough estimate the accuracy of which dependslargely on the coefficients used in converting past expenditures in francs toCFA francs of 1960.

247


phasis put on cotton and rice, and by changing its methods of pro-

duction, including the degree of reliance on mechanization. Of all

these attempts the most recent and perhaps the most interesting has

focused on an intensification of production, of rice as well as of

cotton. However, none of these efforts have made the Office more

than a limited success; and it is the purpose of this study to illuminate

the principal reasons for this failure. Serious inadequacies of data,

particularly on the financial operations of the Office and on the net

income of the settlers, made it impossible to carry out a comprehen-

sive, retrospective economic analysis of the whole scheme. The ap-

proach to this study therefore had to be selective and the apprecia-

tion of the problems qualitative rather than quantitative. These

limitations have not, in our judgment, prevented a proper assess-

ment of the principal factors that have been responsible for the

limited success or partial failure of the Office du Niger.The Office du Niger is such a complex organization that it would

be well to give a brief description at the outset of its organizationalstructure and its various activities. A subsequent chapter will then

deal with the intensification of production as the principal pre-

occupation of the Office since 1958. Lastly, an attempt will be made

to draw some lessons from other experiences of the Office with

mechanization and direct farming.

The organization of the Office

The history of the Office du Niger is that of the development of a

large area which was formerly virtually uninhabited. From the be-

beginning the Office has been concerned both with the development

of land for irrigation and the settlement of the population that could

undertake the necessary farm work. Rather than letting all the

administrative services of the French Soudan contribute, each ac-

cording to its own competence, the Office du Niger became pro-

gressively more or less sovereign within the limits of its territory. It

thus integrated all economic and social activities under a statute

which gave it, an autonomous public enterprise, responsibility for

achieving profitable operations as well as for satisfying the social

needs of the population entrusted to its administration.The duties assumed by the Office du Niger are accordingly ex-

tremely numerous and complex. The Office did not remain simply a

service responsible for certain public works and settlement, but

became an enterprise with a comprehensive jurisdiction extendingto commercial as well as administrative and agricultural questions.The Office as a public works contractor has not only created the

irrigation network but has also constructed buildings, developed

248


villages and is now responsible for the maintenance of all thisinfrastructure. It is also an administrative service which recruitsagricultural labor, which concludes tenancy contracts with settlers,furnishes them with means of production, and sometimes even withconsumer goods. The Office is also a commercial and industrialentrepreneur that processes the paddy and seedcotton produced inthe irrigated areas and markets them. Finally, and above all, theOffice is concerned with agricultural production itself. It is re-sponsible for supervising the settlers, controlling the use of the irriga-tion network, and educating the colonists in methods of agriculturalproduction. Against the payment of fixed charges it can provide thecolonists with a wide variety of mechanical services ranging fromplowing or sowing to the spraying of cotton and the threshing ofpaddy. These mechanical services also permit it to engage in farmingitself. This multiplicity of operations makes it particularly difficultto acquire a good knowledge of the functioning of the Office duNiger.

The burden of these responsibilities is increased by virtue of thefact that the area covered by the Office is quite extensive. The ap-proximately 50,000 hectares that have been developed are scatteredover several hundreds of kilometers. While the principal administra-tion headquarters is at Segou 40 kilometers upstream from theMarkala barrage, the Kolongo sector extends toward the east up toa distance of almost 150 kilometers from S6gou and that of Kouroumain the north more than 200 kilometers from S6gou. The large irriga-tion canals comprising the basic irrigation network have a lengthof 280 kilometers.

The administrationIt is therefore not surprising that the organization of the Office du

Niger is extremely complex and that its staff is quite considerable.In 1955, when the Office was still expecting to expand rapidly inaccordance with original plans, the administration counted almost7,000 employees. This personnel was then progressively reduced toless than 5,000. With the change in management and the departureof French personnel in 1962, the Office has undergone a reorganiza-tion which deprived it of certain attributes of sovereignty which itformerly exercised on its territory (population registry, public health,agricultural research, education). However, it still retains a largestaff numbering, in 1964, about 4,700 employees. Almost half of thispersonnel is considered permanent, although the so-called casuallabor is in fact employed all the year around either on developmentor on agricultural work.

249


In 1964 the administrative services accounted for only 10 percent

of all permanent personnel although this percentage had increased

since 1961. The other employees were engaged more directly with

production, working either for the Department of Works which is

concerned with development work, or for the Department of Pro-

duction which is responsible for agricultural, industrial, and com-

mercial operations. The Department of Works is actually responsible

not only for civil and other works, but also, since 1962, for the man-

agement of river and road transport, the maintenance of the irriga-

tion system, roads, buildings, and machinery, as well as the provision

of all mechanized services for agriculture. For this purpose it had,

in 1964, nearly 1,400 permanent employees. The Department of

Production in that year counted more than 600 employees. It is

concerned with agricultural production (supervision of the settlers

and management of the Office's direct farming operation), the

processing of agricultural products in its rice mills and its cotton

ginnery, and the sale of these products both inside Mali and abroad.

The demands of these two large departments for labor and funds

often compete.

Development work

The development work begun during the 'thirties in the Office du

Niger was done by the Office itself. The infrastructure was finished

in 1947. It includes a barrage across the Niger at Markala, a naviga-

tion canal which bypasses the barrage, and a canal which takes water

from the upstream side of the barrage to the principal canals of

Macina and Sahel. From these two big canals was developed the

irrigation and drainage network serving the fields. The Macina

canal, following the bed of an old flood drain of the Niger River,

permitted the creation, in 1934, of the Kolongo sector which de-

veloped along the Niger River. The Sahel canal extending to the

north made possible the irrigation of the Lower Kala near Niono.

In 1945 the Niono and Kolongo sectors extended over more than

11,000 hectares. After a cessation of extensions for some years new

development work was undertaken in 1948 in the Molodo sector

also situated in the Lower Kala. Subsequently the extension work

was resumed in Kolongo and Niono. From 1952 a fourth sector was

developed in Kourouma by prolonging the Sahel canal beyond

Niono. Up to 1958 new extensions averaged more than 2,000 hec-

tares per year, but by 1961 they had dropped to 500 hectares. After-

ward extensions were resumed with assistance from the U.S.S.R.,

reaching more than 2,800 hectares in 1963 in the Niono and Kou-

rouma sectors. In 1964, however, only 800 hectares were completed.

250


The creation of a fifth sector near Dougabougou in the Upper Kalaand at the beginning of the Sahel canal is now envisaged. The totalarea developed for irrigation in the Office du Niger was around 50,-000 hectares in 1964 (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: AREA DEVELOPED FOR IRRIGATION,(hectares)

Kolongo Niono Molodo Kourouma Total

1948 11,130 11,406 - 22,5361955 12,490 15,609 6,150b 1,709 35,9581958 14,151 16,578 6,150b 5,221 42,1001964 14,151 18,406 7,243' 9,836 49,636

'Not including the Baguineda sector of 3,318 hectares.bCentre rizicole mecanise (CRM).'Includes a small colonized area which previously had been attached to the

Niono sector.

TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT OF CULTIVATED AREA(hectares)

Developed Cultivated UncultivatedArea Area Land

1956 38,231 29,779 8,4521957 40,520 33,128 7,3921958 42,100 35,888 6,2121959 43,247 36,608 8,4391960 44,499 35,673 8,8261961 45,029 33,280 11,7491962 46,050 31,550 14,5001963 48,936 36,589 12,347

All of the developed area is not cropped every year. In 1963 morethan 12,000 hectares were not cultivated (see Table 2). This rep-resented fallow land only to a small extent. The rice land is in effectcultivated year after year. Cotton land is fallowed after one or twoyears of cultivation and this practice accounts for about 2,500 hec-tares of true fallow. The difference represents land that is truly idle.Although this phenomenon has become more marked during recentyears-a maximum of 14,500 hectares was out of cultivation in 1963-- it has always characterized the agricultural operations of theOffice. From 1945 to 1961, when the cultivation of the cotton re-quired little or no fallow, the amount of uncultivated land wasaround 7,000 to 8,000 hectares each year. For the most part thisland was abandoned due to a combination of factors including de-ficiencies in irrigation and drainage and an insufficient supply of

251


manpower. People that were available to till the land have always

tended to concentrate on those areas which were the most fertile,

the easiest to irrigate and drain and the least infested by weeds.

Settlement

The Office du Niger was designed to serve all the countries of the

Niger "loop." It was to draw its settlers from regions in the Soudan

and Upper Volta which were considered to be densely populated.

Its protagonists, however, misjudged the social and economic fac-

tors militating against a migration of manpower. The desire to settle

in the Office du Niger was greatly overestimated. In the Soudan

itself there was for the most part no significant demographic pressure

and although the Upper Volta could be considered overpopulated,

its inhabitants have generally preferred to increase their income by

temporary migration rather than by permanent settlement abroad.

A definitive departure would in effect cut them off from their tradi-

tional environment where kinship ties are very strong. It was there-

fore necessary to use a certain amount of compulsion to recruit set-

tlers, at least until 1945 when forced labor was abolished. In this

early period the greater part of the settlers that were recruited were

Mossi and Samogho from Upper Volta. But in 1945 a significant

number took advantage of the possibility of returning to their native

country. Although this exodus was subsequently checked, a new

waive of departures, amounting to approximately 2,000 Mossi

occurred in 1962. At that time the French personnel was leaving the

Office and quite a few settlers, including many Mossi, were having

increasing difficulties in producing sufficient rice both to meet their

own requirements and to reduce their indebtedness to the Office.

Since 1950 the Bambara and Minianka of the old Soudan, which

has since become Mali, have provided the bulk of the settlers so that

today the majority are in fact Mali nationals. During this period the

recruitment of a sufficient number of settlers was difficult. It was

only for a few years, from 1958 to 1960 that the Office had ample

applications for settlement. This temporary success was due to several

factors-one was the possibility of getting substantial income from

the cultivation of rice on the virgin and therefore very productive

land of the new Kourouma sector. Another was the fact that settle-

ment was opened up to non-farmers such as merchants, Government

employees, etc. Although Kourouma was intended principally for

the production of cotton, these "temporary" or "absentee" farmersfound it much easier and more profitable to grow rice using the

services of the Office for mechanical land preparation and threshing

and employing wage labor for the harvest.

252


Since 1962 the Office has stopped recruiting settlers except forthose who voluntarily come to settle on the edge of the irrigated areain the expectation of subsequently getting land in the Office. It ispossible that the desire to develop other regions of Mali has to someextent limited migration. In any event it is evident that in recentyears a large number of people have not volunteered for settlement.The number of settlers has declined rather than increased owing tovoluntary departures and the eviction of farmers who have failed topay their debts or to cultivate the land themselves. In 1963/64 noless than 2,861 persons left the Office. In 1964 the total settled popu-lation 33,000 persons-was indeed smaller than the maximumreached in 1961 (excluding the Baguin6da sector) even though thecultivated area had nonetheless been increased (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: TOTAL SETTLED POPULATION,(thousands of persons)

1951 20.9 1956 28.2 1961 38.31952 21.0 1957 29.3 1962 37.21953 21.3 1958 32.2 1963 37.31954 23.8 1959 32.8 1964 32.91955 26.2 1960 34.7

.Including Baguineda, with 4,500 people, up to 1961. The exclusion ofBaguineda has been partially offset since 1962 by the settlement of Molodo.

In 1964 the Kolongo sector had no more than 9,700 settlers asthe result of the voluntary departure of settlers originating from theUpper Volta. The Kourouma sector had been affected by the evic-tion of "bad settlers" and counted only 4,500 people. The Molodosector, which had only recently been settled after the abandonmentof direct farming by the Office, had difficulty in getting 6,000 in-habitants. Only the Niono sector, where irrigated agriculture appearsto be much more profitable, witnessed an increase in its populationby the settlement of over 500 new people. This sector, with 12,600people, is by far the most densely populated sector in the Office duNiger.

The Office du Niger used to provide transport for future settlersand their families. It still gives them housing and land, and suppliesthem with a certain amount of equipment on credit. The Office hasbuilt houses of mud brick for its settlers who are assigned to villagesin accordance with their ethnic origin. Each family receives a com-pound composed of one or more houses. The colonist receives anallotment of land which is plowed and sown for him the first year.It had originally been envisaged that at the end of ten years thecolonist would receive an occupation permit which would in effect

253


assign this land to him permanently, but the nationalization of land

in 1962 put an end to this controversial provision for property rights.

In fact the settler has a cultivation right that is transferable by in-

heritance. On the other hand, this right can be withdrawn if he

makes bad use of it or if he does not abide by the obligations imposed

by the Office. The farmer also receives agricultural equipment.

Finally, an advance of foodstuffs is made by the Office in order to

ensure the nourishment of the family during the first agricultural

season. The advances in supplies furnished to the colonist by the

Office represents a credit of approximately 164,000 Mali francs

which the colonist must reimburse in two or three years.

The amount of land assigned to the settler varies widely. It de-

pends, in principle, on the types of crops grown, the size of the family

and the number or workers in the family. Since 1959 the Office has

been trying to prevent settlers from employing wage labor by linking

the allocation of land to the size and composition of the family. Thus

in the villages that grow only rice the allocated area is about one

hectare per inhabitant or around 2 hectares per worker. In the

villages where cotton can be cultivated the family received one

hectare of cotton land per male worker and about one-third of a

hectare of rice land per consumer. While the settler is not required

to accept a minimum area for cultivation, he is obliged to cultivate

all the land that he receives. The administration reserves the right

to decrease the allotment if the colonist does not fully use it. In fact

the average area cultivated per male adult has increased from 2.9

to 3.3 in the period from 1950 to 1960. In terms of the total number

of individuals settled, the area has also increased from somewhat

over 0.7 hectare to nearly 0.9 hectare. The area varies also as be-

tween various sectors of production and ethnic groups. Thus in 1958

the Mossi in Kolongo had on the average 0.91 hectares per person

while the Bambara had 1.69 hectares. On the other hand, in Niono

the average Bambara was farming only 0.84 hectare and the Mossi

1.30 hectares.The agricultural equipment received by the settler generally

consists of two plow oxen, a plow and a harrow. The team of oxen

is sold at a price of 24,000 Mali francs which is below the market

price; the plow costs 7,000 francs. Although the quantity of agricul-

tural equipment and plow oxen owned by the settlers has increased,

it has not done so proportionate to the expansion of the cultivated

area or the growth in the population since 1950.

So that the settler would not be left to deal himself with a bureau-

cratic and extensive administration it was envisaged from the very

beginning of the Office that the colonists would be organized in such

254


TABLE 4: AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT OF THE SETTLERS(in thousands of units)

1948 1953 1958 1963

Oxen 8.2 9.4 10.6 12.2Plows 3.0 3.5 4.0 5.0Carts 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.9Harrows 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.5Cultivators 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2

a way as to facilitate their relations with the Office and the trans-mission of instructions from the Office to the farmers. The settlerswere obliged to belong to Indig6nous Agricultural Associations(Associations agricoles indig6nes). These associations proved com-pletely ineffective and have been called "administrative and account-ing fictions." Thus beginning in 1958 the Office has sought to replaceit with a new type of organization whose definitive statute was deter-mined finally in 1963. It has taken the form of a cooperative group.Membership calls for participation in share capital and no longer forthe annual payment of a contribution as in the case of the old associa-tions. Membership is obligatory for at least one member of eachfamily. There is a cooperative group for several villages (Unite deproduction), i.e., for 200 to 300 families. Relations with the Office aremaintained by the delegates of these groups to the heads of the sec-tors and by the general delegate of the settlers to the head of theDepartment of Settlers (Service du paysannat) at S6gou.

These cooperative groups serve, above all, as intermediaries forthe sale of consumer goods (sugar, salt, soap, etc.) and for the rentalof equipment (carts, plows, sprayers, plow oxen). The cooperativestores are managed by the administration because the settlers arealmost 90 percent illiterate. They generally do not have enoughequipment to rent, all the more because the charges they make forrentals are below the rates that prevail among the settlers. Finally,at the level of Unites de production a number of cooperative groupshave established collective rice fields totalling about 50 hectares forthe whole of the Office, including eight hectares of transplanted ricein Niono. On the initiative of political committees some collectivefields have also been set up in the villages, above all in Kolongowhere there are two hectares of rice grown per village and in Nionowhere about 0.2 hectares of cotton are cultivated per village. Thesecollective fields are generally less well tended than individual fields.The principal limitations of the cooperative group stem from thesupport which the administration must give them and from theircompulsory character which makes them appear to be instrumen-

255


talities of the Office rather than organizations representative of the

settlers.

Industrial and commercial operations

The Office du Niger operates as an enterprise buying requisites of

production (of which a part is resold to the settlers), processing agri-

cultural products and then marketing them. All the purchases of the

Office are now centralized in a single department which is thus

supposed to exercise a better control of supply. The extraordinary

diversity of requirements of the departments concerned with public

works, agricultural production, administration, the settlers and

industrial production is such that it is very difficult for this Depart-

ment of Supply to meet them all in a timely fashion. The autonomy

of the Office vis-a-vis the Government has been manifested by the

direct placement of orders abroad, thanks to the fact that the Office

has its own foreign exchange resources despite the theoretical mo-

nopoly of foreign trade exercised by the Government.The first processing of the two principal agricultural products,

paddy and seedcotton, is done by the three rice mills and the ginnery

owned by the Office. These industrial activities were, and probably

still are, the only operations of the Office that are profitable, all the

more because the difficulties in marketing the processed product are

reflected in the accounts of another department. However, the mill-

ing of rice does pose certain problems. These arise first of all from

some degree of underemployment of capacity. The settlers have a

tendency to limit their deliveries of rice for milling by the Office in

order to parboil the rice themselves and to sell the surplus of par-

boiled rice which traditionally is preferred to milled rice. Since 1962

the monopolization of marketing by the Office leaves the settlers

only such quantities, varying from 40 percent to 80 percent of their

harvest, as are essential for home consumption. From 1960 to 1963

there was a substantial reduction in the quantity of rice milled-

from 37,000 tons of paddy to 20,000 tons. This reflected a decline in

output which was initiated by the sharp cut in prices paid to farmers

by the Office in 1960 and continued owing to marketing difficultiesexperienced in 1962 and 1963. Since then total production has some-

what recovered, and the demand for milling will presumably further

increase as newly developed land is put to rice. While total milling

capacity, estimated at 45,000 tons in 1960, appears ample, utilization

of this capacity has been diflicult because the location of the mills no

longer conforms to the distribution of rice production among the

different sectors. Thus the Kokry rice mill operates at a very low

rate owing to insufficient rice collections in the Kolongo sector. On

256


the other hand, the Office's rice farms in Kourouma have the great-est difficulty in rnilling their output because of the lack of a rice millin that sector. For this reason it is planned to transfer to Kouroumathe Tienfala rice mill which has been inactive since the reconversionof the Baguineda Plain.

The processing of seedcotton is no longer, or is not yet, attendedby any difficulties. The only ginnery is established at Niono near thecotton-producing sector. For a long time it did not operate at itsfull capacity of 8,000 tons because of the insufficient quantity ofseedcotton collected. However, full utilization of its theoretic capac-ity might not have been possible owing to the obsolescence of itsequipment. Recent measures taken to intensify the production ofcotton have justified the construction of a second ginnery, also atNiono. This has been financed by the European Development Fund,as part of a broader involvement in the campaign to increase cottonoutput.

The marketing of cotton and, still more, that of rice encountersand will undoubtedly continue to encounter the biggest difficulties.Within the framework of the protective market enjoyed in Francethe Office du Niger was usually able to market its output at ad-vantageous prices. Today, its distance from European markets,which affects both the cost of requisites of production and the salesprice of products, makes the inherent weak competitive position ofthe Office more marked. On African markets the Office must meetthe competition of other national or foreign producers. It is thedomestic market that absorbs most of the rice production of theOffice, above all when Mali experiences a food shortage as was thecase in 1965.

Agricultural productionAll the functions previously described serve to facilitate or to

process and market the agricultural output which is the primaryconcern of the Office du Niger. In the field of agriculture the Officeperforms several functions. First of all, it furnishes means of produc-tion and, above all, certain services. It enables peasants to acquirethe equipment for ox cultivation or selected seeds. Moreover, inreturn for specific quantities of rice or cotton, the Office furnishesfertilizer and insecticides, Since the beginning of the 'fifties, theOffice makes available to settlers, also against set payments in kind,a certain number of mechanical services. Thus the Department ofWorks can undertake for the account of both the settlers and theOffice's own farms, various operations extending from the plowingof rice fields or the ridging of cotton fields to the threshing of paddy.

257


These mechanized services require only a limited labor force; and

they have made it possible to extend the Office's own direct farming

operations which are mechanized as much as possible.

The Office du Niger also supervises the settlers and operates its

own farms. In each of the four sectors of the Office there is a director

representing the Department of Production. The sector is divided

into five or six production units which are in the charge of supervisors

(instructeurs). Each unit that has been settled extends over 1,000 to

2,500 hectares and includes 5 to 10 villages or 1,000 to 2,000 in-

habitants. The units that are farmed directly by the Office may

each go up to 4,000 hectares. The supervisors have a primary school

education and about half of them are former village extension work-

ers (moniteurs). The extension worker in each village, or the one in

charge of a group of farm workers in the units devoted to direct

farming, is responsible for transmitting the instructions of the super-

visor about the date of various agricultural operations, the use of

irrigation water, and the organization of collective tasks.

The sectors differ in respect to both the date when they began

production and the extent to which they are specialized. Until 1950

the only two sectors in production were Kolongo and Niono. The

first, devoted to rice, accounted for three-quarters of the rice output

of the Office, while Niono, with an area only half as large, was

oriented towards the production of cotton as well as rice. The crea-

tion of the rice-producing sector of Molodo in 1950 and the slow

expansion of the Kourouma sector beginning in 1952 helped to

accentuate the orientation of the Office du Niger towards rice. In

1955, the area under rice accounted for almost 23,000 hectares of

which 12,000 were in Kolongo and 6,000 in Molodo. In the two

sectors where cotton was grown this crop occupied only half of the

area, nearly 4,000 hectares in Niono and 500 in Kourouma. Up to

1960 the increase in the cultivated area took place in the so-called

cotton sectors of Niono and Kourouma but benefited essentially the

production of rice. In 1960 paddy production in the Office reached

almost 56,000 tons, triple that of 1949. The Office also produced

4,300 tons of seedcotton or more than three times the output of 1949.

Production of paddy fell for the first time in the history of the Office

in the years 1961 to 1963. This decline was accentuated by a drop in

yields which began in 1961 and was still continuing in 1964. In the

latter years the Office produced 25 percent less paddy on an area

equivalent to that of 1960. For cotton the situation was reversed.

The increase in yields on smaller areas in Niono and the partial con-

version of the Molodo sector to cotton cultivation made it possible for

the production of seedcotton to rise markedly between 1960 and 1964.

258

Mali Republic: Irrigated .4

In 1964 the production of the Office du Niger was 43,000 tons ofpaddy and nearly 10,000 tons of seedcotton. The Kolongo sectorproduced 12,000 tons of paddy or 40 percent less than a decade agoon an area of about the same extent. The attempt to cultivate cottonin Kolongo begun in 1962 seemed doomed to failure. With 15,000tons of paddy and 7,300 tons of cotton, the Niono sector was theleading producer of both crops in the Office. The output of the twocrops had doubled cornpared to that of 1955-that of paddy, thanksto an increase in area, and that of cotton solely as the result ofdoubling yields. The Molodo sector took second place in cottonproduction with 1,400 tons, but its paddy production of 3,700 tonswas the lowest in the Office as the result of a reduction in area. TheKourouma sector experienced a development quite different fromthat of Molodo-its output of cotton stagnated at less than 1,000tons while its rice output was 6,500 tons. In 1964 the Office du Nigerwas still devoting about 80 percent of its irrigated area to the pro-duction of paddy and seemed, despite the progress in the cultivationof cotton, to be definitely oriented towards rice production.

The agricultural output of the Office comes both from settlers'holdings and the farms operated directly by the Office with wagelabor. Farming by settlers used to be the rule and still accounts forthe larger part of the cultivated area. Until the last few years, thethree sectors of Kolongo, Niono, and Kourounia consisted almostentirely of settler's holdings. Only land that had been newly de-veloped for irrigation in these sectors was cultivated by the Officebefore being assigned to settlers in order to determine whether thedevelopment work had been correctly done and whether properirrigation was possible. Similarly, when settlers left, the Office usedto assume temporary responsibility for the cultivation of their land.In these three sectors there were always some hundreds of hectaresgrown to rice by the Office. Apart from these exceptions to the ruleof leaving farming to settlers, the Office was engaged from 1948 to1961 in a large-scale experiment involving the direct farming ofalmost 6,000 hectares developed for this purpose near Molodo. Anautonomous enterprise known as the Centre rizicole mrcanis6 (CRM)was made responsible during this period for farming in the Molodosector. Farming operations were carried out by paid personnel towhom a significant amount of mechanical equipment was madeavailable. The CRM of Molodo experienced such technical andeconomic difficulties that it was abandoned in 1961 and its landallocated to settlers (see Table 5).

Beginning in 1962 at least one direct farming enterprise (Exploita-tion en Regie directe, ERD) was reestablished in each production

259

TABLE 5: DIRECT RICE FARMING BY THE OFFICE

1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1962/63 1963/64

Har- Har- Har- Har- Har-

Area vest Yield Area vest Yield Area vest Yield Area vest Yield Area vest Yield

thousands tons/ thousands tons/ thousands tons/ thousands tons/ thousands tons/

ha. tons ha. ha. tons ha. ha. tons ha. ha. tons ha. ha. tons ha.

> Kolongo 0.2 0.4 1.8 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.2 2.3 1.1 1.6 0.8 2.6 1.70 0.7

Niono 1.1 2.4 2.2 0.2 0.4 1.9 0.9 1.9 2.1 1.4 3.0 2.2 2.9 3.5 1.2

Molodo 5.6 9.5 1.7 5.7 9.4 1.6 5.7 10.3 1.8 - - - 1.0 1.4 1.4

Kourouma 0.8 2.2 2.8 0.4 1.2 2.9 - - - 1.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 4.5 1.5

7.7 14.5 1.8 6.6 11.2 1.7 6.7 12.4 1.8 3.5 7.4 2.4 9.5 11.1 1.2

'Estimates.


sector. As in the case of previous operations of this kind, the ERDhas relied heavily on mechanization. However, while the CRM hadits own equipment park, the ERD has used the mechanical servicesof the Office against the payment of set charges. These farm enter-prises undertook some large-scale operations (wheat in 1962/63 on350 hectares; cotton in 1963/64 on 900 hectares) which did notmeet with the expected success. With rice the farm enterprises ofthe Office were more successful, since by 1963/64 they had surpassedthe area, though not the yields, reached at the end of the 'fiftieswhen the old CRM was operating. In 1964/65 the farm enterprisesof the Office were expected to have under production more than10,000 hectares, or over one-third of the total cultivated area in theOffice.

Since 1961, farming by settlers has experienced a slight drop withrespect to cultivated area, but an increase in terms of production.Two tendencies concentration on the best land and intensificationof methods of cultivation have led to an increase in yields whichhas been particularly marked in the case of cotton and less in thecase of rice. This recent campaign to intensify production of bothcrops and its effect will be discussed in some detail in a subsequentsection of this study.

TABLE 6: PRODUCTION BY SETTLERS

1962/63 1963/64

Area Harvest Yield Area Harvest Yield

thousands tons/ thousands tons/ha. tons ha. ha. tons ha.

Rice

Kolongo 8.6 9.6 1.1 8.0 10.6a 1.3Niono 5.5 11.3 2.0 5.5 11.6a 2.0Molodo 2.9 3.0a 1.0 2.7 3.1 1.1Kourouma 3.2 6.8 2.1 3.6 6.5 1.9

20.2 30.7 7.2 19.8 31.8 6.3

Cotton

Kolongo 0.3 0.1 0.3 - - -Niono 4.1 5.5 1.3 4.0 6.9 1.7Molodo 1.8 1.3 0.7 1.7 1.4 0.8Kourouma 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.5

7.5 7.2 2.5 6.6 8.8 3.0

,Estimates.

261


Irrigation and drainage problems

From the very beginning of the scheme serious deficiencies in the

irrigation and drainage network have had adverse effects on yields;

and these deficiencies have been aggravated on the one hand by

poor maintenance and on the other hand by the insufficient capacity

of the canals, particularly in view of the burdens placed on them

by the continued extensions of the irrigation system. Proper control

over water, in terms of both quantity and timeliness, is, of course,

essential to good yields of both cotton and rice. Both need water to

ensure timely sowing and a sufficiently long period of vegetative

growth. During the vegetative period cotton needs a regular supply

of water, but too much water or a failure to drain standing water

brings about a quick decline in yields. Rice paddies must have ample

water to ensure submergence to an even depth during the growth

period, but there must also be effective means of draining them at

certain times and particularly before the harvest. Moreover, rice

fields must be dried out between crops in order to prevent infestation

by noxious weeds. In the Office dii Niger proper conditions of irriga-

tion and drainage have never been fully assured.

Certain deficiencies in the irrigation system are attributable to an

inadequate appreciation of hydrological conditions. For a long time

there was an insufficient knowledge of rainfall. Thus the assumption

that the climatic conditions of the northern part of the Office were

similar to those of the Gezira scheme in the Sudan led in 1950 to the

establishment of a sector which was to specialize in the growing

of long-staple cotton. It soon became evident, however, that the

rainfall was much above previous estimates and that this crop was

in practice impossible. The rainfall at Kogoni in the north of the

Office during the 'fifties was, on the average, 600 mm. per year,

very little different from the annual average of 700 mm. reported

at Segou on the banks of the Niger.3 The concentration of the rains

during 40 to 50 days and their unpredictability also make it difficult

to anticipate the needs for irrigation and drainage. In September, if

the rains are insufficient, too infrequent irrigation may cause a loss

in yield up to 500 kilograms of seedcotton per hectare. In the month

of August, on the other hand, excess rains up to 200 mm. may pose

difficult drainage problems. Finally, the possibilities of irrigation

themselves are sometimes insufficient. Although the irrigation system

I Excess humidity resulting from high rainfall after the germination of cotton

is conducive to black arm disease to which long-staple cotton is particularly

susceptible. In the Gezira the rainfall is only about 400 mm. and most of that,

in contrast to the Office du Niger, occurs before the sowing of cotton.

262

Afali Republic: Irrigated Agriculture

is in theory capable of compensating for inadequacies in rainfall atthe end of the crop season, it often cannot cope with the lack of rainat the beginning of the agricultural season. The flood of the Nigercoincides more or less with the rainy season so that the Niger is atits lowest level at the end of the dry season. Since the Nlarkalabarrage cannot store water, pre-irrigation to facilitate land prepara-tion is often impossible.

Other difficulties stem from technical deficiencies in planning orcarrying out the works. The preliminary plans were made on thebasis of topographic surveys on the scale of 1/20,000; and the finalproject was carried out on the basis of plans on the scale of 1/5,000or 1/2,000. NMore detailed and precise data were really requiredduring the stage of preliminary planning and even at times for thefinal plan. The difference in elevations which is only a few metersbetween the extreme points of the Office makes micro-relief par-ticularly important. The lack of information of micro-relief led tothe abandonment of certain fields which proved incapable of beingirrigated or drained. It also developed that field drains had to beconverted at times into irrigation channels. Similarly, the evacuationof water from the Kolongo sector by the drain emptying into theNiger is impossible when the river is in spate. The insufficient in-formation on micro-relief has also made it difficult to carry outlevelling in such a way as to ensure uniform irrigation and completedrainage. When rice is sown directly, a virgin rice field which hasnot been levelled may have a yield of I l2 tons per hectare, but aproperly levelled rice field may attain a yield of three tons. In thesame cotton field yields may vary 100 percent, depending on thevariations in the elevation of the land. Another technical difficultyis due to the inadequate capacity of canals. The development ofadditional land has increased the irrigated area and consequentlythe needs for water. The canals which were originally cut in half-section should have been enlarged, but the increase in the capacityof the Sahel Canal which was envisaged in 1955 still has not beencarried out. Thus, irrigation at Kourouma, which is at the end ofthe network, is sometimes insufficient. A lack of water when paddycomes into ear was held responsible in 1963/64 for a drop in yieldsof more than a ton per hectare. These difficulties can only be ac-centuated by the extensions in the scheme that are continuing.

Finally, the accelerated aggravation of the deficiencies in theirrigation system is undoubtedly due to poor maintenance andinadequate utilization of irrigation water. The management of theOffice is responsible for keeping the whole of the network in goodcondition, but it is more concerned with the development of addi-

263


tional land and its routine operational and administrative tasks.

The farmers are supposed to maintain the field irrigation channels

and drains, or, alternatively, to pay for having this work done by the

Office. Often they do neither. Many canals are sanded up; embank-

ments have caved in; and drains have become infested with noxious

weeds. This lack of concern is also often evidenced by poor irrigation

practices. The amount of water that has to be drained is frequently

greater than that which should result from proper irrigation. Owing

to fears that water may be insufficient or to simple negligence, farm-

ers frequently put far too much water on their fields which are more

often flooded than correctly irrigated.

Intensification of production

By 1958 it was apparent that the record of the Office du Niger

was, on balance, very disappointing. In spite of substantial invest-

ments and experience over thirty years, the production of irrigated

crops in the Office had not shown itself particularly remunerative

either for the farmers who were increasingly reluctant to settle in the

scheme or for the Office itself which could not even cover its current

expenditures. Yields of paddy and seedcotton per hectare were too

low; in 1957 the average was 1,600 kilograms for rice and 700 kilo-

grams for cotton. More serious still, yields which had reached a peak

of 2,000 kilograms for paddy and one of 1,000 kilograms for seed-

cotton in the years 1954 and 1955 appeared to be showing a tendency

to decline. Production was still rising, but only due to an increase in

the cultivated area, i.e., to the development of new land for irriga-

tion. In 1958 it was decided at one and the same time to stop the

expansion of the irrigated area and to launch a campaign for the

intensification of production. The rise in yields per hectare was to

enable the Office to make better use of its invested capital, to balance

its budget and to raise the standard of living of the settlers. This pur-

suit of intensification was to be effected through the introduction of

new techniques. However, other factors have intervened to limit the

results obtained.

Intensification techniques

For Rice. The Office tried to reverse declining rice yields by pro-

gressively replacing direct sowing with transplanting of seedlings

grown in nurseries. Transplanting of rice was to increase yields in

several ways. First of all, it was to control noxious weeds. Parasitic

weeds, of which the most important is wild rice (Oriza Barthii), have

been a significant factor in the reduction of yields, particularly in

Kolongo. The methods previously used to combat wild rice were both

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too costly and too ineffective. This was particularly true of deepplowing. In practice the poor drainage of rice fields had made itimpossible to kill by desiccation the rhizomes exposed to the sun bydeep plowing. When transplanting was adopted, however, the landcould be irrigated at the beginning of the season before it wascropped, stimulating in this way the early growth of wild rice andother noxious weeds which could then be pulled up before the riceseedlings were transplanted. Under these conditions the transplantedrice could get a head start over those weeds which might regrow.Also the regular spacing of the transplanted seedling would facilitatesubsequent weeding. Secondly, transplanting was to make possibleearly sowing and therefore a longer vegetative period. Because of thelack of water for pre-irrigation direct sowing had to be postponeduntil the advent of the rains had made the land sufficiently soft forplowing. Since the much smaller rice nurseries could be irrigated,early sowing of rice for subsequent transplanting was made feasible.Finally, with transplanting the rice seedlings were capable of morevigorous initial growth. It was possible to take better care of plantsin the nurseries. The application of 100 kilograms of sulphate ofammonia per hectare in the nurseries also stimulated the develop-ment of more vigorous plants. The effectiveness of this practice couldbe prolonged by supplementary applications of fertilizer in the paddyfields. Such applications could be at the rate of 80 kilograms perhectare at the time of transplanting and of 40 kilograms per hectareat the time rice comes into ear (in practice the Office has appliedfertilizer to rice fields only on its own farms). Moreover, the adoptionof transplanting was to make possible a saving of 30 percent to 40percent in seed.

Up to 1964 the rice nurseries were managed by the Office whichsold the seedlings to the settlers against payment in kind of 100 kilo-grams of paddy per hectare replanted. It proved necessary to staggersowing in the nurseries during the months of April and May in orderto provide seedlings which were not too old to settlers who were latein plowing their fields. The settlers do transplanting almost entirelyby hand. However, on its own farm enterprises the Office did trans-planting with the help of a manually operated machine which wasintroduced by Chinese experts and would seem to deserve wider use.

Transplanting was begun in 1959 in the Kolongo sector which hadbeen the most severely affected by the spread of wild rice. In 1962the transplanted area amounted to 626 hectares of which 537 were inKolongo. The following year the area was about the same, but in1964 it dropped to 404 hectares. A large part of the transplantedrice is grown on the Office's own farms in Kolongotoino (100 hec-

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tares) and on the collective fields where transplanting is considered

a type of experiment or demonstration. For reasons which we shall

examine later only a small part of the settlers practice transplanting

and each of them does so only on a fraction of his land. The yield

which in the best cases reaches 4 tons, is generally about 2-2½2 tons

per hectare. Owing to the very limited extent to which transplanting

has been adopted, the average paddy yield in the Office has con-

tinued to decline reaching 1.4 tons per hectare in 1964 (see Table 7).

TABLE 7: EVOLUTION OF RICE AND COTTON YIELDS(tons/hectares)

Rice Cotton

Ko- Mo- Kou- Total Ko- Mo- Kou- Total

longo Niono lodo rouma Office longo Niono lodo rouma Office

1949/50 1.9 2.1 - - 2.0 - 0.7 - - 0.7

1950/51 1.3 1.9 1.4 - 1.4 - 0.6 - - 0.6

1951/52 1.7 2.1 1.1 - 1.7 - 1.0 - - 1.0

1952/53 1.8 2.1 2.1 - 1.9 - 0.9 - - 0.9

1953/54 1.9 1.7 2.0 - 1.9 - 1.0 - 0.9 1.0

1954/55 1.8 1.9 2.2 1.0 2.0 - 0.9 - 0.2 0.8

1955/56 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.8 - 0.7 - 0.6 0.7

1956/57 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.9 1.8 - 0.7 - 0.6 0.7

1957/58 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.6 - 0.7 - 0.5 0.6

1958/59 1.4 1.9 1.7 2.2 1.7 - 0.6 - 0.7 0.7

1959/60 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.8 - 0.7 - 0.6 0.7

1960/61 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 - 1.0 neg. 0.7 0.9

1961/62 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.6 - 1.2 n.a. n.a. 1.0

1962/63 1.2 2.1 1.0 2.3 1.5 neg. 1.3 0.8 0.5 1.0

1963/64 1.2 1.8 1.2 1.7 1.4 0.2 1.7 0.8 0.6 1.3

For Cotton. The intensive cultivation of cotton as it has been

practiced in the Office since 1958 represents a systematic application

of principles which have long been recognized. It involves not only

the utilization of the latest agricultural research with respect to

variety selection and crop husbandry, but also increased expendi-

tures on improvement of irrigation and drainage, on fertilizers and

on insecticides.In 1929 agronomists originally made a distinction between land

suitable for rice and that suitable for cotton; and up to 1954 this

distinction was in fact observed by separating the cultivation of these

two crops. However, between 1954 and 1958 a rice-cotton rotation

was tried on half the Niono sector and the whole of the Kourouma

sector. This new rotation encountered great difficulties. The type of

levelling required for a rice field is different from that for a cotton

field. Moreover, the technical methods of cultivating cotton and rice

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are dissimilar with respect to both land preparation (cultivation inthe flat or cultivation on ridges), and method of irrigation (sub-mersion or furrow irrigation). The new rotation had been designedto cope with the infestation of wild rice by introducing a crop, namelycotton, which had to be weeded and needed only limited irrigation.However, in the Niono sector, which is the principal cotton-growingarea, there has always been little wild rice and in the Kolongotomosector, where wild rice was a real problem, drainage conditions aretoo bad to permnit the cultivation of cotton. Moreover, in the cottonsectors the amount of irrigation necessary for the cultivation of ricewas so great that the water table became too high in cotton fieldsthus producing a drop in cotton yields. In 1958 the rice-cotton ro-tation was abandoned in favor of the old division of land betweenrice and cotton in accordance with pedological criteria. While paddyis cultivated continuously in the rice-growing areas, cotton fieldsare fallowed for one year after two years of cropping.

From the beginning some research work was done in the Officedu Niger, and most of this research is now concentrated at theKogoni station. The various methods developed to improve yieldswill be discussed later. Here one consequence of the work on fertil-izers should be noted. It was shown that fertilizers could be used tocorrect small local differences in soils. This has in turn made itpossible to concentrate cotton production on large blocks, facili-tating proper supervision, aerial spraying and mechanical ridging.In recent years the fields devoted to cotton have in fact been largelyregrouped for this purpose. However, no rotation with other cropshas been introduced though research has pointed to the possibilityof a rotation involving the cultivation of cotton for two years followedby two years of grass leys and finally a "between-the-season" wheatcrop. Such a rotation would make it possible to abolish fallow andutilize the full irrigation potential of the Office provided it is pos-sible to do some irrigating during the dry season.

It has already been mentioned that in the past inadequate irriga-tion and, above all, deficient drainage, adversely affected the yieldsof cotton. Improved levelling of land, called "super-levelling," thusbecame an essential feature of the intensification program. Thissuper-levelling, or levelling in strips (called "piano keys"), wasdesigned to eliminate only the transverse slope and to provide auniform grade of 2 percent along the length of the strip so that waterwould flow evenly to all parts of the field and not remain standinganywhere. This super-levelling has the advantage of limiting theamount of earth to be moved, reducing the cost of levelling andavoiding the removal of the most fertile topsoil. Under these condi-

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tions a more even irrigation and a more rapid drainage of excess

water could be assured. The super-levelling of old cotton land was

begun in 1959, and by 1964 the land levelled in this way amountedto over 8,600 hectares, opening up the possibility of cultivating only

"intensive" cotton in 1965. Moreover, a program for the conversionof certain rice lands to cotton cultivation is being financed by the

European Development Fund. This program envisaged not only

the levelling of land, but also a reduction in the area of individualfields, improvement of field drains and irrigation channels and the

elimination of paddy embankments. All of these operations were to

cost about 60,000 to 70,000 Mali francs per hectare. However, of a

first installment of 3,000 hectares which was to be completed in

1963/64, the Office du Niger levelled only 350 hectares because of a

delay in the commencement of the work.

TABLE 8: LAND LEVELLING OPERATIONS(hectares)

Totalup to

1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964a 6/1/64

Kolongo - - - - 292 345 - 637

Niono 6 151 339 687 547 2,383 350 4,463Molodo - 16 - 462 1,220 553 - 2,251Kourouma - 26 372 110 562 225 - 1,295

AnnualTotal 6 193 711 1,259 2,621 3,506 350

CumulativeTotal 6 199 910 2,169 4,790 8,296 8,646 8,646

'To June 1, 1964.

The development of new Allen varieties of cotton which have been

multiplied and distributed systematically since 1950 was the most

important prerequisite to the intensification of cotton cultivation.These varieties were capable of high yields, particularly with im-

proved cultural practices such as the application of fertilizers, in-

secticide treatments, timely planting on ridges and effective weeding.

Paradoxically, however, these same varieties could also produce good

though less reliable yields with these cultural practices on non-

irrigated areas even with an annual rainfall of only around 700 mm.

such as prevails over much of the area of the Office du Niger. Irriga-

tion, if properly conducted, could under these conditions only pro-

vide a more regular and assured supply of water.

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Before the intensification of cotton cultivation, fertilizing was nota general practice and was confined to turning in cottonseed cake atthe time of ridging.4 Under intensive cultivation 100 kilograms oftriple superphosphate, as well as 400 to 500 kilograms of cottonseedcake, are applied per hectare at the time of ridging, and 100 kilo-grams of sulphate of ammonia at the time of thinning. Fertilizersare supplied by the Office against payment by the settler of a chargeof 235 kilograms of seedcotton per hectare. In accordance withrecommendations made by the Institut de recherches sur le coton etles textiles exotiques (IRCT) which adininisters the Kogoni researchstation, the nitrogenous fertilizer applied in 1965 was to be in theform of urea.

In 1959 the cotton which was grown on level land and had re-ceived fertilizer was also sprayed for the first time. The 200 hectaresof cotton treated with insecticides in that year had a yield of 1,900kilograms per hectare as compared with an average yield of 530kilograms for cotton which had not been grown on level land andhad not been fertilized (called "ordinary" cotton). Spraying wasalso extended to "ordinary" cotton which had grown well; and theOffice applied the designation "semi-intensive" to this practicewhich was to continue until all the cotton land was properly leveled.The Office at first advised ten sprayings throughout the season butlater reduced this number to six and sometimes to four. For thefirst three sprayings 400 grams (active mnatter) of endrin mixed withone kilogram (active matter) of DDT are uscd per hectare. Sub-sequent sprayings are done either with endrin or with DDT depend-ing of the type of parasites. For the blocks under "intensive" cotton,spraying is done by plane. The cost of the spraying and the sprayingmaterials furnished by the Office is charged to the settlers who pay370 kilograms of seedcotton per hectare for six treatments and 260kilograms per hectare for four treatments.

The results of the intensification of cotton cultivation have beenmore favorable than in the case of rice. For the whole of the cottongrown in the Office, the average yield rose from 0.6 tons per hectarein 1958 to 1.3 tons in 1964. In 1964, 5,600 hectares out of a total of7,400 hectares were devoted to the intensive cultivation of cotton.However, the results of intensification did not measure up to originalexpectations. The yield of 1.5 tons per hectare obtained on 5,600hectares in 1964 was far from the 2.7 tons per hectare achieved on sixhectares in 1959. At the same time not too much significance ought

I While clearly beneficial to rice, manure has had little effect on cotton evenwhen used in quantities as large as 15 tons per hectare.

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to be attached to this average yield, since it reflects the very poor

output of Kolongo, Molodo, and Kourouma as well as the more

significant production of Niono where yields were around 2 tons

per hectare. An analysis of the results of intensification must take

into account this great difference among the sectors.

TABLE 9: INTENSIVE CULTIVATION OF COTTON

Cultivated Area Average Yield(hectares) (kilograms per hectare)

1958/59 6 2,7001959/60 212 1,9001960/61 727 1,4001961/62 n.a. n.a.1962/63 3,914 1,0301963/64 5,580 1,450

Reasons for the limited success of intensification

Among the factors accounting for the limited success of intensifica-

tion, three principal ones merit special attention: the lack of man-

power, due to the supplementary work required by intensification;

doubts about the profitability of the new practices; and the persist-

ance of irrigation and drainage difficulties.

Lack of Manpower. The Office has always been characterized by

an excessively low density of settlement. Demographic pressure had

never been such as to compel an intensification of cropping. On the

contrary, there was some increase in the size of individual farms in

the period 1950-1960, undoubtedly because of the difficulties en-

countered in recruiting settlers at this time. The low population

density in most of the other regions of Mali and the cessation of

immigration from Upper Volta have for some years still further

limited the number of applicants for settlement. Moreover, the use

of wage labor also became much more difficult. It is undoubtedly

the general policy of Government and local authorities to limit

internal migration for the sake of developing each of the country's

regions. On its part, the Office has been trying to prevent settlers

from employing agricultural laborers and has largely succeeded in

doing so, particularly because the minimum legal wage was fixed

at the high rate of 184 Mali francs per day. Even at this wage rate

the Office itself has not always been able to find the necessary

labor for its own farm enterprises. Particularly in Kourouma,

in the northern part of the Office, the shortage of labor has caused

difficulties which can only have been aggravated by the develop-

270


ment of additional land for irrigation which has taken place in thisregion.

An increase in production per hectare entails both more work bythe peasant and higher outlays for the purchase of other factors ofproduction. In the absence of detailed investigation it is not possibleto determine exactly how many extra days of work are required ineach case. When sown directly rice is said to require from 40 to 65workdays per hectare, depending above all on the amount of weedingwhich may take anywhere from 15 days to 45 days and which, whenrice is transplanted, may take no more than 15 days. Transplantingitself, including the transportation of the seedlings from the nurseriesto the field, is reported to require up to 60 days of work. With theuse of the Chinese rice planting machine the number of man-daysrequired can apparently be reduced to around 30; and the Officehas used this machine on the greater part of the area it has trans-planted on its own farms. However, the rice planter is a ratherdelicate machine and can be used only on perfectly levelled land.Even where the rice planter is not used good results can be achievedwith transplanting only if the land is level enough to permit it tobe uniformly covered with water. Only in this way can such weedsas wild rice be effectively eradicated before transplanting begins.

The very limited results obtained by transplanting are attributableabove all to manpower problems which, however, differ somewhatfrom one production sector to another. In the cotton-producingsectors the settler evidently found it impossible to cope both withthe transplanting of rice and the intensive cultivation of cotton. Thedistribution of agricultural work over seven to eight months left onlylittle scope for an increase in labor input. In particular, rice needsto be transplanted in June or early July, which coincides with thepeak labor period for cotton extending from sowing to weeding. Inthe sectors devoted solely to rice those settlers who have done sometransplanting have done so on only a fraction of their rice land, andthen very probably only because they felt it necessary to respond tosome extent to the intensification campaign launched with the sup-port of the political party. In general, families have preferred to sowas much land as they could directly and then have transplanted alittle rice at a later date when they have been less busy. In the wholeof the Office 625 hectares were transplanted in 1963 and only 404in 1964. The greater part was done in Kolongo where yields ofdirect-sown rice are lowest. On the Office's own farms in Kolongo70 hectares were transplanted in 1963 and 100 hectares in 1964.The Office has apparently not experienced serious difficulty inrecruiting temporary labor for transplanting because its farms have

271


been located near the relatively well-populated areas bordering on

the Niger River. Even here, however, it sought to economize on

manpower through the use of the rice planting machine.

The "ordinary" cultivation of cotton is said to require 80 to 90

man-days of labor, not counting plowing and ridging which are

assumed, for the purpose of this comparison, to be furnished by the

management of the Office against a stipulated charge. For "in-

tensive" cultivation of cotton it is more difficult to estimate the

additional labor required. Supplementary labor is above all required

for more careful weeding and for the picking of a larger quantity of

cotton. Spraying is done by airplane and therefore does not require

more work by the farmer. However, the latter is expected in general

to pay much more attention to all the operations of weeding, irriga-

tion, re-ridging, etc. Altogether he may have to devote between

120 and 130 man-days of labor to each hectare, or 30 to 40 days

more than before.The intensification of cotton production was to go hand in hand,

from 1961, with an expansion of the area under cotton in all the

sectors of the Office. In Kolongo the results obtained were very

discouraging, undoubtedly because of the poor functioning of the

irrigation and drainage network as well as the lack of experience of

the settlers who had hitherto grown only rice. In Molodo, on the

other hand, the lack of sufficient settlers which has characterized

this sector ever since it was open to settlement, appears to have been

linked to the low level of yields. There is evidently a close correlation

between high yields and the ease of recruiting settlers, with a close

interaction of these two factors. It is in Niono that intensification

has been most successful; and it is also in Niono that the problems of

settlement and labor are least serious. On the farming enterprises

of the Office itself the poor results achieved with cotton intensification

have undoubtedly been due to the poor quality as well as to the

limited quantity of labor available. While the principal operations in

rice growing can be mechanized, in cotton cultivation the weeding

and picking which requires most work can only be done by hand. By

1965 it was only in the Niono sector that the Office was continuingto cultivate cotton on its own farms and then only for experimental

purposes and for the multiplication of seed furnished in small quanti-

ties by the Kogoni research station.Incentives for Intensification. How much incentive settlers have had

to intensify their production of cotton and rice is difficult to de-

termine. A definitive answer requires reliable data on (1) the in-

crease in yield per hectare that can be obtained, (2) the cost of this

increase in yield not only in terms of the additional inputs required

272


but also of a possible curtailment of the cropped area owing to thegreater amount of labor required, and (3) the willingness of thesettlers to work harder for the sake of more income. Unfortunately,the information on all these points is not very satisfactory. Any judg-ments must therefore be somewhat speculative and tentative. Onlya socio-economic farm survey that would cover an adequate sampleof settlers in each sector is likely to produce the data for more defini-tive judgments.

Rice: The incentive for transplanting rice might first be discussed.Here a crucial factor is obviously the extent to which rice yields hadfallen as the result of continuous cultivation and particularly theinvasion of wild rice. For example, in the Kolongo sector we notedthat in one village where it was still possible to get yields of over twotons of rice per hectare without transplanting, the area transplantedin 1963/64 had been less than 1 percent of the total, whereas inanother village whose land had been seriously invaded by wild riceand yields were down to about 1 ton per hectare the area trans-planted was a little over 12 percent that same year. Another factorbearing on incentives is the extent of the increase in yield made pos-sible by transplanting. For the sake of illustration, let us assume thata settler in Kolongo can achieve the sector's average yield of 1.2tons of paddy per hectare without transplanting and that he canraise this yield to 2.5 tons by transplanting. However, the area oftransplanted rice that he could grow would be limited by the laboravailable. Since transplanting, which takes around 50 to 60 daysper hectare (or two months or more, counting 25 workdays permonth), can apparently be extended over a period of two months,each worker could manage to grow 0.9 to 1 hectare of transplantedrice. On the other hand, if rice were sown directly in the field, thebottleneck limiting the cropped area would presumably be theweeding that is normally done in August and September. Estimatesof the time required for weeding a hectare of directly-sown rice varygreatly-from 15 to 30 and even 45 days, indicating that during atwo months' period one man could cope with anywhere from 3.3 to1.6 or 1.1 hectares. Actually, the average rice area in Kolongo peradult male worker in 1963/64 was apparently 2.5 hectares.

If the choice is between growing 2.5 hectares of direct-sown rice,with an average yield of 1.2 tons per hectare, and 0.9 to 1.0 hectareat a yield of 2.5 tons per hectare, which one would be more profitableto the settler? In both cases the management of the Office wouldcollect general charges amounting to 400 kilograms of paddy perhectare and 10 percent of the harvest for mechanical threshing; andin the case of transplanted rice, an additional 100 kilograms per

273


hectare would be charged for the seedlings. Thus 2.5 hectares ofdirect-sown rice would have a net output after all charges of 1.70tons.' On the other hand, the net yield of 0.9 to 1.0 hectare oftransplanted rice would be 1.57 or 1.75 tons.6 On such assumptionsthe cultivator transplanting rice would have a slightly superior totalnet production if he were able to reduce the time required for trans-planting one hectare from about 60 days which seems to correspondmore closely to the actual time employed to around 50 days whichmight well be attainable after additional experience with trans-planting. Transplanting would also be clearly advantageous if thefarmer had to take as many as 30 days for weeding in order to achievea yield of 1.2 tons per hectare, for in that event he might have toreduce his rice area to 1.6 hectares in order to get the necessaryweeding done. Similarly, transplanting would be rewarding to thefarmer if the yield from direct-sown rice were significantly lowerthan 1.2 tons per hectare.

The settler might not actually have to make a simple choice be-tween the direct sowing and the transplanting of rice. He might findsome combination of the two advantageous, particularly if this en-ables him to make better use of the labor at his disposal over acertain period. Thus he might find it advantageous to sow some ricedirectly during the month of June and transplant some during Julyand August before the directly-sown rice needs to be weeded. Inthat way sowing and transplanting and the weeding of both directly-sown and transplanted rice could presumably be staggered so as tomake fuller use of family labor resources and increase family income.

The experience in the Kolongo sector demonstrates clearly thatsettlers have not yet been convinced that a significant shift fromdirect-sown to transplanted rice is advantageous to them. For a largenumber of cultivators yields obtained under direct sowing may nothave fallen enough to provide an adequate incentive to switch totransplanting. Owing to the arduous nature of the work involved intransplanting the net increase in total income resulting from trans-planting may have to be quite high in order to appeal to the farmer.Efforts persisting over many years may well be needed to demonstrateto farmers the advantage of the new technique. Such efforts would,however, presumably need to concentrate on areas where low yieldsand considerable weed infestation are likely to make transplantingprofitable to the cultivators.

5 2.5 X 1.2 or 3 tons less 2.5 X 0.4 tons or 1.0 tons and 10 percent of 3 tonsor 0.30 tons.

1 0.9 or 1.0 X 2.5 tons = 2.25 to 2.50 tons, less 0.9 or 1.0 X 0.5 tons, or0.45 to 0.50 tons, and 10 percent of 2.25 to 2.50 tons or 0.225 to 0.250 tons.

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It should be noted here that even if it were profitable for the

settlers to intensify their rice production by growing transplantedrice on a smaller area, this would be economic for the scheme as awhole only if the area released by the existing colonists could be

either effectively farmed by the Office itself or allotted to new

colonists. If the cultivation of transplanted rice resulted in making a

certain amount of acreage idle, one would have to take into account

the loss of the revenue of 400 kilograms of paddy per hectare which

the Office would otherwise receive from this land.Cotton: For cotton, a calculation of the benefit the cultivator de-

rived from the intensification of his method of production might start

initially from the assumption that he need not curtail his acreageunder cotton. In the three years before the cotton intensification waslaunched yields averaged about 650 kilograms per hectare. After

deducting the general water and development charge of 240 kilo-grams per hectare, the net was 410 kilograms (unless the tenant

failed to maintain his irrigation and drainage channels in whichcase he had to pay 30 kilograms more). If the tenant adopted all thepractices of intensive cultivation, he had to pay additional chargesof 110 kilograms of seedcotton for mechanical ridging, 235 kilograms

for fertilizers and a minimum of 370 kilograms for insecticide treat-inents-altogether 715 kilograms more. Thus his gross yield wouldhave to increase by this amount-i.e., from the previously mentionedaverage of 650 kilograms to 1,365 kilograms per hectare to compen-

sate for the additional outlays apart from the extra family labor.Previously we have noted that the total labor required may be120-130 days per hectare or 30-40 more than before. If on the

average 90 days of labor were devoted before intensification to pro-

ducing a net yield of 410 kilograms of seedcotton valued at a total

of 14,000 Mali francs at a price of 34 francs per kilogram, thisrepresented a compensation of 155 francs per man day. A similarrate of compensation for the extra 30 to 40 days of labor assumed tobe required for intensive cultivation of cotton would be the equival-ent of an additional output of approximately 135 to 180 kilogramsof cotton.

On this basis one might conclude that a yield of around 1,500-1,550 kilograms per hectare7 might make intensive cotton cultivationattractive. Such a conclusion assumes, of course, that the cultivatorwants to raise his income and would consider the average return tolabor that he has enjoyed in the past to be adequate also for any

I That is, 135 or 180 kilograms plus the minimum yield of 1,365 kilogramsrequired to compensate for all outlays except the additional labor involved.

275


additional labor input. The farmer may in any event consider lessthan that as unattractive, particularly if he can work for the Officeitself at a minimum wage of 185 francs per day. Presumably oneshould also consider the hypothesis that the tenant might elect to

curtail his area under cotton because he does not dispose of, or isunwilling to utilize, more labor for cotton. In fact, it was evidentfrom interviews with cultivators that a number of them had reducedtheir area-in some cases by as much as half. If one assumes thatsome farmers might reduce the area grown under cotton by about

one-third, i.e., roughly in proportion to the additional labor thatmight be required for intensive cultivation, they would then need ayield of about 1,600 kilograms per hectare in order to get the samenet income as before intensification. 8

It is probable therefore that intensive cultivation of cotton needsto produce a gross yield of 1,500-1,600 kilograms of seedcotton perhectare if it is to be attractive to the cultivator. Yields of this magni-tude and above have been achieved in general only in the Nionosector.

Cultivators who have been wholly or primarily growing rice andare expected to convert at least part of their land to the intensivecultivation of cotton face the question whether intensive cotton pro-

duction is more attractive than rice. The conflict between rice andcotton would come during the harvest season. The harvesting of rice(except for threshing which is done for the cultivator by the Office)

apparently takes about 20 man days per hectare. If the same landcould be made to yield about 1,500 kilograms of seedcotton, thepicking of this might require about 60 days. On this basis the tenantmight be able to grow about three times as much rice as cotton. On

one hectare of cotton his net income at the indicated yield of 1,500kilograms of seedcotton per hectare would be about 550 kilogramsequivalent to 18,700 Mali francs. To get the same income from threehectares of rice, the net income per hectare of rice would need to be

about 6,250 francs, equivalent, at a price of 11 francs per kilogramof paddy, to 568 kilograms of paddy per hectare. Since the Officelevies a general development and water charge of 400 kilograms ofpaddy per hectare and also takes 10 percent of the harvest formechanical threshing, a gross yield of approximately 1,100 kilo-grams of paddy per hectare would be as attractive as a gross yield

I For example, if the reduction were from 1 hectare to 2/3 hectare, the chargeson the latter area under intensive cotton cultivation would be 2/3 X 955 kilo-grams or 637 kilograms. If his previous net output of cotton was 410 kilogramsper hectare, his gross output on two-thirds of a hectare would have to be 637plus 410 or 1,047 kilograms, equal to 1,570 kilograms per hectare.

276


of 1,500 kilogramas of seedcotton per hectare. However, if cottonyields were as high as two tons, the corresponding gross yield ofpaddy would have to be 1,650 kilograms per hectare in order to becompetitive.

All these calculations regarding the relative attractiveness of thetwo types of cotton cultivation or of cotton as compared to ricewould lead to valid conclusions only if it were assumed that all ofthe charges levied by the Office and the prices paid the cultivatorsfor their seedcotton and paddy reflected true economic costs andbenefits respectively. They do indicate, however, a strong doubt thatthe cropping pattern at which the Office has been aiming over recentyears is necessarily the most economic. They point up the need forcarefully conducted investigations to determine the type of croppingand method of cultivation that would yield optimum results bothfor the tenants and the scheme as a whole.

Persistence of Irrigation Problems. In the above analyses the impor-tance of the level of yields has several times been stressed. The failureto achieve attractive yields under intensive cultivation must beattributed in part to continued deficiencies in the irrigation systemand in irrigation practices. The so-called "super-levelling" of cottonland has often been rather poorly executed, leaving both low placeswhere water tends to accumulate and, occasionally, also high placeswhich cannot at all times be sufficiently irrigated. Even where theland has been correctly levelled experience indicates that, as a con-sequence of repeated ridging and re-ridging, the land may againhave to be leveled after three or four years. At the same time it hasproved extremely difficult to persuade cultivators to irrigate withsufficient care to avoid excessive watering and ensure a uniformsupply of water to all parts of their cotton fields.

For rice, too, the potential benefits of transplanting have beenreduced by inadequate levelling. In Kolongo the Office has growntransplanted rice on land previously levelled for cotton production,and it was primarily for this reason that it was possible to achieve ayield of 3.5 tons per hectare in 1963/64, as compared with anaverage of 2.5 tons or less on unlevelled or improperly levelled land.

In the last analysis continued deficiencies in levelling and irriga-tion practices can be attributed to the rather low density of settle-ment in the area of the Office. If the density were higher, the areacultivated per active worker in the colonist's family would be corre-spondingly reduced. There would be incentives to apply more laborper unit of area. In particular, cultivators would be under greaterpressure to level their land themselves and keep it level. On rice landlevelling would be greatly facilitated by subdividing the present

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large fields into smaller paddy fields which would each be sur-

rounded by embankments and within which levelling by hand could

be undertaken. On cotton land the availability of more labor would

make possible more hand levelling and mnore careful, labor-intensive

irrigation practices.

Some other problems

Mechanization

Farmers settling in the Office du Niger have had to pass suddenly

from traditional methods of cultivation, generally implying only

the use of the hand hoe, to modern methods of production based on

the controlled use of water and the recourse to some degree of mech-

anization. The agricultural work in the Office is done partly by the

settlers, with the help of a variety of agricultural implements (hoe,

plow, harrow), and partly by the Office with tractor-drawn imple-

ments. The settlers can call on the Office to carry out certain desig-

nated agricultural operations against the payment of fixed charges.

In addition, the Office makes maximum use of mechanization on its

own farm enterprises.At the beginning there was little mechanization in the Office du

Niger either for land development or for land cultivation. Clearing

was confined to cutting down and burning the bush. Stumps and

roots were generally left because they were not expected to interfere

very much with the ox cultivation the settlers were expected to

practice. The farmers themselves were expected to level the land

with animal-drawn scoops. However, the settlers apparently experi-

enced considerable difficulty in coping with these tasks. Inadequate

levelling and clearing produced heavy weed infestation, poor irriga-

tion and drainage; and animal-drawn implements could not easily

deal with soils hardened by the dry season. By 1948 nearly 9,000

hectares out of 25,000 hectares of cultivated land had actually been

abandoned.When it became possible, after World War II, to acquire Ameri-

can tractors and equipment under the Marshall Plan, extensive

mechanization began. Mechanization was used not only for levelling

land and eradicating roots before it was turned over to colonists for

cultivation, but also increasingly for deep plowing to get rid of

rhizomatous weeds such as wild rice and for annual land preparation.In 1948 the Office established the Centre rizicole mecanise (CRM) in

Molodo where most of the agricultural work was mechanized. There

was also considerable mechanization in the sectors farmed by the

settlers so that the Office in effect took over many operations from

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the farmers. In 1955 mechanical land preparation had extended toalmost 75 percent of the rice area and 60 percent of the cotton area.In the rice areas mechanization went beyond plowing. In 1955 al-most 12,000 of the 18,000 hectares plowed by tractor were eitherlevelled mnechanically or were disc-harrowed after sowing in orderto break the clods left by plowing. These operations thus greatlyincreased the mechanical services of the Office.

By the mid-'fifties, however, doubts about the merits of mechaniza-tion began increasingly to be entertained. Deep plowing had provedlargely ineffective in eradicating wild rice. The CRM was losingmoney; and many colonists were calling on the Office for varioustypes of mechanical operations simply to relieve themselves of work.Moreover, the cost of equipmnent, spares and labor had greatly in-creased. Mechanization was accordingly reduced. Beginning in1955/56 deep plowing was substantially curtailed and virtuallyabandoned within a few years. Starting in 1958 the Office tried topersuade the settlers to return to the use of animal-drawn imple-ments; and in 1959 the tractor service of the Office prepared only35 percent of the cotton and about one-third of the rice area farmedby settlers. However, mechanical preparation of rice land continuedon a large scale until the CRM was abolished in 1960. The reductionwhich followed proved to be only temporary since the expansion ofthe Office's own farming operations had led to renewed mechaniza-tion of rice cultivation despite a virtual cessation of mechanicalservices for the settlers themselves in 1963/64. As far as cotton isconcerned there never really was a reduction in mechanical ridging,primarily because this facilitated early sowing of cotton and was

TABLE 10: TRACTOR OPERATIONS IN RICE CULTIVATION,(thousands of hectares)

Total Plowed by Disc Har-Tractor rowing

Deep Light afterPlowing Plowing Hectares Percentage Levelling Sowing

1949/50 1.4 0.1 1.5 12 - -1954/55 14.6 2.7 17.3 76 9.2 -1955/56 11.7 6.7 18.4 72 5.3 6.61958/59 7.3 12.1 19.4 58 1.5 6.71959/60 0.6 15.2 15.8 47 0.6 5.71960/61 0.5 13.1 13.6 60 0.6 3.51961/62 - 6.7 6.7 26 - 5.51962/63 2.4 5.6 8.0 34 - 4.71963/64 0.2 11.0 11.2 37 - n.a.

'Including the Baguineda sector until 1962.

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TABLE 11: TRACTOR OPERATIONS IN COTTON CULTIVATION(thousands of hectares)

Area Percentageunder of Total

Ridging Cotton Area Ridged

1949/50 0.5 1.9 251954/55 2.0 4.1 48

1955/56 3.1 4.8 641958/59 2.6 5.2 50

1959/60 2.3 6.6 35

1960/61 2.3 5.7 40

1961/62 2.5 6.8 361962/63 5.1 8.0 65

1963/64 5.8 7.4 78

thus considered an essential feature of the intensification of cultiva-

tion. In 1963 mechanical ridging was done on all fields where cotton

was grown by intensive methods, i.e., on almost 80 percent of the

land under cotton.

Experience has shown that there are certain technical possibilities

for mechanization in the Office du Niger and that mechanization

has facilitated some operations. On the other hand, mechanization

has not been sufficient to cope with all the bottlenecks in agricultural

production; and it has given rise to problems of organization and

management as well as doubts concerning its profitability.

Plowing is the most important work done by tractor-drawn imple-

ments. Up to 1957 most of this consisted of deep plowing designed

basically to combat wild rice with its deep rhizomatous roots. It was

noted in 1951 that this deep plowing tended to leave excessively

large clods and that it was therefore necessary also to do levelling.

This operation therefore expanded in proportion to deep plowing.

In 1959 deep plowing was virtually abandoned. Even when amor-

tized over three years the charge of 500 kilograms of paddy per

hectare made for this operation was too high for the settler in view

of its limited efficacy in combatting rhizomatous weeds. In 1962

there was another recourse to deep plowing in the Kolongo sector,

but its results were not satisfactory.

Beginning in 1958 light plowing, with an offset or stubble plow,

has progressively replaced deep plowing in the rice area. Although

the Office advised the settlers to use oxen for the preparation of their

rice fields, it continued to receive many requests for mechanical land

preparation, particularly from the new settlers in Kourouma and

later from those in Molodo. By paying 270 kilograms of paddy per

hectare the settler can have light plowing done by the tractors of

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the Office. Since light plowing, as deep plowing, leaves large clods,it is often necessary to break them after sowing either by harrowingcarried out by the settler himself or by a light disc harrowing doneby tractor.

On the farm enterprises of the Office sowing is done by machinery-in line in the old rice fields and broadcast in the more recentlyopened rice areas where a lot of roots were left in the ground afterclearing. However, on family farms sowing is done by hand at therate of about one hectare per day.

In the cultivation of cotton, ridging is not generally preceded byplowing because the latter would delay the ridging operation. Inorder to protect cotton against excess water from rain or irrigationit is considered desirable to sow cotton on large ridges. Moreover,ridging must be done during the dry season so that cotton can besown upon the advent of the rains. Since pre-irrigation is rarelypossible, it is extremely difficult for oxen weakened by the dry seasonto do this ridging in the hard soil. For these reasons the Office under-took to do mechanical ridging for the account of the settlers withinthe framework of the campaign to intensify cotton production. Atthe time of the harvest, the settlers pay a charge of 110 kilograms ofseedcotton per hectare ridged.

Finally, two operations are carried out automatically by theOffice. One of these is the mechanical threshing of paddy which theOffice has made obligatory since 1960 and for which it levies acharge of one-tenth of the harvest. This operation permits the Officeto enforce more effectively its monopoly of marketing and at thesame time to deduct any payments due by the settlers. The otheroperation is part of the intensive cultivation of cotton and consistsof aerial spraying. This was designed to avoid the creation ofnumerous centers for distributing spraying equipment and in-secticides, to ensure regular and even treatment of all cotton, and tomake unnecessary control of individual cotton fields.

In summary the following operations, apart from spraying, weremechanized as of 1964: (1) for cotton, all ridging; (2) for rice growndirectly by the Office, all land preparation and sowing, and for ricegrown by settlers, a small percentage of land preparation; (3) for allrice (except for a small amount of early-maturing rice), threshing.The first is justified by the difficulty of doing the right type ofridging at the right time by any other than mechanical means; thesecond is said to be made necessary by the shortage of labor; andthe third has apparently arisen primarily out of the need to controlthe output and the deliveries of the settlers.

There is no indication, however, that the situation with respect to

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mechanization has stabilized after the mnany changes in emphasis in

the last 15 years. Toward the end of 1964, for example, the manage-

ment was once more envisaging an increase in mechanization. There

was a tendency to favor more mechanical land preparation for rice

production on the ground that this would relieve a labor bottleneck

caused by the coincidence of the plowing of land for rice and the

first weeding of land under cotton and might also make it possible to

sow rice as early as May, thereby raising yields. Similarly, considera-

tion was being given to the mechanical reaping and binding of rice

on the land farmed by the Office itself because there was reported

to be a considerable shortage of labor at harvest time. It thus appears

that the restless search to overcome the basic disproportion between

land and people is still continuing.

Although the Office is under constant pressure to use machinery

either to overcome labor bottlenecks or to improve the timeliness of

agricultural operations, a number of factors make the employment

of machinery particularly costly. One of these is attributable to the

distance of the Office from all sources of supply. The machinery

itself, the spare parts and gasoline and oil all bear a heavy transport

charge. The second relates to the great difficulty of managing the

employment of all this machinery effectively. Up to 1960 the de-

partment in charge of production managed the necessary equipment

which it apportioned among the sectors; and the CRM in Molodo

had its own machinery park. Since then the Department of Works

is responsible not only for the equipment required for development

work but also for all of the agricultural machinery used on the land

of the settlers and on the farms of the Office. Consequently there are

often conflicting claims on such machinery as can be used for several

purposes, with priority usually being given to development work.

On the whole, it has proved very difficult in the Office du Niger to

ensure adequate and timely use of the machinery essential to agri-

cultural mechanization. The distance of the various sectors from

each other and the multiplicity of activities magnify the problems

encountered in the allocation of the equipment. Finally, one of the

major problems of mechanization is that of machinery maintenance.

This is due not only to difficulties in the supply of spares which for

some years have been very acute, but also to the extraordinary

diversity in types and sources of supply of the machinery, to inade-

quate training in maintenance and insufficient control of repair

work. As the result of the many sources of foreign aid, the tractors,

of which there are some 120, consist of more than 15 different types.

At the end of 1964 only 11 of about 50 caterpillar tractors were in

operating condition, and of 70 wheeled tractors only about 10 could

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be used. Altogether nearly half of the equipment park of the Officewas considered inoperable.

Except for some summary estimates made some years ago, thereare unfortunately no data that would permit an accurate apprecia-tion of the cost of various mechanical operations and the relationshipof these costs to the charges made for these operations by the Office.Similarly, no account is kept of the cost of repairing each piece ofequipment in an effort to determine at what point continuing repairswould appear to be uneconomic.

The farming enterprises of the OfficeIt has already been noted that farming has been carried out not

only on the individual holdings of the settlers but also on the farmsoperated directly by the Office. At first glance one would be temptedto see a clearcut conflict between two principles of operation-be-tween small-scale enterprise based on the work of the settler inspiredby the profit motive, and large-scale mechanized farming with wagelabor. In actual fact, the system is much more complex. In severalrespects it is the Office that indirectly determines the income of thesettler; and we have seen how the settler's own labor is complementedby the mechanical services provided by the Office. The farm enter-prises of the Office have assumed, and still assume, various formswhich raise doubts about their profitability and make any evaluationof their results difficult.

As early as 1926 large-scale farming with wage labor had beentried in Ni6nebale but abandoned the following year. An experi-ment on a much larger scale was undertaken in 1948 when theCRM was established in Molodo. This Centre was made an au-tonomous enterprise which had its own mechanical equipment andwas free to recruit whatever staff was necessary. Land that had beendeveloped for irrigation was made available to it free-of-charge;and in 1953 the CRM attained its maximum extent of 6,100 hectares.The production of paddy sold to the Office was to enable it toamortize the equipment and to meet its operating costs. Althoughthe CRM benefited from the administrative infrastructure of theOffice, it did not have to participate in the payment of overheadexpenses. In spite of yields which were always above 1.6 tons perhectare and for three years about 2 tons per hectare, the CRM wasnever able to operate without a subsidy from the Office in the period1952-1960. The operating cost of agricultural machinery was toohigh for the yields obtained. It could be argued that the area undercultivation was too limited to cover amortization of a substantialinachinery park and that the machinery itself was not sufficiently

283


suited to the work. In any event the CRM was abandoned in 1960

for economic as well as technical reasons and the Molodo sector

was turned over to settlement. The experience in Molodo seemed to

condemn both mechanized farming and farming with wage labor.

During the 1950's the Office also managed other rice farms cover-

ing between 1,000 to 2,000 hectares each year. In part this rep-

resented rice lands which the Department of Works had just de-

veloped and which were farmed by the Office in order to check

that they had been properly developed. The balance consisted of

farms which had been taken over after they had been abandoned by

settlers, usually because yields were low. In both cases profitability

was not an important consideration.

The CRM and the other farming operations of the Office reflected

quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in settlement. The desire

to extend the area under cultivation and the fact that farming by

settlers was not achieving the expected results had led the manage-

ment of the Office to start direct mechanized farming in 1948.

When the development of new land was resumed in 1953, this

made it possible to take into production virgin land on which yields

were higher and for which the. recruitment of settlers was therefore

easier. Transfers of population within the Office also undoubtedly

facilitated the settlement of this land. However, these population

transfers within the Office, as well as the renewed departure of

settlers from other land, led to the abandonment of certain areas

which once more had to be farmed directly by the Office.

A new movement in favor of direct farming by the Office began in

1962. In part it was motivated by the same reasons which prompted

the expansion of direct farming in the past. However, certain new

motives and factors have apparently also played a role. One of these

has been a determination, as declared by the Director General of the

Office, to "show the superiority as well as the modernity of collective

farming." It is not clear, however, how far this socialist preference

for collective enterprise has in fact been the decisive consideration.

The practical difficulty of finding colonists for areas newly developed

and for areas abandoned by other colonists such as the Mossi has

certainly been an important factor. Another consideration has been

the difficulty of turning over newly developed land destined for cot-

ton cultivation directly to colonists. Such land could not be properly

levelled before it had been allowed to settle for a few years; and dur-

ing this period the Office thought it best to keep it under its own

control and use it to grow rice. This practice may have been further

encouraged by the hope that the Office, which has been very short

of funds, could make a considerable profit by farming directly virgin

284


land that seemed likely to produce high rice yields. Finally al-though this was probably not a major motive-the farm enterprisesof the Office were considered an effective means of multiplyingseed, particularly of new varieties, for dissemination throughout theOffice.

The direct farming operations undertaken in 1962 and based onthe same principles of mechanization and use of wage labor havenot yet validated the conclusions drawn from previous experiences.It is, however, possible to hazard some conclusions about some oftheir characteristic features.

Some of the recent farming operations of the Office have assumedthe character of experimental ventures. While the farming of theOffice had previously been confined to rice growing, in the last fewyears a number of different crops have been tried on several hundredsof hectares. Wheat was grown on 350 hectares in 1962/63, but thiscrop achieved an average yield of only one ton per hectare, whichwas considered insufficient. However, in 1963/64 the experimentwas continued on about 60 hectares. In 1964/65 efforts began todevelop, near the beginning of the Sahel canal, a new sector devotedto sugar cane. This crop is in principle well adapted to productionon a large scale. However, attempts by the Office to undertake theintensive cultivation of cotton on its own account have proved verydisappointing. In 1962 and 1963 the Office du Niger tried intensivecultivation of cotton successively in Kourouma (519 hectares) andin Kolongo (455 hectares). In 1964 the only farm used by theOffice for intensive cultivation of cotton was one of 160 hectares atNiono which was used for multiplication of new cotton varieties.

The difficulties encountered by the Office in growing cottonillustrate the problems of using wage labor for work which cannot bemechanized. The most important work in cotton cultivation must bedone by hand. The care of cotton, particularly weeding, must bepainstaking and conscientious, for supervision is very difficult. Dur-ing the first two years each worker was paid for a particular taskwhich he repeated on many fields. This principle was abandonedand in 1964/65 a laborer in Niono was to be responsible for all ofthe work on one hectare of cotton. If the laborer finished the workon his field he could cultivate a supplementary plot. This, however,tended to make him somewhat like a settler, all the more because healso received a half hectare of rice land to ensure his own food supply.

Another characteristic of the Office's own farming operations isthat the greater part of the area which it farms consists of virginrice land. Formerly the farming of this land was undertaken onlytemporarily. The results achieved by farming this newly developed

285


land are evidently favorable. New rice land is about equally dividedbetween the Niono and Kourouma sectors where yields generallyare among the highest. While the farms of the Office in these sectorsachieved yields in 1962/63 that were slightly above those obtainedby the settlers, in the following year the situation was the reverse(see Table 6).

In 1962/63 these new farming operations of the Office were re-ported to show a favorable balance, but in 1963/64 this apparentlywas no longer true. The average rice yield of all of the farms of theOffice in 1962/63 was 2.4 tons per hectare, superior to that of 1.7obtained in 1961. In 1963/64 the yield fell to 1.2 tons per hectare.On the whole it is difficult to evaluate the profitability of such farm-ing operations because, just like the old CRM, but in a differentway, they do not enjoy complete financial autonomy. The farms ofthe Office, just as those of the settlers, pay certain general chargeswhich are supposed to correspond to the overhead expenses butwhich are certainly below real costs. Like the settlers, the Office itselfalso pays for mechanical services provided by the Department ofWorks. They differ from the old CRM in that they do not have theirown machinery. However, like the CRM, they bear the cost of wagelabor but not that of permanent personnel which is a charge on theOffice du Niger as a whole.

Coordination of foreign aidUp to 1962 the needs of the Office for foreign capital and staff

were met solely through French cooperation. Following the whole-sale departure of French personnel and the nationalization of itsmanagement, the Office du Niger has had to cope with numeroustechnical and administrative financial problems. It has sought toresolve them by appealing to many sources for assistance, but thecoordination of all this aid has in turn posed a difficult problem.

Since 1963 it has been possible for the Office to continue theexpansion of the Niono and Kolongo sectors under an agreementwith the U.S.S.R. The supply of Soviet and Czech equipment andthe assignment of Russian experts were undoubtedly basic elementsof this agreement. Altogether some 20 Soviet technicians wereassigned at the end of 1964 to the General Studies Bureau at Segouand to the workshop at Diabali which was the base for carrying outdevelopment work.

On its part the European Development Fund agreed to financethe "super levelling" required for the intensification of cottoncultivation. In 1964 the Department of Works of the Office was put

286


in charge of the necessary work. Around ten engineers and tech-nicians of various nationalities serve as advisors on this project.

Apart from these two types of assistance, directed both toward theexpansion of rice production and the intensification of cotton culti-vation, a third seems to assume even greater importance. This isassistance from Mainland China which has become involved on theone hand in the transplanting of rice and on the other hand in thecultivation of sugar cane. In Kolongo some Chinese experts areconcerned with the operation of rice transplanting machines andwith the training of about 30 Malis in the supervision of transplant-ing. With respect to sugar cane, the Office is engaged in the estab-lishment of a fifth production sector in the lower Kala aroundDougabougou. An experimental sugar mill was started by theChinese in 1964; it was to be followed by the installation of a sugarmill and refinery capable of producing about 4,000 tons of sugar peryear. The necessary supply of cane for this output could be grown on500 hectares, but the Office was actually planning to develop morethan 1,000 hectares of cane in this new sector.

In the field of agricultural research coordination also appears tohave become necessary. The Chinese have a farm for multiplyingsugar cane while experimental work on cane is also done by theInstitut francais de recherche d'agronoinie tropicale (IRAT) only afew kilometers away in the Niono sector. The Kogoni research sta-tion, which formerly was in integral part of the Office du Niger, isnow attached directly to the Ministry of Development in Bamako.The IRCT and the IRAT provide the research personnel for thisstation but very little attention appears to be paid to this researchwork by those responsible for the management of the Office.

Conclusions

The checkered history of the Office du Niger and the very limitedoutput achieved after more than three decades of trial and errorand the investment of substantial capital illustrate many of the pit-falls of planning and managing a large-scale scheme of this kind.

From the beginning the technical planning was seriously deficient.Owing to inadequate data rainfall was seriously underestimated.This not only thwarted plans to grow long-staple cotton, but led tothe establishment of an expensive irrigation infrastructure whosefunction was to supplement rainfall during only a limited period.Owing to the lack of storage, irrigation water is in fact unavailableduring the two closing months of the dry season when the hard soils

287


should be softened for the timely land preparation and sowing which

is so essential to achieve high yields of cotton and rice. Technical

shortcomings in the original layout of the irrigation and drainage

network have continued to handicap the scheme. Since the region

in which the scheme was located is extremely flat, a topographic

survey on an adequate scale was necessary to take into account

significant variations in micro-relief. The lack of detailed topographic

information has created countless difficulties. Some drains have

had to be converted into irrigation canals and vice versa. Some land

has been too high for irrigation and other land too low for effective

drainage. Deficient drainage, aggravated by subsequent lack of

maintenance, has not only been harmful to cotton, but has brought

about an invasion of rhizomatous wild rice which has reduced the

yield of rice, particularly in the Kolongo sector.

It is above all the shortage of manpower that has prevented the

scheme from becoming the expected success. The 50,000 hectares

that were actually developed by 1964 fall far short of the initial

target of several hundred thousand hectares; and even in this area

the density of settlement is insufficient to yield an output that would

meet all costs of both the settlers and the management of the scheme,

provide the settlers with a good livelihood and earn some return on

the large amount of capital invested. Because of the lack of significant

population pressures in the former French Soudan, now Mali, it has

never been possible to recruit enough colonists. A large proportion

have had to be recruited in the distant but more densely populated

parts of Upper Volta, and under conditions which made it difficult

for many of thern to identify themselves closely and continuously

with the scheme and its success.The various attempts that have been made to mechanize agri-

cultural operations have been undertaken largely to compensate

for this shortage of manpower. This is not to say that this has been

the sole or primary motivation in all cases. Mechanical ridging of

cotton land has been adopted, for instance, because it proved diffi-

cult to do the job with oxen in such a way as to ensure timely sowing

as part of the campaign for intensifying cotton cultivation; andmechanical rice threshing has been dictated predominantly by a

desire to control the harvest of the settlers and ensure deliveries to

the management of the Office. In other cases, particularly in the

mechanized preparation of rice land and in the levelling of land

for both cotton and rice, the shortage of labor has been the governing

consideration.Although there are no recent or reliable data on the costs of

mechanization, it has apparently been an expensive expedient. In

288


the Office du Niger the costs of mechanization have been high inrelation to the value of output, partly because the long distance ofthe scheme from both markets and sources of supply depresses theprice of the agricultural products sold by the Office and enhancesthe delivered price of machinery, spare parts, fuel and oil and otherimported requisites of production. Since 1960 the shortage of well-trained administrative and technical staff has also made the efficientemployment and maintenance of machinery much more difficultand undoubtedly more costly.

Cost considerations were responsible for a temporary and partialde-emphasis of mechanization toward the end of the 'fifties and theearly 'sixties. By the end of 1964, however, the Office was once morethinking in terms of greater mechanization to palliate the shortageof labor.

The difficulties of recruiting and keeping enough settlers havebeen an imnportant factor in prompting the management of theOffice to undertake farming itself on an increasing scale. This prac-tice was at the same time in accord with the desire of the socialist-oriented Mali Government and of the managemnent of the schemeto demonstrate the effectiveness of collective or state farming as aninstrument of progress. While the available data are insufficient topermit a detailed and definitive appraisal of this effort, the evidencesuggests that this type of farming is hardly a solution to the difficul-ties experienced by the Office. Costs of operation are bound to berather high, since a high degree of mechanfization is necessitatedby the inadequate supply of labor. For rice direct farming has shownsomewhat better results than in the case of cotton, partly becausethe area farmed has been more fertile than the average and partlybecause mechanized rice cultivation leaves less room for individualeffort. In the production of cotton, involving many operations suchas weeding, thinning and harvesting which require considerableindividual care and effort, direct farmning has for the most partproved a failure and has already been largely abandoned.

Toward the end of the 'fifties the disappointing levels of outputand the corresponding unsatisfactory financial condition of theOffice led to the launching of a campaign to raise the yields of bothrice and cotton. For rice this took the form of an atternpt to shiftfrom the direct sowing of rice to transplanting, involving, above all,more labor. For cotton the campaign featured early planting facili-tated by mechanical ridging; careful and also mnechanical levellingof land to improve irrigation and drainage; the use of fertilizers;and the application of insecticides by aerial spraying. This campaigntherefore involved, above all, additional "cash inputs," although the

289


farmer was also expected to use about a third more labor per hectare,largely for harvesting the higher output anticipated.

These so-called intensification campaigns have enjoyed only amodest measure of success. The transplanting of rice has made the

least progress. It quickly became apparent that farmers growingboth cotton and rice could not intensify the production of both with-

out encountering a labor bottleneck. However, even in the rice-

growing sector of Kolongo, where yields had been adversely affectedby loss of soil fertility and weed infestation, farmers have on the

average transplanted less than 1 percent of their rice. Evidentlygrowers have not been persuaded that the adoption of labor-

intensive techniques of transplanting would be advantageous, par-

ticularly since it apparently involves a significant contraction of thetotal area they could crop.

The cotton intensification campaign has been more successful,although only in Niono, the principal and oldest cotton-growingsector of the Office. There the average yield has been lifted to about

2 tons per hectare as compared with a previous average of 0.8 tons,

and the increase seems more than sufficient to compensate for the

additional inputs required. Elsewhere, however, the yields have

been much lower, and the settlers seem to find the production of

rice more profitable and considerably less demanding. The better

results achieved in Niono are not easily explained, but may be due

to a combination of factors-longer established and more experi-

enced cultivators, better soils and the availability of somewhat more

manpower.For an area with such a large capital investment and heavy over

head costs as the Office du Niger it is obviously important to maxi-

mize net output. Since labor has been and remains the basic limita-tion on production, it is output in terms of returns to labor that must

be maximized. The choice of crops and the methods of growing

them must be determined in the light of this goal. If a proper choiceis to be made much more must be known about (1) labor availability

throughout the cropping season, and particularly at time of peaklabor demand, (2) the labor requirements throughout the season fordifferent crops and the more or less labor intensive methods of pro-ducing them, (3) the specific increases in yields that can be obtainedunder the wide range of conditions prevailing in the Office by variousmethods of intensification, (4) the real economic costs of inputs otherthan labor required for alternative crops and methods of production,including fertilizers, insecticides and various mechanized services,and (5) the incentives which cultivators need to persuade them tomake a greater labor effort. A study focusing on these points

290


would help greatly in determining the cropping pattern and produc-tion methods that would make the best possible use of the laborforce available in the scheme.

It is unlikely, however, that returns can be sufficiently raised toattract many more settlers or much more labor to the Office. In thepast a considerable proportion of settlers have enjoyed a higher in-come than it was possible to attain elsewhere. In part at least thiswas undoubtedly due to the subsidies which the settlers receivedlargely as the result of the fact that the management of the Officedid not rigorously collect all the payments due for services furnishedor credits extended. In any event, the incomes of the settlers havenot been sufficiently attractive to prevent a significant number ofdepartures from time to time. Moreover, over the years the attrac-tiveness of settlement in the Office du Niger has suffered by compari-son with the opportunities that have developed elsewhere in Mali.The most conspicuous of these has been the rapid development ofprofitable cotton growing in the dryland farming areas.' Anotherhas been the development of various areas for rice cultivation, atcomparatively modest cost, in the valley of the Niger River and itstributaries. Thus the incentive to settle in the Office du Niger, whichhas never been high, has been further diminished.

The continued extension of the Office du Niger appears difficult tounderstand in view of the already existing shortage of labor and themanifest need to improve the area already under irrigation. Severalfactors have tended to militate against the formulation of an in-ternally consistent, logical course of action in the Office. It is by nomeans clear how much investment is required to remedy the seriousdeficiencies in the irrigation and drainage network and whether thebenefits would be sufficiently worthwhile in the light of alternativeinvestment opportunities in Mali. Meanwhile, expansion of the areahas continued, perhaps partly because it had certain short-term ad-vantages in the form of the high yields that could be attained forsome years on newly developed virgin land, and partly becauseexternal financing was available for such expansion.

The availability of such financing illustrates yet another problemwhich has made efficient operation and consistent developmentpolicies more difficult. Both financial assistance and technical advicehave come to the Office from many sources. Thus the machinery andequipment in the Office is so varied in origin as to increase greatlythe cost and difficulties of maintenance. While French agronomists

I See the next chapter, "Mali: The Development of Peasant Cotton Produc-tion by the CFDT."

291


have been experimenting with sugar cane, the actual developmentof sugar cane production is being carried out by Mainland Chinesequite independently of the French work. Above all, while the SovietUnion is financing extensions of the Office and providing a certainamount of technical assistance, the European Development Fund isfinancing the conversion of rice land for intensive cotton productionand providing technical advice which focuses on improving the

existing irrigated area to the exclusion of further extensions. As long

as the Office is pulled in various directions, it will be difficult todetermine what should be done to extract at least the maximumbenefit from a scheme which from the beginning has been far froma success.

292


GRAPH I

40

OFFICE DU NIGER: NUMBER OFSETTLERS (INCLUDING FAMILIES)

(THOUSANDS OF PERSONS)

35 - _ t

30-_ _ _ _ _ _

20 ____--

15 < ,___ - ,/-_1_ I

BAMBARA --

10aMSS / .1- -__

.SAMOG OTHERS-

1937 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1964

IB8RD -2860

293

t6Z

vS,9. 9 rs9.s ?9' 9.St9Og. 09/65. 65/95. ss/u9. zg,9g, 9s,gQ. gg,Q f z. £9,?;. eg/5 ,I5;. 95/?;, Og?e%6v?S£zu

.- / 1VDS 9iflHtIdVSOfl-JVJB

OD9NO-1-0 -< V 7 = ~ bt-9

-- -- - 8 *

j , -- W --

- - - - -o----- uT----T--~V f

- 1---s-= ------ ; O'IN~

NO I10 133 20'8

t NAGGVd a331Uuua

j -X I1X X D = - '---0,01

-- -- - H- £ S

vwnodnom I

, ONOINN,,, /O

JOIS 0±C lO NMQ 0'9 lQji.

. ..... .. , .I09NOlOY

L ~ O'OZ

Aaavd 33[H-0'°2] i 1 . 1 I 1 O'Ob?

(53UVl^3H 30O S(]NvsnOHI)

NO1109 ONV3018 Oi NMOS V3NV :8391N na 3914J30

11 HdVdh

VDIIAV 'IVDIdOŽ11 NI IN3WdO'lA3A 'IVHfIllflSI)IOV


GRAPH M

OFFICE DU NIGER: OUTPUT OFRICE AND COTTON(THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)

60.0

40.0 RICE PADDY

MO.O 0- - =.

10.0

2 .0 ......

1.0

2.0 KUOM

310 --- ---.8.6

.4 - I

.3

.210.0 I8.0 SEED COTTON

3.0 ---- ----

2.0 [ MO LODO

1.0.8 ---- --- --.6

------- KOUROUMA

4 - - ,r., /

.2 \-- /

SEMI-LOGARITHMIC SCALE

'48/49 '49150 '5015 '51/52 '525G '53/54 '5-55 '55/56 '56,57 '5758 '58/59 '59,60 '60/6 61/62 '62/63 '63/64

B6D -2862

295


GRAPH M

OFFICE DU NIGER: YIELDS OF RICEAND COTTON(METRIC TONS PER HECTARE)

RICE PADDY SEED COTTON2.0 AVERAGE I 1

1.5- r -. / 10.

AVERAGE

2.0 '.0 * .. ~......... .. _ ___

..tKOLONGOKOLONGO G

1.0 02.5r

NIONO

~~~~~~2.0$f@- ~- ./w r -\ /NIONO

V 515 -. - - ..--___1.5

2.5-----MOLODO /

2.0- .

15 .5

1.0 1 --I..-._--1 - 1 1.0

3.0 - MOLODO _KOUROUMA

I. ' F--... .I -- - --. 52.5-

~ A

2.0-- t --- --- r0 -- 1.

KOUROUMA

0- 0 N N N 1 - N 0 O. O - N N N N N - O -o N

BHD-2865

296


ANNEX 1

DATA ON RAINFALL

Kogoni, 1949-1959 Sahel, 1950-1959 Kayo, 1944-1959

Average Average Average Average Average AverageMonthly Number Monthly Number Monthly NumberRainfall of Rainy Rainfall of Rainy Rainfall of Rainy

Month mm. Days mm. Days mm. Days

January 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1February nil nil nil nil nil nilMarch 2.2 0.5 2.0 0.2 1.0 0.3April 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 5.8 0.9May 13.1 1.7 18.2 3.2 20.3 2.8June 62.4 6.9 76.0 7.2 69.6 6.9July 176.4 11.4 180.9 11.2 174.4 11.7August 212.9 14.8 239.3 14.8 225.3 14.9September 120.2 9.3 138.3 10.3 132.5 10.1October 23.7 2.3 15.4 1.6 23.4 1.8November 2.3 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.2December nil nil 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1

Average 614.1 47.3 671.7 49.0 653.3 49.8

ANNEX 2

CHARGES LEVIED BY THE OFFICE

Rice (Kg. of paddy per hectare)

General charges 400Maintenance of drains and channels 80Deep plowing 500Light plowing 200Seedlings for transplanting 100Fertilizer 420Threshing 10% of the harvest

Cotton (Kg. of seedcotton per hectare)

General charges 240Maintenance of channels and drains 30Ridging 110Fertilizers 235Spraying (6 applications) 370

297

ANNEX 3

CULTIVATED AREAa AND PRODUCTIONb OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS IN THE OFFICE DU NIGER

1948/49 1949/50 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64

KolongoArea

Rice 8.3 8.7 9.1 9.3 9.1 10.1 11.0 12.1 12.8 12.8 12.7 11.6 11.4 n.a. 9.7 10.6N Cotton - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.3 0.4x Production

Rice 15.3 16.7 12.2 16.4 16.8 18.8 20.2 20.0 21.9 18.3 17.6 17.9 17.4 n.a. 11.2 12.3Cotton - - - - - - - - - - neg. neg.

NionoArea

Rice 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 3.0 4.2 4.9 6.0 7.9 8.1 8.9 n.a. 6.9 8.4Cotton 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.2 3.6 4.2 3.9 4.4 4.4 5.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2

ProductionRice 3.1 3.8 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.1 5.7 8.4 9.0 10.2 14.9 16.2 17.7 n.a. 14.3 15.1Cotton 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.6 2.3 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 3.7 4.2 5.5 5.5 7.3

MolodoArea

Rice - neg. 0.9 2.1 4.4 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.9 n.a. 2.8 3.7Cotton - - - - - - - - - - - neg. n.a. 1.8 1.7

ProductionRice - neg. 1.3 2.5 9.4 12.0 13.1 10.0 10.0 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.5 n.a. 3.0 4.5Cotton - - - - - - - - - - - neg. n.a. 1.3 1.4

KouroumaArea

Rice - - neg. neg. 0.2 0.5 1.6 3.1 4.3 4.4 3.8 n.a. 4.2 6.5

Cotton - neg. 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.4 n.a. 1.8 1.1

ProductionRice - - - - neg. neg. 0.2 1.0 4.5 7.1 9.1 8.5 7.4 n.a. 9.6 11.0

Cotton - - - neg. 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.0 n.a. 0.9 0.6

TOTALU

AreaRice 10.0 10.5 11.9 13.4 15.7 18.4 20.1 22.7 25.2 27.8 30.7 30.0 30.0 26.5 23.6 29.2

Cotton 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.5 4.1 4.8 4.5 5.2 5.2 6.6 5.7 6.8 8.0 7.4

ProductionRice 18.4 20.5 17.1 23.1 30.7 34.9 39.2 39.4 45.4 45.3 53.5 55.8 54.7 41.0 38.1 42.9

Cotton 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.6 2.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.1 4.3 5.1 7.2 7.8 9.6

' 'Thousands of hectares. bThousands of tons. 'Not including Baguindda.

ANNEX 4

TOTAL POPULATION SETTLED (JUNE 1960)

ProportionMale Workers

No. of Total Active No. of No. of Persons to TotalCenter Villages Population Population Families Male Workers Per Family Population

0 Niono 39 14,686 9,977 1,665 3,790 8.80 0.25Kolongo 37 12,813 8,607 1,511 3,230 8.00 0.25Baguineda 16 4,488 3,242 319 1,201 14.06 0.26Kourouma 8 5,847 3,993 674 1,457 8.83 0.24So. Kogoni 2 255 182 36 69 7.00 0.36Molodo-Faba 1 232 150 6 53 38.60 0.31

Total 103 38,321 26,151 4,211 9,800 9.10 0.34

2. MALI: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEASANT COTTONPRODUCTION BY THE CFDT

Introduction

Since 1952 the Compagnie fran,aise pour le d6veloppement des

fibres textiles' (CFDT) has been engaged in developing cotton pro-

duction in those nonirrigated areas of the French Sudan that ap-

peared to be particularly well suited to the raising of this crop.

Starting in 1960 the Company has continued its activities under an

agreement with the Government of Mali which has made it respon-

sible for all the agricultural extension work in the greater part of the

eight districts (cercles) in the administrative regions of Bamako(Dioila), Segou (S6gou, San and Tominian) and Sikasso (Koutiala,

Yorosso and Kadiolo). Although its responsibility is no longer con-

fined to cotton, the CFDT has continued to work mainly on this crop,for which it enjoys a ginning monopoly except for the area includedin the Office du Niger. The CFDT operates as an independent com-

pany with the responsibility for performing certain functions, andcomes under the general supervision of the Ministry of Rural De-velopment. The substantial progress that has been made as the result

of the expansion, and, to some extent, more intensive cultivation, of

cotton in the dry areas of Mali during the past few years lends special

interest to an analysis of the methods and the factors that have playeda role in this development.

Agriculture south of the Niger

Ecological and social conditions

Mali to the south of the Niger constitutes an extensive peneplainwhose markedly broken features give way, in the southeast, to asuccession of low hills. The soils belong to the tropical ferruginousgroup which are formed by the decomposition of sandstone. Theirfertility varies according to their stage of development. On the rathereroded hills the laterized soils are ill-adapted to cultivation and out-

French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers.

301


croppings of rock, particularly in the southeast, also stand in theway of their exploitation. The soils of the plains-a mixture of clay,loam and sand-are better suited to agriculture; their fertilitydepends on their texture and, in particular, on the extent of alluvialdeposits from the Niger or Bani Rivers. Soils in the lowlands, thoughvariable in texture, generally are characterized by limited penetra-bility and capacity to hold water. The fertility of the cotton-growingvalleys of the center of Mali varies, but is rather limited.

COTTON AREA IN MALI

..................... ...........................-' - - d - - - -cercle

............ . .

e . . ....... - I

.. . ........

\ *-#I

,UO ,- 9 '| - * S -| 'w .

............. , .

7 - . .. - !;* * 1. .

I UPPER VOLTA

G U I N E AVORY COAST

The area has a Sudanian type of climate that is suitable for cottongrowing. With the rise in rainfall from 700 mm. per annum in thenorth to 1,300 mm. in the south the vegetation of the savanna be-comes gradually more wooded. In the center of Mali the rains are,on an average, spread over a period of between 50 and 60 dayslasting from May to October, the maximum rainfall being inAugust. As the precipitation increases, so does the length of therainy season which in the south may extend over seven or eightmonths. The volume and distribution of rainfall during the growing

302

Mali Republic: Cotton Production

season vary greatly, which often explains the wide fluctuations in

the crops harvested.In general there is not much population pressure, the average

density being about ten inhabitants per square kilometer, which is

about the average for the populated areas of Mali. This density is

greater in the areas to the south of the Niger that are for the most

part better suited to agriculture; and near the river it may be as

much as 40 to 50 per square kilometer. Although no area of Mali

can be considered overpopulated, there are, nevertheless, consider-

able differences in the geographical distribution of the population.

The village pattern of settlement often leaves areas virtually unin-

habited even though land has become comparatively scarce in the

neighborhood of settlements. In spite of the relative absence of

population pressure, there is some labor migration both within Mali

and to foreign countries, although its extent is not known exactly.

For example, a considerable number of young people from the

southern part of Mali around Sikasso go to work for varying periods

on the coffee and cocoa plantations of the Ivory Coast. This labor

migration is induced not only by the attractions of earning more

income in the Ivory Coast but also to the wish to escape, at least

temporarily, from the restraints of what is still, basically, a tradi-

tional and somewhat authoritarian society. This latter desire is also

the reason, at any rate in some degree, for the movement of people

to urban areas which has been proceeding at a faster rate during the

past few years and which both the traditional and Government au-

thorities have tried to curb in order to retain sufficient labor in the

rural areas of the country.The area southeast of the Niger can be divided into several zones

in accordance with the dominant ethnic group. In the north and

the east the people are mainly Bambara (the northern part of the

district of DioUia, the district of Segou, and the western and central

parts of the San district). The administrative region of Sikasso shows

great ethnic diversity; the Miniankas inhabit the area consisting of

the district of Koutiala and the greater part of the district of Yorosso;

near the Upper Volta border, to the east of the districts of Yorosso

and Tominian, the CFDT deals with the Bobo people; and, finally,

the districts of Sikasso and Kadiolo in the southeast are mainly

inhabited by Senoufo. Changes have occurred practically every-

where in the traditional structure, customs and values of these tribal

societies, although the tempo of change has varied. The Bambara

have probably been the most receptive to those modern influences

that tend to develop individualism, but even among them there still

remains a strong traditional and authoritarian element. Thus au-

303


thority of the village chief, or of the chef de terre, who allocates theland for cultivation and settles disputes concerning land tenure, isalmost always very great. The head of the extended family has aconsultative, and often determining, voice in the decisions taken bythe families under his jurisdiction. This influence continues evenwhen fields that were formerly cultivated in common by all themembers of the extended family are now cultivated solely by nuclearfamilies. It should be noted that alongside this traditional societythere has recently been organized a single and somewhat authori-tarian political party that dominates the Government and adminis-tration of Mali, and that exercises, at any rate in certain areas,considerable pressure in favor of agricultural progress.

Pattern of farming

The amount of cultivable land available depends as much on themethods of cultivation employed as on the density of population,which is, generally speaking, not very great. Land under permanentcultivation around the villages may have become exhausted to somedegree, thus compelling the inhabitants to move farther and fartherfrom their huts and discouraging them sometimes from increasingthe area that they cultivate. Similarly, a shortening of the fallowperiod has become noticeable; this used to be ten and twenty years,but now tends to be considerably shorter. Occasionally villagers insearch of new land establish new farming hamlets (hameaux deculture) to take under cultivation land far from the village; and thesehamlets may become independent villages in their own right as thelinks with their villages weaken.

The area cultivated by one family depends, first and foremost,on the size of the family and the number of workers available; itdepends also on the ecological conditions, the farming methods andthe agricultural tools used. A survey carried out in 1960 showed thatan average Bambara family in the S6gou territory, consisting of 8persons, including 5 workers, cultivated 4.5 hectares, whereas theaverage Minianka and Senoufo family in the Sikasso region culti-vated more than 6 hectares although the size of the family was pro-portionately much greater (over 18 persons, 10 of whom wereadults). A study made in 1961 in the zone d'expansion rurale de Zebalaof the Koutiala region showed that the "average" family of 11.77persons, including 5.63 adults, cultivated 5.8 hectares. The latteramounts to 0.5 hectare per inhabitant and about 1 hectare perworker, as compared with 0.56 and 0.9 hectares respectively amongthe Bambara, and 0.33 and 0.6 hectares among the Minianka andSenoufo. In the southern areas, which have a heavy rainfall, a small

304


cultivated area probably suffices to provide for the needs of a family,while in the drier areas of the north larger areas are required and

can be cultivated with the help of oxen and plows.Millet and sorghum take up about 70 percent of the total cultivated

area in the Segou region, but only 40 percent of that in the Sikassoregion where the climate permits a greater diversity of crops. With

an average yield of 650 kg. per hectare, the production of millet is

sufficient to meet the basic food requirements of the Bambara

peasant; in the Sikasso region part of the output is even exportedto Bamako. The other food crops are maize in the north, and yamsin the highlands of the Senoufo region.

After millet and sorghum the most important agricultural product

is rice. Along the Niger and the Bani Rivers it is possible to take

advantage of the flood to cultivate large fields of rice, either by some

degree of controlled irrigation or by simple flooding. In the south,where the rainfall is greater, rice is grown in smaller, low-lying areas

but is nevertheless an important source of income; thus the Sikassoregion was, before the introduction of cotton, a large exporter of

rice. Groundnuts are another important crop in Mali and are eitherconsumed on the farm or sold on the market. As a cash crop, how-ever, they are not profitable enough to compete with cotton or rice;in the more humid areas of the south their development has beenrestricted by the lack of a varietv resistant to rosette.

The cattle-raising area proper is located outside the territorywith which the CFDT is concerned; it provides Mali with its chief

export product. To the south of the Niger the degree of associationof livestock keeping with agriculture varies from region to region.In the Bambara country, between the 700 mm. and 900 mm. iso-

hyets, cattle raising is still migratory, but some peasants own asedentary herd for use as draft animals in cultivating the land. Theuse of the plow and animal traction make farming in this regioncomparatively modern. In the case of the Miniankas, sedentary ornonmigratory stock raising has become more common than in the

northern zone inhabited by the Bambara, but it has been suggestedthat the uneven distribution of cattle anmong families limits the roleof draft cattle in traditional farming. In the Sikasso region theclimate makes it possible to keep cattle the year around, but onlythose of the N'Dama breed or certain crosses with zebu cattle whichare tolerant of trypanosomiasis. Although there is an average of onehead of cattle for each two or three inhabitants in the Sikasso region,little use has been made of animal-drawn implements which are ill-

suited to the cultivation of yams which is the dominant crop.Before 1960, when the CFDT began to intensify and widen the

305


scope of its work, cotton growing had been expanding only veryslowly. At that time the area under cotton (whether grown in puresand or, more commonly, in association with other crops) amountedto about 40,000 hectares; the CFDT marketed only 6,400 tons ofseedcotton, equivalent to approximately 160 kg. per hectare. Inorder to understand what improvements the CFDT is seeking, it isnecessary first of all to describe the local farmers' practices. Tra-ditionally cotton is for the most part grown in association with foodcrops such as millet, maize or yams. The crops grown follow a rota-tion that is determined by the fertility of the soil and the food require-ments of the growers, and is so devised that crops which makeprogressively less demands on the soil follow one another as the latterbecomes exhausted. Thus sorghum, which is generally sown in thefirst year, is followed by millet and then by fonio. Fertility is restoredby leaving the ground fallow, under natural vegetation, for a periodthat normally ranges from five to ten, or even twenty years, butvaries with the fertility of the land and the density of the agriculturalpopulation.

The traditional preparation of the soil begins during the dry sea-son and takes the form of cutting down and clearing natural vegeta-tion when fallow land is being returned to cultivation, or of clearingcrop residues and weeds when land has previously been cultivated.Rapid clearance is followed by burning. After the first rains, whenthe land has absorbed enough water to be capable of cultivation, thepeasants loosen the top soil by lightly tilling it with a hand hoe,(daba). When the crop requires it (in the case of cassava, maize,beans, cotton), the soil is ridged (in the Bambara or Minianka coun-try) or piled up in hills (in the S6noufo country); this method hasthe advantage of concentrating the most fertile top layer of soilaround the roots of the young plants and also protecting them againstreceiving an excessive amount of water. The seeds are broadcast onthe ridges or mounds among food crops sown previously. Since cot-ton is sown only after food crops have already been planted and thevariety of cotton employed has a longer growing cycle, competitionamong these crops grown in association with each other is somewhatreduced.

This traditional method of cultivation has numerous drawbacks.Shallow tillage limits the plants' root development and makes thecrops very sensitive to drought. In the absence of animal tractionthe preparation of the soil is held up until the rains have moistenedthe upper soil layer to a sufficient extent, which entails a correspond-ing delay in the sowing of the cotton and adversely affects the yield.Cultivation in association with other crops places cotton in a sec-

306

Alali Republic: Cotton Production

ondary position subordinated to the requirements of the main crop;the spacing between the cotton seedlings is thus determined by thedistance between the ridges or the mounds, which is itself deter-mined by the requirements of the food crops. The variety of cottongrown in association with other crops must be sufficiently hardy tocompete with the other crops and therefore is of low productivity.All these factors give the cotton traditionally grown a yield potentialtoo low to justify the use of fertilizers and insecticides or to providethe farmer sufficient incentive to grow it as a commercial crop.

Means of assistance

To carry out its activities successfully, the CFDT has progressivelyput into the field both the necessary staff and the requisites of pro-duction. It promotes its program directly within the framework ofrural development areas known as zones d'expansion rurale and in-directly by providing help for village community fields (champscollectifs) in their demonstration work and by participating in theoperation of seasonal agricultural schools.

Development of extension services

Because it operates in several West African countries, the CFDThas long had its African headquarters at Bobo Dioulasso in UpperVolta. Until 1960 the extension service operated from that centerremained rather "thin" and, in the case of Mali, covered only partof the areas suitable for cotton growing. Since that date the programhas been intensified, bringing the CFDT into closer contact withMali cotton growers, and extending its scope in terms both of thesubstance and the geographic area covered.

The "diffused" or "scattered" type of extension service startedby the CFDT in Mali in 1952 was on a scale that provided only oneextension worker (moniteur) to promote cotton growing among apopulation of over 10,000. The instructor had to confine himselfsimply to popularizing cotton production. The object was just tofamiliarize the peasant with this crop and to make him realize theprofit that he could derive from it. The CFDT activities extended tofour "sectors"-Koutiala, San, Segou and Sikasso; the moniteurswere directly responsible to a sector chief, who in turn was underthe director of the "Sudan region," stationed at Segou. This "dif-fused" type of extension service was gradually discontinued in favorof a denser network which now covers the whole of CFDT's areaof operations. Expansion of the latter is immediately accompaniedby detailing to the field sufficient personnel for such a dense exten-sion service.

307


Distribution of Moniteurs Employed Underthe "Diffused" Type of Extension Service

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64

Koutiala 15 9 4Sikasso 9 6 3Segou - - -San 8 6 1

Total 32 21 8

The new agricultural extension organization, which was started in1960 and was made possible by an increase in the available staff,sought to develop close and continuing contacts with villages thathad hitherto been visited only by itinerant extension workers. Thebasic territorial unit is the zone d'expansion rurale (ZER) whichcorresponds more or less to the former canton. This area is dividedinto secteurs de base each of which is in the charge of an agent respon-sible for keeping in permanent touch with several villages comprisingbetween 1,500 and 4,000 inhabitants. The ZER areas are under thejurisdiction of the Rural Development Service.

CFDT has provided this type of extension in those ZER areaswhere cotton growing is undertaken on a significant scale. In thearea south of the Niger a distinction can thus be drawn betweenzones administered by the CFDT and those directly under theRural Development Service. In principle the CFDT acts merely as atechnical adviser to the agricultural services but in actual fact itgenerally has full authority over their agents in ZER areas where itoperates. The nature of the relations between the CFDT, an au-tonomous private organization, and the public authorities differsfrom area to area and the degree of supervision exercised by theMinistry of Rural Development therefore varies among the CFDTproduction sectors. The CFDT was in charge of 2 ZER's in 1961,23 in 1962, and 34 in 1963. By 1964/65 it had become responsiblefor 41 ZER's in the four sectors of S6gou, San Koutiala and Sikassoas well as 10 ZER's established in two new sectors of Bougouni andBamako. The delimitation of the ZER's varies somewhat, for theyare of too recent formation to have reached their optimum size. Theextension service is not organized in conformity with the politicaladministration unit known as the district (cercle), though the latteris used as the basic unit for collecting and tabulating nationalstatistics.

The extension staff put into the field by the CFDT are not civilservants. They are recruited by the CFDT and can be dischargedwithin the framework of Mali labor legislation. They are responsible

308


to a director who has his headquarters at Bamako and is representedin each of the other sectors by a sector head. In 1964/65 the sectorheads in S6gou, San and Koutiala were Europeans, and those inSikasso and Bougouni, Mali nationals. The heads of ZER are eitherforrner moniteurs of the agricultural services who received theiragricultural training in the school at M'Pesoba, or agents who wereformerly in charge of the secteurs de base and were promoted. Thosein charge of the secteurs de base have usually graduated from elemen-tary schools but have had no previous education in agriculture.Their principal tasks are to supervise cotton growing in the fieldsand to watch over the distribution of the equipment and supplies re-quired for production. The European personnel have not the timeto give complete training to these Mali field workers whose job isconfined to carrying out particular tasks. Furthermnore, the em-phasis put on cotton growing limits the extent to which the extensionservice is brought in contact with the problems of agricultural de-velopment as a whole. The CFDT is apparently unwilling to recruitany more agricultural school graduates on the ground that theseare disinclined to work at the village level. The rather low level ofagricultural knowledge possessed by CFDT field workers is thereforenot surprising. In 1963/64 a MVali sector director drew a monthlypay of about 50,000 Mali francs ($200); the head of a ZER, 24,000francs; and the field worker in charge of the secteur de base, 13,000francs or the equivalent of that paid to a probationary moniteur inthe agricultural services. The total cost of the general extensionservice (comprising staff, transport and administrative expenditure)could then be estimated at 53 million Mali francs (about $210,000).

Unites de culture

In order to popularize modern methods of cultivation the CFDTbegan in 1960 to make contracts with a certain number of peasantswho agreed to apply these new techniques to their own crops. Such

Number of ZER Areas(cumulative total)

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

Koutiala 4 7 11 15Sikasso - 5 8 12San 2 5 7 7S6gou 4 5 7 7Bougouni - - - 6Bamako - - - 4

Total 10 22 33 51

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peasants were given the necessary basic agricultural equipment(unite de culture) which they could use free of charge for two years.This consisted of a pair of oxen, a plow, a cultivator and a sprayerfor the application of insecticides. A cart was also supplied, but forthe joint use of several peasants. The CFDT was to regain possessionof these means of production when the contract expired or wasbroken. It was hoped, however, that the beneficiary would agree atthe end of the period to purchase the equipment because he hadlearned to appreciate its usefulness during the two years for whichit had been lent to him. In return for this loan, the farmer undertookto observe the simple instructions issued by the CFDT. The condi-tions of the loan enabled the CFDT not only to require the bene-ficiary to cultivate a hectare of cotton, but also to influence thefarm's production as a whole. Thus there was an obligation topractice rotation of crops with fallowing and to use manure andfertilizer in such a way as to increase the general fertility of the land.The use of the agricultural equipment, in its turn, made it possibleto ensure that the soils would be better prepared and that the wholeof the areas sown would be maintained.

The provision of equipment to such pilot farmers went hand inhand with the establishment of a "dense" extension service. The firstunite's de culture were set up in the Zebala and Baroueli ZER's. Thenumber of unites de culture introduced in the first ZER's was fairlylarge but subsequently reduced. Thus in 1961 there were ten ofthese units in the Zebala ZER whose population at the time was6,700, made up of 567 families. It appears that about 20 units in allwere set up in each of the four initial sectors, except in the case ofKoutiala, where there were 30 units. To the extent that the loansfor equipment were recovered either in money or in kind new unite'sde culture were set up. By 1965, however, this operation had beenwound up.

The success of this type of program appears to depend mainly onthree factors. The first is the need to have the make-up of the equip-ment conform to requirements. The equipment proposed was de-signed to cope with bottlenecks that might prevent the moderniza-tion of farming. Its comparatively complex nature did not prove ahandicap in areas where animal traction was not absolutely novel.However, in the southern areas it was more difficult for the peasantsto adapt themselves to the use of all of this animal-drawn equipment.A second factor is the need to select the right kind of "pilot farmers"to use this equipment. In some cases bad farmers were chosen; andat times favoritism also affected the selection. In retrospect it proveduseful also to make sure that the farmers selected did not have the

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means to acquire the necessary equipment themselves. Thus inKoutiala the young people who had opened up new farming land ina hameau de culture and therefore had no access to equipment mademuch better use of the unites de culture than those farmers who hadstayed behind in the traditional villages. Finally, and above all, theconstant presence of extension workers capable of advising thefarmers is necessary; the provision of equipment does not dispensewith the need for an extension service; only the two together canmake more modern farming truly profitable.

The effect of these unite's de culture has been the subject of muchdebate among the various local representatives of the CFDT. How-ever, if their opinions are considered in the light of the special condi-tions prevailing in their own sectors, it would appear that, broadlyspeaking, this operation has had a beneficial effect. Considering thatthe equipment units were assigned to those peasants who werethought likely to make the best use of them, it seems that, on anaverage, three quarters of the equipment allocated was used satis-factorily. In the Koutiala sector, in particular, in almost half thecases examined, the output of cotton quadrupled on the pilot farm-ers' holdings. However, it would have been interesting to knowwhether the beneficial effect was confined to cotton growing orextended to other farming operations. It should also be said that,following the introduction of a denser extension service some culti-vators have obtained results superior to those achieved by the firstpilot farmers, whose efforts have, in some cases, flagged over theyears.

Communal fields

In its extension work the CFDT has made comparatively littleuse of the rural associations (groupements ruraux) to which peasantsare obliged to belong. In fact these cooperative associations havebeen utilized primarily to resell certain types of agricultural equip-ment, to purchase knapsack sprayers and to serve as agencies for thedistribution of fertilizers and insecticides. It is only on the so-calledchamps collectifs that the associations have had a direct part in pro-moting the use of new methods of cotton growing, and even therethey have made a contribution in only exceptional cases. UnderMali law each village has been required not only to form a coopera-tive association but also to set aside a few hectares for cultivation asa communal field (champs collectif). In most instances the communalfields have apparently provided a bad example of the result of thenew techniques, since the necessary work on these fields was gen-erally done too late and no one considered himself responsible for

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the crops grown on them. However, in some of the areas where theCFDT had just begun to operate the communal field did become,under the guidance of the extension agent, a noteworthy demonstra-tion plot. It appeared that in such cases farmers were not preparedto apply the new methods on their own fields but were quite willingto allow a test to be carried out on the communal field. Once thecommunal field has demonstrated the effectiveness of the new tech-niques, it tends to be neglected in favor of the fields cultivated by thepeasants individually.

Experience has shown that when the CFDT has been able toarrange for a test of the new methods, either on the peasants' ownfields or on the communal field, the way has been cleared for arather rapid adoption of these techniques. This is to a large extentdue, as we ourselves were able to observe, to the superiority of themethods which was obvious in most cases. The very fact that cottonis generally grown in fields that are only a short distance from thevillage, where the peasants can easily see the difference between theresults obtained, makes the demonstration effect of these techniquesstill clearer. It should also be noted that the CFDT has frequentlybeen helped in its task of developing cotton production by the po-litical party which controls the Government and administration ofMali. At the local level this party has made a special effort toarouse popular enthusiasm in favor of development. The efficiencyof the party's local organization naturally varies from one area toanother, but in the Koutiala sector, for example, the party haspositively supported the CFDT, and has made the production ofcotton almost a patriotic issue.

Seasonal agricultural schoolsThe CFDT has also been able to extend the use of animal-drawn

implements by training young peasants in the seasonal agriculturalschools that have been established in recent years. A considerablenumber of these have been built by the Government with the finan-cial assistance of the European Development Fund; and some ofthose located in areas where the CFDT operates have been placedunder its jurisdiction. Others are administered either by the staff ofthe Ministry of Rural Development or by the Administration of theCivic Service (Service civique), the organization in charge of the laborservice which is obligatory for all young people in Mali. In the lattertwo cases the CFDT merely acts as a technical adviser.

In principle this type of school appears excellent. Every year theseschools can each accept about twenty young men between 18 and 25years of age and teach them, for a period of nine months, all farm

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operations from the preparation of the land to the harvesting of thecrop. To enable them to do this, the schools have their own farmenterprises-land, oxen and farm implements. The instruction con-sists mainly of practical work, supplemented by a few courses inthe rudiments of literacy. It is thus possible for the pupils to becomefamiliar with the various types of equipment, the training and use ofoxen for plowing, the production and use of manure and the applica-tion of fertilizers and insecticides. Once they have completed thiscourse of instruction they are supposed to obtain on credit a pair ofoxen and the equipment required to enable them to put modern agri-cultural techniques into practice.

While a few of the schools operate satisfactorily, many of themdisplay serious shortcomings. Some of their deficiencies are due tothe fact that they were set up too quickly and on the basis of criteriathat are open to criticism. Thus the requirement that the schools belocated at the headquarters of an administrative sub-district hasforced some of them to farm poor land on1 which the yields, evenwhen improved methods are used, are no higher, and are sometimeseven lower, than those obtained by the use of traditional techniques.The schools have been given much more equipment than they havebeen able to use and have even, in some cases, received equipmentof a type different from that which the agricultural extension serviceis recommending for general use. The stables have been built on thebasis of a model which in both cost and size is far beyond the meansof an ordinary peasant. In certain instances the personnel of theseschools is deficient. The best results are obtained when these estab-lishments are run by the service that is also responsible for agri-cultural extension; and the worst when the schools are administeredby the Civic Service whose personnel has only limited competence inagriculture. In the latter case the pupils in any event derive onlylimited benefit from the time they spend at the seasonal school, eitherbecause they do not stay there for the whole of the agriculturalseason or because they come from areas in which the methods theyare taught are not applicable. In the schools that are run by theRural Development Service, the number of pupils who come volun-tarily is often insufficient, so that the local authorities then have todraft young men for training. Contrary to expectations, it has oftenproved difficult for the pupils to put into practice the methods theyhave been taught. In many cases young men cannot hope to getland for cultivation before they are married; and in other cases theGovernment has not supplied, at the end of the training period, theoxen and implements that a pupil has learnt to use and that hadbeen promised him.

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Sales of equipment and supplies

One of the most important features of CFDT's operations in Mali

is undoubtedly that the company does not merely give the peasant

advice, but also enables him to follow that advice by supplying him

with the means of production. Agricultural equipment, fertilizer

and insecticides are made available to the CFDT by the Governmentof Mali so that the rural associations can buy them for cash or on

credit. The plows, wheel-assemblies (trains de roues) for carts and

cultivators are sold for cash; such equipment was formerly sold on

credit, but this practice was discontinued to simplify accounting,

particularly when it appeared that the lack of credit did not hamper

sales. Knapsack sprayers are generally sold on the basis of two years'credit. The cost of the fertilizers and insecticide products is recoveredwhen the crop is harvested by deductions from payments made in

respect of the cotton marketed. The credit transactions are carried

out through the rural associations and the agents of the CFDT.

In all areas the greatest demand is for plows, and this demand has

been increasing since 1962. In 1962/63 the CFDT sold 600 plows;

and in 1963/64, 2,907, including 1,000 "Kreka" and 1,907 "Tropi-

cale" plows. In 1964/65 sales fell to 1,505, but only due to the lack of

available equipment. The "Kreka" plows imported at the beginningof 1963 did not find favor among the farmers who complained thatthey were not sturdy enough. Rural associations used to buy a plow

from the CFDT for 6,350 Mali francs (ca. $25) and to resell it to

the farmer for 6,500 francs. More recently, however, the selling priceof the plow was substantially raised to 10,000 francs which reflects

its actual cost. In the extension campaign the use of the cultivator

was stressed only after the adoption of the plow. Cultivators have,in fact, met with only very limited success. In the four years ended1964/65 the CFDT supplied farmers with only 713 cultivators. In

1964/65 there were only 462 cultivators reported in service, as com-

pared with 13,440 plows. In general farmers have found the plow amore versatile instrument because they are increasingly using it forridging cotton, an operation which does inter-row weeding at thesame time. The cultivators received by CFDT in 1964 came equippedwith ridging attachments, but the farmers apparently did not findthese as effective as plows.

Next to plows carts are said to be the most highly appreciated.

In 1964/65, 2,995 were reported in service in the six sectors. Since1961/62 foreign exchange difficulties have greatly reduced the sup-ply of imported carts and wheel assemblies. The CFDT purchased

some wheel assemblies out of its own resources, but it also encoun-

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tered supply difficulties so that its sales fell from 130 in 1963/64 toonly 75 in 1964/65. The wheel assembly with pnuematic tires,which costs 26,000 Mali francs (ca. $100), is generally preferred tothat with metal wheels, although the latter, at 18,000 francs, is con-siderably cheaper and also easier to maintain. Some peasants liavebeen prepared to pay 34,000 francs for this wheel assembly whichthe Government-sponsored Societ6 Mutuelle et de D6veloppementRural (SMDR) sometimes has available. Peasants usually have thebody of the cart made by the village carpenter at a cost reported tobe about 7,000 francs.

There is also a growing demand for sprayers. The number fur-nished by CFDT rose rapidly from only 30 in 1961/62 to 1,810 in1964/65 and totaled 2,831 over this four-year period. Two types ofsprayers have been supplied, but the "Paluver" knapsack sprayerseems to have been more satisfactory. This sprayer has been sold torural associations at a price of 10,000 Mali francs (about $40), in-volving a subsidy of approximately 3,500 francs. Maintenance andspare parts have proved to be a problem. Sprayers often break down.The lack of spare parts obliged CFDT in 1963/64 to establish itsown stock of spares valued at about 1,000,000 Mali francs ($2,000).Moreover, CFDT agents frequently have to intervene to get in-operable equipment repaired or even have to effect repairs them-selves.

The CFDT also supplies the rural association with fertilizer. Itrecommends the application of 50 kg of sulphate of ammonia and75 kg. of triple superphosphate per hectare of cotton. The latter issupposed to be applied at the time of sowing and the former at thetime of thinning. Owing to an increase in the Government subsidy,the price of this dosage of fertilizer per hectare was reduced in 1963from 4,600 to 3,275 francs; and the Company believes that this hasplayed an important part in raising the area fertilized from 893hectares in 1962/63 to 1,824 in 1963/64 and 4,119 in 1964/65. In1963/64 the CFDT sold 170 tons of triple superphosphate and 125tons of sulphate of ammonia.

Finally, the CFDT supplies the peasant with the insecticides forspraying cotton. The total quantity recommended for one hectare(3 or 4 sprayings) consists of 5 liters of endrin (20%) and 5 kg. ofDDT (50%). For this quantity the peasant pays a subsidized priceof 1,750 francs. In 1963/64 the CFDT sold about 19,000 liters ofendrin and nearly 18 tons of "dedelo."

The supply of equipment, which makes it possible for the farmerto follow the technical advice of the extension worker, has undoubt-

315


edly been of great value. It has, however, been complicated by cer-tain problems which are not all within the power of the CFDT toresolve. When farmers' demand for various types of equipment hasbeen stimulated, it is obviously important that this demand besatisfied. However, supplies have frequently been inadequate. Sometypes of equipment have proved to be ill-suited to the requirements-e.g., plows that were not sturdy enough, sprayers with parts thatcorroded too quickly, and cultivators that were poorly adapted forthe tasks they were expected to perform. Limitations in the avail-ability of foreign exchange, requiring shifts in the source of supplyof equipment, have apparently been one factor responsible for this.Another factor has been the inability of the CFDT in some cases toinfluence the types of equipment and supplies procured by theGovernment, although this difficulty now seems to have been over-come. A serious continuing problem has been that of maintenanceand repairs. The lack of a sufficient supply of spare parts has oftenimmobilized equipment for a long time. The poor condition of someequipment is probably due at least in part to the still inadequatetraining of farmers in its use. Moreover, the lack of artisans capableof making repairs has not yet been remedied by any sort of trainingprogram.

It is not quite clear to what extent the supply of draft animals hasbeen an obstacle to the more extensive use of animal-drawn equip-ment. Initially the CFDT sold draft oxen on credit, but it abandonedthis practice because of repayment difficulties, particularly when theborrowers claimed the oxen disappeared or died or had been stolen.The Government and the CFDT apparently agreed that creditwas often abused to buy extra animals when in fact the farmeralready had oxen, and that farmers should be given every incentiveto use any extra income of their own to buy oxen when in fact theyhad none. Yet the lack of draft animals does appear to pose a seriousproblem for some farmers. Sometimes this lack may be due to thecomplexities of agreements under which many farmers entrust theircattle for herding to the Fulani and which may make it difficult toreclaim them for plowing. There is some evidence, however, indi-cating that cattle are often unevenly distributed among farmers.It is difficult for those with no cattle to buy out of their own resourcesa pair of oxen which cost as much as 30,000 francs ($120). It mustbe conceded at the same time that the more general and effectiveuse of draft animals is, above all, dependent on a concerted attackon a complex of related problems-water supply, pasture improve-iment, production of fodder crops and improved veterinary care.

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The new techniques

The CFD T programThe practices that the CFDT undertook to bring into general use

among peasants relate mainly to the growing of cotton and includethe following:

1. improved land preparation with the help of the plow and,eventually, the cultivator;

2. the production and use of manure, as well as the applicationof mineral fertilizers;

3. the use of improved varieties, combined with early sowing;4. more careful weeding, particularly with the help of the inter-

row cultivator; and5. regular spraying.

No special program has been evolved by the CFDT for crops otherthan cotton. Admittedly, certain of the improved techniques em-ployed in the growing of cotton also benefit other crops. Moreover,special attention has been devoted to devising an optimum rotationthat would include all the crops. In the rotation proposed by theCFDT, cotton is planted in the first year after the land has beencleared. Cotton is followed by millet, which thus benefits from themanure or fertilizer applied to the cotton crop, and groundnuts aresown in the third year. The rotation is continued for a fourth yearwith the growing of millet if the soil is still sufficiently fertile; other-wise two years of fallow begin immediately. 2 In practice the rotationfollowed by farmers varies from one area to another. The durationof fallow depends mainly on the density of the agricultural popula-tion, since this determines annual requirements for cultivated land.The system of rotation advocated has been in use for several years inthe M'Pesoba area, whereas farther to the north, in the Baroueliarea, farmers follow a millet/cotton rotation leaving out groundnutswhich is considered a less profitable crop than cotton.

In devising its extension program for cotton, the CFDT has largelyrelied on the research work carried out by the Institut de recherchesde coton et des textiles exotiques (IRCT) in West Africa in general,and more particularly at the N'Tarla experimental station. Thisinstitute has perfected new varieties of Allen cotton which have vir-tually replaced the indigenous varieties over the whole territory. Be-sides this work in the field of genetics, the IRCT has continued its

2 The research station at N'Tarla near M'Pesoba has indicated that two yearsof fallow could maintain soil fertility at an acceptable level.

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research into fertilizer applications, measures of plant protection andmethods of cotton cultivation (date of sowing, method of soil prepar-ation) which are the subjects of CFDT's extension efforts. This re-search work has not been entirely successful as regards the problemsconnected with organic manuring and the maintenance of fertility.At the request of the Rural Development Service, the CFDT under-took in 1963 some applied field research on various methods ofcropping and cultivation. On one or two fields in each sector, plots ofland are set aside for given rotations, the results of which are checkedby agents of the CFDT. It is anticipated that, after some years, it maybe possible to determine the efficacy of various fertilizer formulas inconjunction with different crop rotations.

Land preparationFor the preparation of land the CFDT advocates the use of the

plow. By working the soil to a greater depth the plow has been in-strumental in significantly improving the quality of land preparation.Furthermore, to the extent that the peasant has fully mastered thetechnique of plowing with draft animals, a considerable amount oftime is saved. While it takes from 10 to 15 days to prepare one hec-tare with the hoe, plowing requires only 4 to 5 days, and subsequentridging, about 3 days. However, the advantage of ox plowing ismarked only if it makes possible earlier land preparation and, as aconsequence, earlier planting. At the very beginning of the rainyseason the soil is often too hard for ox plowing, particularly whenthe strength of oxen has been reduced by inadequate feeding through-out the dry season. The CFDT has therefore proposed two methodswhereby the work can be done at an earlier date with the assistanceof draft animals.

In principle it appeared possible to speed up the work of soilpreparation that must be done after the advent of the rains (1) byplowing fallow land, which is destined to be cropped the followingseason, in the autumn before the dry season has hardened the soil(labour d'automne), or (2) by using the cultivator for a preliminaryworking (pre-labour) of land that has been cropped right after theharvest. Both these methods were designed to facilitate the penetra-tion of the soil by the first rains and thus to make possible earlierplowing followed in the rainy season by ridging. The widespreadadoption of these practices has, however, encountered difficulties.In 1964/65 "autumn plowing" took place on only 421 hectares, and"pre-labour" on but 1,419. Autumn plowing has proved difficultbecause it must be done at a time when there is considerable otherfarm work, particularly harvesting. While pre'-labour appeared

318


practicable, since a cultivator required less tractive effort than aplow, the CFDT has not yet been fully successful in finding a culti-vator with sufficiently rigid and strong tines that would be effectivein rather hard soil.

Under the circumstances it has been difficult for the CFDT topersuade the farmers first to plow their land and simultaneouslyturn in whatever manure or compost they use, and then to ridge itfor cotton. In order to save time and work farmers have a tendencyto omit plowing and to confine their land preparation to ridging.In this case the soil under the ridge remains hard, which hinders theroot development of the cotton plant; and the standard of tillage ishardly better than that obtained by the hoe. To counter thistendency the CFDT has recommended that land be plowed ratherthan ridged in those areas, as in the San sector, where rainfall is notvery high and it is accordingly not necessary to plant cotton onridges.

ManuringThe CFDT has hitherto laid great stress on the need to produce

and use organic manure. It has recommended that manure be ap-plied after pre-labour so that it could be turned in by subsequentplowing. Since compost or zeriba manure is usually reserved forcrops grown around the huts and therefore is rarely available forcash crops, the CFDT has emphasized the importance of specialfacilities for the making of manure. In fact, it made the constructionof a pit or stable for the production of manure one of the conditionsfor providing its pilot farmers with basic equipment (unite's de culture).According to estimates made by the CFDT at Koutiala, the additionof ten tons of manure per hectare would increase the cotton yield by400 kg. per hectare and make possible, under reasonably goodcultivation, a total output of 700 kg. per hectare. If the cotton werealso sprayed, a total production of over 1,000 kg. per hectare couldbe achieved.

The results achieved have so far been rather disappointing in re-lation to the effort made by CFDT. The number of manure pits andstables established has, to be sure, been impressive, reaching 5,834 in1964/65. However, in 1964/65 only about 4,000 of these were re-ported to be functioning to a limited extent. In the same year 5,497hectares of cotton were said to have received some manure or com-post. The use of manure appears to be most widespread among theBambara of the Segou sector where CFDT estimated that farmersmanured 2,324 hectares of cotton in 1964/65, or 22% of the totalarea planted to that crop. As a whole an average of only about 8%7

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of the total cotton area was manured. In the Koutiala sector,where the proportion manured approximated the average for all thesectors, the total area manured was almost as large as in S6gou,although, strangely enough, only 377 manure pits were said to be inuse that year. Evidently the quantity of manure applied per hectareis often rather small.

Manure is only of benefit when a rather substantial amount isapplied-between 10 and 15 tons per hectare. However, the use ofmanure on this scale involves a complete transformation of thetraditional system of farming. First of all, the farmer must haveavailable a stable (i.e., a platform surrounded with low walls andcovered with a roof) or a manure pit. Next, it must be possible forhim to keep two animals during the dry season. For this, he musthave a supply of water and reserves of fodder. Water is also requiredfor the regular irrigation of manure. Finally, the peasant also needssome equipment to enable him to procure litter (scythe, sickle andfork), and a cart in which to transport the litter to the stable and themanure to the field. These conditions are rarely fulfilled in theirentirety in Mali; besides a considerable amount of work is involved.More often than not, oxen in the CFDT sectors migrate in search ofgrazing during part of the dry season. Where manure pits are used,as in Sikasso and Koutiala, the problem of drainage is such thatmanure can seldom be produced in the rainy season; and wheremanure is produced on raised stable platforms leaky roofs combinedwith inadequate drainage also often make farmers reluctant to keeptheir cattle there for fear that their health will be adversely affected.Thus manure generally tends to be produced only during part or allof the dry season. The quantity and the effect of the manure appliedto cotton is accordingly far below that recommended; and manyfarmers evidently think that the work involved is disproportionateto the results obtained.

For a long time the CFDT made the supply of artificial fertilizer

Number of Manure Pits and Stables in Operation

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

Koutiala 497 815 843 377Sikasso 250 622 720 439San 30 50 40 15Segou 755 943 1,248 2,874

Total 1,532 2,430 2,322 3,705a

aExcluding 298 in Bamako and Bougouni.

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conditional on the prior application of manure. This had an im-portant cumulative effect, since their use in combination made itpossible to raise the yield of a well-tended crop from 300 to 900 kg.per hectare, whereas the mere application of chemical fertilizersincreased it only from 300 to 550 kg. per hectare. This total increase,however, is slightly below the aggregate effect of the two when ap-plied separately. In view of the difficulties involved in the productionof manure, the CFDT no longer insists on linking the use of manureand fertilizer and simply recommends that manure be applied.

Because soils are relatively homogeneous, the CFDT recommendsthe same dosage of fertilizers everywhere. It calls for the applicationof 50 kg. of ammonia sulphate and 75 kg. of triple superphosphateper hectare of cotton. This amount was sold in 1962 at the cost priceof 4,600 Mali francs (ca. $18), but, in order to expand the use offertilizer, the cost to the peasant was reduced in 1963, by means of asubsidy, to 3,275 francs. The peasant is, in fact, very sensitive to thecost of fertilizer; and for this reason no attempt has been made topersuade him to apply the amount-almost double that used atpresent-which gives the optimum economic yield. The amountcurrently used yields an increase of approximately 250 kg. per hec-tare valued at 8,500 francs on the basis of the price of 34 francs paidper kilogram of seedcotton purchased from the grower. Withouttaking into account the residual effect on the crop next following inthe rotation, which is estimated at 20% of the cost of the fertilizer,the increased value produced is considerable (more than 5,000francs per hectare). Since, as a rule, cotton that has been fertilizedis also sprayed, the yield per hectare then rises to not less than 950kg. if the crop is looked after properly, and the sales proceeds to32,300 francs. After deducting the cost of the insecticide treatments(materials and cost of spraying: 3,750 francs) and of manuring(3,275 francs), the gross income received by the peasant for onehectare of cotton is considerable, enabling him easily to amortize thecost of any equipment, such as sprayers, carts, etc.

The use of chemical fertilizer has proved far more successful thanthat of manure. Although the area that has been given fertilizer isstill not very large in relation to the total, it has nevertheless in-creased considerably since the campaign was started in 1961. Froma figure of 228 hectares for the 1961/62 season, the total rose to 893in the following year, to 1,824 in 1963/64, and, to 4,019 hectares,i.e., 6% of the cotton area, in 1964/65. In the Koutiala sector, inparticular, the area fertilized is reported to have more than doubledeach year since 1961 (2,209 hectares in 1964/65 compared to 113 in1961/62).

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Cotton Areas Treated with Fertilizer

(hectares)

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

Koutiala 113 293 939 2,209Sikasso 5 160 511 772San 20 189 97 161Segou 90 251 277 742

Total 228 893 1,824 3,884a

'Including Bougouni and Bamako, the total was 4,119. For 1965/66 theprovisional total reported is 6,198 hectares.

Improved varieties and date of sowing

The more widespread use of highly productive varieties of cottonhas undoubtedly contributed to the progressive intensification ofcotton growing in areas of comparatively low population density.Thanks to the research work done at the Office du Niger and, from1950, to that of IRCT at the N'Tarla station, the CFDT has beenable to disseminate Allen varieties that are very satisfactory. Thefirst multiplication is always carried out in Koutiala, the next one in

the various sectors, depending upon the location of the ginnery thatsupplies the seed for the following season. The CFDT renews theseed every year and was planning to treat them first with fungicide.The substitution of one variety for another can be effected in threeyears; thus the Allen 333.57 variety was introduced in 1962 toreplace the Allen 151, which is to disappear in 1965.

Seed are distributed by the CFDT within its own areas of opera-tions. The CFDT transports seed intended for use outside the ZER'sto Bamako, where they are taken over by the Rural DevelopmentService or the SMDR which distribute them in the areas for whichthey are solely responsible. The increase in the quantity of seeddistributed clearly testifies to the expansion in cotton growing; theamount distributed rose from 611 tons in 1956/57 to 1,976 tons in1964/65. The amount of seed used per hectare fluctuates between27 and 30 kg. per hectare; in order to avoid wastage, the CFDTwould like to reduce the average rate to a figure in the neighborhoodof 25 kg.

The practice of early sowing, which is recommended as a meansof lengthening the vegetative period and thus raising yields, hasmade some progress, particularly where the use of draft animals hasfacilitated land preparation. It is difficult, however, to put thisprogress on record in terms of the percentage of the total area sownbefore a certain date; the onset of the rainy season, which determineswhether or not sowing will be possible, does in fact occur at widely

322

illali Republic: Cotton Production

varying times, depending on the year. The irregularity of the adventof the first rains also tends to make many peasants space their sowingover a period in order to spread the risk rnore effectively. Numerouspeasants still give priority to food crops, on which their livelihoodultimately depends. Seed drills should, in theory, make it possibleto speed up sowing, but the equipment available cannot be usedwith seed that has not been delinted.

In addition to the early sowing, the CFDT has urged farmers toincrease the density of sowing to 40,000 seed-pockets per hectare withsubsequent thinning to two seedlings per pocket. Some progress hasbeen made. At Baroueli, a density of 35,000 seed-pockets per hectarehas been attained, whereas elsewhere it generally varies between25,000 and 30,000. In general, the growers plant too many seeds perpocket and leave too great a distance between the pockets. Thisprocedure is in fact easier and quicker, for it conforms to the tradi-tional farmer's work rhythm whereby one step determines thespacing.

Care of the cotton

The CFDT checks the various measures that must be taken duringthe growing period, viz. thinning, weeding and ridging. The value ofthinning is not always recognized by the grower, who tends tothink that the more plants there are, the more cotton there will be.On the other hand, the peasants are all well aware of the importanceof weeding, which they have always carried out on their food crops.If the cotton crop is to be tended properly, and at the right moment,it is much more a question of reducing the number of competingclaims on the peasant's time than of showing him how important itis to carry out early weeding. Tests on the research station havedemonstrated that a delay of two or three weeks in the first weedingcould reduce the yield by between 30% and 35%, and that a delayof six weeks could bring about a fall in output of 60%.

In general, efforts to encourage the use of the animal-drawncultivator for expediting and facilitating weeding have had onlylimited success. Weeding with the cultivator calls for well-trainedoxen, and is difficult if the cotton is not planted in a straight line.The peasant generally finds it more convenient to use the hoe for thefirst weeding which is often combined with thinning and the appli-cation of fertilizer. He is afraid, moreover, that the cultivator willuproot the young cotton plants. The second weeding, which is donein conjunction with ridging, can be done more easily with thecultivator. In theory the farmers who cultivate more than half ahectare of cotton feel most strongly that weeding is a bottleneck, and

323


are therefore more inclined to use the cultivator for this operation.

Even those, however, frequently prefer to use the plow for the com-

bined task of ridging and inter-row weeding.

SprayingThe most striking progress has unquestionably been made in the

spraying of cotton. The CFDT recommends that the crop be sprayed

three of four times during the growing season, so as to combat both

the pests attacking the vegetation and the bolls. Depending upon the

date, i.e., according to the nature of the pest, the insecticide treat-ments consist of variable proportions of endrine and DDT. Whether

three or four treatments are given, the overall quantity of insecticide

remains approximately the same, viz. 5 liters of endrine and 5 kg.

of DDT, the total cost of which is 1,750 Mali francs ($7). To this

figure must be added the cost of amortizing and maintaining the

sprayer, which may be estimated at 2,000 francs per hectare. Spray-

ing can raise the yield of cotton that has been sown at the proper time

and has been well looked after from 300 kg. to about 700 kg. perhectare. The additional output of 400 kg. is worth 13,600 francs,

giving a net return of 9,850 francs. The effect of spraying is, there-

fore, spectacular. The peasants are, moreover, very much aware of

its profitability. They even tend to spray fields with low potentialproductivity, which the CFDT tries to discourage so as not to lessen

the value of spraying in the eyes of the peasants. In advising the

farmers, the CFDT extension agents try in each case to determine

whether spraying would be worthwhile in light of the condition of

the fields. As in much of Africa, plant protection measures have metwith great success. The number of hectares that were sprayed at leasttwice rose very rapidly from 519 in 1961/62 to 1,980, and then to

4,228 in 1963/64. During 1964/65, 6,429 hectares received three

treatments and almost 2,000 hectares four. Despite this progress, along time will probably be needed to demonstrate the value of

regular spraying to all cotton growers.

Cotton Areas Sprayed Three Times

(hectares)

1962 1963 1964

Koutiala 323 1,004 2,582Sikasso 361 626 928San 182 90 274Segou 321 988 2,370Bamako - - 145Bougouni - 130

Total 1,187 2,708 6,429

324

AMali Republic: Cotton Production

Cotton production

Ginning and marketing

The collection of seedcotton is done on the samne basis as thedistribution of seed. Thus the CFDT operates in the ZER's forwhich it is responsible, while the SMDR's collect the cotton in theother areas and then turn it over to the CFDT, which carries outthe ginning. For the 1963/64 season, the CFDT had 11 purchasingteams, 5 in the Koutiala sector and 2 in each of the other three sec-tors. In moving from place to place these teamns follow a carefullyprepared itinerary, visiting markets that have been organized in thecenter of several villages. They buy direct from the peasant, deduct-ing the various sums due in respect of spraying, fertilizer, etc., fromthe payment made to him for his cotton. The village cooperativeassociations do not take any part in the marketing although theywere intended to assume such responsibilities.

Outside the Office du Niger the CFDT enjoys virtually a ginningmonopoly in Mali. The ginneries, which have hitherto been financedout of French public funds, have been placed at the disposal of theCFDT for a period of ten years, after which they will become theproperty of the Republic of Mali. In 1965 four ginneries, each cap-able of processing 5,000-6,000 tons of seedcotton, were operating inthe CFDT zone at S6gou, Kimparana, Sikasso and Koutiala. Theirtotal capacity of about 24,000 tons compared with a 1964/65 cropexceeding 21,000 tons. In anticipation of further increases in produc-tion, additional gins with a capacity of 5,000 and 10,000 tons respec-tively were being erected in Sikasso and Koutiala at the end of 1965;and equipment for a ginnery of 7,500 tons at Bamako was underorder.

The output of cotton in the ZER's where the CFDT operates be-comes known only on the official marketing of the crop, for whichthe CFDT is responsible. A comparison of the quantity marketedwith estimates has made it possible to determine that a fairly con-stant amount of cotton is not marketed by the CFDT. In each sectorbetween 500 and 1,000 tons are retained each year for home con-sumption or for trading on local markets. As production rises thisamount is of less and less significance. The output nmarketed by theCFDT has grown considerably in the course of ten years, risingfrom some 1,400 tons in 1955 to a figure of 21,000 tons in 1965.Output has grown at an average rate of about 40% per annum,with a certain slowing down between 1958 and 1962. The rate ofgrowth accelerated again with the intensification of the extensionwork that began in 1960. The Koutiala sector has always con-

325


tributed approximately half of the output of the CFDT sectors, the

contributions of the other sectors varying from year to year. Over

recent years output has tended to level off in the San sector and to

forge ahead steadily in the Segou sector; in the Sikasso sector prog-

ress has been particularly rapid since 1961/62. Altogether the growth

in output is attributable partly to an increase in the area under

cultivation, and partly to a rise in yields.

Marketed Output,

(tons of seedcotton)

1954/55 1,127 1959/60 2,6531955/56 1,538 1960/61 6,3931956/57 2,603 1961/62 5,8931957/58 2,884 1962/63 12,2831958/59 3,825 1963/64 15,763

1964/65 21,772

'Including cotton grown outside the CFDT sectors which in 1964/65 amountedto 529 tons.

Area and yields

The increase in the area under cultivation has made a big con-

tribution to the growth in production. Until 1960 the extent of the

area sown was not known, for at that time cotton was grown mainly

in association with other crops. This method of cultivation is very

much on the decline, for there is none at all in the Koutiala and

S6gou sectors, and it now represents only about 10% of cotton

production in San and Sikasso. The total area under cultivation (in

pure stand and in association with other crops) rose from 42,000

hectares in 1961 to more than 65,000 hectares in 1964, i.e., at a

rate of around 15%7 per annum. This was partly the result of the

increase in the number of ZER's put under the CFDT by the Rural

Development Service. Thus the number of ZER's in the CFDT's

area of operations rose from only 10 in 1961 to 51 in 1964. The

Area Under Cotton

(hectares)

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

Koutiala 21,196 23,634 24,680 28,155Sikasso 8,417 10,931 13,886 16,765San 9,227 10,250 9,680 9,232Segou 3,663 5,891 8,803 10,337

Total 42,503 50,706 57,049 64,489'

aExcluding 1,100 hectares in the new Bougouni sector.

326


CFDT is thus gradually assuming responsibility for the whole ofnonirrigated cotton production in Mali (probably, in all, between70,000 and 75,000 hectares).

The growth in average yield is the result of the progressive in-tensification of cultivation under the guidance of the CFDT. Thisaverage yield expresses the ratio between the whole of the outputmarketed by the CFDT and the whole of the area sown. From a levelof 213 kg. per hectare in 1960/61 and only 138 kg. in 1961/62, theyield rose in succeeding years to 235 kg. and 268 kg, and, in 1964/65,to 314 kg. In the latter year the Koutiala sector is said to have at-tained an average yield of 419 kg. per hectare, and the Segou sectoran average of 376 kg. per hectare, whereas the Sikasso sector stillshowed a yield of only 210 kg. per hectare. A greater increase inyields would undoubtedly have been achieved by the CFDT if itsarea of operations had not constantly been extended. As it is, theaverage yield in 1964/65 corresponds to that which might beachieved by timely planting and proper weeding without any furtherimprovements. The results reflect the fact that, on an average, morethan 90% of the area is still cultivated without such improvedmethods as better soil preparation, application of fertilizer andspraying. However, the increase in yields achieved in Koutiala andSegou demonstrate the potentialities of the extension efforts madeby the CFDT.

Yields

(kg. marketed/hectare sown)

1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

Koutiala 262 157 247 340 419Sikasso 240 102 186 189 208San 118 123 196 183 239segou 117 92 312 320 376

Average 213 138 235 268 314a

'Including the Bamako and Bougouni sectors where yields averaged only101 and 73, respectively.

The more intensive cultivation of cotton has made it possible, incertain cases, to achieve very high yields. The CFDT's annual reportfor the 1956/57 season mentioned that the Koutiala sector hadsecured a "record" yield of between 250 and 300 kg. per hectare-a yield which, to be sure, was the average for several villages. Theintroduction of fertilizers and spraying brought considerably greateropportunities for achieving high yields. In 1961/62, the yield on apilot farm at Fana reached a level of 1,809 kg. per hectare, whereas

327


at Cinzana the maximum recorded for one holding was 1,345 kg.

per hectare. In the following year, it was noted that at Baroueli the

average obtained on 53 hectares, distributed among 22 planters,

stood at a figure of 1,862 kg. per hectare, although there were some

cases where output exceeded two tons. During the 1963/64 season,

fresh records were established, a yield of 3,150 kg. per hectare being

achieved in the village of Leloni, in the Koutiala sector; moreover,

taking the area as a whole, about a dozen planters were able to

show a yield of more than 2.2 tons per hectare. Finally, in 1964/65

records of 3,200 to 3,300 kg. were attained, and more growers ex-

ceeded an output of 2 tons per hectare.

There can be no doubt that the more intensive cultivation of cotton

has been very rewarding for the peasants who were thus seeking to

augment their income. Even without a subsidy the cost of fertilizing

and spraying one hectare of cotton is only 10,000 Mali francs (S40),

including amortization of the cost of the sprayer. Even after taking

into account the depreciation of the plough, which can be used on

the entire farm holding, the total cost does not exceed 12,000 francs

per hectare, the equivalent value of 360 kg. of seed cotton. Ex-

perience has shown that it is possible, in practice, to secure an in-

crease of at least 700 kg. per hectare by incurring this expenditure,

provided that the crop is properly looked after.

The production sectors

The zones d'expansion rurale of the CFDT, some fifty in number, are

scattered over a very large area and contain a population of about

775,000. Widely varying ecological and social conditions give each

sector its own special features; and the CFDT has accordingly had

different experiences in the Bambara, Bobo, Minianka and Senoufo

regions as also in the Sudanian and Sudanian-Guinean zones. In

addition, variations in the differences between the four main sectors

of Koutiala, San, Sikasso and Segou are accentuated by the varying

periods of time for which the extension service has been operating,

as also by differences in the quality of the service and in the methods

employed. 3

The Koutiala sector, set up in 1955, became in the course of one

year the largest producer of Allen cotton in French West Africa.

Its output increased fourfold between 1955 and 1958. In the four

years following the introduction of a "dense" extension service and

more intensive cultivation in 1960, the area doubled and yields rose

I We did not examine the Bamako and Bougouni sectors which were estab-

lished only in 1964.

328


by 60%. With a population that is less than one third of that ofthe CFDT area, the Koutiala sector produces more than half theseedcotton marketed by the Company. Average output per taxpayerin 1964 was 80 kg. in Koutiala as compared with 50 kg. for the wholeCFDT area.

At the outset the Segou sector was confined to the village ofBaroueli alone. In 1956 the intention had been to develop, in theS6gou region, a cotton growing area sufficiently large to justify theestablishment of a ginnery. The results obtained in the first year,however, were such as to produce an opinion that "under existingconditions, this objective does not appear to be attainable."4 In 1959the CFDT still considered that it was "not yet possible to speak of areal start having been made in this sector." 5 It was only from 1960onwards, with the establishment of the pioneer farmers and theintroduction of the dense extension service, that the Baroueli ZERbegan to show the way; and in 1964 the output of Baroueli alonereached 1,200 tons. This spurt in production, due to more intensivecultivation, influenced the development of production in the Segousector as a whole; and the total output and average yield of thatsector has been second only to that of the Koutiala sector in thewhole of the CFDT area.

Until 1962 the Sikasso sector was considered to be "difficult."While there had been a six-fold increase in production in Koutialabetween 1956 and 1962, the output of Sikasso had only tripled duringthat period. Before 1960 the area was more or less neglected, owingto the "poor quality of the land and a system of land tenure that isill-adapted to cotton growing" as well as the "primitive methodsemployed by the S6noufo farmers."6 The conclusion had beendrawn in 1959 that "there is so far no reason to anticipate a change."'Now these conclusions appear too pessimistic, since output rose from859 tons in 1962/63 to 3,500 in 1964/65. The Sikasso sector, with apopulation as large as that of the Koutiala sector, is, however, stillthe most backward, the output per taxpayer being only 28 kg. ofseedcotton as compared with an average of 50 kg. for the CFDTarea as a whole.

The San sector is the one that has made the least progress, al-though, as in the case of Koutiala, cotton has been grown here for avery long time. During the past three years, in particular, there hasbeen some degree of stagnation in production; yields remained

I CFDT, Rapport de la campagne cotonniere 1956/57.6 CFDT, Rapport de la campagne cotonniere 1958/59.6 CFDT, Rapport de la campagne cotonniere 1956/57.7 CFDT, Rapport de la campagne cotonniere 1958/59.

329


among the lowest for a long time, and exceeded 200 kg. per hectare

only in 1964/65.It is regrettable that there has been no detailed study of the

factors that might serve to explain the differences in the results

obtained. Such a study might well yield some information on par-

ticular difficulties on which the extension service should concentrate

if progress in some sectors is to be accelerated. On the basis of our

own limited observations and discussions we can only hazard a

guess about the factors accounting for the differences among the

sectors.Ecological differences may well be important. In general ecologi-

cal conditions are probably more favorable for intensified produc-

tion of cotton in the Koutiala and S6gou sectors. On the other hand,

the San sector is not particularly favored, for it receives the lowest

and probably also the most irregular rainfall. Unreliable rainfall

tends to make the results of more intensive cultivation rather un-

certain and therefore unrewarding. Differences in the extent to

which animal-drawn implements are used has probably also been a

factor. It is probably no accident that the Koutiala sector grew

more cotton per inhabitant in 1964/65 than the other sectors-0.13

hectares as compared with 0.07-0.08 hectares elsewhere-because

it also has the largest number of plows proportionate to the popula-

tion. Yet it appears strange that the Segou sector which has propor-

tionately almost as many plows, planted no more cotton per in-

habitant than the San and Sikasso sectors which proportionately

had only a fifth as many plows. However, it is possible that the rela-

tive shortage of good land over a considerable portion of this sector

made farmers concentrate more on raising yields than on increasing

the area under cultivation. There is no evidence that the type of

population has made much difference. The Bambara and Minianka,

who are generally regarded as good farmers, account for almost all

of the population of the S6gou and Koutiala sectors, but they also

constitute an overwhelming majority of the population of the San

sector where the area under cotton has tended to stagnate and yields

are low.The low level of yields in the Sikasso sector is probably due to the

fact that CFDT did not start a "dense" extension service there until

1962/63. In the immediately following years the extension service

has apparently helped considerably to popularize the growing of

cotton, even if it has not yet succeeded in raising yields significantly.

By 1964/65 the average cotton area per inhabitant was as high as in

S6gou and San. The oft expressed opinion that the Senoufo in-

habitants of Sikasso were ininmical to change does not, in retrospect,

330


appear to be well-founded. In fact in a society as strongly structuredand authoritarian as the S6noufo it is possible that progress can bemade quickly once the traditional notables are persuaded of theworthwhileness of change. The recent expansion of cotton cultivationin the Sikasso sector is also said to have been facilitated by a re-grouping of fields which has been encouraged by CFDT's extensionagents. The development of cotton was said to have been impededby the practice of letting livestock graze untended in the immediateneighborhood of the village. This difficulty has been countered byconcentrating cotton fields in areas which can be better protectedfrom damage by cattle. It is not easy to determine, however, whetherthis new practice has played a significant role in expanding cottongrowing.

Conclusions

The CFDT has had more than ten years' experience in the Re-public of Mali. Its long preoccupation with cotton growing hasenabled it to acquire in this field a knowledge of the technical andadministrative aspects encountered under a variety of local condi-tions. The rapid and sustained expansion that has occurred in cottonproduction bears witness to the efficiency of this organization. Forsome years the CFDT has also been entrusted with the task of de-veloping farming as a whole. This has involved a greater diversifica-tion of its work and a more far-reaching intervention in traditionalagriculture quite apart from an extension service in constant andintimate touch with the farmer. It is with respect to these longer-term activities of the CFDT that some questions can be raised.

Ecological and human factors have generally been favorable tothe development of cotton growing, although the irregular rainfallhas been a handicap in some places. However, the rise in cottonoutput has above all been due to a successful combination of severalfactors:

1. agronomic research which has made it possible to select ahighly productive variety and to perfect effective means ofrealizing its yield potential with appropriate fertilizer appli-cations and plant protection measures;

2. the introduction of an extension service which is capable ofworking closely and constantly with the farmer, providing himwith both the advice and means of production he needs;

3. the provision by the same Company of the equipment andsupplies that enable the peasant to change his traditionalmethods of cultivation, prepare a field for growing cotton inpure stand, fertilize and weed it, and spray it;

331


4. the fact that the farmer has been able to sell his cotton reg-

ularly thanks to the marketing assured by the CFDT; and,

5. the fact that cotton, with its comparatively high price, has

been the most profitable crop for the Mali peasant to grow.

While the greater part of the rise in cotton production has been

due to an expansion of area, the extent to which it has been possible

to persuade farmers to adopt intensive methods of cultivation under

conditions of low population pressure on land appears on the face

of it rather astonishing. To some extent this is probably because land

is not quite as plentiful as it seems. Not only are there places such as

Baroueli where new land is no longer available, but the village-type

of settlement tends to make the land immediately adjoining the

villages comparatively scarce. It is this land which is best suited to

a crop like cotton which needs continuous care and cannot be easily

grown in the bush far away from the homestead where it cannot

easily be tended and protected. However, a more important factor

contributing to intensification of cotton cultivation has been the

poor results obtained with traditional methods as compared with

the high yield attainable by improved practices. This difference in

yields was so marked and striking in relation to the cost involved that

it readily attracted the attention of farmers anxious to increase their

income.On the whole, it seems that the cost of the Government services

devoted to the campaign to increase production has been compara-

tively modest. On the basis of certain data provided by CFDT we

would estimate the cost, apart from subsidies, at around 44 million

francs in 1963/64. This amounted to less than 3 francs per kilogram

of cotton produced or to about 10% of the price realized by the

farmer on his cotton.In spite of the overall success achieved in this campaign to in-

crease agricultural production, a few shortcomings may perhaps be

mentioned. For example, in some cases the Government of Mali has

procured equipment and supplies that proved unsuitable. The pro-

gram has also suffered at times from shortages of equipment whichhave apparently been due to limitations in the availability of foreign

exchange. While there was little or no justification for the sale on

credit of such items as plows and cultivators, the discontinuation of

credit for the purchase of oxen and carts, which cost much more,

may well have slowed up progress to some extent. Finally, insufficient

attention has as yet been paid to the problems of training farmers

and artisans in proper maintenance and repair of equipment.

In the field of more general agricultural development, the activi-

ties of the CFDT appear so far to have been less fruitful than in the

332


case of cotton. It is, of course, difficult to make any assessment sinceit will take some time before the results become clearly evident.There is undoubtedly some truth to the thesis that the cotton pro-gram and the associated efforts to promote the use of animal-drawnimplements do have some indirect effect on agriculture as a whole.On the other hand, it is clear that for the most part the improvedproduction of cotton has been introduced without significantly af-fecting farming as a whole. This problem is underlined by the limitedsuccess achieved in the association of crop and animal husbandry.As indicated elsewhere, this objective can be attained only by per-sistent effort and by tackling the reformation of the entire farmingsystem. In part, the failure to do this seems attributable to deficien-cies in research which has not addressed itself effectively to theproblem of introducing fodder crops and improving the varietiesand cultural practices of crops other than cotton. In part it appearsalso to be due to the somewhat excessive specialization and therather limited training of the extension staff. The CFDT extensionservice has unquestionably been well organized and competentlydirected; but it seems to have been confined too much to technicalimplementation of basic directives. The lower-level extension work-ers do not as yet possess sufficient knowledge or capacity for initiativethat would make them effective in promoting a wider program offarm improvement.

In large part, however, CFDT should not be held accountable forthe limited impact it has had on agriculture as a whole in the fewyears it has been responsible for general extension work. In thetransformation of agriculture progress can only be made step bystep. The first step is to win the confidence of cultivators by intro-ducing new crops and practices which, though limited in scope, aredemonstrably effective in raising the farmers' income. This has byand large been done through the introduction of improved cottonvarieties and the appropriate methods of cultivating them. Farmershave thus been made more receptive in principle to additional inno-vations. Yet additional and more far-reaching changes are muchmore difficult to effect. They not only require a broadening of thetiraining of extension agents, but also further research and testingto develop effective types of intervention. Moreover, these changesare apt to affect the traditional customs and life of the populationmuch more fundamentally. The problems that need to be faced inthe future are thus in many ways more complex, but the successachieved by the initial CFDT program is likely to make furtherprogress easier once the appropriate technical solutions have beendeveloped and the staff has been trained for the broader task.

333


ANNEX 1

OUTPUT MARKETED BY THE CFDT(in tons of seedcotton)

1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59

Sikasso 283 492 517 708Koutiala 567 1,195 1,471 2,185San 547 822 833 806Segou 5 94 63 125

Total for CFDT area 1,402 2,603 2,884 3,824

Output marketed in 1959/60: 2,653 tons

Output marketed in 1960/61: 6,302 tons

1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

Sikasso 859 2,146 2,636 3,483Koutiala 3,307 5,880 8,193 11,816San 1,142 1,871 1,892 2,214Segou 500 1,854 2,579 3,493

Total for CFDT area 5,808 11,751 15,300 21,243,Total for other areas 86 592 463 529

5,894 12,343 15,763 21,772

'Including the new Bamako and Bougouni sectors which are not shownseparately.

ANNEX 2

RAINFALL IN SIKASSO(MM.)

240 240

220- -- 220

200 = t ' -9 - - 2001963

180 -- - -- ---- - - C 160

160 -_ _ __ - 160

1420 -1=- X a = 40

120 - ,120

100 ,., -- ,_ I 1001962

80 v- / 80

60 - 0-- 60

20 -p20

MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEP OCT

334


ANNEX 3

RAINFALL IN BAROUELI

240 -- - 240

220 - j220

200 200

180 - ISO

160- 160

140 ---- - 140

120 120

SC IA- -- i 80

60 \-60\ - 1961

40 40

20 - -20


l6AD -2801

ANNEX 4

RAINFALL IN KOUTIALA(MM )

260 v I 260

240- 1 -240

220 -220

200 -200

1 80 _ --- - 1 80

160- * 160

140 140___

20 - 120__

1oo 100 I t96o

80 ___0_

3353

60 -4---60

40 4

20 -- +20


335


ANNEX 5

RAINFALL IN SAN(MM)

240 240

220 K 220

200 200

180 180

160 1601 40 -1963

40 -- 140

20 20

100 0

80'- I80IN 962

60 NJ 60

40 o 40

20 , '.200


336

3. REPUBLIC OF CHAD: THE WORK OF THEBDPA IN THE BOKORO AREA

Introduction

In accordance with a technical cooperation agreement concluded

by the Governments of France and the Chad, a French state com-pany, the Bureau pour le D6veloppement de la Production Agricole(BDPA), has been charged with the general responsibility for agri-cultural development in the Bokoro area of that country. Within theframework of that agreement, the BDPA has established an extensionservice designed to stimulate people to participate in developmentand to promote the introduction of improvements in traditional agri-cultural methods, including the use of animal-drawn implements,and the adoption of organized marketing.

The work of the BDPA began in 1962 in the sub-prefecture ofBokoro in the Department of Chari-Baguirmi. In 1963 its activitieswere extended to two other sub-prefectures in that Department.The present study, which seeks to assess BDPA's experience in

promnoting agricultural development, covers only the organization'sactivities in the sub-prefecture of Bokoro during the last threeyears. This experience, it should be emphasized at the outset, hastaken place in an area of low agricultural potential characterizedby many difficult problems. The object of the study therefore hasbeen not so much to determine whether the BDPA's program hasbeen successful within the brief period it has operated, but rather tohighlight both the probleins and potentialities of the approachesand methods ernployed.

Agriculture in the Bokoro area

Physical characteristics and human aspects

The Baguirmi area is part of the vast peneplain that stretches forseveral hundred kilometers to the east of Lake Chad as far as theOuadai plateau and is bounded on the south by the Chari River.Bokoro is in the eastern central part of the Republic, in the heart ofthe Department of Chari-Baguirmi.

The soils in the Bokoro area are rather poor, being generally

337


CLIMATE AND VEGETATION Sabelian Zone

OF BAGUIRMI Sodanian Zone

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sandy with some clay. Thus, the naga soils in the north are suitable

only for poor-quality grazing. The soils in the rest of the country are

equally siliceous; they are poor in organic matter but contain a

reasonable volume of exchangeable elements, and are suitable for

the cultivation of millet and groundnuts. In certain temporarily

flooded bottom lands black soils with a predominance of clay may

be found, and these are suitable for the cultivation of the bottom land

sorghum known as berbere.

338

Chad: Bokoro Area

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The Sahelian-Sudanian climate of this area is characterized by

an average annual rainfall which varies, from north to south, from

400 mm. to 600 mm. (about 16 to 24 inches). The sparse rains fall

within four months, with the heaviest rainfall in August. During this

rainy season, from May or June until September, there are not more

than 35 days of rain. This is therefore a critical area where crops

requiring a minimum of humidity can fail because of the erratic

rainfall. The rainfall may in fact be extremely irregular with respect

both to its volume and to its distribution throughout the season. It

339


varies considerably from year to year: for example, at Moyto, during1960, 254 mm. (10 inches) of rain fell in 21 days, while in the follow-ing year 671 mm. (26.4 inches) fell in 33 days.

There are three principal types of vegetation in the Bokoro area.In the north, where rainfall is inadequate and irregular, there is a

steppe covered with the thorny vegetation characteristic of the

Sahelian region. In the center, the comparatively short duration of

the rainy season makes it necessary to grow quick-maturing ground-nut crops, bulrush millet and bottom land sorghum (sorgho de

decrue). To the south of Bokoro, where the influence of the Sudan

begins, early maturing sorghum appears with the savanna.There are no permanent watercourses in the Bokoro area; the few

large rivers, in particular the Batha of Lahri, flow only during therainy season. The length of the dry season and the sandy compositionof the soil prevent any permanent ponds from forming, the one atMoyto lasting the longest. In the absence of permanent surface waterresources, the underground water is of supreme importance to people

and animals alike. The ground water table is generally located at aconsiderable depth (40 m. to 80 m.), except in the neighborhood ofgranite outcrops, where it is near the surface. Where the ground

water table is no deeper than 40 m. to 45 m., a number of wells have

been dug by the inhabitants, a laborious and dangerous task withthe tools at their disposal. As these wells are not lined, they sooncave in and have to be redug every two years. In addition, their

yield is low because of the rudimentary methods used in drawingwater; and many of them dry up during the dry season when theground water level falls. This shortage of water resources has seriousconsequences. It has been estimated that one-third of the villages in

the Bokoro area are abandoned during the dry season, at whichtime the villagers take their cattle and go to permanent ponds or

wells that may be a considerable distance away. They do not returnto their native villages until after the first rains, and sometimes loseprecious time during the land-clearing season. The location of wells,

particularly those of Antanabo and Maigana, determines the routesfollowed by the migrating herds. The development of agricultureand stock raising in the area cannot come about unless wells arefirst provided.

As yet no specific studies have been made of the economic andsocial conditions of the population. This lack of data makes it difficultto appraise the problems and is a considerable obstacle to any de-velopment activities. In 1960, in a report on the development of theeastern part of the Republic, it was stated that "nothing can seriously

340

Chad: Bokoro Area

be undertaken unless the local customs and social organization arefirst studied."

The population of the Bokoro sub-prefecture has been estimated at50,000, of which 15% are nomads. The sedentary population is of lowdensity being established in some 316 villages over an area of 30,000square kilometers, with about 1.2 inhabitants to the square kilo-meter. The Arabicized element predominates, with the Salaimat,in particular the tribe of the Ouled Moussa, representing over 60%0of the total population. These people have left their mark on thecivilization of Bokoro by giving it their language, their religion andtheir stock raising tradition. In addition there is an extremelycomposite "black" population of over 10,000. There is only a veryslight distinction between the Kouka, the founders of the Kingdomof Baguirmi, and the Bilala, who arrived later from the environs ofLake Chad. Stock raising activities are of secondary importance forthem, and although they have become Islamic, they retain some oftheir former customs. The other main ethnic groups represented inBokoro are the Bororos, Fulani stock raisers, few of whom aresedentary, and the Kanouri, merchants who have brought aboutthe introduction of numerous rural crafts. With a few exceptionsthe population is completely illiterate.

These population groups have a strongly hierarchic structure,extending from the chief of a village subdivision (quartzer) or of awhole village to the Sultan in charge of the canton. All the membersof one village are generally united by family ties, so that the headof the village is sometimes the head of a single extended family.During the dry season the villagers often emigrate as far as severaldozen kilometers from their permanent village. In encampments,called feriks, they meet up with the inhabitants of other communitieswho belong to the same lineage (Kasim bet). Their descent is patri-lineal and their marriages are patrilocal. Under the pressure ofeconomic evolution, however, these traditional bonds are tending tobecome less strict.

Economic activityThere is little diversification of economic activity, and the per

capita monetary income of about CFA francs 3,000 to CFA francs4,000 ($12 to $16) is lower than the average for the Republic ofChad. The principal source of money income may be either stockraising or agriculture, depending on the year. It would appear,though it cannot be stated categorically, that the Ouled Moussaare achieving a better equilibrium between these sources of income

341


than the Bilala, who are more given to millet growing. The presence

of water conditions all production in this area and explains the

difference in wealth among certain villages.

The economic and social infrastructure of the Bokoro area is in-

adequate. The sub-prefecture is served by the Fort Lamy-Abech6

road which passes through the villages of Gambir and Bokoro but

which is impassable from June to November. The main villages,

which are at quite a distance from one another, are linked by tracks

that are hardly passable for vehicles. Bokoro, and recently the village

of Maigana, have been provided with landing strips where small

aircraft can land for the purposes of transporting mail, evacuating

the sick and carrying provisions. Few children go to school, owing

to the small number of schools, the absence of interest on the part of

the rural population and the lack of facilities for feeding school

children. The health of the population is poor; bilharzia is common,

and there is only one doctor at the Bokoro hospital center. A number

of infirmaries have been set up in the villages.

Stock Raising. Livestock is a very important economic resource,

but little is known about its effect on the economy of the area and

the income of its inhabitants. While cotton is grown in the Sudanian

region, the Sahelian region, to which Bokoro mainly belongs, is

principally devoted to stock raising. There are two breeds of cattle:

the Choa zebu and the Bororo zebu. The Choa zebu predominates,

especially in the herds of the sedentary population. At the age of

five to six years, it has an average slaughter weight of 300 kg. and

a beef yield of 50%. The Bororo zebu is raised by the Fulani; its

average slaughter weight is 400 kg. and its beef yield 42-45%. On

the whole the health of the livestock herds is reasonably good. Al-

though the principal epizootic diseases (rinderpest and pleuro-

pneumonia) are controlled, pockets of infection still exist. The death

rate among calves is high because they are underfed, much of the

milk being consumed by the stock raisers themselves.

According to the estimates of the Livestock Service, the livestock

of the Bokoro area comprises 160,000 cattle, 140,000 sheep and

goats, 5,000 horses, 6,400 donkeys and 300 camels. These are very

rough estimates, for the movements of livestock make a precise ap-

praisal difficult, and the figures are often deliberately underesti-

mated in an attempt to avoid the cattle tax. The figures declared are

sometimes at least 30% below the true figures, according to certain

observers. A majority of the cattle belong to nomadic stock raisers.

The commercial exploitation of livestock appears to be greater for

sheep and goats than for cattle. The annual offtake of cattle is said

to be 8% per year, which leaves room for only a slow increase in

342

Chad: Bokoro Area

their number in view of the high death rate among calves. The com-position of the herds shows that the males are sold at five or sixyears and that the females are generally kept until they reach a veryadvanced age. The weight of the animals sold for slaughteringv aries according to the time of year-it decreases gradually duringthe dry season. The average weight for an entire year depends onthe rainfall for the previous year. Cattle transactions often take theform of an exchange for millet. In April 1962, the price of an averageox was from CFA francs 6,000 to CFA francs 10,000, the best onesbeing sold at CFA francs 12,000 to CFA francs 14,000. The offtakeof sheep and goats is usually 25% annually, which is a large pro-portion in view of the high death rate due to diseases (strongylosisand pleuropneumonia).

The nomadic stock raisers are mainly Bororos who migrate fromthe area of the Chari River, where they stay during the rainy season,to the northern area of Moussoro, where they spend the winter,crossing the sub-prefecture in the neighborhood of Moyto andBokoro. Their only income comes from the sale of livestock products,and they therefore exploit their herds to the highest extent. Live-stock are also a means of saving in a region where the possibilitiesof investment are rare. This may be the principal motivation of thesedentary livestock keepers or farmers who have acquired cattlecomparatively recently. Their livestock are normally kept near thevillage and leave only during the dry season. Some farmers buylean three-year old cattle for resale in a few years, using thesetransactions to compensate for fluctuations in agricultural output.Cattle are also used to some extent to manure arable land, usuallyby keeping the cattle in certain fields for some time. Finally, in areaswhere trypanosomiasis is rampant, farmers entrust their animals tonomads who then have a right to part of the increase in the herd.

The development of stock raising activities is hindered more bythe shortage of water than by the shortage of grazing. However, theprovision of water supplies must be supplemented by measures toprevent overgrazing in the areas near water points. The undergroundwater resources have been studied, and a large well-boring programfor the livestock areas is being financed by the European Develop-ment Fund. These wells are located on livestock routes and areconsequently quite a distance from arable village land.

Crops. The principal crops are bulrush millet and groundnuts. Inaddition, transplanted sorghum (berbe're) is grown in certain bottomlands, and early maturing sorghum sown during the rainy season isgrown on the high land in the southern part of the area. There arealso certain secondary crops: beans, corn, sesame, potatoes, peas,

343


okra. According to the latest estimate of the Agriculture Service(1960/61) the area and production of various crops in the Bokorosub-prefecture were as follows:

Area under Cultivation Production(hectares) (tons)

Millet and sorghum 27,000 17,550Groundnuts 7,000 4,550 (unshelled)Beans 600 240Maize 250 240Sesame 200 60

Total 35,050

According to an investigation carried out by BDPA in 40 villages inthe sub-prefecture of Bokoro, the individual farm household aver-aged 4.1 persons, of whom 2.6 were part of the labor force; and theaverage area cultivated was 3.2 hectares, of which 2.0 hectares wereunder bulrush millet, 1.0 hectare under groundnuts and the restunder berb6r6 or quick-maturing sorghum.

Bulrush millet is grown on the sandy soils which characterize most

of the land in the sub-prefecture of Bokoro. It is the basic foodstuff

of the population. The production of the area is sufficient to meet

local food requirements (about 300 kg. per person a year) and to

provide a certain volume of exports to the other parts of Chad. Millet

is highly valued and its price on the local markets is always CFA

francs 2 or CFA francs 3 higher per kilo than that of sorghum.

The average yield of 600 kg. to 700 kg. per hectare depends on

the following factors: the fertility of the soil (according to observa-

tions at the Dilbini Experimental Farm the yield of a field where

millet is grown every year falls from 1,000 kg. per hectare in the first

year after clearing to 700 kg. per hectare in the fourth year); the

date of sowing (early sowing produces more than late sowing or

resowing); rainfall (much rain is needed between sowing and the

setting of the ear); upkeep (timely and careful first weeding); and

attacks by pests (such as the quelea bird).

Clearing is restricted to the cutting and burning of the naturalvegetation when the field has previously lain fallow, and to the

gathering and burning of millet stalks and weeds when the field has

been cultivated the previous year. This clearing takes place during

the dry season. Sowing takes place towards the end of May at thetime of the first rains. According to the testimony of farmers, about

6 kg. of seed are used per hectare, which seems very high. The initial

sowing is followed, after germination, by such reseeding as is neces-

sary to attain a density of about 3,500 plants per hectare. The first

344

Chad: Bokoro Area

weeding takes place 15 days later, followed by a second weeding atthe end of June or beginning of July. The fields are guarded forabout ten days during the ripening period. Harvesting takes place inNovember/December.

The number of working days per hectare is not known for certain.According to local statements it is about 45 to 65 days per hectare,depending on whether the millet is grown after the clearing of fallowland or after a previous millet crop. It has been estirnated at theDilbini farm that the work required for a particularly well-tendedcrop is 100-110 days per hectare (yield of 1,200 kg. per hectare).

Number of JI rltiig Days Per Hectare of Millet

Following Fallow Following a Crop

Preparation of the land 30 10 to 15First sowing 1 1Second sowing 0.5 0.5First weeding 10 10Second weeding 8 8Guarding 10 10Harvesting 6 6

Total 65.5 45.5-50.5

Groundnuts is the main cash crop, though a large part of the pro-duction is consumed by the growers. The creeping variety, which isnot very productive, used to be grown, but this was replaced by anupright variety, No. 28-206 selected at Bambey in Senegal, andthen in 1962 by the "Rose of Cameroon," a quick-maturing ground-nut that is better adapted to local rainfall conditions. The yield variesfrom 500 kg. to 1,000 kg. per hectare depending on the density of thesowing, the care taken in weeding, rainfall and attacks by parasites(seed damage done by termites and rodents, leaf spot and "rosette"during the vegetative period, and damage by rats and termites atthe time of harvest).

The groundnut fields are prepared in the same way as the milletfields, although more work must be done after the beginning of therains to eliminate weeds which have sprung up. Sowing takes placetowards the end of June, after the first weeding of the millet, at therate of 30 kilos to 40 kilos of seed per hectare (40,000 to 60,000 plantsper hectare), which is a density insufficient to cover the soil andensure high yields. Any necessary reseeding takes place after germi-nation. The first weeding takes place eight to ten days after sowing,i.e., during the interval between the two millet weedings. This isfollowed by a second weeding one week later. Harvesting takes placein October.

345


Estimates of the number of working days per hectare of ground-

nuts vary considerably: 240 working days per hectare on the Dilbini

farm for a carefully tended crop (yield: 1,200 kg. per hectare); and

100 working days per hectare in the Guera area to the east of

Baguirmi. Under traditional methods of cultivation, with a yield of

300 kg. per hectare, the number of working days required is 85 to

155 according to the testimony of growers.

Number of Working Days Per Hectare of Groundnuts

Following Fallow Following a Crop

Preparation of the land 30 10 to 15Sowing 15 15First weeding 15 to 25 15 to 25Second weeding 0 to 10 0 to 10Harvesting 45 to 75 45 to 75

Total 105 to 155 85 to 140

Transplanted sorghum (berber6) is grown in the temporary bottom

lands, mainly in the Moyto area. The young plants are sown in

nurseries in August/September and transplanted towards the end

of the rainy season. The early varieties are harvested in December/

January and the late varieties between January and April. Yields

are from 1,000 kg. to 2,000 kg. per hectare. "Berber6" is a secondary

crop which has an advantage in that its peak labor requirements

occur at times different than those for other crops. However, this

crop is little valued as a foodstuff and its price is lower than that of

bulrush millet.The distribution of agricultural activities over the year is very

uneven. A period of almost total underemployment during the dry

season is followed by a period of intense activity from the beginning

of the rainy season. The peak of activity is at the end of June and

beginning of July, the time of the groundnut sowing and the first

millet and groundnut weedings. The women take part in all the

farm work except land clearing. There is no definite crop rotation in

this area, where the population density is low and the rural workers

consequently have much land at their disposal. Depending on the

fertility of the soil, a field is cultivated from two to six years. Ground-

nuts are sometimes grown for two or three years in succession at the

head of a rotation, with millet following. Sometimes millet is grown

directly on the cleared land without being rotated with groundnuts.

The land is left fallow for a minimum of two to three years, and

sometimes much longer.

346

Chad: Bokoro Area

The BDPA operationIn 1961 the Chad Government was anxious to start some develop-

ment in the center of the country which had remained economicallyisolated and backward by comparison with other regions. At thesame time it decided that its own Agricultural Service could notinitiate this development. This Service, with its inadequate means,had virtually confined its work to the distribution, and subsequentrecovery, of seed for the production of groundnuts. An operation ofbroader scope, financed by the Fonds d'aide et de coop6ration (FAC)of the French Government, was accordingly launched with the dualobjective of taking over the traditional activities of the AgriculturalService and working more intensively for the development of theregion.

Within the framework of agreements with FAC, a convention wasconcluded by the Government of Chad and BDPA that authorizedBDPA to operate from May 1, 1962 to April 30, 1963. The mandategranted to BDPA was very general, providing for the installationof a technical assistance staff to carry out activities of "rural mod-ernization" and "agricultural extension" and to lay the foundationsof "community organization." In fact the Government wantedBDPA principally to look after groundnut production (distributionof seeds) and introduce the use of draft animals through farmers'cooperative groups. The cost of the European staff and of thedemonstration equipment was estimated at CFA francs 43 million($170,000). A subsequent amendment prolonged this agreement upto April 30, 1965. It provided for a continuation of the work in thesub-prefecture of Bokoro and its extension to the neighboring sub-prefectures of Mongo and Massakory. In addition, the BDPA wasentrusted with the management of the Dilbini Experimental Farmand the training of Chad staff on the limited basis of one trainee foreach of the six modernization centers planned at the time. The costof these activities over two years amounted to CFA francs 108 million($400,000). Another amendment under discussion at the beginningof 1965 envisaged a gradual reduction in BDPA staff, with theretention of three French agents de modernisation until May 1966 andof a French technical adviser on cooperatives until May 1967. Thewhole program was also to remain under BDPA direction until May1968.

BDPA undertook its responsibilities without a preliminary studyof the problems it was likely to face. The lack of basic informationessential to the development of the region has already been stressed.Thus there was insufficient knowledge of the extent and interrela-tionship of the problems as seen by the farmers themselves. On the

347

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social structure, values and customs of the rural population there

was very little information that could be used in determining the

best means of introducing change. Nor had the limited agricultural

research in the area revealed any very promising methods of raising

productivity. In the absence of much of this information, BDPA's

approach to the problems was necessarily fragmentary, tentative and

experimental.

Extension staff

The agreement between the Government of Chad and BDPA

provided for the establishment, in the Sub-prefecture of Bokoro, of

"rural modernization centers" from which the activity of BDPA

348

Chad: Bokoro Area

would radiate. It was decided to set up three centers, at Gambir,NMaigana and Dilbini. During 1963 a fourth center was establishedat Bokoro. The location of these centers seems to have been wellchosen: on a highway (Gambir, Bokoro), at the seat of a traditionalchiefdom (Maigana, Bokoro) and in an area already touched bydevelopment activities (Dilbini). The BDPA staff in the sub-prefec-ture of Bokoro was distributed over 19 zones, corresponding to thecantons into which the sub-prefecture is divided.

The BDPA operation in Chari-Baguirmi is headed by a planningofficer with headquarters in Fort Lamy. There is also a single co-ordinator of all the agricultural extension activities in the Bokoro.Frenchmen head up the modernization centers of Gambir, Maiganaand Dilbini, with the one at Dilbini responsible at the same timefor the experimental farm at this location. Toward the end of 1964and in anticipation of the final approval of the second amendmentto its agreement with the Chad Government, the BDPA also pro-vided two officers to train local personnel and an adviser to organizea union of cooperatives. The French personnel employed in BDPA'sprogram seemed to us well qualified and keenly interested in theirtasks. The maintenance of continuity among such personnel has,however, proved to be a problem. In the course of the first threeyears, the program had three directors in Fort Lamy; and the man-agement of the three modernization centers previously mentionedalso changed several times. The coordinator of extension activitieswas the only officer at the end of 1964 who had served continuouslysince the beginning of 1962. The Paris headquarters of the BDPAdoes, of course, ensure a measure of continuity in direction andpolicy.

The modernization agents, assisted by one or two Chad agricul-tural instructors, are responsible for the modernization centers. TheChad staff includes only two technical deputies, both of whom arestill in training-one for the Bokoro center and the other for theDilbini farm. The four agricultural instructors, as well as five"apprentice" instructors, have been assigned to BDPA by the Agri-culture Service. They are former pupils of the Ba-Illi school. Someof them will be called upon, after further training, to replace theEuropean modernization agents when they leave the sector. Theirsalaries-between CFA francs 18,000 and CFA francs 25,000-arepaid directly by the Ministry of Agriculture. Their training is asyet inadequate. Above all, they do not feel at home. Since they aregenerally of Sara origin, recruited in the south of the Republic, theynot only have to become familiar with the methods of farming inarid areas but also have to learn the vernacular, namely Arabic.

349


The lowest-ranking employees of the extension service are the

eleven "supervisors" (surveillants) made available to BDPA by the

Ministry of Agriculture. As in the case of the instructors, BDPA has

only a nominal voice in selecting them and moving them from post

to post. These supervisors live permanently in the principal villages.

In order to supplement this staff, BDPA has had to recruit and pay

eleven additional extension agents, more or less at the same level,

i.e., persons holding a certificate of primary education. Their pay

varies from CFA francs 8,000 to 12,000.

It was our impression that a considerable period of training and

experience will be necessary before Chad personnel can take over

the responsibilities now carried out by French officers. Because of

their inadequate general training, Chad personnel have been carry-

ing out subordinate tasks rather than playing a very active role. In

addition, the methods adopted in the modernization program are

different from those to which the staff of the Agriculture Service were

accustomed. BDPA has not yet been able to train the Chad personnel

at its disposal because the period of apprenticeship under its own

"modernization agents" has been too short and their knowledge of

working conditions in the field has been insufficient. However, the

Chad Government has been satisfied with the reinforcement of its

activities at the sub-prefecture level, since BDPA has provided an

extension service that is new and closer to the farmers. The number of

extension staff increased from 23 in 1963 to 36 at the beginning of

1964 and 48 at the end of 1964, although the latter figures relate to

the whole of Chari-Baguirmi.BDPA has also recently taken a number of steps that should enable

it to put a more suitable staff of Chad nationals in the field. The

two officers installed at Dilbini have begun their work by organizing

one-week courses for the apprentices and professional staff members.

The purpose of this training is to pave the way for an accelerated

transition to an extension staff composed entirely of Chad nationals

in the sub-prefecture of Bokoro. The desire to make Chad nationals

participate as far as possible in the development of Bokoro is also

indicated by BDPA's insistence on the creation of a regional ad-

ministrative structure to coordinate the various Government de-

partments concerned. The Agriculture Service has up to now had

little connection with BDPA's localized and temporary operation,

and the local authorities have not always been very cooperative.

Community action

The BDPA operation is characterized by a staff in close touch

with the peasant and by the use of community action. BDPA has

350

Chad: Bokoro Area

attempted, in the words of the Agreement with the Republic ofChad, "to associate the farmers with the work of the modernizationcenters." Its work has consisted of encouraging the setting up ofvoluntary groups of farmers within the village framework. In ac-cordance with the empirical nature of its activities, BDPA sought toestablish these groups each time for a specific operation, and it hasrenewed this appeal to solidarity on a number of occasions. Thefarmers have joined to carry out a number of quite dissimilar activi-ties of an economic as well as a purely technical nature. Thus groupshave been formed for the cooperative purchase of sugar, for themarketing of groundnuts and millet and for the purchase and intro-duction of various types of equipment designed to facilitate andimprove agricultural operations.

The Rural Groups. The establishment of rural groups takes placethrough a meeting of the BDPA agents with the village chief. Thehead of the modernization center is introduced by the local authorityand he calls the villagers together and explains the benefits of com-munity action. During the first year, the groups were informal andwere only set up for a particular operation. The head of the villagewas originally the promoter of these groups. At first, after the 1962agricultural year, the activity of the group consisted of marketingthe groundnut harvest jointly; later, sugar and transistor radios werebought. By proposing economic activities which tended to bringabout an immediate increase in the income of the rural population-proposals that were therefore very favorably received-the BDPAsought to pave the way for the introduction of agricultural imple-ments which seemed, at least initially, to impose a burden on thegroups.

The rural groups, which were started at the end of the 1962 agri-cultural year, numbered 19 by March 1963. By December 1963there were 60 groups representing more than 1,000 families. At thattime the groups were no more than small economic entities of varia-ble composition and without any legal basis. In nearly all cases, thegroup had the approval of the head of the village, who often ap-pointed the chairman from among his near relations. The role ofthe chairman was thus doubly limited, namely by the authority ofthe traditional head and by the need for agreement among the mem-bers of the group. No sociological study has been carried out todetermine ways of fitting the groups into the villages, so that it is notknown at all how representative the chairman of a group is or whatpart the group plays in village activities. It is also very difficult toknow who are or should be the prime movers in the group and in thevillage. Experience has shown that groups often want to restrict

351


their membership, perhaps owing to kinship ties or intravillagerivalries; and it has sometimes been necessary to organize anothergroup in a village. However, the BDPA agents are, in their ownwords, "attending only to the group," i.e., they are seeking to givethe group a sounder basis by developing its activities and by makingcontact with the village only through its agency.

The groups were first officially recognized as cooperatives inDecember 1963; by March 31, 1964, 66 groups had subscribed sharesof CFA francs 500 per member. This formal step took place withoutany great difficulty, and it is notable that the interest of the villagerswas shown by the faithfulness with which they participated. Towardthe end of 1964 the number of groups had risen to about 100, cor-responding to about 2,500 families. Probably about 20% of thefarm population of the Bokoro sub-prefecture was included in thesecooperative groups. BDPA considers it necessary to check this ex-pansion movement so as not to be overburdened at a time when itsstaff is limited and must even be reduced in the course of 1965.These groups were to be federated into a Union, but certain difficul-ties involved in the official creation of the Union of the groups obligedBDPA to utilize legal fictions and to deposit the capital of the groups,totalling CFA francs 519,500 in October 1964, and also their re-serves, in a suspense account at the Chad Development Bank.

Supply Operations. Sugar is an essential foodstuff for the consumerin Chari-Baguirmi since it has been estimated that about 30%of current expenditure is devoted to the purchase of sugar and tea.As with all consumer goods marketed through traditional channels,the price of sugar during the rainy season is extremely high. In thatperiod a "loaf" of sugar weighing two kilos (4.4 lbs.), which at othertimes can be bought for as little as CFA francs 250, is sold at CFAfrancs 400 to CFA francs 700 and may even be sold against ultimaterepayment, at harvest time, in the form of a bag of millet worthCFA francs 1,000. BDPA therefore considered it advantageous forthe groups to buy and store sugar before the rainy season in orderto ensure a regular supply at reasonable prices. It has developed amethod of operation under which, acting on behalf of the groups, itobtains a six-months' credit from the Chad Development Bank forthe purchase and storage of sugar. Each group is thus enabled toprovide every member with six loaves of sugar during June and July.The cost of the sugar is recovered at the time of the harvest on thebasis of the normal price of CFA francs 250 per loaf, including the3% interest payable to the Bank. In its desire to make the groupsless dependent on the Bank, BDPA expected to ask each cooperativemember to pay in advance for two loaves of sugar, on which, ac-

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Chad: Bokoro Area

cordingly, he would pay no interest. In July 1963 the groups in thesub-prefecture of Bokoro bought 3.7 tons of sugar, representing1,856 loaves, and in 1964 the supply rose to 17.6 tons, which showshow this operation has expanded. It has been necessary to limitthese purchases to six loaves per family, regardless of the solvencyof the groups, in order to prevent this group activity from expandingto the point at which the beneficiaries could undertake speculativeselling. This supply operation has been so successful that it hasrapidly come to be considered the cornerstone of cooperative action.To a man the villagers consider the purchase of sugar to be the mostimportant group activity without which the growth of the groupswould at least be considerably checked.

At the request of the Government, BDPA has also acted as theintermediary in the distribution and sale of transistor radios to thecooperative groups. These radios, assembled at Fort Lamy fromseparate imported parts, are worth CFA francs 8,700 in cash. ByDecember 1964, 60 radios had been placed with the groups, thanksto a one-year loan from the Development Bank which entails ex-penses totalling CFA francs 435 for the opening of the credit, in-terest, etc. It is anticipated that all the groups will have a radio atthe end of the present agricultural year. While the distribution ofradios was designed primarily to enable the Government to improveits communications with the people, the BDPA expects that theradios will also be a useful supplementary means of carrying onagricultural extension work.

Finally, BDPA proposes to extend the group activity even furtherto the supply of tea, the consumption of which is complementary tothat of sugar. Here too the possibility of lowering the price of teaand eliminating speculation was obviously appealing to the farmers.BDPA has also been asked to organize the sale of cloth through thecooperative groups. The question seems now to be posed, how farthe cooperatives should go in taking over the distribution of con-sumer goods from the traditional merchants. It appears difficult tostop at a particular point since the merchants may find it impossibleto continue their trade in secondary products when their trade in thestaples has been taken away. For the cooperatives, too, the expansioninvolves increasing financial and management responsibilities whichat present must in effect be largely discharged by the French staff ofthe BDPA.

Marketing Operations. Groundnut cultivation is one of the chiefsources of income in Chari-Baguirmi. It is difficult to know whetherthe production of groundnuts yields more money income than stockraising for the Bokoro rural population as a whole; the predonminance

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of one or other of these sources of income varies with the individual.In any event, it was through the cooperative sale of groundnuts, thefirst agricultural product with which BDPA was concerned, thatthe villagers became receptive to the idea of group action. In localtrade the purchase price of unshelled groundnuts is normally be-tween CFA francs 12 and 14 per kilogram, with the higher pricegenerally prevailing during the first days of the harvest. Joint salesorganized at the group level enabled peasants to get a price of CFAfrancs 19 to 20 in 1963. An advance made by the Chad DevelopmentBank has made it possible to make farmers an initial payment ofCFA francs 13 on the delivery of their groundnuts to the coopera-tive; the balance is then paid by an agent of BDPA as soon as thegroundnuts are sold to firms in Fort Lamy. The farmers undoubtedlyappreciate this, although they think of the advance of CFA francs 13as "the price" and do not quite understand the subsequent payment.Groundnuts were sold in Fort Lamy in 1964 at CFA francs 21.50per kilo, and benefited in addition from a general subsidy of CFAfrancs 4 per kilo from the Price Stabilization Fund. The BDPAagent retains CFA francs 4 per kilo to meet the various expenses ofmarketing, transportation, handling, bagging, etc., makes the

additional payment to the producer and then places the balance in areserve at the Bank. These various financial operations are carriedout by an agent of BDPA in his individual capacity, which givesrise to certain problems. It is to take over this responsibility that aUnion of the Groups was to be set up (see page 352).

There are no exact data on the quantities of shelled groundnutsproduced by the region and sold on the markets. The production ofunshelled groundnuts appears to have been 18,850 tons in 1960/61for the whole of the prefecture of Chari-Baguirmi. In 1963, 3,550tons of shelled groundnuts appears to have been marketed in thatprefecture (shelling yields about 75% of the weight of the ground-nuts in shell). For the Sub-prefecture of Bokoro alone, production in1960/61 appears to have been 4,350 tons, and the quantity ofshelled groundnuts marketed in 1963 has been estimated at about2,000 tons. It would therefore appear that the quantities marketedin Bokoro are much greater than the average for the whole Depart-ment. This is undoubtedly the original reason for BDPA's concernwith groundnut production in the sub-prefecture. In the absenceof data, it is not possible to know whether the BDPA operation hasled to an increase in the total quantity marketed, or whether it hascontributed to an increase in groundnut production. There is, how-ever, no doubt about the interest of the farmers in group sales. Notonly do the villagers manifest individually their enthusiasm for the

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Chad: Bokoro Area

marketing operations carried out by the groups, but the increase inthe quantities marketed, running parallel with the increase in thenumber of groups, bears witness to the basic importance of thisactivity. The quantity of shelled groundnuts sold by BDPA on behalfof the cooperative groups rose from 44 tons in 1962/63 to 439 tonsduring the following year. In 1964/65 it was expected that 800 tonswould be marketed cooperatively. That would represent over a thirdof the entire quantity marketed in the sub-prefecture.

After the successful cooperative sale of groundnuts in 1963 themembers of the groups also became interested in having BDPAorganize the selling of their millet in 1964. BDPA first asked theGovernment to fix a minimum price of CFA francs 10 per kilo inlieu of the CFA francs 8 at which the local trade traditionally pur-chased millet. On this basis BDPA began purchasing on behalf ofthe cooperatives, but at the time of our visit in December 1964 ithad had to suspend buying, at least temporarily, after collecting600 tons because its expectations of selling the millet to publicagencies in Fort Lamy had not yet materialized.

Finally, cooperative marketing activities were to be extended tocattle following apparently successful trials with the pooling of cattlefor sale. The movement of such groups of cattle towards the moresoutherly areas is reported to have made possible better prices thanthose obtained on local markets.

Because of their complex nature, the marketing operations presentcertain problems. Firstly, they are not always understood by themembers of the groups, as the villagers often have the impressionthat the purchaser is either BDPA, which deals with them, or theDevelopment Bank, which pays the advance. Secondly, one wondershow long it will be before the cooperatives themselves can take overthe marketing which now is in essence managed by BDPA, andwhether they will then be able to do it efficiently. Members of thecooperatives, who are illiterate and inexperienced, may well find itdifficult to manage these operations and -keep the necessary records.Whether they will eventually be able to do the marketing at lowercost than individual merchants still appears uncertain. At presentthe BDPA retains a marketing charge of CFA francs 4 per kilo ofgroundnuts, but it is doubtful that this is sufficient to cover the costof the time BDPA personnel devote to marketing. Meanwhile, how-ever, it is clear that the members of the cooperative groups ap-preciate the increase in price that they have been able to obtain andare therefore favorable disposed toward BDPA.

Introduction of Implements and Animal Traction. For the purpose ofincreasing groundnut production BDPA has tried to introduce the

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use of new agricultural implements and of draft animals. These were

intended to increase the areas under cultivation and the yield perunit of area. The implements traditionally used by the farmers are

very restricted, consisting basically of a type of hoe (djarraye) which,

for light soils, is very well suited for weeding, the principal task onthe farm. Since the BDPA did not have long enough previous experi-

ence to enable it to determine exactly which implements were best

suited to local conditions, it introduced in the Bokoro area a wholerange of implements for preparing the soil and tending the crops.

Among these were four types of cultivators: Alouette, Occidentale,

Manga and Arara. The experience with each of these implements

was to make it possible to eliminate subsequently the more unsuit-able implements. For sowing, the Eco seed-drill was selected and

for shelling groundnuts, the Cathala sheller, after the screens were

altered to adapt them to the varieties grown. Carts were also to be

introduced.The use of agricultural equipment can often increase yields.

This conclusion has been confirmed by the observations made at the

Dilbini farm and by talks with peasants who were making good use

of the implements at their disposal. When considering such testi-mony one must, however, take into account uncertainties in assessing

the amount of labor used and also the novelty of using draft animalsin cultivation. The individual who works with the "djarraye" is

replaced by a joint effort-a man holds the cultivator, a womanguides the team and a child often goads it on. As with all innovations,it is practice and progressive adaptation that increase efficiency andreveal the advantage of new technical methods. It should also benoted that the African farmer sees an increased yield differently,depending on whether it is measured by unit of work or by unit of

area.The yield per work unit can be improved through the use of ma-

chinery. The preparation of fields by hand requires ten working

days per hectare (when the field has already been cultivated thepreceding year); six days are required with an Occidentale orManga cultivator drawn by an ox, and four working days with anArara cultivator drawn by two oxen. The sowing by hand of onehectare of groundnuts requires fifteen working days, but only fivedays with a seed-drill; weeding requires ten to twelve working daysper hectare by hand, but only eight with the Alouette cultivatorpushed by hand or drawn by a donkey. Four hundred kilos of un-shelled groundnuts pass through the Cathala sheller in one working

day; only ten to twenty kilos can be shelled by hand in a day. Personswho have used the seed-drill declare that they have increased their

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Chad: Bokoro Area

cultivated areas; some of them say they have quadrupled the areasown with groundnuts, which seems exaggerated, and others thatthey have doubled it. A comparison of the estimated groundnut areaper farm for the whole of the sub-prefecture of Bokoro, and thatcultivated by the members of the groups seems to indicate (with allthe reservations that this comparison implies) that the latter growmore groundnuts. This difference may be due to the fact that thevillagers who joined the groups have been those who were most in-clined to grow groundnuts; but it may equally be due to the agri-cultural equipment possessed by the groups.

The yield per hectare can be raised by use of the seed-drill, as thisincreases the density of planting. Data obtained at the Dilbini farmindicate that this increase amounts to 20%7. According to countsmade by BDPA in the growers' fields, the density of plants sownby seed-drill is reported to be about 25%/o higher than the density ofplants sown by hand; and since this evidence is quite clear, yieldprobably increases in proportion to density, at least within the limitsobserved. Under the present circumstances, however, it is difficultto know whether the use of the cultivator brings about an increase inyield per hectare.

Out of all the implements suggested to the farmers, two have hadgreat success: the Cathala sheller and the Eco seed-drill. The seeddrill enables precious time to be saved at a period of intensive farmwork, and it also gives a considerable increase in yield. It is nowbeing adapted for use in the sowing of millet. Use of the shellerallows the harvest to be dealt with much more rapidly and to be soldat a time when prices are higher. The cultivators drawn by draftanimals have not been so successful; the increase in yield per workingday resulting from their use is not so spectacular as in the case of theseed-drill. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the hand-hoeor djarraye is remarkably well adapted to the light soils in theBokoro area; it cuts the weeds, while all that the animal-drawncultivator does is to pull up the weeds which tend to take root againat the next rains. Secondly, the cultivator is more difficult to usethan the seed-drill on poorly cleared land. Thirdly, there is not muchincentive to use the cultivator in land preparation, because the lattercan be spread over a longer period and does not create a peak inlabor requirements as do the weeding of millet and the sowing ofgroundnuts. Lastly, and above all, the hoe has not been used forweeding groundnuts, because the spacing of the rows (0.40 m.apart), which has been recommended and practiced is insufficientto allow the passage of an animal-drawn cultivator. To permit useof the cultivator it will be necessary to advise a spacing of 0.50 m.,

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with closer sowing on the row in order to preserve the same density

per hectare. The weeding of millet with a cultivator may prove

desirable once millet is sown with a seed-drill. Because of the variety

of animal-drawn implements used and of the relatively short ex-

perience so far obtained, it has not yet been possible to determine

which type of cultivator is best suited to local conditions. The cart

has not been adopted by the farmers because it has no obvious ad-

vantage over the pack-animals that are traditionally used (donkeys

and oxen); its use is restricted by its high cost and the comparative

lack of roads or tracks.Most of the farmers seem to possess oxen (contrary to their state-

ments which are affected by the anxiety to avoid the cattle tax), but

the use of draft animals creates certain problems that have not been

solved. By the beginning of the rainy season, when there is heavy

work to do, the oxen are exhausted by the hardships of the dry sea-

son, during which they lack sufficient grazing and water. The train-

ing of the animals is often inadequate because draft oxen are only

used a few weeks a year and more or less have to be trained anew

for each crop season. In addition, cattle thefts are frequent in the

area, especially near the villages where the draft oxen graze un-

guarded; the farmers therefore prefer to entrust their cattle to

herders who keep them in large herds far away from the villages

and the crops. The donkey is preferred as a draft animal, as it is

more hardy and less costly than the ox, though not so strong. A

donkey can draw an Occidentale and an Alouette cultivator or a

seed-drill. In this region it cannot draw a complete Manga cultivator

(with five tines), and it cannot be yoked to an Arara cultivator,

which is very heavy and has to be drawn by two oxen. The villagers

are beginning to use horses as draft animals.In order to introduce implements in agriculture, BDPA has

carried out demonstrations and made equipment available to the

groups for one crop season. In 1962, 40 shellers, 7 Occidentale culti-

vators, 6 seed-drills and 2 carts were demonstrated. In 1963, BDPA

demonstrated 50 Occidentale, 23 Alouette, 24 Manga and 9 Arara

cultivators, and 34 Eco seed-drills. Several training courses have

been organized at the Dilbini farm to teach the villagers to train

their oxen and use the animal-drawn implements. In addition, rural

craftsmen at Dilbini have learned to make harness (collars and

breast-harness).In 1964 the groups began to purchase equipment with the aid of

loans granted by the Development Bank acting through the agency

of BDPA. The groups remain the owners of the equipment and

undertake the repayment of the loan, which could not be amortized

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Chad: Bokoro Area

by a single individual. The duration of the loan is three years andthe rate of interest 5%. In 1964, 80 Occidentale, 35 Manga, 8Alouette and 2 Arara cultivators, 81 seed-drills and 80 shellers wereacquired in this way by the village groups. The prices charged forthese various implements are shown in the following table:

Selling Prices of Implements(CFA francs)

1964 1965

Cultivators:Occidentale 9,000 9,000Alouette 6,000 8,000Manga 10,000 10,000Arara 18,500 18,500

Eco seed-drill 14,000 16,500Device for adapting the seed-drill to millet 1,000Cathala sheller 15,000 15,000Cart 35,000 35,000

The use of the equipment by the groups is not yet satisfactory.In December 1964 the total amount of equipment at Bokoro, in-cluding that lent for demonstration purposes as well as that sold,amounted to 231 cultivators (130 Occidentale, 31 Alouette, 59Manga and 11 Arara), 115 Eco seed-drills and 80 shellers. Thenumber of trained animals is quite sufficient to permit all this equip-ment to be used. However, the area on which these implements areused is still rather limited, although the equipment has generallybeen employed within the groups. The animal-drawn cultivatorsworked an average of two hectares each during 1964, which is verylittle. The coefficient of use of the seed-drills is much better; theycan sow five to six hectares each during the favorable part of theseason; and in 1964 they actually sowed an average of 3.7 hectares.The rate of utilization for both implements in 1964 improved over1962 when the cultivators, on the average, worked only 1.3 hectaresand the seed-drills, 3.1 hectares. The distribution of the implementsamong the various possible users is not as yet creating any problemsbecause the groups have a surplus of equipment. When the use of allthe implements becomes more widespread their distribution maycreate awkward problems, as all the farmers may wish to use theequipment at the same time during the most favorable season. Theimplements are not always used correctly. For example, the Cathalashellers are often overloaded, causing their parts to wear out pre-maturely (bolts in particular) and producing a large percentage ofbroken nuts which have to be eliminated by hand sorting.

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Other activitiesApart from the work carried out through the groups, BDPA has

undertaken some activities of importance to the region as a whole.Thus, at its instigation, the villagers have prepared a landing stripat Maigana and cleared 25 km. of tracks. Other projects involvingtree planting, the establishment of fodder reserves and improvementin calf feeding, have not yet been carried out. It should be noted,however, that a project for the construction of a village silo for storingmillet has been started at Maltain. The activities that have madesome progress are the distribution of groundnut seeds and the agri-cultural experimental work carried out at the Dilbini farm.

Distribution of Groundnut Seeds. As BDPA took over the functions ofthe Agriculture Service, it had to take charge of the distribution andrecovery of the groundnut seeds supplied by the Governmnent to thewhole of the sub-prefecture. This activity, which was its main taskduring the first year, differs fundamentally from BDPA's otheroperations which are based on contacts with the groups alone. Sinceit is a time-consuming activity to distribute seed before each seasonand recover it after the harvest, the BDPA has tried-so far withonly limited success-to educate farmers and the cooperative groupsto retain the seed themselves after the harvest and store it in groupor village silos until it is needed for sowing.

Groundnut seeds have to be renewed every two or three yearsfrom the initial multiplication at the Dilbini farm. Further mnultipli-cation is at present the responsibility of about 40 farmers, who are inaddition members of the groups. This method makes it possible todistribute the risk of bad climatic conditions and reduces the costs oftransportation to the village silos. For such seed farmers have in thepast received a bonus of 30%, which will soon be reduced to 15%primarily because the qualities obtained have not always been verysatisfactory.

The seeds are distributed from the village silo on the basis of 100kilos (unshelled) per hectare. It was proposed that this amount bereduced since 30% of the seeds were apparently being consumed orsold by the farmers. In actual fact, however, the reduction has notbeen made for fear that it would lead to a decline in the area sown.BDPA distributed 335 tons of seed in 1962, of which 205 tons wereof the "Carneroon Rose" variety, and 487 tons in 1963 and 1964.

Seed-dressing, which is free but not compulsory, has become in-creasingly popular owing to its demonstrated effectiveness. Theamount of seed dressed rose from 7 tons in 1962 to 35 tons in 1963and 95 tons in 1964. The dressing is both fungicidal and anti-cryptogamic, consisting of Aldriganox at two parts per thousand.

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Chad: Bokoro Area

The seeds are recovered at the time of harvest, between November10 and December 10. In order to make the farmers themselvesresponsible for seed supply as soon as possible, BDPA has alwayssought to enable them progressively to repay the initial loan fromthe public sector. Thus, on the occasion of each recovery, BDPA hasincreased the stock of seeds by retaining an additional 15% of theadvance granted to each farmer. In this way the stock in additionto the amount required for seed will soon be large enough to repaythe Government entirely for the original seed advance. The farmerswill then "own" their own seed, and it is hoped that under theseconditions they will assume the responsibility of retaining them untilthe sowing season.

Trials. The Dilbini farm is an old establishment of the AgricultureService set up for the purpose of carrying out crop trials and supply-ing selected seed to the farmers in the area. The total area of thefarm is 400 hectares, of which 255 hectares is under grazing, 175hectares is cultivable and 55 hectares is at present cultivated. In1963 this farm was handed over to BDPA which was to manage itLintil May 1966.

The crop trials have been carried out by BDPA under programsdrawn up by the Research Service of the Ministry of Agriculture.These programs include trials with (a) fertilization; (b) varioustypes of spacing in mixed cropping; (c) groundnut varieties; (d) dif-ferent methods of sowing and thinning; (e) rotations (comparisonof fallow land and green manure); (f) soil exhaustion; (g) behaviorof different varieties of edible groundnuts; (h) organic manure;(i) sowing methods; and (j) seed-dressing. Trials are generallycarried out on the farm, but a number of multilocal trials on farmers'fields have also been included. The results of these trials are analyzedand interpreted by the pertinent Services of the Ministry of Agri-culture. They have demonstrated that soils are progressively ex-hausted through cultivation, without, however, succeeding in de-veloping a particularly effective crop rotation. Organic manure hasbeen found to increase yields slightly, but in view of the difficultiesof making and applying it, this finding may not be practically rele-vant. Green manure does not appear profitable. The first trials showthat fertilizer (55 kg. per hectare of ammonium sulphate, 65 kg. perhectare of dicalcium phosphate) applied to the groundnut cropwould produce a profit of CFA francs 2,000 per hectare at the cut-rentselling price, but bearing in mind the expected drop in the price ofgroundnuts its profitability would be very uncertain. The disinfectionof seed and an increase in the density of sown groundnuts make itpossible to obtain an additional yield of about 40%.

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The groundnut seeds selected by the Deli Station are multiplied

at Dilbini before being distributed to the farmers. The Dilbini farm

receives about 20 kilos of seeds and after two multiplication crops it

can supply 20 to 25 tons of selected seeds. Edible groundnuts origi-

nating in the Sudan have been introduced this year. They have a

good yield and their export price is 20% to 25%o higher than those

of the oil-producing groundnuts.BDPA tends to use the Dilbini farm more as a demonstration

center for the practical training of the professional staff agents and

the farmers. The proximity of the former paysannat of Dilbini, where

the two officers in charge of the training are located, permits the

trainees to go to its farm lands and use its available equipment.

Conclusions

BDPA's operations have been carried out in an area where

physical and economic conditions are not very favorable to the de-

velopment of agricultural production. Not only is the area char-

acterized by poor soils and inadequate, irregular rainfall, but the

lack of permanent water resources makes substantial development

virtually impossible. Chari-Baguirmi is at the meeting point of the

farming and stock-raising areas; the settled rural population cannot

devote itself to stock raising alone as this activity necessarily involves

migratory herding (translhumance); and it cannot hope to obtain a

large income from crops when diversification is limited by soil condi-

tions and production is restricted by market limitations. The inhabi-

tants of the Bokoro area must therefore seek to obtain a somewhat

precarious balance between stock raising and the cultivation of millet

and groundnuts.It was in this unfavorable environment that BDPA undertook

its responsibility for rural development. Its task was made difficult

by a number of other factors. One was the lack of preliminary study

which would have yielded a better and more comprehensive under-

standing of the problems and their interrelationship as well as of the

potentially most effective ways of approaching them. Another diffi-

culty was the uncertainty regarding the duration of BDPA's man-

date. It was evident that even under the best circumstances a pro-

longed and comprehensive effort was necessary to make any impact

on the problems of the Bokoro region. BDPA, however, has always

had to work against deadlines set by agreements which did not en-

sure sufficient continuity of action and a planned effort over an

adequate period. These defects were aggravated by the lack of any

specific provision for training Chad staff under its original mandate.

Although comprehensive in theory, the scope and powers of BDPA's

362

Chad: Bokoro Area

mandate have actually never been sufficient considering the magni-tude and complexity of the problems it faced. In practice, its basicresponsibility was agricultural extension, focusing particularly ongroundnuts as a crop. In carrying out its extension work it had con-siderable discretion in working out approaches and methods ofoperation. But BDPA never enjoyed complete autonomy, particu-larly in the recruitment and control of its indigenous staff. Nor haveits operations been sufficiently comprehensive. It has been confinedto agriculture in an area where livestock is obviously of considerableimportance and must be included in any plan for the improvementof living standards in this intrinsically poor region. The emphasisgiven to groundnuts and the neglect of livestock seems all the moreinexplicable in view of the limited potentialities of groundnuts as acash crop in an area remote from overseas markets. Above all, roadsand water supplies, which are evidently so essential to the develop-inent of the area, were not at the outset included in BDPA's sphereof responsibility or made the subject of a coordinate program.

In view of the rather unpromising agricultural potential and thefactors outlined above, it is not surprising that BDPA has not had asignificant impact on production in the few years since the start ofits operations in 1962. Only the production of groundnuts appears tohave experienced a modest increase, thanks largely to the introduc-tion of new implements. This does not mean, however, that BDPAhas not developed a number of potentially constructive and inter-esting approaches to agricultural development and the improvementof rural incomes.

It has been the introduction of animal traction and implementsthat has made BDPA's work interesting not only for the Chad butperhaps for other areas of Africa. The BDPA did not depart fromany particular preconception about the type of implements thatmight be suitable for the Bokoro area. It introduced a range ofimplements and as the result of demonstration, trial and error anumber have been found useful. One of the most important of thesehas been a simple hand-operated groundnut sheller which has beena great time saver, particularly for women, and has permitted themarketing of groundnuts at a time in the season when prices areinost favorable. Another has been a seed-drill for groundnuts whichhas permitted denser planting and, above all, more rapid plantingat a time when there tended to be a labor bottleneck due to thecoincidence of millet weeding and groundnut sowing. The seed-drillis being adapted, and may well be useful, for the sowing of millet.On the other hand, animal-drawn cultivators have proved much lesssuccessful. Some of them have proved too heavy, but the use even of

363


those that could be drawn by oxen or donkeys has been restricted.Their employment for land preparation has been impeded not onlyby roots and stumps left in the land, but also by the fact that landpreparation, at least for millet, is not a bottleneck under the condi-tions prevailing in the Bokoro region. To some extent, however,cultivators have been used to prepare land for groundnuts and toweed groundnuts.

BDPA's greatest contribution to farm income has been made byorganizing cooperative buying of consumer necessities and the mar-keting of agricultural products. Cooperative buying and storing ofsugar, extended recently to tea, have certainly been instrumental inbringing down the price of this product which normally soars duringthe rainy season. The principal problem in this type of activity iswhere to stop and particularly how to avoid putting out of businessthe merchant who, when the cooperatives no longer enjoy the effi-cient management and guidance of BDPA, might not be so inefficientor exploitative as he now appears. As for cooperative marketing,this has no doubt secured for the farmer a much better price forgroundnuts; and experience with the more recently initiated mar-keting of millet may eventually show the same results. But, in allthese activities of a commercial character the problem is posedwhether they can in the end be effectively handled by the membersof the cooperatives themselves when BDPA tutelage is withdrawnwithin a few years, considering the inexperience in business andalmost total illiteracy of the farmers. As yet the training of the chair-men or members of these cooperatives in credit and commerce hasbeen almost totally lacking.

BDPA's experience in the Chad illustrates several approaches toextension which may be relevant elsewhere. One of these is theprinciple that receptivity to improvements or innovations in agri-cultural production can often be developed by doing something forfarmers in other fields. For example, we were struck by the fact thatfarmers' willingness to try various implements was promoted by theconfidence that they had acquired in BDPA, and the group actionit had encouraged, as the result of the benefits received from the co-operative purchase of sugar and the cooperative marketing ofgroundnuts. The other approach or principle relates to the coopera-tive groups organized by BDPA. Groups appear to have been rathereffective instrumentalities of enlisting community interest andparticipation. They appear also to have facilitated innovation ina traditional society where individuals might otherwise have beenreluctant to adopt new practices or methods without the activesupport or participation of at least some of their neighbors. At the

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Chad: Bokoro Area

same time, it has not been clear exactly what role the groups haveplayed in the villages of the Bokoro region, what their relationshipshave been to the village society as a whole and whether they havegiven rise to jealousies and tensions which have handicapped theireffectiveness. As already indicated, very little was known about thesocial structure, values and customs of the population among whichBDPA has been working; and it is quite possible that its work mighthave been made more effective by a preliminary or at least asimultaneous study of the social factors conditioning agriculturaldevelopment.

The experience of BDPA has underlined the vital importance ofgiving adequate attention to staff training. When, as in this case, aforeign organization is given certain responsibilities for agriculture,its program and activities must be premised on the assumption thatits role will be of limited duration. Apart from its task of assessingthe problems and devising and testing various approaches to theseproblems, its principal responsibility must be to train indigenousstaff that can take over and can ensure not only the permanence butalso the further development of the approaches to agriculture whichit has devised. Unfortunately, BDPA's initial mandate did not stressthis training responsibility, so that formal training, apart from jobexperience, did not begin until two and one-half years after thebeginning of its work in Chad. This has all the more seriousconsequences in view of the rather poor education and inadequateexperience of the indigenous staff and BDPA's lack of freedom inselecting this staff.

Another and related lesson of BDPA's operations in the Bokororegion is the importance of sufficient continuity. BDPA could hardlydevise and carry out effective programs on the basis of agreements ofone and two years' duration. Given the difficult problems of agri-culture in the Bokoro region and the limitations of the indigenousstaff, it was really imperative that the organization selected to workand apply a program be assured a mandate of sufficient duration tomake a lasting impact. Under these circumstances there is a fearthat such results as have been achieved may not be enduring.

365


ANNEX 1

10-YEAR RAINFALL DISTRIBUTION AT BOKORO(14 YEARS OBSERVATION)

120 RAINFALL IN MM.

100

80

60

40

20

APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV

ANNEX 2

AREAS TILLED WITH THE USE OF DRAFT ANIMALS(hectares)

Cultivators for Soil Preparation Seed-Drills

1963 1964 1963 1964

Occi- Alou-dentale ette Arara Manga Total

Dilbini 35 - - 8 42 162 57 229

Maigana 12 - 5 10 27 96 14 76Gambir 11 31 10 13 65 117 37 79Bokoro - - - - - 35 - 23

58 31 15 31 134 410 108 407

366

Chad: Bokoro Area

ANNEX 3

SUMMARY OF BDPA ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OFCHARI-BAGUIRMI

1962/63 1963/64 1964/65

No. of villages included in program 74 108No. of inhabitants of such villages 7,470 11,610No. of families 1,660 2,580No. of groups 38 83 129No. of professional staff 23 36 48Sugar distributed under loan (tons) 4 22Groundnuts marketed (tons) 40 445 900aMillet marketed (tons) 600"Land prepared by implements (hectares) 134 428Sowing by seed-drill 108 427Seed distributed (tons) 334 573 680Seed dressed (tons) 7 37 104

'Estimate .

ANNEX 4

Extension of the BDPA Operation in Chari-BaguirmiThe BDPA operation in Chad was always intended to extend

to all of Chari-Baguirmi; it is not surprising, therefore, thatBDPA, supported by the experience acquired during 1962 inBokoro, has undertaken the same agricultural extension and mod-ernization activities in the neighboring sub-prefectures. Since June1963 these activities have been carried out in the two sub-prefec-tures of Mongo and Massakory. The main activity during the1963/64 agricultural year was that of making contacts similar tothose made in Bokoro.

The operation in the sub-prefecture of Massakory was based atthe modernization center of Massaguet. The aid in the sphere ofgroundnut production-multiplication and distribution of seeds,shelling and marketing-was the same as that given in Bokoro.Cultivation with the use of draft animals seems to promise satisfac-tory results. Apparently ten groups had been set up by the end ofthe agricultural year.

The program in the sub-prefecture of Mongo has focused on theAbtouyour area. The existence of a mountain range has endowed thepopulations of this area with a very special character. It appears thatthey are much more opposed to progress than the people of theplains and more reluctant to enter into contact with extension work-ers. It has been possible to diffuse knowledge of methods of ground-

367


nut cultivation, though on a more restricted scale than at Massaguet.

On the other hand, cultivation with draft animals comes up against

two stumbling blocks: the traditionalism of the inhabitants and the

very irregular relief of the country. Community action has shown

some results thanks to the traditional hierarchical structure.

368

4. UPPER VOLTA: THE AGRICULTURAL EXTENSIONPROGRAM OF SATEC IN THE MOSSI COUNTRY

Introduction

The aim of the Soci&t6 d'aide technique et de cooperation(SATEC) in the Republic of Upper Volta is to raise farm outputthrough the introduction of modern methods of cultivation. Duringthe first three years of its operations SATEC primarily emphasizedan improvement in the subsistence production of the Mossi farmer,concentrating its efforts on millet and sorghum. Now it is turning itsattention to the development of cash crops. Through the establish-ment of an agricultural extension service, SATEC has brought aboutthe formation of cooperative groups of farmers which have providedtheir members with facilities for the purchase, on credit, of culti-vators, donkeys and harnesses as well as mineral fertilizers.

This program was initiated in 1961 in some of the cercles (ad-ministrative districts) of the Ouagadougou region and has sincebeen extended progressively within the prefectures of Ouagadougouand Koudougou, which constitute the greater part of the Mossicountry in the heart of Upper Volta. As a result, in 1964, SATECwas assisting in the developing of a region of more than 50,000square kilometers with a population of some 1,300,000 persons.

Agriculture in the Mossi country

The physical and human milieu

The Mossi country forms an extensive plateau in which severalrivers have etched out alluvial valleys. The erosion of the massif ofgneiss and granite produced a foundation of sandy and gravellysoils. Laterite formations, very deficient in nitrogen and phosphorus,cover most of this foundation. These soils were often underlaid by acap or shield which has been progressively uncovered by erosion.Some areas of pre-Cambrian schists to the east and the south of theregion may be very fertile. Finally there are some bottom lands withclayey and hydromorphic soils that are only suitable for rice grow-ing. It can therefore be said that the cultivable area is very limited

369


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ZOONDE FO...PERTIOSO--S AT,j,,.'; .- ',,,...... s--. -- '---- ----------------------------

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\. ,--.--.. . ZONE OF OPERATIONS OF SATECK < IN UPPER VOLTA

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. . . . . . . . .. . . .. .Average annual r,oofaOO

and that these poor and brittle soils are on the whole not very wellsuited to agriculture.

The climate is typically Soudanian, with 50 to 70 days of rainfallover a season lasting from mid-May to mid-October. Total rainfallmay vary between 600 and 1,000 mm. from one year to another, and

its distribution during the season is very uncertain and extremelyirregular. Between the first rain showers near the end of May andthe heavy rainfall of August, there may be one or more periods ofdrought which often ruin early-sown crops. Apart from a fewforest reserves, the Ouagadougou region consists of a poorly woodedsavanna which has deteriorated considerably under human occupa-tion.

The rural population is almost all of the Mossi race who composeone half of the population of Upper Volta. This population isdistributed very unevenly within the region. While average popula-

370

Upper Volta: Mossi Country

tion density is around 25 inhabitants per square km., the densityexceeds 40 in the northern part of the region (Yako, Koudougou,Bousse) and falls well below the average in the south in the cerclesof Leo and Po. Since the proportion of children attending school,which is approximately 7 percent for Upper Volta as a whole, isextremely small, the educational level of the rural sector is very low.Despite the headway made by Catholicism and by Islam, especiallythe latter, a large majority of the people still retain their traditionalanimist beliefs.

In view of demographic pressures labor migration is importantin this country. Information on the length of time that labor migrantsspend in the Ivory Coast and Ghana is inadequate. It probablyaverages less than a year, although it may extend over several yearsor be limited to a single crop season. Labor migration is generallyestimated to take away almost 20 percent of the total working popu-lation of the Upper Volta, a considerable figure particularly as themigrants are usually young people. Although the most obvious causeof these large migrations is the difficulty such persons experience inincreasing their incomes if they remain in the Upper Volta, anotherfactor is the desire of migrant workers to escape from the constraintsof what is still a traditional authoritarian society. It should also benoted that in the case of the Upper Volta the migration of workershas only a limited effect on their subsequent receptivity to change,since the Mossi usually emigrate to the southern regions of Ghanaor of the Ivory Coast where they only come into contact with thecultivation of coffee and cocoa which, for ecological reasons, isimpossible in the Upper Volta.

The traditional social organization is very strongly developed;the chef de terre, who has jurisdiction over land matters, as well as thehead of an extended family unit, still retain a large measure ofauthority. In the vast majority of cases individual households havetheir own farms but they must still work on the collective family land,and, what is more significant, they cannot undertake anything ofimportance without having first obtained the approval of the lineagechief. Thus it is difficult for the head of a restricted family unit tojoin the cooperatives without first consulting the head of the ex-tended family. It is important to bear this hierarchical structure inmind when it is necessary to get in touch with individual farmers.

The economic setting

Precise information on the characteristics of the traditional farm-ing unit is not yet available. The family of an average farmer consistsof eight or nine persons (the head of the family, one or two wives

371


and four or five children), i.e., about four workers. The right tocultivate the land and the management of the farm are within the

competence of this restricted family unit. In the Mossi country it iscustomary for groups of cultivators to assist each other in variousagricultural tasks. The area available for cultivation in the UpperVolta as a whole is less than one hectare per inhabitant, but for theMossi region in the center the Agriculture Department has estimatedthis figure to be only about 0.5 hectare because of the higher popula-tion density. The Department also puts the size of the traditionalfarm in the Ouagadougou region at about 4 hectares, which wouldmean an average area of one hectare for each worker.

Farms generally consist of three types of fields, and each of thesemay in turn consist of several parcels. A "housefield" adjoining thehut is kept under permanent cultivation and receives some manuringin the form of household waste. Since the huts are scattered and thevillages are formed of groups of dwellings at some distance from oneanother, the Mossi are also able to cultivate so-called "village fields"within the village itself. These fields are also cultivated every year,but as they receive practically no manure they are much less fertilethan the "housefields." Lastly, each farm still has one or more addi-tional fields in the bush at some distance from the village. Such fieldsare cultivated after long periods of fallow. The area each farm cancultivate is limited by the high density of the population and by thelong periods of fallow which claim practically half of the cultivableland outside the villages.

The farming of the Mossi peasant is essentially based on foodcrops, with a net preponderance of millets and sorghums to whichsome 70 percent of the cultivated area is apparently devoted. Maizeand small garden crops play a supplementary role. In the region asa whole the production of millet is only roughly equivalent to thetotal consumption, so that at the end of the dry season there aresometimes serious local shortages. Millet yields vary widely, depend-ing on the degree of impoverishment of the soil and the amount andreliability of the rainfall. The reported average yield of 500 kg./ha.therefore has little significance.

Cash crops have been very little developed. Rice growing wouldappeal to farmers, but is restricted to the limited bottomlands of theregion, which usually belong to chiefs or rich farmers. An indigenoustype of cotton is often grown in association with other crops in the"housefields." The production of commercial cotton has not yet beendeveloped, except for the deeper soil area of the pre-Cambrian zone,especially because the Ouagadougou region does not generally havethe good land and regular rainfall that are necessary to this type of

372


cotton. Groundnuts are grown on some scale, taking up about 8percent of the area under cultivation.

The standard of living of the Mossi farmers is generally very low.In 1959 the gross national product per inhabitant in the rural sectorwas estimated at 8,300 CFA francs (US$33). Average annual cashincome per agricultural worker is reported to be about 5,000 CFAfrancs (US$20), which would be approximately 20,000 CFA francs(US$80) per farm. This cash income comes from various sources.The sale of agricultural products accounts for little more than half.Apart from receiving considerable emigrant remittances, the Mossiget money from the sale of wood and cattle and minor handicraftproducts. It is difficult to determine the distribution of wealth, but itappears reasonable to assume that there are marked variations inincome corresponding to the hierarchic social structure.

Prevvious experiences with agricultural extensionIn the course of the last ten years various attempts to carry on

agricultural extension work in the Ouagadougou region have beenmade. These efforts of the Department of Agriculture have hardlybeen successful, but it may be useful to mention some of them brieflyin order to emphasize the difficulties that any attempt at innovationmay encounter in a region where the conditions for agriculturaldevelopment are rather unfavorable.

In 1954 "pilot" or "demonstration" farms were launched in aneffort to provide certain farmers with all the resources needed forefficient farming. In this way it was hoped that they would be trans-formed into modern farmers who would be an example to others.After being equipped with farm buildings, draft oxen and imple-ments, the model farmer was expected to adopt modern methods ofcultivation. But at the end of three years the majority of the 500 orso farms thus established had reverted to the traditional pattern.The reasons for this setback lay in the unsatisfactory choice of farm-ers, in shortcomings in technical farm planning and, more par-ticularly, in a misconception of the psychology of the peasant farmerwho rapidly found himself isolated from his milieu.

"Demonstration plots" have been another effort to improve farm-ing methods. The aim has been to let farmers try out certain newmethods in' a way that would permit them to compare the resultswith those achieved by traditional techniques. Thus the AgriculturalService sought to interest farmers in improving their millet produc-tion by using selected seed and applying, on the fields of cooperativepeasants, a combined nitrogenous phosphatic fertilizer. This experi-ment, which is still continuing, has not achieved the expected

373


demonstration effect because peasants for the most part still do not

consider the expenditure of fertilizers on foodcrops remunerative.

Still another type of program, introduced in 1957, was designed

to develop the use of animal traction in farming through the agency

of Rural Extension Service Centers. The use of draft oxen was to

facilitate better soil preparation and higher sowing density. Their

more widespread use was to be associated with the expansion of

manure production and the establishment of fodder reserves. In the

absence of competent and effective personnel, these measures, which

would have involved radical changes in traditional agricultural

methods, met with little success; and the Centers were turned over

to SATEC in 1964 so that a fresh start could be made.Lastly, since 1957 the Cooperation Department of the Ministry of

Agriculture has been setting up rural cooperatives whose function

has been not only to sell consumer goods and market agricultural

products but also to introduce new production methods on collec-

tive fields set aside in the villages. Lack of personnel was undoubtedly

the reason for the failure of this measure. The production coopera-

tives charged with farming the collective fields have been unable to

repay the loans made to them for capital equipment; the supply and

marketing cooperatives have not been very active; and the consumer

cooperatives have only been able to operate with the help of outside

management and assistance.

SATEC's program

Despite previous setbacks and in view of the heavy concentration

of the Mossi population in the Ouagadougou region, the Government

of Upper Volta decided in 1961 to invite SATEC to undertake an

intensive agricultural extension program. This program, financed by

the Aid and Cooperation Fund of the French Republic, is to continue

until 1967. The geographic scope of SATEC activities has widened

from 6 cercles in 1962 to 8 in 1963 and 12 in 1964, and was to reach

its limit of 13 cercles in 1965. It was ultimately to cover the prefectures

of Ouagadougou and Koudougou which have a population of almost1,300,000 persons, i.e. a little less than 30 percent of the total popu-

lation of Upper Volta.SATEC's program has been characterized on the one hand by the

development of a dense extension service, together with rural co-

operatives, and, on the other, by the emphasis put on increasing food

production with the help of donkey-drawn cultivators and the use

of mineral fertilizers. Subsequent features are to include development

of cash crops, introduction of additional equipment and closer asso-

ciation of animal and crop husbandry. The idea was, first of all, to

374


establish an extension service which, at least in the initial and mostcritical years, would be able to develop the close and continuingcontacts with farmers that were considered necessary to bring aboutimprovements in production. The personnel of this extension servicewas to concentrate on groups of farmers who were in principle willingto change their methods of production and who would be organizedin village cooperative groups for this purpose. The cooperativeswere not only to be the means for increasing receptivity to change,but their capital was to be used to guarantee loans to any of theirmembers for the acquisition of those means of production that wererequired to raise output.

The organizational structure

A Dense Extension Network. The system of advisory services is builtaround the instructor; he is responsible for maintaining continuingcontacts with the farmers through a wide range of activities (actionpolyvalente). His activities are governed by the passage of the seasons:between seasons he contacts new villages and sets up cooperatives;during the cropping season he advises on methods of cultivation; andafter the harvest he travels through the villages to explain the resultsobtained and prepare for the coining season. In this way each in-structor visits the cooperatives for which he is responsible at leasttwice a month. The level of coinpetence of these local extensionagents is tending to improve, although it still seems to be too low toundertake the action on a really broad front that SATEC has inmind for the years to come. Whereas the majority of instructorsdid not even have a Certificate of Primary Studies (certificat d'etudes,primaires) at the outset, this is now a requirement. Moreover,instructors are not actually appointed until they have completed aprobationary year and passed a final examination.

The basic objective was to provide enough extension workers sothat a real impact could be made. The number of instructors whichstarted with 9 in 1961, was increased rapidly to 37 in 1962, 132 in1963 and 155 in 1964. In the latter year, to be sure, this representedonly one per 700 farm families in the whole of the area covered bySATEC. However, since these instructors were to concentrate onfarmers who had joined rural cooperatives, the actual ratio of ex-tension workers to cooperating farmers was 1 to 32 in 1964. Thisratio was reduced to 1 to 50 in 1965 and is to come down to 1 to 130by 1967.

Above the instructors are regional agents. Each of these is re-sponsible for a subsector corresponding to an administrative sub-division (an average of 3 for each cercle) for which there were 5 to 8

375


instructors in 1964. The 18 regional agents existing in 1964 were

chosen from these instructors. During that year a 20-day course for

their training was organized at the Matourkou Training Center.

Originally the regional agents transmitted all the directives to the

lower-level extension workers, but their responsibility is now confined

to certain questions relating to cooperatives, including supply and

finance.At the next higher level are European Technical Assistants

(assistants techniques), who work under the direction of an administra-

tor assisted by an agricultural adviser. Each technical assistant is

responsible for one sector, corresponding in 1964 to about 2 cercles.

These technical assistants, of whom there were 5 in 1964, are to be

replaced in 1967 by African assistants who have been assigned to

them for on-the-job training. Each technical assistant supervises

some 5 or 6 regional agents.

The cost of this extension service was around 50 million CFA

francs up to the end of 1962. In 1963 the budget was 70 million CFA

francs and in 1964, 100 million (US$400,000). This undoubtedly

represents a rather heavy financial burden, amounting on the aver-

age in 1964 to almost 20,000 CFA francs ($80) per cooperative

member, or a little over 250,000 CFA francs ($1,000) for each of the

391 cooperatives which existed in that year. The justification of such

an expenditure can be judged, of course, only in the light of the

effect of the program in the long run. When the number of farmers

per instructor are eventually raised to 130 by 1967, the outlay per

cooperative member will be significantly reduced. Whether this

can be accomplished without sacrificing the rate of progress in

introducing agricultural improvements is a moot question. It will

be noted later that progress has been slow even among the group

of farmers who have profited from the very dense extension service

for several years. Yet the program not only calls for an increase in

the number of farmers to be covered from 8,000 in 1965 to 45,000

in 1967, but for a broadening of the scope of extension activity to put

greater emphasis on such cash crops as cotton and groundnuts.

Cooperative Groups. The formation of cooperative groups is the first

stage in the SATEC program. It is through these groups that im-

provements are introduced and farm equipment is supplied. As a

first step it has been necessary to get the support and approval of the

traditional authorities, particularly of the village chiefs who are the

customary intermediaries between the villages and the outside world.

Thereafter meetings are organized in the villages to explain the

utility of cooperatives to the farmers. Basically the cooperatives were

to make possible the purchase of new farm equipment and supplies

376


by using their capital as a joint fund to guarantee repayment ofloans from the Banque nationale de developpement (BND). Thesecooperatives are managed by SATEC's regional agents who act asintermnediaries between BND and members of the cooperatives.

The number of cooperatives rose from 32 in 1962 to 148 in 1963and 391 in 1964; and the number of members from 453 to 1,908 and5,015 respectively. In 1965 somre 3,000 new inembers are reportedto have been added, as compared with a target increase of 8,000. In1964 the total membership represented 4.7 percent of the estimatednumber of farm families in the areas in which SATEC was activelyworking. Most of the increase in meinbership has apparently comefrom the formation of new cooperatives and the extension of theprogram to new areas. In 1964 the membership of existing coopera-tives increased by only 357 or by about 19 percent, while new coopera-tives enlisted 2,750 farmers of whom 1,557 came from cercles in whichSATEC had not previously been active. Each cooperative has re-mained small, averaging, for example, only about 13 members in1964. We were unable to determine to what extent this small mem-bership was due to lack of interest in joining or to a desire on thepart of the group or its president to confine membership to a smallnumber who could trust each other or who were linked by closekinship ties. In any event there does not seem to have been a quick-ening of interest in cooperatives, since during the three-year period1963-1965 the annual increase in membership remained about thesame-around 3,000.

While the principal function of the cooperative groups was tofacilitate borrowing of production requisites, they were expectedgenerally to encourage innovation on the part of their members.However, the people who are presidents of these cooperatives appeargenerally to occupy this position by virtue of the prestige and respectthat they traditionally enjoy rather than because of their capacity totake the leadership in innovation. SATEC has sought to find withinthe cooperatives other farmers who might be especially qualified topioneer improvements and to serve as volunteer assistants (animateursbe&nevoles) to its own extension workers for this purpose. Although 35of such farmers were enlisted in 1964 for the first time, some difficultyhas apparently been encountered in working out their role in rela-tion to that of the president of the cooperative group.

A five-year loan for draft animals and equipment is granted to afarmer who has subscribed one share of CFA francs 1,40 0 .1 Seasonal

I Initially this entire amount had to be paid in immediately, but subsequentlypayment over three years was permitted.

377


loans for the purchase of fertilizers are also made. The authorizedcapital of each cooperative, plus such reserves that it has provedpossible to set aside, are deposited with the BND as a guarantee forloans granted by BND to the cooperatives. Loans may be made upto an amount of nine times the deposits of the cooperatives withBND and carry an interest rate of 5 percent per annum. The capitalthus paid in amounted in 1964 to more than 7.2 million CFA francs(nearly US$30,000). During the first three years, 1962-1964, creditstotaling about 61 million CFA francs (US$241,000) were extended.

The repayment of credits extended through the cooperatives hasproved difficult. SATEC's program focused in the first instance onraising the production of food crops such as millet and sorghum.Farmers have apparently tended, at least initially, to use any addi-tional output of these grains to enhance their security by increasingtheir stock and, perhaps, to expand their consumption. Whetherthey will eventually be able to derive a significant cash income frommillet and sorghum depends on the possibility of developing themarket for these crops. In any event most of the repayments havebeen made not out of crop income, but out of cash derived from thesale of small stock, from trade and crafts, from wage employmentand other sources.1 Despite the lack of sufficient crop income and thegenerally low standard of living, repayments were remarkably highduring the first two years. On the first due date-June 30, 1963,93.1 percent of the payments were received, and in another sixmonths the rate of recovery had risen to 99.8 percent. There wassome deterioration in 1964, since only 82 percent of the paymentswere made on the due date, but by the end of the year 94.7 percenthad been recovered. The year 1965, however, witnessed a sharpdecline, for by mid-year repayments amounted to only 54.77 percentof the amount due as compared with 82 percent the year before.This may reflect a progressive exhaustion of cash resources availablefor repayment. In this connection it should be noted also that farmershave apparently resisted the invocation of the collective guarantee in

2 In 1965 the French Societ6 d'6tudes pour le d6veloppement 6conomique et

social (SEDES) analyzed a sample inquiry among 39, 46, 21 farmers who hadparticipated in the SATEC program for one, two and three years respectively.Less than half of the farmers who responded indicated that they made theirloan payments out of farm incomes; of these only half used for this purpose cashincome from millet, sorghum, cotton or groundnuts, the crops which were tosome extent affected by the SATEC program. The proportion of those payingout of crop income was not significantly greater among those who had benefitedfrom the program for three years. See SEDES, Le developpement rural dams les

pays d'Afrique Noire (Paris, 1965), Vol. IV, p. 65.

378


the event of defaults. The members of cooperatives have evidentlybeen inclined to insist on expelling a defaulter in place of allowinghis debts to be settled from the joint assets constituted from the sharecapital and eventual reserves.

The methods and objectives

SATEC's program up to 1965 has been based on three main as-sumptions: (1) priority should be given to an increase in the produc-tion of food because farmers had never really been assured that theirfood supplies would be adequate to last until the following harvest;(2) this increase in production would in part be achieved by the ex-tension of the area under cultivation through the introduction ofanimal traction; and (3) an increase in output per hectare could beachieved by the employment of fertilizers. The purpose of this sec-tion is to examine these three aspects of the program carried outbetween 1962 and 1965.

There was certainly considerable justification for the urgencyinitially assigned to raising the output of sorghum and millet onwhich the rural population depended for its subsistence. There is adeep concern about the security of food supply, for otherwise aconsiderable part of the increase in production achieved by theSATEC program would not have been used to reinforce stocks.However, the increasing problem encountered in the recovery ofcredits has also demonstrated that farmers can hardly be expectedto meet cash expenditures for improving their own food supply un-less almost simultaneously effective measures can be taken to increasethe output of cash crops.

SATEC sought to raise the production of millet and sorghum by(1) enabling the farmer to expand the areas under cultivation, and(2) raising yields through the use of fertilizer. The preliminary studyinade by SATEC in 1961 maintained, with some optimism, that"the soil and climate potentialities of the Mossi country are suchthat it is possible to conceive farms that could produce a net incomeper hectare considerably higher than the present figures and at thesame time would have under cultivation an area many times greaterthan the present average." SATEC came to the conclusion that thedonkey-drawn cultivator was the implement best suited to existingphysical and economic conditions in the region; in a second stage,commencing in 1963, those farmers who had introduced animaltraction in the preceding year were to be persuaded also to usefertilizers for raising their yields.

379


Introduction of the animal-drawn cultivatorIt was the experience of the Catholic Mission at Manga, south of

Ouagadougou, that led SATEC to advocate the extended use of thedonkey-drawn cultivator. Since the Mossi farmer did not have suffi-cient financial resources to purchase both a cultivator and a plowat the same time, preference was given to the cultivator since thisimplement could be used for the preparation of light soils as well asthe time-consuming task of weeding. The cultivator could also bedrawn by a donkey which, though much less strong than an ox andmore susceptible to trypanosomiasis, was selected as the best draftanimal for at least the initial part of the program because it seemedto be cheaper, more readily available and easier to train and to feed.It was expected that the new method of cultivation would increaselabor productivity, thus permitting an expansion of the area undercultivation and a consequent increase in total production. A schedulewas even drawn up envisaging how the additional output was toprovide for the amortization of the cost of the equipment used.

Farmers who want to adopt this method of cultivation receive,as a result of their membership in a cooperative group, a bank loanenabling them to purchase equipment selected by SATEC. SATECimports from France "Manga" cultivators which have been madelighter in an effort to adapt them to local needs. These cultivators,which are ultimately to be manufactured locally, are sold by SATECat their actual cost of CFA francs 7,500. The farmer buys the donkeylocally at a cost which by 1964 had risen to an average of CFA francs3,500 as compared with only 1,000-1,500 francs in 1961. Increasedlocal demand from farmers and the growing scarcity of these ani-mals in the region had thus driven up the price. Harnesses are beingmanufactured in four rural workshops which have been set up inUpper Volta to meet the orders placed by SATEC and which sellthem for CFA francs 1,235 each. The credit extended for all thesepurchases totals CFA francs 12,250 and is repayable in five annualinstallments of 2,450 francs each. The number of these equipmentloans corresponds to the number of cooperative members. It wasonly in 1962 and 1963 that about two hundred cultivators andharnesses were sold for cash.

The appeal of animal traction can only be determined by com-paring it with traditional methods of cultivation. Under the tradi-tional methods of growing millet and sorghum the initial tasks ofland preparation, sowing and weeding all fall more or less in thesame period. Toward the end of the dry season farmers clear theland of any vegetation remaining from the preceding harvest. Suchvegetation is put into piles and burned. After the first rains, the

380


farmers hasten to sow. The land is not previously plowed, but theearth is simply loosened with the hand hoe wherever the seeds areput into the ground. Farmers sow as quickly as possible to enablethe cereals to get a head start over the weeds and in order to compen-sate as much as possible for any losses at a later stage. Weedingbegins, depending on the rain, ten to fifteen days after sowing.Weeding should be done as early as possible to ensure that millet,a sensitive plant, is not smothered by the weeds which grow veryvigorously as soon as the rainy season sets in. Sometimes it is evennecessary to interrupt the last sowings in order to weed the fieldssown first. Weeding is the operation that makes the heaviest de-mands on labor because of the amount of field work involved andthe importance of timeleness. Frequently the farmer is unable tomaintain all of the very extensive area that he has sown.

Animal traction was to break this bottleneck by enabling farmersto weed the sown area more rapidly. In principle this certainlyseemed possible. According to the experimental station at Saria, ittakes one person about 20 days to weed one hectare with a handhoe, whereas inter row weeding with a donkey-drawn cultivatorcan be done in two days. The saving in labor is not quite as great asindicated, primarily because weeding on the row itself must be doneby hand and partly because it apparently takes, at least at thepresent level of training of men and animals, three persons to handlean animal-drawn cultivator-one to guide the cultivator, anotherto lead the donkey and still another (usually a boy) to prod theanimal. Nevertheless, the cultivator can be of considerable value inbreaking the weeding bottleneck and therefore extending the areaunder effective cultivation.

Farmers have experienced considerable difficulty in using thecultivator for weeding; and its employment is by no means universaleven among farmers who have been members of cooperatives forthree years.3 A prerequisite, of course, is sowing on straight, equi-distant lines. For this purpose cultivators were provided with a row-marking device, but although it would seem rather easy and certainlynot very time-consuming to mark rows in this way, quite a fewfarmers with whom we spoke complained that they found it par-

' According to the SEDES inquiry to which reference has already been made,56 percent of the farmers (12 out of 21 who were interrogated) who had beenmembers of cooperatives for three years affirmed they were making some useof the cultivator for weeding, while only 35 percent of the farmers in their firstyear indicated positively they were doing so. If the farmers who failed to replyto the inquiry are left out of consideration, the proportions employing thecultivator for weeding were 75 percent and 67 percent respectively.

381


ticularly difficult to carry out this operation properly. Above all,many farmers seemed to fear that the cultivator would do too muchdamage to their crop especially when seedlings were still very youngand delicate and tended to be overgrown with weeds in such a waythat the rows were not easily recognizable. This fear was all thegreater because the men guiding the cultivator and the donkeydrawing it were insufficiently trained. Many farmers have thereforedeclined to use the cultivator for the first weeding, and they havegenerally employed it on only part of the cropped area.

It has likewise proved difficult to convince farmers of the ad-vantages of preparing their land with a cultivator. SATEC'srecommendation that they prepare the land for sowing with twotransversal passages of the cultivator appeared to have considerablemerit. The cultivator could be expected to loosen the soil moreeffectively, thus increasing its capacity to absorb the early rains.This improvement in the water balance of the soil seemed all themore important, since farmers tend to sow too early, with the riskthat the young seedlings will perish in a subsequent drought. Inpractice, however, many farmers have been deterred by certainoffsetting disadvantages which, rightly or wrongly, have appearedimportant to them. Thus a considerable number of farmers haveregarded land preparation with the cultivator as an "extra" opera-tion which delayed rather than facilitated sowing and tended topromote the growth of too many weeds ahead of the planted crops.With the use of the cultivator over the entire field, weed seeds lyingon the surface apparently are lightly covered with soil, facilitatingtheir early germination on the advent of the rains.4 On the otherhand, when the traditional hoe is used the soil is loosened only wherethe crop is sown, and the hoeing and sowing is a single operationwhich takes comparatively little time. True, it takes only 4 to 5days to prepare a hectare of land with the cultivator and to mark therows for line sowing. With the donkey working only a maximum offour hours per day and three persons to a cultivator, this is theequivalent of 6-7.5 man-days. To this, however, the time for sub-sequent sowing must be added. According to information obtainedfrom the Saria Experimental Station, it takes only 6-7 days to planta hectare by hand without use of the cultivator, though other sourcesclaim that this is an under-estimate. In any event, quite a few farm-ers that we questioned testified that the whole operation took longerwhen the cultivator was employed. Although the merits of the

I If the plow were used, weed seeds would probably be buried more deeplythus delaying germination.

382


cultivator for land preparation seem to be disputed, the proportionof people using this implement to prepare at least some portion oftheir land appears to have grown slowly.5 It is probably employedprimarily on the fields near the house and in the village rather thanon the fields in the bush which are more remote and which usuallyhave stumps and roots that may damage the tines or deflect thecultivator.

By and large the cultivator has won some degree of acceptanceby farmers even though very few are evidently using it on all or eventhe greater part of their cropped area. The experience has more thanborne out SATEC's estimate that it takes at least three years for afarmer to learn how to make satisfactory use of animal traction andof the implements that go with it. Above all, considerable time isrequired to train men and animals so that farmers have confidencein their ability to control draft animals well enough for such tasks asrow-marking and inter row cultivation.

As yet the animal-drawn cultivator has probably had only amodest effect on the area under cultivation and on yields. The claimmade by SATEC that farmers using the cultivator for weeding hadbeen enabled to double the average area under crops was evidentlywithout foundation;6 and it is now said that the increase achieved is

I Following an inquiry among a sample of farmers who in 1965 had beenmemnbers of cooperatives for one year, two years and three years respectively,SEDES reported that the corresponding proportion of those who definitelyindicated they were using the cultivator to prepare some of their land was 46percent, 50 percent and 66 percent.

6 A survey made in 1964 was said to have supported this claim. This surveyclassified 89 farms in four categories according to the length of time they hadbeen in contact with SATEC, i.e., in accordance with the number of years duringwhich the equipment had been available to them. A distinction was thereforemade between farms that had been "assisted" since 1962 (provided with facilitiesin 1962), since 1963, and since 1964 and a further 12 farms that had "not yetbeen assisted" but were ready to join cooperatives in 1965. From the average sizeof the 12 farms not yet assisted or equipped with cultivators it was inferred thatthe traditional farmer cultivates about 2 hectares; and from the average culti-vated area of the farms that had been assisted it was concluded that the "mod-ernized" farm has an area of 4 hectares. The 12 farms which were withoutcultivators in 1964 were regarded as representative of the "pre-equipment"situation of those farms which had adopted cultivators by 1964. On this basisit was concluded that the assistance with implements had been instrumental indoubling the areas under cultivation. However, it should be noted that thecultivated area of farms which had been assisted for the first time in 1964 andwhich therefore had been able to use the cultivator for only a single season,actually averaged 4.73 hectares. It would be extremely surprising if thesefarmers had succeeded in doubling their cultivated area so rapidly, particularlywhen the cultivated area of farms which had been equipped with cultivatorssince 1962 had reached only 3.05 hectares by 1964. Thus it would seem that theargumentation used in the survey could also support the contention that con-tinued use of the cultivator actually reduces the cultivated area!

383


15 percent to 20 percent. Certainly our own conversations with

farmers indicated that the expansion in the area planted and main-

tained has been quite small. Comparisons with farmers outside the

program suggest also that people using the cultivator have somewhat

higher yields. However, since the people who have joined the co-

operatives may well have been above-average farmers to begin with,

it is difficult to determine to what extent the cultivator has con-

tributed to the higher yields by improving land preparation and

weed control.Mineral Fertilizers. Numerous tests made in areas in which ecologi-

cal conditions are similar to those in the Mossi territory have often

revealed deficiencies in phosphoric acid and pointed up the need

for prior correction of this shortage to enable nitrogen fertilizers to

affect yields. In line with classic fertilization patterns in areas of

modern agriculture, SATEC sought to introduce the use of a basic

dressing to compensate for this soil deficiency. This dressing, some-

times called a corrective dressing, was to be applied in the first year;

it was then to be supplemented by a "maintenance" dressing ap-

plied each year to compensate for mineral elements taken out of the

soil by the crops. The experimental station of the Institut de re-

cherches agronomiques tropicales (IRAT), established in Saria,

began a series of tests in 1962 which showed that the phosphoric acid

deficiency could be corrected by a dressing of 50 kg. of P205 per hec-

tare and indicated that there also appeared to be a deficiency in

potassium, magnesium, and in a third undetermined element.

At the end of 1962 SATEC decided to promote the use of a correc-

tive dressing in the following season. The first fertilizer formula was

deliberately selected so as to be very complete and effective while

awaiting the results of work on the most suitable composition under-

taken at the same time by the Saria Experimental Station. The

amount of corrective dressing per hectare was 330 kilograms. This

dressing consisted of the following mixture: 90 kg. triple super

phosphate (40 kg. P 2 05); 145 kg. sulphate of ammonia (30 kg. N);

90 kg. potash (25 kg. K 2 0; 7 kg. magnesium oxide; and 5.46 kg. oftrace elements. The research work done at Saria in 1963 confirmed

the effectiveness of phosphatic and nitrogenous fertilizers (when the

phosphoric acid deficiency is corrected, the yield of sorghum rises

proportionate to the amount of nitrogen applied up to a maximum

of 100 kg. per hectare). On the other hand, it also showed that the

application of potassium, magnesium and trace elements had no

bearing on yields. Moreover, these results were only applicable to

soils derived from the more widespread sandstones of this region

and not to those of pre-Cambrian origin.

384

Utpper Volta: Mossi Country

The corrective dressing was fairly extensively used. Two hundredand seventy-one members of cooperatives (60 percent of the 453farmers who had been supplied with a cultivator for at least a year)applied 47.5 tons of corrective dressing to 144 hectares (0.53 hectaresper purchaser), i.e., to some 15 percent of their cultivated land. Thisled to a marked increase in yields; SATEC estimates, on the basis ofa sample survey, that sorghum yields were about 100 percent higherthan the 850 kg. per hectare achieved by traditional methods,whereas that of millet was 70 percent above the 700 kg. per hectareachieved in traditional farming. The cost of this dressing was CFAfrancs 11,000 per hectare of which 3,300 francs was borne by thefarmer with the aid of a crop loan, the balance being met by asubsidy. The value of the additional crops obtained was CFA francs12,000 in the case of sorghum and CFA francs 7,300 in the case ofmillet (based on the price of 14 francs a kilogram for millet andsorghum). Considering the subsidy, the fertilizer therefore conferreda very real benefit on the farmer, all the more so since he could ex-pect to obtain further residual benefits in the longer term.

A maintenance dressing was to have been applied in 1964 to the landthat had received the corrective dressing in the preceding year. Itwas to consist of 30 kg. of nitrogen and 20 kg. of phosphoric acid perhectare. The cost of CFA francs 4,000 was to be fully met by thefarmer. The maintenance dressing was regarded as an operatingexpense, while the corrective dressing had previously been subsidizedbecause of its investment character and its onerous cost. However,the farmers found it difficult to understand the difference betweenthese two types of dressings and considered it surprising that theyhad to pay 4,000 francs for a dressing that contained less fertilizerthan the corrective fertilizer that had cost them only 3,300 francs.It also became evident that in a region where there was no cadastralsurvey and crops were often shifted from field to field it was difficultfor the agricultural extension service officials to follow the applica-tions of fertilizers on each parcel of land in order to be sure that aregular sequence of operations was observed. Since early 1964SATEC has therefore recognized that a program of one correctivedressing followed by annual maintenance dressings was impractical.

The idea of using a single dressing to overcome the phosphatedeficiency was abandoned in 1964 in favor of a series of dressings spreadover three vears. The new dressing per hectare was made up of 29kg. of nitrogen (50 kg. of urea and 30 kg. of sulfate of ammonia),28 kg. of phosphoric acid (30 kg. of triple superphosphate and 40 kg.of Bailifos) and 5 kg. of potassium (10 kg. of sulfate of potassium).In line with the findings at Saria the trace elements and most of the

385


potassium were discontinued, and part of the triple superphosphatewas replaced by a type of phosphate (Bailifos) bought from Senegalwhich was lower in cost.

The new dressing achieved in 1964 a more limited success thanthat realized in the preceding year. Although the total of 572 farmerswho used this dressing was higher in absolute terms than that in1963, the proportion in relation to the total number of farmers being

assisted by SATEC fell from 60 percent in 1963 to 30 percent in1964. Moreover, two-thirds of the farmers who had used fertilizer

in 1963 did not continue in 1964. The total area fertilizedin 1964 was 189 hectares as compared with 144 hectares in 1963.The average area treated by each purchaser of fertilizer thereforefell from 0.53 to 0.32 hectare.7

In principle the increase in yields with this new dressing shouldstill be considerable, although less than that obtained previously.In the case of millet the additional output attainable in the first yearis said to be around 250 kg. per hectare, and in that of sorghum,some 700 kg. per hectare. In the second and third years these yieldscould increase still further. In practice, however, there is often a

great range in the yield obtainable with fertilizers in the field. More-over, it is questionable whether the higher yields can continue to bemaintained in the longer run: the experiments undertaken at theSaria Research Station have indicated that without organic manure

yields tend in practice to fall. The cost of the new dressing is CFAfrancs 5,050 per hectare of which CFA francs 3,900 are paid by thefarmer. The total cost of fertilizers for five successive crops, including

the corrective dressing spread over three years followed by a main-tenance dressing, would thus be CFA francs 23,000 and the cost tothe farmer, allowing for subsidies, would be CFA francs 20,000,

equivalent to approximately 1,500 kg. of sorghum or millet. It there-fore appears that even with the subsidies the dressing of millet fieldswill not be a paying proposition for many of the farmers. In the caseof sorghum, fertilizer could increase the farmer's incomne by someCFA francs 5,000 a year to the extent that he is able to sell thisadditional production.

To increase the profitability of the corrective dressing, assumingfertilizer and millet prices remain unchanged, it would be necessaryeither to increase the productivity of millet varieties or find a way of

I SEDES found that only 21 percent of the farmers who were interviewedand who had been menibers of cooperatives for three years stated definitelythat they used fertilizer in 1964. This compared with 33 percent of the farmerswho had been in cooperatives for two years and 18 percent for those in coopera-tives for the first year.

386

Upper Volta: Afossi Country

extending the residual effect of the corrective dressing over a larger

number of years. The first may be achieved by varietal selectionwhich has not yet yielded decisive results. The latter method involvesmaintaining the fertility of the soil by crop rotations, which have not

yet been perfected, and/or by the application of organic manures.The use of either of these two techniques would take a long time as

they would involve a complete transformation of the traditionalsystem of cultivation. It therefore appears that the efforts to en-courage extensive use of fertilizers on cereals have been premature.More extensive prior research would have been desirable, both to

determine the exact formula to be recommended and to perfect theentire range of techniques needed to obtain the utmost value fromthe fertilizer. Mossi farmers are naturally reluctant to use fertilizers

for food crops and to incur debt to increase the production of cropsof which little if any is being grown for the market.

The efforts made to develop the use of mineral fertilizers for cash

crops are likely to encounter less difficulty in the end. SATEC hasrecommended the use of fertilizers on groundnuts (75 kg./ha. of

simple superphosphate costing CFA francs 2,000 without subsidy) onthe basis of the formula developed by the Institut de recherches surles huiles et oleagineux tropicaux (IRHO) at its experimental stationat Niangoloka in the Upper Volta. Thus 450 farmers applied 8.25tons of fertilizers on 110 hectares of groundnuts, obtaining a yield orsome 1,500 kilograms of groundnuts in the shell from each hectare.Finally, in the case of cotton, SATEC proposes to encourage appli-cation of the dosage recommended by the Compagnie fran,aise

pour le developpement des fibres textiles (CFDT) for West Africa asa whole (75 kg./ha. of triple superphosphate and 50 kg./ha. of sulfate

of ammonia at a cost of CFA francs 3,900 without subsidy).Other Activities and Future Developments. The various other measures

taken by SATEC have always remained within the general frame-work of its program for food crops. In 1963 a start was made with thedressing of millet and sorghum seed. By 1964 seed for only a fewhundred hectares had been dressed, but shortage of material was alimiting factor. SATEC considers that the idea will readily catch onand that by 1965 the use of free insecticides and fungicides will be ona much larger scale. In addition, two trials with silage producedsatisfactory results in 1963 and were continued in the following yearby 15 cooperative farmers. The hoped-for increase in the number ofsilos will have to go hand in hand with the introduction of carts.

The SATEC program for the coming two years is principallydirected toward the development of cash crops. The association oflivestock with agriculture seems much more problematic, since

387


virtually nothing has yet been done in the livestock sector. SATEC

is therefore going to concentrate its main efforts on the cultivation

of groundnuts, which is possible throughout the region, and on the

production of cotton and rice on land suitable for these crops. It will

therefore be adopting a much less rigid attitude, better suited to

variations in local conditions. In some regions and in the case of

some farmers the ox-drawn plow may be proposed in place of the

donkey-drawn cultivator, and, similarly, the use of fertilizers is to be

recommended especially for cash crops.

Conclusion

The Mossi country presented two major difficulties to which the

Mossi have to some extent adjusted, thus achieving a certain eco-

nomic equilibrium. The high density of population has been offset

by the very extensive migration towards the south, and the low

productivity of agriculture has caused the Mossi to turn to comple-

mentary activities. In the last analysis these two phenomena are

related, since the exodus of labor is such that the villages are short

of manpower for farming and the population remaining behind

tends to seek less laborious forms of activity. Moreover, the extremely

irregular character of the rainfall makes agriculture in a region of

poor soils very risky. Finally, the numerous approaches tried out in

the Upper Volta during recent years have encountered difficulties

which have created a certain resistance on the part of Mossi farmers

to all types of innovations in farming methods.

It is in this very unfavorable context that SATEC proposed to the

farmers its program for increasing agricultural production. Since

food production appeared so insufficient that farmers were experi-

encing difficulties in feeding themselves toward the end of the dry

season, SATEC has concentrated its efforts during the first three

years on millet and sorghum. Whether this focus was justified is

difficult to say. Farmers have indeed tended to use any increase in

output primarily for strengthening their food reserves, but additional

markets for millet and sorghum would in any event have been diffi-cult to find. Recently it has appeared that more immediate attention

must be devoted to encouraging cash crops as these alone could jus-

tify, in the long term, the rather high cost of any extension program.

In developing these crops there is, however, a risk that major ob-

stacles will be encountered. Groundnuts, which can be grownthroughout the region, face rnarketing difficulties, since export

prices have tended to fall with the discontinuance of the preferential

rates formerly paid by France. Cotton and rice, for their part, can

388


be grown only on a restricted scale owing to the limited availabilityof land suitable for their cultivation.

The results available do not justify the unqualified conclusionthat the use of the donkey-drawn cultivator has led to a markedincrease in agricultural production. While animal traction shouldimprove soil preparation and facilitate weeding, and farmers haveactually been able to increase the area under cultivation in somecases, it is impossible to draw any general conclusion applicable tothe food production of members of SATEC cooperatives as a whole.It is difficult to assess the effect the introduction of the cultivatorhas had in such a short time, particularly in view of the many factorswhich influence agricultural output. In the long run the cultivatorand the donkey mnay well facilitate the development of agriculturalproduction in the Mfossi country. This inexpensive equipment iswithin the reach of the majority of farmers but a number of yearswill be needed to educate the farmers and train the donkeys beforefull benefit can be obtained from the use of the donkey-drawncultivator.

The use of fertilizer, on which it had been hoped to base allfurther agricultural development, has been impeded by its dubiousprofitability in the case of food crops and by the low technical levelof farming. The changes made in an agricultural extension programthat was prepared before the necessary agricultural research workhad reached a sufficiently advanced stage, have added still furtherto the confusion. The importance of correcting the phosphate de-ficiency of the soils is undeniable. However, appropriate fertilizerdressings can hardly be worked out until there is a better method ofdetermining the results of such field applications as have been tried.Moreover, a profound transformation and improvement of agri-cultural methods is necessary if optimum use is to be made of fertil-izers, and the market for agricultural produce must be developed ifthe farmer is to obtain the money income necessary to pay for thefertilizers.

The cooperatives have not developed so rapidly as was expectedat the outset. Insufficient incoine to pay for shares in the cooperativehas clearly not been the main obstacle to such growth. It is muchmore a case of the natural "wait and see" attitude of the farmers inthe face of new methods, whose effective application calls for acorresponding effort on their part. In point of fact the cooperativesare primarily credit associations, whose success depends on the valueattached by the farmers to the types of equipment and suppliesfinanced. It has been difficult to transform the cooperatives into

389


broader instrumentalities of innovation, particularly since their

presidents have apparently not provided much leadership and it is

not yet clear whether the animateurs first selected in 1964 will be more

effective in pioneering and stimulating improveinents. In retrospect

it probably would have been better if less attention had been focused

on expanding the number of cooperatives and their members and

more effort had been devoted to making sure that the cooperatives

which were established really took root and developed some initia-

tive.Given the extremely unfavorable natural, economic and human

factors with which SATEC has had to contend, its limited achieve-

ments cannot solely be imputed to what was undoubtedly an over-

optimistic initial approach but also to the shortcomings of the exten-

sion service personnel. Extension agents have had practically no

agricultural training and can do little more than pass on the instruc-

tions they receive. The technical assistants have had little knowledge

of the economic and social problems of the region in which they have

been asked to work. Until 1965 SATEC's activities did have the

benefit of continuity of direction from Ouagadougou.Apart from the basic poverty of the agricultural resources of the

Ouagadougou region, the central difficulty has been the lack of

effective prior research on a "package of agricultural improve-

ments" which was technically feasible and economically attractive

to the cultivator. Substantial expenditure on a dense extension net-

work and on fertilizers and animal traction are hazardous unless

applied research has demonstrated that the cash income of farmers

can be raised to compensate for the additional cash outlays and

still leave a net benefit to the farmer that will provide the essential

incentive.

5. IVORY COAST: THE PROGRAM OF ANIMATION RURALEIN THE BOUAKE REGION

Introduction

The Compagnie Internationale de D6veloppement Rural (CIDR)has for several years had the responsibility for developing and carry-ing out a program of animation rurale in the Bouake region of theIvory Coast. This program has involved the selection, training andguidance of farmers willing to assume in their own villages the unpaidrole of animateurs ruraux, i.e., agents for stimulating the adoption ofimprovements in agriculture and village life. In the first instanceCIDR has had to interest villages sufficiently to induce them to putforward candidates for training as animateurs. It has then beenCIDR's task to train them and to advise them constantly as theywork in their villages. At the same time the staff of CIDR has ineffect operated as a general agricultural extension service which hassought to promote the adoption of new methods of cultivation in-cluding new crop rotations with cotton, rice and tobacco, the re-grouping of fields for rnore efficient farming, and the association ofagriculture with animal husbandry. Throughout, the accent hasbeen on promoting self-help among the fariners through the agencyof the animateurs who are supposed to have primary responsibility forvarious types of group action to initiate innovations.

Under an agreement concluded at the end of 1962 with the Gov-ernment, CIDR undertook to extend its program to the whole ofthe Central Department (D6partement du Centre) before 1970.Thanks to the experience gained during the preceding two yearsunder a private contractual arrangement, the CIDR was able tostart working in the sub-prefecture of Bouake during 1963, and toextend its operations to the sub-prefectures of Diabo and B6oumiin the course of 1964.

Agriculture in the Bouake region

Physical and human factorsThe Bouak6 region, situated in the center of the Republic, is an

essentially granitic peneplain dotted with schistose hills. Graniticrocks are covered with leached ferruginous tropical soils which are


red, with little fine gravel or clay, on medium to slight slopes, or

beige and sandy in the plains. On pre-Cambrian formations the soils

are red with clay and fine gravel (see soils map). All these soils can

be cultivated except for those on the hill tops which have a hard cap.

Ecologically the region lies in a transitional area between the

Guinean forest zone to the west and south on the one hand, and the

Soudanian savanna zone on the other. Climatic conditions actually

change more from east to west than they do from north to south.

The Central Department, of which Bouake is the capital, is included

within the 1,100 mm. and 1,300 mm. (ca. 43 to 51 inches) mean

annual isohyets. During the 'fifties rainfall in Bouak6 itself averaged

1,223 mm. (44 inches) and there were 123.2 rainy days. The six or

seven rainy months during the year are interrupted by a short rela-

tively dry period in July and a long dry season from November to

March. The average temperature at Bouake is 26.5° Centigrade

(79.70 F.), with variations up to 100 (180 F.) and a maximum of

340 (93.20 F.).

The vegetation depends much more on soil than on climatic con-

ditions, for the climate is such as to support forest as well as savanna.

The border line between forest and savanna generally coincides with

the line where schists and granite meet. The savanna thrives on

sandy soils, the forest on the clayey slopes of pre-Cambrian forma-

tions. The forest zone thus takes on a V shape enclosing the savanna,

with the result that in the central region of Bouake, M'Bayakro and

Tiebissou, only narrow stretches of forest are found on certain bottom

land. However, the savanna itself is so wooded that the difficulty of

clearing creates an obstacle to the introduction of cultivation with

draft animals.The population of the Bouake region belongs to the Baoule ethnic

group. It is a homogeneous population, Moslem or animist, with

strong traditions still expressed by various ritual prohibitions and

practices, many of which are concerned with agriculture. Thus work

may be forbidden on certain days in deference to earth or bush spirits

or in observance of certain ceremonies; and the cultivation of cer-

tain crops in particular localities may be tabu. Religious rites are

often prescribed such as on the clearance of land or its restoration to

cultivation following fallow. However, under the impact of economic

and social progress these prohibitions have lost much of their force

and need no longer be regarded insuperable even though they must

still to some extent be taken into account. For example, land devoted

to lucrative crops as coffee has often been completely "secularized."

Baoul6 society still has a strong hierarchic structure, with a tribal

chief in charge of several villages and each village headed by a

392

Ivory Coast. Bouake Region

RAINFALL IN THE IVORY COASTj S S O U U DD AA NN \

\ s /'JQ ,- *(U P P E R V O L T A

i' 'o' o, - 150 100 5\1300

21200

-s epdertD0oy

zi

O0000666 G96 .0 1650

chief who also serves as chef de terre competent in land matters. Thevillage chief has the power to allocate virgin land and may some-times even decree a redistribution of land. However, the right tocultivate land belongs to the one who first clears it and to his heirs.The lands of the village thus belong to a few extended families orlineage groups up to six generations in depth. The head of thelineage administers the common "treasure" of the group and grantsland to the individual "households" who are established in accord-ance with the patrilocal tradition. Land transactions are generallyconfined to fragmentation of existing holdings or theexchange of landamong members of a family or inhabitants of the same village. Ap-propriation of new land leads primarily to disputes between villages,

393


PRINCIPAL TRIBES IN THE SUB-PREFECTURESOF THE CENTRAL DEPARTMENT

-J"

.L

.. ,, IL, ) ;.

Booule -. Togoucoa Sub-prefectue bourTdary

Gouro LXIDjamono Djimmn C) Prefecture

I Agn, , P-C*P.l tow-

for it is at this level that competition and rivalry exist. This also

explains the difficulties encountered by the Administration when ithas sought, as part of a more general reconstruction program, to

regroup villages.The nuclear Baouk family usually averages some six to seven

persons and, aside from the head of the family, his wife or wives andchildren, may include one or more collateral relatives. Upon his

death the head of the family was traditionally succeeded by hisbrother by the same mother or by the eldest of his sister's children.Matrilineal succession, however, was considered more and more to

be an obstacle to economic progress and tended to be increasinglyevaded in order to permit the son to inherit the land which hisfather had cultivated and developed. A recent law which forbade

this method of succession, as well as the practice of dowries was well

394

Ivory Coast: Bouak6 Region

SOIL MAP OF THE ENVIRONS OF BOUAKE

X, A;: , R

a/

C./-lk X ,- . .. ' ,/'

Ill' ' ' I ,/ s's,,v

/Ped-M.ly red s.,IS .. th a h,tle fine groel ond day

EzP,ed.-Minnly beige scndy sodls

m Predomisoitly red soils with cliy t d fine grovel oc chistdse bcse

received; and it may be expected that patrilineal succession willrapidly become the rule.

Economic activity

The Central Department has a population of nearly one million,or about one-fourth of the country's total; it is divided into 28 sub-prefectures, each of which is further sub-divided into several cantons.The Department is in a transitional zone between quite differenteconomic regions. With an annual per capita cash income amountingto about CFA francs 5,000 ($20) the standard of living of the Baoul6sis higher than that enjoyed by the S6noufo cultivators of the Sou-danian regions, but much below that of the coffee-growing farmersin the lower Ivory Coast whose money income is about CFA francs20,000 ($80). Situated on the border of the "tree-crop" zone, thisregion has the possibility of growing a variety of cash crops which are

395


impossible to cultivate somewhat to the north. Population densitymay reach 35 per square kilometer in parts adjoining the forest zone,but the average density is somewhat over 10 per square kilometer orabout the same as that for the Ivory Coast as a whole. The town ofBouake, second largest in the country, experienced an increase inpopulation from 42,000 in 1955 to 60,000 in 1963, largely because ofits favorable position on the north-south railroad which makes it amarketing center for the products of the savanna zone.

Crops. Yams are the most characteristic and basic food crop of theBaoule people. It is the crop that requires most of the farmers' time,occupies over half the cultivated land and is the starting point forrotations and mixed cropping. The Baoules have acquired a highlydeveloped technique for its cultivation. Proper selection of variety(early or late) and appropriate planting densities (9,000 plants perhectare) enable them to secure very high yields estimated at morethan 10 tons per hectare. "A harmonious symbiosis of man and en-vironment is thus created, and in referring to the Baoules one cantruly speak of a yam civilization."' Part of the output is marketedand represents an appreciable source of income for the farmers.

Rice growing is traditional in the western part of the CentralDepartment. Upland rice is grown in association with other foodcrops or even with cotton. In the neighborhood of Bouak6 rice is oftengrown in marsh or swamp land. This rice is rarely consumed locally,but marketed in urban areas. It is a profitable crop as yields perhectare may reach three tons and it fetches a price of CFA francs 13per kilogram.

There are many other food crops. Corn and cassava in particularare grown in more or less significant quantities, depending on thedegree of difficulty in surmounting food shortages toward the end ofthe dry season. The Baoul6 farmer also cultivates groundnuts, okra,cucurbits and pimentos. Going from west to east cocoyams andplantain bananas assume importance, while in the neighborhood ofBouak6 groundnuts tend to be replaced by oil palm.

The cultivation of cotton, while traditional among the Baoules,has undergone significant development in recent years. The localBarbadense variety yielded only a total of 1,300 tons of seed cottonin 1960. It was always grown in combination with food crops, usuallyyams. The low density and relatively poor yield of Barbadense haveled to the popularization, from 1960, of a new variety (Allen)-aHirsutum which is less robust and cannot be grown mixed with other

I Service de la Statistique, Etude agricole par sondage dans le Cercle de Bouaki,juillet 1954-janvier 1955 (Ivory Coast, 1955).

396

Ivory Coast: Bouake Region

crops but has a shorter growing period and considerably higheryields. This cotton generally gets four insecticide treatments andoccasional applications of fertilizer. In 1963/64 somewhat over1,200 hectares of the new Allen variety were grown in the CentralDepartment, yielding a rather remarkable output of 1,000 metrictons of seed cotton.

Tobacco has had a long history in the Baoul6 country, but theindigenous variety is only sold locally where it is very popular. Thegrowing of tobacco for industrial processing was introduced onlyrecently. Rio Grande seedlings grown in nurseries are distributed tosome farmers who must be prepared to devote a lot of time to therather delicate drying and curing operation. The cultivation of thistype of tobacco is also made difficult by the need to devote good landto its production, to get proper seedlings and to apply fertilizers.

Coffee is the principal commercial crop of the Department, al-though it is not grown throughout the area. The savanna of theBouak6 region rarely offers suitable conditions for the cultivation ofcoffee; it is in the forest regions of the western (Beoumi, Tiebissou),eastern (M'Bahiakro, Bokanda) and southern (Sinfra, Toumodi,Dimbokro) parts of the Department that good coffee land is found.Coffee was introduced in 1925 but the extension of the area undercultivation was greatest in 1953 and 1954 when coffee prices reachedtheir peak. In 1961 the area planted to coffee was about 50,000hectares, with a density of over 1,000 trees per hectare, and produc-tion was nearly 5,000 tons. The area has since grown even larger,and in many sub-prefectures coffee takes up 60% to 80% of thecultivated land.

Farming. Farming in the Baoule country is characterized by a verycomplex equilibrium which tends to resist innovation. This equilib-rium is one between various crops as well as one between men andwomen. There is a complex of crop rotations and crop combinationsin which men and women both have clearly defined interests. Foodcrops are the primary concern of women, while crops grown solelyor largely for sale are under the control of the men. Yams tend tobe a special case, since it is a man's crop even though a basic foodcrop and women have a right only to that portion which is consumedat home or is required for the purchase of particular small householdrequirements. However, the crops associated with yams or grown inrotation following yams, such as maize, cassava, various types of con-diments, etc., belong to the women. Thus it may prove difficult tochange the crop rotation or to introduce the cultivation of improvedvarieties in pure stands without upsetting the intricate division oflabor and interest between men and women.

397


Techniques of land cultivation vary from region to region andalso from farm to farm. The land is usually allowed to lie fallow for

six years. As a rule yams is the first crop in the rotation, but in the

western part of the region upland rice may take its place. In the

succeeding two or three years either rice or corn or cassava is plantedas the principal crop. The combination of various crops in one field

makes for highly diversified production. Corn, cassava and cotton

will almost always be found in combination with yams; in the forest

regions plantain bananas often appear in combination with young

coffee plants. The introduction of crops in pure stands, particularlyof cotton in the second rotation cycle after a food crop or of tobaccoat the head of a rotation, has not met with serious opposition so long

as the extension of these crops has not proved detrimental to thecrops traditionally grown.

Livestock raising has not developed despite the frequent passage

of herds bound for the south. If it were not for the presence of trypa-nosomiasis the savanna zone of Bouake would be very suitable for

livestock. True, the N'Dama, Baoule or the hybrid N'Dama-Baoul6

breeds are tolerant of trypanosomiasis provided the animal does not

do much work or is reasonably well fed. But the main obstacle lies in

the attitude of the Baoule people themselves who have no livestocktradition, are afraid of animals and do not know how to feed them

or care for them. Moreover, crops are often grown in fields immedi-

ately around the village where freely roaming animals may easilycause damage and altercations. As will be noted later, attempts arenow being made to bring about an integration of agriculture and

animal husbandry.Traditional agricultural practice among the Boual6s involves the

cultivation of yams, together with associated crops, on hills ormounds. The clearing of land and the making of hills are the twomost important tasks. It is generally assumed that 80 work days are

needed to clear one hectare using a hand winch. Clearing is generallylimited to the removal of small stumps that hinder the making of

hills. Hoeing one hectare by hand requires 40 work days, whereas 4days would suffice using a plough on a well-cleared field. Since theintroduction of cotton growing, however, the farmers considerridging the most time-consuming and difficult task. With very fewexceptions only traditional implements are used.

Data gathered from a survey recently made in Bouake region

reveal the remarkable complexity of traditional farming. One mustdistinguish first of all between the Beoumi region east of Bouak6

where rice and coffee are grown and population density reaches 34per square kilometer, and the Brobo-M'Bayakro region to the west

398


which is poorer and population density is no more than about 20

per square kilometer but where nonetheless there is more temporary

labor migration. On the average farm, representative of half of some

250 included in the survey, the area planted to yams was found to

be 0.7 hectares for a family of 6-7 members with 3 active persons.

Despite this common characteristic of Baoul6 farming, the total area

under cultivation, which averaged around 1.15 hectares in the

Brobo-M'Bayakro area, was substantially greater in the Beoumi

region, namely by approximately the area devoted to rice and coffee

(0.36 and 0.8 hectares respectively). Yet there was greater recourse

to paid labor in the former area, where annual expenditures on labor

were CFA francs 1,280-more than the average outlay of CFA francs

515 on Beoumi farms not growing coffee and almost as much as the

CFA francs 1,345 spent by Beoumi farmers who also had coffee.

This disparity is not easy to explain, although the employment of

some migrant labor, primarily from Upper Volta, in both areas

may be partly due to the fact that a considerable number of young

Baoul6s go to work in the Lower Ivory Coast.

Although coffee growing is highly profitable, it has advanced but

little at the expense of other crops; on the other hand, there is rising

competition between cotton, rice and, to a lesser extent, tobacco.

Cotton and irrigated rice compete for labor as both require the

most work towards the end of July and the beginning of August.

Under optimum conditions the yield per hectare is approximately

the same, some CFA francs 30,000. Snuff sold on local markets brings

as much as CFA francs 250 per kilogram, but the demand is limited.

Processed tobacco requires much more care and must be of good

quality to find a market; it then sells for CFA francs 80 the kilogram.

Farmers clearly prefer to sell less tobacco at high prices than much

at a lower rate, especially if the lower-priced tobacco requires more

work.

Means of assistance

Provision of Trained Farming Staff . The Agricultural Service normally

responsible for extension work has tried since 1956 to increase the

number of field agents in order to provide more intensive coverage

of farmers. To this end they sent about one hundred such agents to

work in the Central Department. Each of these was assigned to a

village to give technical assistance to the farmers. This proved of

little avail since the extension workers were insufficiently trained,

and interested in little more than pruning coffee trees. The Depart-

ment still has some forty extension workers who now concentrate

399


particularly on awakening farmers' interest in new techniques. Whenvillages are made receptive in this way, the actual extension work isfor the most part carried on by specialized organizations.

There are a certain number of companies engaged in this spe-cialized extension work. One of these is the Soci6te d'assistance tech-nique et de modernisation agricole en Cote d'Ivoire (SATMACI)whose activity has been reduced and is largely devoted to combatingcocoa pests and diseases in the southern part of the d6partment.Specialized extension services are supplied for cotton by the Com-pagnie francaise pour le developpernent des fibres textiles (CFDT)and for tobacco by the Compagnie agricole et industrielle des tabacsafricains (CAITA). The first of these, for example, has an extensionagent (moniteur) for 10-15 hectares of cotton, which in effect meansone for several villages since the area planted to cotton is still verylimited. The second is basically interested in the buying of tobacco,but provides seedlings to the farmer and some advice on the growingof tobacco. To complete this account of field organizations, it shouldbe mentioned that there were also Centres de coop6ration et decoordination agricole (CCCA) which, until their abolition in 1964,were supposed to promote and assist agricultural marketing coopera-tives.

Pilot Sectors. A special pilot project carried out by the CentralAgricultural Experimental Station (Station centrale d'experimenta-tion agricole or SCEA) laid the technical foundation for the subse-quent CIDR program. SCEA acted on the principle that there wasneed for an intermediary stage between the development of newmethods on research stations on the one hand and their general dis-semination among farmers by an extension service on the other hand.This stage was to consist of trying out the new methods at the level ofthe village which was considered to be the social unit from whichagricultural development had to radiate. A good knowledge of thevillage and of the problems raised by the practical applications of thetechniques developed on the research station was expected to help infinding useful and practicable solutions which could be applied by allof the farmers working under conditions similar to those in the pilotvillage. During this trial the agricultural research station was repre-sented in the pilot village by a rural adviser who guided the develop-ment work.

The village of Bokakouamekro, lying some 45 kilometers east ofBouak6 in the Brobo sub-prefecture, was the first experimental pre-extension pilot sector (secteur pilote experimental de pre-vulgarisation).Following an agricultural and socio-economic survey, SCEA pre-pared a development program which was carried out with the

400


consent of the villagers. The project, begun in 1960, resulted in anincrease in the amount of work devoted to agriculture. The total

area cultivated per worker has risen in three crop years from 1.4 to2 hectares without the help of draft animals. A regrouping of landmade possible a new rotation system as well as the introduction of

Allen cotton. The latter has more than doubled the total cash incomeof the village. With the proceeds of fields set aside for collectivecultivation, the village was able to acquire a herd of cattle.

The lessons, both positive and negative, of this experience with thepilot sector have been surnmed up as follows in a recent study:2

"(a) a permanent extension staff can bring about a considerable in-

crease in efforts by farmers, resulting in a significant rise in moneyincome; (b) the consciousness of common interest is not very marked,

so that it is difficult to get people to come regularly to work on col-lective fields or to tend to collective herds; (c) traditional land tenureoffers little resistance to the regrouping of fields and crops (90% of

the land cleared in 1962 was pooled and regrouped); (d) the increasein income which was very rapid at the outset tends to level off quitequickly unless human effort is supplemented by some other source

of energy; (e) with respect to livestock, animal traction can best beinitiated by using animals to draw carts, and livestock health requiresclose attention; (f) leaders do emerge and can be used to bring along

others; and (g) the key to getting the confidence of the village maylie in the solution of non-agricultural problems which are of greatimportance to the village such as water supply in the case of Boka-kouam6kro."

Other pilot sectors have since been created. On the one hand,Bokakouamekro villagers had reacted so favorably to the interestshown in them that it seemed worthwhile to repeat this experience.On the other hand, it was also realized that this village was notnecessarily typical of an extensive area. Not only had the villagebeen relatively isolated, but its agricultural conditions were char-acteristic only of those of the area underlaid by a pre-Cambrianbasement complex and marked by wooded hills and valleys. Asecond village, Douakankro, was accordingly selected for another

pilot project. In this case efforts concentrated on the reclamation ofmarsh land for rice paddies, but apparently the development of riceproduction which was to be done by the village collectively hasencountered severe competition from the extension of individual

2 Claude Ripailles, in Etude socio-economique de la region de Bouaki, SEDES,Paris (unpublished).

401


cotton fields. A third pilot sector, B6hek6, was started only in 1964in the granitic zone to the west of Bouak6.

Animation Rurale. One of the objectives of animation rurale was tolighten the burden on the agricultural extension staff by trainingfarmers who would be able to set an example to other farmers bytheir successful application of new methods and to act as inter-mediaries between the villagers and the extension service. In practicethis could, of course, be achieved only in the long run since con-siderable staff was bound to be required to select, recruit, train andgive initial support to such animateurs.

In the Ivory Coast attempts have been made to train both youngmen and adult farmers as pioneers in rural improvement. This studyis not concerned with the training aspects and effectiveness of theprogram for youths. Suffice it to say that this training is being donewithin the framework of the so-called Civic Service (service civique) ofthe Army. Groups of youths are trained by putting them on farmswhich they must work under the direction of French or Israelitechnicians. The European Fund of the Common Market alsostarted to finance at one time four rural youth camps but these werediscontinued because they overlapped with the Civic Service.

It is the CIDR which has undertaken the work of animation ruraleamong adult farmers. The results obtained by the Agricultural Serv-ices since 1962 in Bokakouam6kro appeared so conclusive that it wasconsidered opportune to proceed with the more general applicationand dissemination of the approaches used in the pilot sector. A ruraldevelopment zone (ZODER) was accordingly created to integrateservices devoted to agricultural extension and animation rurale in thepromotion of this program.

CIDR's activities

The CIDR seeks to apply the generally accepted principle thatany program in the agricultural field will work in the long run onlyif it changes and is in accord with the changing mentality of thefarmers. In other words, action should be directed at changes of aqualitative nature which will not find quantitative expression untillater. This principle also implies an empirical approach which triesto determine the needs expressed by farmers and to introduce im-proved methods both for satisfying these needs and influencing them.This requires time to study the situation and to make the farmersreceptive. CIDR spent two years on this type of probing in thevicinity of Bouake and did not really start its work officially andsystematically until 1963 when the Brobo operation was launched.

402

Ivory Coast: Bouake' Region

The preliminary action near Bouake

It was at the beginning of the 1961 crop year that CIDR began

this initial work in the Bouak6 region. Upon the request of the Gov-

ernment, the Benedictine monastery located at Bouake had agreed

to sponser a training center for animateurs ruraux (Centre de formation

d'animateurs ruraux or CFAR) as a means of promoting agricultural

improvement and asked CIDR to take charge of it. An agent of the

CIDR was to divide his time between contacting villages for the

purpose of recruiting and advising farmer-trainees and the CFAR

where the training proper of such animateurs was to be organized.

The CFAR at Bouake was active during the 1961 and 1962 crop

years following which it was transferred to the Brobo sub-prefecture.

The training imparted at the Bouake center made it possible to

develop the methods currently employed in all CFAR centers of the

Central Department. In essence, short training sessions of four to six

days each are attended by farmers sent by their respective villages.

These same farmers meet each month during the agricultural season

which runs from May to November. In 1961 and 1962 the CFAR

organized two courses each month.

The area of operations in 1961 was the canton nearest to Bouake;

the canton's chief town, Kouassi Ble Kro, is five kilometers east of

the CFAR and at the center of 33 villages with a population of

4,400. In 1961, 37 trainees from 20 villages attended the meetings.

Of the 37 trainees 21 came back during the last two months of the

agricultural season. To quote a CFAR spokesman: "Under the

circumstances the first recruitment could not be done strictly enough.

At the outset, some candidates came to us in the hope of finding

employment. The villages themselves had not been made receptive

to our program or our methods. Since we did not give the animateurs

any pay or any diplomas their role had to be explained at length so

both the animation trainees and the villages as a whole understood

it." Yet training and field work together had yielded some results

by the end of the season. In 1962 groups of anywhere froin 4 to 32

persons had been formed in four villages to cooperate in growing

certain crops; one village had built a bridge; new cash crops (cotton

and tobacco) were being introduced; two stables had been built

cooperatively to shelter improved bulls. Moreover, a CIDR instruc-

tor in crafts at Kouassi Ble Kro had made an attempt to promote

integration of crafts and agriculture. A cooperative brick kiln was

established with the dual objective of developing new artisans within

a rural milieu and of improving rural housing.

During 1962 the scope of the program was extended. The avail-

ability of two permanent instructors, one at Kouassi Ble Kro and

403


the other at Nbangaopri west of Bouake, enabled CIDR to drawmore villages into its field of action. Thirty-two villages were con-tacted. The total number of CFAR trainees was 67, with an averageattendance of 10 per session. By the end of 1962, 16 of the villageswere ready to adopt overall improvement programs. In 6 villagesrice fields were reclaimed for cultivation; cotton growing was intro-duced in 9 villages, and tobacco cultivation in 7.

Operations of the zone for rural developmentIn April 1963 the Government of the Ivory Coast declared the

sub-prefecture of Brobo and part of the sub-prefectures of Bouak6and of Didi6vi to be a rural developinent zone (zone de de'veloppementrural or ZODER). This step reflected a desire to integrate and co-ordinate programs for rural development, whether technical, eco-nomic or social in their nature. In this effort at integtation an im-portant place was given to animation rurale. Under an agreementbetween the Government and the CIDR, the latter was charged withresponsibility for this activity which was to be carried out throughthe CFAR.

The organization with ZODER is based on a clear distinctionbetween agricultural extension proper and animation rurale. Thedirector of ZODER was given jurisdiction over (1) an extensionservice consisting on the one hand of the specialized extension work-ers of CFDT and CAITA and on the other hand of a number ofgeneral but technically-oriented extension agents called conseillersruraux of the Agricultural Service, and (2) parallel to this, the servicefor animation rurale set up by CIDR and consisting in the essence ofthe personnel of the CFAR. The head of the CFAR was to haveunder him a field staff of conseillers d'animation in charge of recruitingand advising the animateurs who were being trained. In general termsthe service for animation rurale was to influence, stimulate and guidefarmers by keeping permanent contacts with the villagers.

In 1963 the ZODER had a staff of five conseillers ruraux and threeconseillers d'animation. The CFAR established in Brobo was to carryout the work of animation in 41 villages. This program was extendedto 80 villages in 1964 with the help of eight conseillers ruraux and sixconseillers d'animation. As of the end of that year there were threeCFAR in the ZODER of Brobo, namely those of Brobo, Kan andDidi6vi. The ZODER was first under the director of the CFAR ofBrobo, but since 1964 has been directed by a representative of theAgricultural Service.

Within the ZODER farmers might have contacts with representa-tives of no less than four services or companies dealing with agricul-

404


ture, quite apart from those of government services responsible forother aspects of development, such as education, public health,housing, etc. The director of ZODER was supposed to coordinatethe first four services but found this task difficult. In 1964 a com-mittee was set up for the Central Department to bring togetherrepresentatives of all the organizations concerned and to draw up acommon program. Similarly a Directorate of Agriculture was set upto coordinate all the agricultural services in the Department. How-ever, a fully satisfactory solution was not achieved. There was anapparent need for a single extension service which would be multi-purpose in character, that is, deal with all of the aspects of agri-cultural development. Instead, however, there remained a numberof services dealing with the farmer to the latter's confusion. This ledthe government in 1964 to envisage the establishment of regionaldevelopment companies which would also be in charge of all exten-sion work. However, their precise objectives and competence werestill to be clarified. It was certainly not clear how the work of anima-tion rurale as carried out by CIDR would fit into such a regional de-velopment organization.

The role of CIDR

CIDR is only one participant in an integrated action programhaving certain technical and economic objectives. It follows that itswork cannot be isolated from general rural extension work. Nor canthe CIDR be credited with definite achievements that could beexpressed in statistical figures. Its principal concern has been tomake the farmers progressively more receptive to the introductionof new methods. At the same tiine it was actively interested in themethods themselves and in assisting in a practical way in their appli-cation. Yet among the various aspects of CIDR's program it is stillpossible to distinguish between work directly affecting village societyand attitudes as a whole and work of a substantive, technical nature.

Scope and Methods of Training. The training of staff for animationrurale was begun in 1964 by CIDR. Until then the Company hadrecruited conseillers d'animation from among rural youths with primaryschool certificates, giving them field training by assigning them to itsEuropean supervisory personnel (assistants techniques). This provedinsufficient once the work was extended to several sub-prefectures.The Government of the Ivory Coast decided in 1964 to establish aschool for the training of conseillers d'animation and entrusted toCIDR the direction of this training center (CFCA), located in Brobo.

At the end of 1964, a first group of 20 trainees was attending theCFCA. These men had been selected from among 200 candidates.

405


Since the number of children in primary school in the Bouak6

region is about 30-40% of those of school-going age (this is also the

national average), it was not difficult to find an adequate number

of candidates. Three-fourths of the one-year training course is

taken up by practical work spent in two-week training periods in

the villages. In this way the young trainee is brought into contact

with villages which have not yet been the object of animation rurale.

He is encouraged to inquire into all aspects of the village economy

and society that may be relevant to his work-about its origin and

history, the size and composition of its population, the leading peo-

ple, the functions of village authorities, the extent of schooling,

housing conditions, water supply and public health, the availability

and fertility of land, the types of crops grown and their marketing,

etc. From interviews with trainees it was evident that their practical

and theoretical training had stimulated them and made them

curious about their environment. While it would be an exaggeration

to say that they had made socio-economic investigations, they had

undoubtedly acquired a better understanding of village problems

and of the factors that were likely to condition the acceptance of

new methods. Certainly the level of the first group of trainees ap-

peared extremely satisfactory.The training of farmer animateurs is obviously CIDR's principal

function. It is around the animateurs that the various measures to

raise the standards of village production and life are organized; and

these measures themselves serve to train them. They are volunteers,

receive no pay and usually come on the initiative of a group of village

farmers who have some interest in making progress. Only adults

actively engaged in farming are chosen. The CIDR obviously

wants to find and train as animateur a farmer who is likely to play a

leading part in the life of the village, but since the choice is left

in principle to the village and it may take time for the village to

develop confidence in the CFAR, the right candidate who is truly

representative of the village does not always emerge at first. At times

several candidates must be tried and trained before an effective

animateur is found. In any case, the animateurs trained by the CIDR

appeared to have a remarkably high standard of knowledge and

personal influence.Animateurs come for training only a few days during every month

of the agricultural season. Longer training sessions would undoubt-

edly interfere too much with the trainees' own farm work and would

also tend to cut them off from their own environment. The trainees

are accompanied to the CFAR by the conseillers d'animation who are

stationed in the field and who work with the trainees under the

406

Ivorv Coast: Bouake' Region

direction of the resident head of the Center. Instruction is in thevernacular language. Nearly three-quarters of the time of the sessionis devoted to practical work. This focuses on the cultivation of newcrops and improved practices that can be illustrated at various timesof the agricultural season. Visits to the pilot sector are organized inorder to demonstrate the usefulness of new crops and methods ofproduction. Training is concerned not only with technical improve-ments in agriculture but also with problemns of community organiza-tion such as cooperatives, communal work, choice of projects ofcommunity interest, etc. To the extent that the trainees generallydo not know how to read or write, it is evidently difficult to givethem an adequate idea of how to mnanage cooperatives and coopera-tive inarketing.

New crops and methods are demonstrated as far as possible in thefield; and the trainees are expected to learn in large part by doingthe work themselves. However, a wholly satisfactory place for carry-ing out this practical work has not yet been found. In 1963 it wasdone on farmers' fields and on the agricultural research station. Onthe latter the environment was somewhat artificial and the anima-

teurs also found themselves in contact with paid farm laborers whosewhole approach to their task was different. On the other hand, whenthe work was done on actual farms, the benefits received by theowners of such farms often occasioned jealousy. It was accordinglydecided that the CFAR should have its own farm. Yet this alsocreates problems. While the CFAR at capacity will handle twogroups of 20 trainees each every month, each group will be at theCenter only for five days. In order to till and maintain the farmproperly it will therefore presumably be necessary either to keep itvery small or to use hired labor.

In 1963, 37 animateurs completed their training at the BroboCFAR. They represented 22 villages, showing that in some casesthere was mrore than one animateur per village. The five CFAR op-erating in the Bouake region in 1964 trained around sixty farmers.

CIDR is also engaged in training artisans. As already indicated,this program had been started in 1961 at Kouassi Ble Kro nearBouake with a trial cooperative in brick making. This was abandonedin favor of apprenticeship training at a center. During a continuousnine-rnonth stay at the crafts training center, young peasants havethe opportunity of learning certain trades such as woodworking, iron-working and masonry. Beginning in 1965 these trainees are also togrow crops for the purpose of supplying the center which previouslywas subsidized. The CIDR wants these trainees to continue farmingand to use their crafts to supplement their farm income. In 1964 the

407


six trainees lodged at the center were learning woodworking, withthe fabrication of yokes and wheels. It is not yet certain whether itwill be possible to give each one training in a number of crafts.

The Group Approach Within the Village. Within each village theCIDR works largely through "pre-cooperative" groups. Pre-cooperative groups are set up in the village when the rural promotionadviser makes contact with them. In order to avoid confusion withthe cooperative experiment conducted by the former AgriculturalCooperation and Coordination Centers (CCCA), the CIDR callsthese de facto groups "societies." These societies are composed offarmers who have decided to carry on in common certain activitiesproposed by the CIDR. Usually this activity is the joint farming ofone or two plots. When the groups are kept fairly small, this type ofcollective group farming has had some success in achieving its ob-jectives which may be the demonstration of new crops and practices,the development of a community spirit or the earning of some moneyfor community projects or activities. Group farming on this smallscale has enabled about 30 villages to earn some money for commun-ity purposes. Most of the "societies" invested their first profits invillage trade. Others bought a team of oxen (2 villages), brick-making machines (5 villages) or, in one case, a First Aid kit. Thesepre-cooperative societies do not yet have legal status; and theiroperation has not yet posed any management problems since theyare not yet engaged in credit or sales operations. CFDT marketsthe cotton and CAITA the tobacco, but the marketing of foodstuffshas been a problem since the CCCA disappeared.

Action to Improve Agriculture. In the promotion of improvements inagriculture CIDR was greatly assisted by the research previouslydone by the central agricultural experimental station (SCEA) andthe cotton research station operated by the Institut de recherches ducoton et des textiles exotiques (IRCT) both established at Bouak6 formany years and working in close collaboration. SCEA studiesproblems of crop rotation and maintenance of fertility; it has beendevising improved methods of cultivation such as tied ridges andanti-erosion barriers under natural vegetation along the contour,crop rotations with a greater number of commercial crops (uplandrice, tobacco and cotton), cover crops (stylosanthes and desmodium)that can be grazed and can replace natural fallow while at the sametime shortening its duration. It is also under the auspices of SCEAthat the pilot projects have been carried out (see page 400). TheIRCT Station has developed the Allen cotton varieties with theirshort vegetative period and a high yield potential as well as themethods for growing them, dates and density of sowing, fertilizer

408


applications and insecticide treatments. Since all of this researchwas conducted with a very marked concern for adaptation to localphysical human and economic conditions, the dissemination of theresults through extension work has been markedly facilitated.

The regrouping of fields is the major technical theme which invarious forms has been used to introduce modern practices. Normallyfields are very scattered and isolated. Under the new method in-terested farmers cultivate adjoining fields in a single block whileretaining complete control over the cultivation of their own fields.This regrouping of land takes quite some time, for each year itmust be extended in a coordinated fashion until enough land isincluded to cover the entire rotation in crops and fallow. Theshortening of the fallow period by using cover crops being tested atSCEA may make it possible to accelerate and stabilize these regroup-ings. In general, regrouping takes place within extended families,so that there are often several regroupings in each village. Otherpeasants may later join the group; and in the end it is hoped thatall of the village lands will be regrouped. This action is differentfrom the total rearrangement of all the land belonging to a villagesince that entails fixing the limits of such land in relation to that ofneighboring villages. Disputes over land between villages are ex-tremely bitter and fall within the jurisdiction of the Government.

The regrouping of fields has a favorable effect on the developmentof cattle raising. The damage caused to crops by cattle had led to areduction in the size of herds and the cultivation of fields far fromthe village, making it more difficult to supervise crops and requiringmore time to travel to and from the fields. The regrouped lands canbe tended much more easily and can even be protected by some sortof fencing. Moreover, the reorganization also makes it possible toset aside specific areas for livestock.

The reorganization of land has benefited crops as well. When it isdecided to regroup, the Agricultural Service conducts a soil surveyto choose the most favorable area for block cultivation. The block isthen divided into strips along the contour, and each cultivated stripis separated by two or three meters of land kept under natural vegeta-tion to combat erosion. Block cultivation also greatly facilitatesspraying of cotton fields as well as the advisory work of the agri-cultural extension service and the CFDT agents. Construction of atrack to the block permits the use of carts and even of trucks.

The farmers are conscious of the feeling of solidarity which theregrouping of fields has brought about. The possibility of going towork together and of having just one person guard the fields is animportant factor. It also permits a neighbor to take care of a field

409


whose owner is for some reason temporarily incapable of tending it.The groups which have initiated this reorganization of land are oftenthe basis of the "societies" established in the villages.

The introduction of new rotations permits improvement of thetraditional crops and the adoption of industrial crops. The researchstation and the pilot sector have developed crop plans adapted tothe traditions of the villages and to the ecological conditions of theregion. In the Baoul6 savanna the proposed rotation always includesyams at the head of the rotation during the first year. In the secondyear maize or groundnuts are grown during the first rainy season,followed by Allen cotton in the second cropping season. Since thegrowing cycle of Allen cotton is shorter than that of the old varieties,it has been possible to plant this crop during the second rainy season.This has greatly facilitated the expansion of cotton cultivation,because land can be prepared and sown to cotton at a time when thefarmers do not have much to do. During the third year of rotation,rice, peanuts or yams are grown. The farmers then allow their fieldsto lie fallow for two or three years. Cash crops, such as cotton orgroundnuts, are thus introduced without necessarily increasing thecultivated area; and the traditional crops benefit from the new tech-niques applied to farming methods as a whole. Apart from the croprotation mentioned above, rice production has been reintroducedhere and there by reclaiming rice paddies that had been abandoned;and, as already indicated, the cultivation of tobacco for industrialprocessing has been started. Basically the choice of crops has beenleft to the farmers.

Association of animal husbandry with farming is the third greatsubject of extension and is also the hardest to propagate. The woodedsavanna of this region affords plenty of good grazing for cattle, butit also harbors the tsetse fly. The difficulties standing in the way ofanimal husbandry have already been mentioned. To the extent thatlivestock are kept they are not used for traction. The use of ox-drawnplows and cultivators is in any event not easy, because the land israther heavily wooded and difficult to clear off all the roots andstumps which hinder animal-drawn cultivation. The CIDR triedduring 1964 to familiarize some of the animateurs with draft oxen.Under agreement with a Be3oumi butcher who keeps some cattle,two animateurs were installed on his farm for six months to learnfarming with draft animals. This farm is also used as a demonstrationcenter for the other animateurs in the region. Since the chief bottleneckin traditional farming has been land preparation with the hoe, theCIDR is seeking first of all to introduce the use of the plow to preparethe land for cotton and to make the hills for yam cultivation. At the

410

Ivorv Coast: Bouake Region

CFAR in Diabo instruction is given in the handling of plows and

other implements. Three trainees come to the center for a fortnight,

then return to their village farms for a fortnight, after which they go

to another village for two weeks where a Fulani stockherder intro-

duces them to stockraising. This type of training began early in

October 1964 and is to be continued as long as there is sufficient rain

to permit working of the land.

Plans called for the establishment of 6 new centers in 1965 and of

7 new ones in 1966. The savanna region of the Central Department

is divided into five zones. The ZODER of Brober is the base for the

first one; and the ZODER of Beoumi and Diabo, the base for the

second. A second CFAR was planned for 1965 in the sub-prefectures

of Bouake and Didieve, which was to bring the number of CFAR

in the first zone to five. In the second zone, three new centers were

to be set up in 1965, two in the sub-prefecture of Sakasso and one in

that of Botro. Lastly, a center installed near Katiola was to initiate

the program in the third zone. The opening of these six new CFAR

depended on the recruitment of 24 conseillers d'animation. This might

be a bottleneck. New staff to direct these CFAR was also needed;

it was necessary to recruit five CFAR directors as early as 1965, and

also two assistant technicians to head up the new zones to be estab-

lished in 1966. The heads of the zones were to be subordinate to a

chief of operations for the entire savanna zone of the Center Depart-

ment. The CIDR was also contemplating two other operations in

the regions of Abengourou and Korogho.

The CIDR considers the establishment of one CFAR for each

30,000 inhabitants to be the optimum. The four conseillers d'animation

who assist the chief of the CFAR each look after somewhat less than

10,000 inhabitants, corresponding to about 15 villages. The cost

of investment in buildings, vehicles, etc. for one center is on the

order of CFA francs 2.5 million and annual operating costs, includ-

ing staff salaries, amount to CFA francs 3 million. CIDR's entire

operation in the Central Department during the period 1964-1970

is to entail an expenditure of about CFA francs 780 million, including

76 million for investment.

Conclusions

CIDR's program of animation rurale in the Bouake region has

yielded some interesting concrete results and demonstrated certain

potentialities even though it has been going on for only a few years.

At the same time its approach has raised a number of problems

which have not been fully resolved. It would be well to review briefly

411


the factors that have contributed to its success as well as the natureof the continuing problems.

The effectiveness of animation rurale depends on getting the con-fidence of the villages; and this in turn is largely determined by theorientation and training of the staff. In the selection of both itsEuropean and Ivory Coast personnel CIDR appears to have donean outstanding job. The small foreign staff, consisting primarily ofstill rather young men from various European countries, is obviouslycapable and dedicated to its work. It is uncertain, however, whetherenough of such personnel can be found as CIDR's area of operationsis extended. The training of indigenous conseillers d'animation and offarmer animateurs seems to have been well calculated to stimulate theintellectual curiosity of the trainees and to promote a good under-standing of the various environmental factors in the village whichcondition receptivity and progress. The interest of most of theanimateurs in charge has been aroused, and, through them, the in-terest of a considerable portion of the villagers.

The conception of introducing changes through various ad hocgroups of farmers formed with the help of the animateur and the ad-vice of the conseiller d'animation appears to have worked out well inpractice. The group approach has made it possible to avoid the iso-lation which the individual farmer in a traditional society oftenexperiences when he seeks to make progress by himself. While groupaction has been primarily confined to measures in the field of agri-culture, some of it has been directed toward other types of villageimprovements. Not all group activities have been equally successful.Group or collective cultivation of certain fields (champs collectifs) hashad some limited success in demonstrating new crops or methods ofcultivation and in earning some money for village improvements,but in most cases the standards of cultivation have tended to fallwell below those on farms tilled by individual families. On the otherhand, groups have been very effective in initiating the reorganiza-tion of scattered fields cultivated by individual farmers into blockswhere regular crop rotations, soil conservation and better supervisioncan be more easily ensured.

Such success as the CIDR has had is in no small measure due tothe preparatory work of the agricultural research station and thespecial cotton research station. The Bouak6 region is a demonstrationof the way in which applied research and extension work should beeffectively linked. In the last analysis no program of animation ruralecan promote receptivity to change unless it can demonstrate thatit is possible to make changes in traditional agriculture which areworkable and effective in raising income. CIDR could take advan-

412

Ivory Coast: Bouake' Region

tage of new rotations and methods which the agricultural researchstation had developed on its own farm and then successfully testedin pilot projects carried out on farmers' holdings in the village.Similarly, the cotton research station had developed cotton varietiesand perfected their methods of cultivation in such a way that thiscrop could be rather easily fitted into the farmer's crop rotation.

One major problem remains, and that is the eventual relationshipbetween the work of animation rurale and that of agricultural extensionin the more technical sense. Basically, the idea is that animation ruraleshould initially create among farmers a receptivity to innovation andthat the more technically oriented agricultural service should thenadvise farmers on specific ways and ineans of improving their agri-culture. However, experience in the Bouake region indicates thatanimation rurale and agricultural extension work proper cannot easilybe separated. In large part receptivity to change can be promotedonly by demonstrating the practicability and worthwhileness ofspecific innovations. Thus CIDR has in effect taken on the responsi-bilities of a multi-purpose extension service which concentrateslargely on concrete measures to modernize agriculture, but alsodevotes some attention to other village improvements. In this role,there are first of all certain problems of its relationship to the regulargovernment agricultural extension service which is not very wellmanned but does have a certain amount of personnel. Up to thepresent, the two services have worked side by side, with the personnelof the agricultural service primarily supplementing the personnelpreoccupied with animation rurale. It is difficult, however, to keep twosuch services cooperating harmoniously. In theory, of course, theone dealing with animation rurale could be phased out when farmershave been conditioned to accept change readily. However, recep-tivity in a rural environment is likely to be a continuing problem;and the real question is whether a separate service concerned withanimation rurale should not be rendered unnecessary by reorientingthe agricultural service in such a way as to make it more consciousof the factors critically determining farmers' willingness to acceptadvice and guidance and of the ways in which they can be induced tochange.

Whatever organization or organizations eventually do the generalextension work, there is still the problem of the relations betweenthat organization and those which, under arrangements with theGovernment of the Ivory Coast, offer specialized advice and serviceswith respect to particular crops such as cotton, tobacco, cocoa, etc.The need for such specialized organizations cannot in general bechallenged, but it is important that their extension work among

413


farmers be effectively coordinated with that carried out by otherorganizations. Experience in the Bouak6 region indicates that thefarmer can easily be confused and antagonized by too many ap-proaches. It seems important that the specialized services madeavailable by certian organizations for particular crops be channeledas much as possible through a more general extension service andthat the specialized knowledge of crop organizations be used largelyto train and advise the personnel of this general extension service.

414

6. TANZANIA: AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT INSUKUMALAND

Introduction

For some four decades Sukuinaland in Tanzania has been the

object of special attention from those concerned with agricultural

development. The area's agricultural and livestock production have

expanded rather rapidly, particularly during the last decade, but

in directions and in ways which have often been the despair of pro-

fessional agriculturists and veterinarians.

Sukumaland-the land of the Sukuma, the largest tribe in Tan-

zania-comprises today five districts and an area of 17,000 square

miles which supports a population estimated currently at about 1.4

million together with some 3.5 million cattle and 3 million sheep

and goats.' Extending inland from the southern and southeastern

shores of Lake Victoria, it lies at an altitude of 3,700 feet to 4,700

feet and consists largely of flat and gently rolling land punctuated

by occasional granite outcroppings. It comprises a considerable

variety of soil types ranging from light, extremely permeable and

erodable hillsands to heavy impermeable black cotton or "mbuga"

soils. Although large areas were formerly under bush, most of

Sukumaland consists today of a virtually treeless "cultivation

steppe." Rainfall varies from 24" to 45" per year and tends to be

erratic and uncertain, particularly in areas at some distance from

the Lake.2 It is divided between the closing months of the calendar

I Of the 1.4 million about 1.1 million are Sukutna; the balance, other tribesincluding Nyamwezi, Zinza and Kongo among others. The five districts gen-erally included in Sukumnaland are Mwanza Rural, Geita, Kwimba, Maswaand Shinyanga. Since 1957 the Sukurna have also pushed into BiharamuloDistrict along the Lake shore. The actual area of the five districts is 19,050square miles, but the land area is only about 17,000 square miles. Livestockfigures are estimated.

2 Average rainfall recorded by stations with records of five years or more is asfollows:

1. Shinyanga (inland district)-25" to 32" by seven out of nine stations,with five recording about 30";

2. Maswa (inland district)-24" to 31" by seven stations;3. Mwanza-32" to 43" by five out of six stations, with four recording

around 40"-4. Kwimba-30" to 36" by five stations; and5. Geita-37" to 51" by nine stations, with seven recording about 40".


year and a longer season that may stretch from late February toearly May, although in the areas bordering on the Lake there tendsto be a dip rather than a complete cessation of rain between thesetwo periods. Grazing becomes scarce every year toward the end ofthe long dry season, and severe droughts which tend to recur everyfive to seven years cause considerable damage to crops and heavyinroads on livestock holdings. The water problem is aggravated bythe virtual lack of any permanent streams.

SUKUMALAND

m m 60 60 . .5 006066 0-0

-I

Sukuma society and economy

The Bantu-speaking Sukuma have traditionally been grouped in aconsiderable number of chiefdoms which never have been unitedunder a paramount chief. Although the chiefs through their headmennormally allocated land, their control seems never to have beenstrongly authoritarian, partly because there has always been empty

416

Tanzania: Sukumaland

land to which people could stake a claim by clearing. Their influence

has declined drastically since the advent of independence, for local

committees representative of Government and the TANU political

party have largely supplanted them and taken over the power to

allocate land. In any event the mnost important socio-economic unit

within the Sukuma tribe has apparently been the extended family

with a depth of no more than three generations. Within this unit,

the homestead (Kaya) of the monogamous or polygamous "nuclear"

family assumes greater importance, particularly because the role of

primogeniture in land inheritance, together with the availability of

new land, have created both the need and the opportunity for

younger sons to stake out farms of their own.

The Sukuma have long led a rather isolated life. Their land was

not traversed by major trade routes which brought them into con-

tinuing contact with the outside world, or bounded by European

farms or settlements. Their wants were easily satisfied within their

own and adjoining regions, since there was for the most part ample

and relatively fertile land for the production of food and a suitable

cash crop (cotton) as population expanded and expectations began

to rise. There was thus little or no incentive for the Sukuma to be-

come migrant workers and in this way become acquainted with

economic or cultural values different from their own. To this day

only a very small percentage of Sukuma have ever left their native

land. Their interest in education, although developing, is still rather

restricted; according to the 1957 census, the Sukuma had one of the

lowest literacy rates in the country. Similarly, while the desire for

money income has undoubtedly become quite prevalent, the material

ambitions of the Sukuma have always tended to lag behind those to

which successive governments have tried to make them aspire.

Traditional socio-cultural values continue to play an important role

and limit the willingness of the Sukuma to change their work habits

in such a way so as to maximize their incomes. The widespread

incidence of bilharzia, malaria, dysentery, hook worm and other

debilitating diseases is another factor inhibiting an all-out effort to

raise living standards.The Sukuma are both farmers and livestock herders. Bulrush

millet and sorghum used to be their principal food grains, but in

recent years maize has tended to become the dominant cereal.

Cassava, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, chick peas, and green gram

are other food crops of some significance. Intercropping of food

crops, particularly maize and legumes and maize and cassava, is

traditionally practised. Cotton is by far the most important cash

crop, though rice and sisal also contribute some cash income. The

417


Sukuma have always attached great importance to livestock andparticularly cattle, not only as a source of food, but also as a meansof establishing social ties and discharging social obligations and ofsafeguarding their security. The distribution of livestock variesenormously, however, for some Suktimia apparently have no stockat all and a minority of the population is reported to own the bulkof the stock. In the more densely populated and higher rainfall areasof Sukumaland, there is a tendency to concentrate on farming, whileherding is more important in the more sparsely settled areas of lowerrainfall to the south and east. The availability of the heavy mbugasoils, which are difficult to till and are thus generally used for grazing,is also an important determinant of dependence on livestock.

Directions of development

The history of Sukumaland over the last five decades illustrates awide range of development problems encountered in crop and animalhusbandry and has also witnessed many approaches to those prob-lems. It is marked by simultaneous efforts to expand and intensifycultivation; by attempts to control grazing, settlement and methodsof cropping in the interest of protecting land resources; by thewidespread use of ox-drawn, and more recently, tractor-drawn im-plements in agriculture; and by the increasing role which coopera-tives with government support have assumed in the marketing andprocessing, and even the production, of agricultural commodities.

Government programs and policies directed toward the develop-ment of Sukumaland have changed with respect to both focus andmethods over the years. Initially the Government's principal pre-occupation was with the encroachment of bush and the attendantspread of the tsetse fly which by the advent of World War I hadconfined the Sukuma to a diminishing area which was only abouta fourth of that potentially available to them. In the inter-war periodtherefore bush and tsetse clearance was begun, and after WorldWar II this effort was greatly accelerated and supplemented by thedevelopment of water supplies in the newly cleared areas. Simul-taneously, as the Sukumna occupied an even larger land area, theGovernment put more and more emphasis on the conservation ofland and the intensification of production. Agricultural, livestockand administrative officers became increasingly fearful that theSukuma's extensive cultivation and uncontrolled grazing practiceswould lead quickly to the degradation of all the land over which theSukuma were spreading rapidly. This concern found its main ex-pression in the Ten-Year Sukumaland Development Scheme whichwas initiated in 1947-48. Apart from continuing bush clearance and

418


water supply development, the Scheme sought to (1) subject the

settlement of new land to certain controls, (2) establish a better

balance between the number of cattle and the capacity of grazing

land by imposing compulsory offtake quotas, and (3) increase the

per-acre yield of crops, particularly cotton, by requiring certain

measures of soil conservation, improved cultivation practices and an

association of livestock with crop husbandry in such a way so as to

provide the manure deemed necessary for soil fertility. Underlying

this program was a desire to establish certain sound ratios between

population and livestock on the one hand and the availability of

water supplies, grazing and crop land on the other hand-ratios

which were incorporated in what became known as the "Sukuma-

land Equation." Although there was rarely any rigorous insistence

on applying this "equation," partly because of staff and financial

shortages, the principle of controlled land use implicit in it set the

tone for development policy.

The various operational aspects of the Scheme were coordinated

at the district level through Development Teams consisting of all the

governmnent officers concerned and enforced and partly financed

through the Native Authorities who were organized into a Sukuma-

land Federation for this purpose, and given considerable taxing and

other financial responsibility.' Since the administration was evi-

dently convinced that there was neither the time nor the trained staff

necessary to persuade the majority of farmers and herders of the

desirability of the measures contained in the Development Scheme,

primary reliance was placed on the enforcement of a series of regula-

tions by the Native Authorities. These regulations, backed up by

various sanctions, primarily fines, governed not only the conditions

of resettlement and the marketing of cattle, but also required soil-

conservation practices such as tie-ridging on hillsands in order to

conserve moisture and prevent erosion, and prescribed improvements

in agricultural practices such as in the case of cotton for which line

sowing, seeding rates and spacing requirements were all laid down.

Demise of the Ten-Year Development Scheme

The Ten-Year Development Scheme contributed significantly to

the expansion of the area available for grazing and cropping, espe-

cially through bush clearance and the provision of more than 300

water points. In other respects, however, the Scheme had few endur-

I The total development expenditure of the several agencies involved in the

ten-year development program appears to have been about £2 million, of which

about one-half came from Native Authorities.

419


ing achievements to its credit. Even before it came officially to itsend, the controls and regulations had largely collapsed. The im-provements which it sought to effect were not at all or only poorlyunderstood by the cultivators and herders who resented the restric-tions on their freedom and the interference with customary practices.The role of the Native Authorities in enforcing unpopular regulationsalienated the Sukuma and enabled the nascent TANU politicalparty to capitalize on this discontent in its successful drive for in-dependence. The opposition to the land use regulations of both theNative Authorities and the Colonial Government and the strugglefor independence were mutually reinforcing and became very closelyidentified with each other during the 'fifties.

While the rapidly growing movement toward political independ-ence, with its inevitably undiscriminating opposition to virtually allthe measures of a colonial government, was probably an immediatecause of the breakdown and abandonment of the DevelopmentScheme, the latter undoubtedly had certain fundamental shortcom-ings of an economic, sociological and technical character whichwould in any event have greatly impaired its effectiveness. Many ofits shortcomings and deficiencies are of relevance to current develop-ment problems in Sukumaland as well as in other parts of Africa.

Expansion and controlled resettlement

It has already been intimated that the government was conspicu-ously successful in opening up new land for settlement. It has beenestimated that the area occupied by the Sukuma increased fromabout 4,000 square miles at the beginning of World War I to some13,000 square miles in 1957/58. Although Government-sponsoredbush clearance and water development have for the most part beendiscontinued since the late 'fifties, it is noteworthy that the Sukumahave continued to push forward into new land, clearing it with theirown efforts. Since 1958, for example, the huge Biharamulo Districtto the west is being settled in this way, although admittedly thecolonization is being handicapped by a rather high incidence ofsleeping sickness and a dearth of water.4

I Unfortunately, there are no recent statistics showing these populationmovements. The 1957 census shows that, by comparison with 1948, the popu-lation of Geita, Maswa and Shinyanga increased by 93.4%, 19% and 18.9%respectively, or by a total of 216,484, while the population of Kwimba rose byonly 1.4% and that of Mwanza Rural actually declined by the same percentage.Between 1948 and 1957 Geita was the principal "expansion" district, but sincethat period the populations of Shinyanga and Maswa have mounted muchmore rapidly. Biharamulo, the newest expansion district, has probably absorbednearly 5,000 Sukuma immigrants.

420


Attempts to control settlement in the new areas were only tempo-rarily successful and, in the end, were virtually a total failure. Itshould be noted that the government rarely undertook detailedsettlement schemes with heavy overhead provision for housing andcommunity facilities, etc. Instead it confined its efforts to demarcat-ing large blocks for settlement, and outlining the boundaries ofholdings. Within such blocks some areas were reserved for forests inthe interest of conservation and the balance were opened to settle-ment only till a certain pre-determined population density wasachieved. The general objective in imost such areas, more or less inaccord with the "Sukumaland Equation," was to insure each familyabout 20 acres of which it was hoped that 10 would be used for graz-ing, 8 for cropping, and 2 for a wood lot to provide building polesand fuel. The administration on the ground proved quite inadequateto the enforcement of these settlement controls, particularly when agood number of areas were in process of settlement at one time. Thesettlers themselves failed to appreciate the rationale of the controls,particularly since they realized that there were possibilities for move-ment into still newer areas whenever they themselves became awareof the pressure of population and stock on the land. Moreover, theschematic controls which the administration sought to enforce werein any event too undifferentiated for the variety of conditions en-countered and for that reason probably had even less appeal to thesettlers. This was especially the case in Geita District where soilfertility had been overestimated and the typical holding was thustoo small to permit the proper rotation of the area cultivated in sucha way as to maintain fertility.

Controls on livestock

Attempts to control cattle numbers were also in the main unsuc-cessful. The concern of the technically oriented agricultural, veteri-nary and livestock officer with the dangers of overgrazing was quiteunderstandable. It seemed natural to propose a control of livestocknumbers in the face of the Sukuma's tendency to increase the numbercontinuously and of the periodic decimation of herds by severedroughts. Repeated indications of overgrazing over a widening area,such as the replacement of perennial grasses by less nutritious an-nuals, appeared to support the need for controls. To the animalhusbandry specialist it was axiomatic that a limitation of numbersin accordance with "grazing capacity" would not only preventneedless losses but would in the end yield a larger average output ofmeat and milk per unit area.

Yet in retrospect the Government ignored a number of factors

421


important in the reactions of the Sukuma to destocking. While in-

controvertible evidence confirms the existence of overgrazing in some

areas or at certain periods, research on grazing capacity and grazing

management has never been sufficient to permit the setting of sound

ratios of livestock to grazing land under the widely varying condi-

tions prevailing in Sukuinalanid. While the Ukiriguru Research Sta-

tion has done some of the necessary research and experimentation

for the establishment of such a ratio, its results are valid only for the

particular conditions in which the Station is located and under

which only a small fraction of the Sukumna's livestock is kept.

Elsewhere the ratio had to be determined on the basis of observations

which were often highly subjective and therefore subject to chal-

lenge.5 Moreover, the ratios were designed for "average" grazing

conditions covering a wide fluctuation in actual conditions within

the periodic cycle covering good years and drought years. Finally,

Government officers probably uinderestimated the degree of ra-

tionality underlying the livestock holding policies of the Sukuma.

There is little evidence that the Sukuina have a deep emotional

attachment to their cattle or are inclined to increase them simply to

enhance their personal or family prestige. Their unquestioned tend-

ency to increase their livestock holdings appears to be prompted pri-

marily by a deep concern for security as well as the normal social

considerations. Livestock traditionally have been used for the pay-

ment of bride price; and there is for some groups a general obligation

among all the members of an extended family to assist each other in

the payment of bride price. The very fact that cattle so received must

be returned together with any progeny when a wife divorces her

husband or dies childless tends to limit unqualified ownership. In a

variety of ways a large proportion of Sukuma cattle are subject to

actual or potential liens and thus cannot be sold readily.' This does

not mean that they are not sold or slaughtered to any significant

extent. In fact, it has been estimated that the number of cattle that

are sold for "export" from Sukumaland and are slaughtered or die

in Sukumaland may well attain an annual "average" of about 15-

16% of the total number., Despite this "average" offtake there ap-

I The Malya Stock Farm began a limited number of trials in the early 1950's

on this subject, but this effort was abandoned with the termination of the

Sukumaland Development Scheme. Somne of the research at Kongwa, Central

Province, could perhaps be applied to Sukumaland conditions.

I This applies much less to cattle purchased with income from cotton, usually

outside the family herds or outside Sukumaland.I Hides sold in Sukumaland tend to average about 13-15 percent of the esti-

mated total numbers of cattle. While many are brought in from outside, this is

compensated by the fact that a percentage of hides are either not taken from dead

499

Tanzania: Sukuumaland

pears to have been a long-term net increase of probably 4-5%annually in livestock numbers, although the paucity of reliable datamakes a definitihe statement on this subject difficult. NMoreover, thefigures of "average" offtake conceal enormous year-to-year fluctua-tions which illustrate the importance which Sukuma attach to live-stock as a means of security to protect thein against the risk of droughtyears. During good rainfall years, when grass and water supplies arecomparatively plentiful and food is in ample supply, the Sukumabuild up their herds as rapidly as possible by curtailing both salesand slaughter for home consumptioni. Conversely, during the droughtyears, when food crops often fall short of requirements, they tend tosell and slaughter more, or to "accept deaths" among their livestockas part of the natural order.? Thus, many Sukuma appear to uselivestock less as a steady source of food and income than as a reservewhich can be tapped principally to offset deficiencies in food crops,and also whenever there are emergency needs for cash. The Sukumaapparently value the possession of such a reserve which 'auto-matically" fluctuates in accordance with both their own needs andthe variations in grazing conditions.

The rapid development of cotton cultivation since the early 'fiftieswould seem to have reduced the need for such a reserve in manyparts of Sukumaland. Not only has cotton made it possible to earnmoney income, part of which can be saved, but cotton is also thekind of crop which sometimes does quite well in the relatively dryyears which affect adversely most food crops. Thus cotton would seemto be able to function, like livestock, as an equilibrating factor in theSukuma economy. By and large, however, it has not done so as yet.On the contrary, a considerable part of cotton income has ap-parently gone into the purchase of more cattle, particularly in theform of immatures bought outside Sukumaland. Yet it is possiblethat in the long run income from cotton, which, after all, has becomeincreasingly important only during the last decade, may diminish thepressures to acquire ever more livestock, at least in those areas inwhich cotton provides an equivalent level and security of income.

In the view of the Sukuma their livestock and grazing practiceshave apparently been quite "economic"; and over recent years someEuropean observers have recognized that this view has some founda-tion, at least in the short run. Thus farm economic surveys conductedin an area of Kwimba District in 1961/62 and in part of MIaswa

animals, or are not prepared for market sale. Sales of live animals in recent yearsare only 2-3 percent of estimated numbers.

Cattle which die in this way are normally eaten.

423


District in 1962/63 indicated that livestock yielded a return to labor

which compared very favorably to that earned by labor devoted to

crop production.9 This seemed all the more impressive because

much of the land used for grazing cannot readily be cropped.

We do not, however, want to suggest that the Sukuma attitudes

to livestock and grazing were necessarily more justified than those of

the agricultural and livestock officers concerned about the conserva-

tion of land resources. Undoubtedly the experts' views on livestock

holding were not understood or recognized as demonstrably superior

by the Sukuma. But this was due in part to a difference in perspec-

tive. The Sukuma, like most Africans, have a more limited time

horizon than professional livestock and agricultural officers who are

much more interested in the longer-term consequences of certain

traditional grazing and cropping practices. This difference can

ultimately only be bridged by education.1 0

It is possible that the problem of livestock numbers may be posed

in acute form during the years immediately ahead. Since 1960 the

Sukuma have enjoyed a series of record cotton harvests combined

with good rainfall and grazing conditions which have enabled them

to build up their herds to record proportions. A recurrence of severe

drought years in accordance with past patterns may well produce an

abnormally large decimation of stock. Even under the relatively

favorable conditions of 1964 we noted evidence of overgrazing and

progressive deterioration of natural habitat in some areas, including

those more newly settled.It is a moot question whether in the end some sort of balance

between livestock and grazing capacity can be established without

I See M. P. Collinson, Farm Management Survey No. 2 (Usmao Chiefdom,

Kwimba District) and Farm Management Survey No. 3 (Luguru Ginnery Zone,

Maswa District), both published by the Western Research Centre, Ukiriguru.

In each of these surveys "production" was calculated by valuing both the con-

sumption and sale of livestock and livestock products and the net increase in

livestock holdings over the year. Herding labor was assumed to be a boy equiva-

lent to half an adult man employed throughout the year. On this basis livestock

in the Kwimba area gave a net return of Sh 4.65 per man-day used as compared

with Sh 5.14 per inan-day used on crops; in the Maswa area, the return per

man-day used was higher for livestock than for crops-Sh 4.45 as compared with

Sh 3.83. The conclusion becomes even more favorable to livestock when account

is taken of the fact that labor used on crops is unemployed and underemployed

for a considerable part of the year. On the other hand, the value of continued

increases in livestock holdings over the long run may be questioned if there is a

marked deterioration of grazing or growing competition between the use of

land as between cropping and grazing.10 A more drastic but more convincing corrective would be the actual experi-

ence of declining living standards when the land can no longer carry the number

of stock required for subsistence.

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enclosure of land. Among the Sukuma grazing has always beencommunal; an adult male has the right to graze as many cattle ashe wants, both on natural pasture and on cropped land following theharvest. The only exceptions to these unrestricted grazing rights arecertain parts of the reserved household plot (ngitiri) and the smallareas reserved by some villages for dry season grazing. This com-munal grazing system gives no incentive to the individual livestockkeeper to reduce his herd in the hope that he will then be able tofeed them better, for there is no assurance that his action will improvegrazing as long as other livestock keepers continue to increase theirherds. In the past there have been only a few cases of Sukuma en-closing their land for grazing as well as cultivation, and this usuallyin areas of "older" Sukumaland where some land has been aban-doned as soils lost their fertility.1 " It is quite possible that the Tan-zanian Government might frown on a growing movement to encloseas a manifestation of undesirable individualism. Indeed, an enclosuremovement inspired solely by spontaneous individual interest andinitiative might well create serious inequities in land distributionand give rise to numerous disputes. Yet the Government might in theend find it advisable to encourage village groups who have jurisdic-tion over the land to allocate available grazing land or to pool acertain area of grazing land subject to the condition that only anagreed number of cattle be maintained there. The way for suchrevolutionary changes would obviously need to be carefully prepared.

The attempt to associate livestock and agricultureThe Sukumaland Development Scheme attached considerable

importance to the promotion of a closer association of animal andcrop husbandry so as to enable livestock to help intensify agricul-tural production by supplying manure. The Ukiriguru ResearchStation had demonstrated the contribution which manure couldmake to yields, particularly of cotton. For a time the pressure onfarmers to produce and use manure had some success, for at the"height" of the Development Scheme 5 to 10% of Sukuma farmerswere apparently putting manure on a portion of their fields. Butpractical difficulties and economic considerations have militatedagainst a widespread use of manure. The production and spreadingof manure in quantities that would have a notable impact on yields-namely, three to six tons per acre was no easy task for the farmer

" It is not clear whether enclosure in such areas parts of Kwimba Districtfor example-was designed to keep out other peoples livestock or to establishrights to the land so that it could later be sold to people who might return to thearea when soil fertility had been restored.

425


under the conditions prevailing in Sukumaland. He had to provide

himself with either a cattle stall or boma (open pen) and bring his

livestock in every night even though at times the shortage of grazing

and water nearby made this rather impractical. He had to have a

steady supply of litter, and in the dry season it was desirable to

water manure regularly in order to bring about proper decomposi-

tion. Both the transport of litter to the stalls or stables and of manure

to the land required means which were not readily available. While

many Sukuma had no difficulty in saving up enough to pay Sh 100

for an ox-plow, it was not easy to manage the purchase of an ox-cart

which costs about seven times that sum. Above all, the great majority

of Sukuma apparently found that the additional output due to the

use of manure was not worth the considerable extra labor required

to produce and apply the manure. Either they were satisfied with

the yields they were getting in view of their limited income aspira-

tions, or they thought they could get the same increase in production

with less effort by extending the area under cultivation or opening up

new and more fertile land.

The fate of efforts to intensify crop production

These two considerations have governed in fact much of the

Sukuma reaction to efforts to compel or persuade them to intensify,

i.e., to increase yields per acre, especially of cotton. The desire of

virtually all Sukuma to earn some cash income has indeed produced

a remarkable increase in cotton output from an average of about

50,000 bales in the three-year period 1950-52 to 227,750 bales in

1962-64, with a record of an estimated 250,000 bales in 1964. Al-

though reliable data on acreage are lacking, it is generally agreed

that this rise is not due in significant measure to an increase in yields

other than that which may have been achieved by a progressive im-

provement of cotton varieties. There have been ample opportunities

for extending cotton cultivation to newly opened areas, and the

widespread adoption of ox-plowing and, to a much smaller extent, of

tractor-plowing, have made it possible to capitalize on these oppor-

tunities under conditions of a rather sparse population, especially in

the newer settlement areas of the south and east. Even in the more

densely populated sections most cultivators found it easier, in terms

of labor expended, to extend their cotton acreage at the expense of

fallow or grazing than to increase yields by raising the amount of

labor and other inputs per acre.

Within the time horizon limiting their outlook the Sukumna have

generally considered labor rather than land as the scarce production

factor. They have therefore been more interested in the return to

426

Tanzania: Sukcumaland

TABLE 1: COTTON STATISTICS, LAKE REGION COTTONGROWING AREA, 1936-1964, TANZANIAa

Total Number Tons of Seed Cents Paid toof Bales for Planting Growers per Pound

Year Ginned' Distributed, of AR Seed Cottond

1936 43,1251937 30,2171938 20,1131939 39,952 6,4441940 40,575 5,7511941 50,341 5,4881942 34,094 2,8801943 24,671 2,100 121944 17,112 4,371 121945 35,135 4,450 141946 34,725 4,650 151947 32,439 2,307 161948 45,649 5,128 241949 37,382 7,255 241950 38,163 6,349 251951 40,669 4,073 341952 71,394 4,859 501953 38,412 6,461 501954 90,845 5,018 601955 109,258 5,356 601956 120,788 5,816 551957 150,982 7,089 521958 150,574 7,078 521959 183,333 7,949 501960 162,876 9,697 501961 161,223 10,912 551962 195,825 11,640 551963 231,729 13,485 501964 259,645 14,085 50

aLakeRegion here refers to the entire western area of cotton growing. Whilethis was in the Lake Province before independence, it is now parts of three ofthe new administrative regions of Mara, Mwanza and Shinyanga. It is essen-tially Sukumaland plus Ukerewe and Musoma Districts, tangential to the northof Sukumaland. All nineteen ginneries involved are either owned or controlled bythe Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions.

5Each bale is 400 pounds of ginned cotton; it normally requires some 1,200pounds of seed cotton to make one 400 pound bale of ginned cotton.

'The Lint and Seed Marketing Board, who provided most of these statistics,has given figures for the four years 1958 1961 as being tons of seed "planted,"not "distributed." The figures refer to the amount of seed which produced thecrop shown in the same growing year.

d"AR" is clear, white undamaged cotton, the better grade; "BR" is the lowergrade and typically commands about half the price.

SOURCE: Data provided in Mwanza by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board,the Regional Agricultural Officer and the Cotton Coordinating Officer.

labor than the return to land. At any one time their income objectivewas limited, and they wanted to achieve this objective with the leasteffort possible. As recently as 1964, while travelling through Sukuma-

427


land, we noted in many instances that farmers did not bother to pick

all their cotton or delayed their picking until all the bolls were open

and they could pick it all at once. The farmers were sacrificing in-

come in the first case by reducing the quantity, in the latter case by

reducing the quality of cotton. Under such conditions it was hardly

likely that farmers would want to make an effort to raise yields per

acre. 12

Conditions in Sukumaland have generally enabled farmers to

achieve satisfactory outputs of cotton without significant changes iri

traditional methods of cultivation. Not only has land for the most

part been in plentiful supply, but ecological conditions have been

very favorable to cotton. Damage by cotton pests has generally not

been a serious problem even in the absence of spraying. The Ukiri-

guru Research Station may even be said to have facilitated the ex-

tensive cultivation of cotton by developing and distributing improved

varieties which had higher yield potential under traditional methods

and which also were more resistant to attacks by stainers, bollworms

and blackarm.

Adaptation of cultivation practices to variations in conditions

This does not mean that the "traditional" methods of cotton culti-

vation were everywhere the same or that there was an unvarying

total lack of response to efforts to improve practices. Differences in

methods of cultivation have developed gradually in accordance with

varying pressures of population on land, soil types, and opportunities

of expanding into new areas. D. V. Rotenhan, a German agri-

cultural economist, has demonstrated this in a survey of 75 farms

which he made in 1962/63.'3 These farms were equally distributed

over three areas located respectively on Ukerewe Island in Lake

Victoria, which is outside Sukumaland proper, in Kwimba District

and in Shinyanga District where respective populations densities

per square mile in 1957 were 229, 130, and 69. The sample of

farmers in these three areas showed marked differences in the degree

to which they had incorporated labor-intensive practices in their

farming.

12 The reasons for delayed picking are by no means clear. Attempts to en-

courage early planting and picking by opening cotton buying posts earlier have

not had consistent results. The timing and frequency of pickings may be partly

determined by other economic and particularly social activities whose timing in

sequence may be in turn related to food harvests earlier in the calendar year.

In that case the start of cotton picking may be determined not so much by the

date on which buying posts open but by the time of food crop harvests.

13 D. von Rotenhan, Die Organisation der Bodenbenutzung bei den Baumwollbauern

des Sukumalandes, Tanganyika (IFO-Institut fir Wirtschaftsforschung, Afrika-

Studien Heft 13, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, 1966).

428


Another illustration is the existence of two basically differentsystems of growing cotton within Sukumaland. In the hills and re-gions of the more densely populated areas it has long been the customto grow cotton and also maize on ridges which from crest to crest arefive feet apart. Although the making of these ridges is time-con-suming, their value in conserving moisture, promoting root growthand facilitating subsequent weeding has long been recognized by thecultivator when dealing with these lighter and more friable soils.The ridges are made by hand hoe and normally have to be remadeeach year. At the beginning of the cultivating season the weeds arefirst removed from the already existing ridges and put in the furrowsbetween the ridges. The latter are then "split" by hand so that halfcomes to rest in each adjoining furrow and the new ridge is built upwhere the old furrow used to be. The weeds are effectively buried,minimizing the chances of regermination and thus reducing thework devoted to weeding which might otherwise become a seriousbottleneck.

However, in the same areas where ridging has long been custo-mary, the attempt to introduce supplementary tie-ridging waslargely unsuccessful. Many farmers complied with tie-ridging as longas it was compulsory, but then quickly abandoned it. Experimentsat Ukiriguru over eleven consecutive seasons did show that tie-ridging could on the average produce a significant increase in yield byretaining run-off and facilitating the storage of moisture by the soil. 4

This storage of moisture was considered particularly beneficial inhelping the crop through the normally dry month of February notlong after planting. But experience shows that this advantage was notclearly evident to the cultivator. When the impact on yields of sucha practice as tie-ridging becomes evident only after a long period ofyears, it does not readily appeal to the farmer. There may well beyears of ample and well-distributed rainfall when tie-ridging has noeffect. Above all, tie-ridging, to be at all effective, must be doneduring January when the farmer is already extremely busy ridgingand planting. The farmer therefore has the alternative of ridgingand planting a larger acreage or ridging, tie-ridging and planting asmaller acreage. The agricultural economist stationed at Ukiriguruhas advanced the tentative opinion that the labor that must bedevoted to the tie-ridging of an acre of cotton could be alternativelyused to add another 0.4 acre to the area under cotton.'5 When this

4J. E. Peat and K. J. Brown, "Effect of Management on Increasing CropYields in the Lake Province of Tanganyika," East African Agricultural Journal,October 1960.

"See M. P. Collinson, Farm Management Survey No. 3.

429


alternative can be adopted, it is by no means evident that tie-ridging is economically advantageous in giving the farmer a larger

output for his labor.

Extensive cotton cultivationThe other system of cotton cultivation practised in Sukumaland

is the extremely extensive one that prevails in the more sparselypopulated areas of Maswa and Shinyanga Districts. Here the ox-

plow, supplemented modestly but increasingly by the tractor, has

been the primary instrumentality of the extension of cultivation.Here, also, the availability of large treeless areas-the "cultivationsteppe"-with few if any stumps has facilitated the employment of

the ox-drawn or tractor-drawn plow. In Maswa alone there were

8,482 ox-plows as of 1962; and a more recent survey indicated there

were 186 individually-owned tractors in Sukumaland of which 99

were in Maswa. Ox-plowing made it possible to increase the croppedarea about 80% by comparison with hand-ridging."6 This entailed,

however, sowing in the flat and a significant increase in the competi-

tion of weeds which are more effectively controlled by ridging. In

most areas cottonseed was simply broadcast either before or after

ox- or tractor-plowing, and there was little subsequent weeding.

Yields per acre under these conditions have naturally been low butthe return to the limited labor input has been high particularly as

long as the land retained most of its initial fertility or it was possible

to shift to new and virgin land. A comparative survey of farmerssowing cotton and maize in the flat with those practising ridge-

planting has indicated, however, that even where the farmer prac-

tising planting in the flat does much more weeding by way of com-

pensation, the average return on his total labor input tends to be

higher than that of the "ridge farmer" under similar conditions.17

Experience with early planting

Under both the farming systems described above difficulties have

been encountered in carrying out another recommended practicewhich is perhaps of prime importance in raising yields, namely earlyplanting. Experiments at Ukiriguru have repeatedly demonstratedthe significant reductions in yields caused by late planting. However,the farmer generally insists on planting maize first in order to ensurehis food supply even though that adversely affects cotton yield and

causes the earlier-planted maize to become a host to such cottonpests as stainers and bollworms. Those farmers who do practise early

16 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

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planting of cotton not infrequently complain of the damage causedby the pests harbored in their neighbors' early-planted maize! Inthe areas where Sukuma farmers plant their crops on ridges most ofthem evidently consider the large amount of labor involved inridging and planting is such that they simply cannot plant both cot-ton and food crops in time. They consider ridging their "bottleneck"period and use at this time most of any hired labor employed eventhough, in the eyes of the foreign observer, family labor might not befully utilized even then. "8 Two farm surveys in such areas disclosedthat the amount of labor devoted to weeding the old ridges, re-ridging and planting of one acre of maize and one acre of cotton wasaltogether at least twice as great as that subsequently used in weedingthe same acreage. 19

In the Sukumaland areas where plowing and sowing in the flathave been the rule early planting has also encountered difficulties.In theory, it might be expected that the plow would expedite landpreparation and thus facilitate early planting. However, as alreadyindicated, the plow has in fact been used primarily to extend thecropped area, shifting the bottleneck from land preparation andsowing to weeding. In order to cope at least partially with the result-ing weeding problem, farmers have tended to delay their plowinguntil the first "crop" of weeds is up and can be buried by the plow.Here again it is possible that this practice, though sacrificing the ad-vantages of early planting, gives the farmers the best return to theirlabor under present conditions and is probably less punishing on theoxen, who have had some new grazing by this time after the start ofthe rains. These conditions might conceivably be altered if the farmercould be persuaded to use an ox-drawn ridger and, subsequently,an inter-row cultivator which together could give him the benefitsof both early planting and more effective weed control. The use ofsuch implements, however, is rare, and has never been the object ofa concerted extension campaign.

New efforts to intensify

The predominantly "extensive" character of Sukuma cultivationin the past does not lead us to the conclusion that all efforts tointensify production through the application of more labor and cap-

18 In his second farm economic survey, carried out in the Usmao Chiefdomof Kwimba District and covering the 1961/62 crop season, M. P. Collinsonconcluded from the data collected that during the peak "cultivation period,"which he fixed at 2.5 months, only an average of 62 percent of available familylabor was used.

19 M. P. Collinson, Farm Management Survey, Nos. 2 and 3.

431


ital to land are bound to fail in the future. In general conditions are

likely to become more conducive to intensification over the long run.

Population and livestock pressures are building up gradually-in

some areas more rapidly than in others. Although there are still

large "empty" areas in which people can move, particularly in

Biharamulo District, these are relatively less plentiful and probably

also less attractive than in the past. Moreover, it is conceivable that

a succession of severe drought years might produce a considerable

exodus from the marginal rainfall areas of Maswa and Shinyanga

which have been converted on a large scale to cropping under the

rather favorable climatic conditions that have prevailed over recent

years. The disposition to move from the more densely settled areas

may also be slowly diminishing as cash income is being used to a

larger extent for housing improvements such as corrugated iron roof-

ing. Finally, the increase in cash income is gradually whetting appe-

tites for more and may well be affecting favorably the willingness to

work harder for the achievement of rising income targets.20 This does

not mean that revolutionary changes in conditions and attitudes are

to be expected. In devising and promoting various agricultural and

livestock policies it will presumably be necessary to take into account

the substantial variations in the conditioning factors that already

exist and the probability that the rate of change will not be uniform

over all of Sukumaland. A study of these factors could lead to a selec-

tion of areas where people appear to be receptive to change and

where accordingly a concentrated extension effort might prove

effective.In this context it is interesting to examine the renewed efforts to

increase yields which are now being made after a number of years

of comparative Government inactivity. Initiated principally by the

Government but carried out with the help of the TANU political

party and the cooperatives, these efforts include (1) a program to

encourage the use of fertilizers, (2) three pilot ventures managed by

an Israeli organization known as Agridev and intended for rapid ex-

pansion in the future, and (3) a large number of "group" cotton

schemes featured by mechanization of many of the operations. All

of these are too recent to warrant any definitive appraisal, but they

do raise issues and problems as well as potential advantages and

drawbacks which merit at least some preliminary analysis.

20 There is a tendency for young men to seek higher income through wage

employment in the towns, but this may not provide an attractive alternative in

the long run because urban unemployment, perhaps partly stimulated by high

minimum wages, has been increasing. In Mwanza Township, for example,

we were told that there were some 3,000 registered unemployed in mid-1964.

432

Tanzania. Sukumaland

The fertilizer program

Beginning in 1964/65 the government has launched a program toexpand the use of chemical fertilizer on cotton rapidly, setting as atarget for this year the distribution of about 3,700 tons over the cot-ton-growing areas of the old Lake Region, an area somewhat largerthan Sukumaland. This program has been inspired by the favorableexperience with fertilizer on Ukerewe Island. There, an intermittentseries of fertilizer demonstrations carried on since 1950 and culmi-nating in especially striking demonstrations in 1962/63 appeared toindicate excellent responses. Following well-organized and wide-spread farmer visits to demonstration plots in 1962/63, fertilizerswere distributed on a commercial scale in the following year. Wewere told that 345 tons or 6,900 cwt. of fertilizer was made availablein this way through cooperatives to the farmers. This presumablypermitted the fertilization of 2,300 acres of cotton at the recom-mended rate of 1 cwt. of sulphate of ammonia and 2 cwt. of doublesuperphosphate per acre. Yields are reported to have increased froma low level of 200-250 lbs. of seed cotton to 700-800 lbs. If the actualrise in yields approximated 500 lbs. per acre, valued at Sh 250, thiswould certainly compare favorably with the actual cost of the fertil-izer which was only Sh 57 per acre.21 It is admittedly difficult toverify yields per acre owing to the lack of reliable estimates of croppedarea, but the data on cotton seed distributed for planting and theamount of cotton picked and delivered indicate that the amount oflint produced per pound of seed distributed on all of Ukerewe Islandrose from 2.92 lbs. in 1962/63 to an estimated 4.72 lbs. in 1963/64.22

This experience in Ukerewe cannot, however, be considered auto-matically relevant for all of the areas in Sukumaland. Certain spe-cial circumstances contributed to the success with fertilizer onUkerewe. The people, who are not Sukuma, are generally bettereducated, and, as already indicated, the population density on thisisland is far higher than anywhere in Sukumaland. Farms aretypically smaller and people have shown a greater disposition tointensify. Continuous cultivation has led to a more marked deteriora-

21 The fertilizer was actually made available at the subsidized cost of Sh 40.00per acre and on credit repayable at the time of harvest.

22 It is interesting to note in this connection a field survey of a small sample offarmers done by J. S. Mushi, a student at Makerere University in Uganda,and written up in unpublished manuscript entitled, "The Economics of CottonProduction and Extension Techniques in Ukerewe Island." Of 12 farmersgrowing cotton in 1963/64, 6 were found to use fertilizers, I both fertilizer andmanure, I only manure and 4 neither fertilizer nor manure. Those who fertilizedtheir land had an average yield of 739 lbs. of seed cotton per acre as comparedwith only 237 lbs. for those who applied no fertilizer.

433


tion of soil fertility, making people more receptive to the use of or-

ganic manure and, more recently, to fertilizer. Average cotton yields

per acre, for example, appear to have been significantly lower than

in Sukumaland. Ukerewe also has a more ample rainfall2 3 which

may well create soil moisture conditions more favorable to the ready

absorption of fertilizer nutrients. Finally, it should be noted that the

success was preceded by a prolonged series of trials and that the

1963/64 campaign was facilitated by a high concentration of exten-

sion staff (1 worker to 300 farmers) working under an especially able

and energetic Agricultural Officer.

On Ukerewe Island, where it was intended to distribute 1,500 tons

of fertilizer in 1964/65, the program may well be a continued suc-

cess. Good results may also be achieved, at least in part, in the more

densely settled areas of Mwanza District where 650 tons were to be

distributed in 1964/65. There rainfall is fairly good and 40 demon-

stration plots in 1963/64 are said to have produced encouraging

responses. However, the success elsewhere appears more dubious,

particularly in areas where little preparatory work has evidently

been done and little extension staff is available, where more erratic

and lower rainfall may make responses to fertilizer more uncertain,

and where the desire for higher output and incoines may not be

keenly felt.

The Agridev pilot schemes

The pilot projects operated by the Agricultural Development

Company (International) Limited under a technical assistance con-

tract with the Israeli Government are located at (a) Mbarika on the

eastern bank of Smith Sound emanating from Lake Victoria,

(b) Nyatwali at the eastern end of Speke Gulf, and (c) Kalamera

about 10 miles south-southeast of Nyatwali. The first was initiated

in 1962/63; the last two were started in 1963/64. The general objec-

tives are to introduce a modern system of agriculture relying heavily

on mechanization, fertilizers and insecticides and looking toward high

yields, and to develop, with the help of irrigation where possible, a

year-round system of cropping providing farmers with a steadier and

higher income. In pursuit of the latter objective Agridev has in-

stalled a small furrow irrigation system, fed by pump, at Mbarika

and a sprinkler irrigation system at Nyatwali. These are designed to

supplement rainfall during the normal cotton cultivating season

and to make possible the cultivation of such dry season crops as

23 Three stations on Ukerewe with records of five years and over show an

average rainfall ranging from 41" to 64".

434


maize, onions and groundnuts. All projects are under the overalldirection of an Israeli rnanager and a technical manager, and each"farm" has an Israeli manager assisted by an African understudywho is supposed to take over after several years. The settlers on theseprojects are to be organized as a cooperative under qualified manage-ment. The rnanagement provides certain services to all settlers andis expected eventually to deduct the full cost of these from the valueof the products delivered and marketed.

The settlers for these schemes have been recruited by TANU whichhas also strongly supported the Israeli management in maintainingproper settler discipline. On the basis of information obtained on thebackground of these settlers, we would judge that many of them arewell above the Sukuma average in enterprise and experience. Al-though some reluctance to participate was initially experienced,there has been no difficulty so far in getting more than enough ap-plicants to expand the schemes after the first year of operation. Anumber of factors may have made these schemes appealing to settlers.First of all, the schemes provided opportunities to earn an attractiveincoine from the start because the authorities insisted that in theinitial years the mnanagement recover only a fraction of its costs fromthe settlers, with the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unionssubsidizing most of the balance. Secondly, the settlers were not re-quired to abandon their farms outside the scheine, so that they couldhedge the risks of participation in the new venture. This, incidentallyis also an important factor in the "group" schemes discussed below.Finally, extensive mechanization greatly reduces burdensome handlabor and much of such labor can and is being done by hired workerspaid from the rather ample income left to the settlers.

Although force of circumstances led to the use of an unexpectedamount of mnanual labor during the first year at MIbarika, mostoperations have now been or are being mechanized. Mechanicaloperations now include plowing, the first application of fertilizer,disc harrowing and ridging, planting,2 4 inter-row cultivation andspraying. Thus in the cultivation of cotton, which has been the solecrop grown during the rainy season, the settler is responsible onlyfor thinning, weeding on the row, one side dressing of fertilizer andpicking.

The size of each scheme is as yet modest. Mbarika started with

24 Agridev decided to start mechanical sowing of cotton in 1964/65 because inthe preceding year mechanical ridging had advanced so much more rapidlythan handsowing as to create a weeding problem. Agridev expected to import forthis purpose a seed-drill reportedly capable of dealing with cotton seed which hasnot been delinted.

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20 settlers, each with 2 acres of cotton, expanded to 50 settlers and

200 acres (3 acres of cotton and I acre of "dry season" crops to each

settler) in the second year and was to double in 1964/65. Nyatwali

had 15 settlers and 61.5 acres under crops, of which 50 in cotton,

and was expanded by 200 acres in 1964/65. Kalamera started with

100 settlers cultivating 400 acres, but lost a number of settlers andended the year, even after recruiting some replacements, with only

81; it expected to rise again to 100 for the second year. The greater

initial difficulties experienced by this scheme may well have been

due to the fact that it was started on a larger scale and that the

settlers were not as carefully selected.Whether these schemes will be successful can only be determined

after some years of operation and after data on gross and net income

are available. Initial cotton yields at Mbarika were disappointingowing to a number of special circumstances, but were reported to

have averaged 1,000 lbs. in the second year. In Nyatwali productionwas apparently between 1,300 to 1,600 lbs. per acre; and in Kala-

mera perhaps 1,000-1,200 lbs. Productivity can probably be sig-

nificantly increased, but it may well be that the methods used on the

schemes will not produce maximum possible yields until the present

cotton varieties, which have been bred at Ukiriguru to do well under

traditional practices, have been replaced by new ones more re-

sponsive to modern agricultural techniques. The yields will have tobe high enough to leave the settler with a significantly larger net

income than he would otherwise have enjoyed. The cost-overhead

and current-of the services provided by management and charge-

able to the settler is undoubtedly high; and account must also betaken of the tendency of the settlers (confirmed by random inter-views with a number of settlers at Nyatwali) to hire considerable

labor for picking, which, in their view, has now become the "bottle-neck" operation. It would not be surprising if all these charges addedup to the equivalent of 1,000 lbs. of cotton per acre.

It is also too early to determine whether the still modest trials

with irrigated dry-season crops at Mbarika and Nyatwali will provepracticable and appealing to the settlers. Success will hinge in parton whether such crops as onions and groundnuts will find a re-munerative market, taking into account the costs of irrigation andother inputs such as fertilizer, and in part on whether the settler isprepared to work the year around for the sake of additional cashincome, particularly if the objective of raising his net income from

cotton is realized.The Agridev schemes may be regarded as useful experiments with

new techniques. Experimentation with various approaches is worth-

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while particularly where there are no prima facie answers to theproblems posed. It is important, however, to keep the scale and costof such ventures modest so that eventual failure does not involveheavy losses. Even when pilot projects appear successful one mustmake sure that their extension to much larger areas does not createunforeseen problems. For instance, the Agridev-type schemes requireconsiderable managerial and technical skills for their operationwhich may be found for pilot projects but which may not be avail-able on a rapidly expanding scale. Similarly, the rapid extension ofsuch schemes may create problems about the availability of landand settlers since by no means all African farmers are likely to taketo the more "regimented" farming involved; and it may also raisequestions about the supply of sufficient hired labor for harvesting.The selection of the best sites for such schemes, paying particularattention to these demographic and social considerations, is thus ofcritical importance to their success.

The group mechanization schemesBefore the Agridev approach could be fully tested, the Govern-

ment launched in 1964/65 a large-scale program to mechanize andintensify the production of cotton which embodied many of thefeatures of the Agridev schemes. In the previous year it had turnedover to the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions (VFCU) 159Ferguson and Fordson Major tractors which it had bought on creditand which in turn it expected the cooperatives to pay for in sevenyears, including an initial two-year moratorium. 25 In 1963/64 thesewere used only for a limited amount of contract plowing on individualfarms, since the tractors arrived late, drivers had to be trained, andrepair and other facilities had to be established. Beginning in 1964/65 attempts were made to realize the original intention to pool landand create large, consolidated blocks for mechanical cotton cultiva-tions. The goal that year was the establishment of 50 "block schemes"totalling 45,000 acres and ranging in size from 150-3,000 acres.Though the actual size of each farmer's plot was influenced by theamount of land in the block to which he had rights, each participat-ing farmer was generally expected to get about four acres (in somecases only two) all of which was to be devoted to cotton. As in theAgridev schemes, fertilizers and insecticides are to be used in aneffort to get yields to a level at which it is hoped a sufficient net mar-gin will be left after meeting all costs. The extent of mechanization

26 The burden of paying for these tractors is apportioned among the Federa-tion, the Unions and the Cooperative Societies.

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is also about the same, although apparently mechanical sowing and

inter-row cultivation are not immediately envisaged. Spraying is

to be done by tractor-drawn sprayers and, increasingly, by aircraft.

Farmers who are members of cooperatives get half of the services on

credit repayable at harvest, but others must pay cash.

While the cooperatives are officially charged with responsibility

for the supply of mechanical services and other physical inputs for

the schemes, the task of persuading and cajoling people to participate

was assumed by TANU officials. To this end a committee was or-

ganized on each scheme representing all local organizations and

interests. The location of suitable blocks was determined hastily by

agricultural staff. Within each block, of course, there had to be a

readjustment of land rights, which was the principal task of the

block committee. For instance, those who had land rights in blocks

in excess of the projected allotment had to be compensated with land

elsewhere, presumably in part by an exchange with those who had

no land within the scheme but agreed to participate. It was also

necessary to compensate persons who had rights in the area but who

did not want to join. Whether all such adjustments could be made

within a brief period without some arbitrariness appears very ques-

tionable, especially in the areas of denser settlement. In any event

the organizational effort involved in the selection of blocks, the

mobilization of participating farmers and the adjustment of their

land problems, and the timely deployment of tractors have all

caused a considerable shortfall in the target, and may well continue

to impede progress in the future.

In theory some conditions in Sukumaland would seem to favor

the block mechanization schemes. Natural conditions appear to be

much more favorable to mechanization than in many parts of sub-

Saharan Africa in that the sparseness of bush over much of the area

makes unnecessary very costly clearing and destumping operations. 2 6

Also, since land in Sukumaland is not very scarce in many areas, the

existing state of land tenure still seems to be sufficiently flexible and

fluid to permit pooling and re-allocation of land so as to create

sufficiently large blocks for mechanical cultivation should the people

be so inclined. In the past the experience of the old Lake Province

Cotton Committee in operating a contract-plowing service had

demonstrated how costly such a service was, not simply because

overhead costs were high, but more particularly because of the ex-

26 Considerable destumping has been necessary on some blocks, especiallyin Geita District, and land preparation was delayed until it could be effected bygroup labor.

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pense involved in moving tactors and implements from one isolatedfield to another; and experience with other government contractschemes in Africa tends to confirm this finding.

In certain other respects the approach may also be said to haveadvantages, at least in theory. The cultivation of large blocks incotton creates a certain amount of pressure on all the participants toconform to the standards of cultivation that must prevail if muchhigher yields are to be achieved. It also makes possible more eco-nomical use of the very limited numbers of trained agricultural staffwho are available for advice and supervision.

On the other hand, as we witnessed the beginning of this effort,we also became conscious of the many difficulties and dangers in-volved. The staff which is available to manage and direct the tractorand equipment aspects of this operation (under a European directorattached to the VFCU) is pitifully small in relation to the magnitudeof the task. The supplying and servicing of fleets of tractors scatteredamong many cooperative unions and their constituent societies over17,000 square miles may well be beyond the present powers of thesmall and hastily trained staff at the union level. Timeliness andcontinuity of all mechanical operations are absolutely essential tothe success of such a program.2 7 In view of both the haste and thescale of the operation, there is the clear danger of managerial andtechnical deficiencies causing delays which could have disastrousconsequences on cotton yields.

The agricultural aspects also pose problems. The schemes havelargely depleted the rest of Sukumaland of extension staff which is inany case not adequate either numerically or qualitatively. 2 8 Prob-

27 Information subsequently received confirms that the results achieved in1964/65 were indeed disappointing. Areas totaling 41,000 acres were selectedfor 50 group farms, but of this amount only 13,686 acres were cleared and only7,987 were planted. The number of acres planted per tractor employed was nomore than 67. The amount of fertilizer used was sufficient, at the recommendeddosage, for about 4,500 acres. Nearly all of the cotton planted was sprayed byair, most of it six times. The charges for mechanical cultivation, fertilizers andspraying were Sh 1,130,514, but of this sum only Sh 213,976 was recovered.Yields were generally poor. In Mwanza Region the cotton yield on 4,812 acresaveraged but 415 lbs. per acre while the cultivation charges alone amounted tothe equivalent of 426 lbs. per acre. In Shinyanga Region the yield on 902 acresaveraged 266 lbs. as compared with average cultivation charges amounting to236 lbs. Nevertheless, a small number of group farms did well, presumably owingto superior management.

28 WVe found the average quality of the lower grades of the extension staffamong the lowest encountered in the areas visited. The poor quality of the staff,undoubtedly due to inadequacies in education and training, appears to haveinfluenced the decision in the past to try and achieve improvements in agriculturethrough enforcement of regulations rather than through persuasion of farmersby ill-trained personnel.

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ably between 40% and 65% of all extension workers are now work-

ing on these schemes which, at the most, cater to only 5,000 of

Sukumaland's half a million cotton growers. It is by no means clear

whether it will be possible to continue cropping the same land in

cotton indefinitely or whether the sites of block schemes will have to

be shifted from time to time or more land incorporated in them to

provide for fallow or some rotation of cotton with other crops which

are now grown entirely outside the schemes. Experiments at Ukiri-

guru have shown the possibility of continuous cultivation of cotton

on the same land with applications of both fertilizer and manure.

Only experience will tell whether with chemical fertilizer alone and

without replenishment of the organic matter in the soil fertility can

be maintained at a level sufficient to insure the high yields necessary

to make the block schemes economic.Considerable doubt also exists about the possibility of recovering

from the participants on the block schemes all of the costs of the

services supplied to them. In the first year the participants who were

each supposed to have about four acres of cotton in each scheme were

guaranteed 400 lbs. of cotton before they were required to pay any

costs. Recoveries in that year apparently fell considerably short of

outlays. Yields, of course, must be much higher than those normally

obtained in order to pay all the charges and also, perhaps, to pay

for a certain amount of labor for picking which in the eyes of the

farmer may well be his "bottleneck" operation when his cotton area

is as large as four acres.With timne and trial many of these problems may be resolved.

However, the hasty improvisation of the block mechanization

schernes and the scale on which they have been started greatly mag-

nify both the difficulties and the costs of any mistakes or failures. A

number of pilot projects like those of Agridev could well be much

more effective and certainly much less costly in testing out the

feasibility and economics of new systems of cultivation. In such pilot

projects it might well be advisable to introduce a number of varia-

tions in approach for the sake of arriving at one that is likely to be

most economic and appealing under a given set of circumstances.

We would not accept the premise, for example, that mechanization

is the only possible solution that needs to be tested. Many parts of

Sukumaland appear to be well suited to the use of ox-drawn imple-

ments whose use entails little foreign exchange drain and does not

pose difficult managerial and technical problems, and which leave

the individual Sukuma farmer a good deal mnore independent. It

is noteworthy also that virtually all of the large number of plows

already in use in Sukumaland have been acquired without any

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assistance in the form of government credit. True, ox-plows (asindeed tractor-drawn plows) have in the past been used primarilyas instrunments of extensive cultivation. But there appears to be noreason why their use cannot be combined with the practice of ridg-ing and line-sowing as well as with the use of fertilizers and insecti-cides when conditions appear to make intensification economic. TheUkiriguru experiment station, for example, has shown that an ox-plow with a ridger attachment can be used to make three-foot ridgeswhich give quite good control of weeds and can be planted in such away as to make possible the subsequent use of an ox-drawn cultivatorfor weeding. Admittedly, such ox-drawn implements can hardly beused on the heavy mbuga soils, but cotton is grown primarily onlighter soils.

The adequate feeding of oxen may also pose a problem in the moreheavily settled portions of Sukumaland and in lighter rainfall areaswhere grazing and water supplies are more precarious. Yet if TANUand the Government administration can jointly persuade farmers topool and redistribute land for setting up block mechanizationschemes, could they not also persuade farmers to reserve adequategrazing land for plow oxen or even to set aside some land for theproduction of fodder? The oxen fed on a common area thus reservedmight also be used to produce good organic manure which experi-ments have frequently demonstrated to have great value in enhanc-ing the response to fertilizer. In any event, some experimentationwith group farms based on ox-drawn implements seems to us a usefulcomplement to trials with block mechanization schemes.

Need for properly differentiated approachesAt this point it would be well to stress our conclusion, which has

certainly been implicit in all the preceding discussion of Sukuma-land, that no one solution is appropriate to the variety of conditionsfound in this large area. In fact, we would criticize the past approachto the development of Sukumaland particularly on the ground thatit did not differentiate sufficiently in accordance with variations inconditioning factors. The primary variants that should be taken intoaccount in planning various approaches are ecological conditions,the pressure of population and stock on the land and the incomeaspirations (and, with it, the disposition to work) of the population.What needs to be done is to find out more precisely how these condi-tions vary, what their implications are for the farming system prac-ticed and to what degree any of the limiting factors in the farmingsystem can and should be changed.

The farm management studies undertaken by the agricultural

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economist stationed at Ukiriguru represent at least a partial attempt

to find out what the farming conditions are in a given area and how

a set of new practices adjusted to these conditions might be devised.

Although this work has been done on an inadequate scale and has

been almost completely ignored by those planning agricultural de-

velopment and doing extension work, its potential usefulness has

impressed us. A sample of farms in a number of different areas has

been studied in order to determine the pattern of crop and livestock

exploitation, the size of the farm household and the labor units

potentially available, the amount and phasing over time of labor

actually used for various operations and the operating results in

terms of gross and net income expressed both as a total and as a

return to labor used for various crops as well as for livestock. Some

of the findings of these surveys may be open to question primarily

because a shortage of staff has necessitated certain shortcuts and

restricted the size of the sample studied. But this does not invalidate

the fundamental soundness of the approach. With an adequate

sample and a careful checking of results it should be possible to es-

tablish from the frequency distribution of the observations what are

the characteristic conditions and results of the "typical" farmer. In

determining how these conditions could be altered to produce im-

proved results it will be necessary to know (1) what labor is available

within the farm household, (2) how fully that labor is utilized at any

time of the agricultural season, (3) to what extent family labor could

be supplemented by hired labor at critical bottleneck periods,

(4) what are the implications of any proposed set of improved prac-

tices or cropping changes not simply in terms of income, but espe-

cially in terms of their impact on labor requirements, and (5) in

view of the farmer's background and experience, what are his

attitudes toward agriculture and his income expectations.The fitting of various possible "improved" farming systems to

labor availabilities may well disclose critical bottlenecks which will

necessitate the consideration of various means of coping with these

either by the use of animal-drawn or tractor-drawn implements or

by changes in suggested cropping patterns. The "optimum" solution

can be approached only through successive approximations and

substitutions of various factors "at the margin."2 9 Consideration of

all the theoretically possible combinations would undoubtedly be

excessively time consuming, but in practice the possibilities of

29 See the already cited Farm Management Survey No. 3 for the method used by

Collinson in testing the impact of eight different changes in farming patterns on

a "typical" Sukuma farm family working within certain constraints.

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changes in the relatively simple farming patterns of Sukumalandare rather limited, and it is in any event more important to effectsome practicable and acceptable improvements than to strive foroptimum solutions.

Changing institutional and organizational factors

Any retrospective survey of Sukumaland's development over re-cent decades would be incomplete without some comment on thechanges in institutions and organizations which have marked it. Wehave already remarked that the emphasis upon regulation and com-pulsion in the transformation of agriculture during the colonialperiod alienated the African farmer from the Government's agri-cultural and livestock services and his own Native Authorities whobecame identified with the enforcement of unpopular measures. Thisalienation has persisted to this day. The effectiveness of the agri-cultural and livestock services is limited not only by shortages ofstaff and inadequacies in training, but by a continuing distrust onthe part of many Sukuma cultivators. It was our impression, more-over, that these services are now employed almost wholly for tech-nical advice and assistance in carrying out development programsand policies in the formulation of which they have had little or noconsultative voice, let alone a determining role. As for the tradi-tional "native" authorities, they have permanently given way to themodern political apparatus of state and party. Above all, it is nowthe TANU political party, indissolubly identified with the Govern-ment, which is the primary mover of economic and social change.It is the TANU officials who assume principal responsibility formobilizing popular support for, or participation in, the new develop-ment schemes that have been launched in recent years.

In one respect the change appears salutary. In the past the rapidlydeveloping conflict between the Colonial Government and its serv-ices on the one hand and the burgeoning African political independ-ence movement on the other, tended to frustrate even well-inten-tioned and well-conceived measures to improve crop and animalhusbandry. The advent of independence made it possible in prin-ciple for the erstwhile opposition to rally in support of agriculturaldevelopment and to facilitate popular acceptance of measures ofimprovement. Yet in actual fact the potential benefits of this changehave by no means been realized, and other dangers have now arisen.Instead of using the new political machinery to assist the agri-cultural and livestock services in persuading people to accept aprogram well adapted to the varying requirements of farmers and

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livestock keepers, the government and TANU appear to have used

considerable pressure to secure adoption of a new "solution" which

has been devised as a short cut to agricultural development with very

little participation by trained personnel in the Government services

concerned. There seems to be the same impatience as before with

the inevitable slowness of agricultural development and the need

to take sufficient time to persuade the farmers of the soundness of

proposed changes in their methods and pattern of production. While

in principle there is no compulsion, the approach today and that

under the Colonial Government seem actually to differ only in

degree. There is the same danger that failures will bring about dis-

illusionment, resulting in an even stronger disinclination of the

Sukuma to accept Government-inspired proposals for raising the

standard of agricultural and livestock management.


Another set of interesting problems has characterized the relations

between farmers' cooperatives and the Government and those be-

tween the farmers themselves and the increasingly complex and

bureaucratic organization of their cooperatives. After a phenomenal

and, in many ways, impressive growth of the cooperative movement,

there are some signs today of tension between the members at large

and the cooperative bureaucracy and of a tendency by Government

to use the cooperatives as an instrumentality for carrying out policies

and programs in the formulation of which the cooperatives have had

little voice.Cooperatives had their inception in the early 'fifties and initially

for the sole purpose of checking the weights given by Asian cotton

buyers. For many Sukuma the cooperative movement quickly be-

came the expression of aspirations both for political and economic

independence. The cooperative buying, storage and selling of seed

cotton expanded rapidly, and in 1959 the cooperatives were granted

a complete buying monopoly by the Government. By mid-1964

there were 450 cooperative societies with 192,600 members. The

societies in turn were organized in 19 unions federated in the Victoria

Federation of Cooperative Unions (VFCU).The Federation's functions have grown with amazing speed. As of

1964 it had built six and acquired another four cotton ginneries,

thus displacing most of the Asian ginners; its activities had expanded

to include the monopoly handling of paddy, sisal and maize, and it

was operating two sisal factories, three oil mills and two rice mills.

In addition, the Federation had assumed responsibility for distri-

444


buting fertilizers and for operating the Government-acquired fleetof tractors on the group mechanization schemes mentioned previ-ously. Finally, the Federation is the biggest stockholder in Cosata,a large cooperative trading agency, and is participating in the re-cently organized cooperative bank.

This rapid growth in the organization and functions of coopera-tives inevitably gave rise to some serious problems. There have beencontinuing difficulties in getting adequately trained staff for theirfar-flung operations. The fact that Sukumaland is characterizedby an educational development inferior to that in the rest of Tan-zania has compounded the staffing problem. There has been a nat-ural tendency of cooperative committees to distrust the educatedstaff necessary for management and to begrudge them adequatepay; and of the staff to look down on "ignorant" committee mem-bers. Both have on occasion abused their position of trust vis-a-visthe rank and file of cooperative members. Under the circumstancesGovernment powers of supervision and control have had to be in-voked from time to time. In 1962, for example, the Government tookpowers to approve the appointment and veto the dismissal of co-operative staff and instituted severance pay requirements. At thesame time it intervened to prohibit the practice of paying honorariato Union and Federation committee members which had given riseto numerous abuses.

Unfortunately the Government's own staffing problems have madeit increasingly difficult to exercise the necessary supervision andguidance of the cooperatives. Thus in 1964 the Government's Co-operative Department had only one qualified auditor and was suffer-ing from a critical shortage of cooperative officers and inspectors.This has prevented the adequate control and auditing of books soessential to the financial soundness of cooperatives and the certifica-tion of their creditworthiness for loans. Inspections of accounts fre-quently disclose serious discrepancies, unexplained or unauthorizedexpenditures and other deficiencies which in the absence of properlytrained and adequately supervised staff remain in large part un-corrected.

Another problem inherent in the rapid growth has been the in-creasing "bureaucratization" of the cooperative movement, par-ticularly at the level of the VFCU. While a portion of the coopera-tive membership undoubtedly takes pride in the physical facilitiesof the cooperatives, including the rather splendid building housingthe Federation staff, many also view with suspicion and distrust thecooperative bureaucracy from whom they feel far removed. Inmany respects there is no strong sense of identification between the

445


farmers and their cooperatives.5 0 Our own discussions with coopera-

tives at the primary and union levels often disclosed a widespread

ignorance of what was going on in the Federation. The gulf between

the primary cooperatives and the Federation may well grow in pro-

portion to the use by the Government of the Federation as an instru-

ment for carrying out a program which has not been initiated by the

cooperatives themselves. Should a program of this type, such as the

block mechanization schemes, prove unpopular and largely un-

successful, there is little doubt that the standing of cooperatives with

Sukuma farmers would be seriously jeopardized.

Another difficult issue raised by the evolution of cooperatives is

that of monopoly. The trend toward monopoly within the coopera-

tive structure often promotes inefficiency and makes impossible the

development of enterprise capable of taking risks and making deci-

sions in the light of these risks. Monopoly dominates the handling

and processing of cotton. Primary societies are the only authorized

buyers within their respective areas from non-members as well as

members. The transport of cotton from the cooperative buying posts

to the ginneries is also the subject of monopolistic arrangements. On

behalf of the cooperative unions, who in turn act for their primary

societies, the Federation invites tenders each season to provide

transport facilities for the crop at fixed rates. Transporters who sub-

sequently sign a contract with the unions are assured a complete

monopoly, and while the cooperatives are protected in one respect

by the agreed contract rates, they are not protected from the con-

sequences of the bad service often given by the contractors. Although

the ginning of cotton is not yet a monopoly of the Federation, the

policy is to have the VFCU buy out the remaining nine Asian-owned

ginneries before long. In any event each ginnery has a ginning

monopoly within a specified zone of operation. The financing of

cotton buying by the cooperative societies which used to be arranged

by the unions with the ordinary commercial banks has now become

the exclusive prerogative of the cooperative bank. Finally, with the

acquisition by the VFCU of its large tractor fleet individual farmers

and merchants are now being denied loans to buy tractors for use

on their own farms and for contracting.3 1

30 This may well account partly for the fact that about 60 percent of the cotton

growers are not members of cooperatives to whom, however, they are legally

compelled to sell their cotton. There is also apparently some disposition on the

part of cooperative committees to restrict the membership of cooperatives for

the sake of limiting the number of people entitled to share in dividends.

31 This comment should not be interpreted as implying that this type of

private operation of tractors has always been efficient in the past. Lack of the

necessary skills and experience has indeed often made such operation excessively

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At each step in the handling and ginning of cotton the rates ofremuneration are fixed so as to provide a margin adequate even forthe least efficient. Thus the system provides virtually no penaltiesfor the inefficient. The Government Lint and Seed MarketingBoard, for example, pays primary societies five East African centsper pound, or about 10 percent of the price received by growersin recent years, for the simple task of buying and storing seed cottonpending deliveries to ginneries. At this rate of compensation thesocieties should be able to earn a large dividend for payment to theirmembers, but in recent years 12 of the 43 cooperative societies be-longing to three unions in Mwanza District paid no dividend at alland relatively few paid a substantial dividend. For the most partmembers apparently cannot be relied upon to put pressure on themanagement of their societies to reduce costs for the sake of raisingdividends. In 1963/64 the various fixed charges collected for theprimary societies, unions and Federation amounted to about 40%of the price received by the grower.

It might be argued, of course, that the cooperative movement withits monopolistic features has been able, despite the costs entailed, toprovide the grower a better price compared to that obtained whenhe was "at the mercy" of the Asian buyer and ginner. The conten-tion might also be advanced that only the cooperative movementcould have provided the handling, financing and ginning facilitiesessential for the rapidly increasing cotton crop.

However, there would seem to be no evidence to support the lattercontention. To have conceded an expanding role to private tradersand ginners who were almost entirely Asian would undoubtedlyhave been politically unpopular, but there is nothing to suggest thatthese would not have been capable and willing to provide all thenecessary facilities. Nor is there any reason to believe that the com-mercial banks had not coped efficiently with the financing of agrowing cotton harvest.

As to the first argument, the available evidence is hardly sufficientto either support or refute its validity. No doubt there was amplejustification for organizing cotton growers cooperatively in such away as to strengthen their bargaining power in the market placewith the financially stronger and better educated trader and ginner.

costly. Yet the actual experience, with the risks it entails, is likely to act ulti-mately as an incentive to more efficient use of such modern machinery. It isinteresting to note that a study (unpublished) carried out at Ukiriguru ResearchStation has indicated that merchants, owing to their experience with business,appear to be most efficient among private owners in managing and operatingtractors for hire.

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This, however, would have entailed not the institution of monopolies

but some degree of equalization of the terms of competition. Thus

the bulking of cotton by cooperative societies and its sale by auction

or negotiation to private buyers or direct to ginners might well have

brought substantial advantages to growers without exposing them

to the dangers of inefficiency inherent in a monopoly.

In general we would not impugn the usefulness of the cooperative

movement or the tasks which it has managed to discharge despite

tremendous difficulties. The history of the cooperatives in Sukuma-

land does illustrate the problems caused both by excessively rapid

and bureaucratic growth and by the inherent tendency toward

monopoly. The problems arising from the first of these causes can

in the long run be solved by training and experience; and some of the

disadvantages traceable even to the second may in the long run be

overcome. But it would seem better to prevent or avoid both sets of

problems, which may well arise elsewhere in Africa, than to devise

appropriate remedies after they have assumed serious proportions.

The Lint and Seed Marketing Board

A final comment might be made on the role of the Cotton Lint

and Seed Marketing Board (LSMB). This agency was established in

1952 to dispose of the cotton crop in the world market and carry out

certain regulatory and inspection functions. It buys lint and seed

from the ginneries at prices set with the approval of the Government

in advance of each season and in the light of anticipated revenues

from the sale of these products. The price paid to the grower for

seed cotton is fixed on this basis and after agreed, fixed deductions

have been made for the various handling and processing services

already mentioned above. Out of its revenues it maintains an inspec-

tion service designed to maintain ginning standards and quality

and makes grants for repair and maintenance of roads important to

the cotton crop, as well as for cotton research. Its reserve funds have

been the principal source of financing the stores, equipment and

ginneries of the cooperatives. In addition it operates a Price Assist-

ance Fund for the purpose of smoothing out the impact on the grow-

ers of price fluctuations in the world market.

The LSMB appears to have played a useful role in setting aside a

portion of the proceeds from cotton for the purpose of financing serv-

ices and facilities which were essential to the expansion of cotton

production and which otherwise might have had to be defrayed in

part from limited Government income. Its price stabilization opera-

tions, however, are open to serious question. For some years the

Board, with Government approval, pursued a cautious pricing policy

448


which enabled it to accumulate substantial reserves. Over recentyears, however, political pressures have led it to pay prices to grow-ers which have been consistently higher than those warranted by theworld market even though the latter has not been seriously de-pressed. Such payments have caused continuing and substantialinroads in the Price Assistance Fund. Moreover, these subsidies havebeen paid while the VFCU has been receiving considerable suinsannually because the newer cotton varieties have given a substan-tially higher ginning outturn than that assumed in fixing the pricepaid to the grower for seed cotton and the Federation has been al-lowed to retain the difference. In this way the Federation has beenreceiving extra income amounting to around £950,000 per year.

Concluding remarks

The checkered record of Sukumaland's agricultural and livestockdevelopment over the last three or four decades illustrates manyproblems and lessons. There unquestionably have been marked in-creases in production, particularly of cotton, and in standards ofconsumption, but they have primarily come about in ways not an-ticipated or greatly influenced by the Government and its services.While the income aspirations of the Sukuma have gradually risen,they have at any time and even now been limited so that there hasbeen resistance to Government measures seeking to raise income atthe cost of a substantially greater investment of labor. In the past,and probably even now, the Government has overestimated thedesire of the Sukuma to maximize their income and has underesti-mated the ability of the Sukuma to adapt their crop and livestockhusbandry to local conditions. While they have resisted mneasures toimpose on them methods of husbandry for which they felt no need,the varied ernphases they have put on livestock and the varied rneth-ods of cultivation (e.g., planting on handmade ridges in certain areasand sowing in the flat of plowed land in other areas) they haveadopted testify to some degree of natural adaptation to the differ-ences of conditions prevailing in Sukumaland. The Sukuma havetaken advantage of the opportunities to increase their production ofcotton, but they have done it in their owII way and with the leastpossible effort. For the most part they have found it advantageousto raise output by extensive methods rather than by the intensivemethods advocated by Government.

During the colonial period there was a fundamental contradictionbetween the Government policy of opening up new land for agricul-ture and that of encouraging intensification in the older settled areas.Thus the availability of new land combined with the readiness of

449


Sukuma to move in search of better crop and pasture land defeated

the rather undiscriminating Government efforts to intensify produc-

tion by raising yields per unit of area.

Today there is some danger that the mistakes of the past will be

repeated, though perhaps in somewhat different form. There is still

a tendency to rely on uniform and sweeping solutions, whether it be

the dissemination of fertilizers, the Agridev schemes or the mecha-

nized group farms. All emphasize intensification, but with insufficient

regard for differences in conditions. All appear to overlook the

limitations of available management and trained staff. Above all,

the methods employed to secure their adoption savor, as in the past,

more of pressure than of persuasion.

There is little doubt that over at least parts of Sukumaland condi-

tions are now becoming increasingly favorable to more intensive

practices of crop and animal husbandry, and that by various means

it is desirable to extend the limited time horizon which now prevents

the Sukuma from becoming sufficiently aware of the dangers of over-

grazing and extensive cultivation to the natural habitat in which

they live. The time is therefore ripe for new approaches, including

experiments combining intensification with both mechanical and

animal traction, provided that these take sufficient account of the

variety of conditions that prevail and the need for slow and painful

education of the people concerned. Above all, the Sukuma must be

helped to achieve a greater awareness of their problems and the

different types of choices open to them. In the broadest terms this

means more education, not simply of the formal kind, but especially

of the informal type that can be conveyed through reinforced com-

munity development and agricultural extension services and through

discussions within organized groups. It will also require much more

collaboration between the relatively new political and economic

institutions and their leaders on the one hand, and the older but still

quite deeply rooted organizations for community action which still

characterize Sukuma society. Only measures of this type are likely to

build up the popular enthusiasm for change which is the prerequisite

to development.

450

INDEX

Abattoirs, 26, 180 Baguinecda (Office du Niger, Mali),Absentee ownership of land (Kenya), 245n, 257, 298

7, 38, 57, 75, 214 Baguirmi area (Chad), 337, 341, 346,Adjudication of land (Kenya), 9, 151 349, 350, 352, 362, 367Afforestation: in Machakos District Ba-Illi agricultural school (Chad), 349

(Kenya), 96 Bamako region (Mali), 301African District Councils (Kenya), 18, cotton ginning in, 325

23, 108, 113, 150 fertilizer used in, 322African Land Development Board production in, 328n

(ALDEV), (Kenya), 22, 67, 96 spraying in, 324African Livestock Marketing Organi- yields of cotton in, 327

zation (ALMO), (Kenya), 26, 31, ZER areas in, 308-309180 Bambara people (Mali), 303

Agricultural Development Company cotton produced by, 328, 330(International) Lirnited, 434 farming patterns of, 304-306

Agricultural Finance Corporation land allocated to, 254(Kenya), 23, 63-64, 193 manure used by, 319

Agricultural Instructors, 99, 111 Bambey Research Station (Senegal),Agridev operations of (Tanzania), 345

432, 434-437, 440 BananasAhoi and land registration in Kenya, in Bouake region (Ivory Coast),

7, 57 396, 398Aid and Cooperation Fund of French in Machakos District (Kenya), 88

Republic, 347, 374 Bank credit: for agricultural develop-Ainabkoi settlement scheme (Kenya), ment in Kenya, 22

204n, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213n Banks: commercial in Kenya, 62Allan, William E., 141n, 183 Banque nationale de d/veloppemenl (BND),Allen cotton, 268, 317, 322, 328, 396, (Upper Volta), 377, 378

401, 408, 410 Bantu tribes, 131Alouette cultivator, 356, 358-359, 366 Baoule people (Ivory Coast), 392-395,Animateurs, 377, 390, 391, 402-406 396, 399Animation rurale, 391, 402-406 Barbadense cotton, 396

effectiveness of, 412 Baringo District (Kenya), 84, 157-187training of staff for, 405 agricultural development in, 5

Arara cultivator, 356, 358-359, 366 bush clearance in, 175-177Arrowroot: in Machakos District, 88 destocking in, 179-181Artisans: training of, 407 grazing schemes in, 177-179Asian personnel in Africa, 144, 265, land resources in, 159, 233

271, 287, 292, 447 limitations of data, 161Assistant Agricultural Instructors, 17, Perkerra Irrigation Scheme in, 221-

18, 99 241Assistant Agricultural Officer, 224, 237 physical description of, 159-160

451

INDEX

population in, 157-159, 189 economic activity in, 395-399possible approaches to land use in, education in, 406

183-186 farming in, 397-399progress and change in, 161-162 livestock in, 398, 410reaction to grazing and livestock means of assistance to, 399-402

controls in, 181-183 operations of zone for rural develop-South Baringo area, 169-171 ment, 404-405

Baringo Lake (Kenya), 185, 186 physical features of, 391-395Baroueli area (Mali) pilot sectors in, 400-402

cotton yield in, 328, 329 population in, 395-396crop rotation in, 317 preliminary action near, 403density of sowing in, 323 reorganization of land in, 409ZER area in, 310 rotation of crops in, 397, 410

Bennison, R. H., 101n, 103n trained farming staff for, 399-400Beoumi Sub-perfecture (Ivory Coast), Bougouni sector (Mali)

391 area under cotton, 326coffee crop in, 397 fertilizer used in, 322crops in, 399 production of cotton in, 327, 328ndraft animals in, 410 sector head in, 309population in, 398 spraying in, 324training center in, 411 ZER areas in, 308, 309

Berb're, 338, 343, 346 Brobo (Ivory Coast), 400-404Biharamulo District (Tanzania), 415n, population in, 398-399

420, 432 training center in, 405, 407Bobo people (Mali), 303 Brown, K. J., 429nBobo region (Mali): cotton production Brown, L. H., 110n, 175, 177n, 180n,

in, 328 183, 184Bokakouamekro (Ivory Coast),400-402 Brown, R. H., 114nBokoro area (Chad), 337-367 Bureau pour le Developpement de la

agriculture in, 337-346 Production Agricole (BDPA), 337BDPA operation in, 347-362 activities in Chari-Baguirmi, 367community action in, 350-359 extension of operation, 367-368cooperatives in, 351-355, 364 programs of, 347-362crops in, 343-346 See also Bokoro areadraft animals in, 358, 363, 366 Bush clearance: in Baringo District,economic activity in, 341-346 175-177fertilizers and manure in, 361 Butter: marketing of in Kenya, 26-27groundnuts in, 345-346, 353-355,

363 Cadastral plans: in Nyeri Districtimplements used in, 355-359, 363, (Kenya), 12

366 Canals: in Office du Niger, 263marketing in, 353-355 Canneries, 28, 54, 104millet in, 344-345 Carts: sold by CFDT, 314physical features of, 337-341 Cash cropspopulation of, 341 in Central Nyanza, 137-145rural groups in, 351-352 development of, 70, 77sorghum in, 346 in Machakos District, 104-109stock raising in, 342-343 in Mossi country, 372, 387supply operations in, 352-353 in Sukumaland, 417

Boran cattle, 185, 202 CassavaBouake region (Ivory Coast), 391-414 in Bouake region, 396

agriculture in, 391-402 in Machakos District, 88artisans trained in, 407 in Sukumaland, 417Baoule people in, 392-395 Cathala groundnut sheller, 356-359CIDR activities in, 391, 402-414 Cattlecooperatives in, 408, 412 artificial insemination program, 169,crops in, 396-397, 410 203

452

INDEX

in Baringo District, 179-181 sisal in, 139in Bokoro area, 342-343, 358, 363, sugar cane in, 144

366 supplies and equipment in, 143in Bouake region, 398, 410 use of land in, 126, 127in Central Nyanza District, 124, Central Province (Kenya), 124, 173

136, 147-149 bank lending in, 22communal grazing problem, 148 development of production in, 31cooperative ranching, 200-203 land consolidation in, 8-13courses in husbandry, 20 marketing boards in, 27destocking of, 179-181, 422 population in, 189development of dairying, 30-31 research in, 422nexports of products, 43, 106-107 Centre rizicole mecanise (CRM),improved breeds, 148 (Office du Niger, Mali), 259, 261,in irrigation scheme, 234 278, 279, 282-284, 286Kamba attitude toward, 91, 94, 113 Chad Development Bank, 352, 353,in Kano Plains, 147 354, 358and land enclosure policies, 116-117 Chad Republic (study in), 337-367Livestock Research Center, 148 See also Bokoro area (Chad)Livestock Service, 342 Champs collectifs, 307, 311, 412Luo attitudes toward, 129-130 Chari-Baguirmi (Chad), 337, 341, 349,in Machakos District, 106-107, 111- 350, 352, 362

117 BDPA activities in, 367in Mali, 305 groundnuts in, 353-354in Marakwet Division, 165 Chef de terre and land location, 304,marketing of, 25-26, 134 371, 393in Sukumaland, 418, 421-426 CoffeeSee also Dairying; Draft animals in Bouake region, 397, 399

Central Nyanza District (Kenya), 84, in Central Nyanza, 122,124,137-139121-156 cooperative societies, 66, 68

adjudication areas in, 151 data from Farm Economics Surveyagricultural development in, 5 Unit, 44-45animal husbandry in, 147-149 development of crops, 3cash crops in, 137-145 expansion of crops, 30coffee crop in, 137-139 in Machakos District, 88, 105-108cotton in, 139-144 marketing of, 24crop husbandry in, 136-137 Mathira Cooperative, 68ecological factors in, 122-124 in Nyeri District, 41-47extension service in, 133 settlements affecting, 205government efforts in, 132-153 small-scale production of, 79group cotton farming in, 140-142 Coffee Marketing Board, 24irrigation in, 145-147 Coffee Rules, 105labor in, 118, 127-129 Collinson, M. P., 424n, 429n, 431n,land consolidation, enclosure and 442n

registration in, 15, 149-153 Compagnie agricole et industrielle desLuo society in, 129-132 tabacs africains, (CAITA), 400,manure and fertilizer use in, 137 404, 408marketing in, 133-136 Compagnie francaise pour le de-mechanization in, 142-143 veloppensent des fibres textilemodernizing influences in, 132 (CFDT), 301-336, 387, 400, 404,need for research in, 143 409paddy purchases in, 139n area under cotton, 326political consciousness in, 132 care of cotton crops, 323population pressures in, 124-129, communal fields of, 307, 311-312

189 cotton production, 325-331produce purchased in, 135 date of sowing, 322-323rice in, 139 development of extension services,self-help groups in, 149-151 307-309

453

INDEX

equipment provided by, 310-311 expansion of crops, 30ginning and marketing, 325-326 extension services for, 400means of assistance, 307-316 fertilizers for, 269new techniques of, 317-324 ginneries for, 257, 301, 325, 427, 444new varieties of cotton, 317, 322 group-farming schemes, 140-142output marketed by, 334 irrigation for, 223, 245production sectors, 328-331 in Machakos District, 86, 109program developed by, 317-318 marketing of, 25, 325-326recommendations for land prepara- in Mossi country, 372, 388

tion, 318-319 new varieties of, 268, 317, 322, 328,sales of equipment and supplies, 396, 401, 408, 410

314-316 production by CFDT, 301-336seasonal agricultural schools of, production in Office du Niger, 258-

312-313 259, 261, 266-270, 275-277, 285,spraying procedures, 324 290, 299, 300unite de culture, 309-311, 319 spraying of, 143, 154, 269, 272, 324,

Compagnie Internationale de D& 428veloppement Rural (CIDR), 391, in Sukumaland, 417, 423, 426-428,402-414 444

action to improve agriculture, 408- Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing411 Board, 25, 142n, 143, 427, 447,

group approach within villages, 408 448-449scope and methods of training, 405- Credit, 22-24

408 from commercial banks, 22

Conseillers d'animation, 404-406, 411, and cooperatives, 68, 377-379412 demand for, 64-65

Consolidation of land in Kenya, 7-15 in Elgeyo Division, 169in Central Nyanza, 138, 149-153 from government funds, 22-24

initiation of, 8-9 for implements in Bokoro area, 359in Nyeri District, 57 for land purchases, 65, 193-197procedure in, 9-12 for livestock investments, 116spontaneous, 7-8 mortgages, 62-64in Tugen Hills, 173-174 for Mossi country cooperatives, 377-

Cooperatives, 28 379in Bokoro, 351-355, 364 in Nyeri District, 60-65in Bouake region, 408, 412 repayment of loans, 62-64, 196-197

in Central Nyanza, 140-142 volume of, 61-62Department of, 67, 445 Cultivation of soil. See Land prepara-

in Elgeyo Division, 168, 169 tionand farm credit, 68 Cultivatorsfor land purchases, 193 in Bokoro area, 356, 364, 366

in Lembus Forest, 170 for cotton crops, 323in Mali, 307, 311-312 in Mossi country, 380-384, 389

in Mossi country, 374, 375, 376-379,389

in Nyeri District, 65-68 Dairyingin Office du Niger, 255 cooperative societies, 66, 204for ranching, 200-203 data from Farm Economics Surveyin SATEC program, 376-379 Unit, 44for settlement schemes, 199-203 in Elgeyo Division, 168-169in South Baringo, 170 exports of products, 43standards of management, 67-68 land reform affecting, 59in Sukumaland, 437-441, 444-448 marketing of products, 26-27

Cotton mixed with farming, 4in Bouake region, 396-397, 399, 410 in Nyeri District, 49-52in Central Nyanza, 124, 139-144 and settlement cooperatives, 204

courses offered in, 20 small-scale activities, 79

454

INDEX

Destocking of cattle labor migration of, 165-166in Baringo District, 179-181 land use by, 8, 14in Sukumaland, 422 Elgon Nyanza District (Kenya), 128n

Dilbini Experimental Farm (Chad). Employment. See Labor344, 346, 347, 349, 350, 356, 357 Enclosure of land358, 360, 361-362, 366 and animal husbandry, 116-117

Djarraye, 356 in Central Nyanza, 138, 149-153Dowker, Mr., 101n in Elgeyo Division, 166-167Draft animals spontaneous, 7-8

in Bokoro, 358, 363, 366 in Sukumaland, 425in Mossi country, 374, 380-383 Equipment and suppliessupplied by CFDT, 316 for cultivation in Bokoro area, 352-

Dusters: use of, 143, 154 353, 355-359, 363, 366lending of, by CFDT, 310in Machakos District, 103-104

East Coast Fever: of livestock, 116, sales by CFDT, 314-3162 02n of settlers in Office du Niger, 254-255Eco seed-drill, 356-359 Erosion control measures, 69Ecological zones, 16, 33, 35, 59, 85-87, European Development Fund, 257,

122-124 268, 286, 292, 312, 343, 402Ecology Exploitation en Regie directe (ERD),

in Central Nyanza District, 122-124 (Office du Niger, Mali), 259-261in Machakos District, 84-87 Extension services, 16-22, 68-74in Mali, south of Niger River, 301- BDPA operations, 348-350

304 in Central Nyanza, 133in Nyeri District, 33-35 CFDT program, 307-309

Education, 16-22 CIDR program, 391, 402-414in Bouake region, 406 and farm management studies, 71of Kikuyu people, 132 in Mossi country, 373-374of Luo people, 132 SATEC program, 374-388in Mossi country, 371 settlement schemes, 198-199of personnel for BDPA program, shortcomings in, 69-71

349-350, 365 in Sukumaland, 439-440seasonal agricultural schools in

Mali, 312-313of staff in SATEC program, 375-376 Famine: in Machakos District, 89, 93in Sukumaland, 445 Farm Economics Survey Unit intraining of staff for animation rurale, Kenya, 41, 61, 204n, 206, 212,

405-407 234, 235See also Farmers' Training Centers data for Nyeri District, 45-56, 71

Elgeyo Division (Kenya), 165-169 Farm layouts and plans, 17-19credit in, 169 Farmers' Societies, 67dairying in, 168-169 Farmers' Training Centers (FTC) infeatures of farming in, 167-169 Kenya, 19-20, 71-74land enclosure in, 8, 166-167 in Fort Hall, 72, 73, 100landholdings in, 214 in Machakos, 100occupation of plateau, 166 in Maseno, 142-143

Elgeyo-Marakwet District (Kenya), and settlement schemes, 198-199124, 157-187 Fearn, Hugh, 141n

agricultural development in, 5 Fertilizers and manure, 46land enclosure in, 8, 166-167 in Bokoro area, 361land resources in, 159 in Central Nyanza, 137limitations of data from, 161 in CFDT sectors, 315, 319-322physical description of, 159-160 for cotton crops, 269population in, 157-159, 189 in Machakos District, 102-103progress and change in, 161-162 in Mossi country, 373-374, 379,

Elgeyo people in Kenya, 157 384-387

455

INDEX

for rice crops, 265 in Mali, 305in Sukumaland, 425, 433-434 in Mossi country, 373, 388

Field services. See Extension services in Sukumaland, 417Financing of settlement schemes, 194- Group cotton farming, 140-142

197 See also CooperativesFonds d'aide et de cooperation (FAC), 347, Groupements ruraux, 311

374Foreign aid: in Office du Niger, 286- Hameaux de culture, 304, 311

287, 291-292 Heyer, Judith, 10n, 102n, 103nFort Hall district (Kenya), 6, 33 Hides: sold in Sukumaland, 422n

Farmers' Training Center in, 72, 73, Horticultural Cooperative Union

100 (Kenya), 27, 79n, 239land reform in, 12, 13, 59 Horticultural Research Station at

loan payments in, 64n Thika (Kenya), 54population in, 36progress in, 40, 83 Industry: in Office du Niger (Mali),

374 256-257Fort Lamy, 342, 349, 353, 354 Inheritance of land, 6, 16Fragmentation of land, 6-7, 59-60 Insecticides. See Spraying

in Central Nyanza, 127 Institut de recherchesin Luo society, 131 d'agronomies tropicale (IRAT),

in Machakos, 117 287, 384in Tugen Hills, 173-174 sur le coton et les textiles exotiques

French Company for Development of (IRCT), 269, 287, 317, 322, 408Textile Fibers. See Compagnie sur les huiles et oleagineux tropicaux

fran,aise pour le d6veloppement (IRHO), 387des fibres textile (CFDT) Instructeurs, 258

French personnel and funds International Coffee Agreement, 41,

in Bokoro, 337, 349, 350, 353 79, 108, 172in Bouak6 region, 402 International Cooperation Agency, 22

in Mali, 325 Irrigation, 221-241in Mossi country, 374, 380, 388 in Central Nyanza, 145-147in Office du Niger, 245, 252, 286, charges for supplies and services, 231

291-292 cooperation and discipline of ten-French Sudan, 288, 301 ants, 236-239Fulani stock raisers, 316, 341, 342, 411 disposal of tenant income, 236

and grazing areas, 234Geita District (Tanzania), 415n, 420, and housing, 227-228

421, 438n intensification of production, 239-

Gezira Scheme (Sudan), 262 240Ghana: migrant labor in, 371 labor hired by tenants, 234-236Gibb, Alexander, 145 in Machakos District, 110-111Gifts of land for cultivation, 7, 38, 57, in Marakwet Division, 164

75, 214 mechanization in, 228-231Giglioli, E. G., 230 Office du Niger, 245-300Ginneries: cotton. 257, 301, 325, 427, operation of schemes, 224-231

444 Perkerra Scheme, 185-186, 221-241Grazing areas planning and research for, 222-224

in Baringo District, 177-179 production and income from, 231-

in irrigation scheme, 234 234in Machakos District, 114-116 responsibilities of management andin Sukumaland, 425 tenants, 228

Groundnuts results of, 231-239in Bokoro area, 338, 340, 345-346, selection of tenants, 225-227

353-355, 360-361, 362, 363 staff and organization for, 224-225in Bouak6 region, 396, 410 in Sukumaland, 434in Central Nyanza District, 124 See also Office du Niger (Mali)

456

INDEX

Ivory Coast, 303, 371 Kenya Planters' Cooperative Unionprogram in Bouak6 region, 391-414 24, 66

Kenya Tea Development AuthorityJacobs, A. H., 157n (KTDA), 24, 47, 62, 76Jadak and land tenure in Central Kericho District (Kenya), 7, 129, 167

Nyanza (Kenya), 7, 130, 131, Kerio Valley (Kenya), 159, 162, 164,149, 151, 152n 185

Joint Loan Boards, 23 Kiambu District (Kenya), 33Jokakwaro kinship groups in Central animal husbandry in, 31

Nyanza (Kenya), 130, 140, 142, cooperatives in, 66150-152, 155 development of production in, 31

land consolidation in, 12, 16Kabarnet grazing scheme, 178 pineapples in, 54Kalenjin tribes in Kenya, 14-15, 157 population and land in, 36Kamba cattle, 202 progress in, 40, 83Kamba District (Kenya): population Kibos Research Station (Kenya), 143

in, 189 Kikuyu Districts (Kenya), 33Kamba people, 84, 89, 90n, 91-92 animal husbandry in, 31

attitude toward cattle, 113 land consolidation progress in, 12-cultivation practices of, 138 13labor migration of, 118 landholdings in, 38, 214as workers on European farms, 116 land reform in, 152

Kangundo (Machakos District, Ken- land use in, 6, 7ya), 86, 89, 90, 91n, 105, 117 population pressures in, 189, 219

Kano Plains (Kenya), 122, 124 villagization in, 13, 14, 217land preparation in, 142, 143 Kikuyu tribe in Kenya, 39-40, 91livestock in, 147 adaptibility of, 50, 66ox plowing in, 136 attitudes toward land, 149potential in, 145, 152 cultivation practices of, 138, 215rice in, 139 diet of, 77

Karue, Christopher H., 46n, 52n, 61n education of, 132Katumani Research Station (Kenya), employment of, 21, 36, 116, 128, 222

100, 102, 119 on European farms, 116, 128Keben settlement scheme (Kenya), Mau Mau rebellion, 8-9, 13, 14, 58,

206, 208, 210, 213n 132, 217, 222Kenya, 3-241 in North Yatta, 114

agricultural extension and educa- repayment of loans by, 196-197tion in, 16-22 Kipsigis in Kenya, 7-8, 14-15, 126,

Baringo District, 157-187 167Central Nyanza District, 121-156 Kirinyaga District (Kenya): Mwea-credit for agriculture in, 22-24 Tebere Irrigation Scheme in,Elgeyo-Marakwet District, 157-187 221-241focus of investigation in, 5 Kitui District (Kenya), 91irrigation schemes in, 221-241 Kogoni (Office du Niger, Mali)land tenure reform in, 5-16 population in, 298lines of development, 3-5 rainfall in, 262, 297Machakos District, 84-120 research station in, 267, 269, 272,market organization in, 24-29 287Nyeri District, 33-83 Kokwet elders, 7, 163, 166, 167settlement schemes, 188-220 Kolongo sector (Office du Niger,

Kenya Canners, 104 Mali), 249-251, 265-266, 267Kenya Cooperative Creameries collective fields in, 255

(KCC), 26, 66, 168, 170, 172 cotton production in, 261, 266, 272,Kenya Dairy Board, 27 285, 299Kenya Meat Commission (KMC), 26, deep plowing in, 280

31 drainage problems in, 263Kenya Orchards, 104 expansion of, 286

457

INDEX

landholdings in, 254 wage labor in Office du Niger, 270,population of, 253, 298 283rice output in, 256, 258-261, 266, See also Personnel

299 Labor migrationtransplanting of rice in, 265, 271, of Baoules, 399

274, 287, 290 in Central Nyanza, 127-129Koma Rock Cooperative Ranch (Ken- of Elgeyo, 165-166

ya), 113, 185, 201-202 of Kamba, 118Konza Cooperative Ranch (Kenya), of Luo people, 153

203 in'Machakos District, 90-91Koudougou region (Upper Volta) in Mali, 303

population in, 371, 374 in Mossi country, 371SATEC program in, 369-390 in Nyeri District, 35-38

Kourouma sector (Office du Niger, of Tugen people, 170Mali), 249, 250, 251, 252 Labour d'automne in Mali, 318

cotton production in, 261, 266, 285, Lake Shore Savanna (Kenya), 122,299 128, 139, 152

irrigation problems in, 263 Landlabor shortage in, 270 absentee ownership of, 38, 57, 75,

mechanization in, 280 214population of, 253, 298 availability in Machakos District, 87rice milling in, 257 in Central Nyanza, 126, 127rice production in, 258, 260, 261, consolidation of. See Consolidation

266, 299 of landKoutiala District (Mali), 301 credit for purchase of, 65

area under cotton, 326 enclosure of. See Enclosure of landCFDT activities in, 307 farm layouts and plans, 17-19cotton ginning in, 325 fragmentation of. See Fragmentationdistribution of cotton varieties in, of land

322 inadequate development in Nyeri,

ethnic groups in, 303 74-75farming patterns in, 304 inheritance of, 6, 16manure use in, 319-321 levelling operations in Office duparty support of CFDT in, 312 Niger, 267-268, 277, 286production of cotton in, 327-330 Luo attitudes toward, 130-131sector head in, 309 practices in Machakos District, 92spraying in, 324 progress in Kikuyu districts, 12-13unites de culture in, 310, 311 purchases for settlement, 190ZER areas in, 308, 309 registration of. See Registration of

Kwimba District (Tanzania), 415n landcultivation methods in, 428 reorganization in Bouake region,economic surveys in, 423, 424n, 409

431n resources in Baringo and Elgeyo-land enclosure in, 425 Marakwet, 159population in, 420 sales and purchases of, 65, 76-77,

Kyai Irrigation Scheme (Kenya), 111 190smallholders of, 75-81

Land Adjudication Act of Kenya, 9

Labor Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya,in Central Nyanza, 118 193, 194family labor input, 210-211 Land Boards in Kenya, 76n, 77hired by tenants in irrigation Land Control Ordinance in Kenya, 15

schemes, 234-236 Land preparationincrease in settlement schemes, 211 in Bouake region, 398lack of manpower in Office du CFDT recommendations for, 318-

Niger, 270-272, 289 319in Nyeri District, 55-56 in Mali, 306-307

458

INDEX

in Sukumaland, 428-430 fruits and vegetables in, 104-105See also Cultivators; Ox plowing government development efforts in,

Land reform in Kenya, 5-16 92-117in Central Province, 8-13 grazing areas in, 114-116, 176in Embu District, 14 implements used in, 103-104favorable effect on development, improvement of livestock in, 116

58-59 irrigation in, 110-111by Kalenjin tribes, 14-15 Kamba people in, 89, 90n, 91-92by Kipsigis, 7-8, 14-15 Koma Rock Ranch in, 201-202in Meru District, 14 labor migration in, 90-91in Nyeri District, 57-60 land consolidation in, 15social implications of, 57-58 land enclosure and animal hus-

Land Registrar's Office in Kenya, 36, bandry in, 116-11762 livestock problem in, 111 -117

Land Registration Ordinance in Ken- manure use in, 102-103ya, 9, 151 population pressures in, 89-91, 189,

Lands and Settlement, Ministry of (in 219Kenya), 185, 190, 193 resettlement in, 109-110

Layouts of farms, 17-19 search for land in, 90Lembus Forest (Kenya), 160,162,169- seasonal peaks of labor, 103

171 self-help effort in, 96-99Lint and Seed Marketing Board, 25, sisal in, 108, 139

142n, 143, 427, 447, 448-449 soil conservation in, 93-99Livestock. See Cattle water supply in, 95, 96Loans. See Credit MaizeLukenia Cooperative Ranch (Kenya), in Baringo, 171

202-203 hybrid, 77-78Luo people, 126, 129-132 in Machakos District, 88, 89, 100,

attitudes toward cattle, 129-130 101nattitudes toward land, 149 in Mali, 305cultivation practices of, 138 in Marakwet Division, 165education of, 132 marketing of, 25female/male ratio, 127 in Mossi country, 372group farming by, 141n in Sukumaland, 417, 444labor migration of, 128-129, 153 yield on irrigation schemes, 233-234land use by, 6, 7, 15 Maize Board (Kenya), 25, 234traditional society of, 130-131 Makueni settlement (Kenya), 104,

109, 110Mali

Machakos District (Kenya), 84-120 agriculture south of Niger River,afforestation in, 96 301-307agricultural development in, 5 cattle raising in, 305agricultural staff in, 98 comnmunal fields in, 307, 311-312cannery in, 54, 104 cotton production by CFDT, 301-cash crops in, 104-109 336coffee in, 105-108 cultivation methods in, 306-307cooperative ranches in, 201, 203 Office du Niger, 245-300cotton in, 109 pattern of farming in, 304-307cropping pattern in, 87-89 Manga cultivator, 356, 358, 359, 366cultivation practices in, 138 Manpower. See Laborearly-maturing food crops in, 100- Manure use. See Fertilizers and

101 manureecology of, 84-87 Mara District (Tanzania), 427efforts to improve crop husbandry, Marakwet Division (Kenya), 162-165

99-104 Marakwet people, 157, 163-165exports from, 106-107 Marco Surveys, 128nFarmers' Training Center in, 100 Margoli-Bunyore settlers, 198n

459

INDEX

Market organization in Kenya, 24-29 production in Elgeyo Division, 168coffee, 24 yields in Nyeri District, 50cotton, 25 Milletdairy products, 26-27 in Bokoro area, 338, 340, 344-345general produce, 27-28 dressing of seeds, 387livestock and meat, 25-26 fertilizers affecting output of, 386maize, 25 in Machakos District, 100pyrethrum, 25 in Mali, 305role of cooperatives in, 28-29 in Mossi country, 372, 378, 379, 386tea, 24-25 in Sukumaland, 417vegetables and fruits, 67 Minianka people (Mali), 252, 303

Marketing cattle raising by, 305in Bokoro area, 353-355 cotton production of, 328, 330in Central Nyanza, 133-136 farming patterns of, 304-306of cotton in CFDT sectors, 325-326 Mixed cropping: in Machakos Dis-

Masai, 91, 165 trict, 88-89Maseno (Kenya), 125, 126n Molodo sector (Office du Niger,

Farmers' Training Center in, 142- Mali), 250, 251143 cotton production in, 259, 261, 266,

land tenure reform in, 151 299Livestock Research Center in, 148 labor problems in, 272

Maswa District (Tanzania), 415n large-scale farming in, 283cotton cultivation in, 430 mechanization in, 278, 280, 282economic surveys in, 423-424 population in, 253, 298population in, 420 rice production in, 258, 259, 260,rainfall in, 432 261, 266, 299

Mathira Division (Kenya), 33 Mondo, 131Coffee Cooperative in, 68 Moniteurs, 258, 307, 309, 400coffee production in, 46n Mortgages, 62-64efficiency of cooperatives in. 67 Mossi country (Upper Volta)landholdings in, 37 agriculture in, 369-374tea production in, 48n cooperatives in, 374-379, 389wages in, 56n crops in, 372

Mau Mau rebellion, 8, 9, 13, 14, 58, cultivators in, 380-384, 389132, 217, 222 draft animals in, 374, 380-383, 389

Mautuma settlement scheme (Kenya), economic setting of, 371-373198n extension services in, 373-374

Meat: marketing of, 25-26 fertilizers used in, 373-374, 379.Mechanization 384-387

in Central Nyanza, 142-143 physical features of, 369-374, 379in Elgeyo Division, 168 SATEC program in, 369, 374-388group schemes in Sukumaland, 437- Mossi people in Upper Volta, 252,

441 254, 284in irrigation schemes, 228-231 M'Pesoba area (Mali), 309, 317in Machakos District, 104 Muramati, 6in Office du Niger, 278-284, 288- Mushi, J. S., 433n

289 Mwanza Rural District (Tanzania),in settlement schemes, 215-217 415nin South Baringo, 171 cooperatives in, 447in Sukumaland, 430, 437-441 cotton grown in, 427, 439

Meru District (Kenya), 14, 138n fertilizer program in, 434Migration of labor. See Labor migra- population in, 420

tion Mwea-Tebere Irrigation SchemeMilk (Kenya), 30, 218, 221-241

expanded production of, 30-31 organization of, 224exports of, 43 responsibilities of management andmarketing of, 26-27 tenants, 228

460

INDEX

tenants for, 225-227 farming opportunities in, 97Mweiga Settlement Scheme (Kenya), inadequate development of land in,

204n, 206, 208, 210, 215 74-75Mwethya, 97 Kikuyu inhabitants of, 39-40

labor migration in, 35-38Naga soils, 339 land consolidation in, 8, 12, 13, 16Nakuru District (Kenya), 91, 165, 170 land holdings in, 173Nandi tribe in Kenya, 14, 126 land reform in, 57-60Native Authorities in Sukumaland Marketing Union in, 66

(Tanzania), 419, 420, 443 neglected areas of development, 74-Native Land Tenure Rules (Kenya), 9 81Ndalat settlement scheme (Kenya), pigs in, 54

206, 208, 210, 211 pineapple in, 53-54N'Dama breed of cattle, 305 population in, 35-38Ngitiri, 425 potatoes in, 52Ngwatanio, 97 progress achieved in, 40-55Niger River, 245, 250, 262, 272, 291. pyrethrum in, 52-53, 204

301, 302, 305 size of farms in, 214Nilo-Hamitic people, 157 small landowners in, 75-81Niono sector (Office du Niger, Mali), tea cultivation in, 47-49

250, 251collective fields in, 255 Occidentale cultivator, 356, 358, 359,cotton ginnery in, 257 366cotton production in, 258, 259, 261, Office du Niger (Mali), 245-300

266, 272, 285, 290, 299 administration of, 249-250expansion of, 286 agricultural equipment of settlers,landholdings in, 254 254-255population in, 298 agricultural production in, 257-261rice production in, 258, 259, 260, charges levied by, 300

261, 266, 299 cooperatives in, 255Njemps, 157, 175, 225, 226, 234 coordination of foreign aid in, 286-Njukia, John, 49n, 52n 287, 291-292Njuri, 14 cotton production in, 266-270, 275-North Tetu. See Tetu Divisions 277, 285, 290, 299N'Tarla experimental station (Mali), development work in, 250-252

317, 322 direct farming in, 260, 284-285, 289Nut grass infestation, 223 experimental ventures in, 285Nyabondo Plateau (Central Nyanza, farming enterprises in, 283-286, 289

Kenya), 123, 124, 131, 141n incentives for intensification, 272-land tenure reform in, 151, 152n 277

Nyanza Province (Kenya), 141n industrial and commercial opera-marketing boards in, 27, 133, 135, tions in, 256-257

136, 139n intensification of production in.Nyeri District (Kenya), 6, 33-83 264-278

agricultural development in, 5 irrigation and drainage problems,animal husbandry in, 31 262-264, 277, 288cadastral plans irn, 12 lack of manpower, 270-272, 289coffee cultivation in, 41-47 land levelling operations in, 267-cooperatives in, 65-68 268, 277, 286credit policies in, 22, 60-65 limited success of intensification,cultivation practices in, 138 270-278, 290dairying in, 49-52 mechanization in, 278-284, 288-289ecology of, 33-35 organization of, 248-261employment in, 55-56 production by settlers, 261extension services in, 68-74 research work done at, 322factors in development of, 56-74 rice production in, 264-266, 273-Farmers' Training Center in, 100 275, 286, 289, 299

461

INDEX

settlement of, 252-256 for SATEC program, 375-376sugar cane in, 285, 287, 292 for seasonal agricultural schools, 313

See also Kolongo sector; Kourouma for settlement schemes, 197-199sector; Molodo sector; Niono for Sukumaland extension services,sector 439-440, 445

Oliver, S. C., 92n, 118n for teaching in Farmers' TrainingOmamo, W. Odongo, 58n Centers, 20Ominde, S. H., 125n, 126n Pig Industry Board (Kenya), 26Onions Pig Breeders' Cooperative Union

in Baringo District, 186 (Nyeri District, Kenya), 66-67cash income from, 233 Pigsexports of, 43 exports of, 43and irrigation scheme, 223 in Nyeri District, 54

Oret, 163 small-scale activities, 79Othaya Division (Nyeri District, Ken- Pineapple

ya), 33, 37, 62, 76n canning of, 28Ouagadougou Region (Upper Volta) cooperative societies, 66

agricultural resources of, 390 development of crops, 3climate and soil in, 372 expansion of crops, 30extension services in, 373 in Nyeri District, 42, 53-54population in, 374 Plans for farms, 17-19SATEC program in, 369-390 Planting: early, 100-102size of farms in, 372 Plows: sold by CFDT, 314

Ox plowing, 142, 155 Populationin Central Nyanza, 136 in Baringo, 157-159, 189in CFDT sectors, 318 in Beoumi region, 398in Machakos District, 101 in Bokoro area, 341in settlements, 215-216 in Bouake region, 395-396in South Baringo, 171 in Brobo-M'Bayakro region, 398-in Sukumaland, 430, 441 399

in Central Nyanza District, 124-

Pangas, 139 129, 189Peas, pigeon, 87, 88 in Central Province, 189Peat, J. E., 429n in Elgeyo-Marakwet, 157-159, 189

Peberdy, J. F. 96 n in Kamba District of Machakos, 189

Penwill, Mr., 92n in Kikuyu Districts, 189Perkerra Irrigation Scheme (Kenya), in Luo District of Central Nyanza,

185-186, 221-241 189organization for, 225 in Machakos District, 87, 89-91, 189responsibilities of management and in Mali, 303

tenants, 228 in Mossi country, 370-371tenants for, 225-227 in Nyeri District, 35-38

Perkerra River, 222 in Office du Niger, 253, 298Personnel settlement schemes, 188-220

for agricultural services in Kenya, in Sukumaland, 420n16-17 Porter, Philip W., 89n

for BDPA extension services, 348- Potatoes350, 365 in Elgeyo Division, 168

for Bouake extension services, 399- exports of, 79400 in Nyeri District, 52

for CFDT program, 308-309 production of, 30, 43education of. See Education Poultry, 20, 43, 79for field services in Kenya, 16-17 Pre-labour of land, 318government field staff, 68-74 Producefor irrigation schemes, 224-225 exports of, 43for Machakos agricultural staff, 98 in Machakos District, 88, 104-105managers of cooperatives, 67-68 marketing of, 27-28, 67, 134

462

INDEX

purchased in Central Nyanza, 135 transplanting of, 265, 271, 273, 287,small-scale production of, 79 290

Productivity of small land holdings, wild rice control, 264-265, 267, 271,77-79 280, 288

Pulses: in Machakos District, 88 Rift Valley, 38n, 160, 189, 192Pyrethrum Ripailles, Claude, 401n

in Central Nyanza District, 124 Rotation of cropscooperative societies, 66, 204 in Bouake region, 397, 410courses offered in, 20 CFDT program for, 317development of crops, 3 Rotenhan, D. V., 428in Elgeyo Division, 168 Rural Extension Service Centers, 374expansion of crops, 30 Russian aid: to Office du Niger, Mali,marketing of, 25 286, 292in Nyeri District, 42, 52-53and settlement cooperatives, 204 Sabatia Settlement Scheme (Kenya),

Pyrethrum Board, 25, 52, 53, 66 201Saga, 150

Rainfall Sahelian region, 297, 339, 340, 342in Baringo, 159 Sahiwal cattle, 148, 202, 234in Bokoro area, 339 San District (Mali), 301in Bouake region, 392 area under cotton, 326in Central Nyanza, 122-124 CFDT activities in, 307in Elgeyo-Marakwet, 159 cotton production in, 326-330in Machakos District, 85-87 ethnic groups in, 303in Mali, 302 manure used in, 320in Mossi country, 370 rainfall in, 319in Nyeri District, 33-34 sector head in, 309in Office du Niger, 262, 297 spraying in, 324in Sukumaland, 415 ZER areas in, 308, 309

Ranching: cooperative, 200-203 Saria experimental station (UpperRecord of Existing Rights (land tenure Volta), 381, 382, 384, 386

reform, Kenya), 10-11 Schools: in Kenya, 21Reform of land tenure. See Land re- See also Education

form in Kenya Seasonal labor peaks: in MachakosRegional Agricultural Board, 23 District, 103Registration of land, 9-12, 36, 62, 151 Segou (Mali), 249, 255, 262, 301

in Central Nyanza, 138, 149-153 area under cotton, 326in Nyeri District, 57 CFDT activities in, 307

Repayment of loans, 62-64, 196-197 cotton ginning in, 325Resettlement: in Machakos District, ethnic groups in, 303

109-110 farming patterns in, 304, 305Rice manure used in, 319, 320

in Bouake region, 396, 399, 410 production of cotton in, 326-330in Central Nyanza, 124, 139 sector head in, 309charges levied by Office du Niger, spraying in, 324

300 ZER areas in, 308, 309expansion of output, 30 Self-help groupsfertilizers for, 265 in Central Nyanza, 149-151irrigation for, 222 in Machakos District, 96-99in Mali, 305 Senoufo people in Mali, 303, 304, 306,milling of, in Office du Niger, 256 395in Mossi country, 372, 388 Senoufo region (Mali): cotton pro-in Mwea-Tebere, 232, 240 duction in, 328-331in Office du Niger, 256, 259-261, Settlement Administration (Kenya),

264-266, 273-275, 286, 289, 299, 198, 200, 203, 204, 215, 220300 Settlement Department (Kenya), 190,

in Sukumaland, 417, 444 197, 200

463

INDEX

Settlement Fund Trustees (Kenya), cost of program, 376190, 193, 195, 197, 200 future developments of program,

Settlement Ministry (Kenya), 19 387-388Settlement Officers (Kenya), 195, 197, general, 374-388

198, 202, 218 methods and objectives of program,Settlement schemes in Kenya, 188-220 379

and cooperatives, 199-203 organizational structure, 375-379criteria of settler selection, 212-213 staffing, 375-376efficiency of, 212 Societe d'assistance et de modernisa-and employment increase, 211 tion agricole en C6te d'Ivoireextension work on, 198-199 (SATMACI), 400family labor input in, 210-211 Societe d'etudes pour le developpe-financing of, 194-197 ment economique et socialhigh-density schemes, 191-192, 219 (SEDES), 378n, 381n, 383n,large farms, 193-194 386n, 401nlow-density schemes, 191-192, 219 Societe Mutuelle et de Developpementmechanization in, 215-217 Rural (SMDR), 315, 322, 325pattern of, 217 Soilprocedures for, 190-191 in Bokoro area, 337-338and production patterns, 203-211 in Bouake region, 391-392profitability of, 205-210 Conservation Service, 191purchase of land for, 190 control of erosion, 69responsibility for, 190-191 in Machakos District, conservationstaffing and supervision of, 197-199 of, 93-99types of, 191-194 in Mossi country, 369, 379yeoman farms, 192-193 in Sukumaland, 415

Settlers: Department of, 255 in Tugen Hills, conservation of, 173Shinyanga District (Tanzania), 415n Sorghum

cotton growing in, 427, 439 in Bokoro area, 338, 340, 346cultivation methods in, 428, 430 dressing of seeds, 387population in, 420 fertilizers affecting output of, 386rainfall in, 432 in Machakos District, 88, 100, 101n

Sikasso region (Mali), 301 in Mali, 305area under cotton, 326 in Mossi country, 372, 378, 379, 386cattle raising in, 305 in Sukumaland, 417CFDT activities in, 307 Sorrenson, M. P. K., 13ncotton ginning in, 325 South Baringo (Kenya), 169-171ethnic groups in, 303 South Tetu. See Tetu Divisions (Nyerifarming patterns in, 304, 305 District, Kenya)labor in, 303 Sprayingmanure used in, 320 in Central Nyanza, 138, 143, 154production of cotton in, 326-331 in CFDT sectors, 315, 324sector head in, 309 of coffee, 46, 138, 154spraying in, 324 of cotton, 143, 154, 269, 272, 324,ZER areas in, 308, 309 428

Simba-Emali Ranch (Kenya), 113 in Mossi country, 387Sisal in Sukumaland, 428

in Baringo, 171 Staff. See Personnelin Central Nyanza, 124, 139 Station centrale d'exp6rimentationin Machakos District, 86, 88, 108, agricole (SCEA) (Ivory Coast),

139 400, 408, 409in Sukumaland, 417, 444 Subsistence farming, 70, 77, 80-81

Smallholders of land, 75-81 Sudanian zone, 245, 252, 288, 301,Societe d'aide technique et de co- 339, 340

operation (SATEC), Upper climate in, 370Volta cotton production in, 328, 342

cooperative groups formed, 376-379 groundnuts in, 362

464

INDEX

Sugar cane expansion of crops, 30in Central Nyanza, 124, 144-145 marketing of, 24-25development of crops, 3 in Nyeri District, 42, 47-49expansion of crops, 30 purchases in Bokoro area, 353in Machakos District, 88 settlements affecting, 205in Office du Niger, 285, 287, 292 small-scale production of, 79

Sugar purchases: in Bokoro area, 352- Teachers: in Farmers' Training Cen-353 ters, 20

Sukuma tribe, 415n, 416-418, 424 Tebere. See Mwea-Tebere Irrigationattitudes toward cattle, 418, 422 Scheme (Kenya)

Sukumaland (Tanzania), 415-450 Tenants for irrigation schemes, 225-association of livestock and agri- 227

culture, 425-426 Ten-Year Sukumaland Developmentchanging factors in, 443-444 Scheme, 418-419, 425controlled resettlement in, 420-421 Terrace construction: in Machakoscooperatives in, 437-441, 444-448 District, 94cotton crop in, 417, 423, 426-428, Tetu Divisions (Nyeri District, Ken-

430 ya), 33crops in, 417 efficiency of cooperatives in, 67differences in cultivation methods, Land Boards in, 76n

428-430 land consolidation in, 59directions of development, 418-419 landholdings in, 37early planting in, 430-431 loan repayments in, 62economy in, 416-418 Pig Breeders' Cooperative Union, 66fertilizer program in, 433-434 pineapples in, 53group mechanization schemes, 437- subsistence agriculture in, 78

441 Tobacco, 397, 399, 400, 410Lint and Seed Marketing Board, Tractor use. See Mechanization

427, 447, 448-449 Transhumance, 362livestock in, 418, 421-425 Trans-Nzoia District (Kenya), 164need for differentiated approaches, Transplanting of rice, 265, 271, 273,

441-443 287, 290new efforts in, 431-441 Tugen Hills (Kenya), 157, 160, 162,physical features of, 415-416 172-174population in, 420n Tugen people in Kenya, 157, 175, 182,society in, 416-418 225, 226, 234Ten-Year Development Scheme, labor migration of, 170

418-420, 425 land use by, 14Sukumaland Equation, 419, 421Sukumaland Federation, 419 Uasin Gishu District (Kenya), 165,Supplies. See Equipment and supplies 166Surveillants, 350 Uganda Lint Marketing Board, 25Swynnerton Plan, 3, 4, 16, 17, 22, 28, Ukerewe District (Tanzania), 427

30, 41 Ukerewe Island (Tanzania), 428, 433,Sytek, NVilliam L., 130n, 141n, 152n 434

Ukiriguru Research Station (Tan-Taboran maize, 100, 101n zania), 422, 425, 428, 429, 430,TANU political party (Tanzania), 436, 441, 442, 447n

417, 420, 432, 435, 438, 441, 443, Unions. See Cooperatives444 Unite de production, 255

Tanzania: Sukumaland in, 415-450 lUnites de culture, 309-311, 319Tea Uplands Bacon Factory (Kenya), 26,

in Central Nyanza, 124 54, 67courses offered in, 20 Upper Volta, 245, 252, 270, 288, 303,data from Farm Economics Survey 307

Unit, 45 SATEC program in Mossi country,development of crops, 3 369-390

465

INDEX

Veterinary Department, 20, 114, 148, mechanized farming of, 215-216180 in Office du Niger, 285

Victoria Federation of Cooperative settlements affecting, 205Unions (VFCU) (Tanzania), 427, Wheel assemblies: sold by CFDT,435, 437, 439, 444-446, 449 314-315

Village settlements: in irrigation Whisson, Michael, 131nschemes, 227-228 Wilson, Gordon, 130n, 131n

Villagization in Kikuyu districts, 13, Women: role of, 79, 80-81, 91, 97,14, 217 131, 153, 394, 397

Volta. See Upper Volta

Wages Yamsin Mathira Division, 56n in Bouake region, 396, 410in Nyeri District, 55n in Mali, 305

Wambugu Farmers' Training Center, Yatta Furrow in Machakos District,71 Kenya, 110, 115, 119

Water supply Yattas (Machakos District, Kenya),in Machakos District, 95, 96 90, 110, 114, 176in Nyeri District, 34 Yeoman farms (Kenya), 192-193See also Irrigation

Wattle: in Machakos District, 88Weeding Zebu cattle, 148, 305, 342

of cotton crops, 323 Zone de d;veloppement rural, (ZODER)methods in Mossi country, 381 in Ivory Coast, 402, 404-405, 411problems in Sukumaland, 431 Zones d'expansion rurale (ZER), in

Wells: in Bokoro area, 340 Mali, 304, 307, 308-309, 310,WVeu, 92n 322, 326, 328Wheat Zones, ecological, 16, 33, 35, 59,

in Elgeyo Division, 168 85-87, 122-124

466

Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa

Volume II: The Case Studies

John C. de Wilde et al.

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