Handbook of Decentralised Governance and Development in India

Handbook of Decentralised Governance and

Development in India

This handbook examines 25 years of decentralised governance and development in India. It provides a historical overview of developments since the introduction of decentralisation reforms (73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts) and critically assesses the measures initiated to strengthen decentralised institutions and deepen grassroots democracy. It also discusses the status of service delivery and identifies the issues and challenges involved in achieving development at the local level. The volume studies themes such as the devolution of powers in India, administra-tive and fiscal decentralisation, decentralised planning, Panchayats in scheduled areas, the socio-logical aspects of decentralisation, caste, gender and local democracy, capacity building, ICT for local governance, urban local governance, workfare and decentralisation, and decentralised natural resource management. It also looks at Panchayati Raj institutions from a Gandhian perspective.

The first of its kind, this handbook will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of decentralisation and development, development studies, fiscal decentralisation, political studies, political sociology, Indian politics, Indian government, public policy and governance, political economy, South Asian studies, and South Asian politics.

D. Rajasekhar is the HAG Professor in Economics at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, India. He obtained his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India (through the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum). He was Visiting Scholar at the universities of Oxford, Melbourne, Hitotsubashi, Sussex, and at the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen. He worked extensively on decentrali-sation, social protection, and microfinance and served in policy bodies constituted by the govern-ment. He has published 27 books and 89 articles in national and international journals and as book chapters. His paper (co-authored) on ‘Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?’ was published in The Economic Journal. His paper (co-authored) on ‘Collusion, Co-option and Capture: Social Accountability and Social Audits in Karnataka, India’, published in Oxford Development Studies, was awarded the Sanjaya Lall Prize for its contribution to development studies. He is currently collaborating with researchers from the London School of Economics, and the universities of Bristol, Melbourne, Tsuda, and Hitotsubashi in research relating to decentralisation and poverty reduction, delivery of public services, and social protection. His recent books include Decentralised Governance, Development Programmes and Elite Capture (2018) and Cooperatives and Social Innovations: Experiences from the Asia Pacific Region (2020).

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Handbook of Decentralised Governance and

Development in India

Edited by D. Rajasekhar

First published 2022by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2022 selection and editorial matter, D. Rajasekhar; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of D. Rajasekhar to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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ISBN: 978-0-367-33769-8 (hbk)ISBN: 978-1-032-05514-5 (pbk)ISBN: 978-0-429-32188-7 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9780429321887

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https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429321887

v v

List of tables viiiList of figures xList of contributors xiPreface xiv

PART 1The setting 1

1 Decentralised governance and development in India: An introduction 3D. Rajasekhar

2 Seeing PRIs in India and their history from a Gandhian perspective 22M. V. Nadkarni

3 The evolution of devolution 34V. K. Natraj

PART 2Dimensions of decentralisation 45

4 Political decentralisation: Role of political parties from colonial times 47George Mathew

5 Rural local governance and administrative decentralisation: An institutional analysis 62N. Sivanna and N. Veeresha

6 Fiscal decentralisation in India: Status and raising issues 78M. A. Oommen

7 State–sub-state level fiscal decentralisation in India: Theoretical issues and policy options 92M. A. Oommen

Contents

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Contents

8 Decentralised planning in India: Challenges and prospects 106M. Devendra Babu

9 Implementation of PESA and status of panchayat raj institutions in fifth scheduled areas of Indian states: Issues, challenges and ways ahead 122Yatindra Singh Sisodia

PART 3Decentralised rural governance 135

10 Deliberative democracy through Grama Sabha: Progress and issues 137D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula

11 Decentralised governance in India: The anticipated and the unanticipated 154Manish Thakur

12 Interrogating local democracy: Formal and informal local governance in Karnataka 167Kripa Ananthpur

13 Good governance in Gram Panchayats of Kerala: Not so good? 184D. Narayana

14 Capacity development for good governance in Panchayats: Status, effectiveness and issues 199D. Rajasekhar

15 ICT for local governance: Status, emerging issues and prospects 217Inderjeet Singh Sodhi

PART 4Decentralised urban governance 233

16 Decentralised governance in urban areas: Problems and prospects from a socio-historical perspective 235N. Jayaram

17 Urban local governance: Revisiting the fundamentals 249Amita Bhide

18 Intergovernmental transfers to urban local bodies in India: Issues and directions for reforms 264Shibani Mishra, Alok Kumar Mishra and Prerna Panda

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Contents

PART 5Sectorial aspects of decentralisation 287

19 Implementing workfare through decentralised government for poverty reduction 289R. Manjula

20 The policy and practice of decentralised natural resource management in India 308Mahima Upadhyay

21 Devolving rights to forest dwellers: Politics of institutional choice and recognition in the Forest Rights Act implementation process in West Bengal, India 322Bidhan Kanti Das

Index 339

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5.1 Top-, middle- and low-ranking states in the devolution index 66 5.2 Devolution ranking of states in policy 67 5.3 Staff position in Gram Panchayats (top five states in the devolution index) 68 5.4 Staff position in Gram Panchayats (bottom five states in the devolution index) 69 5.5 Devolution ranking of states in practice 70 5.6 Gap between devolution policy and practice of Panchayat functionaries 71 5.7 Nature of administrative decentralisation in the Panchayats of selected states 72 6.1 Ranking of states in regard to devolution of functions, funds and functionaries and

IGT (2015–16) 83 6.2 Nature and quantum of devolution recommended by union finance commissions

to local governments in India 85 6.3 Horizontal criteria adopted by union finance commissions for distribution of

grants-in-aid to states for Panchayats and ULGs 85 7.1 Criteria for inter-tier distribution of development funds 99 7.2 OSR as percentage of total expenditure (Kerala and Tamil Nadu)-GPs 100 7.3 OSR as percentage of total expenditure (Kerala and Tamil Nadu)-ULGs 100 8.1 Initiatives in decentralised planning in India 109 8.2 Status of devolution in major states of India 112 8.3 Status of District Planning Committees in major states of India 113 8.4 State-wise status of District Rural Development Agency in India 114 8.5 Status of constitution of SFC by the states 115 8.6 Details of issues of the round table conferences of ministers of panchayat raj

of states 116 9.1 Knowledge and participation of panchayat representatives in PESA areas 127 9.2 Information about various stages of work among panchayat representatives 128 9.3 Perception of panchayat representatives in PESA areas 129 9.4 Knowledge and perception of panchayat representatives 130 10.1 Distribution of states by the prescribed quorum for GS meetings 140 10.2 Major functions assigned to Grama Sabha in different states 141 10.3 Participation of citizens in GS meetings in Madhya Pradesh 147 12.1 Structures and activities of GPs and CVCs 176 13.1 Distribution of states by Gram Panchayat size and transfer of tertiary-sector

functions 187 13.2 Distribution of states by Gram Panchayat size and sanctioned/own functionaries 187 13.3 Per capita allocation of untied funds (plan and non-plan) by the State Finance

Commission by state across tiers of Panchayat (Rs), 2015 188

Tables

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Tables

13.4 Services offered through Panchayats by tier in Indian States, 2016 196 13.5 Districts (%) with integrated district plans in 2015 by state 197 13.6 Services (%) offered by states across tiers out of the maximum possible services,

2015 197 14.1 Funds (Rs. crores) released and utilised under the RGPSA/RGSA 206 15.1 Status of ICT infrastructure in Gram Panchayats 220 17.1 An index of urban devolution 252 17.2 Status of implementation of decentralisation reforms post JNNURM 253 18.1 Trends in municipal revenues in India 267 18.2 Distribution of local government revenues: Select OECD countries 2010 268 18.3 Major sources of shared revenues and compensations in municipal corporations of

India 268 18.4 Major sources of general and specific-purpose transfers in municipal corporations

of India 269 18.5 Distribution of municipal revenues by source in India (%): 2012–2013 270 18.6 Central and state tax–GDP ratios 1950–1951 to 2015–2016 270 18.7 Distribution of grants to states for urban local bodies: Criteria and weights (%)

adopted by the Finance Commissions of India 276 18.8 Inter-governmental transfers versus own-source revenues in select metropolitan

areas 277 18.9 Distribution of tax revenue sources of select metropolitan cities 279 18.10 Recommendations of local finance committees and commissions in India 280 19.1 Key features of the previous wage employment programmes (1970s to the mid-

2000s) 292 19.2 Performance of MGNREGS in India during 2008–09 to 2018–19 297 21.1 Basic unit of authority vested in rights determination as well as forest governance 326 21.2 Comparative account of potential CFR versus CFR recognition under the act 328

Charts

5.1 Analytical and spatial dimensions of administrative systems 64 14.1 Training institutions in states for Panchayats 208

Appendices

6A List of the states that have no activity report (out of 25 states) as per the “Report of the Mid-Term Review and Appraisal” (2006) 88

6B Vertical sharing of resources based on latest SFC report available 887A Criteria for horizontal distribution of Tamil Nadu 1027B Status of deficit in Karnataka panchayats 1047C Percentage distribution of financial condition of ULG (2002–07) in

percent – Karnataka 10414A Number of programs organised and participants trained by NIRD (1992–93 to

2016–17) 214

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5.1 Devolution index 65 5.2 Status of devolution in India (region-wise) 66 13.1 Distribution of electrified houses by social groups 189 13.2 Distribution of households by availability of latrine within the house

by social groups 190 13.3 Households using improved sanitation facility (%) by social groups, 2013–14 190 13.4 Nutritional status of children, 2013–14 – stunted (%) by social group 191 13.5 Nutritional status of children 2013–14 – underweight (%) by social group 191 13.6 Percentage of rural houses with cement and mosaic floor, 2011 192 13.7 Percentage of urban houses with cement and mosaic floor, 2011 192 13.8 Population (age 20–24) attending educational institutions by social group, 2011 193 13.9 Poverty (%) by social group, 2009–10 193 13.10 Percentage of urban households with drainage, garbage disposal, no direct

opening to road, 2012 194 13.11 Percentage of rural households with drainage, garbage disposal, no direct

opening to road, 2012 195 14.1 Proportion of ERs trained to total (2008–09 to 2010–11) 204 14.2 Distribution of states by proportion of funds accessed for capacity development

(2014–15 to 2017–18) 207 14.3 Distribution of states by proportion of trainees to total (2014–15 to 2018–19) 209 14.4 Distribution of key states by total funds received (%) and trainees (%) during

the period 2014–15 to 2018–19 209 14.5 Distribution of states by amount (Rs.) spent for each trainee during 2014–15 to

2018–19 210 19.1 Share of SCs/STs in the total person days of employment in India (in %) 298 19.2 Share of women in the total person days of employment in India (in %) 298 19.3 Average person days of employment per household 299 19.4 Proportion of households availing of 100 days of employment 300

Figures

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Kripa Ananthpur works at the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. Her research focuses on the dynamics of local democracy, women’s empowerment, and the interface between governance and civil society institutions. She has extensively researched on decentrali-sation and governance in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, South Africa, and East Timor.

M. Devendra Babu is an Honorary Professor, Karnataka State Rural Development and Panchayat Raj University, Gadag, Karnataka, and formerly a Professor of Economics, Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru, India.

Amita Bhide is a Professor and Dean at the School of Habitat Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India. She studies issues of urban transformation and governance through a practice-based perspective.

Bidhan Kanti Das is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and Jt. Coordinator of M Phil in Development Studies at the Institute of Development Studies, Kolkata, India. He has published over 25 papers in peer-reviewed journals and has edited two volumes. His research interests are forest governance, tribal development, climate vulnerability.

N. Jayaram is a Visiting Professor at the Institute of Public Policy, National Law School of India University, Bengaluru, India. He has taught sociology at Bangalore University and Goa University, and research methodology at Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India.

R. Manjula is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development, ISEC, Bengaluru, India. She has co-authored books and research papers (published in national and international journals and as chapters). Her most recent co-edited book is Cooperatives and Social Innovation (2020).

George Mathew is the Chairman of the Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, India. His area of specialisation is local governments and decentralisation. His research and studies focus on the political empowerment of women and the marginalised through the local governments in rural India. His concern is integrating research with action.

Alok Kumar Mishra is an Associate Professor of Economics, School of Economics, and the Director of the Programme of Land, Housing, Transport and Urban Economics, HUDCO Chair Programme, ICSSR Sponsored Research Programme at the University of Hyderabad, India.

Contributors

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Contributors

Shibani Mishra is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Binayak Acharya College, Berhampur, under the Government of Odisha, India. She is also studying for her PhD in Urban Public Finance at the School of Economics, University of Hyderabad, India.

M. V. Nadkarni is an economist who is also interested in other social sciences and ethics. He is an Honorary Visiting Professor at Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru, India, and author of several books including the latest Socio-economic Change and the Broad-basing Process in India (edited, 2020).

D. Narayana is currently a member of the Contributory Pension Review Committee of Government of Kerala, India. He was the Director of Gulati Institute of Finance and Taxation (GIFT), Thiruvananthapuram during 2012–13 and 2016–19. He has a PhD from the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India.

V. K. Natraj was educated at the University of Mysore, India, and at Oxford, UK. He retired as a Professor of Development Studies from Mysore and served as the Director of the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. He is the co-editor of Development Narratives: The Political Economy of Tamil Nadu (2014). He was also visiting faculty at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.

M. A. Oommen is an Honorary Fellow, Centre for Development Studies, and Honorary Professor, Gulati Institute of Finance and Taxation, Kerala, India. He is a development economist of repute with a rich collection of professional papers and about 30books to his credit.

Prerna Panda is currently working as an Assistant Professor of Economics at Government Women’s College, Sundargarh, Odisha, India. She is also studying for her doctoral degree in Urban Economics at the School of Economics, University of Hyderabad, India.

D. Rajasekhar is HAG Professor and head of the Centre for Decentralisation and Development in the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru. His areas of interest are decentrali-zation, social protection, microfinance and public services, and published extensively on these themes.

Yatindra Singh Sisodia is a Professor and Director at the M.P. Institute of Social Science Research, Ujjain, India. With democracy, decentralised governance, electoral politics, tribes, and development as his areas of interest, he has 18 books and over 80 papers in reputed journals and edited volumes to his credit.

N. Sivanna (retired Professor at ISEC, Bengaluru) is currently working as an Honorary Professor at Rural Development and Panchayati Raj (RDPR) University, Gadadg, Karnataka, India. With a special focus on decentralisation, he has authored many books, monographs, work-ing papers, and published research articles in various research journals.

Inderjeet Singh Sodhi is a Professor of Public Administration at Rajiv Gandhi National Institute of Youth Development, Sriperumbudur, India. With local governance, disaster man-agement, and rural development as his areas of interest, he earlier taught atthe University of Dodoma, Tanzania,Africa, and Colleges in Jaipur, India.

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Contributors

Manish Thakur is a Professor at the Public Policy and Management Group, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata, India.

Mahima Upadhyay is a PhD scholar at Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru, India. She is working on institutional analysis of local government and decentralised natural resource management as her PhD research.

N. Veeresha is a PhD Fellow in Political Science at Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru, India. He is currently a Guest Faculty at the University Law College, Bangalore University, Bengaluru, India, and working on a doctoral dissertation related to insur-rection and governance.

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It has been 27 years since historic legislations on decentralised governance were passed by the Indian Parliament. Since then, public services at the local level have been sought to be deliv-ered through decentralised governance, and it is believed that this may have resulted in the good development outcomes of democratic decision-making and improved service delivery in both rural and urban areas. In order to critically examine the progress that decentralised gov-ernance has made since then and the impact of democratic decentralisation on development outcomes, the Centre for Decentralisation and Development (CDD) at the Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bengaluru, organised a seminar entitled ‘Twenty-Five Years of Decentralised Governance in India: Status, Issues and the Way Forward’ during 28–30 August 2018 at the Institute.

A large number of papers were presented in this seminar; of them, those providing historical perspective for the last 27 years are included in this volume. In addition, five additional chapters are included so that the volume is complete in terms of issues covered. These papers were revised three times in the light of comments provided.

The experience of reading the papers presented in the seminar, making a careful selection of papers for the volume and editing the same in the last couple of years, has been a gratifying experience to me as the subject of the volume is close to my heart. During this period, I have received generous help and support from organisations and well-meaning persons.

A partial grant from the Indian Council for Social Science Research, New Delhi, was greatly helpful in organising the seminar. My heartfelt thanks go to Dr. A Ravindra, former Chairman, Board of Governors (BoG), ISEC, Prof. Sudha Rao, Member of BoG, ISEC, Prof. M G Chandrakanth, former Director, ISEC, Dr. S S Meenakshisundaram and Prof. R S Deshpande for their support and encouragement. A six-member screening committee, constituted for the organisation of the seminar, screened the abstracts and provided comments on draft papers. I am immensely grateful to Prof N. Jayaram for not only being part of the screening committee and offering critical comments on a number of draft papers but also for his guidance in the organisa-tion of the seminar and bringing out this volume. My sincere thanks go to Prof M. V. Nadkarni and Prof Abdul Aziz, members of the screening committee, for their support in the screening of abstracts as well as in the review of draft papers.

My heartfelt thanks to my colleague Dr R. Manjula who has been with me in this more than two-year journey right from the organisation of the seminar to the publication of the volume. She helped me in the organisation of the seminar, took an active part in the screening commit-tee meetings, and provided considerable support at all the stages of publication of this volume. I also thank Prof M. Devendra Babu, my former colleague at the Centre for Decentralisation and Development, for being part of the screening committee and his participation in the screening of abstracts. The research assistance provided by Mr. Murali J. is gratefully acknowledged.

Preface

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Preface

I am thankful to three referees of Routledge (two at the stage of proposal clearance and one after the full manuscript was submitted) for their critical and incisive comments on the papers included in this volume. I thank all the chapter contributors for their patience in revising their papers in response to three rounds of comments, and improving the quality of their chapters in the process.

Last but not the least, my heartfelt thanks go to Dr Shashank S. Sinha, Publishing Director, Routledge, for providing the idea that the papers presented in the seminar have potential to be brought out as a handbook of decentralised governance and development, Ms Antara Ray Chaudhury, Development Editor, Routledge, for getting the entire process of refereeing com-pleted in an efficient and gentle manner, and Ms Anvitaa Bajaj, Editorial Assistant, Routledge, for her help and support in the editorial process.

D. Rajasekhar

The setting The setting

Part 1

The setting

3DOI: 10.4324/9780429321887-1

D. Rajasekhar Decentralised governance and development in India

It has been over two-and-half decades since historic legislations on decentralised governance were passed by the Indian Parliament. Ever since, public services at the local level have been sought to be delivered through decentralised governance, which has resulted in good develop-ment outcomes such as the increased participation of people in service delivery improvements and in local development in both rural and urban areas. In order to critically examine the pro-gress that decentralised governance has made in the last 25 years and the impact of democratic decentralisation on development outcomes, this handbook of decentralised governance and development in India presents chapters contributed by eminent scholars who have worked extensively on the subject.

The chapters in this volume aim to provide a historical overview of developments since the introduction of decentralisation reforms (73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, henceforth 73rd and 74th CAAs), critically assess the measures initiated to strengthen decentral-ised institutions and deepen the grassroots democracy, discuss the status of service delivery and identify issues and challenges involved in achieving development at the local level.

Concept of decentralisation

A straightforward definition of decentralisation in the English dictionary is an ‘act or process of giving some of the power of a central government, organisation, etc., to smaller parts or organi-sations around the country’.1 Yet, academicians and development organisations have found it challenging to define decentralisation and the various publications2 that have come up on this subject are testimony to this. In contrast, there is no disagreement on the use of the term cen-tralisation, an antonym of decentralisation, as the concentration of power, resources and author-ity in a centre.

A common approach has been to include changes introduced by the central government towards giving away its powers under decentralisation (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983). According to this approach, decentralisation is the process that transfers political, administrative and fiscal responsibilities (or powers) from the centre to local organisations. Local organisations, in general, include locally elected governments, community based organisations and so on. In

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Decentralised governance and development in India

An introduction

D. Rajasekhar

https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429321887

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D. Rajasekhar

some studies, the transfer of powers by the central government to community based organisa-tions is termed decentralisation.3 In India, however, it is the transfer of functions to consti-tutionally created local governments that is widely viewed as decentralisation.4 Accordingly, decentralisation is defined as the transfer of political, administrative and financial powers by the central government to elected governments at the district, sub-district and village levels. So, one often hears in the Indian discourse that decentralisation means the transfer of the three Fs – functions, functionaries and finances – from the central government to a locally elected government. The transfer of functions from the centre to the periphery takes place on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, which can be defined as the devolution of functions to that government which is best suited to undertaking the devolved functions and delivering good outcomes.

I agree with this view, but would like to go beyond this definition for the simple reason that mere transfer of powers to a locally elected government will not result in decentralisa-tion. In my view, an essential component of decentralisation should be the participation of people in decision-making, empowerment of the community and the democratisation of the society. This is because the transfer of powers takes place, in the first place, for the benefit of the community, including those marginalised – women and persons from the disadvantaged caste groups. Decentralisation is meaningful to the community when people seize the opportunity provided (i.e., utilise the powers that are transferred to the local government), participate in the decision-making process for service delivery and local development and assert their rights and entitlements.

Viewed from this angle, the participation of people in the local government is a dominant par-adigm. Deliberative democracy (deliberation leading to consensus-based decision-making) for improved service delivery and local development is an integral part of decentralised governance. The participation of people in decentralised governance (i.e., taking part in village assemblies, voting in elections) enables the poor to hold the local government accountable and contribute to improved and efficient service delivery. This is likely to result in elected leaders and other elites being accountable to the community for their actions rather than allowing them to capture benefits from or co-opt the marginalised in the process of development. If such empowerment does not take place, the likely result is the exit (Hirschman, 1970) of the people from the process of development, and co-option and capture of benefits through decentralised governance (Lakha, Rajasekhar and Manjula, 2015; Rajasekhar, Devendra Babu and Manjula, 2018), leading to loss of interest in the very decentralisation. The participation of people and hearing their voices will result in improved service delivery and local development, while exit, capture and co-option are unlikely to result in good development outcomes. I therefore define decentralisation as the devolution of political, administrative and fiscal powers from the centre to the locally elected government, and the participation of people and the presence of their voices in improving ser-vice delivery and development through the local government.

Forms of decentralisation

The degree of decision-making power transferred by the central government depends on the form of decentralisation. About 40 years ago, Rondinelli (1981) arrived at three forms of decen-tralisation, and there has been hardly any disagreement on them since.

The first form of decentralisation is deconcentration, which can be in two extreme forms (Rondinelli, 1981, p. 137). At one extreme, it is a mere shifting of the workload from the central government to staff located in outside offices, where staff may not be given powers to decide how these functions should be performed. At the other extreme, a system of field administra-tion is created where the staff, still under the direction and control of the ministry, make routine

5


decisions and adjust the implementation of central directives to conditions in the locality subject to guidelines.

The second form of decentralisation is delegation, which ‘implies the transfer or creation of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities […] to an organisation that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out’ (Rondinelli, 1981, p. 138). Organisations to which functions are delegated are under the indirect control of the central government, and the ultimate responsibility for the functions remains with the latter.

The third, and most radical, form of decentralisation is devolution, which implies the strength-ening or creation of an independent local government. The characteristics of devolution are that a local government (a) will have autonomy and be outside the direct control of the central government; (b) must have clear or legal jurisdiction where it will undertake functions; (c) will be given powers to raise resources to undertake functions; (d) will be developed as an institution, which, in the perception of local citizens, will deliver services to satisfy needs and on which they have an influence; and (e) will have reciprocal and mutually benefiting interaction with other levels of government. It needs to be noted that the central (or higher levels of the) govern-ment will have supervisory power and a financial role, and that the local government will act in accordance with national development plans and policies.

Another form, namely privatisation, is added in another paper by Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1983). According to them, privatisation takes place when the central government divests itself of the responsibility for certain functions and transfers them to, inter alia, volun-tary organisations, cooperatives, religious organisations, parallel organisations and interest groups (farmers’ cooperatives, credit associations, mutual aid societies, village development organisa-tions, women and youth clubs), or allows private enterprises to perform these functions. The responsibilities transferred will include the production of goods and the supply of services (which were hitherto undertaken by the central government or its agencies), supervision of services and so on.

These forms are also seen as a hierarchy of decentralisation types – ranging from the least to the most desirable. Deconcentration is seen as the least desirable form, while devolution is viewed as a process of putting local government firmly and legally on the ground as has been done in India through the 73rd and 74th CAAs. There is considerable dislike in India for privati-sation as a form of decentralisation,5 although privatisation trends are strongly visible in the form of transferring functions to parallel organisations, voluntary agencies, farmers’ producer organi-sations and so on. Falletti (2005), however, argues that one form complements the other – the introduction of the weakest form will lead to the demand for stronger forms of decentralisation.

Another categorisation that one often comes across in the literature is political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. Political decentralisation is the degree to which the central govern-ment allows the local government to undertake political functions of governance. The indica-tors used to measure political decentralisation are representation through elections, articulation and representation of interests, participation and contestation. Administrative decentralisation is defined as the extent to which the local government has autonomy from the central govern-ment in relation to the administrative staff. This is measured in terms of the freedom that the local government has in the recruitment and discipline of staff. Fiscal decentralisation, which is defined as the extent to which the central government has devolved financial powers to the local government, is measured in terms of empowerment in the mobilisation of own revenue and autonomy in expenditures (see Schneider, 2003).

When the three types of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation are firmly estab-lished, one would say that there is democratic decentralisation. This is considered to be much more valuable. Blair (2000, p. 21) defines democratic decentralisation as ‘meaningful authority

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D. Rajasekhar

devolved to local units of governance that are accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty’. Viewed from this angle, democratic decentralisation excludes all those forms and types that do not have a democratic component.

Justification for democratic decentralisation

Why do we need democratic decentralisation? Based on a review of decentralisation experiments in a number of countries, Rondinelli (1981, pp. 135–136) provided 14 benefits of decentralisa-tion. The benefits that top the list are decentralised and need-based planning that reflects the preferences of the community, and overcoming the limitations of centrally controlled national planning such as red tape and highly structured procedures. The other important ones are (a) knowledge of and sensitivity to local problems and needs; (b) greater political and administrative penetration of national government policies; (c) greater representation for political, religious, ethnic and tribal groups in development decision-making; (d) development of flexible, innova-tive and creative administration with greater capability; (e) participation of citizens in develop-ment planning and management; and (f) political stability and national unity.

Based on a review of existing studies, I argue below that there are at least two broad pur-poses for which decentralisation reforms are introduced. The first one is instrumental purpose (a means), namely, to enable citizens to participate in democratic decision-making, and promote transparency and accountability in decision-making, service delivery and local development. Sometimes, it is stated that this is a means as well as an end in itself because the above will result in certain values such as participation, equality, inclusiveness, fair treatment to all citizens and rule of law. These are attributes of good governance and development that are important in themselves. The second purpose is to bring development (an end) in a broader sense including area development, human resource development and poverty reduction. Let us examine each of these in some detail below.

Decentralisation is introduced for good governance (participation, transparency and account-ability) at the local level to achieve development. A central government, the geographical loca-tion of which is far from the residence of a large proportion of the population, will find it difficult to understand the needs of all citizens, prioritise the same and initiate activities to address these needs.6 Even if the central government undertakes these activities, such activities will lead to inefficient outcomes because of information asymmetry.7 On the other hand, local governments, being close to the people, have an information advantage to identify people’s needs, prioritise them, prepare need-based plans and undertake activities. In this, village assem-bly is an important institutional mechanism to secure people’s participation in the deliberation (Rao and Sanyal, 2010: Gibson, 2012). In this entire process of identification of needs and plan-ning activities to address the needs, the local government facilitates the participation of citizens including marginalised populations such as women or those belonging to disadvantaged castes and groups.8 Citizen participation results in a demand for accountability and transparency from the elected leaders and officers and eliminates corruption in the process (Rondinelli, 1983; Kulipossa, 2004; Sharma, 2006). If elected leaders fail in their accountability, they are voted out in the elections. Thus, the purpose of reforms is to bring in decentralised governance (participa-tion, transparency and accountability).

The second important purpose of decentralisation is to achieve certain development out-comes such as human resource development, area development and poverty reduction (Johnson, 2003). Local government, being closer to the people, is in an advantageous position to obtain information on the situation, problems and needs of citizens. The problems and needs of citi-zens may be related to human resource development (drinking water, sanitation, health and

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education), area development (intra- and inter-village roads, streetlights, infrastructure that pro-motes natural resources and so on) and poverty reduction (through development of farm and non-farm activities, provision of wage employment and so on). Leaders elected to the local government will have incentives (such as re-election) to formulate plans in accordance with the above needs and preferences of citizens and implement them for the benefit of people (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Blair, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson, 1989; Kulipossa, 2004; Oates, 1972; Jutting et al., 2005; Smoke, 2015). Decentralised planning provides cost-efficient services as a decentralised government will con-sider local preferences more carefully as compared to the central government (Oates, 1972).

Transferring fiscal powers to local governments such as tax imposition and the use of tax rev-enue for service delivery strengthens the relationship between citizens and elected leaders. The needs and preferences of citizens will have to be incorporated into the planning and implemen-tation of development plans; otherwise, citizens will refuse to pay taxes and defeat leaders not accountable to them in elections. The accountability of elected leaders can further be enhanced through civil society and community based organisations (Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri, 2007; Sanyal, 2009). All these will result in good development outcomes.

Policies of affirmative action for disadvantaged groups such as women and those belong-ing to depressed castes will promote inclusive development by encouraging participation from these disadvantaged groups in the decentralised planning and implementation (Duflo, 2005). Because of such participation and voices, the locally elected government will be expected to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of public officials,9 and promote the coverage, qual-ity and efficiency of service provision through better governance and resource allocation10 (Robinson, 2007; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Besley et al., 2012; Rajasekhar and Manjula, 2012: Deininger et al., 2015; Smoke, 2015), although some studies are cautious in their conclu-sions about the beneficial impact of affirmative action policies (Kudva, 2005; Ban and Rao, 2008 and Jayal, 2006).

There are, however, critiques of decentralisation (Prud’homme, 1995). Bardhan (2002, p. 187) argues that uncritical celebration of decentralisation may lead one to overlook its limitations. Some of the limitations are (a) that decentralisation reforms may not benefit backward regions to the same extent that they have benefited developed regions; (b) poor governance leading to the ‘exit’ of marginalised groups from participation because of the perception that ‘nobody lis-tens to them’; (c) elite capture of benefits that are meant for the poor (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006); and (d) livelihood concerns preventing the poor from participating in the decentralised government (Rajasekhar, Babu and Manjula, 2018).

Evolution of local self-government in India

The rural local government in India is called a panchayat, which literally means an assembly of five people. Panchayats have existed in India since Vedic times. Nadkarni, Sivanna and Suresh (2018) review the evolution of local government from the Vedic times to the British India period and note that there was a well-structured and well-functioning local decentralised insti-tution with women participation in ancient India. Despite some setbacks in the post-Buddha period, the continued presence of village assemblies, town councils and guilds indicates that some form of local decision-making prevailed.

During medieval India, the local bodies particularly at the village level ‘performed several functions: managing community lands, collection of taxes, keeping track of ownership and transfer of lands, maintaining peace and order, and looking after village temples and their needs’ (Nadkarni, Sivanna and Suresh, 2018, p. 107). They survived the onslaught of hostile Muslim

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invaders. Akbar accepted the village institutions and made them part of his civic administration. However, the introduction of feudal chiefs and revenue collectors from the Mughal period onwards gradually weakened the role of these village-level decentralised institutions, especially in the collection of land revenue. Mughals placed city administration in the hands of the office of Kotwal, a centralised autocratic regime, although the public charity of local merchants and guilds ensured that some towns received drinking water through wells and tanks and other civic amenities such as parks and schools.

So, when the British arrived in India, they found local bodies in several villages. In the eyes of the British, these were dominated by upper castes and rich cultivators, and were not repre-sentative of the village (Maddick, 1970). Lower-caste households eking out a livelihood from wage labour in agriculture did not have much say in these bodies. The British did not build upon these traditional institutions which had the village as the basic unit of governance. The reforms introduced by Lord Ripon and others created local boards at the block level, far from villages. According to Nadkarni, Sivanna and Suresh (2018), this was done for better supervision from above. The British reforms on decentralisation did not have an adult franchise as the base, and compromised equality (especially women participation). Local boards were widely seen as appendages of the British administration (Maddick, 1970). Thus, at the time of independence, panchayats were found to be weak in many parts of India.

Local self-government figured prominently during the struggle for India’s freedom from colonial rule. Spearheading the discussion, Mahatma Gandhi argued for village swaraj as an independent republic, yet linked with many other institutions. The lack of consensus on local government resulted in the mention of this only in the directive principles leading to the non-formulation of legislation firmly placing panchayats in India. The need for vibrant micro-insti-tutional arrangement to involve the people was, however, felt soon after independence as rural development programmes such as Community Development Programme of 1952 did not suc-ceed in enabling the people to participate in the governance. In 1957, the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee was appointed to assess the extent to which community development projects and national extension services had succeeded in the utilisation of local initiatives and creation of institutions to ensure continuity in the process of improving economic and social conditions in rural areas. The committee recommended the establishment of three-tier, elected Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs), and the devolution of the necessary resources, power and authority to them so that the community could be meaningfully involved in the planning, decision-making and implementation process. The Santhanam committee was appointed in 1963 to look into the fiscal aspects of PRIs.

Soon after this, PRIs were set up in several Indian states and were beginning to make some difference at the local level. However, two important developments resulted in the weakening of the Panchayati Raj system. First, the loss of Congress party influence at the grassroots level resulted in a process which could be called centralisation. Second, PRIs did not succeed in bringing democratic decentralisation, increasing the participation of people – especially those belonging to SC and ST communities – or addressing the issues concerned with the develop-ment. This has been attributed to the resistance by politicians and bureaucrats at the state level to share power and resources with the PRIs, domination of the local elite over the implementation of rural development programmes, capacity constraints in PRIs, corruption, inadequate devolu-tion of powers and responsibilities to panchayats, frequent interference into the Panchayat Raj system by the government and its officials, irregular elections within Panchayat Raj bodies, etc. (Mathew, 1994).

The imposition of emergency and the call for strengthening the democracy of the society generated an interest in decentralised decision-making at the local level. As it was realised that

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PRIs were not playing an effective role in rural development, a high-level committee under the chairmanship of Ashok Mehta was appointed to examine and suggest measures to strengthen PRIs. The committee recommended PRIs as a two-tier system, with Mandal Panchayat at the base and Zilla Parishad at the top. It believed that the PRIs were capable of planning for them-selves with the resources available to them, and that such planning should take care of the rural–urban continuum. The committee recommended four-year terms to PRIs and reservations to SC and ST households.

The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts

Following the Ashok Mehta Committee report, and the experience of West Bengal and the Karnataka states in decentralised governance in the 1980s, the discussion on ways of securing people’s participation in the development process through PRIs and the devolution of powers continued. In addition, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, suggesting liberalisation policies for addressing the problems of poverty, unemployment, ill-health and poor education, stressed the revitalisation of local government to secure people’s participation in addressing these prob-lems and carrying out the development.

In response to the above, historic legislations (the 73rd and 74th CAAs) were passed in 1992. Hailed as important landmarks for their radical approach towards decentralisation, these legisla-tions devolved powers to sub-state level governments and sought to ensure the participation of citizens in general and disadvantaged groups in particular. These legislations sought to bring a new political system at the grassroots level by giving priority to decentralised political institu-tions and to people’s participation in local governance and planning. In rural areas, a three-tier model with democratically elected governments at the village (Grama Panchayat), block/taluk (Taluk Panchayat) and district (Zilla Panchayat) levels was adopted. These were the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) that have become the rural part of decentralised governance in India. In urban areas, the 74th CAA provided a legislative framework for the establishment and strength-ening of urban decentralisation. The two legislations incorporated the following provisions to strengthen decentralised governance in rural as well as urban areas.

Gram and Ward Sabha

In order to enable the participation of people in decision-making processes for the identifica-tion and prioritisation of needs, as well as the preparation and implementation of plans, a pro-vision for the Grama Sabha consisting of all voters in the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat and Ward Sabhas in urban areas was made. Grama Sabha will exercise such powers and perform such functions at the village level as decided by the state government. These institutions are expected to play key roles in the monitoring the implementation of development plans, and the promo-tion of accountability, at the local level. Certain rules such as quorum, mandatory participation of women and so on aim to ensure that citizens including women and those belonging to dis-advantaged castes do participate in the decision-making.

Mandatory elections

A five-year term is uniformly provided to all local governments in rural and urban areas with elections within six months in the case of premature dissolution. In view of irregular elections before the 73rd and 74th CAAs, mandatory elections to local governments once in

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five years are expected to promote the accountability of elected leaders to the decentralised government.

Reservations to disadvantaged groups

Historically, the participation of disadvantaged groups (women and those belonging to SC and ST communities) in decentralised governance was limited or non-existent because of the pre-vailing social and economic structure. In order to improve their representation and participation in the local self-government, one-third of seats and executive positions are reserved for women and for persons belonging to SC/ST categories; the reservation for SCs and STs is done accord-ing to proportion to their population.

Constitution of the finance commission

PRIs should have adequate resources to implement plans prepared by the people and fulfil their aspirations. In view of changing aspirations, there is also a need to periodically revise the quan-tum of funds to be provided to PRIs. The amendments have, therefore, made it mandatory to constitute a finance commission once in five years to review the finances and to recommend the size of funds to be allocated to PRIs and also the principles and the basis on which taxes should be collected in the jurisdiction of Grama Panchayats and urban local bodies.

Devolution of functions

Article 243G empowers the state governments to endow panchayats with such powers and authority to enable them to function as institutions of self-government. Panchayats are made responsible for the preparation and execution of plans for economic development and social justice with regard to functions listed in the 11th and 12th schedules of the Constitution.

The volume and its major themes

After the historic legislations on decentralised governance were passed by the Indian Parliament in the early 1990s, all the Indian states passed conformity acts and implemented the provisions of these two historic legislations. Elections to PRIs were held regularly, barring a few deviations here and there. The policy of reservations was followed in the last 27 years, and this has improved the representation of women and those belonging to depressed castes significantly. State finance commissions (SFCs) were constituted in different states, although several states have defaulted in terms of the Constitution of the required number of commissions in the last 27 years and in the implementation of their recommendations. The state governments transferred some or all the functions relating to local development and sought to deliver public services at the local level in accordance with principles and practices of decentralised governance.

A three-day seminar on Twenty-five Years of Decentralised Governance in India: Status, Issues and the Way Forward was organised by the Centre for Decentralisation and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru to critically examine the progress that decentralised governance has made since then and the impact of democratic decentralisation on development outcomes. In the seminar, which was organised during 28–30 August 2018, 36 papers were presented. Of them, those providing an overview of developments relating to various aspects of decentralisation for the last 27 years, assessing their status and discussing issues, are included in this volume. In addition, five chapters (dealing with evolution of decentralisation, Grama

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Sabha, capacity building, urban decentralisation and natural resource management) were added to make the volume complete in terms of issues covered. The chapters included in the volume were revised three times in response to comments provided by the editor, experts and reviewers of Routledge.

This volume is unique in the following respects.

• To the best of my knowledge, this is the only volume on decentralisation in India which provides a historical overview – which documents the developments in the decentralisation during the first 40 years of the post-independence period and, later, 27 years of decentral-ised governance after historic legislations were passed and complied with by Indian states.

• This is perhaps the only volume on decentralisation which provides a comprehensive account on decentralisation covering the setting (for the initiation of decentralisation reforms in India), different dimensions of decentralisation (political, administrative, functional and fiscal), decentralised governance in rural and urban areas and finally sectoral aspects of decen-tralisation. Almost all the chapters provide the status at the all-India level with the help of secondary data collected from devolutions index reports, finance commission reports and so on, and provide an assessment of the subject chosen for a discussion.

• Third, given that the volume is comprehensive in dealing with diverse aspects of the decen-tralisation, the conclusions and key arguments that emerge from the volume will be of considerable relevance to policy-makers and researchers in India and outside.

• A number of universities and other educational institutions in India offer a course on decentralised governance for development. In addition, competitive exams conducted by the central and state governments for various administrative positions also include the subject of the Panchayati Raj system in India. There is no textbook which covers various aspects of decentralisation in India in a comprehensive and historical manner. This volume fills in this gap.

The chapters in this volume are presented in five parts. Part 1 deals with the setting, while Part 2 discusses different dimensions of decentralisation. Parts 3 and 4 are on rural decentralised gov-ernance and urban decentralised governance, respectively. The last part is devoted to a discussion of sectoral aspects of decentralisation.

Part 1: The setting

The two chapters included in this part deal with the history of decentralisation in India before the enactment of the two legislations (the 73rd and 74th CAAs) and address the following ques-tions: What was the background to decentralisation reforms in India? What factors influenced the enactment of these legislations?

M. V. Nadkarni, in his chapter ‘Seeing Panchayati Raj Institutions in India and their his-tory from a Gandhian perspective’, argues that Gandhi’s perspective provided an important motive for ushering in PRIs. Gandhi’s contribution lies in providing certain moral principles of governance with which to judge the actual PRIs today. These principles, derived from his faith in truth and nonviolence, emphasised people’s sovereignty, individual dignity and freedom, self-rule, equality, inclusiveness, commitment to the welfare of all (Sarvodaya) – not just of a majority – non-discrimination and, last but not least, avoidance of hierarchy, authoritarianism and patronisation from above. In his Hind Swaraj (1909), Gandhi sought an alternative to the prevailing political and economic system; decentralised democracy in the form of PRIs was an integral part of this alternative. People’s active participation in governance was seen as its very

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life-blood by him. Merely instituting local governments but dominated by and totally depend-ent on the state and central governments was not Gandhi’s idea of Panchayati Raj.

The second chapter of Part 1 – ‘The evolution of devolution’ by V. K. Natraj – analyses factors that influenced the evolution of decentralisation/devolution. The writings of Mahatma Gandhi and opposition to his view constituted the first factor. Mahatma Gandhi’s idea of decentrali-sation, where the village was the centre, did not receive much support from members of the Constituent Assembly who favoured a western or Anglo-American style of Constitution with a parliamentary democracy. Second, the period just after independence was not considered to be the right time for decentralisation as the need to maintain the unity and integrity of the country was considered to be immense. Third, with the techno-centric approach to agricultural development through the green revolution in the 1960s to 1970s, the institutional structures required for the development were almost absent from the discussion, thereby resulting in less emphasis on decentralised government in the policy discourse. The fourth important factor is the perspective on development which has undergone changes over time. Factors such as the emergence of scepticism about the role of centralised governance, the neglect of the human side of development, economic reforms and the growth of civil society and public participation have played fairly important roles in the development of the devolution perspective. Finally, the coalition politics bringing changes in the centre-state power equation also paved the way for devolution policies.

Part 2: Dimensions of decentralisation

The three important dimensions of the decentralisation – political, administrative and fiscal – are discussed in Part 2 of the volume by raising the following questions: Are political parties working for devolution of powers through local governments and developing the culture of political decentralisation? Does the local government have administrative autonomy – that is, freedom to recruit and control the staff? Is the local government empowered to mobilise its own revenue and take appropriate decisions on expenditure? Did finance commissions strengthen fiscal decentralisation? Could Panchayats and urban local bodies develop decentralised plans for economic development and social justice? For the benefit of 9 percent of the tribes in India, the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) was passed in 1996 and areas from ten Indian states came under the act. What is the status of the implementation of PESA? The six chapters included in this part address these questions.

George Mathew, in his chapter ‘Political decentralisation: the role of political parties from colonial times’, analyses the history of political decentralisation in India from the Ripon Resolution (1882), which is considered the Magna Carta of local governments, and provides a detailed discussion on arguments for and against the elections to panchayats on political party symbols. While political decentralisation is associated with pluralistic politics and representative government, it also supports democratisation by giving citizens more influence in the formula-tion and implementation of policies through reservations, Grama Sabha and district planning. Although political parties did not support decentralisation, the judiciary stood by the panchay-ats, brilliant young people came forward to contest in panchayat elections and the improved par-ticipation of women and disadvantaged groups brought accountability and transparency issues to the forefront.

The chapter ‘Rural local governance and administrative decentralisation: an institutional analysis’ by N. Sivanna and N. Veeresha looks at the status of administrative decentralisation with the help of indices of devolution across the states. The authors seek to find out the extent of the devolution of powers by the state governments to the rural local governments to recruit,

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discipline and transfer the personnel, analyse issues and challenges faced by PRIs in the admin-istrative decentralisation and identify measures needed to strengthen the same. They argue that administrative decentralisation has taken place in the form of delegation rather than devolution, and that the recruitment, supervision and control of panchayat staff are still in the hands of state government and line departments.

The two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) by M. A. Oommen, ‘Fiscal decentralisation in India: status and raising issues’ and ‘State sub-state level fiscal decentralisation in India: theoretical issues and policy options’ are on fiscal decentralisation. They are interconnected and hence must be read together. In Chapter 6, Oommen examines the direction, progress and quality of the pro-cess of fiscal decentralisation as this plays an important role in determining the extent to which decentralised governments become viable agents of social and economic transformation at the local level. After outlining the manner in which the central and state governments have gone about the process of fiscal decentralisation, he presents the progress, status and quality under four heads (fiscal assignments, transfer system, basic services and horizontal equity and creating institutions of local self-government). He argues that important problems plaguing fiscal decen-tralisation are inefficient functional assignments (non-specification of roles and responsibilities of panchayats; not defining the boundaries of the state government) and funds and functionaries not following functions and expenditure responsibilities. In Chapter 7, Oommen analyses the potential of the Union Finance Commission to reduce inter-state horizontal disparities and of the State Finance Commission to reduce intra-state disparities in the delivery of minimum basic services to the citizens of India. The state governments tasked with implementing the recom-mendations of SFCs have failed in rectifying the vertical and horizontal imbalances at the state sub-state level. The state governments have also not adhered to the constitutional mandate of the periodic constitution of SFCs, placing SFC reports in the public domain and preparing action-taken reports. Specific purpose finance (or tied fund) dominates vertical transfers in almost all the states and untied funds are either small or non-existent, making it difficult for the local gov-ernment to carry out planning for the functions devolved to them for economic development and social justice.

In his chapter ‘Decentralised planning in India: challenges and prospects’, M. Devendra Babu provides a historical overview of local-level development planning in India during the planning period through the recommendations and suggestions of various committees and commissions on decentralised planning. Offering a summary of the decentralisation of functions, functionar-ies and finance across states and the status of district planning committees (DPCs), the author argues that the attention paid to decentralised planning is inadequate, and that panchayats con-fine their role to service delivery and some agency functions in the absence of real devolution. He also underlines the emerging policy trends towards a re-centralisation of functions and finances.

The Indian government’s Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), passed in 1996 in order to address the needs of tribal people, aims at empowering tribes in states with Fifth Scheduled Areas to manage their local affairs and to preserve and safeguard their traditions and customs, their cultural identities as well as their customary modes of social–personal rela-tions. In his chapter ‘Implementation of PESA and status of Panchayati Raj institutions in Fifth Scheduled Areas of Indian states: issues, challenges and ways ahead’, Yatindra Singh Sisodia pro-vides an overview on the functioning of the PESA Act with the help of primary data collected from representatives of local governments located in the contiguous Fifth Scheduled Areas of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan. He argues that while PESA provided an impetus to the functioning of panchayats in the tribal areas, there was little progress with regard to fulfilling the overall development needs of tribes in the Fifth Scheduled Areas.

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Part 3: Decentralised rural governance

The main intentions behind the 73rd CAA were to create institutional structures for decen-tralised rural governance, facilitate the participation of citizens, especially those belonging to disadvantaged groups, and democratise rural society. How has Grama Sabha, an important insti-tution created to facilitate the participation of citizens, performed over the last 27 years? Has decentralisation contributed to the democratisation of society? What are the unanticipated con-sequences? What has been the role of traditional and informal panchayats in decentralised rural governance? What is the role of the size of the local government; capacity development; and information and communications technology (ICT) in influencing decentralised rural govern-ance? The six chapters in this part address these questions.

D. Rajasekhar and R. Manjula in their chapter ‘Deliberative democracy through Grama Sabha: progress and issues’ discuss the progress made in the functioning of Grama Sabha (GS) – an institution created to promote deliberative democracy; assess the needs and preferences of citizens and incorporate the same into planning; oversee the implementation of development programmes; and ensure the accountability of the local government to citizens and its progress in decentralising rural governance and improving service delivery at the grassroots level. With the help of a secondary source review and evidence from the states of Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, this chapter discusses the functioning of GS, progress in the people’s participation and impact on service delivery. The authors argue that although Grama Sabha resulted in important benefits such as improved participation and the strengthening of democratic decision-making and politics at the local level, its effectiveness in promoting deliberative democracy in all states was limited by a number of factors.

Manish Thakur, in his chapter ‘Decentralised governance in India: the anticipated and the unanticipated’, provides a sociological perspective on decentralisation by providing a synop-tic review of the benefits of the 73rd CAA in relation to its impact on social structure and processes of politicisation. He argues that although decentralisation policies have not led to substantial improvement in the quality of the delivery of public services at the grassroots level, they have created an unanticipated public good of making the rural stratification system quite malleable. They have done so by letting the idea of democratic citizenship take strong roots in the countryside and opening up the field of political representation to hitherto marginalised communities. He further argues that these unanticipated consequences should not necessarily be detrimental to the overall public good even when they undermine the efficacy of the antici-pated policy outcomes.

Customary village councils (CVCs), as collegiate, collective and cooperative institutions, have existed since Mughal times, and are engaged in religious activities, dispute resolution, social service and support and participation in development activities. What explains the persistence of these institutions at the village level? What are the domains in which CVCs and Grama Panchayats interact? What is the nature and impact of interaction? Kripa Ananthpur, in her chapter ‘Interrogating local democracy: formal and informal local governance in Karnataka’, analyses these questions as they have deeper implications for local democracy with the help of three sets of research data collected over a period of 15 years. After providing a detailed account of the pattern of membership in CVCs, leadership, participation of different socio-economic groups, legitimacy of these institutions and their activities, the author argues that the coexistence of Grama Panchayats and CVCs is attributed to complementary roles performed by them, and contributes to our understanding of the concept of ‘institutional dualism’.

D. Narayana in his chapter ‘Good governance in Gram Panchayats of Kerala: not so good?’ puts forward a hypothesis that the size of the local government matters in local governance. It is widely

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regarded that a decentralised government is best-suited for the provision of public and quasi-public goods, identification of target groups of beneficiaries and effective implementation of poli-cies. In the context of an Indian decentralisation that is over two-and-half decades old, Kerala is often talked about as a success story. Among the Indian states, Kerala is often credited with taking democratic decentralisation forward and achieving remarkable results in the provision of public services. These achievements of Kerala are often attributed to political decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation. The issue explored in this chapter is whether a viable size and historical advan-tage of higher literacy and lower social gradient in education played a part in this success. Given that the success is confined to the provision of services benefiting individuals the often-heard story is hard to believe. The author argues in this chapter that the size of Grama Panchayats matters in the good governance with reference to Kerala state, and that this has a theoretical foundation.

In his chapter ‘Capacity development for good governance in panchayats: status, effectiveness and issues’, D. Rajasekhar examines the effectiveness of capacity development policies and pro-grammes for about three million elected representatives (ERs) of local government and discusses the issues involved in the capacity development. With the help of a review of secondary sources and literature, the chapter shows that the policies and programmes were in line with the require-ment for capacity development of ERs; of them, most are women and belong to disadvantaged caste groups having little prior experience in decentralised governance. However, a gradual shift of the policies away from the qualitative development of the capacity of ERs and limited decentralisation adversely affected the effectiveness of these policies. The implementation of policies and programmes was such that they aimed at quantitative dimensions of training rather than quality aspects. The mere provision of training to ERs did not result in significant capacity development in the absence of sufficient devolution of powers and an appropriate decentralisa-tion framework.

Technology is needed for informed decision-making, efficient service delivery and enhanced participation, transparency and accountability. Information and communications technology (ICT) can be used for interaction between four different groups of stakeholders, namely govern-ment to government, government to business, government to citizen and citizen to government. The chapter on ‘ICT for local governance: status, emerging issues and prospects’ by Inderjeet Singh Sodhi provides a broad spectrum of the programmes and projects launched to introduce ICT and e-governance in the functioning of local government. The author traces the status of the implementation of ICT projects wherein the local government stores and exchanges data on a variety of aspects and provides speedy delivery of services, bringing out the nuances of introducing ICT in different schemes of government at the national level.

Part 4: Decentralised urban governance

India has experienced an unprecedented growth of its urban population in recent decades. Given that such rapid growth is on account of migration into towns and cities, and that growing urban populations put enormous pressure on infrastructure, basic services, land, housing and the environment, there is an immense need to strengthen democratic decentralisation in urban areas. This is because issues relating to basic services in urban areas are local and so citizen participa-tion in decentralised governance is crucial. Hence, the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (1992), relating to urban decentralised governance, was introduced. Although there were a few studies soon after the legislation, research on decentralised urban governance has been neglected in India, and as compared to decentralised rural governance not many scholars have in the past paid attention to issues relating to urban decentralised governance. The three chapters in this part therefore deal with urban decentralised governance.

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In his chapter ‘Decentralised governance in urban areas: problems and prospects from a socio-historical perspective’, N. Jayaram traces the idea and practice of urban governance from a socio-historical perspective. It starts with a discussion of the introduction of urban governance institutions in the form of municipalities in the colonial era and the changes this institution underwent in the post-independence period up to the enactment of the 74th Amendment in 1992. It then examines the nature and trends in the decentralised urban governance since the implementation of this amendment in 1993. Jayaram argues that there is a disjunction between the objectives of the 74th Amendment and the reality of urban governance regarding the rela-tionship between the state governments and urban local bodies, the dynamics of party politics and power play in relation to urban governance, the problems associated with the funding of the urban bodies, and the similarities and differences across the cities under the three tiers.

Amita Bhide in her chapter ‘Urban local governance: revising the fundamentals’ analyses the state of urban decentralised governance linked to land-use planning and regulation/control of building, as well as poverty alleviation. She finds that the status of devolution is poor and that we have, even after 25 years of the 74th Amendment, created a highly complex, fragmented and confused system of urban governance that produces poor outcomes on the ground. She notes that ‘a new lease of life’ to urban local governments that was expected to be provided by the 74th Amendment has remained a dream, and that decentralised reforms failed to make a dent in the situation of highly dependent, incapable, corrupt and inefficient urban local governments. Even while contemporary urban programmes pay lip service to the issue of urban decentrali-sation, there is very little action on ground. The author argues that the failure to decentralise is rooted in the mismatch between the actual nature of Indian cities, changes in their political environment and the precepts of urban decentralisation.

In the context of a highly unsatisfactory state of municipal finances and intergovernmental transfers to municipalities, the chapter ‘Intergovernmental transfers to urban local bodies in India: issues and directions for reforms’ by Shibani Mishra, Alok Kumar Mishra and Prerna Panda looks at the fiscal federalism and public finance frameworks mandated by the Constitution of India and the role of state and central finance commissions in the schemes of central–state and state–local transfers. The theory and practice of intergovernmental transfers, including both international and national practices, are analysed to draw lessons for designing a robust system of fiscal transfers to ULBs in India and suggest directions for reforms in the system of intergovern-mental transfers to municipalities in India in the context of the new regime of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) which has subsumed some important municipal taxes. The authors argue for a robust framework of municipal finance, including the sharing of tax bases or tax yields at the state level, the sharing of the divisible pool of taxes at the central level and a partnership-based approach to finance urban infrastructure.

Part 5: Sectoral aspects of decentralisation

The three chapters in this final part look at the sectoral aspects of decentralisation. These aspects are poverty reduction through the provision of wage employment, decentralised natural resource management and decentralised management of forest resources.

In her chapter ‘Implementing workfare through decentralised government for poverty reduction’, R. Manjula examines the evolution of workfare (work + welfare) programmes for the creation of wage employment for the poor to achieve the objectives of poverty allevia-tion and livelihood security in India. Several workfare programmes have been implemented since independence to address the problem of seasonal unemployment in rural areas, but the outcomes were poor. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

17


(MGNREGS) was therefore implemented in 2006. Grama Panchayats are assigned a greater role in the implementation of programmes meant for poverty alleviation and employment crea-tion. The author analyses the progress made in the implementation of MGNREGS through decentralised government and the challenges faced in the provision of wage employment. The implementation of MGNREGS by the local government shows that the scheme was successful in providing wage employment to female workers and in raising agricultural wages, but chal-lenges such as the hoarding of job cards, inadequate provision of work and delays in the release of wages still remain to be addressed.

The next chapter, ‘The policy and practice of decentralised natural resource management in India’ by Mahima Upadhyay, looks at the policy and the practice of decentralised natural resource management against the background of decentralisation being practiced in India as an institu-tional mechanism to deal with resource degradation and ensure efficiency, equity and sustain-ability in resource management. The institutional arrangements adopt a pluralistic-polycentric approach within a decentralised framework and involve the community, the line departments and the local government in the management of natural resources. The author argues that the practice, however, seems to favour the user groups over other institutional structures such as the local governments. Second, though the outcomes of natural resource management have been mixed, community participation has had a significant role in the success of decentralised man-agement of resources. Given that the local government is constitutionally mandated to promote deliberative democracy, there is a need to strengthen its role in the resource management arena.

The final chapter in the volume is entitled ‘Devolving rights to forest dwellers: politics of institutional choice and recognition in the Forest Rights Act Implementation process in West Bengal, India’ by Bidhan Kanti Das. This chapter analyses the implementation process of the Forest Right Act (2006) at the state level, using an ‘institutional choice and recognition’ framework for decentralisation reforms in the forestry sector. Based on micro-level evidence in Maoist-affected districts of West Bengal, India, this chapter explores the reasons behind this ‘institutional choice and recognition’ by the state. It also tries to examine the consequences of choosing and recognising a new institutional arrangement at the state level. It is argued that the ‘bundle of forest rights’ under the act has been reduced to only individual land titles on the ground, denying ‘community forest rights’ claims in the governance of forest resources. Second, the state government treated individual land rights claims as another ‘beneficiary scheme’ of the local government, with the intention of ‘political clientelism’ to secure votes in democratic politics in rural West Bengal. Third, the recognition of individual land titles will allow the forest department to retain its power and authority over forest resources. The state should therefore play an important role in transferring power to the local government for the management of natural resources.

Towards a conclusion

The Handbook of Decentralised Governance and Development in India reaches the following over-all conclusions. The ideas of Mahatma Gandhi positively influenced the design of decentral-ised governance. Mahatma Gandhi’s moral principles of governance, in particular decentralised democracy, formed important components of the 73rd and 74th CAAs such as mandatory elec-tions, provision of Grama and Ward Sabhas, mandatory participation of disadvantaged groups in the meetings of these institutions and reservations to disadvantaged groups to promote people’s participation in the decision-making and democratisation of the society. This design, as the chapters in this volume show, contributed to the spread of deliberative democracy and democ-ratisation of society in some Indian states. Panchayats created a new type of political opportunity

18

D. Rajasekhar

structure at the village level in an unprecedented way and have furthered the spread and reach of democratic political contestation to the hitherto politically uninitiated. It should, however, be noted that the functioning of Grama Sabha, an institution created to promote deliberative democracy, was adversely affected by poor implementation, frequent changes in the functions assigned to Grama Sabha, schemes (sponsored at the central as well as state government levels) making deliberative democracy redundant and parallel bodies marginalising people’s assembly.

The gap between the principles of decentralised governance and practice in the field has continued even after 27 years of decentralised governance reforms. Political decentralisation has not received much support from political parties, which do not even ensure that elections to panchayats are held on political party symbols on a uniform basis. The administrative decentrali-sation has taken the form of delegation rather than devolution, and panchayats do not have con-trol over their staff, leading to unproductive devolution of functions on account of inadequate staff to carry out devolved functions. The problem of inefficient functional assignment continues to plague the fiscal decentralisation. The cardinal principle of public finance that the allocation of funds and functionaries should follow functions or expenditure responsibilities is not adhered to. The much-needed simultaneous transfer of disaggregated functions, funds and functionaries has not happened in any desired pace and manner.

State finance commissions (SFCs) are provided in the decentralised governance reforms to bring in an efficient transfer system that ensures predictable vertical transfers to rectify the expenditure and resource mismatch, facilitate horizontal equity and offset the comparative fiscal disadvantages of panchayats and municipalities. Here again there is a hiatus between principle and practice. Most SFCs and the state governments tasked to implement the recommendations of SFCs have failed to rectify the vertical and horizontal imbalances at the state sub-state level. The state governments have also not adhered to the constitutional mandate of the periodic constitution of SFCs, placing SFC reports in the public domain and preparing action-taken reports. Specific purpose finance (or tied fund) dominates the vertical transfers in almost all the states and untied funds form either a small or a non-existent part of the total funds, thus mak-ing it difficult for the local government to carry out decentralised planning for the functions devolved to them. As a result, the development outcomes, as shown by the chapters that focus on sectoral aspects of decentralisation, have tended to be poor and uneven across the regions and social groups.

Several chapters in this volume show that there is an underlying tendency to re-usurp pan-chayat functions by the staff of panchayats or line departments. It is the staff of line departments who prepare plans for panchayats under the supervision and guidance of state-level depart-mental heads. Most of the funds are allocated to district rural development agencies, which are independent of panchayats in many states and are headed by bureaucrats. A discussion on capacity development policies and programmes shows that there is a shift in the focus of these programmes away from elected representatives to the training of staff and training infrastructure leading to re-usurpation of panchayat powers and functions by bureaucrats. The discussion on decentralised management of natural resources as well as forests in the volume also shows the tendency to re-usurp panchayat functions through user groups in the case of natural resource management and by not recognising the community rights to forest resources.

The idea and practice of urban governance show a disjunction between the objectives of the 74th Amendment and the reality of urban governance regarding the relationship between the state governments and urban local bodies, the dynamics of party politics and power play in rela-tion to urban governance, the problems associated with the funding of the urban bodies, and the similarities and differences across the cities under the three tiers. The fundamental concepts of ‘urban’ or ‘local’ or the ‘nature of the institution at the local level’ are being contested, and need

19


to be revisited. It is argued that top-down efforts to bring urban decentralisation are likely to encounter resistance at multiple levels and be prone to manipulation and co-option to produce a highly complex and fragmented political space, unless accompanied by moves to encourage a simultaneous bottom-up demand for local autonomy.

Notes

1 www .o xford learn ersdi ction aries .com/ defin ition /engl ish /d ecent raliz e (accessed on 25 October 2020).

2 See, for instance, Wallis (1991), UNDP (1999), Schneider (2003) and Mewes (2011).3 In the literature on decentralised natural resource management, the transfer of certain functions to user

groups in the management of natural resources is termed ‘decentralisation’. See, for instance, Ribot, Agrawal and Larson (2006).

4 According to this view, the transfer of functions to organisations other than local government (that is, line departments, community-based organisations and so on) does not constitute decentralisation.

5 In a seminar on the decentralised delivery of educational services held at the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (NIEPA), New Delhi, participants disagreed that privatisa-tion is one of the forms of decentralisation as it would then mean that private schools set up in India will qualify to be called decentralised units.

6 During the COVID-19 lockdown period, the strong call for decentralised decision-making by indi-vidual state governments regarding the pandemic was made as it was felt that the central government would not be in a position to determine the intensity of the disease in a locality and the ameliorative measures that should be taken.

7 Information asymmetry theory proposes that an imbalance in information between the two parties leads to inefficient outcomes.

8 Heller and Rao (2015) term this ‘deliberative democracy’. See this book for a detailed discussion.9 The mechanism through which this happens is that female leaders tend to be less criminal and corrupt,

more efficacious and less vulnerable to political opportunism (see Baskaran et al., 2018).10 Besley et al. (2004) find that the reservation of seats for SC/ST resulted in the enhanced targeting of

public goods in favour of households belonging to these communities.

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Decentralised governance and development in India Ban, Radu. and Rao, Vijayendra. (2008). ‘Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women Reservations onVillage Democracies in South India’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 56(3), pp. 501–530. Bardhan, P. (2002). ‘Decentralization of Governance and Development’, Journal of Economic Perspectives,16(4), pp. 185–205. Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2006). ‘Decentralization and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery inDeveloping Countries’, The Economic Journal, 116, pp. 101–127. Baskaran, T. , Bhalotra, S. , Min, B. and Uppal, Y. (2018). ‘Women Legislators and Economic Performance’,IGC Working Paper, Reference Number: S-35326-INC-1, May. Besley, Timothy. , Pande, Rohini. , Rahman, Lupin. and Rao, Vijayendra. (2004). ‘The Politics of PublicGood Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments’, Journal of the European Economic Association,2(2–3), pp. 416–426. Besley, Timothy. , Pande, Rohini. and Rao, Vijayendra. (2012). ‘Just Rewards? Local Politics and PublicResource Allocation in South India’, The World Bank Economic Review, 26(2), pp. 191–216. Blair, Harry. (2000). ‘Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in SixCountries’, World Development, 28(1), pp. 21–39. Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra. and Duflo, Esther. (2004). ‘Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from aRandomised Policy Experiment in India’, Econometrica, 72(5), pp. 1409–1443. Crook, Richard C. and Manor, James. (1998). Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and WestAfrica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crook, Richard C. and Sverrisson, Alan Sturla. (2001). ‘Decentralisation and Poverty Alleviation inDeveloping Countries: A Comparative Analysis or, Is West Bengal Unique?’, IDS Working Papers 130,Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Deininger, Klaus. , Jin, Songqing. , Nagarajan, Hari K. and Xia, Fang. (2015). ‘Does Female ReservationAffect Long-term Political Outcomes? Evidence from Rural India’, Journal of Development Studies, 51(1), pp.32–49. Duflo, Esther. (2005). ‘Why Political Reservations?’ Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2–3),pp. 668–678. Falleti, T. G. (2005). ‘A Sequential Theory Of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in ComparativePerspective’, American Political Science Review, 99(3): 327–346. Gibson, C. (2012). ‘Making Redistributive Democracy Matter: Development and Women’s Participation in theGram Sabhas of Kerala, India’, American Sociological Review, 77(3), pp. 409–434. Heller, Patrick. , Harilal, K. N. and Chaudhuri, Shubham. (2007). ‘Building Local Democracy: Evaluating theImpact of Decentralization in Kerala, India’, World Development, 35, pp. 626–648. Heller, Patrick. and Rao, Vijayendra. (eds.) (2015). Deliberation and Development: Rethinking the Role ofVoice and Collective Action in Unequal Societies. Washington: World Bank. Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations andStates. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Jayal, Niraja Gopal. (2006). ‘Engendering Local Democracy: The Impact of Quotas for Women in India’sPanchayats’, Democratization, 13(1), pp. 15–35. Johnson, Craig. (2003). Decentralisation in India: Poverty, Politics and Panchayati Raj, Working Paper 199.London: Overseas Development Institute. Jutting, J. , Corsi, E. , Kauffmann, C. , McDonnell, I. , Osterrieder, H. , Pinaud, N. and Wegner, L. (2005).‘What Makes Decentralisation in Developing Countries Pro-Poor?’ The European Journal of DevelopmentResearch, 17(4), pp. 626–648. Kudva, Neema. (2005). ‘Engineering Elections: The Experience of Women in “Panchayat Raj” in Karnataka,India’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 16(3), pp. 445–463. Kulipossa, F. P. (2004). ‘Decentralisation and Democracy in Developing Countries: An Overview’,Development in Practice, 14(6), pp. 768–779. Lakha, Salim. , Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2015). ‘Collusion, Cooption and Capture: SocialAccountability and Social Audits in Karnataka, India’, Oxford Development Studies, 43(3), pp. 330–348. Maddick, Henry. (1970). Panchayati Raj: A Study of Rural Local Government in India. UK: Longman. Manor, James. (1999). The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralisation. Directions in DevelopmentSeries. Washington, DC: World Bank. Mathew, George. (1994). Panchayat Raj: From Legislation to Movement. New Delhi: Concept. Mewes, K. (2011). ‘Decentralization: Concepts and Definitions’, in Decentralization on the Example of theYemeni Water Sector. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Nadkarni, M. V. , Sivanna, N. and Suresh, Lavanya. (2018). Decentralised Democracy in India – Gandhi’sVision and Reality. Abingdon: Routledge.

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Handbook of Decentralised Governance and Development in India

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