I ,tot |'z.oo)_ - Unified Court Records Database

I ,tot |’z.oo)_International Criminal Tribunal for RwandaTribunal p6nal international pour le Rwanda

TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before: Judge Navanethem PillayJudge Erik MoseJudge Andresia Vaz

Registry: Adama Dieng

Date: 15 August 2002

The PROSECUTORV.

Joseph NZIRORERA

Case No. ICTR-98-44-I

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PROSECUTOR’S RESPONSE TO DEFENCE MOTION FOR FULL DISCLOSUREOF SUPPORTING MATERIAL

The Office of the Prosecutor:Kenneth C FlemingAmanda ReichmanKirsten Keith

Counsel for the Accused:Peter Robinson

Counsel for Co-Accused :ForI~douard Karemera ¯ForAndr~ Rwamakuba ¯For Mathieu Ngimmpatse ̄

Didier SkornickiDavid HooperCharles Roach, Frederic Weyl

The PROSECUTOR"p.

Joseph NZIRORERA

PROSECUTOR’S RESPONSE TO DEFENCE MOTION FOR FULL DISCLOSUREOF SUPPORTING MATERIAL

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This response is made to the Motion by the Defence for Full Disclosure of SupportingMaterial, dated 9 August 2002.

2. The Prosecution has reviewed the Motion, in conjunction with the following:

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4.

5.

Order for Non-Disclosure of the Indictment and the Warrants of Arrest, dated 29August 1998;Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Amendment of the Order ofConfirmation and Non-Disclsoure of the Indictment, dated 6 April 1999;Prosecutor’s Request for an Amendment of the Order of Confirmation and Non-Disclosure of the Indictment, dated 10 September 1999;Rescission of the Order for Non-Disclosure, dated 27 September 1999; andAmended Indictment, dated 21 November 2001.

Accordingly, the Prosecution does not oppose the Motion.

Further, attached is a copy of the supporting material as requested by the Defence.

The Prosecution requests that the Registry alsoAccused, namely Edouard KAREMERA,NGIRUMPATSE and their counsel with copies of the attached supporting material.

Kenneth C. FlemingSenior Trial Attorney

be directed to furnish the other Co-Andrd RWAMAKUBA, Mathieu

Done this day, 15 August 2002,Arusha, Tanzania

Case No: ICTR-98-44-I 2

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1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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SUPPORTING MATERIALCONFIDENTIAL


1.1 The revolution of 1959 marked the beginning of a period of ethnicclashes between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda, causing hundreds ofTutsi to die and thousands more to flee the country in the yearsimmediately following. The revolution resulted in the abolition of the Tutsimonarchy and the proclamation of the First Republic in early 1961,confirmed in a referendum held in the same year. Legislative electionsheld in September 1961 confirmed the dominant position of the MDR-PARMEHUTU (Mouvement Ddmocratiqtte Rdpublicain - Parti duMouvement d’Emancipation Hutu), led by Gr6goire Kayibanda, who wassubsequently elected President of the Republic by the Legislative Assemblyon 26 October 1961.

Most observers agree that the revolutionary transition from the Tutsi-dominated monarchy to the Hutu-led republic, which took place betweenNovember 1959 and September 1961, cuhninating in the proclamation ofIndependence on 1 July, 1962, constitutes a crucial period for theunderstanding of the subsequent ethnic division of the country (Reyntjens,1985; Lema, 1993; C. Newbury, 1988)....

The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed through theparliamentary elections of 25 September 1961, which resulted in a crushingvictory for the Hutu-led parties. Parmehutu obtained no less than 78% of thevotes, gaining 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR (the Tutsi-dominated party)received 17% and seven seats. A simultaneous referendum led to an equallymassive rejection of the monarchy in favour of a republican system ofgovernment. Following the elections, Gr6goire Kayibanda was electedPresident by the new parliament on 26 October, 1961, appointing a


government that initially was composed of members of Parmehutu, UNARand APROSOMA.

The revolution of 1959--196t, with the support of the Belgian administration(Harroy, 1984; Logiest,1988), led to the abolition of the monarchy and to theremoval of all political and administrative Tutsi structures on which, fordecades, Belgium had based its policy of indirect rule.

Though, initially, the number of victims was rather small, the attempts on thepart of the Tutsi-led traditional power-elite to maintain authoritarian rule ledto violent clashes. The Belgians supported the revolt. The abolition of themonarchy and the rise of a Hutu elite became definitive in Sel~tember 1961when, at a referendum, 80% of the electorate voted in favour of a republic. Atthe same time, the results of the parliamentary elections showed acorrespondingly clear victory for the Hutu-dominated parties..°o

On 1 November, 1959, ethnic violence broke out as a result of a leader of theParmehutu party being molested by Tutsi youth. The ensuing riots led to awidespread Hutu uprising, during which hundreds of Tutsi were killed. TheBelgian government responded by sending troops to the country. In fact, therevolt of November 1959 was only the beginning of a series of violent actionsagainst Tutsi. While the events of 1959 were responsible for hundreds ofdeaths, the toll gradually increased during successive crises. The first politicalvictims were Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs. Of the 43 Tutsi chiefs and 549 sub-chiefs in office in early November 1959, 21 and 314 respectively wereeliminated through murder, expulsion or exile. They were replaced by"temporary" Hutu authorities that, six months after the revolt, occupied abouthalf the posts.

Elimination by physical means continued, especially during periods ofpolitical tension, such as before and during the municipal elections of 1960and the parliamentary elections of September 1961.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996. p 28-31

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1.2 The early years of the First Republic, which was under the

domination of the Hutu of central and southern Rwanda, were again

marked by ethnic violence. The victims were predominantly Tutsi, the

former ruling elite, and those related to them, who were killed, driven to

other regions of Rwanda or forced to flee the country. The gradual

elimination of the opposition parties in those early years confirmed the

MDR-PARMEHUTU as the single party, the only party to present


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candidates in the elections of 1965.

As in many other African countries, after an initial period of multi-partyism,Rwanda became a de facto single-party state. The elimination of theopposition was achieved through a combination of various teclmiques such asintimidation, arrest, physical, violence and, sometimes, by negotiation. Theactual policy of Parmehutu aimed at extinction of other parties, both Hutu andTutsi. Already during a speech delivered on the occasion of the firstalmiversary of independence, President Gr6goire Kayibanda indicated hispreference for "a majority party -- an ’overwhehning’ rnajority -- with someminor opposition on the side". Thus, he asserted that "a proliferation ofpolitical parties would distract the population, render the progress of thecountry rather incoherent and lead to harmful stagnation of the nation"(Chronique de politique dtrang~re, t963). The outcome was that in 1965 theMDR-Parmehutu was the only party to propose candidates for theparliamentary and presidential elections. Without being fullyconstitutionalized as such, it nevertheless called itself "National Party".Having eliminated the opposition, the concentration of power within the partyincreased. Especially from 1968 onwards, numerous conflicts.,or divisionswithin the government forced the regime to withdraw more and more withinitself. In 1972, the usurpation of power by a small group of politicians fromGitamara, President Gr6goire Kayibanda’s home region in central Rwanda,was completed (Reyntjens, 1985).

Still, the final blow was dealt at the end of 1963. An attack in Bugesera byinyenzi led to a great deal of violence.In the pr6fecture of Gikongoro alone, itwas estimated that between 5,000 to 8,000 Tutsi were killed; that is, about10--20% of the total Tutsi population of the pr6fecture. The majority of theTutsi leadership that remained inside the country was eliminated: 15 of itsmost important leaders were immediately executed without any kind of trial.This was the end of the tWO Tutsi parties, UNAR and RADER, and at thesame time it brought to an end any Tutsi participation in public life. Criseswith lesser impact would still continue to affect the minority ethnic group. Thelast time this occurred until 1990 was in the beginning of 1973, constituting aprelude to the coup of 5 July, 1973 (Reyntjens, 1994).

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint E;~aluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996. p 33

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1.3 The early part of 1973 in Rwanda was again marked by ethnicconfrontations between the Hutu and Tutsi, prompting another exodus ofthe Tutsi minority from the country, as had occurred between 1959 and1963. This new outburst of" ethnic and political tension between the North

.I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

and South resulted in ~a military coup by General Juv6nal Habyarimana on

5 July 1973, shifting power from civilian to military hands and from the

Hutu of central Rwanda to the Hutu of the northern prefectures of Gisenyi

(Habyarimana’s native region) and Ruhengeri.

17. In 1973, when ethnic unrest and violence were at their height, MajorGeneral Juvenal Habyarimana seized power in a military coup d~tat. Hefounded the second Republic, a regime dominated by the single party set upby the President, The National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy andDevelopment (MRND)

Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions on his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WalyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1).par 17

On 5 July 1973, the Chief of Staff, Major Juv6nal Habyarimana, a native ofGisenyi prefecture, seized power in a coup d’6tat. The then Chief of Security,Alexis Kanyarengwe, had implemented a strategy of political and ethnictension, aimed at making the coup d’6tat pass off as being necessary forrestoring order to the country. School children, students, civil servants andprivate sector employees of Hutu origin were incited to chase away their Tutsifriends and colleagues from educational establishments and workplaces;violence occurred in certain places. This was followed by large-scaleemigration of Tutsis into exile to join those Tutsis who from 1959 to 1963 hadto leave the country. Moreover, the manoeuver tended to give preference toexecutives from the northern part of the country (called Rukiga) over thosefrom the southern part of the country (referred to as Nduga), who wereconsidered to be close to the Tutsis. In fact, the coup d’6tat brought about areversal of the regional power base in favour of the military from the northwho controlled the army, as well as a changed in political alliances.

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal for,Rwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 15

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1.4 In 1975, President Habyarimana founded the Mouvement

Rdvolutionnaire National pour le Ddveloppement (M~D), a single party,

and assumed the position of party Chairman. The administrative and

party hierarchies were indistinguishable in this single party state from the

level of the Prdfet to the bourgmestres, and down to that of the conseillers

de secteurs and responsables de cellule.

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In order to rid him~self of the Comit6 pour la paix et l’unit6 nationaie (theCommittee for Peace and National Unity) in which his "Comrades of 5 July"(T. Lizinde, A. Kanyarengwe, etc.) Who brought him to power were openlyplotting against him and to replace the MDR-PARMEHUTU accused ofregionalism and etlmicism, J. Habyarimana established the MRND on 5 July1975, immediately took control of it and turned it into a political tool entirelyat his service.o.°

Like many other similar regimes, the legal tenn duplication of functions hasbeen applied to the Rwandan Government, to describe the symbiosis betweenthe MRND single party and the State. In the Rwandan case, however, theterm seems inadequate due to the hypertrophy and omnipresence of thegovermnent supervisory apparatus, and the extreme poverty of politicaldiscourse, the absence of "opponents" and alternative political th.~mes and thelack of distinct political rites.

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 16, 22.

1.5 From 1973 to 1994, the government of President Habyarimana useda system of ethnic and regional quotaswhich was supposed to provide

educational and employment opportunities for all, but which was used

increasingly to discriminate against both Tutsi and Hutu from regions

outside the northwest.

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In fact, by the late 1980s, persons from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri

occupied many of the most important positions in the military, political,

economic and administrative sectors of Rwandan society. Among the

privileged elite, an inner circle of relatives and close associates of President

Habyarimana and his wife, Agathe Kanziga, known as the Akazu, enjoyed

great power. This select group, almost exclusively Hutu, was

supplemented by individuals who shared its extremist Hutu ideology, andwho came mainly from the native region of the President and his wife.

18. As from 1973, regional rivalries were added to this ethnic antagonisrn,with the north, the home region of the President of the Republic, enjoyingprivileges in relation to the rest of the country.

Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions on his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WatyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994~7~Add. 1).

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Finally, it should b~e observed that access to power and knowledge came to

very few regional groups in the country, notably in the northern prdfectures ofGisenyi and Ruhengeri. This concentration took place over a number of yearsand narrowed down to these two pr6fectures in the late 1980s. This is seen tohappen on all levels, but we shall limit ourselves to three illustrations. In themid-1980s, the pr6fecture of Gisenyi alone arrogated to itself nearly one-thirdof the 85 most important posts in the republic, as well as near-total leadershipof the army and security services. According to a survey dating back to theearly 1990s, 33 public institutions out of a total of 68 were under thedirectorship of people coming from Gisenyi (19 posts) and Ruhengeri (14posts).

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessons from theRwanda Experience: Vol. 1, Historical Perspective: Some ExplanatoryFactors

It therefore seems to us that as regards access to the top positions, the quotasystem and the disparity indices at the end of the 1980s, could be consideredas real archaic practices which the most reactionary factions (in the true senseof the word) among the ruling authorities held onto. On the one hand, theconcentration and the brazen defence of the privileges enjoyed by the nativesof Ruhengeri and Gisenyi prefectures had rendered null and void the principleof "distributive justice" which was initially claimed to justify" the system.(p.25).,.

Other complementary elements must also be integrated into the analysis of thepresidential power structure.The first concerns the organisation known as Akazu which benefitted fromsome unsolicited publicity, when an open letter from Christophe Mfizi toPresident Habyarimana was published. This term, which historically denotedthe "court", the circle of relatives and friends of the ruling family, was usedopenly in 1991. Akazu included members of the civilian and military eliteprincipally stemming from Karago and Giciye communes (in Gisenyiprefecture). They not only formed a parallel power network within the army,the party and the administration, but they were also collected rents [sic] fromthe economic and financial system of the country. Members of the President’sfamily and friends of Akazu Were found both in the Banque nationale duRwanda (which the Governor Jean Berckmans Birara had to abandon in1993), the Banque continentale africaine au Rwanda, the Banquecommerciale du Rwanda and the Banque de Kigali. The same applied in thenatioanl offices (coffee) and in the import-export sector: "La Centrale", "LaRwafidaise", "Kipharnaa", "Agrotec", NAHV, etc. In retrospect, in the jointanalyses made on the exercise of power during the last years of the regime ofPresident Juv6nal Habyarimana, Akazu seemed to have become the place parexcellence where all the important de facto decisions were being made, sincehis wife’s family was considered to be the decisive element of a counter forceto a President from a modest lineage and who canae to power "accidentally"simply by virtue of his seniority in the ranks.

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Politica~l Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 25, 27-28.

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1.6 In 1990, the President of the Republic, duv6nal Habyarimana, andhis single party, the MRND, were facing mounting opposition, includingfrom other Hutu. .,

The one-party state was seen more and more as the obstacle rather than theroad to further development. This view was mainly propagated by urbanpoliticians from the opposition and by the RPF ....Political opposition against Habyarimana was equally on the rise. Althoughofficially Habyarima was re-elected President for seven years with 99.98%ofthe votes on 19 December 1988, domestic opposition started to sound louderand louder.As in other parts of Africa in the early 1990s, several protestdemonstrations were held in Rwanda in1990. A strike was suppressed by thepolice on 4 July, 1990, and a letter denouncing the one-pm-ty system waspublished and circulated on 1 September.... Whereas in January 1989 President Habyarimana considered any politicalchange feasible only within the one-party system, one and a half years later,on 5 July 1990, he agreed to the necessity of a separation between party andstate.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessons from theRwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: Some ExplanatoryFactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint E.valuation ofEmergency Assistance toRwanda. March 1996. p 39-40

The political and social struggles carried out by emerging political parties andassociations at the end of the 1980s in the prefectures of the south and inKigali brought together both Hutus and Tutsis who were most often keen onpromoting claims of a predominantly regional nature (whereby the quarrelbetween the two universi’ty campuses in Butare and Ruhengeri.All the same, the government was and remained undeniably "Hutu" insofar asits legitimacy was based on the exercise of power by the "ethnic majority" andthe quota system perpetuated real discrimination against individuals in areasof schooling, employment and access to elected positions or those in authority,etc.

Political Background to the I994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 24.


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1.7 On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made

mainly of Tutsi refugees, attacked Rwanda. Within days the government

began arresting thousands of people, presumed to be opponents of

Habyarimana and suspected of being RPF accomplices. Although the

Tutsi were the main target, Hutu political opponents were also arrested.

19. It was against this background of relatively non-violent ethnic andregional rivalries, and a few months after the announcement by the Presidentof the Republic that the country would soon be opened up to multi-party ruleand democratization, that a devastating attack was launched in October 1990by the FPR, an armed force consisting mainly of Tutsi refugees outsideRwanda, many of them former members of the Ugandan armed forces. Theresult of this attack and of a policy of deliberately targeted governmentpropaganda was that all Tutsi inside the country were collectively labelledaccomplices of the FPR. It was this linkage, the ensuing climate and thedirectives which followed that triggered the massacres of civilians describedin this report.

Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions on his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WalyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994~7~Add. 1).

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On 1 October 1990, the offensive launched from Uganda by several thousandcombatants from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), representing themajority of the Tutsis living abroad, severely shook the foundations ofPresident Juv6nal Habyarimana’s regime. (p.30-31)

..T!}e.incursion of 1 October 1990 and particularly the mysterious attack bycommando infiltrators which allegedly took place in the streets of Kigaliduring the night of 4 October (about which there has since been considerabledoubt that it actually took place) was to give the army the pretext fordisregarding the existing Rwandan laws and carrying out massive andarbitrary arrests of various categories of loaown or suspected opponents -journalists, executives of the NGOs, lawyers, etcl - , Hutus but especiallyTutsis, who, for months had been sharing ideas, condemning the sameshortcomings and supporting the same causes. (p.33)

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 31 and 33.

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1.8 Following pressure from the internal opposition and the

international community, and the RPF attack of October 1990, President

Habyarimana permitted the introduction of multiple political parties and

the adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1991. The Mouvement

Rdvolutionnaire National pour le Ddveloppement (MRND) was renamed


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Mouvement Rdpublicain National pour la Ddmocratie et le Ddveloppement

(MRND). The first transitional government was made up almost

exclusively of MRND members, following the refusal of the main

opposition parties to take part. With the second transitional government

in April 1992, the MRND became a minority party for the first time in its

history, with nine ministerialportfolios out of 19. On the other hand, the

MRND retained its domination over the local administration.

21 .... Under the Constitution of 10 June 1991, however, real power remainsvested in the President of the Republic, who controls the army, the policeforce and most of the local government. The result of this is that action by thePrime Minister and some of his ministers is often obstructed by MRNDrepresentatives in the Government.

Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions on his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WalyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1).

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The new political-military situation following the invasion of 1 October led tothe acceptance of the multi-party system by Habyarimana in a speech on 13November, which led to the creation of new political parties..°.

Formally, the one-party system was abrogated with the adoption of a newconstitution on 10 June 1991 and the law on political parties, one’Week later.°,.

On 6 April 1992, after heavy national and international pressure, a newtransitional government was established. It included all the major oppositionparties and was led by President Habyarimana and a Prime Minister from theopposition (Dismas Nsengiyaremye, MDR).

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996. p 40

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In late 1991, faced with the prevarications which accompanied theappointment of a new Prime Minister, Sylvestre Nsanzimana, and the delay informing his government, several tens of thousands of persons demonstrated inKigali on 17 November 1991 and 8 January 1992 to criticise the lingeringconflict in the north, to contest the prerogatives maintained by the renamedMNRD [sic] (and which accused all other parties in the opposition ofcollaborating with the RPF), etc. At the same time, there were growingconcerns among the general staff of the Rwandan army and the dignitaries ofthe regime, who published a communiqu6 on 1 December 1991 signed byLieutenant-Colonel A. Nsengiyumva entitled "Leadership of the militaryoperations of the Rwandan Armed Forces". The communiqu6 condemned therampant anarchy and the progress of the Inyenzi.

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In addition, the predictable but increasingly visible opposition between thePresident and the opposition parties quickly led to a breakdown in thefunctioning of the government and even the ministries, themselves hostages ofthe rivalries between the parties. The MRND, deeply divided and in theprocess of rebuilding, systematically objected to the central decisions which itdid not approve due to its strong, continued presence in the prefectural andcommunal administrations (in July 1992, only 4 of the 11 renewed Prefectswere from the opposition parties).°°.

... The MRND ... At the end of t993, it controlled 86 of the 143 communes inthe country, compared with 36 communes controlled by the MDR, 18 by thePSD, 1 by the PL, and 1 by the CDR and 1 headed by a non-partisanbourgmestre... A similar denomination was felt at the prefectural level where,despite the official vacancy of certain posts, it had de facto or indirect controlof 8 of the 11 prefectures.

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,

Document 1, p. 36, 42-32, and 58.

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1.9 The new Government then entered negotiations with the RPF, whichresulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993. TheAccords provided for a new system of sharing military and civilian powerbetween the RPF, the opposition parties and the MRND.

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Political Background to the I994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal .~Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1.

See paragraphs 1.10 and 1.11

1.10 By the terms of the Arusha Accords, which provided for theintegration of both sides’ armed forces, the new national army was to belimited to 13,000 men, 60% FAR (Forces ArmdesRwandaises) and 40%RPF. The posts of command were to be shared equally (50%-50%)between the two sides, with the post of Chief of Staff of the Army assignedto the FAR.

The Gendarmerie was to be limited to 6,000 men, 60% FAR and

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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

40% RPF, with theposts of command Shared equally (50%-50%) betweenthe two sides and the post of Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie assigned tothe RPF.

Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces ,/"Art. 74 on Integration (RA Command); Art. 144 (Gendarmerie)/

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1.11 As regards representation within the government, the ArushaAccords limited the number of ministerial portfolios to be held by theMRND to five, plus the Presidency. The other portfolios were to be sharedas follows: RPF, five; MDR (Mouvement ddmocratique rdpublicain), four(including the post of Prime Minister); PSD (Patti social-ddmocrate), three;PL (Parti libdral), three; and the PDC (Parti ddmocrate-chrdtien), one.

Protocol of Agreement on Power Sharing /Art. 14 and Art. 55 of the "’

During the transition period, seats in the Council of Ministers of a Broad-based Transitional Governrnent (BBTG) would be divided between thegovernment and the internal opposition parties as well as the RPF. The rulingparty (MRND) was left with only 5 out of 19 portfolios, and most werepolitically insignificant. The regime also would lose power in localadministrative structures and the judicial branch

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.2, Early Warning and ConflictManagementPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to rwanda. March !996, p24

1.12 For the men and women close to President Habyarimana, includingthe members of the Akazu, who held positions of prominence in the varioussectors of Rwandan society, this new power sharing plan,.as demanded bythe political opposition and as stipulated in the Arusha Accords, meant arelinquishment of power and the loss of numerous privileges and benefits.With political changes following the establishment of the multi-partygovernment of April 1992, several important military officers from thenorth had been forced to retire. At the same time, many of the militarywere facing massive demobilisation with the implementation of the ArushaAccords.

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56. The rejection of alternate political power, which typifies French-speakingblack Africa in general, takes on a special foirn in Rwanda, where it has strongethnic overtones. The reason for what is taldng place in Rwanda is not ethnicas such, but rather political, the aim being the seizure of political power, orrather the retention of power, by the representatives of one ethnic group,previously the underdogs, who are using every means, principally theelimination of the opposing ethnic group, but also the eliminatio’h of politicalopponents within their own group. From this standpoint, the portrayal of themain enemy and their supporters, as mentioned above, is quite revealing. Theresistance to the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993 is indicative ofthis and even of the rejection of simple power sharing or political coexistence.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-Srgui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994, Par 56

As has been shown above, since the beginning of the 1990s the Habyarimanaregime had been facing strong internal and external political and militarypressure for liberalization (e.g. for a multi-party system, more respect forhuman rights, good governance and fair settlement of the refugees). Suchreforms could lead only to a reduction of the power and privileges enjoyed bythe supporters of the one-party system in MRND, the army, local and nationaladministrations, public enterprises etc. One could therefore expect a strongopposition from those groups to the restructuring process.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspec~tive: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to rwanda. March 1996. p 41

The distribution of portfolios agreed to at Amsha accentuated the dramaticnature of the change. Ideologically and politically, the BBTG represented afrontal attack on the power base erected by the Habyarimana governmentduring twenty years of ruling the country _- a denial of authoritarian rule, of"Hutu power", and especially north-western-based Hutu Power, which was theregional constituency and political backbone of the regime. The terms of theAgreement signalled a pluralist state and a civil society, and the idea of apeople tmited by a common Rwandese nationality rather than divided alongnarrow lines into Hum versus Tutsi. Significantly, the hardliners whosurrounded Habyarimana - senior ministers in the MRND party, seniormilitary figures in the armed forces and the Presidential Guard, and membersof the newly formed Coalition pour la drfence de la rrpublique (CDR) - weredenied power in the transitionai institutions.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.2, Early Warning and ConflictManagement "

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....... ,,-i,, ,~ .... 1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Published l~y: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of

Emergency Assistance to rwanda. March 1996 p 25

The first contacts between Boniface Ngulinzira, Minister of Foreign Affairs inthe Rwandan Government and the RPF in Kampala and the drawing up of acalendar for negotiations on 25 May was followed four days later - the day ofthe official start of negotiatioias between the opposition parties and the RPF inBrussels - by a mutiny of soldiers, who feared that they would be demobilisedin Ruhengeri and Gisenyi prefectures, accompanied by looting and massacres.The necessary return to order of the anaaed forces then constituted apermanent source of instaNlity, under the constant threat of a new putschistattempt. (Although originating in the MRND, the Minister of Defence, JamesGasana, was particularly at risk and often by-passed. One notes in particularthe creation of the AMASASU in January 1993 which demanded theestablishment of a cleansed army and the elimination of all RPF allies),

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 42.

1.13 From 1990, Habyarimana and several of his close associates devisedthe strategy of inciting hatred and fear of the Tutsi minority as a way ofrebuilding solidarity among the Hutu and keeping themselves in power.They strongly opposed any form of power sharing, including the oneenvisaged by the Arusha Accords.

()20 .... Although the majority of the population consider that it is possible forthe two main etlmic groups to live together peacefully, there is a certain elitewhich, in order to cling to power, is continuing to fuel ethnic hatred, forinstance by spreading rumours prejudicial to the Tutsi. The FPR is oftenidentified with the Tutsi ethnic group. It should also be noted that somemembers of the opposition parties, though Hutu themselves’; have beenaccused of being traitors to their country by Hutu extremists (such as membersof the Coalition for the defense of the Republic(CDR) party, a radical offshootof the MRND) because their opposition to the Government in power and theirattempt to enter into the dialogue with the FPR.

Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions o1: his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WalyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/i994/7/Add. 1).

See paragraphs 1. t4 and t. 15

1.14 Determined to avoid the power sharing prescribed by the Arusha

13

1. HISTORICAL CONTEXI

(--’’4)

Ir"

()

--. /

Accords, several prominent civilian and military figures pursued their

strategy of ethnic division and incitement to violence. Tli’ey targeted andlabelled as RPF accomplices the entire Tutsi population, and also Hutu

opposed to their domination, particularly those from regions other than

northwestern Rwanda. At the same time, they sought to divide Hutu

opposition parties, attracting some of their members back to the supportof Habyarimana. These efibrts to divide the Hutu opposition were futhered

by the assassination of Melchior Ndandaye, the democratically elected

Hutu President in neighboring Burundi, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundi

army. By late 1993, two of the three major parties opposed to the MRND

had each split into two factions. The faction of each known as the "Power"

faction aligned itself with the MRND.

In the aftermath of the murder of Ndadaye, accusations of corruption and ofethnicism increased. The MDR, the PL and the PSD split politically, betweenthose ready for power-sharing (the moderates) and those who were ready to to the utmost extremities to retain power (the so-called "Power" fractions).Each side accused the other of complicity with either the MRND or the RPF.For instance, Faustin Twagiramungu (a pro-reform Hutu) was accused siding with the RPF and of having been corrupted. That accusation allowedthe "Power group" within the MDR to adopt’a harsher pro-Hutu stance. Withinthe PL, its chairman, Justin Mugenzi, was accused of anti-RPF positions,whereas the Minister of Social Affairs, Ndasingwa, was accused of sidingwith the RPF.

As noted above, in the early 1990s the Habyarimana regime had attempted toestablish a broad Hutu-dominated front. The strategy adopted by at least partof the regime’s supporters was to create a political climate that would result ina political and military marginalization of the RPF and, broadly speaking, ofthe whole Tutsi population. Political and etlmic polarization was clearly astrategy from the start of the conflict (Reyntjens, 1994). This has beenconfirmed in a number of reports by different international human rightsorganizations (Africa Watch, 1992; Amnesty International, 1992; F6d6rationInternationale des droits de l’homme, 1993; Africa Watch, 1993; HumanRights Watch/Arms Project 1994; African Rights, 1994).

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExPlanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint E)aluation ofEmergency Assistance to rwanda. March 1996, p.46

In the interim, two major events occulted which definitely altered thefavourable conditions for peace which were still visible here and there. First,the splintering of the opposition parties into marked ethnic tendencies becameirreversible.

14

J" HISTORICAL CONTEXT

...°,

The partisans of a reverse alliance with the MRND gained ground.

Political Background to the I994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert Report

..,Prepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal for

fRwanda, by Andr~ Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 56.

1.15 The strategy adopted in the early 1990s, which culminated in thewidespread massacres of April 1994, comprised several components, whichwere carefully worked out by the various prominent figures who sharedthe extremist Hutu ideology, including the members of the Akazu.

¯In addition to the nc~tement to ethnic violence and the

i ’extermination of the Tutsi and their "accomplices,,, was the organizationand military training of the youth wings of the political parties, notably theInterahamwe (youth wing of the MRND), the preparation of lists of peopleto be eliminated, the distribution of weapons to civilians, the assassinationof certain political opponents and the massacre of many Tutsi in variousparts of Rwanda between October 1990 and April 1994.

58. Overwhelming evidence indicates that the extermination of Tutsis byHutus had been planned months in advance of its actual execution. The mass

exterminations of Tutsi were carried out primarily by Hutu elements in aconcerted, planned, systematic and methodical way and were motivated out ofetlmic hatred. These mass exterminations were clearly "committe~ with intentto destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic(al), racial, or religious group,as such" within the meaning of article II of the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.62. Ample evidence of extensive preparation and planning months in advanceof the actual violations indicates the concerted and premeditated character ofthe criminal acts in question.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to j"Security Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, December1994, par. 58 et 62

26. The massacres do seem to have been planned. There are various pieces ofevidence pointing to this conclusion. The first is the campaign of incffement toetlmic hatred and violence orchestrated by the media belonging to theGovernment, or close to it, such as Radio Rwanda, and above all RadioT616vision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). The second is the distribution arms to the civilian population~ and more particularly to members of themilitias. Pastoral letters issued by the Bishop and priests of Nyundo diocese inDecember 1993 condemn this distribution of arms to tile population.

Furthermore, the members of tile militias’are reported to have undergone

15

. ,~, .


()

()

intensive training at military installations from November 1993 to March1994. To this must be added the reign of terror carried out by the militias andthe assassination of political figures.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

This illustrates the attitude of groups of major regime supporters tl’Lroughoutthe conflict. First, creation of a poisoned political climate and of etlmicismhad been planned since the beginning of the conflict. Second, direct means(use of militias; spreading of weapons; creation of extremist movements;political assassinations and planned massacres) as well as indirect means(permanent climate of terror and fear; propaganda via the media) werestrategically used, certainly from 1992 on. Third, the planning emanated fromthe highest-ranking persons in the army, the Presidential guard, theadministration etc. who had beneftted from the one-party regime(Lemarchand, 1995; African Rights, 1994).

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996, p. 49

The first holds that all the mechanisms for a genocide were in place politicallyand militarily (coordination between soldiers and armed militants, propagandaand elements o f justification), and logistically (groups trained and supervised,lists of victims, weapon caches). There was an undeniable will in thepresidential camp to fight, to "finish off" the ethnic adversary. However, onsecond thought, while each year since 1990, each month and each week sincethe signing of the Arusha Accords saw an increase in ethnic tension, and theplan became more concrete, the factors which triggered the genocide as wellas the scope of the actual genocide remain largely unlcnown.

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr~ Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, ",April 1997,Document 1, p. 60.

j .

J

1.16 The incitement to ethnic hatred took the form of public speeches by

people sharing the extremist ideology. These political and military figures

publicly appealed to hatred and fear of the Tutsi and urged the Hutu

majority to "finish off the enemy and its accomplices". A perfect

illustration is the speech made in November 1992 by ¯L6on Mugesera, vice-

chairman of the MRND t’or Gisenyi prdfecture, who at the time was

t6


already inciting the public to exterminate the Tutsi and their

"accomplices".

With the intention of ensuring widespread dissemination of the calls

to ethnic violence, prominent figures from the President’s circle set up true

hate media. Thus the creation of Radio Tdldvision Libre des Mille Collines

(RTLM) and of the newspaper Kangura was a part of the strategy andpursued the same logic.

’)

.~’ "

63. In 1992, Leon Mugesera, an official in President Habyarimana’sMouvement r~volutionnaire national pour le d~veloppement delivered aspeech at a party conference at Gisenyi. In his speech, he explicitly called onHutus to kill Tutsis and to dump their bodies in the rivers of Rwanda...64. Racist hate propaganda was disseminated on a widespread basis as farback as 1993, especially by Radio-T61~vision Libre des Mille Collines(RTLM), a private radio station owned by members of PresidentHabyarimana’s party. These incitements branded Tutsis as well as certain Hutuopponents of the President as "enemies" and "traitors" who "deserve to die".The radio referred to all Tutsi as "the enemy" and accused them of siding withRPF. It called for all "enemies" to be "exterminated,,. Posters, leaflets andradio broadcasts on Radio des Milles Collines dehumanized Tutsis as"snakes", "cockroaches" and "animals". Individuals targeted in the radiobroadcasts were among the first killed (along with their families) in April1994.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, December1994, Par. 63 and 64

58. False rumours and tracts designed to inflame ethnic hatred and encourageviolence are constantly circulating in Rwanda. The Tutsi are portrayed, forexample, as "bloodthirsty, power-hungry and determined to impose their ruleon the people of Rwanda by means of the gun". They are even said to bepreparing to exterminate the Rwandese people. Repeated appeals are made tothe Hutu proclaiming the "ten commandments", which advocate an ideologyof apartheid to keep the Tutsi from returning to power. This is a long-standingcampaign, as pointed out in various reports, including those of theInternational Commission of Inquiry on gross violations of human rights since1 October 1990 (7-21 January 1993), comprising representatives of severalnon-governmental organizations, or the report submitted by Mr. Bacre WalyNdiaye, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993 (E/CN.4/1994~7/Add.1).59. One new and significant development, however, is the deep involvementof Radio Rwanda, the national broadcasting station controlled by thePresident, and in particular of Radio-T6l~vision Libre des Mille Collines

/

17

.....¸

L HISTORICAL CONTEXT

f-..,

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(

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(:}

(RTLM). A striking fact is that the broadcasts of these stations in Frenchdiffer significantly from those in Kinyarwanda, the only language spoken byvirtually all Rwandese. While broadcasts in French are inoffensive, those inKinyarwanda are highly aggressive in tone. RTLM does not hesitate to call forthe extermination of the Tutsi and it is notorious for the decisive role that itappears to have played in the massacres. It is known as the "killer radiostation", and justifiably so. According to Reporters sans fronti~res, at the endof April this propaganda organ of the Hutu extremists proclaimed that "by 5May, the cleansing of the Tutsi must be completed" and that "the grave is stillonly half full, who will help us to fill it?". This campaign is, as a senior UnitedNations official has pointed out, made more dangerous by the fact that thegenerally illiterate Rwandese rural population listens very attentively tobroadcasts in Kinyarwanda; they hold their radio sets in one hand and theirmachetes in the other, ready to go

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

The political violence that plagued Rwanda throughout 1993 and the firstmonths of 1994 was increasingly fueled by influential media, which agitatedthe Hutu population against their presumed enemies. On 8 July, 1993, Radio-T616vision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) started to broadcast, officiallyto counterbalance Radio Muhabura (RPF) and the official Radio Rwanda(Reyntjens, 1994). According to African Rights (1994), "RTLMC played key role in inciting violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu... (It) ferventlyopposed the Arusha Accords". Among the RTLMC promoters one foundinfluential people belonging to the right wing of the MRND (e.g. Kabuga) andthe CDR: Hassan Ngeze, director of the very pro-CDR newspaper Kangura(established already in 1989) and Ferdinand Nahimana, Director of theNational Information Services. The latter was even dismissed for his ethnicand regional excesses.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996, p.48

:

1.17 The creation of the youth wings of the political parties, originally

established to encourage or even force adherence to one or another party

in the newly-established multi-party system, provided Habyarimana’s

circle with a large, devoted and effective workforce to implement the

adopted strategy. These youth organizations, which were affiliated to the

political parties, were soon manipulated as part of the anti-Tutsi

18


C" ~b7-

C)

’tcampaign. Some of the members of these organizations, notably the

Interahamwe (MRND), were organized into militia groups, which were

financed, trained and led by prominent civilians and military figures from

the President of the Republic’s entourage. They were issued weapons, with

the complicity of certain military and civilian authorities. The militia

groups were transported to training sites, including certain military

camps, in public administration vehicles or vehicles belonging to

companies controlled by the President’s circle.

65. Subsequently, a training camp for Hum militia (interahamwe) wasestablished in Mutara. The programmes there, which lasted for three weekseach, involved the indoctrination of groups of 300 men in ethnic hatredagainst the Tutsi minority. The programmes also propagated information onmethods of mass murder. These trainees formed the militia of interahamwe,and formed the core perpetrators of genocide. This militia was augmented bythe impuzamugambi of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR).The impuzamugambi militia were trained, armed and led by the PresidentialGuard and other elements of the Rwandese government army.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, December1994, Par. 65

f.

To give an example from the build-up of the party militias (interahamwe "those who work together"): They were first seen in action during a massacrecarried out at Bugesera in March 1992. "Specific details of the establishmentof these militias are found in a Ministry of Defence memorandum datedSeptember 1991. This envisaged at least one armed man for every 10households and one policeman per sector"~ While at that date "themobilization was to be restricted to the northern areas close to the front line","the ’home guard’ project was overtaken by the mass mobilization of partymilitia throughout the country under the control of very senior politicians andmilitary officers. It is likely that one motivation for this was that, asopposition political parties mobilized, lines of authority from the Presidencyto every rural commune began to dissolve. This made it more essential tomobilize a militia whose sole loyalty was to the hard-liners". "Interahamwewere recruited widely across Rwanda. Many were unemployed young men"."The arming of the interahamwe intensified after the FebrUary 1993 offensiveby the RPF", notwithstanding several prior demands from the Prime Minister(Dismas Nsengiyaremye) "to the MRND and the CDR to adhere to the law political parties, and disband the militias" (African Rights, 1994).

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to rwanda. March 1996, p.47

/

/

19

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I, HISTORICAL CONTEXT .

1.18 During the mass arrests of October 1990, the civilian and militaryauthorities followed lists that had been drawn up in order to identify, andlocate the presumed accomplices of the RPF, the majorit~ of whom wereTutsi. Later, Army, Gendarmerie, local authorities and Interahamwe weregiven orders to prepare new lists or update the existing ones, which weresubsequently used during the massacres of 1994. In March 19931 such a listwas found in the vehicle of the Army Chief of Staff.

9. There now seems to be little¯ doubt that the massacres were planned.This is the conclusion reached from a number of consistent indications, not tosay evidence, including:...

(d) The "screening" carried out at the roadblocks by militiamen andsoldiers, and the lists drawn up by the public authorities with the aim ofidentifying Tutsi, after which they were immediately executed.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, submitted by Mr.R. Degni-Sdgui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7t, 18 J~inuary 1995

/’"J

/

1.19 Towards the end of 1991, certain Rwandan authorities distributedweapons to certain civilians in the north-eastern region of the country aspart of a civil self-defence campaign, in reaction to the RPF attack ofOctober 1990. Later, some authorities distributed weapons nationwide,notably to the Interahamwe and carefully selected individuals, even inregions distant from the war zone. Towards the end of 1993, the Bishop ofNyundo criticized the distribution of weapons in a public letter,questioning its purpose.

22...The situation has become particularly explosive with the distribution ofweapons to civilians by the authorities, officially to combat the forces of theFPR, an example being in the municipality of Mutara, where 193 guns weredistributed in February 1993 ....

Report by the Special Rapp0rteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions on his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WalyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1).

.t

/’

/

2O


(.

78. On 15 April (1~94) and thereafter, Rwandese army troops distributed

interahamwe militia automatic and semi-automatic rifles and pistols, withwhich they continued the mass slaughter of Tutsis that had begun with

machetes and other weapons.Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 78

f,

26...The second is the distribution of arms to the civilian population, and moreparticularly to members of the militias. Pastoral letters issued by the Bishopand priests of Nyundo diocese in December 1993 condemn this distribution ofarms to the population.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni’S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Colnmissioil on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

1.20 The pursuit of the strategy thus described played a catalytic role inthe political and ethnic violence of the time, which climaxed in the April1994 massacres. The early part of the 90s was marked by numerouspolitical assassinations and large massacres of the Tutsi minority,including the one in Kibilira (1990), tha~t of the Bagogwe (1991) and one in Bugesera (1992). The massacres were instigated and organized local authorities with the complicity of certain prominent persons from thePresident’s circle. Therein can be found the components of the strategywhich culminated in the genocide of 1994.

Mass killings were carried out in October 1990, January-February 1991 andMarch 1992. From December 1992 to February 1993, about 2,000 peoplewere murdered. The report of the fact-finding mission of the InternationalFederation of Human Rights of February 1993 recounted massive andsystematic human rights violations. These violations were principally carriedout against Tutsi individuals. The facts were corroborated by other sources(see reports published by Amnesty International, Rwanda, persecution ofTutsi, minority and repression of government critics, 1990-1992, May 1992;and also by the Association rwandaise pour la D6fense des droits de lapersonne et des libert6s publiques, Rapport sur de droits: de l’homme auRwanda, September 1991-September 1992.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December

1994, Par. 55

21

.i’"...... ~. ~. .. ,.

" . ...-.:?’ .. ¯

1, HISTORICAL CONTEXT

.-.

~")

28. Massacres ot~ civilian populations have been perpetrated ~!ther by theRwandese security forces or by certain sectors of the population. Killings havetaken place not only in the combat zones during or after clashes, but also inareas situated some distance from the hostilities. In the latter case, it has beenshown time and time again that government officials were involved, eitherdirectly by encouraging, planning, directing or participating in the violence, orindirectly through incompetence, negligence or deliberate inaction...,,,

Violations attributable to the Rwandese armed forces35. The FAR have also played an active and welt-planned role at the highestlevel in certain cases of killings of Tutsi by the population, notably withrespect to massacres targeting the Bagogwe ... The FAR are also accused ofincitement to murder and of giving logistic supports to the killers. There havebeen also occasions, for example in the case of the massacres at Bugesera inMarch 1992, when soldiers disarmed the Tutsi so that they would be unable todefend themselves against their attackers, or prevent population under threatof violence from fleeing the area by setting up roadblocks.

36. The FAR’s involvement in the killings has been confirmed by numerousreliable witnesses, and even by the findings of a commission set up by theGovernment on 15 September 1992 to investigate allegations of’massacres inthe prefecture of Kibungo. It should be noted that these findings have notresulted in the imposition of any penalties on the accused military personnel.

Violations attributable to local government officials37. The role of such officials (prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, councillors,sector leaders or cell leaders) in the massacres of civilian populations consistschiefly in encouraging, planning and directing the operation, and in somecases actually participating in it. In fact, there are numerous well-documentedreports to the effect that certain mayors have spread unfounded rumoursexacerbating ethnic hatred and have encouraged the population to massacreTutsi people. In some cases, such officials have facilitated the task of thoseperpetrating the massacres by supplying them with equipment, such asvehicles or fuel. On many occasions, the authorities have not intervened toprevent such action and have not taken any steps to stop killings of civiliansby a mob...

Violations attributable to political party militias40. Youth organizations of some political parties have been converted intomilitias, sometimes armed, and used in the struggle for power. This hasresulted in brawls and armed confrontations. In addition, it has been reportedon numerous occasions that two of these i~ailitias, those of the MRND and ofthe CDR, have been guilty of incitement to ethnic violence against the Tutsis,of massacres of civilian populations and of political assassinations. In a fewwell documented cases, it has been shown that members of these militias havebeen backed by plain-clothes members of the FAR and by representatives ofthe local authorities. In any event, it would seem that such militias have been

22

¯ ¯ .... .:2 ’.: ..... :..~ ¯J.-,.. ’~.=...,

t. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

able to commit their misdeeds and impose a reign of terror with completeimpunity. For instances, they have succeeded in setting up roadblocks, incomplete defiance of the law, without being in any way troubled by thesecurity forces in the vicinity. It has also been reported that these militias havebeen trained by members of the Presidential Guard and by members of thearmed forces. It has been suggested that this state of affairs is the result ofefforts by certain authorities to "privatize" violence by channelling it throughsuch groups, so as to avoid being held responsible for the massacres. It hasalso been reported that the MRND and the CDR militias h~ve recruitedchildren and displaced persons and made them take part in violentdemonstrations in return for payment..,,

Violations attributable to private individuals

42. The Rwandese population, 95 per Cent of whom are farmers, are for themost part peace-loving. Nevertheless, the worst killings can be attributed to"out of control" mobs of Hutu peasants. Most of the massacres are the result ofethnic violence, said to be deliberately fomented by certain individualsallegedly close to those in power. A study of the phases preceding outbreaksof violence among the population shows that such outbreaks were planned andprepared, with targets being identified in speeches by representatives of theauthorities, broadcast on Rwandese radio and leaflets. It is also noteworthythat at the time of the violence the persons, perpetrating the massacres wereunder organized leadership. In this connection; local government officialshave been found to play a leading role in most cases (see sect. 2, para. 37above). This analysis appears to be confirmed by the fact that the disturbancesvery often follow the lines of local boundaries, depending on whether or notthe authorities are involved. The fact that theattacks are simultaneous, andthat the rumours spread are similar, would also suggest the existence of anorganization, not confined to a single commune. The above remarks shouldnot obscure the facts that under cover of ethnic disturbances some settling ofscores between neighbours or murders accompanied by robbery may havetaken place. The fact remains that such crimes, which were usually directedagainst the Tutsi, have also gone unpunished; the persons arrested after theviolence have been quickly released without being made to stand trial.

Report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary orarbitrary executions on his mission to Rwanda , Mr.Bacre WalyNdiaye 8-17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1).

Some examples are: In mid-October 1990, a group of Hutu, agitated by localauthorities, ;take revenge on a group of Tutsi in the region of Kibilira(Gisenyi), killing 300 people and causing a massive flight of refugees (AfricaWatch, 1992). Citizens, mainly Tutsi, accused of sympathizing with the RPF,are sentenced to death. More than 8,000 citizens are arrested without clearmotives. International diplomatic and NGO pressure results in lifting of thedeath penalty and the release of the prisoners. After a temporary territorialsuccess for the RPF in the Ruhengeri area, military and civilian authorities

.L

C,/"¯

23


,

take revenge on the~Bagogwe, a Tutsi sub-group, causing at least 500 deaths.

The Bagogwe were to become further victims of terror during the conflict(December 1991 and November/December 1992).From the end of 1991, the south of the country became involved in the conflictfor the first time (Frdrration Internationale des droits de l’homme, 1993). Theviolence that occurred in Bugesera is indicated by several sources as the darkturning-point in the anti-reform strategy of Habyarimana’s supporters. "The1992 Bugesera massacre marked an important turning point in thedevelopment of the methods of killings, because of the central role played byextremist propaganda. For four months before the killing started, extremistpoliticians and ideologues had been active in the area, inciting the Hutupopulace" (African Rights, 1994). Rwambuka, the mayor of Kanzenze whobelonged to the central committee of the MRND, was the driving force behindthe terror. Five hundred persons were arrested after the events, but in mostcases released without charges (Fddgration Internationale des droits del~ornme, 1993).

Similtaneous and similar patterns of violent conflicts against Tutsi andreform-minded Hutu at different places (e.g. Kibilira in March 1992; Kibilira,Kayoya, Mutura in November/December 1992) reveal a particular strategyand plan adopted by local authorities, with strong support from the highestlevels. Increasing involvement of party militias, multiplication of the numberof FAR soldiers by five over a 16- months period, escalating hostile ethnic-political propaganda by highly-placed officials against presumed opponents ofthe regime (Hum and Tutsi in opposition parties and.RPF), and a deliberately-created climate of insecurity and unsafety, are different indications of anorganized aggressive attitude agai~si( any opponents of the MRND regime(Frdrration Internationale des droits de l’homme, 1993).


,

°~.

1.21 In early 1994, certain prominent people from Habyarimana’s circleinstigated violent demonstrations in Kigali aimed at preventing theimplementation of the Arusha Accords. Soldiers in civilian clothes andmilitiamen took part, seeking to provoke confrontations with the BelgianUNAMIR soldiers. These incidents were partially the cafise of thepostponement of the establishment of the institutions foreseen by theArusha Accords.

However, the implementation process was fundamentally a race against itself:the closer the Arusha Accords came to be realized, the more the extremists

24


(1:1:2 .i

were prepared to’sink it in violence. The point was formulated unequivocallyin a cable from the UNAMIR force commander to DPKO/New York on 11January 1994: A "very important government Official" turned informer hadtold him that "hostilities may commence again if political de~’dlock ends".Previously, "hostilities" had often been interpreted to mean renewed civil war.By early 1994, the term clearly conveyed the meaning of civil violence. It wasquickly recognized by the ’SRSG, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, who reported tothe Secretary-General soon after his arrival in Kigali on 23 October that theextremist adversary to the peace process was a powerful, subversive ThirdForce - ruthless, well-organized, well-equipped and centrally directed.Additional information provided in the UNAMIR cable of 11 January to theUN Secretariat in New York was quite specific. The Rwandese governmentinformant had revealed the extremists’ plan to assassinate politicians at thescheduled ceremony for swearing in of the transitional government. In theprocess, they would provoke an encounter with Belgian UNAMIR soldiers,expecting that by killing some, the entire UN contingent would leave Rwanda.As the RPF would be instigated to resume war, 1,700 interahamwe who hadbeen training in camps outside Kigali were staged to sew insecuritythroughout the city; teams of 40 each were organized within Kigali to kill allthe Tutsi who had been registered by the militias. The informer estimated hisunits could kill 1,000 persons per 20 minutes.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol:2, Early Warning and ConflictManagementPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to rwanda. March 1996, p.37

The strategy of the presidential circle was to do anything to delay theestablishment of transitional institutions through a series of unansweredconvocations (due to boycotting, CDR and Interaharnwe demonstrations, theabsence of a quorum, etc.).

Political Background to the 1994 Rwandan Crisis, Expert ReportPrepared at the Request of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda, by Andr6 Guichaoua, Arusha, Tanzania, April 1997,Document 1, p. 57.

J/

/

1.22 On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying, among other passengers, the

President of the Republic of Rwanda, Juv6nal Habyarimana, was shot

down on its approach to Kigali airport.

56. On 6 April 1994, Juv6nal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda, CyprionNtyamira, President of Burundi, and a number of members of their entourageand crew were killed when the aircraft carrying them was attacked. Thisdisaster triggered a preplanned execution of severe human rights violations,

25


including systematic, widespread and flagrant breaches of internationalhumanitarian law, large-scale crimes against humanity and genocide.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 56

(

1.23 In the hours which followed the crash of the President’s plane, thesenior officers of the FAR convened to assess the situation. Those whoshared the extremist Hutu ideology, generally from the North, proposed anArmy take-over. During a second meeting which took place on themorning of 7 April, that option was rejected in favour of setting up aninterim Government.

See first paragraphs of Part 6

1.24 Already on the morning of 7 April and while these discussions weretaking place, groups of military, lists in hand, proceeded to arrest, confineand carry out systematic assassinations of a large number of politicalopponents, both Hutu and Tutsi, including the Prime Minister, some of theMinisters in her Government and the President of the ConstitutionalCourt. At the same time, however, the military were evacuating prominentmembers of the dead President’s circle, including the MRND Ministers, tosafe locations.

The Belgian UNAMIR soldiers sent to protect the Prime Ministerwere disarmed, arrested and taken to Kigali military camp, where theywere massacred, prompting the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent inthe days that followed. After the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, the UNSecurity Council drastically reduced the number of UNAMIR personnel inRwanda.

68. Before dawn on 7 April, members of the Presidential Guard went to thehomes of moderate opposition members and then killed them and theirfamilies:. Among those killed were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, 10Belgian UNAMIR soldiers who tried to protect her, the President of theSupreme Court (Cour de Cassation), Mr. Joseph Kavaruganda, and humanrights advocates Charles Sharnukiga, Fidele Kanyabugoyi, Ignace Ruhatanaand Patrick Gahizi. Soldiers also attacked a Roman Catholic centre in Kigaliand murdered 17 Tutsis, mostly priests and nuns, including FatherChrysologue Mahame (Society of Jesus) and Abbot Augustin Ntagara.

26


Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December .//

1994, Par. 68

:i: ")

(° :,..,

Almost immediately (i.e. the same evening) after the crash of the aircraft, selective assassination of opposition politicians, of which most were Hutufrom parties opposing the party in power, began. The most apparent act wasthe killing of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwitingiyimana, along with 10Belgian UN soldiers who were assigned to protect her. The President¯ of theConstitutional Court and the Minister of Information were other prominentimmediate targets. The leadership of every opposition party was hit in asimilar way (African Rights, 1994).The second target group for assassination, once the leading politicians hadbeen killed, were dissenting civilians, Hum as well as Tutsi. These includedjournalists, human rights activists, representatives of non-governmentalgroups and civil servants. African Rights lists as an example, by name andoccupation, 27 journalists who were reported killed immediately after April 6.Following the killing of the opposition, the generalized massacre of Tutsistarts.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996, p.51.

/

"’)

The Belgian decision to withdraw its contingent, following the murder of the10 Belgian peacekeepers, was communicated to the Secretary-General on 12April, and to the Security Council the next day. UNAMIR was deprived of itsstrongest unit, and put the rest of the force in a precarious position. TheSecretary-General made the point bluntly in a letter to Security-Councilmembers on 13 April. Belgian withdrawal will make it "extremely difficult forUNAMIR to carry cut its task effectively...In these circumstances, I haveasked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plansfor the withdrawal of UNAMIR."

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.2, Early Warning and ConflictManagementPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint E~,aluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996, p.43

1.25 The leaders of various political parties not targeted in theassassinations assembled at the request of military officers. Other than

members of the MRND, most participants were members of the "Power"

wings of their respective parties. Given the political and constitutional void

created by the deaths of most national political authorities, they set up a

27

°,,,

An interim government was proclaimed on 9 April, based on the MRND andthe factions of the other parties that supported it. Th6odore Sindikubwabo, theformer Speaker of the parliament, was appointed President and JeanKambanda Prime Minister. On 13 April, the interim government moved fromKigali to Gitarama on the grounds that order had collapsed in the capital.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: Some

Explanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to rwanda. March 1996, p. 52

See beginning of Part. 6

1.26 In the hours that following the crash of President Habyarimana,splane, military and militiamen set up roadblocks and began slaughteringTutsi and members of the Hutu opposition in Kigali and fn other parts ofRwanda. At the roadblocks, they checked the identity cards of passers-byand killed those or most of those who were identified as Tutsi. Military

patrols, often involving militiamen, scoured the city, lists in hand, toexecute the Tutsi and certain political opponents.

66. Events in the hours immediately following the aircraft crash claiming thelives of President Habyarimana and President Ntyamira underscore the factthat extensive planning and premeditation were involved in the human rightsviolations. As stated in the first report of the Special Rapporteur (ibid., para.26), the "provisional Government" was formed within only a few hours of theaircraft crash. Within 30 to 45 minutes of the crash, even before the newscould be spread by national radio, barricades were erected on certain majorthoroughfares. The Special Rapporteur records that within 45 minutes of thecrash, the road from the Hotel M~ridien to Amahoro Stadium was blocked bysoldiers and civilians. He notes that senior officers of the general staff of the"provisional Government" conceded these facts. However, the officerscontended that the exceptionally swift pace of events was really attributable tocivilians and certain soldiers acting spontaneously in reaction to the suddendeath of the Rwandese President, who had enjoyed great popularity. This

28

’i

i’ "

explanation can har~dly be ’convincing because news of the crash, which had

only occurred 45 minutes previously, had yet to be disseminated.Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),8/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 66

,¯,-

46...But the problem is more’apparent than real, for two reasons: firstly, manywitnesses confirm that the vetting carried out at roadblocks to check identitieswas aimed essentially at the Tutsi. Secondly, and above all, the main enemy,identified with the FPR, is still the Tutsi, who is the inyenzi (cockroach), to crushed at all costs. The Hutu moderate is merely a supporter of the mainenemy, and is targeted only as a traitor to his ethnic group, which he dares tooppose ....

60. Impunity, like incitement to hatred and murder, is a recurrent cause of themassacres. The political party militias put up road blocks, check the identityof those passing through, arrest Tutsi and moderate Hutu and execute them inthe street, in front of everyone and watched by members of the gendarmerieand FAR. The armed forces, far from bothering the militias, actually helpthem. This is also true of some local authorities, prefects or mayors, who havebeen personally involved in the slaughter.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-S~gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human ,./Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

1.27 During the entire period of the genocide, FAR military, particularly

units of the Presidential Guard, the Para-Commando Batallion,Reconnaissance Battalion and the Gendarmerie, in complicity with

militiamen, actively participated in the massacres of the Tutsi throughout

Rwanda, "

69. On 8 April 1994, the Presidential Guard, along with Rwandese armytroops and interahamwe militia, began a systematic slaughter of Tutsi civiliansin Kigali. As the Special Rapporteur states in his report, roadblocks had beenset up and identity cards inspected to determine the ethnic identity ofindividuals within 30 to 45 minutes of the aircraft crash. At that time,individuals bearing Tutsi physical traits were singled out and summarilyexecuted. As reported extensively in press reports, the streets of Kigali hadbegun to fill with corpses.

70. Eyewitness accounts indicate that house-to-house searches were carriedout and Tutsis were hunted down and killed. Some Tutsis tried to flee tochurches or hotels or to places where there might be safety in numbers.

29

.j’ S a1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT "

t"

I

X\

t

\

\

However, soldiers systematically murdered Tutsis who had tried to take refugein the warehouse of the Belgian Red Cross in K.igali. Churches and theAmahoro Stadium were surrounded by soldiers who prevented ~I’utsis insidefrom leaving.

71. On 9 April 1994, the Rwandese Army and interahamwe militia continuedto slaughter Tutsis at street barricades in Kigali and began to take people outof the churches for execution. At least 100persons that were either inside or infront of a church were murdered. Others were burnt alive in a chapel.

"\

72. Within the next week; the Presidential Guard and militia had killed anestimated 20,000 people in Kiga!i and its immediate environs. The masskillings, fomented by Radio des MiIles CotIines broadcasts which encouragedlisteners to "fill the half-empty graves", spread to areas outside Kigali.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (t994),S/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 69 to 72

28...It has also been reported that, when the Tutsi have shut themselves in aroom or a church which the militiamen cannot get into, the military come totheir aid, breaking down doors, throwing in grenades and leaving it to the

J"

militia to finish things ore This barbansin does not spare either children inorphanages or patients in hospital, who are taken away and killed or finishedoff. .. -’

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted’ by Mr.R. Degni-S~gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HamanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May I994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

1.28 As soon as it was formed, the Interim Government espoused the plan

for extermination put in place. Throughout the period of the massacres,the Government made decisions and issued directives to aid and abet inthe extermination of the Tutsi population and the eliminati0n of the IIutupolitical opponents. Members of the Government incited the population toeliminate the enemy and its "accomplices", some of them participatingdirectly in the massacres.

-’@- s0=?o -r9 t na:Theodore Sindikubwabo, spoke on the radio and called for the killing of

-- "accomplices" in Butare. The Presidential Guard flew in that ni~’tt and dugpits, filled them with burning tyres, and pushed Tutsis into them. They alsoexecuted Tutsis near the National University for the next three days, killingthousands.

.-., .. ,-

the eresiderigbt ~e ~i~rovistonaf .Kwttnd6se ¢5ovemmenr’,

30

%

1, HISTORICAL CONTEXT

/r---,

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 80

61. No legal steps have been taken against those responsible for the earlier andpresent massacres, although they are known to the public and the authorities.On the contrary, they continue to live quietly and move about freely, quiteundisturbed and with complete impunity. Worse still, many local .officials whoparticularly distinguished themselves by their acts of cruelty, have beenpromoted, whereas those who managed to keep the peace and preventmassacres were quite simply dismissed. A case in point is that of the MayorJean-Baptiste Gatete, notorious for his crimes, who was made Chief ofCabinet to the Minister for Family Affairs in June 1993. The second categoryincludes the Prefect of Butare, who was killed, and the Prefect of Kibungo,who was dismissed. As has been noted, the slaughter in the two prefecturesbegan immediately they were replaced.

65. The Rwandese "interim Government" also bears a full measure ofresponsibility for having refused to take effective steps to prevent theviolations of human rights and international humanitarian law, includinggenocide. From the outset of the atrocities, the Rwandese leaders maintainedthat the massacres would cease only with the end of the armed conflict.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-S~gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

The interim government did very little to stop, or even oppose, ~e massacresgoing on in the country. On the contrary, from the documentation available inthe form of interviews and statements over the radio, governmentrepresentatives rather denied or played down the evidence of killings, andsometimes even encouraged them (cf Th6odore Sindilo.tbwabo’s speech inButare on 19 May, 1994) (African Rights, 1994; Prunier, 1995).


1.29 Local authorities, including prefers, bourgmestres, conseillers desecteurs and responsables de cellule applied the Government-issueddirectives in execution of the plan for the extermination of the Tutsi

population. They incited and ordered their subordinates to perpetrate the

massacres and took a direct part in them.

31


60. Impunity, like incitement to hatred and murder, is a recurrent cause of themassacres. The political party militias put up road blocks, check the identityof those passing through, arrest Tutsi and moderate Hutu and execute them inthe street, in front of everyone and watched by members of the gendarmerieand FAR. The armed forces, far from bothering the militias, actually helpthem. This is also true of some local authorities, prefects or mayors, who havebeen personally involved in the slaughter.

61. No legal steps have been taken against those responsible for the earlier andpresent massacres, although they are known to the public and the authorities.On the contrary, they continue to live quietly and move about freely, quiteundisturbed and with complete impunity. Worse still, many local officials whoparticularly distinguished themselves by their acts of cruelty, have beenpromoted, whereas those who managed to keep the peace mad preventmassacres were quite simply dismissed. A case in point is that of the MayorJean-Baptiste Gatete, notorious for his crimes, who was mffde Chief ofCabinet to the Minister for Family Affairs in June 1993. The second categoryincludes the Prefect of Butare, who was killed, and the Prefect of Kibungo,who was dismissed. As has been noted, the slaughter in the two prefecturesbegan immediately they were replaced.

63. As far as the organs or authorities involved in the recent atrocities areconcerned, however, some responsibility can be apportioned immediately to:The Rwandese State authorities and, in particular, senior national politicalfigures, such as a number of ministers; various components of the governmentsecurity forces, such as the Presidential Guard, the Rwandese Armed Forces(FAR) and the gendarmerie; and some local authorities, prefects and mayors;

Report on the situation of human rights m Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragaph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

1.30 Having been psychologically and militarily prepared for severalmonths, the groups of militiamen spearheaded the execution of theextermination plan and were directly involved in the massacres of the

civilian Tutsi population and of moderate Hutus, thus causing the deaths

of hundreds of thousands of people in less than 100 days.

57. Since 6 April 1994, an estimated 500,000 unarmed civilians have beenmurdered in Rwanda. That estimate indeed may err on the conservative sidefor, as the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights observedin his report of 28 June 1994 (S/1994/1157,armex I, para. 24), some reliableestimates put the number of dead at close to 1 million. It is unlikely that the

32

’ . ¯.


O

world will ever know the exact number of men,slaughtered in this holocaust.

women and children

92. The mass murder of Tutsis continued throughout areas con(r011ed by theRwandese "provisional Government". Reliable estimates put the number ofpersons murdered in Rwanda.between 6 April 1994 and 15 July 1994 at half amillion.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 57 and 92

21. The atrocities have extended over the entire national territory. Adistinction must, however, be made between the governmental area and thearea controlled by the FPR. In the first area, most of the massacres are carriedout by the militias of the National Revolutionary Movement for Democracyand Development (MRND) - the interahamwe ("those who attack together") and of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) - impuzamugbmi("those who have a single aim"), and are directed against the Tutsi in generaland against Hutu who are considered moderate, i.e. against unarmed anddefenceless people. Examples, supplied by trustworthy witnesses, are notlacking. A few may be mentioned: in Butare, several thousand persons havebeen massacred or mutilated; in Gisenyi, thousands of Tutsi have suffered thesame fate, some of them having allegedly bden buried alive in common gravesin the town’s cemetery; in the parish of Nyundo (prefecture of Kibuye), morethan 560 persons have been killed including, 56 members of the clergy andnuns and 11 lay ministers; atrocities have also occurred in Kibuye itself,particularly in the stadium and the parish church; at Gikongo, a quarter ofKigali, on one day, Sunday 10 April, the street was covered with corpses forthe length of a kilometre. At Kiziguro, a parish on the road between Kabiroand Murambi, a common grave was found containing several hundreds ofcorpses and a few survivors crying for help. In Cyangugu, the number ofpersons massacred to date is estimated at more than 25,000.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.R. Degni-S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on HumanRights, under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of25 May 1994, E/CNI4/1995/7, 28 June 1994

The violence that followed is one of the worst in the history of humankind.Within a period of less than three months, at least 500,000 people were killed4; thousands and thousands were maimed, raped and both physically andpsychologically afflicted for life; two million fled to neighbouring countries;and one million became internally displaced.There is no question that these massacres took place. Eye-~vitnesses inRwanda and all over the world, with their own eyes or on TV, could see howfloating bodies filled the rivers and lakes along the borders of Rwanda.Journalists flocked into the area and reported extensively: some 50

J

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O

\.)

@

publications have already been published on the massacres (Guichaoua, 1995;Braeckman, 1995:1; Prunier, 1995; Verschave, 1994; Brauman, 1994).,oo

The massacres were implemented in such a meticulous way that it is difficultto conclude that they were organized in advance. Most Rwanda-watchersagree that the massacres were carried out according to a plan well-prepared byhigher officials in the local and national government, the army, thePresidential Guard and the MRND party..~.

It thus seems that the killings were no spontaneous outbursts, but followedinstructions from the highest level. This is also the only conclusion that can bedrawn after having studied the sequence of the massacres.

The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons fromthe Rwanda Experience: Vol.1, Historical Perspective: SomeExplanatory FactorsPublished by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996, p. 50 and 51

39. In his first report (S/1994/1157, annex I) of 28 June 1994, the SpecialRapporteur reported large-scale massacres organized and carried out by Hutumilitias- the interahamwe, close to the National Revolutionary Movement forDemocracy and Development (MRND), and the impuzamugambi ("those have a single aim"), close to the Coalition" for the Defence of the Republic(CDR).41. In his second report (ibid., annex II) of 12 August 1994, the SpecialRapporteur condemned in particular the activities of Radio-Tdldvision Libredes Mille Collines (RTLM) and the exiled former Government, which he saidwere responsible for incitement to the murder of Tutsis and Hutu moderatesand had caused the refugees to be afraid to return to Rwanda.42. In his third report (S/1994/1157/Add.i, annex), of 11 November 1994, theSpecial Rapporteur confirmed the constituent elements of genocide, namelythe discovery of mass graves and the existence of proof or indications of theplanned genocide of Tutsis.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant toSecurity Council resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December1994, Par. 39, 41 and 42

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34,t

e

2. TERRITORIAL, TEMPORAL AND MATERIAL JURISDICTION

TERRITORIAL, TEMPORAL AND MATERIAL JURISDICTION

2.1 The crimes referred to in this indictment took place in Rwanda

between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

2.2 During the events referred to in this indictment, Rwanda was

divided into 11 prdfectures: Butare, Byumba, Cyangugu, Gikongoro,

Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye, Kigali-Ville, Kigali-Rural andRuhengeri. Eachprdfecture was subdivided into communes and secteurs.

Rwandan Legislation, Legislative Act No. 10/75, 11 March 1975 (Structure andOperation of the Pr6fecture)

Rwandan Legislation, Legislation from 23 November 1963 (Structure of theCommune)

2.3 During the events referred to in this indictment Butare prefecture

was divided in 20 communes: Nyakizu, Kigembe, Gishamvu, Ngoma,

Runyinya, Maraba, Ruhashya, Mbazi, Shyanda, Muyaga, Mugusa,

Nyaruhengeri, Ndora, Muganza, Kibayi, Rusatira, Nyabisindu,

Ntyazo, Muyira and Huye.

Rwandan Legislation, Territorial Organization of the Republic. 15 April 1963, ,t//,

ANNEX II: Commune Borders, Part III, Butare Pr6fecture

/

()2.4 During the events referred to in this indictment, the Tutsi, the Hutu

and the Twa were identified as racial or ethnic groups.

See "Legislative Act no. 01/81 dated 16 January 1981, concerning the Census,National Identification Card, Residency and Rwandese Home Address" and"Ministerial Order no. 01/03 dated 19 January 1981, providing for the enforcement ofthe Legislative Act no. 01/81 dated 16 January 1981, concerning the Census, NationalIdentification Card, Residency and Rwandese Home Address", J.O no. 2 bis dated 20January 1981 ....

/f

2.5 During the events referred¯ to in this indictment, there were

throughout Rwanda widespread or systematic attacks directed against a

civilian population on political, ethnic or racial grounds.

"[The massacres] being perpetrated at present are unprecedented~t~!~ey] have takenon an extent unequaled in space and time. The atrocities have extended over theentire national territory.

35

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()

Examples, ..., are not lacking. A few may be mentioned: in Butare, severalthousand persons have been massacred or mutilated; in Gisenyi, thousands of Tutsihave suffered the same fate, some of them having allegedly been buriedalive ....... atrocities have also occurred in Kibuye...; at Gikondo, a neighbourhood ofKigali .... at Kiziguro ... a common grave was found containing several hundreds ofcorpses and a few survivors crying for help. In Cyangugu, the number of personsmassacred to date is estimated at more than 25,000.

Those massacres are still continuing. Veritable manhunts have been carriedout from house to house, from family to family, from village to village, by membersof the militias who, at the present time, are not hesitating to raid the so-calleddisplaced persons’ camps.

The massacres are systematic in nature. Whole families are exterminated -grandparents, parents and children. No one escapes, not even newborn babies .... thevictims are pursued to their very last refuge and killed there. This is true ofecclesiastical buildings, particularly churches, which once served as a refuge for theTutsi .... The same applies to hiding places ... the woods and forests, to which theattackers set fire to make sure that they leave no survivors behind them. The sameapplies also to the frontiers, which are blocked to prevent the Tutsi from escaping toneighbouring countries..."

Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda ̄submitted by Mr. R.Degni-S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, underparagraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, UNDocument E/CN.4/1995/7, of 28 June 1994, pp. 6,7,8.

See paragraphs 6.17 and following

(1)

2.6 During the events referred to in this indictment, a state of non-

international armed conflict existed in Rwanda. The victims referred to in

this indictment were protected persons, according to the provisions of

Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol

II.

"The death of President Juv6nal Habyafimana [on 6 April 1994] was the spark to thepowder keg which set off the massacre of civilians. The next day, fighting resumedbetween the government forces and the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] [...][...]The United Nations should: Demand that the parties to the conflict put an immediateend to the war [...]" !.

UN Document E/CN.4/1995/7, 28 June 1994, Report on the Situation ofe " ’ "Human Rights in Rwanda, submitted by Mr. R. D gm-Segm, Special

Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights under paragraph 20 ofCommission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1, pp. 5, 17

69. On 8 April 1994, the Presidential Guard, along with Rwandese army troops andinterahamwe militia, began a systematic slaughter of Tutsi civilians in Kigali. As the

/

36


Special Rapporteur states in his report, roadblocks had been set up and identity cards-inspected to determine the etlmic identity of individuals within 30 to 45 minutes ofthe aircraft crash. At that time, individuals bearing Tutsi physical traits were singledout and summarily executed. As reported extensively in press reports, the streets ofKigali had begun to fill with corpses.,oo

71. On 9 April 1994, the Rwandese Army and interahamwe militia continued toslaughter Tutsis at street barricades in Kigali and began to take people out of thechurches for execution. At least 100 persons that were either inside or in front of achurch were murdered. Others were burnt alive in a Chapel,

()

o

72. Within the next week, the Presidential Guard and militia had killed an estimated20,000 people in Kigali and its immediate environs. The mass killings, fomented byRadio des Milles Collines broadcasts which encouraged listeners to "fill the half-empty graves", spread to areas outside Kigali.

Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to SecurityCouncil resolution 935 (1994),S/1994/1405, 9 December 1994, Par. 69, 71-72.

THE POWER STRUCTURE

The Government

L’;

’")

3.1 According to the Constitution of 10 June 1991, executive power isexercised by the President of the Republic, assisted by the Government,composed of the Prime Minister and the ministers. The members of theGovernment are appointed by the President of the Republic upon theproposal of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister directs theGovernment’s program. The Government determines and appliesnational policy. To that effect, it controls the civil service and the armedforces. The Prime Minister decides the functions of the ministers andofficials under the Prime Minister’s authority. The resignation ortermination of tenure of the Prime Minister, for whatevd[" reason, causesthe Government to resign.

The constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 10 June 1991 (Gazette, 1991,p615) //"amended by Law No. 18/93 of August 1993 (Gazette, 1993,p. 1257)

3.2 The Ministers implement the Government’s policy, as defined by thePrime Minister. They are answerable to the Head of the Government fordoing so. In carrying out their duties, they have at their disposal the civilservice and local administration corresponding to their functions.

37

5:CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: PREPARATION

C.!¯,

O

The constitution ot~the Republic of Rwanda, 10 June 1991 (Gazette, 1991,p615) amended by Law No. 18/93 of August 1993 (Gazette, 1993,p.125))

The Local Public Administration

3.3 The Prdfet represents executive power at prefectural level. ThePrdfet is appointed by {he President of the Republic on the

recommendation of the Minister of the Interior and carries out his dutiesunder that Minister’s hierarchical authority. The Prdfet’s authority covers

the entire prdfecture.

The Pr6fet must carry out the duties attached to his office, notably:

-Administer the prdfecture in conformity with the laws and regulations in forceand in general ensure their implementation and observance.-Ensure peace, public order and the safety of people and property-Assist and supervise the communal authorities-Inform the central government of the situation in the prdfecture and of anyevent of interest.

,t.

Rwandan Legislation, Legislative Act No. 10/75, 11 March 1975 (Structure and--f""

Operation of the Pr6fecture) Article 3 and 8.-

3.4 In his capacity as administrator of the prdfecture, the Prdfet is

responsible for ensuring peace, public order and the safety of people and

property. The Prdfet, in the discharge of his policing duties, maintaining

peace and public order, may request the intervention of the army and of

the Gendarmerie Nationale. The Prdfet has hierarchical authority over all

civil servants and all persons holding public office within the boundaries of

the prdfecture, including the bourgmestres and conseilIers de secteur.

Legislation, Legislative Act, 23 January 1974 (Creation of the Gendarmerie) RwandanArticles 8-2, 2, 3, 4, 29, 30, 31, 32, 24, 37, 40 and 47. "

Rwandan Legislation, Legislative Act No. 10/75, 11 March 1975 (Structure f.and Operation of the Pr6fecture) Article 11.

- All the sous-pr~fets,"- All the bourgmestres of the communes and all public administration staff in thecommunes;- All heads of public administration departments, who are ex-officio members of theprefectural committee chaired by the Prdfet;- All the administrative staff of the prdfecture;- All staff under contract with the prefectural administration;

38


(

- All government en~ployees in theprdfecture.

Rwandan Legislation, Legislative Act No 10/75, 11 March 1975 (Structure and /"Operation of the Pr6fecture) Articles 3, 8, 15, 17, 36, 41, 46, 49, 50, 51, 59, 76,77, 78.

Rwandan Legislation, Legislation from 23 November 1963Commune) Articles 64, 65, 66, 67, 68 and 70.

(Structure of the

3.5 Similarly to the Prdfet, the Bourgmestre represents executive powerat the commune level. He is appointed by the President of the Republic on

the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. He is under thehierarchical authority of the Prdfet. He has authority over the civil

servants posted in his commune. Moreover, he has policing duties in

regard to maintaining order and law enforcement.

The Bourgmestre must carry out the duties attached to his office, notably:

- Under the authority of the higher administration, the Bourgmestre isresponsible for the commune’s economic, social and culturaldevelopment and for the enforcement of its laws and regulations.- Administration of the commune is under the direct authority of theBourgmestre.- In case of emergency, the Bourgmestre, at his own initiative, caninvoke police regulations to impose prison sentences not exceeding 7days, and~or 200francs ’fine.-The Bourgmestre can detain anyone causing public disorder for up to48 hours.

Rwandan Legislation, Legislation from 23 November 1963 (Structure//

of the Commune)

Legislative Act of 26 September 1974, Legislative Act of 30 January /1975

The Bourgmestre holds de jure attthority over his subordinates, i.e.:- commune police officers, who are responsible for maintaining andreestablishing public order and enforcing laws and regulations- elements of the national police provided to the commune by authorityof the Pr6fet.- government employees working at commune level

Rwandan Legislation, Legislation from 23 November 1963 (Structureof the Commune) ./~

Legislative Act of 26 September 1974, Legislative Act of 30 January,/"

/

/ 39

"? .


1975~Articles 60, 104, 1093.6During the events referred to in this indictment, the main political

parties in Rwanda were the MRND (Mouvement R~publicain Nationalpour la D~mocratie et le DdveloppemenO, the CDR (Coalition pour laD~fense de la R~publique), the MDR (Mouvement DdmocratiqueR~publicain), the PSD (Parti Social-Ddmocrate) and the PL (PartiLiberal). The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) was a politico-militaryopposition organization.

GUICHAOUA, Andr6, Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994),Lille,Universit6 des Sciences et Technologies, (diffusion Karthala) 1995

(.)

(~.i

3.7 Le MRND (Mouvement R6volutionnaire National pour leD6veloppement) 6tait un mouvement cr66 par Juvenal Habyarimana le juillet 1975. Ce mouvement 6tait de far un v6ritable Parti-Etat. II visaitdoter le Pr6sident de la R6publique d’un appareil puissant destin6contr61er tousles rouages de l’Etat. Parmi les objectifs du mouvement, il yavait le soutien et le contr61e des activit6s des divers pouvoirs de l’Etat. LePr6sident du MRND 6tait la seule personne 61igible ~ la Pr6sidence de laR6publique. Chaque Rwandais 6tait membre du MRND dbs sa naissance.

3.8 Les organes du MRND (Mouvement R6volutionnaire National pourle D6veloppement) 6taient trbs centralis6s au sommet et trbs ramifi6s h labase. I1 s’agit d’une structure tentaculaire qui vise ~ embrigader touslescitoyens rwandais et h encadrer d’une faqon monolithique toute la viepolitique du pays. Les organes nationaux comprennaient Le Pr6sident duMouvement, le Secr6taire G6n6ral, le Congr~s National et le Comit6Central. Le Comit6 Central 6tait compos6 du Pr6sident du Mouvement,d’autres membres nomm6s par lui, du Secr6taire G6n6ral et du Pr6sidentdu CND (Conseil national de D6veloppement). Au second niveau, il y avaitdes organes pr6fectoraux et des organes de base. Les premiersconcernaient la pr6fecture; les seconds la commune, le secteur et la cellule.Dans cette structure, le responsable du Mouvement 6tait le pr6fet dans lapr6fecture et le bourgmestre dans la commune. Ces deux personnages6taient des fonctionnaires publics nomm6s directement par le Pr6sident dela R6publique qui 6tait en m~me temps le Pr6sident du MRND

3.9 Avec l’introduction du multipartisme et l’adoption d’une nouvelleconstitution le 10 juin 1991, le Mouvement Rdvolutionnaire National pour leDdveloppement (MRND) est alors rebaptis6 Mouvement RdpublicainNationai pour la Ddmocratie et le Ddveloppement (MRND). Les Statuts ont

40


f.-.

~ii¯- 1

6t6 amend6s mais la s~ucture du nouveau parti est demeur6

essentiellement la m~me.

3.10 La plupart des partis politiques avaient cr66 une aile jeunesse eft leur sein. Celle duMRND ~tait cormue sous l’appellation "lnterahamwe" et celle de ia CDR sous lenora de "Impuzamugambi’. La creation des ailes jeunesses r~pondait 5 deuxpreoccupations au sein des partis politiques: sensibiliser les jeunes h la politiqueet les mobiliser. Le MRND et la CDR ont suivi l’exemple du MDR et du FPR quiavaient d~jh constitu~ leurs mouvements de jeunesse.

I think one of the major differences between the Interahamwe and the otheryouth wings o f the other parties was that some Interahamwe, who later werecalled a professional Interahamwes, underwent military training or parmilitarytraining and here I’m only- I would mention only what I know on the basis ofexisting literature. Persomaally I did not do research on the topic. In Kibuye,for example, Gishwati was also mentioned as a training venue. It wasestimated in February, March 1994, that between 1,500 and 2.000Interahamwe must have undergone military training or parmilitary training.The exact figure that was mentioned, I do not know whether it is revaled, it isa figure of 1.700. This is a major difference. I am not sure wether even themilitia of the CDR that is in Impuzamugambi underwent military training butfor the Interahamwe it seems to be certain that they were taken aboard lorriesand trucks, the former commander o f the Presidential Guard was in charge ofthis trainint at GabiroT6moingnage du Pr. ReyntjensICTR 96-3-Y, le 13 october 1997

3.11 Les Interahamwe-MRND ont ~t~ crg~s ~t la fin de 1991 h l’initiative du comit~

central du MRND suite ~ l’av~nement du multipartisme. Les Interahamwe-MRND~taient une organisation bien structur~e 5 l’image du parti MRND. Ils avaient auniveau national un President, deux vice-pr~sidents, un Secr~taire G~n~ral et unTr~sorier. Leur president devait, entre autre, assurer la liaison avec le comit~ central duMRND. En juin 1993, pour garantir une meilleure eouverture du territoire et une plusgrande efficacitfi, le Comit~ Central du MRND a d~cid~ de crier des comit~sd’Interahamwe-MRND au niveau des diff~rentes Prefectures du pays.

3.12 Numerous MRND youth wings’ members subsequently received military training andwere thus tranformed from youth movements into militias.

The Forces A rmdes Rwandaises

3.13 The Forces Armdes Rwandaises (FAR) were composed of the Armde

Rwandaise (AR) and the Gendarmerie Nationale (GN). The Forces ArmdesRwandaises did not have a unified command and came directly under the

Minister of Defence. The Commander-in-Chief of the Forces Armdes

Rwandaises was the President of the Republic.

41


3.14

The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 10 June 1991, Art. 45 (Gazette, 1991,p.615).

The General Staff of the Rwandan Army was headed by the Chief ofStaff, assisted by four senior officers in charge of four bureaux: G-1(Personnel and Administration), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (MilitaryOperations) and G-4 (Logistics).

/

3.15

°t.

Documents from the Ministry of Defence (Rwandan Army), dated 1 January1993 and 5 March 1994

The territory of Rwanda was divided into various militaryoperations sectors, each headed by a military sector commander.Also, there were elite units within the Rwandan Army, namely thePresidential Guard, Para-Commando Battalion and ReconnaissanceBattalion. The troops were divided into companies within the sectorsand the units.

Documents from the Ministry of Defence (Rwandan Army), dated 1 January /"1993 and 5 March 1994

()

3.16 The General Staff of the Gendarmerie Nationale was headed by theChief of Staff, assisted by four senior officers in charge of four bureaux:G-1 (Personnel and Administration), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (MilitaryOperations) and G-4 (Logistics).

,x.

Legislative Act of 23 January 1974 on the Creation of the Gendarmerie j(Gazette 1974, p. 123)

3.17 The Gendarmerie Nationale was responsible for maintainingpublic order and peace and the observance of the laws in effect in thecountry.

Legislative Act of 23 January 1974 on the Creation of the Gendarmerie(Gazette 1974, p. 123)

/

3.18 The Gendarmerie Nationale was under the Minister of Defence butcould carry out its duties of ensuring public order and peace at the request

¯ of the local government authority having jurisdiction, namely the Prdfet.In cases of emergency, this request could be made verbally, notably by

42°~

S /q5:CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: PREPARATIONi

telephone. Such requests had to be carried out immediately. In addition,the Gendarmerie Nationale was obliged to transmit to the Prefer allinformation relating to public order. It had the duty to assist anyone indanger.

Legislative Act of 23 January 1974 on the Creation of the Gendarmerie /

(Gazette 1974, p. 123)3.19 By virtue of their rank and their functions, the officers of theRwandan Army had the duty to enforce the general rules of discipline forall soldiers under their authority, even those not belonging to their units.

Presidential Order No. 413/02 of 13 December 1978 on Regulations onDiscipline Within the Rwandan Armed Forces (Gazette 1978, p. 774).

3.19 The Gendarmerie Nationale was responsible for maintaining publicorder and peace and the observance of the laws in effect in the country.

,t.

Legislative Act of 23 January t974 on the Creation of the Gendarmerie (Gazette ,,1/-’:

1974, p. 123).

43

4. THE ACCUSED

Augustin Bizimana

4.1 Augustin Bizimana was born in 1954, in Gituza commune, Byumbaprdfecture, Rwanda.

4.2 During the events referred to in this indictment, Augustin Bizimana heldthe office of Minister of Defence in the Interim Government. He held his officeuntil mid-July 1994. Before that Augustin Bizimana was Minister of Defencein the third multi-party government formed on 18 July 1993.

GUICHAOUA, Andr6, Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994),Lille,Universit6 des Sciences et Technologies, (diffusion Karthala) 1995.

4.3 In his capacity as Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana had advisorswho informed him of the socio-political situation in the country. Furthermore,

the Minister of Defence was responsible for controlling the possession ofweapons and explosives by the civilian population.

Annex to Prime Ministerial Order on the Structure and Powers of Central AdministrationDepartments, Ministry of Defence (Journal Officiel de la R@ublique Rwandaise, 31 st year,No. 22, 15 November 1992, p. 1766 onwards)

©

C!

4.4 In his capacity as Minister, Augustin Bizimana supported the policyimplemented by the Interim Government. Furthermore, in the exercise of hispowers, he never publicly disavowed this policy and did not resign, as permittedby the Constitution.

The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10 June 1991 (Journal Officiel, 1991, p.615),articles 50 to 56.

4.5 In his capacity as Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana exercisedauthority over the members of the Forces Armies Rwandaises.

44

:,~. ,:.:.. ~ ~ ;,~:, ,v .... .,: ~:’, ~:~;,~.~":~:>~:;~!~:~:~:.~.:;,’:" :, ..... ;’~,:~., . " ": " :.:’ ~: ~. ~ ~.~" ~’:’:’~’ii~,~ ?~’~,~!,+:~-:~,i~,!~’!:~,~’i:~,~:’.~,~-,~:~..

::: ¯i! =:=i~: :~ ~ :. :: ~ :,~i~i~?~ :~i~++:~!i~,~ =:.: ¯ .... ¯ ~ ~ / -:~: ~ .....~ ~!:i, ~!~0 ~ ~: :~

Edouard Karemera ~ ~ ~

4.6 Edouard Karemera was born in Mabanza commune, Kibuye prgfecture,

Rwanda.4.7 ¯ During the events referred to in this indictment, Edouard Karemera heldthe office of Minister of the Interior in the Interim Government headed by JeanKambanda. He held his office until mid-July 1994. Edouard Karemera was alsoVice-Chairman of the Mouvement rdpublicain national poti~r la ddmocratie et leddveloppement (MRND). Before that, Edouard Karemera was Minister Institutional Relations in the MRND government of May 1987.


4.8 In his capacity as Minister of the Interior, Edouard Karemera had theduty of ensuring the security of people and property throughout the country. Tothat end, he received periodic reports from the prefers and bourgmestres onsecurity in their respective administrative constituencies. Furthermore, theMinister of the Interior submitted to the President of the Republic the names ofthe prdfets and bourgmestres to be appointed.

Annex to Prime Ministerial Order on the St{-ucture and Powers of Central AdministrationDepartments, Ministry of Defence (Journal Officiel de la R@ublique Rwandaise, 31 st year,No. 22, 15 November 1992, p. 1754onwards)

()The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10 June 1991 (Journal OJficiel, 1991, p.615),article 56.

4.9 In his capacity as Minister, Edouard Karemera supported the policyimplemented by the Interim Government and in the exercise of his powers, henever publicly disavowed this policy and did not resign, as permitted by theConstitution.

The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10 June 1991 (Journal OJficiet, 199 t, p.615),articles 50 to 56.

4.10 In his capacity as Minister of the Interior, Edouard Karemera exercisedauthority over the prdfets. He had direct hierarchical authority over local

45

government civil servants throughout Rwanda.Furthermore, in his capacity asVice-Chairman of tl~e Mouvement rdpubHcain pour la ddmocratie et leddveloppement (MRND), Edouard Karemera exercised authority over the

members of his party’s youth wing, the Interahamwe.

Law of 23 November 1963 on the Structure of the Commune (Journal Officiet, 1963, p. 507,

articles 46 and 56, among others)

5)

( ’%’.,

Callixte Nzabonimana

4.11 Callixte Nzabonimana was born in Gitarama prdfecture, Rwanda.

4.12 During the events referred to in this indictment, Callixte Nzabonimana

held the office of Minister of Youth in the Interim Government, He was amember of the MRND. He held this office until mid-July 1994, Before that,Callixte Nzabonimana was Minister of Planning in the MRND governmentsfrom 15 January 1989 to 4 February 1991, in the first so-called "multi-party"government formed on 31 December 1991 and the second multi-party

government formed on 16 April 1992.


4.13 In his capacity as Minister, Callixte Nzabonimana supported the policyimplemented by the Interim Government and in the exercise of his powers, henever publicly disavowed this policy and did not resign, as permitted by the

Constitution.

The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10 June 1991 (Journal Officiel, 1991, p. 615),articles 50 to 56.

4.14 In his capacity as an MRND Minister from Gitarama, CallixteNzabonimana exercised influence over the bourgmestres and militiamen in

Gitarama prdfecture.

¯ Gitaramapr~feCture was almost 100% MDR, so the Interahamwe had very little support inthepr~fecture. The MRND had very little representation in this prdfeeture. That enabled he

46

to repositior~ itself at the expense of the MDR. The main architect of this change wasMinister Callixte N~.abonimana,

Andr6 Rwamakub_a

4.15 Andr6 Rwamakuba was born in 1950, in Gikomero commune, Kigali-

Rural prdfecture, Rwanda.

4.16 During the events referred to in this indictment, Andr6 Rwamakuba heldthe office of Minister of Primary and Secondary Education in the InterimGovernment headed by Jean Kambanda. He was a member̄ of the MDR. He

held his office until mid-July 1994.


4.17 In his capacity as Minister in the Interim Government, Andr6 Rwamakubasupported the policy implemented by the Interim Government and in theexercise of his powers, he never publicly disavowed this’policy and did not

resign, as permitted by the Constitution’.

¯ The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 10 June 1991 (Journal OfficieI, 1991, p.615),

articles 50 to 56.

()

~;".

Mathieu Ngiruznp_a_t~

in Tare commune, Kigali-Rural4.18 Mathieu Ngirumpatse was bornprdfecture, Rwanda.

4.19 During the events referred to in this indictment, Mathieu Ngirumpatse was~" *

¯t

Chairman of the Mouvement rdpublicain pour la democratte et le deveIoppemen(MRND). On 17 May 1994, he was appointed Director General for ForeignAffairs in the President’s Office. Before that, Mathieu Ngirumpatse wassuccessively Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, in 1962, Rwanda’s Ambassadorto Ethiopia and Germany, Secretary General in the Presidet~t’s Office in chargeof external relatiOns, general manager of SONARWA, Secretary General and

47

then Chairman of thex MRND, and Minister of Justice in the first so-called"multi-party" government formed on 31 December 1991.


NGIRUMPATSE MATHIEU Did his studies in BUKAVU, in the former Zaire, where heestablished a lot of relations. In 1962, he was appointed premier substitut’du procureur dela Rdpublique. He also served as ambassador in several countries, including Ethiopia,Germany, etc. After an outstanding career in the diplomatic service, he returned to Rwandain 1985. He was appointed secretary-general in charge of foreign affairs in the Office of thePresident of the Republic. President Habyarimana appointed him advisor in flae Office of thePresident. In 1991, Mathieu was appointed Minister of Justice in SLYVESTRENSANZIMANA’s cabinet. After that, he was appointed general manager of SONARWA.

Ref. IIF 740 du 23/12/97

4.20 In his capacity as Chairman of the Mouvement rdpublicain pour laddmocratie et le ddveloppement (MRND), Mathieu Ngirumpatse exercisedauthority over the members of his party’s youth wing, the Interahamwe.

(.2

Joseph Nzirorera

4.21 Joseph Nzirorera was born in 1950, in Mukingo commune, Ruhengeriprdfecture, Rwanda. "

4.22 During the events referred to in this indictment, Joseph Nzirorera wasSecretary-General of the Mouvement rdpublicain national pour la ddmocratie etle ddveloppement OVIRND). In July 1994, he was elected Speaker of the Rwandanparliament, the Conseil National pour le Ddveloppement (CND). Before that,Joseph Nzirorera held the office of Minister of Works, Energy and Water in theMRND government of 15 January 1989, that of Minister of Industry, Mines andArtisanat in the MRND government formed on 9 July 1990 and the governmentformed on 4 February 1991.

GUICHAOUA, Andre, Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994),Lille,Universit6 des Sciences et Technologies, (diffusion Karthala) 1995.

48

4.23 In his capacity as Secretary-General of the Mouvement r~publicain pour

laddmocratie et le d~vetoppement (MRND), Joseph Nzirorera exercised authorityover the members of his party’s youth wing, the Interahamwe.

4.24 F61icien Kabuga was born in 1935 in Muniga secteur, Mukarange¯ ecommune, Byumba prdfectur , Rwanda.

4.25 During the events referred to in this indictment, F61icien Kabuga was abusinessman. He was related by marriage to the family of PresidentHabyarimana. He was also President of the Comit~ Provisoire of the National

Defence Fund [Fonds de Ddfense Nationale] (F.D.N.), and President of theComitd d’Initiative of Radio T~Idvision Libre des Mille Collines s.a. (RTLM s.a.).As the main financier and backer of the MRND and the CDR and theirrespective militia groups, F61icien Kabuga exercised considerable influence overthose organizations and authority over their members, including the

Interahamwe-MRND militiamen.

()

4.26 Juv6nal Kajelijeli was born in Rwinzovu cetlule, Rwinzovu secteur,Mukingo commune, Ruhengeri prdfecture, Rwanda.

4.27 During the events referred to in this indictment, Juv6nal Kajelijeli wasbourgemestre of Mukingo commune, having been re-appointed in June 1994 untilJuly 13th 1994. Before that he had held the same position from 1988 to 1993. Aswell he was the founder and leader of a band of Interahamwe-MRND in Mukingocommune who were active throughout the region.¯ He had close ties with JosephNzirorera and because of this benefited in authority and status.

4.28 In his capacity as bourgemestre Juv6nal Kajelijeli exercised authority overhis subordinates. Moreover having held the office of bourgemestre for so long aswell as being the leader of a band of Interhamwe-MRND, Juv6nal Ka]elijeliexercised authority over the Interhamwe-MRND and the civilian population of

49

k .

J

5"~t2.4.THE ACCUSED

Mukingo commune.

5o


5. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THEFACTS: PREPARATION

5.1 From late 1990 until July 1994, Augustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera,Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Rwamakuba, Mathieu N~irumpatse, JosephNzirorera, F61icien Kabuga, Juv6nal Kajelijeli, Andr6 Ntagerura, PaulineNyiramasuhuko and Eliezer Niyitekega, conspired among themselves and withothers, notably Th6oneste Bagosora, Augustin Ndindiliyimana, AugustinBizimungu, Tharcisse Renzaho, Emmanuel Bagambiki, Sylvain Nsabimana andAlphonse Nteziryayo, to work out a plan with the intent to exterminate thecivilian Tutsi population and eliminate members of the opposition, so that theycould remain in power. The components of this plan consisted of, among otherthings, recourse to hatred and ethnic violence, the training of and distributionof weapons to militiamen as well as the preparation of lists of people to beeliminated. In executing the plan, they organized, ordered and participated inthe massacres perpetrated against the Tutsi population and of moderate Hutu.

See paragraph 5,2 onwards

5.2 In a letter dated 3 December 1993, certain FAR officers revealed to theUNAMIR Commander and to all the Ministers, including Augustin Bizimana,the existence of what they called a "Machiavellian plan" conceived by militarywho were mainly from the North and who shared the extremist Hutu ideology.The objective of the Northern military was to oppose the Arusha Accords andkeep themselves in power. The means to achieve this consisted in exterminatingthe Tutsi and their "accomplices". The letter indicated moreover the names ofpolitical opponents to be eliminated. Some of them were in fact killed on themorning of 7 April 1994.

Kigali, 3 December 1993

The Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda -UNAMIR-Kigali ........However, it is noteworthy that some soldiers, mainly from the same area as the President ofthe Republic and who were still in favour of a military solution to the conflict rernain fiercely

5O

¯ ̄ ¯ ..

opposed to the implementation of the Peace Accord for obvious selfish and partisan reasons.

The attitude of these ~soldiers is understandable because they have always been pampered byPresident Habyarimana’s regime. That is why they have remained impervious to the on-going political changes and are trying by all means to stick to their Master who, in spite ofhis fine speeches calling on the Rwandan people to support the Peace Accord, is in factinstigating diabolic manoevures aimed at spreading confusion and devastation within thepopulation. The events which just occurred in Kirambo, Mutara and Ngende testify to thisfact.Similar massacres are being prepared and will spread throughout the entire regions of thecountry beginning with the regions with high concentration of Tutsis, particularly Bugesera,Kibuye, Kibungo etc. This strategy aims at making the people believe that it is an etlmicupheaval and this will incite the RPF to violate the cease-fire as Was the case in February1993. This is an act that could serve as an excuse for widespread resumption of hostilities.This Machiavellian plan has as target some higNy placed people in the country particularlythe Prime Minister of the broad-based transitional government Mr. Faustin Twagiranmnguas well as Mr. Landoald Ndasingwa, F61icien Gatabazi, Dismas Nsengiyaremye, BonifaceNgulinzira who played an active role in the conclusion of the Peace Accord and who relievedMr. Habyarimana of his powers.According to the on-going plan, Mr. Twagiramungu should have been physically eliminatedbetween 5 and 30 December 1993, probably the period when the transitional institutionswere set up ....Commander,We would like to point out that even we high ranking officers of the Rwandan Armed Forcesreceived this information from corroborative and reliable sources for in the recent past, wewere part of the soldiers on the payroll of the President of the Republic.

Letter dated 3 December 1993, signed by several people.

’")’~."

5.3 On 10 January 1994, UNAMIR was informed by an I1~terahamwe-MRNDleader working under the orders of Mathieu Ngirumpatse of the details of a planto exterminate the Tutsi population and its "accomplices".

He confirmed that he was in charge of or led 20 to 30 cellules in Kigali and that he couldcontact every cellule leader by telephone to give them orders. According to JPT, theseInterahamwe cellules could kill a thousand Tutsis in twenty minutes. He confirmed that the list ofTutsis had been prepared by the MRND and the members of the Iilterahamwe Cellules andthat the residences of the targets had already been clearly located. JPT has always refusedto show us his list as long as he was not protected. His lists were sent to the MRNDHeadquarters.

Statement from a source to Commander Fral~ Claeys, UNAMIR, Interviewof24/9/1996.

See paragraph 5.11 onwards

51


Speeches and Incitement

5.4 The incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was a fundamental part ofthe plan put in place. It was articulated, before and during the genocide, byelements of the FAR on the one hand, and by members of the Government andlocal authorities on the other.

See paragraphs 5.5 to 5.8

5.5 On 4 December 1991, President Juv6nal Habyarimana set up a militarycommission. The commission, presided by Th6oneste Bagosora, was given thetask of finding an answer to the following question: "What do we need to do inorder to defeat the enemy militarily, in the media and politically?"

1. On 4 December 1991, the Head of State presided over a meeting at the ESM involvingvarious high-ranking soldiers. At the end of the meeting, a committee made up of 10officers was set up to carry out an in-depth reflection and find a response to thequestion:"What can be done to defeat the enemy at the military, media and political levels?"

G-2 department circular of 2 r September 1992

5.6 In a letter dated 21 September 1992, the General Staff of the RwandanArmy ordered that an extract from the commission report be circulated amongthe troops. The extract defined the main enemy as follows: "The Tutsisfrominside or outside the country, who are extremists and nostalgic for power, who donot recognize and have never recognized the realities of the Social Revolution of1959, and are seeking to regain power in Rwanda by any means, including takingup arms." The secondary enemy was defined as: "Anyone providing any kind ofassistance to the main enemy". The document specified that the enemy was beingrecruited from within certain social groups, notably: "the Tutsis inside thecountry, Hutus who are dissatisfied with the present regime, foreigners married toTutsi women...". Among the activities the enemy was accused oi, the documentmentioned "the diversion of national opinion from the ethnic problem to the socio-economic problem between the rich and the poor".

52

. ..,:. ’:. ¯

¯ii; .~i: : :~i /:i::~::::~:~~:

5. EXPOSE SUCCINT DES FAITS: PREPARATION

(i,.

- ENI document

-Distribute this document widely and lay emphasis on the chapters concerning the definitionof the enemy, his identification as well as recruitment circles... This will enable our menremain alert an NOT bank only on political negotiations.

G-2 circular dated 21 September 1992

Quite clearly, the definition of the enemy, which had always existed and had lain in a drawersomewhere for several months, was taken out and spread about, precisely because of thepeace agreement. In that, [ see a very clear warning to the soldier~ for them not to let theirguard down.

The peace agreement is not an end in itself; the struggle is not over, so do not place your trustentirely in the negotiations.

Q. Thank you for this information. However, before going any further, how do you knowthat this document is authentic and therefore reliable?

A. This document was given to the international commission in January 1993 and I was inRwanda at the time. I was working with the commission. I discussed the contents of thisletter with a certain nmnber of senior Rwandan officials, who confirmed its authenticity.

Testimony by Dr. DesforgesICTR-96-4-T, 12 February 1997

(:-2)£

L̄. ̄5.7 The document and the use made of it by the seniorencouraged and promoted ethnic hatred and violence.

officers aided,

I remember that in 1993, Major Ntabakuse called us together and told us that it wasnecessary to first identify the enemy in order to defeat them. He showed us a documentwhich talked about identifying the enemy and the current method of fighting them. I did notpersonally get the opportunity to examine the document but Major Ntabakuse cornmentedon a few its main points. What stuck in my memory is that the enemy was defined as allTutsis from within together with their sympathizers. It was also stated in the document thatit was not enough for one to fight at the frontline, one also had to mobilize the people andget them actively involved in fighting the enemy from within.

Witness AI

53¯

¯ : d’/.!~ ~.:?,:2::i/-,,’"i:";~ /<.i/’:~i):i~ ... ;~] .......

"9o76:CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: PREPARATION

A. The day after this letter was circulated among the entire military command, the CDRreleased a press communique containing a list of people considered to be enemies andtraitors of the nation. These two names were in fact on the list.

Therefore, on two consecutive days, the military authorities had circulated among the troopsa list of people considered to be enemies of the nation, and the very next day, the CDR wascirculating the same message among the general public in the communique.

Testimony by Dr. DesforgesICTR-96-4-T, 12 February 1997

()

C

¯ .. ¢-

5.8 Colonel Throneste Bagosora participated in the Arusha talks, and openly

manifested his opposition to the concessions made by the Government

representative, Boniface Ngulinzira, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the point of

leaving the negotiation table. Colonel Throneste Bagosora left Arusha sayingthat he was returning to Rwanda to "prepare the apocalypse". On 11 April 1994,

Boniface Ngulinzira was assassinated by the military. His death was announcedon RTLM in these terms: "We have exterminated aH the accomplices of the RPF,

Boniface Ngulinzira will no longer go and sell the country to the RPF’s advantage

in Arusha. The Peace Accords are only scraps of paper, as our father,Habyarimana, had predicted’,.

After the departure of the blue berets, Mr. Boniface Ngulinzira suggested that we leave ETO.I will not wait for the soldiers and the militia to come and kill me here. We went acrossETO, past the fence and were headed for Kagarama neighbourhood. On the way, we werestopped by the militia who took our money, watches and bracelets. They took us to yard ofa big militiaman in Kagarama neighbourhood and one hour after our arrest, six soldiers fromthe presidential guard came and took ...... I have not seen him since then. Later, I learnt ofhis death over Radio RTLM, the gruesome voice of the genociders saying: "gee haveexterminated all RFP accomplices. Mr. Boniface Ngulinzira will no longer go to Arusha tosell the country to the RPF. The peace Accords are nothing but toilet paper as our fatherHabyrimana had predicted.

Witness DX

Sometime around Christmas 1992, I was in Arusha for the negotiations between theRwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), negotiations which resultedin what is commonly called "Arusha Accords". I was a member of the RPF delegation. Atthat time, negotiations were focused on the merging of both forces.Colonel Throneste BAGOSORA whom I knew earlier was with the govemnaent delegation

54


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which was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Boniface NGLrLINZIRA. We lodged atthe Mount Meru Hotel. I remember that BAGOSORA was one floor above the rest of theother members of the delegation.One day, about the same time, Andrew RWIGAMBBA, Faustin MUSARE, PatrickMAZIMPAKA and I were on our way to take breakfast at the hotel"restaurant on the groundfloor. We had to use the lift. When the lift stopped on our floor and its doors opened,Colonel BAGASORA was in the lift with his suitcases. A bit surprised, I asked him wherehe was going. He said in a derisive manner "I’m going back to prepare the apocalypse."May I point out that I was in the lift with the colleagues I mentioned above. We went withBagosora to the ground floor. At that time, I did not know the implications of what he hadsaid. On the contrary, I made a connection between the bible and the reference made to theworld coming to an end. We separated and BAGOSORA returned to Kigali.

Witness KT

5.9 The characterization of the Tutsis as the enemy and of members of the

opposition as their accomplices was echoed by politicians, notably by L~on

Mugesera, MRND Vice-Chairman for Gisenyiprdfecture, in a speech he made

on 22 November 1992. Broadcast on the state radio and therefore reaching a

much larger audience, L~on Mugesera’s speech already at that time was an

incitement to exterminate the Tutsi population and their "accomplices’.

It is said that if someone strikes you on the cheek, you should turfi’the other cheek for it tobe struck as well. I am here to tell you that this passage has taken on another meaning withinour Movement. If your adversary strikes you on the cheek, stlike him back on both cheeksso hard that he never gets up again. To start with, in yourprdfecture you must strictly forbidanyone from displaying the flag or the cap of any of the parties I mentioned; you must denythem access, especially if they try to hold a meeting here. I am talking about all of Gisenyiprefecture without exception.

(The MDR, PL and PSD parties) have plotted to allow Byumba prefecture to fall into thehands of the enemy... They have plotted to demoralize our armed forces.., punishment awaitsany irresponsible authorities who allow the enemy to do as they please in our home.

On that count, the law is clear on this. "Anyone found guilty of acts designed to destroy themorale of the armed forces shall be sentenced to death." What are we waiting for?*o.

You know very well that there are accomplices in this country. They send their children tojoin the ranks of the RPF. These facts have been reported to you, you are very much awareof them... What are we waiting for to decimate these families along with the people who arerecruiting them... How often have we asked that all these people be counted and placed on

55

/̄~?: !i)~ ~iii~!~i ::i~:~:, ! :i:: : , ¯:¯: ~ i


a list, so they can be brought to justice before the public. And if they are unwilling, weshould remember the adage that appears in our constitution: "Justice is rendered in the nameof the people." And if the justice system can longer bring justice to the people.., in that case,we, the people, who have been betrayed by the justice system; we will be obliged to take upour responsibilities and decimate these hoodlums! ... The MDR official and every otherspokeperson for his party in this commune and in this prdfecture no longer have the right tospeak, because they are accomplices.... The fatal error we made in 1959 was that we allowed them (the Tutsi) to leave (thecountry). (Their home) was in Ethiopia, but we are going to find a shortcut for them, Nyabarongo river. I want to stress this point. We really must react.... In conclusion, ... you must know that if you spare someone’s life, he will not spare yoursin return. That is why, fi’om now on, they must be prepared and 1.eave these places and golive with their own people, or with the rebels. Force them to leave.

Speech made by L6on Mugesera on 22 November 1992, cited in the Reportby the International Commission of Enquiry on Violations of Human Rightsin Rwanda Since 1 October 1990, March 1993, p. 23-25.

President: How would you explain the speech.Professor REYNTJENS: First, Mr. MUGESERA was the MRND chairman for Gisenyi. Inother words, he was an important figure, because Gisenyi was the cradle of power, the homeof President HABYARIMANA. So it was important, it wasn’t just anyone who was talking.

Second, he made the speech in Kabaya sous-prdfecture, where PresidentHABYARIMANA’s home commune is. Geographically speaking, he was addressing peoplefrom the source of power.

Third, he was speaking less than one month after the first Arusha protocol on power sharingwas signed. I think one must keep the context in mind, because Mr. MUGESERA veryclearly tries, and we will see some examples, to scupper the Arusha.,process, because it mustreally be qualified as a genuine appeal to massacre, to murder, incitement to murder, in fact.

Testimony by Professor Filip ReyntjensICTR-96-3, 13 October 1997

5.10 In February 1994, Mathieu Ngirumpatse chaired an MRND gathering at

Nyamirambo stadium, where speakers took the floor and incited violence against

the Tutsis.

56


In February 1994, during one of my many trips, I attended a public meeting chaired by anMRND minister named NGIRUMPATSE at Nyamirambo stadium in Kigali. SEMANZAspoke to the large crowd, but I would not be able to repeat what he said. The meeting endedwith a chant of "Tubatsembasembe", which means "Let us exterminate them", "them"meaning the Tutsis.

During the meeting in Nyamirambo in February 1994, NGIRUMPATSE and SEMANZAwere also accompanied by RUGAMBARARA and BISENGIMANA, but they did not makespeeches.

IIF 0935

()_i

5.11 From April to July 1994, incitement to hatred and violence was

propagated by vai-ious prominent persons, including members of the MRND, the

Government and local authorities. The President, Th6odore Sindikubwabo, the

Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, Ministers Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6Rwamakuba, Eliezer Niyitegeka and Andr6 Ntagerura, local authorities such as

theprdfets, Emmanuel Bagambiki, Sylvain Nsabimana and Alphonse Nteziryayo,

publicly incited the people to exterminate the Tutsi population and its

"accomplices".

Murara centre (Rutobwe commune) is located between the paved road and my home. AtMurara centre, I found a crowd of approximately 60 to 100 people surrounding the Ministerof Youth, Callixte NZABONIMANA. I kmow Minister NZABONIMANA well because heis originally from Nyabikenke commune (Gitarama), which borders on Rutobwe commune.NZABONIMANA was standing at the centre of the crowd, megaphone in hand. I did not seeany soldiers with him; however, I saw his official black Mercedes parked near the crowd. Istopped for a moment to listen to what he was saying to the crowd. Hence, I heard himtelling the people that all the Tutsis were RPF accomplices. He went on to say that all thelocalities, except Rutobwe commune, had already massacred them. I listened to his remarksfor approximately 5 to 10 minutes and then I continued on my way home, dropped off thechildren and headed for Kigali.

T6moin KB

"...The Hutus used to hold meetings around that time... The following Sunday, 10 April1994, the Minister of Youth at the time, Callixte NZABONIMANA, came and said that theTutsis had to be exterminated. [...]"

IFF 1160

57

()

At that time, the killings had not started in our commune. I am sure that it was precisely inan attempt to give the "green light" that RWAMAKUBA came. I followed all that was saidand done for I was in my doorway about 15m away from the crowd (made up initially ofabout one hundred people but which later swelled when the people realized that themassacres were about to start) ....RWAMAKLrBA came to sensitize the people so that they would start the massacres. Afterassembling some people upor~ arrival, he asked them why they had not started killing. Infact he said: "There are police and military reservists here who can help you. Do you needanything else? What is stopping you from starting the killing?".o,

After the gory task [killing the two youngpeopte], the crowd came back to the front of thesecteur office; five minutes later, a young man arrived on a motorbike. The brigadierordered him to stop and asked him where he was coming from. He said that he was fleeingthe massacres in Rutongo commune which was northwest of Gikomero. The crowddiscussed what to do with him. Some said he was Hutu and should be spared while thosewho thought he was Tutsi said he should be killed. Andr6 RWAMAKUBA said the fugitivecould not be a Hutu, for only the Tutsis were fleeing; he therefore decided that the manshould be killed. The young man was taken into the same woods where the first set of youngpeople were killed and was defir~itely killed there; in any case, his motorbike was retrievedby bridagier NYARWAYA.After these incidents, RWAMAKUBA told the people they had just started the killings andthat it was a good start.... After Andr6 RWAMAKUBA left for Kigali [12 April 1994], the ~nterahamwe militiamenand elements of the Presidential Guard arrived in the afternoon; with the help of thepopulation, they started killing the refugees. More than four thousand (4000) people werekilled at the Gikomero Protestant school complex situated about 200m from my house. Thebodies were thrown into latrines built by the centre. .,¯.,,

My relations were massacred at another site, in Gicaca, in the same commune, where abouttwo thousand (2000) people were killed ....More were killed in their hills. Most, if not all, were killed because they were Tutsis.,..

Regarding contribution in cash or in kind which RWAMAKUBA gave, I can only tell youwhat he said at the meeting I have just mentioned and this is related to your question. Heurged those who did not have the necessary means to effectively take part in the killings toseek assistance from him.

IFF 0919Jean KAMBANDA’s government moved its seat to Gitarama the following day, 12 April1994, after fleeing Kigali. Andr6 RWAMAKUBA was among the most active ministers insensitizing the bourgmestres of Gitarama at their meeting of 21 April 1994 in Murambi, thenew seat of the Government. He thus contributed to appealing to massacre the TiStsis. It wasduring that period that he was appointed Government spokesman, with his inflammatory

58

J

S,..,oa. "5. EXPOSE SUCCINT DES FAITS: PREPARATION

C’. :,

statements on Radio Rwanda and RTLM. He returned to the unoccupied zones of the capital

regularly to assess the situation and the Interahamwe’s activities. He asked the Interahamwe

over the radio to continue the hunt for the Tutsis.

For instance, when a shell from the RPF side hit one of the buildings of the CentreHospitalier de Kigali (CHK) [Kigali general hospital], he went there and then, on RTLM,made a direct appeal to all the militiamen to kill all the Tutsis, including patients and thosewho had taken refuge at CHK. This was around late April or early May 1994.Another example: when the people of Kigali-Rural fled the RPF combat zones and gatheredmGltaramapr~fecture, Andr RWAMAKUBA went to the Gacurabwenge displaced personscamp in Taba commune, Gitarama, where the Interahamwe from Gikomero(RWAMAKUBA’s native commune) and Rubungo had gathered. Then, he drafted a radiocommuniqu6 along with the Bourgmestre of Gikomero at the time, T~lesphoreRUTAGANIRA, calling on the Interahamwe militiamen who were.still killing in Gikomero,to continue to hmat down the Tutsis everywhere they could be hiding and exterminate them.This was in May 1994. The communiqu6 was drafted in the presence of other militiamenfrom Gikomero, including Mathias RUBANGUKA (a former accountant, currently in

prison), NYARWAYA (a brigadier) and others.As he was on his way into exile to Gisenyi and then Zaire, Andr6 RWAMAKUBA neverstopped appealing to the militiamen to massacre over the Radio Rwanda and RTLMairwaves. At the time, I was among the group of refugees in Byumba. We listenedconstantly to the country’s various radio stations. RWAMAKUBA spoke on the radioalmost daily. He was not the only one who spoke, either. Others, like Prime Minister JeanKAMBANDA, the reporter Hassan NGEZE and the Minister of Information, EliezerNIYITEGEKA, also went on the air. This took place during the period when the ComitONational de Ddveloppement [sic] was seated in Gisenyi. IIF 0934

you asked me about Eliezer Ntiyitegeka. I saw him once at Bisesero. At that time he was the

Minister of Information. When I saw him at Bisesero I do not see him with a rifle. I saw himstanding in the middle of a big group of attackers. It seems to me tha

t he was the

leader of the group. I heard him saying "our land has enough fertilizer, so we can stop killingnow if we wmat". After he had said these words, the attackers strated attacking again. I sawthat Eliezer Ntiyitegeka was one of them. I did not see if he was armed with a weapon.

Witness FE

5.12 The creation of media, such as the newspaper Ifangura and Radio

Tdldvision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), launched and directed by, among

others, F61icien Kabuga, he.lped to propagate the extremist Hutu ideology and

59


C

its message of ethnic hatred and violence, and contributed to the indoctrination

of the Rwandan people: At a public rally organized to raise funds ibr RTLM,F61icien Kabuga asserted that RTLM should be the radio ibr Hutu "Power".

When summoned bythe Minister of Information in November 1993 and again

on 10 February 1994 and ordered to stop broadcasting messages inciting inter-

ethnic hatred, F61icien Kabuga defended the broadcasts aired on RTLM.

Yes, I think that those who are listening to Radio Rwanda already kmow my voice, my nameis Hassan NGEZE, I am the director of the newspaper K_ANGURA,..

Radio Rwanda cassette 1044 - 12 June 1994

Interview with Hassan Ngeze: "This is when the enemy tried to use that private newspaper’Kanguka’ to brainwash the people, to transmit what he wishes through that newspaper.Then, after knowing them well, I could not betray the country, that I could not help thosewith whom I was working to betray to country, helping them... That is when a newspapernamed ’Kangura’ was born...

Radio Rwanda cassette AV/942 - 29 April 1994

I know Mr. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza. He was a major shareholder of RTLM. He workedclosely with Ferdinand Nahimana. He was a member of the CDR party, and many times atmeetings of political parties on Stmdays he spoke about the suprerrfl~cy of the Hutu majorityand many times CDRR [sic] spoke about the" killing of Tutsis.

Witness FP

RTLM was the initiative of people like NAHIMANA ferdinand. SERUGENDO joseph,BARAYAGWIZAjean bosco and KABUGA felicien. They formed the ’comite d’initiative’.¯. The President of RTLM was Kabuga. As a matter of fact they appointed the ’comited’initiative’ as the direction. This was a provisional structure to be replaced by an officialstructure. There were five people in the direction: KABUGA, NAHIMANA, HABIMANAPhocas, BARAYAGWIZA and SERUGENDO... Barayagwiza was also like Nahimana theideologist of RTLM.

Witness AN

Jean Bosco BARAYAGWIZA was one of the intellectuals at Radio RTLM, who broadcastthe hate messages. I personally heard him on Radio Rwanda airwaves during a conferenceheld at the "diplomat" hotel. He was responding to a question and in essence saying that the"Inyenzi are nothing but cockroaches. They cannot give birth to butterflies, they can onlybring more cockroaches into the world." He was referring to the Tutsis in general and moreprecisely, to the members of the RPF. I no longer recall the date, but this occmTed beforethe events of 1994. .),

Witness FR

60

Jean Bosco Barayagwiza interviewed by RTLM at a press conference held by the CDR party."Of course, in our communiqu6 in fine, we stated that the Impuzamugambi will not bepatient for ever. There is a limit to patience. Especially that the acts of provocation of theRPF’s death squads overstepped the threshold of tolerance. We urge the government to faceup to their responsibilities, to protect the population and especially the CDR members. Ofcourse, if the Rwandan government fails in its duty, then, we will have to defend ourselves.Because we fear to fall back into the situation that has been recently prevailing in Bujurnburawhere the population was practically surrounded by the armed forces. We risk beingsurrounded by the RPF forces if we do not manage to defend ourselves. The Hutus ofBurundi have been very courageous. They were not armed by rr~’anaged to hold back theattacks of the armour of Bikomagu’s army. And we believe that our Impuzamugambi,although not armed, will be able to defend themselves against the RPF’s death squads, andmight even chase those assassins. "

RTLM cassette C57/K95 from 02/04/94

In 1993, there was yet another meeting organized by the MRND in the same stadium aboutthe establishment of the RTLM. Once again it was NGIRUMPATSE who introduced theimportant personalities. Although the MRND organized the meeting, it was also a gatheringof HUTU POWER, attended by politicians from MRND, R, PSD and PL. Among the peopleNGIRUMPATSE introduced as members of HUTU POWER were: Felicien KABUGA,Froduald KARAMIRA, Justin MUGENZI, Ferdinanrd NAHIMANA, Jean-BoscoBARAYAGWIZA, Hassan NGEZE and the journalists: KANTANO,Valerie BEMERIKI,Noel HITIMANA and Gaspard GAHIGI. I recognized these people and I think AnanieNKURUNZIZA was also there but I do not know him. Apart from NGIRUMPATSE,KABUGA also took the floor and said that he had established the RTLM because RadioRwanda was an [nyenzi radio station and so RTLM would become the HUTU POWER radiostation. He asked the people to contribute and gave the RTLM account number...

Witness RS,x.

It wasthus the first day I had been able to move about since 6 April 1994. It was on that dayprecisely (28 April 1994) that I saw Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza again. He was at the KiyovuHotel roadblock. It was about 11:00 a.m. He was wearing mauve/brown civilian clothes.He was talking with the guards at the roadblock. Given his social status, I understood thathe was giving instructions. On the same day, at about 4:00 p.m., as I was still driving for my"officer,’" I saw Barayagwiza at the roadblock that was at the bend in the road that comesdown from Kiyovu to join the road to Gikondo and runs alongside the former UNAMIRstation. The bend is at the Cercle sportifnear the French school. Jean-Bosco Barayagwizawas dressed in the [same] mamler and was also talking with the guards at the said roadblock,who were playing with the monkey they had with them.

Witness FT

RTLM was already operating before the genocide and played a definite role in preparing

61


people mentally. RTLM preached all forms of ethnicism. [Translator’s note: the Frenchtext uses the invented word ethnisme.]... Round tables were organized with MRNDextremists in order to propagate racist ideas... This station’s goal was to sully and not toinform. This radio station had high ratings. It captured well the extremist tendency in thegovernment.

Witness DS

There were two meetings with RTLM and Mininfor, organised by the Minister ofInformation. I was invited at the second one. That was on February !0, 1994. The meetingswere organised to warn RTLM and to tell them to stop their increasing violence andmessages, inciting to genocide.

Witness AN

No final report of the meeting on 10 February 1994 was ever issued because one of RTLMofficials did not wish to cooperate in the drafting of this document. This official’s name isJean-Bosco Barayagwiza. He even threatened me when I went to present this document tohim. He insulted me and said that I was an enemy of the Rwandan people, anINKOTANYI... I attended two meetings between the Ministry of Infomaation and RTLM on26 November 1993 and 10 February 1994... On 26.11.1993, RTLM was represented byF61icien Kabuga, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Phocas Habimana.Kabuga was the head of the delegation.

Witness GO

()

5.13 During the events referred to in this indictment, the President, TheodoreSindikubwabo, the Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, Ministers, Augustin

Bizimana and Andr6 Rwamakuba, and Prdfet Tharcisse Renzaho used RTLMto incite, aid and abet the extermination of the Tutsi population and the

elimination of numerous moderate Hutu.

See notably paragraphs 5.8, 5.11, 5.42, 6.14, 6.43, 6.45, 6.80.

The Militia Groups

5.14 Political rivalries during the multi-party period exacerbated tensionsamong the various political parties. Thus, in a climate of almost total impunity,the Interahamwe-MRND were encouraged to use violence to oppose the political

¯ demonstrations organized by parties of the opposition and to terrorize Rwandancitizens in order to prevent them from joining parties other than tile MRND.

D6sir6 Murenzi, the Manager of PETRO-RWANDA, had the idea of creating the

62

Interahamwe movement to counter other aggressive youth organizations. In no time, themovement became popular and gained the attention of many including some personalitiesaround the President. This gave further impetus to the movement. Murenzi was removedand replaced by Robert Kajuga. As a matter of fact, he resigned because the movement wasdrifting and manipulated by some AKAZU members. The move~ient was not organicallyaffiliated to the party and did not have any recognized legal existence. It however served asan instrument of rivalry between party personalities competing for authorityand power. Theprospects of elections and the attendant ministerial posts paved the way for a group of peoplewhose sole interest was money. In fact most Interahamwe were evil doers, jobless and"hooligans". The [nterahamwe were banla’olled by people like Nzirorera and Semanza whobacked groups loyal to them.

Witness ED

9. The Interahamwe’s political agenda.¯ Fight the youth wings of the opposition parties;¯ Participate in the MRND’s struggle for political control;¯ Strengthen the MRND’s expansion throughout the country;" Intimidate the opposition using violent means, including political assassinations; preventRwandans from joining opposition parties.

A. Fight against the opposition youth wings ....The first confrontations involving the Interahamwe were about flags. The youth wings ofeach political party flew their party flags in the neighborhoods, especially in Kigali. Thenumber of political party flags were an indication of the size of a political party’smembership in that particular neighborhood. The first confrontations took place in Gikondo,Kimicanga and Kacyiru, all working-class neighborhoods.

B. Participation in the MRND ’s struggle for political control.During grass-roots meetings, these youths, who included street children, former soldiers andeven soldiers, harangued other youths. The stakes were high because young people make upover 50% of Rwanda’s population. Each party wanted to secure the largest segment of thepopulation, namely the youths.

C. Strengthening the MRND’s territorial expansion and intimidating the population.Certain regions of the country, such as the prefectures of Butare, Gitarama, Gikongoro,Kibuye and Kanazi sous-pr~fecture (Kigali-Rural) did not fully accept the MRND party.Rather, they were opposition strongholds. Part o~the Interahamwe’s mission was to travelthroughout the country recruiting youths to their movement, if necessary by violent means.

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Expert witness report by Frangois Xavier NZANZUWERA: "La crirninalitd desInterahamwe entre 1992 et 1994." Case against Georges Rutaganda p. 25-26 ,

5.15 The transformation of the Interahamwe to serve the interests of the MRND

was an illicit operation formally forbidden by the law. Further, to extend theactivities of the militia group; the MRND central committee formed

Interahamwe-MRND committees atprdfecture level in June 1993. This decision

was carried out in their localities by political figures, including among others,Pauline Nyiramasuhuko in Butare and Joseph Nzirorera in Ruhengeri.

Law No. 28/91 of 18 June 1991 on Political Parties (Gazette, 199t, p. 728, Art. 4)

O

ZC

ICTR

ZC

ICTR

ZC

ICTR

ZC

In my view, because, er, at the prefecture level, I believe that was done because ifsomething could be done at the prefecture level, there was no need to ask, there wasno need to ask every time what needed to be done at the national comrnittee, whichwas in IGgali. They could, the committees, the local committees could makedecisions without referring to the national committee. That is, in my view, it was a,how shall I say, a decentralized approach. In other words, do everything you can inyour ownprdfecture without referring to the Interahamwe national committee.

But in reality, isn’t it true that these’prefectural committees did not answer to theMRND central committee? They had. higher authority at the prefectural level, isn’tthat right?

These local committees came directly under the MRND chairman for the prefecture.It was the members, the members of the prdfecture central committee who camedirectly under the national committee. It was not the Interahamwe; the Interahamwecame under the prefecture central committee. They were under the direct leadershipof the MRND chairman for the prefecture. .,

Do you remember who the prefecture chairmen you mentioned were, I am talkingabout the MRND prefecture chairmen in June 1993, at the time the Interahamwe wasformed? Beginning with Gisenyi, who was chairman for MRND prdfecturechain’nan?

It was Mr. Banzi, Banzi, [spelled] B-A-N-Z-I, for Gisenyi.

What about Ruhengeri? Er, first nmr~e first, what was Banzi’s first name?

Wellars, Wellars Banzi.

64


ICTR Wellars?

ZC Yes, Wellars.ICTR Is that W-E-L-L-A-R-S?

ZC ...A-R-S.

ICTR How about for Ruhengeri?

ZC For Ruhengeri, it was Mr. Joseph Nzirorera, [spelled] N-Z-I-R-O-R-E-R-A, JosephNzirorera. [...]

ICTR How about Butare?

ZC For Butare, it was Amandin Rugira, [spel!ed] R-U-G-I-R-A.ICTR First name?ZC Amandin.ICTR Sorry?ZC Amandin, [spelled] A-M-A-N-D-I-N ....ICTR A-M-A-N-D-I-N?ZC Yea, Amandin.ICTR Amandin?ZC Hmm.ICTR Okay.ZC So...ICTR Who was who?ZC Who was MRND chairman for Butare, central committee as well as MRND for

Butare. It was given, they gave it, to Mr. Barabwiriza, Barabwiriza, [spelled]B-A-R-A-B-W-I-R-I-Z-A, who was with the MRND central committee at the time and alsoadvisor on foreign affairs in the Office of the President of the Republic. They selected MsPauline Nyiramasuhuko [spelled] N-Y-I-R-A-M-A-S-U-H-U-K-O, she was, she was thenMinister of Family and Social Affairs. She was the one who gave the order to form theInterahamwe in Butare.ICTR You said earlier that Butare was a PSD stronghold, is that correct?ZC Yes.

Witness ZC

5.16 In order to ensure that, when the time came, the extermination of theenemy and its "accomplices" would be carried out swiftly and effectively, it was

necessary to turn the Interahamwe-MRND into a militia group, structuredi

armed and complementary to the Armed Forces. As from 1993, and even before

65


that date, the leaders of the MRND, in collaboration with officers of the FAR,decided to provide military training to those members most devoted to their

extremist cause and to other idle youths. Furthermore, weapons were

distributed to them.

See paragraph 5.17 and follov~ing.

Training of the Militia Groups

5.17 The training of Interahamwe-MRND was supervised by civilian andmilitary authorities. Training was conducted simultaneously in several

prdfectures around the country: Kigali, Cyangugu, Gisenyi and Butare, as well

as in the Mutara sector. Training also took place in military camps, notably

Gabiro, Gako, Mukamira and Bigogwe, as well as around these camps or in

neighbouring forests.

In December, it was confirmed that the Interahamwe were undergoing training. The firstplace where they assembled and underwent night training was north of Kanombe airport(coordinates: 1584 and 1883). Later, the were other training centres, namely BIGOGWE,MUTARA, BUGESERA, GAKO and NYUNGWE forest...

UNAMIR REPORT, MIO, 13 February 1994

Hence, the Interahamwe were reportedly using training facilities with the collaboration of

FAR instructors and their members receiving basic military training. According to somesources, 1,300 young Interahamwe were reportedly trained in the training camps outsideKigali (of whom at least 300 were reported to have received training since UNAMIR wasdeployed). There are also reports of at least 800 Interahamwe in or around KigaliThey were reportedly transported notably in ONATRACOM (ofjqce National des Transportsen Commun) vehicles, including at least five buses per day, from a pick-up point locatednorth of Kanombe. They may have been heading for a place near Lake IHEMA, in theAkagera national park, or to GAKO military camp (in the Bugesera military zone),RUI~,A (east of Lake Mukazi), GIKORO, GISHALI and MURAMBI. Other possibletraining camps were mentioned, including NYUNGWE forest (in the south-western part ofthe country) .... as well as in GISHWATI forest (east of Gisenyi) and on Mount Kigali, northof Kanombe where night training was reportedly conducted. There was also reportedly acamp in MUKAMIRA (Ruhengeri).

RWANDA- A Study of the Interahamwe Militia, by Major Hock, GeneralIntelligence and Security Service, Belgian Armed Forces. 13 pages, 2 February 1994,page 2-3.

66


(:

5.18 Moreover, in 1993, the implication of Colonel L6onard Nkundiye’s men

in the training given was confirmed by internal inquiries which were ordered

following a telegram sent to various units, as well as to General Staff, by the

Commander of the Rwamagana military camp. The telegram revealed the

implication of soldiers from the Mutara sector in the training in question. Oneof the inquiries indicated that on at least two occasions, Joseph Nzirorera went

to inspect the militia troops which were undergoing training in the Mutara

sector.

Before, it was thought that it was new recruits who were being trained. It was difficult todistinguish the Interahamwe from the new recruits. The Interahamwe used to train in theMutara area, as per a telegram from the Commander of Rwamagazaa. They were trained bymilitary personnel from the Presidential Guard. I know that the commander of the squad inKibungo conducted an inquiry in the Mutara area. He confirmed the report.

Witness AX

A telegram from Gendarme Major Michel Havugiyaremye, commander of the Kibungosquad, based in Rwamagana, asked how to deal with the Interahamwe who were returningby bus from militia training sites in the Mutara region: :I telephoned Major MichelHavugiyaremye, who confirnaed the news and sent me the telegram. Later, I asked Fiddle,a civilian colleague, to go inquire in the Mutara region about the veracity of the informationabout the training. He submitted a report to me around December 1993. The reportconfirmed, among other things, that Interahamwe were being trained in the Mutara regionunder the supervision of Colonel Nkundiye and that ONATRACOM buses were being usedto transport them to the location. Furthermore, the report indicated that Joseph Nzirorera,Secretary-General of the MRND, had travelled to Gabiro, in the Mutara area, on at least twooccasions, to inspect the Interahamwe who were training at that location.

Witness CT

I remember an incident involving the Interahamwe. It happened at the Matara training camp.Buses transporting Interahamwe and soldiers back from their training in Agakera Parkstopped at Ruamagana camp to request fuel. They must have stopped there thil~ing that it

was all right. However, the Camp Commander, Michel Habugiyaremye, was utterlysurprised to see them there and told them that it was inconceivable for soldiers to trainInterahamwe because it amounted to getting involved in party politics. This was contrary tothe duties and obligations of a soldier. The commander wrote an official report and sent itto the Army Headquarters, to General Ndindilihymana, an’tong others. He read me themessage in person and confirnled the incident to me. Later, I investigated the matter to findout if soldiers were involved in training Interahamwe. I communicated with Lt. Col.Nkundiye. He did not confirm or ~teny the reports. I then asked Major Mugaragu whoconfirmed the reports.

Witness BW

67


()

5.19 Furthermore as early as 1993 Joseph Nzirorera and Juvenal Kajelijeli

organized and supervised the creation and the training of a group ofInterahamwe-MRND militia in their native commune of Mukingo.

See paragraphs 6.82 to 6.86.

5.20 A few months before the events of 1994, Minister of Defence Agustin

Bizimana was asked why soldiers were training and distributing weapons to

members of a political organization. He replied that those people were going to

become rangers in the national parks, whereas the parks had been devastated

by the war and the rangers unemployed.

I remember an exchange at a cabinet meeting in January 1994, when I asked the Minister ofDefence, Augustin Bizimana (MRND) why he was taking members of a politicalorganization, training and arming them. He replied that after receiving training, thesemilitiamen were going to become park rangers. I then asked him if he had received a requestfrom the Department of Tourism and, if so, how the department was planning to pay for thetraining. I told him that I was surprised since all the former forest rangers were technicallyunemployed, because the national parks in question had been devastated by war [...]. He had

nothing to say that.We knew that he was recruiting people throughout the country to join the _Tnterahamwe.Whenever I visited my home region of Gitarama, people would tell me names of youths who

had joined the Interahamwe.

In Daniel Hebig, Jacqueline Martin et Michel Majoros "Rwanda, Documents sur le

g6nocide" Editions Luc Pire 1997 P.55.

5.21 In Cyanguguprdfecture, as from 1991 and in particular between I January1994 and 31 July 1994, the Minister of Transport, Andr6 Ntagerura encouraged

and facilitated the training of the Interahamwe-MRND, notably in Karengera

and other communes in Cyangugu prdfecture. In January 1994, Andr6

Ntagerura declared that the Hutu were training the Interahamwe-MRND so one

day they ~ould take vengeance against the Tutsi.

A lot of military training sessions were organised; they started in 1993 and continued in

68

5. EXPOSE SUCC1NT DES FAITS: PREPARATION

©

1994. The militiamen would come in the morning to collect necessary equipment and thenproceeded to the football field for physical exercises and shooting drills. They often wentinto the forest. All the people who lived in the neighbourhood of the communal office wereaware of these military training sessions but I do not know who financed them.Witness LA

Since 1991, NTAGERURA had the habit of spending his weekends in Cyangugu. He wouldusually remain there from Friday to Monday. During these visits, he cormnitted himself totraining the fnterahamwe and to preparing the MRND policy¯,o,

Following one of these meetings, which took place around 1993 in Kirambo commune, thewitness states that he saw the participants beat those who had not attended these meetings.Among those who were beaten, he recognized Antoine and Bibianne from Kagano commune,who were later hospitalized at Kibogora hospital. Another example took place on 23 January1993 following a closed meeting of the Interahamwe. One group of 250 persons led byYussoufMunyiakazi attacked a residence at CIMERWA. The house, occupied by the personcalled Th6obald RUTIHUNZA, was surrounded and the Interahamwe began to sing whilethreatening to take him mad burn him in the public square. By chance, a helicoptertransporting the Chief of Staff, Nsabimana D~ogracias, landed at that moment in CIMERWAand the Interahamwe dispersed immediately..,°

In January 1993, before the genocide, he saw weapons being distributed in Cyanguguprdfeeture. These weapons (rifles, pistols, g?enades) and uniforms arrived by truck. Theywere initially stored in the houses of YussoufMUNYLAU,2AZI and BAKUNDUKIZE beforebeing distributed to the militias in the prdfecture.

Witness MJ

In the same period of 1994, I once saw a official letter which was signed by AndreNTAGERURA and in wich [sic] letter he ordered that the members of the Interahamwecould use some vehicles of the Department of Transport.I remember that the Interahamwe were allowed to use them for their meetings for examplein the area of Cyangugu. : ¯ .Andre NTAGERURA was from that area and he also went in that period, several times toCyangugu to held [sic] meetings. As for me, he was in that time quite engaged withorganizing meetings and giving orders to inferior persons in and outside his Ministry.

Witness MK

In January 1994, the President ofBurundi, NDADAYE was buried after he was killed a fewmonths before and in that period the Tutsi’s in Rwanda were in problems because it was said, thathe was killed by Tutsi’s. I that period, I met once NTAGERURA in Ntendezi. He offered me a drinkand we had a conversation. He then said to me: ’7’ve been told, that you insulted HABYAR[MANA,so drink this beer but do it never again. Go and tell the tutsi’s not to insult him anymore. You Tutsi "s

69

°~.


say that we Hutu’s are stupid and that we act without thinking but remember now that we are notstupid anymore and we do not act without thinking. You sent your children into INKOTANYI (theFPR) and we also train our INTERAHAMWE. Your relatives did this to NDADA YE but you willbe payed back one day. "

I felt threatened by these words, also due to the fact that there a lot of Interahamwe-membersaround us, and intellectuals who showed, that they agreed with him:-BUSUNYU Michael, ....

Witness LF

0

0

5.22 Between 1992 and April 1994, Andr6 Ntagerura, as Minister of Transport

and Communications, put vehicles of the state company, ONATRACOM (Office

national des transports en commun), at the disposal of the militiamen.

In the same period of 1994, I once saw a official letter which was signed by AndreNTAGERURA and in wich [sic] letter he ordered that the members of the Interahamwecould use some vehicles of the Department of Transport.I remember that the I.nterahamwe were allowed to use them for their meetings for examplein the area of Cyangugu.Andre NTAGERURA was from that area and he also went in that period, several times toCyangugu to held [sic] meetings. As for the, he was in that time quite engaged withorganizing meetings and giving orders to inferior persons in mad outside his Ministry.

Witness MK

I was hired as a bus driver by ONATRACOM. At the beginning, I worked in Kigali beforebeing transferred to the Butare branch in 1992. When the war broke out in 1990, soldiersregularly came for buses at ONATRACOM in Kigali to transport them to the front. Theywould come with an authorization from the Ministry of Transport. I know this because onseveral occasions, I drove them to Butaro (Ruhengeri), from where I often went on missionsto Kigali for supplies. I was even paid mission allowances.

During the same period, the Interahamwe also had access to the company for their militarytraining. MOISE UWIMANA and ALPHONSE SANO were among the drivers who tookthem to their training. MOISE UWIMANA is still a driver at ONATRACOM in Kigali, butI do not know ALPHONSE SANO’s whereabouts. "

I know Minister Andr6 NTAGERURA very well because he was the Minister of Transportand used to hold meetings with my bosses at ONATRACOM in Kigali. I do not know whatwas discussed at those meetings’because I never participated in them. Nevertheless, I knowthat one evening he came to ONATRACOM to request buses. That happened before I was

70


transferred to Butare, but I am unable to specify the date. When he arrived at the office, thedrivers were scattered in the courtyard, and the dispatch officer, EMMANUEL MUREKEZI,told us that the Minister of Transport wanted buses. Hence, five buses, with their drivers,were provided to Mr. NTAGERURA. MOISE UWIMANA was among the drivers. Someof those buses were used to transport Interahamwe militiamen to fhe Bugesera for militarytraining. I know this because-I often meet [sic] MOISE with the [nterahamwe he used totransport to the Bugesera. This happened long before the crash of the PresidentHABYARIMANA’s plane.°,°

In the afternoon of 8 April, our repair shop manager, DEO, accompanied by a soldier, camefor me at my home to take me to the repair shop. We found Minister NTAGERURA at theshop with soldiers. I recognized them clearly because I knew them from before, and also theywere in military uniform.

That is how I went to Gitarama, where the authorities ordered me to transport displacedpeople to Gisenyi. Also, on two occasions, I transported soldiers to the front in Mugusa(Butare) and to the front in Rusatira (Butare).. I drove Interahamwe to the ESO where theyreceived weapons and ammunition, and to Ngoma (Butare) where they received militarytraining. Witness LK

5.23 On 10 January 1994, a leader of the Interahamwe,MRND militia informedUNAMIR that 1,700 militiamen had undergone training i nd that they couldeliminate 1,000 Tutsis every twenty minutes. This informer stated that he took

I[~*his orders from Mathieu N~,lrumpatse, Chairman of the MRND.

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT... (who) IS TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERAHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OFMRND.°°.

4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HEALSO STATED HE IS PAID RF150, 000 PER MONTH BY MRND PARTY TO TRAININTERAHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OFTHE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.5. INTERAHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPSOUTSIDE KIGALI. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUTKIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL INTHREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING FOCUS WASDISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND TACTICS.

Code cable sent by General Dallaire, UNAMIR Force Commander,

71

,.::


to General Baril, Department of Peace Keeping Operations, U.N.,New York, 11 January 1994.

5.24 The secret training of the militiamen became more and more notorious.They could on some occasions be seen training in public places or on their wayto the training sites, while chanting slogans inciting the extermination of theenemy.

On several occasions, I saw Anatole NSENGIYUMVA accompany bus convoys ofInterahamwe going to their training grounds. Most of the militiamen were ch-essed in civilianclothes and wore hats with CDR insignia. They sang, saying they were going to exterminatethe Tutsis.

Witness ON

Distribution of Weapons

5.25 In order to implement the plan for the extermination of the enemy and its"accomplices", the militiamen were to receive weapons, in addition to militarytraining. Hence, the civilian and military authorities distributed weapons to themilitiamen and certain carefully selected members of the civilian population invarious prdfectures of the country.

See paragraph 5.26 and the following.

5.26 In 1993, President Habyarimana declared in Ruhengeri that theInterahamwe-MRND had to be equipped so that, come the right time, "ilsdescendent". During the same year, the President took part in a meeting at H6telRebero, in the company of Joseph Nzirorera, to fundraise for the Interahamwe-MRND. On that occasion, they made substantial contributions.

President HABYARIMANA said in 1993 in Ruhengeri: "Ndasaba ababishinzwe kugira ngobazambike Interahamwe maze igihe nikigera tuzamanuke", meaning: "I am asking those whoare concerned tO clothe and equip the Interahamwe so that when the time comes, we shall’take action’."

Witness AA

72


C’,.

4t’

5.27 Before and during the events referred to in this indictment, AugustinBizimana, F61icien Kabuga, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, JeanKambanda, Andr6 Ntagerura, Th6oneste Bagosora and others participated inthe distribution of weapons to the militiamen and certain carefully selectedmembers of the civilian popu.lation with the intent to exterminate the Tutsipopulation and eliminate its "accomplices".

See paragraph 5.28 onward.

5.28 In February 1993, without the knowledge of the Minister of Defence at thattime, James Gasana, Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora arranged for weapons to bedistributed to the bourgmestres of Gisenyi. The weapons were taken from theArmy’s logistics base in Kigali and were then distributed to certain carefullyselected civilians in Gisenyi.

While he was Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry ofDefence (MINADEF), under MinisterJames Gasana, Bagosora took delivery of warfare weapons from the.Rwandan Army towardsthe end of 1992, early 1993. Some time later, Minister Gasana learned that at least 300warfare weapons from the Rwandan Army base had been distributed by Colonel Bagosorato civilians in Gisenyi prefecture. According to Minister Gasana, Bagosora had obtainedthese weapons from the logistics base of the Rwandan Army, claiming that he hadauthorization from the Minister of Defence. Moreover, in order to obtain the weapons,Colonel Bagosora was required to have the General Staff’s approval, either from the G-4, orfrom the General Staff.Bagosora admitted to Minister Gasana that he had obtained and distributed those weapons.The Minister asked me to prepare a letter of reprimand to Colonel Bagosora, instructing himto recover the weapons and return them to the base, and obtain acknowledgment of receiptupon delivery. I prepared the letter and gave it to the Minister, who signed it mad handed itto the person concerned. To my knowledge, the weapons were never recovered..°o

It was reported to rne once or twice that Colonel Bagosora had included himself in theprocedure for issuing authorization to carry or acquire firearms, without the knowledge ofthe department concerned. It was reported to me, for example, that Colonel Basogora hadseized the reply forms requests to acquire or carry firearms. I noticed that when I laterreceived a copy of the reply. I filed a complaint with the Minister.

Witness CT

3. On 25 March 1993, the Prime Minister, in his letter Ref. 202/02.3.5, asked the Ministryof Defence (MINADEF) to recover all the weapons which had been distributed.4. In his letter, Ref. 1409/06.1.9 of 20 April 1993, the Minister of Defence issued his report

73

¯ 5: S75:CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: PREPARATION

on the recovery of t~ae weapons. The reported stated that KARAGO commune, certainlybecause it was the home commune of the President of the Republic, had refused to hand overthe 110 guns and 9,200 rounds. In this letter, the Ministry of Defence revealed that 521 gunsand 34,200 magazines had been distributed by Colonel Bagosora in the Minister’s absenceand without his knowledge to the communes of MUTARA, KARAGO, RUBAVU andRWEKERE. In the letter, the Minister of Defence admitted lending 237 guns to BYUMBAprdfecture to arm the commurial police.

UNAMIR REPORT, MIO, ~2 February

5.29 From July 1993 to July 1994, the new Minister of Defence, AugustinBizimana, encouraged and facilitated the acquiring of weapons tbr MRND

militants by openly asserting that the Ministry of Defence was a Ministry of the

MRND. Augustin Bizimana personally received several influential members of

the MRND, the CDR and Interahamwe-MRND in his office.

While James Gasana was Minister, the policy consisted in deterring the proliferation ofweapons. Consequently, strict criteria had been put into place. Many applications were made,due to the war, Very few permits were granted by the Minister. With the arrival of the newMinister, Bizimana, the situation changed. He used to say openly that the Ministry ofDefence was an MRND Ministry. The Minister was a weak man. He spent most of his timedealing with politics, leaving military matters "to his Directeur de Cabinet, Colonel Bagosora.People said this and I was able to observe it. Unlike the former Minister, James Gasana,Minister Bizimana frequently received politicians and civil servants, who were members ofthe MRND and the CDR, including Interahamwe in his office. After he was appointed, therewas an increase in the number of applications to acquire and carry fi’teaa-rns, particularly frommembers of the MRND. On the applications by the Interahamwe, the Minister would marksystematically "AccorcP [Approved]. On the applications from individuals belonging toparties in the opposition, he would write "N@atif" [Denied].

Witness CT

5.30 Further, in a letter from Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana dated 19January 1994, the Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana, was reproached forrefusing to carry out a Cabinet decision "to recover all firearms distributed¯illegally to the civilian population".

Letter of the Prime Miriistre Agathe Uwilingiyimana sent to all the Ministers dated19 January 1994.

74

5, EXPOSE SUCCINT DES FAITS: PREPARATION

5.31 As from 1992, Fdlicien Kabuga, through his company, ETSKabuga, made

massive purchases of machetes, hoes and other agricultural implements knowing

that they would be used as weapons during the massacres. Moreover, F6licienKabuga gave logistical support to the Interahamwe militiamen by issuing them

weapons and uniforms and by providing them transport in his company’s

vehicles.

Transport Order from 26.10.93 for the transport of 25,662 kg of machetes from Mombasato Kigali in the name of Kabuga.

Port release order from Mombassa-12.X.1992, for 3750 wooden cases of machetes, inKabuga’s name. .~

The licenses given to ETS Kabuga Fdlicien in the years 1992, 1993, 1994 for import ofmachetes and other similar tools.

Massive purchases of hand weapons including machetes, spades and screwdrivers were madein 1992 and particularly 1993. The level of purchases greatly exceeded that of previousyears, thus providing a link with the preparation of the genocide... According to CLADO,numerous receipts were made out in the name of Fdlicien Kabuga, a close friend ofHabyarimana." (p. 529),..

More than four tonnes of hand weapons were collected from the killing fields of thegenocide. One machete weighs approximately one kilogram. (p. 529).,,

Question: Did you find evidence that weapons were supplied directly to the militias?Answer: All the supplies were made indirectly. The government had ready access tobusinessmen who served as intermediaries for these transactions. (p. 530)°.,

My research shows, and this is borne out by Arusha, that a series of private business people,including F. Kabuga, planned the genocide and the supply of weapons to the militias. I willhand this list of business people over to the President. The accourtts belong to people whowere part of President Habyarimana’s entourage, who are known as g~nocidaires. (p. 521)

Testimony by Mr. Galand before the Belgian Senate

Kabuga owned a building in Muhima secteur. The MRND offices were on the first floor.Kabuga’s business was on the ground floor. Kabuga also owned a building in Gakinjiro.The CDR office was located in this building. The two buildings had the flags oftheir parties.¯. Kabuga raised funds for the MRND .... Several contractors told me that Kabuga wasasking them for contributions... I know that KABUGA used to make his vehicles available

75


to the MRND and the Interahamwe for them to transport people to meetings... Thejeepwas carrying Kabuga’s children. They were wearing MRND berets... I know that Kabugarented the Meridien Hotel in Gisenyi during the genocide for the fhterim government.

Kabuga had his own pick-up trucks to transport the goods. The name of his business wasmarked on the vehicle doors. ! know that KABUGA used to make his vehicles available tothe MRND and the Interahamwe for them to transport people to meetings...since they werewearing MRND berets and Interahamwe uniforms. They were armed with sticks. I saw themseveral times in Kigali... I know there was a workshop producing clothing in the basementof his office in Muhima. The lnterahamwe uniforms were sewn in the workshop. Theworkshop was near my house and I saw the uniform material being brought in regularly. Iknow that Kabuga rented the Meridien Hotel in Gisenyi during the genocide for the interimgovernment. All the Tutsi staff who were still alive had to leave the hotel. I think thatJacques Pitteloud has copies of the rent bills that Kabuga paid.

Witness FN

1. F. Kabuga was one of the founding members of the CDR party and he made his Kigalihome available at no cost for use as the party secretariat.

3. Mr. Kabuga made his Daihatsu minibuses, marked ’F. Kabuga’ on the doors,available tothe CDR for Kigali, in order for them to organize meetings to incite racial hatred. F.Kabuga paid for the rent of the Meridien Hotel in Gisenyi for the genocidal govenm-tent touse as its headquarters... Mr. Kabuga placed ~t number of vehicles at the disposal of his son-in-law, Mr. MBARUSHIMANA, to carry out massacres in Nyamirambo...

Witness EP

In May 1994 Felicien KABUGA organized a meeting for big traders at Hotel Meridien towhich I was invited. There were about 50 to 60 traders who attended the meeting atMeridien here in Gisenyi, KABUGA presided over the meeting. He initiated the meetingin order to raise fund. Naturally the interim government knew about his initiative.KABUGA presented himself as a rich and powerul man who wanted to raise fund in orderto buy weapons and amunition for the Interhamwes and soldiers so that they could go onfighting the enemy. Among other things, he said: "we should fight these Tutsis so that theydo not rule our country any longer. All the Tutsis should be exterminated".*,o

I know KABUGA was often putting his pickups and minibuses at the disposal of theInterhamwes.,..

KABUGA was ... always escorted by soldiers and Interhamwes in arnay uniform andinterhamwe ketenge.

IIF 31

76


ICTR - Tell us, when did you notice, how, that a certain para-military tendency wasbeginning to appear among these parallel committees, this parallel committee?

X - Well, with regard to the para-military, I can tell you that, when we began to havethe MRND meetings in Rwanda, uh, there were military reservists from the PresidentialGuard who joined the Interahamwe.

ICTR - What time period are we talking about here?

X - The period when the Interahamwe were formed, 1992.

ICTR - Late 1992 ?

X - Late 1992, November [inaudible].

ICTR - Yeah.

X - We noticed, among the Interahamwe members at the time, there were a lot ofPresidential Guard soldiers, but they weren’t on active service, they were, I’d say, already,[inaudible], they were participating in the meetings, they wore military braid and I noticedthat, I saw that there were para-military aspects, that was when, uh, that was when, in theMRND, I do not know in which hotel, they decided to train certain Interahamwe in themilitary camps in Rwanda. At the time, there was recruiting going on, well I wouldn’t callit recruiting, I don’t know how it was decided who would participate in the training, I justknow it was around, in 1993 that they did that. And we heard that there were youths wholeft for Bugesera, Bigogwe and Butara. And these military camps were led, commanded bythe people, I mean, soldiers who were pro-MRND. They did the.,, training and when theyreturned we saw that there were youths returning from training. I found out later. And lateron, I heard that there was training on the streets of Kigali, the people on the committee, butthen, I noticed that once, my friend Ephrem was, phoned me, I had a meeting with him, hephoned me, he said that the meeting we had set, we would see one another at six o’clock atKabuga’s place, Kabuga’s large building, Umuhima, Umuhima, M-U’H-I-M-A, so I did notkmow what he did there, I was there at six o’clock. He came, he told me that, and they beganthe training, soldiers, they, the people from the Presidential Guard who trained them how tohandle weapons, how to clean them, still the weapons, and I told him why were we not told,he said, well, we, we said that you were not interested in that kind of training, we began todo our training. And I asked him who was, who participated in the training, it was weaponstraining, he told me, hetold me the names of, I know he said Bernard’s name because he wasalso there when we met, there was [inaudible] was there as well, there was, because theywere returning from the training, I saw the people, there was a guy named Bunani, Bunani,

77


there was Bunani, that’s B-U-N-A-N-I, there was Alphonse Uwimana, Uwimana, that’s U-W-I-M-A-N-A. That was when I realized that there were some people high up in the parallelcommittee and the group supporting them carried out training in the compound of FrlicienKabuga’s building.

Trmoin ZC

~’")

(

¯f©

5.32 Around November 1993, in Gisenyi, Joseph Nzirorera and Military

Commander Anatole Nsengiyumva participated in the distribution of weapons

to the militiamen.

On January 15, 1994 at about 1.00 p.m., I saw Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva driving aMilitary Truck. Later, I saw the Military Truck parked in front of the home of one BamabeSamvura, who was our neighboour and an MRND political party m.~mber. Samvura was alsoknown to be an Interahamwe leader. I saw arms being off loaded from the Military Truckinto the home of Mr, Barnabe Samvura. These arms were stored in the home of Mr BamabeSamvura. On that same day, a meeting was held at the home of a certain Throdore Busogo.His home was also very close to my family home and I could hear and see most of what wenton in the house and whoever went in and out of the same house. At this meeting, there wasColonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, one Nge),e Hassan, Celestin Basenibamwe, FostinRwamahungu, Hakizimana Fazhiri, Conseiller of Gisenyi Secteur, and a lawyer calledHaguma Hilaire. I heard the participants at the meeting say that they were going to instructthe Interahamwe to start beating members of the Tutsi ethnic origin, start ceasing anddestroying their property, and even start killing them. It was at this point in time that mostmembers of the Tutsi etlmic origin started seeking refuge into the Catholic Churches.

Witness EB

In December 1993, Colonel Anatole NSENGIYUMVA held a meeting at the Hrtel PalmBeach in Gisenyi with the Interahamwe. I was at the meeting. At the meeting, ColonelAnatole NSENGIYUMVA promised to distribute weapons to us. He told us not to be afraidbecause, although he was a colonel in the Rwandan Army, he was himself an Interahamwe.Two weeks later, I went to the Mukamira military camp in the company of ColonelBonaventure BUREGEYA. General Augustin BIZIMUNGU pergbnally gave me an R4, aKalaclmikov-type assault weapon, and a 50-round magazine. On handing me the gun,General Bizimungu and Colonel BUREGEYA told me that the Tutsi were going to attackin a few days and that I had to defend both myself and the Hutu.

Witness ZD

78


Bernard Munyagishari was actually chief of Interahamwe. He distributed guns to theInterahamwe and inspected i:oad blocks. Most people who had guns were doing the killings.

Witness PB

5.33 Towards the end of 1993, in an open letter broadcast on national radio, the

Bishop of the diocese of Nyundo, in Gisenyi prdfecture, denounced the

distribution of weapons in that prdfecture.

Prior to the death of President Habyarimana and the total outbreak of hostilities, there hadbeen arms distribution to the local communities by the Government. When we at the Parishlearned of the arms distribution, we protested to the Government. Several letters werewritten by the Nyundo church to the Government protesting the distribution of anrts to thelocal community. In fact, these arms we were told were being distributed by the Goven~mentto mostly Hutu communities. At some point, there was a meeting held at the Nyundodiocese headed by Bishop Kalibushi to protest about the arms distribution. The Diocese sentout a statement on the matter to the National Radio Station in Kigali. The National RadioStation was advised by the Diocese to broadcast the contents of the statement in French andto the local population in Kinyarwanda. To our greatest dismay, the protest letter wasbroadcast only in Kinyarwanda. For some obvious reasons, may be the government did notwant the International Community to know about the arms distribution and our protest in thatregard. These arms actually carte from Kigali first to the Prefect, then to the bourgmasters,to the Conseiller, then the Responsables and finally into the hands’of the Interahamwe and

the local community. Witness OW

O

(;?!

5.34 From 1993 to July 1994, in Cyangugu prdfecture, Minister Andr6

Ntagerura, Prdfet Emmanuel Bagambiki, and Yussuf Munyakazi, all of whomwere influential figures within the MRND in Cyangugu, assisted in and

facilitated the distribution of weapons, ammunition and uniforms to MRND

militiamen, the Interahamwe.

When I worked at the airport in Kamembe, I saw in the period before April 1994NTAGURERA [sic] regularly coming by plane to the airport. He sometimes also came bycar to the airport. It is difficult to say how often he came to the airport. ,

In the period from February and March 1994 NTAGERURA came often by plane and hebrought every time several boxes with him. In this period a man called NYANDWI, who

" 79


worked for the ministry of planning in Cyangugu came to the airport to receive the boxesfrom NTAGERURA. Several times NTAGERURA called from my office or the office ofthe commander of the airport to NYANDWI to ask him to pick him up from the airport.Then they left the airport together. I never saw NTAGERURA hand over the boxes to another person at the airport. The number of boxes was between 2 and 5. To the end of Marchthe number of transports was more often and the number of boxes up to 5.

In the beginning of the transport of the boxes I didn’t lmow what the [sic] contained. But Iknew NYANDWI very well. He was a neighbour and we cmrte after work to the same placeto drink beer. I didn’t have the impression that he hid something from me. NYANDWI toldme later that these boxes contained arms: machetes, grenades and rifles. He told me severaltimes after he had transported the boxes what kind of arms they contained. He also told methey were going to use them. In this drinking place also the pe3ple, who worked at theprefecture office, came to drink beer. I heard from them that nomaally the boxes which werebrought to the prefecture office contained office equipment. These boxes were opened andunpacked. The boxes which were brought by NYANDWI stayed closed and were stored inan store room where only high ranking people had access to.

The people from the prefecture office were not afraid to talk to me. They even told me aboutmeetings which were held and about what was going on. I don’t imow any nanaes of peoplewho worked at this prefecture office, who are still alive or who are not collaborators.

During the war I stayed in a refugee cafnp NYARUSHISHI. In June 1994 I metNTAGERURA with the French minister of defense in this camp. NTAGERURA wasunpleasantly surprised to see me. He said to the prefect who was with him: "How is itpossible that his one is still alive? Isn’t it the man who worked at Kamembe airport?" Theprefect didn’t respond his question and looked ashamed.

Witness LR

© Since 1991, NTAGERURA had the habit of spending his weekends in Cyangugu. He wouldusually remain there from Friday to Monday. During these visits, he committed himself totraining the Interahamwe and to preparing the MRND policy. .,

Following one of these meetings, which took place around 1993 in Kirambo commune, thewitness states that he saw the participants beat those who had not attended these meetings.Among those who were beaten, he recognized Antoine and Bibiamae from Kagano commune,who were later hospitalized at Kibogora hospital. Another example took place on 23 January1993 following a closed meeting of the Interahamwe. One group of 250 persons led byYussoufMunyiakazi attacked a residence at CIMERWA. The house, occupied by the personcalled Throbald RUTIHUNZA, was surrounded and the Interahamwe began to sing whilethreatening to take him and burn him in the public square. By chance, a helicoptertransporting the Chief of Staff, Nsabimana Drogracias, landed at that moment in CIMERWA

80


,t.

and the Interahamwe dispei’sed immediately.,,.

In January 1993, before the genocide, he saw weapons being distributed in Cyanguguprdfecture. These weapons (rifles, pistols, grenades) and uniforms arrived by truck. Theywere initially stored in the houses of YussoufMUNYIAKAZI and BAKUNDUYdZE beforebeing distributed to the militias in the prdfecture.

Witness MJ

C¯,i

5.35 Due to the proliferation of weapons in Kigali-villeprdfecmre, UNAMIR put

in place a disarmament program, titled Kigali Weapon Security Area (KWSA).

The program came into effect in early 1994. Concurrently, in cooperation withthe Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, Augustin Ndindiliyimana, UNAMIR

organized search operations in Kigali. The effectiveness of the operations was

compromised by General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who gave advance

information on the locations targeted in the searches to Mathieu Ngirumpatse,

MRND Chairman. The latter passed the information on to the Interahamwe-

MRND, who moved the weapons. "

ICTR- Still on the same subject, do you remember sometime in early 1994 the launching ofKWSA, or Kigali Weapon Secure Area; i.e.,UNAMIR ordering that people in Kigali bedisarmed. Do you remember that?ZC -Yes, I do remember that.ICTR -So, do you recall meetings or discussions beingheld by the Interahamwe regardingtheir reaction to the disarmament programme?ZC -In fact, at the time of the disarmament, I recall that there were meetings between theInterahamwe and the MRND committees in the office of the chain~an, MathieuNgirumpatse.ICTR -Was that in Kiyovu?ZC - No, no. It was at his [Ngirumpatse’s] private office in Kigali. At the meeting, heasked the Interahamwe committee to beware of the weapons which had been distributed tothe secteurs because at the time it was said that it was not good to be seen with weapons,because UNAMIR was accusing the MRND for having armed the Interahamwe. So, theyasked the committee to instruct the secteur leaders to warn the people bearing arms, becauseit was unauthorized. The weapons had been issued secretly, so they were not to be displayed.So, the [nterahamwe were able to keep their weapons without being caught, until the war of1994. But what I recall regarding the disarmament is that I got the opportunity to see howthey went about disarming the soldiers; I saw how they went about disarming Major Kabera,Kabera [spelled] K-A-B-E-R-A. This happened in the middle of town. He was carrying hisweapon, a revolver. He was stopped by Belgian UNAMIR personnel. He ran to a store

81


nearby, called Imba, which belonged to Alphonse Nibange, Nibange [spelled] N-I-B-A-N-G-E. They pursued him into the store, forced him out and humiliated him in front of the peoplewho were there by taking away his weapon. So the people, especially the Interahamwe, notthe MRND but the Interahamwe, a letter was written, they wrote to Dallaire asking him toreview the disarmament of military personnel, because the Rwandan military personnel werenot to be humiliated in front of the people. That was said because it was observed that theBelgian UNAMIR persolmel h’ad a axe to grind against the soldiers, the members of the ex-FAR. They were doing it to humiliate them. I know there is a docur/~ent to that effect, a letteraddressed to Dallaire asking him to review the procedure.ICTR -To go back to the meeting, it did take place in Ngirumpatse’s office, correct?ZC -Mathieu Ngirumpatse.ICTR - Ngirumpatse, that’s right. What was the approximate date?ZC -It was, let’s see...ICTR -Given that the KWSA took place in early .... during the first week of January.ZC -It was immediately after the order, the decision, immediately after the decision. Itwas done in a hurry because it had to be done right away to avoid being caught unawares.It happened immediately after the decision, yes, that’s when it happened. It was before thedecision to launch KWA [KWSA]. A meeting was held between the Minister of Defence andDallaire regarding the programme. So, at the end of the meeting, since the Minister taaew thatthere were weapons out there which had been issued by him, he asked to meet Ngirumpatse.So, Ngirumpatse went to the Ministry of Defence and was infom:ed of the imminentdecision. So, Ngirumpatse called us to a meeting well before the...ICTR -The decision itself.ZC -Yes, long before the decision was taken, and, he....said that a decision was about tobe taken, but he informed the committee in order for it to, in tuna, alert the people bearingweapons. It was decided before...Another way to win-n, there were ways. After the decisionwas announced, UNAMIR was to ask to search a particular area, fo.r which they required toobtain permission from the General Staff of the Gendarmerie Nationale. From theGendarmerie Nationale, whose Chief of Staff at the time was General Ndindilimana,[spelled] N-D-I-N-D-I-L-I-M-A-N-A, General Ndindilimana. Whenever he was asked forauthorization to go search a particular area, before taking the deci..., er, before issuing theauthorization, he would infon’n Mathieu Ngirumpatse, who was the chairman of the MRND,and Ngirumpatse would immediately inform the committee through Robert, in turn informedthe secteur due to be searched, and everything, all the weapons were removed from thesecteur and taken to a different secteur. So, everyone was infonaed in time, thanks toNdindilimana who gave the authorization. And Ngirumpatse who...said that the Chief ofStaff of the Gendarmerie had just infornaed him that searches were being conducted in agiven secteur. And so the secteur would escape the search operations each time.ICTR -How do you know that this...What do you know about this procedure, how do youknow that it originated front Ndindilimana, Ngirumpatse, etc..?ZC -I told you that Robert acted as an intermediary. Whenever there was somethingconcerning the Interahamwe, in higher circles, he would be informed about it either by the

82


committee or by Ngirumpatse, especially considering that as chairman, Ngirumpatse wasRobert’s personal friend, because he was a friend of the family and also of Nzirorera, assecretary-general of the party. That is how the Interahamwe managed to find out whensearches were going to be conducted, or what UNAMIR was planning to do, or some kindof check ...And they would escape the search, thm-tks to Ngirumpatse and Ndindiliyimanawho found out [inaudible].ICTR -Do you ka-~ow this because Robert told you or because you were personally presentat some point?ZC -I told you that we met. At that moment, he [inaudible] us and later, I know thatanother meeting was held which we all attended, the whole committee, with MathieuNgirumpatse. He informed us that he got everything in ten~s of weapons, searches, etc, fromNdindilimana. It was Ndindilimana who gave the information on the dates and the secteurs

/targeted. He said...I was present when Ngirumpatse said that./Witness ZC )

5.36 On 7 January 1994, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Augustin Bizimana, A’ttgustinNdindiliyimana, D~ogratias Nsabimana, Robert Kajuga and other influential .....

MRND members participated in a meeting at the MRND headquarters in

opposition to the disarmament program. It was decided at this meeting to use all

possible means to resist the implementation, of the disarmament, and also to hideweapons at various locations.

~ k will proceed in order, if that is all right with you.

~_....~u veere talking about a meeting which took place before the implementation of

ZC -Yes.ICTR -Can you tell us who was at the meeting, where it was held, what was said, etc..?ZC -Ok. The meeting was held in Mr. Ngirumpatse’s law office. It is right next to LaRwandaise, next to the office of La Rwmldaise, close to a... it was across fl’om thecommercial bank. That’s where his office was. So he called a meeting, that the Minister ofDefence and General Dallaire, that they were about to begin disalTning people in Kigali.ICTR -Who was there?ZC -....there was Mathieu Ngirumpatse, who chaired the meeting, Robert Kajuga,Ph6nias Ruhumuliza, Georges Rutagm~da, Eugene Barushimana, Dieudom~6 Niyitegeka, theconseillers, Serugendo, Epha’em Nkezabera, m~d Bernard Maniragaba among the conseillers.ICTR - Sebanetsi was not present?ZC - No, Sebanetsi was not.ICTR -Were other MRND representatives present?ZC -No. No, no, no. Only Mathieu Ngirumpatse, who chaired the meeting.

83

5:CONCISE S’TATEMENT OF FACTS: PREPARATION

ICTR -Was anyone else there7 Was Bizimana himself there?ZC -No, no, no. He did not come. It was the committees, the conseillers and MathieuNgirumpatse. "ICTR -Ndindilimana was not present either?ZC -No, Ndindilimana was not present.ICTR -Ok. And, in your opin!on, how long was it after Bizimana’s meeting with Dallaire,do you know?ZC -You know, for me things went very fast, because it was immediately following thismeeting that...requested by Ngirumpatse, the decision followed a few days later. So, in myview, the meeting must have been, Bizimana and Dallaire met, let’s see, a day before theywere called in. And Bizimana informed Ngirumpatse.ICTR -Do you remember - perhaps you will recall the date - do you remember how longafter New Year’s day this meeting with Ngirumpatse took place?ZC -On what date the decision about the plan was taken...I do not know the date.ICTR -Ok. Who said what exactly at the meeting?ZC -The meeting held by Ngirumpatse...ICTR -Yes.ZC -...it was simply because it did not take long, not even 15 minutes. It was to warnpeople of the decision which was about to be taken regarding the disarmament, and the factthatthere was a large number of weapons in the secteurs which had been issued illegally andUNAMIR was accusing the MRND of having armed the Interahamwe...ICTR -Which was true.ZC -Which was true, yes. So, he said that-it was necessary to act fast, to ask the secteurleaders to do all they could to hide the weapons. And continually keep informed regardingwhich places were going to be searched. That is all that was discussed at that meeting.ICTR -But, who told you that?ZC -I was told by Mathieu Ngirumpatse.

Witness ZC

©¯ .~,

As part of my duties, I would often go to meet with the unit commanders of the FAR and theGendarmerie in the zone under my responsibility to make sure that the KWSA (weaponsstorage zone) protocol of agreement was properly implemented....

Following the refusal by New York to authorize us to search the weapons caches, we,General Dallaire and myself, attempted to accomplish the same objective by involving theGendarmerie, under the control of UNAMIR, cordoning off areas and searching them. TheChief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, General NDINDILIYIMANA, agreed to this type ofoperation. A first exercise was conducted before 6 January 1994, on a date can no longerspecify, as I can find no trace of it in my personal logbook. I can confim’l, however, that theexercise did take place because I was there. According to the procedure agreed to byUNAMIR and the Gendarmerie, UNAMIR was to provide the technical control of theexercise, while ensuring that peoples’ rights were respected, and, the gendamaerie was to

84

5. EXPOSE SUCCINT DF..S FAITS: PREPARATION

cordon offthe selected areas and conduct the searches. The first operation ended in failure,not due to lack of commitment to attain the desired results, but due to technical errors, forexample, choosing a overly wide zone of operation in comparison to the persolmel available.

Witness ZE

O

O

5.37 On 10 January 1994, UNAMIR was informed by an Interahamwe-MRND

leader of the existence of weapons caches in Kigali and a plan to eliminate the

Tutsi population. It instructed one of its officers to uncover, the exact locationsof the weapons. That officer identified several caches throughout Kigali, in

places controlled by members of the MRND, notably at the party headquarters

in Kimihurura, in a house belonging to General Augustin Ndindiliyimana.

During the search of that house, the UNAMIR officer discovered several

firearms and cases of ammunition. The informer asserted that, as regards themilitary aspects of his duties, he was under the orders of MRND Chairman,

Mathieu Ngirumpatse, and the Army Chief of Stall, D~ogratias Nsabimana.

Moreover, he informed UNAMIR that the weapons that had been distributed

came from the Army.

The informer said that he had received the order to locate and catalogue systematically wherethe Tutsi lived throughout Kigali. The murder of Tutsi in the various secteurs in Kigali wassupposed to begin when instructions were issued and passed on to a number of responsablesde cellule. According to him, he was receiving such orders .directly from the Chaim~an of theMRND, NGIRUMPATSE and was in direct contact with the Chief of Staff of the FAR,General NSABIMANA, concerning military matters. I was informed that the Interahamwewere being trained by the FAR, who were also distributing weapons to them.,,, ,t.

On 13 January 1994, I had a second interview with the informer. The meeting was productivebecause our informer agreed to show us the weapons caches. On that occasion, CaptainDEME (Senegal), who was Captain’s CLAEY’s deputy, went with him to see the locationof the weapons caches. Hence, the informer and the UNAMIR officer were able to locateseveral weapons caches, including the one near the MRND party headquarters inKimihurura. Our intelligence officer himself saw weapons hidden in the MRND headquartersbuilding in Kimihurura. The informer gave us until Tuesday, 18 January to take action at theMRND headquarters, saying that after that date, he could not guarantee that the weaponswould still be at the indicated location.

Witness ZE

85


Establishment of Lists

Cl

5.38 Having identified the Tutsi as the enemy and the members of the

opposition as their accomplices, members of the Army General Stafi, civilian

authorities and militiamen established lists of people to be executed.

In December 1993, secret meetings were held in Rubavu and Gishati commune offices, inGisenyi prefecture. The purpose of these meetings was to take measures for the eliminationof the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The following people participated in the meetings: HassanNgeze, BARAGWIZA, Barnab6 SAMVURA and Christophe NIZEYIMANA, director ofthe !nstitut Saint Fiddle in Gisenyi. Hassan NGEZE had established a list of Tutsi andmoderate Hutu to be eliminated. On the list were, among others, Monseigneur WenceslasKALIBUSHI, the priest for Gisenyi parish, Modeste NTABARO, the accountant for theGisenyi M6ridien hotel, and SEMUCYO, a teacher at Nyundo secondary school.

Witness ZD

5.39 In 1992, at a meeting, Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora instructed the two

General Staffs to establish lists of people identified as the enemy and itsaccomplices. The Intelligence Bureau (G’2) of the Rwandan Army established

the lists under the supervision of Anatole Nsengiyumva. The lists were regularly

updated during the time that Augustin Bizimana was Minister of Defense.

At a meeting in late 1992 or early 1993, there was a meeting at the Ministry of Defence(MINADEF) between the two Chiefs of Staff, Gasana and Col. Bagosora. Col. Bagosoraasked the two Chiefs of Staffto establish lists of the enerny’s accomplices.Later, the General Staff of the Gendarmerie Nationale met and refi~sed to establish the listsbecause there was no legal or objective criteria to base them on.

Witness AX

Beginning in 1992, the G-2 intelligence officers established lists of people described astraitors and of accomplices. The lists were regularly updated. I remember certain names,like...There were more than a hundred names on the lists. Since the end of the genocide, Ibelieve I have seen only three survivors from the list of 100 which I had typed. The G-2 hadanother list of politicians that I was never able to read...I learned that the list was ofpoliticians, because once, Corporal ...informed me when he gave me a list, that another onewas in the G-2’s possession and that it included the names of Landouard NDASINGWA,F61icien GATABAZI and Agathe UWILINGIMANA.

Witness AK

86


5.40 On 10 January 1994, an Interahamwe-MRND leader informed UNAMIR

that he had received orders to establish lists of Tutsi to be eliminated.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERAHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF.

SINCE U’NAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ](LL TUTSl IN KIGALI. HESUSPECTS IT IS FOR EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS

PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 100(] TUTSIS.Code cable sent by General Dallaire, UNAMIR Force Commander,to General Barit, Department of Peace Keeping Operations, U.N.,NewYork, 11 January 1994.

O

():

5.41 On 25 February 1994, at a meeting at MRND headquarters in

Kimihurura, chaired by the Chairman of the Interahamwe-MRND, Robert

Kajuga, Interahamwe-MRND leaders of KigaU-viIle ordered their militants to

establish lists of names of Tutsi with the intent to eliminate them.

A meeting of the Interahamwe committees in Ydgali-Villepr~fecture was held the day beforeyesterday, on 25 February, at the MRND secretariat in Kimihurura under the chairmanshipof Robert Jerry Kajuga, the national chairmma. After a long, labored discussion, the meetingtook the measures below, which were to be implemented as of Saturday, 26 February 1994,following consultations with the grass-roots by the Interahamwe chaimaen in Kigali-Ville

prefecture.Since the RPF combatants were organized and assisted by young .Tutsi throughout Kigali-Ville prefecture, vigilance was called for and lists of individuals were requested:

Report of 27 February 1994 (Kibat)

O 5.42 From 7 April to late July, military and Interahanzwe-MRND massacred

members of the Tutsi population and of moderate Hutu by means of pre-

established lists, among other things.

The chief wan’mat officer who lived near my house did not pay any attention to me since he

had to kill people, prominent civilians whose names were on a list. Personally, I never sawa list but I heard soldier from the Presidential Guard talking about it. It was around 3:00 p.m.when the soldier spoke about the list to his brother on the way to the airport. He said thatthere was a list of people to be killed but the tnterahamwe in the area had not yet proceeded

to kill the people listed." Witness DU

At around 7:30 a.l-n. (on 7 April), she [the neighbor] tried tO leave but two shots were fired

., 87

:., :: ~:?,/: i.i:i~!: ....


fifty metres away from my house. I went to check and saw nine soldiers from the Para,Commando Battalion and the Presidential Guard, as well as a civilian who was annarenttvacting as their guide. They were carrying a list. It had the names oftlie people to be killed...They went to another neighbor’s house, threw a grenade and shot open the door of the house.They killed the occupants. They left on foot. My house servant, whom I had sent to followthem, later told me thatthe soldiers had shot at a number of homes (four families)."

Witness CP

Around noon another militia vehicle arrived with an officer. Until that time the people lockedin the room were only guarded by the soldiers. They waited until the arrival of the officer.

They were at~narentlv ordered to search for specific people and to lock them up and waituntil further orders. The officer asked me where ...... and .... were. I showed them the place

where they were living. The officer then ordered us to go to the lib’~-ary and not to come outanymore. That was what we did and a few moments later we saw ...mad pass the libraryand walk in the direction of the room where the others were clocked. They wereaccompanied by two soldiers...Shortly after we heard two explosions coming from thedirection of room 28 and automatic gun fire. After a short time the firing stopped...When we collected the personal belongings of the death people we counted 17 people instead

of 19 people...Witness ET

, ."

On 7 April in the morning... At around 9:00 a.m. the same day, a group of soldiers from thePresidential Guard arrived. They started kdaogking at the gate; then they forced it open andthen the broke the door to the main living-room...This group of soldiers was comnaanded byan officer who had the rank of captain (I heard him being addressed as Captain). He took outa list of names from his pocket and scanned it .... The officer hesitated briefly and then

ordered his subordinates to kill me because I was a Tutsi, after all. At that very moment, oneof the soldiers answered back at the officer who had given the order for me to be executed,saying "Colonel Bagosora gave strict orders; he said we should stick to this list;consequently, we should not be killed. Let us first finish with the list mad we can deal with

the others after that...Witness BA

On 6 April 1994, I was at home with my wife when Radio RTLM announced at 8:45 p.m.that an airplane had crashed in the Masaka area. At 9:10 p.m., we heard gunshots from thedirection of Kabeza, which was inhabited by civilians. Jean de Dieu ICAYIGAMBA’sservant, whose name was KAYUMBA, came to my home to tell me that soldiers who hada list were coming to kill I<_AYIGAMBA and txis fanaily. This was at 10:10. KAYIGAMBAwas my neighbour; he was a Tutsi who worked at the Banque Populaire.

Witness GJ

Precursors Revealing A Deliberate Course of Action

88

, 5. EXPOSE SUCCINT DES FAITS: PREPARATION

5.43 The political and ethnic violence of the early 1990s was characterized bythe use of the elements of the strategy which achieved its finality in the genocideof April 1994. The massacres of the Tutsi minority at thattime, including thosein Kibilira (1990), in Bugesera (1992), and those of the Bagogwe (1991), instigated, facilitated and organized by civilian and military authorities. Oneach occasion, a campaign of incitement to ethnic violence, conducted by localauthorities, was followed by massacres of the Tutsi minority, perpetrated bygroups of militiamen and civilians, armed and assisted by the same authoritiesand by certain military personnel. On each occasion, these crimes remainedunpunished and the authorities implicated were generally not taken to task.

9. There now seems to be little doubt that the massacres were planned. This is theconclusion reached from a number of consistent indications, not to say evidence, including:

°.°

(d) The "screening" carried out at the roadblocks by militiamen and soldiers, andthe lists drawn up by the public authorities with the aim of identifying Tutsi, afterwhich they were immediately executed.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, submitted by Mr. R.Degni-S6gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994,E/CN.4/1995/71, 18 January i995

O

5.44 Cooperation between the Interahamwe-MRND and certain militarypersonnel, particularly those in the Presidential Guard and the Para-CommandoBattalion, was manifested in early 1994 in opposition to the implementation ofthe institutions provided for under the Arusha Accords. On 5 January 1994, atthe time of the swearing-in ceremony of the Broad-Based TransitionalGovernment, theInterahamwe-MRND organized a demonstration in cooperationwith members of the Presidential Guard. They prevented political opponentsfrom entering the Conseil national de ddveloppement (CARD). The swearing-in ofthe members of the Government did not take place. In the end, only thePresident, Juv6nal Habyarimana, was sworn in.

During the demonstrations, some members of the Presidential Guarcl in civilian clothes couldbe seen, together with the Interahamwe. They worked in collaboration with each other.Sometimes, murders were even committed by the Presidential Guard and the fnterahamweacting together. I personally arrested a member of the Presidential Guard wlio had just killed

89

. ’ . ~ .. .,

’;:.,2. ̄


~-")

someone from the opposition. He was wearing civilian clothes and had a Motorola radio.According to what I was able to observe, there was a certain amount of collaborationbetween the members of the Presidential Guard and the Interahamwe. These members of thePresidential Guard supported the actions of the Interaharnwe.In every case where the Presidential Guard let its support to the Interahamwe, notably duringdemonstrations by the latter, there would be a number of members of the Presidential Guardin civilian clothes, who were sometimes armed. All these cases were included in a report,which was submitted to the Chief of Staff. The matter was also dis~ssed at meetings of the

General Staff.Witness CK

The day before the institutions were put into place, access cards to the CND had to bedistributed in collaboration with Mpiranya, second-in-command of the Presidential Guard,at the UNAMIR headquarters. Mpiranya himself was in charge of distributing the cards tothe various political parties...He had marked something on the cards with the view to denyaccess to the CND to moderates, such as those on the list by Lando, vice-chaimaan of theParti Libdral. Major Mpiranya was at the entrance to the CND, in civilian clothes, a lightgrey suit, with his troops in uniform. He was shoving the UNAMIR soldiers, denying entryto certain people, including those belonging to the Lando faction. An attempt was made tonegotiate with Mpiranya, but it proved to be impossible to reach any kind of agreement. Theend result was that the swearing-in ceremony was called off.

Witness ER

The first attempt to put the Broad-Based Transitional Goverlmaent into place was slated for5 Jalmary 1994. Access to the CND for the swearing-in ceremony was controlled. I was toldthat a problem arose as regards the checking of laissez-passers at the entrance to the CND.I was informed of this situation at the meeting which took place op 5 Jmmary 1994, late inthe day, (in which I participated.) Witness

5.45 On 8 January 1994, Interahamwe, in complicity with elements of the

Presidential Guard and the Para-Commando Battalion dressed in civilian

clothes, again organized a demonstration near the CND. On ................. the

[nterahamwe-MRND had hidden weapons very nearby and were equipped with

radios provided by the Presidential Guard. That demonstration was intended

to provoke and cause injury to the Belgian UNAMIR soldiers.

At the demonstration by the MRND to overthrow Dismas, which took place at the Prime

Minister’s office, members of the Presidential Guard in civilian clothes, with concealedpistols were mixed in with the Interahamwe youths. The Presidential Guard was protecting

9O

~ ¯ .... 2:;11; : ~ ’ ; ,. :,’:¯

5. EXPOSE SUCCINT DES FA1TS: PREPARATION

the Interahamwe against the demonstrators. Witness AX

()

3, INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE

GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS INPLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE

MINISTER OF THE MRND AN’D THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION.RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

Code cable sent by General Dallaire, UNAMIR Force Commander,to General Baril, Department of Peace Keeping Operations, U.N.,New York, 11 January 1994.

On 8 January 1994, we experienced the first violent demonstration since nay arrival. For partof the day, nobody could gain have access to the CND. Both intersections on either side ofthe CND were blocked offby the demonstrators.

The informer told me that during the demonstration on 8 January, weapons had been hiddenin the bushes around the intersection by the M6ridien hotel and in certain houses near theintersection at "Chez Lando" and that grenades had been distributed to the demonstrators.The informer indicated that the purpose was to provoke and possibly injure or kill Belgian

military personnel. Witness ZE

()

5.46 Finally, as of 7 April 1994, throughout Rwanda, Tutsis and certain

moderate Hutus began to flee their homes to escape the violence to which theywere victims on their hills and to seek refuge in places where they had

traditionally felt safe, notably churches, hospitals and other public buildings

such as commune andprdfecture offices. On several occasions, gathering placeswere indicated to them by the local authorities, who had promised to protect

them. For the initial days, the refugees were protected by a few gendarmes and

communal police in these various locations, but subsequently, the refugees weresystematically attacked and massacred by militiamen, often assisted by the same

authorities who had promised to protect the refugees. Dfiring the numerous

attacks on the refugees throughout the country, personnel of the FAR, military

or gendarmes, who were supposed to protect them, prevented the Tutsi fromescaping and facilitated their massacre by the Interahamwe-MRND. On several

occasions, these FAR personnel participated directly in the massacres.

See the following paragraphs notably 6.21 onward and 6.46 to 6.97.

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5. EXPOSE SUCCINT DES FAITSi PREPARATION

’..:"

5A7 Furthermore, soldiers, militiamen and gendarmes raped or sexuallyassaulted or committed other crimes of a sexual nature against Tutsi women and

girls, sometimes after having first kidnapped them.

When the violence began in 1994, rape of Tutsi women was widespread. The targeted useof sexual violence against tutsi women was fueled by both ethnic and gender stereotypes;Tutsi women were targeted on the basis of the genocide propaganda which had portrayedthem as calculated seductress-spies bent on dominating and undermining the Hum. Tutsiwomen were also targeted because of the gender stereotype which portrayed them ascalculated seductress-spies bent on dominating and undermining the Hutu. Tutsi womenwere also targeted because of the gender stereotype which portrayed them as beautiful anddesirable, but inaccessible to Hum men whom they allegedly looked down upon and were"too good" for. Rape served to shatter these images by humilitalng, degrading, andultimately destroying the Tutsi woman. (page 18)

Both Tutsi and Hum women were raped, but there was a difference both in the numbersassaulted and in the reasons for the rapes. Most of the women raped were Tutsi and theywere attacked as one more means of terrorizing and destroying the Tutsi ethnic group. (page

41)

Many women were subjected to rape and gang-rape while being held collectively by a militagroup in order to sexually service the group. (page 52)

As militia killed and pillaged, their members often singled out women to be held for theirpersonal sexual service. They locked these women in their own homes or in the captors’homes, sometimes briefly, sometimes for the duration of the genocide. Such women were

, " " "because captors hid them in a space between the roof andoften called’ women of the ceilingthe ceiling to prevent their being discovered and killed by others. The arrangement wassometimes referred to as "forced marriages" and the women so held as "wives," but theseterms obfuscate the total lack of consent by the women and the coercive conditions underwhich they were held. These women were in fact captives, looted possessions of the

militiamen, held in sexual slavery. (page 56)"Shattered Lives": Report by the International Federation of Human

Rights, January 1997

See also Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Sdgui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 ofCommission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, E/CN.4/1996/68, 29 January 1996

p. 7.

93

.... ,¯ : ,~ ,~i,!% :,~;::!i.¯; ~//~: ~ ;¯: :~.;....................... ..........+,, +, ........ ................................... ......... <%~,,~ i~’~::’~¯’~?::i+~"?~ +~i~~:~’~+~:~!:+~’~!~!!~!~+~< ..... ’~ ~: >’ ~+ . ¯ ;,..

..... ...... ,¢sr r....... .. :..’",i’ "- +-"~" ...’,’:i. " :*"..:~-+~+ ."

~NT OF FACTS: PREPARATION

The survey of 304 rape survivors conducted by the Ministry of Family and Promotion ofWomen in collaboration with UNICEF found their average age to be twenty-four years old.Among ~em, 28 percent were under eighteen years; 43.75 percent were between nineteenand twenty-six; 17.1 percent were between twenty-seven and thirty five; 8.55 percent werebetween thirty-six and forty-five; and 1.6 percent were over forty-five; 0.7 percent did not

respond. Among the group, 63.8 percent were young single women.Ministry of Family and the Promotion of Women, "Enqu~te effectudeaupr+s des victimes" in collaboration with UNICEF, cited in

"Shattered Lives", page 24.

()

Rape was systematic and was used as a "weapon" by the perpetrators of the massacres. This

can be estimated from the number and nature of the victims as well as from the forms ofrape .... a great many women were raped; rape was the rule and its absence the exception....The forms of rape similarly testify to their systematic nature. Two may be noted: gangrape and incest. The former, perhaps less common than individual incidents of rape,consisted in the victim being raped by several of her tormentors at one time. Many womenwho underwent this type of rape died as a result. The cases of incest are still more revealingof the systematic and abominable nature of the rape: direct relatives, or blood relatives, wereforced to have incestuous intercourse. According to reliable testimony, militiamen forcedfathers or sons to have sexual relations with their own daughters or mothers and vice versa.In addition to these atrocities the women were subjected to various brutalities whichgenerally caused their death. Some were sexually humiliated: they were stripped and/orMashed and exposed to public mockery. Others had pieces of trees branches pushed intotheir vagina. Even more had their external genitals, their buttocks and their breasts cut off.

Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, submitted by Mr. R.Degni-S~gui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, underparagraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994,E/CN.4/1996/68, 29 January 1996, Par. 16, 18.

Sexual abuses were commited, mainly on young girls in hiding at their friends’. They were

raped prior to their being killed. I know a young girl called Valdine who sought refuge at hergod-mother’s; she was raped before she was killed. Many survivors in hiding throughout thecountry were raped; I know many survivors who became mothers as a result of those rapes.Witness GA

I know some stories about woman (sic) and girls who were sexually abused and or raped. know from "XX" from sector Gihombo, cellule Butare ( NDLR: Kibuye Prefecture), and"XX", from sector Butimbo, cellule Gaseke (NDLR: Kibuye Prefecture) that they became

pregnant after they’ve been raped. Their babies died shortly after they were born. I knowfrom "XX" that she was raped and became pregnant as well but that her baby is still alive.

94

Witness GB ’

I eye-witnessed and heard about the acts that I will relate ... related to the massacres in

Gisovu, in Kibuye prefecture, Rwanda.... So, Musema saw her. I heard him say "come here, we are going to kill you the way youkill others." As the little ’YY’ was continuing to cry, he ordered that the breast of themother be cut offand given to the little one which would make him stop crying. He gave theorder to the Twas who worked as night watchmen at the tea factory. I heard ’XX’ screaming.She screamed for a long time. I suppose they cut her breast off.Thereafter, Musema ordered that ’XX’ be raped and killed because she had refused to revealthe secrets of her husband. I heard him say exactly these words "Come here, my Twas, rapethis woman and kill her like you were taught to." Just after these words, I heard ’XX’ screamwhile people were laughing. She screamed for a long time. I believe they cut her breast offbecause I heard the Interahamwe say "Who will take care of you If we leave you with onebreast? Who will get you healed? You may even day as a result of this wound. I believe shewas raped because they were saying "You have already made love with the Tutsis. There you

are! Now you have done it with Twas." Witness GC

Next day we fled to Musambira commune (NDLR: Gitarama Prefecture) ...... When we arrivedat the forest, the Interahamwe started to undress all women by force. They were beating us.They started even to kill some of the w°men" An old woman begged the Interahamwe notto undress her but they refused. They gathered all our clothes. We were all naked. It ishorrible to say...We were still naked. When we arrives in Ruli, Nyamabuty commune, wewere stopped by a roadblock. This roadblock was manned by civilians...Then they started toselect women. I was selected. I saw six women selected but maybe they took more womento a small forest in the neighbourhood...One man took me to the forest and raped me. Afterhis turn some other men, at least 7, raped me. I do not know if they used c0ndoms...Theytook me to the chief of the roadblock. He was sitting in a local pub with other persons. The

chief raped me in that pub. Witness GD

I came to Kabgaye on 13 April 1994 and left on 2 June 1994... On 13 April, I decided to joinmy family. I found them in a classroom at the nursing school (ESI).,. There were no wallsseparating the various classrooms, so the soldiers could come at any time and select girls andwomen. Then at night, they would take them and rape them, whether in their room Oroutside the school. I saw women and girls being abducted by these soldiers but I did notwitness the rape. But on their way back, I saw some of the women and girls limping andothers crying as they told their mothe~ what had happened. In our custom, girls never darereveal to people that they have been raped. One day, I also saw a girl who was wearing askirt and was topless. The soldiers would come every evening to select girls to rape. They

95

There were more than 4,000 people at the Home St.-Jean and more than 16,000 at the IGbuyeparish...At least 75% were women and children...The militia, the armed gangs, the gendarmesand the prison guards in uniforms lined up at the roundabout at the cenrer of town...At about10 a.m., they attacked the church with guns and grenades and others tried to flee. Some were

"ured b eole with machetes or clubs as they tried to flee. After overpowering us, theinj Y P .P .... t_... ,l. .... Ives as thveir names were read from the list.attackers asked certain women to snow m~,,~,,,The women and girls stepped forward; they were ordered to undress and lie down on theground, and they were killed, some with machetes and some by gunshots and others wereburned alive. An employee in the Kibuye prosecutor’s office named Adrien called out the

Witness GEnames.

©

96

QCONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: OTHER VIOLATIONS OFINTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ..... ....

()

Power Crisis

6.1 On 6 April 1994 at about 8:30 p.m., the plane carrying, among otherpassengers, the President of the Republic, Juv6nal Habyarimana, was shot down

on its approach to Kigali Airport, Rwanda.

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Juvdnal Habyarimana of Rwanda and PresidentCyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed at Kigali airport, killing all those on board ....Following the deaths of the two Presidents, widespread killings, having both political andethnic dimensions, began in Kigali and also in other parts of the country.

l lnited Nations Peacekeeping Information Notes, United Nations AssistanceMission for Rwanda, Update: December, 1994, page 213:

...many witnesses confirm that the vetting carried out at road-blocks to check identities wasaimed essentially at the Tutsi. Secondly, and above all, the main enemy, identified with theRPF, is still the Tutsi, who is the inyenzi, (cockroach), to be crushed at all costs. (Besides),the moderate Hum is merely a supporter of the main enemy, and is targeted only as a traitorto his ethnic group, which he dares to oppose. [see document of the Rwandan Anrly GeneralStaff of 21 September 1992, defining the principal enemy and its supporter].

Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R.Degni-Sdgui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,under paragraph 20 of Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994,UN Document E/CN.4/1995/7, of 28 June 1994, page 13.

O

C,

6.2 Following the crash of the President’s plane, the Forces Armdes

Rwandaises were left without leadership. The President was dead, along with the

Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, Colonel D6ogratias Nsabimana. The

Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana, and the Chief of Intelligence Services

(G2) in the Rwandan Army, Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo, were on mission in the

Republic of Cameroon. They returned to the country in the days that followed.

Gratien Kabiligi, the officer in charge of operations (G3) in the Rwandan Army

General Staff, was also on mission in Egypt: In the absence of the Minister of

Defence, Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora, directeur de cabinet, asserted himself as

the man of the moment capable of managing the crisis.

97

()

O

At the assassination of President Juv6nal Habyarimana on 6 April i994, around 20.30 hours,as the Minister of D~fense Mr. Augustin Biziriian~i was on mission in Yaound6, Cameroon,and whereas the Government ofAgathe Uwilingiyimana had already been inoperative sinceJanuary 1994, Colonel Th6oneste BAGOSORA had to assume his responsibilities in hiscapacity as Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry of Defense.,.It should be noted that there was no General Staff for the Rwandan Government Forces asa whole and that solely the Minister of Defense coordinated the Rwandan Army and theGendarmerie nationale...The Chief of Staff, Major-General Deogratias Nsabimana, had died along with the Presidentof the Republic; Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo (G2),the chief of military intelligence, was mission in Cameroon with the Minister of Defence; Colonel Gratien Kabiligi (G3), chief the ’operations’ bureau, was on mission in Egypt.

"L ’assassinat du President Habyarimana ou l’ultime opdration du Tutsi pour sareconqugte du pouvoir par la force au Rwanda" [The assassination of PresidentHabyarimana or the final Tutsi attempt to re-conquer power in Rwanda by force], byColonel Th6oneste BEMS BAGOSORA, Yaounde, 30 October 1995, Page 4, 5 and9.

6.3 On 7 April 1994, the Minister of Defence Augustin Bizimana informed

Gratien Kabiligi of the massacres perpetrated in the city of Igdgali and ordered

him to report back to the Headquarters as soon as possible. Although Augustin

Bizimana was abroad on 6 April 1994, he remained in contact with the FAR

General Staff and returned to Kigali swiftly in order to continue to carry out his

duties of minister. Further, at no poilit and in no way thereafter did he

denounce or condemn the arrangements made by his closest collaborators and

subordinates, notably his directeur de cabinet, Th6oneste Bagosora.

At the assassination of President Juv6nal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, around 20.30 hours,as the Minister of Defense Mr. Augustin Bizimana was on mission in Yaound6, Cameroon,and whereas the Government of Agathe Uwilingiyimana had already been inoperative sinceJanuary 1994, Colonel Th6oneste BAGOSORA had to assume his responsibilities in hiscapacity as Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry of Defense... "It should be noted that there was no General S taft for the Rwandan Government Forces asa whole and that solely the Minister of Defense coordinated the Rwandan Army and theGendarmerie nationale...The Chief of Staff, Major-General Deogratias Nsabimana, had died along with the Presidentof the Republic; Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo (G2),the chief of military intelligence, was mission in Cameroon with the Minister of Defence; Colonel Gratien Kabiligi (G3), chief the ’operations’ bureau, was on mission in Egypt.

"L ’assassinat du Prdsident Habyarimana ou l ’ultime opdration du Tutsi pour sareconqudte du pouvoir par la force au Rwanda" [The assassination of PresidentHabyarimana or the final Tutsi attempt to re-conquer power in Rwanda by force], byColonel Th6oneste BEMS BAGOSORA, Yaounde, 30 October 1995, Page 4, 5 and

98

0

Military Takeover Attem?t

6.4 Within the first hours following the death of the President, two importantmeetings took place in Kigali. where Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and severalArmy offciers attempted to seize power. During this period Colonel TheonesteBagosora openly opposed any consultation with the Prime Minister, AgatheUwilingiyimana.

1. The Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry of Defense [MINADEF] chaired a meeting inthe night of 6 to 7 April 1994 which included the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie nationale[GdN], officers of the Ministry of Defense [MINADEF], members of the General Staff ofthe Rwandan Army [RA] and of the Gendarmerie nationale, the Commanding Officer ofUNAMIR, and the Commander of the I~cole Sup6rieure Militaire [ESM].

2. The purpose of the meeting was to decide on urgent security measures to prevent possibleexcesses, reassure the population, and to keep the peace at the time of a power vacuum...

,L

3. The Commanding Officer of UNAMIR recommended and hoped that:- the militias of the political parties should remain calm.- the Presidential Guard Battalion should return to camp.

The Directeur de Cabinet assured him of all the cooperation walTanted by the presentsituation.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING INCLUDING THE DIRECTEUR DECABINET - THE GENDARMERIE NATIONALE CHIEF OF STAFF -THE OFFICERS OF THE CABINET OF THE MINADEF - RWANDAARMY AND GENDARMERIE NATIONALE GENERAL STAFF, THENIGHT OF 6 TO 7 APRIL 1994

By Lt. Col. Ruhorahoza J.B., Rapporteur.

As soon as the deaths of the President and the Chief of General Staff were official, ColonelBAGASORA proposed that the army take the whole matter in hand, but the other officerswho were not close to the President’s Office did not share this opinion. ICAYUMBA agreedwith BAGOSORA after he received telephone calls from some officers. GeneralDALLAIRE arrived and said that if we chose BAGOSORA’s proposal, the UN could donothing but leave .... Earlier on during the discussions, the status o.f Prime Minister Agathewas contested. For BAGOSORA, the government no longer existed. He even said so toGeneral DALLAIRE.

Witness BW

99

...the evening of 6 April... I arrived at around 9:00 PM and found several officers in a smallroom at the Army Headquarters. In attendance were Colonel Bagasora, GeneralNdindiliyamana, Lt. Col. Rwabalinda, Lt. Col. Rwamanywa and Lt. Col. Kayumba. PerhapsLt. Col. Kanandelc~ve was also present but I do not know that for a fact. By the time I arrived,the officers present had confirmation that the President was indeed on the plane. When otherofficers arrived, we moved to a larger room. I remember that Colonel Marchal and GeneralDallaire were also present. Before they arrived, General Ndindilyimana had asked ColonelBagasora to chair the meeting. Bagasora accepted immediately, and nobody questioned thedecision .... Immediately after choosing a replacement for the Chief of Staff, Bagasora said:"There is a political vacuum and I think we need to take matters in our hands". One of theofficer said that the army did not have the authority to make that decision but I do not knowexactly which officer it was. Some officers said that may decision on the subject had to bemade in the spirit of the Amsha Accords. It was ctear that Colonel Bagasora had somethingelse in mind. He stuck to his guns claiming that the President’s death created a political

vacuum and suggested a coup d’~tat .... At the beginning, Colonel Kayumba remainedsilent. Later on, he went into the room where Colonel Bagasora was receiving calls. Shortlyafter, Colonel Bagasora returned to the place we were. When he returned from that room,Kayumba told us that he shared Bagasora’s position and added that he had spoken to otherofficers and they had agreed that the military should take matters in their hands.

Witness BW

Colonel BAGOSORA confirmed to me the death of the Head of State mad informed me thata Military Committee had been set up to temporarily govern the country .... ColonelBAGOSORA rejected any idea of contacting.the Prime Minister, despite nay advice and thatof General Dallaire on the opportuneness of such an encounter.

Letter from Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, Former Special Representative of theSecretary General of the UN in Rwmada, Yaounde, 20 July 1995.

©

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6.5 While this meeting was going on, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana

was tracked down, arrested, sexually assaulted and killed by Rwandan Army

personnel. Concurrently, members of the Rwandan Army arrested, confined and

killed important opposition leaders. Hence, the following were killed: the

President of the Constitutional Court, the Chairman of the PSD party and

Minister of Agriculture, the Vice-Chairman of the PL party and Minister of

Labor and Community Affairs, as well as a member of the Political Bureau ofthe MDR, the Minister of Information. That same morning, the ten Belgian

para-commandos from UNAMIR who were dispached to the Prime Minister

residence to escort her to the radio were brutally murdered at Kigali military

camp.

100

EcoleIn April 1994, I was Chief Warrant Officer in the FAR and an arms drill instructor at theSupdrieure Militaige (ESM) in Kigali. I taught arms drills to officer cadets...

On the morning of 7 April, at about 7:00 am, I reported to the ESM. There were roadblockseverywhere. I was able to pass through them because I was in unifoma and was carrying myweapon. I arrived at the ESM at around 8:00 a.m. and was ordered by the second-in-command of the school to take position at the comer of Rue de NYARUGUNGA and AvenuePaul VI in order to defend the ESM.There was a roadblock next to the French Cooperation office which was manned by soldiersfrom the ESM. Belgian military personnel passed by in five or five jeeps on their way toAgathe’s residence. It was around 9:00 a.m.They passed through the roadblock after engaging in a protracted argument and shooting inthe air. I saw the jeeps go to Agathe’s residence. An armored vehicle came out of thepresidential residence and headed in the direction of Agathe’s residence. Soldiersaccompanied the armored vehicle. They were deployed as a skimaish contingent. They wentup to Agathe’s residence. .,Other soldiers fi’om the ESM and Kigali military camp were heading for Agathe’s residence.The jeeps of the Belgian military personnel were in front of Agathe’s gate. I think there werefour or five of them.A minibus from the air force squadron arrived at Agathe’s residence. It came from thedirection of Kigali military canlp. I believe it was carrying two or three people.The vehicle went straight to Agathe’s residence. At that moment, I was still at standing atmy defence position. I saw the minibus leave Agathe’s residence and head for Kigalimilitary camp. In it, I saw a number of Belgian soldiers. I did not see any black peace-keepers in the vehicle. It headed for the camp via Avenue de l ’Armde, but it is possible thatit reached the camp via Avenue de la R~volution. Some colleagues came and told me thatafter being dropped off at Kigali military camp, the Belgian soldiers were beaten by thedisabled and the wounded who were at the camp. They went on to say that already two ofthe Belgians had died. I do not recall the names of the colleagues who told me that.I immediately went to Kigali military camp to see what was going on there. When I arrivedat the camp entrance, I saw Colonel NUBAHA preventing the Rwandan military personnelfrom going into the room where the Belgian soldiers were. They had locked themselves inthe room, together with a number of Ghanaians.Outside the room, a black UN captain who spoke better English than French was asking thecamp commander to release the UN military personnel. Rwandzm soldiers were shouting thatbecause the President had died, the Belgian nationals had to die as well. Colonel NUBAHAattempted to release the Belgian nationals with the UN Captain. The Rwandan soldierspresent refilsed. So, Colonel NUBAHA and the Ghanian Captain got the Ghanaianpeacekeepers out of the UN duty room.As the Ghanaian soldiers were leaving the UN duty room, a Rwandan soldier from the bandcompany managed to gain entry into the room. At that very moment, a Belgian soldiermanaged to take away the Rwandan soldier’s weapon, a Kalachnikov. The Ghanaians leftthe room and the Belgians remained behind in the UN duty room, with the Rwandan soldierthey were holding.The Rwandan soldiers Were afraid to enter the UN duty room because they had seen the

101

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Belgians seize the Kalachnikov.They started shooting at the room with sub-machine guns in order to kill the Belgians inside.The bullets were not hitting the Belgians. The soldiers went around the front of the room andthrew grenades through the windows. I could hear a Belgian soldier shouting in French:"Colonel, save us, Colonel."I knew that the shouts were aimed at Colonel NUBAHA. Colonel NUBAHA had-left for theESM at that moment and reportedly told people participating in a meeting that Rwandansoldiers were killing Belgian military personnel.I did not see ifNUBAHA returned towards the guardroom.They continued firing at the house with guns and grenades.The Belgian too were shooting, blindly, with the Kalachnikov.In the end, an MGL was brought in, a multiple grenade launching rifle, because it was beingsaid that lieutenant was not yet dead. The building was shot at with an MGL for a long while,until no more cries were heard.It was then around 11:30 a.m. I was at the location at that moment.I would like to mention, now that the question is asked, that I was not near the UN duty roomall the time. I returned to my defense position several times. I saw only two bodies at the UNduty room.Since the question is asked, I would like to specify that the grenade launcher was seized froma soldier who was passing by. I did not know the identity of the soldiers who did the shootingand who had weapons. Since I belonged to the ESM, I did not know the people from Kigalimilitary camp. While they were shooting at the Belgians, there was a period of respite atAgathe’s residence. From my defense position, I saw soldiers heading for Agathe’sresidence. These were officer cadets who were following OP3 (officier de la policejudieiaire) training. I thought they were looters.When they arrived at Agathe’s residence, they shouted and went inside the compound andfound Agathe hidden in the servants’ quarters. I heard shouts of joy and applause. They wereyelling out that they had found Agathe.At that moment, I went to Agathe’s residence with soldiers who were at the position. Theyall ran towards Agathe’s residence without being ordered to do so.We all went into the compound and I saw Agathe holding a dia’y and videotape. She was bythe servants’ quarters.Some people were yelling out saying that she should be killed and others that she should bedriven to the General StaffHeadquarters, Agathe said that she kmew a lot of state secrets andthat she should be taken to the General Staff Headquarters. She went on to say that sheshould not be killed. The two sides, those in favour of idlling her and those in favour ofdriving her to the General Staff Headquarters, were having a fierce argument amongthemselves. While they were arguing, I left the residence with 15 to 20 other soldiers. Themajority of us were from the south. The others, approximately 30 individuals, remained onsite and continued to argue.When we returned to our positions, I heard gunshots and applause coming from the Agathe’sresidence. It was approximately 11:45 a.m. I am sure of the time because Chief WarrantOfficer BITWAYIKI (currently a refugee in Zaire), who, although he was from the north,was not an extremist, told us to look at our watches because that was a moment we wouldnever forget.

102

It was he who had discreetly signaled to us to leave Agathe’s residence. Soon thereafter, Isaw a corporal passilg by our position. He was wearing a gold necklace and he told us it wasAgathe’s and that he was going to give it to his wife. Hence, we understood the reason forthe gunshots and the applause we had heard moments before and that Agathe was dead.We asked the other soldiers returning from Agathe’s residence who had shot Agathe. Theytold us that it was a gendarmerie lieutenant who was receiving training in criminalinvestigation work. At around 2:00 p.m., I once again went to Agathe’s residence with thesoldiers who were at the position with me. We found the bodies of two men on the thresholdof Agathe’s house. They were wearing suits. There was a third dead body which I recognizedas being that of Agathe’s servant because I knew that the individual worked at the house.We found Agathe’s body in her living room. The body was nude. Her night dress had beenlifted up to her chest. I saw gunshot wounds on the body. I also shw noticed that a bottle(Fanta or Petit Mutzig) had been forced into her vagina. Only the bottom of the bottle wasstill visible. According to what I have heard, Agathe’s body reportedly remained there fortwo days before being transported to the morgue at the Ic~kl’,IOMBE military hospital. (Thiswas reported to me by a chief warrant officer named NZUNGIZE, who was a medicalassistant at the hospital. He is in Zaire.)

Witness AE

©

When I arrived there was a large concentration of Presidential Guard soldiers in the street.I stopped .......... and next ......... the home of the Bizimana the MinisterofDefence. There wasa PG soldier standing with a group of other PG soldiers and I spoke with him in front of theothers. I cannot rember this sodiers name but we had seen ezch oflaer before, We spoke aboutthe death of member of the opposition and the death of the Presidentby the RPF. I cannotnow remember the conversation exactly but it was somethig like this.The soldier said; "Your friends are dead."I said: "Which friends?"The soldier said: " (Frrderic) Nzamurambaho (Minister of Agriculture) and some names I don’t remember." .,

I ask why they had been killed and they said something like these opposition leaders and theRPF were responsible for the death of the President. They said that they received their ordersto kill these opposition peiople from above. I remember this because it was an odd comment.They seemed surprised in this conversation that I did not knew about these matters. They gota bit agitated with me and so I quickly went. ........ I became very scared as a result of thisbecause I realized that I was at risk of linked with members of the opposition. You see i waswondering what they meant by orders from above, and who gave the orders ........... "

Witness CQ

While we were on the assembly grounds, on 7 April, at around 7:30 a.m., I saw theCommander of the Reconnaissance Battalion, Major Nzuwonemeye, leaving the camp withsix armored vehicles. I did not know where they were headed. It was only in the afternoonthat I learned that they had gone to the residence of the Prime Minister, Agathe

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UWILINGIYIMANA, in order to murder her.Witness CE

On 7 April 1994, at about 8:00 a.m., when I was going to collect the documents I had left ...I met ... of the Presidential Guard camp, along with a section that he was leading. They weregoing down towards the ministerial area near the Primature. After I struck up a conversationwith him, he told me that they were in the process of searching for and arresting certainprominent authority figures and that the order had corne from Colonel BAGOSORA. Thesergeant told me this with pleasure because they were getting a great deal of money fi’om thevictims, who thought they would be pardoned .... At almost the same moment, I personallysaw the Minister of Infonaaation, RUCOGOZA, and his wife in a Volkswagon Jetta car, inthe company of the PG, going towards the Presidential Guard camp. They were to beexecuted there shortly thereafter...

Witness DT

When we arrived at Agathe’s house (which was almost next door), we met a group soldiers led by a second lieutenant and two non-commissioned officers named SEMANA andNIYONEZIMA from the Presidential Guard camp. There were also reinforcements from theKanombe military, camp. It must have been to dissuade Agathe’s B~lgian guards fi’om tryingto put up any resistance. Sergeant SEMANA, whom I had known since we went to theButare school for non-commissioned officers [ESO], confided to me that they had just killedAgathe, her husband, her advisor Ignace, and a man were must have been their guest, andthat there were others on the list that was issued by Colonel BAGOSORA. However, therewere three people whom I did not know in this group of soldiers, which had just committedthe crime; Sergeant SEMANA told me th@ came from the Kanombe- camp as part of acompany of reinforcements whose mission was to subdue Agathe’s Belgian close protectionteam in case of resistance.

Witness DT

The vehicle belonged to SAGAHUTU’s squadron. I got out and waited at the camp. Thejeep went out on its own without an escort. When they returned, the driver, CorporalRUHUMULIZA, who was from Kibungo and is now a refugee in Zaire, told me what theyhad gone to do. In addition, when the armoured vehicles returned from patrol in themorning, two soldiers who took part told me about what had happened. The two soldiers area Corporal nicknamed Django, who subsequently died, and Corporal AFRICA, who tookrefuge in Zaire. From what they said about the events, I gathered that they had taken part inthe attack on Prime Minister Agathe’s residence. They said they found Agathe at anembassy (I no longer recall which one), took her to her home, removed all her clothingexcept her undergarments, laid her on the ground, pushed a soft drink bottle into her vaginaand then began shooting her, starting with the head and then the rest of her body. I believethat this patrol was led by SAGAHUTU, because he did not stay at the camp and was outmoving around all night.

Witness DN

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()

Murder of Kavaruganda, President of the Constitutional Court00:00: Telephone Call from next:door neighb0ur, F. Nzamuran:ibaho ~inister of Agricultureand PSD chairman, killed shortly after): "Our neighbour, the ministers of the MRND andtheir family, have been evacuated by the Presidential Guard." 04:30: Second telephone carlfrom the same neighbour: "We are under attack and the entire fieighbourhood has beensurrounded by the Presidential. Guard since they evacuated the MRND dignitaries who livedin the ministerial neighbourhood."06:00: A soldier knocks at the door: "My superiors have asked me to come get you. I amCaptain Kabera of the Presidential Guard."06:55: Joseph Kavaruganda (President of the Constitutional Court) on the telephone: "ThePresidential Guard has entered the property with about folnty men led by Captain Kabera..

The Presidential Guard is attacking. They have starting shooting and are probablybreaking down the door entering the living room. It’s over for us."A gendarme accompanying the Presidential Guard, who knows the fanaily, says: "We havecome from Minister Lando’s house (vice-chairman of the Parti Libdral); they are all dead,even his mother is dead."07:10 In the master bedroom, the following are present: Joseph Kavarugand and his wife,and Captain Kabera with about ten of his men.- Kabera: Military salute! Mister President, you are going to come with us, whetherwillingly or by force, we are going to place you under cover, where we have placed the other,to prevent the RPF from capturing you and to put the transition institutions in place. TheMinister of Information Faustin Rucogoza is already there.- Kavaruganda: I am not crazy. I cannot put’the institutions in place when the President isdead. There are other priorities at the moment ....The pick-up truck engine starts, Joseph Kavaruganda anaong the soldiers and CaptainKabera...

"Communiqud from Almunciata Kavaruganda, widow of JosephKavaruganda, President of the Constitutional Court", 26/12/95, Brussels,pages 7 and 8.

During the night of 6 to 7 April, I noticed from my location a number of civilian carsentering the camp with civilian passengers. They would then head in the direction of the non-commissioned officers’ canteen. On 7 April, at around 11:00, while I was with SergeantNdahayo, I overhead a conversation on his radio between Adjutant Rulinda andCommandant Mpiranyi concerning the presence on the camp premises of the Minister ofInformation, Mr. Rucogos. The Adjutant said that the Minister of Infomlation was at thecamp, to which the Commandant responded: "Why do you keep those people around?" Afew moments later, we heard gunshots, and later some soldiers said that the Minister hadbeen assassinated.I also remember that on 7 April 1994, at around 11:00, Corporal Mujyambere told me thatthe President of the Constitutional Court, Mr. Kavaruganda, was also being detained at thecamp. I later heard on the radio that he had been killed.

Witness BB.L

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(:;!:

Murder of Landoal~Ndasingwa

Later, I was assigned to the 1st Battalion Muvumba in the Mutara region. In July 1992, Iwas transferred to the Kanombe camp where I stayed until December 1992. When I receivedmy paratrooper’s licence, I was transferred to the Presidential Guard battalion at Kimihururacamp...Some of the soldiers who were on duty at the camp gate, including .... infom~ed me thatAdjutant Kinyakura had left tl’~e camp with soldiers from the Paracommando Battalion to gokill Minister Ndasingwa.

Witness BB

In 1992 Ndasingwa Landoald became minister of Labour and Social Affairs for the LiberalParty. He was also the first vice president of the PL. Early in the morning of the 7th of April1994 there came about twenty members of the Presidential Guard, I knew it was thePresidential Guard because I recognized their uniforms with their black berets. I think theycame from their barracks, about 500 meters from Lando’s place. I saw they were armed with(hand) grenades, rifles (R4 and G3), pistols and rockets. They surrounded Lando’s house..The leader of the PG was a Adjudant...The adjudant asked the Gendarmes to help him finishhis mission.The PG forced the wife, the mother and the two children of Lando to go to the bedroom ofLando. The whole family had to seat on Lando’s bed. Then a very little soldier came in. Hewas about 1.60 meter also a member of the PG. The soldier was armed with a pistol he shotLando through his head. After he shot Lando he also shot the other members of the family.He also shot them through the head. But the daughter of Lando died very slowly. The houseboy was also killed by the PG.

Witness EQ

O 6.6 The elimination of political opponents made it possible to set aside theestablishment of the Broa d-Based Transitional Governmenf (BBTG), stipulatedin the Arusha Accords, in favour of an Interim Government. The murder of theBelgian soldiers prompted the withdrawal of most of UNAMIR’s contingents.Those two events removed the two major obstacles to the pursuit of themassacres.

ICTR -Going back to Ms. Agathe...who do you think could have...were the real people toeliminate ? Do you know why she was eliminated?ZB -It was to put the Government into place.ICTR -Which was impossible as long as she was in there?ZB -Yes...

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ICTRZBICTR

:...

-She was not killed because she was a Hutu?-No.-Because based on the remarks of your vice-chairman, when he came to get you, I

think it carries a whole lot of meaning even as regards the people responsible; precisely onthat point, if we talk about the murder of Ms. Agathe, I think it is possible to zero in on agroup; I do not think we would have any difficulty based on the words of Mr. Karemera whotold you to identify the group which killed her.ZB -No.ICTR -Ok. So, do you remember what Mr. Karemera told you when he came to see you?ZB -Yes.ICTR -I have here the...the text we prepared together, when you..:could you read out..ZB -Yes.ICTR -...what he told you, and then your translation of those words, because I thinknaturally you made one...ZB "Ibya Agatha byabaye ngombwa ko tubirangi ngo tubone uko okushyirahogouvernement." [translation - It was necessary to get rid of Agathe in order to put ourGovernment into place.]

Witness ZB

Formation of the Interim Government

6.7 Making up for the failure of the attempt at a military takeover by certainmilitary personnel, the leaders of the MRND and military officers, includingColonel Th~oneste Bagosora, put in place an Interim Government which wouldaid and abet the continuation of the massacres.

©

C

See paragraph 6.8 onward

6.8 Already, in the night of 6 to 7 April, in Kigali, the Presidential Guard (PG)moved the MRND ministers and prominent members of the deceased PresidentHabyarimana’s circle. Some were taken to military camps. They weresubsequently moved to the HOtel Diplomate, where they were guarded bymembers of the Reconnaissance Battalion.

I was transferred to the Reconnaissance Battalion, Kigali Barracks, in 1988 .... On 7 April,at around 9:00 a.m., certain Ministers came to Kigali Barracks. They were CasimirBizimungu, Agn~s Ntamabyariro, Justin Mugenzi and Pauline Nyi~amasuhuko. They werethen taken to the H6tel des Diplomates. Our platoon commander, 2nd Lieutenant FaustinHabimana, then assigned two armored cars to escort them to the Hdtel des Diplomates.

Witness DY

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i"

(-)

CI;

6.9 On 7 April, at ~about 7:00 a.m,, ~ Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora called ameeting at the Ministry of Defence of the members of the MRND executive

committee, including Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera and Joseph

Nzirorera. The purpose of the meeting was to appoint a new President of the

Republic.

Immediately afterwards, [return to the ESM after the meeting with Mr. Booh Booh], Itelephoned Mathieu Ngirumpatse, President of the MRND, to brief him on the situation andwe agreed to meet at the Ministry of Defense early the following morning, at 07.00 hours.... Around 6:30, I left my house and went to my office at MINADEF, where ~ was to meetthe executive committee of the MRND party at 7:00. The executive committee memberscame to the meeting and told me they were not prepared to present a candidate in suchcircumstances, especially since they could not call a meeting of their party congress toappoint the candidate. I had to ask them to cut short the discussion so 1 could get to themeeting of the diplomatic corps...

Statement by Colonel Th6oneste BAGOSORA on his schedule fi’om the 6th April at18.00 to the 8th April 1994 at 19.00, signed by Col. BEMS BAGOSORA Th6oneste,

on 8 August 1994 in Goma, Za’fre, page 4.

6.10 On 8 April, Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora summoned political partyrepresentatives to a meeting to form a new Government. To that effect, he

arranged their transport to the Ministry of Defence. The members of the

Government were appointed at the meeting in the presence of MRND

representatives Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera and JosephNzirorera. They were almost all members of the MRND and of "Power" wings

of the other political parties. No one of Tutsi descent was included either in the

talks or in the new Government.

The following day, on 8 April at 08.00, I was again at the meeting of representatives ofpolitical parties which, on the previous day, had asked the crisis committee to facilitatecontacts for them. On that day, I practically remained at nay office where I closely followedthe developments between the representatives of the five political parties, i.e. the MRND,MDR, PSD, PDC, and PL. When they concluded their discussions at 19.30 hours, Iaccompanied them to the ESM [l~cole Sup6rieure Militaire] where the crisis committee was

to meet.,..Statement by Colonel Th6oneste BAGOSORA on his schedule from 6 April 1994 at18.00 hours to 8 April 1994 at 19.00 hours, signed by Col. BEMS BAGOSORATh6oneste, on 8 August 1994 in Goma, Za~’re, page 7.

The next morning [8 April], Ndindiliyimana called us to a meeting to tell us thatBAGOSORA hadassembled political leaders to fon-n an interim government.

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O

Ci

,L.

’During this meeting, BAGOSORA arrived with members of this government and we realizedthat he had chosen l~is men himself and that it was not at all consistent with the decisions

¯ reached at the meeting the previous day [which was to fox’in a transitional government in thecontext of the applicationof the Arusha Accords]We were faced with the fait accompli.By the 8th, I realized that no consensus had been reached between the POlitical body and themilitary and that the situation on the ground continued...

Witness EI

As far as Th6oneste BAGOSORA is concerned, I consider him to be the mastermind, theprime mover of events. I had drafted for my own use a list of persons whom I held to beaccountable: BAGOSORA’s name came first. During the months of May and :rune 1994,I met several ministers who told me how things happened during the night of the 6 to 7 April1994. They told me that it was BAGOSORA himself who selected them and who came toget them. The same applied for the interim president. It was BAGOSORA along with theinterim government who encouraged the massacres ....

Witness EJ

At the meeting which took place on the evening of the 7th, I felt that there was antagonismbetween BAGOSORA and the rest of the team in the sense that BAGOSORA wanted tochair the crisis committee, whereas this was a military cornmittee. We were opposed to himbeing chairman because he was retired fi’om the military and as Directeur de Cabinet, he wasa politician. We wanted a person from the military who had served the longest and who hadthe highest rank, i.e. Augustin NDINDILIYIMANA. He was present at the meeting.BAGOSORA said that he should be chairman’based on the fact that he was the representativeof the Minister in charge of the two forces, the Army and the Gendm’merie, but theparticipants refused outright.He then launched into personal attacks against certain officers, such as Colonel L6onidasRUSATIRA, saying that when the latter was Chef de Cabinet for the Minister of Defence,he had priority over the Chiefs of Staff. We pointed out that at the time, it was the Ministerhimself who delegated his Chef de Cabinet.In the end, it was NDINDILIYIMANA who chaired the meeting.BAGOSORA refused to have anything to do with the meeting and did not participate.It was decided at the meeting to examine ways to restore discipline within the PresidentialGuard and to facilitate contacts between the senior members of the Government and thepoliticians with the RPF, with UMANIR acting as the intermediary, in order to form atransitional government, as part of the implementation of the Arusha Accords.Normally it was the Chef de Cabinet for the Minister of Defence who was to act as theliaison between the top military brass and the various political and governnaent authorities,and thus ensure that the implementation of the decisions made at the meeting. The MilitaryHigh Command did not have any contact with its various administrative units.Bagosora left the meeting angry.The next morning [8 April], Ndindiliyimana called us to a meeting to tell us thatBAGOSORA had assembled political leaders to form an interim govemnaent.During this meeting, BAGOSORA arrived with members of this government and we realized

109

that he had chosen his men himself and that it was not at all consistent with the decisionsreached at the meeti/lg the previous day [which was to form a transitional govenmaent in the

context of the application of the Arusha Accords]We were faced with the fait accompli. "’

Witness EI

C?:

6.11 Jean Kambanda was appointed Prime Minister of the Interim Governmentof Rwanda formed on 8 April 1994. The Government was ofticially sworn in on

9 April 1994. It was composed of 19 cabinet Ministers.Augustin Bizimana,Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Ntagerura and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko wereamong the nine MRND ministers. AS the designated Minister of the Interior did

not take up office, he was replaced by Edouard Karemera, Vice-Chairman of theMRND. The MDR was represented by three ministers, inlcuding Andr6

Rwamakuba and Eli6zer Niyitegeka.

I, Jean Kambanda, in the name of God the Almighty, swear before the Nation that I shallfaithful!y perform my duties, remain loyal to the Head of State and to the Republic andpromote the.interests~ of Rwanda in accordance with the constitutio~er laws.

.......Our country is experiencing~ent is about to be put in place whichwill deal with the problem of the war, as well the insecurity in the country and the faminewhich is plaguing several regions of the country, affecting mainly tl~e people who have beendisplaced due to the war. The parties participating in the Govermrtent used those three pointsas their basis and presented them to serve as the government’s line of conduct. Given thedelicate task at hand and the hard times we are facing, the following are the Ministers wewish to assist us in this Cabinet:

Mr. J6rome Bicamumpaka, Minister of Foreign AffairsMr. Faustin Munyazesa, Minister of the Interior mad Community Development

.Ms. Agn6s Ntamabyaliro, Minister of JusticeMr. Augustin Bizimana, Minister of DefenceDr. Straton Nsabumukunzi, Minister of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

~,Dr. Andr6 Rwamubuka, Minister of Primary and Secondary Education,,Dr. Daniel Mbangura, Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research.Mr. Emmanuel Ndindibahizi, Minister of Finance.,Mr. Prosper Mugiraneza, Minister of Public Service.Mr. Eliezer Niyitegeka, Minister of InformationAVIr. Justin Mugenzi, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Small Industry..Dr. Augustin Ngirabatware, Minister of Planning¯ ,Dr. Casimir Bizimungu, Minister of Health,,Mr. Andr6 Ntagerura, Minister of Transport and Communications,.,g,lr. Jean de Dieu Habineza, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs,,Mr. Rafiki Hyacinthe Nsengiyumva, Minister of Works and Energy

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..... ~

O

5-,.jg-!dvlr. Caspard Ruhumukiza, Minister of the Environment and Tourism,Ms. Pauline Nyiram~asuhuko, Minister of Family and Gender Affairs.,Mr. Callixte Nzabonimana, Minister of YouthYour Excellency, those are the officials I would like to assist me in accomplishing the threeobjectives assigned to us by the parties in this government.

Speech by Jean Kambanda, 9 April 1994, aired on the radio

After his nomination in accordance with the Constitution, the President of the Republic alsoasked the party from which the Prime Minister came to give him another candidate. Thatparty is MDR. So, MDR nominated me, Kambanda as a candidate. The President of theRepublic and the political parties also agreed upon that. Then, the President of the Republicasked me to set up a government immediately. In agreement with the political parties, weset up a government of which I introduced some members to you. That government was setup during difficult times, because as we were being sworn in, firing could be heard in Kigali.It was on the 9th.

Speech of lean Kambanda, 19 April 1994, Radio Broadcast.

6.12 As soon as the Interim Government was tormed, numerous Cabinetmembers supported the plan of extermination in place and took the necessarysteps to execute it. They incited the people to eliminate "the enemy and itsaccomplices", distributed weapons to them, dismissed local governmentauthorities who were opposed to the massacres, replacing them with others whowere devoted to the cause, and adopted.directives intended to facilitate themassacre of the civilian Tutsi population.

See paragrpah 6.13 onward

Scaling-Down of UNAMIR’s Person n el

6.13 UNAMIR was established in order to facilitate the peacefulimplementation of the institutions foreseen under the Arusha Accords. ThisUnited Nations military force was perceived as an obstacle by Certain membersof the extremist political circles. Certain eminent figures in this circle thusadopted a strategy intended to provoke the Belgian lnilitary contingent,UNAMIR’s most effective and best-equipped contingent. Their ultimate goalwas to force them to withdraw.

See paragrpah 6.14 onward

6.14 Hence, a propaganda campaign against the Belgians was run, notably withthe aid of the media, such as Radio Tdldvision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM),

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founded and directed by F61icien Kabuga, and the newspaper Kangura.

~h;~p~hl~’~hieh:"~efe’~tieifi~ i~i~]~ted in :~gati~:are ~other sot~~~;on2as "~g~ds;;t~e:~:~atir~9tgi~ a.tmosp:here~ Ehere is also a document from the national command0~"N~rhhamw~,"~:’~dre?S~d"io’ the special representative, Mr. Booh Booh, harshlycriticizing the biased attitude of UNAMIR, and the Belgians in particular. .... I think it isimportant to put the anti-Belgian atmosphere in context. It was an anti-UNAMIR sentimentwith periodic flare-ups directed at the Belgian. One incident struck me as being significantin that regard, and that was when a stone was thrown into the glass door of the administratorof Radio Mille Collines. I realized the security of the Belgian military personnel and theexpatriates was in danger....Radio Mille Collines aimed at various targets, especially the.Belgians in UN~IR and General Dallaire?’ .........

Testimony by Colonel Luc Marchal before the Belgian Senate, 7/3/97

Also see paragraphs 6.5 to 6.20

6.15 On 7 January 1994, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Augustin Bizimana, AugustinNdindiliyimana, D6ogratias Nsabimana, Robert Kajuga and other influentialMRND members participated in a meeting at the MRND headquarters. On thatoccasion, they decided to provoke the Belgians by various means, notably duringthe demonstration which was to take place on 8 January 1994.

After the Belgian military personnel started confiscating the weapons, ammunition and the otherexplosives approximately four days ago, as part of their UNAMIR mission, Mr. Ngirumpatse,chairman of the MRND, convened a meeting of the Interahamwe officials at the party headquartersin Kimihurura yesterday afternoon to decide on how best to react. The meeting was attended by theMinister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff of the FAR and the Gendarmerie, the SCR officials(pro-MRND), the high-ranking political leaders within the MRND, and the Interahamwe nationalchairman, Robert Kajuga. At the conclusion of the meeting, aside from the demonstration decidedon yesterday and organized to counter those wishing to put the transitional "Government" into place,the reaction vis-5.-vis the Belgian soldiers was to be as follows:

4. Make the Interahamwe aware of the absolute need for them defend themselves should theBelgian soldiers (UNAMIR) attempt to confiscate the weapons from a member of the

MRND and, if necessary, teach them the Intifada (war of stones)..~5. Render inoperative the cooperation between ¯a) UNAMIR and gendarmes chosen to assist it;b) civilians, the Belgian soldiers and UNAMIR,

Report from a source to KITBAT, Lt. Nees, 8/1/94

112

6.16 Indeed, on 8 January 1994, elements of the Rwandan Army in civilian

clothes participated in the said demonstration with a number oflnterahamwe-MRND. They had hidden weapons in the vicinity of the demonstration with the

intent to kill some Belgian UNAMIR soldiers. Finally, no Belgian UNAMIR

partol was sent to the scene ....

2, HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAY’S DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH

AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND

BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPEDTO PROVOKE THE R.PF BN TO ENGAGE ( BEING FIRED UPON)

THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTieS WERe TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON

ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLEAMENT, BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE .PROVOKED AND IF

BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS

GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA,

3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERSOF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS INPLA1N CLOTH ES, ALSO AT LEAST

ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALi WERE IN THE

DEMONSTRATION.Code cable sent by GeneraI Dallaire, UNAMIR Force Commander, toGeneral Baril, Department of Peace Keepfi~g Operations, U.N., New York,11 January 1994.

6.17 On 26 January 1994, Joseph Nzirorera, Edouard Karemera, Jean

Habyarimana and the Chairman of the Interahamwe, Robert Kajuga,

participated in a meeting at the MRND headquarters. They worked out a

strategy to set the Interahamwe-M1LND against the Belgian troops.

According to our correspondent....there was a meeting of the MRND political authorities atthe party secretariat in Kimihurura on Wednesday, 26th, in the afternoon. The meeting wasled by Joseph Nzirorera (National Secretary of the MRND) and attended by EdouardKaremera (tst vice-chairman), Jean I-Iabyarimana (MRND chairman in Kigali-Villeprdfecture) and Robert Kajuga (national chaim~an of the Interahamwe). The meetingexamined ways and means to set the Interahamwe against the Belgian UNAMIR troops. Atthe conclusion of the meeting, proposals were made and were to be submitted to the MRNDchairman for decision. The proposals included the following:

Refuse to heed the orders of the Belgian UNAMIR troops

¯ Whenever the military personnel go a specific location, quickly call in theother Interahamwe in the area to discourage the soldiers from carrying outtheir plamaed action.

¯ Should the Belgians use their strong-handed approach, respond with back-upfrom other Interahamwe and if necessary call upon the civilians present to actas witnesses. .,

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Do not intervene in certain areas where the Belgians enjoy the sympathy of the population,but put up resistance first. Plunge the Belgian UNAMIR troops into a state of collective

panic by means of all possible shams. Report from a source to KITBAT, Lt. Nees, 29/1/94

6.18 In the night of 6 to 7 April 1994, a number of Belgian military personnel

were ordered to go to the Prime Minister’s residence and to escort her to the

¯ nto make an address. When they arrived at

national radio staUo , where she wasthe Prime Minister’s residence at around 5:00 a.m., they were attacked by FAR

personnel. Later, the ten Belgian paracommandos, along with the five Ghanaian

soldiers who were guarding the Prime Minister, were disarmed and arrested.Despite the terms under which their surrender was negotiated and the promiseto take them to a UNAMIR base, the Belgian and Ghanaian soldiers were taken

to Kigali military camp.

Sector HQ told Oscar that Agathe was to make a speech on Radio Rwm~da at 5:30 a.m. toappeal to people to be cairn. She therefore required an escort. At 2:38 a.m., although he hadnot yet reached Viking, Y6 received the assigmnent of escorting Agathe from her residenceto the Radio Rwanda building, where she was to speak at 5:30, while two sections of C6would take position outside the building. $6 specified that under the circumstances, theyshould use a double escort. Y6 asked to be allowed to retrieve the two jeeps left at the

d Y1, hearing this order onthe radio, notified Y6 that Y1 hadairport, but $6 refuse ~ . ~.~,,,~,,aA ereforeca out the mission with Y6,completed the Booh Boon assignment and ~ .....

th try

proposing to meet Y6 at Agathe’s home.At 3:04 a.m., Y6 reported that he had been stopped at the roadblock at the intersection 400m north of Agathe’s home. $3 asked Y6 to meet Agathe by going around on the north side.

Y1 was also stopped by roadblocks and asked for gendarmes in order to bypass them. The

request was transmitted to C6, who assigned gendarmes.At 3"19 a.m., Y1 and Y2 managed to meet Y6 and Y5 at the .porner of Avenue de laR6publique and Rue de l’H6pital, where they crone upon other roadblocks blocking the citycentre. Y6 backed up approximately 100 metres to the 1000 Collines intersection.At 3:45 a.m., Y6 reported that Y Base was able to get in touch with Agathe by telephone, butunfortunately she could do nothing to get things moving.C6, C22 and the gendarmes met them at the I000 Collines intersection, but were unable toget things moving. $3 asked Sector HQ for an RAF liaison officer ~o intervene ~md told Y6zo remain on the spot until the Officer arrived. At 5:03, the situation was unchanged.At about 5:15, Y6 report that the Agathe assiglmaent would still be possible as C6 had just

reported that C6 had found a route via the south.At 5:32 a.m., Y1 reported that while in contact with an AML crew who were at the 1000Collines, the RAF had told Y1 that only the Mia~ister of Defence could authorize Agathe tospeak on the radio (and the Minister of Defence was abroad, at the regional conference in

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Yaound6).o~.

At about 5:35 a.m.,~the four jeeps with Y6 passed through the Saint S1%e roadblock onAvenue Paul VI, where C6 was located, and they continued in the direction of Agathe’shouse. They were caught in gunfire at the house. Two jeeps managed to enter the property,while the two others remained outside on the left side of the road. All the personnel enteredthe house. Y6 contacted Agathe and notified Oscar that she wanted reinforcements for herguards and no longer wanted to go to Radio Rwanda, This was 5:42 a.m. Her vehicles onthe road were being targetted .by an AML.$6, believing C6 was still accompanied by one section, asked C6 and Y6 to take position inas secure a place as possible until daylight, and then to try to regroup. Y6 said that if Y6were to take position inside the house, Y6 would lose radio contact. $6 told Y6 that radiocontact had to take precedence and Y6 therefore had to take position in the garden of thehouse.Shortly before 6:00 a.m., Y5 reported Y6 that the Rwandans believed that the Belgianswanted to kill Agathe and that the situation had to be clarified. $6 asked Sector HQ toclarify the situation at its level, and ordered the escort to protect Agathe inside or around herhouse, but not to shoot unless they were themselves directly attacked.At about 6:50 a.m., Y6 reported that explosions had gone off very near them, and it waslikely rifle grenades. $6 told them to take cover, if necessary inside the house, near thevehicles.At 7:20 a.m., Y6 reported that Y6 was inside the house and that sho~ting and movement wastaking place around Agathe’s house. Similar information came in from several billets,notably Viking and Franciscus.At about 8:20, Agathe requested help through Y6 and said sfie wanted to flee. $6 told Y6to remain under cover and not to follow the Prime Minister if She wanted to flee from gardento garden because Y6 would no longer be in radio contact with PC Bn and their behaviourwould look suspect to the FAR at the various roadblocks. On S6’s advice, Y6 tried topersuade Agathe to remain with them because they could not go along with her, but she fledanyway and took refuge at the neighbours’ homeAround 8:30 a.m., Y6 notified $6 that a Rwandan major was proposing to take the escortback to UNAMIR if they surrendered. The soldiers accompanying him were behaving in athreatening manner, saying "If you do not do as we ask, you will die". Y6 went on to daythat Agathe had left. $6 told Y6 that since Agathe had left, Y6 could negotiate theirdeparture without having to hand over their weapons.At that time, technical problems due to the radio battery forced $6 to leave the duty officeand make contact again from his vehicle in the parking lot of the Pegasus. Meanwhile, K9came on the Bn network and said that Y6 was the leader on the ground, and that Y6 couldassess the situation and negotiate something better.At 8:45, things started to move faster, and Y6 notifed $6 that THREE of his men had alreadybeen disarmed and forced to the ground. $6 then told Y6 "Since three men are on the groundand disarmed, I think it is best to do as they say." From that momeiht on, there was no morecontact with Y6 on the Bn network. Having heard strange voices on the network andpresuming that the FAR could hear the Bn network via Y6’s vehicle, $6 told the Bn to switchto the Res frequency. Around 9:06 a.m., the operator on duty, after receiving a message fromC6 (M6’s Motorola was located at Vittamine), notified $6 that Y6 could be heard on the

115

Motorola network. Y6 had just enough time to tell $6 "We have been disarmed and takensomewhere, I don’t~know where; two men are outside; they are being beaten. Colonel, Ithink we are going to be lynched." Not knowing what to say, $6 tried to appear reassuringand replied that he must be exaggerating and that they were probably just going to be beaten.From that point on, thebattalion LOST contact with Y6.

KIBAT [Kigali Battalion] Report, 7 April 1994

,L,

As regards the ten peace-keepers, once they were disarmed, they were in no position tochoose one place over another, they received promises that they would be taken to anotherUN camp in exchange for their weapons . I know this because it was reported by theBattalion to the sector. In his last radio conversation with his battalion commander, Lt. Lotinsaid that he had been taken to a FAR camp but did not know exactly where he was. Thatmeans that even if he had had a choice as regards his destination, he could not have chosenKigali military camp as he did not know the place. I would like to point out that I did notfollow that last conversation between Lt. Lotin and Lt. Col. Dewez, because the radio Lt.Lotin used was that of the UN Observer at Kigali camp. I was not personally listening in onthis network. I learned of the contents of this last conversation much later on.

W[tness ZE

6.19 As soon as they arrived at Camp Kigali at around 9:00 a.m., the UNAMIRSoldiers were attacked and beaten by Rwandan soldiers in front of RwandanArmy officers. Four of the Belgian soldierswere killed instantly. Meanwhile, theGhanaian soldiers were set free. The six remaining Belgian soldiers withstoodseveral attacks over some hours before finally being killed.

When I arrived at the camp entrance, I saw Colonel NUBAHA preventing the Rwandanmilitary personnel from going into the room where the Belgian soldiers were. They hadlocked themselves in the room, together with a number of Ghanaians.Outside the room, a black UN captain who spoke better English than French was asking thecamp commander to release the UN military persomael. Rwandan soldiers were shouting thatbecause the President had died, the Belgian nationals had to die as well. Colonel NUBAHAattempted to release the Belgian nationals with the UN Captain. The Rwandan soldierspresent refused. So, Colonel NUBAHA and the Ghanian Captain got the Ghanaianpeacekeepers out of the UN duty room.As the Ghanaian soldiers were leaving the UN duty room, a Rwandan soldier from the bandcompany managed to gain entry into the room. At that very moment, a Belgian soldiermanaged to take away the Rwandan soldier’s weapon, a Kalachnikov. The Ghanaians leftthe room and the Belgians remained behind in the UN duty room, with the Rwandan soldierthey were holding.

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°L,.

The Rwandan soldiers were afraid to enter the UN duty room because they had seen ihe

Belgians seize the I~alachnikov.They started shooting at the room with sub-machine guns in order to kill the Belgians inside.The bullets were not hitting the Belgians. The soldiers went around the front of the room andthrew grenades through the windows. I could hear a Belgian soldier shouting in French:"Colonel, save us, Colonel."I knew that the shouts were aimed at Colonel NLrI3AHA. Colonel NUBAHA had left for theESM at that moment and reportedly told people participating in a meeting that Rwandansoldiers were killing Belgian military personnel.I did not see ifNUBAHA returned towards the guardroom.They continued firing at the house with guns and grenades.The Belgian too were shooting, blindly, with the Kalachnikov.In the end, an MGL was brought in, a multiple genade launching rifle, because it was beingsaid that lieutenant was not yet dead. The building was shot at with an MGL for a long while,until no more cries were heard.It was then around 11:30 a.m. I was at the location at that moment..4 would like to mention,now that the question is asked, that I was not near the UN duty room all the time. I returnedto my defense position several times. I saw only two bodies at the UN duty room.Since the question is asked, I would like to specify that the grenade launcher was seized froma soldier who was passing by. I did not know the identity of the soldiers who did the shootingand who had weapons. Since I belonged to the ESM, I did not know the people from Kigalimilitary camp.

Witness AE

©

Also see paragraph 6.5

6.20 Due to the anti-Belgian propaganda and the murder of the ten Belgianpara-commandos, Belgium informed the Security Council on 13 April 1994 thatit was withdrawing its contingent from Rwanda. A week later, the SecurityCouncil ordered a drastic reduction of UNAMIR’s civilian and military¯personnel.

It is obvious that under these conditions the continuation of the :~2NAMIR operation hasbecome pointless within the terms of its present mandate. In any event the continuedpresence of the Belgian contingent would expose it to unacceptable risks and wouldconstitute an obstacle to UNAMIR action as a whole. Indeed, Belgiun: notes that anextremist political faction is waging an anti-Belgian campaign and inciting people to murderBelgian soldiers. Having already suffered the loss of 10 soldiers, the Belgian contingentca:mot take such threats lightly.In conclusion the Belgian Goverment is of the opinion that is is imperative to suspend theactivities of UNAMIR without delay, until such time as the cinditions are met for the

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0

resumption of the peace process.LetteT from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nationsadressed to the President of the Security Council, dated April 13"~ 1994.

°t

In the light of this decision by the Goverment of Belgium, it is nay assessment that it will beextremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks effectively. The continued dischargeby UNAMIR of its mandate will become untenable unless the Belgian contingent is repalceby another, equally well equip ed contingent or unless the goverment of Belgium reconsidersits decision to withdraw its contingent.In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commanderto prepare plans for withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary, and sexad theirrecomandations to me in this regard. I shall keep the Council informed.

Letter from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the President ofthe Security Council, dated April 13th 1994

Perpetration of the Massacres

6.21 As from 7 April 1994, massacres of the Tutsi population and the murder

of numerous political opponents were perpetrated throughout the territory of

Rwanda. These crimes, which had been planned and prepared fbr a long time by

prominent civilian and military figures who shared the extremist Hutu ideology,

were carried out by militiamen, military personnel and gendarmes on the orders

and directives of some of these authorities, including Augustin Bizimana,

Edouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Rwamakuba, MathieuNgirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, Frlicien Kabuga and Juvenal Kaj elijeli..

See paragraphs 6.22 onward

6.22 As of the night of 6 to 7 April, in the capital, elements of the FAR set up

roadblocks, reinforced with armored vehicles, on the major roads, controlling

people’s movements. Concurrently, groups of soldiers and Interahamwe-MRND

scoured the city and murdered civilians. On the other hand Interahamwe-MRND

set up roadblocks of their own or joined those manned by military personnel. At

these places, people’s identities were checked, notably by means of verification

of identity cards, and the Tutsi or those identified as such were summarily

executed.

The night of 6 to 7 April, I was at home in Nyakabanda. At about 10 pm, RTLM announced thatthe President’s plane had been hit by a rocket. Then at 10:30, a number o£,grenades were launchedin the neighbourhood. There was also gunfire.

On the morning of 7 April, at about 7:00 am, I reported to the ESM. There were roadblocks

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.(’~)

L2

everywhere.weapon.

I was able to pass through them because I was in uniform and was can’ying my

Witness AE

Personally, on 6 April at about 9:00 pm, I received the order to strengthen the security forAgathe Uwilingiyimana and Faustin Twagiramungu. When we arrived at the President’sOffice, we were stopped by the PG (Presidential Guard) who were in an armoured vehicleand who prohibited us frona going on to Agathe Uwilingiyimana’s place. The roadblock wasa the comer of ESM and Avenue Paul VI. ’There were two sections of the PG. I personally recognized Corporal M uyambese andanother corporal named Edison, whose last name I cannot renaember. They are both fromGisenyi. After asking us where we were headed, they told us to turn around or else theywould kill us, because we knew what they had to do. The Rwandan gendarmes who wereguarding them (the oposition ministers) were taken prisoner by the PG.

Witness DE

From of the 7th of April 1994 we saw roadbloks appearing everywhere. These roadblockswere occupied by either soldiers or gendamaes together with people dressed in civilianclothes. These civilians were armed with mostly machetes but also spears and clubs. At theroadblocks all vehicles were searched to see if there were black people present. Whenwetried to pass a roadblock with black African people, who were not Rwandan, in our cars wehad a lot problems and sometimes we even had to point our weapons at the people whooccupied the roadblock.

Witness EK

On 6 April 1994, the day of the accident with the President’s plane, I was still in Kigali. Iwas living in Nyamirambo. The night of 6 April 1994, at about 8:00 pro, I was in Kiyovu,Rugenge secteur, Kabasingerezi cellule, in a small bar/shop, at the home of...I heard about the President’s death the same night between 8:30 and 9:00 pro. I was told thenews by..., whose home I was at that time. Suddenly, all nay fi’iends who were there, fiveof them, decided to return home. On my way, I came across a roadblock at near the businessLa Rwandaise downtown. The people manning the roadblock were wearing paratrooperuniforms, I immediately turned back to return to the home of... where i remained for therest of the night at his suggestion2

Witness CZ

On 7 April 1994 at 4:00 a.m., part of the para-commando battalion left the camp and begankilling all the Tutsis who lived around the camp and those wlno lived near PresidentHabyarimana’s residence. I witnessed that personally. The head of the para-commandobattalion was Major NTABAKUZE.

Witness GS

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I know that the soldiers at Kanombe barracks started firing immediately after the plane

crashed down... S~ortly after the plane came down, my son- in-law; a paratrooper inKanombe told me Nat I should not leave home again for they were going to start "working."To them, that meant "kill..."

Witness FM

6.23 Following the meeting of the morning of 7 APril 1994, Colonel Throneste

Bagosora ordered different Rwandan Army units Commanders to proceed with

the massacres. Furthermore the same day, the General Staff of the Rwandan

Army sent a telegram ordering the troops to seek the assistance of the

Interahamwe-MRND and of the people in identifying the Tutsi and to proceed

to exterminate them.

I think the 7 April 1994 meeting ended without reaching a consensus... All the officers wereon the tarmac discussing in groups. I moved close to Bagosora’s group. He was withColonel Nkundiye (a former Presidential Guard member and a former Presidential Guardcommandant and at that time Mutara secteur commandant), M~or Ntabukuze, para battalioncommandant, Major Uzuwonemeye (reconnaissance battalion commandant), and anotherofficer whose name I no longer recall. Then Bagosora told us in Kinyarwanda to startworking. That actually meant ’to start the work’. .... and I understand it as something theyshould set in motion or which had already been set in motion and well known to them all,something like a plan... I was intrigued because Bagosora was discussing with a formerPresidential Guard, a paratrooper and a sic -’a soldier from the armoured vehicle unit.

Witness BT

GUKORA, "to work," had been used since 1959 to mean to kill the Tutsis and bum thehouses. This word has become a part of the Rwandan mentality.

Witness ES

As regards the television interview you just read to me on Bagosora’s control over the threeelite units, namely the Presidential Guard, the Para-Commando Battalion and theReconnaissance Battalion, I have concluded that, since none of our requests was followedup by the Rwandan authorities, someone else was controlling these units. [n my view,Bagosora was the only person who had the authority to do it, in his capacity as Directeur deCabinet of the Ministry of Defence.

W i t n e s s Z E

On 7 April 1994, at about 8:00 a.m., when I was going to collect the documents I had left ...I met ... of the Presidential Guard canap, along with a section that he was leading. They weregoing down towards the ministerial area near the Primature. After I struck up a conversationwith him, he told me that they were in the process of searching for and arresting certainprominent authority figures and that the order had come fi’om Colonel BAGOSORA. The

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()

sergeant told me this~with pleasure because they were getting a great deal of money from the

victims, who thought they wouId be pardoned .... At almost the same moment, I personallysaw the Minister of Information, RUCOGOZA, and his wife in a Volkswagon Jetta car, inthe company of the PG, going towards the Presidential Guard eamp. They were to beexecuted there shortly thereafter...

Witness DT

On 7 April in the moming... At around 9:00 a.m. the same day, a group of soldiers fi’om thePresidential Guard arrived. They started knocking at the gate; then they forced it o pen andthen the broke the door to the main living-room...This group of soldiers was commanded byan officer who had the rank of captain (I heard him being addressed as Captain). He took outa list of names from his pocket and scanned it .... The officer hesitated briefly and thenordered his subordinates to kill me because I was a Tutsi, after all. At that very moment, oneof the soldiers answered back at the officer who had given the order for me to be executed,saying "Colonel Bagosora gave strict orders; he said we should stick to this list;consequently, we should not be killed. Let us first finish with the list and we can deal withthe others after that...

Witness BA

©

C

6.24 With Colonel Th~oneste Bagosora’s communique, broadcast by radio the

same day, asking people to remain at home and await further instructions, the

process of elimination of the civilian Tutsi population and of moderate Hutu by

military personnel and Interahamwe-MRND was facilitated.

On 7 April, around 6 a.m., Radio Rwanda broadcast the news together with an announcementfrom the army headquarters asking everyone to stay home.

Witness AA

During this period I saw some Gendarmes who were on a small post near Kabeza celluleoffice. They were accompanied with local interahamwe who showed them the houses for theTutsis in the area in order to kill them... On Thursday, at about 9 hrs in the morning duringthis period I was in the neighbour’s house, I saw the same Gendarmes ldllfl-tg a whole fmnilyin the area, the family members were Tutsi, it was the family or ..it was a family fi’om 8 to9 personts, I could identify from the military persons an Adjudant named COME, and aninfluential Interahamwe named John Birinda.

Witness CS

121

6.25 From April to July 1994, the officers of the General Staff of the Armyparticipated in daily meetings at which they were informed of the massacres ofthe civilian Tutsi population. These meetings assembled the members of theGeneral Staff and unit commanders, including, among others, Major-GeneralAugustin Bizimungu, as well as the directeur du cabinet in the Ministry ofDefence, Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora, and the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie,General Augustin Ndindiliyimana.

There were officers’ meetings at the Headquarters every day. These meetings were chairedby the Chief of Staff, Major General Augustin BIZIMUNGU and Colonel KABILiGI. Theunit commanders based in K.igali took part in the meetings: the city Ops Commander, MajorNTABAKUZE, Major MPIRANYA, etc ....

Witness AJ

On 9 April ..... we arrived at Kigali camp ....... After the operations, the officers would meeteveryday in the Multipurpose Room at the Headquarters. The officers included: MajorGeneral Augustin Bizimungu, Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo, GB Gratien Kabiligi, ColonelTh6oneste Bagosora, Colonel Nzinkiko, Major Nzuwonemeye, Lt. Colonel EphremRwabalinda, Major G6rar Ntamagezo, Maj or Nubaha, Commander B i vain vagara ....

Witness AK

When I arrived at the staff headquarters, I saw the chief of staff who explained to me theenemy’s position and that of the population. He said that the gendarmerie was in charge ofthe population and asked me to direct the operations there..,.

I attended some meetings at the staff headquarters during which the situation at the enemyfront was reported to the Govellament. That is all...

How many meetings were held during that period?

Since I arrived there, we held one meeting every week.In May and June, there were about six meetings to which all the ~taff and service officerswere invited,..

Gratien Kabiligi’s statement of 19 July 1997

6.26 Further, from April to July 1994, in the course of the massacres, somesoldiers gave assistance to Interahamwe-MRND, notably by providing themlogistical support, i.e. weapons, transport and fuel.

After the presidential plane was shot down, a Warrant Officer called Rudakangwa distributed

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AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT IN’I’¥RNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE

weapons to the Interahamwe at the roadblock on the Kanombe-Kigali road via Rubirizi.They distributed generally grenades and kakashnikovs along with ammunition. Theseweapons came from the Kanombe camp and were ordered by Ntabakuze. Witness DQ

The Chief Warrant Officer told the population that he was going to request weapons to fightthe enemy. Three days later, I saw the Chief Warrant Officer return with weapons. Theyincluded weapons with wooded butts which he bought in a Suzuki Samouri. The followingday, he distributed them to the Interahamwe. The Interahamwe tool< the weapons and laterasked the for some other type. I recognized one of the weapons as a G3 because my

neighbour had one... Witness DU

Between 8 and 10 April (I do not know the exact date), I saw Interahamwe come to CampKanombe to get fuel. They came in all kinds of civilian vehicles, including pick-ups trucks,minibus taxis. I can confin’n that they were Interahamwe because they were wearing theiruniforms. Up until I left, the Interahamwe continued to take fuel fi.0rn the pump located inthe Transport unit garage. But this post for fuel and lubricants was managed by

eadquarters .... We began to pack our belongings on 9 April and everything left on 10

HApril. On 11 April, we moved to Camp Kigali, where the Kigali-Ville Operations Cornmandhad been moved. When we were moving, I saw members of the Para-Commando Battalion,some of whom I recognized, on the APEKA school grounds where they were training more

than a hundred Interahamwe militiamen. Witness AJ

I also remember another incident, First Sergeant NTAMBARA, who was a mechanic in thesame unit as me, asked Commander BAZIRAMWABO for pemaission to go to Biryogo totake command of some Interahamwe. He rnade his request in the garage in nay presence.The commander replied that he would first seek the opinion of his superior officer,NZUWONEMEYE. Later on, he asked NTAMBARA to state his requirements, sinceNZUWONEMEYE had apparently agreed to the request. NTAMBARA requested grenadesand. ammunition for distribution to the [nterahamwe. After getting initial supplies, he

returned regularly to the camp to stock up again. Witness DN

6.27 Between April and July 1994, the Interahamwe-MRND militia

spearheaded the massacres, having been armed and well trained to exterminate

the enemy and its "accomplices" when the time was deemed to be appropriate.

123

The Interahamwe had a visible national, prefectural and local structure, as well

as a secret parallel s[ructure in which the most influential members of theMRND played a leadership role. Thanks to that very elaborate structure,

supported by the existing broad-based structure of the MRND, directives

circulated easily and were implemented effectively within the militia’s organs.

The Interahamwe-MRND participated actively and massively in the massacres

of 1994 ....

( :, .

ICTR

X

ICTRX

ICTR

X

Wait a second. Are you saying that the money was collected and deposited into theaccount?

It was not, was not deposited into the account. It was subsequently administered bythe parallel committee of the tnterahamwe.I see.Because we carried on with the 200,000 Rwandan francs, I was able to carry on themeeting with the 200,000 francs. I believe that with 200,000 francs, we managed toconduct two or three meetings. The money was gone. When that happened, theofficial committee went to the parallel committee and asked what happened to thefunds that were raised. The unofficial committee could not account for the money.So, we, the official committee, we combined the preparations for the meetings fromthen on.So, as I understand it, even if two of those individuals were not officially membersof the Interahamwe?Yes. For the Interahamwe, the m~mbers of the central committee, the entireexecutive was Interahamwe. It was, it was then that things increased and ...

Witness ZC-L.

. L

The Interahamwe modeled their organization on the MRND patty. However. despite the factthat they had their own organization, the Interahamwe received their orders fiom the MRNDparty, especially the national committee

[Expert witness report by Francois Xavier NZANZUWERA: "La criminalitd des[nterahamwe entre 1992 et 1994."] Case against Geol~es Rutaganda t).5.

6.28 Joseph Nzirorera, Secretary General of the MRND, exercised genuine

authority over the party youth wing, the Interahamwe, and gave orders to

massacre the civilian Tutsi population.

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6.29 In May 1994, Joseph Nzirorera went to the Canadian Embassy in Kigali

to find the family of a political opponent assassinated on 7 April. On that

occasion, Joseph Nzirorera ordered that all the Tutsi in the secteur be

eliminated. Following those orders, roadblocks were set up and several Tutsi

were killed.

\

C

,i )

In May 1994, I had sought refuge at the Canadian Embassy. When there, I heard a man’svoice saying, "Where are Kavaruganda’s children?" Chrysologue replied, "They are nothere, they left." The man then said, "There are many Tutsis here; they must beexterminated." When he left, Chrysologue told me that the man was Nzirorera. I do notknow Nzirorera and could not recognize his voice.

Witness BZ

From the 17th we were under protection of Jean-Baptiste, until the wife of Kavamganda andthe children left. I do not remember the date, but it was about two weeks after she came. Theday she left, Jean-Baptiste asked me, why I did not inform him about the departure. Abouttwo weeks later, Nzirorera, at that time Minister of Public Words and later President of theAssembly, came to the Ernbassy. Nzirorera crone with 3 soldiers of the Presidentiel Guard.Those were not the soldiers who guarded Juvenal’s house. I let them in. N zirorera did notsay, who he was and I did not kalow him. He asked me: Where are Kavaruganda’wife andthe children? I told him, they left. Then Nzirorera asked me " Who did you inform?""Nobody", I answered. I do not kwow why he asked for them. I think he came to kill them.Then I heard him saying: "All Tutsi’s who are here, should die." He was speaking with aloud voice so even the guards at the roadblock could hear him. Nzirorera was dressed in civilclotyes: shirt and trousers. As I said,I did not know this man was Nzirorera. After he left,.............. watchman ofpanalpina told me, he recognised this man as Nzirorera. Nzirorera leftat 10.00 a.m. At 14.00 p.m. the same day, the guards of the roadblock killed a Tutsi,named .....

¯ ’ Wimess BM

... I saw Minister Joseph NZIRORERA, trying to gain entry into the Canadian Embassy. Isaw him el.atering the Embassy. I do not remember the exact date. 1 know MinisterNZIRORERA because he was a Panalpina customer. I did not stop and did not hear whatNZIRORERA said. I was told that he was looking for ICAVARAGUNDA’s wife. Mycolleague, ..., who also worked at ... told me that he had heard NZIRORERA saying that"The Tutsis had to be killed and roadblocks had to be set up". When NZIRORERA left,roadblocks wer4~set up and the hunt for Tutsis began .... AFter setting up theroadblocks, they began the manhunt. A group of people came to .... I was in the building.

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... Before NZIRORERA came, I was on good terms with all the other guards, even soldiersto whom .... After NZIRORERA gave the order to set up roadblocks and to kill the Tutsiswho were there, the~situation changed and I was hunted to be killed. After NZIRORERAgave the order to set up roadblocks and to kill all the Tutsis, th~ entire group of guards(approximately thirty of them) used to constantly repeat the following slogan: "It’sNZIRORERA’s orders." Whenever they were about to carry out any kind of wrongful actthey would say: "It’s NZIRORERA’s orders."

Witness CB

6.30 Fearing the opinion of the international community, certain leaders

attempted to conceal the massacres in Kigali. Thus, as early as 9 April 1994, the

Secretary General of the MRND, Joseph Nzirorera, ordered the htterahamwe to

stop the massacres. The order was respected and made it possible to gather up

the corpses in the streets and conceal them in mass graves.

[...] The next morning, on 9 April, ifI remember correctly, was when the Government wasdue to be put in place. Ok. I was waiting for Ephrem to come and get me. He did not showup. Then in the afternoon...ICTR -Sorry to ask, but why were you waiting for him? To do what? Was he supposed tocome pick you up and what for?ZC -No. I thought we had to meet every day, you know. So v~e said: "Come by whenyou want. I’m here. You’ll find me here." I waited for him until the afternoon. That is whenhe came. He came with Bernard, accompanied by ajeep protected [?] by Presidential Guardsoldiers. When they arrived, they called me outside. They told me that the Government hadassigned Mr. Nzirorera the task of putting a stop to the massacres because there wasbeginning to be a lot of talk about the massacres within the international community. So,Nzirorera was put in charge of that, together with Minister Justin Mugenzi o f the PL [PartiLibdral]; so he asked...Nzirorera asked to see the Interahamwe committee to try and arrangea small meeting with him and try to travel throughout the city of Kigali and pacify things.So, when they came, I asked them if they had any news about Robert and they said they didnot. They said: "Perhaps Robert is at the office, but as we do not kmow how to reach theoffice by telephone, we have not heard from hint." I also asked them if they had seen, er, ifthey had seen Ph6nias, the first vice-chairman, mad they said they had not. I then asked aboutGeorges and they answered: "No. Georges lives in the Kicukiro area. We have, we have notbeen able to reach him but as you are here, and you are a member of the committee, we katowvery well that the secretary of the Interahamwe, Eugene Ngarushimana, he is at the FrenchEmbassy with you and Be... Eugbne, we are going to try to hold a meeting with Nzirorera."We went to the H6tel des Diplomates. When we arrived there, we all got into the jeep; therewere at least...it was a large jeep, there at least six soldiers in the jeep. WE arrived at theH6tel des Diplomates: Wedid not have much trouble getting into the H6tel des Diplomates.We got in easily. There was no problem because they saw that we were with individuals fromthe Presidential Guard.

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:/.L

ICTR Let me interrupt you right there. Why ,s ,t that ,t was thos.e2w° col,

w t part of the national committee, who were askeo oy ~,~L,u,~,,, ~,~ere n;committee members and try to pacify the city?ZC -You see, as I indicated earlier on, before 6 April, I told you that EpN’em and Bernard

had formed a parallel conwnittee. The committee they formed worked in close collaborationwith Nzirorera. So, from the first days, i.e. 6 and 7 April, both of them were going around,

so, I believe they were seen with Nzirorera and they, it was easy for them move about; they

had just ....Incidentally, I forgot to mention this - because when th@ came to see rne saying

that they had delayed coming to me in the morning because the Government was due to beformed, put into place, and Nzirorera had called Bernard’s house to ask him to find Ephremand tell him to meet them at the H6tel des Diplomates. So, Bernard went and called Ephrem.They met at the H6tel des Diplomates where they were given instructions by Nzirorera.For...I believe he told me that they said that...They spoke with Nzirorera...that they had

moved me from Nyamirambo to Kiyovu. So he said: "OK. Call and try to ¯find someone fromthe legal...rather, national committee and bring them here. That way you can go around allthe secteurs in Kigali." So, to go further back in time, when Ephrem came to see me at mysister-in-law’ s place, I noticed that he was with Jean-Pierre S eb anetsi, i d o n’ t know how

Sebanetsi managed to ....He lived in the Remera area, which was already affected by ...But

when I asked him how he had managed to get to Epl~rem’s house, he answered: "With greatdifficulty". When he tried to leave his house, he saw P,_PF soldiers patrolling Remera, wherehe lived. He was not scared of leaving, going out of his house. He said to himself: "I’m goingto continue." He wanted to see if he could see anyone on the main road leading to Sonatubeto give him a ride, because he did not have a vehicle. So he could leave. So, he got arrestedby RPF soldiers in the Remera area. They asked him what he was doing mad he said: "Yousee, this area is a potential war zone, so I would like to evacuate nay family.’" He was told:"Better do it quickly. We are not like your soldiers, the ex-FAR, we don’t kill people. Tryand evacuate your family. If you see anyone with a vehicle, try and, contact him and get outof here." Right next to him, therewas merchant who had two vehicles. He gave a vehicle toSebanetsi who put it into his vehicle [sic], in this vehicle it was the city centre [?]; they leftwith the merchant. The merchant had a younger brother who worked at the national bank,as an executive. He lived in the same area as Ephrem. So, that’s how he managed to get toEphrem’s house. Sebanetsi and Ephrem asked me, they told me that Nzirorera wanted to seeus to tell us what they had decided to...at their first cabinet meeting. We went to the Hdtel

des Diplomates.ICTR -At around what time?ZC -Er, it was around 2:00, 2 o’clock in the afternoon. [ no riced that aimost everyone was

there.ICTR -Meaning?ZC -The entire cabinet, all the MRND Ministers, all the new Ministers, all the authorities,everyone. And there were many Tutsi who had taken refuge at the H6tel des Diplomates atthe time. I remember one, the brother, er, the brother, Robert Kaj u ga’s brother. His name is

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Eucliffe Kajuga. He was at the Hdtel des Diplomates, together with his wife and wife’ssister. When I arrived, Eucliffe called me inside because he wa

"me: "Any news ofl~obe 9- .,, _ __ s afral.d to go out. He askedrt. and I answered. As a matter of fact, I also would like to hearfrom him. I don’t know. I thought you knew." He said: "You know, dad is dead." and Ianswered: "I know that, but I don’t know where Robert is." [ told him that he might be at thehotel or at the office. Anyhow, there were...I saw Tutsi merchants at the place. At that verymoment, I saw my brother-in-law’s elder brother, the Ambassador to France, [inaudible]. Hewas in Kigali. And since he spent the nights at the tribunal, he had the advantage to call himbefore [inaudible]; he was at the hotel. So we went and set ourselves up in a room, therotunda, at the H6tel des Diplomates. Eugbne was there...at the [-[6tel des Diplomates...ICTR -Eugene?ZC -Ngarushimana [phonetic], the Znterakamwe secretary.ICTR -So, he was no longer at the French Embassy?ZC -No, he was...In the morning, he left the French Embassy and come to the H6teldes Diplomates. And I also saw, I believe it was the last time I saw Ferdinand Nahimana inKigali, because he too was at the French Embassy; I saw him at the Hdtel des Diplomatesthat day. And then we went to the Rotunda with the committee. Sebanetsi, Nzirorera, whocame with Mugenzi, told us that the Govermnent had asked him to make sure that themassacres ended. So, he was counting on us to pacify things. And he said: "You are at mydisposal [inaudible]. You’re going to try and convince the people, and we’ll meet again at6:00 o’clock, this evening. OK?"ICTR -That was Nzirorera talking?ZC -Yes. He was with Mugenzi. [Inaudible]ICTR -Was he telling you that, well, the idea behind putting an end to the rnassacres wassimply because of public opinion?ZC -It was due to public opinion. And there were, already there were, there werereporters already in Kigali, and we did not want these reporters to take photos of the bodies.I-Ie said to make sure that...tell those people to gather up all the dead bodies and the nextmorning Alphonse would give us trucks from the Ministry of Works, and we were told theMinistry of Justice was going to provide prisoners to load the bodies; that way all the deadbodies lying along the road could be gathered up and hidden away in mass graves inNyamirambo. So we left, we left the Hdtel des Diptomates; we stmted with Biryogo secteurbecause it was very nearby. In Biryogo, we called the secteur leader, not the administrativeleader, but the Interahamwe leader, and...ICTR -Hold on, who, who, who was in that convoy, who were the people present?ZC -Who was in the convoy? There were six soldiers from the Presidential Guard,there was me, also Ephrem Nkezereba, Bernard Maniragaba and Jean-Pierre Sebanatsi. Yes.So, we started with Biryogo. When we an’ived in Biryago sectez?~-, there were problems.Problems between members of the CDR and those of the MRND. The [nterahamwe withpeople on the...Well, anyhow, Biryogo was a divided secteur. So, the secte,u, leader, ourseeteur leader...ICTR -Interahamwe?ZC -Interahamwe?. He was a Moslem. Moslems in the area tended to hide the Tutsi[inaudible] each time; they really collaborated, you know... So, the mere hers o t" the CDR inBiryogo did not like that. They were scouring the area l:or these Tutsi. And the CDR, er,

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6: C O N O1S F.’~E~k~I~$,l R2~ [~TTNE~ ~S:

MRND secteur leader of the Interahamwe did not want that. He continued to hide the Tutsis.When we arrived there, there were problems. Bernard...It was Bernard who spoke the firsttime and when he tried to begin the operation, the CDR secteur leader said "No, before youbegin your operation, you need to know that we have problems here. Either you want us tokill the Tutsi or you don’t want us to kill them. Yes, we have to kill tile Tutsi in this secteur,it is our mission. In your case, yourInterahamwe want to hide these Tutsi. So, we want youto tell us what to do." So, that became a problem for Bernard to begin whereas he had beenassigned a mission by the Government saying...ICTR -To stop it.ZC -To stop the massacres. So, Bernard had problems; we called the...We stopped themeeting. We called the secteur leader for the [nteraham~t,e and asked him what was goingon. He said: "We are hiding them, we are not hiding it from you; we the Muslims here inBiryogo, we have our own laws. We don’t know who is Tutsi mad who is not; we don’t knowwho is Rwandan and who is not because all the Muslims are Tanzanian, Ugandan and wehave intermarried with them. Now, we don’t know what to do. But the CDR people, theyconsider all the Tutsi, all the Muslims here as Tutsi." I need tO explain what t mean. This isbecause in 1972/73, before the coup d’~tat by Habyarimana, the President was Kayibanda.He never supported the Muslims. He thought that they were I[..]. He considered all theMuslims as members of the UNAR, a Tutsi party at the time. So, he did not support the

t 97_~, he proposedTutsi, the Muslims because... And he used to relocate them. So, before c -,to the Muslims to have the Tutsi living in Biryogo and Nyamirambo relocated to Butamo[phonetic] commune, which borders on Nyamirambo. So, all the Ht.lh.t started to consider theTutsi as Tutsi...ICTR -As Muslims, you mean?ZC -Yes. Muslims were not well [inaudible]. On that, the CDR was not a [inaudible]party. They always had that in mind, and took all the Muslims to be Tutsi. So, so we held ashort meeting with our secteur leader. We asked Bernard to ex plain to the MDR supportersthat yes, there were Tutsi, but that not all Muslims were Tutsi. And, that if they were notdead, it was there luck because the Government had assigned us a mission to stop themassacres. So, he spoke when we...he..the CDR, the officials in charge of security in thesecteur, he spoke and explained all that. On leaving, we realized that they had only acceptedhalf. But they had accept it. We left.ICTR -It was...what was the name of the secteur leader for the CDR, do you know?ZC - No, I don’t remember.ICTR -How about the name of the secteur leader for the Interahamwe?ZC -[inaudible], I do not remember the names right at this very moment, i know thenames...he was even cited in the case of the secteur leader for Nyamirambo in Kigali, heperpetrated killings down there, in the secteur. We finished the work in Biryogo and wenton to Nyamirambo secteur, close to a stationjudiciaire, where there were gendarmes. Weheld a meeting. It worked. Everyone agreed to the idea that if there were really any Tutsiremaining, they were, it was said that, that, that they would be the ones to give an account

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of everything that happened during the killings, the killings have to stop. Biryogo,Nyamirambo. It was Bernard who spoke. So anyhow, we arrived in Nyakabanda secteur; asI was originally fro}n that seeteur, I approached the people. I was the one who spoke inNyakabanda. There were many government employees of the national bank, seniorexecutives at the national bank, senior executives at the commercial bank. It was easy in thatcase. They quickly realized that we h’ad come down, that we had arrived in Kimisagarasecteur, yes, Kimisagara [phonetic]. Yes, there was Ms. Rose, the administrative chief forthe secteur. She was an Interahamwe who belonged to the MRND. When we arrived, shewas in a jeep, a Chevrolet jeep which she had taken from a house in town belonging toexpatriates.ICTR -Who?ZC -Rose.ICTR -Oh, her? .l

ZC -Her, yes. So, when they saw us, they asked "Who are these people coming to myseeteur?" So, we stopped. Bernard got out. And they recognized each other and startedtalking to each other. She said: "You’re coming now. I had some errands. There are Tutsidown there that I was going to see because they were going to mourn. So, if you have thingsto tell me, better do it fast because we would like to carry on with our killing operations."To which Bernard responded: "All that has now changed. We just carne fi’om the Hdtel desDiplomates. We have a message from the Goverrmtent", adding "The killings will now haveto stop, because enough is enough. If there are people left, it’s their luck. lust leave it at thatand try to gather up the dead bodies so that [inaudible]." The woman was very surprised andshe said: "I did not know that because there are Tutsi in my area. I would have liked toeliminate them all." I said to her: "No. Forget that. You need to give that up." We leftKimisagara and went to Gasyata. Gasyata is on the way to Byumba. We arrived in Gasyatasecteur and saw very large numbers of Interahamwe. In Gasyata, there was a fiiend, a youngTutsi friend of mine to whom I had given a loan, I had lent him a car I used to own. And nowI remember, the guy was a cab-driver. I wanted know what he was tip to. 1 called someonewho knew him well and asked him if he had may news about Rutayisire. He said: "Ah, youmean your driver friend Rutayisire? Well, your driver was killed on the first day. He waskilled by the tnterahamwe. They slit his throat." As for the car, he had rented it to the afamily of an old, retired colonel whose name was Nyatanyi, Nyatanyi, spelled N-Y-A-T-A-N-Y-I, Nyatanyi who lived in Nderema [phonetic]. So, I kept quiet. Epln’em was the one whospoke in Gasyata and told them what they had to do, and as regards that matter, there was noproblem. While we were in Gasyata, Colonel Muderuka, spelled M-U-D-E-R-U-K-A, whowas the chief of operations in Kigali and patrolled all the secteurs. He was there. He listenedto what Ephrem had to say. After the meeting, we talked with Muderuka. Maderuka knewEphrem well; they were in Butare together at one time. He said: "It’s good. the stuff youguys are doing because we in the military have not been able to stop the l<illing due to anintervention in the war...in the killings, we are unable to stop that because the lt~tet’aDamweare really in [inaudible]."We left Gasyata mad tried to go to Khnihurura secteur, er, Kacyiru.When we arrived at the bridge below the road leading to the truck stop, we wanted to takethe road leading to the gendarmerie. People coming from the gendarmerie said to us: "Youshould not go up this road because there are infiltrators, RPF infiltrations." So we gave upon that idea. We went up to Muhima Secteur. There were very many people in M uhinaa. It

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was Jean-Pierre Sebanetsi who made a speech and it took a long time. The peopleunderstood. We...It was around 5:30 or 6:30 o’clock. We were in a hurry to ....ICTR ...You were in Muhima secteur, is that right?ZC -That’s correct.ICTR -What happened there?ZC -. .... There, it was Seba/aetsi who spoke. He explained to the people ol:the secteur thepurpose of the mission, which was to ask them to stop the massacres and that if any Tutsi hadsurvived, it was their luck; the people should leave them alone and find all possible meansto remove the dead bodies because the next day the Ministry of Works was due to send indump trucks to transport the bodies to mass graves in Nyamirambo ........ Gikondo was a placewhere there were many Interahamwe and many CDR members ......... On the way fromMuhima to Gikondo, all the roads, ....there were roadblocks. We found dead bodies scatteredalong all the roads ...... those who were manning the roadblocks were taferahamwe.ICTR -Did you see any roadblocks which were not manned by Interahamwe?ZC -No. When we were going around the secteurs, we did not see any roadblocks thatwere not mmmed by Interahamwe. They were all roadblocks manned by I~.~terahamwe. Iremember now that at the time, the term Interahamwe was confusin.g because the PSD youthwing and that of the. MDR were confused with Interahamwe. And we could see all thatbecause when you came up to a roadblock and asked who was rnanning, sometimes peoplewould say that it was MDR-Power people, sometimes mixed with PSD-Power youthwingers. So, we arrived in Gikondo at around 6:00 p.m., somewhere around that time. We

then held the meeting at the Gikondo secteur office. There too, there were many people,especially MRND and CDR members. We asked Bernard to speak, saying that since he hadheld a lot of meetings during this mission, he was the one who was best suited, to speak tothe people in Kinyarwanda, you see. So, we said that he should be the one m speak inGikondo and many other secteurs. So, he explained the purpose of our mission. The peopleagreed to our proposal. Stop [the massacres] and bring the bodies up. The reason [ say "bringup" is because the city of Kigali is built on a mountain. The roads are [inaudible] the bodieson the paved road. It was to make it easy for the trucks to pick up the bodies. So, fromGikondo, we went directly to the H6tel des Diplomates. When we arrived at the hotel,Nzirorera, Mugenzi were patiently waiting for us, together with the entire council, all theMinisters were...[Break in the recording]ICTR -You said you arrived at the H6tel des Diplomates, who did you meet, or whathappened there?ZC -At the Hgtel des Diplomates... I believe we got there at around 6:30 in the evening.It was, I think besides the Ministers, the entire Government was t.here in the garden of theHdtel des Diplornates. And Nzirorera was there impatiently awaiting our arrival, togetherwith Mr. Justin Mugenzi. We went into the hotel conference room, not to the rotunda thistime, they had a conference room. So, they asked us if our mission had been successful, er,.... Bernard took the floor mad spoke to the two gentlemen. He said that in the secte~ms we had

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been to, it was a success, that the people accepted our proposal and they were waiting for thetrucks the next day t~ load the dead bodies. I remember that at that moment Mugenzi asked

us if we could send Interahamwe to see search for his son-in-law who was stuck in Remera.We told him that it was not possible because if it were, we would ask the leader in Remera,but we did not go to Remera. If he had said: ’<Oh, really", we could have tried. But later, thenext day, I believe I saw the son-in-law, Gufaran de Dieu [phonetic], who is currently herein Nairobi. I asked him and he told me that soldiers had been sent to get him ouc o r the area.While we were reporting to N.zirorera and Mugenzi, there was a n!eeting taking place nextto us, at which I saw Augustin Ruzindana, the former governor of the national bank andCharles Nyandwi, the fomaer Minister of Higher Education.ICTR -Could you spell his name?ZC -There was, there was also Sim6on, the former Minister in the ONce of the Presidentof the Republic of Rwanda, Ruzindana, spelled: R-U-Z-I-N-D-A-N-A; Nyandwi is spelledN-Y-A-N-D-W-I, Sim6on Nteziryayo, spelled N-T-E-Z-I-R-Y-A-Y-O. All three weremembers of the MRND central colnmittee. They were talking to Mr. Mathieu Ngirumpatse,spelled N-G-I-R-U-M-P-A-T-S-E, who was the MRND chairman at the time. The meetingended. The two men thanked us and bought us drinks at the hotel. We stayed there until 8:00in the evening. We then left the conference room for home. At the reception desk, we metthe Minister of Information, Eliezer Niyitegeka, spelled N-I-Y-I-T-E-G-E-K-A, who wastogether with a French woman reporter, who was there to gather news. He introduced us toher. He was with Joseph Serugendo, spelled S-E-R-U-G-E-N-D-O, was the head of thetechnical section at the radio station. We had a little chat with Eliezer, who asked Serugendo

to provide him with a Motorola so he could be in constant contact with the national radiostation; that way, each time a decision was made at the cabinet meeting, it would bebroadcast; so he could contact the radio easily because we did not have a mobile telephoneat the time. So, Serugendo promised to secure him a radio, saying: "We will do that rightaway." He then asked us if we had a vehicle so he could do it right then. As we had thePresidential Guard jeep, we authorized the driver to take him, t~ bring him to the radio

station and bring back the equipment.ICTR -Who authorized that?ZC -It was Ephrem who went and asked the driver to give Serugendo a ride to the radiostation and bring back the Motorola equipment. He brought back the Motorala with him andgave it to the Minister of Infomaation. We got into the jeep when it returned and Bernard

invited us to his place in Gitega.ICTR -Before going to Gitega, you said, while talking to, er, while reporting to Nzirorera,Ruzindana and the others were at a meeting. Well, could you hear what they were talking

about?ZC -No. No. No. We couldnot hem" anything. They were, well, i cannotwere not next-door to us but the things they were discussing, and the thidiscussing were different. We did not take an interest in their discussion.ICTR -You say that you saw, you saw Nahimana at that place, that you sawthe secretary of the Interahamwe there."ZCICTRZC

say that theyngs we were

the secretary,

-Yes.-Who else did you see, either the first time you went there or the second time?-I saw Ngirabatware, I am talking about the MRND people that I saw at that place.

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Augustin Ngirabatware. He was the Minister of Planning, Ngirabatware, spelledN-G-I-R-A-B-A-T-,W-A-R-E. He was there. I saw the Minister of Transport andCommunications, Mr. Ntagerura, spelled N-T-A-G-E-R-U-R-A, Ntagerura. 1 saw Mr. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, spelled B-A-R-A-Y-A-G-W-I-Z-A [sic]. I also saw tile Prime Minister,Mr. Kambanda, spelled K-A-M-B-A-N-D-A. I saw the brother of Robert Kajuga, EucliffeKajuga, spelled K-A-J-U-G-A, again. He was with his wife and her sister. I saw Bernard,Bernard Shamunoko, spelled S-H-A-M-U-N-O-K-A [sic], elder brotherof Mbadishimm’ta [phonetic], Jean Marie Vianney, the Ambassador to Paris. l saw manymerchants who were taking refuge at the Hdtel des Diplomates and many prominent figures.I saw Rafiki, because I went up to him and congratulated him, Anselme Rafiki, spelled R-A-F-I-K-I, the Minister of Works at the time. I congratulated him.ICTR -Why?ZC -Because he had been appointed Minister of Works, and @e knew each other wellbefore he became Minister. I saw Emmanuel, the Minister of Finance, Ndindabahizi. He wasRafiki, Ndindabahizi, spelled N-D-I-N-D’A-B-A-H-I±Z-I, he was with Rafiki. [ greeted themtogether. I saw Mpundutse, Frangois Mpundutse, who was chairman of the CND, er, of thePSD at the time; Mpundutse is spelled M-P-U-N-D-U-T-S-E, Frangois [was his first name].And many others.ICTR -Did you see Bagosora?ZC -Yes. On arrival at the Hdtel des Diplomates, to receive Nzirorera’s mission, I sawNdilonga [phonetic]. He was in the middle of a crowd of people. There were Ministersamong them. He was talking to Ministers.ICTR -Who did you see?ZC -I saw Mr. Bagosora talking with many of the authorities on the lawn at the HOtel desDiplomates.ICTR -The garden in front of the hotel?ZC -Yes, yes, yes.ICTR -And when you returned from the mission, was he still there?ZC -No. No. On returning from the mission, I did not see him again.ICTR -But why were those meeting assembled at the HOtel des Diplomates, rather thansome place else?ZC -The H~tel des Diplomates is the place where people were, sworn in, the Ministers.And it happened to be the swearing-in day. So, they were invited to the place and that iswhere they decided they were going to stay as a Government. They had rooms [inaudible]ICTR -And so Nzirorera assigned you the task of putting an end to the massacres inresponse to public opinion, is that correct?ZCICTRZCICTRZC

-That is correct.-Did he tell you to have the roadblocks dismantled?-No. No, No.-Did you tell you to have the Interahamwe disarmed?-No.

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ICTR -Did he tell you to make, er, to force the Interahamwe to return to their areas, to put

an end to the killing~s?ZC -No. No. No’. The mission was simply to talk to the peop.!e, to tell thena that theyshould no longer perpetrate the massacres, that international opinion condemned that, butthey did not tell us to,..to disarm or to tell the Interahamwe to return to dleir homes. Theroadblocks were still in operation.ICTR -Did he tell you that it was, that was wrong to perpetrate the massacres or was itsimply in reaction to public opinion that the massacres had to stop?ZC -No. No. No. Because.i.as regards public opinion...he talked about public opinion butnot about killing or not killing. But I know that Mugenzi, Justin Mugcnzi, when we returned,he asked us if we had seen mmay bodies of Tutsi. It was clear that he was very happy aboutthe situation in Kigali, as regards the slaughter of Tutsi. Another person who came to uswhile we were giving the report was Mr. Edouard Karemera, who had been appointedMinister of the Interior; his name is spelled KA-R-E-M-E-R-A. He asked us about thesituation, appearing really eager to know if many Tutsi had been killed.ICTR -What do you mean by that, what did he say to you?ZC -He asked us if really, if what everyone was saying, if it was really true that manyTutsi had been killed. We told him that it was true that a lot of killings were taking place,especially in the city of Kigali. And he was...I personally saw him smiling, really pleasedwith what the people had done, pleased with the killings.ICTR -Are you saying that Mugenzi was also happy about the situation?ZC -Yes. When he asked, when he asked us if it was true...he was worried, worried thatperhaps only a few Tutsi had been killed. He wanted us to tell him about that, confirmingthat, yes, many had been killed. He wanted to know if the things he was hearing were true,because according to him, the Ministers had not...he said that they had not gone around thecity of Kigali, that his Ministers had not gone around Kigali.ZC -Did Nzirorera express his views on the massacres?ZC -No. Nzirorera was indifferent.ICTR -What do you mean by "indifferent"?ZC -Indifferent in the sense that he did not ask about the massacres, l~le did not questionour report when we said, because we told him [inaudible], because when we returned fromGikondo, I believe, I think we took a [inaudible] road and observed that many bodies hadbeen brought to the road. So, we told him that we had seen many bodies along the road. TheRed Cross was in the process of gathering up the bodies. It was about not killing [’?] we toldhim that there were many bodies on that road. He accepted it like that...

Witness ZC

At that time, I did not know what the activities ofPr~fet Tharcisse Renzaho were, but I heardhim on Radio Rwanda call on all the drivers in the Ministry 0fWorks to go and collect allthe dead bodies in town. Some of them were already in a state of putrefaction.

Witness UA

Around 15 April, the Prdfet of Kigali, Tharcisse Renzaho, aired a radio communique to theeffect that all the bodies scattered around town had to be collected. The bodies were

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transported in yellow NISSAN lorries .....W i mess ZA

6.31 Concurrently, Joseph Nzirorera, aided by Colonel Theoneste Bagosoraprocured weapons for the Interahamwe-MRND at the roadblocks and themassacres resumed.

ICTR Your meeting with Mr. B agosora, what were the circumstances o f your meeting,your first meeting?ZF My first meeting with Bagosora, it was clearly during a...ICTR Ok, once again, I need to specify that...ZF When the Government decided to move to Gitarama, er...m light of the problems we

were having with the Interahamwe as regards we were having lack of weapons, Mr.Nzirorera specifically put us in touch with Bagosora.

ICTR In what way did he put you in touch with Mr. Bagosora?ZF Well, before he left for Gitararna, Mr. Nzirorera told us to get in touch with Mr.

Bagosora, whom he was going to see and to...ICTR There, you are referring to...you, er, Mr. Nzirorera, what did you ask him to do?ZF Mr. Nzirorera?ICTR Specifically?ZF Specifically, before Mr. Nzirorera and Mr. Ngirumpatse, we outlined the problems

the Interahamwe were facing, their concerns...ICTR What exactly?ZF ...with regard to weapons. .,ICTR Regarding weapons, okay.ZF Yea, weapons...ICTR So, you mean there was a lack of weapons at the roadblocks?ZF ...at the roadblocks.ICTR When you toured the roadblocks during your...during your, during your pacification

mission?ZF In each of our reports, we indicated that everywhere we went, people said the

weapons had not arrived.ICTR Ok.ZF When the government suddenly moved to Gitarama, we once again asked Mr.

Nzirorera about it and he us get in touch with Mr. Bagosora,ICTR Okay.ZF ... to whom he was going to present the matter. It was on this occasion that for all

intents and purposes I got in touch for the first time...

135

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ZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRBagosora when you met him?

For all intents and purposes?Yes. t

You mean y~u met him for the first time or you had already methim?No, that was the very first time.First time, your first contact with him. So you got in touch with .Joseph the same dayyou got in contact with Mr. Bagosora, was it the same (lay’?Yes.You met him later that day?Later in the...Later that afternoon?In the afternoon.Where did you meet?We were at the H6tel des Diplomates.You were at the H6tel des Diplomates? And so, what, what did you ask from

ZF He was aware of our request...ICTR Okay.ZF ...We were asking for weapons, er...ICTR Clearly?ZF Clearly.ICTR Okay.ZF It was straightforward.ICTR Oh, I see.ZF And...ICTR You mean weapons for the roadblocks?ZF For the roadblocks.ICTR For the tnterahamwe?ZF Yes.ICTR That’s, that’s, that’s the way it was?

ZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRZF

ICTR

Yes.

I see. Okay.And so, from.., from the H6tel des Diplomates, we went to the Ministry of Defence.Why did you go there?We went there with Mr. Bagosora who asked to go with him.He was accompanying you?Yea,...Oh, yea? ’<Rather, we were the ones accompanying him.Oh, you were the ones accompanying him?Yea, we were accompanying him.Oh, okay. [Laughter]. I see.So, we accompanied him to the Ministry of De fence, where he made the variouscontacts and in the end he told us to go and see...You were personally present while he was making the various contacts. Did he make

136

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any phone calls?He made telephone calls, but we were not..,we were not right in front of him.He made the phone calls privately in his office? "Yes.And yet after making his contacts he told you what the outcome? l-Ie made contacts?He made contacts...Okay.So, from the H6tel des Diplomates we went to Ministry Of Defence where he madethe contacts, er...Okay.... just as any official would make contacts by telephone.Ok. And then what happened?So, in the end we were told...When you say "We were told", who told you?Mr. Bagosora!I see.Mr. Bagosora told us to go to, to go see the warrant officer, or a chief warrant officer,whose name he mentioned but did not catch it, a warrant officer whom Mr. Nzirorerahad mentioned to us, and who had given a telephone number to Mr. Maniragaba...Oh, really?Yea.I see. Mr. Nzirorera had already given you, had already giyen you...A telephone number....had the warrant officer’s telephone number with him?Yea, the warrant officer’s telephone number.Who was with the Pres..., who was...?Who was at the weapons depot...Okay....at the Kiyovu residence...The President’s residence?

That’s right.They had a weapons depot at that location?They had a weapons depot. I went in there. I saw, I saw, I saw, I saw, I saw the depot.Okay.Er, in the evening, that evening, we helped ourselves.How many weapons did you take that occasion?Well, I would say that evening, we were given, guns, GP guns, at least one hundredweapons.At least̄ one hundred?A least one hundred. Er...

137

ICTRZFICTRZFICTRZFICTRZF

With amm,..with ammunition?With ammunition, magazines, magazines for those weapons.And those w~eapons were distributed?We dist...we distributed most of them that evening.Where?At the secteur...at the Gitega secteur office.Gitega! That was Bernard’s secteur, wasn’t it?

Yes indeed, Gitega was particularly the secteur. Yes, Bernard’s secteur because that’s wherehe lived and because he controlled it particularly.ICTR Were there other instances? Did yougo to that location on other occasions, for, for

weapons?ZF To...? .,ICTR To the depot.ZF You mean the depot where we were...ICTR Yes.ZF No, I did not go back there.ICTR Do you know of anyone else who did...?ZF Well, Bet, or rather Robert. Robert, Robert did go there. He went there the next day

and on other occasions to...To take delivery of weapons?To take delivery of pistols, that’s all there was.Pistols?Pistols, that’s all there was, only pistols.How were the contacts made? Do yo.u know how the arrangements for the pistolswere made?I think it was done the smrle way. I arn in a position to conclude that it was done thesame way since we were introduced ourselves, we were tuned in.So at the time, just to clarify, at the when you toured the roadblocks, there werebodies, killings were being cm’ried out, killings...?Killings, of civilians.Those killings were very, very intense. There were bodies at most of the roadblocksyou toured, there were bodies everywhere? "There were bodies, and that was embarrassing, it a lot of uneasiness to authorities,it that we came...And there is ...there is no doubt in your mind that the weapons requested were aimedat making things more effective. There was a lack of more efficient weapons for theelimination of the enemy, namely the Tutsis: men, women and children?That was clearly the case, absolutely.That was the case? No attacks were taking place at that point in time, so, it was notexactly what one might call setf-defence?I cannot really talk of attacks as such at the roadblocks, no.There were, there were no attacks..,...attacks, I am not a soldier but as regards attacks, perhaps exchange of gunfire

soldiers...

ICTRZFICTRZFICTR

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138

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Okay, but that was, it was not, was not...But as regards attacks at the roadblocks...When the request was made......not, not at that point in time.When the request was made, when Mr. Joseph Nzirorera was asked, it was clear, itwas...the situation at tlie roadblocks was clear There was no doubt whatsoever thatthe weapons requested were for killing, that was clearly the case? Nobody can...Those weapons were for killing.Okay.The people were complaining of being attacked and not being able to defendthemselves, since they did not have the weapons, er...Okay, but no attacks were taking place, there was no one around to......for war, er, at least at the roadblocks at that point in time.And that is why the meeting, when the, the request was submitted to Mr. Bagosora,it was in similar circumstances, the situation is explained to him, or...I must say that we did not have to discuss, we were never discussed, the Imerahamwecortlmittee did not discuss this issue with Bagosora. ..He was already...He had already been made aware of it.Was this at the meeting7In fact, his jeep, the j eep, his j eep, rather his escort, his escort accompan ied us for thedays...During the visits?For the pacification mission...The pacification mission.

Witness ZF

/-

f " )

6.32 In May 1994, F61icien Kabuga organized a meeting to raise funds to

purchase weapons for the Interahamwe-MRND. On that occasion, he asserted

that all the Tutsi must be exterminated, a statement he reiterated in public on

other occasions.In May 1994 Felicien KABUGA organized a meeting for big traders at Hotel Meridien towhich I was invited. There were about 50 to 60 traders who attended tlne meeting atMeridien here in Gisenyi. I¢~kBUGA presided over the meeting. He initiated the meetingin order to raise fund. Naturally the interim govermnent knew about Inis initiative.KABUGA presented himself as a rich and powerul man who wan~ed to raise t’und in orderto buy weapons and arnunition for the Interhamwes and soldiers so that they could go onfighting the enemy. Among other things, he said: "we should fight these Tutsis so that theydo not rule our country any longer. All the Tutsis should be exterminated".°.,

I know KABUGA was often putting his pickups and minibuses at the disposal of the

139

Interhamwes..4,

KABUGA was ... ~dwaysinterhamwe ketenge.

escorted by soldiers and Interhamwes in army uniforna and

lIF "

C

Interim Government,t

6.33 As soon as the Interim Government was formed, certain Cabinet members

supported the plan of extermination in place, including Augustin Bizimana,

Edouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andrfi Rwamakuba, Andrg

Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et Eliezer Niyetegeka. They incited the

people to eliminate "the enemy and its accomplices" and distributed weapons to

them. The Government dismissed local government authorities who were

opposed to the massacres and replaced them with others who were devoted to the

cause.


(’’)

6.34 Already, on 8 April, the new Government summoned all the prdfets to a

meeting in Kigali for the purpose of assessing the situation in the country at the

time. The emergency meeting was heldon 11 April 1994 and recorded the

participation of all the Government ministers and all the prdfets, except thoseofRuhengeri, Cyangugu and Butare. At this meeting, the sitfiation as regards the

massacres in each prdfecture was analyzed.

And therefore that level, everyone of us showed some interest in information on the situationin all thepr~fectures. And it was decided, there, it was there, I cannot say it is this personor that person who came up with the idea; it was decided that the best way of having a betterknowledge of what was going on in the prefectures was to convene a meeting of all thePrdfets ........ As I said, the first meeting, with the Pr@ts took place on [ [ April 94 in Kigali.All the Prefers attended except those for Butare, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, of CyanguguBagambild, ofRuhengeri, Bariyanga who died in Rernera, Kigali in the night of 6 to 7 April94. During that first meeting, somepr~fectures were labeled inactive; tlaey included Butareand Gitarama and this explains why their Pr@ts were later fired. As Ruhengeri prefecturehad be handed over to someone from the MDR following the death of Pr@t Bariyanga, itbecame a scene of clashes not between Hutus and Tutsis but between MRND and MDRmembers particularly in Ruhondo, Mukingwe, Muhuri communes, etc ....... At Kibuyeprdfecture, the Prgfet transmitted a comprehensive report oil. all communes. He went as faras accusing law enforcement agents around, at that time the gendarmes, o f not gi ring enough

140

support to the communal authorities in their activities. This means in the massacres.Regarding Kibungo, apart from the verbal report made by the P~fet at their first meeting heldon 11 April 1994, no other report was submitted. This Prefer himself was later assassinatedand his successor did not have time to run his prdfecture as he was forced into exile inTanzania immediately after he took office. The Pr~fet appointed for Byumba did not havethe opportunity of reaching his prefecture for it was totally overrun by the RPF as soon ashostilities resumed in April 1994. Regarding Gisenyi prdfecture, the Prefer who wasappointed, a member of the Liberal Party, also submitted comprehensive reports on themassacres and I was surprised that he was reinstated after the RPF tool< over. The Prdfet ofGikongoro did not submit may report on his prdfecture. The prdfeculres o f" Kigali-ville andKigali-Rural practically worked together. Karera Fran?ois the former Bour~mestre ofNyarugenge which at that time was part of Kigali town was in charge o1" Kigal i-Rural whileColonel Tharcisse Renzaho headed KVP Kigali-Ville pr@cture. Regarding the town,Colonel Renzaho behaved more like the interior Minister that like a Bow2gmestre. H is reportwas in form of directives: for example" avoid disclosing where the massacres tool< place";" the ministers’ broadcast on the radio rnust portray a good image of the country and notwhat they can actually see.

Witness ZB

%4-, =

6.35 Rather than take immediate action to put an end to the massacres, on 17

April, the Interim Government dismissed several authorities, among them thePrdfet of Butare, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, for their refusal to take part in

the massacres so that the killings could spread to the country as a whole.

Communique by the Rwandan Government:

2--)"7 ,

"Today 17 April 1994’, the cabinet convened a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister HisExcellency Jean Kambanda. One of the agenda items the Ministers have to discuss is theadministrative issue of the country". The cabinet has deemed it necessary to appointPrefects in the prefectures who still do not have any. They include Kigali, Byumba,Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. After Listening to the views and suggestiOias of the representativesof the political parties within the government, the cabinet appointed the fol lowing people asPrdfets for these prefectures:Francois KARERA, PreFer of KigaliElias NYIRIBIBI, Prefer of ByumbaBazir NSABUMGISHA, Prefer of RuhengeriCharles ZIRIMWABAGABO, Prefer of Gisenyi.

The Cabinet also took the decision to fire the Pr~fets of Butare and I<ibungo. Mr SilvianNsabimana became the new Prdfet of Butare while Mr. Anaclet Rudakubana became the

141

£1ao

6. CONCISE STATEMENT OI ~ THE FACTS;OTHEIt VIOLATION S OF 1NTE RN ATIONA L H U M AN [TARIAN LAW

Pr@t of Kibungo. The cabinet congratulated the Prdfet of Gitarama, the Pr@t ofGikongoro, the Pr~fet of Cyangugu and the Prefer of Kibuye on a job well done. [-Ie gavethe go ahead for them to continue heading theseprdfectures.

The names of the new Prdfects are:The Prdfet of Kigali-ville prdfecture: Mr Francois KareraThe Prefer of GitaramaprOfecture: Mr. Fiddle UwizeyeThe PreferThe PrdfetThe Pr~fetThe PreferThe PrOfetThe PrdfetThe PreferThe PrdfetThe Prdfet

ofButare prdfecture: Mr. Silvain Nsabimanaof Gikongoro prdfecture Mr Laurent Bucyibarutaof Cyangugupr~fecture Mr Emmanuel Bagambikiof Kibuye prdfecture Dr. CI6m.ent Kayishemao f Gisenyi prefecture Dr. Charles Zirimwabagab oof Ruhengeri prefecture Mr. Bazir Nsabumugishaof Byumbaprdfecture Mr. Elias NyiribibiofKibungo prdfecture Mr. Anaclet Rudakubanaof Kigali town prefecture: Mr Tharcisse Renzaho

The cabinet requested that the new Prefers take office by Tuesday 19 April 1994."

This communique was read by Eliezar Niyitegeka, Minister of lnfomaation midGovernment spokesperson (Radio Rwanda)

6.36 Between 9 April and 14 July 1994, numerous Cabinet meetings were heldsuccessively in Kigali, Gitarama and Gisenyi. During this period, the PrimeMinister, Jean Kambanda, and Ministers Augustin Bizimana, EdouardKaremera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Rwamakuba, Andr6 Ntagerura,Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et Eliezer Niyetegeka were regularly briefed on the

t

situation in regard to the massacres of the civilian populatmn. On severaloccasions during these meetings, the Ministers demanded weapons to distributein their respective home prdfectures, knowing that the weapons would be usedin the massacres.

-The Office of the Prosecutor is in possession of Jem’t Kambanda’s diari.es for the years1994,1995, 1996, seized during his arrest in Nairobi in July 1997.

-Communiqu6 delivered by the Rwandan Govenmaent, 17 April 1994

With the help of the Pr6fets’ reports, during the cabinet meet il.~gs held in Gisenyi andGitarama, the Interior Minister Karemera submitted the repol~ which we .received irregularly,about once a month between April and June 1994. We discussed recent developments

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6..EXPOS~ SI.!CCIN(~ DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS DI.I DROIT INTERNATIONAl. lttlMANITAIRE

(i:

concerning the massacres in each prdfecture. The cabinet meetings were held during twoperiods: the first period was from April to late May: the Ministers, all of them withoutexception requested for as many weapons as possible for their prr.fectures or origin todistribute to the people with the hidden intention of eliminating the Rwandan Tutsis as muchas possible. During this first period, the army was still in charge o1’ all weapons. Thegovernment distributed very few weapons mad people got weapons through personal contactswith soldiers. Discussions during the cabinet meeting always centered around the fact thatMinisters complained that they did not have enough weapons to distribute in their prdfectureof origin. In Kigali, this problem did not arise because people had already been givenweapons. During the second period: June 1994, we received 10,000 weapons to bedistributed specifically to the civil defence; As a result of the pressure of war, FAR received7500 of these weapons. The remaining 2500 were the responsibility of lZeremera, theMinister of Interior who was in charge of Civil Defence. i do not know how they weredistributed. However, I can tell you that 250 of these weapons were I’or Butare through theBrigade General Gatsinzi but never got there. At the cabinet meeting, the reason people gavefor asking for weapons was so they could protect their prefecture fi’om the RPF. May Ipoint out that during that same period, obtaining weapons for your pr@cture in order toofficially eliminate the Tutsis was out of the question. It was always to fight the RPF thatis the armed enemy. Although today, it has been observed that these weapons have servedto eliminate civilian Tutsis, no demand of this kind was officially made by any ministerduring cabinet meetings. This is what I have to say about the meetings with the Prdfets. "

Witness ZB

ICTRZBICTRZBICTR

-But you say here, "with the reports that were received from the Pr@t~s"-Yes.- We were discussing developments in the massacres.-Yes. "- In everyprrfecture, so the reports should contain SOlne information which are quite

clear, and which leave no doubt about the topic.ZB - For someone who wants to understand. But for someone who says lie did not know,he can still say "I was not informed of any massacres in nay prrfecture"ICTR Okay. During the cabinet meetings when you discussed ihese reports what did youtalk about? How did you discuss?ZB -I said earlier that we discussed the problems in the pr@cture. We would say, therewas a problem in such and such a commune. The word problem can mean a lot of things.ICTR -But what kind of trouble was this, when you use the word ill this specific context?ZB -I explained, I explained that the word trouble in this specific case means massacres,but that no one said it publicly.ICTR -That is it, it was not to be said. the word massacre was not to be mentioned, but thenthey were synonyms, other words were simply used,..ZB -Synonyms for those who want, those who believe, who would admit it, but for those

143

. .. . ¯

6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAl., IIUMANITARIAN LAW

who do not want to admit it ....ZB -No. Because the Ministers never asked for weapons to go and ki II publicly.. It wasalways to fight the FPR but we laaew and this was confirmed later that it was fbr the killingof the Tutsis.ICTR -Did the government kaaow that the RPF were not in some regions? That there hadbeen massacres and also that there were ministers who still asked fbr weapons sayilag: ’weneed weapons to fight the RPF".ZB -Yes.ICTR -Where?ZB -When the war first broke out, we knew in what regions the fighting with ....ICTR -The RPF.ZB -The RPF and others places where they were not present. The RPF was not presentin Gitararna, Butare, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Gisenyi prdfectures as well in some parts ofRuhengeri and Kigali.ICTR -There were no soldiers, was this known?ZB -It was known "

ICTR - It was known?ZB -Yes.ICTR -So then when the ministers from these regions came to ask for weapons, for I wouldimagine that ministers from the various regions requested for weapons, would someone atthe cabinet meeting say? "Why are you asking for weapons, you I<now this is not tree".ZBICTRZBICTRZB

-No.-Everyone lmew that there was no war between the RPF and the FAR at that location.-Everyone knew it.-Everyone knew that there was an ethnic cleansing operation going.-Yes.

Witness ZB

On several occasions I attempted to stop the massacres and to persuade several Ministers tointervene, but in vain. I tried to talk to Prime Minister Kambanda but three days after ourmeeting, I was relieved of my duties.

Witness BW

6.37 During these numerous Cabinet meetings, the Interim Governmentadopted directives and gave instructions to theprdfets and thai bottt~mestres. Thedecisions, which were then passed on to the general public, were intended toincite, aid and abet the perpetration of the massacres. In order to ensure thatthe directives and instructions were carried out, Jean Kambanda’s InterimGovernment designated a Minister for eachprdfecture to be responsible for whatwas termed ’pacification’. Callixte Nzabonimana for Citarama, PaulineNyiramasuhuko for Butare and Andr6 Ntagerura for Cyangugu were among

144

6..EXPOSE SUCCINCT DES FAITS:

AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAl, HUMANITAIRE

those assigned this task.

PD - What party was Caltixte with?JK - He was a member of.the MRND.PD - MRND? Ok.MD - You had to meet with him to discuss what you were going Io say about hirn?JK - Yes, because people thought it was too much. Hence, it was ~vcn discussed outsidegovernment circles, because people thought it was outrageous tbr a Minister to be paradingaround the hills with people going to commit murders.

MD - Openly as that?JK - In front of everyone, it was not, they used the term "unbecoming", saying that it was

unbecoming for a government minister.MD - So you, that was the reason you met with him? Because it had been brought to yourattention, you were..., and it...it brought on...it brought on...

JK - Discredit.MD - Discredit to the Government?JK - Yes. .... ,~MD - And, er, were you alone wlaen you met wltl-t iron.

JK - I believe I was alone. I don t believe this is a matter to be discussed in a group, but

I had talked about it with other people beforehand, especially rrlembers of my party.

MD - And what was his reaction?JK - Sorry?

MD - What was his attitude during the meeting? Was it, was it...JK Well, he was saying that what people were saying was false, that all he had done was totake on responsibility as someone who had been called upon to pacify the, his region, thatperhaps he was being criticized for visiting the bourgmestres, etc. But [ told him that he wasbeing associated with all the groups which were can-ying out killings. I even asked him, Iasked hirn to personally intervene and make a public radio announcement denying his

personal participation in...MD - Yes.JK - ...in the massacres, to go on the air and say so.MD - But you said that his radio address was...JK - It wasn’t, well, anyhow, it did not bring about the change I was expecting, that

everyone was expecting.

Witness ZB

145

Within the framework 6fpacification of the country, before 23 April 1994, the governmenthad assigned to the Ministers regions to pacify. In that regard, PauLine was assigned Butare

145

Witness ZB

--.~- Nta~,erura ....ZB -Yes, it was ~itu~,.. ~, __.-~.1~ ¢~roICTR -Which region was lap respon~u* ....

ZB .Cyangugu.ICTR _Cyangugu.ZB -Yes. Witness ZB

.t

6.38 On 27 April 1994, the Interim Government ordered roadblocks to be setup, knowing that the roadblocks were being used to identify the Tutsi and their-accomplices" for the purpose of eliminating them.

On behalf of the government of Rwanda, I am writting to c0mrnunicate to you theinstructions to be followed by all the levels in charge of security and by the whole populationso that security ~nd calm which have been troubled in all the corners of the country return

to organize,quickly.1) As it has started to be done in most of the prefectures, you are requestedwithout delay and frequently, security meetings at the level of your prefecture. In thesemeetings, concrete mesures must be taken and immediately implemented according to thesecurity problems that the prefecture is faced with. Every prefectural security meeting mustsuggest a follow-up scheme in order to supervise the implementation of those mesures so as

to follow-up the re.establisl~nent of security.¯ . ¯ ̄ to reinforce security, you are requested, at

to be able ce it ~s the respons~b}htY of eve ryon;~, ~11 evels and all the persons capable

2)1 Sd2ahng wlth the security probl~,,, to ~.. thelof the

1 leveof doing so to assist you: the representatives of the parties, the representativesdenominations, the representatives of the central administration of the country, the National¯ ’ theArmy.3)

The enemy who attacked Rwanda is weU kmown: it is the RPF_INKOTANYI ....

population must remain watchful in order to unmask the enemy and his accomplices andhand them over to the authorities, and get the National At’my to assist them where they prove

ofincapable of doing that.The authorities of the communes, secteurs and cellules are requested, with the assistancethe National Army wherever possible, to identify places where should be set up 0fficiallyrecognized roadblocks and to set up a system in which the rounds would continue to be done

in order to prevent the enemy from infiltrating. Those who are on those roadblocks and whoare doing those rounds shall not commit acts of violence against innocent population.

Instructions to restore security in the country, letter t’rom primeMinister Jean Kambanda to all prdfets, 27 April 1994

146

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. program training sessions (weapons handling, tactics and resistance against guerillas,

ideological and moral training);- identify and choose and/or instruments for enemy detection...

carry out regular and frequent follow-up, monitoring and evaluation visits to roadblocks

manned by civilians;- hold meetings with the people to raise awareness of the importance of roadblocks andpatrols for civil defence and clarification of activities to be undertaken in this context;- do a brief evaluation of local authorities and identify those who may possibly handicap the

implementation of the civil defence strategy ....Letter from the Minister of the interior to all prefers

The order to set up those road blocs emanated from a communique o [" the Prime MinisterKambanda which was transmitted by Radio Rwanda. [ heard that announcement myself.Opposite the hotel, there was a roadblock controlled by soldiers belonging to the PresidentialGuards but, later on, those soldiers were replaced by the soldiers fl’om the E.S.O.

(Translator’s note: E.S.O. stands for "EcoIe des Sous-Officiers, ~,hich means the Non-Commissioned Officers’ School). I also saw a road block controlleet by soldiers on I:l~e roadleading to Kabutare. I saw a road block on the road which runs close to the oftice of theprefect. The road bloc was controlled by civilians whom I did not know and it was also setup starting from 7 April. I saw, with my own eyes, a road block beside the Chic Chocrestaurant. The road bloc was set up by civilians. Another road bloc located near themarket at a place called Rwabayanga was also under the control of other civilians .... No

~futsi could cross those road blocks. Soldiers had their own road blocs and so did thecivilians most of whom were Hutu. I realized that at those road blocs, both the soldiers andthe civilians checked the identity cards of people who wanted to cross and the Tutsi werearrested at those road blocs. Previously, the soldiers were the ones wlLo killed people atthose road blocs and later on those soldiers called the civilians who were near-by and handed

them those people they had arrested to kill thern. But about eleven days afterwat’ds, I wasable i;o notice that they avoided killing at road blocs in order to hide back those kitlhlgs from

the expatriates. Thus, they had gathered the arrested Tutsi and a vehicle was transportingthem to Kabutare where they were killed. I saw, with nay own eyes, soldiers killing one by

one the persons that had been brought into that forest. When the interim President,Th6odore SINDIKUBWABO, was set at the head of the country, the identi fication of peoplewas increased, which made it possible to distinguish the Hum fl-om the wanted Tutsi.Wimess Q.I

I can recollect that KAMBANDA used to tell in the Radio Rwmi’da that every Rwandesemust have a gun in order to hunt the enemey. There was also the announcen’,ent by thesepoliticians that the people should be very strong at the roadblocks where the military and thecivilian persons were given the guns. This rnean they should stop the people who are notcarrying the identity card of Hutu and kill them. These sorts or" messages were passed

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through the Radio Rwanda very often in its day to day program.Witness FB

ICTR -We saw that it was done...at, the roadblock the first one you saw on 7 April twogroups were mixed?ZB -That is why I am making a distinction between a purely niilitary checkpoint and afree- for- all which could accommodate everyone.ICTR -Would you describe the first roadblock as disorderly?ZB -It was a military checkpoint .....ICTR -It was not a military checkpoint. However, It was aheady 7 AI)ril and aheady by7April, there were disorderly roadblocks and when a curfew was in force and people wereadvised to stay home, were the roadblocks in existence then?ZB -Yes, I have already said something about that.ICTR -roadblocks that were not manned by the soldiersZB -The ones I saw were manned by soldiers .......ICTR -YesZB -...and civilians. Manned. I do not know who controlled who but both of them werethere, I do not know who was .... if the soldiers were in charge of the ItzteralTamwe but theywere both at the roadblock.ICTR -But for them to be on the road so quickly, did that not make you ask questions?ZB -Yes.ICTR -The fact that the fnterahamwe were already outside. That they were immediatelyat the roadblocks.ZB -I have already talked about that. I wondered how they received authorization to goout while everyone else had been advised to stay home.

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ICTR So...Were they able to see later that the two groups had probably distanced

themselves from each other?ZB -We did not notice that but the tension remained until the end.ICTR -So they did not succeed..does that mean that they wanted to continue worldng?

ZB -They continued working.ICTR - They continued working together, to mix?ZB -But according to the reports I received, tension did not stop between the two groups.According to the information I received, the soldiers were complaining about the behaviour

of the Interahamwe at the front.ICTR -At the front?ZB -Yes.ICTR -We notice from the declaration that if they did not join the lntera/Tcm~we in lootingand killing. Soldiers bearing name tags and identification numbers were detailed to and made

responsible for specific roadblocks.ZB -YesICTR -He did not commit any crime?ZB -No.ICTR -But he moved a few metres away, or maybe about 100 metres or..

ZB -That is not confin~ned. I said "he could ...."

ICTR -He could do it?ZB -....as I saw soldiers at the other roadblock .....ICTR -Hmm,HmmZB -... I cannot say: "they came from the militatay checkpoint or ... if they found theirway there". So that may mean that even the soldiers can leave their own checkpoint to

commit crimes at the so called anarchical roadblocks. That I cannot con fima.ICTR -What you can confirm is that there were soldiers at a roadblock where people were

massacred and killed?ZB -Yes. Witness ZB

.L

6.39 On 25 May 1994, the Interim Government adopted directives concerningthe civil self-defence program. Its purpose was to legalize the distribution ofweapons to the militiamen on the one hand and to legitimize the massacres of thecivilian population on the other. As part of the civil selfdefence program, theInterim Government, by ministerial decision, appointed several military officersto lead the ’self defence committees’ established in each prd~/’ecture. Some ofthese officers took an active part in the massacres, including AlphonseNteziryayo in Butare.

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6. C()NCISE STATI~.~IEN"rOF I’I.IE FAC"I"S:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTEI:t.NATIONAL I.IUMANITAIUAN LAW

["")

(2

There were meetings every day. During the meetings, I opposed ma’ny proposals. There wasno talk of national defense, but rather of civil defense. On one occasion The Prime Ministerintroduces a law regarding civil defense. The population was known to be armed, buttransforming this situation into law was difficult. Militias had a certain u ii l ity in combat. Isaid that the law was unconstitutional. Both Mugyaneza Prosp6re and I said that these armscould be used to kill the Tutsis ........... The law was supported by the Ministry of Interiorbecause the ministre was out of the cotintl~¢. The dossiers were than passed on to the PrimeMinister.

Witness CR

The Prime Minister’s Directives to the Prdfets for the Organization of the Civil Self-DefenceProgramme:, In order for our defence programme to succeed, it is important fbr us to lend our fullsupport to our armed forces, which are putting tip stout resistance against the enemy.- The enemy enjoys the support of certain foreign Governments, in men and equipment. Forus to conquer the enemy, it is imperative to mobilize our most effective weapon, namely theRwandan people, who have demonstrated their unfailing support to the current Governmentin defending our country, which is under threat. Hence, the people are called upon to jointheir Army in the fight against the enemy.-the people’s strength can be turned to good account only if the people are organized andtrained to defend themselves effectively against any form of aggression. For that reason, thecommunal and prefectural authorities must do all in their power to make sure that the initialmeasures as regards mobilization, orgmlization and training are in place within the next twoweeks.-As much as possible, the tactical and strategic organization of the people’s resistance mustbe kept a secret.-Directing the physical, moral and ideological training and the arms drills.-Discipline.-Weaponry and logistics (careful use of weapons and ammunition).- The Bourgmestres will automatically be members and have a supervisory role. It is theywho will chair the communal committee meetings on the coordination of civilian self-defence as well as those of the communal committee on civil self-defence.

Signed: J. Kambanda, Prime Minister, 25 May 1994

ICTR -To your lmowledge, did those people play an active part in the massacres, after ...after 6 April?ZB -Yes, they did play an active part in the massacres.ICTR -They played an active part.ICTR -Did the civil defence include the Interahamwe? Did the civil del~cnce ia Rwandainclude the Interahamwe? ’<

ZB -Yes, it did.ICTR -It did include the Interahamwe? When the civil defence service was established, was

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ICTRZBICTRZBready.

ICTR8 JuneZBICTR

it established by your Government?ZB -Officially yes, since the.., that was when the people realized that there was a civildefence programme in place, but as I mentioned earlier, the structures were ah’eady in place.

-What you did was legislate based on an already-existing situation?-We made public a situation which was already in place.-And operational?-It was operational since some people had already received military tra i n in g and were

For 6 April 1994.

-So a directive was published on 25 May 1994, and, as it says here. circulated around1994, is that correct? It was circulated on 8 June 1994?-Yes, that is correct.-So, when the Government was put into place, there was ah’eady a civil defence

programme or, as I mentioned earlier, the Interahamwe, who were seen at roadblocks andin certain areas of the country. In other areas, especially those areas which, er. which wereconsidered unlikely to be attacked, notl~ng was in place. Ci v i l ian sel f-de l:ence groups wereformed. Self-defence, as they were called, or the groups, the militia were formed, people whoorganized themselves to go and perpetrate, massacres, especially, in all the communes, likethe ones I mentioned for Cyanda [phonetic] commune, when [ asked the question "Are thereInterahamwe in your commune?", "No.", but where he said that there were still people who,who massacre the Tutsi. So, while we were talking about the Government, legislation.., forthe, who had responsibility for the roadblocks, the plan was to do the same for civil self-defence.ICTR -We should perhaps wait a little because I don’t know i f’...[inaudible].ICTR -[inaudible] is con-ring from the airport.ICTR -Ok. It seems to be quieter; perhaps we can now resume the imerview, go ahead.ZB -So, when the, the directive for...for restoring security in tl{e country, better knownas pacification, was put into place, the plan was also to deal with civilian selt’-defence,because at the beginning, the Ministers whose home regions had not been included in thecivilian self-defence progranm~e, requested for one to be established in their home regions.At the time, the, the infonnation regarding the civilian self-defence was circulated at thesame time as the directive on the...for restoring security was being prepared .....ICTR -In whose interest was it that the civil defence programrne become an official ....ICTR A goverml~ent organization.ICTR -A goverm’nent organization, or at [east...[inaudib le]...ICTR -one that had the Government’sICTR -The Government’s blessing.ZB -I think this was in everyone’s interest. Because those who already had a civilian self-defence programme or the, to be more candid, the MRND officials who had alre.ady trainedthe Interahamwe militarily certainly had a stake in seeing the, er, the Governm)nt endorsethe civilian self-defence programme. But the, as regards the Government, some of the

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6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF TH g FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF’ INTERNATIONAL I IUMANITARIAN LAW

Ministers who were not MRND could have had stakes oll two levels. Firstly, theorganizational level. Perhaps organizing the chaos which was observed in the, theprdfectures. It is possible that there were people who had an interest in, saying: "Well, sincew’e cannot stop the machine, we might as well organize it" or those who l’clt li’ustrated whenthe decision was made to arm some parts of the country militarily, to say "It is also hightime that the people in our regions are armed". These were the people, the three groups whohad a stake in seeing the directive...[inaudible]...ICTR -Ok. As regards 8 June 1994, are you able to tell me how many people lost their livesin Randa at the time, up until then. Counting from 6 April, and looking at the two months,the sixty or so days, in that period, cma you give me an idea of how many people, victims ...ZB -When?ICTR -Well, I would like you to situate that before the publication.ZB -Ok.ICTR -Before the recognition.ZB -Ok. .,ICTR -How many people..?ZB -I would say that after the publication of the instructions, the massacres were all butended, it was already...ICTR -It was already over.ZB -Yes, it was already over.ICTR -How...ICTR -Go ahead, continue...ICTR -No. No.ICTR -Ok. We know what their functions were, we know the role played by theInterahamwe or civilian self-defence, the, that group, in the massacres. The Goverm,nentknew exactly what those people were doing, how could, how could a Government recognizea group of murderers which had just slaughtered a population and make it. make it an officialpart of the Government? How can...How can a Government justify taking a group ofmurderers, recognize it and make it part of the Govenm’~ent? What was your rationale ? Atthat point in time, the things those people had done were well known?ZB -Yes.ICTR -What, how, why, why did the Government want to identify itsell, want to recogrtizethis group, to the point of according it official recognition? It is, it was..1 would like you toexplain to me what was your rationale was, how a government came about preparing thisdocument, the proposal knowing clearly what these people had’ done in the past, theirreputation. What was it trying to accomplish?

ICTR -You personally, what do you consider the h~terahamwe were guilty of at that pointin time?ZB -Guilty of..., you mean me personally?ICTR -Yes, you personally.ZB -I consider the fnterahamwe guilty of slaughtering people at the roadblocks.

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6..ExPOS~ St~CclNc’r Ot~’S FAITS:

AUTRES~AIRE

ICTRZB[CTI<ZBICTI<

.Guilty of slaughtering people at the roadblockS. .,

.Yes. slaughter at the roadblockS?-Who did they

slaughtered the Tutsi.-They slaughtered the Tutsi? Based on what?-They

ZB -On ethnic grounds.ICTR -On ethnic grounds, it was... ¯ s’?

tZ;TR -Ok. As a Govet~?~.ahamWe . whom...wh°S part o f the p, wandan

the time that the...ttae ~n~-that these people had eliminated GovernmeN, you

civilian self-defence " you knewTutsi; then, you as a

population on ethnic grounds, because they were

agree to publish this

do what you did. Did all the members of the Governmentdecided to

of the directive.

-s9 In your opinion, what weredirective? remember anyone being opposed to the publication

the

ZB -I do nottt’Le consequence ¯ _ famine?

,~ou consider were "~-e civilian se~f-detence progICTR _What do tie Government an.a m .. doin~ this, it was giving its stamp of approval

forconsequences ,-,~.,errmaent, tt was mrap~e m ~ ".,~:,,;~ters have the sameZB -For me ~,~ ~" ..... n the ~ovenm~en~ ~,"~: .... oncerning ttae- __~..Ac the massa~s~,,o..- . _ ~.~ Governmem..-~.-" _7 ~.~ ~ame COl’~ClltStUt~ "as feb~’~° _., _ :~mviduats m u~ .o ,-~ all arrtve at ~,~ o your co~.tlgl.-yl’nen,ICTR Dick me t~ ,c ~,,ch that you womu ,~ individuals,information as yourself, =~’ people were eliminating

inwrahamwe, i.e., that thoseeveryone knew that

citizenry, on ethnic grounds?iafom~ed that

ZB -I believe so. BecauSe, as I already indicated on other occasiOnS,massacres were being carried out in the country. All the Ministers weremassacres were being carried out in the country, and they kneW who was carryh~g them out.ICTR -So, when, when the Ministers expressed their support, when eve~’yoae in theGovernment expressed support for this document, they did conCtonC me massacres?’Nitness ZB

ZB .Yes, they condoned the massacres.

nda, Augustin Bizimana’

. , ,A "ulv 1994, 3ea,’ Ka’nb2. a R,,,amakuba,..A.ndre

¯Karemera! . ~: ...... huko et Eliezer ~ ......... ,,. including, o

Edouard ~ ,._~N,,~ram~,,~- ---,,~ral orelect"’~°’Nta erura, t, amme -~- ,~,ith others, to ~-’~

¯ ¯

eithger on their own u~ ,,153

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6. CONCISE STATEMENT OIr TIlE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTEIINATIONAL ItUMANIT-kRIAN LAW

C

Kibuye and Gitarama, in order to monitor the implementation of the

Government-issued instructions, directives and guidelines, notably with regard

to civil defence and security. During the many visits they made, these

personalities knew or had reason to know that massacres were perpetrated

against the civilian Tutsi population.At no time did Augustin Bizimana, EdouardKaremera, Callixte Nzabonimana or Andr6 Rwamakuba take any action to stop

those massacres nor to punish the persons responsible.

We have three items on the agenda of this security council meeting, to whicla you beeninvited.The first item is in regard to the instructions to fbllow to restore security in your region.The second item is the message our Government sent to the RPF asking it to stop thefighting.The third item deals the progress with of the war and what can be done to win it once and forall, because the enemy described it as "final". This is a popular term among young peoplenowadays. The enemy called it "final" because it is the last. So, we should also consider itas the last and fight accordingly.In short, we have sent a message to the Prdfets in each prdfecture, including your own,indicating what can be done tO restore security for the people, put an end to the recent unrest,because this is a weapon the enemy can use to seize power by force.

THE RPF-INKOTANYI did not honor theArusha Accords. They resumed the fighting,attacked our positions and even the fnkotanyi who were guarding their leaders left the CNDand spread to all parts of the city of Kigali, started to slaughter people and attempted tocapture the military camps of the Forces Armies Rwandaises.The citizens who lost their lives are not fi-om one ethnic group. They were fiom all the etlmicgroups because in their recruitxnent, the RPF did not ask for the people’s ethnic background,we do not know this; what we know is that it had combatants i n.~ every commune. Thosecombatants launched the attacks in the communes and the people defended themselves. Wewould like the RPF to understand that, instead of spreading rumors, claiming that theauthorities are the ones who are behind the massacres. It should review its policies todetermine the actual objectives of its combatants in the communes.

...On behalf of the Government, I alia pleased to communicate to you the instructions to befollowed by all the institutions dealing with security anti by the tx’ople i~ order to quicklyrestore peace and security, which have been disrupted througlaout the country. As is the casealmost everywhere else, each one of you is requested to hold meetings ia your/)rcfecture.At these meetings, you should make decisions which will be implemented according to theprevailing security concerns in theprgfecture. Every prefectural council on security should.make sure that these measures are implemented in order to tbllow tip closely on the gradualreturn of security.

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The enemy who is attacking Rwanda is known; some people hesitate and do not want us tosay this out loud. The enemy who attacked Rwanda is the RPF-]~lc~)laJ~yi. 1 said that and Irepeat that we need peace, we wmat peace, but we wi 11 take on wlnoever chooses war. [n otherwords, if the RPF wmats peace, we will help it achieve peace. Shol:~ld they opt [br war, wewill fight them. Those who declare themselves members of the RPF will be considered asour enemy, as enemies of our country. As i said earlier, the enemy has recruited combatantsin all the communes, including Kibuye and Butare, my home pr@eture, la its publications,it claims that we are relieving its partisans of their jobs. This is what we have to respond tothat: "If they love you, Iet them join you, let them become INKOZ4NYI like you and you wiI1take them with you to the Peace Accords." They should not claim to be moderates. Theyassert that there are extremists that they refuse to accept, that they want to haverepresentatives in the Government. The enemy will not have representatives in Governmentas long as it refuses to join this Govemlnent.

You see, the country was attacked by the Inkotanyi, the President was ldIled. Them has beenunrest. The authorities who claim to be politicians, who have ydu to say anything to thepeople, whose side are they on, the people’s or the enemy’s? Let them come out in the open;they l~ow who they are; they should stop acting in the dark. They are waiting l~br tke end ofthe war to come mad take over power. They will not do so. They will claim that they wereon our side, where were they with us? Let each one of them come out in the open, then wecan choose. Whoever is not with us is against us. Nobody should claim that they fled whilewaiting to see how things would fma out and then corne out wanting to be a mediator. We donot need mediators. Let them choose whether to be [nkotan.)d or the poop le’s representatives.The ]nkotanyi should go to Mulindi and talk on Radio Mut~abura.

You should tell fl~e people to avoid anything that might lead them to fight or kilt one otheron ethnic grounds. The enemy is not someone ti’om a different ethnic group than yours, norfi’om a different region than yours, it is not someone from a different religion, party orwhatever, All that reassures the enemy. Nevertheless, the people should remain vigilant anduncover the enemy with its instruments and bring it to the ad,nil~istration, and if this is notpossible, call upon the Army. The officials in the communes, secte’~r.s~ anct c:elhdes, withassistance from the Army, where possible, are requested to desigaate places to set up knownand accepted roadblocks and examine ways to continue the night watch ("r’om~d.s") to preventthe enemy from infiltrating. At the roadblocks or during the rounds, a void m i s Lreafi n g thosewho are vulnerable ....

.,.Ten people come to a certain area of Kigali, start shooting in the air and the people runaway saying that the RPF has captured the city. We have told the people that they nnzst ceasedoing that. When will they stop fleeing? So ~hr, three million of them have fled. They arerunning everywhere in the mountains, not knowing where they are going because there is

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6. CONCISE STATE,~’LEN]" OF Tll E FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTEI~NATIONAI. HUMANITARIAN LAW

shooting everywhere. We waat the people to stay in their homes and be provided means todefend themselves, what we call civil defence, such as is already tile case in Kigali. Insteadof running away whenever they hear someone shooting, they should go and find out wherethe gunshots are coming from, see who is behind the shooting, because, as matter of f~act, wehave noticed that it is approximately five individuals shooting from.}t single location. If thereare ten of you, you can chase them away. The RPF refuses to accept civil defence. Tkey saythat it is one of the weapons were are using to defeat them.

We are asking that 10 to 20 young people hi each secteur receive mill tory training, That isnot difficult; we can take them to the commune. We have reservists, policemen who knowhow to shoot, let them teach them how to shoot, and show them military tactics. TheGovernment should provide them weapons to protect their sectet.ms’; they will be able tosurround and fight five [nkomnyis if attacked. Instead of running away every si ngle time,to go heaven-knows-where (applause). That is what needs to be done in m’der to assist theArmy effectively. Whenever we say that, the RPF starts to tremble, thinldng we are incapableof doing it, and nobody in the Government can raise a finger and reject this idea.~.o,°

The Government’s role is to provide the people weapons :for them to steadfastly remainin their country and fight the enemy to victory.

...As regards the progress of the war, there is no problem in Gisenyi. The people are ingood shape, the Army too, our Zairian neighbors assure us that they w~tl not let any enemyuse their country as a base to come mid threaten our security; they have also completedeverything I just told you. They have finalized all the preparations as regards the enemy.Despite the rumors spread by the enemy, the people of Ruhengeri -~rc awai ring instructionsto chase the enemy into to Uganda.

Extracts from the speech made by .lean Kambandaon 4 May 1994, in Kibuye, Radio Rwanda

The people have mobilized; I would like to take this opportunhy, H onorable Prdfet, tocongratulate Kigalipr6fecture and its people. Tlley have demonstrated whm it means to facethe enemy. They have assisted the armed forces in an exemplary t:ashion and have joinedforces against the enemy. Anyone with eyes can see for themselves; moreover, this is m~example for other prdfectures. In fact, everywhere, the courage shown by the people ofIGgali will be our message to the people of otherprd.[~ctures for them to act likewise andthus the enemy will never breach our defences. The RPF cm~ continue to wage war if itwishes, we have not only the people, but also a government, the a,-med fbrces and weapons.

Radio address by Jean Kambanda on RTLM, 19 May 1994

About Pauline I must say that I saw her in camoflage uniform and carrying a gun. She wasoutside her house with former Prime Minister Jean KAMBANDA who also had tlae same

t56 . 156

6..EXPOSI~ SUCChN(Fr I)ES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)t.t I)l,tOrl" INTI"+RNA’FIONAI. IIUMANITAIRE

kind of uniform and a gun. There were many Presidential guards to protect tltern. I heardPauline saying that they had not finished with the refugees at the Prefecture. The last timeI saw Pauline was at the end of June 1994, when she fled with her family and she waswearing a camoflaged uniform. KAMBANDA and his fmnily were together with Paulinewhen they left.

Witness FA

We wanted to tell you, Excellency Prime Minister, that you have proved a hero by acceptingto head the Government during these hard times. We people of Kibuye gathering here andthose we represent in this meeting, we want to show that we strongly support you and I’d likethem to show it to you. (General applause). Your Exellency the Prime Minister ...... Theongoing war cannot be temlinated if we don’t work together. The’bxample you have givento us indicate that you want to put an end to this war. The unity you have, the unity we haveis the first factor that would enable us to win this war. We also thank you, Excellency thePrime Minister and the Government you are leading, for having established the fact thatevery Rwandan, wherever he/she is, must be a "soldier" so as to win this war. as a matterof fact, the Government is called after that. It has come protect the attacked. To be able toprotect, every Rwandan must be a "soldier". The fact that you have thought of helping usbecome an efficient "soldier" is an idea all of us people of Kibuye are left with and whichwe do support. And as you have resolved to spread it all over th country, we would ask youspeed it up because it is a very serious problem which, once resolved, would contribute toour victory. We therefore ask you, as you have undertaken to provide the population withthe means to defend themselves, to speed up that process to reach the people of Kibuye whoare only waiting for that and who wish the victory would happen quickly ...... As some havealready mentioned, had we worked together right at the start, this war could not have gonebeyond the border from Uganda.

Audio cassette tape - Radio Rwanda, visit of J. Kambanda, KibL~ye, May

1994

Ntagerura (Minister of Transport and Communications) was passing by in the Prel’ecture ....as a supervisor. He attended a meeting in end April... the President, Sindikubwabo was alsoat the meeting.. People were congratulated for what they already had done. They were toldnot to forget the women and children.

Witness LF

During the war, he (Andre Ntagemra) came to Cyangugu to direct meetings o f C onseillers,and Bourgmasters from the entire prefecture. On 11 April 1994, he chaired a meeting inCyangugu.

Witness LP

During my stay in the area (Bisesero) I personally saw the Minister for Information (Eliezer

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6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE; FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OI7 INTERNATIONAl, IIIUMANITARIAN LAW

Niyitegeka) once. He came together with attackers from Gisovu coi~am une. They waited forgroups from other areas, and they attacked us at the same time. I did not see that the Ministerdid any shooting or killing himself but I personally heard him say, at the time he looked atthe dead bodies, that "we now have enough fertilizer for the soil".

Witness FE

During this same time when officials were visiting tile pr/4/ectures in order to pay tribute toand congratulate those who had contributed to the genocide, Prime M in ister ,lean Kambandacongratulated the population of Butare and this speech was aired on Radio Rwanda.

Wimess PB

There was a meeting in the prefectoral building in the morning. The Minister of In formationNIYITEGEKA, the Prime Minister KAMBANDA, the Prefect KAY[SHEMA and localauthorities. I knew there was going to be meeting like all the other’s because it wasannounced on the radio that the Prime Minister was to pay a visit to Kibuye. The actinghospital director, Leonard HITIMANA... was invited to the meeting.Shortly after 15h00CYRIAC’s group, made up of about 20-30 power members fi’om Rutsiro and Kibuye, cameto the hospital... They were armed with machetes thich clubs. They searched the hospitalwards and when they found the children, they took them out a~)d led them towards anenslosure, where they killed them.

\Vitness FG

On 3 May 1994, a meeting led by Prime Minister Jean Kambanda was held in the main roomof the prdfecture...The Prdfet read his report on the security situation in his prefecture... Heasked for ammunition to combat the Inkotanyi, who he said were armed and were on MountKarongi...The Prime Minister asked if they were really fnlcota~o.’i. [ n tinct, he wanted to knowif it was true that they were armed...The Prime Minister promised to iook tbr a solution. Dr.L6onard HITIMANA, who was attending meeting, asked for assistance l:br the childrensurvivors at Kibuye hospital. Immediately after he spoke, Prime M in ister K.AMBANDA, theMinister of Information, Elizer NIYITEGEKA, PrSfet KAY[SHEMA and a man namedDonat MUREGO consulted together. It was MUREGO who spoke, promising that a solutionwould be found urgently. The same day, the children at the hospital were massacred after

the meeting.Witness GR

... the third meeting was held in one of the halls of the CFC in Mt~rambi, to which theinterim government had retreated .... Apart from the Pr@t ofGitarama [Ficl&le UWIZEYE]and the bourgmestres, the Prime Minister [Jena Kambanda] was ~.!t the meeting in the hallwith certain members of the government, representatives of political parties, including theopposition parties, as well as the heads of the church denominations .... l’la¢ Pr(~/iet was thefirst speaker. He described the situation in the prefecture, which, althot@a certainly

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worsening, was not yet hopeless. The bourgmestres, who were being threatened in theircommunes, including one Bourgmestre [Rubogwe] who had been manhandled by a minsterand the militia in his own commune, added their comments to the information provided by

the Prdfet. In reply, the Prime Minister read a message he had prepared in advance. It wasa political message and did not refer at all to the issues raised ... Other members of thegovernment spoke, among who I recall MUGENZI and KAREMISRA. Their speeches werenot about pacifying things or stopping the killings .... The meeting.ended in total confusion.

... Jean Paul attended the third meeting as welt, and he was among those who spoke aiderthe Prdfer about the ldnd of difficulties they had had with the j~.l.erahamwe in theircommunes~ Witness FN

At the end of each day, Minister Callixte would say ~hat he was going home to Nyabukenge[phonetic transcription], approximately 30 kilometres outside Gitarama. He woYtld hold night

meetings, for, and visit the BourgmesWes individually in order to orgmaize the massacres intheir communes with them. He took refuge with us in Zaire. 1 flew over the pr@ctl.~re beforethe end of April, while returnhlg from Ruhengeri and the Nyabarongo. I saw a lot of bodiesfloating and houses destroyed all over the place. As he said that he wec~t home every evening,I called him in a few days later to explain if he lmew anything about tl~e acts committed inhis commune and infonr~ him that I knew of his personal itlvolvement in the massacres, asper the information I had received from my intelligence sources. He ~oid me thai. it was theHutu population which was behind the massacres and denied any i~ersonal involvement. Iordered him to make a radio mmouncement dissociating himself :fi:om the group oi’killers,and denying that he supported them. I know that, that he did so but in a very guarded andunconvincing manner. "’

Witness ZB

159

ICTR - What party was Cailixte with?ZB - He was a member of the MRND.ICTR - MRND? Ok.ICTR - You had to meet with him to discuss what you were goil~g to say abou~ him?ZB - Yes, because people thought it was too much. t-tcnee, it was oven discussed outsidegovernment circles, because people fl~ought it was outrageous l"or a ~%’t inis’,cr to be paradingaround the hills with people going to conunit murders.ICTR - Openly as that?ZB - In front of everyone, it was not, they used the term "unbecoming", saying that it was

unbecoming for a government minister.ICTR - So you, that was the reason you met with him? Because it had been brought to your

attention, you were .... and it...it brough~ on...it brought on...

ZB - Discredit.

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ICTRZBICTRZB

ICTRZBICTRZB

- Discredit to the Government?- Yes.- And, er, were you alone when you met with him?- I believe I was alone. I don’t believe this is a matter to be discussed in a group, but

I had talked about it with other people beforehand, especially members ol: my party.- And what was his reaction?- Sorry?- What was his attitude during the meeting? Was it, was it...- Well, he was saying that what people were saying was false, that all he had donewas to take on responsibility as someone who had been called upon to paci["T the, kisregion, that perhaps he was being criticized for visiting the bourgmeslres, etc. ButI told him that he was being associated with alt the goups which were carrying outkillings. I even asked him, I asked him to personally intervene and make a publicradio announcement denying his personal participation in.,.

ICTR - Yes.JK - ...in the massacres, to go on the air and say so.

ICTR - But you said that his radio address was...ZB - It wasn’t, well, anyhow, it did not bring about the change 1 was expecting, that

everyone was expecting. WitneSS ZB

6.41 Thus, in May 1994, in Kibuye, Jean Kambanda atten0ed a meeting of

heads of government departments regarding security issues. Among the other

participants at the meeting were Cl6ment Kayishema, Pr~fet of Kib uye, EdouardKaremera, Vice-Chairman of the MRND (subsequently appointed Minister of

the Interior), Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Minister of Finance, Eliezer Niyitegeka,

Minister of Information, and Donat Murego, Executive Secreta ry of the MDR.

In the course of the meeting, a participant asked the Prime Minister outrighthow to ensure the protection of the children who had survived the massacres and

were at the hospital. Jean Kambanda did not reply, and none of tim other

ministers of his cabinet proposed adequate or necessary measures to ensure the

safety of the survivors. On the same day, alter the meeting, the children were

killed.

This meeting was public and held in the Prefect’s office in Kibuye. Many authorities werepresent at that meeting. I can mention:- The Prime-minister, KAMBANDA, Jean- The fomler Minister of Information, NIYITEGEKA0 Eleiziet"- The former Minister of Finance, NDINDABAHIZI, Emmanuel

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AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU DROI’F INTERNATIONAl, HUMAN[TAIRE

- The vice-President of the MRND, ICkREMERA, Edouard- The secretary-general ofMDR, MUREGO, Donat .,This was the official delegation from Kigali.The Prime-minister held a speech in which he explained what was going on in the country.He invited the population to resist again the enemy, because RPF was all over the country.He talked about the current gouvernment, which was a strong, united gouvemment. He said,that the people had to choose whether to be Rwmldese oi" to support the RPF. ~-le confirmedthat there were lists of people who supported the RI?3 and that these people had to beconsidered as members of the RPF. He said, the gouvernmen~ would not totcrate :my RPFsupporter or complice. The whole speech was broadcasted, without being censured, on theRwandese radio. Before this speech, the Prefect ICkYISHEMA, made a speech ia which heexplained the current situation. He said that the general situation was stable except in theregion of Bisesero where fightings were going on. There was a!so a speech by KAREMERA.He said, that he was glad that all the political parties were united and they supported thecurrent gouvernment. He said, that he was glad that all the political parties were un.ited andthey supported the current gouvernment. He said, that they hM given instructions to youngin the MRND to behave in a good way. He also invited the people to sa~ppor~ the newgouvemement,The Minister of Information, NIYITEGEKA, who was also the President o[’M DR in Kibuyeregion said in his speech that most of the leaders, in the M DR, who collaborated with theRPF were excluded. He said that now they had to look for people who were comolice withRPF at regionat mad communal level, so that there would be a sfiong M I-)R party. In thename of MDR, he said that the party was proud of the nomination of.KAMBANDA asPrime-minister and he asked the population to support the new go,tvemmcnt a nct tile armyin their fight against the RPF.In the name ofPSD, a speech was made by NDINDABAHIZi, Emmanuel, tl~e Minister ofFinance. He said that his party used to be pro-RPF, but now riley wet.e supporting thegouvernment and its policy.In this meeting HITIMANA asked NIYITEGEKA and MUREGO why M I.)R party had donenothing to stop the killing by controllh~g the young men of their party, tnstead of givh~g hima clear answer. They harrassed him and told him that he should not support the enemy.HITIMANA also asked ICAYISHEMA mad KAMBANDA for aid t’or the children whosurvived the massacres at Home St-Jean and the Stadium in Kibuye. The answer was that thegouvernement has problems to find enough food for the soldiers and that he (l:litimana)should be knowing how to deal with the children I understood what he meant with thesewords. I think he meant, that these children sb.ould be killed. The day a[%r, the hospitalwhere the children s~ayed, was attacked and all the people in them. personel as well as thechildren, were killed. So I assume that all the people that were present m tl~e meetingunderstood what ICAMBANDA or ICAYISHEMA had meant and that me people whoexecuted the attack were instructed. I can not remember whether it was Kambm~da orKayishema who gave that answer. There were also requests for" artns and support-, done by

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the Burgemasters of Gishyita mad Gisovu in order to get rid of Bisesero problem in theircommunes. The answer of the Prime-minister was that the Prefect had to report to himwhether it was the RPF or just Tutsis who fled in the Bisesero region. In my opinion he gavethis disguised answer becasue the quesiton of the Burgemasters was too clear. They saidclearly that they would kill all the people but had not enough means.

Witness GK

On 3 May 1994, I attended a meeting for which I had received a written invitation signed byPrefer KAYISHEMA. It was a meeting of departmental heads held at the Kibuve pr4fecturemeeting hall to discuss public security matters. The organizers o [:.,ttle mcet itag were on thepodium. The meeting was chaired by Prime Minister, Jean KAMBANDA. The others onthe podium were:- C16ment KAYISHEMA, the Prdfet of Kibuye- Edouard KAREMERA, Minister of Interior and Communal Development;- Emmanuel NDINDABAHIZI, Minister of Finance;- Eliezer NIYITEGEKA, Minister of Information;- Donath MUREGO, MDR Secretary General;- Cyprien MUNYAMPUNDU, Member of Parliament, Secretary o1: National Assembly.

There were between 50 and 100 persons in attendance, including the departmental heads.I knew all the participants on the podium either personally or from the fact that they were allpublic figures. The meeting was recorded and broadcast over the radio on 9 May 1994. .The meeting started with a presentation by Prefer KAYISHEMA, followed by other speechesgiven by one or several participant on the podium. The meeting ended around 2 or 3 p.m.After the speeches, the floor was opened for questions. I took the ot)portunity to express myfear to Prime Minister IC&MBANDA for the safety of the children at the hospital. This fearstemmed fi-om the fact the Interahamwe had been trying to enter the hospital ever since their[the children’s] arrival. They did not seem to be aware of the peace policy expressed by thePresident, and I feared that their intention was to kill the children. [ wanted to know whatthe government was going to do to protect the children against the7:-~terahrmve. I thereforeasked him to explain the protective measures that were going to be implemented. Thechairman of the meeting, the Prime Minister, did not answer me and preferredto give thefloor to Eliezer NIYITEGEKA and to Donath MUREGO. The latter two attacked meverbally, called me a traitor and told me that these children too were with the enemy andshould not be assisted. No one on the podium came to the defense o f’tlae children, nor wasthere any reaction fi’om the podium. I was taken abaci< by this ki net o I" respOnSe and reactionon the podium, because I had asked that question with the pl’ol]oulad belief that theGovernment wanted to pursue a policy of peace. The response, patticttlaity the tone of theresponse, made me believe that it was not at all the case, and that in reality, the leaders onthe podium intended to pursue the policy of genocide against the Tutsi.I rushed back to the hospital, and when I got there at about 4 p.m., l’realized that the childrenwere no longer at the hospital. The charge nurses there told me that the lmeraDamwe had

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"L.6..EXI’OSE SI.ICCINCT DES FAITS:

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come armed with machetes and cudgels and had gone with the children towards Lake Kivu.The nurses were very worried that the children would be massacred.Since I had been treated like a traitor for wanting to protect [the children]. I knew that I wasin danger. Therefore I had no choice but to flee.

Witness GY

Kambanda’s speeches focused on galvanizing the Hutus. He would tell the people to engagein the struggle for liberation against the enemy wherever they were, hoc arKt gun in hand. Heusually communicated his messages by way of the press. He visited the ])ltercdmmwe trainingcamps, notably in Gitarama. During such visits, he also made speeches aimed at furthergalvanizing the youths, who had become butchers of part of the population, notably theTutsi, but also the Hutu moderates.

Witness 854/K96

There was a meeting in the prefectoral building in the mornilag. The Mi n ister o f InformationNIYITEGEICA, the Prime Minister KAMBANDA, the Prefect I~AYIStrfEMA and localauthorities. I knew there was going to be meeting like all the others because it wasannounced on the radio that the Prime Minister was to pay a visit to l<ibuye. The actinghospital director, Leonard HITIMANA,.. was invited to the meeting.Shortly after 15h00 CYRIAC’s group, made up of about 20-30 power members from Rutsiroand Kibuye, came to the hospital... They were armed with machetes thich clubs. Theysearched the hospital wards and when they found the children, they tool.: them out and ledthem towards an enslosure, where they killed them.

Witness FG

6.42 Furthermore, between 24 April and 14 July 1994, Th6odore

Sindikubwabo, Jean Kambanda, Augustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera,

Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Rwamakuba, Andr6 Ntagerura, Pauline Nyira

masuhuko et Eliezer Niyitegeka, travelled, either on their own or witil others, to

severalprdfectures, including Butare, Gitarama, Gisenyi, i(ibuye and Cyangugu,

to incite and urge the population to commit massacres, notably by commending

the perpetrators.

The people have mobilized; I would like to take this opportuniiy, Honorable Pr6fet, tocongratulate Kigali prdfecture and its inhabitants. They have served as an example of whatit means to face the enemy. They have assisted the armed fbrces in aa exemplary fashionand have joined forces against the enemy" This is obvious to anyone with eyes and theexample has been set for other prefectures. Every else, the cotlrttg.c o1" the inhabitants of

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6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAl, ilUMANITAIllAN LAW

Kigali will be spoken of in messages we are sending out so that the inhabitants of otherprefectures proceed in the same manner and thus the enemy will never breach our defences.The RPF cart continue to wage war if it wishes, we have the people, a govermnent, the armedforces and weapons as well.

Radio address by Jean Kambanda 9.n P, TLM, t9 May 1994

We wanted to tell you, Excellency Prime Minister, that you have proved a hero by acceptingto head the Government during these hard times. We people of Kibuye gathering here andthose we represent in this meeting, we want to show that we strongly support you and i’d likethem to show it to you. (General applause). Your Exellency the Prime Minister ...... Theongoing war cannot be terminated if we don’t work together’. The example a you have givento us indicate that you want to put an end to this war. The unity you have. the unity we haveis the first factor that would enable us to win this war. We also thank you. Excellency thePrime Minister and the Government you are leading, for having established the/%act thatevery Rwandan, wherever he/she is, must be a "soldier" so as to win this war. as a matterof fact, the Government is called after that. It has come protect the attacked. To be able toprotect, every Rwandan must be a "soldier". The fact that you have thought of helping usbecome an efficient "soldier" is an idea all of us people of Kibuye are left with and whichwe do support. And as you have resolved to spread it all over th country, we would ask youspeed it up because it is a very serious problem which, once resolved, would contribute toour victory. We therefore ask you, as you have tmdertaken to provide the population withthe means to defend themselves, to speed up that process to reach the people of Kibuye whoare only waiting for that mad who wish the vidtory would happen quickly ...... As some havealready mentioned, had we worked together right at the start, this war could not have gonebeyond the border from Uganda.

Cassette Tape - Radio RwandaVisit of.1. Kambanda, Kibuye, 1994

During the fighting’s in the hills there were about one thousand people, most women,children and elderly people, anaong whom was y father, hiding in a cave on a hillside inBisesero. It was a safe place that was recognized by the l nterahanawe. People stayed thereduring the days, when the Interahamwe and the soldiers chased them, anti tcii the cave bydark to look for food and find relatives. On the 23rd of,lune, in the motn~ng, 1 saw from anopposite hill, that a boy, whose father was a interahamwe-member, Sl)Otted the refugees inthe cave. I could hear him shout to some Interahan:we-rnen that he found Inyenzi in a cave.I heard also the father of that boy, encouraging him to shout louder so that more lnterahamwecould hear it. The narne of the child is NGEZAHAYO. He was about 16 years old, at thistime and is now still living in that area. I told this to the local authorities but they refusedto arrest him because of his age. His father is in prison. Nothing happened to fine refugeesat that moment. About 9.00 p.m. that day I spoke to some people who had hidden in thecave. We told them not to hide in the cave anymore because the place was discovered byInterahamwe. Nevertheless most people wanted to stay in the cave. because they t’elt save

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¯, ." i~ suCCl~(:T DES FAITS", . 6..F,.Xi O.~l:....~ ~l I.lt~MANi’rAIRE

AIJTRE~

there en they had no possibility to hide somewhere else. Most of these people were women,children and elderly people. The next morning I saW a lot of lnterahamwe and soldiersarriving by cars and buses. It was early in the morning and 1 found myse/f at about the sameplace as the day before. I estimate the number of people that arrived at some hundreds.

Among them I recognized the following people". RUzINDANA, a businessman from Mugonero,. NDIMBATI, the Burgomaster of GisoVU;

’time_; ....

- KAMBAN ,l~-t"-’n ~ even met him sometlshoot in the’~ave, but l saw nobody

often in Kigatl a~,~ ~the soldiers staaing to . , ~t~nant’ who was alwaY~ob~t

I saw the interahamwe and ,Aier I think it was a .L!el start shoodng" When¯ out. I saw one 2-~’ ; b~’ telling the sotcl~e~? ..~ ~o ~er firewood anti semu~coming _,, ..... nine the at.~ - _..n the sotcite~b ~atl I saw tile

KAMBANI)a ~’~’~’2~,~; the interahamwe m,~ ,, out. After that,

came out of the cave, ̄ ~’~"I saw that agian, nobody came and soil so that

on fire in the entrance of the cave.interahamwe, not the soldiers, close the entrance of the cave with grassnobody could get out and everybody would die from suffocation. I sa~ them use shovelsand hoes. After having closed the cave I saw them go away. At (~.30 p.m., \~:hen it wasalmost dark and I felt safe, i went to the cave with about sixty other men and opened the cave

with our handS, hoes only survivor we foup, d is sti~l living in 13isesero. Histhe cave like that. The can show the place of this event as well as the residenc

DEFANYI, FrancoiS. Isurvivor and the place from whiCh I saw this all happen.

Witness FF

During my stay in the area (Bisesero) I personally saw the Minister for ~nformation (Eliezercame together with attackers from Gisovu commune- Tl~ey waited forthat the Minister

time he looked atNiyitegeka) once. Ite attacked us at the same time. l did not seegroups from other areas, and theydid any shooting or killing himself but [ personally heard him s~y, at thethe dead bodies, that "we now have enough fertilizer for the so~ -~

Witness FE

. ¯ the refectoral building in the morning. ~rhe Minister of informationthe Prefect KA’flSI-tEMA and local

ere was a meetlpg m. _ P ¯ aister KAMBANDA, all me o[hers because it wasYITEGEKA, tt~e P rmae Mt~

Ta~uthorities. I lcaaew there was going to be meeting likeannounced on the radio that the Prime Minister was to pay a visit to Kibuye. 2~he acting

hospital director, Leonard ttlTIMANA-’" was invited to the mecm~g.Shortly after 15h00 cYRiAC" s group, made up o f about 20-30 power members from Rutsiroand Kibuye, came to the hospital... They were armed with machetes thich clubs. Theysearched the hospital wards and when they found the childrem they tool< men~ out and led

165

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".7

them towards an enslosure, where they killed them.

Witness FG

Ntagerura (Minister of Transport and Telecommunications) was passing by ill the Prefecture.... as a supersivor. He attended a meeting in end April... the President Sindikubwabo wasalso at the meeting.. People were congratulated for what they ah’cady had done. They weretold not to forget the women and children.

Witness LF

...We sent another message to the leaders ofpr6fectures, asking thena to Forward that messageto the bourgmestres, the conseillers, and even to the cellules’leaders. We held a meeting onMonday the 1 lth with all the Pr6fets of Rwanda. We were asking that Bourgmestres,Conseillers and even cellules’leaders should be informed of that message. At that questionof cellules’leader that has been won-ying the previous governments when some people weresaying that they are MRND cellules’leaders, that they should not be given the reward theyare entitled to. We said that cellules’leaders belonged to all parties since they work for allthe residents. You are Bourgmestres, I think you know that better than me, thecellules’leaders are the first authority to which the residents appeal. So to deny them thereward they are entitled to by the law is feigning to ignore the,iv duty.That is why thegovernment decided, even if it does not have sufficient means fbr the time being, that thecellules’leaders reward should be counted m:nong the debts that the government should paysoon.Then, the cellules leaders will dedicate themselves to their work, Feeling that thegovernment is behind them, that they have got support. That is a decision taken by thegovernment after having considered that they have a great role to play in restoring calm andsecurity in the country. That message we gave to the Pr<Sl’ets is the same as the one I amaddressing to you. We started to meet with some Bourgmestres in some Pr~:fectures. Westarted yesterday in Gitaranaa. Today we have come to Butare. The program will be extendedto other prefectures, and we will be asking Bourgmestres to do their possible in order to:First, ensure the resident’s security. Secondly, protect the country’s sovereignty. That meansthat they have to prevent the residents from carrying out troubles but they have to rememberthat we are fighting against RPF. They should remember that it should not be good if anycommune was infiltrated by the emaemy, by RPF. We are confident in the residents, we havethe confidence that they will help you with that, because they have the ability and the will,they do not accept that we should be brought to the yoke of 59".

Speech by Jean KAMBANDA. 13utare, 19-4-1994

During this sarne time when officials were visiting the prdJ’ectm’es in order to pay tribute toand congratulate those who had contributed to the genocide, Prime Minister .Iean Kambandacongratulated the population of Butare and this speech was aired ~3n Radio Rwanda ....

Witness PB

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6..EXI’()SE’ SU(’CIN(.’r DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS l)tJ l)liOIT INTERN~VFIO~NAL IIUMANITAIRE

I have seen Pauline NYIRAMASUHUKO and her son Shalom in Cyarwa, where I lived atthat moment. I can remember it was the middle of the month of May 1994. I saw that theywere dressed in military suits .... During that particulm" time I saw Pauline holding a speech.She used a loudspeaker and was inciting the civilians - mainly Hutu - to kill the Tutsi people.The same day as Pauline had.given that speech, the Hum population o 1-" Cyarwa started totake out the Tutsi people fi’om their houses .... Later that same day I saw I’rom my house thatthese civilians forced Tutsi people with violence to walk fiom tlaei~ houses to a little bridgein Cyarwa .... I did not see the killings myself, because [ did not dare to watch. But I heardthe screeming [sic] and yelling, which came from the direction of" the bridge, [ went out ofmy house to watch waht exactly had happened... I saw that all the people were lying dead onthe ground near the bridge. As I watched the dead bodies, I saw that these people were IdUedwith machetes, little hoes and clubs. The killers were still present and I saw they had theseweapons in their hands. I saw daat there was blood on these weapons. At the same momentas I was watching the dead bodies, I saw Pauline and Shalom. They were leaning against acar.

Witness QF

In Butare, the perpetrators of the genocide were divided into four teams:2. The second team was made up of the Pr6fet and his direct collaborators who supervisedthe killings at theprgfecture level. To that end, Sylvain NSABIMANA was appointed Preferof Butare. He directed what was referred to as the operations, or the killings. He was anative of Mbazi commune.

According to my information KAMBANDA Jean was a Close fiiend to Dr. SostheneMunyemana. KAMBANDA and Dr. Sosthene organized and supervised the massacres of thetutsis in the Prefecture of Butare .... In fact, since KAMBANDA lost his position as thehigher leader of the M.D.R. party to the benefit ofMrne Agathe U’WILINGtYIMANA, theresidence of Tumba had been terrorized by KAMBANDA and DR. Sosthene.In early june 1994, KAMBANDA Jean held a meeting at the Faculty o f Med i cin at ButareHospital. He explained to us that there was no genocide going on. it was simply a waragainst the R.P.F. At that occasion, all the professors asked him about a list that had beendrafted by the Crisis Committe, concerning the people that had to be killed. Fie did notaddress our question.

\,Vitness SO

... the third meeting was held in one of the halls of the CFC in Murambi, to which the interimgovernment had retreated .... Apart from the Pr~fet of Gitarama [Fid&le U W IZ EYE] and the5ourgmestres, the Prime Minister [Jean Kambanda] was at the meeting in the hall withcertain members of the government, representatives of political parties, including theopposition parties, as well as the heads of the church denominations .... The Pr@t was thefirst speaker. He described the situation in the prdfectut’e, which, although certainly

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OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAl, HtlMANITARIAN LAW

worsening, was not yet hopeless. The bourgmestres, who were being threatened in theircommunes, including one Bourgmestre [Rubogwe] who had been manhandled by a ministerand the militia in his own commune, added their comments to the in formation provided bythe Prdfet. In reply, the Prime Minister read a message he had prepared in advance. It wasa political message and did not refer at all to the issues raised .. Other members of thegovernment spoke, among who I recall MUGENZI and KA.ILEM ERA. Their speeches werenot about pacifying things or stopping the killings .... The meeting ended in te tat confusion.

... Jean Paul AKAYESU attended the third meeting as welt, and he was among those whospoke after the Prdfet about the kind of difficulties theyhad had with the l)aeraDamwe intheir communes.

Witness FH

I heard that Jean-Baptiste HABYARIMANA, Prefect of gutare was dismissed on 18 April1994. The next day, on 19 April 1994, President SIND[KUBWABO accompanied bymembers of the Government came to Butare. He was received at.!he MRND’s palace andit is where he pronounced his incendiary speech. I heard this speech on Radio Rwanda. Hewas saying that, instead of staying indifferent, the population of Butare had to show morepatriotism... Between 19 and 20 April 1994, houses of Tutsi in the surroundirtgs of the townwere burning. On 20 April 1994, the new Prefect Sylvain held a meeting of all Burgomastersof Butare at MRND’s palace. On 21 April 1994 at 15h00, the massacres officially started.I say officially because they killed systematically fi’om house to house... On 26 or 27 April1994, Joseph Kanyabashi mad the Prefect Sylvain held a meet{ng o.f the two sectors ofNgoma and Matyazo on the football ground of Ngoma in fi-ont of Electrogaz. t was insidethe church and I could hear their speeches. Each one in his speech asl<ed the population tostop killing and to organize themselves to defend their neighborhoods. The massacrescontinued.

Witness QB

{-)About early May 1994, Kanyabashi convened a meeting at Ngoma parish. Among theattendants were: the Prefect, Sylvain, the Bourgmestre, Kanyabashi, and the Commandantde place. I did not know his name. The Bourgmestre Kanyabashi announced that the killingshave been stopped and that the people in hiding had hencetbrth nothing to fear. He addedthat whoever dared to kill again would face harsh punishment. The PreFect then took the"floor and confirmed what the Bourgmestre had just said. He told the public: "Keep onworldng as I am telling you and follow what you have been told’, ble actually meant: "keepon killing as I have just told you mad respect the instructions as the President o i: the Republictold you’. Not everybody understood the rneaning of those words. The people who were inhiding came out and were killed that very night, including those who had sought refuge inthe parish. Witness QA

168168

6..EXPOS~ SIICCINCT DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)II I)ROIT INTERNATIONAl. IIIIMANITAIRE

"...The Hutus used to hold meetings around that time... The lbllowing Sunday, 10 April1994, the Minister of Youth at the time, Callixte NZABONIMAN,5, came and said that theTutsis had to be exterminated .... ".

IFF 1160

6.43 On several occasions, Minister Andr6 Rwama ku ba m atie p u blic statements

aimed at exacerbating ethnic hatred and inciting the murder of the Tutsis. Some

of his statements were broadcast on RTLM.

I also saw Andr6 RWAMAKUBA hit a man on the head with a club ....I no longer recall the exact date, but it was shortly betbre I left the pt@cture forNyaruhengeri (between early and Mid-June), Andr6 came along with the civilian pr6fetwhose name I do not know, who replaced the assassinated pr@t. Then Andr6 told thecivilianpr6fet: "I told you, these people, you transferred them from the University hospitalto theprdfecture here. I asked you to ensure that all the Tutsis there were killed and now youare still keeping them here. Every Tutsi should be exterminated". Andr6 said this before theold people who had sustained open wounds in their heads and whom Dr. GATERA hadhoped would give up the ghost at the roadblocks or at the pr@cture.

11 F ()310

Regarding Dr. Andre RWAMAKUBA, I can~confinn that I have krtown him [:or quite sometime. We are both from the same commune, that is Gikomero. We completed our studiesin humanities the same year, 1970. With the advent of multiparty politics, RWAMAKUBAjoined the MDR and I the Patti Liberal (PL). He ended up becoming a hardliner within theMDR and was known for his extremist acts.°.°

During the genocide, he visited Oikomero commune several times to sensitize the masses.This sensitization focused mainly on the extermination ol? the Tutsis.

ItF 0925

As regards Dr. Andr6 RWAMAKUBA, I met him two years before the events ol:’April 1994.But three months earlier, I saw him in a khaki coloured 505 Peugeot, in the company ofMinister GASANA and Aloys MUNYANGAZU. The vehicle belonged to GASANA .... Ithad a loudspeaker on the roof.... At the same time, Andr6 RWAMAKUBA and hiscompanions were making speeches into a microphone, which were then carried by theloudspeaker. Basically the speeches were designed to excite the Flutus into uniting in orderto get rid of the Tutsis. I remember one sentence that was repeated over and over: "The tirnehas ,come for the Hutus to get rid of the enemy." Alter 25 minutes of slogans,RWAMAKUBA and his companions left for Rutunga secteur.

I 1 F 0967

169 169

6. (’()NCISi~ STATIEMI,:NT ()F THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF h\’TERNATIONAI. IIUMA~NiTAIIIAN LAW

The last time I saw him [Dr. Andr6 Rwamakuba, Minister of Education], l was able to seehim closely; he arrived in Gikomero secteur, the office of which was in a small centre whichbore that same name Gikomero; it served as a refuge for threatened people, be they Hutu orTutsi. This happened on 12 April 1994 between 10 a.m. and I2 noon. My house was about100m away from that office. I was shocked by what he did to two young people; he seizedtheir certificates and tore them up .... After tearing up the certificates, RWAMAKUBAordered the crowd to seize the young people and kill them.

¯ IIF 0919

At that time, the killings had not started in our commutze. 1 am sure that it was precisely inarl attempt to give the "green light" that RWAMAKUBA came. I Followed all that was saidand done for I was in my doorway about 15m away fi’om the crowd (made up initially ofabout one hundred people but which later swelled when the people realized that themassacres were about to start) ....RWAMAKUBA came to sensitize the people so that tlley would start the massacres. Afterassembling some people upon arrival, he asked them why they hact not started killing. Infact he said: "There are police and military reservists here who can help you. Do you needanything else? What is stopping you from starting the killing?"...

After the gory task [killing the two young people], the crowd came back to the fiont of thesecteur office; five minutes later, a young man arrived on a motorbike. The brigadierordered him to stop and asked him where he was coming from. He saEd that he was fleeingthe massacres in Rutongo commune which was northwest of Gikomero. The crowddiscussed what to do with him. Some said he was Hutu and sliould be spared while thosewho thought he was Tutsi said he should be killed. Andr6 RWAMAKUBA said the fugitivecould not be a Hutu, for only the Tutsis were fleeing; he therefore decided that the manshould be killed. The young man was taken into the same woods where the first set of youngpeople were killed and was definitely killed there; in any case, his ’lnotorbike was retrievedby bridagier NYARWAYA.After these incidents, RWAMAKUBA told the people they had just started the killings andthat it was a good start.... After Andr4 RWAMAKUBA left for Kigali [ t 2 April 1994], the h~te/’aham we nail itiamenand elements of the Presidential Guard at’rived in the afternoon: with tim help of thepopulation, they started killing the refugees. More than COL," thousaiKt (40()0) people werekilled at the Gikomero Protestant school complex situated about 200m (iom my house. Thebodies were thrown into latrines built by the centre...,

My relations were massacred at another site, in Gicaca, in the same commmze, where abouttwo thousand (2000) people were killed ....More were killed in their hills. Most, if not all, were killed because they were Tutsis.

170 170

6..E,~I’()SE St!(:(:lN(:’r DES FAITS:

AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)1.1 DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE

°o,

Regarding contribution in cash or in kind which RWAMAK.UBA gave, 1 eLlll only tell youwhat he said at the meeting I have just mentioned and this is related to your question. Heurged those who did not have the necessary means to e[-Tectivcly take purr in the killings to

Seek assistance from him.IFL: 0919

Jean KAMBANDA’s government moved its seat to Gitaranla the following day, 12 April1994, after fleeing Kigali. Andr4 RWAMAKUBA was among the most active ministers insensitizing the bourgmestres of Gitarama at their meeting of 21 April 1994 in Murambi, thenew seat of the Government. He thus contributed to appealing to massacre the Tutsis. It wasduring that period that he was appointed Government spokesman, with liis inflalnmatorystatements on Radio Rwanda and RTLM. He returned to the unoccupied zones oftlae capitalregularly to assess the situation and the Interahamwe’s activities. He asked the lizlerahamwe

over the radio to continue the hunt for the Tutsis.

For instance, when a shell from the RPF side hit one of the buildings of the CentreItospitalier de Kigali (CHK) [Kigali general hospital], he went there and then, on RTLM,made a direct appeal to all the militiamen to kill all the Tutsis, including patients and thosewho had taken refuge at CHK. This was around late April or early May 1994.

Another example: when the people of Kigali-Rm’al fled the RPF combat zones and gatheredin Gitaramapr~fecture, Andr~ RWAMAKUBA went to the Gacurabwenge displaced personscamp in Taba commune, Gitarama, where the htterahamwe from Gikornero(RWAMAKUBA’s native commune) and Rubungo had gathered. Then. lie drafted a radiocommuniqu6 along with. the Bourgmestre of G ikomero at the time, T61esphoreRUTAGANIRA, calling on the Interahamwe militiamen who were still killing in Gikomero,to continue to hunt down the Tutsis everywhere they could be hiding and exterminate them.This was in May 1994. The communiqu~ was drafted in the presence of other militiamenfrom Gikomero, including Mathias RUBANGUICA. (a tbrmer accountant, currently inprison), NYARWAYA (a brigadier) and others.

As he was on his way into exile to Gisenyi and then Zaire, Andr6 RWAMAKUBA neverstopped appealing to the militiamen to massacre over [he Radio lkwanda and RTLMairwaves. At the time, I was among the group of refugees in gyumba. We listenedconstantly to the country’s various radio stations. RWAMAKL.!BA spoke on the radioalmost daily. He was not the only one who spoke, either. Others, lil<e Prime Minister JeanKAMBANDA, the reporter Hassan NGEZE and the Minister of h~forlnatiol:t, EliezerNIYITEGEKA, also went on the air. This took place during the period when the ComitdNational de Ddveloppement [sic] was seated in Gisenyi.

171171

6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OI 7 INTEP.NATIONAL liUMANITARIAN LAW

IlF 0934

The meetings were widely reported on the radio; that is how we l<new that RWAMAKUBAwas one of the main promoters.

,;

However, after he was appointed to the so-called ’Abatabazi’ government, ! heard tlae speechhe made, which was broadcast on the radio. Likeall of his peers in the government of thetime, he was inciting the population to kill those who did not espouse thcir point of view.

I IF 1211

During the events of 1994, I did not see Dr. Andr6 RWAMAICUBA, as I had sought refugein Byumba. However, after he was appointed to the so-called ’Abatabazi" government [asMinister of Education and Scientific Research in the [l~terim govermlzei~fl, I heard the speechhe made, which was broadcast on the radio. Like all of his peers in the government oftlaetime, he was inciting the population to kill those who did not espouse their point of view.

I[F 12116.44 Thus, the Minister of the Interior, Edouard Karemera made a speech

encouraging the continuation of the massacres of the Tutsis at a meeting of the

Interim Government in Gitarama.

(:)

... the third meeting was held in one of thd halls of the CFC in Murambi, to which theinterim government had retreated .... Apart fiom the Prdfet ofGitarama [Fidrte UWIZEYE]and the bourgmestres, the Prime Minister [Jena Kambanda] was e~t the meeting in the hallwith certain members of the government, representatives of political parties, including theopposition parties, as well as the heads of the church denominations .... The Pr@t was thefirst speaker. He described the situation in the prdfecture, which, although certainlyworsening, was not yet hopeless. The bourgmestres, who were being threatened in theircommunes, including one Bourgmestre [Rubogwe] who had been marthandled by a ministerand the militia in his own commune, added their comments to the information provided bythe Prefer. In reply, the Plime Minister read a message he had prepared in advance. It wasa political message and did not refer at all to the issues raised ... Other members of thegovernment spoke, among who I recallMUGENZI and I~REMERA. Their speeches werenot about pacifying things or stopping the killings .... The meeting ended in total con:fusion.

0136/H95

6.45 On 21 April 1994, Jean Kambanda, in his capacity as Prime Minister,

clearly demonstrated his support for Radio Tdldvision Libre des Mille Coltines

(RTLM), founded and directed by Frlicien Kabuga, wiiile knowilig the radio

172 .~ 172

6..EXPOSI~ SUC(71NCT DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS I}U DROIT INTERNATION.,~,I. I IUMANITAIRE

station incited to exterminate and persecute the Tutsi and their "accomplices".

On that occasion, Jean Kambanda described tile radio station as "anindispensable weapon in the fight against the enemy." Between 8 April arid 14

July 1994, at meetings in various places in the country and over the radio, Jean

Kambanda directly and pubIicly incited the population to carry out acts of

violence, i.e. murders and assaults, against the Tutsis and their "accomplices".In the radio broadcasts, the Prime Minister called on the Rwa~dans to rise up

and mobilize against the enemy; he appealed to the chefi" de celhtle to dedicate

themselves to the work. On several occasions, the Minister ot" Education, Andr6Rwamakuba, also encouraged the massacre of the Tutsis ore.!- the radio. Around

late May 1994, he was appointed Government spokesman and continued to make

inflammatory speeches over the Radio Rwanda and RTLM airwaves. Following

all these repeated appeals, massacres were perpetrated against the civilian

population.

You should know that we shall defeat the Inkotanyi. You should know that nowhere in theworld has a people ever been defeated when they knew that the enemy was in the minority.I too assert that the there is no way for the RPF to lead this country. I confirm that the RPFcannot rule Rwanda because you have all ceased to be afraid, because you already realizedthat this minority does not even represent 10% of the population, whereas you represent90%; because you now have patrols and you capture all the enemies who come in as scouts;that is why f invite each one of you to Amahoro Stadium on l J~lO~ 1994. ! repeat and [ hope,since the Inkotanyi have accomplices everywhere, that this message reaches them as welland that they have already put down their weapons. I im,ite them also to Amahoro stadiumon lstJuly, f would like for them to understand just one thing: as of this very moment today,any Ird¢otanyi who are in Rwanda today and who refitse to put down their weapo,s and puttheir hands in the air, and declare an end to the wal: will not reihrn to Uganda. You areperhaps thinking: "He is saying thatto try and appease us whereas they are in Gitarama andeverywhere else; he is just trying to appease us and for him to have peace o[" mind, whileplaying for time. Do the Inkotanyi really have that we don’t have? The advantage they hadover us was they were more combat-ready than we were, arm cottseq.em/v holder; hence,they attacked us with desperation. We are more m tmero~s th,t~ they ~~.If it is guns you have been told we do not have, you have already been i~aib,nlcd that we arebeginning to acquire them. Even the Army Chief o l: Stal~[" told you yc.sterday, t-le used thesame words I just used. If he as Army Chief of Staff" and I as l-lead o 1" the Government aretelling you this, there must be a compelling reason and conclusive evide~ace. What are they?When people tell you that the Inkotanyi are in the Mutara region, l<ibutago, Bugesera,

173 173

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6, (" ’()N("IS E STATF, ~ I ENT O F TI FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTEIt.NATIONAI., IIU.’HAN ITAI~,IAN LAW

Gitarama, these people are everywhere. Aren’t they? The lnkotanyi"are where you here themshooting fi’om, and nowhere else. What we are going to do is return to.our land, our bananafields in Kibungo, Mutera, Bugesera. You are perhaps going to tell me: "Don’t say that, it’sa secret. They might find out." Well, let them find out. I know there is nothing they can doabout it. Do they have people to send to those places? 1 know they don’t, so 1 know that Idon’t run the risk of meeting tlaem there. Recently, they declared on their radio station thatI was going to roam all over with my belongings until l reach Lake K ivu and throw myselfin. I say that the only journey I will undertake will be to return to Kigali. because I want thatfeast to take place and to have you as my guests.

Extract from a speech by ,loan Kambanda, broadcast on" 9 April 1994

Fellow Rwandans, rise up as one to prevent the enemy from taking our country by force. Acttogether with the Armed Forces to protect your security. Be at peace with yourselves, do notbe afraid because the Inzirabwoba will certainly defeat the ]il/cotalTyi. Times are hard but ifall of us Rwandans act together with our maned forces, we should win the war.Fellow Rwandans, the RPF has used all kinds of tactics to take over power by tbrce. But forus all, they have been uncovered. We refuse to give in to the use of arms. Our soldiers haveresponded well, the people both in Kigali mad everywhere else in the country have mobilizedthemselves. In all these places, the goal is to defeat the Inkom~od 9nce and [’or all...Rise up all together so that we can fight to win. We shall achieve that goal if we act as one.The people, the nation’s armed forces, the Govermnent, all together; there is only one enemy;let us fight him together and we will win colic what may.Do not lose heart; give it all you’ve got.

Extract from radio address by .lean KambandaBroadcast on 13 April 1994

As for us, the Rwandan govermaaent and its Am:y are a common body. ,So, thcy cannot saythat they negotiate with the RWANDAN Army and that they refuse to negotiate with itsgovernment since they are a same body, they are interdependent. In other respects, we do notsee who will be their interlocutor if the RPF refuses to negotiate with themselves. If not, theydo not have any other option but negotiating with the Rwandan government .... "

"To the population, we ask them to unite their efforts with those of the Army to ensure theirown security. We tell our An’ny not to yield to RPF,s blackmailing that pretends that ourArmy is allegedly disintegreted because we know that the Army is still joining with thegovernment and that, in consequence, the population must make common cause with theArmy in their combat against the attacker".

Excerpt of an interview with .Ican KambandaBroadcast o’n RTLM. 14 April 1994

174 174

6..EXP()Si~ SLICCINCT DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)LJ I)i{OIT IN’FEI{NA"rlONAI. IIL.IMANITAIRE

")

6

C

"...You are Bourgmestres, I think you know that better than me, the cetht/es’ leaders are thefirst authority to which the residents appeal. So, to deny them the reward they are entitledto by the law is feigning to ignore their duty. That is why the government decided, even ifit does not have sufficient means for the time being, that thecelhtles’ leaders will dedicatethemselves to their work, feeling that the government is behind them. that they have gotsupport. That is a decision taken by the government after having considered that they havea great role to play in restoring calm and security in the country. That message we gave tothe Prdfets is the same as the one I am addressing to you. We started to met with someBourgmestres in somepr~fectures. We started yesterday by Gitarama. Today we have cometo Butare. The program will be extended to other prefectures, and we will be askingBourgmestres to do their possible in order to: First, ensure the residents’ security Secondly,protect the county’s sovereignty. That means that they have to prevent the residents fromcarrying out troubles but they have to remember that we are lqghting against RPF. Theyshould remember that the country’s sovereignty comes fi:om each COl’HslitHte’S sovereignty.They should remember that it should not be good if any comnaune was infiltrated by theenemy, by RFP. We are confident in the residents, we have the confidence that they willhelp you with that, because they have the ability and the will, they do not accept that weshould be brought back to the yoke of 59....You cannot walk for more than 500 meters in Kigali town without meeting a roadblock ofresidents who are ensuring their safety, who are protecting the sovereignty of their countryand protecting their property which is in Kigali town and for whicln they worked hard.Whoever believes that he can take Kigali is wi’ong unless, if he first takes all those residents,and that remains to be proved.

Speech of.lean Kambandaadressed and broadcast 19 April 1994

The RTLM radio did indeed air several speeches inciting to hatred and violence duringmassacres. It basically said: the country’s enemy is the Tutsi and we have to exterminatethem, until one day a Hutu child can ask what a Tutsi looked like. The journalist in questionwas named KANTANO. The former Prime Minister. K.AMBANDA. would tall< along thesame lines on Radio Rwanda.

Witness QI

"...You are Bourgmestres, I think you know that better than me, the celhtlu.,.’ leaders are the firstauthority to which the residents appeal. So, to deny them the reward they are entitled to bythe law is feigning to ignore their duty. That is why the government decideal, even if it doesnot have sufficient means for the time being, that thec’elhde.~" leaders will dedicate themselvesto their work, feeling that the government is behind them. that they hzk’z_~-.~,ts_uP.I)X~. That

175 175

’ .’)

(il

O

6. CONCISE STA’I’EMI~NT OF THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTFA~NATIONAL Ill MANITARIAN LAW

is a decision taken by the govermrtent after having considered that they have a great role toplay in restoring calm and security in the country. That messag~e to tile/~,’c!ri’ts is the

~ame as the one I am addressing to yotI. We started to met with some I~m,:~me.~’tres in someprefectures. We started yesterday by Gitarama. Today we have come to B tmu’c. The programwill be extended to other prefectures, and we wilt be asking/3om’gmeswe.~ to do their possiblein order to: First, ensure the residents’ security. Secondly, protect the country’s sovereignty.That means that they have to prevent the residents from carrying out troubles but they haveto remember that we are fighting against RPF. They should remember that the country’ssovereignty comes from each commune’s sovereignty. They should remember that it shouldnot be good if any commune was infiltrated by the enemy, by RFP. We are confident in theresidents, we have the confidence that they will help you with that, because they have theability and the will, they do not accept that we should be brought back to the yoke of 59....You cannot walk for more than 500 meters in Kigali town without meeting a roadblock of

residents who are ensuring their safety, who are protecti ag the sovcreigmy o 1" lheir countryand protecting their property which is in Kigali town and lTor which they worked hard.Whoever believes that he can take Kigali is wrong unless, if t~e first takes all tt~ose residents,

and that remains to be proved. Speech o f Jean Kambandaadressed and broadcast 19 April 1994

"...I have told you at the start that we should not be mistaken about our enemy. We knowwhat characterizes our enerny and we shall fight anyone who will attack us. Anybody whomight have collaborated with the enemy and is still adamant, thinking the past situation is

the same today, would be mistaken..... I’ve said that anyone who is working for RPF is an enemy to all oI" us and to the country.I don’t see any other questions you want me to deal with when you tell me that there issomebody suspected of... If you suspect someone of complicity with ILT~F, provide evidence

and the decision-makers will take appropriate measures. Message, Jean KambandaRadio Rwanda

I remember a speech from KAMBANDA, the former Pri me M inister of Rwanda. tqe statedon Radio Rwanda that everyone should look for the enemy, the enemy is not far fl’om you,the enemy is Tutsi and the Hutu who doesn’t share our opinion. This statement was given

by him shortly after the attack on the church (at Nyange)."

Witness FI

I also heard Jean ICAMBANDA ask the people to go to the farms with hoes and guns and use

the guns to fight the enemy if he came. [In a radio broadcast.] Witness FK

176

The RTLM radio did indeed air several speeches inciting to haued and violence during the

176

6..EXPOSI": SUCCINCT DES FAITS:

AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)U I)ROIT INTERNA’rIONAL HUMANITAIRE

massacres. It basically said: the country’s enemy is the Tutsi and we have to exterminatethem, until one day a Hutu child can ask what a Tutsi looked like. T, he journalist in questionwas named KANTANO. The former Prime Minister, KAMBANDA, would talk along the

same lines on Radio Rwanda.Witness QI

In May of 19941 listened to RTLM broadcast the speech delivered by the prime Minister ofthe transitional government of Rwanda. In his speech, the P ime Minister stressed the needfor stopping people from rmming azad urged them to take up arms and fight the enemy whenthey appeared. He drew the attention that people should know tilll when ~hey could flee.

Witness FJ

C:

During the war the politicians used to pass their messages that the Tutsis are responsible forthe War, because they wanted to restore the monarchy and the Tutsis are the enemy ofRwanda and especially the Hums. For example KAMBANDA, a member of MDR(power) .... I can recollect that KAMBANDA used to tell in Radio Rwanda that everyrwandese must have a gun in order to hunt the enemy. Witness FB

)̧

(2,

The day before the visit by Jean KAMBANDA, who was Prime Minister of the InterimGovernment at the time, an invitation to participate in a meeting he was due to chair on 14April 1994 was posted in the hallway at the faculty of medicii~,e and at the universitylaboratory. As all my other colleagues, I had been invited as a member of the universityteaching staff. The meeting started as atmounced at 9:00 a.m., on 14 April 1994 in the main

auditorium of the faculty of medicine.Besides the officials of Butare university, the meeting was also attended by pret’ecturalofficials and even by certain merchants of Butare town.Considering the fact the meeting dates back to 1994, I do not believe [ am able to recall allthe details. However, I believe the rector of the university opened the meeting by introducing

Mr. Jean KAMBANDA.Immediately after the rector’s introduction, the Prime Minister took the floor andoutlined the purpose of the meeting, i.e., organizing the civil de fence in Butare. He wenton to emphasize the topics to be discussed. He spoke in Kinyarwanda, the nationallanguage. The points I remember him raising were as follows:- His ability to secure firearms for the civilian population- Making youths available to back up the civil defence- Organizing these youths, who had to satisfy specific criteria- Better organize the civilian patrols.In his speech, the Prime Minister kept repeating his favorite slogan in Kinyarwanda. Iinterpret the slogan to mean the following: "Every patriotic citizen should keep his hoe anda gun handy to defend himself against the enemy, whoever he is, v,d~erevcr he is and in any

177177

5)

("

()

°

178

circumstance’,.¯ . , , .

Witness GQI would like to say to the listeners of RTLM, that this station is another weapon the countryhas used to fight this war. People think war is fought only with bullets and guns. In reality,

¯ educating the people is also part of fighting a war. We woukl there/bre liko thank this radiostation for having educated the people and told them the whole (rulh. In tiler, rhis is one ofthe weapons the country has used and continues to use to light tile enemy, tZven in lbreigncountries, you must have heard that when there is a war, news bulletins also become weaponsthat are used to face the enemy; we therefore are gtatefi~l [br the .Way the station has beenused to educate the people and tetl the Rwandan people the truth acgard)ng this war

finaudible]." .,, .

Radio message by Jeml KambandaBroadcast on RTLM, on 21 April 1994

Jean KAMBANDA’s government moved its seat to Git~ram:t the ibllowing day, 12 April1994, after fleeing Kigali. Andr6 RWAMAKUBA was among the most active ministers insensitizing the bourgTnestres of Gitarama at their meeting o1’21 April 1994 in ,.\4 urambi, thenew seat of the Government. He thus contributed to appealing to massacre the Tutsis. It wasduring that period that he was appointed Government spokesman, with his in[]ammatorystatements on Radio Rwanda and RTLM. He-returned to the unoccupied zones of the capitalregularly to assess the situation and the ]hterahamwe’s activities. He asked the l)~terahamweover the radio to continue the hunt for the Tutsis.

For instance, when a shell from the RPF side hit one of" the buildings of the Centre

Hospitalier de Kigali (CHK) [Kigali general hospital], he went there and ~hen, on RTLM,made a direct appeal to all the militiamen to kill all the Tursis, includin~ patients and thosewho had taken refuge at CHK. This was around late April or early/’,4av 1994.

Another example: when the people of Kigali,Rural fled the Rpt7 combat zones mad gatheredin Gitaramapr~fecture, Andr6 RWAMAKUBA went to the Gacurabwenge displaced personscamp in Taba commune, Gitarama wl

(RWAMAKUBA’snativecommunM .... ., ,1ere the I/~lera/lamwe li’om G/komerocommuniqu6 along with ,, ,mu JxttOungo had gathered. Then, he drafted a radio

the Bourgmestre of Gikomero ~I[ I tile [i :.RUTAGANIRA, calling on theZnterahamwe m;ht; ......... me, T61esphoreto continue to hunt downthe Tutsis everywhere they could bc hiding a~d ~-’xtcrrninate them....... ,ucn who were srill killin~ in Gikomero,This was in May 1994. The communiqu6 was dralriecl in tlac presence, oi’~)thcr militiamenfrom Gikomero, including Mathias RUBANGUKA (a l:brmerprison), NYARWAYA (a brigadier) andothers,

accountm2t, currently in

As he was on his way into exile to Gisenyi and then Zaire, Andr6 RWAMAKUBA never

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stopped appealing to the militiamen to massacre over the Radio P, wanda and RTLMairwaves. At the time, I was among the group of’ refugees in Byumba. We listenedconstantly-to the country’s various radio stations. RWAMAKUBA spoke on the radioalmost daily. He was not the only one who spoke, eidaer. Others, like Prime ~,’linister JeanKAMBANDA, the reporter .Hassan NGEZE and the Minister o1" fnlbrnmtion, EliezerNIYITEGEKA, also went on the air. This tool< place during the period when the Comit~National de Ddveloppement [sic] was seated in G i senyi...... 111 = 0934

6.46 Between 8 April and 14 July 1994, in severalprdfectures, including Butare,Kibuye, Kigali, Gitarama and Gisenyi, ministers, prffets, bottrgmestres, civilservants and soldiers gave orders to commit, instigatect, assisted in commitingand did themselves commit massacres of members of the q’~tsi popt~iation andmoderate Hutu population. Jean Kambanda, Augustin gizitnana, EdouardKaremera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Rwamakuba, Andr(, Ntagerura,Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Eliezer Niyitegeka knew or iiad reason to knowthat their subordinates had committed or were preparing to commit crimes, andfailed to prevent these crimes from being committed or to punish theperpetrators thereof.


"

6.47 Ministers Augustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera, Callixie i\~:’~bonimana,Andr6 Rwamakuba, Andr6 Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasui~ui2o and EliezerNiyitegeka, members of Jean Kambanda’s Government, l’ailed in tileir duty toensure the security of the Rwandan people.


6.48 Between April and July 1994, a roadblock was set up near tile residenceof Minister Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsbne Shalom Ntahob~iii in Butaretown. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Ars~ne Shalom Ntalmbaii manned thisroadblock. During this entire period, Pauline Nyiramas~ui~t~i~u and ArsbneShalom Ntahobali made use of the roadblock, with the assistance of soldiers andother unknown persons, to identify, abduct and kill members of the Tutsipopulation. The presence of Prime Minister Jean lZambanda at the roadblockon at least two occasions, in April and May 1994, showed his SUl?port for Pauline

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Nyiramasuhuko’s actions

You asked me if I had experiences with PAULINE NYIRAMASUHUKO and her sonCHALOM. Well, I knowthat not far from her house there was a roadblock. 1 know this,because I had to pass this roadblock during one occasion .... it was.~at the end o 1" May 1994.When I arrived not far from that road block i saw many soldiers on it. 1 saw about 8 soldiersin military uniform who can’ied guns. Among them 1 also saw some civilians who had’traditional weapons, like lances which they had made of’iron pipes. I tried to walk aroundthis road block over a path that begins at the church ol"the E.E.R. I tried to pass this roadblock on that morning. I remember it was around 10,00 Ai M.On that path which is situated a bit low fi’om the road I was suddenly coniSonte,t with asoldier. He walked into my direction. I lalew this man. He knew nay husband too. This manwith the name: IYAKARE was shocked and told me that it was extremely dangerous for meto try to pass this road block. He knew I was Tutsi. 1 explained to llim why t had to pass. Hedecided to help me because he knew me and thanks to his help [ could pass the road block.

At the moment we would pass together this road block I saw CHALOM. [ know CHALOMand PAULINE because we came from the same area. 1 heard CHALOM speaking toIYAKARE and he asked for my ID card. I had seen that CHALOM and his soldiers werechecking everybody. They wanted to see their [D cards. I did not say anything butimmediately IYAKARE said to CHALOM that he had my 1D card in his possession and thateverything was all right. CHALOM said nothing and we went on.I will describe the situation on that road block. On the mad block I saw PAULINENYIRAMASUHI_IKO. PAULINE was dressed in military uniform with several colours.CHALOM wore a green military uniform. I did not see that PA;UL[NE cacried a gun orweapon. CHALOM had a gun ....I saw that they had already arrested some person, apparently Tutsi’s. I saw these Tutsi’s wereforced to stay close to each other and were separated from other people who were to bechecked. I saw that the Hutu’s were allowed to go on and pass the road block. Together withIYAKAR_E I passed the road block .....When we arrived this house after some minutes 1 turned around and I had a perf’ect view onthe road block. The distance was not far. [ even could he-lr people screaming to each other.I could see very clearly that the soldiers, ordered by C HA LOM and PA U L t N E because theywere without any doubt in charge of everything at that road block and they had divided thegroup of an’ested Tutsi’s in two groups. One group had to climb on a great military track.I asked IYAICdkRE what would happen with these people who were on that truck.He replied to me not to ask because I did not want to know that. But nevertheless he told methat these people were brought to the Prefecture Place. Short after that f saw that the othergroup were taken away by soldiers in uniform with guns and some civilians with traditionalat’ms. I saw that PAULINE was still on that mad block and she was still laughing! I saw thatCHALOM was very exited. He moved with his arms and gestured to the soldiers to hLtrry up.I could hear CHALOM screaming loudly and very clearly the tbllowirLL_,, words: "’ Bring

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them to the place where we have brought the other o~,es. They started Io walk fi’om theroadblock int he direction of... the forest. Later, when the war was ended people invited meto go to the place where people were burried in the forest, l did not wani to go.

Witness SR

About Pauline I must say that I saw her in camollage unil-brm and carrying a gLtn. She wasoutside her house with former Prime Minister Jean ICAMBANDA who also had the samekind of uniform and a gun. There were many Presiclential guards to protect them. I heardPauline saying that they had not finished with the refugees at the PreI’ecturc. The last timeI saw Pauline was at the end of June 1994, when she fled with her lim~ily and she waswearing a carnoflaged uniforrrl. KAMBANDA and his family wdre togetl+cr with Paulinewhen they left.

Witness FA

I visited my region in Butare with Mrs Pauline NY[RAMASUHUKO. She was in chargeof pacification in our region. She took me in her vehicle along with her guards. During theperiod the government was in GITARAMA, after April, sine accompanied me 3 or4 timesto BUTARE.

\,Vitness ZB

6.49 On his travels around the country, Minister ofDefence Augusrin Bizimana

crossed through roadblocks, manned by soldiers and Interaham~ve-MRND,

around which corpses were strewn. On those occasions, he never raised the

slightest objection to what he saw. Further, Augustin Bizim-uia witnessed the

execution of two Tutsi individuals by a member of his escort .’it a roadblock, and

did not intervene to prevent the crime being committed.

At a time which I cannot specify, Major TERERAHO ordered me lo go to MinisterBIZIMANA’s house in Kimihurura to receive and carry out orders J]’om him. When Iarrived at the designated location, the Minister gave me his personal jeep and instructed meto drive it to Gitararna where the government was to be instaltecl..i. When l arrived atGitarama, I parked the vehicle at the military camp in that Iocalit3,. The K,linister arrived thefollowing day by helicopter. Meanwhile, a pick-ul~ transportil~g his close protection tearnarrived in Kigali and the Minster turned them over to me. The gov,~’rnmcilt continuedoperating from Gitarama. I sometimes took the Minister l i"om I,Labgayi where he lived tocamp Gitarama or Murambi where the Ministers’ o l:’fices were Iocatod.

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,t°,o

At that time, there were many refugees further down from the Kabagayi church and theMinister’s residence was not far from the place occupied by tile refugees .... As we drove pastat various times with the Minster, we saw these refugees and the Minister was shocked byhow many they were .... There were several roactblocks on the routc we toot< fi’om Kabgayito Murambi with the Minister; they would be opened [br us immediately. Some of them

were manned by soldiers and others by h¢terahamwe militiamen. The Minister saw theseroadblocks but never made any comments about them.

II F 0899

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One day, as I was driving BIZIMANA between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, we arrived at aroadblock where some Tutsis had been arrested. One ofthe soldiers in [3[ZIMANA’s escort,named MURWANASHYAKA, who was sitting in the scout vehicle, got out and shot twoof the arrested people with a machine gun. This occurred belbre the very eyes ofBIZIMANA, who did not react in any way and said nothing. [ never saw [3 tZIMANA killanyone, but he always wore a military uniform and carried a 50-cm UZI sub-machine gun.I do not kaaow where M-URWANASHYAI~A is now.

..... I.IF t467

6.50 In June 1994, Interior Minister Edouara K:;remern ordered theCommander in Gisenyi, Anatole Nsengiyumva, to send troops into the Biseseroarea, in KJbuyeprdfecture, supposedly to combat the enemy, qitimugh the RPFwas in fact never in Bisesero. There was only of a group of Tutsis cefi~gees whohad gathered in that region, fleeing the massacres.

Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva

Re: Search Operation in Kibuye

Dear Sir:I hereby respectfully inform you that at the Cabinet Meeting held today, Friday, 17 June1994, the Government decided to ask the command of the Gisenyi operations sector to backup the Gendarmerie unit in Kibuye, with the support of the people, in conductitag the searchoperation in Bisesero secteur, Gishyita comntune, which has become an RPF sanctuary. TheGovernment would like.to request that the operation be completed by 20 June 1994 at the

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latest¯

In the absence of the Minister of Defence, who is oil mission abroad, the Minister of theInterior and Community Development has been asked to communicate this decision to you

and follow it up.

The Pr~fet of Kibuye as well as the Commander of" the Kibuye unibhave received a copy ofthis letter and are asked to make the necessary arrangements to make sure the operation is

conducted smoothly and within the prescribed period.

Signed: Edouard Karemera..... Minister of the Interior and Community Development¯ . ¯ , °

Pro Justicia No.37/95, P.V. No.24.772: The Advance o f the I:PI?. il~. itwanda

This meeting was public and held in the Prefect’s office in Kibuye. Many authorities were

present at that meeting. I can mention:- The Prime-minister, KAMBANDA, Jean- The former Minister ofInfon-nation, NIYITEGEI~., Eleizier- The former Minister of Finartce, NDINDABAHIZI, Emmanuel- The vice-President of the M_RND, KAREMERA, Edouard- The secretary-general of MDR, MUREGO, DonatThis was the official delegation front Kigali.Before this speech, the Prefect KAYISHEMA, made a speech in whirl’, he explained thecurrent situation. He said that the general situation was stable except in the region of

Bisesero where fightings were goingon ....There were also requests l:’or arms and support,

done by the Burgemasters of Gishyita and Gisovu in order to get rid o f 13 isesero problern intheir communes. The answer of the Prime-minister was that the Prefect had to report to him

whether it was the RPF or just Tutsis who fled in the Bisesero region, tn my opinion he gavethis disguised answer becasue the quesiton of the Burgemasters was too clear. They saidclearly that they would kill all the people but had not enough means.Witness GK

¯ , ° . ¯

During the fighting’s in the hills there were about one dlollsand people, most women,children and elderly people, among whom was y filther, hiding in a cave ola a hillside inBisesero. It was a safe place that was recognized by the interahamwc. Peoplc stayed thereduring the days, when the Interahamwe and the soldiers chased them, and tei’t the cave bydark to look for food and find relatives. On the 23rd of.lune, in the morning, I saw from an¯ opposite hill, that a boy, whose father was a interahamwe-member, spotted the l-efugees in:the cave. I could hear him shout to some Interahamwe-men that he found lnyenzi in a cave.

’Witness IVF

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6.51 From May to July 1994, in Butare and Gitarama prd)"’ectures, Jean

Kambanda distributed weapons and ammunition to members of:the civilian

population, militants of the political parties and militiamen. ’fhese weapons

distributions received wide media coverage and could not have gone unnoticed

by the members of the Interi m Government, who had to know timt tile weapons

would be used to massacre civilians, the majority of whom were members of the

Tutsi population.

The Office of the Prosecutor is in possession of audio-visual recording showing distributionof arms:-ICTR video tracking No.Cry Justice, 1995 (CNN)-ICTR video tracking No.Ingoma Y’Abatabazi ’-ICTR video tracking No. B0008/K97, video no. 90 -Rwanda: Apr~s la mort du PrOsident J. Habyarimarta, [Rwanda: After tlne k-)catla oli’PresidentJ. Habyarimana], Orinfor

1699 K/97 - video no.82 -

B0004/K97, video no.86 -

I know Jean Kambanda as the interim Prime Minister dming the 1.994 \vat, My job at thetime was as a journalist for Radio Rwanda. 1 lived in Gitm,anaa and the provisionalgovernment had established itself there, not far fi’om Gitarama [town]. /-ks a journalist I hadto cover certain events, including those on the video that you showed me. They weregatherings organized by the government in NYAI(2~BANDA to swear in a new Bo,rgmestre.I know that the man was a doctor, but I do not remember his name. I theret’ore went to thelocation for 10:00 a.m. I saw JK arrive in a vehicle; he was escorted by soldiers and wasarriving from Gisenyi. At the scene was a crowd of spectators made up of resiclents madpeople displaced by the war. A fair number of youths were lined up with sticks, to be usedas if they were weapons. The young people had received military training. JK movedtoward mount NDIZA to attend a demonstration by these young people to show offtheirmilitary knowledge. It was an official event. We returned to the ptat[:olm, where .I[C gavea speech. I remember that he said that even the civilian population could be amaed to defenditself against the enemy, for he himself had a pistol on his belt-, lqe pulled out his pistol andshowed it to everyone, holding it up in the air. Afterwards, tae personalty distributed theguns that were beside him. I third< he gave out more or less 20 gttns, us well as ammunition.He said there would be more weapons later. Thus, at that location, there ,,vzts :t demonstrationof the young people’s military training, the swearing in o f tla e l_¢omgmestre, the cliscri b utionof weapons and his speech. At around 3:30 p.m., .I K went to NYA B IICEN ICE, -t cc)mmunenot far from there. At that location he also made a speech and swore in a lh)t<gntestre, who

I recall was a single man and a teacher, but again t cannot remember his mttne. However,I do remember that during his speech, JK again pulled out his I gi.~tol and shot :t round into the

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AUTRES VIOI.ATIONS I)lr I)R(WF INTERNATIONAl, liUMANITAIRE

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air to show the people that even he as a civilian could be armed. Fie told tile people that theRPF did not have many soldiers, that it was guns that scare peoplc.,and that anyone can use

them...Yes, I attended a meeting of the heads of service and the bo,rgme.vtres in G itarama on 12April in my capacity as a journalist. It was at the time when the government was setting upin the region. JK chaired the meeting, during which it was stressed that the hourg, mestreshad to be vigilant in order to hunt down the enemy (Tutsis). l-!c said that anyone who takesrefuge in the bush is not someone to be protected. Fie also sztid "The go\,crlm~em is now herein Gitarama, the country is at war.’ After the heads oFscrvice leli :rod o,~1,,; ti~c hom.’:,*mestresremained, one bourgmestre in the room said to JK. ’We cannot collqucr tl~e enemy when weare working with them’ and the president supported the listener in his remarks.

Witness EN, , . , ,

Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. kaaother issue on people’s minds at this time is that theInterim Government you lead promised to secure weapons tbr them so that they can fight theenemy, and they are firmly COl~nitted to fighting the enemy; what is the situation as regardsthe weapons?

The issue of securing weapons, guns, has proved to be a di Fficult unc. not due to lack ofinterest on the Government’s part, but because, as you know. the U hired Nzaions decided toimpose an arms embargo on Rwanda. Of c.ourse, you understand that we (lid not accept thedecision and that we have written to the UN Secretary-General~inl’omling him that thedecision is detrimental to Rwanda’s interests and that it should be directed against bothwarring parties [inaudible], whereas the other side continues to receive weapons fromUganda. We would have wished to see the decision be applied to Uganda as well. but evenso, the Government has continued to do everything in its power to secure weapons; so, ithas all it needs to face the enemy. We are also in the process oF ,_,raduallv secttring weaponsfor the people. We thought it was better to give the already available weapons ~o the soldiersbut we estimate that at least 200 civilians in every l~r~fect~Ire wil soon bc given weapons for

use against the enemy...Jean KambandaInterviewed by Gaspard Gahigi on 21 April 1994

6.52 In the course of the massacres, between April and July 1994 Andr6

Ntagerura authorized the use of vehicles belonging to the State company,ONATRACOM, in order to transport either militiamen, weapons and

ammunition or Tutsi victims to certain execution sites in C)’:~ou~u~ . pr5fecture

and otherprdfectures such as Butare, Ruhengeri and Kibuye, ,.din the intent to

facilitate the extermination of the Tutsi population and t.’~e .e:imin’.~ion of its

"accomplices".

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6. (;(INCISE S’I’ATEMI:.NT ()F TIlE FACTS:OTHER VIOI.ATIONS OF INTI,’.IINATI(/NAI. IIU31ANITARIAN LAW

6.53 On 25 April 1994, in Gisenyi prdfecture, DSlicien K:lbuga, Mathieu

Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera and Anatole Nsengiyumva agreed together

and with others to establish the Fonds de Ddf’ense Nationale (i?DN), for the

purpose of providing assistance to the Interim Government to figi~t the enemy

and its "accomplices". This Fund would serve to buy weapol~.s, vehicles and

uniforms for the Interahamwe militia and the Army in all pr~!/’ect, res in the

country. F61icien Kabuga was appointed chairman o f the comitd i)co visoire of the

FDN and was a signatory to the fund’s accounts with the Banqtte de K~,aliand

Banque Commerciale du Rwanda, the latter opened by Anatoie Nsengiyumva in

Gisenyi. On 20 May 1994, F61icien Kabuga informed the Interim Government

of the establishment of the fund and advised it how it should be managed and

operated.

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186

p.2... They (the participants in this meeting) also wanted the intelligence service to reformed as a matter of urgency and the director of ORIN FOR to be aptgointed; the latterwould quickly create a unit responsible for refuting the allegations o f the enemy and of thosewho intend to sully the image of our country.p.5 As regards the coordination of the civilian forces, the armed tbrces and the youth whosupport them, the participants at the meeting decided to create a National Defence Fund.p.6 As it is clear that the war we are waging has the full support of the Belgian and Ugandangovernments, the meeting participants asked the Rwandan government to accuse the twocountries officially...

..... Letter to the government dated 25.04.94 regarding the sctting up of aNational Defence Fund, signed by F. Kabuga as president of" the comitdprovisoire.

We have the honour to inform you that the FND has been set up to help support our armedforces and the civilian population which is helping them fight and win the war beitag wagedagainst us by the enemy, the FPR Inlcotazo, i.It would be best for the government to open a single centr.’fl account at the Central Bank tocollect all the monies... Management of the fund would be detcmnined by the representativesof the government, the armed forces and public institutions...

Letter to the Prime Miaistcr and signed by Kabuga dated 20.05.94

For theprdfectures that are already at war:- Cost of feeding militiamen- Transportation during military operations

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AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)U I}I~.()IT INTEI.~NATIONAI, IIUMANITAIRE

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187

- Fuel- Costs related to intelligence and infomaation

- Purchase of hand weaponsFor the prefectures not yet affected by the war:- Purchase of hand weapons "

Ministerial Instruction for the use o f the FDN (National t.-2.etbl/ce Fund)

-Bank document with FDN account number and F. Kabuga’s name as signatory.

On my way to the stadium, I saw Hassan Ngeze’s vehicle. I saw KABUGA in the stadium.He was seated at the covered stand in the section reserved for dignitaries... 14.abuga had amicrophone to speak to the people. Kabuga spoke l’or an hour, an hotu and a laalli The mainthrust of his speech was to ask people to contribute tbr the purchase or: weapons andammunition for the army and the Interahamwe. The armed [brces needed weapons to defeatthe Inyenzi. He said that we could give our contributions to the co~rs’eillenx or the leaders of

the political parties like the MRND and CDR. " Vv’itness FD

In May 1994, F. Kabuga organized a meeting of all the most prominent merchants. Iattended the meeting, which took place at the Meridien. Approximately 50-60 merchantswere present in the Meridien Hotel conference room in Gisenyi. Kabuga chaired themeeting. It was held on his initiative to collect money. Naturally the interim governmentwas aware of his initiative. Kabuga wanted to collect money to l~urchasc weapons andammunition for the soldiers and the I17tera/Tamwe so they cottlcI continue ii9ilting the enemy.For the merchants, they always used receipts bearing the Chamber of Commerce stamp, andfor the general public they used receipts bearing the MRND stamp.In all of the meetings the atmosphere was tense. The sole purpose was to collect money topurchase weapons and arnlnunition for the army and the it~tera/aamwe so they could

exterminate all the Inyenzi. Wi mess FC

I will now shift gears to tell you about the meeting we held at the Meridien taocet in Gisenyiduring the Genocide. I was present. The reason for the meeting was For c~s to raise I:unds sothat the army could buy arms to distribute to the tnterahanawe anti other local militia. Thismeeting was called and chaired by the then presicient o(the Gisenyi C:h’a~abcr or" Commerce,Mathias Nyagasaza. He invited all businessmen in Gisenyi anti oti!aer busaissmen who ranaway from Kigali back home to Gisenyi because of the war situation. At this meeting at theMeridien were: F6licien Kabuga, Bigilimfura, Depute Augustine 13asebya, Minister Edouard

Karemera, Mathias Ngirumpatse, Eliizer Niyitegeka who was Minister o t’in brmatioa, ontbusinessman called Ndorayabo, Ndamiyahimana Jo~l, the manager o~ SOC.OIv ANDA, andother ministers and businessmen. After the Rinds were raised, the gt’oup asked Colonel

187

6. CONCISE STA’I’I:.M I~NT OF THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTI:A~NATIONAL IIUMANITAI~IAN LAW

Anatole Nsengiyumva, who was the chief military officer in Gisenyi to produce a bankaccount number where this money could be deposited. The Colonel p~’oduced an accountnumber at Banque Commerciale de Rwanda in Gisenyi and managers and businessmen whoattended the fund raising deposited large sums o["money into this account, t was present atthe meeting and we all agreed on where, how and when the money.:si~ou td be deposited andused as required.

Witness OZ

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6: EXPOSE SUCCINCT DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT HUiMANITAIRE INTERNATIONAL

EXTEN,~fON OF THE MASSACRES

6.54 From April to July 1994, by virtue of their position, their Statements, theorders they gave and their acts and omissions, Augustin Bizimana, EdouardKaremera, Callixte Nzabonimfina, Andr6 Rwamakuba, Ma’thieu Ngirumpatse,Joseph Nzirorera, F61icien Kabuga and Juvenal Kajelijeli exercised authorityover the local authorities and the Interahamwe-MRND. These local authoritiesand militiamen, in complicity with the military, as from 6 April, committedmassacres of the Tutsi population and of moderate Hutu which extendedthroughout Rwandan territory, with the knowledge of Augustin Bizimana,Edouard Karemera, CaUixte Nzabonimana, Andr6 Rwamakuba, MathieuNgirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera and F61icien Kabuga.


6.55 The massacres of members of the Tutsi population and the murder of themoderate Hutu extended throughout the territory of Rwanda. In everyprdfecture, local civil and military authorities and militiamen, includingInterahamwe-MRND, espoused the plan’of extermination and followed thedirectives and orders in order to execute it. They called on the civilianpopulation to eliminate the enemy and its "accomplices". They distributedweapons to civilians and militiamen. They gave orders to commit, aided, abettedand participated in the massacres.


6.56 From April to July 1994, in all the regions of the country, members of theTutsi population who were fleeing fl’om the massacres on their hills soughtrefuge in locations they thought would be safe, often on the recommendation ofthe local civil and military authorities. In many of these places, despite thepromise that they would be protected by the local civil and military authorities,the refugees were attacked, abducted and massacred, often on the orders or withthe complicity of those same authorities.


i)

(%.

KIGALI

6.57 By virtue of the fact that Kigali was the capital of Rwanda, seat of the

Government till 12 April 1994, the place where the elite units of the Rwandan

Army were based and where the headquarters for both the Army and the

Gendarmerie were situated, several of the civilian and military figures who had

planned and organized the massacres played a leading role in carrying out the

massacres in Kigali.


6.58 At the time of the events referred to in this indictment, the Prdfet of Kigali,

Lieutenant-Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, was also an officer on active service inthe Rwandan Army and attached to the Ministry of the interior, under the

authority of Edouard Karemera. By virtue of his rank, his office and his links

with prominent figures who shared the extremist Hutu ideology, he acted as a de

facto Minister of the Interior in Kigaliprdfecture. Anyone who wanted to leave

the city had to have an authorization signed by him. Also, his authorization

carried weight in other prdfectures.

Kigali-Ville and Kigali-Ruralpr~fectures operationally were virtually inseparable. FrancoisKarera, a former Bourgmestre of Nyarugenge; which at the time was in chm-ge of the city ofKigali, was in charge of Kigali-Rural prdfecture, and Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho was incharge of Kigali-Villepr~fecture (PVK). As regards the city, the Colonel Renzaho actedmore like a Minister of the Interior than a Bourgmestre. His reports took the form ofdirectives, such as "Avoid saying where there are bodies." or "The Ministers have to presenta positive image of the country rather what they see i ll reality on the radio". He spoke on theradio as he wanted, as though he were a government spokesperson, without having anydirectiye to that effect. It was as though he had abrogated the powers of the Minister of theInterior, due to the fact that the position of Minister of the Interior had remained vacant fortoo long. He did not report on the criminal plan, he was more subtle than that. Thebourgmestres and the conseillers lived in the smrte building as Renzaho. I saw him, I sawthem together. He has never admitted it, he used to say that he was destroying the enemy. Iknew that he used to go around touring the roadblocks and bragged about it on the radio. Hehad taken the best stores, such as Ati-Rwanda. He had constituted his own anti-lootingbrigade, but with endorsement from the government. As regards tlne Petit Kigali., which Iknow was owned by an Italian woman, I had been there be lbre the war o f April 1994; I wastold that it was the Imerahamwe’s nerve centre. I (lid not return to the place after April 1994.A woman narned XXXXXX showed me a video footage of the place filmed between Apriland July 1994. I have never had a report or i.nl:omaation on tltc place. Nobody could live likethat in Kigali without the green-light

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from Renzaho, who acted as the coordinator of the h~terahamwe in the city. He was the onlypolitical leader who stayed in Kigali. He was both a soldier and a politician. In Kigali, therewas no administration, no civil servants either. The Army ~Yas in charge of the war and hewas in charge of the civil defense. Hence this is a rnan, this was a man who degerved to berecognized in our milieu, he was active. He was also subtle. Hie behaved as though, behavedas though he was everyone’s boss. A Colonel. It is no accident that soldiers of his age andrank were chosen to be in charge of civil defense, even elsewhere. They were respected,because they had fought in wars in the past, they had war experience, they knew theirregion...ICTR -Can we assume that Renzaho, Renzaho had total control of Kigali? Was he really theonly master...? You said that there was no government, that there was no longer, that therewas no longer an administration, no civil servants, was it him?ZB -That is clear.ICTR -So, it was him?ZB -Yes, it was.ICTR -So, he had control over everything that happened there?ZB -What I can say is that I had no doubt that he knew everything that went on in Kigali...

Wimess ZB

Three days after President Habyarimmaa’s death, tl~ee to four soldiers attacked nay residencearoung 4 p.m. One of them had a black beret on like the ones the Presidential Guard wore,

and his colleagues wore the red berets of the gendarmerie .... Two days later the samesoldiers came back, ahnost at the same time as the previous occasion. Once again, they tookus in ransom .... Immediately after their departure, I telephoned a friend who came to takeme and the family to the Kigali townpr~fecture (PVK). Upon our arrival at the PVK, were threatened by the communal policemen who said we were RPF accomplices, becausemy wife and three of her sisters who were with us were Tutsis ....

In fact, anybody wishing to leave Fdgali town at that time had to be equipped with a permitissued by the prefectoral authorities known as travel papers.... Four of us volunteered to fillin the forms which were later to be signed by Pr@t RENZAHO. Each candidate wasrequested to submit his identity card and a sum of 100Rwf. I received no special instructionsabout ethnicity in the issuance of those documents. In any case, the Tutsis could not go outbecause they were tl~a’eatened. I concluded the work in three to four days during which I hadno contact with RENZAHO who was permanently in his o ffiee, where he seemed to be verybusy. At that time, there were also a few Tutsis in the/)r@cIHre; they could not leave andI left them there. I do not know what happened to them afterwards. I seized that opportunityto fill some travel papers for members of my family and i hereby make available to you acopy of my trav61 papers signed by Prdfet RENZAHO. Dud ng my stay at the prdfecture, theconseillers de secteur used to come around regularly to receive instructions fromRENZAHO.

190

Witness UC

6.59 On at least two occasions, Tharcisse Renzaho sent the conseillers de secteur

and political leaders to collect weapons and ammunition from the Armyheadquarters in order to distribute them at the roadblocks. Those roadblocks

were used to exterminate the Tutsi population and eliminate its "accomPlices".Subsequently, Tharcisse Renzaho continued to distribute weapons to the

Interahamwe-MRND.

In the morning of 9 April, I received a telephone call fi’om the Kigali town pr~fect~reinforming me that Prdfet Tharcisse RENZAHO wished to meet all col~seillers de secteur atthe prdfecture .... At the prdfecture, I found other conseillers de secteur... We went into thebig conference hall of the prdfecture and the meeting was chaired by the Pr@t, Thm-cisseRENZAHO. It was not a long meeting. The Pre’/’bl took the floor to icfform us that amisfortune had just befallen the country, that the President was dead and that we shouldprotect ourselves mad ensure security. He then asked the corl.s’e/llers c.le sec~e~m in attendanceto each go and collect five rifles fi’om the military headquarters in order to ensure security.He said nothing more. We then went to the militaa’y headquarters, where the soldiersresponsible for giving us the weapons gave them to us; we signed to acknowledge receiptand left .... After collecting the weapons, ... I immediately called the two ceIh~le leaders infor a meeting .... I explained to them that I had just arrived from a meeting, at the end ofwhich the Prdfet requested us to look for people who would receive the weapons and ensuresecurity at the roadblocks.

Witness AU

On 16 April 1994, Prdfet Renzaho again convened a meeting of the pre~bcturaI committeein which the leaders of the MRND, MDR, CDR political parties took part. He informed themthat weapons existed for the security of Kigali, He pointed out that the commander of theprefectural police, Major Nyamuhimba, Sous-pr~fet Butera, the chief of prefecturaladministration, were responsible for transporting the bou~Nmestres, the co~.tseiller desecteurs and political party leaders to the Ministry of DeFense to collect weapons. Eachconseiller ofsecteur received 5 weapons with ammunition; however, 1 do not know howmany weapons were given to each political party leader. I received my five weapons andammunition which I distributed to my five cellule leaders, speci~/ing that the weapons wereto be used to ensure the safety of the population.

Wimess UB

6.60 On 8 April 1994, Joseph Nzirorera, MRND Secretary-General, interrupteda radio conversation between Th6oneste Bagosora and Tharcisse Renzaho to ask

confirmation that the manager of the Banqtte Rwattdaise de DdvelolJl)ement had

been "liquidated".

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Telephone communications were cut off the next day anct we could only communicate bywalkie-talkie that...In the afternoon of 8 April, I was changi ng the Frequency o f my walkie-talkie in order to listen in on what was going oil when [ heard a conversation betweenColonel Th~oneste Bagosora and the Pr6fet ofKigali, Tharcisse Renzaho; Cdl. Bagosora wasasking the Pr6fet in Kinyarwanda if the manager o[’ the 13anque Rwamtaise deDdveloppement (BRD) had been eliminated, to which Tharcisse Renzaho responded in theaffirmative. A third party, Joseph Nzirorera, intervened and asked Tharcisse Renzaho if hewas sure; Renzaho replied: "Positive". Other people spoke but I am not sure whose voicesthey were.

Witness BJ

:! )

(,

6.61 Starting on 7 April, in Kigali, Interahamwe-MRND, elements of the

Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie perpetrated massacres of the civilian Tutsi

population. Concurrently, elements of the Presidential Guard, Para-Comnaando

Battalion and Reconnaissance Battalion and Interahamwe-MPdND murdered

political opponents. Numerous massacres of the civilian Tutsi population tookplace in places where they had seek refl~ge for their safety.


ETO-Nyanza

6.62 As of 7 April 1994, many Tutsis sought refl~ge at the Ecole Technique

Officielle (ETO), under the protection of UNAMIR, to escape the attacks against

them. On 11 April 1994, immediately following the retreat of the UNAMIR

Belgian contingent based at ETO, Interahamwe-MRND and soldiers rounded up

the refugees and moved them to Nyanza. Alter t’orcing them to walk for two

kilometres, the soldiers massacred the refugees. The survivors were dispatched

by Interahamwe-MRND on the soldiers’ orders.

On 11 April 1994... That smaae day, at around 1:30 PM, UNAMtR trucks came to pick up theBelgian soldiers. When the soldiers climbed into the trucks in readiness for departure, ... Thepeople began to disperse. They left the ETO compound by going al:ound the back througha hole in the fence because it was almost impossible to go out througli the main gate wherethe [nterahamwe and the soldiers were standing .... \,Vhen we got to the paved road, we werestopped by a group o1: soldiers. They were wearing C{HllOl.l ilaged uni forms. I al~.l sure theybelonged to the Presidential Guards. lknow them very wcl I, there is no doubt in my mind.

192

Even before the war, you could tell the soldiers fi’om the Presidential Guards from the othersoldiers due to their ttniform. Those soldiers prevented us fiom going any further .... Afterfifteen minutes, they told us to resume our journey by taking the road leading to the ETO.... We continued on and passed by the ETO. Past the school, behind a Set of s!lops, there wasanother road which led into the one we were walking on. At the place where the two roadsmet, I saw a stopped car, a Mercedes painted with lnilitary colors: There were two peopleinside the car, one of whom I recognized as being Colonel IBAGASORA. l knew him verywell, not as a fi’iend, but rather as a Rwandan power figure who was l~m\vn everywhere inthe country. He was the Chief of Staffofthe Minister of Del~?nse. His picture oflen appearedin the papers. I saw him at basketball games on several occasions. I do not know the exactreason why BAGASORA was there. I had the feeling he was there to monitor people’smovements. While we were walking, my glasses were taken away by force. A truck full ofsoldiers passed us while we were walking. The soldiers were armed and t believe they alsobelonged to the Presidential Guards. When we arrived at tile top of NYANZA hilt, the longline of refugees stopped and the soldiers told us to sit down. X,Vc were ordered to wait for theothers. In the meantime, the fnterahamwe and the soldiers surrounded cis. Tl~ewasan incline next to where we were sitting. From there, line soldiers started to shoot ac us. I ampositive that it was the soldiers who had passed us earlier; they were looking for the ideallocation. The Interahamwe were throwing grenades into the crowd .... The next day, ataround 5:00 AM, the soldiers and the Interahamwe returned. Tl’,ey ki [.led the survivors. Theysearched and looted the bodies. I was able to hide because 1 had tbur or five dead bodies ontop of me .... Approximately 20 to 30 people survived the massacres. More than 4000 peoplewere massacred. My wife and three of nay children were among the victims. It was ahorrendous sight.

\;\,"[mess

~<’-’)

Centre Hospitalier de Kigali

6.63 When the massacres started, the Centre Hosp#aiier de Kigali (CHK) took

in numerous wounded Tutsi from various areas ,~f the city. On several

occasions, soldiers who were supposed to be guarding the hospital selected Tutsi

patients and killed them on the spot. Furthermore, a list of the staff of Tutsi

descent was drawn up and several of the people on the list were Miled. Each

morning, the officer in charge reported to MINADEF (Ministry of i)efence),

directed by Augustin Bizimana, on the number of Tutsi who had been killed.

I remained in hospital until¯ mid-May. I left the maternity (laospital) once because a soldiershowed me a list of nurses who were to be killed that same evening and my name was on thelist. I changed location and left for the clinic. It was difficult because we were being

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f

prevented from leaving the maternity, where I had been assigned in order to preventcommunication ... A short soldier came to look for me. A nurse told him I was not around.He did not give up but came to Iook for me: Once again, he showed me that list. He said..."everyone on the list is dead except you... I’ll do all I can to help you. I have been told tokill you but I do not want to kill you.., after you leave, [ will say [ have killed you .... " Thesoldier in charge of security in CHK was Lieutenant Pierre Nsanzimana of the 33 rd Battalion(possibly from Kanombe). Every morning, he had to give a situation report on the previousday to MINADEF. He would say how many Tutsis had been killed, people who wereconsidered enemies .... Lieutenant Pierre Nsazimana of" the 33rd b~tttalion, who was in chargeof security and who reported to MINADET every morning, looked for me and foLIrld me at02:00 a.m. at the clinic... He wanted to know what I was doing there. ]initially, he torturedme ....

Witness ZA

BUTARE

6.64 1-’hree important factors delayed the start of the massacres in Butareprdfecture. Historically, this prdfecture had a large Tutsi population living inharmony with the Hutu majority. Since the inception of the multiparty system,the Parti SocialDdmocrate (PSD) dominated the political scene in Butare and theMouvement rdpublicain national pour la de’mocratie et le ddveloppement (MRND)¯ played a lesser role in that area than elsewhere in ~he country. Hence, theInterahamwe organizational structure was less elaborate and its membership wassmaller. Furthermore, the Prdfet of Butare, Jean Bap~iste Habyaiimana (PSD),the only Prdfet of Tutsi descent in the country, had openly opposed the massacresin his prdfecture, where he had succeeded in maintaining cahn, with a fewexceptions, notably Nyakizu commune. Thus, thousands of people, the maj orityof whom were Tutsi, came from otherprdfectm’es to seek refl, ge in Butare in thedays which immediately followed the start of the massacres.

6.65 The country’s civiland military leaders bec:tr:.e :~ware of the e×ceptionalsituation in Butare. Thus, the Interim Goverz:naent, of wilich PaulineNyaramasuhuko was a member, removed Prd/’et Ha[~y:~iimana from office andincited the people to get involved in the massacres. !)rd/’et Habyaihnana wassubsequently arrested and never seen again. Moreover, elements of the Army

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and Interahamwe militiamen were sent to Butare as reinforcements to start.themassacres.

ICTR - On what date .... on what date, did you replace tile/)rc!fet of Butare?ZB - On the 19th.ICTR - The 19th. Yesterday’ or the day before, I can’t rerncmber which, you said that hewas replaced under false pretexts.ZB - Yes.ICTR - The people are there, they know tltat the reason given for replacin~ the Ps’~!/’et is notthe real reason. Do you know whether or not, at the time in g utare, massacres were goingon?ZB - Yes.ICTR - Were fl~ere no massacres going on? Can we say "no massacres" or would it be moreaccurate to say "almost no rnassacres"?ZB - Uh, I would say "almost no massacres" because "no massacres", well, somewherethere had to be some.., some.., shall we say, clashes, but they were not yet serious, shall wesay.ICTR - Not serious? They were under control; you could saythat there were somemassacres going on?ZB - Yes.ICTR He was replaced by a Pr~fet who was more ia line, uh, with the ideas beingdisseminated at the time?ZB - Yes.ICTR - He was more active. Then, after that, a directive was issued according to which,"the acts of violence, the looting, mad the other acts of cruelty must stop." When ... we sawyesterday, when this.., this.., this Pr@t was replaced, it was precisely because they wantedsomeone more effective.ZB - Yes.ICTR - So that the massacres would start in that pr@cture as well?ZB - Yes.

Witness ZB

¯O °6.66 On 19 April 1994, the swearin~,-m ceremony in Butare for the new Prdfet,

Sylvain Nsabimana, was the occasion of a large gathering which had been

announced and organized by the hlterim Government. On that occasion,

President Th6odore Sindikubwabo made an intlan~n~atory speech, openly and

explicitly calling on the people of Butare to follow the example of the other

prdfectures and begin the massacres¯ He violently denounced the <’banyira

ntibindeba", meaning those who did not feel concerned, li[e asked them to "get

out of the way" and "let us work". Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, who

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subsequently took the floor, did not contradict the President of tile Republic.

s - ...¯

¯ , )

(~" ,

ZC - Edouard Karemera. So then, he took the floor and introduced, he said that a change¯ was needed in Butare. And that now in Butare the Pr@t, Sylvain Sabimana [sic], had beenfound. And he went on to say that he hoped that they were going, he was going, uh, hewould be a good leader for Butarepr~fecture. He did not talk tot long: his speech was noteven ten minutes long. He then handed over to Sindikubwaho, and Sindikubwabo began to,when he took the floor, he inforrrted, made comrnents to people, explained to them, he saidto ask the Prefer, he must not be one of those people who say that it’s none o f their business,I mean, he used the word ’Ntibindeba’, spelled ’N-T-[:B-I-N-D-E-B-A’, which means ’it’snone of my business’. He said that he had to ensure that the p~:opte of 13utarc were called todo what all the prefectures were doing. And Butmc was not, not an exception, that thepeople really had to be pushed to obey the government’s policy; tlnerl, he thant,:ed Kibuyeprefecture, saying that he was thanldng Kibuyepr@cture because they had aheady finisheddoing what the goverm-nent had asked. So, he asked the new Pr~fet to be very vigilant. So,basically, that was it, that was what he said in his speectn.ICTR - Did that meat, in your view, what did it rneala when you heard him say "’do not beone of those who think they are not concerned"?ZC - There, it is because in Butare, the people were saying that Butare could not be putto fire like all the otherprOfectures, because Butare was a pr#fecmre where the Tutsi andHutu lived in harmony. That is, they lived as friends, as brothers; they intermarried; so, hesaid that he did not want any of that. That people had to get: it into their heads that they hadto kill; for him, it was, the people had to separate themselves from the Tutsi and show themthat they were enemies of the Hutu.ICTR - And when you say that he encouraged the prOfecture to do" as the other pr~[ectureswere doing and obey the govemrnent, how did you interpret that’?ZC - I interpreted that to mean, starting the killings in Butare, killing the Tutsi like in allthe otherprdfectures. That is nay own interpretation.. But it was borne out afterwards.ICTR - Did you discuss it, then, when he said that, did you discuss it with anyone aroundyou, what he meant, with anyone else?ZC - With my cousin; we said that now that, we discussed it with nay cousin, we said thatnow that Butare is just like all the other pr@ctures, tile kit tings arc going to begin here.Until, because until that day, 18 April, no one in [:3utare had died.

Witness ZC

6.67 Because they were present at the ceremony and did not dissociate

themselves from¯ the statements made by the President of the Rep~tblic, the

members of the Government, including Jean Kambanda and Pauline

Nyiramasuhuko, prominent politicians such as Edoua:’d Karemer’~, and several

bourgmestres, including Joseph Kanyabashi, gave a ciear signal to ttie people

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that the massacres were ordered and condoned by tlle Government. Further,Joseph Kanyabashi, as the dean of the bottrgmestres of Butare, in tim presenceof the new Prdfet, Sylvain Nsabimana, made a speech in support of the Presidentof the Republic, assuring him that his instructions would be heede,d. Shortlythereafter, the massacres of Tutsis began in the pr~fectttre.

The next day, on 19 April 1994, President Sindikubwabo accompanied members of theGoverment came in Butare. He was received at the M.R.N.D,’s palace and it is where he

pronounced his incendiary speech. I heard this speech on Radio Rwanda. He was saying that,instead of staying indifferent, the population of Butare had to show more patriotism. Theresponse of Joseph Kanyabashi to the speech of the President was also broadcast. I heard himsaying that the population had to comply with the orders oi~ the President. Between t9 and20 April 1994 houses of the Tusis in the surroundings or the towri~\vere burning.

\.\fitness

Between 19 and 20 April 1994, the incoming President of the Republic Mr. Sindikubwaboorganised and chaired a meeting at the M.R.N.D.’s offices in Butare. Political leaders andsenior administrative oficials were present. It was ptecisely at that meeting that PresidentSindikubwabo asked the participant to get down to work. The work ::t that time meant to killthe Tutsis. Mr. Kanyabashi in his capacity as senior burgomaster oi" Bur-we Prclk-cmre spokefirst after the president’s speech. He spoke essentially about beginning the slaughterprincipally the setting up of roadblocks, and checMng of identity cards to idcntify tutsis andexterminate them.

Witness QC

,°"

6.68 The next day, two military planes landed in Butare with numerousPresidential Guard and Para-Commando Battaiion :~oidiers on board. Thesesoldiers, in tandem with the [nterahamwe of Butare, took p’~rt in murdering andmassacring civilians, notably the former Queen of Rwanda, ’-?,osaiie Gicanda, ahistorical symbol tbr all Tutsi.

In 1988, I was selected to join the Presidential Guard battalion in Kimihuvura .... On 30March 1994, I was informed that I had been transfened to Butare to protect Dr. SeraphinBARARENGANA, President HABYARIMANA’s younger brother .... Since we had notransport, we left Butare only on 3 April 1994 .... Also, on 20 Apiit, at around 4:00 p.m., Iheard two military airplanes landing. The soldiers who were in charge or’security in our zonetold us that the planes had brought Presidential G utu’d soldiers to 13 mare. Our post chief, 1 stSergeant HABIMANA, was from the north. [-le was the only one who was able to moveabout after that, He continued to make trips to the town and to the [_:,SO. He confirmed the

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news of the arrival of the two military planes, but refused to tell us the planes brought inelements of our battalion. The soldiers who had told us about the arrival of the PresidentialGuard soldiers also told us that the elements from our battal iota had received as.sistance fromsoldiers from the ESO m.td, with Interahamwe militiamen, had carried out massacres ofcivilians .... On ... 25 April .... i arrived at the Presidential Guard camp ha Kimihurura after6:00 p.m. I noticed that the camp was being protected by zt company of the Para-ComrnandoBattalion. Hence, I realized that our n.ten had been assigned to other duties. Since i was notsaris fled with this assumption, I asked’XX’, who confimned to me that our men had been sentto Butare town together with Major NTABAKUZE’s para-commandos at 4:00 p.m., on 20April.

Witness CY

(

... However, after Kigali, the massacres spread to Gikongoro, then the commzmes in Butarewhich border on Gikongoro. Lt. Col. MUVUNY17 kept the same kind of pressure on his men,until Interim President SINDIK.UBWABO came to Butare to Butare on l 9 April. PresidentSINDIKUBWABO held a public meeting with the people, during ’,~qdch he asked people ofButare to act like others in other parts of the country. This was incitement to commitmassacres. The day after President SINDIKUBWABO’s speech, a meeting took place ataround 9:00 a.m. on the parking lot inside the camp. The meeting was led by the $2-$3officer, Captain Ildephonse NYZEYIMANA. Lt. Col. M bWUNYI was not present. CaptainNYZEYIMANA told the men that the enemy was in Kiaali and wanted ro head for Butarevia the Bugesera area, talcing advantage of the influx o f r::!’ugees. He immediately gaveOrders for roadblocks to be set up to search tl-te refugees comin~ in from t’or weapons .... Thegroup which worked with him on a frequent basis was macie up ol ( the following: 2ndLieutenant Pierre BIZIMANA, 2nd Lieutenant K.AKWER.ERE, Chiel! \Varrant OfficerNTIBIRAMIRA, Chief Warrant Officer NTAMUHANGA, Chief Wal"rant OfficerKANYESHYAMBA .... At the camp, we learned tlmt the kiltings had st-trted taking placein the town and that 2nd Lieutenant Pierre BIZIMANA hact killed Queen GtCANDA ....From then on, I would regularly see the group mentioned earlier leavin,z the Captain’s officeafter meeting with him. When they returned, I f’ound our along with the students that theywould go meet up with It,tterahamwe militiamen outside the camp in order to massacrecivilians.

Wimess B\,’

Right after NSABIMANA was sworn in, the massacres begun with.flte attack on the fan-tilyof the former Queen, Rosalie, by elements ot" the Presidential Guards [’tom Kigali.

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.OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAl, HUMANITARIAN LAW

Witness RU

6.69 In the days which followed the unleashing of the massacres, btterahamwe-

MRND from outside the prdfecture, notably from VAga!i, came in to reinforce

their fellow militiamen in Butare in perpetrating tile massacres. This included

a detachment oflnterahamwe-MRND which was accompanying their Chart man,

Robert Kajuga.

The next day, the ad interim President delivered a speech here in Butare ........ The followingday, around April 18, 1994, we saw houses burning around Butare city People were gettingscared because shootings could be heard all around. Sadil<i Serizahiga, Simon Rwicaninyoniand myself went to an elderly man called .lames Kagabo to call Kaayabashi on the phone.Kagabo talked with Kanyabashi who advised that the poptatati0n should gather at Ngomasector office. He came that very day to preside over the meeting. We asked him what shouldbe our attitude given that we could see houses in lames and hear shootings, l-Ie said weshould defend ourselves in case we were attacked. Our tel31:.," was that we could not possiblydo so against guns while we didn’t have any. His answer was that we should find a way todefend ourselves. The meeting was attended by both Tutsis and Hutus because then it wasnot yet known which people were the targets. The meeting ended on that note and Said’swhereabouts were still unknown. The meeting ended at t.8:30 and we heard an aircraftlanding at Butare airport. Members o.f the Interaharnwe and presidential guards (GP)disembarked, but I did not see them get off the platte. The following day, strangers wereseen moving around the town and Interal~amwe members with their commander, RobertKajuga (I do not know where he presently is) were accommodated at lqotel Ibis. The hotelwas under surveillance. Some of the Interahamwe were in m iiitary attire, grey trousers andblue berets with a badge bearing President Habyarimana’s ci?:qgy. Others wore trousers andshirts in rather plain cloth printed with President Habyarimana’s pictures. The Igresidentialguards were in battle-field attire or patchwork uniforms, \vith also the President’s badge. Ingeneral, they are the ones who killed people here in Butare. I personalty saw theln shootingto kill and they were supported by machete-amaed teenagers whom they urged to take, as a

reward, the property of the dead. \Vitness QC

6.70 On 20 April 1994,.Milfister Pauline Nyiramasuimi~o asked tt~e new Pr~fet,

Sylvain Nsabimana, for military assistance to proceed with tile massacres in her¯ o ~ t, eredhome commune, Ngoma. Sylvain Nsabimana agree,.i r~ her request "~nd

"

the military authorities to provide her the necessary reinforcements.

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At that very moment, I saw Nyiramasuhuko arrive at the prefecture offices with herbodyguards. There were two of them; she had two bodyguards.ICTR - Civilians or soldiers?ZC - Anned soldiers. So she came and went into the oitice where I wus with tile Sous-Prefer. She asked where the’Prdfet was. We totd her that the Pr@t was not there yet. Shesaid she would wait for him. She passed right by the former Pr@t; she did not even greet

him. She went back to her car to return home.ICTR - Was she dressed in civilian clothes?ZC - She was dressed in civilian clothes. She was wearing a dress. So, I was still

waiting there at the prdfecture offices for the PrdJet. The Prdfet arrived arotmd 10:00, orsomething, 10:00 or 11:00. They came in with, he had the ofiSce key. They entered togetherwith the former Prdfet. I greeted him. Ii greeted Nsabimana. I!:le asked me if [ wanted to seehim; I said yes, I waaated to see him. He said, "Wait, we are going.., it won’t be long. Justwait." We, I waited until i 1:00; they finished and the i’ormer PrcJ/’et left the oti~ce. I waswaiting outside, I told him I was waiting for him. He let’t again with the car for his homewith the escort. I told him that I wanted to go to Kigali to get something, that [ had to go

buy, to get money too, I needed authorization. He told me to wait. He went into his officebut left the door open .... When he phoned the Sous-Prdfet, who issued out the

authorizations, Madame Nyiramasuhuko entered his office. Entered without knocldng. Shesaid, "I am in a huh’y, I want, I came to ask you for reintbrccments." The Prd./Ot asked why,"In our commune, Mbazi, we are being threatened by the Tutsi, we have to make sure wehave military reinforcements because there are more T utsi there than HutLt." This was in thePrdfet’s office. The Pr~J’et said, "What an-t i supposed to doT’ because he did not know what

~ot, should talk to the ESO or thethe system was, how thiags were done. He said " ’ ’commander for Ngoma."ICTR - You mean, she was the one telling him that’.)ZC - She, she told him that. So, he said "Ok, I’ll try." He asked, he phoned the Sous-Prdfet; the Sous-Prdfet phoned the commander for Ngoma and passed the phone to thePrdfet, who said, "I am here with the Minister, Minister Nyiramasuhuko; she would likereinforcements because apparently in her area, (they were fiom the same region as

Nsabimana, he came from Mb~i commtme) "’there are a I.ot oF’Futsi there, we have to do allwe can to provide her with reinforcements. Er, I’m going to send her to you." She thankedthe Prdfet and went straight to Ngoma to get the reint:orcements.

\,Vitness ZC

6.71 Following 20 April and the start of the massacres, civil servants and

political appointees who did not approve of or i~articipate with enougit zeal in

the killings of Tutsis; were dismissed by the auth~rme:.:..; osepl’~ ,,.,,~-, : .,~,,,sn~ and

Sylvain Nsabimana were responsible rot such disiiii:~;-~i.~.

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6: CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNAllONAI, HUhlANrFARIAN LAW

I met Sylvain NSABIMANA on 19-4-1994, tile day that my successor Elie Ndayambaje wassworn in; I did not know him before that. During the ceremony, Sylvain NSABIMANAthanked those who had placed their confidence in him and asked all the houlgmestres toattend a meeting the following day, 20-4-1994. During the meeting, he presented his workplan and asked the people to increase the ti’equency of the patrbls in order to prevent the RPFfrom infiltrating. The situatiol.’t in the neighbouring com,ttmes was serious because houseswere being burned down. Faced with the threats against nay commune, [ inl:omled the Sous-Prdfet of the matter during the meeting so that [ could have reinforcements. He passed theinformation on to Prdfet NSABIMANA, who said to wait until the end ot" tile meeting, butI did not receive a positive answer. Thcrcfbre, in my c:u;’a.:ity as ZJo.~,:%-ne.~’/re, [ can statethat thepr@ts did not tal<e any appropriate measures to stop the killings atnd restore law andorder. In April 1994, I went to see l~r~;,/bt NSABh,LANA in his oFiicc to request tklelvouchers, and he reproached me for not being active in my work; in nay opinioa, that meantthat I had not taken an active part in the killings. The Pr#/et also told me that according toreports from the people, [ was taking my work Lightly and "h:ld not applied mysel f" during themassacres’. I believe that this is why I was relieved of" my duties.

Witness RV

The soldiers sent by Joseph Kanyabashi went and conl:icmed the deatla oU Said ...... Thefollowing day Said was replaced by Jacques Habimana. Joseph Kanyabashi ~q~ointed thisjacques Habimana without any election. It was usual Io elect tlne conseitler. JacquesHabimana was kalown as an extremist. [-le was the leader o15 the killers, who civilians,¯ Interahamwes and sometime soldiers. I know’this because Jacques k[abimana used to reunitethe killers every evening to remind them of any tutsis houses they had overlooked that day.He would identify these houses to be attacked the next (lay. life would thank them for thegood work they had done that day.

Witness QE

;,.,2’

Immediately after the death of consillor Sudi, Kanyabashi tool( the decision to appoint notorious extremist o f the MDR-PAW A party called ,I acq ucs fl abim an u to ~eplace the deadman ......... As to the speci tic case of Francois Semanzi sectonti consillor i\;r Burwc-Urban hedied at the end of june L994 ..... before his death he remained hidden 12or a long time to theextent that it was thought he was already dead. It is precisely during his pt-olonged abscence,not of his own choosing that he was replaced by Hutu extremist Venust Uwizeye.

Witness QC

6.72 From 20 April the massacres became widespre:"d within the pM/’ecture.

In Butare, as in all the regions of the country, nume~’o~,;s peopie s~,,~gnt refuge

¯ ~ |c,c,,rm,b timt hadin locations they thought would be sale or iml~reg:r.m|e, often ~ "’"" .......

been indicated to them by the authorities, such "~.-~ Cb’:~i:,’incia p::~’i:~i~, Matyazo

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clinic, Ngoma church, Butare nniversity hospital, the premises of the prd[’ectureoffices in the town of Butare, and the Ecole Evaugdliste du Rwanda (Eva ngelicalSchool of Rwanda). In these places, despite the promise made by the authoritiesthat they would be protected, the refugees were attacked, abducted or idlled bysoldiers and militiamen, often On the orders or with the complicity of timse sameauthorities.

In April 1994, I was in Cyahinda when 1 heard about the plane crash o[’the presidents plane.The following day we saw houses in Gikongoro burning. Gikongoto is in the neighboring

! prefecture and tllis sector is adjacent to it. Tutsis of Gwamil,:o started fleeing into CyahindaParish. I heard that killings took place in Gikongoro. Many refugees came from Gikongoro,

1 Mubuga, Kivu, Nyamagabe and other places. All came to hide here in the parish compound.

~i)The refugees told us that the killings wet’e being coordhaated by the sub-prefect, called

i (’:’~; Biniga.Around the 15th of April we saw many civilians, armed witla sidc weapons, in front of them

were people anaaed with guns. We saw them coming in the direction of’this cegon and I alsofled to the Cyahinda Parish. We knew tlaat Tutsis were being killed and [ was aft’aid that thesame would happen here. We heard that the Tutsis who had staved in their homes had been

killed.Witness RP

rQ_,.

On 18 or 19 April, President Sindikubwabo arrived at the commtme offices. Before hisarrival, gendarmes disappeared into h[ding because it was being said that he had corrle tolecture to those were committing the massacres. I recall seeitag President S ind ikubwabo with

a megaphone and speaking to the public as follows: "Do no~ be @~id. def’erM yourselves,do as in 1959, take care of the enemy, bm do not be q/?aid. 1 will se~d you reiv/orcements.’"He also said, "Even if you have to brea/c down the church lo dislo~@e zh.em do iz I am in

charge." ... After he left, Bourgmestre Ntaganzwa told the peop!e assembled: "}"o,t haveheard the President for yourselves; he has told you l:o co~zrimw the wor/c.’" That same day,commune employees who were not in Favour of the killings were executed. It was alsofollowing this that the people let loose and went to find the remaining people who werehiding in the hills and houses like Gasasa and to finish off the massacres at Cvahinda parish.The Bourgmestre personally gave orders and coord inated cvery tlaing.

Witness SK

6.73 Between April and July 1994, P~’ime [’v[inistec ,~ean K’Imbanda, oftenaccompanied by other lninisters, including Pauline Nv,li-arnqstliltti;al, visitedseveral communes, including Ndora and Muganza, in May alid .Juile 1994. Thesevisits demonstrated his government’s support for the mqssacres of [he Tutsi and

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xmoderate Hutu. The approval of the massacres was also made lnanifest by the

dismissal ofbourgmestres who dared oppose the Idllings and by the appointment

of bourgmestres who were more cooperative. Thus, Elie Ndayambaje was

appointed Bourgmestre of Muganza ca 20 dune 1994 by .Jlean.~,,;"’ .... ,,,~,,,;’"nda’sInterim Government, whereas he had ordered and taaen part in ti~e massacres

of the Tutsi population in Muganza commttlte and the surrounding area.

These events took place during my visit to the region in May. Ndora commul~e wasdistinctive in that the majority of the population was Tutsi. It was also the home communeof Pauline NYIRAMASUHUKO, who was accompanying me on that occasion. We stoppedat the commune office to greet the Bourgmestre; Paul ine tall<ed with the BouzNmestre, whileI talked with the peasant farmers who were at the office. [ was familiar etaough with theregion to know that houses, in fact some very nice houses, had vanished. I asked thesepeople about what had happened to these homes. "Fh%, replied that they had killed theoccupants and, to hide their crimes, they had torn clown the houses, tilled the ground andplanted sweet potatoes or bananas. [ noticed the same thing during a visit to Kybayicommune. In Kybayi, it happened right behind the commw~e offiq,.es. In Ndora commune,the people had set up roadblocks where they filtered out the people fiom Bugasera, Mayaga(Gitarama mad Butare), who Were travelling towards Butare town. One day, the roadblockguards killed people; the Boulgmestre did not condone their actions; he brought them to theButareprOfecture offices. He was scoffed at anti told that no one wanted these people andto take them back with him. I camaot spccit’y vel-tether it was the Pr@et. or the miIitatTcommander who said this. He had them imprisoned in his communal prison l-btlowing theobjections of the majority of the population and a ciemonsq"tzion by 5.()00 people near thecommune office, some o.1 whom [ questioneci. Pauline came out of her meeting with theBourgmestre. I l~aew the story, having heard it fi’om the peasam [qrmets. We talked to eachother discreetly about what we should te[t the Bom’gmesrre to do. There was no other choicebut to decide to release the people. I tool,: it upon myself as Prime Minister to have thesepeople released, even though I knew it was not right, but I knew that 1 would thus avoid arevolt in the commune. The decision was made in concert with Pauline. A few clays laterwe removed him from his post. We decided not to laumiliate him in front of his people andto have the detainees released after we left.

Witness ZB

During a meeting that he held in May 1994 in Karambogo, Alphonse NTEZIRVAYO talkedabout civilian selfdefence. He told the people not to fen, the noise ol" ,.z, unfirc in case clan

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f

attack by the RPF. He exhorted the people to defend themselves and shortly after themeeting, rnassacres took place. I concluded fi’om this that the people began killing as a resultof his speech. During the same meeting, the presiding j uclgc o I" the Tri bunal o t’ Fi rst Instancein Butare, Jean Baptiste RUSINDANA, told the people to stop raping the Tutsi wornenunless they wanted to be killed by the RPF. Alphonse NTF-ZIRYAYO added that they hadto make sure that the RPF forces did not lind any o[-’thoir accomplice when they arrived,which meant that all the Tutsis, even those who had taken rei’uge with Hum tilmilies, had tobe eliminated. During Elie NDAYAMBAJE’s swearing-in ceremony, which must havetaken place in early June 1994, Alphonse NTBZIRYAYO, ill concert wil:h N DA YAMBAJE,incited the people to eliminate the Tutsis. He spoke naetaphor[cally, saying <you must sweepout your houses inside and outside and you must throw out the trash’, which meant we hadto stop hiding Tutsis. This was when they distributcd ’,rouGhens. One was given to the

:.~s<tblil]ai,,t. ~lll(t at-tother to theDirector of the Kirarambogo school district, Narcissc "’ "’ " ’ ""commtlnal brigade commander, Pierre I<LAREKEZI. The massacres began in the communeon 20 April 1994.

Witness RV

The second day, I believe it was the 23th of April 1994, [ saw Elie arrive in Kabuye in aToyota truck. The truck was loaded with armecI soldiers. Al)parerttly he wanted to finish thekillings more quickly, because there were so many el:us and some of us had started ~o resistby throwing some stones at the attackers, i saw that the soidiers were wearing camouflageuniforms and dark green helmets. These soldiers Sial-ted shooting into the crowdimmediately. I saw Elie leave with his truck. Soon he returned in his rmck and [ saw himsupply annes, rifles, grenades emd pangas to Hutu civilians. ! saw thenn immectiately beginto shoot into the crowd and attack with traditional weapons. I sa\~ tlla[ many people wereinured and died. The shooting lasted 9 am. until sunset.I was able to see Elie frorn rny position on the hill. El ie arri red with his car on a aclj acent hill.I estimate that the distance was between eighty and hundrect me~ers fi’om me. When the carstopped and Elie got out of his car I recognized him immediately. I saw Elie accompany thesoldiers to our hill. It was clear that he was superv{sing the:n1 anti also tlnat: he supervised thesupply of arms to Hutu civilians. Elie was present ’,.vncn tl~o shootings smrtod, i saw Eliechange the positions o[" some shooters and I also saw hiin l~rovide drinks to the men whowere shooting. Many people were killed chat day. My wi re and all o1" my children and Isurvived the second day.The third day, the 24th of April 1994, the tdltings started a~ 8 ~tln~ and Iastoci until sunset. Isaw the same people shootiilg at and killing the crowd. Ag~tl n many people were ki Iled. Thehill was covered with dead bodies-those or" women, men, children and cattle, t also saw Elieon the third day. Again he was with the shooting soldiers and policemen and civilians. Onceagain I saw Elie provide supplies to them- inclucting bullets, grenades and drinks.We survived the shooting again that day. In the evening my wife and l decided to flee. Wejoined a group of 29 people. We fled together in the night, h."lv wil’o and my six chilch’eu and

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t’,

I were together. When the group came across a post of a,’med l-tutus we were lbrced to splitup. A woman and a child in our group were shot there and killed with pangas. My wi~’e tookour last born child and l took the oldest (ire. There t was separated from my wife andyoungest child. We fled. In the morning I returned to the place where I had last seen nay wifeand child. I could not find them. What I did see from there was the last part of the killing ofthe remaining people on the hill. They were shot and macheted to death. Afterwards I sawthe Hutu civilians take our cattle and leave the hill, which was covered with dead bodies.I would estimate that of the eighty thousand refugees on the hill, approximately lq ve to tenthousand people survived by fleeing the area. I am thc on 15’ sul-\,’ivor of wlaich I zma aware outof about 1500 Tutsis fi’om my sector, Remora.I especially want to state that none of the people killed on this specil:’tc hill were soldiers,policemen or members of some sort of armed militia gl’ot, tl3. ’l~hey were all unatnaed civilians:men, women, the elderly and children. In nay opinion it w-ts certainly not an act of war. Ibelieve it was a slaughter. It is also a fact tlnat ah-nost all these pe@le were o!I’utsi origin.Some may have been Hutus married toTutsis, butt only a small percentage. 1 also want tostate that the resistence I spoke off consisted only of some men throwing stones at theshooters.

\Vi mess RT

When we arrived in GJsagara the interim-president SIN D I K.t_iB \,\-" A BO came to us. I saw himmyself. Thus I could hear what he said. He said: ’Where are those people going, moving hereand there? They should be taken to Kabuye, to join the others.’ t saw at his face and heardat his voice that SINDIKUBWABO was gngry. After that the soldiers and policemenimmediately carried out his orders. We were herded to a hill in the sector Kabuye nearGisagara. I estimate that about a fifty thousand people had been gathered on that hill. Ibelieve it was on Friday the 26th of April 1994.I know that all the people gathered on ttlat hill in Kabuye were Tutsis. Some of them wereHutu women who were married to Tutsis and their children. From our gtoup o1:" refugees Ican mention that in the beginning there were l-]utu women and Children too. ~3ut in Gisagarathey were separated by their Hutu relatives. 1 do not know if this separation had happenedalso to other groups of refugees.The refugees on the hill in Kabuye were men, women, chitdlen, babies and the elderly. Noneof them was wearing a uniform and nobody was carrying weapons:, We wei’e unarmed. Theonly things we carriecl were some of our possessions and some of us were carrying traditionaltools, like hoes, pangas and machetes. Some call these tools weapons but I believe that theyare tools. Upon our arrival on the hill we were ’disarmed’ by the soldiers, whicla means thatthey took our traditional tools.

\,\,’i lleSS .EV

6.74 From 20 April to late June 1994, President ~ heo~mre S|l~d,lvtlD~ abO and

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¢"~.

ministers Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Andr6 Rwamakuba, Syivain Nsabimana andJoseph Kanyabashi met and discussed the progress of ti~e massacres in Butare.

.Upon seeing the remaining refugees at the pr(~fectttre oft~ces, several of theseauthorities seized the opportunity to publicly and directly call t’or the eiiminationof those refugees.

The next day, on 19 April t994, President Sinclikub\vabo :LcCOmlganiecl nacnabers of theGoverment came in Butare. He was received at the M.I~,.N.D.’s palace :.lld it is where hepronounced his incendiary speech. I heard this speech on Radio P, wanda, trle was saying that,instead of staying indifferent, the population of Butare had to show more l xm’iotism. Theresponse of Joseph Kanyabashi to the speech of the President was also broadcast. I heard him

¯ saying that the population had to comply with the orders of the President. Between t9 and20 April 1994 houses of the Tusis in the surroundings of the town were burning.

Witness QB

..During the warwe fled ..... we were brought back to the Prei~cmre’s Place. It was the Pastorof the EER, who brought us to this place. When we arrived at the Prefecture 1 estimate therewere about 3000 person. We stayed there for about one and a half montll ........ One a day atthe Prefecture’s Place [saw PAULINE NY.[R.AMASUHUKO alTiving together with thePrefect. I heard her saying the words: " What are these people doing here. Why don’t theykill them? I saw that PAULINE was not "alone. She was in company witl~ PresidentSIN IKUBWABO ....... I remember it was at’otlrtd the 10th of.rune [994 .... They meant uswhen they said that these people needed to be killed.Dm-ing the nights we had to stay at thePrefecture’s Place [ saw that CHALOM, PAULINE and KAZUNGU came. They came witha car. It was a TOYOTA, Pick up model. I could not see tl~,e colour of fine car, because thecar was covered with blood and mud. When they attired ! saw that the l nterahamwe wasalso on that TOYOTA. I saw that PAULINE remained in the car. CHALOM was the driver.Isaw that CHALOM and KAZUNGU got out of the cat" and immediately started to wake uppeople who were sleeping on the field of line Prefecture’s Place. l only saw CI-{ALOM andKAZUNGU carrying fire arms. The Interahamwe had traditional weapons, like ctubs. Assoon as CHALOM and KAZUNGU had waken tlp people, they [breed together with theInterahamwe these people to get on the cat’. People who did not want to get ort thatTOYOTA, were strangled or beaten up with clubs. They really forced them to get on the car.I heard that CHALOM also gave orders to the ltatcraha~nwc to lbrce people to get on the car.People who were chosen by CHALOt’v’I and KAZUNGU were fbreed to take off theirclothes.I also saw that they tore offpeople’s clothes. I could see that all chosen people whogot on that car were completely naked. I could see all this from a distance o f’about 20 meters.When the car was filled up. with naked people, PAULINE, CltALOM, K.AZUNGU, and theInterahamwe drove away. CHALOM drove the car. Afier sometime 1 saw tlacm coming backwith an empty car. All the naked people who were on tl;~at c:tr when they Icii, were not there

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.: (’ONCISE STATEM I.INT OF Til E FACTS:OTI-IER VIOLATIONS OF IN*I’I.’A{NAllONAI. IIUMANrrARIAN LAW

any more. All the naked people were brought to a place called: RWABAYANGA. Therethese people were killed. It was told to me by a woman who came back when she wastransported on that same car. Her name is: ("X"). Also a boy with ttle name: ("X") back. They could escape from RWABAYANGA. ("X") cot!ld escape in the night. One wayor the other he managed to ran away. ("X") was brought back by an Interahamwe.

Witness RE

(.

Butare University Hospital

6.75 In late April 1994, numerous Tutsi went to the ii:t~t::re university hospitalto seek refuge or to receive treatment for their w~unds. On seve~-ai occasions,various authorities demanded that the refugees ano !~:~-:ents idenri~’v themselves.Those identified as being Tutsi were kilfed on rile s~<~ ,,~" abducte-:i and executedelsewhere.

Around 20 April 1994, I left Karama Parish and went to take refuge in Butare UniversityHospital... A Hutu lady patient told me: "If Andrd came, that would be the end of those whowere here." One day, I no longer recall the exact date, I heard the sound of a vehicle. It wasAndrd who was arriving at the hospital. He was wearing blacI< boots, a black pair of trousersand a short-sleeved shirt. 1 went into hiding.and fiom there. [ saw a red l~ict,:-up Followingthe vehicle that had brought Andrd. i saw some persons dressed in banana [eaves, armedwith clubs and machetes milling around the red pick-up. I knew that the Hutu staffat thehospital were compiling a list of Tutsi patients and gtving i~ to Andrd who then went on tosearch for the Tutsis throughout the hospi[aI. Once, .1 saw Zacharie oF l-lutu ethnic originwho worked at the surgery unit give the list to A.ndr6. Then i saw Andre go througtn the list.Accompanied by soldiers keeping watch over the wounded soldierg, Andr6 searched all therooms and checked identity cards. He tore into pieces the identity cards o1: the Tutsis andthen forced those who carried Tutsi identity cards and tl’ose who did not have any to goinside the vehicle. I also saw Andr6 RWAMAKUBA hit a man on the head with a club. Theman had difficulties walking with crtaches and with a pla,~;[ca on his tea. "!’he crutches weretaken from him and he was carried into tile vehicle:. While Andrd was seurcking For theTutsis, the persons who were dressed in banana leaves whom I referreci to earlier, werewaiting outside. At one point also, 1 no longer recall the d:tte, after he had torn the identitycards into pieces, 1 heard Andr6 say: "’Ni Murebe k,v’isi L,ibwwan.,/ttma. wl~ich meant:"Look at the world tbr tlne last time". Andrd would comc at times twice at u:~v. A )regnantwoman tried to escape but she fell and the killers linished her.... In May 1994. probablyaround Mid-May, I left the hospital and wen[ to take relieve at Butare/~rc;/bc, tz~re; somerefugees said that ifAndr6 came to the pr4/’ectttre, nobody could survive.

Witness RJ

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f-

(

6.76 In April and May 1994, Minister .’:~,ndr~3 Rwa~n’,~i,~aba, "~ !~n:,,siclan, in the

company of militiamen, checked the iaentities of d~.e patients :’:t the Butare

university hospital. He had the Tutsi selected and forcect them to get into

vehicles. These people were never seen again. Furthernmre, Andr6 Rwamakuba

led massacres on the hospital’s very premises, l!te struck wounded people withclubs and allowed the militiamen accompanying hin’t to kill women; timse who

were pregnant were disembowelled.

Around 20 April 1994, l left Karama Parish and went to take refuge in Btttare UniversityHospital... A Hutu Lady patient told me: "1 f Andr6 came, that would be the end of those whowere here." One day, I no longer recall the exact date, [ heard the sound oi’a vehicle. [t wasAndr6 who was arriving at the hospital. He was wearing black boots, a black pair o f trousersand a short-sleeved shirt. I went into hiding and fi’om there, 1 sa~’a red picl<-up followingthe vehicle that had brought Andr6. I saw some persons dressed in banana leaves, armedwith clubs and machetes milling around tim red pick-up. 1 knew that the 1-[utu staff at thehospital were compiling a list of Tutsi patients and giving it to Andr6 who then went on tosearch for the Tutsis throughout the hospital. Once, [ saw Zacharie of lqutu ethnic originwho worked at the surgery unit give the list to Andr6. Then I saw Andt6 go through the list.Accompanied by soldiers keeping watch over the wounded soldiers,/:\ndr6 setuched all therooms and checked identity cards. He tocc into pieces tile identity cards of the Tutsis andthen forced those who carried Tutsi identit:/cards and ttaosc who did not have any to goinside the vehicle. I also saw Andr6 RWAMAKUBA hit a man on the head wida a club. Theman had difficulties walking with crutches and with a plaster on his leg. The crotches weretaken from him and he was carried into the vehicle. White Andr6 was searching for theTutsis, the persons who were dressed in banana leaves whom [ referred to earlier, werewaiting outside. At one point also, I no longer recall the date, after he had torn the identitycards into pieces, I heard Andr6 say: "Ni Murebe I<w’isi Ubwwanyuma", wlfich meant:"Look at the world for the last time". Anch4 woulct come ar times twice a day. A pregnantwoman tried to escape but she fell and the killers ftnishec laer .... lt~ May t994, probably

around Mid-May, I left the hospital and went to take t-ei:’uge at Bmare prQ/ect.re; sorne¯ refugees said that if Artdt6 came to the/)r4/’ec’..’e, lobody could survive.

\.\/i mess

GISENYI

6.77 In the night ¯ot"6 to 7 April i994, in C:seayi pro!lecture, Military

Commander Anatole Nsen ,umva ~,,,e ....

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,, ,MENT OF TIIlg FACTS"¯ ,~c~s~ s r~Tp.,..,,,,,-r,(i~i~" ~.: %%-,;’,-r~c,~~

()T|~

,.. ~ ,’~isenVi military cain!). At this

__ \ .. ~,sselnble at u :. ..... ,t~ to kiii atl the RPF. _umarnen tu ,* . _., ,ho nart~c~-v"’’’°

accomplices and all the Tutsi. At the end of the meed’~, Anatoie Nseaoiyumva

._ _.,,:,~e ago u,L, .... . ___.,,, or(lereu ~"~ r . . ,autllor~u~o ._~,.lo Nsenglyum~"

aaa ’!; :~flades to tt~e a,AiitialnenassemblY, Aga,u-~

ordered his subordinates to distribute weapons

were present.¯ a mectia~ o f Ivt~,ND

who~

bigger

On the night of April 6, 1994, Colonel Anatole NsengiyUm\’a chaired meetingpolitical patty members in Gisenyi. The purpose of this meeting was to prepare for aarea as the

meeting to be held later where by the killings of pcrsom; .,,x, ou!d bc decided. yhisc¯ ......." ..;, ~ in a suspicious plane crash.was to be held because people in Gisenyi and in particular. 1~c°ple from dac ~;amc- ,-.,,,e iust learned ot t~ ):~ati *--/-ttu ethnic ov~g~n beh

Colonel ~’~’y -~ned the dowmng u’,_ ,,~o~n,,ivumva alter m.,., ’-,¯ hat the iutsts w" , ,-,^/,,n Anato~ ~ ~.... ^~,,,,,,~, .... et

. aeTutsi ethnic origin. . to the-. --~ ~r(~anlz~U uj "-’.

meetmg~ "-"~ members of tl -. ...... a sent one Captain Bizumurenge,~ or~,anized revenge against Anatote NsengWm’~’"~u e -^ *,~,ht, Coronet

members of the MRND political party and some

On the sam~ **’~first, and collected a

OisenYi Sector to collect prominentCamp- The Captain came to our compoundxxxXxXXXX Hereafter, we

interahmwe into the Armylady called Mama Sifa. The Captain also tool< me and asked mewent along picking MIIND political part?,’ leaders and ~ntcralmm\vc. In fact. most of tlae

interahamwe" We them drove these people to tl~e Army CamP, where

people we picked weremeeting chaired by Colonel An’atote Nsengiyunwa" i was outsidethe meeting ended, the

said to theerect, youthey all attended another

~ ¯ -oed andin the vehicuie I was xxxxxxxXXX Captaiu Bizumuren~e- /-\fie(’....... ,’ and elimim’,~c ,,\.,b, oeveriIqKON l ,~\~. I’~ l, town.participanS came outside and Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumvalnterahamwe"g° and arrest evetT accomptic~ of.

\veal back to

know to be a Tuts~ ̄ The crowd then dispersed and mos~ I)e°Ple

and oilier civilian

" of d~e "r~.)~.si ethnic originAfter instructions from Colonel At~atoie Nsengiyun~Va, the tnterahmWe~

was sttpcv\.’~s~ng

population went to the ctty of Gisenyi and started killin~ n~embers

0~e l<:i~lings

o f their "[ Lttsi ?c~cnds. The wordand moderate blutus. [ xxxxxxxXX Captain gizumarengc who

..

to tail a

by the Interabznwe" Some moderate 1-1ares \\:ere hiding some

meeting of the

....... ~went to Colonel Nsengiyumva and he ordered Captain Biz,emureng¢interahrnwe at t.30 p.m. on April "7, 1994. As the mee6t~g was convened, Colonel Anatole

NsengiyumVa addressed the [nterahmwe. l was prcSem when he said the totiow~ng: ,,"tie who will try again to hide a Tutsi or help him/her t?ee.will be killed in his/her place.After the meeting, the lnterahmwe and soldiers in ci\.,iii’m cloths went bacl~ to townsearching for Tutsis to be killed. They wcre armed witla cit!ics and n-mct~etes, i saw the

killings continue so massi ve after the rneetir~g. \,Vimess OV

6.78

, , ,-,i gor,qtn

Furthermore, o~ 7 Apri| 1994, Ap.atole Nse~g~)’ ....~ ’ 209

t~: I:.XI’OSE St~(’(’IN(’T lIES FAITS:AtH’RI~]S VI()I,A’I’IONS Ill" LIII()IT HI.IMANI’I’..’klItI,: IN’H:.I¢.NATIONAL

from Kigali ordering him to start the massacres. Between 7 April and mid-July1994, in Gisenyi, Anatole Nsengiyumva ordered .nilitiamen anci soldiers toexterminate the civilian Tutsi population and its "accomplices". Between Apriland July 1994, the militiamen, on the orders of Anatoie Nsengiyumwt, hunteddown, abducted, raped and killed several members ¢~( d~e Tutsi qnd moderateHutu population in Gisenyi.

ICTR -Okay. Did the hTterahamwe in Gisenyi, did the lmercdlamwe receive speci tic ordersto kill for example as well as more general orders, like you can kill all the Ttttsis i[:you want?Kabiligi.ZD -Yes, they received the order.ICTR -But there are two types of orders.ZD -They received orders which came fiom, the comnam-:der in claargc,, t-hat was of coursehim, Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva.ICTR -Can you shed more light on that?ZD -Nothing more, only that he gave orders to the lntera/mmwe to start the operation.For he told them that he had received a telegram fiom Ki~ali that the Presidertt of theRepublic had died. That the operation on the Tutsis mad moderate l-:Iutu inust commence.

\Vitaess ZD

~’)

’ ’}

During the rneeting that took place on April 7, 1994, at the Army cmv, p, r saw ColonelAnatole Nsengiyumva distribute rifles and grenades to the interahzunwe. [ hemd ColonelAnatole Nsengiyumva instruct Conseiller l?’:tziri to naoLHat ro::d blocks in his Sector. The roadblocks were to be supervised by Captian gizumurenge and other ~oidiers appointed byColonel AnatoIe Nsengiymnva. Captain Bizumurenge told me that Colonel AnatoleNsengiyurnva telephoned Burgornasters in Gisenyi Prefecture tel lin.g them ro distribute riflesand grenades to CDR members and the Interahmwe.

The killings were done by the Interahamwe or, orders given by Colonel AnatoleNsengiyumva mad supervised by Captain Bizumurenge. I am telling you what ! saw with naytwo eyes. I was present during some of the killings. Al"tei" some o1" the killings, CaptainBizumurenge orderedme to transport some o[’ the tie:tel bo!,:i~:s fi’om the :x,~-m)., Canap to place called "Commune Rouge". "’(’~m~une ro~gc." v,~L; :~ ams~ ~’~,’,~’ i\;r ’l’uisis andmoderate Hutus who werel<illed ......

Witness OV

210

(~: ( {iN(~ISI:.’ S’FA’Ft,’,MI,:NT Oi: TIlE FACTS:-OTllEI{ VIOI.ATIONS ()1: INTI:]RNA’f’I();NAI. tlUMANITAI(IA:N

Bernard Munyagishari had set up and trained a groul~ o1" young lnilicianaen called"Intarumikwa" in order to perpetrate rnassaci’es and scxuat assault. Indeed the young peoplein the group had the cynical habit ofrapinb, dleir victims bcibre killing them. [’here is thewell-knowncase of ..., the dat.ighter of nay neighbot~r, .... i~crnal’d M unyugisi mri kidnapedthe girl and kept her in his house for three w,..’ei<s. The Ix)or girl was rapeci ill ,ut’p. {?y BernardMunyagishafi, Damas Karil,:umutima and one Michel whose t:ts[ name 1 do not [<now. Thethree rapists made her understand that she would not be killed. But her lit’tiers body waslater found in an open volcanic field, Mu, Mal~os’o.

Bernard Munyagishari also controlled another group of women led by his wife, Zainabou.The group had the sad reputation of inflicting physic~d torture on Tuts~ women bet bre killingthem. These strange torturers whipped and mutilated their victims and tried re see if theywould bleed milk instead of blood, in allusion to the pastoral activities of tile "t"utsis, be:torefinishing them offby driving urnbrella stems into their genitals.[...]On 7 April 1994, Omari Faizi, together with a welt-know;1 h~rer~#za/m.ve called Thomas,arrested Mr. Rudasingwa’s two wives and i)araded them n’tked round the city ot’Gisenyibefore taking them to the cemetew where d-~ey were executed.

Witness EB

,"i,

"̄ ),". >/

6.79 From May to July 1994, Joseph Nzirorera gave or~ie:’s to militiamen to killmembers of the Tutsi population. He furthermore corn’,nended them for their

work. He gave them money in proportion to the number of Tutsi killed.

ICTR -Okay. Did the Dzterahamwe in Oisenyi, did the hl/eraba/m,ve receive spcci tic ordersto kill for example as well as more general orders, like you o:m kill all tile Tutsis il’you want?Kabitigi.ZD -Yes, they received the order.ICTR -But there are two types of orders. .~ZD -They received oirders which came fi-orn, the commander in charge, that was el:coursehim, Colonel Anatole Nsengiyurnva.ICTR -Can you shed rnore Nght on that?ZD -Nothing more, only that he gave orders to ihe/~t/e/’Jhamwe to start the operation.

211

6: I~XPOSE SUCCINCT DES FAITS:AUTRES VIOLATIONS I)U I)ROFF HUMANITAIRE INTI~RNATIONAL

For he told them that he had received a telegram fi’om Kigali that the President of theRepublic had died. That the operation on the Tutsis and moderate Hutu must commence.

’v\.: i~ hess ZD

f’")

6.80 In late May and early June, several Tutsi and modera,te Hutus attempted

to flee their prdfectures and take refuge in Gisenyi. :,nformed of tills, JosephNzirorera ordered militiamen to continue to search h)r the Tutsi an~i eliminate

them.

Around late May or early June, Joseph NZIRORERA told u-; that Tutsi and Hutu l?rom Kigalihad sought refuge in Gisenyi and that we had to continuc ~o scatoh tbt" al-ld kill ttlcm. He alsosaid that RTLM radio had moved to Gisenyi and that the station would help us by pointingout the locations where they were hiding.

\,Vii hess ZD

6.81 In June 1994, F61icien Kabuga, aoseph Nzirorec:l, Anatole Nsei:giyumva

and Juv6nal Uwiligimana held a meeting in Gisenyi. Daring the meeti’,zg, Joseph

Nzirorera and Juvfnal Uwiligimana took note of ti~e names of the Tutsi and

moderate Hutu who had come from other prd/’ect:’.re:;. They drew u) a list of

people to eliminate, which they handed over to tlte ,*ee~:erahamu,e.

In June 1994, F61icien ICABUGA, Joseph NZIROR, ERA, Anatole NSENGIYUMVA andJuvenal UWILINGIMANA held a lneeting at the Mderidien hotel iq Gisenyi. During themeeting, Juvenal UW[LIGIMANA and Joseph NZIRORER A (who was dressed in militmTuniform, to my great surprise, as he was a civilian) revealed the identity of a certain numberof people who had come from Kigali and had sought rei:’uge in the M6ridien and Palm Beachhotels in Gisenyi. We were given a list of the people to be killed, includitlg Stanis SIMBIZI,the manager of the school print shop ill Kigati, notably the manager of the school print shopin Kigali. In addition, regal’cling the manage,, el:the school pdn.t shop in Kigali, RTLM radiohad broadcast a great deal o[" information about his ileciJa#_, ,o Gisenyi, emphasizing that hehad to be found and killed.

Witness ZD

RUHENGE~

6.82 Ruhengeri Prefecture is located in ti~e Norri~ ,,;’este,’n part of Rwanda and

has historically been the site of period~c’~as mass:~c-’e~ ,,, ,rs tat,.,= popumnon. Fh|s

212

;zqw6: ( ’ONCISE STATEM ENT OF T11E FACTS:

OTHEI’t VIOLATIONS OF IN’I’I~.I’t, NATIONAL IIUMANITARIAN LAW

(

©

Q....

was true as well in 1994 wllen Joseph Nzirorera and duvenal Kajelijeii played apreeminent role in these nrassacres.

When the war broke out in 1990, the Tutsi population in [~.uhengeri prd/ecture becamevictims of persecution fi’om some the most influential people in the region nan-rely:-BAHEZA, trader residing in and native of Mukingo commune (currently in exile),-NZIROKEKA, at that time Minster of Works and Energy,-BAGEGEZA, Minitrape driver. He transporred the ’!’utsis arrested at locationsdisclosed by Bourgmestre ICAJEL[JELI.

The Tutsis in Ruhengeri pr@cture were not allowed to imve laissez-passers and wereforced to join the MRND party. .L

NZIRORERA supplied uniforms and weapons (guns, inachetes and clubs) to theInterahamwe who acted ruthlessly to prevent the Tutsis in Mukingo and Nkulicommunes from travelling to another commul~e. Every time the RPF forces attacked,Interahamwe burnt Tuts[ houses in retaliation. "l’iae communal authorities preventedthe Tutsis from going to the market. Those who wen~ ~:0 the market in spite of thisprohibition were pursued. This persecution lasted unti 1993 when BoTtrgmestreKAJELIJELI was dismissed.

Between 1992 and [993, the Jgou./LerJtesrr’e of r\,iu!dngo, KAJEL[JEL[, andNZIRORERA decreed the extermination of young Tutsi men in Mukingo and Nkulicommunes. This decision took immediate effect for many young Tutsis in thesecommunes died during this period. Whea_h,zterhamwe came to arrest the T utsis, theyonly attacked the Tutsi youths. They said they had received orders fromNZIRORERA and 1LAJELIJELI to attack only tiac youths, i?’ollo\ving thesemassacres, KAJELIJELI was sacked and peace returnccl to these two commuJ’tes.

In May 1991, I4JkJE[,IJ ELI organized the abduction and disappearance of’ my father,Juvenal KABANGO, nay brother KA MASA, my u n c les G A.. SAHANI, I-leachnasterof Mukingo primary school, K.ADEREVU, a driver at ONATRACOM, and ourneighbours SABIN and GAPANDE, both teachers at k/lukingo primary school.

I was at horne when the KAJELIJELI’s driver called MUHUNDE, the head of thecommunal police, NAHASON, and other communal policemen whose narnes[ do notknow arrived on boarct at red pick-up belonging ~o ?:.’lui.cingo com/mtlze to arrest nayfather, brother, uncles and neighbours. "t-’he i)o!iucmen, inciucling rllc YrNadierhimself were all in uniform and were can’ying guns, ;viv~t brand, I do not I<~ow. Thearrests took place at 3 l?.m. These people \.vet’e tak~’p t t~ fine ¢c)mmtme el’lice wherea Minitrape minibus d ri yen by BAG EG i2.TZA was waiti n g ibr them. "Flaey’ boa rdcd this

213

6: EXPOSE S[!CCINCT lIES FAITS:A[71"I{I.’,.~ VIOI,ATIONS l)t: lll{orr HI;MANITAII{F INTI~t~N:vrIONAL

{5-

)

bus and were takento the Nyaruhgonga grave in Nku li commu./~e. At the same tin’m,I saw KAJELIJELI whonl [ knew very well on board an ONATRACOM bus withmany of the people that had been arrested. 1 followed all that was going on f:or [ hadfollowed the red pick-up n’uck, believing that my relations and neighbours were beingtransported to the communal jail. [ was right there with sotne other people when thetwo buses headed for tile grave at Nyaruhgonga. Acc,:~rding to what [ was told, allthese people were thrown into the grave ::live. Othcp~ wc,c then cut into pieces withmachetes. According to dae same socirce, the total nurnbcr ol"pedple buried was aboutthree thousand. However, i estimate the nLimber oifpeoplo in the two buses at three

hundred.

In August 1993, around 7pro, we were attacked by//~:.e~’a/sam.we. During tl:is attack,my mother received a cut to her arm and my 3 year o:c: brother TUVISE~ ~GE waskilled by the attackers. I recognized most of tl:e aggressors in spite o t ~ the l~act thatthere were many of them. I recognized:-TUYIRINGIRE-NKUNDIYE-MBARISHIMANA-NYAKAMWE-JAVANI and-KAZUNGU-NSENGIMANA-TWARAYISENZEThey were all dressed il.1 the MRND red, yellow..,=,ccc-i-~ and bl~,,.,, t,~lit’orm. OnlyJAVANI and ICAZUNGU had guns wi, ile the others :,.,,cL’e armed with machetes. Iam convinced that they acted upon the orders of a superior, speciiical ly KA. ELIJELI,for he was in charge of weapons wl:ich he distribLited to the ls~ie:’aDa:~.r~.~.’e l’or thesecarefully thought out operations.

The Interahamwe came to remove roofings, windows and ttne doors of our house inwhich the Tutsis in the commune had sought refuge. \’\,% were scared and left thehouse to seek refuge at Busogo parish. [in the iTtce oi-" our .-;ecurity problem,Bourgmestre HARERA, who succeeded KA.II:£LIJE,:LI, ,vent to seek help fl’orn theRuhengeri gendamaerie. FiReen gendarmes were senr t:~ p~ovide security. \.Vlnen thegendarmes left two months later, I:ztel’a/i.anzwe stab’red harassing again. For tl:e

second time, we had to leave our homes co hide in the t.Jnivc!isity ot" Busogo, wherewe remained for one week. Bougreme.s’gr’e HARERA askc([ us to go back home. ThePresident died two and a half months later.

214

6: (’ONCISE STATEMENT O1: TIlE FACTS:OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATI()NAL HU~IANITARIAN LAW

In the morning of 7 April, the day after the President’s death, a radio communiqueadvised people to stay home. At 7 a.m, lnterahamwe arrived oft board two pick-ups,one rented by KAJELIJELI and NZ[RORERA and the ot!~er belonging to BAHEZA,and surrounded our house. At 8 a.m, they started burnir~g houses, inclucling ore’s, andkilling. I deduced that the pick-up truck hact been t’c’lttccl by NZIRc.)REI~.A andKAJELIJELI simply because after _/:tte:’/lam~ve got out o1: the pick-up, i[ returned toNkuli where NZIRORERA was leading the killings, q"lac pick-up returncd to us withKAJELIJELI on board; he was the one who gave instruction>to the//Het’a/~amwe to

burn houses and to kill. ICAJELIJELI himself’came ro o!tr house, i was there whenhe ordered the Intera/Tamwe to exterminate all the Tutsis in tl~e area. [ owe my lifeto a Hum friend of the family who laid me in his house during the attack and theperiod of the killings.

In my extended family, there were fqve houses occupi.c,i bv 67 poop!c: 62, \\;ere killedduring the attack. Close I"amily membcls kilicci incit~o.cd:-my brothers: Gafeza, Ndtmgutse, Kanyandekwe and i(.~g,itube-my uncle Gateyiteyi-my uncle’s wife, Mukomusoni-my cousins on my father’s side: Nyiramuhire, M~tkabw@ma, Tuyisenge and

Ngamije.

In fact, there were many victims fl’om the area. During the exlaumation oftlae massgrave in which nay family members were buried, 87 bociics were counted. I remainedin hiding until the killings ended.

1FF 4249

6.83 Joseph Nzirorera and Juvenal Kajelijeli were n::tives of the same communeand were long-time allies in their attempts to eliminate all tlm Tutsis in Rwanda

in general and in theirprdfecture of Ruhengeri inv,a ..... ~;~,.,...,,’ ..... ,,.,’~",~,,,~ i,2aj eiijeli’s

relationship with such all influential figure as dosepb, i’;zirore:-’a enabied him to

flout the local authorities, carry out atrocities "~"~ " * ’"" "" " ~",~e,,t,ttS’. rile t t,t.~l p()i)tilatioll and

avoid any real sanction witatsoever.

Sometime around 1993, before the genocide started ........ A iic.\v daya therc.:ti"te:, while [ wasin Busogo, I observed youths planting a tree in front o1~" NZIROKE[-?,A’s house inMubyangabo. Henceforth, the house becarne the [ttte/’a/~,~m,t:e headquarters and everymorning and evening, I would see them raising [sic] theil: flag on the tree 1 saw themplanting. It is also at this location that later, NZIRORERA went to meet the lit/e/’ahamwe.As they came out, 1 would laear them singing: NZII(ORI-21~,,.’\ was their leadec:, he obtained

215

6: EXI’()SI~ S[~(:CIN(TF DES FAiTS:AU’FRES VIOLATIONS DU I}I(OIT HUMAN rrAIl(I," INTF.RNATIONAL

money for them; he was powerful. That d’a),, while the 5.’oung nlen were worMng atNZIRORERA’s house, I-(.A.J ELIJELI arri\’¢(.l with at hind O (uni forms Ior imerahamwein a red Hilux pick-up which belonged to the c’cammm~e. ’i"h;.’ uni t’orms were not i)acl,:ecl, soI was able to recognize them. They were distributed t,.,,,~v’. .\’o"r~’-z., ._ men who were atNZIRORERA’s house, because it was the lirst time t saw pccqfle with those uni [’or’ms. Thatday, I saw a relative ofNZIRORERA, a man named M UH [JM [30, wearing that uni lbrnl and

carrying a pistol. It was also the first h~tera.hamwe lsaw retried and in tlll[[k)l’ITl.

Ill: 425l

t":"

.--)

()(.

,’ ")

During his tenure as Bou~gmestre, KA.IELtJ ELI behaved l ii<c an extremist. I-to was a violentand mean-spirited man. He would have people abducted and tlney would ther~ go missing.I recall the abduction of .lean Damascbne GASAHANE. the headn-u/stcr oi" the Mukingoprimary school, and two o1" his younger brothers. They were imprisoned at the commu~,e jailat first and were then reported missing. [ also recall the abduction el" RUDA’IINYA andBUKUMBA; like the others, they were jailed and never lneard i"rom again. 1 she uld point outthat BAKUMBA worked as a clerk at the Ruhengeri court of appeals. These abductions took

,. lay; victims wcre takenplace in broad daylight and everyone therelbre kaew about lhem. ,-r- .~to detention in the commzme vehicle. All the peopie -tbduc.t’ed and declared missing were

Ix A.,’ k- [_ l.I ’= I ~ethnic Tutsis. These are all genuine cases mat " ’ ~:~: cannot de ay. The abductions

were carried out by KAJELIJELI’s driver and the communal policemen. Tt~e abduction ofGASAHANE and his two brothers was carried ou’ in the presence o1." ills wii"e aiqd children.GASAI-tANE’s wife survived the genocide o f April i 994 and current y i i\;es i i~ P, uhengeri.Her name is Immacul6e MUK_AMUGEMA, but she is better known by rhe nicknameNYARABIGANAGANO.

Following a cornplaint by the people of Bagogwe, which was home area of the people whowere abducted and who then disappeareci, and a report by the prefectural administrationaddressed to the Minister of the Interior, the cabinet, led by the Head of" State,HABYARIMANA himself, decided to remo\’e KAJ I-’..L.[,IE[.,i i?om his of’rice o[’?,oui’gmestre.

With regard to these abductions and the murder of lG other people from Nyabirchc .x’ecteur,

the Ruhengeri prosecutor’s office opened an investigation into I<.AJI:7.Lt.tELt and hisaccomplices. However, the investigation l’,ad produced ~t<~ results I.)3’ the c,,,’cnts ot April1994, which brought about in the collapse ol’lhe H~Lbyarim’um. regime.

li F 4253

216

6: ~. ( iNCISE STATI.]M F.NI" I } ,: TI I E FACTS:OTIIEI~, VI(}I.AT,ONS O1: IN’i"I.,RNATI(JNAI. I,[’MANIT:M~,IAN LAW

6.84 In 1993 Juvenal Kajelijeli formed and led :;a interahamwe-MRNDbatallion in Mukingo Prefecture, and st~pervised i~":; military., trai~iP.g. .. Theuniforms for these militiamen were provide{i t;y .~,)..;e ,~ Nzi~’orec’~.

)

After KAJELIJELI was removed from o ffice, he remained in M ul<ingo comirmne and [brineda squad called "AMAH1NDURE", which means volcanic cPq)fiol-t. The squad was made upof former soldiers and Interahamwe. The ex-soldiers were in charge of: tFaining civilianmilitiamen. KAJELIJELI personally recruited the squad members, primarity [-lutus whowere members of the MRND party. Only the [nte/.’ohamwe \yore the *4.RND tin ifol-mS in the

, ~ene~ a, o [’ the partyparty colours; the uniforms were provided by NZIRORI-2RA. secretary < ..... ’

at the time. The training o.f" the [nteva/:amwe militiamen and the squad members wascommon kmowledge, as they took place in t}roaci cia\,iigi~t P.c:,~-the c"o/mn,z/zc.’. -l"b,e trainingwas conducted using imitation weapons. On the ott~cr ln:mvi, the nigb.l rounds were carriedout with real firearms. According to the organizers, the parrots were designed to search forand arrest the Inkotanyi, i.e. the armed forces o ~’the RPF. Accorc.!ing to a statement madeby KAJELIJELI at a meeting at the Mukingo cormmme office in Gisesero, which [ attended,the purpose of the squad was to stop the in[]l mttion oi" the l;dconzm.,i anct l]glnt tlvem in Butarocommune. The squad emanated fi’om the association ofwhic.in [~:xJELtJEL.[ was the founderand president, whose purpose was to compensate l~)r the incompetence of the R.wandmlarmed forces at the tin-re, which had lost the battle \rich the iZPi: in gutmo ccJmm~me [t was

no secret to the inhabitants o f.Mukindo. "lhe recrui’me ~:n.,l t::u:/ing was conduc.~cd in public.Boys and girls joined up in t"ull knowlutl,_,.~: of :,..~’.-, ..~:c. ihe :-;ClL,~!d \\:a:-; lii-lcic up individuals from Mukineo and Nku[i. ’,(A.IiEI._I.It::IL.i ,.’,’a:~ ~,ltcn ~)zescnt ~u tile ,rainingsessions. As an irthabitant ofMukingo commwze, I sk~’,,,. i"&.,\.J tT.L[JELi at tlac trai~dng sessionsregularly. Up until the accidental death o I: President HABYARIMANA. the battalion wasnot involved in any reprehensible act.

[IF," 4253

6.85 As from 7 April, Juvenal Kajelije!i organized..~:.~}.ervised and i~ardcipatedin attacks by Interahantwe-MRND on..,~,*~,-’ "P,,,-;"~:’......,,., ic .... ~ "’~"’~:-,-~ ~,t,.,,-,~..~,., co~..~, :,,~::.e and

the neighbouring areas.

On the morning of 7 April. KAJELI.IELt went to thc ,,’om¢mmc’ o[i]cc 1o gc~ weapons fordistribution to the b~lera/~am we. The b’ouvgrnes~’e Ie )oitCdly Ie [\.1$¢d. KA.I [~: [.. I.t E k l then

217

went to the Mukarnira military camp, where he was supplied with the weapons. These werethe weapons the tnterahamwe used to massacre the Bagogwe in Busogo sectez~l and otherswho had sought refuge at the Busogo catholic parish. 1’ was told this by a communal policeofficer from Mukingo n:.uned Boniface NI(,URIYE, who is currently in Mul¢ingo and is

unemployed. Like everyone else, I heard about the 13agogwe massacres via hearsay in thecommune. People said that n~en, women and children wore among the victims, and theywere unarrned. The people were all ethnic Tutsis.

That evening, after the victims were buried, it was reporled that 13o,M7lne.s’ts": i:;,’tnmanuelHARELIMANA had died at his horrle. According to tile rilMOttrs, he w-is poisoned byKAJELIJELI in a bar in Mukingo corn/re.me, where they had had a diiilk together.KAJELIJELI was thor@it to have poisoned the/3o~:NH~es:/’e to prevent him from reportingthe events of 7 April to the hierarchical authorities, which implicated him in the massacre ofthe Bagogwe.

IIF4253

6,86 In April 1994 Juvenal Kajelejeii led " group of :Irnlect ini.d ,h,im~le-

1VIltND to the residences of Tutsi in MuMngo Comin~,i,~o After ’ ’,,’" -,o¯ - . i~,,, ~,~ rounded

up these tutsi Juvenal Kajelijeli ordered anti p,,, .<,,:,,<,.d in ti~eir siaughter

using grenades and finishing the survivors witi~ traditional weapons.

After the killings of 7 April, KAJELIJELt’s S:z:e~’aDamwe contirmed to pursue the Bagogwefrom the commune. That is how a lady named NZA MUI:,OS HA, daughter oF MUDADARI,wife of MUNYAMBAR.A, arid K_AJELIJEL[’s neigllboul-, came to be killed. Her childrensurvived and still live ill Mukingo commune. { heard abotit Ms. NSAMUKOSI-{A’s deathfrom acquaintances o:fmine. Also, the Conseiller oFlT, winzovu secrem arrived aftel: the ladydied and saved her children, who live in the sarne sectelH".

.;

This death squad led by KAJELIJELI went as !~qr as to kilt the people who In~(l l:lecl Busengosous-pr~fecture and sought ref’tlge at tl-~e Ruhengeri court el’appeals. Thereal:’ter, they triedto go on to the university, located in Nyakinama conzm¢.mc:. The operations commander forthe region, Major BIZIMUNGU, t~l-eventii~g them fi’ona reaching their target. TheInterahamwe themselves recounted theii: exploits of" tl~e ,1:~\’ at bars irl the c’om~nH/~e:. Theydid not conceal anything. That is how 1 ibund OUt ~l[)t,~ti{ !i i,;’ i!itlSS~lCl’e O [’ the reJhgccs at the

Ruhengeri court of appeals.

KAJELIJELI did not take part directly in the killing, but their instructkms came iiom hhn,because these Interahamwe were under his ctirect orders and he was the one who chairedtheir meetings at the Busogo I prirnary school. I can conliln~ this because KA.117LI.I ELI was

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VIOLATIONS ()1: tNTI’]tlNAI’~I()NAI, HI/MANITAI~IAN

./" ")

C

the most influential person in the commune alld he supported them, because he managed themoney provided by the MRND for the D~teraDamwe. Further, he was the one who instructedthe militiamen to barricade the roads to prevent vehicle nlovement. I l<new a young manwho attended these meetings and would come and toll us witac was said at them. His nameis DUSABE, and he is MBURABUZE’s soil, DUSAI3E w:~s riot a l-i~can t)crson and did notparticipate in the massacres. 1-[e still lives in Mul<ingo c()lssnHnce, Oataraga mccte,~r.

KAJELIJELI was often seen at the roadbloci<s, whicll he SUl~crvised I)ersonaliy. 1 personallysaw him at the roadblocks several times, because fie did rocmds in bioad daylight. Once, thePr~fet of Ruhengeri came and ordered the DtteraDaml, i.’e to remove a roadblock. Theyrefused, arguing that only KAJELIJELI could order them to do so, This incident wasbroadcast on the radio. The militiamen who manned the roadblocks were given food byNZIRORERA’s mother, NYfRAMAKUBA, currently in exile.

In June 1994, precisely one week bet:bre tllc l-~,l:>ii : captured Kigali, KA.ILY, LtJELI wasreappointed Bow~mestre by the cabinet el" KAM.BANDA’s interim government..[ supposethat was a reward for his loyal services during the events of" April 1994, because it is notoften you see someone removed from oi:lice for violent acts who continues to perpetratethem and is then reappointed to the same post.

[IF 4253

()

,)

GITARAMA

6.87 As from 11 April 1994, the Interim Cove~,nme:~. ~’eacti,~g .~o me pressureof the RPF attacks on the capital and in oraer ~; conti.ac~e ~o carry ot~t its duties,

moved to Gltara ma prejecut re, w est o f i(.~ g’l i i. ~" " n o m e p rejectttre¯ .... t~tal’am<~ was tiie" "’~ ’

of Grfgoire Kayibanda, President oi’ the ~"’- ’ , ....",~rst {teptiblic, .,,d ’,ir~ MDR

stronghold. The MRND was not well represented in ti~e pr#/’ectnre in the

period leading up to the events of 1994. As from April 1994, the M RND spared

no effort to drive out the bourgmestres who ’,~,e:-e opposed to its policy with

regard to massacres and to replace them with !cvai ~;::,’:y men.

GUICHAOUA, Andr6, Les crises politique.s’ au B~Hun<ti c; c;tr Ri.vamlcz (1993-/994), Lille,Universit6 des Sciences et Technologies, (difl\,sion Kalth:Ila) 199’5 p, ¯525.

Gitaramaprdfecture was almost 100% M DR, so the .l,te’rul~,,twe had very tittte supl)ort inthepr~fecture. The MRND had very little ropl’cserilati()it il~ this l)rc!/k,cet~l’e. ’illat eilzibied the

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MRND to reposition itself at the expense or’the MDR. The mtlin architect offthis claange wasMinister Callixte Nzabonimana..Hence, the/~otc,gmc-:.v,’/"e.s’ \.yore dismissed on the pretext theyhad links with the RPF, but itl reality it \\’v~.q due t,.~ ~lie i’~et thut they were opposed to theMRND.

Witness ZB

-)(

6.88 As in other regions of Rwanda, several meetings were helcl in Gitarama,with members of the Government, senior MRND ofiici:~is and representatives ofthe local authorities in attendance. Tl~e pttrpose of ti~e "’" ~*" g~................... ;!,cedllmS VV~’,S tO supervise

the progress of the massacres in the region and e~.co~.~age tD.e popttlation, the

militia and the army to cot~tinue commi~~ing ~:-.cm.

... the third meeting was held in one of" tile halls of the C’i,:L/: in ~iktranabi, to \\,hicla theinterim government had retreated .... Apart from the Pl-@’.f o f" Gitarama [Fid&le UW [ZEYE]and the bourgmestt’es, the Prime Minister [Jena Kambanda] was at the meeting in the hallwith certain members of the goverm-nent, representatives oi"political parties, including theopposition parties, as well as the heads of the church ctenornir~ations .... Tlae P!’~fel" was the

first speaker. He described the situation in the l)rq~/’ec~t,t’ce, whicla, althot@a certainlyworsening, was not yet hopeless. Th.e /)ottlgr~eslres, who were being tht:eatened itt theircommunes, including one Botu~n~estre [Rubogwe] ,vho h~ld been manhanctlecl bs.,’ a ministerand the militia in his own conznTz.tne, aclcted tl:~eir comments to the inlbmmtion provicled bythe Prdfet. In reply, the Prime Minister re::td ~t message he t,~lct prepm:ed in adv’ance, it wasa political message and did not refer at ~lll to the issues r:li:-:ect ...., Other membels of the

,<.,-~I,.c,vIERA. Their si~eeches weregovernment spoke, among who i recall MDGENZI ~tnd ’ " ; ’~’ ~not about pacifying things or stopping the killings .... The naeeting ended in total confusion.

0668/K96

t’k2~

, }

6.89 Between April anti ,july 1994, i~ v,,,,,~,,,,,:,,.,,refused to carry out the Gove,’nmen~’s C’,:~-ecE~ves ~." 12::£:~S:tc!’e ~ho ~ L~S~, <~ x~, |10

had not shown sutI’icient ze:~i ill car~’yi~.ag ,i~e:n <~t~, -,.~’~,~’e .’eprim:,.~’.:~.e,~i :~-~ct evenon occasion attacked in ft’ont of their- c!~,izens, {l~c.-~;: ..~ismisseci o~’, ivo~se yet,physically eliminated. Thus, C:;llixte ""’’~ ..... i~;:~ ~’.-~; ..,;¢~ t~e p’.,~rtici~,’~ e:-’n of thelnterahamwe-MRND, publicly bent ti~e iSottt’gHt’~e’,’t~"e ~;;" :~.¢~t)ogwe i,’.’ ~is c.¢~¢,.~Hztttzeoffices. Furthermore, Callixte Nzabonimana was ti~e i}~’imary fo~’ce t)ei,i:~d the

dismissal of the bourgmestres, being the only minister" f~-om that region :tnd the

person in charge of"pacitication".

... the third meeting was held in one ot the t:ztlls; off the ~.’f:(" in =Murzu~atM, to s:’laich the

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6: (’ONCISE S’I’ATEMI~NT OF Till" FACTS:(.)THI,;.I~ VIOI.:V!’IONS {}I." IN’[’I~RNATIONAI ilUMANITAI(IAN

interim goven’unent had retreated .... Apart li’orn the Pr@,I .::,fGitaramu [Fiddqc U \.VIZEYE]and the bourgmestres, the Prime Minister [,lena Kambandz~] was at the meeting in the hallwith certain members of the government, representatives o i’ political parties, including theopposition parties, as well as the heads o l:" the chutch dcnomi nations .... ’thc Prc!/i/f was thefirst speaker. He described the situation in the l)rC!/e’cl:trc’, xvlaicta, ~llthough ccrtainlyworsening, was not yet hopeless. Tlne bou~gmesLres, who were being thrcarcned in theircommunes, including one 13ouJgmesu-e [Rubogwe] who bald been manhzmdlcd by a ministerand the militia in his own commulle, added their comments to tim inlbrmation provided bythe Pr~fet. In reply, the Prime Minister read a message he had prepared in advm,cc. It wasa political message and did not refer at z~lf to t l~e issues rzliscd ... ()thor mcp.abets of thegovernment spoke, anaong who I recall M UGENZ[ -rod I(ARtZM EI~%. Their speeches werenot about pacifying things or stopping the killings .... The meeting ended in totai conl(usion.

v;t}~,) </ I.’.~ JlD

6.90 During the events of 1994, Callixte Nzabonima,~a played a am,io~ role in

the massacres of the Tutsis in Gitarama. He visiteo the i)ottt~*mesrce.v frequently

to organize the massacres in their communes ~.viti~ t!’,eaa. Furthe:’, ~e ~?e~’sonally

travelled through the Mils along with peasant fa~’n~e~s ~,~ i~e eertaip, ti~e farmers

were carrying out properly their orders ro Mii tile ",’ur;2s.

At the end of each day, Minister Calli×te would say thai l~c was going home ~o N.vabukenge[phonetic transcription], approximately 30 kilometl-es outside Gitarama. He would hold nightmeetings, for, and visit the Bourgmes~res Jndivktual[y in order to organize the massacres intheir communes with them. He took refftge with us in Zaire. i I"lew over the/)rc:1Lec:,:zzre beforethe end of April, while returning fiom R~.thengeri and the Nyabarongo. t s:m,’ ~ l~t of bodiesfloating and h.ouses destroyed all over the !3lace. As he s’tid th:tr he went home crepe evening,I called him in a few days later to explain if he knew anythhag about the acts committed inhis commune and inform him that I knew of his personai iiw,:~lvemenr i~: the massacres, asper the information I had received from my intelli~ence sources. He told me lhat it was theHutu population which was behind the massacres :rod denied any personal in,<~Ivcment. Iordered him to make a radio announcement dissociatine ninaseilf fiom the group otldllers,and denying that he supported them. ] know that, that-he did so b.u~ ~n a vc~v gumded andunconvincing manner.

ICTRZBICTRICTRZB

- What party was ("allixte with’?- He was a member of the M RN i2).- MRND? Ok.- You had to meet with him to discuss \,\.’lial votl k.\..’~.t’.2, going to say about him?- Yes, because people thought it w:~s too rnuclu [lcnce. it was even disct,ssed outside

221 221

I~ZB

0: I~XP()SI’~ .~U(:CIS(’T I)l:.S F/,,ITS:AUTRI’~S VIOLATI(}NS I){: i.~I{OIT II[IMANI’I’AII¢I:; INTI;~RNATIONAI,

government circles, because people thought it was outrageous lbr a"Minister to be paradingaround the hills with people going to comrnit murders.ICTR - Openly as that?ZB - In front of everyone, it was not, they used the term "’anbecoming", saying that it wasimbecoming for a government minister.ICTR - So you, that was the reason you met with him? 13ec:msc it had been brougl~t to yourattention, you were .... m~d it...it brougi~t ~! .... i! brought o~!...- Discredit.ICTR -Discredit to the Government?ZB - Yes.ICTR - And, er, were you alone when you met with Mm?ZB - I believe I was alone. I don’t believe this is a matter to be discussed in a group, butI had talked about it with other people beforehand, especiaily members o [" nay party.ICTR - And what was his reaction?ZB - Sorry?ICTR - What was his attitude during the meeting? Was it. was it...ZB - Well, he was saying that what people were sav[~,_, was [:alse. thal all he had donewas to take on responsibility as someone who had been tailed upon to paci l:y the, his region,that perhaps he was being criticized for visiting the bou/ig/nes/res, etc. But [ told him tlmt hewas being associated with all the groups which were carrying out kiJlings. 1 even asked him,I asked him to personally intervene and make a public radio announcement denying Nspersonal participation in...ICTR - Yes.JK - ...in the massacres, to go on the air anc[ say so.ICTR - But you said that his radio address was...ZB - It wasn’t, well. anyhow, it did not bring about u:c oh-rage I was expecting, thateveryone was expecu ng.

Witness ZB

(-)Gitaramaprdfecture was ah-nost 100% MDR, so the Inte/’aham~/e had vet:y little support inthepr&fecture. The MRND had very little representation in this p/’~fecture.That enabled theMRND to reposition itself’at the expense of’the MDR. The main architect of this change wasMinister Callixte Nzabonimana. Hence. the hou/Lgmestres were dismissed on the pretext theyhad links with the RPF, but in reality it was due to the I’ae! that they were opposed to theMRND.

Witness ZB

Nursing School

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6.91 Between April and June 1994, several people found refuge at thesecondary nursing school in Kabgayi, Gitaramaprdfecture, where students andstaffwere already located. On several occasions during this period, soldiers andInterahamwe militiamen abducted and raped female q’~,~t,~i stu(tents and refugees.Minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana and the General Staff of the RwandanArmy were informed of this sifuation but did not take any effective steps to endthe crimes once and for all.

When the war stm’ted in 1994 the Interahamwes killed tutsts, i llcd ro Kubgayi. (la2Sl) EcoleSecondaire des Infirmieres ............. I sought refuge from the l<i Ilings on the 18’" o1" April untilthe 2na of June 1994 .......... At Kabgayi there were thousands o I’ refugees ........... At the sametime the soldiers also began raping girls and young mothers The first time they selectedfemales to be raped it was about 40 of us from a line up ti~ev made us do. ]"lacy took usoutside the coumpound to a fbrest which was nearby. lhcr,c on co lathe soldiers told us togive it out. Prior to this they had killed a woman who h~d refused ~o be raped in front ofeverybody. As they were also carrying weapons such as utms and small axes we compliedto their orders. During my stay i was raped at least 15 times by the soldiers latter byinterahamwe. After the first collective rape they just came and called us one by one and tookus to the forest or some houses where they raped us .............. When we were being raped theytold us it was to see the diference between tutsi and hutu women.

\,Vitness EZ

CYANGUGU

6.92 Although Cyangugu prdj’ectttre, in southwesrecn t~w:tnda, was neveraffected by fighting between the armies, it was tl,e theatre for ~.umerousmassacres of the civilian Tutsi population. These mass]ores i~aa t~een preparedfrom early 1994 during frequent meetings helO i~erween rae fV[inister ofTransport, Andr~ Ntagerura, the Prd.fet for the region anti interai,.amwe-MRNDleaders. Andr6 Ntagerura was a native of Cyangugu and maintained stronglinks with the Interaham,,e-MRND. Furtiier, he p~,~i~iich, encoacage(i, violenceagainst the Tutsis and helped htteraltam~;,e-MRND cc~,mir mas~:’,cce,~.

Ntagerura (Minister of Transport and Tetecommunicationsl was passing i~v in the Prefbcture.... as a supersivor. He attended a meeting in end April... tl~e l?residen( Sindikubwabo wasalso at the meeting.. People were congratulated for what they already had done. They weretold not to forget the women and childt’en.

\,\;it hess

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Ntagerura came to Cyangugu during the massacres in Muv to take pan in u meeting led bythe President of the Republic, Th,5odore .SINO[KUB\V,~t~,,,). wh~.~ was conunctading thepeople for killing the Tutsis. The meeting was broadcast ~,~. tile Radio P, wanda airwaves.... In the month of June 1994, ~ AZIMP..’\KA, N’I’:\GISI.IL:I~.A. ’i’,~tL~,:,ttl’ou, :.Illd the l:onner Pr¢fetof Cyangugu told the population not to be aft’aid and that shot~hJ the Hutus fail. they wouldflee to Zaire and those who remained behind in R.wanda would be killed by ihc RPF ....

Iattended this meeting, which took place in late June 1994. :’NTAGER.URA was a[ the meetingon that day and reinforced what the Pr6fet had j us! said. [31c even e×plained to the populationthat the war had not succeeded because ol’a weapons embargo which the United Nations hadimposed on Rwanda.

Witness LP

KIBUYE

(’"’~)

6.93 K.ibuye region is located on the shores el’Lake iZivu in western Rwanda.

Between April and July 1994, large-scaie massacres ~,f Tutsi ~ook place in this

region, particularly in Bisesero.

See pm-agraph 6.95 onward

6.94 On several occasions, members of dae interim C<~ ve.’nrnenr ~’en~ to i~ibuye

to monitor the progress of ~lle massacres. Thus, in May 1994, Pri, me iV[inister

Jean Kambanda held a meeting with the heads of govecnnlent dep’u’tments in

the region to discuss the security situation. Several ministers attended the

meeting, including Edouard Karemera and Eliezer .N~vit-~,,~v - In the cotlrse of

the meeting, a participant ’t:~ked the Prime [’~[nlistet" " " " ,:,~~’ to care for riie children

who had survived the mas:~:tcres and were at ti~e tl(;:,~,t,,l." ".,-; ’,~ ’ ""! l:e -~:’rxnie" Ministerdid not reply, and none of ti~e other ministers preseni: i3rooosed a soiurion to the

problem. That same day, after the meeting, the chiidren were kiiied.

This meeting was public and held in the PreFect’s office iu Kibttye. k, lanv authorities werepresent at that meeting, i can mention:- The Prime-rninister, KAMBANDA, J can- The fen’her Minister ol" hitbn’nation, NI YITEGEI(A, Elci::ier- The former Minister o1’ Finance, NDINDABAH IZI, i:’:mm:muei- The vice-President of ti,c M RND. K...\ i~ fi:..’, 1 iRA. [:!dow..~

224224

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6: (:()NCISE STA’r~M r,;NT ? THE FAO-vI’S:OTtlEII \"I()I,ATIONS OF’ INTI~II.NATI(INAI. IIILMANITAIIIAN

,t̄¸

; .)

( .

f-,

- The secretary-general of" MDR, M UREGO, DonatThis was the official delegation ti’om Kigali.The Prime-minister held a speech in which he explained ’,vliat was goin~ on in the country.He invited the population to resist again the enemy, because 17,I:>t: was all ovel" the coclntry,He talked about the current gouvemment, which was a strong, united gouvcmmcnl. He said,that the people had to choose whether to be Rwandese or to support the RPF. I=le confirmedthat there were lists of peop[e who supported tlne RPF and that these people had to beConsidered as members of the RPF. He said, the gouvernment would not tolerate any RPFsupporter or complice. The whole speech was broadcasted, \.v’ithocil. being censured, on theRwandese radio. Before this speech, the PlqiL~ct I4. AY.I S I i {-{,\,t ix, nladO a speech iri which heexplained the current situation. He said that the general situutioll was stable except in theregion of Bisesero where tightings were going on. Tllere \:,us ~’iso a speech by i;,AIT‘EMERA.

He said, that he was glad that all the political parties wore united and they scG~ported thecurrent gouvermnent. He said, that he was glad that all the i)olitical parties wore united andthey supported the current gouvemmenL He said, that they il;.i(l given instructions to youngin the MRND to behave in a good way. He also invited tile people to support the newgouvernement.The Minister of Information, NIYITEGEKA, who was also the Presideat o f MDR in Kibuyeregion said in his speech that most of the leadei-s, in the MDR, who collaborated with theRPF were excluded. He said that now they had to look lbi" people who were complice withRPF at regional and communal level, so that there would be a strong MDR. p-uty. In thename of MDR, he said that the party was proud of the nomination of KAMI3ANDA asPrime-minister and he asked the population to suppo:rt the new gouvernment and the armyin their fight against the RI?F.In the name ofPSD, a speech was made by I’,IDINDABAt-f iZ[, Emmanuel, the Minister ofFinance. He said that his party used to be pro-RPF, but now they were supporting thegouvernment and its pc [icy.In this meeting HITIMANA asked b,rIYITEGEKA and MUlZF, GO why MUlL party had donenothing to stop the killing by controlling the young men o I-’ their pcu’~y. Instead of’giving hima clear answer. They hclrrassed him and {old iiim that I,.c: siu.)utd riot scipi)orc the enemy.HITIMANA also asked iZAY[SHE?,/IA and lZAMB,’:\ND.’\ For aid for tile children whosurvived the massacres at l-tome St-Jean ::llld the .."51~ldl.LIl], in i(ibtivo. ’f’ilc :illS\.\,(2l \,v.as that gouvernement has problems to :find enough ibod for the soldiers aild dmt fie (lzl.itimana)should be knowing how to deal with the children [ understood what he meant: with thesewords. I think he meant, that these children should be l<illcd. The day ai’tei’, the hospitalwhere the children stayed, was attackecl anti all the people in there, personel as well as thechildren, were killed, So I assume that all the people that were pi-esent at the meeting

1/" \ \lunderstood what KAMBANDA or ~x,-’. ¯ ISI7tEMA had i:leant and that the people whoexecuted the attack were instructed. 1 c:m nc)t rememi)e~" whetheF it was F, ambanda Kayishema who gave that answer. There wore also i’cquest.~; ior re’ms and support, clone by

the Burgemasters of Gishyita and Gisovu in order to get rid o1- Biseser,) probicln i,t theircommunes. The answer of" the Prime-minister was clam the Prci"cct had to report to him

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o°~..,

whether it was the RPF or just Tutsis who fled in the Bisesero region. In my opinion he gavethis disguised answer becastie the quesiton of tile Burgem-istcrs was toc) clear. They saidclearly that they would kill all the people but had not enough moans.

Witness GK

On 3 May 1994, I attended a lneeting for wlaich I had received at written invitation signed byPrdfet KAYISHEMA. tt was A meeting ofdel.)artmental heads hold at the Kibuye pr@cutremeeting hall to discuss public security malters. The organizers of the meeting were on thepodium. The meeting was chaired by Prime Minister, .lean KAMBANI.)A. The others onthe podiurn were:- C16ment KAYISHEMA, the Prdfet or" Kibuye- Edouard KAREMERA, Minister of Interior and Colaamuimt Dex~elopnacnt;

- Emmanuel NDIND ABAH[ZI, Minister o [" Finance;- Eliezer NIYITEGEKA, Minis ter o ftn t’o rm at iO11;- Donath MUREGO, MDR. Secretary General;- Cyprien MUNYAM PUNDU, Member oi’ Parliamem, Sccret:u", oi" Nationtlt Assembly.

~, ,~ the dcp.:~rtmental heads.There were between 50 and 100 persons in attendance, inct~." "-I knew all the participants on the podium eid]er personally or from the iiic~ thut ;hey were allpublic figures. The meeting was recorded and broadcast over tile ra[dio on 9 May 1994.

The meeting started with a presentation by Pj.@,tlC, AYISH EMA. gol lowed by other speechesgiven by one or several participant on the podium. The meeting ended around 2 or 3 p.m.After the speeches, the floor was opened for questions. I took d~,e opportut~ity to express myfear to Prime Minister KAMBANDA for the safety of the children at the hospital. This fearstemmed fi’om the fact the isz~et’alTann~.’e had been trying to enter the hospital ever since their[the cNlch-en’s] arrival. They did not seem to be aware o1 the." !)eaoe policy expressed by thePresident, mad I feared tltat their retention was to kill tile ct~iidrcn, l. wanted to know wl:tatthe government was going to do to protect the childrei~ agm nst the l)~lera/m~,~.’e. I thereforeasked him to explain the protective measures that were ooing [o be iml~lemented. Thechairman of the meeting, tile Prime Minister, did not answer me and pref’erred to gtve the

floor to Eliezer NIYITEGEICA. and to Donath MUREGO. The, latter two uttacked meverbally, called me a traitor and told me that these children too were with tile enemy andshould not be assisted. No one on the podium came to the defense o1 the children, nor wasthere any reaction fi’om the podium. 1 was taken aback by this I<ind of response and reactionon the podium, because t had asked thac cluestion witll the I)roibund belief that theGoverl’m-mnt wanted to pursue a polio\ <Ji t>cacc. The rcst~<mse. 1]’u’{iculariy the tone of theresponse, made me believe that it wars ~;ot at a~] tlac cal>;c’..,:-~<1 Lime ill ,Ca’.tV. tile ]u,’idel’S on

the podium intended to purst.le the poiicv o(get,ocidc ue;.ti~st the iuisi.I rushed back to the hospital, and when i got lhere z t0 about 4 p.m.. I ro~tlized tinat tile childrenwere no longer at the hospital. The charge ilt|rses there told me that the htlerahamlve hadcome armed with machetes and cudgels and had gone with the children towar(Is Lake Kivu.

The nurses were very worried that the children would be nmssacred.

226 226

’.’., ..

".’? 4.

6: (.’()~%"(’ISE STATE,~II".~I" (.)F "I’111~ FACTS:OTHER VI(.)I, ATIO~rS OF I~"I’I~I~N+%’I.:.[ON+Xl.. II t!.M.~k.,NII’AI(IAN

Since I had been treated like a traitor for wanting to protect [tile children], I knew that I wasin danger. Therefore I had no choice but to flee.

Wilncss GY

6.95 Bisesero is located i~ two commtHze:; ii~ i(ibti>’e :;;’,=,./e~:t,’zr~:.’" ,~,=,..,:.~;e :~’’’’’’ it washome to a large Tutsi community, it :~o..,.,.~,:,l,,..,.~._.. :: i:~’~;e ::a:~s:~ ~" ".~’~:~:;i :-efugees

trying desperately to escape the killings m~der ~.’~,~, everv’~vi;ere eise in the

prdfecture. However, from 9 April to 30 June 1994, the Tt~si.,,-~",~,,,~o¢.,~.~.~.~. in

Bisesero were the target of repeated attacks by soldiers, gendarmes, poiice and

Interahamwe-MRND.

(":

C ::..’

As for the Bisesero region, which was 90% Tutsi anti was wiiere the refugees tool< shelter,it was under siege ft’om the otaset up tmtil the French ztttiveci.

"3 " ;r ,~ -1_ 4, rt 9~

The attackers came in waves on a daily bztsis. Every day, ita[aatbitzmts of o~ae or twocommunes came (Gistayita, Rwamatamt~, Gitesi, Gisovu). "rhere were soidiets, policeofficers, Interaha~m4,eand civilians. Every d~y, all these groups were rept’esented, but theindividuals were different.

176/I=[95

During the fighting’s in the hills there were a,,boctt o~!c, ,,laousstlad people, most women,children and elderly people, manong wlnon~ \x.,~ts ), fad.their. P!iC!ilag ill Z~ C:I\"e O.I1. zi t~illside inBisesero. It was a sal~ plztce that was ~’ec.ogtaized I)}: tint {~t..:~-tllazmn\.vc. Peo!)lc stt~\.’ed thereduring the days, when the lnterahamwe :rod the solcliets ci-~:~sect thel?a, ~md teft t!~e cave bydark to look for food ai~.d find relatives. On the 23rd of.ltmc, in tlae momitag, i sz~w from anopposite hill, that a boy, whose father was ~t interahamwe-member, spotted the re lTitgees inthe cave. I could hear him shout to some Itaterahataawe-men ttaat he t’ounad .I~ayenzi ira a cave.

Witness FF

6.96 The massacres of the Tutsis in Bisesero were ~,eii (;~’galiize(i. Ti~ose who

led the massacres held meetings after eact~ attack to pr2pa."e ti~e ~exi o~es. Buses

from ONATRACOM., a state company, wele ttse(i ~~.; [:~c~l~t~1~-e li"~I~si~f~,~’~:Ition of

the attackers. Promix~ent iigures suci~ ::’~ the i)r~",;L,~ ;~i" ~t~e rL~gi~:~ aii:i’~ment

Kayishema, and the Minister of [nform:~tion, giie:,.e: !~i,~’i~e~;~,~,~:~ v’,’e~’e seen

among the attackers on several occasions. By tl~eir iJi’ese~.ce :t:~i ti~ei:- s~)eeches,

they encouraged the attackers to perperl’ate the mass~tc:’es.

227 227

6: EXI’OSIC SUCCIN(SF [}gS FAITS:AtJTRES V|OLAT[ONS I)[: I)I(OIT [[[!;MANITAIIUC INTERNATIONAl,

Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva ¯u

Re: Search Operation in Kibuye

Dear Sir:I hereby respectfully inforna you that at tile Cabinet Meeting hel;:t, tochlv, l::ridav, [ 7 June1994, the Government decided to ask the command of the (;iscnyi opcratioris scc£or to backup the Gendarmerie unit in Kibuye, with th~ support of the l)Cc)l)le, iri conducting the searchoperation in Bisesem sectetts.’, Gishyita c’omsmH.w, which has become an I(!’1," sanctuary. TheGovernment would like to request that the operation be coml)iered bv 20 June t 994 at thelatest. ’ "

In the absence of the Minister o Dcicta.c. who is on r~.is:-..’ion abroad, the Minister o[" theInterior and Community Development hus been asked to c¢,,, ’, II1UII1CJt,.; ’this decision to youand follow it up.

The Pr~J’et of Kibuye as well as the Commander of’the Kibuye unit have received a copy ofthis letter and are asked to make the necessary arrangements to make sure rt~e operation isconducted smoothly and within the prescribed period.

Signed: Edoum’d KaremeraMinister of the Interior and Community Development

Pro Justicia No.37/95, P.V. No.24.772: The Adv:mce o i" t! ~e t’PR i~a R’,v:u~da

This meeting was public and held in the Prefect’s office in Kibuye. Many amhorities werepresent at that meeting. I can mention:- The Prime-minister, KAMBANDA, .lean- The former Minister o [:" I nfbrmatiol~, N I YiT EG EKA, l.I~ ~z.~ ~l- The foremr Minister ol’Finance, NDIND.,\BAI-IIZL E~mrmmlet- The vice-President of the MRND, KAR LTMEI~.A, Edouard-The secretary-general of MDR, MUREGO, DonatThis was the official de.legation frorn K iaali.Before this speech, the Prefiect IQAY’ISI-[L!!{\,,IA, made a .......... ’s~ .....n in \\,’i~ic’i~ he explained thecurrent situation. He said that the general situation was stable exccor in li~c region ofBisesero where fightings were ,,oin<, on. There were also requests I"or ,:u-nqs and support,

¯ .~ ..,

done by the Burgemasters of Gishyita and Gisovu in order to get rid oi" Bisesero problern intheir cotm:nunes, The answer of the Prime-minister was that the PreJ’ecc had to report to ltimwhether it was the RPF or.lust Tutsis who ii,..d in the Bisese~’o region, in mv o!~inio a he gavethis disguised answer becasue the qucsilon of the i:.turgcm:tslcrs was too c!e-l,-. They saidclearly that they would kill all the people but had not , ,,, :~ u,,.~..l~ means.

228228

6: (ONC[SE STATEM EN’F ()F THE FACTS:Ol’|[[,.’.R VIOLATIONS OF INTF.RN,VI’[ONA[, i[[’MAN|TARIAN LAW

ZBICTRZBICTRZB

-Yes, it was Andre Ntagerura ....-Which region was he responsib [e lbr?-Cyangugu.-Cyangugu.-Yes.

\,\.’i mess

\,Vilness ZB

’:/). ,:

On 6 June 1994, soldiers surrounded tile quartier and arrested me at my residence around

6:30 am. I recognized the soldiers from the uni.form they were ~:},cming. They led me toKamembe market square where I saw many other people who had also been arrested by thesoldiers. Their number could be put at about two htmdred (200) people. At the market also fomtd some senior officers among whom I t:ecognised Samuel. the head oi:Cyanguguanrly barracks. I no longer recall whether he was a lieuten-mt or second-lieutenant. A one-eyed second-lieutenant by the name oF KAJISHO and the K:mlembe l;’ozmgmesn’e, in theperson of Napoleon MUBILIGI were also there. The l:u,er is currcntl;’ detained at theCyangugu central prison. I had a driver’s licence on mc whi-’h wus sncttched and torn in themarket by soldiers wim called me un i, renzi askilqg :’~c’ !~v~\,,,’ I lnanaged to obtain it.Throughout that tinm, the soldiers were t’dc!ng other peop ie to the market. Vv’e were thenarranged into groups. The Bowlines|re and the soldiers then |nspected the g|’oups and putthose they recognized in another group. Actually, those were people identified as Hutus.Around 2 pro, those separated oi.tt were released. About one hundred and twenty (120) outof approximately two hundred (200) o f t|s..The remaining group was tal<en in two ONATRACOM buses to the gemlarmerie brigadenear the Hotel des chutes. I must point out at this stage tlnat we were given serious beatingby the soldiers white boarding the buses al the market.At the gendarmerie, we spent two nights in good conditions, we wece even allowed toreceive visitors.I was thus visited by members of my religious Faith who were not neccssur[ Ix, oi" the sameetlmic origin as I, as well as my wife, a Hum. On the third night, around I t pin, gendarmescame to announce that we were all~,~oin~,= to be taken bac~ to our respective ~omes. Weimmediately thought that we were going to be killed because the J.~,eltc/avnzerie carol5 waslocated veW near a famous place known as Gatandara where i)cople wore ki tied. The soldiersthen let us into a dual- cabin, all road, pickup.

En route, I gave 2,500 FRW to a soldier so as not to be dropi~cd at (~;:~tm~data. Oil arrival atGatandara the velnicle pretended to stop. ti~cn contlnue<l to the.. miiitarv txtrracks. The vehicledropped us and went back lbr our COmlXmions at the ,.e,e’~,’,-,,.r:Hc’v/c’. :nitiatiy, all detaineeswere assembled in a halt i~mide the burr:<i,’s. At thatstu,_,c, v, -. ~oliccd the absence o1" [’our ofour co-detail’tees, including Cyril a nut~x.u. (o1" l(.amemt~c .)~igin)and (iaimn~a (who

229 229

6: I~.XI’O.~I~’. S(;C(?INCT DES F~.XlTS:At.’TRI~N VIOLATIONS IH: IH¢OIT IIUMANITAII~I*’. INTI,:Ix~NA’rlONAL

working in a Kamembe restaurant) When we left tl-te prison, we leai’nl ["tom Kura and Biderithat those people who had been killed at Gatandam. I<~uru was a driver with l<.amembecommune and Bideri ape@cture driver, l<ura was responsible For collec~:ing cort)ses at thetime of the genocide. They should cun’ently be at the Cyangugu central prison.

Witness LG

6.97 In May 1994, Eliezer Niyitegeka ’-"’nister o~" ~)rm::c,~a ~,a rae ~,nterim

Government, personally l)articipareu i~z the mas:~--~’:’es w~:ci: :~,~o:~ lJ,ace in

Kibuye, by shooting at Tutsis.

I can give you the following names of leaders of several attacks (in Bisesero)Eliezer Ntiyitegeka, fromer Minister ot: [iT[:ormation.Concerning Eliezer Ntiyitegeka, [ can tell you that I heard ~iorn X that he was on hill namedGisoru. On that day Eliezer Ntiyitegeka sen~ soldiers after him He l’eard Eliezer shouting"run ater hhn, kill him". [ saw Eliezer Ntiyitegeka myselI’on May 13.1 saw him talking withothers, during a rneetilag at the end of the attack. H.e was talking to thhe population.

573/K96

In the group from Gisovu. i recognized the t’oliowing peol:)ie:- Eliezer NIYITEGEI’~\. Minister of tntbnnation a~ dae tin ~c’. ile was wearing a clarl( pair trousers and a casual light-colored shim- Police officers: SEBAHIRE and R U KAZAM B Y A!vI.t3 ! c; ~: G iso vu c’o~mmH~e..o

- NDIMBATI, Bou~gmestre of Gisovu

I knew all these people very well and they were all carrying I:][earms and used them.In fact, the group from Gisovu [a group o1’ people who had come to -tttacl< tlae refitgees onMyira hill in Bisesero, Kibuye, along wi~:h another group 15ore Gishyita] came with vehicles,which they parked less tl-tan 3 kilometres away, and came to attack us on l:oot. The vehicleswere: a small white Suzul<i car, in which Minister Eliezer seemed to h.tve been !~iding , a redpick-up belonging to the Gisovu teat t’actory and a ye!lo,’,’ truck, wl~,icla belonged to themerchant ObedRUZ[NDANA. 1 pet’sonally saw all the vehicles. Tllc group was led byELIEZER, NDIMBAT1 and MUSEMA. [ did not see them teading the group, but l was ableto recognize them among the attackers, and considering thc type o1" political responsibilitythey had, I deduce from that they were the leaders.

230 230

" .... s’2se6: CONCISE STATEMENT OF "I’HE FACTS:

OTHER VIOLATIONS OF IN’rERNATION:kl, IIUMANITARIAN LAW

After approximately 30 minutes of intense fighting, we rnanaged to drive the attackers backand take away seven of their guns, but in fact we did not know how to use them .... We hadkilled approximately ten of the attacl,:ers, including the communal policemen SEBAHIRE,RUKAZAMBYAMB [ and M YOTS[.

[IF 1028

l-" )a’

’"

NIYITEGEKA Eliezer: I saw him ldll two children (GAFUKU and NGEZAHAYO) in May1994. He also gave the order to the [ntera/mmwe to exterminalc all the Tutsis and those whoresembled Tutsis. I was told this by others.

1435/K97

In ... 1993, there was a problem in his party, the MDR, whe~e i~c was responsible forinformation. There was a split within the party and Eliczer joined the extemist Powerfaction. Early on in the war, he was very well known in Kibuye. In Bisesero, he used tocome primarily from Gisovu, because he was originally fi’om there.

I saw him notably during the attack of 13 May 1994. He was with the leaders:KAYISHEMA, S1KUBVABO, MIICA and RUZINrDANA, and had a gun. \,Vhen I can past,I saw all of them shooting, except ;for M.IKA, who nonei:heless did have a gun. This was onthe road in the location I have just described :lbovel

At one point, I believe it ,,.’,,as around 20 May, because 1 lind taken refuge in a hole at weekafter the big attack, t saw EL[EZER rape a young girl who had been captured by his rnen andbrought to him during a widespread attack on a hill very close to the home of the rnerchantfi’om Gishyita named Assiel ICABANDA (who was decapitated). At that time, I was hiddenin a small area of bush and [ saw it happen. They made tile gh’l, who was about 13 or 15years old, enter his red car. What makes me say that he raped her, because obviously 1 couldnot see inside the cat, is that white his men continued their pursuit, they talked amongthemselves and said they had raped her.

I also saw the girl got out o[thc vehicle :=:,co :~ willie a~~d ,’-;:>,, i:![..Li.!ZF,7,’, i~im,<:c!l’shoot herright in fi-ont of the vehicle. I personalty saw him shoot hc.t.

¯ 1437/K97

231 231

6: EXPOSE SUCCINCT DES FAITS:

AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU I)ROIT I-{UMANITAIP.E INTERNATIONAL

C,

Responsibility

6.98 From April to July I994, several iiunace~a mousan, peo0ie Weremassacred throughout Rwanda. The .,n~jority of ti~e ;,icdins ;,vere kilted solelybecause they were Tutsi or.-lppeared to be Tutsi. ’.~’he ,oliver victimS, nearly allHutu, were killed because ttiey were considered ’Ft~si accom!~iices, were linkedto them through marriage or were opposed to the extremist i-iutu ideology.

6.99 From 7 April 1994 around the country, rllo:~t ol’ the niassacres wereperpetrated with the participation, aid qnd instigadoli of b~rerahamwe-MRNDmilitiamen, military personnel and gendarmes.

l es~,i~ oi’a strategy adopted and6.100 The massacres thus perpetrateci were the "~ "elaborated by political, civil and military auttiorities in the country, such asAugustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr6Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorer-,,, F61iciei/-~" ’..-~a b ug,l~ d uven alKajelijeli and Andr6 Ntagerura, Parline ’ r ,--0 .,.. ........ -. ~-’, .~. .

Tharcisse Renzaho, Emmanuel ’ ",o ..... "-" " " ....B,~,,mb,ki, Svlv~:.~ Ns.,bii,~an.~, Alphonse’Nteziryayo, Th6oneste Bagosora, Atl~HStill~ N(!i2,ti~iivinl,,l.,.. -’,- and .Au~ustmo "Bizimungu, who conspired to exterminate the Tutsi {3~,?t~iation. As from 7 April,other authorities at the national and local levels e~i~o~ed this pi~iil alld joinedthe first group in encouraging, organizing and """;-’-~" <,",pal rl,.,,,,dn~, il, tile massacres ofthe Tutsi population and its "accomplices".

6.101 During the events referred to in tiffs indictine~e, ;apes, sexuai ass’luits andother crimes of a sexual nature were widely nnc~ ~ototio~si;, committed

throughout Rwanda. These crimes were pe:’pe,ri-ated by, among drivers,militiamen including Interahamwe-MRND, soldiers :.:~d gendarme.~ :~ga-~nst theTutsi population, in particular Tutsi women and gii’is.

;, % ¯6.102 Members of the Interim Government, politicui ,eade~ s, military officersand local authorities aided and abettea tl~eir subo ..... " ...., u,,,.0~es an(i otl~er~ i~ c:~rrying

232 232

~:~-~i:~/~:~.~.~.::!i%:~ :’:..:i.~:~:. ~ ’¸ ~ ~i~!i~~; i ~:~!~i i:~:~’~ ~:~:~ ~i-. ~; ~::i~;?~.~i, i ¯ "-’~ ~!~ ~:~%~!~%~ ~ ~ ~i,~ ,~i-

6: CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:OTHEi( VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

out the massacres of the Tutsi population and its "accomplices". Without thecomplicity of the local and national civil and military authorities, the principalmassacres would not have occurred.

6.103 Knowing that massacres of the civilian popuiati~n were being committed,the political and military authorities, including Augustin Bizimana, EdouardKaremera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andr~ Rwamakuba, 5,iathieu Ngirumpatse,Joseph Nzirorera, F61icien Kabuga and Juv6nai K:~jeii.ieii took n() measures stop them. On the contrary, they refuse(i to intervc:~e ~o contro| a~id appeal tothe population as long as a cease-fire l~ad not l)ee:~ ~ieciare¢i. This categoricalrefusal was communicated to the Speci,,,i Rap ~ -÷ ..... "po~ ~,~. ~,ia the Chief ~i’ Staff of

Rwandan Army, Major-General Augustin Bizimungu.

6.104 Augustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera, Ca!iixte Nzabonima~’,a, Andr6Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, 3oseph Nziro.,’era, F6iicien K abuga andJuv6nal Kajelijeli, in their position of au0mrity,,,~,,.:-,, in concert witi~, notablyAndr6 Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuiud~o, i~liezer Niyitegeka, ~ harc~sseRenzaho, Th6oneste Bagosora, Augustin Ndin(liliyimana and AugustinBizimungu, participated in the planning, p’reparati()~ or execution of a commonscheme, strategy or plan, to commit the atrocities set forth above. Ti~e crimeswere committed by them personally, by persor~s riley assisted or by theirsubordinates, and with their knowledge or consent.

233 233

UNITED NATIONS ~_~..~. ~NATIONS UNIES

International Criminal Tribunal for RwandaTribunal p~nal international pour le Rwanda

’ ~IIflNAE.. REGISTR~RECEIVED "

p ,slArusha International Conference Centre

P.O. Box 6016, Arusha, TanzaniaTel: 255 57 4207-1114367-72 or 1 212 963 2850---Fax: 255 57 4000/4373 or 1 212 963 2848

Case No. ICTR-98-44-I

THE PROSECUTOR

AGAINST

AUGUSTIN BIZIMANAEDOUARD KAREMERA

CALLIXTE NZABONIMANAANDRI~ RWAMAKUBA

MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSEJOSEPH NZIRORERA

FELICIEN KABUGAJUVENAL KAJELIJELI

AMENDEMENT TO THE SUPPORTING MATERIAL

4.28 In his capacity as bourgemestre Juv6nal Kajelijeli exercised authorityover his subordinates, namely the conseillers de secteurs, the communalemployees as well as the members of the communal police. Moreover havingheld the office of bourgemestre for so long as well as being the leader of aband of Interhamwe-MRND, Juvenal Kaj elijeli exercised authority over theInterhamwe-MRND and the civilian population of Mukingo commune.

1",I. De dossier ICTR-9B-44"I

Case No.ICTR-9B’44"I

THE pRosECUTOR

ADDENDUM TO THE suPpORTING IyIATERIAL

6.91 Between April and June 1994, several people found refuge at thesecondary nursing school in Kabgayi, Gitarama prdfecture, where studentsand staff were already located. On several occasions during this period,soldiers and Interahamwe militiamen abducted and raped female Tutsistudents and refugees. Minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana and theGeneral Staff of the Rwandan Army were informed of this situation but didnot take any effective steps to end the crimes once and for all.

I have known this Hutu lady (Dorothee Mukandanga) since 1962. We met several timesas students and she was the head of the Kabgayi nursing school of which she was aproduct and where she had taught. My family- in-taw sought refuge there in April 1994.The Minister of Information even lived in one of the flats. I often visited her. Onemorning, I heard she had been murdered. As I was close her, I went there myself to seewhat had happened. As I was close to the lady, I entrusted the task of investigating theincident to Captain BIKWENO who was in charge of my personal guard. What he toldme shocked me. The soldiers who upon my request had been posted to ensure the safetyof the institution and the people on the premises had decided to kill the principal of theschool because of her ethnic origin. Using the keys they had forcibly taken fromDorothde, they searched everywhere until they found the principal and killed her. Theythen proceeded to the dormitory of the young female students and raped them. Doroth~ewas allegedly against their action and they killed her on the spot; I verbally transmittedthe findings of this investigation to the Minister of Defense Mr. BIZIMANA whoseinvestigations gave the same result. We learnt that the same group of soldiers abductedpeople picked because of their ethnic group who they were supposed to have beenprotecting, took them into the forest and eliminated them. The Bishops of Kabgayiconfirmed all of this during their visits. The discovery of several bodies in the forest bythe RPF is not strange for 3 bishops and about l O prefects were killed when that regionwas taken.The decision taken by the Army Headquarters following a request made by the Ministryof Defense was to transfer this group to the front and replace it with another, an effortthat turned out to be unproductive as the abductions continued; the Minister of Defenseassured me that the camp will be guarded for he goes back there every night to sleep,"

Witness ZB

@)@ lnternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

irilr""r P6nal International pour le RwandaArusha lnternaiional Confer€nce centre -

p.o eox ooidlAiusha, ranzania - 8 P 6016' Aru.tl^1]*iil:PuBoxburo Arus"d "iiilii ri,. :ii si so1o0d/504373 or 1 212 s63 2a4at4eTel: 255 57 504207-11 504367'72ot 1212961

PROOF OF SERVICE _ ARUSHAPRE'JVE DE NOTIFICATION - ARUSHA

)ate: 20 August,2002 Case Name / affaire:- JOSEPH NZIRORERA- MATHIEU NGTRUMPATSE. EDWARD KAREMERA- ANDRE RWAMAKUBA

I O :

A :Ll rc1f] Judge N. Pillay, PresidentE , Judge Mose, vice PresideniE/ Judge A. vaz

Case No ./ no. deI'affaire'.

tr E. NahamYa, Go-ordinator

flrcztr! JudgeW H. Sekuletr Judge M. Giineytr c. Aptel, Co-ordinator

!rcatr Judge L.G Williamstr Judge Y OstrovskYtr Judge P. Dolenc! M. Niang, Co-ordinator

rcTR-98-44-l

KEN FLEMING

ALO: recetved bY I regu Par

received bY

. . . . . , . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . " r ' , , l " A

g\e.*)L*+'++e llt9.1 K I P'1-'nDw

trtril

Etr!

I-l orp I euRen u Dt! PRooUREURE- rti"t Attorney in charge of case: '

- Co-Counsel / Conseil Adioint """'

E ln / eI Arusha Arusha ' ' ' (sisnarure) D by fax comprete / renp'7'cMs3brs FoRM

All Decisions: ! Appeals Chamber Unit, The Hague E Suzanne Chenault, Jurist Linguist

All Decisions & lmportant Public Documents: E Press & Public Affairs n Legal Library

tr JP.F".6,6 (O|c, CMS) E Yan Ling (TCl) E R Kouambo (Tc2) E K Afande (Tca) E F. Talon (APPeals)

fl A. Dieng n A. Miller, OLA, NY E P. Nyambe fl K. Moghalu E S. Van Driessche

E wvss- D E WVSS-P E E. o'Donnell E LDF[/S fl M.Goetz E P. Enow

Subj ectObjet:

Documents name / dtte du documentpniiiiiirion's REsPoNSE ro DEFENcE MorloN FoR FULLDISCLOSURE OF SUPPORTING MATERIAL

DateFlled I Date enregistrd16/08i2002

Pages240

Kind|yfindattachedthefol|owingdocument(s)/veuil lezt|ouverenannexete(s)document(s)suivant(s):

#.#a\N,g-:U lnternationalgritin"t.t'lu*tM'n&

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PROOF OF SERVICE TO DEJAINEESpREUvE oe uorirlciion o'ncres aux DETENUS

Upon signature of the detainee' Please return this she€i to.ihe originalor as proot of service'

Formulaireaetrere|tioyaat'expealeuraimentsig||ipa|Iedftenu.

Case Name / affaire:

Case No / affaire no"

The Prosecutor vs.

tcTR-98-44-T

- JOSEPH NZIRORERA- MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSE- EDWARD KAREMERA- ANDBE BWAMAKUBA

Date: 20 August,2002

'a-Couptetn PaR LE DETENU

I conlirm reception of the

document(s) listed below'

Je confime raceqtion du/des

docume nts mentionne (s ) cr

dessous

Siqnatute Dalg'fime I Heuret

l;4 "r,4losloz tzt14Name ol detainee / nom ou

d6tenu

NZIRORERA

Dale ,Fime I Heure

'r/lq";Print name / nom

SAIDOU GUINDO

Security Officer

Commanding Officer, UNDF

- Jp. Fom6t6 {orc, cust n v.jf,f9j)

E F. Talon Ahouandogbo (APPeals)

E R. Kouambo (Tc2) I K' Afande (Tc3)

E Other / Autre

Kindly find attached the lollowing documents / Veuiltez lrouver en annexe les documents suivants-

MOTION FOR FULLDateFtled I Date enregistri

1610812002

Pages

240Documents name / /itre du document

O*OSECUTON'S RESPONSE TO DEFENCE

bii-closune oF suPPoFrlNG MATERIAL

c q y o G u n b L . o l i z ' o , r d 9 ) c m ! 4 0 6CM54

PROOF OF SERVICE TO DEJTINEESpREUvE DE notirl{ntioN D'AcrEs AUx DETENUS

Upon signature of the detainee' please return this she-et to.the originator as proot ot service'

Formuktreaetterelt'oieat'"tpAait""'afimetsign6pdrleditenu'

DateFllod I Date enregistre

161Oa2002

Pages

240Documents name / ,itre du document

rn6liiuion's RESPoNsE ro DEFENcE MorloNbii-cloiune oF suPPoRrlNG MATERIAL

FOR FULL

c ' J y o @ ! M ! @ l i : r c I ' ' c d ) c N 4 f ucM34

@K@ lnternational Griminal Tribunal for Rwanda.iiit"""i petal lnternational pour le Rwanda

Arusha lntemational Conlerence Centrep.o.eo" ooidlA';a, iin'"ni" ' e p -oolo' ll'."il,1311i:i:

PROOF OF SERVICE TO DETAINEES

PREUVE DE NOTiFICATION D'ACTES AIJX DETENUS

Upon signaiure ot the detainee, Please return this sheet to the originator as prool ol service'

Formulaile d etre renvoJA d I'expdditeur dLment signe pat le ditenu'

-

Documents name / titre du document

PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSE TO DEFENCE

oisct-osune oF sUPPoRTING MATERIALMOTION FOR FULL

Date Flled I Date enregistri

ft108/2002

Pages

240

cMs4

Case Name / affaire:

Case No / affaire no:

The Prosecutor vs.

tcTR-98-44-T

- JOSEPH NZIRORERA- MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSE- EDWARD KAREMERA. ANDRE RWAMAKUBA

Date: 20 August' 2002

Name of detainee / nom dud€tenu

NGIRUMPATSE

Oate ,T ime/Heure

2[ffia>

Print name / nom

SAIDOU GUINDO

Security Officer

Commanding Officer, UNDF

Eo rora,U (OlC. CMS) tr YrinS/c[c1) cR Kouambo (icz) IK Afande (TC3)

,WE F. Talon Ahouandogbo (Appeals)v ' E othet I Autre " """""" ""'

Kindfy find attached the Jollowing documents / Veuillez trouvet en annexe tes documents suivanfs'

al Tribunal for Rwanda)rAft-z of tr," Dr""tlve for the Registry' court Management sectlon InI(

ffinamuer ttt E APPeals omcerK. Afande F. Talon /A N'Gum

Chamber

(name)

Defence

(name)

Prosecutor's OfficeK. Fleming

K. Keith

Other:

(name)

Case ICTR 9844Trre Prosecutor vs. Nzirorera

Document's dale: 1 518102

Documenl =-RlclNAL: Fill sections below TION into ! Eng tr Fr ! KinYar'

is a(n): E Ens n Fr (original was liled on )

! Decision ! corresPondencflL]&i sro.i."ion trot non-Parties l- []I Notice of ApPeal n APPeal Book

Disclosure I Submission from partiesf stf lctlv Confidentral / Under Seal

I Confrdential (Public

ete-gase taxe actlon with regard to translatlon:u.

ff-eartylct'amoers hereby submits the onginal and'\lrill

NOT oversee lranslallonlgnore the boxes below'

f l Reference material is provided in annex to

ffiffi;EnuiEd6t cMs regarding translatrons:

, Filino Partv/Chamber hereby submits BOTH the

iiioinai ana ine translation to cMs for filing

K flting Party/Chamber will be submitting translation to

ctrts in Or" course, details are provided below Fill in

the boxes below.

TRANSLATIoNSTATUSoNDATEoFF|L|NGoFoR|GINAL(comp|etedbychamber/Fi | ingParty}

Name of contact Person:The document is submitted to the followingaccredited translation service Oranslation fees will

be submitted io LDFMS):Name of service:Address:

t ^ : ' , " .

6-ef en ce i s ove rse ei n g tra n s I at i o n :

Fover-seeing translalion (copy of translation requisition

slio is attached for referenci) C tName of contact petson (r'!' 'nn 't1-7' J '1t avi

The document is submitted for translation in:

X ,qirtn" I Kigali I The Hague

transtffin received bY CMS on:

!:_:

Number of PagesExpected date of translation:

FoffiFFlcl,At usE oNLY (rRlM DArA ENrRY / TRANSLA

ffiatron with chambers/Lcss ).. COMMENTS

GMSl

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