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Guinea‐Bissau: A Narco‐Developmental State?

Posted on May 24, 2011 (http://africanarguments.org/2011/05/24/guinea‐bissau‐a‐narco‐developmental‐state/) by Magnus(http://africanarguments.org/author/magnus/)

(http://africanarguments.org/wp‐content/uploads/2011/05/GBport.bmp)By Marie Gibert

Guinea‐Bissau has repeatedly, over the past few years, beendubbed a ‘narco‐state’.[1] This label has tended to beassociated with the image of a dysfunctional ‘failed’ state. Yet,a recent report published by the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank shows remarkable improvements inthe country’s health and education sectors and calls for amore qualified understanding of the country’s politics.

The evidence that supported the “narco‐state” label was generally sketchy,but nevertheless undeniable. As in other West African countries, theBissau‐Guinean police have seized a number of major drug shipments fromtraffickers and planes – generally originating from Latin America andheaded to Europe – in past years. Expensive cars allegedly owned by drug‐traffickers or their allies were also seen in ever greater numbers in thestreets of Bissau. The ‘narco‐state’ tag was further strengthened by visiblelinks between representatives of the state and drug‐trafficking networks,as some of the arrested traffickers and seized drugs later vanished from

the state’s prisons and coffers, with no explanation forthcoming from the Bissau‐Guinean authorities.[2] Another sign ofcriminal state complicity was in the rapid and ostensible enrichment of some of Guinea‐Bissau’s senior military officers.

Although the government of Guinea‐Bissau has signalled its willingness to address the issue,[3] the series of political crises since2009 has made this task very difficult. In spite of the peaceful legislative and presidential elections that took place in November2008 and June‐July 2009, the coup attempts, political assassinations and army mutinies during the same period underlined thepersistent and violent rivalries in Guinea‐Bissau’s political leadership.

The assassinations, on 1 March 2009, of the head of the armed forces, General Batista Tagme Na Wai, and of the president,João Bernardo (“Nino”) Vieira, paradoxically raised hopes. Many thought that the personal antagonism between the two menaccounted in great part for the political paralysis preventing essential reforms, first and foremost in the security sector. In spiteof the violence that preceded and marked the subsequent presidential election campaign, the smooth running of the twoelection rounds and the unanimous, domestic and international, recognition of its result – the election of Malam Bacai Sanhá, ofthe ruling party PAIGC – as democratic and transparent, raised hope that Guinea‐Bissau was finally entering a new era of peaceand greater prosperity.

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The return in December 2009 of Rear‐Admiral José Américo Bubo na Tchuto – who had been accused of organising a failed coupattempt in August 2008 and had taken refuge in The Gambia – and the army mutiny organised by some of his allies the followingApril, however, cast a further shadow on Guinea‐Bissau’s future. The events led to the dismissal of Chief of Staff General ZamoraInduta, who had been appointed following his predecessor’s assassination and had promised to proceed with the long awaitedreform of the army. It also saw the reinstatement of Rear‐Admiral Bubo na Tchuto, cleared from charges of coup attempt andinvolvement in drug‐trafficking activities by a military court, at his old position at the head of the country’s navy, and the rise ofhis ally General António Indjai.

Many analysts have seen in these events the hand of a narco‐trafficking mafia eager to prevent any political reform that couldlead to repression of their activities and to protect their accomplices within the army and civilian administration. While theinfluence of narco‐trafficking over the current power relations in Guinea‐Bissau cannot be doubted, the direct involvement ofnarco‐traffickers in the above crises is still the object of much speculation. Analysts and journalists alike hastily drew on somerumours – for example that the bomb that killed General Tagme Na Wai in March 2009 was made in Thailand, a country knownfor its involvement in the international drug trade – to draw a link that we should still treat with the greatest caution.

Nonetheless, the events of 2009 and 2010 have come to confirm Guinea‐Bissau’s narco‐state label in the minds of manyinternational actors. This has had, overall, negative consequences for Guinea‐Bissau as the international community has beenincreasingly reluctant to support a country with such an uncertain political future. Most notably, in 2010 the EU decided towithdraw its initial plans to follow up EUSSR Guinea‐Bissau (a mission in support of security sector reform), with another,similarmission.[4] In reaction to the official appointment of mutiny leaders at the head of the army, the EU subsequently opened anarticle 96 consultation procedure with Guinea‐Bissau, which could eventually lead to a definitive suspension of EU developmentaid. While there may therefore have been a time when the spotlight drawn on narco‐trafficking suited Guinea‐Bissau’s politicalleadership – providing renewed international interest in the small country and averting eyes away from its long‐time, unsolvedpolitical rivalries – this is hardly the case now, and Guinea‐Bissau seems increasingly isolated.

However, not all donors have turned their backs. The Bretton Woods institutions have remained consistently present in thecountry, with IMF staff continuing regular visits to the country. And the government of Guinea‐Bissau carried on with theimplementation of the economic and administrative reforms agreed with the IMF and the World Bank. This is remarkable, giventhe political atmosphere of the last years and the general – and seemingly sensible – belief that political instability and violencenecessarily disrupt governmental action.

What is more, the IMF, World Bank and government’s joint efforts seem to have produced measurable, positive results for thewelfare of the country’s population. In their joint staff advisory note on the second annual progress report of Guinea‐Bissau’spoverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) published in December 2010, the IMF and World Bank teams thus note that the countryhas made significant progress with respect to most indicators covering education and health, Quoting figures obtained from theMultiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in 2010, they underline that primaryschool enrolment rates rose from 42% in 2000 to 45% on 2006 and 65% in 2010. Gender equality in education has followed asimilar trend, with the ratio of girls’ to boys’ enrolment expanding from 0.67 in 2000 to 0.83 in 2006 to 0.94 in 2010. Theilliteracy rate among women of 15‐24 years has accordingly decreased from 83% in 2000 to 61% in 2010. Results are alsoimpressive in the health sector, with child mortality falling from 223 deaths per 1,000 births in 2006 to 155 in 2010. The choleraawareness and prevention programme led by the national health authorities and their NGO partners also seem to haveeffectively prevented any new outbreaks in 2009 and 2010.

The IMF‐World Bank report attributes these improvements to broadening access to social services thanks to governmentreforms supported by NGOs and the private sector. Among these, the report quotes the elimination of school fees and theintroduction of school feeding programmes in most primary schools, large‐scale vaccination campaigns, the effectivedistribution of bed nets and improvements in health facilities, as well as an incentive premium for healthcare workers operatingin isolated rural areas (and its effective payment).[5]

Although this positive assessment must be treated with great care – all specialists of Africa know how unreliable such figures canbe – it does call for more caution in our descriptions and analyses of states like Guinea‐Bissau, which many would hastily call‘failed’. It is important to note, first, that dynamic governmental action, supported by external and private actors and no doubtalso strengthened by Guinea‐Bissau’s history of state presence in rural areas,[6] can result in significant improvements in healthand education over a remarkably short period of time. While these short‐term results remain terribly fragile and insufficient,they indicate that adequate – and sufficiently supported – governmental action can have a significant social impact extremelyquickly.

Second, while the Bissau‐Guinean state may be ‘failed’ enough, notably in the security sector, to attract narco‐traffickinginterests, it clearly seems to have been strong enough to lead an effective campaign in two sectors that are of vital importanceto the country’s population. This is not to say that the recent political events, and the many signs of narco‐trafficking’s pervasiveinfluence in Guinea‐Bissau are not extremely worrying – indeed, the IMF and World Bank teams underline that politicalinstability has repeatedly compromised the ability of the government to provide essential public goods and services and hascontributed to the exodus of qualified personnel.[7] Nevertheless, this shows that a state can be failed in certain – especially

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politically sensitive – sectors and remain, or become effective again, in others. Perhaps more importantly, it shows that a statecan continue to function, at least partially, in the kind of ‘no peace‐no war’ situation that Guinea‐Bissau has been experiencingfor many years.

Finally, these recent improvements in Guinea‐Bissau’s health and education sectors call on donors and journalists/analysts aliketo be extremely weary of easy and quick labelling tendencies. Guinea‐Bissau’s security sector is indisputably in need of a reformthat would, inter alia, put an end to narco‐trafficking’s detrimental influence on the country’s politics. It is also clear that thisreform is unlikely without a strong political will, at the heads of both the state and the army. The above results obtained by thegovernment in adverse political conditions also seem to indicate, however, that there may be a greater need for constructive –and possibly selective and target‐orientated – external support than for all‐encompassing sanctions and conditions on the partof donors. Not least because a government able to make a significant difference in the daily lives of its citizens will no doubt bemore popular and thus have a strong advantage over a still reform‐resistant army.

Marie Gibert is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand,Johannesburg, South Africa.

[1] E. Bernard (2008), ‘Guinea‐Bissau: Drug Boom, Lost Hope’, Open Democracy, 13 September 2008; see also M. Vernaschi’swidely publicised photo‐reportage on drug‐trafficking in Guinea‐Bissau, Guinea‐Bissau: West Africa’s New Achilles’ Heel, PulitzerCentre on Crisis Reporting, May 2009,  http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/africa/guinea‐bissau‐west‐africas‐new‐achilles‐heel(http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/africa/guinea‐bissau‐west‐africas‐new‐achilles‐heel),.

[2] In 2006, 674 kg of cocaine disappeared from a ministry of finance safe after it had been seized from traffickers. In 2006 again,two Colombians arrested in the country’s largest ever drugs haul were released without charge, and in September 2007,another Colombian suspect walked free two weeks after being arrested in possession of weaponry and large amounts of cash. InAugust 2008, a Bissau‐Guinean judge ordered the liberation, on bail, of four suspects arrested after more than 500 kg of cocainehad been seized at Bissau airport. The four suspects fled the country and it remains unclear what happened to the drugs. InNovember 2010, three military officers and a police officer were arrested at a military camp in possession of cocaine. As inprevious cases, however, their fate has remained unclear.

[3] In 2007‐2011, the Bissau‐Guinean authorities announced the creation of an inter‐ministerial commission in charge ofinvestigating the involvement of politicians in drug‐trafficking, a special council to oversee the national strategy to combat drug‐trafficking, various special police units against drug‐trafficking and an anti‐narcotics agency. These apparent signs of thegovernment’s determination to address the issue, however, have often been contradicted by other, more consequentialdecisions, such as the sacking, in June 2007, of the chief of the judiciary police who was widely regarded as the country’s mosteffective officer in the fight against drug‐trafficking, or judges’ decision to release suspected drug‐traffickers.

[4] Meanwhile, the Council of the European Union authorised the European Commission, in September 2010, to opennegotiations with Guinea‐Bissau for the renewal of the fisheries partnership agreement – a major source of revenue for thegovernment.

[5] International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2010), Guinea‐Bissau: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Second AnnualProgress Report – Joint Staff Advisory Report, IMF Country Report No. 10/381, 22 December 2010, available online:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24534.0 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24534.0), pp. 2‐3 and 7.

[6] Providing health and education services to the remotest parts of the country was part of the PAIGC and its leader, AmilcarCabral’s, strategy to gather popular support during the guerrilla it led against Portugal and to start building a state worthy ofbecoming independent in the eyes of the international community. See P. Chabal (2003), Amilcar Cabral: RevolutionaryLeadership and People’s War, London: Hurst.

[7] IMF and World Bank (2010), op. cit., p. 10.

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3 thoughts on “Guinea‐Bissau: A Narco‐Developmental State?”

1. Magnus (http://www.cabralinstitute.org/) says:July 12, 2011 at 8:53 am (http://africanarguments.org/2011/05/24/guinea‐bissau‐a‐narco‐developmental‐state/#comment‐14013)

AFRICAN ARGUMENTS: GUINEA‐BISSAU

By Toby Green and Peter R. Thompson

Marie Gibert’s article published in African Arguments (“Guinea‐Bissau: A Narco‐Developmental State?”, 24th May 2011)is a classic example of how to construct a misleading portrayal of a country on the basis of “objective” economic andsocial indicators. We would like to make it clear at the outset that we have never met the author, and indeed would liketo encourage all researchers to enhance international understanding of the country, as Dr Gibert has tried to do. Ourmain concern is simply that an accurate portrayal of Guinea‐Bissau reaches an informed audience.

Dr Gibert contends that the development indicators collated by the UN and other non‐governmental agencies warnsagainst accepting facile tags such as that Guinea‐Bissau is a “narco‐state”. She notes that these suggest that primaryschool enrolment is rising, that the gender balance of pupils enrolled is becoming more equitable, and that there aremarked improvements in rates of literacy among young women and in healthcare. However, she has little to say aboutthe “narco‐state” epithet itself, beyond the fact that it should not mislead informed and interested observers about thetrue state of the country.

Unfortunately, however, Dr Gibert’s article is misleading at almost every level.

We will begin by analysing the question of the involvement of the political hierarchy with drug‐trafficking. Manyinformed international observers, not least the United Nations and the White House, have suggested that facets of thepolitical establishment at every level are complicit in narcotics trafficking. Another area of concern for the internationalcommunity is the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by members of the country’s parliament, theoretically opening thedoor for the facilitation of illicit activity and abuse of power. To call Guinea‐Bissau a “narco‐state” is therefore merely areflection of this reality. However, there are a few signs which give grounds for optimism: recently, a new deal wassigned by the President, Malam Bacai Sanha, and the Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Junior, as to how the politicians ofthe country will tackle the drugs trafficking issue. A new All‐Party Parliamentary Group on Guinea‐Bissau has beenestablished in the United Kingdom parliament, strongly welcomed by the UN and the wider international community,and one of its foci will be the issue of the drugs problem as well as the related matter of security sector reform. Thisshould not come as a surprise; the UK Home Office has estimated that half of all the cocaine entering British shores isbeing trafficked through West Africa.

Dr Gibert has little to say on these key questions, but the reality is that these are fast‐changing issues and they cannotmerely be swatted aside with the unsubstantiated view that those calling Guinea‐Bissau a “narco‐state” are just givingthe country a misnomer. Important though the drugs question is, it is really of secondary importance to the core of DrGibert’s article, which is that these issues are a distraction from the key question of how the running of the state isaffecting and benefitting the people of Guinea‐Bissau. On her reading, the reality is far rosier than the generalinternational perception of the country might suggest. What she calls “dynamic government action” has allowed thegovernment to remain “effective” in its provision of basic social and educational services.

We would love to be able to concur with this view, but sadly we are unable to. Both of the authors of this article spendextended periods in the country and the reality is that the both the state and the economy of the country are in a stateof dysfunction. The availability of micro‐credit is so tenuous that many of the small retailers and stores in Bissau andsmall towns around the country are owned by foreigners, generally from Guinea‐Conakry, Mauritania and Senegal. Thecriminal justice system is in a parlous state, with police unable to fuel their vehicles, the integrity of criminal trialsendlessly disputed, and detainee rights within the military justice system a serious cause for concern. The subsistenceagriculture sector is in collapse; rudimentary domestic livestock is often imported from neighbouring countries, whilechickens are sold at local markets for three times the price of a corn‐fed chicken in a British supermarket. The major cashcrop – the cashew nut – is often bartered with foreign traders for rice, even though for centuries rice has been the staplecrop of the people. Meanwhile, senior government officials often have no access to the Internet and some members of

parliament are illiterate. Ministries struggle to pay their rent, and civil servants (including teachers) can often still gowithout payment for months on end. This inevitably makes it impossible for them to effectively monitor the provision ofprogrammes and the delivery of education services, such as those lauded by Dr Gibert.

At the political level, meanwhile, the country is in a state of perpetual crisis. Division pervades the upper echelons ofgovernment, with senior figures often better able to talk to an opposition party than to a colleague in their own. Thispolitical paralysis has had a further knock‐on effect on the morale of civil servants charged with delivering programmes,many of whom themselves struggle to feed their children on their unpaid wages whilst trying to roll out anti‐povertystrategies devised by international organisations.

In short, the government of Guinea‐Bissau is in a very real crisis. The state is paralysed, and the drugs industry hasprovided an outlet for a political class which increasingly sees little point in trying to engage with an international systemthat does not seem to want to engage with them. It is easy to write theoretically positive news about a much malignedand desperately poor country, but we both believe that Dr Gibert’s article could only have been written by someone whohas not had the opportunity to visit the country in person. We hope that Dr Gibert will attempt to rectify this in the nearfuture, so that she can observe the realities on the ground for herself.

Toby Green, a widely published historian, is in the Departments of History and Spanish, Portuguese and Latin AmericanStudies at King’s College London. He is Director of Institutional Relations at the Amilcar Cabral Institute of Economic andPolitical Research.

Peter R. Thompson, a businessman and commentator on African economic and political affairs, is the founder andpresident of the Amilcar Cabral Institute, an affiliate of the University of Birmingham’s Centre for West African Studiesand the Secretariat of the All‐Party Parliamentary Group for Guinea‐Bissau.

2. Marie Gibert says:July 18, 2011 at 10:25 am (http://africanarguments.org/2011/05/24/guinea‐bissau‐a‐narco‐developmental‐state/#comment‐14023)

Response from Marie Gibert

Opening with the pithy one‐line paragraph that my article is ‘misleading at almost every level’, Toby Green and Peter R.Thompson then go on to misrepresent what I wrote, at almost every level.

My intention in the original piece was not, as accused, to paint a rosy picture of Guinea‐Bissau – and a full reading of itwould show that I did not – but to question the often facile interpretation of Guinea‐Bissau politics through the ‘narco‐state’, and indeed ‘failed state’, labels. Behind the widely (and often too easily) used concept of ‘narco‐state’ withregards to Guinea‐Bissau, there is a much more complex political reality, one that is highly dysfunctional in some regardsbut may be more functional (and I think I was very cautious in my assertions there, but I will come back to this) than isgenerally expected in others.

On the concept of ‘narco‐state’, I think I was very careful to emphasise that there is clear evidence showing verypreoccupying links between state and army officials and drug‐trafficking networks. In fact, I am grateful to the editor ofAfrican Arguments for giving me the space to describe at the necessary length these suspected links and the many crisesGuinea‐Bissau has recently experienced. Beyond these obvious observations – links between Guinea‐Bissau’s politicalelite and drug‐trafficking and the country’s political crisis – however, I have several problems with the concept of ‘narco‐state’ as it is currently used to designate Guinea‐Bissau:1) It tends to suggest that the entire state apparatus has been taken over by the drug‐trafficking industry, something Idispute (and so do Green and Thompson, when they rightly underline the daily struggles of many civil servants in Guinea‐Bissau, who are neither paid regularly nor involved in the lucrative drug trade). What seems clear, on the other hand, isthat narco‐rents, like other external rents in West Africa (mineral resources, foreign aid), have increased the stakes andthe competition for access to positions within the state and army elites.[1] I therefore contend that the influence of thedrug trade over politics in Guinea‐Bissau is very real, but much more indirect than that generally suggested by theproponents of the ‘narco‐state’ label. In other words, it cannot be properly understood without reference to the politicalhistory of the country.2) This label has also led many to believe that Guinea‐Bissau’s politics are to be analysed through the exclusive ‘drug‐trafficking grid’. There again, my wish was to call for greater caution as Guinea‐Bissau has a long history of personalrivalries and some events are not necessarily best explained through the influence of drug‐trafficking networks (theassassinations of Tagme Na Wai and Vieira in March 2009 being a case in point).[2] The fact that the ‘narco‐state’ labelhas too often been a pretext to neglect Guinea‐Bissau’s rich political history, and the complex relations between its armyand civilian power, and between Bissau and the rest of the country, is, in my view, very problematic.

3) The link between the drug trade and Guinea Bissau’s non‐development is also far from clear. Sure, the country isextremely poor, and dysfunctional at many levels. Some of this can be traced to the detrimental effects of criminality.But was the country a haven of stability and prosperity before the drug trade arrived? Hardly. And what of othercountries – can a direct and causal link between poverty and crime be demonstrated? I doubt it. The relationshipbetween criminality and development is a complex and non‐linear one, something the ‘narco‐state’ label only serves todistort.[3]4) The ‘narco‐state’ concept, finally wrongly suggests that a transnational phenomenon such as drug‐trafficking has beencircumscribed to one state, when we know that it has gone across borders and affects the economies and politics ofother states and cities. Many credible rumours thus partly attribute the recent construction boom in Dakar to the drugbusiness and its money laundering needs – and yet, no one refers to Dakar as a narco‐capital.[4]

As for painting a rosy picture of Guinea‐Bissau… Once again, I think I took the time both to highlight the many recentcrises the state has been through, but also the extreme fragility of the figures showing improvements in the health andeducation sectors. I also questioned the reliability of these figures, although some show such strong patterns that weshould perhaps be cautious before rejecting them en masse, as Green and Thompson would seemingly ask us to do.These figures, and my piece, do not question the fact that life remains extremely difficult for most Bissau‐Guineans, northat levels of poverty and food insecurity are high throughout the country – it will take many years with similarimprovement levels to bring the daily reality of the population of Guinea‐Bissau to anything close to satisfactory. In fact,the latest Integrated Light Household Survey shows that poverty and extreme poverty rates have increased from 65% to69% and from 21% to 33% respectively, between 2002 and 2010 – thus overall confirming some of the serious issuesunderlined by Green and Thompson.[5] But an overall increase in poverty does not exclude improvements in othersectors – in the health and education sectors, as I underlined in my original piece, but also in the production levels ofstaple foods such as rice and of Guinea‐Bissau’s main cash crop, cashew nuts. Recent figures published by the WorldFood Programme and Food and Agriculture Organisation all show that rice production has been increasing over the lastfour years, underlining some success in the developmental initiatives meant to curb the process of substitution of cashcrops for food crops.[6] The 2011 cashew season was the best ever with a record of upwards 150,000 tons produced anda season‐closing price of FCFA520/kg, there again confirming (irregular) improvements noted over the last years.[7]Again, if Green and Thompson wish to reject such figures en masse, they might first consider how they are gathered andthe strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies used. I am sure the institutions involved, which are often moreaware of the weaknesses than we might think, would be happy to engage in a discussion. In any case, whether thesefigures are more or less reliable than the evidence Green and Thompson present, with such insights as ‘rudimentarylivestock is often imported from other countries’ as if that somehow sets the country apart in West Africa and Africamore widely, is open to question.

Interestingly enough, there are reasons to believe that these recent increases in cashew production, while partly due toongoing high levels in international demand and improved internal marketing and production capacity, may also havebeen stimulated by drug‐money, with the same people involved in drug‐transport through Guinea‐Bissau launderingtheir earnings in the cashew sector.[8] Of course we must treat such insights with great caution, and it is not myintention to suggest that this allegedly slight positive effect could offset the negative consequences of drug‐trafficking inthe country. But once again, this observation suggests a more complex and qualified reading of the links between drug‐trafficking and Guinea‐Bissau’s political and economic scenes.

This, once again, shows that whatever the degree of penetration of drug‐trafficking networks into Guinea‐Bissau, it hasnot led to complete economic and political collapse and the state, while worryingly weak, remains functional in someregards (with the support, to a great extent, of foreign aid and organisations). It also shows that the political instability ofthe last years – which some have directly attributed to narco‐trafficking – has not necessarily been synonymous with alinear deterioration of the population’s welfare. The evidence provided by Green and Thompson, on the other hand,while rightly underlining some of the many daily issues that many Bissau‐Guineans face, cannot be used to draw anycausal link between narco‐trafficking and a worsening socio‐economic situation. The salary arrears they cite date back toKumba Iala’s time in office (2000‐2003) and successive governments have since put much effort into paying them, withincreased success for Carlos Gomes Junior’s current government. The very poor state of the subsistence agriculture andthe heavy presence of foreign traders are two features that go back long into Guinea‐Bissau’s colonial and post‐colonialpast. This was the main objective of my reflections – to invite analysts to think beyond the ‘narco‐trafficking politicalinstability negative development’ cycle that has too often been taken for granted and, instead, look at the rich andfascinating complexity of Guinea‐Bissau’s political history and reality.

It is kind of Green and Thompson to encourage me to go to Guinea‐Bissau. I will undoubtedly be travelling there in thenear future, to update an understanding based on many years of research, and five years living in West Africa, includingfieldwork in Guinea‐Bissau itself.

[1] My thanks go to Alexandre Abreu, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), for suggesting this perspective.[2] On this, I would encourage those reading in French to have a look at Vincent Foucher’s excellent piece entitled‘Guinée‐Bissau : la coke dope le pouvoir’, Alternative Internationales (49), December 2010, which tries to unravel thelinks between drug‐trafficking and politics in Guinea‐Bissau and offers a very good analysis of what we know and do not

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know.[3] On this, see, for example, C. Cramer (2006), Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in DevelopingCountries, London: Hurst.[4] My thanks go to Richard Moncrieff, South African Institute of International Affairs, for pointing this out.[5] Ministry of the Economy and Regional Integration of Guinea‐Bissau (2011), Inquérito Ligeiropara Avaliação daPobreza, p. 8.[6] World Food Programme (2011), Résultat de l’enquête approfondie sur la sécurité alimentaire et la vulnérabilité desménages ruraux, p. 30.[7] My thanks go to Alexandre Abreu, SOAS, for providing these figures and the above sources.[8] My thanks go to Vincent Foucher, International Crisis Group, for this interesting observation.

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Tanzania: opposition rifts evident as politics enters the courtroom (again) – By Chambi Chachage(http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/tanzania‐opposition‐rifts‐evident‐as‐politics‐enters‐the‐courtroom‐again‐by‐chambi‐chachage/)By AfricanArgumentsEditor

Five MPs “shake up the Parliament.” That is how Mwananchi, a leading Swahili newspaper in Tanzania assessed the ongoing19th parliamentary session. Conspicuous by his absence among the big five is Zitto Kabwe. The fi ...

Sudan elections event recordings now online (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/31/sudan‐elections‐events‐recordings‐now‐online/)By AfricanArgumentsEditor

Last week we held two panel discussions on the upcoming Sudan elections.  The first focused on the current state of Sudan’seconomy; the second on the political environment leading up to the February polls. The pa ...

Congo: Making Mineral Revenues Benefit Provinces – By Decky Kipuka Kabongi(http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/30/congo‐making‐mineral‐revenues‐benefit‐provinces‐by‐decky‐kipuka‐kabongi/)By AfricanArgumentsEditor

The redistribution of mineral revenues between the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) central government and provinces isone issue currently dominating political debate in the country. On the 19th May 2014, Presiden ...

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Nigeria 2015: Jonathan’s defeat the result of a perfect political storm – By Joachim MacEbong(http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64521)by Monte McMurchy (http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64521)

Notwithstanding this 'perfect' civic electoral governance transfer 'storm'; the social civic 'publics' issue of ordinal salience will bein that … (http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64521)

Read more (http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64514)

Read more (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/nigeria‐2015‐goodluck‐jonathans‐fight‐for‐survival‐by‐lagun‐akinloye/#comment‐64314)

Read more (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64225)

Read more (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64132)

Nigeria 2015: Jonathan’s defeat the result of a perfect political storm – By Joachim MacEbong(http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64514)by Hank Cohen (http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64514)

The INEC Chairman was also very wise to announce the cumulative results of each state as they came in. This …(http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/01/nigeria‐2015‐jonathans‐defeat‐the‐result‐of‐a‐perfect‐political‐storm‐by‐joachim‐macebong/#comment‐64514)

Nigeria 2015: Goodluck Jonathan’s fight for survival – By Lagun Akinloye (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/nigeria‐2015‐goodluck‐jonathans‐fight‐for‐survival‐by‐lagun‐akinloye/#comment‐64314)by sola ola (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/nigeria‐2015‐goodluck‐jonathans‐fight‐for‐survival‐by‐lagun‐akinloye/#comment‐64314)

A cannot imagine why for the life of me a Nigerian journalist such as u would fall for the western …(http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/nigeria‐2015‐goodluck‐jonathans‐fight‐for‐survival‐by‐lagun‐akinloye/#comment‐64314)

Why Nigeria’s election really MATTERS – By Richard Dowden (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64225)by reginald arkhurst (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64225)

Spot on Richard where Nigeria leads the rest of Africa will follow so they must get it right. Reginald Arkhurst …(http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64225)

Why Nigeria’s election really MATTERS – By Richard Dowden (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64132)by Ben Igiebor (http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64132)

Good analysis, Richard. I am currently in Lagos and will witness the election tomorrow at a polling booth in Ikoyi. I'll …(http://africanarguments.org/2015/03/27/why‐nigerias‐election‐really‐matters‐by‐richard‐dowden/#comment‐64132)

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The Truth about the Lies: Women, violence andthe AU Commission of Inquiry Report – ByAnyieth D’Awol http://t.co/1CVOgHNtRN(http://t.co/1CVOgHNtRN) about 10 hours ago(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583571138464325633)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

Nigeria 2015: Jonathan’s defeat the result of aperfect political storm – By Joachim MacEbonghttp://t.co/c5UTAfNcNT(http://t.co/c5UTAfNcNT) about 11 hours ago(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583553137555943424)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

Nigeria 2015: Jonathan’s defeat the result of aperfect political storm – By Joachim MacEbonghttp://t.co/c5UTAfNcNT(http://t.co/c5UTAfNcNT) 03:15:21 PM April 01,2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583286534113202176)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

Sudan elections event recordings now onlinehttp://t.co/MGmLTy2H55(http://t.co/MGmLTy2H55) 12:58:51 PM April01, 2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583252183392587776)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

Nigeria 2015: Jonathan’s defeat the result of aperfect political storm – Joachim MacEbonghttp://t.co/c5UTAg4NFr(http://t.co/c5UTAg4NFr) @je_mc2(http://twitter.com/je_mc2) #NigeriaDecided(http://twitter.com/search?q=%23NigeriaDecided) 10:59:58 AM April 01,2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583222265329766400)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

Tanzania: opposition rifts evident as politicsenters the courtroom (again) – By ChambiChachage http://t.co/QjUOmrf5ft(http://t.co/QjUOmrf5ft) 09:53:56 AM April 01,2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583205648730615808)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

.@je_mc2 just filed. #NigeriaDecided(http://twitter.com/search?q=%23NigeriaDecided) 09:49:06 AM April 01,2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583204429840646144)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

We'll have something of an overview on resultslater today #NigeriaDecided(http://twitter.com/search?q=%23NigeriaDecided) @je_mc2(http://twitter.com/je_mc2) is working hard toproduce it... 09:46:12 AM April 01, 2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583203700019187712)from Twitter Web Client (http://twitter.com)

Decent summary in Guardian on#Nigeriadecided (http://twitter.com/search?q=%23Nigeriadecided): "Muhammadu Buharihails peaceful handover of power"http://t.co/YKJhsbAf7l (http://t.co/YKJhsbAf7l)09:45:03 AM April 01, 2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/583203410381541376)

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#HH (http://twitter.com/search?q=%23HH) Iwould rather encourage businessmen to go intopolitics because they are financiallyindependent #Zambia2016(http://twitter.com/search?q=%23Zambia2016)06:49:26 PM March 31, 2015(http://twitter.com/africaarguments/statuses/582978021071695877)from Twitter for Android(http://twitter.com/download/android)