1

Project Completion Report Validation

Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme -Niger Delta

Region (CBNRMP-ND)

Federal Republic of Nigeria

Date of validation by IOE: May 2017

I. Basic project data

Approval (US$ m) Actual (US$ m)

Region West and Central

Africa Total project costs 84,800 52,710

Country Federal Republic of

Nigeria IFAD loan and percentage of total 15,000

b 18% 16,793 30.4%

Loan number LI-598-NG Federal Govt. of Nigeria 10,200 12% 8,442 15%

Type of project (subsector) Rural Development NDDC

15,000 18% 15,000 28%

Financing type Loan States Govt. 8,200 9.6% 7,736 14%

Lending termsa HC Local Govt. Councils 32,000 37.7% 4,250 7.6%

Date of approval 11/12/2002 Beneficiariesc 4,400 5% 2,494 4.5%

Date of loan signature 09/07/2003

Co-Financer (World Bank)

d

(3,800)

Date of effectiveness 06/07/2005

Loan amendments 1

Number of beneficiaries (direct)

2,800,000 people

400,000 HHs

2,783,399 people

291,435 HHs

Loan closure extensions 1

Country programme managers

A. BARRY

(Jul-10 to May-12)

A. TODA

(May-12 to Dec-16)

B. ODOEMENA

(from Dec-16) Loan closing date 31/03/2016 19/08/2016

Regional director(s)

M. BEAVOGUI

I. DE WILLEBOIS Mid-term review 27/05/2010

Project completion report reviewer Manuela Bucciarelli

IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%) 100%

e

Project completion report quality control panel

Date of the project completion report 31/12/2016

Source: Project Completion Report 2016; Mid-term Review 2010; President Report 2001. a) There are four types of lending terms. This was a special loan on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a

service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75 per cent) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of ten years.

b) Equivalent to SDR 11.35 million.

c) It was estimated that beneficiaries will contribute the equivalent of US$4.4 million (5.4 per cent of total programme costs) in

the form of labour and materials for the construction and rehabilitation of village infrastructure under the CDF. d) This amount was included in the Formulation and Appraisal Report and it was proposed for funding under the World Bank

Niger Delta Institutional Strengthening Project. It never materialized and removed from the actual financing of CBNRMP-ND. e) This 100 per cent of the amount expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). IFAD financing in US$ was 112 per cent of the

appraisal estimate due to foreign exchange differences over the programme life.

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II. Project outline 1. Introduction. The Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme,

Niger Delta (CBNRMP-ND)1 was a ten-year programme implemented by the Federal

Government of Nigeria, Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the State

governments of the nine Niger Delta states and IFAD2. The programme was

approved for a loan of US$15 million on 23 June 2003, became effective in July

2005, and disbursement went into effect on 06 July 2006. The initial completion

date was 30 September 2013 but, at the Federal Government of Nigeria’s request,

IFAD granted a 2-year extension in 2012. The modified completion date was set as

30 September 2015 and the programme officially closed on 30 March 2016. There

was also a joint Federal Government of Nigeria/IFAD Mid-term Review (MTR) held

in May 2010.

2. Project area. The CBNRMP was implemented in each of the nine states of the

Niger Delta3. A total of eighty Local Government Areas were targeted within the

nine participating states for a total of 243 communities covered. The programme

aimed to reach roughly 2.8 million beneficiaries in the entire Niger Delta region.

Despite significant economic growth over the last 30 years due to oil export

revenues, 50 per cent of the rural population in the Niger Delta region was still

classified as poor and 20 per cent as food insecure.4 The exploitation of the Niger

Delta’s vast natural resources5 had not resulted in significant social or economic

benefits for the population. Environmental degradation, deteriorating economic

conditions, community conflicts and violence prevailed in the late 1990s and

2000s. This led to the erosion of traditional social structures, lack of confidence in

development processes, and institutions without strong political influence or

community coordination mechanisms. In particular, the younger parts of the

population became involved in the resulting social unrest such as armed robbery,

militancy, kidnapping and homicide. Moreover, due to poor extension support and

environmental challenges, major crops did not reach their full production potential,

access to drinking water was limited,6 and infrastructure were under-developed.

3. Project goal, objectives and components. The CBNRMP intended to improve

the standard of living and quality of life of at least 400,000 poor rural households

of the Niger Delta region, with an emphasis on women and youth. The

programme’s purposes7 were: i) to strengthen the community development

capacity of rural communities and service providers; and (ii) to establish a

community development fund with effective disbursal. The programme’s objectives

were to be achieved via three components: a) Institutional strengthening/capacity

building; b) Community development fund creation; and c) Management and

Coordination. The first component: Institutional Strengthening (46 per cent

of total allocations, at appraisal) provided community-level awareness and

capacity building while also providing institutional capacity building and monitoring

and evaluation (M&E) support to the implementing agencies using a Community

Driven Development (CDD) approach. The second component: Community

Development Fund establishment (54 per cent of total allocations, at

1 Referred as CBNRMP through this report.

2 The programme responds to a request of the Federal Government of Nigeria for assistance to alleviate rural poverty in

the Niger Delta region, at the time when IFAD and Federal Government of Nigeria completed the framework for partnership and the Country Strategic Opportunity Paper (COSOP) for Nigeria had been approved in 2001. 3 These are: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States.

4 National Bureau of Statistics. Revised Poverty Statistics, Abuja 2013.

5 The Niger Delta region is one of the world’s largest wetlands comprising a vast floodplain built over many years by the

accumulation of sedimentary deposits washed down the Niger and Benue rivers. In addition, over 60 per cent of Nigeria mangrove forests are found in the Delta Region (Formulation Report, 2002). 6 In 2001 only 24 per cent of the rural population had access to drinking water (Formulation Report, 2002)

7 Programme implementation was structured along a theory of change of establishing rural institutions to effect a

change in mind-set of the people and drive infrastructure development, which would induce beneficiaries to pursue agriculture as a business. IFAD disbursement was planned for the first eight years during which period, the LGCs and NDDC were expected to learn and integrate the CDD framework in their business development models (President Report and Project Completion Report - PCR).

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appraisal) supported initiatives identified by the rural poor that would develop

community and Local Government Council (LGC) capacity to secure additional

funding for community development projects from the government, other local

agencies, without IFAD support. This component originally had three sub-

components (described below), but was modified after the MTR and subsequent

supervision missions recommended the programme re-focus on agriculture and

agriculture-related infrastructure. Component 3: Management and

Coordination8 supported the efficient management of the two above components

in order to increase the capacity of the institutions at the federal, regional, state

and LGC levels. The programme was implemented by the Project Coordination Unit

under the leadership of the Lead Programme Agency, the Federal Ministry of

Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) and the line Federal Ministry of

Finance (FMF). Implementation was supervised by the NDDC which financed

programme activities to the tune of US$15 million.

4. Target group. IFAD-supported activities targeted the poorest of the poor.9 The

poor were classified into different strata during programme formulation in order to

allow for the design of tailor-made activities for the different strata.10 The poorest

of the poor represented 29 per cent of the rural population in the Delta Region and

are characterized by food insecurity, limited labour and resources, and small farm

size (less than 2ha). The majority of this group are female-headed households,

young families with small children, or women in polygynous families with sole

responsibility for their children and unemployed youth. A three-state (Abia, Rivers

and Ondo) pilot of the CDD approach in the first 15-18 months of the programme

focusing on one LGC per state helped develop the overall geographical targeting

strategy. Geographic locations selected had to fulfill three criteria, based on

geographical representation, wealth and community participation11. Each state

started with nine participating LGCs, with the exception of Bayelsa State; 57 LGCs

participated in the programme at completion date.12

5. Financing. At design the estimated total programme cost was US$84.8 million,

out of which 18 per cent (US$15 million) was to be financed through an IFAD loan,

and the rest by co-financers (the Federal Government of Nigeria, NDDC, the nine

participating states and the LGCs), according to the percentages and amounts

reported in Table 1, Annex I. The intervention design assumed that government

counterparts were deeply committed to agriculture in the Delta region. This

commitment was to be translated into financial contributions to the programme.

The IFAD loan and the NDCC grant met the initial targets and the Federal

Government of Nigeria and the States Counterparts were just below the targets, at

83 and 94 per cent respectively. The LGC disbursement was very low (only 13 per

cent of the planned contribution). At completion, the actual expenditures of the

programme were US$55.23 million, representing 65 per cent of the revised total

cost (Table 1, Annex I).

6. Changes and developments during implementation. The programme

implementation effectively had three phases, instead of the two initially designed:

the first phase (July 2006 to May 2010) focused heavily on CDD sensitization and

awareness raising, establishment of social infrastructure, and capacity building.

8 This component includes M&E, partnerships, linkages and knowledge management.

9 Past interventions rarely reached the extremely poor, so this programme was supposed to raise the poor’s awareness

of the opportunities available to them. 10

The population in the programme area was divided into four groups: poorest; poor; less poor and well-off, and their specific features are described. 11

The criteria were:(i) the main agro-ecological zones in each state had to be represented; (ii) wealth ranking tools had to be used to identify LGCs with higher proportions of poor communities that had a demonstrated commitment to a CDD approach; and (iii) a community participation approach had to be used within the LGCs to identify the communities to be included. The targeting approach, as described extensively in the formulation report, was supposed to be integral part of the planning process, with the assumption that all segments of the population would participate in the dialogue to set the community priorities. 12

80 LGCs were selected to participate in the programme. Some LGCs were unable to contribute their counterpart funding, so the total number of participating LGCs was reduced to 57.

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After the MTR, the programme (2010 to 2013) shifted its focus from social

infrastructure to agriculture and agricultural infrastructure needs. Lastly, Phase 3

(2014-2015), the extension period, focused on the consolidation of activities (such

as categorization of agro-enterprises) for exit and sustainability.

7. Intervention logic. The CBNRMP-ND’s central goal was to bring about a change

in the mindset of people who would pursue agriculture as an employment

generation activity. The programme was designed to promote innovation and a

community-driven development approach with LGCs and NDDC expected to learn

from, integrate, and scale up the CDD framework in their own business

development models. Component 1 would promote pro-poor legislation at both the

local and state government levels as well as pro-poor regulations at community

level, beneficiary capacity strengthening, and more effective service delivery to the

poor. Component 2 was meant to promote an increase in crops, livestock,

aquaculture and fish catch productivity, an increase in beneficiary net income from

agro-enterprises, an increase in jobs, and improved household drinking water. All

programme activities would have a focus on youth and women. The aim of the

programme was also to reduce current tensions and conflicts among the youth in

the region by improving productive opportunities and channeling their energies into

natural resources management and sustainable livelihoods.

8. Delivery of outputs. A detailed analysis of the actual project progress is

presented in Annex 8 of the Project Completion Report (PCR). The programme

reached 76.3 per cent of the appraisal target for activities under the livelihood

improvement component, 75.8 per cent of the appraisal target for the Community

Development Fund (CDF) component, 62.2 per cent of the appraisal target for the

rural infrastructure sub-component, and 53.1 per cent of the target for the Natural

Resources Management sub-component. The quality of both the outputs and data

analysis is discussed in the Effectiveness and PCR quality sections, respectively.

III. Review of findings

A. Core criteria

Relevance

9. Relevance of objectives. The objectives of CBNRMP were well aligned with the

government’s Economic Empowerment Strategy of 1999-2003, Vision 20:2020,13

7-Point Agenda, and the Strategic Development Framework of the NDCC (2005),

all of which advocate for the participation of rural communities in development

processes and for youth empowerment. The programme was a response to the

Federal Government of Nigeria's request for assistance and was designed against

the backdrop of the 2001 Nigeria Rural Development Strategy. The programme

objectives also reflected the strategic direction of the IFAD 2001 Country Strategic

Opportunities Paper (COSOP) for Nigeria14. CBNRMP interfaced closely with two

World Bank projects.15 CBNRMP also built on and adapted the community-driven

development approach of the IFAD Community Based Agricultural and Rural

Development Programme in northern Nigeria.

10. Relevance to the needs of beneficiaries is rated high. The programme

addressed the needs of the rural poor and of women in the target areas: it adopted

the principles of CDD to improve smallholder farmers’ participation in development.

In particular, beneficiaries appreciated the CDF component, which supported

initiatives identified directly by the rural poor. The introduction of Commodity Apex

Development Associations (CADAs) to support the community-based enterprises

13

Vision 20:2020 lays the overarching policy framework for Nigeria to become one of the top 20 economies in the world by year 2020. 14

IFAD 2001 COSOP for Nigeria emphasized empowerment of the rural poor, female empowerment, and access to and management of resources, infrastructures and services. 15

The Niger Delta Institutional Strengthening project and the Nigeria Local Empowerment and Environmental Management Programme.

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increased the relevance to the needs of beneficiaries. CADAs consisted of

enterprises specialized in certain commodities, representatives of farmer groups,

agro-entrepreneurs and agro-allied entrepreneurs, mostly youth and women. The

MTR also reports that interventions were largely relevant to the needs of the very

poor communities.

11. Targeting. The Appraisal report includes a very detailed Annex on “Targeting

Considerations”,16 but the Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) in 2016 reported

that the actual process was somewhat opaque because of the absence of reliable

sub-state poverty data.17

12. Relevance of project design. The design of the CBNRMP was based on

participatory community-led initiatives. The project had a long time span (more

than ten years including the extension). The country’s policy direction shifted over

the course of this period and a stronger emphasis was placed on agriculture, as

evidenced by the Agricultural Transformation Agenda in 2011. IFAD priorities

significantly evolved during this time as well, as described in the COSOP (2010-

2015), towards market-led and commodity based approaches. The paradigm shift

to agriculture, together with other adjustments, such as the link with Songhai

Agricultural Center and the establishment of the CADAs, contributed to increase the

project’s relevance. Given the changes in the overall context and priorities, the re-

design was relevant. However, the adjustment took several years to materialize

because of the initial focus of activities and limited staff competencies on social

issues. The re-design caused some turbulence in programme implementation (for

instance with the introduction of CADAs and with the abandonment of some

infrastructure projects). The re-design also meant a change in the community

development plans that had already been agreed upon.18

13. The design of CBNRMP was quite ambitious and included a diverse range of

interventions: social and economic infrastructure development, agricultural

production, and multi-level capacity development components in an environment of

social unrest. In particular, the programme over-ambitiously assumed that the

states and the LGCs would pay their counterpart funds, which was not realistic and

it represents a clear design flaw.

14. Potential risks linked to local conflict and ethnic violence were recognized during

CBNRMP formulation, but no conflict analysis was done and no mitigation strategy

was developed. Insecurity did not affect service delivery because beneficiaries and

staff went to safer locations for delivery, but risk associated with not having done a

conflict analysis should not be under-estimated.

15. In summary, the project responded to the needs of beneficiaries and was well

aligned to government and IFAD priorities in the country, as observed above. Given

the overly ambitious design, the unrealistic reliance on state funding and the

absence of conflict analysis and mitigation strategies, the PCRV rates the relevance

criterion as moderately satisfactory, 4. This is higher than the CPE’s assessment

of relevance but one point below the Programme Management Department (PMD)

rating of satisfactory. The higher PMD rating, according to the PCRV, was mostly

driven by considerations on the appropriateness and usefulness of the re-design.

Effectiveness

16. The programme’s outreach was below target, but outreach to youth was good. The

programme reached 291,435 households (73 per cent of the appraisal target of

400,000) and benefitted an additional 104,565 households indirectly. CBNRMP

16

See Working Paper 1, Targeting Considerations, Appraisal Report 2002, p. 25ff. 17

There are 185 Local Government Areas (80 of which were selected to participate in the programme) and between 8,444-10,555 villages in the nine Niger Delta states. The cost of assembling screening data for all of these villages seemed to be prohibitive. 18

Country Programme Evaluation, 2016.

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reached 2,783,399 beneficiaries. 1,087,012 of these beneficiaries were youth (53

per cent)19.

17. Objective 1: strengthen community development capacity of the rural

community and service providers. Component 1 covered capacity building,

institutional linkages, and internal and external communication. Almost all training

targets were achieved at the individual capacity building level.20 The training for

commodity groups and rural institutions members on various aspects of crop,

livestock, fisheries, processing/marketing, and community management was less

effective.21 The impact survey report data also show significant achievements in

this sub-component.

18. After the revisions introduced by the MTR, the programme adopted the CADA

model. 154 CADAs were formed and strengthened, reaching the appraisal target.

Youth in Agriculture Foundations were established in each of the nine states and

1083 Community Action Plans were developed in line with the CDD approach. As

proven by the supervision mission in 2015, some CADAs showed significant

momentum, implemented saving and credit activities and had a clear mandate and

sense of purpose.

19. In terms of institutional linkages (sub component 2), the programme connected 70

per cent of the 8,994 farmer groups to input, output and credit markets and

established linkages with the USAID-funded MARKETS II, World Bank-assisted

Fadama III, and Songhai Centre initiative. The link with the Songhai Center was

crucial as it allowed strong youth involvement in agro-enterprise groups. On the

other hand, despite some community-level achievement with strengthening

existing fishing protocols, policy gaps still remain (see Rural Impact Section-

Institutions and Policies). Also, the PCRV notes that many institutional linkages

foreseen at design, such as with non-governmental organisations, were not put in

place. With regards to communication and knowledge management, despite some

progress such as the development of a website, production and distribution of

informational materials, training modules, outreach activities, and the inclusion of

the programme in the IFAD central communication platform, a clear

Communication and Knowledge Management strategy was never developed.

20. In general, this component was quite satisfactory in terms of strengthening rural

institutions. As an immediate consequence, beneficiaries and youth began to view

agriculture as a business and entrepreneurship opportunity.

21. Objective 2: community development fund established and effectively

disbursing.22 With regard to the sustainable livelihood sub-component,

supervision missions and the impact survey confirm the successful establishment of

micro-enterprises.23 The exact number of livelihood micro-projects reported in the

PCR (12,790 in total) could not be verified24. The most profitable sub-sectors were

cassava production, followed by fisheries, poultry and yams. The PCR also reported

that aquaculture-related enterprises had higher production levels than predicted at

the time of appraisal.

19

Youth are citizens of Nigeria aged between 18–35 years of age - Second National Youth Policy Document of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2009, p. 6 (CPE 2016). 20

The number of government official, staff of service providers and financial institutions trained reached 2,072, 103 per cent of the original target of 2014; 93 per cent of the target of 3,209 women and youth trained on income generating, life skill and vocational activities (Data from the PCR Log-frame updated in December 2015). 21

The programme trained 233,247 people, equal to 69 per cent of the target (out of 338,000 potential trainees).These figures were confirmed by the latest supervision mission in May 2015. 22

The overall assessment of this component in the PCR is moderately satisfactory. The Supervision Mission had rated the progress during the review period as satisfactory. 23

These were established in crop, livestock, fisheries, aquaculture, snail rearing, honey production, vegetable, and agro-processing as well as Non Timber Forest Products. 24

The 2015 Supervision Mission Report reported a total of 9,279 enterprises promoted by the programme, out of the 12,873 foreseen in the Appraisal. In general, the most profitable sub-sector was cassava production, followed by fisheries, poultry and yams.

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22. The PCR reports that a total of 3,426 ha of land was cultivated under improved

technology, but this information is hard to verify. The Results and Impact

Management System (RIMS) data for 2015 report a total of 2,070 ha of land under

“improved management practice” and the impact survey revealed increases in

produce volume for most crops cultivated in the programme areas. This trend

affirms that the overall increase can be attributed to the training and improved

technologies introduced by the programme (see impact section). Among the

successful models introduced by CBNRMP, as described in the Innovation Section,

was the Youth Enterprise Incubation Model,25 which created job opportunities.

23. The sustainable Natural Resources Management sub-component, which promoted

sustainable aquaculture in order to avoid over-fishing, did not show high

performance. While CBNRMP recorded use of special fishing gear by communities

(especially in Warri North LGC and Rivers State) that was meant to protect the

environment, forest and waterways were nevertheless cleared and converted into

aquaculture enterprises. The absence of an environmental impact assessment was

a weakness (see the Environment and Natural Resources Management Section of

this report).

24. In terms of community infrastructure improvement, less was achieved than

expected. The impact survey estimates that only 34 per cent of the targeted

number of infrastructure projects was completed, while the functionality of the

existing infrastructure stood at roughly 77 per cent. The MTR had expressed

concerns about lack of NDDC and state government responsibility for completing

and ensuring the functionality of ongoing community infrastructure projects. At the

end of the programme there were 31 incomplete projects. The PCRV considers the

performance of the CDF interventions as a whole to be moderately satisfactory.26

25. In summary, CBNRMP has performed effectively in terms of outreach. The first

objective was nearly achieved. The second was achieved with improvement of

livelihoods of rural poor, through the establishment of microenterprises as

described above. The Natural Resources Management component under-performed

and, as addressed in the environmental and natural resources management

section, was rather ineffective in terms of sustainable use of natural resources.

Given this mixed effectiveness, the PCRV agrees with the PMD rating of

moderately satisfactory, 4.

Efficiency

26. Time lapse. CBNRMP became effective 24 months after it was signed and 31

months after it was approved. This is shorter than the average time lapse recorded

in IFAD programmes in the country (equal to 32 months), but much higher than

the average IFAD effectiveness lag (around 12 months).27 Reasons for the delay in

start-up and counterpart funding included the slow appointment of programme

staff and opening of accounts. It appears that no expenditures were made before

2009.28 After the MTR recommended a reallocation of funds between IFAD and the

LGCs, as described above, disbursements increased significantly.

27. Time overruns. As recommended by the MTR, the programme had a two year

extension to help the refocus on agriculture and to allow for more impact to be

realized using the CDD approach. The completion date was shifted from 30

September 2013 to 30 September 2015, and the revised closing date was 30

March 2016.

25

The PCR states that CBNRMP created 6,500 jobs in agro-enterprises and more than 63,000 jobs in services provision and non-farm enterprises. 26

As reported in the CPE, the CBNRMP has only built and maintained a relatively small part of the social and economic infrastructures planned: 18 out of 48 school buildings, five out of 25 health centers; 97 out of 120 boreholes; 39 out of 120 km of rural roads; 16 out of 52 small bridges; two out of landing jetties; 37 out of 90 agro-processing facilities. 27

Source: CPE, 2016. 28

Only 13 per cent and 20 per cent of the Annual Work Plan and Budget were spent in 2009 and 2010, respectively.

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28. Cost per beneficiary. The PCR reports that the cumulative Cost per Beneficiary

(CPB) on the IFAD loan was US$7.41, as compared to the appraisal CPB of US$6.

The CPE reports an IFAD CPB equal to 5.9 at completion. The CPB for the CBNRMP-

ND is lower than the one attained by other IFAD programmes in Nigeria and lower

than in other IFAD-supported countries. High population density in the region

meant that reaching beneficiaries and serving communities was relatively cheap,

making CBNRMP more efficient than other IFAD projects in Nigeria between 2009

and 2015.

29. Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) at project completion. The

analysis conducted at project completion showed an EIRR of 42 per cent against a

12 per cent cost of capital. No data was found on the estimated EIRR at project

appraisal. The financial analysis of individual enterprises also reported a positive

cost-benefit ratio, higher for honey production and fish production and lower for

goat rearing. This indicates that it was a good decision to promote farmer’s

investments in these enterprises.

30. Project costs. As stated above, government disbursements were below target:

percentages of disbursements are shown in Table 1, Annex I. IFAD financing

percentage for two of the categories in the CDF Component and one in the

Institutional Strengthening Component were increased from 22.5 per cent (initial

allocation) to 40 per cent in June 2013 and to 100 per cent in September 2014.

After the MTR, due to very high inflation rate, the expected contribution from the

federal and state governments was increased by US$11 million;29 the US$4.4

million expected contribution from the communities and the Technical Assistance of

US$3.8 million, which never materialized, were removed. The amendments to IFAD

financing percentages were not followed by appropriate adjustments in the

expected contributions from NDDC, federal and state governments and the LGCs.

Counterpart funding commitment also varied across states with Ondo and Cross

River States providing 73 per cent and 63 per cent against the original allocation

and Imo and Akwa States only providing 27 per cent and 33 per cent.

31. Project management costs. The estimated programme management cost for

CBNRMP, as a proportion of total programme cost, was 30 per cent.30 The high

costs can be attributed to the fact that programme coordination units were

stretched to work in many states and LGCs. In addition, as described in the

Partners section, the quality of programme management was not satisfactory. At

the Programme Support Office (PSO) and the State Programme Support Office

(SPSO) levels, management was weak due to a lack of induction and training at the

beginning of the programme. Low managerial and technical expertise of some staff

led to poor guidance and ultimately to a decrease in IFAD resources, with the result

that in 2014 the programme was classified as “at risk”. This low-quality programme

management helps explain low cost efficiency as well.

32. Overall, delays in effectiveness, high overheads, and high programme management

costs had a negative impact on efficiency. However, CBNRMP showed good

economic returns and cost-efficiency as demonstrated by high EIRR and low cost

per beneficiary. These two elements do not compensate for the disbursement

underperformance or the inefficiencies highlighted above. The PCRV therefore rates

efficiency as moderately unsatisfactory, 3 in agreement with the PCR rating and

the CPE rating.

Rural poverty impact

33. Household assets. Data on ownership of household assets in the Impact Survey

show that on average beneficiaries reported owning more assets compared to non-

29

The PCRV found a mistake in the PCR text (paragraph 64, page 32) related to the increase of LGCs disbursement of 15 million, which did not happen, as confirmed by the Finance Officer and the Country Presence Officer. 30

This compares unfavorably to the average of 20 per cent for the other IFAD-funded projects in Nigeria in the same period (CPE 2016).

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beneficiaries.31 However, there is some variability across assets; beneficiaries

owned more radio, TV, refrigerators and other non-production related items while

non-beneficiaries owned more boats, motor-bikes and tractors. The impact survey

includes an analysis of assets ownership by quintile of the population. Based on the

survey data, well-being within the core poor (first quintile) was not superior to that

of the non-beneficiaries, therefore implying that the programme had least impact

on the poorest. In terms of financial assets RIMS Data from 2014 show a lower

than expected value of voluntary savings (only 37 per cent of the target), despite a

high number of savings and credit groups formed. Given the particular problems in

generating accurate household income data, attribution remains difficult and

depends on the presence or absence of other development actors. Despite the

unreliability of impact survey data, the CPE confirmed that beneficiary asset

ownership improved everywhere, except in regions affected by conflict where

inequality seems to have increased.

34. Food security, nutrition and agricultural productivity. Data from the Impact

Survey revealed that beneficiaries obtained higher yields as compared to non-

beneficiaries. The PCR makes a strong connection between this outcome and the

training that beneficiaries received on agricultural best practices and improved

technologies. It further states that the reduction in poverty rates and increase in

income amongst beneficiaries were due to productivity increases of agricultural

enterprises. However, the same survey data also show increases in agricultural

productivity for non-beneficiaries, albeit at a slower pace and improvement in

livestock production over the course of the programme, especially in poultry and

small ruminant production. There were also gains made in fishery production, and

the artisanal fisheries outperformed the aquaculture enterprises. It is difficult to

attribute productivity gains solely to project interventions. Other programmes32 are

supporting agriculture, irrigation schemes, and improved techniques in some states

in the region, like Imo state. Regardless, states still experienced increased

productivity in major crops, which made an impact at both the individual and

community levels. In terms of food security and nutrition, the analysis of RIMS

data in 2015 and the impact study revealed that households in both participating

and non-participating groups had at least three meals a day.33 The quantities of

rice, garri/fufu, beans, and plantains households consumed each week increased

over the course of the programme. The nutritional value of meals also improved as

people began to consume more eggs, milk, vegetables, and fruits. These results

were possible by an increase in household income, as explained below.

35. Income. As mentioned in the household asset section, household net income

increased as a result of increased participation in agricultural enterprise and

increased crop productivity. It is estimated that the net income of the enterprises

was NGN 303,227, higher than the national minimum wage (216,000) per annum

and 62 per cent of rural households reported an increase of income by 75 per cent.

As stated in the efficiency section, a high Benefit Cost Ratio in all enterprises

corroborates that businesses profits increased in target areas which translated into

higher income for groups of the population. The CPE reported that 88 per cent of

beneficiary households increased their income by 60 per cent (against a target of

half of beneficiaries increasing incomes by a quarter). In general, even though

making a quantified estimate of income change is difficult because of the quality of

the empirical evidence, the PCRV holds that the community-led interventions,

which were concentrated in selected communities over ten years, resulted in

income growth for beneficiaries.

31

Beneficiaries had a higher Asset Index Factor, equal to 2.4 at completion, compared with non-beneficiaries’ index (0.8), Impact Survey. 32

World Bank FADAMA, Federal Government of Nigeria, Agricultural Transformation Agenda Growth Enhancement Support Programme. 33

In 2007, 35.5 per cent of population in the Niger Delta region had less than three meals a day (National Statistics).

10

36. Human capital, social capital, and empowerment. The re-design of the CDD

approach allowed for a stronger focus on youth empowerment. The different forms

of agri-business (poultry, fishing, bee-keeping) attracted poor youth and women to

agri-business. The young people and women who participated in agri-business

increased their income as well as their confidence by participating in groups. Other

social benefits of the programme included a reduction in youth migration because

of increased employment and a decrease in the trafficking of young women, but

these impacts were not supported by strong evidence. Economic empowerment

impacts were measured through job creation for poor household members. It is

reported in the PCR and verified in supervision missions that the number of jobs

created was approximately 68,000, equal to 65 per cent of the target. Most of

these jobs were for youth (54 per cent) and women (45 per cent).

37. Institutions and policies. Strengthening institutions (including CADA and the

Youth in Agriculture Foundation, service providers, and the local government) was

among the intended outcomes of Component 1 and, as reported in the

effectiveness section, was satisfactorily achieved. The CDD approach improved

rural governance by successfully establishing a community-based development

mechanism at the village-level. The programme was able to help institute the

democratic election of local leaders,34 and encourage transparent accounting and

procurement processes. In terms of linkages and policies, as stated above under

Component 1, apart from links with initiatives like Songhai, USAID/Markets, and a

non-governmental organization called the Smallholder Foundation, no other

significant links were made. At the policy level, in Kuruma River State, community

members now have the legal right to fish and are legally obligated to fish

responsibly, with guidelines following the Food and Agriculture Organisation

recommendations for responsible fisheries. Nevertheless the programme under-

performed in terms of promoting pro-poor legislations and regulations.

38. In summary, the programme’s contribution to decreasing poverty was moderately

satisfactory, 4, the same rating assigned by the PMD. However, despite positive

results in terms of asset ownership, productivity, and income, the overall impact on

poverty reduction needs to take into account measurement errors and attribution

challenges.

Sustainability of benefits

39. Institutional sustainability and ownership. The MTR and supervision missions

indicate inadequate local government commitment. This low level of general LGC

commitment, including by their chairpersons, decreased the effectiveness of the

programme in the first years. Committees were formed within LGCs, but they were

non-functional and had no annual budget. Therefore programmes activities were

not internalised at the LGC level and within the Directorate of Agriculture and

Fisheries. The PCR states that an exit strategy that would distribute functions to

partner institutions was never developed. At the time of the project closure,

discussions were ongoing regarding the establishment of an Agriculture Enterprise

Development Support Unit (AEDSU) in NDCC, to continue the work on agri-

business development and to act as a structure to strategically uptake the CBNRMP

model. This unit, which is hosted in the Agriculture and Fishery Directorate, is

currently liaising with other agencies and the Federal Government of Nigeria to

ensure the continuation of the model. As noted in the relevance section, the

continuous changes and re-direction of the programme after the MTR reduced the

time that programme actors had to effectively implement activities and negatively

affected local institutions’ progress towards independence. At the community level,

the majority of CADAs and the Youth in Agriculture Foundation are sustainable

arrangements that are actively engaged in implementation, maintaining assets,

supporting enterprises groups and are, in turn, strongly supported by communities.

34

See Gender section for more details in female participation in leadership positions.

11

However, the 2015 supervision mission suggested a need for further capacity

building assistance and LGCs engagement in promoting CADA ownership by local

governments.

40. Economic, financial and technical sustainability. The programme promoted

the creation of a large number of enterprises. The enterprises categorized as

“strong” were self-sustainable and started offering mentorship and training to other

business owners. The model adopted by the programme had elements of

sustainability: the focus on high-value enterprises with potential for quick returns

for youth, incubation and mentorship of young businesses by leading

entrepreneurs, and individual ownership of enterprises. Other features of the

commodity groups and enterprises also contributed to their sustainability: record

keeping, analysis of financial viability, operational guides for the preparation of the

Community Action Plans and, most importantly, the functional linkages established

with other programmes meant to guarantee the continuation of support beyond the

CBNRMP.

41. The infrastructures established by the programme were functional and maintained

by communities and local authorities. Handover to the LGCs was completed, but

the latest supervision mission in 2015 reported that a proper business plan was not

yet in place. About 31 projects were still not completed and the NDDC was

supposed to finance their completion.

42. In summary, despite low LGC commitment and the uncertainty regarding the exit

strategy of the programme, the enterprise model was sustainable. Therefore the

sustainability of CBNRMP is rated by the PCRV as moderately satisfactory, 4.

This rating is equal to the rating assigned by PMD.

B. Other Criteria

Innovation

43. The most innovative idea introduced by the programme was its enterprise models.

In particular, the incubator/cluster delivery model35 was piloted by the CBNRMP in

the country and it led to employment creation and high youth engagement.

44. The use of CADAs marked a departure from the traditional CDD process and

reinforced the programme’s focus on enterprise development by commodity

groups. CADAs also helped institutionalize a participatory decision making process

in the communities. It is expected that CADAs will coordinate and supervise agro-

enterprises and commodity groups. CADAs are also expected to serve as an entry

point for other development partners and government into the community.

45. Another innovation introduced by the programme was the establishment of the

Youth in Agriculture Foundation. This rural coordination platform for agri-

enterprises facilitates policy dialogue with government and other development

partners. This forum, which at the time of programme’s closure had 880 members

(enterprises champions), successfully contributed to regional job creation and

youth poverty reduction. This innovation deliberately addressed youth crime and

unemployment in the Delta.

46. In recognition of these achievements, the PCRV considers the programme

satisfactory, 5, the same rating assigned by PMD to this criterion.

Scaling up

47. In terms of successful replication and scaling up of innovations introduced by

CBNRMP, the evidence is mixed. The PCR states that the modified CDD approach,

through the establishment of CADAs, is already being applied in the Value Chain

35

In this model, “champions” acted as mentors in each state and clustered unemployed youth as apprentices who would gain hands-on practical training on enterprise identification, planning, budgeting and management. The enterprises also received initial recovery seed capital to run their businesses. The net profits were then divided between the champions and the apprentices.

12

Development Programme and will be expanded in CASP programme’s areas.

Meanwhile, there is not much evidence of CADAs being replicated outside of IFAD

project areas. NDCC was invited to continue funding for two-three years from

2016, but no firm response has been given. At the time of the PCRV finalization,

the commission had carried out a stock-taking exercise and was awaiting national

budget by the parliament to continue with the follow-up of CADA and their

enterprises.

48. The Youth in Agriculture Foundation model was quite successful and is gaining

acceptance by other donors like the African Development Bank, who included it as

a youth empowerment strategy in its upcoming ENABLE Programme for Nigeria.

49. Overall, as affirmed by the 2016 Nigeria CPE, with the exception of the Youth in

Agriculture Foundation model, the project's success in promoting replication of

innovations was limited given the uncertainty regarding scaling up of the CADAs36.

The PCRV rates the scaling-up criterion as moderately unsatisfactory, 3, two

points below the PMD rating of Satisfactory.

Gender equality and women’s empowerment

50. CBNRMP was approved before IFAD gender policies were put into effect but since

the early 2000 the Government of Nigeria had shown commitment towards gender

equality37.The CBNRMP gender strategy38 aims at fostering female participation

through a gender-sensitive approach to community development and set quota for

women’s participation (40 per cent).

51. The programme benefitted a total of 291,435 households. 41 per cent of

individuals reached by the programme were female, close to the appraisal target of

42 per cent. 53 per cent of people participating in marketing groups were women,

50 per cent of people trained in income generating activities were women, and 45

per cent of voluntary savers were women39. The survey data shows that male

beneficiaries benefitted more from activities focused on the farm input

procurement process, keeping of farm records, savings strategies, conflict

resolution and management, and community participation activities. Female

beneficiaries benefitted more from linkages with non-governmental organizations,

market outlets, and enterprise management activities. The number of women in

leadership positions was below the target, suggesting that actions fostering social

change for women had less impact than envisioned.

52. Ascertaining female attendance rates from the gender disaggregated M&E data was

simple, but measuring female empowerment and gender equality is significantly

more difficult. The PCR states that the programme successfully increased gender

equality by including women in leadership positions, changing meeting venues to

outside the villages to allow them to speak freely, and establishing the YIAF. There

is, however, scant evidence of increase in terms of equality. The impact survey

reports that, although men still made more decisions, female decision-making

power was improved. However, there was no significant difference in female

income or output. No data was gathered to measure whether the female workload

increased due to their participation in programme activities, and the CPE

consultations with female beneficiaries reported that gender roles remained

unchanged. Therefore it seems that pre-programme inequalities were not impacted

much.

36

With regards to replication, the newly established AEDSU in the Directorate of Agriculture and Fisheries would be mandated to promote the up-scaling and replication of successful agricultural enterprises within and outside the participating communities. The AEDSU is not yet operational. 37

The National Policy on Women (2000) specifies the overriding principles that underpin the Government of Nigeria's commitment to equality of women and men before the law (CPE 2016). 38

Gender sensitive CDD approach integrated nine gender and poor-specific strategic interventions into programme components (capacity building, gender analysis and mainstreaming in CDD design, direct targeting, self-targeting, and gender-sensitive M&E); proportional quotas (40 per cent women beneficiaries) decided through stakeholder agreement (CPE 2016). 39

RIMS 2015.

13

53. Gender equality, mainstreaming, and women’s empowerment performance is

assessed as moderately satisfactory, 4 which is below the rating given to this

criterion by the PMD (5, satisfactory).

Environment and natural resources management

54. An Environmental Management Plan was included in the formulation document of

CBNRMP and indicates the major areas in which the programme could have had an

environmental impact. Possible negative impacts include disproportionate artisanal

fishing, damages to protected areas, deforestation, pollution from effluents and

from oil, land clearing and soil erosion, water pollution, and negative impact on

human health. The Environmental Management Plan also presents mitigation

measures.40 The environmental management plan was not reflected in the project's

implementation plan, nor was it systematically discussed in the progress reports.

No proper assessment of the impact of the programme on the environment was

done at the time of project completion.

55. The programme successfully promoted aquaculture and fishery enterprises and

infrastructure, but little attention was paid to the importance of protecting natural

resources or avoiding over fishing.41 LGCs did not pass as much pro-poor LGC

legislation and regulation on environmental protection42 as it was expected when

programme targets were set (only 60 per cent of the target policies were adopted).

Only 24 per cent of the land targeted for sustainable management was actually put

under sustainable management over the course of the programme (including

soil/water conservation and agro-forestry).

56. Based on the observations above, the PCRV assigns to the environmental

management criterion a rating of moderately unsatisfactory, 3, the same rating

assigned by PMD.

Adaptation to climate change

57. As stated above, the absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment during

implementation or at completion makes it difficult to comprehensively assess

whether the programme demonstrated environmental and climate-related risk

awareness. The Delta Region is characterized by high rainfall and river discharge

during rainy season combined with the low flat terrain and poorly drained soils

which make it particularly vulnerable to flooding and erosion. Deforestation due to

converting forest to agricultural land increases carbon emissions and in the case of

mangroves, has affected fish breeding. However, supervision reports, the MTR and

the PCR do not mention any specific measures aimed at lowering the risks posed

by the consequences of climatic changes. The PCRV assigns to this criterion a

rating of moderately unsatisfactory, 3, the same as the PMD rating.

C. Overall project achievement

58. The CBNRMP-ND made a moderate contribution to overall poverty reduction in the

Niger Delta Region. Sustainability, efficiency, environment, and climate change

were assessed as moderately unsatisfactory. Other criteria received a rating of 4.

Effectiveness and efficiency were reduced by the uncertainty surrounding

counterpart funding and the turbulence caused the re-design, both of which

affected output delivery. Targeting was a challenge because of the weak

disaggregated poverty statistics, but outreach was good, including for women and

youth. Notable successes of the programme were the use of the CDD model, the

40 The programme design was also based on an Environmental Impact Assessment of the Artisanal Fisheries Development Project – finalised in March 2002, and IFAD’s input to the Poverty and Environment Strategy for Nigeria in September 2001. 41

Large swamps, mangrove, rivers and waterways were cleared and converted to aquaculture enterprises without environmental impact assessment. For this reason, the physical performance of the Natural Resources Management subcomponent is rated moderately unsatisfactory. 42

These include: sanitation, waste management, erosion/flood and coastal zone management, plant, soil and water conservation.

14

introduction of innovative enterprise models, and strong youth engagement.

Inefficiencies in fund disbursement, poor documentation of lessons, and little focus

on sustainability during design and implementation made it difficult for the

programme to be successful in attaining its objectives. The PCRV assigns to the

overall programme achievement criterion a rating of 4, moderately satisfactory,

the same rating assigned by PMD.

D. Performance of partners

59. IFAD. IFAD’s overall performance in CBNRMP was good. IFAD took over the direct

supervision of the programme from the World Bank in June 2009. IFAD supervision

reports are of good quality; supervision missions were held twice a year since the

programme began43 and, according to the 2016 CPE the enhanced country

presence since 2008 improved programme quality. IFAD’s MTR introduced major

modifications which improved achievement of results. However, IFAD took more

than three years to process the loan agreement amendment needed to increment

the IFAD contribution, to reduce the contribution of LGCs44 and to re-adjust the

design. This negatively affected programme implementation, as stated above. In

terms of monitoring, IFAD gave sufficient support to setting up the baseline

(2006/2007), impact (2015), and thematic studies (2015). Although the M&E data

collection structure was well conceived, its operationalization and, in particular, the

use of self-monitoring community-based teams rather than fully automated

databases, increased the margin for human error and called the integrity of the

monitoring system into question, despite the introduction in 2013 of the

Performance Monitoring Plan45. IFAD’s overall performance in CBNRMP is rated as

moderately satisfactory, 4, the same rating as the one assigned by PMD.

60. Government. The Federal Government of Nigeria, through its main ministries,

FMF and FMARD, showed commitment to providing oversight during programme

implementation. The Federal Government of Nigeria was less reliable when it came

to financial management and disbursement. Although the FMF disbursed

approximately 83 per cent of the allocated budget (US$10,400,000), delays in

processing the amendment of the financing agreement caused problems during

implementation. FMARD performed well, and did especially well to establish the

Emergency Task Force to bring the programme out of risk. However, two

shortcomings in the Federal Government of Nigeria's performance were the

scrapping of the Project Coordination Unit, which was supposed to act as broker

between the state governments and NDDC and, secondly, the failure to establish a

Programme Management Coordination Group, which would have reviewed PSO

activities and kept the NDDC informed.

61. NDDC. The Niger Delta Development Commission’s mandate was to supervise

CBNRMP activities and finance the programme’s operation. The NDDC was able to

release more than 100 per cent of allocated funds and participated in the various

sensitization and awareness creation meetings, but some concerns remain about

its limited understanding of the CDD approach and limited capacity to internalize

youth and enterprise development strategies.

62. State Governments. The various states governments performed unevenly in

terms of disbursement as well as commitment and support to implementation.46

43

IFAD supervision missions were carried out in: January 2007; June 2007; January 2008; June 2008; January 2009; May 2009; November 2010; July 2011; July 2012; June 2013; November 2013; April 2014; October 2014; October 2015. 44

IFAD contribution was increased from 22.5 per cent to 62.5 per cent and LGCs contribution was decreased from 45 per cent to 5 per cent to support only the overhead and operational costs of LGC staff. 45

The Performance Monitoring Plan implied the use by farmers of simplified templates and farm record books to generate primary data which were routinely collated and transmitted to PSO by the SPSO staff. 46

The PCR reports that disbursements ranged from a low of 33 per cent in Akwa Ibon State to highs of 73 per cent and 63 per cent in Ondo State and Cross River, respectively. However, as reported in the Supervision Mission report in 2015, only three of the nine participating states (Abia, Cross Rivers and Rivers) paid arrears of counterpart funds during the 2014 review period.

15

The PCR reported a 94 per cent disbursement rate for state governments at

completion, but this seems unrealistic. Unavailability and delays of counterpart

disbursements have been the main reasons for slow completion of infrastructure

schemes and also affected the drawdown of IFAD funds.

63. Local Government Councils’ financial contributions have been poor. Only 13 per

cent of the planned funds for programming were released due to lack of financial

autonomy and political will. The institutions established by participating LGCs such

as the Local Government Development Committee, the Community Driven

Development Team, and the Local Government Technical Support Team, remained

un-functioning due to lack of funds.

64. State Governments’ financial under-performance (and fluctuations throughout the

programme’s life) demonstrates that agriculture was not a high priority on their

development agenda. Urban and industrial development is higher on the agenda in

this region. Given the under-achievement in disbursement, which caused non-

attainment of targets in some activities, the PCRV rates Government performance

as moderately unsatisfactory, 3. This rating is the same as the rating assigned

by PMD.

IV. Assessment of PCR quality 65. Scope. The PCR follows the standard outline for PCRs. All sections and annexes are

included and are of an appropriate length.47 RIMS data for 2014 is included, but

RIMS data for 2015 is not. No Environmental Impact Assessment is included. Most

of the sections are overly descriptive, especially the Innovation and Lessons

Learned Sections. Despite these minor shortcomings, the PCR scope is rated

satisfactory, 5.

66. Quality of data and process. The process of PCR preparation was satisfactory,

including review missions along with validation of findings with participation of the

main stakeholders. The PCR used a variety of data sources, including programme

progress reports compiled by the PSO, thematic studies, RIMS surveys, an impact

assessment survey, and stakeholders consultations’ findings. Participatory methods

of data gathering were also adopted and reflected in the PCR. However, the

reliability of data remains questionable. Instead of reporting tables showing the

physical progress of output delivery, Annex 8 reports a long list of charts that are

not easily understood.

67. Financial information reporting in the PCR is not always clear, especially with

regards to the loan amendments and disbursements of various partners, as

addressed in the efficiency section of this report. The PCRV noted a discrepancy in

the rating assigned to Gender between the PCR where this criterion was rated

moderately satisfactory and the annexed table, where the same criterion was rated

Satisfactory. The PCR quality is rated moderately satisfactory, 4.

68. Lessons learned. The PCR presents design and implementation information on

activities and processes that benefitted the project, and the PCRV concurs with its

statements. At the end of the document, the PCR highlights areas that should be

improved in future projects and IFAD programmes. The PCRV therefore rates the

lessons section of the PCR as satisfactory, 5.

69. Candour. The PCR provides information on project achievements with sufficient

evidence. PMD’s views on the replicability and sustainability of project activities are

also reported and substantiated. In certain instances, the PCRV finds that

assessments made in the PCR are overly positive and optimistic. There is

significantly less candour in the document’s discussion of programme weaknesses.

The PCR is assigned a candour rating of moderately satisfactory, 4.

47

The Targeting and Outreach sub-section in the Effectiveness section is missing a heading.

16

V. Lessons learned 70. The targeting approach used in the CBNRMP, which translated into a few

communities targeted in each Local Government Area, was among the causes of

the low interest and commitment by the LGCs. In terms of financing, IFAD and

beneficiaries should be financing activities, while the government and state

counterparts should only cover staff overhead and taxes, utilities, and operations

costs. Direct engagement of partners through inception meetings/start up

workshops is important to increasing counterpart buy-in, and thus enhancing

programme effectiveness.

71. An important lesson of the CBNRMP is the importance of documenting the

knowledge generated during the implementation. The lack of a Knowledge

Management Strategy affected the effective implementation of the programme.

72. A key success of the programme was the establishment of CADAs. In general, the

adaptation of the CDD approach to agro-business development and the

institutionalization of the CADAs as umbrella associations yielded positive results.

The programme highlights the adaptive nature of the CDD model as well as its

effectiveness in economically empowering rural communities.

73. Lastly, it is important to mention that in the CBNRMP the partnership with NDDC

was new: while this partner was seen at design as appropriate for IFAD’s work in

the Niger Delta, because of its role as supporting all development activities in the

region, this is an unusual partner for IFAD, given that its focus is on large

infrastructure investments and has little experience and weak capacity on CDD and

on smallholder agriculture. Moreover, lack of transparency and financial

mismanagement seem to have characterized the performance of NDDC and this

poses some concerns about its suitability as an IFAD partner in the long run.

Annex I

17

Project Financing

The table below is a comparison of appraisal allocations and actual disbursements per

financier. The PCR amounts are reported in column (2). Disbursements as per

Supervision Mission in 2015 and the data reported for CBNRMP in the CPE are also

reported for comparison purposes.

Table 1: Project costs (USD, 000)

Appraisal allocation

(1)

% of total Actual Disbursement

PCR

(2)

% of total Actual Disbursement

(SM May 2015)

Actual Disbursement (CPE 2016)

1

% Disbursed

(2/1)

IFAD loan 15,000 17.6 16,794 30.4 13,110 16, 471 112 %

NDCC (grant) 15,000 17.6 15,488 28 15,0002 9, 637

3 103 %

FNG (PSO counterpart)

10,200 12 8,442 15 8,288 6,636 83 %

States (State counterpart)

8,200 9.6 7,736 14 4,136 2, 078 94 %

LGCs 32,000 37.7 4,250 7.6 5,139 4,740 13 %

Beneficiaries 4,400 5 2,494 4.5 61 %

84,800 55,204 46,129 39, 563 65%

Source: PCR, Supervision Mission Report 2015, Country Programme Evaluation (CPE), 2016.

1 Data received from Programme Officers.

2 This refers to the eight-year funding. Additional 455.4 are reported for NDDC in the two-year extension allocation.

3 This figure is reported under “Others” in the CPE table.

Annex II

18

Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated

Rural poverty impact Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.

X Yes

Four impact domains

Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means

of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.

No

Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital

and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor’s individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.

No

Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security

relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.

No

Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies

is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.

No

Project performance Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. X Yes

Relevance The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.

X Yes

Effectiveness The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

X

Yes

Efficiency

Sustainability of benefits

A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.

The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project’s life.

X

X

Yes

Yes

Other performance criteria

Gender equality and women’s empowerment

Innovation and scaling up

The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women’s empowerment, for example, in terms of women’s access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women’s incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.

The extent to which IFAD development interventions:

(i) have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.

X

X

Yes

Yes

Environment and natural resources management

The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.

X Yes

Adaptation to climate change

The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures X Yes

Annex II

19

Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated

Overall project achievement

This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women’s empowerment, innovation and scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.

X Yes

Performance of partners

IFAD

Government

This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner’s expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.

X

X

Yes

Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE’s evaluation criteria and key questions.

Annex III

20

Rating comparisona

Criteria

Programme Management Department (PMD) rating

IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV) rating

Net rating disconnect (PCRV-PMD)

Rural poverty impact 4 4 0

Project performance

Relevance 5 4 -1

Effectiveness 4 4 0

Efficiency 3 3 0

Sustainability of benefits 4 4 0

Project performanceb 4 3.75 -0.25

Other performance criteria

Gender equality and women's empowerment 5 4 -1

Innovation 5 5 0

Scaling up 5 3 -2

Environment and natural resources management 3 3 0

Adaptation to climate change 3 3 0

Overall project achievementc 4 4 0

Performance of partnersd

IFAD 4 4 0

Government 3 3 0

Average net disconnect -4/12 = -0.33

a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 =

satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable. b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon

the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation and scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change. d The rating for partners’ performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

PMD rating IOE PCRV rating Net disconnect

Candour 4

Lessons 5

Quality (methods, data, participatory process) 4

Scope 5

Overall rating of the project completion report 4

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable

Annex IV

21

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FMARD. 2014. A Beneficiary Impact Assessment Study of the IFAD-Assisted

Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme – Niger Delta

(CBNRMP-ND).

Annex V

22

Abbreviations and acronyms

AEDSU Agricultural Enterprise Development Support Unit

CADA Commodity apex development association

CBNRMP-ND Community Based Natural Resource Management Programme, Niger

Delta CDD Community driven development

CDF Community Development Fund

COSOP Country strategic opportunities paper

CPB Cost per beneficiary

CPE Country programme evaluation

EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return

FMARD Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

FMF Federal Ministry of Finance

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IRR Internal rate of return

LGC LGC local government council

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MTR Mid-term review

NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission

PCR Project completion report

PMD Programme Management Department

PSO Programme Support Office

RIMS Results and Impact Management System

YEAP Youth Empowerment in Agriculture Programme