global politics CORE CONCEPT READINGS

w w w . g l o p o i b . w o r d p r e s s . c o m

contents Introduction Power Sovereignty Legitimacy Interdependence Human rights Justice Liberty Equality Development Globalisation Inequality Sustainability Peace Conflict Violence Non-violence

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introduction The IB Subject Guide for Global Politics identifies 16 key concepts that 'weave aconceptual thread through the course'. The aim behind identifying these core concepts is toenable provide a conceptual framework that helps you to access and understand thepolitical issues encoutered through the two years of the course. There are four concepts attached to each of the four core units but it is important toremember that each concept can be related to any area of the course. The attachment ofconcepts to units simply indicates where the links between the two are most obvious.

Power, Sovereignty andInternational Relations

Human Rights

Peace and Conflict

Development

PowerSovereigntyLegitimacyInterdependence

Human rightsJusticeLibertyEquality

DevelopmentGlobalisationInequalitySustainability

PeaceConflictViolenceNon-violence

While definitions of each of these conceptsare provided in the subject guide, the IBacknowledge that 'a few sentences couldnever capture the different and contestedinterpretations of these big, important andorganizing ideas of the theory and practice ofpolitics'. The aim of this resource is toprovide a starting point for you to explorethese concepts from multiple approaches andperspectives in a variety of contexts. It may be helpful to see this booklet as acollection of stimulus material, organisedaround the 16 key concepts, that provides astarting point for your own further readingand exploration of these core concepts thatare so essential to success in the IB GlobalPolitics course. Each section begins with the definition ofeach concept provided in the subject guidebut remember the caveat given above.

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power Power is a central concept in the study of global politics and a key focus of thecourse. Power can be seen as ability to effect change and, rather than beingviewed as a unitary or independent force, is as an aspect of relations amongpeople functioning within a social organization. Contested relationshipsbetween people and groups of people dominate politics, particularly in thisera of increased globalization, and so understanding the dynamics of powerplays a prominent role in understanding global politics.

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The Continued Power of Militaries in an IncreasinglyAutocratic World The Rise and Fall of Soft Power Offensive Realism in Brief The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Powerin Asia North Korea’s Power Structure

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The Continued Power of Militaries in an IncreasinglyAutocratic WorldThree events this week served as a reminder that, ina world where democracy is buffeted on many fronts—the rise of populists who often undermine the ruleof law, a growing disinterest in democracy promotionfrom leaders of the United States and other states,and the influence of major authoritarian powers—armed forces remain political actors in manycountries, despite an overall reduction in coups sincethe days of the Cold War. In Thailand, ruled by amilitary junta since 2014, the military’s favored partywon the largest share of the popular vote in electionslast month, but a group of anti-junta parties appear,overall, to have garnered the biggest number of seatsin the lower house of parliament. So, the Thai militaryappears to be maneuvering to ensure that thesecond-biggest party in the anti-junta alliance isdefanged, and to use a range of inducements toconvince smaller political parties to join the pro-military alliance in parliament. No matter whathappens, it is almost certain that Thailand’s militarywill remain in control of government, resistingattempts at real civilian oversight of the armed forces. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, which holds presidentialelections next week, the military is steadily regainingmuch of the power it lost in the period after the fall ofSuharto, as Indonesian democracy emerged. AsEvan Laksmana notes in the New York Times, bothcandidates in the Indonesian elections, incumbentJoko Widodo (known as Jokowi) and challengerPrabowo Subianto, have helped the military regainpower, or will likely do so if elected. If Prabowo, aretired former lieutenant general, were to win (whichstill seems unlikely given polls of the race) there is apossibility that he would reduce limits on the centralgovernment and undermine democratic checks andnorms—and potentially allow the military and othersecurity forces far greater rein domestically. Jokowi,though not as openly disdainful of democratic normsand institutions as Prabowo, has surrounded himselfwith military men. He has allowed the armed forces toreassert their influence over domestic issuesincluding counterterrorism and counternarcotics,among other areas. This is a worrying trend in acountry where, for decades, the armed forces wereknown for dominating politics and committing rightsabuses.

In other parts of Southeast Asia, militaries retainsignificant political leverage, though outright coupshave declined since the Cold War, as they have inregions like Africa as well. In Myanmar, the military,still by far the most powerful actor in the countrydespite a technically civilian government, appear tobe extending their new battle in Rakhine State. There,fighting has intensified in recent weeks between themilitary and the insurgent Arakan Army. The militaryretains near-total control over internal security, and itis unclear whether operations, like the one rampingup against the Arakan Army, are taken solely on themilitary’s initiative, or whether the armed forces evenreally consult with the civilian government beforeacting. But Southeast Asia is not unique. In Sudan this week,the armed forces indeed launched a coup, removinglongtime leader Omar al-Bashir. To be sure, Bashirwas one of the most repressive rulers in the world,and came to power three decades ago in a coup aswell. But the military takeover could neuter themassive protest movement in Sudan, prevent a realtransition to a freer form of government, and installjust as repressive a regime in Khartoum as Bashir’sgovernment. Just as other types of autocratic regimes have freerrein today than they did in the 1990s and early 2000s,militaries also face fewer constraints on their power.Democratic powers are distracted by their own deeppolitical problems, populations in some states havesoured on democracy and looked to otheralternatives, and the U.S. government views regionslike Southeast Asia as places home to a growingcontest for influence with China—and thus requiringcloser ties with almost any government willing to alignwith Washington. The U.S. government appearedready to completely normalize military-to-militaryrelations with Bangkok, before the election lastmonth, even though the election process was unfair.

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With Egypt, the White House has lavished fulsomepraise on autocratic leader Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, amilitary man who took power in a coup six years agoand now has indicated he wants to stay in officeanother fifteen years. The Indonesian military’screeping re-emergence in Indonesian domesticpolitics has had little impact on U.S.-Indonesiasecurity ties, or Indonesia’s security links with otherregional democracies. Meanwhile, in a world increasingly looking forstrongman rule as an alternative to democracy, tosolve crises of graft and a lack of politicalaccountability by elected leaders, military men havebecome more attractive. In some countries, likeThailand, where populists already have ruled,populations have looked to the military as means ofousting populist leaders—though in reality militarygovernments only further erode democratic normsand institutions. In places like Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand,or even Brazil, armed forces, too, are againembedding within their military cultures a resistanceto civilian oversight—or refusing to change theircultures to embrace civilian oversight. For a time inThailand in the late 1990s and early 2000s, forinstance, it appeared that the Thai armed forces werebeginning to shift, with younger officers at leastconsidering an end to the kingdom’s cycle of coupsand military meddling in politics. Whatever glimmer ofhope there was for a civilianization of the Thai militarynow has vanished. The country has had two coups inthe past fifteen years, and both older and youngergenerations of Thai officers seem committed to thecontinuation of the Royal Thai Army as the dominantpolitical actor.

Kurlantzick, J "The Continued Power of Militaries in an Increasingly Autocratic World", Council on ForeignRelations, 12/4/19, www.cfr.org/blog/continued-power-militaries-increasingly-autocratic-world

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The Rise and Fall of Soft Power

Nearly three decades ago, American political scientistand former Clinton administration official Joseph Nyeput forth an idea in the pages of Foreign Policy. Hecalled it soft power, a concept that caught fire andwent on to define the post-Cold War era.Nye argued that, although the United States seemedrelatively weaker than it had been at the end of WorldWar II, the country still had a unique source of powerto bring to bear. Beyond using military power “to dothings and control others,” Nye later explained, “to getothers to do what they otherwise would not,” theUnited States could draw on its soft power—itsnoncoercive power—to cement its leadership positionin the world. Hard power was easy to measure, of course. We cancount the number of missiles and tanks and troops.(As Soviet leader Joseph Stalin is famously said tohave asked, “How many divisions does the Popehave?”) But what was the content of America’s softpower? Nye put it into three categories: cultural,ideological, and institutional. In these areas, the worldwould want to be like the United States. And that pull,in turn, would help the nation shape the world. “If astate can make its power seem legitimate in the eyesof others, it will encounter less resistance to itswishes.” That is, he argued, “if its culture andideology are attractive, others will more willinglyfollow.” For Nye, the basis of U.S. soft power wasliberal democratic politics, free market economics,and fundamental values such as human rights—inessence, liberalism. In the quarter-century that followed Nye’s conceptionof soft power, world affairs played out within thebroad contours of his predictions. After the UnitedStates won the Cold War, American liberalism hadunparalleled appeal around the world. Everyonewanted to vote, everyone wanted jeans, andeveryone wanted free speech—so much so that thepolitical theorist Francis Fukuyama coined the phrase“the end of history” to capture the idea that wholeworld was careening toward a political endpointalready reached by the West.

In the decades between the 1980s and 2010s, thenumber of liberal democracies (as defined byFreedom House) grew from around 100 to close to150. The number of free market capitalist economies,based on rankings published by the Wall StreetJournal and the Heritage Foundation, grew from over40 to close to 100. Never before in human history hadso many countries given up so many old political andeconomic arrangements for one new system.Nye might have called it soft power. I call it the greatconversion. In the realm of international relations, just as Nyeadvocated, the United States led a drive to establishand enlarge international institutions that wouldsupport its new order, such as the World TradeOrganization, the World Bank, and the InternationalMonetary Fund. It also expanded its system ofalliances to bring former competitors further into thefold. Things played out similarly in Europe, where theEuropean Union played a role similar to that of theUnited States. For an entire generation, the worldwatched in astonishment as scores of countriesvoluntarily gave up increasingly large portions of theirsovereignty to subject themselves to shared sets ofrules based on the same liberal values. Brussels’sproposition dovetailed perfectly with Nye’s; allmember states and potential member states wantedwhat the Western European core wanted. In fact, atone point, it seemed as though everyone wantedwhat Western Europe wanted: even Turkey, a largeMuslim country with a very different culture and set ofvalues, and Ukraine, which risked war with Russia inits attempt to join.Until recently, in other words, it really did look as if the21st century would belong to the United States, theWest, and their global soft power empire. But it wasnot to be so.

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Several things went wrong. For one, the productsdidn’t really suit the customers. From the “third wave”democracies of the 1970s and 1980s to the EasternEuropean states that rushed to join the EU and NATOafter the Cold War to, most recently, the countriesthat weathered the Arab Spring, liberal democracyhas had a hard time sticking. In many cases,moreover, it brought about rather catastrophicoutcomes for the people involved.One theory for why is that the neoliberal economicrevolution, which was part and parcel of the softpower era, weakened states instead of strengtheningthem. The market was never a uniting force—the ideathat it could be an all-encompassing mechanism toprovide growth, good governance, and societal well-being was an illusion to begin with. The Germansociologist Wolfgang Streeck elaborated on this ideaat a conference in Taiwan this summer. Soft powerglobalization, he warned, is simply “outpacing thecapacity of national societies and internationalorganizations to build effective institutions ofeconomic and political governance.” In turn,“increasing debt, rising inequality, and unstablegrowth” is leading to “a general crisis of political-economic governability.” That crisis has resulted ininternal revolts on soft power’s home turf. Streeckcalls it “taking back control.” You might call it the riseof America’s Donald Trump, Hungary’s Viktor Orban,or Italy’s Five Star Movement and the League. So far, such revolts have resulted in anti-liberalgoverning majorities in Austria, the Czech Republic,Hungary, Italy, Poland, and the United States—andthat is just among developed countries. Such is thesorry state of soft power liberalism that it has hadtrouble holding on even in places where it shouldhave had the best chances of surviving.Second, the United States, and by extension Europe,grew so confident in the potency of their soft powerthat they went into overdrive converting the rest of theworld to their systems. As Anthony Lake—whoserved as national security advisor to the UnitedStates’ first post-Cold War president, Bill Clinton—said, America’s future prosperity relied on“promot[ing] democracy abroad.”

Such a policy of enlargement would succeed the ColdWar doctrine of containment. That idea became evenmore extreme when President George W. Bushfamously proclaimed the United States “a moralnation” and said that “moral truth is the same in everyculture, in every time, and in every place.” This wassoft power on steroids! In his recent book, Has the West Lost It?, KishoreMahbubani, a Singaporean academic and formerdiplomat, calls all this Western hubris. Indeed, hubrismay be the only appropriate word for what transpired.Confidence in the potency and legitimacy of softpower was so great that tremendous hard power wasdeployed in its name.The Iraq War was the most prominent example. Andthe intervention in Libya, with European support, wasthe most recent. In both cases, the United States andEurope were left worse off. Third, the hubris of soft power led to the illusion thatsoft power could somehow exist on its own. But evenNye never said that. In reality, soft power is andalways will be an extension of hard power. Imagine ifthe United States had become poor, destitute, andweak like many of the new democracies around theworld but had retained its liberal values andinstitutions. Few other countries would continue towant to be like it. The idea that soft power couldperhaps be effective on its own perhaps underpinnedthe fatally mistaken belief that Iraq wouldautomatically become a liberal democracy afterSaddam Hussein was toppled.The European project, perhaps even more so, wasbuilt on a false understanding of soft power. For manydecades, Europe was essentially a free rider in thesoft power game; the United States guaranteed itssecurity, and its economic well-being was reliant onthe U.S.-led global economic order. With the UnitedStates now less interested in providing either—andfocusing more on hard power—Europe is facing realchallenges.

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The fourth problem is that soft power is actually veryfragile and easily turned. For a good couple ofdecades, soft power, compounded by the internet andsocial media, really seemed unstoppable. It wasbehind numerous color revolutions that overthrewgovernments and dismembered states. The Westcheered when Facebook and Google spread the fireof revolution in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and Kiev’sMaidan, but it wasn’t so happy when Russia used thesame in a bid to subvert politics in the West.When the West was confident of its soft power, itcherished the belief that the more open a society, thebetter. But now, calls for censorship of parts ofinternet are heard routinely in the media and inlegislative chambers. Internet giants are undertremendous political and social pressure to self-censor their content. And many, including Facebook,YouTube, and Apple, are doing so. And so, one of thebedrocks of liberalism’s soft power—free speech—has fallen from favor. Now, hard power is everywhere. The United States isno doubt the biggest player in this game: Fire andfury to North Korea, trade wars on everyone, guttingthe WTO, and using domestic laws to punish foreigncompanies for doing business with a third country.The list goes on. For its part, Europe looks like a deerin headlights. As some, including German ChancellorAngela Merkel, call for standing firm against Trump,others, including French President EmmanuelMacron, are looking for peace. And, of course, there is Russia. By adroitly using itslimited but still considerable hard power, Russiaachieved the most significant territorial gain by forcesince the end of World War II, taking Crimea fromUkraine. Meanwhile, Moscow’s forceful actions inSyria changed the course of the civil war there to itsfavor. There are also small hard powers. The mostsignificant is North Korea, whose leader, Kim JongUn, after being vilified by the Western world for solong, met Trump as an equal this summer. It isunlikely that he would have accomplished such a feathad he not built nuclear weapons. So far, Kim’s hardpower play is paying off handsomely.

There is little doubt, in other words, that the era ofsoft power has given way to an era of hard power—and that is dangerous. For centuries, hard power politics resulted inimmeasurable human suffering. Just in the 20thcentury alone, hard power drove two world wars anda long Cold War that threatened to annihilatemankind. It is possible to aspire to something better this time.And this is where China may come in. In Nye’soriginal soft power article, China rarely came up. Andwhen it did, it was either lumped in with the SovietUnion or brushed off as a country lacking any ability,hard or soft, to challenge Western dominance.Thirty years later, Nye’s omission seems strange. Inthe era of soft power, China was the only majorcountry that bucked the trend. It integrated itself intothe post-World War II international order byexpanding deep and broad cultural and economic tieswith virtually all countries in the world. It is now thelargest trading nation in the world and in history. But itsteadfastly refused to become a customer of Westernsoft power. It engineered its own highly complextransition from a centrally planned economy to amarket economy, yet it refused to allow the market torise above the state. It rejected Western definitions ofdemocracy, freedom, and human rights, and itretained and strengthened its one-party politicalsystem. In soft power terms, China did not agree towant what the West wanted—culturally, ideologically,or institutionally. The result? Contrary to most of the countries thatwent through the great conversion, China succeededat a speed and scale unprecedented in humanhistory. The country turned from a poor agrarianbackwater into the largest industrial economy in theworld by purchasing power parity. In the process ofdoing so, it lifted 700 million people out of poverty.Harvard University’s Graham Allison calls this miraclethe “pyramid of poverty.” Forty years ago, nine out 10Chinese lived under the “extreme poverty line” set bythe World Bank. Today, the pyramid has been flipped,with only around 10 percent of Chinese living underthat line. Without that reversal, global poverty wouldlikely have increased rather than decreased over thelast several decades.

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Such achievements could be the content of a newkind of soft power. Nearly two decades ago, Chinese grand strategistZheng Bijian coined the term “peaceful rise” toarticulate China’s aspirations for itself. Over theyears, the notion of peaceful rise has encounteredmuch suspicion. Critics, for example, point to tensionsin the South China Sea to show that China’sintentions are not, in fact, peaceful. And Allison haswarned that, whatever their intentions, the UnitedStates and China could still fall into a Thucydidestrap, in which the strength of a rising power (China)strikes fear in the incumbent power (the UnitedStates), resulting in war. In his recent book, Destinedfor War, Allison pointed out that most of the 16 suchcases of a rising power in history resulted inbloodshed. However, stepping back, it is plain to see that China’speaceful rise has already happened. It is a fact on theground, as evidenced by the enormity of its economy,its trading volume, and, yes, its increasing militarystrength. Compared to the rise of other great powersin history—the Athenian Empire, the Roman Empire,the British Empire, America’s manifest destiny,modern Germany, France, and Japan, all of whichwere accompanied by tremendous violence—China’srise so far has been bigger and faster than them all.And yet, it has happened peacefully. No invasion ofany other country, no colonization, no war. Yes,Allison may be right that the psychology of theThucydides trap is still true. But in substance, theworld has already passed the point at which such aconflict could be contemplated responsibly.

And that is perhaps why China is now refocusing fromhard power to soft, even as the rest of the world hasseemed to go in the opposite direction. President XiJinping, for example, has called for “a community ofshared destiny,” in which nations are allowed theirown development paths while working to increaseinterconnectedness. In the policy arena, such softpower mostly takes the form of the Belt and RoadInitiative, which leverages China’s massive capitaland capacity to drive infrastructure-led developmentin other countries to spur economic growth that wouldultimately benefit China itself. It is a new potential soft power proposition: “You don’thave to want to be like us, you don’t have to wantwhat we want; you can participate in a new form ofglobalization while retaining your own culture,ideology, and institutions.” This is, in many ways, theopposite of Nye’s formulation, with all the downfallsthat approach entails: overreach, the illusion ofuniversal appeals, and internal and externalbacklashes In the post-Cold War era, the West linked soft powerand liberalism, but that coupling was nevernecessary. In the next century, it may well be softpower decoupled from ideology that could rule theday. There is no illusion, not least in Beijing, that anykind of soft power can exist and succeed without hardpower. But China’s proposition is moreaccommodating of difference. By not forcing othercountries into its own mold, China’s new form of softpower can mean a more peaceful 21st century. Theworld should embrace it. This article is adapted from a lecture given at theUniversity of Bologna in June 2018. An Italiantranslation of the lecture was published in theItalian journal Limes.

Li, E "The Rise and Fall of Soft Power", Foreign Policy, 20/8/18, www.foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/

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Offensive Realism in Brief

In its simplest form, my theory maintains that thebasic structure of the international system forcesstates concerned about their security to compete witheach other for power. The ultimate goal of every greatpower is to maximize its share of world power andeventually dominate the system. In practical terms,this means that the most powerful states seek toestablish hegemony in their region of the world whilealso ensuring that no rival great power dominatesanother area. The theory begins with five assumptions about theworld, which are all reasonable approximations ofreality. First of all, states are the key actors ininternational politics, and no higher authority standsabove them. There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathanin the system that states can turn to if they get intotrouble and need help. This is called an anarchicsystem, as opposed to a hierarchic one. The next two assumptions deal with capabilities andintentions, respectively. All states have offensivemilitary capabilities, although some have more thanothers, indeed sometimes many more than others.Capabilities are reasonably easy to measure becausethey are largely composed of material objects thatcan be seen, assessed, and counted. Intentions are a different matter. States can never becertain about the intentions of other states, becauseintentions are inside the heads of leaders and thusvirtually impossible to see and difficult to measure. Inparticular, states can never know with completeconfidence whether another state might have its gunsights on them for one reason or another. Theproblem of discerning states’ intentions is especiallyacute when one ponders their future intentions, sinceit is almost impossible to know who the leaders of anycountry will be five or more years from now, muchless what they will think about foreign policy.

The theory also assumes that states rank survival astheir most important goal. This is not to say it is theironly goal, for states invariably have numerousambitions. However, when push comes to shove,survival trumps all other goals, basically because if astate does not survive, it cannot pursue those othergoals. Survival means more than merely maintaininga state’s territorial integrity, although that goal is offundamental importance; it also means preserving theautonomy of a state’s policymaking process. Finally,states are assumed to be rational actors, which is tosay they are reasonably effective at designingstrategies that maximize their chances of survival. These assumptions, when combined, cause states tobehave in particular ways. Specifically, in a worldwhere there is some chance—even just a small one—that other states might have malign intentions aswell as formidable offensive military capabilities,states tend to fear each other. That fear iscompounded by what I call the “9-1-1” problem—thefact that there is no night watchman in an anarchicsystem whom states can call if trouble comesknocking at their door. Accordingly, they recognizethey must look out for their own survival, and the bestway to do that is to be especially powerful. The logic here is straightforward: the more powerful astate is relative to its competitors, the less likely itssurvival will be at risk. No country in the WesternHemisphere, for example, would dare attack theUnited States, because it is so much stronger thanany of its neighbors. This reasoning drives greatpowers to look for opportunities to move the balanceof power in their favor, as well as to prevent otherstates from gaining power at their expense. Theultimate aim is to be the hegemon: that is, the onlygreat power in the system.

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When people talk about hegemony today, they areusually referring to the United States, which is oftendescribed as a global hegemon. However, I do notbelieve it is possible for any country—including theUnited States—to achieve global hegemony. Oneobstacle to world domination is that it is very difficultto conquer and subdue distant great powers, becauseof the problems associated with projecting andsustaining power over huge distances, especiallyacross enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic andPacific Oceans. This problem is less acute whendealing with minor powers, but even so, the power ofnationalism makes it extremely difficult to occupy andrule a hostile country. The paramount goal a greatpower can attain is regional hegemony, which meansdominating one’s surrounding neighborhood. TheUnited States, for example, is a regional hegemon inthe Western Hemisphere. Although it is plainly themost powerful state on the planet by far, it is not aglobal hegemon. Once a state achieves regional hegemony, it has afurther aim: to prevent other great powers fromdominating their geographical regions. In other words,no regional hegemon wants a peer competitor. Themain reason is that regional hegemons—becausethey are so dominant in their neighborhood—are freeto roam around the globe and interfere in otherregions of the world. This situation implies thatregional hegemons are likely to try to cause trouble ineach other’s backyard. Thus, any state that achievesregional hegemony will want to make sure that noother great power achieves a similar position, freeingthat counterpart to roam into its neighborhood.

Most Americans never think about it, but one of themain reasons the United States is able to stationmilitary forces all around the globe and intrude in thepolitics of virtually every region is that it faces noserious threats in the Western Hemisphere. If theUnited States had dangerous foes in its ownbackyard, it would be much less capable of roaminginto distant regions. But if a rival state achieves regional dominance, thegoal will be to end its hegemony as expeditiously aspossible. The reason is simple: it is much morepropitious to have two or more great powers in all theother key areas of the world, so that the great powersthere will have to worry about each other and thus beless able to interfere in the distant hegemon’s ownbackyard. In sum, the best way to survive ininternational anarchy is to be the sole regionalhegemon.

Mearsheimer, J "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", Genius, Accessed 17/5/19, www.genius.com/John-mearsheimer-offensive-realism-in-brief-annotated

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The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power inAsiat is a pleasure and an honor to be here at theUniversity of Sydney to give the annual MichaelHintze Lecture in International Security. I would like tothank Alan Dupont for inviting me, and all of you forcoming out this evening to hear me talk. The UnitedStates has been the most powerful state on theplanet for many decades, and has deployed robustmilitary forces in the Asia-Pacific region since theearly years of World War II. America’s presence inyour neighborhood has had significant consequencesfor Australia and for the wider region. This is how theAustralian government sees it, at least according tothe 2009 Defence White Paper: “Australia has been avery secure country for many decades, in largemeasure because the wider Asia-Pacific region hasenjoyed an unprecedented era of peace and stabilityunderwritten by US strategic primacy.” The UnitedStates, in other words, has acted as a pacifier in thispart of the world. However, according to the very nextsentence in the White Paper, “That order is beingtransformed as economic changes start to bringabout changes in the distribution of strategic power.”The argument here, of course, is that the rise ofChina is having a significant effect on the globalbalance of power. In particular, the power gapbetween China and the United States is shrinking andin all likelihood “US strategic primacy” in this regionwill be no more. This is not to say that the UnitedStates will disappear; in fact, its presence here islikely to grow in response to China’s rise. But theUnited States will no longer be the preponderantpower in your neighborhood, as it has been since1945.The most important question that flows from thisdiscussion is whether China can rise peacefully. It isclear from the Defence White Paper—which is taskedwith assessing Australia’s strategic situation -that policymakers here are worried about thechanging balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.Consider these comments from that document: “Asother powers rise, and the primacy of the UnitedStates is increasingly tested, power relations willinevitably change. When this happens there will bethe possibility of miscalculation. There is a small butstill concerning possibility of growing confrontationbetween some of these powers.” At another point inthe White Paper, we read that, “Risks resulting fromescalating strategic competition could emerge quiteunpredictably, and is a factor to be considered in ourdefence planning.”

In short, the Australian government seems to sensethat the shifting balance of power between China andthe United States may not be good for peace in theneighborhood. I would like to argue tonight that Australians shouldbe worried about China’s rise, because it is likely tolead to an intense security competition betweenChina and the United States, with considerablepotential for war. Moreover, most of China’sneighbors, to include India, Japan, Singapore, SouthKorea, Russia, Vietnam, and yes Australia, will joinwith the United States to contain China’s power. Toput it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully. It is important to emphasize, however, that I am notarguing that Chinese behavior alone will drive thesecurity competition that lies ahead. The UnitedStates is also likely to behave in aggressive ways,thus further increasing the prospects for trouble herein the Asia-Pacific region Naturally, not everyone will agree with myassessment of the situation. Many believe that Chinacan rise peacefully, that it is not inevitable that theUnited States and a powerful China will haveconfrontational relations. Of course, they assume thatChina will have peaceful intentions and that welcomefact of life can help facilitate stability in this region,even though the underlying balance of power isexpected to change dramatically. I would like to examine three key arguments that areoften employed to support this optimistic prognosis First, some claim that China can allay any fears aboutits rise by making it clear to its neighbors and theUnited States that it has peaceful intentions, that itwill not use force to change the balance of power.This perspective can be found in the Defence WhitePaper, which states: “The pace, scope and structureof China’s military modernization have the potential togive its neighbors cause for concern if not carefullyexplained, and if China does not reach out to othersto build confidence regarding its military plans.” Inessence, the belief here is that Beijing has the abilityto signal its present and future intentions to Australiaand other countries in compelling ways.

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Unfortunately, states can never be certain about eachother’s intentions. They cannot know with a highdegree of certainty whether they are dealing with arevisionist state or a status quo power. For example,there is still no consensus among experts as towhether the Soviet Union was bent on dominatingEurasia during the Cold War. Nor is there aconsensus on whether Imperial Germany was ahighly aggressive state that was principallyresponsible for causing World War I. The root of theproblem is that unlike military capabilities, which wecan see and count, intentions cannot be empiricallyverified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern.You might say that Chinese leaders can use words toexplain their intentions. But talk is cheap and leadershave been known to lie to foreign audiences. Thus, itis hard to know the intentions of China’s presentleaders, which is not to say that they are necessarilyrevisionist. But even if one could determine China’s intentionstoday, there is no way to know what they will be in thefuture. After all, it is impossible to identify who will berunning the foreign policy of any countryfive or tenyears from now, much less whether they will haveaggressive intentions. It cannot be emphasizedenough that we face radical uncertainty when itcomes to determining the future intentions of anycountry, China included.A second line of argument isthat a benign China can avoid confrontation bybuilding defensive rather than offensive militaryforces. In other words, Beijing can signal that it is astatus quo power by denying itself the capability touse force to alter the balance of power. After all, acountry that hashardly any offensive capability cannotbe a revisionist state, because it does not have themeans to act aggressively. Not surprisingly, Chineseleaders often claim that their military is designedsolelyfor defensive purposes. For example, the NewYork Times recently reported in an important articleon the Chinese navy that its leaders maintain that it is“purely a self-defense force.”

One problem with this approach is that it is difficult todistinguish between offensive and defensive militarycapabilities. Negotiators at the 1932 DisarmamentConference tried to make these distinctions andfound themselves tied in knots trying to determinewhether particular weapons like tanks and aircraftcarriers are offensive or defensive in nature. Thebasic problem is that the capabilities that statesdevelop simply to defend themselves often havesignificant offensive potential. Consider what China is doing today. It is buildingmilitary forces that have significant power projectioncapability, and as the Defence White Paper tells us,China’s “military modernization will be increasinglycharacterized by the development of power projectioncapabilities.” For example, the Chinese are buildingnaval forces that can project power out to the so-called “Second Island Chain” in the Western Pacific.And they also say that they are planning to build a“blue water navy” that can operate in the Arabian Seaand the Indian Ocean. For understandable reasons,they want to be able to protect their sea-lanes and nothave to depend on the American navy to handle thatmission. Although they do not have that capability yet,as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent article inForeign Affairs, “China’s naval leaders are displayingthe aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S. naval strategist Alfred ThayerMahan, who argued for sea control and the decisivebattle.” Of course, most Chinese leaders think that their navyis defensively oriented, even though it hasconsiderable offensive capability and will have muchmore in the future. Indeed, they refer to theirnavalstrategy as “Far Sea Defense.” As Kaplan’scomments indicate, it seems almost certain that asthe Chinese navy grows in size and capability, noneof China’s neighbors, including Australia, will considerit to be defensively oriented. They will instead view itas a formidable offensive force. Thus, anyone lookingto determine China’s future intentions by observing itsmilitary is likely to conclude that Beijing is bent onaggression.

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Finally, some maintain that China’s recent behaviortoward its neighbors, which has not been aggressivein any meaningful way, is a reliable indicator of howChina will act in the decades ahead. The centralproblem with this argument is that past behavior isusually not a reliable indicator of future behavior,because leaders come and go and some are morehawkish than others. Plus circumstances at homeand abroad can change in ways that make the use ofmilitary force more or less attractive. The Chinese case is illustrative in this regard. Beijingdoes not possess a formidable military todayand it iscertainly in no position to pick a fight with the UnitedStates. This is not to say that China isa paper tiger,but it does not have the capability to cause muchtrouble in this region. However, that situation isexpected to change markedly over time, in whichcase China will have significant offensive capability.Then, we will see how committed it is to the statusquo. But right now we cannot tell much about China’sfuture behavior, because it has such limited capabilityto act aggressively. What all of this tells us is that there is no good way todivine what China’s intentions will be down the roador to predict its future behavior based on its recentforeign policies. It does seem clear, however, thatChina will eventually have a military with significantoffensive potential. Up to now, I have been concerned with how anAmerican or an Australian might assess China’sfuture behavior. But to fully understand how China’srise will affect stability in the Asia-Pacific region, wemust also consider what Chinese leaders can divineabout future American behavior, by looking at itsintentions, capabilities, and present behavior. There is obviously no way China’s leaders can knowwho will be in charge of American foreign policy in theyears ahead, much less what their intentions towardChina will be. But they do know that all of America’spost-Cold War presidents, including Barack Obama,have stated that they are committed to maintainingAmerican primacy. And that means Washington islikely to go to considerable lengths to prevent Chinafrom becoming too powerful.

Regarding capabilities, the United States spendsmore money on defense than all the other countriesin the world combined. Moreover, because theAmerican military is designed to fight all around theglobe, it has abundant power projection assets. Muchof that capability is either located in the Asia-Pacificregion or can be moved there quickly should the needarise. China cannot help but see that the UnitedStates has formidable military forces in itsneighborhood that are designed in good part foroffensive purposes. Surely, when Washington movesaircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits—as it did in1996—or when it redeploys submarines to theWestern Pacific, China sees these naval assets asoffensive, not defensive in nature. This is not to deny that most Americans, like mostChinese, think that their military is a defensiveinstrument; but that is not the way it looks when youare at the other end of the rifle barrel. Thus, anyonein China seeking to gauge American intentions byassessing its military capabilities is likely to think it isa revisionist state, not a status quo power. Lastly,there is the matter of America’s recent behavior andwhat that might tell us about future U.S. actions. As Isaid earlier, past actions are usually not a reliableindicator of future behavior, because circumstanceschange and new leaders sometimes think differentlyabout foreign policy than their predecessors. But ifChinese leaders try to gauge how the United States islikely to act down the road by looking at its recentforeign policy, they will almost certainly conclude thatit is a war-like and dangerous country. After all,America has been at war for 14 of the 21 years sincethe Cold War ended. That is 2 out of every 3 years.And remember that the Obama administration isapparently contemplating a new war against Iran. One might argue that this is all true, but the UnitedStates has not threatened to attack China. Theproblem with this argument is that American leadersfrom both the Democratic and Republican partieshave made it clear that they believe the UnitedStates, to quote Madeleine Albright, is the“indispensable nation” and therefore it has both theright and the responsibility to police the entire globe.

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Furthermore, most Chinese are well aware of how theUnited States took advantage of a weak China bypushing forward the infamous “Open Door” policy inthe early 20th century. Chinese officials also knowthat the United States and China fought a bloody warin Korea between 1950 and 1953. It is not surprisingthat the Economist recently reported that, “A retiredChinese admiral likened the American navy to a manwith a criminal record ‘wandering just outside the gateof a family home’.” It seems that this is a case wherewe should be thankful that countries usually don’t paymuch attention to a potential rival’s past behaviorwhen trying to determine its future intentions. What all of this tells us is that the future securityenvironment in the Asia-Pacific region will revolvearound China and the United States, and each ofthose great powers will have a military with significantoffensive capability and unknowable intentions. There is one other factor that matters greatly forfuture Sino-American relations. There is nocentralized authority that states can turn to for help ifa dangerous aggressor threatens them. There is nonight watchman in the international system, whichmeans that states have to rely mainly on themselvesto ensure their survival. Thus, the core question thatany leader has to ask him or herself is this: what isthe best way to maximize my country’s security in aworld where another state might have significantoffensive military capability as well as offensiveintentions, and where there is no higher body I canturn to for help if that other state threatens mycountry? This question—more than any other—willmotivate American as well as Chinese leaders in theyears ahead, as it has in the past. I believe there is a straightforward answer to thisquestion and that all great powers know it and actaccordingly. The best way for any state to ensure itssurvival is to be much more powerful than all theother states in the system, because the weaker statesare unlikely to attack it for fear they will be soundlydefeated. No country in the Western Hemisphere, forexample, would dare strike the United Statesbecause it is so powerful relative to all its neighbors

To be more specific, the ideal situation for any greatpower is to be the hegemon in the system, becausethen its survival would almost be guaranteed. Ahegemon is a country that is so powerful that itdominates all the other states. In other words, noother state has the military wherewithal to put up aserious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is theonly great power in the system. When people talk about hegemony these days, theyare usually referring to the United States, which theydescribe as a global hegemon. I do not like thisterminology, however, because it is virtuallyimpossible for any state—including the United States—to achieve global hegemony. The main obstacle toworld domination is the difficulty of projecting powerover huge distances, especially across enormousbodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The best outcome that a great power can hope for isto achieve regional hegemony, and possibly controlanother region that is close by and easily accessibleover land. The United States, which dominates theWestern Hemisphere, is the only regional hegemon inmodern history. Five other great powers have tried todominate their region—Napoleonic France, ImperialGermany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and theSoviet Union—but none succeeded. The United States, it should be emphasized, did notbecome a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere byaccident. When it gained its independence in 1783, itwas a weak country comprised of 13 states runningup and down the Atlantic seaboard. Over the courseof the next 115 years, American policymakers workedunrelentingly in pursuit of regional hegemony. Theyexpanded America’s boundaries from the Atlantic tothe Pacific Oceans as part of a policy commonlyreferred to as “Manifest Destiny.” Indeed, the UnitedStates was an expansionist power of the first order.Henry Cabot Lodge put the point well when he notedthat the United States had a “record of conquest,colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled byany people in the nineteenth century.” Or I might addthe twentieth century.

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But America’s leaders in the nineteenth century werenot just concerned with turning the United States intoa powerful territorial state. They were also determinedto push the European great powers out of theWestern Hemisphere, and make it clear to them thatthey were not welcome back. This policy, which is stillin effect today, is known as the "Monroe Doctrine.” By1898, the last European empire in the Americas hadcollapsed and the United States had become aregional hegemon. States that achieve regional hegemony have a furtheraim: they seek to prevent great powers in othergeographical regions from duplicating their feat. Aregional hegemon, in other words, does not wantpeer competitors. The United States, for example,played a key role in preventing Imperial Japan,Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and the SovietUnion from gaining regional supremacy. Regionalhegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons inother regions, because they fear that a rival greatpower that dominates its own region will be anespecially powerful foe that is essentially free to roamaround the globe and cause trouble in their backyard.Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least twogreat powers located together in other regions,because their proximity will force them to concentratetheir attention on each other rather than the distanthegemon. Furthermore, if a potential hegemonemerges among them, the other great powers in thatregion might be able to contain it by themselves,allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on thesidelines. The bottom line is that for sound strategic reasons theUnited States labored for more than a century to gainregional hegemony, and after achieving that goal, ithas made sure that no other great power dominatedeither Asia or Europe the way it dominates theWestern Hemisphere. What does America’s past behavior tell us about therise of China? In particular, how should we expectChina to conduct itself as it grows more powerful?And how should we expect the United States andChina’s neighbors to react to a strong China?

I expect China to act the way the United States hasacted over its long history. Specifically, I believe thatChina will try to dominate the Asia-Pacific regionmuch as the United States dominates the WesternHemisphere. For good strategic reasons, China willseek to maximize the power gap between itself andpotentially dangerous neighbors like India, Japan andRussia. China will want to make sure that it is sopowerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal tothreaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue militarysuperiority so that it can go on the warpath andconquer other countries in the region, although that isalways a possibility. Instead, it is more likely thatBeijing will want to dictate the boundaries ofacceptable behavior to neighboring countries, muchthe way the United States makes it clear to otherstates in the Americas that it is the boss. Gainingregional hegemony, I might add, is probably the onlyway that China will get Taiwan back. A much more powerful China can also be expected totry to push the United States out of the Pacific-Asiaregion, much the way the United States pushed theEuropean great powers out of the WesternHemisphere in the nineteenth century. We shouldexpect China to come up with its own version of theMonroe Doctrine, as Imperial Japan did in the 1930s.In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy.Consider that in March, Chinese officials told twohigh-ranking American policymakers that the UnitedStates was no longer allowed to interfere in the SouthChina Sea, which China views as a “core interest” likeTaiwan and Tibet. And it seems that China feels thesame way about the Yellow Sea. Last week the U.S.and South Korean navies conducted joint navalexercises in response to North Korea’s allegedsinking of a South Korean naval vessel. Those navalmaneuvers were originally planned to take place inthe Yellow Sea, which is adjacent to the Chinesecoastline, but vigorous protests from China forced theObama administration to move them further east intothe Sea of Japan.

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These ambitious goals make good strategic sense forChina. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japanand Russia as its neighbors, just as the United Statesprefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on itsborders. No state in its right mind should want otherpowerful states located in itsregion? All Chinesesurely remember what happened in the last centurywhen Japan was powerful and China was weak.Furthermore, why would a powerful China acceptU.S. military forces operating in its backyard?American policymakers, after all, express outragewhenever distant great powers send military forcesinto the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forcesare invariably seen as a potential threat to Americansecurity. The same logic should apply to China. Whywould China feel safe with U.S. forces deployed on itsdoorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine,would not China’s security be better served bypushing the American military out of the Asia-Pacificregion? Why should we expect China to act any differentlythan the United States has over the course of itshistory? Are they more principled than Americansare? More ethical? Are they less nationalisticthanAmericans? Less concerned about their survival?They are none of these things, of course, which iswhy China is likely to imitate the United States andattempt to become a regional hegemon. And what is the likely American response if Chinaattempts to dominate Asia? It is crystal clear from thehistorical record that the United States does nottolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated over thecourse of the twentieth century, it is determined toremain the world’s only regional hegemon. Therefore,the United States can be expected to go to greatlengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it tothe point where it is no longer a threat to rule theroost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely toact toward China similar to the way it behaved towardthe Soviet Union during the Cold War.

China’s neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region arecertain to fear its rise as well, and they too will dowhatever they can to prevent it from achievingregional hegemony. Indeed, there is alreadysubstantial evidence that countries like India, Japan,and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore,South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’sascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it.India and Japan, for example, signed a “Joint SecurityDeclaration” in October 2008, in good part becausethey are worried about China’s growing power. Indiaand the United States, which had testy relations atbest during the Cold War, have become good friendsover the past decade, in large part because they bothfear China. Just last month, the Obamaadministration, which is filled with people who preachto the world about the importance of human rights,announced that it was resuming relations withIndonesia’s elite special forces, despite their richhistory of human rights abuses. The reason for thisshift was that Washington wants Indonesia on its sideas China grows more powerful, and as the New YorkTimes reported, Indonesian officials “dropped hintsthat the group might explore building ties with theChinese military if the ban remained.” Singapore, which sits astride the critically importantStraits of Malacca and worries about China’s growingpower, badly wants to upgrade its already close tieswith the United States. Toward that end, it built theChangi Naval Base in the late 1990s so that the U.S.Navy could operate an aircraft carrier out ofSingapore if the need arose. And the recent decisionby Japan to allow the U.S. Marines to remain onOkinawa was driven in part by Tokyo’s concernsabout China’s growing assertiveness in the regionand the related need to keep the American securityumbrella firmly in place over Japan. Most of China’sneighbors will eventually join an American-ledbalancing coalition designed to check China’s rise,much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,and even China, joined forces with the United Statesto contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

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I would like to discuss in more detail how I thinkChina’s rise will affect Australia in particular. There isno question that geography works to Australia’sadvantage; it is located far away from China andthere are large bodies of water separating the twocountries. Australia, of course, faced a similarsituation with regard to Imperial Japan, which helpsexplain why the Japanese military did not invadeAustralia when it went on a rampage across theAsian-Pacific region in December 1941 One might be tempted to think that Australia’slocation means that it has little to fear from China andtherefore it can stay on the sidelines as the balancingcoalition to contain China comes together. Indeed,the 2009 White Paper raises the possibility that “anAustralian government might take the view thatarmed neutrality was the best approach in terms ofsecuring its territory and people.” This is not going tohappen, however, because China—should it continueits rapid rise—will eventually present a seriousenough threat to Australia that it will have no choicebut to join the American-led alliance to contain China.I would like to make three points to support this claim. First, please remember that we are not talking aboutthe threat posed by today’s Chinese military, whichdoes not have a lot of power projection capability andis not much of a danger to its neighbors. We aretalking about how Australians will think about Chinaafter it has undergone two more decades ofimpressive economic growth and has used itsabundant wealth to build a military that is filled withhighly sophisticated weaponry. We are talking abouta Chinese military that comes close to rivaling theU.S. military in terms of the quality of its weaponry.That Chinese military, however, should have twoimportant advantages over its American counterpart.It should be larger, maybe even much larger, sinceChina’s population will be at least three times biggerthan the U.S. population by the middle of this century.Furthermore, the United States will be at a significantdisadvantage in its competition with China, becausethe American military will be projecting its poweracross 6,000 miles of ocean, while the Chinesemilitary will be operating in its own backyard. In short,China is likely to have far more offensive militarypower in 2030 than it has in 2010.

Second, although Imperial Japan did not launch anamphibious assault against Australia in 1942, itseriously contemplated that option, and decidedagainst it not only because of the difficulty of theoperation, but also because Japan thought that it hadan alternative strategy for dealing with Australia.Specifically, it felt that it could use its control of theWestern Pacific to effectively blockade Australia andneutralize it. Although that strategy failed, we shouldnot lose sight of the fact that Imperial Japan was agrave threat to Australia, which is why Australiaenthusiastically fought alongside the United States inWorld War II. Third, Chinese strategist are going to pay seriousattention to Australia in the years ahead, mainlybecause of oil. China’s dependence on imported oil,which is already substantial, is going to increasemarkedly over the next few decades. Much of thatimported oil will come out of the Middle East andmost of it will be transported to China by ship. For allthe talk about moving oil by pipelines and railroadsthrough Burma and Pakistan, the fact is that maritimetransport is a much easier and cheaper option. TheChinese, of course, know this and it is one reasonwhy they are planning to build a blue water navy.They want to be able to protect their sea-lanes thatrun to and from the Middle East. China, however, faces a major geographical problemin securing those sea-lanes, which has significantimplications for Australia. Specifically, there are threemajor water passages that connect the South ChinaSea and the Indian Ocean. Otherwise, variousSoutheast Asian countries separate those two largebodies of water. That means China must have accessto at least one of those passages at all times if ithopes to be able to control its sea-lanes to and fromthe oil-rich Middle East Chinese ships can go through the Straits of Malacca,which are surrounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, andSingapore, or they can go further south and traverseeither the Lombok Strait or the Sunda Strait, both ofwhich cut through Indonesia, and both of which bringyou out into the open waters of the Indian Ocean justto the northwest of Australia.

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China, however, is not likely to be able to get throughthe Straits of Malacca in a conflict with the UnitedStates, because Singapore, which is closely alliedwith Washington, sits astride that passageway. Thisis what Chinese strategists call “the Malaccadilemma.” Therefore, China has a powerful incentiveto make sure its ships can move through the twomain openings that run through Indonesia. his situation almost certainly means that China willmaintain a significant military presence in the watersoff the northern coast of Australia and maybe even onIndonesian territory. China will for sure be deeplyconcerned about Australia’s power projectioncapabilities, and will work to make sure that theycannot be used to shut down either the Lombok orSunda Straits or threaten China shipping in the IndianOcean. The steps that China takes to neutralize thethreat that Australia poses to its sea-lanes—andremember, we are talking about a much morepowerful China than exists today—will surely pushCanberra to work closely with Washington to containChina. In short, there are serious limits to how muchgeography can shield Australia from an expansiveChina.

The picture I have painted this evening of what islikely to happen if China continues itsimpressiveeconomic growth is not a pretty one.Indeed, it is downright depressing. I wish that I couldtell a more optimistic story about the prospects forpeace in the Asia-Pacific region. But the fact is thatinternational politics is a nasty and dangerousbusiness and no amount of good will can amelioratethe intense security competition that sets in when anaspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. And there islittle doubt that there is one on the horizon. Thankyou.

Mearsheimer, J "The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia", University of Chicago,4/8/10, www.mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/T0008.pdf

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North Korea’s Power Structure

IntroductionNorth Korea has been ruled by one of the world’slongest-running dynastic dictatorships. Threegenerations of the Kim family have ruled withabsolute authority, using heavy repression and asystem of patronage that ensures support from elitesand the military. The latest supreme leader, KimJong-un, appears to have deftly handled his earlyyears at the top through reshuffling party and militarystructures and accelerating a buildup of nuclear andmissile capabilities. As North Korea seeks to grow itseconomy and open up to the outside world, expertssay Kim’s relationship with elites could be tested andwill be crucial to the regime’s survival. The Kim DynastyThree generations of Kims have held the position ofsupreme leader in North Korea since the end ofWorld War II and Korea’s liberation from Japanesecolonial rule. Kim Il-sung was the founding father ofNorth Korea, where he ruled from 1948 until his deathin 1994. He was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il,who served for seventeen years until a fatal heartattack in late 2011. Leadership then passed to KimJong-il’s twenty-eight-year-old son, Kim Jong-un, in2012, and while there was speculation over his abilityto maintain regime stability, he has swiftlyconsolidated his power. He has installed his own toppersonnel, reinvigorated the Worker’s Party of Korea(WPK) as the core political organ, and reclaimedpower from elite factions that had been delegatedauthority in Kim Jong-il’s later years. Periodic purges of leadership are not out of the normfor North Korean leaders. Some have been brutal,such as the executions of Kim Jong-un’s uncle JangSong-thaek and Minister of Defense Hyon Yong-chol.Scores of other top officials have been retired,demoted, or otherwise shuffled out of positions ofauthority under Kim. In an opaque informationclimate, disappearances from public view should notalways be considered punitive or fatal; some officialstransition from public positions to cushy behind-the-scenes roles or resurface months or years later. .

Nevertheless, “investigations and purges createupheaval in the system,” says Michael Madden, thefounder of North Korea Leadership Watch, a blogfocused on leadership and political culture in NorthKorea. Creating this sense of instability andunpredictability for elites is one of the levers thatallows Kim Jong-un to maintain his hold on power. Kim Jong-un is believed to have at least two childrenwith his wife, Ri Sol-ju. While their names are notpublicly known, the oldest child is reported to be adaughter. He is alleged to suffer from a range ofmedical problems, some stemming from obesity andsmoking, including high blood pressure, diabetes, andgout. Both his father and grandfather died ofsuspected heart attacks. Experts say that in the eventof his death or serious illness, the next leader wouldundoubtedly be a direct Kim family member. Thepromotion of his younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, and thedevelopment of her public profile have raisedspeculation that she could be in line to be thesuccessor. Other close relatives who could also beinvolved in a power transition are Kim Sol-song, anolder half sister, or Kim’s older brother, Kim Jong-chul. Some family members, however, have fallen outof favor, including Kim’s uncle Jang, who was marriedto Kim Kyong-hui, the daughter of Kim Il-sung. KimJong-nam, Kim’s half brother, was assassinated inFebruary 2017 in Malaysia in an attack suspected tohave been carried out by North Korea. Party Above AllChief policymaking comes from the WPK’s CentralCommittee and three subordinate institutions: thePolitical Bureau, or Politburo; the ControlCommission; and the Executive Policy Bureau, whichalso controls surveillance and appoints top personnelacross the party, cabinet, and military. The CentralCommittee’s Organization Guidance Department(OGD) and Propaganda and Agitation Departmentare among the most influential party agencies. TheCentral Committee is made up of around twentydepartments, ranging from the sciences toagriculture, that link to civilian state and militarybodies.

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The governmental departments submit policy ideas tothe respective entities of the party’s CentralCommittee, who then deliberate, tweak, and approveinitiatives. The party exercises policy control throughthis process. Decisions on matters such as NorthKorea’s recent summits with South Korea and theUnited States have likely followed consultationbetween Kim and close aides, all of whom hold highpositions within the party. The party, first founded in the late 1940s, initially hadstrong ties to the Soviet and Chinese rulingCommunist Parties, but as Kim Il-sung consolidatedhis position in the aftermath of the Korean War(1950–1953), the juche state philosophy came todominate North Korean politics. Juche, translated asself-reliance, emphasizes independence andsovereignty as principles to guide the nation’s politics,economy, and defenses. In North Korea, the military,the internal security apparatus, and the cabinet allplay a supporting role to enact the party’s vision, saysKen Gause, an expert on North Korean leadership atthe Virginia-based research organization CNA,adding that “the military and the party are fused veryclosely.” A Military Rebalance?Another ideological tenet, songun, or military first,was embedded as a guiding political philosophy in the1990s, elevating the military above other elements insociety. The military is made up of an estimated 1.2million active personnel, including two hundredthousand special operations forces, as well asmillions more in reserves and paramilitary personnel.From the outset, the military operated under thedirection of the WPK. The military itself has a generalpolitical bureau staffed by political commissars whoreceive instructions from the party’s OGD, which arethen distributed among the branches of the KoreanPeople’s Army (KPA); state security and the nationalpolice also have their own political directors. UnderKim Jong-il, the military, or at least individualmembers of the military, amassed increasingdecision-making power, gaining the upper hand overthe party. Analysts have described Kim Jong-il’s reignas more informal, relying on personal relationshipsand bypassing the formal bureaucracy.

The transition to Kim Jong-un’s rule has rebalancedthe military-party dynamic again, with theauthoritarian leader favoring the regularization andformal institutionalization of the party’s levers ofpower to bring influential factions to heel, particularlywithin the military. For example, in June 2018, Kimreplaced three top military generals: the chief of themilitary’s general staff, Ri Myong-su; the director ofthe military’s political bureau, Kim Jong-gak; and thedefense chief, Pak Yong-sik. Analysts say the movereflects Kim Jong-un’s push to put in place leaderswho are directly loyal to him while removing regentsand confidants of his father, such as Ri, tighten theparty’s hold on the military, and root out corruption. In a country where rhetoric is significant, Maddensays there has been a recent shift in references toNorth Korea’s sources of power: where it used to be“party, army, state,” it has become “party, state,army,” reflecting a reimagining of priorities. Themilitary’s primary responsibility remains safeguardingthe security of the nation; yet, the KPA owns a fewdozen trading companies and economic sites and istherefore involved in a good portion of the country’seconomic activity. Kim, like his father before him,wants to use military personnel to carry out civilianconstruction and critical infrastructure projects. At thesame time, experts say that Kim is also redistributingvaluable economic real estate, such as transferringcontrol of facilities in some sectors, such as fisheriesand manufacturing, from the military to civilian andgovernment departments and reducing the proportionof revenue or goods that the military siphons off itself. The Economy and the EliteNorth Korea is among the world’s poorest nations,with widespread malnutrition. Its economic activitycenters on mining and manufacturing, as well asagriculture, forestry, and fishing. While heavyinternational sanctions have intensified North Korea’sisolation, the economy still appeared to be registeringmodest growth through 2016, according to SouthKorea’s central bank. Kim has instituted slightchanges and relaxed rules, including the liberalizationof domestic markets, which have spawned growth,says a report by Daily NK, a South Korea–basedonline newspaper.

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In his first years in power, Kim Jong-un developed thebyungjin policy, or “parallel development” of thecountry’s nuclear capabilities and its economy. To doso, Kim has rolled out policy modifications, shiftingaway from a centrally planned economy to one that ismore incentive-based and allows for greaterautonomy at the county and provincial levels.Industries such as shellfish and genericpharmaceuticals remain under tight control, but thereare some sectors where opening up is taking place,such as agriculture. Still, North Korea’s coterie ofelites, which experts estimate totals about fiftyfamilies and up to two thousand people, exerts heavyinfluence over the state’s economic functioning. Theyare said to hold important roles in which they facilitateor execute policy, as well as control hard currencyoperations, resources, or information. Even before Kim Jong-un came to power, there wasincreasing room for these moneyed elites. This group,known as the donju—money masters or lords—started making fortunes by facilitating trade in blackmarkets that emerged at a time when the governmentwas unable to provide sufficient food and services, inthe late 1990s. Restrictions on these markets haveeased over time, and in some circumstances marketactivity is even sanctioned without reprisal. Forexample, agricultural collectives are allowed toprivately sell their surplus crops. Still, personalconnections run deep across the economy: manychildren or other family members of high-poweredparty, military, and civilian officials run foreign tradingcompanies that fuel the country’s economicdevelopment.In recent years, there are anecdotal accounts fromjournalists, researchers, and visitors of theconstruction or opening of ski resorts, theme parks,and a new airport—signs of an economic uptick andinterest in infrastructure for potential tourism.

All this, despite stringent international economicsanctions that have crippled formal trade and normaleconomic ties with dynamic regional actors such asChina, Russia, and South Korea. If sanctions reliefmaterializes and North Korea seeks to diversify itsbusiness relations with the outside world, experts saythat all moves to grow the economy will have to bedelicately calibrated by the leadership to ensurepolitical stability inside the regime. The Future of the RegimeExperts say Kim Jong-un has deftly navigated his riseto power. While drawing on nostalgia for hisgrandfather’s era and grandiose persona, “Kim Jong-un is also determined to be seen as a ‘modern leader’of a ‘modern North Korea,’” writes the BrookingsInstitution’s Jung H. Pak. Economic development isfashioned as the vehicle for this modernization. InKim’s 2018 New Year’s speech, he emphasized usingthe acquisition of nuclear weapons as a springboardfor progress and prosperity, stating that “the centraltask facing socialist economic construction this yearis to enhance the independence and Juche characterof the national economy and improve the people’sstandard of living.” CNA’s Gause says “the economyis Kim Jong-un’s strategy,” adding that all of hisrecent efforts at diplomacy are “designed to hook intothe South Korean economic engine” and solidify hislegacy.Experts say North Korea is entering a critical periodof change under a regime that has by and largeresisted rapid change and outside influence. Even asthe ultimate authority, they say, Kim will need tocultivate the support of enough elites andsuccessfully manage the pace of change to meet hisgoal of making North Korea a strong and prosperousnation.

Albert, E "North Korea's Power Structure", Council on Foreign Relations, 19/7/18,www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure

sovereigntySovereignty characterizes a state’s independence, its control over territoryand its ability to govern itself. How states use their sovereign power is at theheart of many important issues in global politics. Some theorists argue thatsovereign power is increasingly being eroded by aspects of globalization suchas global communication and trade, which states cannot always fully control.Others argue that sovereign states exercise a great deal of power when actingin their national interest and that this is unlikely to change.

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What Brexit Means Is State Sovereignty At Risk In Our Modern Society? Article 50 ruling shows the ECJ respects sovereigntymore than UK govt does China's 'Sovereign Internet'

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What Brexit Means

IntroductionFor decades, the United Kingdom has had anambivalent and sometimes contentious relationshipwith the European Union. London has kept itsdistance from EU authority by negotiating opt-outsfrom some of its central policies, including thecommon euro currency and the border-free SchengenArea. Advocates of a British exit, or Brexit, from theunion argued that by reclaiming its nationalsovereignty, the UK would be better able to manageimmigration, free itself from onerous regulations, andspark more dynamic growth. The victory of the Leave campaign in a June 2016referendum on the UK’s future in the bloc led to theresignation of Prime Minister David Cameron. Underhis successor, Prime Minister Theresa May, the UKhas spent years negotiating a new relationship withthe EU. With May committing to leave the EU SingleMarket by March 2019, the UK could face the loss ofpreferential access to its largest trading partner, thedisruption of its large financial sector, and even thebreakup of the UK itself. May’s razor-thin majority inParliament and deep divisions within her ownConservative Party have repeatedly raised thespecter that negotiations with the EU could fail.Meanwhile, some fear the Brexit process couldaccelerate nationalist movements from Scotland toHungary, which would have unpredictableconsequences for the EU. What is the history of the UK’s membership in theEU?The UK remained aloof from the continent’s firstpostwar efforts toward integration, the European Coaland Steel Community (ECSC) and the the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC), formed in the hopes ofavoiding another devastating war. “We did not enterthe EU with the same political imperatives [as Franceand Germany],” Robin Niblett, head of the London-based think tank Chatham House, has argued. “Wehad not been invaded, we did not lose the war, andwe have historical connections to all sorts of otherparts of the world from our empire andcommonwealth.”

The UK didn’t join the EEC until 1973. The Britishpeople approved membership in a 1975 referendum,but suspicion of political union with the rest of Europeremained strong. Critics argued that the Europeanproject was already moving beyond mere economicintegration and toward a European “superstate.”As integration deepened throughout the 1980s and1990s, the UK’s leaders pushed for opt-outs. The UKdidn’t join the single currency or the border-free Schengen area, and it negotiated a reducedbudget contribution. Prime Minister MargaretThatcher declared in 1988, “We have not successfullyrolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only tosee them reimposed at a European level.” Why did Prime Minister David Cameron try tochange the terms of membership?Many conservatives never reconciled withmembership in the EU, and discontent rose inparticular over immigration. The issue of migrationfrom within the EU is fraught, as the UK is currentlyrequired to accept the free movement of EU citizens.Economic migration from eastern Europe spiked afterthe EU expansions of 2004 and 2007, pushing netmigration to the UK to more than three hundredthousand people a year by 2015. Cameron called thesituation unsustainable. “It was never envisaged thatfree movement would trigger quite such vast numbersof people moving across our continent,” he said in2015. Drawing on this anger, in 2014, the anti-EU UKIndependence Party (UKIP) surged, winning the mostvotes in the UK’s elections to the European Unionparliament with an anti-immigration platform. A wave of asylum seekers arriving from beyond thebloc’s borders has also driven tensions. The UK isexempt from the EU’s 2015 plans to resettlehundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees fromthe Middle East and Africa, thanks to opt-outs fromEU immigration policy. But for Euroskeptics,Brussels’s faltering response has highlighted the EU’sdysfunction, and UK policymakers have bristled atsuggestions that EU asylum policy might be altered tomake it harder to deport migrants to other EUcountries. (Under the current system, non-EU asylumseekers are supposed to remain in the first EUcountry they enter.)

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The eurozone crisis also created strains after the EUproposed an unprecedented “fiscal compact” tocoordinate budget policy. Cameron rejected the ideain 2012 as harmful to the UK’s financial sector andchafed at the possibility of an additional treatychange.In a 2013 speech, Cameron attacked flaws in theeurozone and what he called the EU’s excessivebureaucracy and lack of democratic accountability.He also promised to hold a referendum on the UK’sEU membership if his Conservative Party won the2015 elections, which it subsequently did. In November 2015, Cameron announced that beforeholding a referendum, he would seek EU reform infour major areas: national sovereignty, immigrationpolicy, financial and economic regulation, andcompetitiveness. In February 2016, EU leadersagreed to a number of changes, including protectionsfor non-euro currencies within the EU, new limits onmigrants’ benefits, a commitment to reducing EUregulation, and official recognition that the push for“ever closer union” does not apply to the UK.With these reforms, Cameron hoped to quell thecountry’s Euroskepticism, but the specter of massmigration, combined with several major terroristattacks in Europe, gave the Leave camp newammunition. “What he didn’t bargain for was that themigration crisis would get very bad,” says CFR SeniorFellow Sebastian Mallaby. EU leaders have madeclear that the subsequent Leave win invalidated thereforms. What happens now that the British people havevoted Leave?The UK’s situation is unprecedented; no full memberof the EU has ever left. (Greenland, a territory ofDenmark, left in 1982.)Under the terms of Article 50 of the 2009 LisbonTreaty, beginning the process of leaving the EUrequired an official notification from the UKgovernment. This led to debate over when, or even if,the article should be invoked, and whether the UKParliament could block it.

Prime Minister May, who won the Conservative Partyleadership race to succeed Cameron in July 2016,made clear that “Brexit means Brexit.” However, theBritish high court ruled that invoking Article 50 didrequire the support of Parliament, which subsequentlyvoted affirmatively. May triggered Article 50 on March29, 2017. The treaty gives the UK a two-year window tonegotiate the terms of its withdrawal, meaning thatunless the EU were to approve an extension, the UKwill exit in March 2019, with or without a deal.Negotiations have been extremely complex. The UKneeds to determine numerous transitionalprocedures for disentangling itself from EUregulations, settling the status of the millions of UKcitizens residing in the EU and non-UK EU citizens inthe UK, and deciding the future of UK-EU securitycooperation. The final withdrawal deal must beapproved by a supermajority of EU countries, as wellas by a majority in the European Parliament. Separately but simultaneously, the UK is negotiatingthe terms of its future association with the EU. It’sunclear what such a relationship would look like, butseveral non-EU countries offer potential models Norway, for instance, is a part of the EuropeanEconomic Area (EEA), which gives it partial access tothe Single Market in goods and services. However, ithas no say in making EU law even though it has tocontribute to the EU budget and abide by EUregulations. Switzerland is not part of the EEA, but ithas partial access to the Single Market through a webof bilateral agreements that cover goods but notservices, which comprise almost 80 percent of the UKeconomy. Turkey has only a customs union, meaninga free market of goods but not services as well. However, both Norway and Switzerland must alsoaccept the free movement of people from anywherein the EU, one of the Leave campaign’s primarycomplaints.

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In January 2017, May confirmed that the UK will notremain in the Single Market or EU customs unionafter Brexit. Instead, the government will pursue anew trade agreement with the EU. May called snapelections for June 2017 with the goal of strengtheningher parliamentary majority, and the campaign focusedheavily on the parties’ competing visions for Brexit.The Conservatives’ platform called for withdrawingfrom EU institutions, drastically reducing immigration,and accepting that “no deal is better than a bad deal.”The Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn espoused amore pro-EU vision for Brexit talks, remaining open tothe free movement of EU citizens and ruling outleaving the union without first reaching a frameworkagreement on the future of EU-UK relations. Corbynperformed well enough to deny the Conservatives amajority, weakening May’s hand in subsequentnegotiations with the EU. By November 2018, May had reached a deal with herEU counterparts, but it led to defections of prominentministers from her government and divisions amongConservatives, who feared that the proposalconceded too much. Prominent among theircomplaints was the plan for a “backstop” that couldkeep the UK in the EU customs union indefinitely,until a solution to the Northern Ireland border issuecould be found. In January 2019, May lost aparliamentary vote on her plan by the largest marginof any prime minister in history. This defeat has leftseveral scenarios still in play: a hard, no-deal Brexit;a renegotiated plan that could win the support ofParliament; or, as some have proposed, a secondreferendum, to avoid Brexit altogether. What were the arguments for leaving the EU?Reclaiming sovereignty was at the forefront of theLeave campaign. For Leave supporters, Europeaninstitutions have changed beyond recognition since1973, and they accuse the EU of becoming asuffocating bureaucracy with ever-expandingregulations. “Laws which govern citizens in thiscountry are decided by politicians from other nationswho we never elected and can’t throw out,” arguedJustice Minister Michael Gove.

Immigration was the leading complaint. The numberof EU migrants in the UK nearly tripled between 2004and 2015, from about one million to over three million,almost totally due to an influx of citizens from newermembers including Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.At the same time, terror attacks in Paris and Brusselsinvolving EU citizens raised fears that the freemovement of people leaves the UK vulnerable. Withover three thousand EU nationals having traveled toSyria to fight with the self-proclaimed Islamic State,the former head of UK intelligence, Richard Dearlove,argued that controlling immigration would be theprimary security benefit of a Brexit. (On the contrary,critics said Brexit would hurt intelligence cooperation.) The immigration issue powerfully combines anxietiesover identity, economic security, and terrorism, saysMatthew Goodwin, an expert on UK politics at theUniversity of Kent. “The referendum is as much aboutimmigration as it is about Britain’s relationship withEurope,” he says.For some analysts, European institutions are ill-equipped to address the economic challenges of themodern world. Economist Roger Bootle, author ofThe Trouble With Europe, argues that the EU’s focuson “harmonization”—the continent-widestandardization of everything from labor regulations tothe size of olive oil containers—threatens Europe withpersistent low growth and high unemployment.Leaving will spark economic dynamism, according toDominic Cummings, director of the Vote Leavecampaign. The EU is “extraordinarily opaque,extraordinarily slow, extraordinarily bureaucratic,” hesays. Leave supporters believes that without thatburden, the UK can reduce regulation, improvecompetitiveness, and forge trade deals with fast-growing emerging economies. To Cummings, thereforms Cameron negotiated were trivial, leaving theUK no choice but to eject from a dysfunctional union.

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How has the UK benefited from membership, andwhat are the risks of leaving?The UK is highly integrated with the rest of the EU interms of trade, investment, migration, and financialservices (see graphic). The Remain side cautionedagainst risking that relationship: Cameron warnedabout a “leap into the dark,” while Finance MinisterGeorge Osborne foresaw a “convulsive shock.” In the days after the Brexit vote, global marketsshook. The British pound fell sharply, reaching a lownot seen in more than a century. In response, the UKcentral bank unveiled a large package of stimulusmeasures, including its first cut in interest rates inmore than seven years. The long-term outlook is still uncertain. For AdamPosen, president of the Peterson Institute forInternational Economics and former voting member ofthe Bank of England, the pro-Brexit camp’s economicarguments were a “fantasy.” He argues thatimmigration from the EU has driven growth and thatbelonging to the EU has allowed the UK to “punchabove its weight” in trade, since the larger bloc cannegotiate more favorable market-access deals withoutside countries. Other U.S. observers have warned that a Brexitwould damage the UK’s special relationship with theUnited States. On an April 2016 state visit, PresidentBarack Obama argued that membership in the EUenhances the UK’s global influence and aids U.S.interests. But President Donald J. Trump has praisedthe Brexit vote and promised a rapid start to newtrade talks between the UK and the United States. Much will depend on the UK’s post-Brexit relationshipwith the EU. Losing barrier-free access to the SingleMarket, with its more than five hundred millionconsumers and over $18 trillion worth of GDP, placesmore pressure on UK policymakers to strike a tradedeal with the EU. Without it, UK exports would besubject to the union’s external tariff starting in 2019.

Trade would suffer and some foreign investors wouldlikely pull out of major industries, such as the thrivingautomotive sector. The UK would also be shut out ofany EU-U.S. free-trade deal (known as TTIP) andwould need to renegotiate trade access with the fifty-three countries with which the EU currently has tradeagreements. Particularly hard hit, argues founder of the pro-Remain website InFacts, Hugo Dixon, will be financialservices. They currently enjoy “passporting,” meaningUK-based financial institutions can operate freelyanywhere in the EU. If that is lost, many firms arelikely to move their offices—and jobs—out of the UKto elsewhere in Europe. How could the Leave vote affect the rest ofEurope?The most immediate consequence could be thebreakup of the UK itself. Scotland, which held anunsuccessful independence referendum in 2014,voted to remain in the EU. In March 2017, Scotland’sfirst minister, Nicola Sturgeon, proposed a newreferendum, arguing that the largely pro-Remaincitizens of Scotland deserve a choice over whether toremain in the EU by leaving the UK. However, PrimeMinister May rejected such a vote, which must beapproved by London. Ireland, too, will face a dilemma; it is stronglycommitted to the EU but economically intertwinedwith the UK. Ireland’s government has also warnedthat a Brexit could upend Northern Ireland’s peacesettlement and complicate border between Irelandand Northern Ireland. Some analysts say that thepotential Conservative coalition with the DemocraticUnionist Party (DUP), a party from Northern Irelanddevoted to maintaining union with the UnitedKingdom, could push the issue of the Irish landborder to the forefront of negotiations.

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Elsewhere, Brexit may embolden Euroskeptics byproviding a “template” for leaving, says CFR’sMallaby. “The younger generation of Italians,Portuguese, and Greeks associate membership ofthe eurozone, and, by extension, the EuropeanUnion, with a terrible depression,” he says. That hastranslated into electoral gains for anti-EU parties,such as France’s National Front, Germany’sAlternative für Deutschland, and Hungary’s Jobbik.Polling has repeatedly found that a majority of Frenchcitizens want their own EU referendum, though theMay 2017 French presidential elections gave the pro-EU Emmanuel Macron a resounding victory overEuroskeptic Marine Le Pen.

The ultimate fear around the continent is that Brexitcould unravel the rest of the EU, especially if the UKeconomy performs well in its aftermath. Even barringthat, Brexit will be a heavy blow to a union that hasstruggled to maintain a united front maintainingsanctions on Russia and managing theunprecedented wave of migrants. And, in the wake of2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, when France invokedthe EU’s mutual defense clause for the first time,Brexit threatens to end Europe’s hopes for a trulycommon security and defense policy once and for all.

McBride, J "What Brexit Means", Council for Foreign Relations, Accessed 11/1/19,www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexit-means

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Is State Sovereignty At Risk In Our Modern Society?

The signing of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648significantly changed the nature of internationalrelations since it illustrated the beginning of twoimportant principles: state sovereignty as well as thenotion of non-interference. The treaties built on the1933 Montevideo Convention, which had suggestedthese principles, mainly through its definition of thestate, a territory that is defined by its undisputablesovereignty. That same point was also built into theUnited Nations’ (UN) charter which says that “theOrganization’s foundation depends on the equalsovereignty of all its members.” As such, statesovereignty has been an undeniable pillar ofinternational relations for decades and it is stillessential the international community nowadays. But it is becoming more and more common to findlimitations to state sovereignty in the contemporaryworld, in part due to globalization. This phenomenonhas now reached all four corners of the globe, whichleads to the interconnection of international actorscompared to the Westphalian era. Consequently,interstate relations alone are not enough tocharacterize international relations anymore.Unprecedented links between citizens of all over theworld are developing and adding itself to the layers ofinterstate relations in the sense that nations’ citizenscan communicate and share information like neverbefore — mainly through the use of the Internet butadditionally fueled by an incessant global mediacoverage. We are also witnessing an outbreak of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) taking overstate responsibilities and acting as internationalorganizations much like the UN or the InternationalCourt of Justice attempted to do in the 20th century,mainly through their desire and ability to ensurefundamental rights within countries. And finally,international corporations see their power growthrough offering services until now reserved to nation-states such as health services and communications.These three points can lead to the following question:to what extent international private actors such asNGOs, medias and corporations put state sovereigntyat risk?

In Ted Levitt’s 1983 essay entitled The Globalizationof Markets, the author explains that — in the contextof globalization — companies are moving away fromoffering personalized goods and are nowmanufacturing “(…) globally standardized productsthat are advanced, functional, reliable—and lowpriced.” That mass production state of mind leads toLevitt’s notion that “(…) only global companies willachieve long-term success by concentrating on whateveryone wants (…)”, hence the necessity of a massproduction chain. To Levitt’s mind, companies willalso use technology as a means to efficientlypenetrate globalized markets. By securing their placewithin globalization, it will enable companies toprovide the optimal standardized products, “(…)achieving for itself vastly expanded markets andprofits.” Although Levitt published his essay 35 yearsago, his ideas apply almost eerily to our consumeristand globalized societies across the world. Globalcompanies’ marketing strategy as developed by Levittcan be applied aptly to international companies suchas Facebook and Google and their way of penetratingthe Indian market. According to the Courrier International’s article TheSilicon Valley Is Taking Over the World[1], Googleand Facebook’s directors expressed their willingnessto offer Internet to the Indian people for seeminglyselfless reasons: “to reduce poverty, to improveeducation and to create jobs”. Insuring decent accessto education and employment represent fieldstraditionally guaranteed by the state, but are hereused by both multinationals in order to legitimize theirwill of penetrating the Indian market. They are thusinfringing upon state responsibilities, which perhapsrepresents a threat to the Indian government. Indeed,if private companies can offer job growth and a bettereducation, what core missions are left to the state?How can its sovereignty stand if it cannot solveproblems inherent to all nation-states? Indeed, the“GAFA” companies (Google, Apple, Facebook andAmazon) are overstepping on the goals of even theUN as the organization wishes to achieve a globalaccess to the Internet here by 2030.

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In spite Facebook’s efforts, the Indian governmentdidn’t agree to the company’s offer since it didn’t,according to several NGOs, follow the principle ofInternet neutrality. The company wished to implant aFree Basics Internet plan that would grant freeInternet access to the Indian population but forpreselected websites only; NGOs concluded that theoffer did not respect the notion of Internet neutrality,where the Internet is fully accessible in its entiretyand under the same conditions for all people. Inresponse, Facebook put in place a marketingcampaign in India in order to sway popular opinionagainst the decision of the Indian government.Billboards were put up across the country and thecompany started a petition. Mark Zuckergburg evenwrote a compelling piece published in Times of Indiaasserting that “In every society, there are certainbasic services that are so important for people’swellbeing that we expect everyone to be able toaccess them freely.”

If the government is not capable of offering basicservices to its population, shouldn’t it accept the helpof external actors? To insure the comfort of itspopulation and the growth of its country, it should.Even though the traditional definition of statesovereignty does not completely apply to the modernworld we live in, it gives us a chance to redefine it.Moreover, states should accept working with outsidepartners in order to implement new ways of offeringservices to its population if needs be. It can be a firststep to creating a more relevant form of governmentsuited to twenty-first century politics.

Valentin, M "Is State Sovereignty At Risk In Our Modern Society?", International Association for PoliticalScience Students, Accessed 17/5/19, www.iapss.org/2018/02/28/is-state-sovereignty-at-risk-in-our-modern-society/

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Article 50 ruling shows the ECJ respects sovereignty morethan UK govt doesToday's ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)found that the UK could unilaterally decide to revokeArticle 50 if it wanted to. It is a game-changingmoment. It means we can stay in the EU on ourcurrent terms - including the rebate and guaranteesagainst the euro. It means that we do not need theagreement of other member states. We can make thedecision on our own. We are, even now, in charge ofour own destiny. The ruling provides a moment of decisive politicaldrama which could sharpen the minds of MPs as theycome to vote on Theresa May's deal tomorrow andthen, more importantly, decide what to do in the wakeof its seemingly inevitable defeat. But it doessomething else too. It shows that EU legal decisionstake firm account of sovereignty, in a manner whichthe UK government often ignores. The British government fought this case tooth-and-nail. First it tried to appeal at the Supreme Court, thenit was fighting it in Europe. While it has been carefulnot to mention the case in public, in private it hasdeploying a frenzied and panicked legal attack. It is a quite extraordinary thing for them to have done.This was a British government spending Britishtaxpayers' cash on trying to limit our own nationalsovereignty. They were trying to escape a clearstatement about the powers held by the Britishparliament, simply because that power happened toentail unilateral revocation of Article 50. We don't often see such mountainous levels of self-harm from a national government. In any normalscenario we'd expect them to direct legal funds intoexpanding British sovereignty, not trying to limit it. Butthese are not normal times. Everything is framedthrough the spectrum of the people's will. Everythingis culture war, at any cost, even if it involves limitingyour own room to manoeuvre in high-stakesnegotiations.

Instead, it is left to the hated ECJ, whose removalfrom British political life is considered a sacrosanctred line in Brexit negotiations, to stand up for the UK'sfreedom. This decision is framed by concerns about Britishsovereignty. It is baked-in to the argument. If theBrexiters cared about the rhetoric they espoused atthe referendum they would pay careful attention to it.But they don't. So they won't. As the advocate general argued last week, the caseis basically about deciding something which has notyet been written into law. Article 50 said how a statecould leave the EU, but there was no following articlestating what happened if they changed their mind.So they looked at what Article 50 intended to do anddecided to answer the question by following thosesame principles. They concluded it did two things.Firstly, it allowed states the sovereign right to leavethe EU if they wished. And second it created theconditions for that withdrawal to be orderly. Thismeant that any decision to cancel Article 50 shouldfollow the same principles. "The sovereign nature of the right of withdrawal…supports the conclusion that the member stateconcerned has a right to revoke the notification of itsintention to withdraw," the ruling reads."Given that a state cannot be forced to accede to theEuropean Union against its will, neither can it beforced to withdraw from the European Union againstits will." The European Council and Commission had beenwary of this judgement. They felt troublesomemember states, like Hungary, would be able to use itto knock the system about, by first triggering Article50 and then revoking it, then perhaps doing so again.They wanted the Council to have to give unanimousapproval to a British request for cancellation.

Dunt, I, "Article 50 ruling shows the ECJ respects sovereignty more than UK govt does", Politics.co.uk, 10/12/18, www.politics.co.uk/blogs/2018/12/10/article-50-ruling-shows-the-ecj-respects-sovereignty-more-th

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China's 'Sovereign Internet'

A new report in People’s Daily interviewed fiveChinese experts on Internet security and politicalthought, including Fang Binxing (credited withcreating China’s “Great Firewall”). The report focuseson the idea of “Internet sovereignty” — the idea thateach country has the right to control its domesticinternet space. Yet by moving from a discussion ofChina’s rights to talk of international law, the reportmoves beyond a defense of China’s internetcensorship to outlining China’s vision for globalinternet governance. The idea of China’s “Internet sovereignty” is a high-profile resurrection of a concept first rolled out in a2010 white paper called “The Internet in China.” Thewhite paper explained the “Internet sovereignty ofChina” as meaning that “within Chinese territory theInternet is under the jurisdiction of Chinesesovereignty.” All persons and organizations operatingwithin Chinese territory are expected to follow China’sInternet laws and regulations, the white paper said. In an interview with New Yorker’s Evan Osnos at thetime, Columbia University professor Tim Wu notedthat China’s idea of “Internet sovereignty” was simply“a statement of private international law as typicallypracticed.” Most countries, Wu noted, have decidedthat the Internet is subject to national laws. Thedifference between China and the rest of the world,according to Wu, was simply one of scale: “Othercountries, if they don’t consider the Internetsovereign, have a certain respect for the network as aplatform for free speech … Again this varies fromplace to place, but China is unique in its lack ofrespect for the idea of an open Internet.” Thus, among China’s rules and regulations for theInternet are typical prohibitions against “divulgingstate secrets” and “subverting state power” as well asmore unique bans on “damaging state honor,”“propagating heretical or superstitious ideas,”“spreading rumors [and] disrupting social order andstability.” These rules were lumped into the categoryof “internet security,” equating these actions tohacking and other forms of cyber crime.

The People’s Daily article seeks to argue not only thatChina has the right to set up its own rules andregulations for the Internet, but that an internationalconsensus should be reached to recognize this right.The article begins by noting that, in the Internet age,China now has “information borders” in addition totraditional sovereignty over land, air, and sea. Thereport argues that each country has a right tostrengthen control over its own domestic Internet, andthat such actions will help safeguard order andstability on the global Internet system. In the interview with People’s Daily, Fang Binxingpointed to a 2013 report from a UN-commissionedgroup of experts on information security. That reportnoted that “state sovereignty and international normsand principles that flow from sovereignty apply toState conduct of ICT [information and communicationtechnologies]-related activities, and to theirjurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within theirterritory.” Fang argued that this statement proves theUN has already accepted China’s idea of “Internetsovereignty.” Fang made no mention of the next item in the UNreport, which requires that “state efforts to addressthe security of ICTs must go hand-in-hand withrespect for human rights and fundamental freedomset forth in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights.” The juxtaposition of these two points in theUN report outlines the basic difference betweenChina’s concept of the Internet and the Westernconcept: is cyberspace entirely made up of domesticspheres, each under a different country’s sovereignrule, or is the Internet as a whole subject tointernational rule in the name of “universal values”?People’s Daily argues for the former approach.

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Thus Wang suggests that each country can controlthese physical aspects of cyber space and “othercountries have no right to interfere.” Yet even while holding that “Internet sovereignty” isimmune to external interference, the People’s Dailyarticle acknowledged the importance of internationalconsensus on defining cyberspace boundaries andrules of conduct. Currently, disagreements betweencountries are a major barrier to defining boundariesand implementing control of cyberspace, WangXiaofeng of Fudan University’s Center for AmericaStudies said. Lang Ping of the Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences noted that no country canindependently face the challenges posed bycyberspace.

Tiezzi, S, "China's 'Sovereign Internet'", The Diplomat, 24/6/14, www.thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/

legitimacyLegitimacy refers to an actor or an action being commonly consideredacceptable and provides the fundamental basis or rationale for all forms ofgovernance and other ways of exercising power over others. The mostaccepted contemporary source of legitimacy in a state is some form ofdemocracy or constitutionalism whereby the governed have a defined andperiodical opportunity to choose who they wish to exercise power over them.Other sources of legitimacy are suggested in states in which such anopportunity does not exist. Within any proposed overall framework oflegitimacy, individual actions by a state can be considered more or lesslegitimate. Other actors of global politics and their actions can also beevaluated from the perspective of legitimacy.

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Africa’s ‘Leaders for Life’ Who Is Venezuela’s Legitimate President? A MessyDispute, Explained The Chinese Communist Party and Legitimacy The EU’s ‘legitimacy deficit’

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Africa’s ‘Leaders for Life’

Sub-Saharan Africa is home to many of the world’slongest-ruling heads of state. Some postcolonialleaders in the 1960s and 1970s sought to become“president for life,” with several managing to remain inpower for three or more terms. By the turn of thetwenty-first century, the trend of entrenchedleadership had spread across the region, spurringcorruption, instability, societal fractures, andeconomic stagnation. But the trend may be reversing,in part due to sustained pressure by civil societygroups and regional blocs. How prevalent is this trend?Many African countries struggled with transfers ofpower in their first half century after independence.Leaders who gained recognition during nationalmovements for independence consolidated powerand bound their own positions in office with theircountries’ national identities. By early 2019, threeAfrican heads of state had been in power for morethan three decades each: Teodoro Obiang NguemaMbasogo in Equatorial Guinea, Paul Biya inCameroon, and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda. Morethan a dozen other African heads of state have beenin power for at least ten years. In August 2017,Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos steppeddown after thirty-eight years in office, and inNovember of that year, Zimbabwean PresidentRobert Mugabe was forced from office after thirty-seven years by a military coup. In 2019, Sudan’sOmar al-Bashir was ousted after three decades inpower. Military coups were once common as a means toseize power, with both Mbasogo and Musevenientering their presidencies this way. They havedeclined during the last two decades; there weretwenty-seven successful coups from 1970 to 1982,but only twelve from 2000 to 2012. What has been its impact on growth and stability?Strong correlations exist between sub-SaharanAfrica’s entrenched leadership and its developmentaland security challenges, including conflict orinstability, stagnant or declining economies, anddemocratic backsliding. The Economist’s 2018Democracy Index finds that more than twentycountries in sub-Saharan Africa have authoritariangovernments. Prominent examples include:

Zimbabwe. Once one of the continent’s richestnations, Zimbabwe tumbled under Mugabe to a placeof chronic underdevelopment with a long-strugglingeconomy. Mugabe’s alleged misuse of federalfunds has been linked to underfunded anddysfunctional government departments andprograms. In the wake of a slew of constitutionalamendments granting Mugabe broad power, thecountry experienced drops [PDF] in life expectancyand per capita income between 1990 and 2005.Economic instability has continued under Mugabe’ssuccessor, Emmerson Mnangagwa, with a severecurrency crisis prompting widespread protests in early2018. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under thethree-decade-long dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko,the DRC suffered from gross corruption,embezzlement, and neglect of public infrastructure.An economy based almost exclusively on mineralextraction deteriorated as Mobutu forced out foreign-owned companies and embezzled government funds.Laurent Kabila overthrew Mobutu in 1997 but wasassassinated in 2001; his son, Joseph, succeededhim, amassing a fortune by stealing state funds andeffectively disregarding the provision of publicservices. A war in the country’s east, considered theworld’s deadliest conflict since World War II,continued under his presidency. Kabila stepped downafter a December 2018 election, two years after hismandate was set to end, though election observersand many opposition leaders questioned the vote’slegitimacy. Sudan. Omar al-Bashir came to power in a 1989military coup that ousted the democratically electedprime minister. He remained in office despiteallegations by international and domestic observers ofwidespread electoral irregularities and fraud. Hepresided over a decades-long civil war that endedwith the south seceding to become the new state ofSouth Sudan in 2011. Bashir was indicted by theInternational Criminal Court in 2009 on charges ofwar crimes and crimes against humanity forinvolvement in attacks on civilians in Darfur.Following months of protests sparked by the risingprice of bread, the armed forces pushed Bashir out inApril 2019 and established a transitional militarycouncil.

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Rights abuses in the countries with the longest-serving leaders have included secret or arbitraryarrests and detentions, tight restrictions on freedomof expression, and police brutality, according tomonitoring groups. Human Rights Watch reportedthat the humanitarian situation in Burundi “remainsdire” nearly four years after President PierreNkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term sparkedmass protests. It accused the security services andthe ruling party’s youth league of widespread abusesahead of a May 2018 referendum to lengthenpresidential terms. Why has the problem persisted?Leaders are increasingly securing longer termsthrough “constitutional coups,” proposingamendments for approval by the legislature orjudiciary, or in national referenda, that allow foradditional terms in office. This practice grew morefrequent after 2000, when many postcolonial leaderswere nearing the ends of their constitutional termlimits. Since then, at least seventeen heads of state havetried to remain in power by tweaking their countries’constitutions. Namibian President Sam Nujoma did soin 1998, followed by Gnassingbe Eyadema, thepresident of Togo, in 2002. One year later, theGabonese parliament voted to remove term limitsfrom its constitution, allowing President Omar Bongoto run for a sixth term. Following these initialinstances, attempts to extend terms became fairlyregular occurrences, popping up every one to twoyears on the continent in countries including Angola,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti,Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, theRepublic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, andUganda. Angola’s dos Santos and former SenegalesePresident Abdoulaye Wade, among others, claimedthey were eligible to run for additional terms becausethe constitutions containing term limits were passedduring their mandates; they argued the limits shouldonly apply to future presidential terms.

Angola’s dos Santos and former SenegalesePresident Abdoulaye Wade, among others, claimedthey were eligible to run for additional terms becausethe constitutions containing term limits were passedduring their mandates; they argued the limits shouldonly apply to future presidential terms. Many experts say that countries lacking an effectivepolitical opposition are vulnerable to constitutionalcoups. Though several countries across sub-SaharanAfrica tout themselves as multiparty states, some,including Cameroon and Rwanda, remain de factoone-party states. Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, who haseffectively been the country’s leader since1994, secured another seven-year term in August2017, with the electoral commission reporting he hadthe support of almost 99 percent of voters.“Executives are able to act with impunity becausethere is no strong, organized opposition to challengeentrenched incumbents and push them toward agenuine political opening,” American University’sAdrienne LeBas writes of these countries. Kleptocratic incumbents have even more incentivesto stay in office; they could lose their wealth if theywere to lose power and potentially face prosecution.The network of businesses that Kabila and his familyhave built in and beyond the DRC has brought themhundreds of millions of dollars. Angola’s dos Santoswas long accused of funneling government funds to asmall group of elites, as well as to his own family. Hisdaughter Isabel, the wealthiest woman on thecontinent, was named head of the state oil companyby her father in late 2016. “Very few African countries—in fact almost none—have any kind of pension or security scheme forformer presidents or heads of state. So out of powermeans out of money,” Anneke Van Woudenberg,then Human Rights Watch’s deputy director forAfrica, told Newsweek. Dos Santos’s successor,former Defense Minister Joao Lourenco, pledgedto crack down on corruption; he removed Isabel dosSantos from the national oil company, and herbrother, Jose Filomeno dos Santos, as chair of thecountry’s sovereign wealth fund.

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Mugabe has called the push for term limits a Westernattempt to “place a yoke around the necks of Africanleaders,” and some politicians who concur with himpoint to Western democracies, including the UnitedKingdom and Canada, that have no such provisions. When have leaders failed to extend their rule?Zambian President Frederick Chiluba’s and MalawianPresident Bakili Muluzi’s proposals to raisepresidential term limits in 2001 and 2003,respectively, were stopped after opposition and civilsociety groups formed alliances with lawmakers fromthe countries’ ruling parties. In 2006, Nigeria’s senaterejected an amendment put forth by PresidentOlusegun Obasanjo that would have allowed him toserve a third term. Citizens have often opposed constitutional coupattempts through protest, at times successfullyblocking them. In 2012, large protests in Senegal ledto an electoral defeat for Wade, who was running fora disputed third term. After weeks of demonstrationsin October 2014, Burkinabe citizens stopped BlaiseCompaore from repealing the constitutional provisionon term limits and forced his resignation. Polling byAfrobarometer found that roughly 75 percent ofcitizens surveyed in thirty-four African countriesbetween 2011 and 2013 believed leaders should belimited to two terms in office. Gambia’s small size and geography conspiredagainst former President Yahya Jammeh, who ruledfrom 1994 until his ouster in 2017, argues VirginiaComolli, a senior fellow at the International Institutefor Strategic Studies. The country is surrounded bySenegal, which supported opposition candidate andelection winner Adama Barrow. How have regional and international actorsresponded?The African Union (AU), which has prevented somemilitary coups by threatening countries withsuspension, sanctions, or military intervention, hasbeen criticized for not taking similar actions againstattempts at extending presidential terms.

In 2012, the AU ratified the African Charter onDemocracy, Elections and Governance [PDF], whichcalls on its member states to identify illegal means ofaccessing power or staying in office, includingrefusals “to relinquish power after free, fair, andtransparent elections” and constitutional amendmentsthat infringe upon “the principles of democraticchanges of power,” and sanction those responsible.In January 2017, the AU stated it would not recognizeJammeh, who lost the 2016 election but nonethelessattempted to stay on. The West African bloc ECOWAS has also becomeactive in some cases. A military offensive byECOWAS troops forced Jammeh to step down andleave the country. The body often deploys observersto help ensure free and fair elections in the region; in2019 it sent observers to Nigeria and Senegal.ECOWAS leaders discussed a proposal to banpresidents from seeking third terms at a 2015regional summit, but the bloc postponed adecision due to opposition from Togo and Gambia. The United Nations and European Union haveimposed sanctions on several African countries,including Burundi, the DRC, and Zimbabwe, inresponse to impeded political transitions or fairelections. The United Nations endorsed ECOWASmilitary action in Gambia and threatened sanctions ifJammeh refused to leave. Millions in EU developmentaid to Gambia was frozen in December 2014 due tohuman rights concerns under Jammeh; followingJammeh’s departure, the bloc released the funds. What is U.S. policy toward extended mandates?Democracy promotion has long been a U.S. priority inthe region. President Barack Obama said in a 2012brief on U.S. strategy in sub-Saharan Africa that theUnited States would “not stand idly by when actorsthreaten legitimately elected governments ormanipulate the fairness and integrity of democraticprocesses.” In an address to AU leaders three yearslater, Obama urged the body to ensure that heads ofstate comply with term limits.

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It remains to be seen how closely President Donald J.Trump will adhere to that precedent. Hisadministration has said it will not “subsidize corruptleaders and abusers of human rights” on thecontinent, but a new Africa strategy outlined in late2018 marked a shift in priority from democracyadvancement to countering China and Russia in theregion. The United States has imposed economic sanctions,including bans on travel to the United States andbusiness transactions with U.S. nationals, onindividuals who “undermine democratic processes.”The United States issued sanctions against Mugabe and other Zimbabwean officials in 2003. The Obamaand Trump administrations have sanctioned topofficials from the DRC since Kabila refused toschedule an election in late 2016. Ahead of Nigeria’s2019 election, the United States and United Kingdomjointly announced they would deny visas to Nigeriansinvolved in vote rigging or electoral violence.

At the same time, analysts contend that the UnitedStates has often prioritized security interests overconcerns about prolonged rule. Washington haschosen not to penalize long-serving leaders ofpartners, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Uganda.And in the DRC, CFR’s Michelle D. Gavin points out,Washington accepted disputed 2018 election resultsto avoid further instability. The U.S. military trainspartner nations’ military forces, shares intelligencewith them, and helps their troops combat Islamistrebel groups on the continent, including al-Shabab inKenya and Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Felter, C "Africa's Leaders for Life", Council for Foreign Relations, 29/4/19, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/africas-leaders-life

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Who Is Venezuela’s Legitimate President? A Messy Dispute,ExplainedVenezuela’s crisis has raised questions that coulddetermine the country’s future — and that a far-offnews reader could be forgiven for finding confusing.Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader, has declared thatPresident Nicolás Maduro is illegitimate and hasasserted himself as Venezuela’s interim president. So who is the legitimate leader, how can we tell andwho gets to decide? The United States and several countries in LatinAmerica and Europe have recognized Mr. Guaidó asthe rightful leader, and he has called on the military towithdraw its support for Mr. Maduro. But would elevating Mr. Guaidó constitute ademocratic transition or a coup? The answers to these questions, though urgentlyimportant, are not at all straightforward. Here is somehelp in trying to think them through. Who is more legitimate, Mr. Maduro or Mr.Guaidó?There is no one litmus test for political legitimacy,which can come from a few different sources. BothMr. Maduro and Mr. Guaidó have debatable claims tolegitimacy, which is part of what makes this somessy. Calling a leader “legitimate” does not mean that he orshe is popular, successful or morally upstanding. Itsimply means that citizens, political elites and foreigngovernments recognize the leader’s rightful authority. So when a leader takes power and is initially treatedas legitimate — and Mr. Maduro was generallyaccepted when he took office in 2013 — it’s verydifficult for him or her to lose it. But Mr. Maduro has seen his sources of legitimacyweaken.

Protesters filled the streets of Caracas, theVenezuelan capital, last week to denounce him asillegitimate. Still, even 300,000 protesters wouldconstitute only about 1 percent of the population. Mr.Maduro is thought to retain some support, particularlyamong the poor. Many of Venezuela’s neighbors have dropped theirrecognition of Mr. Maduro, as have the United Statesand Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Spain,among other nations. If Mr. Maduro cannot representhimself as legitimate abroad, then he will look lesslegitimate at home, which invites citizens and politicalofficials to reject him as well. The weakest point in Mr. Maduro’s popular legitimacymay be his 2018 re-election victory, which was widelydisputed amid fraud allegations that suggest he mightnot actually have the popular support to act aspresident. But plenty of world leaders steal elections and are stilltreated by their citizens, however grudgingly, aslegitimate. So whether or not the allegations of a rigged electionrender Mr. Maduro illegitimate is not ultimately up toelection monitors. It’s up to Venezuelan citizens andpolitical officials, who collectively confer legitimacy onMr. Maduro by continuing to treat him as president —or not. Mr. Maduro’s legitimacy has another weak point: thepolitical institutions that hold him in power. After theopposition won the legislature in 2015, Mr. Maduro’sallies stacked the Supreme Court with loyalists. In2017, Mr. Maduro created a second legislature, whichwas filled with loyalists in elections widely condemnedas fraudulent. The new, loyalist-controlled legislaturethen stripped the opposition-controlled legislature ofits powers. If Venezuelan citizens and political elites come totreat those Maduro-allied institutions as illegitimate,then his own legitimacy suffers.Mr. Guaidó’s claims to legitimacy are imperfect aswell.

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He has argued that Mr. Maduro’s disputed re-electionvictory left the presidency technically empty,triggering a rule that allows for Mr. Guaidó, as head ofthe National Assembly, to be sworn in as interimleader. That only makes Mr. Guaidó legitimate if he canconvince enough citizens, political elites and foreigngovernments to treat him as such. It’s not the world’s easiest sell. Mr. Guaidó’s claimderives from a creative interpretation of aconstitutional provision, rather than from popular willor the due process of the law. It’s mostly a claimabout the weakness of Mr. Maduro’s legitimacy ratherthan the strength of his own. Mr. Guaidó’s apparent hope is that he can rallyenough protesters — and win over enough politicalelites and foreign governments — to convince thecountry’s military, or even Mr. Maduro’s owngovernment, that they will all be better off installingMr. Guaidó. That is why Mr. Guaidó is so focused on the issue oflegitimacy. Not as a way to appeal to the democraticideals of Venezuelan generals and elites. But as away to convince those power brokers that, if they puthim in office, he would be accepted at home andabroad — and finally return stability. Would Mr. Guaidó taking power constitute acoup?In practice, the answer largely depends on whether ornot Venezuelans and foreign governments choose tosee Mr. Guaidó’s ascent as legitimate. Think about the 2011 Egyptian revolution, which waswidely accepted as a legitimate change ofgovernment. Though protesters initiated themovement calling for President Hosni Mubarak tostep down, it was the generals who removed him andinstalled themselves as interim leaders.

Coup leaders, who tend to strike amid unrest, almostalways claim to be serving the will of the people. Thatdoesn’t make Egypt’s generals wrong about havingpopular support. But it exposes an uncomfortabletruth: the line between coups and revolutions is oftena matter of perception. This doesn’t make the distinction meaningless, justsubjective, determined by whether citizens andgovernments see the change in power as reflectingtheir wishes. If Venezuelans believe that Mr. Guaidó does not havea popular mandate to take power, his installationwould be seen as subverting popular will andtherefore a coup. But if they believe Mr. Guaidó has a popularmandate, then even if he is installed by a handful ofgenerals, his ascent would likely be seen as reflectingpopular will and therefore legitimate. If that feels like a low bar for legitimizing a coup, thenMr. Maduro has only himself to blame. If Venezuela’s elections were seen as free and fair,then that would be the only legitimate way to changethe government. It’s only because their legitimacy hasbeen widely questioned in recent years that Mr.Guaidó and his foreign backers can claim that forcingout Mr. Maduro would serve democracy. Does the United States recognizing Mr. Guaidóconstitute a coup?Countries will sometimes revoke their recognition of aleader who loses an election but refuses to stepdown. Or a leader who loses the ability to govern.After Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian leader, massacredprotesters and lost control of much of the military,many foreign leaders declared him no longerlegitimate. This sort of revocation is usually couched asreflecting the will of the people. But it is often alsointended to help push that leader out.

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It’s a signal to the leader and his or her supporters: Ifyou stay in office, we won’t deal with you, making itharder for you to rule. It’s also a signal to thecountry’s citizens, political elites and its military: If youpush out this leader, we won’t object. If that helps to take down a despot who is widely seenas illegitimate and helps create the conditions fordemocracy, it can serve legitimate democratic rule.But if it promotes American interests at the cost ofpopular will — as the United States did in supportingcoups in Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973 — then it istantamount to participating in an illegitimate coup. Venezuela is a difficult case because Mr. Maduro’slegitimacy is contested within his country. If you seehim as illegitimate, then the American policy seems toadvance Venezuelans’ democratic rights to elect theirown leader. If you see him as still legitimate, then theUnited States is arguably subverting Venezuelandemocracy.

The Trump administration’s record hurts its claims tobe acting in support of Venezuelan democracy. It hasbeen so vehement in its opposition to Mr. Maduro’sgovernment, and so bellicose about supportingregime change in Venezuela and elsewhere, that itsmotives are not seen as particularly benign ordemocratic. And the United States has a long history ofencouraging or conducting coups in Latin America.This does not mean that any political transitionendorsed by the Trump administration is necessarilya coup. Nor does it make Mr. Guaidó an Americanpuppet. But keep in mind that the legitimacy of any transitionis a matter of perception, and that perceptions inVenezuela right now are divided. The Trumpadministration’s eagerness to remove Mr. Madurocould hurt the legitimacy of any new Venezuelangovernment, regardless of how it comes about.

Fisher, M, "Who Is Venezuela’s Legitimate President? A Messy Dispute, Explained", New York Times,,4/2/19, www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-guaido-legitimate.html

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The Chinese Communist Party and Legitimacy

Earlier in September, Wang Qishan, ChinesePresident Xi Jinping’s de facto right hand man, openlydiscussed the question of the Chinese CommunistParty’s (CCP) legitimacy at the “Party and the WorldDialogue 2015” conference in Beijing, China’s capital.“The CCP’s legitimacy lies in history and popularsupport from the people. The Party is the choice bythe people,” Wang said to more than 60 politiciansand academics from home and abroad, includingformer South African President Thabo Mbeki andformer Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Chinese senior cadres have long blocked publicmention of the party’s legitimacy, especially by high-ranking officials. Yet, private discussion andacademic studies on this subject have actuallyintensified in recent years among scholars andpolicymakers. Why the sudden mention of legitimacyin public? How is the issue of legitimacy laid out inChinese official discourse? The most obvious and perhaps oxymoronicexplanation why someone like Wang, a member ofthe CCP’s Politburo, would raise the topic in public isthat they have to. Sixty-six years after it came intopower, the CCP is no longer a revolutionary party (geming dang) but a governing party (zhi zheng dang).German sociologist Max Weber concluded thatpolitical legitimacy may derive from tradition,charisma, and legality or rationality. Although theseare simplified ideal types, Weber’s theory oflegitimacy nonetheless provides a useful frameworkwithin which to answer why the CCP has decided tobring up its legitimacy issue in a seemingly suddenway. For a long time before and after it became the rulingparty of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP didnot need to and in fact could not talk about seekinglegitimacy from the people because of Marxistideology that emphasized the centrality and vitality ofclass struggle. Its legitimacy was thus ratified not byballot but by people’s voluntary cooperation andparticipation in massive political and socialmovements.

As a revolutionary party, the CCP only claimed to bethe party of the workers and peasants. Its basis forlegitimacy came from a system of majority tyrannysupported by these social classes, or, as MaoZedong famously put it, “Political power grows out ofthe barrel of a gun.” While Mao is still frequentlybrought up and worshipped by the Party as a “greatpatriot and national hero,” his influence is andprobably will not ever be as large as that before 1978,when the Party’s legitimacy was, consciously orunconsciously, based on the charisma of the leader.Not only was Mao seen as the one man whopossessed the right to lead by virtue of power andheroism, his thoughts were considered as “invincible.” The appeal to class struggle and ideology, however,soon failed as a source of legitimacy and led to thechaotic Cultural Revolution. It was then that DengXiaoping and his successors began to put seekinglegitimacy from a wider social base on the partyagenda. The Party has used two main sources toclaim its legitimacy: history, or what Max Weberdefined as “traditional authority,” anddevelopmentalism, or as some refer to as the so-called “East Asian Model.” Wang’s speech, though arare public mention of legitimacy, resonates with theofficial Party rhetoric; that is, the CCP is legitimatebecause it has always existed. In addition,authoritarian regimes are usually headed by a strongman who is determined and able to justify mostpolitical repression by promises of economic successthat benefits a majority of the dominated. Take South Korea. While many criticize the latePresident Park Chung-hee as dictator, Park turns outto be South Koreans’ most popular president ever.Under his rule, South Korea, once occupied by Japanduring World World II and devastated by the KoreanWar in the 1950s, was transformed into one of themost developed countries in East Asia and the world. Or a more recent case: Singapore, whose 2015general elections came just two days after WangQishan’s speech.

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Contrary to what most Western scholars and mediapredicted, Singaporeans handed the ruling People’sAction Party (PAP) a sweeping victory, with 83 of the89 seats in parliament, while the opposition Workers’Party winning just six seats. Some analysissuggested one reason for the surprise result wereSingaporeans’ feelings of nostalgia for Lee KuanYew, Singapore’s founding father who died earlierthis year. Lee’s iron-fisted political rule, pro-business,anti-corruption approach to government helpedtransform Singapore into one of the wealthiestcountries it is today. Chinese analysts and partyschools have long looked to Singapore’s governanceand political model to justify authoritarianism and theCCP’s one-party rule. One of the frequent referencesthey turn to is Singapore. Soon The Beijing-basednewspaper Global Times, one of the CCP’smouthpieces, was quick to describe the Singaporeanelection as a robust victory for the PAP after thepassing of Lee Kuan Yew, citing PAP’s economicsuccess. This is not to say authoritarian regimes boastingstrong leadership traditions and economic successare immune to legitimacy issues. In fact, legitimacycrises is more evident than ever in most authoritariancountries. With the death of Lee Kuan Yew, theapogee of strong-man politics that began in the 1960shas passed. Facing a more confident and contentiouspublic, these regimes had only economicperformance to justify their authorities. And when the“economic miracle” gradually loses its magic power,accompanied by growing social inequality, thatlegitimacy weakens. The PAP in Singapore may havewon a resounding victory in the recent elections, but ithas had to move rapidly to respond to growingcomplaints from Singaporeans. This potential legitimacy crisis also explains why theCCP would rather take the risk of raising itslegitimacy in public than passively wait for others todefine for it.

The “Theory of Three Represents” proposed byformer President Jiang Zemin, the “Scientific Outlookon Development” offered by former President HuJintao, and the “Chinese Dream” introduced byPresident Xi Jinping are the latest efforts by the CCPto address its concerns over the these ideologicalcrisis of its legitimacy. If we were to sum up theseofficial discourses, they all emphasize the Party’slegitimacy not with reference to the CCP’srevolutionary past, but to the vitality of the CCPresulting from its ability to adapt to an ever-changingenvironment and to reform itself from within. Unlikethe PAP, however, the CCP’s claims to legitimacyseems to be much less persuasive, even among itsown members. In recent years, the PAP in Singapore has adjustedand appealed to the rationality embedded in theconstitutional and legal system; popular supportmanifest in the votes won through open andcompetitive elections becomes the new source oflegitimacy. While Singaporeans can express theirdissatisfaction by voting for the Worker’s Party, thecomplaints in China are reflected in the fact thatpeople, some of them CCP members, are divided intothose in favor of free markets and developmentalism,and those who want to return to the Mao era, andothers. In the face of such public doubts, the CCPhas chosen to cling to the economic miracle andresort to costly repressions, as sources of legitimacy.Even in Wang’s recent speech, there is no actualsubstance suggesting the Party will try to seekrationality or other news sources for its legitimacy. In sum, while it may be a first for a CCP’s high-ranking official to publicly discuss the legitimacyissue, there is no reason to become excited aboutany hidden meanings behind Wang’s move. And asmuch as authoritarian states like China andSingapore share traits, such as an emphasis ondevelopmentalism, analysts should not be overlyoptimistic about China’s chances of replicating thePAP’s success. The PAP has actively established itslegal and rational authority in Singapore. The CCPhas far more work to do in that regard.

Ruan, L, "The Chinese Communist Party and Legitimacy", The Diplomat, 30/9/15,www.thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-chinese-communist-party-and-legitimacy/

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The EU’s ‘legitimacy deficit’

Legal scholar and former German ConstitutionalCourt judge, Dieter Grimm, diagnosed the sourceof the European Union’s current ‘legitimacydeficit’ and offered some solutions for movingbeyond the current crisis in a talk on 7 Februaryat the Hertie School of Governance. ‘There is little doubt the European Union suffers froma lack of acceptance by its citizens. It is likewiseundisputed that this lack endangers the project ofEuropean integration,’ Grimm told an audience at thejoint invitation of the Hertie School and the German-British Society. ‘It is less clear what sources of thisweakness are and consequently it is less clear whatthe adequate remedy might be.’ Grimm traced the historical origins of this Achillesheel, beginning with two seminal EU Court of Justicedecisions in the 1960s, to the signing of theMaastricht Treaty that laid the basis for the EU, thefailure of European integrationists to recognisewaning public support, and consequently, GreatBritain’s decision to leave the union. ‘Under the cloak of economic integration, changestook place that went far beyond a common market,’Grimm said. These did not become the subject ofpolitical debate, but their consequences unfoldedover time. Grimm sees the Treaty of Maastricht in1992 as a turning point for the high level of supportthe EU had until then largely taken for granted. Interms of integration it was a ‘step forward’, but interms of acceptance among the population, ‘it was astep backward,’ he said. As nationalist voices began to rise in the EuropeanParliament, the EU sought a constitutional treaty in2003. The idea was to have ‘more Europe,’ but itturned out that this objective was not shared by all:‘The constitution failed precisely in those countrieswhere it was submitted to a referendum,’ Grimm said.

One reason was a disconnect between citizens andtheir representatives in the European Parliament,which is built into the legislative system, Grimm said.Electorates vote for national parties, but theirEuropeanisation in the form of faction-building occursonly after elections. This means national parties runon programmes that may not even be represented inparliament. Nevertheless, Grimm said he doubts thatEuropeanising elections alone would solve thelegitimacy problem. The decisive flaw is the ‘growing autonomy of theEU’s executive and judicial organs’ from democraticprocesses in the EU and at the national level. Grimmoutlined several events that have led to this. For one,the shift from unanimity in favour of qualified majorityvoting in the EU Council helped smoothe politicalprocesses, but has meant member states are nowsubject to laws they may not have approved. But the most far-reaching consequence arose fromtwo European Court of Justice judgements in 1963and 1964, Grimm said. Judging European law to bedirectly applicable in the member states, the courtpaved the way for European law to take precedenceover national law – including national constitutionallaw. ‘From that moment on, the European Court ofJustice could take integration into its own hands. Themember states were no longer needed,’ Grimm said. The court didn’t interpret the law as it would a treatybetween states, but rather, as it would a nationalconstitution, ‘relying on an objective purpose anddetached from the intent of the member states.’ Theconsequence was ‘constitutionalisation’, said Grimm.‘The treaties have not become a constitution,’ hesaid, ‘but they function like a constitution.’ Through these mechanisms, member states firsttransferred powers to the EU and then the EU tookpowers from the member states, according to Grimm.“The European Court of Justice pursued this secondpath with missionary zeal,” he said, while politicians,the public and media took little notice. In terms ofeconomic integration, this was a success story, but iteroded the project’s legitimacy by “reducing the realmof national law – areas the member states hadactually reserved for themselves.”

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Grimm argues that ‘over-constitutionalisation’ of theEU treaties prevents states from resisting this trend.Constitutions usually regulate how political decisionsare produced, but leave those decisions toinstitutions, which make policies based on electoralpreferences. But the by far greatest part of thetreaties is comprised of norms that are not ofconstitutional nature, and would usually fall under‘ordinary law’ in the member states. Thus, “decisionsof an enormous political impact come about throughadministrative and judicial channels – through non-political mechanisms and hence outside thedemocratic process,” Grimm said. The only way tochange this is to amend the treaties, which is verydifficult. Some have suggested that the EU’s legitimacy deficitcould be solved by reforms that would strengthen thepower of the European Parliament and place it at thecentre of the EU. But Grimm does not believe thiswould be a panacea, as the EU would then be evenmore dependent on its own, internal legitimacyderived from the parliamentary election. “Put simply:the EU cannot do without the legitimacy thatemanates from the member states,” he said. Grimm proffered several solutions to the currentcrisis. First, ‘internal legitimation’ must be restored.The European Parliament elections must be broughtcloser to the public through a Europeanisation thatwould allow national interests to be balanced beforethe election, rather than after. Next, safeguards areneeded for the ‘creeping erosion’ of member states’powers. Communalisation must be limited and thereshould be a division of powers in the legislativebranch according to subject matters, like in everyfederal polity.

Finally, the treaties should be reduced to a clearlyconstitutional nature, in order to ‘repoliticise’ decision-making, which has been eroded by the growingautonomy of the judiciary and executive in democraticprocesses. This would require limiting the treaties toprovisions on the goals of the EU, the powers of itsinstitutions and their procedures and rights. All otherprovisions would be removed and relegated toordinary law.While politically difficult, this solution is legally easy,Grimm asserted.The event was co-hosted by the German-BritishSociety and the Dahrendorf Forum. Helmut Anheier,President of the Hertie School of Governance,chaired the discussion. Rupert Graf Strachwitz, ViceChair of the Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft, servedas discussant.

"The EU’s ‘legitimacy deficit’ Dahrendorf Forum, accessed on 17/5/19, www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/news/the-eus-legitimacy-deficit/

interdependenceIn global politics, the concept of interdependence most often refers to themutual reliance between and among groups, organizations, geographic areasand/or states for access to resources that sustain living arrangements. Often,this mutual reliance is economic (such as trade), but can also have a securitydimension (such as defence arrangements) and, increasingly, a sustainabilitydimension (such as environmental treaties). Globalization has increasedinterdependence, while often changing the relationships of power among thevarious actors engaged in global politics.

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The Complex Interdependence of China’s Belt andRoad Initiative in the Philippines Human society is totally interdependent—that’s ahuge advantage, but also a huge survival risk Energy independence in an interdependent world

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The Complex Interdependence of China’s Belt and RoadInitiative in the PhilippinesIn international relations, “complex interdependence”refers to the multiple channels of interaction andagendas in interstate relations, which involvedomestic stakeholders—public and private—onnonmilitary issues. Since the Belt and Road Initiativecame into being, most analyses have largely focusedon infrastructure development. The BRI not only hasthe potential to impact a host government’ssocioeconomic agenda, but also its overall bilateralrelationship with China. The case of the Philippines demonstrates that toexamine the progress of the BRI, it is imperative thatit not only be measured through hard infrastructure,but also against the four other major areas ofcooperation—policy coordination, trade andinvestment facilitation, financial coordination andintegration, and people‐to‐people ties andconnectivity. Beyond InfrastructureThe 2017 Belt and Road Big Data Report clearlyemphasizes on the non-hard infrastructureachievements of the BRI in terms of the following:signed cooperation agreements, established direct airroutes, number of trains put into service, investmentsof Chinese enterprises in BRI countries (and vice‐versa), economic and trade zones setup, signedbilateral currency swap deals, availability of the ChinaUnionpay, sister‐cities forged, increase in touristexchanges, number of enrolled foreign students inChina and implemented visa‐free policies towardChina. Against this backdrop, the BRI should not beinterpreted as an initiative that only involves theChinese government or its state‐owned enterprises,but also private Chinese companies. In the Belt andRoad Big Data Report, of the top 50 most involvedand influential Chinese enterprises, 42 percent areprivate, 56 percent are SOEs, and 2 percent are jointventures. Apart from manufacturing and construction,these companies also operate in the areas offinancing and IT, for example, Alibaba, Huawei,Lenovo, Tencent and JD. The report also mentionsthat the “participation [of private enterprises] into theinitiative enhances the reputation and influence of theChinese brands and products.”

Five Key Areas of Cooperation Policy coordination: Beijing and Manila signed aSix‐Year Development Program for Trade andEconomic Cooperation in March 2017, which aims togradually harmonize mutual development goals andinterests within the BRI framework. This move is alsoindicative that China will increase its meagerinvestments in the Philippines, which lags behind theU.S. and Japan. Complementing the program is theagreement of the Board of Investments and the Bankof China on the 2017-2019 Investment Priorities Planfor Chinese Companies, which is meant to facilitatebusiness‐matching activities and industrial linkages. Infrastructure development and connectivity: Inthis second area of cooperation, China has pledged$7.34 billion in soft loans or official developmentassistance and grants for large‐scale Philippineinfrastructure projects and flagship programs. Thisamount forms part of $24 billion worth of agreementsBeijing committed to President Rodrigo Duterte on hisfirst visit to China in 2016. Interestingly, from 2016,when President Duterte took office, to 2017, loansand grants from China registered an astronomical5,862 percent increase, according to Bloomberg. Thebasket of loans through official developmentassistance programs in two tranches ($7.19 billion)includes dam and irrigation, railways, expresswaysand bridge projects, among others. Trade and investment: China became thePhilippines’ largest trading partner in early 2017,marking an increase of $15.04 billion (16 percent)from 2016. Furthermore, investments approved bythe Philippine Economic Zone Authority and theBoard of Investments more than tripled for the firstthree quarters of 2017 to around $40 million (from$10.9 million in 2016). Remarkably, private Chinesefirms are also making headways in penetrating thePhilippine consumer market through mobile firmssuch as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo—enterprises that last year ranked among the top 10selling brands in the world, according to the WorldIntellectual Property Organization.

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Even Alibaba Group is making its presence felt inpromoting financial inclusion and digital paymentservices through strategic partnerships with localfirms, such as Globe Fintech Innovations Inc. or Mint.Moreover, Alibaba’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChatPay have also signed licensing agreements with AsiaUnited Bank, which favorably enables Chinesetourists to drive the growth of cashless paymentsystems in the Philippines. In the area oftelecommunications, President Duterte evenendorsed the participation of a Chinese state-runcompany to be the third telecom carrier in the countryin order to break the long‐standing duopoly andimprove the quality of Internet service in thePhilippines. Financial integration and connectivity: ThePhilippine Central Bank last year officially added therenminbi as part of its international reserves, joiningmore than half of BRI countries that have alreadydone so. Early this year, the Central Bank additionallyapproved the Peso-Yuan spot market, which willlower the transaction costs for Philippine and Chinesebanks and businesses by reducing reliance on thedollar as the intermediate peg. Around the same time,the issuance of “panda bonds” or renminbi‐denominated bonds worth $200 million began, whichcould pave the way for more access to Chineseassistance in Philippine financial requirements.Furthermore, the Philippine government hasannounced plans of partnering with the AlibabaGroup to create a more inclusive financial system tohelp rural communities and SMEs. Their plans wouldalso cut transaction costs for overseas Filipinoworkers when remitting money to the Philippinesthrough online banking services.

People–to–people exchanges andconnectivity: China has become the Philippines’second-largest tourism market. As of November2017, 14 new flights connect China and thePhilippines, and the Philippine Bureau of Immigrationinitiated a Visa Upon Arrival scheme for Chinesetourists. Separately, in the area of media andcommunications, China Central Television and thePresidential Communications Operations Office havesigned an MOU for the rebroadcasting of ChinaGlobal Television Network programs, which are partof the Belt and Road News Alliance of China CentralTelevision.The significant progress in the BRI’s five key areas ofcooperation in the Philippines underscores the risingstakes in and deepening complex interdependence ofSino-Philippine relations.The BRI in the Philippines is also indicative that theChina-led regime is not only a government venture,but is a “whole‐of‐country” approach, which includesthe active participation of China’s private sector.While it is true that the success of China’s BRI woulddepend on the political environment in each country,China may err on the side of caution by ensuring thatproposed projects are transparent, commerciallyviable, and that participating companies are of goodstanding. Should Chinese projects flounder, there is arisk of legal action and nationalist backlash, andChina, the BRI, and President Duterte would allaccrue reputational costs.Going forward, deepened Sino-Philippine economiccooperation will shift the bilateral dynamics fromconfrontation to cooperation and create anenvironment conducive to advancing the overall ties.But sustaining the BRI momentum, apart from riskmitigation strategies, policy guidance orinstitutionalization—just as what China has done withother countries—may be done through an MOU onBelt and Road cooperation. A joint BRI workingcommittee or BRI action plan may also be formed sothat planned projects can outlive brief six-year stintsof Philippine presidencies.

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Human society is totally interdependent—that’s a hugeadvantage, but also a huge survival riskA few years ago, a man named Mike Vilhauer wasfishing near Sunset Lake, in California’s SierraNevada mountains. He wandered into the woods tolook for bait, and promptly got lost. For the next fivedays, he lived off the land—drinking from a stream,sleeping in a rocky cave, eating the occasionaldandelion. After Vilhauer’s rescue, national andinternational news outlets breathlessly described his“fight for survival,” “against the odds.” Vilhauer’s survival seems like an impressiveachievement, until you stop to consider that he wassimply doing what humans did, day in and day out, formost of the last 200,000 years. Of necessity, ourdistant ancestors had wide-ranging survival skills:they foraged, hunted, herded, and built shelters. It’sonly in the last few millennia that we have taken onincreasingly specialized roles. Today, we are frycooks and nuclear physicists, bloggers and plumbers—but few of us retain the general skills that wereonce a prerequisite for survival. This is interdependence, which now defines us—asindividuals, communities, and nations—as neverbefore. Interdependence means that we don’t all haveto farm, or build houses, or make semiconductors.Instead, our complex social systems rely on thedivision of labor and exchange of goods and servicesto meet human needs. When people concentrate theirlabors on what each does best, all of society benefits—or so said Adam Smith in 1776 at the dawn ofmodern economic thinking. A few years later David Ricardo extended this idea tonations, claiming that if each country focuses itsproduction capacity on what it does better thananyone else—exploiting their comparative advantage—all nations will be better off. Later, this thinkingbecame a pillar of the post-World War II internationalorder. Interdependence theory—which holds thatnations that depend on each other economically aremore likely to work harmoniously together—hasshaped thinking in Washington for almost three-quarters of a century.

Interdependence has obvious upsides. It iswondrously efficient, as it removes the redundanciesof effort involved when everyone has to, say, cantheir own fruit—or when every nation has to grow itsown rice or mill its own steel. And interdependencehas coincided with an extraordinary period of peaceand prosperity in the industrialized world. But there are downsides as well. As a society’s effortsare divided into ever more discrete tasks, eachmember of that society becomes ever moredependent on others for the production of socialgoods and, ultimately, for survival—as Mike Villhauerlearned on his ill-fated fishing trip. Interdependent societies are more connected andintegrated, but they are also more fragile, more brittle,and more vulnerable to cascading failures. So whilehighly integrated societies can accomplish feats thatno group of unspecialized laborers could dream of,they do not do so well when subjected to shocks suchas earthquakes, epidemics, financial crises, andpolitical conflict. A generation ago, such shocksgenerally had only local effects. But in today’s hyper-connected world, a disruption in one place can swiftlycascade across the entire planet, threatening globalsupplies of goods and information. That’s whathappened after the Tohoku disaster in Japan in 2011,the Wall Street crash of 2008, and the SARSepidemic of 2002. Accordingly, the World EconomicForum has warned of “the prospect of rapid contagionthrough increasingly interconnected systems and thethreat of disastrous impacts.” If your community is tightly entwined with globalmarkets, it is vulnerable to impacts from distantdisasters. In one recent study, researchers measuredthe economic interdependence of 364 USmetropolitan areas; they then looked at how thosecities fared during the Great Recession. Theresearchers found that the most integrated,interdependent cities (typically also the largest cities)suffered greater drops in economic performance andtook longer to recover than their less-integratedcounterparts.

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Interdependence can pose geopolitical threats, aswell. Our economic ties to other nations expose us topotential acts of coercion and extortion by key tradingpartners. Two decades ago, no nation had thecapacity to cut off the flow of critical materials orinformation to the US population. Today, a simpleembargo or blockade could halt the supply of vitaldrugs, electronics, and financial information. That danger is real and present. A recent RANDCorporation report, prepared for the NationalIntelligence Council, found that China has quietlycornered the market on raw materials that lay at thebase of most high-tech manufacturing supply chains.For example, China now controls 97% of the world’ssupply of rare earth elements, which are essential tomanufacturing everything from iPhones to advancedmilitary technology. That gives China extraordinaryleverage over the US economy and national security.It is not difficult to imagine a scenario (a trade war;escalating tensions in the South China Sea) wheresuch leverage would come in handy. These dangers do not, however, warrant a wholesaleretreat from interdependence. This is not anendorsement of Trumpist “build the wall” isolationismand nationalism. It would not serve us as individuals,or as a nation, to wall ourselves off from the rest ofhumanity in pursuit of self-sufficiency. That path couldleave us isolated and friendless in a dangerous world.And it would dampen the dynamism that comes withglobal trade in goods and ideas. As with any set of trade-offs, there is a sweet spot tobe found—somewhere between hyper-connectedness and rigorous self-sufficiency. Whatmight that look like?

For individuals and families, it could mean planningfor inevitable disruptions—natural, social, andeconomic. Not by moving to a survivalist compound,but by developing small-scale, local backups for theglobe-spanning systems that supply essential goodsand services. Begin by considering how you wouldobtain the essentials—food, water, and power—ifsupply chains are cut off. Often, solutions are best generated at the communitylevel. For example, small-scale “microgrids,” poweredby renewable energy, offer an increasingly viablealternative to the huge but fragile mega-grid thatsupplies most Americans with energy. That’s how Co-op City, a housing complex in the Bronx, kept thelights on during Superstorm Sandy in 2012. Similarly, robust local food networks can keep foodon the table in times of crisis. Though local food nowaccounts for a small share of American agriculturalmarkets, that can change quickly: During World WarII, Americans planted “Victory Gardens” to help thewar effort and produced 40 percent of the vegetablesgrown in the US. At the national level, we can work to decreasedependence on China and others for raw materials.And we can place limits on the outsourcing of keyindustries, while nurturing a diverse industrial base inthe US. Some industries already enjoy protectionfrom global competition; for example, the Americanshipbuilding industry is propped up by legislation thatprevents naval warships from being built outside theUS. In this and similar cases, costs to efficiency maybe counterbalanced by gains in national security andeconomic resilience. It won’t be easy to strike the right balance between ofself-sufficiency and interdependence. But it isimportant to get it right. Otherwise, like Mike Vilhauer,we may find ourselves wandering in the woods,fighting for survival against the odds.

Shutters, S "Human society is totally interdependent—that’s a huge advantage, but also a huge survival risk ",Quartz, 2/5/17, www.qz.com/960232/human-society-is-totally-interdependent-thats-a-huge-advantage-but-

also-a-huge-survival-risk/

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Energy independence in an interdependent world

When President Richard Nixon proclaimed in theearly 1970s that he wanted to secure national energyindependence, the United States imported a quarterof its oil. By the decade’s end, after an Arab oilembargo and the Iranian Revolution, domesticproduction was in decline, Americans were importinghalf their petroleum needs at 15 times the price, and itwas widely believed that the country was running outof natural gas. Energy shocks contributed to a lethal combination ofstagnant economic growth and inflation, and everyUS president since Nixon likewise has proclaimedenergy independence as a goal. But few people tookthose promises seriously. Today, energy experts no longer scoff. By the end ofthis decade, according to the US Energy InformationAdministration, nearly half of the crude oil thatAmerica consumes will be produced at home, while82 per cent will come from the US side of the Atlantic.Philip Verleger, a respected energy analyst, arguesthat, by 2023, the 50th anniversary of Nixon’s “ProjectIndependence”, the US will be energy independent inthe sense that it will export more energy than itimports. Verleger argues that energy independence “couldmake this the New American Century by creating aneconomic environment where the United Statesenjoys access to energy supplies at much lower costthan other parts of the world”. Already, Europeansand Asians pay 4-6 times more for their natural gasthan Americans do. What happened? The technology of horizontal drillingand hydraulic fracturing, by which shale and othertight rock formations at great depths are bombardedwith water and chemicals, has released major newsupplies of both natural gas and oil. The US’ shale-gas industry grew by 45 per cent annually from 2005to 2010 and the share of shale gas in the US’ overallgas production grew from 4 per cent to 24 per cent.

The US is estimated to have enough gas to sustainits current rate of production for more than a century.While many other countries also have considerableshale-gas potential, problems abound, includingwater scarcity in China, investment security inArgentina, and environmental restrictions in severalEuropean countries. The American economy will benefit in myriad waysfrom its change in energy supply. Hundreds ofthousands of jobs are already being created, some inremote, previously stagnating regions. This additionaleconomic activity will boost overall GDP growth,yielding significant new fiscal revenues. In addition,the lower energy-import bill will cause the US’ tradedeficit to narrow and its balance-of-payments positionto improve. Some US industries, such as chemicalsand plastics, will gain a significant comparativeadvantage in production costs. Indeed, the International Energy Agency estimatesthat the additional precautions needed to ensureshale-gas wells’ environmental safety - includingcareful attention to seismic conditions, properlysealed shafts, and appropriate waste-watermanagement - add only about 7 per cent to the cost. With respect to climate change, however, the effectsof greater reliance on shale gas are mixed. Becausenatural-gas combustion produces fewer greenhousegases than other hydrocarbons, such as coal or oil, itcan be a bridge to a less carbon-intensive future. Butthe low price of gas will impede the development ofrenewable energy sources unless accompanied bysubsidies or carbon taxes.At this stage, one can only speculate about thegeopolitical effects. Clearly, the strengthening of theUS economy would enhance American economicpower - a scenario that runs counter to the currentfashion of portraying the US as being in decline.

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But one should not jump to conclusions. A balance ofenergy imports and exports is only a firstapproximation of independence. As I argue in mybook The Future of Power, global interdependenceinvolves both sensitivity and vulnerability. The USmay be less vulnerable in the long run if it importsless energy, but oil is a fungible commodity, and theUS economy will remain sensitive to shocks fromsudden changes in world prices. In other words, a revolution in Saudi Arabia or ablockade of the Strait of Hormuz could still inflictdamage on the US and its allies. So, even if Americahad no other interests in the Middle East, such asIsrael or nuclear non-proliferation, a balance ofenergy imports and exports would be unlikely to freethe US from military expenditures - which someexperts estimate run to $50 billion per year - toprotect oil routes in the region. At the same time, the US’ bargaining position in worldpolitics should be enhanced. Power arises fromasymmetries in interdependence. You and I maydepend on each other, but if I depend on you lessthan you do on me, my bargaining power isincreased.

For decades, the US and Saudi Arabia have had abalance of asymmetries in which we depended onthem as the swing producer of oil, and they dependedon us for ultimate military security. Now the bargainswill be struck on somewhat better terms from the US’point of view.Likewise, Russia has enjoyed leverage over Europeand its small neighbors through its control of naturalgas supplies and pipelines. As North Americabecomes self-sufficient in gas, more from variousother regions will be freed up to provide alternativesources for Europe, thereby diminishing Russia’sleverage.In East Asia, which has become the focus of USforeign policy, China will find itself increasinglydependent on Middle Eastern oil. American efforts topersuade China to play a greater role in regionalsecurity arrangements may be strengthened, andChina’s awareness of the vulnerability of its supplyroutes to US naval disruption in the unlikely event ofconflict could also have a subtle effect on each side’sbargaining power.A balance of energy imports and exports does notproduce pure independence, but it does alter thepower relations involved in energy interdependence.Nixon got that right

Nye, J "Energy independence in an interdependent world", Al Jazeera, 15/7/12,https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/201271211394189679.html

human rightsHuman rights are basic claims and entitlements that, many argue, one shouldbe able to exercise simply by virtue of being a human being. Manycontemporary thinkers argue they are essential for living a life of dignity, areinalienable, and should be accepted as universal. The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 is recognized as the beginning of theformal discussion of human rights around the world. Critics argue that humanrights are a Western, or at least culturally relative, concept.

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Why climate change is a threat to human rights? Business and human rights | Why businesses arenothing without strong human rights Human rights in Iran The North Korea Nuclear Agreement and HumanRights

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Why climate change is a threat to human rights?

A question I'm often asked is, where did I get mypassion for human rights and justice? It startedearly. I grew up in the west of Ireland, wedgedbetween four brothers, two older than me and twoyounger than me. So of course I had to be interestedin human rights, and equality and justice, and usingmy elbows! And those issues stayed with me and guided me, andin particular, when I was elected the first womanPresident of Ireland, from 1990 to 1997. I dedicatedmy presidency to having a space for those who feltmarginalized on the island of Ireland, and bringingtogether communities from Northern Ireland withthose from the Republic, trying to build peace. And Iwent as the first Irish president to the UnitedKingdom and met with Queen Elizabeth II, and alsowelcomed to my official residence -- which we call"Áras an Uachtaráin," the house of the president -- members of the royal family, including, notably, thePrince of Wales. And I was aware that at the time ofmy presidency, Ireland was a country beginning arapid economic progress. We were a country that wasbenefiting from the solidarity of the EuropeanUnion. Indeed, when Ireland first joined the EuropeanUnion in 1973, there were parts of the country thatwere considered developing, including my ownbeloved native county, County Mayo. I led tradedelegations here to the United States, to Japan, toIndia, to encourage investment, to help to createjobs, to build up our economy, to build up our healthsystem, our education -- our development. What I didn't have to do as president was buy land onmainland Europe, so that Irish citizens could go therebecause our island was going underwater. What Ididn't have to think about, either as president or as aconstitutional lawyer, was the implications for thesovereignty of the territory because of the impact ofclimate change. But that is what President Tong, ofthe Republic of Kiribati, has to wake up everymorning thinking about.

He has bought land in Fiji as an insurancepolicy, what he calls, "migration with dignity," becausehe knows that his people may have to leave theirislands. As I listened to President Tong describing thesituation, I really felt that this was a problem that noleader should have to face. And as I heard him speakabout the pain of his problems, I thought aboutEleanor Roosevelt. I thought about her and thosewho worked with her on the Commission on HumanRights, which she chaired in 1948, and drew up theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights. For them, itwould have been unimaginable that a whole countrycould go out of existence because of human-inducedclimate change. I came to climate change not as a scientist or anenvironmental lawyer, and I wasn't really impressedby the images of polar bears or melting glaciers. Itwas because of the impact on people, and the impacton their rights -- their rights to food and safe water,health, education and shelter. And I say this withhumility, because I came late to the issue of climatechange. When I served as UN High Commissioner forHuman Rights from 1997 to 2002, climate changewasn't at the front of my mind. I don't remembermaking a single speech on climate change. I knewthat there was another part of the United Nations -- the UN Convention on Climate Change -- that wasdealing with the issue of climate change. It was laterwhen I started to work in African countries on issuesof development and human rights. And I kept hearingthis pervasive sentence: "Oh, but things are so muchworse now, things are so much worse." And then Iexplored what was behind that; it was about changesin the climate -- climate shocks, changes in theweather. I met Constance Okollet, who had formed a women'sgroup in Eastern Uganda, and she told me that whenshe was growing up, she had a very normal life in hervillage and they didn't go hungry, they knew that theseasons would come as they were predicted tocome, they knew when to sow and they knew when toharvest, and so they had enough food.

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But, in recent years, at the time of thisconversation, they had nothing but long periods ofdrought, and then flash flooding, and then moredrought. The school had been destroyed, livelihoodshad been destroyed, their harvest had beendestroyed. She forms this women's group to try tokeep her community together. And this was a realitythat really struck me, because of course, ConstanceOkollet wasn't responsible for the greenhouse gasemissions that were causing this problem. Indeed, I was very struck about the situation inMalawi in January of this year. There was anunprecedented flooding in the country, it coveredabout a third of the country, over 300 people werekilled, and hundreds of thousands lost theirlivelihoods. And the average person in Malawi emitsabout 80 kg of CO2 a year. The average US citizenemits about 17.5 metric tons. So those who aresuffering disproportionately don't drive cars, don'thave electricity, don't consume very significantly, andyet they are feeling more and more the impacts of thechanges in the climate, the changes that arepreventing them from knowing how to grow foodproperly, and knowing how to look after their future. Ithink it was really the importance of the injustice thatreally struck me very forcibly. And I know that we're not able to address some ofthat injustice because we're not on course for a safeworld. Governments around the world agreed at theconference in Copenhagen, and have repeated it atevery conference on climate, that we have to staybelow two degrees Celsius of warming above pre-Industrial standards. But we're on course for aboutfour degrees. So we face an existential threat to thefuture of our planet. And that made me realize thatclimate change is the greatest threat to human rightsin the 21st century.

And that brought me then to climate justice. Climatejustice responds to the moral argument -- both sidesof the moral argument -- to address climatechange. First of all, to be on the side of those who aresuffering most and are most effected. Andsecondly, to make sure that they're not left behindagain, when we start to move and start to addressclimate change with climate action, as we are doing. In our very unequal world today, it's very striking howmany people are left behind. In our world of 7.2 billionpeople, about 3 billion are left behind. 1.3 billion don'thave access to electricity, and they light their homeswith kerosene and candles, both of which aredangerous. And in fact they spend a lot of their tinyincome on that form of lighting. 2.6 billion people cookon open fires -- on coal, wood and animal dung. Andthis causes about 4 million deaths a year from indoorsmoke inhalation, and of course, most of those whodie are women. So we have a very unequalworld, and we need to change from "business asusual." And we shouldn't underestimate the scale andthe transformative nature of the change which will beneeded, because we have to go to zero carbonemissions by about 2050, if we're going to stay belowtwo degrees Celsius of warming. And that means wehave to leave about two-thirds of the knownresources of fossil fuels in the ground. It's a very big change, and it means thatobviously, industrialized countries must cut theiremissions, must become much more energy-efficient, and must move as quickly as possible torenewable energy. For developing countries andemerging economies, the problem and the challengeis to grow without emissions, because they mustdevelop; they have very poor populations. So theymust develop without emissions, and that is adifferent kind of problem. Indeed, no country in theworld has actually grown without emissions. All thecountries have developed with fossil fuels, and thenmay be moving to renewable energy.

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So it is a very big challenge, and it requires the totalsupport of the international community, with thenecessary finance and technology, and systems andsupport, because no country can make itself safefrom the dangers of climate change. This is an issuethat requires complete human solidarity. Humansolidarity, if you like, based on self-interest -- becausewe are all in this together, and we have to worktogether to ensure that we reach zero carbon by2050. The good news is that change is happening, and it'shappening very fast. Here in California, there's a veryambitious emissions target to cut emissions. InHawaii, they're passing legislation to have 100percent renewable energy by 2045. And governmentsare very ambitious around the world. In Costa Rica,they have committed to being carbon-neutral by2021. In Ethiopia, the commitment is to be carbon-neutral by 2027. Apple have pledged that theirfactories in China will use renewable energy. Andthere is a race on at the moment to convert electricityfrom tidal and wave power, in order that we can leavethe coal in the ground. And that change is bothwelcome and is happening very rapidly. But it's stillnot enough, and the political will is still not enough. Let me come back to President Tong and his peoplein Kiribati. They actually could be able to live on theirisland and have a solution, but it would take a lot ofpolitical will. President Tong told me about hisambitious idea to either build up or even float the littleislands where his people live. This, of course, isbeyond the resources of Kiribati itself. It would requiregreat solidarity and support from other countries, andit would require the kind of imaginative idea that webring together when we want to have a space stationin the air. But wouldn't it be wonderful to have thisengineering wonder and to allow a people to remainin their sovereign territory, and be part of thecommunity of nations? That is the kind of idea that weshould be thinking about. Yes, the challenges of thetransformation we need are big, but they can besolved. We are actually, as a people, very capable ofcoming together to solve problems.

I was very conscious of this as I took part this year incommemoration of the 70th anniversary of the end ofthe Second World War in 1945. 1945 was anextraordinary year. It was a year when the worldfaced what must have seemed almost insolubleproblems -- the devastation of the world wars,particularly the Second World War; the fragile peacethat had been brought about; the need for a wholeeconomic regeneration. But the leaders of that timedidn't flinch from this. They had the capacity, they hada sense of being driven by never again must theworld have this kind of problem. And they had to buildstructures for peace and security. And what did weget? What did they achieve? The Charter of theUnited Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, asthey're called, The World Bank, and the InternationalMonetary Fund. A Marshall Plan for Europe, adevastated Europe, to reconstruct it. And indeed afew years later, the Universal Declaration of HumanRights. 2015 is a year that is similar in its importance to 1945,with similar challenges and similar potential. Therewill be two big summits this year: the first one, inSeptember in New York, is the summit for thesustainable development goals. And then the summitin Paris in December, to give us a climateagreement. The sustainable development goals areintended to help countries to live sustainably, in tunewith Mother Earth, not to take out of Mother Earth anddestroy ecosystems, but rather, to live in harmonywith Mother Earth, by living under sustainabledevelopment. And the sustainable developmentgoals will come into operation for all countries onJanuary 1, 2016. The climate agreement -- a bindingclimate agreement -- is needed because of thescientific evidence that we're on a trajectory for abouta four-degree world and we have to change course tostay below two degrees. So we need to take stepsthat will be monitored and reviewed, so that we cankeep increasing the ambition of how we cutemissions, and how we move more rapidly torenewable energy, so that we have a safe world. The reality is that this issue is much too important tobe left to politicians and to the United Nations.

Robinson, M "Why climate change is a threat to human rights",TED, May 2015,https://www.ted.com/talks/mary_robinson_why_climate_change_is_a_threat_to_human_rights?language=en

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Business and human rights | Why businesses are nothingwithout strong human rightsLet’s start with a seemingly unconventionalproposition: civil society and business share thesame space, and therefore should share aninterest in defending what unites them. Howcontroversial is that proposition, really? This “shared space” is anchored in accountablegovernance. Civil society actors and companies bothdepend on the same legal and institutionalframeworks that define the shared space to operate.Civil society cannot flourish, and business willstruggle to thrive, without the rules and standards thathold public and private powers accountable. Civic freedoms – freedoms of expression,association, information and assembly – allowcitizens to expose abuses related to corruption,workplace safety, public health, toxic pollution andgender discrimination. These rights support stable,predictable legal and regulatory environments. At thesame time, they enable the free flow of information,investment and entrepreneurial innovation. Whenthese civic freedoms are undermined, business andcivil society alike are subject to the law of the jungleinstead of the rule of law. 'Human rights are the foundation of a healthy societyand sustainable business' – Paul Polman, UnileverCEO Companies should recognize the positive role thatcivil society organizations and human rightsdefenders play in protecting this space. Moreover,where reasonably possible, they have a responsibilityto support these crucial actors when under pressureor threat. From the murder of the Honduran environmentalistBerta Cáceres and the Saudi journalist JamalKhashoggi to politically motivated chargesagainst Cambodian trade unionists, attacks on humanrights defenders and civic freedoms around theworld should and do concern the businesscommunity.

These freedoms are being eroded as authoritariangovernments act with impunity and democraciesembrace illiberal populism and nationalism. Nearly sixin 10 countries are seriously restricting people’sfundamental freedoms of association, peacefulassembly and expression, according to the global civilsociety alliance CIVICUS. Sometimes, companies arecomplicit in this repression. Since 2015, there havebeen close to 1,400 recorded attacks against citizensand organizations working on human rights issuesrelated to business. Multinational corporations and their investors can nolonger afford to be bystanders with so much at stake.All too often, companies take the rule of law,accountable governance and stable environments forgranted. Recent research by the B Team, a leadingnon-profit initiative formed by a global group ofbusiness leaders, has found clear evidence that limitson important civic freedoms may produce negativeeconomic outcomes. Countries with higher degrees ofrespect for civic rights experience higher economicgrowth rates and higher levels of humandevelopment.Issues and incidents in and out of the headlines arepresenting inescapable challenges to businessleaders. A growing number of corporate leaders arerecognizing that they must defend the interests andvalues that they share with civil society around theworld. Some are making public statements; othersare registering their concerns privately. Increasingawareness of the “shared space” in which companiesand civil society operate, and expectations of theresponsibilities of businesses, are compellingshareholders and employees to take sides andpressure companies, however difficult the choicesand trade-offs may be. The rise of corporate activism Five prominent examples from 2018 demonstrate thistrend:

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• Eight multinational corporations and investorsissued a call to protect civic freedoms, human rightsdefenders and rule of law in a landmark jointstatement developed through the Business Networkon Civic Freedoms and Human Rights Defenders.The statement is the first of its kind, with supportersranging across the consumer goods, mining, apparel,banking, jewellery and footwear sectors, and stressesthat when human rights defenders are under attack,so is sustainable and profitable business. • Adidas and Nike were among global apparel brandsthat urged the Cambodian government to droppolitically motivated criminal charges against labourrights activist Tola Moeun and others – and havepublicly supported freedom of association. • In the US, companies have spoken out inunprecedented tone and numbers against the currentadministration’s immigration policies: Microsoft,Cisco, Airbnb, Apple, Salesforce, and the USChamber of Commerce, among others, challengedthetravel ban imposed on citizens from half a dozenMuslim-majority countries and opposed theseparation of migrant families at the US-Mexicoborder. • In Germany, BMW and Daimler engaged with theiremployees to combat xenophobia and racismfollowing far-right riots againstimmigrants; Siemens even urged employees to speakout and emphasized that tolerance and respect areimportant business values (as its CEO, Joe Kaeser,has made explicitly clear in public statements). • A group of 14 human rights organizations and morethan 1,400 Google employees called on Google torefrain from launching a censored search engine inChina (known as "Project Dragonfly"), and partly as aresult, the company has discontinued the project.These advocacy efforts illustrate that employees tooare leading movements within companies, especiallywithin the tech sector, to respect human rights.Companies will need to be mindful of rising employeeexpectations, or risk reputational damage and theloss of valuable talent, as younger workers seek toalign their values with those of their employers.

Inescapable challenges “Corporate activism” – whether reluctant or deliberate– is not easy. New guidance published by theBusiness and Human Rights Resource Centre andthe International Service for Human Rightsanticipates these inescapable challenges forcompanies and their leaders. The guidance,titled Shared Space Under Pressure: BusinessSupport for Civic Freedoms and Human RightsDefenders, provides an analytical and operationalframework, with specific examples from differentcountries, sectors and initiatives, to inform companiesas they decide whether and how to act. It highlightsfive specific decision factors that companies shouldconsider: 1. Whether the company has a normativeresponsibility to act, based on the UN GuidingPrinciples for Business and Human Rights. Allcompanies must ensure – through the application ofthe UN Guiding Principles – that their operations donot cause, contribute and are not linked to attacks onactivists and civic freedoms. If they do, they mustaddress the causes and consequences. 2. Whether the company has a discretionaryopportunity to act. If so, whether there is a compellingbusiness case to support civic freedoms and humanrights defenders and/or a willingness to make a moralchoice to do so. Besides defending the core elementsof the shared space, the business case rests onmanaging operational and repetitional risks; buildingcompetitive advantage; and overcoming mistrust andsecuring the social licence to operate. Companiescan also make a moral choice to act, both to do noharm anywhere and to do good where possible. 3. How the company will act in a particular situation oron a certain issue. There is no one type of action thatapplies to all circumstances: a spectrum of actions(individual and collective, public and private) may becombined to address an issue or situation.

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In some situations, such as the increasing restrictionson Hungarian civil society, companies prefer to raiseconcerns individually and privately with thegovernment. In others, such as Cambodia’scrackdown on striking workers, companies choose tomake collective and public statements. Companiesshould be guided by pragmatic flexibility as theyconsider circumstances, relationships andopportunities to make a positive difference. 4. Who within the organization decides whether andhow, a company will act. it is essential that thesedecisions are involving corporate headquarters andin-country executives and staff. It is important tointegrate legal counsel, human rights and corporateresponsibility experts, government, public affairs and(in certain circumstances) security and humanresources staff into the deliberative process. Equally,local civil society and other stakeholders with whichthe company should maintain steady engagementshould be consulted. CEO-level decisions areessential when a company’s core values, reputation,operations and relationships are at stake. 5. Whether the risks of inaction outweigh the risks ofaction. Responsible companies should evaluate boththe risks of action and inaction. Companies mayperceive that taking critical positions, especially inpublic, may put relationships with host countrygovernments at stake. But often companies willconclude that the risks and potential costs of inactionare more difficult to anticipate, mitigate and manageover the long-term than the risks of action. It isunwise to be on the wrong side of history based on ashortsighted cost-benefit analysis.

These decision factors provide practical steps thatcompanies can and should take to be allies of civilsociety and not just bystanders – or worse, casualties– in the global crackdown against the “shared space”.It is not the business of companies to pick fights, butfights are already coming to companies that couldmake or break them. Companies should engagecarefully but deliberately – in their own interest – tosupport and defend this invaluable but fragile sharedspace.

Freeman, B et al. "Business and human rights | Why businesses are nothing without strong humanrights", 17/1/19, International Service for Human Rights www.ishr.ch/news/business-and-human-rights-why-businesses-are-nothing-without-strong-human-rights

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Human Rights in Iran

Global monitors say Iran’s human rights situationis poor and unlikely to improve amid a climate ofpolitical uncertainty and growing externalpressures. But activists urge continuedinternational scrutiny of Iran’s violations. IntroductionThe human rights situation in Iran continues to arouseconcern from the world’s leading watchdog groups,with reports of ongoing abuses since the disputed2009 presidential election provoked mass protests. AMarch 2013 report by a UN Special Rapporteur cites"widespread and systemic" torture, harassment,arrest, and attacks against human rights defenders,lawyers, and journalists. Under an increasinglyrepressive regime focused on survival amid internalstrife and external pressures, experts say prospectsfor reform are bleak, and urge the internationalcommunity to keep the spotlight on Iran’s humanrights violations. Structural ObstaclesIran has ratified the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights and the International Covenant onEconomic, Social, and Cultural Rights withoutreservations, committing itself to the protection andpromotion of civil, political, economic, and socialrights including freedom of expression, assembly,association, and religion. The Iranian Constitutionalso guarantees these freedoms. But Iranian lawyer and human rights activistMehrangiz Kar says several articles of theconstitution guaranteeing specific liberties suffer fromambiguity and are often restricted by variousconditions and provisions. For instance, Article 24 onpress freedom states: "publications and the press arefree to express their ideas unless these contravenethe precepts of Islam or harm public rights. Theseconditions will be defined by laws." Since the precepts of Islam and public rights are notclearly defined by legislated laws, Kar writes, theauthorities are free to interpret the "article in supportof their own political and factional interests."

International organizations have accused severalbranches of the Iranian government of human rightsabuses, particularly security forces like the eliteRevolutionary Guards and the volunteer paramilitaryforce the Basij, as well as the judiciary. Hadi Ghaemi,executive director of International Campaign forHuman Rights in Iran, writes that after the 2009protests following the disputed presidential election,the "judiciary has emerged as a key instrument tointimidate protestors and remove many leadingactivists and opinion makers, steps that were bothcritical to the regime’s survival." The judiciary, henotes, also implements the Islamic penal code,including stoning, amputations and flogging, allconsidered torture under international law. Plus, Iranhas separate Islamic revolutionary courts whose legalstanding has been repeatedly questioned by rightsgroups. Formed after the 1979 revolution toprosecute government officials of the previousregime, they are primarily charged with tryingoffenses involving acts against national security, drugsmuggling, and espionage. A Failing GradeRecent reports from international organizations andWestern governments have slammed Iran’s rightsrecord. The 2012 U.S. State Department report (PDF)notes the role of Iran’s regular and paramilitarysecurity forces in cracking down on protestors andhow they have committed serious human rightsabuses, including torture and murders, with impunity.Tehran rejects these claims. Rights groups point tosome particular issues of concern: Arbitrary arrest and detention: More than fourthousand people were arrested in connection withprotests over the disputed 2009 elections. Hundredsmore have been arrested since then in connectionwith protests. Rights groups say the governmentdenies due process and fair trials to detainees anduses systematic torture in its prisons and detentionfacilities. Kouhyar Goudarzi, an Iranian human rightsactivist who fled the country in 2013 after his ownrepeated detentions for speaking out on abuses, toldRFE/RL in an interview that Iranian "civil society is ina state of desperation and that the establishment hasmanaged to instill fear and silence dissent."

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Capital punishment: Rights groups accuse theIranian authorities of imposing the death penalty andusing execution as a political tool. A 2013 report bythe UN Special Rapporteur (PDF) notes an increasein executions, both official and secret. It says 297executions were officially announced by thegovernment and about 200 secret executions wereconfirmed by family members, prison officials andmembers of the judiciary in 2012. Women’s rights: The Iranian constitution allowsequal rights for men and women "in conformity withIslamic criteria." One of the few positive notes in theUN rapporteur’s 2013 report related to advances inliteracy, access to education for women, andwomen’s health during the past 30 years. Forinstance, literary and primary school enrollment ratesfor women and girls were estimated at near 100percent. According to the World Economic Forum’s2010 Gender Gap report (PDF)--which compareddisparity between men and women on economicparticipation, access to education, health, andpolitical empowerment--Iran ranked 123 out of 134countries. This was better than most countries in theregion, ahead of Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Saudi Arabia,and even Turkey. However, the UN report notes thatthe application of certain laws is a barrier to genderequality in Iran. For instance, a woman’s worth andtestimony in a court of law is regarded as half that ofa man’s. Religious, ethnic, and other minorities: There arewidespread abuses against members of recognizedand unrecognized religious and ethnic minorities suchas Arabs, Azeris, Baloch, Kurds, Namatullahi SufiMuslims, Sunnis, Baha’is, and Christians. Iran’slargest non-Muslim religious minority, the Baha’i, hashistorically been discriminated against and continuesto be denied jobs and educational opportunities, andface arbitrary detention and unfair trials. There arerising reports of such abuses committed against otherreligious minorities, reported the U.S. StateDepartment in May 2013 as part of its annual reporton international religious freedoms. Human RightsWatch says Iran also engages in systematicdiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation andgender identity. "Iran is one of only seven countrieswith laws allowing executions for consensual same-sex conduct," it says.

Prospects for ReformMost human rights abuses are political in nature andclosely linked with establishing the regime’s controlover its population. The regime’s crackdown since the2009 protests and its growing insecurities in the wakeof the Arab uprisings have made many expertsskeptical of prospects for reform within the currentpolitical system. "The government realizes thepotential for such uprisings in Iran" says Ghaemi,"and it has made the regime and the securityapparatus even more repressive and intolerant." "I don’t see a kinder, gentler Islamic republichappening anytime soon," says CFR’s IsobelColeman. Iran experienced a period of reforms andrelative improvement in human rights under PresidentMohammad Khatami from 1997 to 2004. ButColeman says she is doubtful of another period ofreforms under an elected official, saying the humanrights situation will remain "grim" unless there is afundamental change in the regime. Kar says theremust be separation between the state and Islam inpolitics and governance The ongoing power struggle between SupremeLeader Ali Khamenei and President MahmoudAhmadinejad has made prospects for reform evenmore uncertain. Speaking at an academic gatheringin October 2011, Khamenei went as far as proposingthe possibility of eliminating the position of thepresident (NYT) and moving toward a parliamentarysystem. Eliminating the presidency will enhance thepowers of the supreme leader, but either way,Khamenei will seek to ensure that the next presidentor prime minister is under his control, experts say.The tipping point, Ghaemi says, could be the 2013presidential elections, which may allow Khamenei toreshape the political landscape in his vision or hemay face greater resistance from competing centersof power in Tehran. "It is a nasty squabble withoutany heroes and regardless of who wins, the real loserwill be democracy in Iran," wrote dissident AkbarGanji in Foreign Affairs in April 2013.

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"Many Iranians would like a more progressive anddemocratic government," says Iranian-Americanjournalist Roxana Saberi, who spent four months inthe notorious Evin prison in Iran in 2009. But shesays it is not clear how many of them prefer anIslamic or a secular government. A March 2011 paperin Political Research Quarterly based on a 2005 anda 2008 survey in Iran argued that popular discontentwith the regime’s performance had a strong andpositive correlation to greater support for democracy. Kar says for any meaningful change, there must bereforms in election laws that grant the GuardianCouncil of twelve Islamic jurists, six of themappointed by the supreme leader, the right to vetoparliamentary and presidential candidates. Ghaemicalls for reform of the judiciary and greateraccountability for the country’s security forces. Policy OptionsRights activists in and outside Iran have repeatedlysaid the international focus on Iran’s nuclearprogram--which many Western states believe is coverfor a weapons program-- has hampered efforts toadvance human rights reforms. Iranian human rightsactivist Shirin Ebadi, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate,says "unfortunately, the nuclear energy issue hasstalemated many issues in Iran, the most importantbeing the issue of human rights." But global attention to Iranian human rights has beenon the rise. In March 2011, the UN Human RightsCouncil appointed a special rapporteur for Iran toinvestigate the country’s human rights violations, thefirst since 2002.The United States imposed the first sanctions on Iranfor human rights abuses in September 2010. TenIranian officials were initially barred from travel to theUnited States, and financial restrictions wereimposed. Scores of Iranian individuals have sincebeen added to sanctions lists for rights abuses. TheEuropean Union also sanctioned thirty-two Iranianofficials in April 2011 and another twenty-nine inOctober. By early 2013 the EU had sanctioned almost90 individuals because of rights violations. Theseinclude senior members of security forces and thejudiciary.

While the impact of sanctions remain uncertain,experts say targeted sanctions are effective tools fornaming and shaming Iranian authorities and keepingthe spotlight on human rights abuses. "It’s the bestway to show that the international community cares,"says Ghaemi, urging for sanctions that target privatesector and government companies that enablerepression, such as those that censor mobile,satellite, and Internet communications. Coleman saysthe United States must be more consistent on humanrights in Iran. Some experts have also called for the United Statesto support greater openness in Iran by providingIranians with improved access to technology. On May30, 2013, the U.S. departments of State and Treasuryannounced the lifting of sanctions on companies thatseek to sell cell phones, laptops, encryptiontechnology, and other equipment to Iranians whowant to circumvent government media controls. Some Iranians have also questioned what they seeas lack of adequate U.S. support for the GreenMovement in 2009. Others caution any direct U.S.involvement, arguing it would delegitimize theopposition movement. In an October 2011 interviewwith BBC Persia, Secretary of State Hillary Clintonsaid if the Green Movement or some other oppositionmovement gained strength and decided that theywanted U.S. support, they should ask for it moredirectly. Saberi says the international community should alsofind a way to "help exiled journalists and human rightsdefenders who have fled Iran to continue theireducation and their work, and lead by example byobserving human rights ourselves."

Bajoria, J et.al, "Human Rights in Iran", Council for Foreign Relations, 4/6/13,www.cfr.org/backgrounder/human-rights-iran

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The North Korea Nuclear Agreement and Human Rights

The agreement between President Trump and KimJong Un may be the start of denuclearization, oranother failed effort brought down by North Koreancheating. But if the United States and North Koreaare to have a new relationship, it must include thehuman rights dimension. There’s no reason to rehearse here in detail theastonishing nature of the regime’s tyranny. The sizeand vicious nature of its prison camp system, thepunishment of family members for what the regimeappears to believe is a blood taint, the number ofdeaths, the murder of Otto Warmbier—all are wellknown. It is the most brutal regime on Earth. The first point to make is that raising human rightsissues will not destroy the effort to change NorthKorea’s nuclear conduct. President George W. Bushraised freedom of religion repeatedly with Chineseleaders and that did not prevent a workingrelationship. President Reagan put human rightsissues at the center of his relations with the Soviets,and that did not prevent remarkable progress in therelationship. As George Shultz wrote in his memoirTurmoil and Triumph, "Ronald Reagan and I both gave pride of place tohuman rights. He took up the subject at each of hismeetings with Gorbachev and with most visitors fromthe Soviet Union to the Oval Office. I pounded on thesubject at every opportunity....” Indeed he did, making it the first subject at meetingsrather than a throwaway in the final minutes. Yetrelations with the Soviets prospered. The second point to make is that the only possibleguarantee that a nuclear deal with North Korea willlast over the years is some change in that society. Aslong as there is brutal one-man rule, the only thingneeded to destroy any progress that has been madeis a whim by that man. If and when there are otherswith influence—some day, one can dream, ajournalist or legislator or mayor or clergyman—therecan be something called “public opinion.”

It exists even in dictatorships. Shultz describedReagan’s approach to the Soviets this way: “I’m notplaying games. I’m not trying to push you into acorner publicly. I understand politicians even in yourcircumstances have to worry about how they look anddon’t want to be pushed around in public." So pressing for change in North Korea is not utopianand foolish idealism. Shultz noted that he andReagan “increasingly emphasi[zed] to the Soviets theadvantages to them, in the emerging knowledge andinformation age, of changing the way they dealt withtheir own people.” That is the kind of argument worthmaking, and to some extent the Trump administrationhas been making it to North Korea. The third point is that how we act toward North Koreamust reflect who we are as Americans, even if theimpact over there is slight. That regime killed anAmerican named Otto Warmbier, and not in thedistant and murky past: next week is the firstanniversary of his death. The Trump administrationmust recognize that among our nation’s greatestassets is our association with the cause of liberty.Working for the peaceful expansion of the frontiers ofliberty is not a sucker’s game, or a disadvantage orliability, or a waste of resources. It is in very concreteways one of the greatest advantages of the UnitedStates in world politics. It is ultimately what ties allieslike Australia, South Korea, and Japan to us: theknowledge that what we seek for them is what weseek for ourselves—peace, security, and liberty. The alternative is to leave those allies, and others,with the sense that our relations with North Koreaexclude them and their interests, which we haveforgotten. That is what happened in the Obamaadministration's nuclear agreement with Iran: closeallies situated near Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, theUAE, and Israel, came to believe their own interestswere simply being forgotten. We saw in 2009 that theObama administration viewed protests in Iranaskance, not as the people's call for freedom but asan inconvenience to negotiations with the regime.Japan and other allies in Asia have critical securityinterests at stake in our relations with North Korea,and we should always give maintaining close andlongstanding alliances pride of place as we undertaketo open new relationships with hostile powers.

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This is not to say that the President should return toWashington and suddenly blast human rights abusesin North Korea. That should be a steady, constanttheme in American diplomacy, never abandoned andnever diminished. When we did the nuclear deal withLibya in 2003, we did not take Qadhafi’s weaponsand then turn around and commence a human rightsonslaught meant to weaken or to bring down hisregime. I believe we bit our tongues and actually saidless than we should, but one can understand why: wewere starting a relationship with Libya that we thoughtwould lead in the medium run to a political openingthere as the economy and society changed andpariah status was replaced by internationalengagement.

But the goals and the American standards of conductmust be clear and our disgust at the Kim regime’streatment of its people should always be equallyclear. As in the Soviet case, that will not destroy ourbilateral relationship; instead it will push the regimetoward change and in any event will remind theregime who we are and what we believe. To put itanother way, a nuclear agreement with North Koreais not a single transaction--or if it is, it will fail. It mustbe the start of an effort to change relations betweenour two countries, and to change the relationshipbetween the regime in North Korea and both theinternational system and its own people. In that effort,a constant assertion of our belief in human rights isessential to success and to our own self-respect.

Abrams, E, "The North Korea Nuclear Agreement and Human Rights", 12/6/18, Council for Foreign Affairs,www.cfr.org/blog/north-korea-nuclear-agreement-and-human-rights

justiceThere are a number of different interpretations of the concept of justice. It isoften closely associated with the idea of fairness and with individuals gettingwhat they deserve, although what is meant by desert is also contested. Oneavenue is to approach justice through the idea of rights, and what individualscan legitimately expect of one another or of their government. Some theoristsalso argue that equality not only in the institutions and procedures of a societybut also in capabilities or well-being outcomes is required for justice to berealized.

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Treatment of Terrorists: How Does Gender AffectJustice? What is Extradition? By not investigating the U.S. for war crimes, theInternational Criminal Court shows colonialism stillthrives in international law Why memories of the Truth and ReconciliationCommission still ache

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Treatment of Terrorists: How Does Gender Affect Justice?

From arrest to sentencing to post-conflictreintegration and disarmament programming,evidence suggests that governments tend to beless responsive to women in terrorism comparedto their male counterparts. Such disparities intreatment have numerous consequences forjustice, security, and the prevention of violentextremism and subsequent conflict. “I am not an evil or malicious person,” KeonnaThomas reportedly explained to the judge at hersentencing hearing in September 2017, months aftershe pleaded guilty to attempting to provide materialsupport to the Islamic State, “I was, I guess at onepoint, impressionable.” Though undoubtedlygrounded in some truth, Thomas’ explanation mimicsthe language surrounding most women charged withIslamic State-related criminal offenses in the UnitedStates. From news media to defense attorneys,commentators regularly cast female terrorismoffenders as naïve, gullible, susceptible targets ofviolent extremism, even when they admit theirculpability by pleading guilty. While unsurprising,given that portrayals of women in terrorism tend to bemisleading, it is crucial to examine the effects suchrhetoric has on confronting women’s participation inthe myriad manifestations of violent extremism. Whilethe data suggests that women often receivedifferential treatment within the criminal justicesystem, this discussion explores the disparatetreatment of terrorist offenders as it pertains togender, both inside and outside of conventional legalframeworks. Although defendants in terrorism cases are notimmune to the broader effects of discrimination withinthe criminal justice system, discrepancies in thepunishment of women compared to men in thesecases appear consistent with differences insentencing for non-terrorism-related criminaloffenders. In the United States, formal sentencingguidelines are designed to achieve fair outcomes andprevent unnecessary disparities by keepingcharacteristics about a defendant, like gender, race,ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, out ofsentencing considerations.

Despite this safeguard, evidence suggests that thefederal court system in the United States is broadlymore lenient on female defendants than their malecounterparts, even when controlling for legalcharacteristics like criminal history. A 2015 study offelony cases found that women were 58 percent lesslikely to be sentenced to prison than men, and positsthat judges were inclined to treat female defendantsdifferently when they conformed to traditional genderroles. A few years earlier, a 2012 review of a swath offederal criminal cases discovered a considerablegender gap in sentence length distribution, which theauthor ascribes to a “winnowing” of defendantscreated by discretionary decisions at each proceduralstage.Both patterns of judicial discretion and theprocess of sifting out women offenders at eachencounter with the criminal justice process mirror theterrorism cases reviewed in this article. The followingdata and analysis indicate that women involved incrimes motivated by violent extremism are less likelyto be arrested, less likely to be convicted, and finallysentenced at unequal rates. The abovementionedcase of Keonna Thomas, among others, shows howgender dimensions become a part of legalproceedings. Evidence presented in court filings shows thatThomas, a Philadelphia woman, was a vocaladvocate for the Islamic State online for more than ayear before her April 2015 arrest, using platforms likeTwitter and Skype to advance its agenda.8 As earlyas August 2013, prior to the Islamic State’s officialdeclaration of its caliphate, Thomas shared a pictureof a child clad in camouflage wearing tactical gearand firearm magazine holsters with the caption, “Askyourselves, while this young man is holdingmagazines for the Islamic state, what are you doingfor it? #ISIS.” In private communications with threealleged separate co-conspirators, Thomas expressedher resounding support of the group and desire totravel to the region, as well as articulating her interestin becoming a martyr.An affidavit reveals authoritiesknew of Thomas’ electronic communications with aknown “Somalia-based violent jihadi fighter originallyfrom Minnesota,” a known “overseas [Islamic State]fighter,” and a “radical Islamic cleric located inJamaica.”

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News reports and a legal document identified theseco-conspirators as Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan(“Miski”), Abu Khalid Al-Amriki, and Sheikh AbdullahFaisal, respectively, three alleged established playersin the Islamic State’s extensive virtual networks. As atestament to her support for the Islamic State and itsfighters, Thomas married Abu Khalid al-Amriki onlineand arranged plans to meet the alleged Islamic Statefighter Shawn Parson, who was believed to be aTrinidadian, in Syria.In electronic communications,after Parson said, “u probably want to do Istishadee(martyrdom operations) with me,” Thomasresponded, “that would be amazing … a girl can onlywish.” Between February and March 2015, Thomasprepared for her journey to Syria: she obtained apassport, researched indirect routes to Syria by wayof Spain and Turkey, acquired a Turkish visa, andpurchased plane tickets to fly from PhiladelphiaInternational Airport to Barcelona, Spain, on March29, 2015. A mix of court documents shows thatauthorities derailed Thomas’ travel plans byconducting a search warrant of her belongings twodays before her scheduled departure, seizing herpassport and other relevant possessions.Followingher arrest, Thomas initially pleaded not guilty. Monthslater, however, she admitted her culpability with onecount of attempting to provide material support to aterrorist organization. For this offense, Thomas facedup to 15 years in prison. At the time, one of herdefense attorneys said Thomas “look[ed] forward toputting this behind her and being a mother to her twoyoung children.” Their specific mention of her childrenis interesting given that a review of literatureregarding the sentencing of federal offenders notesthat “having dependents (more specifically,dependent children) creates leniency at sentencing,especially for women.” By September 2017, U.S. District Judge MichaelBaylson sentenced her to eight years, crediting thetime she served while the justice system processedher case. In media coverage of her hearing, it is easyto find instances where news producers ruminateover Thomas’ gender and contextualize her case withclichés about women in terrorism.

Anecdotally, reports most often cast Thomas asnaïve, misled, and out-of-touch with reality. They alsosuggest that her desire for love and romance droveher to extremism. While problematic, these framingpatterns are not wholly surprising as gender-relatedbiases in media coverage of women in terrorism is anestablished phenomenon. Arguably more concerning are instances whereThomas’ defense drew on similarly biased tropesabout women in extremism to obtain a reducedsentence for their client. Specifically, one articlequotes a sentencing memo to the U.S. District Judgeby Thomas’ lawyers, Elizabeth Toplin and KathleenGaughan, who advocated for a reduced sentence byexplaining, “Ms. Thomas was a lonely, depressed,anxiety-ridden mother who spent too much time onthe internet … By attempting to relocate to [IslamicState]-held territory and marry an [Islamic State]fighter, she never gave [the Islamic State] anything ofvalue – except her love.” While considering the job ofdefense attorneys and federal defenders—to fight forthe best interests of their client—it is crucial toexamine the extent to which gender-linked biasesmight intentionally or inadvertently seep into the logicand outcome of legal decisions for terrorism-relatedcrimes. Although sentencing guidelines are designedto act as a safeguard against unwarrantedconsiderations regarding a defendant’s personalcharacteristics, it is fair to question the efficacy ofsuch measures when Thomas’ defense rhetoricallyinstrumentalized her gender.

Alexander, A et.al.,"Treatment of Terrorists: How Does Gender Affect Justice?", Combating Terrorism CenterWest Point, 9/18, www./ctc.usma.edu/treatment-terrorists-gender-affect-justice/

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What Is Extradition?

Introduction Building on a practice dating back to antiquity, statesforge extradition treaties so they can pursue fugitivesand other wanted individuals in faraway jurisdictions.Extradition has become ever more important giventhe spread of transnational criminal organizations,including those involved in terrorism, drug trafficking,counterfeiting, and cybercrime. The United States has extradition treaties with morethan a hundred countries. But even with treaties inplace, extraditions are often contentious andsometimes become embroiled in geopolitical friction,as with a recent case involving a Turkish cleric,Fethullah Gulen, living in the United States. Instancesin which countries have no extradition treaty often stirthe most public interest, as was the case with formerU.S. security contractor Edward Snowden, who fledto Russia to avoid prosecution. The recent arrest of WikiLeaks founder JulianAssange in the United Kingdom thrust theinternational extradition process back into thespotlight. Assange, who was evicted from Ecuador’sLondon embassy after living there for years, iswanted by U.S. authorities on hacking-relatedcharges. What is extradition? Extradition is the formal process of one statesurrendering an individual to another state forprosecution or punishment for crimes committed inthe requesting country’s jurisdiction. It typically isenabled by a bilateral or multilateral treaty. Somestates will extradite without a treaty, but those casesare rare.

What is in an extradition treaty? Treaties signed in recent decades tend to take a “dualcriminality” approach, classifying as extraditable allcrimes that are punishable in both jurisdictions. Olderextradition treaties, by contrast, tend to list coveredoffenses. For instance, the treaty between Albaniaand the United States, signed in 1933, includes aninventory of more than two dozen crimes, includingmurder, rape, arson, and burglary. Many extraditiontreaties only allow extradition for crimes that carry apunishment of more than one year. Treaties also define instances when extradition is tobe denied. For instance, authorities generally cannotextradite individuals for military or political offenses,with exceptions for terrorism and other violent acts.Some states will not extradite to jurisdictions withcapital punishment or life imprisonment under anycircumstances, or unless the requesting authoritypledges not to impose those penalties. Other common provisions deal with nationality (manystates will not extradite their own citizens, or will onlydo so on a limited basis), double jeopardy, statutes oflimitations, administrative expenses, legalrepresentation, and transfer of evidence. How does the U.S. extradition process work? Extraditions from the United States. The processgenerally begins with a foreign government making arequest to the U.S. State Department with treaty-required paperwork, which often includes details onthe person sought, the offenses alleged, chargingdocuments, arrest warrants, and evidence. Whenforeign authorities believe there is a flight risk, theycan request a provisional arrest and detention whilethey assemble the required material. From there, thesecretary of state decides whether to pass therequest on to the Justice Department, which reviewsthe case for treaty compliance, obtains an arrestwarrant, and arrests the fugitive, who then goesbefore a federal judge or magistrate.

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The court then decides whether there is probablecause to believe the person committed the offensecovered by the applicable treaty. (An individual’srights in these hearings are more limited than inregular trials. They cannot appeal the court’s ruling,but they may contest the court’s jurisdiction.) If thecourt finds probable cause, it certifies the extraditionand passes the case back to the secretary of state,who has final say on the matter. This certificationprocedure is not a fact-finding endeavor or anindependent evaluation of the evidence, as would bedone in a trial; rather, it determines whether the factsalleged constitute a crime in the prosecuting country. Extraditions to the United States. A state or federalprosecutor meets with the relevant law enforcementagency to learn about the crime and decide whetheran extradition is worth the significant costs. (Therequesting state or federal attorney’s office coverstranslation costs.) Prosecutors then prepare anapplication to the Justice Department, which reviewsit for sufficiency. If approved, Justice forwards it to theState Department. Upon its approval, the StateDepartment sends the request to the relevant U.S.embassy, which forwards it to authorities in thecountry of refuge. From there, the process varies bycountry, but it tends to follow a path similar to that inthe United States. Suspects are able to contest orappeal extradition in many countries. Upon theapproval of the country of refuge, the U.S. MarshalsService will most often escort the fugitive to theUnited States. Interpol red notice. Any of the international policeorganization’s nearly two hundred member countriescan, with a valid arrest warrant or court order, requestwhat is known as a red notice for a wanted individual.This notice serves as an alert to police and borderagents worldwide. Member countries may, at theirdiscretion, arrest the subject of the notice and initiatelegal proceedings over extradition.

How long does the process take? Timing varies widely from case to case, but theaverage extradition involving the United States takesmore than a year from request to surrender. Somehave taken more than a dozen years, while manycases are closed without a fugitive’s capture Which countries have extradition treaties with theUnited States? The United States has extradition treaties with morethan one hundred countries, some dating back morethan a century. It does not have treaties with dozensof others, including China, Iran, North Korea, andRussia, as well as many African, Middle Eastern, andformerly Soviet countries.However, the United States does collaborate withsome of these countries on law enforcement matters,including on transfers of persons in custody, on acase-by-case basis. For instance, the United Statesreturned two corruption suspects to China ahead of ahigh-profile summit between Presidents BarackObama and Xi Jinping in 2014. How many people are extradited to the UnitedStates annually? It is difficult to obtain complete data on extraditions,because different agencies have different reportingstandards. Additionally, law enforcement or politicalsensitivities preclude many extraditions from beingrecorded. Analysts estimate that the U.S. MarshalsService, which handles the great majority ofinternational extraditions, have managed between350 and 600 extraditions to the United States eachyear for the past dozen or so years.

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Do political considerations play a role? Even when a treaty is in place, many factors influencebilateral cooperation on extraditions, including lawenforcement priorities, bureaucratic resources, andcommercial and political relations between countries.For instance, despite signing an extradition treaty in1978, Mexico and the United States quarreled overextraditions for more than a decade after, culminatingin the Camarena affair in the late 1980s, whenAmerican bounty hunters abducted a Mexicanphysician suspected of aiding in the torture andmurder of a U.S. drug enforcement agent. Theepisode poisoned extradition cooperation betweenthe two countries for several years. “Mexico has been historically reluctant to extradite itscitizens to the United States, particularly in the face ofseveral perceived trespasses on Mexican sovereigntyby U.S. law enforcement in the pursuit of suspects,”wrote Emily Edmonds-Poli and David Shirk in a 2018law journal article Extraditions from Mexico to the United States thensurged in the early 2000s, from just twelve in 2000 tomore than one hundred in 2009. Analysts attribute theuptick to warming ties and counternarcoticscooperation between the administrations ofPresidents Felipe Calderon and George W. Bush,and later, Barack Obama. What are some recent high-profile extraditioncases? Julian Assange. Acting on a U.S. extraditionrequest, British authorities arrested the WikiLeaksfounder after he was evicted from the Ecuadorianembassy in London in April 2019. Ecuador hadgranted Assange asylum in 2012 and allowed him toreside at its embassy to avoid extradition to Sweden,where he faced charges of rape and otherallegations. However, Ecuador withdrew itsprotection, citing grievances against Assange andWikiLeaks. U.S. authorities have charged Assangewith conspiracy to hack into U.S. governmentcomputers and release hundreds of thousands ofclassified documents between 2010 and 2011.

Meng Wanzhou. Canadian authorities arrestedMeng, an executive of the Chinese telecom giantHuawei, in December 2018 at the request of theUnited States. U.S. prosecutors have charged herwith bank and wire fraud related to Huawei’s businesswith Iran. The extradition proceedings have garneredsignificant media attention given the status of thesuspect and the backdrop of delicate U.S.-Chinatrade talks. In the days following Meng’s arrest, Chinadetained two Canadians in what many commentatorscharacterized as political retaliation. Fethullah Gulen. In 2016, Turkish prosecutors filedan extradition request for the cleric, who has lived inthe United States for more than fifteen years. Ankaraalleges that Gulen leads a terrorist organization thatwas behind the 2016 coup attempt against PresidentRecep Tayyip Erdogan. The Justice Departmentrejected Turkey’s request, saying it failed to meet “thelegal standards for extradition.” However, PresidentsTrump and Erdogan reportedly discussed theextradition question in late 2018, raising questionsabout Gulen’s fate. Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman Loera. The Mexicangovernment extradited Guzman, the former kingpin ofthe Sinaloa Cartel, to the United States in 2017 toface multiple drug-related charges. Prior to histransfer, he twice escaped maximum-security prisonsin Mexico, prompting concerns about the integrity ofthe Mexican judicial system. In February 2019, hewas convicted in a New York federal court after athree-month trial that provided deep insights into theworkings of one of the most lucrative transnationalcriminal enterprises in history.

Masters, J, "What is Extradition?", Council for ForeignRelations, 11/4/19, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-

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By not investigating the U.S. for war crimes, theInternational Criminal Court shows colonialism still thrivesin international lawOn April 5, the United States revoked the visa of theInternational Criminal Court’s (ICC) chief prosecutor,Fatou Bensouda, for her attempts to open aninvestigation into alleged war crimes committed bythe U.S. in Afghanistan. A week later, judges at theICC rejected Bensouda’s request to open a probe intoU.S. involvement in Afghanistan. While rights advocates condemned this move asamounting to U.S. interference in the workings of theICC, it’s more alarming than mere obstruction — andis rooted in the pre-existing hierarchy and embeddedcolonial structures in international legal order. Bensouda’s visa revocation underscores the existingsystematic inequality in international legal order. Thisis rooted in the presumed hierarchy by a group ofelite nations that have dominated international orderfrom a position of assumed racial, cultural, political,historical, material, economic and legal superiority. These developments come in light of commentsmade by the Trump administration’s national securityadvisor, John Bolton, who delegitimized the role ofthe ICC in a speech he delivered in September 2018.He said that “the U.S. will take any means necessary”to overcome “unjust prosecution by this illegitimateCourt.” Countries like the U.S. have always enjoyeddominance through this presumed superiority,enabling them to suggest other nations are like-minded when it comes to the international legal order. The U.S. and other powerful nations have not onlybeen successful in maintaining the status quo ofimbalance inherent in international law, but have alsobeen instrumental in establishing the rules governingthat legal order. With tectonic political shifts across the world, theICC’s representatives — and jurists like Bensouda —represent some of the last vestiges of resisting thedominant global legal order by attempting to hold theWest accountable for their transgressions in theglobal South.

Unfortunately, however, the Court’s unwillingness tomove beyond its imperial roots is evident from thedecision to reject Bensouda’s request. The ICC hasblatantly redefined the notion of “justice” and hasbeen preoccupied with African states while turning ablind eye to equally serious crimes committed by theU.S. Meddling is routine Needless to say, U.S. interference and intervention indozens of sovereign nation states is commonplace.Meddling with the functioning of one of the highestjudicial bodies in the world is therefore a familiarpattern of American supremacy in the internationallegal order. The move by the U.S. to revoke Bensouda’s visa isan expression of that supremacy through intimidationand bullying of representatives of internationalinstitutions. However, it also points to the U.S.wielding power in the age of its new-found sense ofself-alienation, which manifests into ongoingimperialist tendencies that influence the decisionsmade by international institutions. This perpetuates the West’s practice and tendency touse global legal institutions such as the InternationalCriminal Court to continuously persecute anddemonize the global South. Bensouda’s efforts have certainly not been halted bythe U.S. government’s move against her. However,the revocation of her visa and the Court’s validation ofsuch a move by rejecting Bensouda’s request raisesquestions on broader justice issues, what is beingconsidered within the purview of the ICC, and thelegitimacy of international law. Such tactics should not come as a surprise. The U.S.has had a long history of supposed “exceptionalism”facilitated by international law when it comes to itsparticipation in the global legal order and its violationsof international humanitarian and human rights lawwith impunity.

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For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006qualified the so-called war on terror as a form ofarmed conflict. However, as Jeremy Waldron, aprofessor at New York University School of Law,pointed out, the U.S. consistently violated the GenevaConventions during the war through extraordinaryrendition techniques and unlawful detention. This wasdone under the pretext that the particular category ofarmed conflict that the U.S. was involved in lackedexplicit mention in the Geneva Conventions. Disregarding international law Bensouda’s role in investigating these alleged warcrimes has the potential to shine a spotlight on thehistorical American practice of disregardinginternational law. By engaging in bullying tactics, the U.S. is nowreaching a new level of abrogation of internationallegal order. This could not only prevent the Courtfrom being able to investigate the alleged violations,but also has the potential to reinforce its hegemonicselective power when it comes to the implementationof international criminal law. U.S. dominance in the global legal order does notstop at its borders. It has a ripple effect, compellingother major powers with military, economic andpolitical clout to follow suit. We’ve witnessed similar practices by Israel as itdenies United Nations Human Rights Councilinvestigators entry to the occupied territories ofPalestine as they investigate alleged war crimes andcrimes against humanity in Gaza. And in some casesthere has been systematic pressure from the highestoffices in the UN pushing for withdrawal of scholarlyreports on the situation in the Middle East. While past incidents have often resulted in theresignation of the individuals who have been blockedby these forces, it’s refreshing to see Bensouda’sresistance “without fear or favour.”

The U.S. and Israel have been particularly effective inresisting the legitimacy of the global legal order. Byrecognizing Israel’s illegal annexation of GolanHeights, the U.S. administration under PresidentDonald Trump is legitimizing contempt towardsinternational legal principles. At the heart of this lies international law’s deepconnections to structures of power and inequality.Thankfully, international legal order is a contestedspace in which committed jurists like Bensouda arestill fighting oppression through their unapologeticacts of resistance. It is now up to the ICC to change its role from amechanism that facilitates inequality in internationallaw to one that perpetuates and supports resistancefor justice.

Doutaghi, H et.al.,"By not investigating the U.S. for war crimes, the International Criminal Court showscolonialism still thrives in international law", The Conversation, 15/4/19, www.theconversation.com/by-not-

investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269

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Why memories of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissionstill acheIt’s 20 years since the submission of the report ofSouth Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission(TRC), which was a court-like restorative justice bodythat sought to reveal human rights abuses underapartheid. When Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whochaired the TRC process, handed over the report tothen President Nelson Mandela in October 1998, hewas handing over more than a physical archive ofmemory of the past. Tutu aptly called the TRC “the third way”. It lifted theveil of lies perpetuated under apartheid, offeringvictims, perpetrators and “implicated others”. Toborrow American academic Michael Rothberg’s term,it was a horizon moment pregnant with possibility thatoriented the country toward a hopeful (ifunpredictable) future. Here was a chance for South Africans to begin anew.But, two decades later and after almost 25 years ofpost-apartheid democracy, the hope that wasenvisioned then – and the racial reconciliation thesehistorical moments of 1994 and 1998 promised – areonly barely visible. What remains are the memories of the stories told atthe TRC and their history-making impetus. All thatremains, as Chief Justice Ismail Mohamed then said, "is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones" It’s a deep and traumatic memory that could beshared, but is impossible to translate, into objectiveand corroborative evidence which could survive therigours of the law. Some of the cases that came before the TRC hadalready been tried and tested in a case of law and thecourts had found “no one to blame”. It’s a refrain atthe end of many inquests, which became the title of abook by George Bizos, the South African humanrights lawyer who represented anti-apartheid activists,including Mandela and Walter Sisulu.

She was bearing witness to the shards of herbrokenness after the murder of her husband, FortCalata. She recalled the painful details of the day shereceived the news that his charred remains had beenfound with the burnt-out wreck of the car in which hewas travelling with his comrades. At the time she wasa 26-year-old mother of two, and expecting her thirdchild. Even the memory of this moment was too much tobear. Mrs Calata’s “iconic” scream didn’t just mark theopening of the TRC. Hers was the voice of a “secondwounding”; an expression of anger and pain,screamed at a past that goes back severalgenerations, calling up deeply buried emotions thatreverberated over several generations. There was a sense that Mrs Calata was at lastreclaiming her agency, with the violent movement ofher body thrown back as she let out her wailing cry.She was confronting this violent history told on thestage of the TRC, exposing those responsible for herirreparable loss. American social activist bell hooks writes that blacksubjectivity is not a standpoint that exists only tooppose dehumanisation, 'but as that movement which enables… self-actualisation.' Objectified in so many ways as the racial and sexual“other” to legitimise the colonial and apartheid order,Calata’s TRC testimony shifted the gaze from theobject of oppression to shine the light on theperpetrators’ depravity. This powerful stanceunsettles the view of a world that associatesgoodness with all things white and savagery withblack people. The TRC laid bare the savagery of apartheid. Nolonger would it be possible to deny the barbarism ofthe apartheid state and the men and women whowere its executioners.

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A similar move is reflected in the exposure of whiteAmerica’s vicious terrorism of the lynching of blackpeople in the artist Ken Gonzales Day’s project“Erased Lynchings”. In a series of photographs, Gonzales Day showslynchings of black bodies with the images of theropes and bodies removed from the scene of thecrime, leaving the white spectators in thephotographs. The series invites the viewer to cast thegaze not on the victims of the lynchings, but rather onthe spectators to this crime, gleefully standing by towitness this atrocity to its conclusion. This forces us to reflect on the extreme depravity ofthese spectators, and to ponder about the conditionsof a society that perpetuates such acts ofdehumanisation. Far from denial of history, invitingthe imaginary at these sites of the crime presents theviewer with potent evidence of who the doer of theevil deed is.

Who are these people, and what stories did or dothey tell their children about this shameful history?How are the memories of this shame passed down?Through its silencing and denial? Most importantly,how does it play out in societies where perpetratorsand victims live in the same country in the aftermathof violent pasts? These are some of the most urgent questions of ourtime. Few topics stake a more compelling claim onhumanities research than the legacies of historicaltrauma. Apartheid, colonialism, slavery and otherwatershed moments of crimes against humanity inthe 20th century are not events in “the past”. They area history whose traumatic repercussions reverberatesacross multiple generations. We should receive the cry of Nomonde Calata as acall to arms; to rethink our notions of “reconciliation”,“forgiveness” and other concepts that imply a goal, anaccomplishment. Dealing with the past will alwaysremain “unfinished business”, because I think thatmuch of what happens in the afterlife of historicaltrauma is enigmatic, muddy, elusive, andunpredictable. The words “forgiveness” or“reconciliation” fall short of adequately capturing thiscomplexity.

Gobodo-Madikizela, P, "Why memories of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission still ache", TheConversation, 29/11/18, www.theconversation.com/why-memories-of-the-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-

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libertyThe concept of liberty refers to having freedom and autonomy. It is oftendivided into positive and negative liberty, with negative liberty defined asindividuals having the freedom from external coercion and positive libertydefined as individuals having the autonomy to carry out their own rationalwill. Some scholars reject this distinction and argue that in practice, one formof liberty cannot exist without the other. It is also questioned if such anunderstanding of liberty is sufficient for an interdependent world, in which theseeming freedom and autonomy of some may depend on lack of some forms ofliberty for others. Hence, debates on equality inform our understanding ofliberty as well.

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The messy reality of religious liberty in America The Human Freedom Index provides a snapshot ofglobal liberty Atlantic Charter 2.0: A “Declaration of Principles forFreedom, Prosperity, and Peace” Why the Press Is Less Free Today

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The messy reality of religious liberty in America

On Tuesday, Dec. 5, a visibly divided U.S. SupremeCourt tackled the contentious issue of religiousfreedom when it heard oral arguments in“Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil RightsCommission.” The arguments appeared to evenlysplit the four conservative justices from the fourliberals. Justice Anthony Kennedy, who is often aswing vote, seemed to side with the baker. The case involves a Denver bakery owner whorefused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple,citing his religious belief that marriage can bebetween only a man and woman. The couple sued,and a lower court ruled the baker violated Colorado’spublic accommodations law. The statute forbidsdiscrimination by businesses serving the public,including on the basis of sexual orientation. In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the bakery’slawyers have emphasized free speech issues bypresenting the baker as an artist who has a right tochoose how he expresses himself. But religiousfreedom remains central to the case. A key questionis whether a business owner must provide servicesthat conflict with his or her religious beliefs. This divisive case highlights the vast differencebetween the reality and the rhetoric of religiousfreedom, which is often considered to be the idealthat promotes harmony and equality. But, historysuggests that it does lead to more conflict. The rhetoric: Equality and goodwill It is true that throughout U.S. history, Americans haveidealized religious freedom and imagined that itbrings harmony. The First Amendment’s clauses guaranteeingreligious free exercise and preventing establishmentof an official church seemed to promise less discordto the Founding Fathers. In an 1802 letter, ThomasJefferson, for example, wrote that “religion is a matterwhich lies solely between Man & his God.” As thenation’s third president, he argued that a “wall ofseparation between Church & State” would give allpeople equally the right to free conscience.

Later presidents echoed the view that religiousfreedom brings equality and unity by preventinggovernment from favoring particular faiths. Before his election in 1960, John F. Kennedy tried toease fears about his Catholicism by affirmingreligious liberty. Kennedy believed this freedom keptone group from oppressing another. It formed thebasis of a society, he declared, where people would“refrain from those attitudes of disdain and divisionwhich have so often marred their works in the past,and promote instead the American ideal ofbrotherhood.” In the early 1990s, George H.W. Bush identifiedreligious liberty as the basis for other rights. Hecredited it as a major reason for the vibrancy ofAmerican society. The reality: Conflict and debate But, the promised harmony has proved elusive.Scholars such as Steven K. Green and Tisa Wengerhave documented arguments about religious freedomthroughout U.S. history. Minority communities, ranging from Catholics toMormons, have fought to have their traditions andcustoms recognized as religious. As I show in mywork on pluralism, Americans have debated whatconstitutes a religious expression rather than acultural practice. People have also argued whetherreligious expression can extend into political, socialand business interactions. These debates have required the intervention of thecourts and have often ended at the Supreme Court.Thus, a right intended to free Americans fromgovernment has instead necessitated frequentinvolvement of a major government institution. Further complicating matters, the Supreme Court haschanged its position over time. Its evolvinginterpretations show how religious freedom debatescreate shifting categories of winners and losers.

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To the courts Like Masterpiece Cakeshop, one of the SupremeCourt’s first religious liberty cases involved marriage.In 1878, a Mormon resident of the Utah territory suedthe federal government after he was charged withbigamy. He argued that the law violated his religiousliberty by criminalizing his polygamous marriage. TheSupreme Court disagreed. In Reynolds v. UnitedStates, the court ruled that the First Amendmentguaranteed only freedom of belief, not freedom ofpractice. In the 20th century, the Supreme Court showedgreater sympathy to religious liberty claims. In severalcases – including one brought by Jehovah’sWitnesses challenging a statute requiring a permit forpublic evangelizing and another by an Amishcommunity that objected to Wisconsin’s compulsorypublic school law – justices sided with those whoclaimed their freedom was violated. That changed in 1990. The court ruled against twomen who lost their jobs after using peyote, the cactus,which has hallucinogenic properties and has longbeen used in Native American religious practices.Because they were fired for drug use, the men weredenied unemployment benefits. They claimed that asmembers of a Native American church, they used thedrug for religious purposes. Moving away from earlier decisions, justices ruledthat religious belief was not a ground for refusing toobey laws “prohibiting conduct that the State is free toregulate.”

New century, new conflicts The peyote case set the stage for MasterpieceCakeshop. It was in response to the case thatCongress passed the Religious Freedom RestorationAct (RFRA) of 1993. It required that laws restrictingreligious expression must show that they serve acompelling need. RFRA was central in the Supreme Court’s 2014decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. That contentioussplit ruling allowed small, closely held companies theright to deny contraceptive benefits mandated by theAffordable Care Act on the grounds of protecting theirowners’ religious liberty. Similarly, in October 2017, the Trump administrationinvoked freedom of religion when it allowed allemployers a religious exemption to the contraceptioncoverage requirement in the Affordable Care Act. Critics saw that policy change as an attack onwomen’s rights. Reaction to it on both sides againshowed that government involvement in debatesabout religious freedom invariably produces winnersand losers. Given our polarized society and the division amongthe Supreme Court justices today, this pattern willcontinue, whatever the verdict is.

Mislin, D, "The messy reality of religious liberty in America", The Conversation, 28/11/17,www.theconversation.com/the-messy-reality-of-religious-liberty-in-america-85963

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The Human Freedom Index provides a snapshot of globallibertyAs a new year begins, it is important to pause andtake a look at the state of global liberty. The HumanFreedom Index makes it possible to do just that.Through a holistic range of categories, the HumanFreedom Index measures aspects of human freedomincluding the size of government, freedom ofmovement, identity, and relationships, as well assecurity and safety among others. A total of 76individual indicators from these categories are usedto paint a picture of the overall state of humanfreedom across the globe. New Zealand, Switzerland,and Hong Kong rank the highest. While the Republicof Yemen, Venezuela, and Syria, bottomed out the2019 Human Freedom Index. The state of global liberty declined slightly in 2018.“Of the 12 major categories that make up the index,all except 3 saw some deterioration since 2008,” saysthe report. On the whole, there was an improvementin economic freedom. However, this was overcomeby a greater decline in personal freedom, whichdropped the global average, albeit all movement wasmarginal. High levels of human freedom are associated withhigher levels of prosperity. This is shown by the freestquarter of the countries having an average per capitaincome that is more than 3 times the income of thosewho live in countries in the least free quarter. Despitethe benefits of freedom, most of the global populationhas been excluded. According to the 2018 report,less than 15 percent of the world’s population lives inthese top countries. Meanwhile, almost half of theworld’s population — 42 percent — lives in countriesthat fall into the bottom quarter on the index.

Publications such as the Human Freedom Index,provide the foundational information from which tocraft policy that can increase human flourishing.While almost half of the population currently lives withlow levels of freedom, indexes such as these providethe groundwork needed to change that and increasehuman flourishing.

CLICK HERE TO READ THELATEST VERSION OF THEHUMAN FREEDOM INDEX

"The Human Freedom Index provides a snapshot of global liberty", Atlas Network, 10/1/19,www.atlasnetwork.org/news/article/the-human-freedom-index-provides-a-snapshot-of-global-liberty

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Atlantic Charter 2.0: A “Declaration of Principles forFreedom, Prosperity, and Peace”In August 1941, four months before the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor drew the United States intoWorld War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt and WinstonChurchill held a secret rendezvous off the coast ofNewfoundland, Canada. Much of continental Europe,including France, had fallen to Nazi Germany, andimperial Japan was on the march in Asia. At this darkmoment, the U.S. president and British prime ministersought to give hope to oppressed peoples, byoutlining their vision for an open, just, and stablepostwar world. Their handiwork was the AtlanticCharter, the founding document of what today we callthe “liberal international order.” After a seven-decade run, that world order is undergrave assault. Many people, including citizens in freesocieties, have grown skeptical of democracy, openmarkets, and international institutions. Globally,nationalism, populism, and protectionism areascendant. Authoritarian powers, China and Russiaforemost among them, seek to weaken Westernsolidarity and liberal values. Meanwhile, the UnitedStates, the former champion of an open world, hasabdicated global leadership. Under President DonaldJ. Trump, it has embraced an amoral, transactional,and insular foreign policy, contributing to the sense ofa world adrift. Fortunately, not everyone is taking this lying down. Atthis weekend’s Munich Security Conference, a groupof international statesmen and women released a“Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity,and Peace.” This document advances sevenprinciples for a free, fair, and sustainable internationalorder, consistent with the Atlantic Charter but updatedfor today’s circumstances. Call it Atlantic Charter 2.0. The co-chairs of this effort are Madeleine Albright,Stephen Hadley, Carl Bildt, and Yoriko Kawaguchi,who formerly served as U.S. secretary of state, U.S.national security advisor, and Swedish and Japaneseprime ministers, respectively.

Although sponsored by the Atlantic Council and theCentre for International Governance Innovation, thisinitiative is not simply a transatlantic or even Westernendeavor. Its global task force includes luminariesfrom democracies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,as well as Europe and North America. The original Atlantic Charter had eight principles. ThisDeclaration offers “seven statements,” on topicsranging from international peace to the worldeconomy to the global commons. Each enunciates abasic human right and outlines the obligations ofstates (and, where appropriate, private entities andindividuals) in promoting and defending it.Collectively, these principles offer a hopeful vision ofthe future, with potentially global appeal. Let’s take a closer look at the seven statements. Freedom and Justice: The Declaration’s point ofdeparture is “the right of all people to live in free andjust societies, where fundamental rights are protectedunder the rule of law.” Beyond repeating well-established liberties like freedom of expression andassembly (already enumerated in the UN Covenanton Civil and Political Rights), the text adds somecontemporary wrinkles. In promoting the “free flow ofinformation,” for example, governments are expectedto protect personal information and individual privacy.They are also obliged to “combat corruption,” and toensure equal protection under the law, regardless of“gender, disability, and sexual identity,” among otherfactors. Democracy and Self-Determination: The authorsunequivocally agree that all just governments derivetheir legitimacy from the consent of the governed, andthat citizens have a right to “choose their own leadersthrough a free, fair, and competitive democraticprocess,” without meddling, threats or intimidation, or“foreign interference.” These principles are allunassailable. But they merit constant repetition, givena global retreat of democracy that (according toFreedom House) has entered its thirteenth year.

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Peace and Security: All peoples, the documentcontinues, have a right “to live in peace, free fromthreats of aggression, terrorism, oppression, crimesagainst humanity, and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction.” Accordingly, governments mustavoid endangering the peace or allowing suchviolence to occur on their territories. In the real world,of course, things are not always so black or white.Nuclear deterrence, for instance, is based on theimplicit threat of annihilation. The document alsofudges on its call for states to “refrain from the use offorce,” adding the qualifier: “except as just andnecessary to advance these principles.” Who gets tomake that decision remains ambiguous. Free Markets and Equal Opportunity: The greatestcriticism of the liberal international order is that it nolonger delivers shared prosperity. Aware of this, theauthors temper their neoliberal instincts withrecognition that restoring confidence in globalizationrequires addressing surging inequality andstrengthening social safety nets. “We affirm the rightof all people to engage in economic activity based onfree market principles,” they write, but add thatcitizens must have “equal opportunity to contribute toand the ability to share in the benefits of nationalprosperity.” To this end, governments have anobligation to “protect the rights of workers, includingthe right to seek gainful employment; seek to mitigatethe adverse impacts of global trade; and encourageinclusive, equitable, and well-regulated economies.”The drafters clearly hope that such measures will de-fang economic populism. An Open and Healthy Planet: Like the AtlanticCharter, the Declaration insists on the freedom of theseas, a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy since 1776and an increasing concern given Chinese behavior inthe South and East China Seas. But its support for“free and open access to the global commons” goeswell beyond the oceans. The document calls on allstates to “refrain from undue interference withfreedom of navigation in the air, seas, and outerspace, or with access to cyberspace.” Even moresignificant, the same statement affirms the right of allpeople to “a safe and healthy planet.” Back in 1941,few imagined that human activities might somedayjeopardize life on Earth. Today, few outside the WhiteHouse and other conservative circles ignore thereality of global warming and its catastrophicpotential.

The Right of Assistance: Any effort to revitalize theliberal international order must counter a powerfulsovereigntist mindset that is skeptical of internationalcommitments and rejects external concerns aboutinternal conduct. The Declaration tackles thisdilemma head on, by framing sovereignty in terms notsimply of rights but of responsibilities. “We affirm theright of national sovereignty, while recognizing thatsovereignty obligates governments to uphold theseprinciples.” This will be the Declaration’s mostcontroversial statement. The authors posit thatcitizens in all countries (“including in non-freesocieties”) have the right to receive outside aid torealize their rights. Moreover, where governments“are unwilling or unable to cease and remedy flagrantor systemic violations,” other states may “take suchactions just and necessary to prevent them.” It isunclear how many sovereignty-minded states will signonto this broad and potentially interventionistprinciple. Collective Action: The Declaration closes by“affirm[ing] the right of all people to cooperate insupport of these principles and to work together toadvance them.” Whether governments will availthemselves of this “right” is an open question. Theworld is confronting a crisis of multilateralism, asmany legacy institutions—some dating from the1940s—struggle to adapt to emerging threats, shiftingpower dynamics, and demands for accountability.The authors provide some grounds for hope, byadvocating cooperation not only within formal bodieslike the United Nations but also within more flexible“partnerships, coalitions, and alliances that bringtogether likeminded governments,” as well asmultistakeholder arrangements that unitegovernments with private actors in resolving complexglobal challenges. Multilateralism, the authors aresaying, comes in many forms. Skeptics may well discount this weekend’sDeclaration as a “high-minded” exercise divorcedfrom the ugly realities of world politics. They would bewrong. The success of the liberal world order hasalways rested on a combination of power andidealism.

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This was something that Roosevelt realizedinstinctively in 1941. Questioned by reporters, thepresident conceded that the Atlantic Charter did “notprovide rules of easy application.” Nevertheless, heinsisted, “it was a good thing to have principles,” sothat humanity has something to aim for. He hopedthat the charter would take its place beside theMagna Carta and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,“as a step toward a better life of the people of theworld.”

In the same vein, the authors of this weekend’sDeclaration acknowledge that “principles are not self-executing.” Accordingly, they propose to “develop aplan of action to implement these principles andadvance our common goals.” The ultimate goal is to“create a more effective and responsive set of globalrules” tailored to modern realities and grounded ininternational law. This will be a difficult journey. Butthe authors of the Declaration have taken theessential first step, by delimiting the destination.

Patrick, S,"Atlantic Charter 2.0: A “Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace”, Council forForeign Relations, 16/2/19, www.cfr.org/blog/atlantic-charter-20-declaration-principles-freedom-prosperity-

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Why the Press Is Less Free Today

In the worldwide movement away from democracy,perhaps the most vulnerable institution is the freepress, and the most disposable people arejournalists. If they’re doing their job right, they canhave few friends in powerful places. Journalistsbecome reliably useful to governments, corporations,or armed groups only when they betray their calling.They seldom even have a base of support within thegeneral public. In some places, it’s impossible toreport the truth without making oneself an object ofhatred and a target of violence for one sector ofsociety or another. In recent years, reporting the news has become anever more dangerous activity. Between 2002 and2012, according to the Committee to ProtectJournalists (C.P.J.), five hundred and six journalistswere killed worldwide, as opposed to three hundredand ninety in the previous decade. Even in the mostviolent war zones, such as Iraq and Syria, the causeof death is most often simple murder, rather thanbeing killed while covering combat. One major shift inthe years since September 11, 2001, has been theerosion of a commonly accepted idea of pressneutrality. Journalists are now seen by manycombatants, especially jihadis, as legitimate targetsand valuable propaganda tools, alive or dead. Thebest-known cases involve Western reporters, fromDaniel Pearl to James Foley, but the mostendangered journalists are ones you’ve probablynever heard of—the newspaper reporter in Tijuana,the cameraman in Karachi, the blogger in Tehran. Joel Simon, the executive director of C.P.J, has justpublished a book called “The New Censorship: Insidethe Global Battle for Media Freedom.” It seemsstrange to speak of growing censorship in an erawhen elections are common around the world, privatefreedoms have expanded even in repressivecountries like China, the Internet and social mediaswamp our brains with indiscriminate informationevery nanosecond, and anyone with a Twitteraccount or a Facebook page can be a journalist.

But Simon makes a persuasive case that the globaltrend is toward less, not greater, freedom of thepress. “Deluged with data, we are blind to the largerreality,” he writes. “Around the world new systems ofcontrol are taking hold. They are stifling the globalconversation and impeding the development ofpolicies and solutions based on an informedunderstanding of the local realities. Repression andviolence against journalists is at record levels, andpress freedom is in decline.” “The New Censorship” outlines four main reasonswhy this is so. The first is the rise of elected leaders,such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s RecepTayyip Erdoğan, and the leftist Presidents ofVenezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, who use theirpower to intimidate independent journalists and makeit nearly impossible for them to function. They exploittheir democratic mandates to govern as dictators—“democratators,” as Simon calls them. They do thisnot only by manipulating, denouncing, and jailingcritical reporters but by creating an atmosphere inwhich a free press is considered a kind of fifth columnin the body politic, an import from the West that atbest serves as a propaganda tool for outside interests—introducing alien values and stoking chaos—and atworst actively undermines national security and pride. Demagogues like Putin and Erdoğan create tyranniesof the majority, so that the dissenting stance that’s thenormal position of an independent press is easilyisolated, tainted with foreign associations, andblamed for social ills. The idea that freedom ofexpression, along with other public liberties, is aspecifically Western ideology, rather than a universalright, is increasingly common, from Caracas toBeijing. Because they have popular support, theseleaders enjoy a certain protection against the familiarcampaigns of denunciation that are directed at theworld’s more straightforward dictators, such as NorthKorea’s Kim Jong-un or Saudi Arabia’s KingAbdullah.

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The second source of censorship, according toSimon, is terrorism. The beheading of Daniel Pearl inKarachi began the trend of turning journalists intospecific high-value targets. The Iraq War—thedeadliest in history for journalists, with a hundred andfifty killed, eighty-five per cent of them Iraqis, most ofwhom were murdered—worsened it, making thecapture and execution of reporters a normal part ofthe media landscape. (For me, there was a turningpoint when I was reporting in Iraq in early 2004, andrealized that the press sign in my car windshieldoffered no protection and perhaps invited trouble; Iasked my Iraqi driver to take it down.) In Syria, wheremany foreign reporters and many more Syrian oneshave been kidnapped or killed, the basic functions ofjournalism have all but ceased. The extreme violence of conflict today is actuallyamplified by technological progress. Armed groups nolonger need to keep journalists alive, because theyhave their own means of—in the terrible cliché—“telling their story”: they can post their own videos,publish their own online reports, and tweet to theirown followers, knowing that the international presswill pick up the most sensational stories anyway. “Thedirect links created between content producers andconsumers make it possible for violent groups tobypass the traditional media and reach the public viachat rooms and websites,” Simon writes. “Journalistshave become less essential and therefore morevulnerable as a result.”

Another casualty of technological change is theforeign news bureau—the presence of large numbersof correspondents in places like Sao Paolo, Nairobi,and Jakarta. Simon got his start as a stringer inMexico City in the early nineties. The system wasobviously inefficient, with a dozen or two Americansall reporting the same thing for papers up north, andtherefore doomed to “disruption.” But as the declineof traditional media closed foreign bureaus all overthe world, critical reporting has been left to localreporters. Many of them are talented, enterprising,and courageous, and often more able than theirWestern counterparts to work up sources and get tothe heart of the story. But their position is also farmore precarious. They have no wealthy foreign newsorganization or influential foreign government to backthem. The only government around, their own, mightwant them dead. In countries like Mexico, thePhilippines, and Pakistan, local journalists are thetarget of brutal campaigns of intimidation and murderby shadowy secret services or armed groups, fromnarco-traffickers to Islamists.

Packer, G, "Why the Press Is Less Free Today", The New Yorker, 13/11/14, www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/press-freedom-new-censorship

equalityEgalitarian theories are based on a concept of equality that all people, orgroups of people, are seen as having the same intrinsic value. Equality istherefore closely linked to justice and fairness, as egalitarians argue thatjustice can only exist if there is equality. Increasingly, with growingpolarization within societies, equality is also linked to liberty, as differentpeople have differing possibilities to be free and autonomous.

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We Finally Won the Right to Drive in Saudi Arabia.But the Kingdom's War on Women Is Only GettingWorse Why Africa is the most homophobic continent #MeToo has skipped Indonesia — here’s why 7 surprising and outrageous stats about genderinequality

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We Finally Won the Right to Drive in Saudi Arabia. But theKingdom's War on Women Is Only Getting Worse

Al-Sharif is a Saudi Arabian women's rightsactivist and the author of Daring to Drive: A SaudiWoman's Awakening. In 2011, she was detainedafter filming herself driving through the Saudi cityKhobar, an act that was prohibited at the time.Manal al-Sharif co-founded the Women2Drivemovement in Saudi Arabia in 2011, campaigningfor the right of women to drive in the kingdom. InJune 2018, the Saudi monarchy eventually lifted along-term ban on women driving. Al-Sharif, 39,has lived in Sydney, Australia with her four-year-old son for the past two years, and has beenunable to return to her homeland after the arrestof fellow women’s rights activists in the countrylast year. Her 13-year-old son still lives in theKingdom with his grandmother; al-Sharif has notseen him for over a year. From April 10, al-Sharifis driving across the United States in partnershipwith Human Rights Foundation to raiseawareness of ongoing human rights abuses inSaudi Arabia. Shortly before she embarked onthis journey, al-Sharif spoke with TIME about thefuture of women’s rights in her home country. Originally, I was planning to go back to Saudi Arabiawhen the ban on women driving was lifted. I wantedto drive coast-to-coast with my eldest son, tocelebrate. If you are a Saudi and you marry a non-Saudi, you need a special permission from thegovernment to marry. I was never granted thatpermission and so my son is not recognized by theSaudi government. That means they will not issuehim a visa to enter the country. So my younger sonlives with me in Australia and can’t go back homewith me. I have two sons who have never met, who Ihave never held in my arms at the same time. Theonly way to be with one is to leave the other. The only charges the women in jail today are facingare contacting foreign organizations. Those foreignorganizations are human rights organizations.

The way they have been tortured, put in solitaryconfinement and have been subject to a smearcampaign and character assassination by the pro-government media shows how scared the authoritiesare of these women, and how powerful and effectivethey are. These women were hunted down and takenfrom their homes. Women living abroad were flownback to Saudi Arabia and literally kidnapped —women like Loujain al-Hathloul, a vocal advocate forwomen’s rights who was abducted while driving in theUnited Arab Emirates in March 2018. She wasbrought back to Saudi Arabia on a private jet, whereshe is still in jail. The activists were put in a secret prison, where theywere tortured and sexually assaulted. Thisinformation has even been confirmed by theirfamilies. Although in late March, some of the activistswere temporarily released, the brutal way thesewomen were treated shows that this government isnot supportive of women’s rights or reforms. The government doesn’t understand that they needus. Activists are the most patriotic people, becausethey are fighting for a better country; they are nottraitors. What happened the last two years is a hugecrackdown on activists, especially peaceful activistswho used social media. Social media was the placewhere where we could talk, where we could discuss— it was our virtual parliament. As a citizen of SaudiArabia, you live in one of the richest countries in theworld, but you don’t own your own life, you don’t ownyour own decisions. There were a lot of red flags on the outside, like withthe war in Yemen and the brutal Qatar embargo, butthen the war moved inside Saudi Arabia. It started asa war against people who joined terrorist groups, butit has now morphed into a war targeting activists andthe social media influencers — many of whom are injail today.

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There have been huge efforts from the government topropagate its agenda on social media and toinfluence the discourse in an unprecedented way.The Saudi regime now has a kind of power over theircitizens in a way that they didn’t even dream of tenyears ago. It is really painful for us to see. The sametools we use to push for social change are being usedto undermine us and put our lives in danger. The second part of the story is the reaction ofdemocracies around the world to the assassination ofJamal Khashoggi, which is an assault on freedom ofexpression, and the indifference of the world to theimprisonment and the torture of these women.Countries can talk about all the values of democracy,but these values should not just be for one set ofcitizens. If these countries become allied withdictatorships that violate the same values that thosedemocracies call for, this is hypocrisy. This is adouble standard. The assassination of Khashoggi, which took place inTurkey just over six months ago now, cannot bedismissed as an internal issue for Saudi Arabia. Youcannot say that when you buy our oil, when you sendyour companies to develop huge projects and whenyou accept investments from Saudi money. This iswhy we have to question the influence of Saudimoney on think tanks and policy makers in the U.S.Instead of driving in Saudi Arabia, I moved the drivecampaign to the U.S., because Washington andRiyadh are close allies. Ever since President DonaldTrump came to the White House, it’s been a greenlight for the Saudis to get away with human rightsviolations.

We won’t be anonymous or silent anymore. We willkeep speaking up in the face of tyranny and injustice.Those regimes should be the ones who are afraid,not us. I call for a Global Magnitsky Act targetingregimes like Saudi Arabia, legislation that willsanction individuals who commit human rightsabuses. It’s time democracies put the values theybelieve into action. My drive is a call to act. I couldn’t do the drive cross-country in my own homeland, so I’m doing it in theU.S., moving between cities like Washington, D.C.and Birmingham, Alabama, where American civilrights movements took place. It’s a reminder to revisitthese values that humans around the globe werefighting for and are still fighting for. Are we stillstanding up for these democratic values or not?Martin Luther King Jr. once said “Injustice anywhereis a threat to justice everywhere.” And the fight forwomen’s rights anywhere contributes to the fight forwomen’s rights everywhere.

Al-Sharif, M, "We Finally Won the Right to Drive in Saudi Arabia. But the Kingdom's War on Women Is OnlyGetting Worse" 10/4/19, TIME, www.time.com/5567330/saudi-arabia-women-rights-drive/

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Why Africa is the most homophobic continent

Simon Lokodo cannot imagine kissing a man. "I thinkI shall die," he said last week. "I would not exist. It isinhuman. I would be mad. Just imagine eating yourfaeces." Lokodo is "ethics and integrity" minister in Ugandaand a champion of the country's swingeing anti-homosexuality bill, which looked set to become lawon Sunday until President Yoweri Museveni halted it,pending scientific advice. The delay was a smallvictory for activists dismayed a week ago whenMuseveni insisted that he would approve thelegislation. That news prompted Kenneth Roth,executive director of Human Rights Watch, to tweet:"In name of Africa culture Uganda Pres will sign anti-gay law pushed by US evangelists toughening Britishcolonial ban." In 140 characters, Roth encapsulated a broad sweepof history and geography and one of the centralparadoxes of Africa's new war on gay and lesbianpeople. It is a war marked by political opportunism,biblical fundamentalism and a clash between culturalrelativism and universal human rights. But it is also ameasure of conservatives' anxiety that every daymore and more African homosexuals are coming outand losing their fear. Western liberals eager to seethe best in Africa must face an inconvenient truth: thisis the most homophobic continent on Earth. Same-sex relations are illegal in 36 of Africa's 55 countries,according to Amnesty International, and punishableby death in some states. Now a fresh crackdown isunder way. In January, Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathansigned into law a bill criminalising same-sex "amorousrelationships" and membership of LGBT rightsgroups. Last week Gambian president YahyaJammeh declared: "We will fight these vermins calledhomosexuals or gays the same way we are fightingmalaria-causing mosquitoes, if not moreaggressively."

This is not, however, merely the hate-filled bile ofpoliticians. They make such statements because theyknow they will strike a popular chord in swaths ofAfrica. Anyone who has spent a fair amount of timeon the continent is likely to encounter a warm,friendly, decent human being who will stop them shortwith an outburst of homophobic prejudice.Newspapers, TV and radio often fan the flames. So it is in Uganda, where a tabloid once publishedphotographs of dozens of gay people under thewords: "Hang them." Homosexuality was already acrime there, but the new legislation, rushed throughparliament in December, broadens the scope of lifeimprisonment for a range of "offences" includingsuggestive touching in public. Museveni has untilSunday to sign, veto or amend the bill, and at first heindicated that he would knock it back. On 18 January, the Associated Press (AP) reported,he held a meeting with US-based rights activists and,on the phone, South African retired archbishopDesmond Tutu, who drew a comparison between thelegislation and racist laws under apartheid. Museveni"specifically said this bill is a fascist bill," SantiagoCanton of the Robert F Kennedy Centre for Justiceand Human Rights told AP. "Those were the firstwords that came out of his mouth." Something changed his mind. A month later thepresident, under domestic pressure, announced thathe would sign the bill after receiving a report onhomosexuality from a team of "medical experts". Butthe Observer has obtained the report, entitled"Scientific statement from the ministry of health onhomosexuality"; it is far from the bigots' charter thatmight be expected. "Homosexuality existed in Africaway before the coming of the white man," it states."There are a spectrum of sexual behaviours. Somepeople are less fixed in one form of sexuality thanothers. Thus sexuality is a far more flexible humanquality than used to be assumed in the past.Homosexuality has no clear cut cause; severalfactors are involved which differ from individual toindividual. It is not a disease that has a treatment."

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But Simon Lokodo argues that the most importantconclusion is that there is no definitive gene forhomosexuality. "It is a social style of life that isacquired," he said by phone from Uganda. "Theychose to be homosexual and are trying to recruitothers. The commercialisation of homosexuality isunacceptable. If they were doing it in their own roomswe wouldn't mind, but when they go for children,that's not fair. They are beasts of the forest." With chilling conviction, Lokodo, a former Catholicpriest, set out why he believes the state shouldinterfere in the choices of consenting adults in private."Homosexuality is unnatural, abnormal and strange toour cultures," he said. "It has no output whatsoever; itonly does damage and destruction. You cannot havea right to be a sick human being. There is no right inhomosexuality. It must be cured." The minister has also considered the anatomicalimplications. "Excretion is through the anus, like theexhaust of an engine. The human body receives whatit takes from the mouth. They're twisting nature thewrong way. Homosexuality will destroy humanitybecause there is no procreation; it will destroy healthbecause the backsides will not hold." After the bill drew criticism from Barack Obama,Lokodo accused the west of trying to "blackmail"Uganda. "When I heard the US saying they will cutaid, we said fine. Will they be comfortable if we cometo America and started practising polygamy?Homosexuality is strange to us and polygamy isstrange to you. We have divergent views." Promoters of the bill in Uganda, which gainedindependence from Britain in 1962, appealed topopulist notions of culture that frame homosexualityas an "un-African", alien behaviour foisted on thecontinent by western imperialists. Seen through thisprism, a strike against gay and lesbian people is astrike against colonialism and in favour of Africannationalism and self-worth.

Yet as the scientists' report noted, homosexuality hasexisted throughout human history. Anthropologistsfound an ethnic group in central Africa where it wascustomary for a male warrior to marry a teenage boyand celebrate victory in battle by having sexualintercourse. In many cases, the very laws beingimposed so zealously were introduced by theEuropean empires that carved up and plunderedAfrica. "Prior to western colonisation, there are no records ofany African laws against homosexuality," said PeterTatchell, the veteran human rights and gay rightscampaigner. "The real import into Africa was nothomosexuality but homophobia." It was enforced legally by colonial administrators andideologically by Christian missionaries. Tatchell, whotwice tried to arrest Zimbabwean president RobertMugabe over human rights abuses, added: "Thecolonial narratives of racism and homophobia arevery closely intertwined. It's one of the great tragediesof Africa that so many people have internalised thehomophobia of that colonial oppression and nowproclaim it as their own authentic African tradition." Defence of "tradition" can be a sleight of hand totrade on cultural relativism and exploit postcolonialguilt. Some in the west may be reluctant to criticiseAfrican attitudes, lest they be accused of racism. Butactivists counter that they are appealing to humanrights, such as the right not to be tortured, that applyeverywhere at all times. A minority has an absoluteright to be protected from violations by a majority,they argue. This counts for little at the altar of politicalexpediency, however, according to Kapya Kaoma, anEpiscopal priest from Zambia, and religion andsexuality researcher at the US-based thinktankPolitical Research Associates. Politicians tend to"blame the gays" to distract attention from their ownfailings, he says, casting them as the enemy within.Mugabe peppered his speeches with praise of Adamand Eve and denunciations of homosexuals asanimals while electioneering last year.

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The share of the sub-Saharan Africa population thatis Christian climbed from 9% in 1910 to 63% in 2010,says the Pew Research Centre. Kaoma said:"Religious fundamentalism is strong in thesecountries. That provides the militant reaction to LGBTrights. One of the fears for fundamentalists is losinggrip of the country; they are told they have lost gripbecause of the gays. They say, 'We don't want to loseNigeria or Uganda just as our brothers lost America tothe gays. If it means killing, we will kill.'" He saidhomosexuality is a rare point of convergence forChristian and Islamic hardliners. US evangelicals have been accused of turning theirattention to Africa and whipping up homophobia withlurid stories about child molestation, bestiality, rapeand deadly diseases. Kaoma reflected: "In Americathe conservatives are losing. In Africa they arewinning and the progressives are on the retreat.People are not paying attention to how world religionsare taking advantage of globalisation. Those opposedto gay rights can connect very easily with Africangroups opposed to gay rights. In the past they had totravel; now they send an email and share tactics.Conservatives argue that gays are out to destroy'traditional family values'; as Africans encounter fast-changing values, this language sounds veryattractive." There is, however, a paradox in the wave ofoppression: the harsh laws being enacted may be ameasure not of failure but of success, a reaction togay and lesbians asserting their political identity andrights as never before. Graeme Reid, director of thelesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rightsprogramme at Human Rights Watch, said: "I do see itas a backlash against the increasing visibility. Overthe last 25 years there's been an unprecedentedgrowth of LGBT movements across sub-SaharanAfrica. Clearly, this is an indigenous Africanphenomenon. There are various reasons: one is theHIV/Aids epidemic and the funding that becameavailable for men who have sex with men. There wasa more open discussion around sexuality."

Anyone who attended the recent opening of theQueer and Trans Art-iculations: Collaborative Art forSocial Change, an exhibition at the Wits Art Museumin Johannesburg, could not help but feel hopeful.Many among the spectacular first-night crowd wereconfidently gay, lesbian, transgender and, in the wordof one guest, "performative". Despite the works'reminder of the deadly hate crimes that persist inSouth Africa, the event's celebratory, out-and-proudatmosphere offered a glimpse of another possiblefuture. Last week, Edwin Cameron, a South Africanconstitutional court judge, and one of the first publicfigures in Africa to come out as gay and HIV-positive,reflected: "The most interesting thing going on here iswhat I call an 'unstable transition'. It explains the forceof the backlash just as African gays and lesbians arestarting to come out. It releases hatred and rage, butwhat is happening is irreversible. Gays and lesbiansare coming to consciousness, organising themselvesand speaking out."

Smith, D, "Why Africa is the most homophobic continent", The Guardian, 23/2/14,www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/africa-homophobia-uganda-anti-gay-law

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#MeToo has skipped Indonesia — here’s why

“I won’t give up, I’ll keep my fire up.” That’s what rape survivor Agni said last year afteradministrators at Indonesia’s Gadjah MadaUniversity, one of Indonesia’s top schools, ignoredher report that she had been sexually assaulted by afriend during a residential community service programin a remote area of the archipelagic country. According to Agni (not her real name), the universityseemed more interested in protecting its good imagethan in pursuing justice. But after the student newspaper, Balairung, exposedAgni’s plight, the campus rape case became nationalnews. A hashtag went viral on social media:#SaveAgni. Many Indonesians hoped that this controversy wouldkickstart their #MeToo moment. Starting in the UnitedStates, the movement to expose and punish sexualassault has spread internationally over the last 18months, but it has not yet reached the world’s largestMuslim population. Indonesia’s weak #MeToo movementAgni’s case is one of many unresolved sexualviolence cases in Indonesia exposed during the#MeToo era. While women in other countries are bringing down thepowerful men who assaulted and harassed them, inIndonesia assault victims are still struggling to findjustice. Indonesian feminist Tunggal Pawestri coined#SayaJuga – a direct translation of #MeToo – toencourage more public discussion of sexual assault.Still, in Indonesia, #MeToo remains limited to thesocial media savvy and middle-upper class women. The latest Indonesian National Women’s LifeExperience Survey shows that one in threeIndonesian women has suffered physical and/orsexual violence, which is similar to the globalaverage, according to the World Health Organizationand the World Bank.

I study gender issues in Indonesia, where I was oncea researcher for the National Commission onViolence against Women. In my assessment, a combination of a deep-rootedpatriarchal culture, conservative religious values andgender-insensitive law enforcement practices are toblame why #MeToo is not happening in Indonesia. Patriarchal cultureOne shared feature of countries that have developedtheir own powerful #MeToo movement – such asChina, South Korea, and India – is the strong supportof the government, legal system and public to takeaction against sexual violence. In Indonesia, these institutions have the oppositeeffect. The country’s strong patriarchal culture – reinforcedby the government and religious leaders – hasprevented women from speaking up about sex, letalone sexual violence. Under the 32-year authoritarian rule of New Orderregime, which ended in 1998, women were barredfrom entering politics. Their roles were mainly limitedto being mothers and wives. Hence, discussions of women’s issues have fordecades revolved around domestic duties. Genderequality and protection from sexual violence simplyweren’t part of Indonesia’s public debate. Any effort to create more gender-balanced policiesgets a powerful pushback from Indonesia’sconservative Muslim leaders, who believe womenshould be pious, obedient, and able to uphold theirmorality. That includes wearing modest fashion and aveil to avoid arousing men. Of course, women in hijab also experience sexualassault. Rape is about power, not attraction.

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The media advances Indonesia’s victim-blamingculture, too. Stories about sexual harassment oftenportray women as responsible for stoking maledesire. Bad regulations and poor law enforcementThis strong patriarchal culture has contributed to legalprotections so weak that women may even becriminalised for reporting rape. That’s what happened to Baiq Nuril, a teacher inLombok, in the West Nusa Tenggara province ofIndonesia. Last year, she reported her boss forharassment and she was jailed for defamation underIndonesia’s controversial Electronic and InformationSystem Law. Activists are fighting for the approval of acomprehensive anti-sexual violence bill currentlyundergoing legislative debate. If passed, the lawwould broaden the definition of sexual violence toinclude rape, sexual harassment, and harmfulcustomary practices like female genital mutilation. The bill would also require that schools teach theirstudents about sexual violence, ensure that womenreceive mental health assistance after experiencingsexual trauma, and provide safe facilities for womenin public places. The legalisation of the anti-sexual violence bill couldbe a light in the Indonesian darkness, protecting Agniand other victims. But conservative Islamic groupshave challenged the bill, arguing that it promotes freesex and deviant sexual behaviour. Indonesian women may also feel discouraged fromreporting rape to law enforcement. Although Indonesian police protocols encourageofficers to gain victims’ trust – including by assigningmore female police officers and psychologists tosexual violence cases – these guidelines have noteliminated a strong victim-blaming culture in lawenforcement.

Police often interrogate victims, asking victims toprovide eyewitnesses to their sexual assault andshare extremely detailed accounts of their rape. In November 2017, Indonesia’s National Police Chief,Gen. Tito Karnavian, said investigators should ask awoman who reports sexual violence whether “shewas comfortable during the rape.” The shocking statement left victims feeling hopeless.If Indonesia’s police chief, the embodiment of legalprotection, thinks rape can be gentle – that a womancan be “comfortable” – how can survivors everbelieve that the police are on their side? What’s next?The global #MeToo movement has roused morepeople worldwide to speak up about sexual assaultand raised public sympathy – just not in Indonesia. Most Indonesian women are silent, or silenced, withina deeply entrenched patriarchal culture intertwinedwith and reinforced by religious conservatism. Thisputs the one in three women who’ve experiencesexual violence here in an extremely difficult position,in an environment permeated by victim-blaming. Many women, bound within a system that preventsthem from fighting back or speaking up, pass theseattitudes on to younger generations. Despite these systematic problems, one Indonesiansexual assault victim refuses to give up. Agni haspromised to continue her fight for justice at GadjahMada University. Hopefully, there will be a time when otherIndonesians can speak #MeToo out loud, without fearor doubt.

Kartika, D, "#MeToo has skipped Indonesia — here’s why", The Conversation, 8/3/19,www.theconversation.com/metoo-has-skipped-indonesia-heres-why-112530

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7 surprising and outrageous stats about gender inequality

Around the world, the achievements of women arebeing celebrated on International Women’s Day,which began back in 1911. But the day also highlightsthe work that remains to be done in order to achievegender parity.The theme for this year is #BalanceforBetter -encapsulating the idea that a gender-balanced worldbenefits everyone, economically and socially. And it’sup to everyone, men and women, to make it happen.As the following statistics show, there are hugedifferences in the types of inequality faced by womenin different parts of the world - from culturalrepresentation, to domestic burdens and childmarriage. But through collective action and sharedownership, change is possible. 1. Women are 47% more likely to suffer severeinjuries in car crashes because safety featuresare designed for men In their 2011 study of more than 45,000 crash victimsover 11 years, researchers from the University ofVirginia found women drivers were much more likelyto be injured in a crash than men. They said this was because car safety features hadbeen designed for men. The positioning of headrestraints, as well as women’s shorter height, differentneck strength and musculature, as well as theirpreferred seating position, meant they were moresusceptible to injury. 2. 33,000 girls become child brides every day Globally, 12 million girls each year get married beforethe age of 18 - roughly 33,000 every day, or oneevery two seconds. There are some 650 millionwomen alive today who were child brides. The reasons behind it vary between communities, butit’s often because girls are not valued as highly asboys and marrying them off at a young age transfersthe ‘economic burden’ to another family.

3. Women in rural parts of Africa spend 40 billionhours a year collecting water In rural parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a lack of servicesand infrastructure, combined with an expectation ofhousehold duties and limited employmentopportunities for women, means they shoulder anunequal burden of gathering water and wood for theirfamilies. 4. According to the UN, collectively these womenspend 40 billion hours a year collecting water. At the current rate of progress, it will take another 108years to reach gender parity, according to the WorldEconomic Forum’s most recent Global Gender Gapreport. Across the 106 countries covered since the firstedition of the report, the biggest gaps to close are inthe economic and political empowerment dimensions,which will take 202 and 107 years to close,respectively. 5. Only 6 countries give women equal legal workrights as men The World Bank’s recent Women, Business and theLaw report measured gender discrimination in 187countries. It found that only Belgium, Denmark, France, Latvia,Luxembourg and Sweden scored full marks on eightindicators - from receiving a pension to freedom ofmovement - influencing economic decisions womenmake during their careers. A typical economy only gives women three-quartersthe rights of men in the measured areas.

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6. 22% of AI professionals are women - and itcould be down to lack of confidence According to the Forum’s Global Gender Gap report,only 22% of the world's AI professionals are female,compared with 78% who are male. This accounts fora gender gap of 72% yet to close - and reflects thebroader STEM skills gap. In 2012, just 14% of women starting university inOECD countries chose science-related subjects,compared with 39% of men. A 2015 PISA report found even high-achieving girlsunderachieved when they were asked to ‘think likescientists’. Girls were less confident at solvingscience and maths problems and reported higherlevels of anxiety towards maths. In a study of students at Cornell University in 2003,psychologists found that women rated their scientificabilities lower than men, even though they performedroughly the same in a quiz. The researchers said: “Women mightdisproportionately avoid scientific pursuits becausetheir self-views lead them to mischaracterize how wellthey are objectively doing on any given scientifictask.” 7. For every female film character, there are 2.24men The Geena Davis Institute analysed 120 theatricalreleases between 2010 and 2013 in 10 countries -and found that of the 5,799 speaking or namedcharacters, less than a third (30.9%) were female andmore than a third (69.1%) were male.

Whiting, K, "7 surprising and outrageous stats about gender inequality", World Economic Forum, 8/3/19,/www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/surprising-stats-about-gender-inequality/

developmentDevelopment is a sustained increase in the standard of living and well-being ofa level of social organization. Many consider it to involve increased income;better access to basic goods and services; improvements in education,healthcare and public health; well-functioning institutions; decreasedinequality; reduced poverty and unemployment; and more sustainableproduction and consumption patterns. The focus of development debates incontemporary global politics is on issues faced by developing countries, andon the imperative of shifting the focus from modernization (seen asWesternization). However, all societies and communities face questions abouthow to best promote well-being and reduce ill-being.

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The World Bank Group’s Role in Global Development What Does it Take to Empower Ultra-Poor Women? Why Costa Rica tops the Happy Planet Index A Short History of Sustainable Development

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The World Bank Group’s Role in Global Development

The World Bank Group is a family of five multilateralinstitutions focused on economic development whoseoverarching mission is global poverty reduction.Established by Western powers in 1944, the WorldBank was originally tasked with rebuilding theeconomies of postwar Europe. More than seventyyears later, it has expanded its reach into nearly all ofthe world’s developing countries. Today the bankmaintains more than 2,600 projects. Since April 2019, the bank has been led by formerU.S. Treasury Department official and Wall Streeteconomist David Malpass. A longtime critic of thebank, Malpass took over after the previous president,American public health expert Jim Yong Kim,unexpectedly stepped down. By tradition, anAmerican has always led the bank, leading someobservers to argue that the institution, which largelyserves the developing world, is too dominated by theWest. Others, including Malpass himself at times,suggest the bank has outlived its usefulnessaltogether, citing the increase in private capital flowsavailable to developing countries. Supporters of thebank contend that it contributes to global economicdevelopment as an arbiter of best practices. Bretton WoodsThe World Bank, along with its sister organization,the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was createdat the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshirein 1944. The Allied powers, led by the United Statesand the United Kingdom, sought to restore Europeanprosperity and prevent a recurrence of the economicmalaise of the 1920s and 1930s, which helped fuelthe rise of totalitarianism. The IMF, which by tacitagreement would be led by a European, was chargedwith managing the global regime of exchange ratesand balance of payments. The World Bank, to be ledby an American, would provide member countrieswith postwar reconstruction loans. While the IMFwould focus on “firefighting” immediatemacroeconomic problems, the World Bank wouldconcentrate on the longer task of development.

In recent decades, the bank’s primary focus hasshifted from partnering with middle-income nations ongrowth-related programs and trade liberalizationtoward global poverty alleviation. These efforts takeplace in the world’s poorest countries—particularlythose in Africa—and in middle-income countries, suchas China and India, where many of the world’s poorreside. In 2013, the bank set a goal to end extremepoverty, experienced by people living on $1.25 or lessper day, by 2030. Other priorities for the bank includereconstruction in postconflict nations andtransnational issues, including public health andenvironmental concerns. Organization and OperationsThe World Bank Group is composed of five separateinstitutions: the International Bank for Reconstructionand Development (IBRD), the InternationalDevelopment Association (IDA), the InternationalFinance Corporation, the Multilateral InvestmentGuarantee Agency, and the International Center forSettlement of Investment Disputes. Each of theseagencies is owned and operated as a cooperative byits member countries. Together, the IBRD and the IDA are commonlyreferred to as the World Bank. The bank’s six largestshareholders—out of its 189 members—were theUnited States, Japan, China, Germany, France, andthe United Kingdom. Ultimate policymaking authority at the bank rests withthe board of governors, mostly made up of seniorfinance or development officials from membercountries. The board of governors, in turn, delegatescertain powers to the board of directors, which iscomposed of twenty-five executives and the WorldBank’s president. The International Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment . The IBRD was established in 1944 asthe World Bank’s charter institution.

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Through loans, guarantees, and other services, theIBRD works with middle-income and creditworthy low-income nations to fight poverty. Projects span theglobe and vary from digitizing health systems inBelarus to reducing air pollution in Colombia togenerating solar power in Pakistan. The International Development Association. As acomplement to the IBRD, the IDA was established in1960 to promote broad-based development work inthe world’s poorest countries by offering interest-freecredits and grants. The IDA currently has programs insixty-nine countries, of which thirty-seven are inAfrica, with a focus on education, health, andsustainable environmental practices. Criticism of the ‘Washington Consensus’The World Bank, like the IMF, has been the subject ofmuch criticism over the years. In his 2006 book, TheWhite Man’s Burden, former World Bank economistWilliam Easterly delivers a broad indictment ofWestern efforts at poverty reduction. “The plan to endworld poverty shows all the pretensions of utopiansocial engineering,” he writes. The bank’s attempts torapidly impose free markets on developing countriesin the 1980s and 1990s, known as economic “shocktherapy,” produced a “record of failure” in LatinAmerica, Africa, and former Soviet countries, Easterlywrites, saying client nations would be better servedby homegrown, piecemeal reforms. Joseph Stiglitz, one of the most vocal critics of theWorld Bank, resigned from his position as theinstitution’s chief economist in 1999, criticizing thebank’s advocacy of what he calls free-marketfundamentalism for many developing countries.Stiglitz argued the economic reforms the IMF andWorld Bank often required as conditions for theirlending—the so-called Washington Consensus offiscal austerity, high interest rates, trade liberalization,privatization, and open capital markets—have oftenbeen counterproductive for target economies anddevastating for their populations. In particular, helinks indiscriminate lending conditionality to the onsetof financial crises in East Asia in 1997 and Argentinain 1999.

Postconflict Success StoriesThe World Bank is, at the same time, revered bymany as the preeminent brain trust in developmenteconomics. “You could certainly find brilliantdevelopment economists outside the Bank,” writesCFR’s Sebastian Mallaby in his book The World’sBanker, but “nobody could match the Bank’sconcentration of talent.” As a result, he says, thebank’s annual World Development Report oftenestablishes the accepted wisdom on any givendevelopment topic. The World Bank has had several successfulinterventions, in the estimation of many observers.For Mallaby, the 1995 experience in Bosnia was aparticular victory for the bank, which demonstrated itsability to move quickly into postcrisis reconstruction.He writes, “Bosnia came to suggest a route out of theBank’s deepest long-term difficulty”: that its slow-moving bureaucracy might alienate big clients—namely China, India, Brazil, and South Africa—thatincreasingly have access to private capital markets. In The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Mahn-JeKim offers the bank’s multidecade involvementin South Korea as another triumph. The World Bankprovided almost half of South Korea’s public fundingin the high-growth years of the 1970s and 1980s.“Among the institutions and nations that providedpublic loans to Korea,” he writes, “the Bank was themost important.” He adds that the bank helpedtransfer valuable management techniques and was“critical” in the country’s ability to access othersources of foreign financing. The Rise of AlternativesSome critics question whether there is still a niche forthe World Bank in the modern architecture of globalfinance, particularly given the increasingly globalnature of private capital flows and the ascendance oflarge emerging economies such as the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

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“The financial markets of today bear virtually nosimilarity to those of 1944,” writes JessicaEinhorn in Foreign Affairs. “The [World Bank] wascreated to provide credit to its member countries, andin those days, that credit was often the only kindavailable to them. Those days are over.” This financial reality has led some to recommend thatthe bank narrow its focus to countries that lackaccess to private markets. “If the World Bank wantsto have a significant role on the lending side, it’sgoing to have to be in the poorest of the poorcountries or war-torn countries where the privatesector has been effectively scared off,” said CFR’sBenn Steil. Former World Bank President Robert Zoellick hasoffered a different take. “There is a view in somequarters in developed countries that the Bank shouldwork with the poorest countries and not withdeveloping countries. I’m an adamant opponent ofthat view,” Zoellick told the Telegraph in 2012. “If youbelieve in a multilateral system then India and Brazilare going to become more important over time andwe need to draw from their knowledge and, in time,their finances.” Nevertheless, the subsequent creation of theBRICS’s New Development Bank and the China-ledAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) havepresented developing countries with alternatives tothe Bretton Woods institutions. Rebecca Liao, aChina analyst, writes that the AIIB “was born out oftwo main grievances about the World Bank” thatdeveloping nations shared. First, developingcountries have long complained about theconditionality of World Bank loans and have cast theirterms as onerous. Second, emerging markets—Chinain particular—have been frustrated with their relativelack of influence at the World Bank and the IMF. Liaowrites, “As the economies of these countries grew inthe last 30 years, their voting powers within bothorganizations remained flat.”

Jim Yong Kim’s 2012 election as World Bankpresident exemplified this second complaint. Kimdefeated candidates from Colombia and Nigeria—itwas the first time that the board of governors evenconsidered more than one candidate—despite hiscomparatively thin background in economics. At thetime, the Economist wrote that the tradition of havingan American lead the World Bank and a Europeanthe IMF “has persisted because it has not been worthpicking a fight over,” but that Kim’s relativeinexperience “gives others the chance to insist on thebest candidate, not simply the American one.”Despite pointed complaints from many within thebank [PDF], the board unanimously appointed Kim toa second term in September 2016. Kim’s sudden resignation in January 2019, nearlythree years before the end of his term, and PresidentDonald J. Trump’s subsequent nomination of U.S.Treasury undersecretary David Malpass to lead thebank, again highlighted these tensions. Malpass,formerly chief economist for the now-defunct BearStearns investment bank, had been a critic of theWorld Bank. He had argued that it has grown toolarge and redundant, since it continues to lend tocountries with access to plenty of other lendingresources, such as China and Brazil. Nevertheless,no challengers to Malpass’s candidacy emerged, andhe was unanimously approved by the board. Malpassbegan his tenure as the thirteenth World Bankpresident on April 9, 2019. To increase its legitimacy, the bank should reformits voting structure and adopt a competitive electionprocess, CFR’s Thomas Bollyky argues. “Having anAmerican at the helm of the bank partly served toreassure Wall Street, originally the main supplier ofthe bank’s capital,” he says. “With the globalization ofcapital markets, this justification . . . is long outdated.”Bollyky recommends a voting system that requiresleaders to win over a majority of countries, not simplythe votes of the primary shareholders.

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An Ideas Bank The World Bank argues that it has a number ofcomparative advantages over other institutions: aglobal presence, a repository of best practices,financial acumen, leadership in global public goods,and an established role as an internationaldevelopment catalyst. According to Vikram Nehru, aformer World Bank chief economist for East Asia,while the bank has always represented a tiny share ofpublic investment in most countries, its strengthcomes from leveraging its lending with ideas. Forinstance, he says, China has used the bank tofinance a host of small projects with the sole intentionof learning best practices.

Still, CFR’s Steil says that the middle-incomecountries, such as China, where many of the world’spoor live “at some point will need to assumeresponsibility for their own people, given theireconomic growth.” He echoes some of Malpass’scriticisms, noting that China’s more than $3 trillion inreserves “dwarfs anything the World Bank could everbring to bear.” Instead of direct funding, he says, thebank’s future value could lie in the advisoryassistance it provides, based on its long experienceof successes, as well as failures.

Masters, J et.al., "The World Bank Group’s Role in Global Development" , Council for Foreign Relations,9/4/19, /www.cfr.org/backgrounder/world-bank-groups-role-global-development

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What Does it Take to Empower Ultra-Poor Women?

There is no more urgent and fundamental problem indevelopment than finding effective ways to help theultra-poor improve their economic and socialcondition. But most interventions don’t reach thepoorest of the poor. In fact, a CGD study found thatonly 24 percent of studies on women’s economicempowerment targeted the extreme poor and 10percent didn’t specify their target group’s income atall. For projects to work, researchers need tounderstand what works and for whom. A stellar panelcohosted by CGD and Women for WomenInternational recently came together to discuss thechallenges in addressing the needs of the poorestwomen and to explore how graduation programsperform in addressing them. Here are some keytakeaways from the discussion: Who are the ultra-poor?If you’re wondering if there is a difference betweenthe “extreme poor” and “ultra-poor,” there is. Anestimated 767 million people live in extreme poverty,earning around $1.90 or less a day. About 400 millionof these people are ultra-poor, meaning they earnsignificantly less than this threshold. Ultra-poorhouseholds face the worst forms of poverty. They arefood- and housing-insecure and have few or noassets. They lack skills and education, are oftenisolated, and are vulnerable to natural disasters andclimate change. The ultra-poor are disconnected fromgovernment services and markets, and they are oftenin poor health. Why focus on ultra-poor women?Most ultra-poor households are headed by women.They often live in communities that pose strictrestrictions on opportunities for women. Globally,women aged 25–34 are 22 percent more likely thanmen to be extremely poor. What are graduation programs and why shouldwe focus on them?Graduation programs bundle social and economicinterventions to help women overcome their uniqueconstraints. These programs generally offerparticipants a productive asset like something to sell,an initial sum of money, vocational training, andhealthcare. They are multifaceted solutions formultifaceted problems.

Through randomized control trials (RCTs),Innovations for Poverty Action has studied the effectsof a bundled graduation program in six countries onalmost 20,000 people in 10,000 households asmeasured by 10 indices: consumption, food security,productive and household assets, financial inclusion,time use, income and revenues, physical health,mental health, political involvement, and women’sempowerment. At the end of the program, all 10indices showed statistically significant improvement,and one year post-intervention, 8 out of the 10 indicesremained significantly improved. Notably, physicalhealth and women’s empowerment were the twomeasurements that did not have the longevityresearchers hoped for. And measurement ofempowerment—agency, decision-making authority,confidence, aspirations—remains a challenge. Evidence from Women for Women Internationalshows that interventions cannot empower women ifthey are not holistic and designed specifically forwomen. Most aid projects operate in silos, and mostonly focus on improving incomes. Women for WomenInternational combines economic empowerment withpsycho-social support. Lifting women out of ultra-poorconditions requires building a supportive communityso women feel socially empowered and reclaim asense of agency alongside economic interventions. So how can we best reach women in the mostvulnerable households? As the panel noted, a goodplace to start is by recognizing three important facts: 1. Violence is the elephant in the room—and it’snot only war and conflictUltra-poor women experience high rates of intimatepartner violence. Physical and emotional abuse iscommon but forced economic dependence cancripple the entire household. An abusive partner canwithhold cash, assets, and even access to food tocontrol household decision-making power. The goodnews is that the evidence generally does not supportthe concern that boosting ultra-poor women’s incomeraises intimate partner violence—though it does notdecrease it either.

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2. Women’s mental health and psycho-socialdevelopment matterImproving women’s mental health and psychosocialdevelopment should be integrated within programs’theories of change. Many interventions measurewomen’s agency and mental health but onlyimplement an economic-focused intervention (e.g.,business trainings and direct cash transfers). Thesedon’t automatically result in social and psychologicalimprovements—and we should stop assuming thatthey do. Specifically, including program measuresthat address positive mental health practices can helpwomen develop longer-term aspirations and takecontrol over their own lives.

3. Gender dynamics in the household need tochange, with the support of menBoth men and women are trapped by discriminatorysocial norms. Surveys show that many women(especially in fragile states) agree that violenceagainst women in certain contexts is permissible.Graduation programs should promote collaborativeand mutually beneficial household dynamics. Thisrequires men’s participation—rising out of ultra-poverty is an endeavor that requires all hands ondeck. Practitioners are finding that working at thecommunity level—with both women and men—topromote a sense of the possibilities for shared gainsis essential to change gender norms.When women are left outside economic and politicalopportunity, it is no surprise that poverty and conflictpersist. As Women for Women International CEOLaurie Adams (one of the authors of this post) put it,“We need to invest in women to build peace,prosperity, and democracy from the bottom up.”

Francis, J et.al.,"What Does it Take to Empower Ultra-Poor Women?", Center for Global Development, 8/4/19,www.cgdev.org/blog/what-does-it-take-empower-ultra-poor-women

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Why Costa Rica tops the Happy Planet Index

A child growing up in the Costa Rican countryside issurrounded by some of the most beautiful andbiodiverse landscapes in the world. The governmentof this tiny Central American country aims to keep itthat way. But preserving this land of tropicalrainforests isn’t Costa Rica’s only accomplishment.The government ensures all citizens have access tohealth care and education, and the country activelypromotes peace around the world. So when the NewEconomics Foundation released its second HappyPlanet Index, a ranking of countries based on theirenvironmental impact and the health and happinessof their citizens, the No. 1 spot went to Costa Rica,population 4 million. The United States’ ranking: No. 108 in 2016. What can our neighbor to the south teach us abouthappiness, longevity, and environmentalsustainability? “Costa Rica enjoys a privileged position as a mid-income country where citizens have sufficient sparetime and abundant interpersonal relations,” saysCosta Rican economics professor Mariano Rojas. “Amid-income level allows most citizens to satisfy theirbasic needs. Government intervention in theeconomy assures that all Costa Ricans have accessto education, health, and nutrition services.” CostaRicans, he added, have not entered the “race forstatus and conspicuous consumption.” Created in 2008, the Happy Planet Index examinessustainable happiness on a national level, ranking143 countries according to three measurements: howhappy its citizens are, how long they live, and howmuch of the planet’s resources they each consume.The HPI multiplies years of life expectancy by lifesatisfaction (as measured by the Gallup Poll and theWorld Values Survey), to obtain “Happy Life Years,”which are then divided by pressure on ecosystems,as measured by the ecological footprint. (Theecological footprint, in turn, measures how much landand water it takes to provide for each person.)

The Happy Planet Index “strips down the economy towhat really matters,” says New EconomicsFoundation researcher Saamah Abdallah. Itmeasures “what goes in, in terms of resource use,and the outcomes that are important, which arehappy and healthy lives for us all. In this way, itreminds us that the economy is there for a purpose -and that is to improve our lives.” Abdallah calls the importance of family, friends, andcommunity “social capital.” People who live incountries with higher levels of material wealth oftenreport less happiness than people in countries withless wealth but stronger social networks. According tothe HPI, a Costa Rican has an ecological footprintone-fourth that of the average person in the UnitedStates. The United States is one country where social capitalis falling, according to a study conducted by theeconomist Stefano Bartolini. “It is not surprising that social capital should be fallingin the U.S.,” Abdallah says. “Americans work thelongest hours in the Western world and have theshortest holidays. All their time is spent makingmoney, rather than building social bonds, which arejust as important to well-being.” The importance of peace.Domestic and international peace has long been apriority in Costa Rica. In 1948, the country abolishedits military, allowing it to spend more on health andeducation. Its University of Peace, established in1980, offers a master’s degree in peace and conflictstudies as well as ongoing workshops - like a recentone on corporate responsibility offered to internationalbusiness executives. In September 2009, the Costa Ricanlegislature created a Ministry of Justice and Peace ,emphasizing the role of peace promotion and conflictresolution in preventing violent crime. Shortlyafterward, the country hosted the 2009 GlobalAlliance Summit for Ministries and Departments ofPeace, where representatives of 40 countriesgathered to work on developing peace infrastructurein their own governments.

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Central to Costa Rica’s promotion of peace is theRasur Foundation, which organized the summit andlobbied for the creation of the Ministry of Justice andPeace. Rasur is a teacher in a Costa Rican poemwho tells a group of children, “Before directing thelightning in the sky, we must first harness the stormsin our own hearts.” Through its Peace Academy, theRasur Foundation works with the Costa RicanMinistry of Education to introduce techniques ofconflict resolution and “being peace” in Costa Ricanschools. Costa Rica’s Nobel Prize-winning president, OscarArias Sanchez, who attended the Summit, is quotedon the Foundation’s website: “Peace is not a dream. It’s an arduous task. We muststart by finding peaceful solutions to everydayconflicts with the people around us. Peace does notbegin with the other person; it begins with each andevery one of us.” Costa Ricans are not only reporting happy lives, theyare living long ones. In the second measurement ofthe Happy Planet Index, longevity, Costa Rica scoredan average of 78.5 life years, compared with 77.9 forthe United States. Some studies have suggested thatCosta Rican men live longer than men anywhere elsein the world. There is little difference in lifeexpectancy across income levels, unlike in the UnitedStates. Researchers from the Harvard School ofPublic Health have found an “enormous gap” in U.S.life expectancy, depending on race, income, location,and other factors. Costa Rica’s Nicoya Peninsula is one of the world’s“Blue Zones” - places where the inhabitantsfrequently live to be over 100 years old. The residentsof these zones generally eat well, get plenty ofexercise, and have a genetic predisposition tolongevity. Nationwide, Costa Ricans benefit from acombination of government-run and private insuranceoptions. Costa Rica promotes good health among itscitizens even before they are born, sending doctorsand nurses out into the countryside to provideprenatal care and teach parents how to raise healthychildren.

Protecting the landscape.The Costa Rican government’s promotion of peaceand health for its citizens extends to a peaceful andhealthy relationship to the planet. The size of itsecological footprint indicates that “the country onlynarrowly fails to achieve the goal of...consuming itsfair share of the Earth’s natural resources,” accordingto the Happy Planet Index.Costa Rica has pioneered techniques of landmanagement, reforestation, and alternatives to fossilfuels. Spurred by rapid deforestation of its pristinerainforests due to logging and agriculture, the countrybegan converting parts of its territory to national parksin the 1970s and prohibited the export of certaintrees. Even so, by 1987, illegal logging, cattleranching, and development had reduced the country’srainforest from 73 to 21 percent of the landscape. Soin 1996 Costa Rica introduced the Payment forEnvironmental Services Program (PES). Oil importersand water-bottling and sewage-treatment plants nowhave to pay a special tax to do business in thecountry, while other businesses contribute via avoluntary carbon-offset fee. The money is used to paylocal people to protect the trees, water, and soil intheir surrounding environment by abstaining fromcattle ranching and illegal logging. The PES program has had mixed results. In someareas, cattle ranching and illegal logging remain moreprofitable, and the government has had to scrambleto raise enough money to finance the program. Butoverall, because of the country’s new environmentalpolicies, including a massive UN-sponsored tree-planting program begun in 2007, more than half ofCosta Rica’s territory is once again covered withrainforest. In a further effort to go green, the country has bannedoil drilling within its borders and invests heavily inrenewable energy sources like hydroelectric, wind,and geothermal power, which now provide 95 percentof its energy. In the capital, San Jose, vehicles arepermitted downtown only on certain days, dependingon the license-plate number. A planned commutertrain will also cut down on automobile pollution. Thecountry has pledged to go carbon neutral by 2021,the year of its bicentennial.

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“The position of Costa Rica is that we all have tomake ourselves present on the issue of climatechange,” said Gerardo Mondragón in a telephoneinterview with YES! Magazine. He is with Paz con LaNaturaleza (Peace with Nature), an advisory agencyto President Arias on ecological planning. “We wantto get the message out that all countries have tosupport one another in this , and in particular,industrialized countries should support thosecountries who have clear initiatives.” Critics of Costa Rica’s green policy, like RachelGodfrey Wood of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,have pointed out that no amount of tree planting cancompletely undo the damage done by fossil fuels. The Costa Rican conservation organization FECONposts regularly on its website about continuingecological problems in Costa Rica: deforestation bylandowners, pineapple plantations that cause soilerosion and pollute community drinking water withpesticides, and a new mining development in LasCrucitas that has local residents worried aboutcyanide poisoning in the region. Another controversyrecently erupted in a region called Las Baulas, whereenvironmentalists fear development will threaten theturtle population. “We have to go slow,” Mondragón said of theenvironmental challenges still facing Costa Rica. “Butwe still have to let people know what’s happening.”He blamed the Las Crucitas mining project onantiquated laws that don’t give Costa Rica enoughprotection from environmental damage by companiesworking within its borders. “We need to change theselaws so that development can proceed in a balancedway.”

As a stable democracy for the past century, CostaRica has been considered a “business-friendly”country. Though large banana, pineapple, and coffeeplantations have not disappeared, ecotourism andhigh-tech companies have increasingly invested inCosta Rica. But a recent struggle between proponents andopponents of CAFTA, the Central American FreeTrade Agreement that passed last year, highlighteddivisions over the issue of liberalizing trade laws. Inone camp are those such as President Arias, whosupport CAFTA because they believe it will bringadditional foreign investment; in the other camp arethose who fear trade liberalization and privatizationwill allow businesses to be unaccountable to CostaRica’s labor or environmental regulations. Thecontroversy over CAFTA illustrates an innatedilemma in Costa Rica’s green strategy: How can acountry that relies on corporate investment for itseconomic survival demand that those samecorporations abide by the country’s ecologicalguidelines? And what clout does it have in enforcingthose guidelines? No country, not even Costa Rica with its No.1ranking, has reached the goal of “one planet living”that the creators of the Happy Planet Index believewe should all aspire to: consuming our fair share ofthe Earth’s resources. “We want nations, regions, andcities to assess how well they are doing based onwell-being and environmental impact,” says Abdallahof the New Economics Foundation. “We would like tohighlight the message that good lives need not costthe Earth and that ‘one planet living’ can actuallymean a better life.”

Garrigues, L, "Why Costa Rica tops the Happy Planet Index", Open Democracy,28/2/19,www.opendemocracy.net/en/transformation/why-costa-rica-tops-happy-planet-index/

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A Short History of Sustainable Development

A short history of the concept of sustainabledevelopment could begin with the US government’sNational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969.This act came largely in response to the 1969 SantaBarbara oil spill, which had a devastating impact onwildlife and the natural environment in the area. But itwas also the product of greater societal attention tothe consequences of industrial pollution, awarenessof which was promoted by the 1962 publication SilentSpring by Rachael Carson. Around the same time,and as a result of the same push towards greatconcern for the environment, arrived the Clean WaterAct, the Water Quality Act, the push to ban DDT, andthe institution of the National Wilderness PreservationSystem. Shortly after the passage of NEPA, the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) opened its doors in 1970,promoting protection of the environment throughresearch, standard-setting, and monitoring. The goalsof the EPA concerned both human health as well asnatural resource protection. The next step in the growth of sustainabledevelopment as a mainstream concept and practicewas the 1972 United Nations Conference on theHuman Environment, in Stockholm, Sweden. Thisconference “brought the industrialized and developingnations together to delineate the ‘rights’ of the humanfamily to a healthy and productive environment. Aseries of such meetings followed, e.g. on the rights ofpeople to adequate food, to sound housing, to safewater, to access to means of family planning. Therecognition to revitalize humanity’s connection withNature, led to the creation of global institutions withinthe UN system.” Here, we have a transition from anational focus to an international one. At this point, the term ‘sustainable’ had yet to reallytake off. The United National Conference onSustainable Development provides an excellent,condensed history of the term, which I will quote atlength:

'The concept of sustainable development wasoriginally synonymous with that of sustainability andis often still used in that way. Both terms derive fromthe older forestry term “sustained yield”, which in turna translation of the German term “nachhaltiger Ertrag”is dating from 1713. According to different sources,the concept of sustainability in the sense of a balancebetween resource consumption and reproduction washowever applied to forestry already in the 12th to 16thcentury. The history of the concept of sustainability is howevermuch older. Already in 400 BCE, Aristotle referred toa Greek concept in talking about householdeconomics. This Greek household concept differedfrom modern ones in that the household had to beself-sustaining at least to a certain extent and couldnot just be consumption oriented.' The first time the term ‘sustainable’ was used “in themodern sense” was as part of the Club of Rome, in1972. This came to the fore as a part of thepublication of Limits to Growth, a report thatdescribed a particular state in which the globalpopulation would achieve balance or equilibrium.“Describing the desirable “state of global equilibrium”,the authors used the word “sustainable”: “We aresearching for a model output that represents a worldsystem that is: 1. sustainable without sudden anduncontrolled collapse; and 2. capable of satisfying thebasic material requirements of all of its people." About fifteen years after the Club of Rome’spublication came another large step forward in thismovement, at least according to most mainstreamsources. The World Commission on Environment andDevelopment (WCED) was tasked by the SecretaryGeneral of the UN, in 1983, to “re-examine criticalenvironmental and development problems around theworld and formulate realistic proposals to addressthem.”[7] This culminated in the 1987 BruntlandReport’s publication of “Our Common Future”, whichestablished a suggested path for sustainabledevelopment on a global level and served to bring theconcept of sustainability into the foreground on aninternational level.

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A ground-breaking step came in 1992 with the firstUN Conference on Environment and Development(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. At this conference, anagenda called Agenda 21 was adopted, which“recognized each nation’s right to pursue social andeconomic progress and assigned to States theresponsibility of adopting a model of sustainabledevelopment.” The Secretary Genearl of UNCEDregarded Agenda 21 as a “program of action for atolerable future for the human family and an initialstep toward making sure the world will change into amore just, secure and wealthy habitat for allhumanity.” The focus, then, had become broader thanwhen the EPA was first established. The emphasiswas much more clearly on working towards a worldwhere all peoples had access to the naturalresources they needed to thrive. Another notable international protocol designed toguide the international community towardssustainable development, in this case particularlyenvironmental, was the Kyoto Climate Agreement in1997. Its goal was to reduce the emissions of itssignatories, with more emphasis placed on thosedeveloped countries which were responsible for mostof the air pollution and its subsequent consequences.It might be noted that the US is the only developedcountry and one of the only two in general (the otherbeing South Sudan) that has not ratified this protocol. Complications and Criticisms of the SustainableMovementThough the notion of sustainable developmenttypically enjoys positive attention on a global level,there have been various points of criticism and somecomplications that have developed over time. I willdescribe a few below. EnvironmentalOne point of contention has arisen as a result of thedifferences in power and responsibility between somedeveloping and developed countries. For instance,developed countries are most often the ones pushingfor particular types of sustainable development,whether that means a cap in emissions from powerplants or a transition towards more sustainable formsof energy such as wind and solar.

However, developed countries are often the oneswho have already benefitted from the exploitation ofenvironmental resources employing these less-sustainable methods for many decades, whereasmany developing countries are just now beginning tohave access to these technologies. At the same time,these new sustainable technologies entail morecosts, which may be possible for developedcountries, but not for many developing countries. Inother words, one criticism is that developed countrieshave long benefitted from unsustainable practicesand are now imposing their new-found sustainablevalues upon developing countries, for whom thistransition is much more difficult and costly EconomicThe previous point was mostly focused on natural,environmental concerns (e.g., how we might reduceemissions). Another large focus in the sustainabledevelopment movement has been on freeing peoplesin parts of the developing world from the bonds ofpoverty and starvation. In essence, this is a focus onthe economics of sustainable development. Perhaps the biggest conflict seen regardingsustainable development is economic in nature.Broadly speaking, the global economy has aneoliberal bent to it. With regard to sustainabledevelopment, “ the tenets of neoliberal economicagenda such as commodification, deregulation,privatisation and cuts in government expenditure mayin some context undermine the attainment ofsustainable development by increasing poverty andinequality. This in turn increases the exploitation ofenvironmental resources, such as forests, as a resultof poverty-induced constraints. Additionally, theregulatory capacity of environmental managementprovided by the state has been reduced mainly due tobudgetary constraints imposed by the adoption ofneoliberalism…” In other words, the properties of theneoliberal economic system run counter to whatmany consider to be the goals of sustainabledevelopment. Neoliberal economics can be harmful tothe environment, and to the standard of living forvarious groups of people – particularly the poor.

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Indian economist Amartya Sen is famous for his workon the relationship between economics and socialjustice, particularly in relation to famine and starvationas a result of faulty economic policies. One of hismost profound arguments, that of ‘capability’, arguesthat the rights provided by governments (such as theright to vote, freedom of speech, etc.) are emptybenefits, not of much use unless the society providesits citizens “functionings,” such as education,transportation to voting locations, access to food,etc.Therefore, in order to promote sustainabledevelopment with the lives of people in mind, wemust focus on economic policies that may hinder orpromote well-being. Further to the political left of Amartya Sen’s work liesthe opinion of many NGOs and academics who viewthe world system of capitalism to be incompatible withsustainable development progress. …there is an unspoken (and largely untested)assumption that there need be no fundamentalcontradiction between sustainable development andcapitalism. That assumption stands in stark contrastto the prevailing view of many radical academics andnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) that thereare profound (and possibly unmanageable)contradictions which demand a completely differentworld order. Though, what this new world order would look like isup for speculation. Confusions over TerminologyThere seems to be some confusion in this camp,around expectations as well as around theterminology used and definitions understood. Forexample, some go as far as to suggest that “A greeneconomy cannot be a wasteful economy since wemust reduce our consumption of the earth’sresources and so have to ensure that those we useare used efficiently,” which seems to be a rathersimplistic, vague understanding of what a “green”future would look like.

A similar concern is addressed by the UN’sSustainable Development Knowledge Platform:Despite the growing international interest in greeneconomy, negotiations between Member States onthe concept in the lead up to Rio+20 werechallenging. This was partly due to the lack of aninternationally agreed definition or universal principlesfor green economy, the emergence of interrelated butdifferent terminology and concepts over recent years(such as green growth, low carbon development,sustainable economy, steady-state economy etc.), alack of clarity around what green economy policymeasures encompass and how they integrate withnational priorities and objectives relating to economicgrowth and poverty eradication, as well as aperceived lack of experience in designing,implementing and reviewing the costs and benefits ofgreen economy policies. In sum, the lack of clarity and cohesion regardingthese terms and their implications seems to becausing some internal discord within organizationsworking towards sustainable development. It also ispreventing large-scale action internationally.

Stofleth, D, "A Short History of Sustainable Development", Rethinking Prosperity, 23/2/17,www.rethinkingprosperity.org/a-short-history-of-sustainable-development/

globalisationGlobalization is a process by which the world’s local, national and regionaleconomies, societies and cultures are becoming increasingly integrated andconnected. The term refers to the reduction of barriers and borders, as people,goods, services and ideas flow more freely between different parts of theworld. Globalization is a process that has been taking place for centuries butthe pace has quickened in recent decades, facilitated by developments intransportation and communication technology, and powered by cheapenergy. It is now widely acknowledged that globalization has both benefitsand drawbacks and that its benefits are not evenly distributed.

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Runaway World: Globalisation Globalisation has made the world a better place The political threats to globalisation The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policyfor a New Century

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Runaway World: Globalisation

Recorded at The Royal Institution of Great Britain,London, for BBC Radio 4 (1999) A friend of mine studies village life in central Africa. Afew years ago, she paid her first visit to a remote areawhere she was to carry out her fieldwork. Theevening she got there, she was invited to a localhome for an evening's entertainment. She expectedto find out about the traditional pastimes of thisisolated community. Instead, the evening turned outto be a viewing of Basic Instinct on video. The film atthat point hadn't even reached the cinemas inLondon. Such vignettes reveal something about ourworld. And what they reveal isn't trivial. It isn't just amatter of people adding modern paraphernalia -videos, TVs, personal computers and so forth - totheir traditional ways of life. We live in a world oftransformations, affecting almost every aspect ofwhat we do. For better or worse, we are beingpropelled into a global order that no one fullyunderstands, but which is making its effects felt uponall of us. Globalisation is the main theme of my lecture tonight,and of the lectures as a whole. The term may not be -it isn't - a particularly attractive or elegant one. Butabsolutely no-one who wants to understand ourprospects and possibilities at century's end canignore it. I travel a lot to speak abroad. I haven't beento a single country recently where globalisation isn'tbeing intensively discussed. In France, the word ismondialisation. In Spain and Latin America, it isglobalization. The Germans say globalisierung. The global spread of the term is evidence of the verydevelopments to which it refers. Every business gurutalks about it. No political speech is complete withoutreference to it. Yet as little as 10 years ago the termwas hardly used, either in the academic literature orin everyday language. It has come from nowhere tobe almost everywhere. Given its sudden popularity,we shouldn't be surprised that the meaning of thenotion isn't always clear, or that an intellectualreaction has set in against it. Globalisation hassomething to do with the thesis that we now all live inone world - but in what ways exactly, and is the ideareally valid?

Different thinkers have taken almost completelyopposite views about globalisation in debates thathave sprung up over the past few years. Somedispute the whole thing. I'll call them the sceptics.According to the sceptics, all the talk aboutglobalisation is only that - just talk. Whatever itsbenefits, its trials and tribulations, the globaleconomy isn't especially different from that whichexisted at previous periods. The world carries onmuch the same as it has done for many years. Most countries, the sceptics argue, only gain a smallamount of their income from external trade.Moreover, a good deal of economic exchange isbetween regions, rather than being truly world-wide.The countries of the European Union, for example,mostly trade among themselves. The same is true ofthe other main trading blocs, such as those of theAsia Pacific or North America. Others, however, take a very different position. I'lllabel them the radicals. The radicals argue that notonly is globalisation very real, but that itsconsequences can be felt everywhere. The globalmarketplace, they say, is much more developed thaneven two or three decades ago, and is indifferent tonational borders. Nations have lost most of thesovereignty they once had, and politicians have lostmost of their capability to influence events. It isn'tsurprising that no one respects political leaders anymore, or has much interest in what they have to say.The era of the nation state is over. Nations, as theJapanese business writer Keniche Ohmae puts it,have become mere 'fictions'. Authors like Ohmae seethe economic difficulties of last year and this asdemonstrating the reality of globalisation, albeit seenfrom its disruptive side. Well, who is right in this debate? I think it is theradicals. The level of world trade today is muchhigher than it ever was before, and involves a muchwider range of goods and services. But the biggestdifference is in the level of finance and capital flows.

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Geared as it is to electronic money - money thatexists only as digits in computers - the current worldeconomy has no parallels in earlier times. In the newglobal electronic economy, fund managers, banks,corporations, as well as millions of individualinvestors, can transfer vast amounts of capital fromone side of the world to another at the click of amouse. As they do so, they can destabilise whatmight have seemed rock-solid economies - ashappened in East Asia. The volume of world financial transactions is usuallymeasured in US dollars. A million dollars is a lot ofmoney for most people. Measured as a stack ofthousand dollar notes, it would be eight inches high.A billion dollars - in other words, a million million -would be over 120 miles high, 20 times higher thanMount Everest. Yet far more than a trillion dollars isnow turned over each day on global currencymarkets, a massive increase from only 10 years ago,let alone the more distant past. The value of whatevermoney we may have in our pockets, or our bankaccounts, shifts from moment to moment according tofluctuations in such markets. I would have nohesitation, therefore, in saying that globalisation, aswe are experiencing it, is in many respects not onlynew, but revolutionary. However, I don't believe either the sceptics or theradicals have properly understood either what it is orits implications for us. Both groups see thephenomenon almost solely in economic terms. This isa mistake. Globalisation is political, technological andcultural, as well as economic. It has been influencedabove all by developments in systems ofcommunication, dating back only to the late 1960's. In the mid-19th Century, a Massachusetts portraitpainter, Samuel Morse, transmitted the first message,"What hath god wrought?", by electric telegraph. In sodoing, he initiated a new phase in world history.Never before could a message be sent withoutsomeone going somewhere to carry it. Yet the adventof satellite communications marks every bit asdramatic a break with the past

The first communications satellite was launched onlyjust over 30 years ago. Now there are more than 200such satellites above the earth, each carrying a vastrange of information. For the first time ever,instantaneous communication is possible from oneside of the world to the other. Other types ofelectronic communication, more and more integratedwith satellite transmission, have also accelerated overthe past few years. No dedicated transatlantic ortranspacific cables existed at all until the late 1950's.The first held less than 100 voice paths. Those oftoday carry more than a million. On the first of February 1999, about 150 years afterMorse invented his system of dots and dashes,Morse code finally disappeared from the world stage,discontinued as a means of communication for thesea. In its place has come a system using satellitetechnology, whereby any ship in distress can bepinpointed immediately. Most countries prepared forthe transition some while before. The French, forexample, stopped using Morse as a distress code intheir local waters two years ago, signing off with aGallic flourish: 'Calling all. This is our last cry beforeour eternal silence'. Instantaneous electroniccommunication isn't just a way in which news orinformation is conveyed more quickly. Its existencealters the very texture of our lives, rich and poor alike.When the image of Nelson Mandela maybe is morefamiliar to us than the face of our next doorneighbour, something has changed in the nature ofour everyday experience Nelson Mandela is a global celebrity, and celebrityitself is largely a product of new communicationstechnology. The reach of media technologies isgrowing with each wave of innovation. It took 40years for radio in the United States to gain anaudience of 50 million. The same number were usingpersonal computers only 15 years after the PC wasintroduced. It needed a mere four years, after it wasmade available for 50 million Americans to beregularly using the Internet.

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It is wrong to think of globalisation as just concerningthe big systems, like the world financial order.Globalisation isn't only about what is 'out there',remote and far away from the individual. It is an 'inhere' phenomenon too, influencing intimate andpersonal aspects of our lives. The debate aboutfamily values, for example, that is going on in manycountries, might seem far removed from globalisinginfluences. It isn't. Traditional family systems arebecoming transformed, or are under strain, in manyparts of the world, particularly as women stake claimto greater equality. There has never before been asociety, so far as we know from the historical record,in which women have been even approximately equalto men. This is a truly global revolution in everydaylife, whose consequences are being felt around theworld in spheres from work to politics. Globalisation thus is a complex set of processes, nota single one. And these operate in a contradictory oroppositional fashion. Most people think of it as simply'pulling away' power or influence from localcommunities and nations into the global arena. Andindeed this is one of its consequences. Nations dolose some of the economic power they once had.However, it also has an opposite effect. Globalisationnot only pulls upwards, it pushes downwards,creating new pressures for local autonomy. TheAmerican sociologist Daniel Bell expresses this verywell when he says that the nation becomes too smallto solve the big problems, but also too large to solvethe small ones. Globalisation is the reason for the revival of localcultural identities in different parts of the world. If oneasks, for example, why the Scots want moreindependence in the UK, or why there is a strongseparatist movement in Quebec, the answer is not tobe found only in their cultural history. Localnationalisms spring up as a response to globalisingtendencies, as the hold of older nation-statesweakens. Globalisation also squeezes sideways. It creates neweconomic and cultural zones within and acrossnations. Examples are the Hong Kong region,northern Italy, or Silicon Valley in California.

The area around Barcelona in northern Spain extendsover into France. Catalonia, where Barcelona islocated, is closely integrated into the EuropeanUnion. It is part of Spain, yet also looks outwards. The changes are being propelled by a range offactors, some structural, others more specific andhistorical. Economic influences are certainly amongthe driving forces, especially the global financialsystem. Yet they aren't like forces of nature. Theyhave been shaped by technology, and culturaldiffusion, as well as by the decisions of governmentsto liberalise and deregulate their national economies. The collapse of Soviet communism has added furtherweight to such developments, since no significantgroup of countries any longer stands outside. Thatcollapse wasn't just something that happened tooccur. Globalisation explains both why and howSoviet communism met its end. The Soviet Union andthe East European countries were comparable to theWest in terms of growth rates until somewherearound the early 1970s. After that point, they fellrapidly behind. Soviet communism, with its emphasisupon state-run enterprise and heavy industry, couldnot compete in the global electronic economy. Theideological and cultural control upon whichcommunist political authority was based similarlycould not survive in an era of global media. The Soviet and the East European regimes wereunable to prevent the reception of western radio andTV broadcasts. Television played a direct role in the1989 revolutions, which have rightly been called thefirst "television revolutions". Street protests takingplace in one country were watched by the audiencesin others, large numbers of whom then took to thestreets themselves. Globalisation, of course, isn't developing in an even-handed way, and is by no means wholly benign in itsconsequences. To many living outside Europe andNorth America, it looks uncomfortably likeWesternisation - or, perhaps, Americanisation,since the US is now the sole superpower, with adominant economic, cultural and military position inthe global order. Many of the most visible culturalexpressions of globalisation are American - Coca-Cola, McDonald's.

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It would see it as destroying local cultures, wideningworld inequalities and worsening the lot of theimpoverished. Globalisation, some argue, creates aworld of winners and losers, a few on the fast track toprosperity, the majority condemned to a life of miseryand despair. And indeed the statistics are daunting.The share of the poorest fifth of the world's populationin global income has dropped from 2.3% to 1.4% overthe past 10 years. The proportion taken by the richestfifth, on the other hand, has risen from 70% to 85%.In Sub Saharan Africa, 20 countries have lowerincomes per head in real terms than they did twodecades ago. In many less developed countries,safety and environmental regulations are low orvirtually non existent. Some trans-national companiessell goods there that are controlled or banned in theindustrial countries - poor quality medical drugs,destructive pesticides or high tar and nicotine contentcigarettes. As one writer put it recently, rather than aglobal village, this is more like global pillage. Along with ecological risk, to which it is related,expanding inequality is the most serious problemfacing world society. It will not do, however, merely toblame it on the wealthy. It is fundamental to myargument that globalisation today is only partlyWesternisation. Of course the western nations, andmore generally the industrial countries, still have farmore influence over world affairs than do the poorerstates. But globalisation is becoming increasingly decentred - not under the control of any group ofnations, and still less of the large corporations. Itseffects are felt just as much in the western countriesas elsewhere This is true of the global financial system,communications and media, and of changes affectingthe nature of government itself. Examples of 'reversecolonisation' are becoming more and more common.Reverse colonisation means that non-westerncountries influence developments in the west.Examples abound - such as the Latinising of LosAngeles, the emergence of a globally-oriented hightech sector in India, or the selling of Brazilian TVprogrammes to Portugal.

Is globalisation a force promoting the general good?The question can't be answered in simple way, giventhe complexity of the phenomenon. People who askit, and who blame globalisation for deepening worldinequalities, usually have in mind economicglobalisation, and within that, free trade. Now it issurely obvious that free trade is not an unalloyedbenefit. This is especially so as concerns the lessdeveloped countries. Opening up a country, orregions within it, to free trade can undermine a localsubsistence economy. An area that becomesdependent upon a few products sold on worldmarkets is very vulnerable to shifts in prices as wellas to technological change. Trade always needs aframework of institutions, as do other forms ofeconomic development. Markets cannot be createdby purely economic means, and how far a giveneconomy should be exposed to the worldmarketplace must depend upon a range of criteria.Yet to oppose economic globalisation, and to opt foreconomic protectionism, would be a misplaced tacticfor rich and poor nations alike. Protectionism may bea necessary strategy at some times and in somecountries. In my view, for example, Malaysia wascorrect to introduce controls in 1998, to stem theflood of capital from the country. But more permanentforms of protectionism will not help the developmentof the poor countries, and among the rich would leadto warring trade blocs. The debates about globalisation I mentioned at thebeginning have concentrated mainly upon itsimplications for the nation-state. Are nation-states,and hence national political leaders, still powerful, orare they becoming largely irrelevant to the forcesshaping the world? Nation-states are indeed stillpowerful and political leaders have a large role to playin the world. Yet at the same time the nation-state isbeing reshaped before our eyes. National economicpolicy can't be as effective as it once was. Moreimportantly, nations have to rethink their identitiesnow the older forms of geopolitics are becomingobsolete. Although this is a contentious point, I wouldsay that, following the dissolving of the cold war,nations no longer have enemies. Who are theenemies of Britain, or France, or Japan? Nationstoday face risks and dangers rather than enemies, amassive shift in their very nature.

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It isn't only of the nation that such comments could bemade. Everywhere we look, we see institutions thatappear the same as they used to be from the outside,and carry the same names, but inside have becomequite different. We continue to talk of the nation, thefamily, work, tradition, nature, as if they were all thesame as in the past. They are not. The outer shellremains, but inside all is different - and this ishappening not only in the US, Britain, or France, butalmost everywhere. They are what I call shellinstitutions, and I shall talk about them quite a bit inthe lectures to come. They are institutions that havebecome inadequate to the tasks they are called uponto perform. As the changes I have described in this lecture gatherweight, they are creating something that has neverexisted before, a global cosmopolitan society. We arethe first generation to live in this society, whosecontours we can as yet only dimly see. It is shakingup our existing ways of life, no matter where wehappen to be. This is not - at least at the moment - aglobal order driven by collective human will. Instead,it is emerging in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion,carried along by a mixture of economic, technologicaland cultural imperatives.

It is not settled or secure, but fraught with anxieties,as well as scarred by deep divisions. Many of us feelin the grip of forces over which we have no control.Can we re-impose our will upon them? I believe wecan. The powerlessness we experienceis not a sign of personal failings, but reflects theincapacities of our institutions. We need toreconstruct those we have, or create new ones, inways appropriate to the global age. We should and we can look to achieve greater controlover our runaway world. We shan't be able to do so ifwe shirk the challenges, or pretend that all can go onas before. For globalisation is not incidental to ourlives today. It is a shift in our very life circumstances.It is the way we now live.

Giddens, A, "Runaway World: The Reith Lectures", BBC, 1999, www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/features/the-reith-lectures/transcripts/1990/

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Globalisation has made the world a better place

I was recently in beautiful Chile for a FuturesCongress, and I had a chance to travel south to thevery tip of Latin America. I also recently made a BBCradio documentary called Fixing Globalisation, inwhich I criss-crossed the UK in search of ideas forimproving certain aspects of it and discussed topicalissues with well-known experts. In both cases, I sawthings that convinced me that it is past time forsomeone to come to globalisation’s defence. Chile today is Latin America’s richest country, withper capita GDP of about $23,000 – similar to that ofcentral European countries. This is quite anachievement for a country that depends so heavily oncopper production, and it sets Chile apart from manyof its neighbours. Like many other countries, Chile isfacing economic challenges, and its growth rateleaves something to be desired; but it also has manypromising opportunities beyond its borders. For example, when I led a review on antimicrobialresistance, I learned that copper has powerfulantibacterial properties and is an ideal material foruse in healthcare facilities where bacteria oftenspread. This means that copper producers such asChile, Australia, and Canada can improve globalhealth – and boost exports – by introducing affordablecopper infrastructure into hospitals and other clinicalsettings around the world. Chile is also a storehouse of knowledge for managingearthquakes and tsunamis. While I was there, Ivisited La Serena, which in 2015 experienced thesixth strongest earthquake ever recorded. But theensuing tsunami killed only 11 people, though itsurely would have killed far more in many otherplaces. Chilean officials’ advanced preparation andrapid response seems to have made the difference.With so much institutional experience, Chile can be avaluable resource for other countries threatened byseismic events.

La Serena is also near one of the world’s beststargazing sites, which attracts leading astronomersfrom around the globe. In fact, Chile hosts muchremarkable collaboration among the world’sscientists, in part because it is just north of theAntarctic – long a site for scientific and environmentalcooperation. Beyond Chile, it is interesting that the Chinesepresident, Xi Jinping, is attending the WorldEconomic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos thisyear. Now that Donald Trump has been electedpresident of the US, and the UK is withdrawing fromthe EU, I had assumed that such an elitist event’sglory days were behind it. Xi’s presence suggests thatChina is exploring where it can position itself on theworld stage, and which elements of globalisation itcan harness to its advantage, now that westernpowers are turning inward. Indeed, as the Chinese ambassador to the UKpointed out on my radio programme, China is alreadythe largest importer – yes, importer – for at least 70countries, and accounts for about 10% to 11% of allimports globally. Despite its supposed economicchallenges, China will likely be a bigger importer thanthe EU before this decade is over, and it will probablysurpass the US soon thereafter. This will not happen without globalisation. Africancountries, in particular, will need to trade more withone another, and there is talk of creating an Africanfree-trade area. But this could prove difficult now thatanti-trade sentiment is on the rise. Are globalisation’scritics – those who wrongly consider it a zero-sumgame – against eradicating global poverty?

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Policymakers can take action to alleviate anxietiesabout globalisation. For starters, the seeminglyendless growth of profits as a share of global GDPmust stop. Anyone who thinks this sounds radicalneeds to brush up on economics. Higher profitsshould attract new market entrants, which would thenerode incumbents’ profits through competition. Thefact that this isn’t happening suggests that somemarkets have been rigged, or have simply failed.Policymakers need to address this with strongerregulation in some areas. For example, as I havepreviously argued, the current climate is far toopermissive of share-repurchase programmes. At the same time, policymakers need to pursuemeasures to increase wages for the lowest earners,which could actually help boost productivity as capitalbecomes less expensive relative to labour. And, asthe World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, recentlypointed out to me, we need to strengthenenforcement of laws governing trade deals, and domore to help challenged domestic sectors that loseout as a result of those deals.

This reminds me of a sad story I heard from somelaid-off Goodyear workers in Wolverhampton, inEngland’s West Midlands. They told me that joblistings for their lost positions were posted on a noticeboard, and they could reapply for them if they wantedto move to Mexico. The workers surmised that it waseasier for the company to close its factory in the UKthan to close even less productive factories in Franceor Germany. Surely changes like this can be handledbetter. Lastly, policymakers need to prioritise developmentprojects such as the UK’s “northern powerhouse” and“Midlands engine”. And more such initiatives shouldbe launched elsewhere. Despite the many challenges it has created,globalisation has made the world a better place thanit otherwise would have been. And we still need it toeradicate poverty and generate higher livingstandards for all.

O'Neill, J, "Globalisation has made the world a better place", The Guardian (originally Project Syndicate),18/1/17, www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/18/globalisation-world-trade-asia-global-poverty

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The political threats to globalisation

If you had to define “globalisation” with an image,what would it be? A container ship from China stuffedwith toys and T-shirts? A programmer tapping at akeyboard in Bangalore? A plane circling gloomily overHeathrow airport? Most people’s pictures ofglobalisation are to do with economics, technologyand business. But before markets, modems andmanufacturers could do their work, political changeshad to take place. The foundations of the globalisedbusiness world are political – and so are the biggestthreats to the system. The challenge to theglobalisation consensus comes from below. Politicalelites in the US, Asia and Europe are struggling toconvince citizens that globalisation is not just a gamethat benefits the rich. If the argument is lost in any ofthe major world economies, the political consensusthat underpins globalisation could unravel. That consensus is a recent creation. The politicalchanges that made globalisation possible took placein a remarkably short period of time – from 1978 to1991 to be precise. The first and most importantdevelopment was China’s decision to turn fromMaoism to the market, with the reforms initiated byDeng Xiaoping in 1978. A year later, MargaretThatcher came to power in Britain. One of her firstacts was the abolition of foreign exchange controls,easing London’s rise as a global financial centre andsetting an example that was emulated internationally.Then, in 1980, Ronald Reagan took power in the USon a platform of deregulation and tax cuts – giving ahuge boost to market ideology around the world. Inthe mid-1980s, the European Union committed itselfto creating a single market. In 1989, the collapse of the Berlin wall allowedeastern Europe – and Russia itself – to join theglobalisation game. The 1980s also saw thediscrediting of protectionist populists in the largestcountries of Latin America. Finally, in 1991, cameanother huge change: the decision by Indian leadersto move away from the regulation and protectionismthat had hobbled the Indian economy sinceindependence.

So, in less than 15 years, the political elites in thepower centres of the world had come to broadlysimilar conclusions. They embraced global businessand market economics. The result is a world in which it now feels as naturalto do business in Beijing, Moscow and Delhi as inLondon and New York. But this world has been withus for less than 20 years. Previous eras ofglobalisation were ended by political upheaval – theoutbreak of war in 1914 and the rise of fascism in the1930s. So could the same thing happen again? The most obvious threat is a crisis in the mostimportant political and economic relationship in theworld – that between the US and China. The Bushadministration, despite its bellicose reputation, hasbeen assiduous in avoiding confrontation with China;and the Chinese similarly have no desire for a clashwith America – at least, not now. Globalisation hascreated a web of mutual interests. The real risk inChinese-American relations is of miscalculation: aclash – whether over trade or Tibet or Taiwan – thatescalates into something that does real damage.Combine a looming recession in America, apresidential election and the Beijing Olympics andyou have a formula for potential trouble. Over the longer-term, terrorism and climate changealso pose risks to the system. Globalisation dependson ease of travel. But, in different ways, both globalwarming and global terrorism threaten the ability tohop on a plane at a moment’s notice. But the biggest risk is that politicians simply begin tolose the argument for globalisation. A recent opinionpoll showed that 58 per cent of Americans thinkglobalisation is bad for the US and just 28 per centthink it has helped America. Ten years ago there wasa narrow majority in favour of globalisation. Politiciansare reacting to this shift. Democratic presidentialcandidates are taking an increasingly sceptical line onfree trade. Republicans rail against illegalimmigration.

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In Europe, Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, hasbeen arguing for protectionism on a European level.He wants to re-establish “community preference” –essentially higher tariffs against goods from outsidethe European Union. Mr Sarkozy does not have manyEU allies yet. But the re-election of Silvio Berlusconiin Italy could change that. Outsiders see the Indians and the Chinese as thegreatest beneficiaries of globalisation. But the lastIndian government lost a general election, largelybecause poor, rural voters felt left out by the boom.With another election in the offing, India’s politiciansare not rushing to sign a new world trade deal. Thepolitical climate in a one-party state such as China isharder to gauge. But the authorities’ evident anxietyabout rural unemployment, environmental protestsand the wealth gap between the rich coasts and thepoorer inland regions suggests that global capitalismcan be a tough sell – even in China.

The sense that the poor have lost out as a result ofglobalisation has grown with the rise in world foodprices. Hunger – that most traditional threat to rulingelites – is returning to many countries that haveembraced globalisation. Political leaders around theworld are struggling to contain all these pressuresand maintain the consensus that has madeglobalisation possible. But their task is getting harder.Globalisation was made possible by political change.But what politics made, politics can take away.

Rachman, G, "The political threats to globalisation", FT,7/4/08, www.ft.com/content/e6d8281c-04af-11dd-a2f0-000077b07658

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The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for aNew CenturySeptember 11 signaled the end of the age ofgeopolitics and the advent of a new age—the era ofglobal politics. The challenge U.S. policymakers facetoday is to recognize that fundamental change inworld politics and to use America’s unrivaled military,economic, and political power to fashion aninternational environment conducive to its interestsand values. For much of the 20th century, geopolitics droveAmerican foreign policy. Successive presidentssought to prevent any single country from dominatingthe centers of strategic power in Europe and Asia. Tothat end the United States fought two world wars andcarried on its four-decade-long Cold War with theSoviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet empireended the last serious challenge for territorialdominion over Eurasia. The primary goal of Americanforeign policy was achieved. During the 1990s, American foreign policy focused onconsolidating its success. Together with its Europeanallies, the United States set out to create, for the firsttime in history, a peaceful, undivided, and democraticEurope. That effort is now all but complete. TheEuropean Union—which will encompass most ofEurope with the expected accession of 10 newmembers in 2004—has become the focal point forEuropean policy on a wide range of issues. The NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization has evolved from acollective defense alliance into Europe’s mainsecurity institution. A new relationship with Russia isbeing forged. Progress has been slower, though still significant, inAsia. U.S. relations with its two key regional partners,Japan and South Korea, remain the foundation ofregional stability. Democracy is taking root in SouthKorea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan. U.S.engagement with China is slowly tying aneconomically surging Beijing into the global economy.

The success of American policy over the past decademeans that no power—not Russia, not Germany, nota united Europe, and not China or Japan—todayposes a hegemonic threat to Eurasia. In this new era,American foreign policy will no longer pivot ongeography. Instead, it will be defined by thecombination of America’s unrivaled power in worldaffairs and the extensive and growing globalization ofworld politics. The United States is today the only truly globalpower. Its military reach—whether on land, at sea, orin the air—extends to every point on the globe. Itseconomic prowess fuels world trade and industry. Itspolitical and cultural appeal—what Joseph Nye hascalled soft power—is so extensive that mostinternational institutions reflect American interests.America’s position in the world is unique—no othercountry in history has ever come close. But is America’s exalted position sustainable?Militarily, the vast gap between the United States andeveryone else is growing. Whereas defense spendingin most other countries is falling, U.S. defensespending is rising rapidly. This year’s requestedincrease in defense spending is greater than theentire Chinese defense budget. Most remarkably,America can afford to spend more. Defense spendingtakes a smaller share of the U.S. gross domesticproduct than it did a decade ago—and even the Bushadministration’s projected increases will produce anoverall budget equal to only about 3.5 percent ofGDP, about half of Cold War highs. There is littleprospect of any country or group of countriesdevoting the resources necessary to begin competingwith the United States militarily, let alone surpassingit. Economically, the United States may not widen itsedge over its competitors, but neither is it likely to fallbehind. The U.S. economy has proven itself at leastas adept as its major competitors in realizing theproductivity gains made possible by informationtechnology.

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Europe and Japan face severe demographicchallenges as their populations rapidly age, creatinglikely labor shortages and severe budgetarypressures. China is modernizing rapidly, and Russiamay have turned the corner, but their economiestoday are comparable in output to those of Italy andBelgium—and they have yet to develop a politicalinfrastructure that can support sustained economicgrowth. Which brings us to the issue of how to transform thisunquestioned power into influence. Unless employeddeftly, America’s military and economic superioritycan breed resentment, even among its friends. Agrowing perception that Washington cares only aboutits own interests and is willing to use its muscle to getits way has fueled a worrisome gap between U.S. andEuropean attitudes. European elites increasinglycriticize the United States as being morally, socially,and culturally retrograde—especially in its perceivedembrace of the death penalty, predatory capitalism,and fast food and mass entertainment. Europe hasalso begun to exercise diplomatic muscle ininternational institutions and other arenas, seeking tocreate new international regimes designed to limitAmerica’s recourse to its hard power. The sustainability of American power ultimatelydepends on the extent to which others believe it isemployed not just in U.S. interests but in theirinterests as well. Following its victory in World War II,the United States led the effort to create not only newsecurity institutions, such as the United Nations andNATO, but also new regimes to promote economicrecovery, development, and prosperity, such as theMarshall Plan, the Bretton Woods monetary system,and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs topromote free trade. These institutions andagreements preserved and extended American power—but in a way that benefited all who participated. Thechallenge for the United States is to do the sametoday.

Globalization is not just an economic phenomenon,but a political, cultural, military, and environmentalone as well. Nor is globalization new; networks ofinterdependence spanning continents wereincreasing rapidly in the decades before the FirstWorld War as the steam engine and the telegraphreduced the cost of transportation and information.What distinguishes globalization today is the speedand volume of cross-border contacts. The prophets of globalization have trumpeted itsbenefits, particularly how the increased flow of goods,services, and capital across borders can boosteconomic activity and enhance prosperity. During the1990s the more globalized economies grew anaverage of 5 percent a year, while the less globalizedeconomies contracted by an average of 1 percent ayear. The spread of ideas and information across theInternet and other global media has broadenedcultural horizons and empowered people around theworld to challenge autocratic rulers and advance thecause of human rights and democracy. Globalizationcan even lessen the chance of war. Fearing that warwith Pakistan would disrupt their ties to U.S.-basedmultinationals, India’s powerful electronic sectorsuccessfully pressed New Delhi in mid-2002 todeescalate its conflict with Pakistan. But globalization also brings terrible new perils. Ahandful of men from halfway across the globe canhijack four commercial airliners and slam them intokey symbols of American power, killing thousands. Acomputer hacker in the Philippines can shut down theInternet and disrupt e-commerce thousands of milesaway. Speculators can produce a run on the Thaicurrency, plunging Russia and Brazil into recession,robbing American exporters of markets, and costingAmerican jobs. Greenhouse gases accumulating inthe atmosphere in newly booming economies canraise global temperatures, possibly flooding coastalplains and turning mountain meadows into deserts.

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Worse, for the United States, is that its power makesit a magnet for terrorism. As Richard Betts hasargued, America’s power “animates both theterrorists’ purposes and their choice of tactics….Political and cultural power makes the United Statesa target for those who blame it for their problems. Atthe same time, American economic and militarypower prevents them from resisting or retaliatingagainst the United States on its own terms. To smitethe only superpower requires unconventional modesof force and tactics [which] offer hope to the weakthat they can work their will despite their overall deficitin power.” Worse still, other weak countries mightdecide to buy their security by turning a blind eye toterrorist activities on their soil, thereby increasing therisk to the United States. Much of the foreign policy debate in the United Statestoday revolves around assessments of thefundamental importance of American primacy andglobalization. Americanists, so called because theyemphasize American primacy, see a world in whichthe United States can use its predominant power toget its way, regardless of what others want. Theybelieve the United States must summon the will to goit alone if necessary. Globalists emphasizeglobalization. They see a world that defies unilateralU.S. solutions and instead requires internationalcooperation. They warn against thinking that Americacan go it alone. Americanists see two great virtues in America’sprimacy. First, it enables the United States to set itsown foreign policy objectives and to achieve themwithout relying on others. The result is a preferencefor unilateral action, unbound by internationalagreements or institutions that would otherwiseconstrain America’s ability to act. As CharlesKrauthammer puts it, “An unprecedentedly dominantUnited States…is in the unique position of being ableto fashion its own foreign policy. After a decade ofPrometheus playing pygmy, the first task of the new[Bush] administration is precisely to reassertAmerican freedom of action.” The views, preferences,and interests of allies, friends, or anyone else shouldtherefore have no influence on American action.

Second, because American power enables the UnitedStates to pursue its interests as it pleases, Americanforeign policy should seek to maintain, extend, andstrengthen that relative position of power. AsPresident Bush told graduating West Point cadets lastJune, “America has, and intends to keep, militarystrength beyond challenge, thereby making thedestabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, andlimiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”In other words, the United States can achieve itspolicy objectives best if it can prevent others fromacquiring the power necessary to oppose it effectivelywhen interests clash. It is as good a definition of whatwould constitute an American empire as one can get. In contrast, Globalists stress how globalization bothlimits and transforms America’s capacity to use itspower to influence events overseas. At bottom, thechallenges and opportunities created by the forces ofglobalization are not susceptible to America acting onits own. Combating the spread of infectious diseases,preventing the spread of weapons of massdestruction, defeating terrorism, securing access toopen markets, protecting human rights, promotingdemocracy, and preserving the environment allrequire the cooperation of other countries. As BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair put it succinctly followingthe September 11 attacks, “we are all internationalistsnow.” But, Globalists argue, it is not simply that the natureof the issues arising from globalization limits thereach of American power and compels internationalcooperation. Globalization transforms the nature ofpower itself. No one has grappled with this problemmore thoughtfully than Joseph Nye in his latest book,The Paradox of American Power. As Nye explains,“power today is distributed among countries in apattern that resembles a complex three-dimensionalchess game.” One dimension is military power, wherethe United States enjoys an unrivaled advantage, andthe power distribution is therefore unipolar. Thesecond dimension is economic, where power amongthe United States, Europe, and Japan is distributedmore equally.

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The third dimension is transnational relations, wherepower is widely dispersed and essentially beyondgovernment control. This is the realm of nonstateactors—from multinational companies and moneymanagers to terrorist organizations and crimesyndicates to nongovernmental organizations and theinternational media. “Those who recommend ahegemonic [or power-based] American foreignpolicy,” Nye concludes, “are relying on woefullyinadequate analysis. When you are in a three-dimensional game, you will lose if you focus on theinterstate military board and fail to notice the otherboards and the vertical connections among them.” Both Americanists and Globalists are right inimportant ways. Take the Americanists first. Despiteglobalization, power remains the coin of the realm ininternational politics. Five decades of concerted U.S.and allied efforts may have transformed Europe into aKantian zone of perpetual peace where the rule oflaw has triumphed, but in much of the rest of theworld military might continues to hold sway. True, nocountry, not even China, poses the geostrategicthreat to the United States that first Germany andthen the Soviet Union did in the previous century.Still, lesser- order threats abound, from Pyongyang toTeheran to Baghdad, and U.S. military and economicpower will be needed to contain, if not extinguish,them. More broadly, the rule of law demands morethan simply codifying rules of behavior. It alsorequires the willingness and ability to enforce them.But that requirement, as Mancur Olson demonstratedyears ago, runs into a fundamental collective-actionproblem—if the potential costs of action are great andthe benefits widely shared, few will be willing to incurthe costs. That is where overwhelming power, andthe concomitant willingness and ability to provide forglobal public goods, makes a crucial difference. So,without American primacy—or something like it—it isdoubtful that the rule of law can be sustained. The wise application of American primacy can furtherU.S. values and interests. The use (or threat) ofAmerican military might evicted Iraqi troops fromKuwait, convinced Haiti’s military junta to relinquishpower, ended Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, and brokeal- Qaida’s hold over Afghanistan.

Nor does American primacy advance only U.S.interests and values. As the one country willing andable to break deadlocks and stalemates preventingprogress on issues from promoting peace in theBalkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East topreserving financial stability around the world, theUnited States frequently advances the interests ofmost other democratic states as well. Often, theUnited States is exactly what Madeleine Albright saidit was—the indispensable nation that makes itpossible to mobilize the world into effective action. And the United States does differ from othercountries. Unique among past hegemons in notseeking to expand its power through territorial gains,it is also unique among its contemporaries. Itsprimacy and global interests prompt others both toseek its assistance in addressing their problems andto resent it for meddling in their affairs. Theambivalence the world feels about Americanengagement—as well as the unique nature of thatengagement—makes it imperative that the UnitedStates not mistake the conduct of foreign policy for apopularity contest. Doing the right thing may notalways be popular—but it is vitally importantnevertheless. But Globalists are right that while America ispowerful, it is not omnipotent. Far more able thanmost countries to protect itself against the perniciousconsequences of globalization, it is by no meansinvulnerable. Some crucial problems do defyunilateral solutions. Global warming is perhaps themost obvious case, but others include stopping thespread of weapons of mass destruction and fightingglobal terrorism. In other cases, such as protectingthe American homeland from terrorist attack,unilateral action can reduce but not eliminate risks. Similarly, unilateral American power may not beenough to sustain the benefits of globalization.Globalization is not irreversible. World War I, theRussian Revolution, and the Great Depressioncombined to strangle the economic and socialinteractions that emerged early in the 20th century.

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Economic globalization today rests on an intricateweb of international trade and financial institutions.Extending, developing, and improving theseinstitutions requires the cooperation of others.Without it, the benefits of globalization, which help tounderwrite American power, could erode. Globalization has greatly broadened America’sforeign policy agenda. Infectious diseases, poverty,and poor governance not only offend our moralsensibilities but also represent potential new securitythreats. Failed and failing states endanger not justtheir own citizens but Americans as well. If the UnitedStates cannot find ways to encourage prosperity andgood governance, it runs the risk of seeing threats toits security multiply. It could eventually find itselfharmed not by bears in the woods but by swarms oftiny pests. Finally, cooperation can extend the life of Americanprimacy. Working with others can spread the costs ofaction over a wider array of actors, enabling theUnited States to do more with less. By creatinginternational regimes and organizations Washingtoncan imbed its interests and values in institutions thatwill shape and constrain countries for decades,regardless of the vicissitudes of American power. Andcooperation can build bonds with other countries,lessening the chances of cultural and political tacticsthat can over the years sap U.S. power. Both Americanists and Globalists understandessential truths about the world today. Powercontinues to matter, but power alone will often not beenough to achieve our goals. A pragmatic Americaninternationalism would recognize that we do not needto pick between these two truths. Both should guideAmerican foreign policy. But what should America seek to accomplish abroad?The indisputable first objective must be to safeguardand enhance our liberty, security, and prosperity. Thequestion is how. In the new age of global politics, thebest way to accomplish these goals is to promote aninternational order based on democracy, humanrights, and free enterprise—to extend the zone ofpeace and prosperity that the United States helpedestablish in Europe to every other region of the world.

Put differently, the United States needs to integratethe world’s have-nots into the globalized West.Pursuing that goal is not charity. Creating aninternational order in which more people are free andprosperous is profoundly in America’s self-interest. Ina world of market democracies, America andAmericans are likely to be both more prosperous andmore secure. In such a world we are most likely torealize the promise of globalization while minimizingits dangers. Ensuring that a commitment to democracy and openmarkets triumphs on a global scale entails four broadstrategies. First, it is necessary to sustain andstrengthen the bases of American power. This, mostof all, requires ensuring that the fundamentals of thenation’s economy remain sound. It is important not tospend today what the country may need tomorrow. Italso requires maintaining America’s military edge,both technologically and in terms of the overallcapacity to bring force to bear at a time and place ofAmerica’s own choosing. And it requires persistentdiplomatic engagement on Washington’s part todemonstrate awareness that what happens abroadand matters to others can also have a profoundimpact on security and prosperity at home. Second, U.S. policy should seek to extend and adaptproven international institutions and arrangements.NATO’s recent transformation is a prime example.During the 1990s, the collective defense organizationthat had safeguarded the territorial integrity of itsmembers against the Soviet Union for four decadesgradually took on a new role: providing security forevery state and its citizens in an ever enlarging northAtlantic area. By taking the lead in stabilizing conflict-ridden regions like the Balkans, as well as by openingits doors to new members, NATO began to do forEurope’s east what it had done for Europe’s west.The world trading system is also ripe for change.Barriers to the free flow of goods, capital, andservices have steadily fallen over the years, and moreand more countries have joined the free tradingregime. Now it is time to lower the most perniciousbarriers, especially those for agricultural goods, andbring poor countries into the global economic system.

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Third, U.S. policy should enforce compliance withexisting international agreements and strengthen theability of institutions to monitor and compelcompliance. Too many favor the negotiation of newsets of rules or new institutions for their own sake,and too few pay attention to making sure new rulesare upheld and new institutions function effectively.Iraq is a case in point. Even if one believes that Iraqcan be contained and deterred and that thereforeforcible regime change is neither necessary noradvisable, Baghdad’s refusal to comply with UNSecurity Council resolutions (including the criticalterms of the Gulf War cease-fire resolution) meansthat the threat and possible use of force must be inplay. A willingness to use force is no doubt necessary(though by no means sufficient) to persuade SaddamHussein to allow UN inspectors to reenter Iraq andpermit them to carry out the mandate of theinternational community. If he refuses, the UnitedStates must be prepared to use force, preferably withothers but alone if necessary, to compel compliance.Bad behavior that produces no consequences getsemulated. Finally, U.S. policy must take the lead in creatingeffective international institutions and arrangementsto handle new challenges, especially those arisingfrom the downside of globalization. The United Statesmust lead not only because it alone can help theinternational community overcome its collective-action problems, but because it is most likely to behurt by inaction. Just as one example, aninternational system for reporting and monitoringresearch in dangerous pathogens could provide earlywarning if biotechnologists create such pathogenseither deliberately or inadvertently.

As these strategies make clear, promoting aninternational order based on market democracies willrequire the United States to lead as well as listen, togive as well as take. Arguing that American foreignpolicy should be either unilateral or multilateral is toposit a false choice as well as to confuse means withends. Unilateralism can be put to good or bad uses.The flaw in the Bush administration’s decision towithdraw the United States from the Kyoto Treaty wasnot so much that Washington went its own way—though the peremptory manner of the withdrawalmaximized bad feelings—but that it has failed topropose a better strategy for dealing with a rise inglobal temperatures that its own EPA scientistsacknowledge. In this case, what is needed is notmore multilateralism, but more unilateral action on thepart of the United States to curtail its greenhouse gasemissions. Likewise, multilateralism can produce amodern day Kellogg-Briand Treaty just as easily as itproduces a Gulf War coalition or a World TradeOrganization. Can U.S. foreign policy promote a liberal world orderin the new age of global politics? In many ways it hasno other choice. The pernicious effects ofglobalization, which empower tiny groups of people toinflict grievous harm, make it essential to create aworld community that shares American values. Butthere is also good reason to believe that the UnitedStates can succeed in integrating the rest of the worldinto the western world order. Immediately after WorldWar II, the United States forged a series of boldpolitical, economic, and military arrangements thatmade allies of former enemies and set the stage forvictory in the age of geopolitics. U.S. policymakers atthe time took a broad view of American interests andunderstood that their efforts would be for naught ifAmerica’s partners did not see them as being in theinterest of all. U.S. policymakers in the age of globalpolitics must do likewise.

Dalder, I et.al., "The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century", Brookings Institute,1/1/3, www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-of-politics-american-foreign-policy-for-a-new-century/

inequalityInequality refers to a state of affairs where equality between people or groupsof people is not realized and the consequent potential compromises of justiceand liberty. Inequality often manifests itself through unequal access toresources that are needed to sustain life and develop individuals andcommunities. Consequently, the concept is closely connected to discussions ofpower and of who holds the rights to these resources and their proceeds.Inequality can be examined both as a phenomenon within and betweensocieties.

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The Inequality Report:The Palestinian Arab Minorityin Israel Is income inequality rising around the world? 10 Important Examples of Gender InequalityHappening Today A marriage to celebrate: that of gender equality andeconomic development

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The Inequality Report:The Palestinian Arab Minority inIsraelInequality in Israel takes many forms. Some of themajor fault-lines that divide Israeli society, creatingrelatively privileged and deprived groups, are(Ashkenazim) versus (Mizrahim); men versus women;Israel-born Jews (Sabar)versus new immigrants(Olim); Orthodox versus secular Jews; rural versusurban dwellers; rich versus poor; left-wing versusright-wing supporters; and gay versus straight people.This report focuses on inequalities between Jewishcitizens of Israel—the majority—and Palestinian Arabcitizens of Israel, a national, non-immigrant minorityliving in its historical homeland Today, Palestinian citizens of the state comprise 20%of the total population, numbering almost 1.2 millionpeople. They remained in their homeland followingthe establishment of the State of Israel in 1948,becoming an involuntary minority. A part of thePalestinian people who currently live in the WestBank, the Gaza Strip and the Diaspora, they belongto three religious communities: Muslim (82%),Christian (9.5%) and Druze (8.5%). Their statusunder international human rights instruments to whichIsrael is a State party is that of a national, ethnic,linguistic and religious minority. However, despite this status, the Palestinian minorityis not declared as a national minority in the BasicLaws of Israel. In 1948, Israel was established as aJewish state. The definition of Israel as “the JewishState” or “the State of the Jewish People” makesinequality a practical, political and ideological realityfor Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are marginalizedand discriminated against by the state on the basis oftheir national belonging and religious affiliation asnon-Jews. They are frequently and increasinglyviewed as a “fifth column” as a result of theirPalestinian identity and national, religious, ethnic andcultural ties to their fellow Palestinians in theOccupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) andsurrounding Arab and Muslim states, a number ofwhich are considered “enemy states” byIsrael.Furthermore, this perception is not restricted tothe state authorities: according to the IsraelDemocracy Institute, in 2010 53% of the Jewishpublic maintained that the state was entitled toencourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel.

Numerous groups of Palestinian citizens of Israel face“compound discrimination” or multiple forms ofdiscrimination on the basis of both their nationalbelonging and their membership in one or moredistinct subgroups. For instance, Arab women inIsrael face discrimination as members of the Arabminority and as women, and Arab Bedouin face anadditional layer of institutional and socialdiscrimination. Some individuals are subjected tomultiple forms of discrimination, for instance disabledfemale Arab Bedouin children living in theunrecognized villages in the Naqab (Negev), referredto by the state as “illegally constructed villages” or“illegal settlements”. With regard to certainmarginalized groups, Israel has some of the world’smost forward-thinking and progressive laws andpolicies. Israel’s Knesset, for example, has legislatedstrong anti-discrimination legislation and legalprotections for women and disabled persons.However, the same has not been done for thePalestinian minority in Israel. As a result, Palestinianswho are also members of other marginalized groupsdo not receive the full benefit of such protections.Moreover, according to a recent poll, just 51% ofJewish citizens of Israel support full equality in rightsbetween Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel. Thesame attitude prevails among Jewish youth, with49.5% of Jewish 15- to 18-year-olds respondingnegatively, in a poll carried out in 2010, to thequestion of whether Arab citizens should be grantedrights equal to those of Jews. This report details some of the main legal, politicaland policy structures that institutionalizediscrimination against the Palestinian minority inIsrael, and entrench inequalities between Palestinianand Jewish citizens. It provides indicators ofinequalities, including official state data, and explainshow specific laws and policies work to exclude thePalestinian minority from state resources andservices, as well as the structures of power. It furtherdemonstrates how the State of Israel, as anethnocracy or “ethnic nation-state”, is systematicallyfailing to adopt effective measures to redress thegaps that exist between the Palestinian minority andthe Jewish majority and, moreover, how, byprivileging Jewish citizens in many fields, the stateactively preserves and even widens these gaps.

Hesketh, K, et.al.,"The Inequality Report:The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel",Adalah The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, March 2011,

https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf

Click here to read the full report

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Is income inequality rising around the world?

Rising levels of inequality has become a key politicalissue in recent years; "the defining issue of our time,"as Barack Obama described it back in 2013. It was atthe heart of the Occupy movement protests, and hasreceived a huge amount of attention in the media andin policy circles. But much of this discussion hasfocussed on what's been happening in rich countries,in particular upon trends seen in the US. We tend tohear less about inequality in the rest of the world.How has income inequality within countries beenchanging around the world more generally?To answer this question, we brought togetherestimates of income inequality for two points in time:today and a generation ago in 1990. Our metric ofincome inequality is the Gini index which is higher ina country with higher inequality.

We rely on estimates from two online databases:PovcalNet, run by the World Bank, and the Chartbookof Economic Inequality, which I published togetherwith Tony Atkinson, Salvatore Morelli, and Max RoserThis gave us a sample of 83 countries, coveringaround 85% of the world's population The chart below compares levels of inequality todaywith those one generation ago. If you've not seen thissort of chart before, it may take a moment tounderstand what's going on. How high a country is inthe chart shows you the level of inequality in 2015.How far to the right shows you the level of inequalityin 1990.3 In addition, a 45 degree line is plotted.Countries below this line saw a fall in the Gini indexbetween the two dates; countries above saw anincrease.

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Four observations on inequality across the globeSo what does the chart tell us about inequality withincountries across the world? 1. No general trend to higher inequality: It's amistake to think that inequality is risingeverywhere. Over the last 25 years, inequality hasgone up in many countries and has fallen in manyothers. It's important to know this. It shows that risinginequality is not ubiquitous, nor inevitable in the faceof globalisation, and suggests that politics and policyat the level of individual countries can make adifference. 2. Note the diversity between countries: As well asthere being different trends, notice how very differentthe level of inequality is across countries. The spreadyou see – from the highest inequality countries inLatin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, to the lowest-inequality countries in Scandinavia – is much largerthan the changes in individual countries over thisperiod. 3. There are clear regional patterns: - Almost all Latin American and Caribbean countriesshow very high levels of inequality, but considerabledeclines from 1990 to 2015.-Conversely, advanced industrial economies showlower levels of inequality, but rises in most, thoughnot all, instances.-A number of Eastern European countriesexperienced rising inequality as they transitioned fromsocialist regimes.-Across the six countries in our sample from theMiddle East and North Africa region, we mostly seefalls. In Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia andPacific, the trends are more mixed. 4. Across countries, the average level ofinequality has not changed:- The rises and falls seen in the Gini index in differentcountries more or less cancel out, the average Giniacross countries fell marginally from 39.6 to 38.6.-There were rises in inequality in some of the worldmost populous countries, including China, India, theUS and Indonesia (together accounting for around45% of world population). As a result, if we weightcountries according to the size of their population wesee that this weighted average Gini index increasedby four percentage points, from 36.7 to 40.8.

-This means that, whilst in terms of the averagecountry the Gini index stayed roughly constant acrossthe two periods, the average person lived in a countrythat saw rising inequality. 5. Levels of inequality are converging:Interestingly, the chart shows that there was someconvergence in inequality levels across countriesover the last 25 years. Amongst those countries witha Gini index below 40 in 1990 (left half of the chart),hardly any saw substantial falls to 2015. Amongstthose with a Gini index above 40 in 1990 (right half ofthe chart), hardly any saw substantial rises. Asalready pointed out, this apparent convergence workslargely through regional dynamics. That said, thosecountries in our sample from the Sub-Saharan Africaand East Asia and Pacific regions are more evenlysplit between rising and falling levels of inequality, butstill roughly fit this convergent pattern. ConclusionThe Gini index is just one of the many ways we canmeasure inequality, each with their own pros andcons. You can read more about this in the 'Furthernotes' section below, as well as in our entry onIncome Inequality.Nevertheless, it is clear from the chart we cannotmake generalisations about inequality across theglobe based on what we see in rich countries. Norshould we limit ourselves to thinking inequality musteither be going up or going down, full stop. Posing thequestion in such a polarised way precludes ameaningful answer. Whether inequality is rising orfalling depends on where, when and what aspect ofinequality we have in mind.But this is very important to know in itself. It shows usthat rising inequality is not just an inevitable outcomeof global economic forces, completely beyond ourcontrol. National institutions, politics and policy play akey role in shaping how these forces impact incomesacross the distribution. Being attentive to thedifferences between countries is an important step inknowing what can be done to reduce inequality.

Hassel, J, "Is income inequality rising around the world?", OurWorld in Data, 19/11/18,www.ourworldindata.org/income-

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10 Important Examples of Gender Inequality HappeningTodayThe fight for gender equality is an ongoing strugglefor men and women throughout the world. Manyaspects of gender inequality are events that men willnever face, but that constantly shape women’s mentalhealth and opportunities. Listed here are the top 10examples of gender inequality found in the daily livesof women across the globe. Infant Life Expectancy: In India and China, the twomost populous nations in the world, there issignificant data that shows a survival disadvantagefor girls under five years of age. In China, girls havea seven percent higher infant mortality rate than boys,and in India, a study conducted in the first decade ofthe 2000s found that the risk of death between theages of one and five was 75 percent higher for girlsthan for boys. Access to Prenatal Care and Maternal Mortality:As of 2017, there are 1.6 billion women ofreproductive age in the developing world. Of the 127million women who gave birth in 2017, just 63 percentreceived a minimum of four antenatal care visits andonly 72 percent gave birth in a health facility. Amongwomen who experienced medical complicationsduring pregnancy or delivery, only one in threereceived the care they or their newborns needed. In 2017, an estimated 308,000 women in developingnations died from pregnancy-related causes and 2.7million babies died in their first month of life. Many ofthese deaths could have been prevented with fullaccess to healthcare. Education: Less than 40 percent of countries offergirls and boys equal access to education and only 39percent of countries have equal proportions of thesexes enrolled in secondary education. By achievinguniversal primary and secondary educationattainability in the adult population, it could bepossible to lift more than 420 million people out ofpoverty. This would have its greatest effect on womenand girls who are the most likely to never havestepped foot inside a school.

Even once girls are attending school, discriminationfollows. One in four girls states that they never feelcomfortable using school latrines. Girls are at greaterrisk of sexual violence, harassment and exploitationin school. School-related gender-based violence isanother major obstacle to universal schooling and theright to education for girls. Illiteracy: There are approximately 774 millionilliterate adults in the world and two-thirds of them arewomen. There are approximately 123 million illiterateyouths and 61 percent of them are girls. Women’sshare in the illiterate population has not budged in 20years. These facts not only affect women but theirchildren as well. A child born to a mother with theability to read is 50 percent more likely to survive pastage five. Economic Independence: Increases in female laborforce participation result in faster economic growth,but women continue to participate in labor markets onan unequal basis with men. In 2013, the maleemployment-to-population ratio was 72.2 percentcompared to 47.1 percent for women, and womencontinue to earn only 60-75 percent of men’s wagesglobally. It is estimated that women’s income couldincrease globally up to 76 percent if the employmentparticipation gap between men and women wasclosed, which could have a global value of $17 trillion.Women also carry a disproportionate amount ofresponsibility for unpaid care work. Women devoteone to three hours more a day to housework thanmen, two to 10 times the amount of time a day to care(for children, elderly and the sick) and one to fourhours less a day to income-based activities. The timegiven to these unpaid tasks directly and negativelyimpacts women’s participation in the workforce andtheir ability to foster economic independence. Violence Against Women, Sexual Assault andRape: The mental health effects of sexual assaultand rape can have jarring results on women’s stabilityand livelihoods. Women who have experiencedsexual or physical abuse at the hands of theirpartners are twice as likely to have an abortion,almost twice as likely to have depression and, insome regions, 1.5 times more likely to acquire HIVcompared with women who have not experiencedpartner violence.

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The prevalence of sexual assault and violenceagainst women is deep and systemic, making it oneof the most important examples of gender inequality.Worldwide, around 120 million girls, a number whichrepresents slightly more than one in 10, haveexperienced forced intercourse or another forcedsexual act in their lifetime. Female Genital Mutilation: At least 200 millionwomen and girls alive today have undergone femalegenital mutilation. In most of these cases, the majorityof girls were cut before age five. In these instances,proper anesthesia is rarely used or is ineffective,causing severe pain. Excessive bleeding is alsopossible, resulting from the accidental cutting of theclitoral artery or other blood vessels during theprocedure. Chronic genital infections, reproductivetract infections and urinary tract infections arecommon.Female genital mutilation is also associatedwith an increased risk of Caesarean section,postpartum hemorrhage and extended maternalhospital stay. All of these subsequent complicationsalong with the shock and use of physical force duringthe procedure are some of the many reasons whysurvivors describe the experience as an extremelytraumatic event. Child Marriage: Globally, almost 750 million womenand girls alive today married before their eighteenthbirthday. Those who suffer from child marriage oftenexperience early pregnancy which is a key factor inthe premature end of education. As mothers andwives, girls become socially isolated and are at anincreased risk for domestic violence. Child marriageis one the most devastating examples of genderinequality, as it limits women’s opportunities and theirability to reach their full individual potential.

Human Trafficking: Adult women and girls accountfor 71 percent of all human trafficking victimsdetected globally. Girls alone represent nearly threeout of every four children trafficked. Women and girlsare clearly the disproportionate victims of humantrafficking with 75 percent trafficked for the purpose ofsexual exploitation. Representation in Government: As of June 2016,only 22.8 percent of all national parliamentarianswere women. There is growing evidence that womenin positions of leadership and political decision-making improve the systems in which they work. These are 10 of the countless ways in which womenare oppressed, abused and neglected. These top tenexamples of gender inequality cannot begin to dojustice to the discrimination and obstacles thatwomen around the world face each day. Women’srights are human rights and affect every person inevery community.

Sherwood Bigelow, C, "10 Important Examples of Gender Inequality Happening Today", The Borgen Project, 11/7/18, www.borgenproject.org/examples-of-gender-inequality/

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A marriage to celebrate: that of gender equality andeconomic developmentAt the start of 2015, I spent several monthsvolunteering in Bangladesh with Voluntary ServiceOverseas (VSO) and International Citizen Service(ICS), working with a very poor and sociallyconservative community in the northwest of thecountry. The community, Pairabondh, faces many challenges,not least significant gender inequality. The bazaarand teashops were dominated by men, while womenworked all day collecting the potato harvest in thefields, preparing food, doing laundry and tending tothe animals. Sixty-five percent of women areunemployed and nearly half the female populationcannot read or write. While I was there, my colleagues and I were invited tothe wedding of the eldest daughter of one of the host-families I had grown close to. The female volunteerswere invited to participate in a pre-wedding ceremonythat involves painting your body with turmeric. This should have been a cause of excitement andhappiness for us all. However, at 15 years old, thebride, Mukhti, was under-age. The legal age formarriage in Bangladesh is 18 for girls and 21 forboys. Despite our affection for the family, none of uswanted to condone an illegal marriage and,ultimately, we turned down the invitation. Themarriage went against the very goals of our project,which sought to empower women by buildinghandicrafts cooperatives to provide them withemployment opportunities. Bangladesh holds the world’s worst record on childmarriage, and the problem is widespread: accordingto UNICEF, nearly two-thirds of girls are marriedbefore the age of 18. More than a quarter of girls aremarried before they reach 15. Poverty and a traditional patriarchal society combine,particularly in rural areas, to keep the rate of childmarriage elevated despite national legislation. Younggirls are often considered an economic burden totheir families; prevailing cultural attitudes mean that itis still difficult for girls to work and earn an income. For families, marrying their daughters to older men indifferent families is often a survival strategy.

Dowry payments, which are a relatively new butgrowing phenomenon in Bangladesh, are lower whengirls are younger, acting as another incentive forfamilies to marry their daughters at a young age. Such marriages are also a way for families to buildtheir social status and to protect girls' sexuality in anenvironment that is perceived to be unsafe — sexualharassment and assault are all too common and eventhe rumour of an inappropriate relationship canpermanently damage a girl's reputation, that of herfamily, and her future prospects. Early marriage has serious consequences for girls. Itsignificantly increases the chances of dropping out ofschool, limiting their future choices. Of 28 pupils whohad gone on to a local high school the previous year,a local primary school teacher told me, 14 haddropped out within a year: seven girls, all due to earlymarriage, and seven boys, who had gone to find workin the garment factories. Girls who marry young face intense pressure tobecome pregnant; in Bangladesh, it is estimated thata third of girls aged between 15 and 19 are mothersor are pregnant. Pregnancy at this age carriessignificant health risks, including higher maternal andinfant mortality. Teenage mothers are twice as likelyto die in childbirth, and babies born to mothers under14 are 50 percent more likely to die than those bornto mothers aged over 20, a situation compounded bythe poor levels of health care in the country, whereless than a quarter of births are attended by amedical professional. In all, around 12,000 womendie every year here simply trying to bring life into thisworld. Eliminating early marriage in such communitiespresents a real challenge to the Bangladeshiauthorities and to the numerous developmentorganizations operating in the country. Legislationhas been an important step — although there is nowalarming pressure to lower the legal age for girls —but it has not changed social attitudes. Even inmiddle class and educated families, it is highlyunusual for people of either sex to remain unmarriedafter the age of 25.

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The successful eradication of early marriage willrequire a grassroots approach, working community bycommunity. From my own experience, parents aredesperately trying to do the best thing for theirdaughters. It is only by educating parents across acommunity about the implications of marrying soyoung that we will start to see a shift in attitudes. Bangladesh is, however, making progress, andgender equality is a national priority alongsideeconomic development. Girls now outnumber boys inprimary and secondary schools. Women are alsomaking gains in the formal labour market, thanks toparticipation in the garment industry and the micro-credit revolution that was started right here inBangladesh. Twenty percent of seats in the nationalparliament are reserved for women, which is belowthe global average of 25 percent but higher than theregional average of 18 percent, according to UNWomen. Women lead both of Bangladesh’s two mainpolitical parties, and the country has had a femaleleader since the early 1990s. I met so many wonderful women during my time inBangladesh. From the young women whovolunteered at a community health clinic to the oldlady who owned a small tea shack to prevent herdaughters-in-law from neglecting her to point ofstarvation, they were a constant reminder of both thestrength of women struggling against poverty and theentrenched gender inequality in Bangladesh — nonemore so than Romana, one of the entrepreneurs ourproject was supporting.

Romana was a young girl when her family told hershe was getting married. However, she managed toresist the pressure and convince her family to allowher to continue her education. It took great courageto stand up to her family and defend her right toeducation. She is now in her early twenties andmarried to a man who is very proud and supportive ofher. She is a quiet and unassuming woman whenyou first meet her, but I was continually impressed byher confidence and determination. Her business willhelp provide employment to a dozen marginalizedwomen and young people, hopefully giving them theopportunity to improve their lives. The path to gender equality is a long and slow onebut putting incomes into the hands of women is onestep on that journey; it results in better nutrition andeducation for their children, and gives them moresocial capital and decision-making power in theirfamilies and communities.

Anderton, V, "A marriage to celebrate: that of gender equality and economic development", Open Canada,29/10/15, www.opencanada.org/features/marriage-celebrate-gender-equality-and-economic-development/

sustainabilityDefinitions of sustainability begin with the idea that development should meetthe needs of the present without compromising the ability of futuregenerations to meet their needs. Sustainability today has three fields ofdebate—environmental, sociopolitical and economic. In global politics,mechanisms and incentives required for political institutions, economic actorsand individuals to take a longer term and more inclusive well-beingperspective in their decision-making are particularly important.

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The Inevitability of Sustainability Politics, Technologyand Management Sustainable development goals: all you need to know Big Holes in the UN Development Goals Are Exposedby New Studies Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need toKnow

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The Inevitability of Sustainability Politics, Technology andManagementWhat are the sustainable development goals?The sustainable development goals (SDGs) are anew, universal set of goals, targets and indicators thatUN member states will be expected to use to frametheir agendas and political policies over the next 15years. The SDGs follow and expand on the millenniumdevelopment goals (MDGs), which were agreed bygovernments in 2001 and are due to expire at the endof this year. Why do we need another set of goals?There is broad agreement that, while the MDGsprovided a focal point for governments – a frameworkaround which they could develop policies andoverseas aid programmes designed to end povertyand improve the lives of poor people – as well as arallying point for NGOs to hold them to account, theywere too narrow. The eight MDGs – reduce poverty and hunger;achieve universal education; promote genderequality; reduce child and maternal deaths; combatHIV, malaria and other diseases; ensureenvironmental sustainability; develop globalpartnerships – failed to consider the root causes ofpoverty and overlooked gender inequality as well asthe holistic nature of development. The goals madeno mention of human rights and did not specificallyaddress economic development. While the MDGs, intheory, applied to all countries, in reality they wereconsidered targets for poor countries to achieve, withfinance from wealthy states. Conversely, everycountry will be expected to work towards achievingthe SDGs. As the MDG deadline approaches, about 1 billionpeople still live on less than $1.25 a day – the WorldBank measure on poverty – and more than 800million people do not have enough food to eat.Women are still fighting hard for their rights, andmillions of women still die in childbirth.

What are the proposed 17 goals?1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere2) End hunger, achieve food security and improvednutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture3) Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for allat all ages4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality educationand promote lifelong learning opportunities for all5) Achieve gender equality and empower all womenand girls6) Ensure availability and sustainable management ofwater and sanitation for all7) Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainableand modern energy for all8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainableeconomic growth, full and productive employment,and decent work for all9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive andsustainable industrialisation, and foster innovation10) Reduce inequality within and among countries11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive,safe, resilient and sustainable12) Ensure sustainable consumption and productionpatterns13) Take urgent action to combat climate change andits impacts (taking note of agreements made by theUNFCCC forum)14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seasand marine resources for sustainable development15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use ofterrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests,combat desertification and halt and reverse landdegradation, and halt biodiversity loss16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies forsustainable development, provide access to justicefor all and build effective, accountable and inclusiveinstitutions at all levels17) Strengthen the means of implementation andrevitalise the global partnership for sustainabledevelopment Within the goals are 169 targets, to put a bit of meaton the bones. Targets under goal one, for example,include reducing by at least half the number of peopleliving in poverty by 2030, and eradicating extremepoverty (people living on less than $1.25 a day).Under goal five, there’s a target on eliminatingviolence against women, while goal 16 has a target topromote the rule of law and equal access to justice.

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Public policy and law can help prevent seriousdamage from these impulses. But the general point isthat the best, most effective managers will besustainability managers and the best runorganizations will adhere to these principles becausethey lead to long-term profitability. A sustainabilityperspective would lead a CEO to question an entireproduction process and to see if there was some wayto manufacture the same good without generatingpollution and waste in the first place.The sustainability perspective is an effort to usedesign, engineering and public policy to makeeconomic production and consumption efficient andeffective. Pollution and poisoning people or the planetmay provide some short-term benefits, but ourexperience with environmental remediation andrestoration tells us that these short-term benefits areconsumed quite rapidly, and are soon replaced bylonger term costs. We might make $50 million sellingthe good that resulted in pollution, but the pollutionmight well cost $500 million to clean up. If you are indoubt, ask BP about the costs of clean-up. Thesustainability perspective asks if there is a way tokeep making the $50 million without needing to paythe $500 million in clean-up costs. The clean-up costsmay seem optional, but if the alternative is to allow akey resource to be destroyed, it must be paid. Since1980 and for the foreseeable future, America’smilitary, industry and citizens will be paying hundredsof billions of dollars to clean up the toxic wastesdumped during the middle of the 20th century. Chinawill soon be facing a similar clean-up bill.In sustainability management, environmentalprotection and efficient use of resources is not addedto a production process but is central to that process.The best run organizations try to minimize their use ofnon-renewable resources and try to reduce theirenvironmental and carbon foot-print. Companies likeWalmart don’t do this because they love nature, butbecause they see it as a way to make money. Itbecomes yet another cost advantage a companyuses to beat the competition.The issue of theenvironment still has a regulatory dimension, becausevaluable and vulnerable natural resources must beprotected from evil and stupid people. Not allcompanies are managed as well as Walmart,Pepisco, Starbucks and the many other companiesthat are working to adopt sustainability management.

But more and more are. And these companies needgovernment to provide reasonable rules as well asincentives for the development of renewable energy,smart grids, and other forms of sustainabilitytechnology and infrastructure.The environmental issue is now part of the overallissue of economic development and economicgrowth. Logic tells us that non-sustainable economicgrowth leads to economic shrinkage. The politics ofsustainability is about protecting the planet so we cancontinue to benefit from the resources and wealth itprovides for us. The evolution of the sustainabilityissue is not well understood by many in the politicalworld, but that is starting to change. Climate changeis only one element of this issue. In many respectsglobal warming must be seen as an impact of the lackof sufficient renewable energy. Ecosystem and oceanpreservation are required to ensure high quality foodand water. Careful development of land is required toprotect ecosystems and a community’s sense of well-being. Sustainability politics is often most visible at the locallevel as communities work to preserve the quality oftheir water supply, air, and way of life. The force ofthis political current should not be underestimated. Itcombines the political salience of economic growthwith the emotional power of parents protecting theirchildren’s future. Sustainability politics is not goingaway, in some ways it has just begun, in many waysit has been with us for a very long time. It wascertainly on John F. Kennedy’s mind almost a halfcentury ago, in June, 1963 when he spoke about theurgency of preventing nuclear war and observed that“Total war ... makes no sense in an age when thedeadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchangewould be carried by wind and water and soil and seedto the far corners of the globe and to generations yetunborn... For in the final analysis, our most basiccommon link is that we all inhabit this small planet.We all breathe the same air. We all cherish ourchildren’s future. And we are all mortal.” Seven yearsbefore the EPA was established, Kennedyunderstood the importance of an interconnectedbiosphere. This awareness has formed theconceptual base for sustainability politics and needsto be understood as a long-term, continuouslygrowing force in our political world.

Cohen, SThe Inevitability of Sustainability Politics, Technology and Management, Huffpost, 24/11/12,www.huffpost.com/entry/sustainability-politics_b_1908969

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How were the goals chosen?Unlike the MDGs, which were drawn up by a group ofmen in the basement of UN headquarters (or so thelegend goes), the UN has conducted the largestconsultation programme in its history to gaugeopinion on what the SDGs should include. Establishing post-2015 goals was an outcome of theRio+20 summit in 2012, which mandated the creationof an open working group to come up with a draftagenda. The open working group, with representatives from70 countries, had its first meeting in March 2013 andpublished its final draft, with its 17 suggestions, inJuly 2014. The draft was presented to the UN generalassembly in September last year. Member statenegotiations followed, and the final wording of thegoals and targets, and the preamble and declarationthat comes with them, were agreed in August 2015. Alongside the open working group discussions, theUN conducted a series of “global conversations”.These included 11 thematic and 83 nationalconsultations, and door-to-door surveys. The UN alsolaunched an online My World survey asking people toprioritise the areas they’d like to see addressed in thegoals. The results of the consultations were fed intothe the working group’s discussions. Are governments happy about the proposed 17goals?The majority seem to be, but a handful of memberstates, including the UK and Japan, aren’t so keen.Some countries feel that an agenda consisting of 17goals is too unwieldy to implement or sell to thepublic, and would prefer a narrower brief. Or so theysay. Some believe the underlying reason is to get ridof some of the more uncomfortable goals, such asthose relating to the environment. Britain’s primeminister, David Cameron, has publicly said he wants12 goals at the most, preferably 10. It’s not clear,though, which goals the UK government would liketaken out if they had the choice.

Amina Mohammed, the UN secretary general’sspecial adviser on post-2015 development planning,said it had been a hard fight to get the number ofgoals down to 17, so there would be strongresistance to reducing them further. Some NGOs also believe there are too many goals,but there is a general consensus that it is better tohave 17 goals that include targets on women’sempowerment, good governance, and peace andsecurity, for example, than fewer goals that don’taddress these issues. How will the goals be measured?The indicators are still being thrashed out by anexpert group. Each indicator is being assessed for itsfeasibility, suitability and relevance, and roughly twofor each target are expected. The indicators are dueto be finalised in March 2016. How will the goals be funded? That’s the trillion-dollar question. Rough calculationsfrom the intergovernmental committee of experts onsustainable development financing have put the costof providing a social safety net to eradicate extremepoverty at about $66bn (£43bn) a year, while annualinvestments in improving infrastructure (water,agriculture, transport, power) could be up to a total of$7tn globally. In its report last year, the committee said publicfinance and aid would be central to support theimplementation of the SDGs. But it insisted thatmoney generated from the private sector, through taxreforms, and through a crackdown on illicit financialflows and corruption, was also vital.

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It included a recommitment to the UN target on aidspending – 0.7% of GNI – set more than 40 yearsago and pledges to collect more taxes and fight taxevasion. But civil society groups were less impressed,saying the summit had failed to produce new moneyto fund the goals, or offer ways to transform theinternational finance system. Calls for a newinternational tax body fell on deaf ears. A major conference on financing for the SDGs, heldin the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in July, failed toease concerns that there will not be enough cash tomeet the aspirational nature of the goals. The UNsaid the Addis Ababa action agenda (AAAA for short)contained “bold measures to overhaul global financepractices and generate investment” for tackling thechallenges of sustainable development.

When will the new goals come into force?The SDGs will be officially adopted at a UN summit inNew York in September, and will become applicablefrom January 2016. The deadline for the SDGS is2030.

Ford, l, "Sustainable development goals: all you need to know", Guardian, 19/1/15,www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/19/sustainable-development-goals-united-nations

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Big Holes in the UN Development Goals Are Exposed byNew StudiesThe sustainable development goals (SDGs) are anew, universal set of goals, targets and indicators thatUN member states will be expected to use to frametheir agendas and political policies over the next 15years. The SDGs follow and expand on the millenniumdevelopment goals (MDGs), which were agreed bygovernments in 2001 and are due to expire at the endof this year. They are finding that the lofty visions that producedthe SDGs, now in their fourth year of implementation,have from the start been undercut and tarnished bypolitical manipulation and a simplistic reliance onmetrics — numbers — based often on dubious orunrealistic data. After years of public commitments in the UnitedNations to human rights and the centrality of womenin development, gender-specific promises have beenwatered down by the SDGs. Human-rights issues arebarely mentioned as well, especially those applying towomen, both in the home and in the community,experts found. The specialists, from academia as well as a few UNagencies, have raised fundamental questions abouthow the SDGs, also known in their entirety as the2030 Agenda, deal with a range of contemporaryissues, among them gender equality, access tojustice, definitions of quality education and thegrowing phenomenon of extreme inequality. The analyses were first published in late January in aspecial issue of the scholarly Global Policy Journal,titled “Knowledge and Politics in Setting andMeasuring the SDGs.” On March 8, the research washighlighted at a panel discussion held at the UN,which brought together some contributors to thepublication. The SDGs were not a remake or a sequel to theMillennium Development Goals. They were a wholenew idea, a framework to be created and monitorednot by UN specialists but by governments around theworld, with no North-South divide. The goals weredesigned to be much more than a plan to endpoverty, as they are often wrongly described.

The ambitious 17 goals and 169 targets wereadopted in 2015 by the UN’s 193 member nationsafter intense, sometimes stormy negotiations. But realtrouble exploded when an expert group appointed bygovernments devised indicators to track thecommitments. They adopted 230 markers. Serge Kapto, a specialist on data for development atthe UN Development Program, recalled in acommentary on the newly published findings howfireworks erupted at the first meeting of the expertgroup at the UN, which could have been amonumental occasion. “But from the beginning,” he wrote, “sparks flew, andthe meeting descended into a shouting match,chaotic at times, between technically mindedstatisticians eager to get started and political mindeddiplomats just emerging from a bruising thoughultimately successful negotiation of the 2030Agenda.” It was an ominous beginning. Since then, Kaptoadded, the expert group “has carefully avoidedmeeting in New York.” Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, the director and a professor atthe Julien J. Studley Graduate Programs inInternational Affairs at The New School in New York,and Desmond McNeill, director of the Center forDevelopment and the Environment at the Universityof Oslo, organized the special Global Policy projectand the UN event on March 8 with the Friedrich EbertStiftung’s New York office. The two scholars wrote a comprehensive introductionto the findings, touching on the major issues involvedin the broad research. Fukuda-Parr, the primary author of the UNDP HumanDevelopment Reports from 1995 to 2004, is a leadingresearcher and author on human rights anddevelopment, global health and global goal setting. “Until the SDGs, development agendas werequalitative statements of important social and politicalpriorities,” she and McNeill wrote. “Quantitativetargets were often included in these agendas, butonly selectively on a few actionable priorities.

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“The SDGs were the first to use goal setting as aprocess for elaborating and negotiating a UNdevelopment agenda, and deliberately adopting thelanguage of numbers to articulate global norms. . . .But the reliance on targets and indicators can distortthe meaning of social norms, create perverseincentives, frame hegemonic discourses and disruptpower structures,” the authors said, adding thatindicators, “unwittingly or not,” can lead tomisinterpretation and modification of a goal’s intent. Other examples of flaws cited in Global Policyinclude: • Margaret Satterthwaite, a professor of clinical lawand director of the Center for Human Rights andGlobal Justice at New York University School of Law,and Sukti Dhital, deputy director of the Robert L.Bernstein Institute for Human Rights at the lawschool, wrote: “The choice of SDG indicators has importantsignaling, knowledge and governance effects. Theseeffects may be especially pronounced for issues thatare newly on the global monitoring agenda. This isespecially true for the core human rights issue ofaccess to justice set out in SDG 16.3. While theofficial indicators for this target capture essentialcriminal justice phenomena, the exclusion of accessto civil justice is so severe that it must be corrected. “What’s needed is the adoption of an indicator forwhich data can be gathered through a well designed,inclusive survey module that assesses the ability ofordinary citizens to obtain resolutions to theireveryday justice problems. . . . Only once thosechallenges are targeted and measured will we beable to build equitable and dignified justice systemsfor all.” • Shahra Razavi, the chief of research and data at UNWomen, commenting on the Global Policy papersfrom her perspective, wrote that the “slippage inambition” in the SDGs “certainly applies to in the caseof women’s rights, with the ambition to have genderequality as a cross-cutting issue sometimesevaporating as the targets were set and the indicatorsselected.”

The goals most relevant to women, Razavi added,were often “gender sparse” or “gender blind.” Shecited Goal 6 as an example. It covers ensuring waterand sanitation for all. “Not only are safe drinking water and sanitationessential for the full enjoyment of life and humanrights, they are particularly important for women andgirls who most often are the primary users, providersand managers of water in their households,” shewrote. “When safe drinking water is not available athome, women and girls are the ones who are forcedto travel long distances to fetch the water.” • Sara Burke, the senior expert on global economicpolicies at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in New York,and Bettina Luise Rürup, executive director of theFES office at the UN, provided an overview of theGlobal Policy Journal. They wrote that the publicationof the collected research papers shows how theSDGs have been “consistently watered down andeven distorted in the power struggle over who definesdevelopment. “The roots of the power struggle over global goals liein conflicting theories of economic and social changeembraced by different development actors: nationalgovernments, civil society groups, multilateralagencies and the private sector. . . . Like a Trojanhorse, each indicator conceals the theories of changeand development that lie within, exerting theirinterpretive influence,” the authors wrote. “While we all enjoy a good mystery, we are notdetectives and cannot yet know the overall impactthis power struggle over indicators is having now onthe SDGs. However, this special ‘political thriller’issue of Global Policy Journal reveals the darkunderbelly of competing interests in the 2030 Agendaand their sometimes mysterious unintendedconsequences.”

Crossette, B, "Big Holes in the UN Development GoalsAre Exposed by New Studies", PassBlue, 18/3/19,

www.passblue.com/2019/03/18/big-holes-in-the-un-development-goals-are-exposed-by-new-studies/

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Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know

What Is the Paris Agreement?The Paris Agreement is a landmark environmentalaccord that was adopted by nearly every nation in2015 to address climate change and its negativeimpacts. The deal aims to substantially reduce globalgreenhouse gas emissions in an effort to limit theglobal temperature increase in this century to 2degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, whilepursuing means to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees.The agreement includes commitments from all majoremitting countries to cut their climate-altering pollutionand to strengthen those commitments over time. Thepact provides a pathway for developed nations toassist developing nations in their climate mitigationand adaptation efforts, and it creates a framework forthe transparent monitoring, reporting, and ratchetingup of countries’ individual and collective climategoals. History of the Paris AgreementHammered out over two weeks in Paris during theUnited Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange’s (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties(COP21) and adopted on December 12, 2015, theParis Agreement marked an historic turning point forglobal climate action, as world leaders representing195 nations came to a consensus on an accord thathas commitments from all countries aimed atcombating climate change and adapting to itsimpacts. President Obama was able to formally enter theUnited States into the agreement under internationallaw through executive action, since it imposed no newlegal obligations on the country. The United Stateshas a number of tools already on the books, underlaws already passed by Congress, to cut carbonpollution. The country formally joined the agreementin September 2016 after submitting its proposal forparticipation. The Paris Agreement could not takeeffect until at least 55 nations representing at least 55percent of global emissions had formally joined. Thishappened on October 5, 2016, and the agreementwent into force 30 days later on November 4, 2016.

How Many Countries Are in the Paris Agreement?At present, 197 countries—every nation on earth, withthe last signatory being war-torn Syria—have adoptedthe Paris Agreement. Of those, 179 have solidifiedtheir climate proposals with formal approval—including the United States, for now. The only majoremitting countries that have yet to formally join theagreement are Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The Paris Agreement and TrumpFollowing through on a campaign promise, Trump—aclimate denier who has claimed climate change is a“hoax” perpetuated by China—announced in June2017 his intent to withdraw the United States from theParis Agreement. Yet notwithstanding the president’sdeclaration from the Rose Garden that “We’re gettingout,” it’s not quite that easy. The process forwithdrawing requires that the agreement be in forcefor three years before any country can formallyannounce its intention to drop out. Then it has to waita year before actually leaving the pact. This meansthe earliest the United States could officially exit isNovember 4, 2020—a day after the presidentialelection. Even a formal withdrawal wouldn’tnecessarily be permanent, experts say; a futurepresident could rejoin in as short as a month’s time. Since Trump’s announcement, U.S. envoys havecontinued to participate—as mandated—in U.N.climate negotiations to solidify details of theagreement. Meanwhile, thousands of leadersnationwide have stepped in to fill the void created bythe lack of federal climate leadership, reflecting thewill of the vast majority of Americans who support theParis Agreement. Among city and state officials,businesses leaders, universities, and private citizens,there has been a groundswell of participation ininitiatives such as America’s Pledge, the UnitedStates Climate Alliance, We Are Still In, and theAmerican Cities Climate Challenge. Thecomplementary and sometimes overlappingmovements aim to deepen and accelerate efforts totackle climate change at the local, regional, andnational levels. Each of these efforts is focused onkeeping the United States working toward the goalsof the Paris Agreement despite the attempts byTrump to take the country in the opposite direction.

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Paris Agreement SummaryThe 32-page document establishes a framework forglobal climate action, including the mitigation of andadaptation to climate change, support for developingnations, and the transparent reporting andstrengthening of climate goals. Here’s what it aims todo: Limit global temperature rise by reducinggreenhouse gas emissions.In an effort to “significantly reduce the risks andimpacts of climate change,” the accord calls forlimiting the global average temperature rise in thiscentury to well below 2 degrees Celsius, whilepursuing efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1.5degrees. It also asks countries to work to achieve aleveling-off of global greenhouse gas emissions assoon as possible and to become carbon neutral nolater than the second half of this century. To achievethese objectives, 186 countries—responsible for morethan 90 percent of global emissions—submittedcarbon reduction targets, known as “intendednationally determined contributions” (INDCs), prior tothe Paris conference. These targets outlined eachcountry’s commitments for curbing emissions(including through the preservation of carbon sinks)through 2025 or 2030, including both economy-widecarbon-cutting goals and the individual commitmentsof some 2,250 cities and 2,025 companies. INDCs turn into NDCs—nationally determinedcontributions—once a country formally joins theagreement. There are no specific requirements abouthow or how much countries should cut emissions, butthere have been political expectations about the typeand stringency of targets by various countries. As aresult, national plans vary greatly in scope andambition, largely reflecting each country’s capabilities,its level of development, and its contribution toemissions over time. China, for example, committedto leveling off its carbon emissions no later than 2030and reducing carbon emissions per unit of grossdomestic product (GDP) by 60 to 65 percent from2005 levels by 2030. India set its sights on cuttingemissions intensity by 33 to 35 percent below 2005levels and generating 40 percent of its electricity fromnon-fossil-fuel sources by 2030.

The United States—the world’s largest historicalemitter and the second-biggest current carbon emitterafter China—committed to cutting overall greenhousegas emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levelsby 2025. U.S. initiatives to achieve the target includethe Clean Power Plan (a state-by-state program tocut carbon pollution from the power sector) and thetightening of automotive fuel economy standards toreduce transportation emissions—both policies theTrump administration is working hard to roll back. Provide a framework for transparency,accountability, and the achievement of moreambitious targets.The Paris Agreement includes a series of mandatorymeasures for the monitoring, verification, and publicreporting of progress toward a country’s emissions-reduction targets. The enhanced transparency rulesapply common frameworks for all countries, withaccommodations and support provided for nationsthat currently lack the capacity to enable them tostrengthen their systems over time. Among other requirements, countries must reporttheir greenhouse gas inventories and progressrelative to their targets, allowing outside experts toevaluate their success. Countries are also expectedto revisit their pledges by 2020 and put forward newtargets every five years, with the goal of furtherdriving down emissions. They must participate in a“global stocktake” to measure collective efforts towardmeeting the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals aswell. Meanwhile, developed countries also have toestimate how much financial assistance they’llallocate to developing nations to help them reduceemissions and adapt to the impacts of climatechange. These transparency and accountability provisions aresimilar to those in the frameworks of otherinternational agreements. While the system doesn’tinclude financial penalties, the requirements areaimed at making the progress of individual nationseasy to track and fostering a sense of global peerpressure, discouraging any dragging of feet amongcountries that may consider doing so.

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Mobilize support for climate change mitigationand adaptation in developing nations.Recognizing that many developing countries andsmall island nations that have contributed the least toclimate change could suffer the most from itsconsequences, the Paris Agreement includes a planfor developed countries—and others “in a position todo so”—to continue to provide financial resources tohelp developing countries mitigate and increaseresilience to climate change. The agreement buildson the financial commitments of the 2009Copenhagen Accord, which aimed to scale up publicand private climate finance for developing nations to$100 billion a year by 2020. (To put that intoperspective, global military spending in 2017 alonewas about $1.7 trillion, more than a third of whichcame from the United States.) The Copenhagen pactalso created the Green Climate Fund to help mobilizetransformational finance using targeted public dollars.The Paris Agreement established the expectation thatthe world would set a higher annual goal by 2025 tobuild on the $100 billion target for 2020 and would putmechanisms in place to achieve that scaling up. While developed nations are not legally bound tocontribute a specific amount to the mitigation andadaptation efforts of developing countries, they areencouraged to provide financial support and arerequired to report on the financing they supply or willmobilize. Why Is the Paris Agreement Important?Rarely is there consensus among nearly all nationson a single topic. But with the Paris accord, leadersfrom around the world collectively agreed that climatechange is driven by human behavior, that it’s a threatto the environment and all of humanity, and thatglobal action is needed to stop it. It also created aclear framework for all countries to make emissionsreduction commitments and strengthen those actionsover time. Here are some key reasons why theagreement is so important:

Human-generated emissions cause globalwarming.Carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane aregases that collect in the atmosphere and prevent heatfrom radiating from earth’s surface into space,creating what’s known as the greenhouse effect.According to the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC), the leading international scientificbody studying the subject, the concentration of theseheat-trapping gases has increased substantially sincepreindustrial times to levels not seen in at least800,000 years. Carbon dioxide (the chief contributorto climate change) is up by 40 percent, nitrous oxideby 20 percent, and methane by a whopping 150percent since 1750—mainly from the burning of dirtyfossil fuels. The IPCC says it’s “extremely likely” thatthese emissions are mostly to blame for the rise inglobal temperatures since the 1950s. Meanwhile,deforestation and forest degradation have contributedtheir fair share of global carbon emissions as well. Global warming threatens climate systems.Hotter temperatures—both on land and at sea—alterglobal weather patterns and change how and whereprecipitation falls. Those shifting patterns exacerbatedangerous and deadly drought, heat waves, floods,wildfires, and storms, including hurricanes. They alsomelt ice caps, glaciers, and layers of permafrost,which can lead to rising sea levels and coastalerosion. Warmer temperatures impact wholeecosystems as well, throwing migration patterns andlife cycles out of whack. For example, an early springcan induce trees and plants to flower before bees andother pollinators have emerged. While global warmingmay equate to longer growing seasons and higherfood production in some regions, areas alreadycoping with water scarcity are expected to becomedrier, creating the potential for drought, failed crops,or wildfires. Climate change endangers human health.As climate change fuels temperature increases andextreme weather events, it jeopardizes our air, water,and food; spreads disease; and imperils our homesand safety. We are confronting a growing publichealth crisis.

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- Extreme heat contributes directly to cardiovasculardeaths and respiratory disease. In the Indian city ofAhmedabad, for example, more than 1,300 excessdeaths were recorded during a heat wave in May2010. High temperatures also reduce air quality bycreating more smog, pollen, and other air-borneallergens—all of which can trigger asthma, whichafflicts 235 million people around the world. Extremeheat can also exacerbate drought, leading tomalnutrition and famine. - Changing weather patterns can impact sources offresh water and food. While drought creates waterscarcity, floods can contaminate drinking watersupplies, increasing the risk of water-borne diseasesand illnesses spread by disease-carrying insects,such as mosquitoes. Unpredictable weather patternsand water supplies can also wreak havoc onagriculture and food supplies, particularly in regionsof the world that are less climate-resilient and wherestaple food crops are critical for survival. - Extreme weather and rising seas can destroyhomes, public infrastructure, and entire ways of life—forcing people to move or migrate, displacing wholepopulations, and increasing the threat of civil unrest.Indeed, the World Economic Forum ranks extremeweather, natural disasters, and our collective failureto mitigate and adapt to climate change as among thegreatest threats facing humanity in the comingdecade. We’re already experiencing some of thosedangers. In the United States, six recent naturaldisasters equated to tens of thousands ofhospitalizations and ER and doctor visits, as well asmore than 1,600 premature deaths. In 2017 alone, 16extreme weather–related disasters cost the country arecord-breaking $306 billion in damages. The countries hardest hit by the impact of climatechange will be low-lying nations uniquely vulnerableto sea level rise and developing countries that lackthe resources to adapt to temperature andprecipitation changes. But wealthy nations such asthe United States are increasingly vulnerable as well.Indeed, many millions of Americans—particularlychildren, the elderly, and the impoverished—arealready suffering climate change’s wrath.

Global warming can be mitigated only with globalaction.The IPCC notes that climate change will be limitedonly by “substantial and sustained reductions ingreenhouse gas emissions.” While one can debatethe merits of using a single global temperaturethreshold to represent dangerous climate change, thegeneral scientific view is that any rise in globaltemperatures of more than 2 degrees Celsius wouldbe an unacceptable risk—potentially resulting in massextinctions, more severe droughts and hurricanes,and a watery Arctic. Furthermore, as the IPCC notes,while it remains uncertain precisely how much globalwarming will “trigger abrupt and irreversible changes”in the earth’s systems, the risk of crossing thethreshold only increases as temperatures rise.To avoid major changes to life as we know it, globalaction must be taken. Hence, the Paris Agreement,which sets the ultimate goal of capping globalwarming rise this century to 1.5 degrees Celsius.Indeed, the seemingly small difference between 1.5and 2 degrees could have a dramatic impact on low-lying nations and coral reefs. What Are the Paris Agreement's Costs?There’s a lot of misinformation out there about theParis Agreement, including the idea that it will hurt theU.S. economy. That was among a number ofunfounded claims Trump repeated in his 2017 RoseGarden address, arguing that the accord would costthe U.S. economy $3 trillion by 2040 and $2.7 millionjobs by 2025, making us less competitive againstChina and India. But as fact checkers noted, thesestatistics originated from a debunked March 2017study that exaggerated the future costs of emissionsreductions, underestimated advances in energyefficiency and clean energy technologies, and outrightignored the huge health and economic costs ofclimate change itself.

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In fact, research makes clear that the cost of climateinaction far outweighs the cost of reducing carbonpollution. One recent study suggests that if the UnitedStates failed to meet its Paris climate goals, it couldcost the economy as much as $6 trillion in the comingdecades. A worldwide failure to meet the NDCscurrently laid out in the agreement could reduceglobal GDP more than 25 percent by century’s end.Meanwhile, another study estimates that meeting—oreven exceeding—the Paris goals via infrastructureinvestments in both clean energy and energyefficiency could have major global rewards—to thetune of some $19 trillion. In terms of employment, the clean energy sectoralready employs more than 3 million Americans—about 14 times the number of coal, gas, oil, and otherfossil fuel industry workers—and has the potential toemploy many more with further investments in energyefficiency, renewable energy, and electric gridmodernization to replace the aging coal-poweredinfrastructure. Indeed, moving forward with the CleanPower Plan alone could deliver more than a half-million new jobs by 2030. Meanwhile, coal jobs aren’tso much being transferred “out of America”—anotherTrump claim—as they are falling victim to marketforces as renewable and natural gas prices decline. Finally, rather than giving China and India a pass topollute, as Trump claims, the pact represents the firsttime those two major developing economies haveagreed to concrete and ambitious climatecommitments. Both countries, which are alreadypoised to lead the world in renewable energy, havemade significant progress to meet their Paris goals.And since Trump announced his intent to withdrawthe United States from the accord, the leaders ofChina and India have reaffirmed their commitmentand continued to implement domestic measurestoward achieving their targets.

International Agreements on Climate ChangeThe Paris Agreement is the culmination of decades ofinternational efforts to combat climate change. Hereis a brief history. United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChangeIn 1992, President George H.W. Bush joined 107other heads of state at the Rio Earth Summit in Brazilto adopt a series of environmental agreements,including the UNFCCC framework that remains ineffect today. The international treaty aims to preventdangerous human interference with earth’s climatesystems over the long term. The pact sets no limitson greenhouse gas emissions for individual countriesand contains no enforcement mechanisms, butinstead establishes a framework for internationalnegotiations of future agreements, or protocols, to setbinding emissions targets. Participating countriesmeet annually at a Conference of the Parties (COP)to assess their progress and continue talks on how tobest tackle climate change. Kyoto ProtocolThe Kyoto Protocol, a landmark environmental treatythat was adopted in 1997 at the COP3 in Japan,represents the first time nations agreed to legallymandated, country-specific emissions reductiontargets. The protocol, which didn’t go into effect until2005, set binding emissions reduction targets fordeveloped countries only, on the premise that theywere responsible for most of the earth’s high levels ofgreenhouse gas emissions. The United States initiallysigned the agreement but never ratified it; PresidentGeorge W. Bush argued that the deal would hurt theU.S. economy since developing nations such asChina and India were not included. Without theparticipation of those three countries, the treaty’seffectiveness proved limited, with its targets coveringonly a small fraction of total global emissions. The Kyoto Protocol’s initial commitment periodextended through 2012. That year, at the COP18 inDoha, Qatar, delegates agreed to extend the accorduntil 2020 (without some developed nations that haddropped out).

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They also reaffirmed their 2011 pledge from theCOP17 in Durban, South Africa, to create a new,comprehensive climate treaty by 2015 that wouldrequire all big emitters not included in the KyotoProtocol—such as China, India, and the UnitedStates—to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.The new treaty—what would become the ParisAgreement—was to fully replace the Kyoto Protocolby 2020. However, the Paris accord went into effectearlier than expected, in November 2016. Kyoto Protocol Versus the Paris AgreementWhile the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement bothset out to address climate change, there are somekey differences between them.Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which established legallybinding emissions reduction targets (as well aspenalties for noncompliance) for developed nationsonly, the Paris Agreement requires that all countries—rich, poor, developed, and developing—do theirpart and slash greenhouse gas emissions. To thatend, greater flexibility is built into the ParisAgreement: No language is included on thecommitments countries should make, nations canvoluntarily set their emissions targets (NDCs), andcountries incur no penalties for falling short of theirproposed targets. What the Paris Agreement doesrequire, however, is the monitoring, reporting, andreassessing of individual and collective countrytargets over time in an effort to move the world closerto the broader objectives of the deal. And theagreement sets forth a requirement for countries toannounce their next round of targets every five years—unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which aimed for thatobjective but didn’t include a specific requirement toachieve it. Beyond ParisWhile the Paris Agreement ultimately aims to capglobal temperature rise at 1.5 degrees Celsius in thiscentury, many studies evaluating the voluntarypledges individual countries made in Paris show thatthe cumulative effect of those emissions reductionswon’t be large enough to keep temperatures underthat cap. Indeed, the targets countries laid out areexpected to limit future temperature rise to between2.7 and 3.7 degrees Celsius.

Meanwhile, current evaluations of how countries areperforming in the context of their Paris climate goalsindicate some nations are already falling short of theircommitments However, it’s important to remember the ParisAgreement isn’t static. Instead, it’s designed to boostcountries’ national efforts over time—meaning thatcurrent commitments represent the floor, not theceiling, of climate change ambition. The heavy lifting—reining in emissions even further by 2030 and 2050—still needs to be done, and the accord provides thetools to ensure that happens. Reflecting the collective belief of nearly every nationon earth that climate change is humanity’s war tofight, the Paris Agreement exposes America’s climateskeptics—including Trump—as global outliers. In fact,the mobilization of support for climate action acrossthe country and the world provides hope that theParis Agreement marked a turning point in the fightagainst climate change. We can all contribute to thecause by seeking opportunities to slash globalwarming contributions—at the individual, local, andnational levels. The effort will be well worth thereward of a safer, cleaner world for futuregenerations.

Denchak, M, "Paris Climate Agreement:Everything You Need to Know", NRDC, 12/12/18,

https://www.nrdc.org/stories/paris-climate-agreement-everything-you-need-know

peacePeace is often defined as both the absence of conflict and violence as well as astate of harmonious relations. Many also refer to peace as a personal state ofnon-conflict, particularly with oneself and with one’s relationship to others.Peace is the ultimate goal of many organizations that monitor and regulatesocial relationships.

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Peacemaking Is More Complicated Than Ever. TheParis Peace Forum Shows Why The Northern Ireland Peace Process No enlightenment yet: affirmative Nonkilling forPositive Peace Why Syrian Women Could Be the Key to SuccessfulPeace Talks

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Peacemaking Is More Complicated Than Ever. The ParisPeace Forum Shows WhyPeace is complicated. That is the overriding, if unintended, message of thisweek’s Paris Peace Forum, a new multilateralconclave initiated by the French government tocommemorate the end of World War I The organizers claim that the event is based on the“simple idea” that “international cooperation is key totackling global challenges and ensuring durablepeace.” That is pretty much where the simplicity ends,however. Over 100 groups from around the world arein Paris to present their ideas about peace to 2,500participants. Their approaches to the issue are, to putit mildly, eclectic. One organization hopes to promote harmonybetween Israelis and Palestinians through projects toprotect barn owls. Another wants an internationalvillage on the moon. Nobody seems to favor breedingowls in space. But the forum will be an annual event,so this idea may yet emerge. The discussions in Paris will range from cybersecurityand financial transparency to safeguardingcommunities in poor countries. If this sounds a bitdiffuse, it reflects the state of international debatesabout peace and security today. Violence is takingincreasingly complex forms in different societies. Thethreats arising from new technologies like artificialintelligence are mind-bogglingly difficult to grasp.Trying to have a focused chat about “peace” is nowalmost impossible. This is hardly unprecedented. It has been a long timesince international relations theorists thought peaceand conflict was a simple matter of fights and dealsbetween sovereign states. Since the 19th century,successive advocates of peace have worked up evermore ambitious visions of international law,humanitarian aid, arms control, human rights andpeacekeeping. Today’s policymakers are simultaneously theinheritors, beneficiaries and victims of this longprocess.

The idea of peace as a noble, cosmopolitan goal isnow baked into many political cultures, especially inEurope. The last weekend has shown thatcommemorations of World War I can still strike apowerful chord with the public, even if theconflagration is now distant history. For believers in international cooperation, such asFrench President Emmanuel Macron, this heritage isa source of enduring political leverage. There isnothing quite like a solemn memorial to past wars toget foreign leaders to gather and talk more or lessconstructively. More substantively, supporters ofinternational peace and security have managed toconstruct an unprecedentedly dense network ofinternational and regional organizations to handleconflicts. This institutional legacy is also on display in Paris.The Peace Forum’s institutional partners includeUnited Nations agencies, numerous Europeaninstitutions, the Red Cross and philanthropic bodieslike the U.S.-based Ford Foundation, which has along history of backing peace projects. Foreign policyanalysts often lament the political and operationalflaws of these bodies. Yet the capacity of thismultiplicity of actors to mitigate today’s conflictsshould not be underrated. It is easier to grasp this by looking at a specific crisisthan a grand meeting like the Paris forum. TakeSomalia. The African Union, European Union andU.N. all have missions on the ground working tostand up a new state in one of the world’s weakestcountries. A plethora of international NGOs and aidbodies are also on board. It is a messy setup withmany inefficiencies. But the number of institutionalplayers involved is a testament to how the globalconflict management system has grown, creating aframework to make peace in very hard cases. The legacy of peacebuilding efforts since World War Imay ultimately be a global system that is toocumbersome to function.

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And yet the transaction costs of this growth are alsohigh. The international peace industry has evolvederratically and is struggling to cope with new threats.The secretariats of multilateral bodies like the U.N.are locked in interminable turf wars over who “owns”each particular crisis. The governance structures ofthese organizations, such as the U.N. SecurityCouncil, look creaky. In a new era of competitivemultipolarity, established powers like the U.S. andFrance find themselves trapped in destructive battlesover multilateral rules and norms with rivals likeChina. The legacy of a century of earnest, and oftenproductive, efforts at international peacebuilding sinceWorld War I may ultimately be a global system that istoo cumbersome to function. Facing these constraints, advocates for peace arecasting about for new ways to fix the world’sproblems. There are three broad trends in theseefforts, all on display in the Paris Peace Forum. These could be dubbed the globalist, entrepreneurialand localist strands of peacemaking. The globalists hanker after an overarching strategicnarrative about the need for global harmony. Theylink maintaining international peace and security tothe fight against climate change and fulfilling theU.N.’s Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs.U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has,unsurprisingly, emerged as a leading voice for thissort of interconnected thinking. The entrepreneurs may buy this logic, but their basicinstinct is to assume that nonstate actors, like citiesand corporations, can fix problems that governmentscan’t tackle alone. Champions of this school includebillionaires-turned-activists like former Microsoft chiefBill Gates and former New York Mayor MichaelBloomberg.

By contrast, localists tend to distrust grand strategiclogics of peace altogether and emphasize the need tolook at grassroots tensions in specific communities tounderstand conflict. This approach, with its embraceof complexity, seems especially attractive toacademic experts with time to explore the nuances ofconflict zones, such as Columbia University’sSeverine Autesserre and American University’sSusanna Campbell. Thoughtful experts inorganizations like the U.N. are also increasinglyconvinced of the need for a deeper understanding of,and involvement in, such ground-level tensions andfights. All these approaches have real value. Smartpolicymakers can mix and match them to addressspecific crises. If you want to tackle violence in theSahel, for example, you need to grasp both theimpact of climate change on the region and highlylocalized farmer-herder security dynamics. Nonetheless, there is a risk that debates over how wemake and maintain peace will become even morediffuse moving forward, making it harder to shapecoherent responses to future threats. This risk is only compounded by the proliferation ofnew technologies that could cause disruption in thefuture, each involving specific and often ratherhermetic expert communities. The variety andintricacy of threats to international peace and securityare expanding. The organizers of the Paris PeaceForum deserve huge credit for aiming to capture all ofthem in their event. With luck, the forum will identify answers to some ofthe threats we face. They won’t be simple.

Gowan, R, "Peacemaking Is More Complicated Than Ever. The Paris Peace Forum Shows Why", WorldPolitics Review, 12/11/18, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26722/peacemaking-is-more-

complicated-than-ever-the-paris-peace-forum-shows-why

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The Northern Ireland Peace Process

IntroductionNorthern Ireland, a long-contested region of theUnited Kingdom, experienced decades of conflictbetween the late 1960s and the late 1990s thatclaimed more than thirty-five hundred lives. The era,known as the Troubles, largely pitted the historicallydominant Protestants against the Catholic minority. Apeace deal struck in April 1998 created a power-sharing government that included political forcesaligned with armed groups. Twenty years later, most of the Belfast Agreement—usually called the Good Friday Agreement—has beenimplemented. Although paramilitary groups still exist,they have mostly disarmed, and to a large extentviolence has ceased. However, with Belfast’s mainpolitical institutions suspended and Brexit throwinglong-standing assumptions into doubt, NorthernIreland’s future is far from assured

What has driven the conflict in Northern Ireland?Northern Ireland’s modern period of conflict started inthe late 1960s and lasted more than three decades.What started as a civil rights movement—Catholicsprotesting what they saw as discrimination byNorthern Ireland’s Protestant-dominated government—deteriorated into violence, with the involvement ofparamilitary groups on both sides and the arrival in1969 of the British Army. The conflict involved mostly Protestant loyalists, whowanted to remain part of the United Kingdom, againstmostly Catholic republicans, who wished to unite withthe Republic of Ireland. Protestant unionists andCatholic nationalists shared their respectivecommunities’ goals but tended to eschew violence.

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What is the Good Friday Agreement?Reached in 1998, the Good FridayAgreement provided a framework for politicalsettlement in Northern Ireland centered on power-sharing between unionists and nationalists. It wassigned by the British and Irish governments, as wellas four of the major political parties in NorthernIreland: Sinn Fein, the Ulster Unionist Party, theSocial Democratic and Labour Party, and the AllianceParty. Among major parties, only the DemocraticUnionist Party (DUP) abstained. While the agreementconfirmed that Northern Ireland is a part of the UnitedKingdom, it stipulates that Ireland could be united ifthat was supported in a vote by majorities in bothNorthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The agreement called for the devolution of authorityover certain policy areas from the UK Parliament to anewly created assembly in Belfast, and it paved theway for paramilitary groups to abandon their weaponsand join the political process. It has contributed to asharp reduction in violence, and the annual conflict-related death toll, which peaked at 480 in 1972, hasdropped to the single digits in recent years. What is the governing structure of NorthernIreland?The government in Northern Ireland is composed oftwo main bodies, both based at the Stormont Estatein Belfast. A popularly elected, ninety-memberassembly legislates on matters such as trade, health,education, and agriculture. The assembly requiressupport from both unionists and nationalists to makeimportant decisions, ensuring that neither candominate. A cabinet-like executive administers thegovernment. It is chaired by a first minister and adeputy first minister, one from each main tradition. Sofar, the first minister has always been a unionist andthe deputy first minister a nationalist or republican. Has the Good Friday Agreement beensuccessful?Distrust among the factions persisted for years afterthe accord. Political jockeying over devolution—thetransfer of police, judicial, and other powers fromLondon to Belfast—and the decommissioning ofparamilitary groups’ weapons hinderedimplementation of the Good Friday Agreement.

While London devolved local powers in late 1999,political turmoil in Northern Ireland prompted it toreimpose direct rule in 2000 and again in 2002.London only restored the devolved government in2007, with the breakthrough St. Andrews Agreement,signed by the UK and Irish governments andNorthern Ireland’s main parties. By then, the DUPwas the largest unionist party and Sinn Fein thelargest among nationalists and republicans. Another milestone came in 2010, with theHillsborough Agreement, in which Sinn Fein and theDUP finally agreed on terms for the devolution ofpolicing and justice functions, as well as a roadmapfor managing sectarian parades. By the mid-2010s,the political institutions envisioned in the Good FridayAgreement were generally functioning well, as partieswith starkly differing views served together ingovernment. What is the status of Northern Ireland’sgovernment?The relative political stability in Belfast began tounravel in 2017, when an energy scandal precipitatedthe resignation of Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness asdeputy first minister. This caused the executive’scollapse and led to fresh elections for the assembly inMarch 2017. However, more than two years after thevote, the two largest parties remain unable to resolvetheir differences, and Northern Ireland remainswithout a government. Faced with this impasse, London could call newelections or resume direct rule. It has so far avoidedeither option, preferring to encourage continuednegotiations, though in 2017 and 2018 it set NorthernIreland’s budget, tax rates, and related provisions. What were the results of the 2017 elections?Though the 2017 vote did not lead to a restoredassembly, Sinn Fein was largely seen as the winner.While the DUP remained the single largest party, thetwo largest nationalist parties, including Sinn Fein,won thirty-nine seats versus the two largest unionistparties, which won thirty-eight.

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This ended the unionist parties’ long-standing pluralityin the assembly, a result indicative of NorthernIreland’s demographic shifts. As of the last census,the minority Catholic population has increased to 45percent of Northern Ireland’s 1.8 million people, whileProtestants, no longer a majority, now make up just48 percent. Despite this electoral setback, the DUP gainedinfluence in London in June 2017, when UK PrimeMinister Theresa May lost her Conservative Party’smajority in parliament and allied with the DUP toremain in power. May promised some $1.4 billion innew funding for Northern Ireland, but Sinn Feinleaders criticized the deal as imperiling the UKgovernment’s impartiality and its commitment to theGood Friday Agreement. What are the outstanding challenges?Recent disagreements have centered on languageand culture. Sinn Fein seeks legislation to promotethe Irish language, while the DUP insists on a similarmeasure for Ulster Scots, which is traditionallyspoken by the descendants of Protestants who cameto Northern Ireland from Scotland. Sinn Fein,meanwhile, has undergone a generational shift inleadership, with the 2017 death of McGuinness andthe retirement of long-time republican leader GerryAdams as party president.Other issues also continue to cause friction. Paradesand marches—held mainly but not exclusively byProtestant groups—can have heavily sectarianundertones. The same is true of flags and emblems,displayed by all sides on lampposts and buildings.Moreover, Northern Ireland’s leaders have neverdeveloped a comprehensive approach to the legacyof past violence, as some other postconflict societieshave. Efforts to prosecute those responsible forkillings and to pursue other initiatives have beenuneven, something analysts say has hinderedreconciliation.

These issues—parades, flags, and the legacy of thepast—were the subject of 2013 negotiations chairedby Richard N. Haass, president of the Council onForeign Relations, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, anadjunct senior fellow at CFR. The talks, whichinvolved the five main political parties, did notproduce an agreement, though many of the proposals—including establishing a historical investigations unitto look into unsolved deaths during the conflict and acommission to help victims get information aboutrelatives’ deaths—formed a large part of the StormontHouse Agreement, reached in 2014. Implementationof that agreement has lagged, however. How will Brexit affect Northern Ireland’seconomy?A majority of Northern Ireland’s people—almost 56percent—voted for the UK to remain in the EU. TheDUP was alone among Northern Ireland’s mainparties in supporting Brexit. A significant amount ofdirect funding is at stake: the EU provides NorthernIreland with nearly a billion euros a year foragriculture, employment, and projects related to thepeace process. But the most contentious issue is Northern Ireland’sborder with the Republic of Ireland. The border, whichwas heavily militarized during the conflict, has sincebecome essentially invisible, with people and goodscrossing freely. The UK’s only land border, it is set tobecome an external EU border when the UKwithdraws from the bloc. This poses a fundamental challenge to Prime MinisterMay, who has insisted that the UK will leave the EU’ssingle market, the arrangement that allows tariff-freetrade and the free movement of services, people, andmoney. May has also pledged to leave the EU’scustoms union, whose members apply common tariffsto goods coming from outside the bloc. Instead, sheis seeking a trade agreement with the EU that has yetto be defined.

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It is not clear whether leaving the single market andcustoms union can be reconciled with avoiding a so-called hard border subject to customs andimmigration checks. While people might continue totravel freely thanks to a separate UK-Irelandagreement, the Common Travel Area, goods areanother matter. One possibility is that NorthernIreland could keep its customs rules aligned withthose of the EU, eliminating the need for borderchecks. This is the idea behind the so-called Irishbackstop, a part of the deal May has sought with theEU that would maintain Northern Ireland as part ofthe EU customs union and single market until apermanent trade deal is worked out. But that hasbecome a sticking point for hard-line Brexiteers inMay’s party who reject any measure that would keepany part of the UK tied to EU regulations. Could Brexit threaten the peace process?Some observers fear that the UK’s impendingdeparture from the EU threatens the Good FridayAgreement; they include Tony Blair, the UK primeminister who presided over the accord. Ireland’sprime minister, Leo Varadkar, echoed this point inMarch 2018, arguing that Brexit “threatens to drive awedge between Britain and Ireland, betweenNorthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, andpotentially between the two communities in NorthernIreland.” Sinn Fein leaders have called Brexit “themost serious threat in the history of the peaceprocess.”

That is because the agreement established intricatearrangements among the various parties. The ThreeStrands of the pact created a web of institutions togovern Northern Ireland (Strand One), bring togetherleaders in Northern Ireland with those in Ireland(Strand Two, or North-South cooperation), and bringtogether leaders from throughout the UK and Ireland(Strand Three, or East-West cooperation). There arecurrently more than 140 areas of Northern Ireland–Republic of Ireland cross-border cooperation, rangingfrom health-care services to energy infrastructure topolicing. Many experts and political leaders fear thatany disruption to this cooperation could underminetrust in the agreement and thus the basis of peace inNorthern Ireland. The reimposition of a hard border between NorthernIreland and Ireland could cause instability in its ownright. Some security officials worry that theresumption of customs checks and other borderinfrastructure would revive lingering tensions betweencommunities and even provide targets for the lastremaining paramilitary groups. Prime Minister May and Irish leaders have pledged toprotect the arrangements set out in the Good FridayAgreement. However, some Brexit supporters havecriticized the deal’s power-sharing institutions andcalled the pact outdated. Some in the DUP, whichopposed the agreement in 1998, have alsoquestioned the arrangements it established. Perhaps the ultimate question is whether Brexit couldlead Northern Ireland’s people to vote to leave the UKand join a united Ireland, as the Good FridayAgreement allows. Since the 2016 Brexit vote,nationalist and republican leaders have called for areferendum, which would require London’s approval,though none is imminent.

Landow, C, et.al., "The Northern Ireland Peace Process", Council for Foreign Relations, 12/3/19, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/northern-ireland-peace-process

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No enlightenment yet: affirmative Nonkilling for PositivePeaceOpinion: Economists on Peace contributor DrAnoop Swarup on the influence of faith onenlightenment and why we need a Global Non-killing Index.In these times of disruption, delusion and darkness ina globalised world, human dignity and life appear tobe the foremost calamity as human trafficking,exploitation, terrorism and wars take the front seat inour struggle for existence in the 21st century. StevenPinker in his book ‘Enlightenment Now’ toys with theidea, though not in as many words, that people arenot “individuals,” but are “the expendable cells of asuperorganism”. Though he rightly states that lifeexpectancy is up, but prefers to give all the credit toreason and science at the expense of spirituality andreligion, for human progress. Treating karma asunscientific reflects little knowledge andunderstanding of the role religion has played over thecenturies in bringing about trust, morality anddiscipline amongst humans in the path of civilisationalascent. Incidentally enough, his term “romantic greenmovement”, does subordinate human interests to atranscendent entity, the ecosystem and his usage ofthe term diclinism – the idea that civilisation isassumed to be in steady decline and on the verge ofcollapse – too, is preposterous. Enlightenment ideals and religionThe assumption that life is best endowed withmeaning if only we remember our enlightenmentideals as products of human reason and itsrefinement along with science, hinges on too myopican outlook, for Pinker as a professor of cognitivescience. Trashing the role of religion and spiritualitythat have brought discipline, trust and hope and to mymind have indeed been the pillars on which theedifice of humanism, science and reason have beenbuilt, is not at all good reasoning. What Pinkercharacterises as manifestations of delusionalthinking, including religious faith, have been thehuman footprints, as also the threats and acts suchas environmental degradation, climate change andthe quest for weapons of mass destruction thatendangers life on planet earth have been checked.Perhaps it is due to reason and science gone horriblywrong, that the threats, scope and the total number ofkillings are on the rise in the 21st century attributableto industrial accidents, drug abuse, and pollutants, asalso genocides, terror and weapons of massdestruction.

Affirmation for a nonkilling societyTerrorism, violence and brutality related incidents areon the increase as such mindsets are cultivatedattacks are due to the threatened or actual use offorce and violence by a state or even non-state actorsto attain a political, economic, religious, or social goalthrough fear, coercion, or intimidation by itsperpetrators. It is in this context that political scientistsand philosophers both past and present who raise thequestion about the possibility of a nonkilling andnonviolent society become ever so relevant, and it isthe affirmative nonkilling approach to Positive Peace,that can make a real world difference in these difficulttimes. Here it is worth a reflection that in the pastsuch a possibility has been consistently answered innegative by political scientists on the basis of threegrounds: first, humans are killers by nature, second,competition for scarce resources makes peoplekill,and third, the possibility of rape requires thereadiness of men to kill to defend related females.Also, Paige emphasised upon our traditional politicalthoughts conditioning and approach both from eastand west which has had often supported lethality andviolence for maintaining the integrity of the state andthe security of individuals. During the course of aresearch undertaken by us, this question was put upto peace researchers and the general public. Wewere confronted by a diverse array of opinion that wediscovered, that revealed one common denominator:the end howsoever good should invariably be justifiedby the means. We do have the earlier reported factthat even those who killed, believed in the possibilityof a “nonkilling society”. Therefore, it is oursubmission that the end we envisage for ourselves,be it justice, equality or peace should becommensurate with the right approach, means andmethods. In order to foster a nonkilling society, ourfindings brought us to the most imperative conclusion:that peace needs to be cultivated and nurtured in thehuman mind. As was stated in the Seville Statement: “human culture gives us the ability to shape andchange our nature from one generation to another”.So, by evolving our own upbringing, learning, ethosand the cultural values, we indeed have greatchances of turning our civilisation into a nonkillingone.

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The case for a universal nonkilling indexThus, on the basis of the survey and to gauge humanadvancement after due deliberation, a very importantindicator was conceived, that is, a country wise indexof human nonkilling. This could be a great measure ofnot only the level of societal development, but also ofhuman consciousness and enlightenment, critical to afuture positive. It is my argument that this wouldprove to be a better indicator of humanity’s wellbeingon virtually all parameters, since life, as we know inour contemporary world is held in utmost reverence inalmost all human cultures and societies. Indeed, suchan indicator, the Global Nonkilling Index (GNI) wouldindeed also be a good reflection of a society’s wellbeing, as the what, why and how, as also the ways,nature and numbers that the killings occur would alsobe a measure of human progress. The variablestaken up in our study for the preparation of the indexinclude war deaths, domestic armed conflict relateddeaths, death penalty, homicide and suicide. Here itmay be important to draw a distinction with the GlobalPeace Index (GPI) that contains 23 parameters, theHappiness Index (HI) with seven parameters and theGlobal Terrorism Index (GTI), which focuses just onterror. It may also be pointed out that the Global PeaceIndex (GPI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace(IEP), divides peace into Negative Peace andPositive Peace, as the IEP framework posits NegativePeace as absence of violence, or fear of violence,while Positive Peace is identified as the “attitudes,institutions and structures,” for creating andperpetuating a peaceful society. Such a definitiondoes overlook the bulls’ eye and the stark reality ofquantifying and preserving human life through‘affirmative nonkilling approach’ as the actualmeasure of human progress and enlightenment.These are broad indices that aim to measure terror,peace and happiness on a large scale without anyreference to the loss of human lives due to othercauses that have a bearing on individual’s threatperception as also overall society’s good.

Since the 1990s, the Human Development Indices(HDI) and the report primarily focuses on reductionsor otherwise in human development achievements inthe distribution of health, education, and incomewithin countries, and does proclaim to provide acomplete, multidimensional view of humandevelopment, but does not give adequate weightageto human killings. Globally speaking, though life expectancy ratios havegone up over the past century, when accounting forinequalities, the 2017 HDI value of 0.728 falls to0.582, a year later thus, reveals an average loss ofabout 20 percent. Also, the report delves deeper tolook into data unravelling the overall (percentage)loss in HDI that ranges from 3.6 percent in Japan to45.3 per cent in Comoros, and the composition isvastly different amongst countries. On exploration ofthe interactive visualisation to see country-levelcomposition, we merely focus on just threedimensions: health and longevity, knowledge andstandard of living, overlooking poverty which is one ofthe root causes of deaths and killings as also humansecurity with weightage on homicides, suicides, wars,armed conflicts, terror, genocides and even deathpenalty. Such a nonkilling index and country wisecomparison, will ultimately lead humanity to think ofuniversally acceptable and affirmative approaches tostop killings worldwide and eventually to adevelopmental paradigm for the whole world. Thus, it is reiterated, that nonkilling is more focusedand can be a better and direct measure of societalwell being and progress, as it is measurable andachievable. Once available country wise, to thepolicymakers and the public at large, it can be the firststep or rather the foundational steptowards measuring human progress, peace andhappiness, as one cannot overlook the same whiletalking about development, peace and happiness.The variables taken up in our study for thepreparation of the index were based on verifiableWorld Health Organisation (WHO) data on wardeaths, armed conflict deaths (internal), deathpenalty, homicide and suicide.

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In the GNI, the killing of not just others, but also of theself due to suicide, is observed as an importantparameter for the wellbeing of a society. The index isbuilt on quiet simplistic calculations. Each of the fivevariables has been assigned the value of five, just likethe GPI, making the total score to 25. The GPI hasgiven different weightage to different variables afterholding a robust discussion on it. Internal peace wasgiven more weightage, as it was argued that internalpeace also affects external peace. But here each ofthe five variables is given equal weightage. The homicide and suicide rates are taken from thewebsite of the WHO. The war deaths and internalarmed conflict deaths are taken from the UppsalaConflict Data Programme and the Global PeaceIndex, respectively. The death penalty is taken fromAmnesty International. The period of the datacollection is for the whole year of 2015, the reasonbeing suicide rates are collected by the WHO everyfive years. The homicide and suicide rates arecalculated as the number of deaths divided by thetotal population, the result multiplied by onehundred thousand. The scoring rate of death penaltyis the number of executions divided by the populationof that state, and multiplied by one hundred thousand.Weightage of these five indicators is allotted in termsof the highest and lowest range. The rankings areallotted according to the band prepared for eachvariable and the rate bands are prepared according tothe highest and lowest rate of that particular variable.

Thus, the more the score is, the more would be thekilling. The average score of all 172 countries is takenout to benchmark the score as to which country isperforming better and which worse. The average thatcame out is 5.8. Countries that have a killing rateabove 5.8 reflect a poor score. Top 20 nations with high killing scoreThe chart below portrays the score of the top 20countries where the killing rate is the highest. Thereare different reasons for the high killing rates in thesecountries. Some are affected by war and terrorism,while few others are facing internal disturbances thatlead the people to kill. The internal disturbances andwar, however, are not prevalent all around the world.The suicides and homicides which are universallyfound all over the globe are also matter of greatconcern. An honourable example of a nonkilling stateto be cited, though tiny, is the state of San Marino; acountry where no killing, no traffic fatality and nohomicides or suicides have been reported since2013, an exemplary achievement. Sadly enough, thegovernments of the day have only been takingnegative steps to curb violence and killings, alsowhen perhaps it is too late. There are always the lawsagainst those who commit homicides and in mostcountries against those who commit suicide, not tospeak of terror and violence, but nothing is done bythe state and the society to cultivate affirmativenonkilling through cultivating a healthy mind to bringabout Positive Peace.

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The government and the law as a last recourse endup with a deterrent law and force in this regard. Thetask of the creation of a healthy and nonkilling andnonviolent society through structures and affirmativeapproaches rests primarily with the state, theeducational institutions and the society. A different take for a future positiveIn this era of war and menace of terror and conflict, ithas become difficult to establish peace. Time andagain, history reveals that no war in the name ofreligion, god or peace has been successful in bringingabout perpetual peace. States may exist withoutcrimes being committed by individuals, but wherethere exists practices of discrimination, humiliationand suppression of any section of society, peace isonly a farce there. Moreover, if the state actors arethemselves committing crimes and even legalisingthem, then the danger of the eruption of violence andkillings leading the state into anarchy becomes all themore imminent. The art and literature of any societyare helpful in comprehending the mindset of thatsociety at large, not only the freedom given to them,but also the message given by them should beunderstood. The nonkilling index is a critical measurefor human development, progress and enlightenmentand hence its inclusion is proposed in the GPI, HDI, HI, as well as in the reports. As discussed earlier,though Pinker’s rationalisation is boldly different,these are arguably untenable particularly, his atheismfor an apostate.

Enlightenment nowOf course, enlightenment that is, as yet not there, isan unfinished task to be accomplished throughaffirmative nonkilling approaches for Positive Peace.The ideals of human past, more particularly from theoutlook of religion, spirituality and faith, rather thanreason and science alone, have given us hope for ourhumanism and future. Yes, optimism over pessimismof the past should be the order of the day. There is,as yet no ground for complacency as we do pay aprice for the uncertainty of freedom and progress.There is work to be done in bringing abouttransformational structures and changes in oursocietal upbringing and thought, through affirmativeand positive approaches to non-killing peace whichwill prove to be a critical development paradigm.

Swarup, A, "No enlightenment yet: affirmative Nonkilling for Positive Peace", Vision of Humanity, 2017,www.visionofhumanity.org/news/no-enlightenment-yet-affirmative-non-killing-for-positive-peace/

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Why Syrian Women Could Be the Key to Successful PeaceTalksSince the start of the Syrian war in 2011, Syrianwomen have been involved in all aspects of theconflict: from fighting, demonstrating anddocumenting war crimes to providing humanitarianrelief and local politics. Syrian women, who make up more than 50 percent ofthe Syrian population, are also taking on a moreactive role in local negotiations to end the conflict thathas killed more than half a million people anddisplaced millions more, including tens of thousandsof females. However, women remain grosslyunderrepresented in international peace negotiations. Women are disproportionately impacted by armedconflict, and thus are typically viewed as victimsrather than actors with agency in peace processesand negotiations. Early Syrian peace talks did not include women, oronly included a select few. In 2016, U.N. specialenvoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura initiated aWomen’s Advisory Board consisting of 12 Syrianwomen who serve as third-party observers to talks.He also pushed for increased female participation in2017 peace talks, where women comprised nearly 20percent of negotiators. But recent Moscow-backed peace talks held in theRussian city of Sochi in early 2018 were sorelymissing any representation of Syrian women. Around 1,500 delegates attended the Sochi meeting,officially known as the Syrian Congress of NationalDialogue, which aimed to diversify the range of Syrianvoices at the table and jump-start a dialogue betweenSyrian government figures and opposition forces.While sources reporting on the event broke down thedifferent ethnicities and political affiliationsrepresented in Sochi, not one article referencedwhether Syrian women participated. The fact that the Sochi negotiations aimed to includea wide range of Syrian voices, but still excludedwomen, means the talks had failed right from thestart.

Evidence shows that the inclusion of women in peaceprocesses is essential to establishing lasting peace. Astudy from the Council on Foreign Relations foundthat including women in negotiations makes theagreement 64 percent less likely to fail. The samereport showed that women’s participation in peaceprocesses makes long-term agreements 35 percentmore likely to last for at least 15 years. Colombia provides an illustrative example. Womencomprised one-third of the total number of negotiatorsand played an essential role in talks that led to apeace agreement between the Colombiangovernment and the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC) after more than 50 years of conflict.Women have also been proven to be significantlycapable at bridging divides within highly polarizedconflicts similar to Syria. In Liberia, for instance,Christian and Muslim women worked together to pushdiffering parties to negotiate the end to the bloodycivil war. Syrian women have also played a vital and influentialrole in leading local peace and negotiation efforts.Successful local efforts led by women includemonitoring and documenting human rights abuses,establishing cease-fires, creating local politicalcouncils and distributing humanitarian aid. In theDamascus suburb of Zabadani, Syrian women wereinstrumental in pressuring a militia to adopt atemporary cease-fire with government forces. Syrian women also have been highly involved ininitiating locally led relief and development workwithin the country. Women Now for Development isan organization led by Syrian women that empowerswomen to push Syria toward peace by promotingdemocratic values and resilience at the local level. The impact and effectiveness of such initiatives at thelocal level has proven women’s ability as communitypeacemakers and further justifies the need forinternational stakeholders to guarantee Syrianwomen a place in international negotiating arenas.The international community, including the UnitedNations, must elevate Syrian women’s voices bydirectly supporting their local peace initiatives, whichspan ethnic and political backgrounds.

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Establishing the Women’s Advisory Board was a stepin the right direction by the U.N., but the peaceprocess needs more substantial female participationbefore a solution to the conflict is foreseeable. U.N.Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) states thatthe political process and constitution must be Syrian-led, and Syrian women must be counted among thepeacebuilders. It is not only important to give womena place at the table, but it is also important to protectthe voices of women peacemakers to ensure thatthey are heard and respected. A January report from the Inclusive Peace &Transition Initiative recommended achieving broaderinclusion through direct representation innegotiations, the roles of impartial observers orconsultants, involvement in commissions andworkshops, and soliciting contributions to publicdecision-making and civic action.

For Syria peace talks, this also means having femalerepresentatives from all ethnicities and politicalbackgrounds represented in the Syrian constitutionalcommittee. In post-Arab Spring Tunisia, the inclusionof women in the young democracy’s constitution-drafting process led to a more legitimate,representative constitution. Women are an untapped source of potential and maybe the answer for a peaceful outcome to one ofhistory’s most polarizing conflicts. Women’s inclusionin today’s peace processes could spell equality in afuture Syria, but peace will likely remain elusive ifwomen continue to be sidelined.

Coulouris, R, "Why Syrian Women Could Be the Key to Successful Peace Talks", NewsDeeply, 19/6/18,www.newsdeeply.com/peacebuilding/articles/2018/06/19/why-syrian-women-could-be-the-key-to-successful-peace-talks

conflictConflict is the dynamic process of actual or perceived opposition betweenindividuals or groups. This could be opposition over positions, interests orvalues. Most theorists would distinguish between non-violent and violentconflict. In this distinction, non-violent conflict can be a useful mechanism forsocial change and transformation, while violent conflict is harmful andrequires conflict resolution.

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The Lingering Specter of Nuclear War'' Could climate change worsen global conflict? Threading on thin ice? Conflict dynamics on theKorean Peninsula Conflict dynamics in the Bidibidi refugee settlement inUganda

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The Lingering Specter of Nuclear War

A mushroom-shaped plume of fire and smoketowered over the New Mexico desert in the earlyhours of July 16, 1945. The Trinity nuclear test, thefirst of its kind, signaled the successful culmination ofthe Manhattan Project and the beginning of theAtomic Age. The United States had gained the meansto level cities in a single blast, a capability it employedto devastating effect the next month in the skies overHiroshima and Nagasaki. During the subsequent ColdWar arms race, the United States and Soviet Uniongenerated immense thermonuclear arsenals ofalmost unimaginable destructive power. Thanks to the logic of deterrence and plain dumb luck—the relative contribution of each up for debate—nocountry has used a nuclear weapon against anothersince 1945. Russia and the United States, the leadingnuclear powers, have reduced their arsenals fromCold War highs by 89 percent and 87 percent,respectively. That is the good news. The bad news is that the nuclear nonproliferation andarms control regimes are fraying badly, as newernuclear powers expand their arsenals, as non-nuclearnations reconsider whether to acquire such weapons,and as uneven technological advances, including inthe domains of cyberspace and outer space,undermine the calculus of deterrence. After sevenand a half decades of uneasy nuclear peace, anincreasingly crowded and complex internationallandscape has renewed the specter of catastrophicnuclear war. Nuclear anxieties have returned in force. They havebeen front and center in media coverage of, amongother things: the recent armed confrontation betweenIndia and Pakistan, President Trump’s negotiationswith North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, the U.S.repudiation of the Iran nuclear deal, Washington’sintention to withdraw from the Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, and U.S.plans to modernize its nuclear arsenal. If a nuclearsword of Damocles continues to hang overhumanity’s collective head, it is now joined by aproverbial axe, mace, and spear.

Gambling With the GlobeIn 2018, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists movedthe hands on its Doomsday Clock, created in 1947 tosymbolize the risk of nuclear Armageddon, to twominutes to midnight—a proximity matched only oncebefore, in 1953. Last month, the Bulletin chose tokeep the hands there. Humanity has traipsed into a“new abnormal,” its editors lamented: Awash indisinformation and riven by geopolitical fault lines, theworld teeters on the brink of catastrophe. Some critics find admonishments of this sort alarmistand unhelpful. Nuclear weapons have fueledapocalyptic anxieties for decades, as Cato InstituteSenior Fellow John Mueller recently noted in ForeignAffairs. An unhealthy obsession with their risks, hesuggests, detracts from sensible decision-making. However, the historical record provides amplegrounds for concern, given how close nuclear powershave come to using these weapons against oneanother, both intentionally and inadvertently. Thelitany of near-misses and false alarms makes forsobering reading. During the 1962 Cuban MissileCrisis, U.S. President John F. Kennedy assessed thelikelihood of nuclear war to be more or less a coin flip.In 1995, Russia misinterpreted a Norwegian rocketlaunch as a possible attack. And just last year, theState of Hawaii’s Emergency Management Agencyerroneously issued an incoming ballistic missile alert.Seth Baum, executive director of the GlobalCatastrophic Risk Institute, estimates the rate of suchincidents at one per year. Magnifying the risk of accidental or unauthorizednuclear war is uncertainty over the security ofcommand and control structures to manage and usethese weapons. In his harrowing 2017 tell-all, TheDoomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear WarPlanner, Daniel Ellsberg (of Pentagon Papers fame)chronicles the pathologies of the early U.S. nuclearapparatus. These included strong incentives tosubordinate safety to offensive readiness, as well as“safeguards” against unauthorized use that consistedof little more than a sealed envelope. The samevulnerabilities may afflict more recent nuclear powers,not least Pakistan and North Korea.

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Meanwhile, nuclear proliferation and technologicalinnovation are undermining much of the gametheoretic logic of deterrence, which has long beencentral to nuclear strategy. In its most basic form,deterrence relies on the threat of retaliation todiscourage adversaries from striking. The logic worksbest in a simple bilateral contest between rational,unitary actors. It begins to falter in a messier world ofmultiple countries, fragmented national authorities,and irrational leaders. Technological innovation alsocomplicates nuclear deterrence. Cyberweapons,antisatellite weapons, hypersonic missiles, artificialintelligence, and other innovations are challenginglongstanding assumptions, blurring distinctionsbetween conventional and nuclear war, andexacerbating ambiguities in the international balanceof power. Deterrence, in sum, is becoming a riskierbet. The failure of nuclear deterrence could precipitateglobal catastrophe. How big a catastrophe woulddepend on multiple factors, including the number anddestructive power of the weapons used and theirtargets. A significant exchange could kill tens andeven hundreds of millions of people in the initialblasts and ensuing firestorms, as well as fromdispersed radiation, which is indifferent to nationalborders. Groundwater contamination, “black rain,”and other localized hazards would add to thedevastation. Disruptions to global supply chainswould forestall recovery in affected areas and couldthreaten access to food, medicine, fertilizer, and otheressential goods elsewhere. Starvation and exposureto radiation would weaken immune systems andincrease susceptibility to disease. All of this wouldoccur in a context of degraded communicationnetworks, hair-trigger military force postures, andrampant fear and uncertainty. The aftermath would benightmarish by almost any measure. Beyond its devastating short-term impact, a large-scale nuclear exchange could cause significant long-term damage to Earth’s environment, with risksincreasing with the number and yields of nuclearweapons used.

In 1982, future Nobel laureate Paul J. Crutzen andJohn W. Birks published a seminal paper, “TheAtmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon,”examining potential climatic effects from theatmospheric smoke and dust generated by a nuclearwar and its associated conflagrations. The followingyear, a group of scientists that included astronomerCarl Sagan determined [PDF] that a major U.S.-Soviet exchange could cause midsummer continentalland temperatures in the northern hemisphere toplunge below freezing, and dramatically change localweather and precipitation. The effects would persistfor months and threaten global crop yields, producinga “nuclear winter.” The scientific jury on nuclear winter and its more mildform, nuclear autumn, is still out. Recent studies[PDF] suggest that nuclear war would indeed havesignificant environmental effects. What remainsdisputed is how widespread and enduring thesewould be. In 2007 [PDF], some of the sameatmospheric scientists who had popularized thenuclear winter scenario found that a regional nuclearexchange between India and Pakistan involving 100Hiroshima-scale blasts would be sufficient to triggercooling exceeding that of the “Little Ice Age,” whichlasted from the early 14th century to the mid 19thcentury and saw a 0.6 degrees Celsius decline inmean annual temperatures across the northernhemisphere. The resulting decrease in agriculturalproductivity, which might take up to a decade toattenuate, would put two to three billion people [PDF]at risk of starvation. These findings, however, remaincontested, dependent on assumptions about theflammability of modern cities and the amount of sootthat would reach the upper atmosphere. A study from2018 casts doubt on the magnitude of climatic effectsfrom a regional nuclear war. With luck—or, preferably, smart policymaking—humanity will never need to find out which side of thisargument has it right.

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The Frazzled International Nuclear RegimeWith no nuclear weapons having been used in conflictin seventy-four years, it is tempting to conclude thatnuclear war is an improbable contingency. It iscomforting to believe that regardless of geopoliticalcrises or false alarms, the political and ethical bar tousing nuclear weapons remains high. This mindsetsuggests that escalation ladders are difficult to climb,at least in normal times. Ours, however, are not “normal” times, if such timesexist at all. In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs,Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues that we should nolonger think in terms of escalatory “ladders,” as haslong been the norm, but instead in terms of a “web,”thanks to the complex linkages between multipolarnuclear competition, advanced weaponry, and newunderstandings of the psychology of decision-making.This web suggests more complicated dynamics ofdeterrence and an increased number of potentialfailure points. Worse, perhaps, the longstanding taboo against theuse of nuclear weapons may be at risk of vanishing,particularly when it comes to growing interest bysome nations in tactical nuclear weapons andmaintaining a capability for waging “limited” nuclearwar. The world’s nine nuclear powers are expandingand modernizing their arsenals, spending trillions ofdollars collectively to produce atomic munitions andupgrade delivery systems. At the same time, strategiccompetition in Asia and the Middle East is increasingincentives for countries to go nuclear, raising thedanger of a nuclear cascade. Reducing the specter of catastrophic nuclear warrequires first of all strengthening existing arms controland nonproliferation regimes, to reduce the numberand salience of nuclear weapons, as well as theirspread to new state and nonstate actors.

Pressing multilateral priorities include ratifying theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), whichwould prohibit nuclear explosions; bringing into forcethe Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), whichwould prohibit the further production of nuclearweapons material; achieving universal adherence tothe Additional Protocol of the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA), which would enhance theagency’s ability to detect declared and undeclarednuclear programs; amending the Treaty on theNonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to makeit illegal for parties to withdraw from it (as North Koreadid); preventing North Korea’s production ofadditional nuclear weapons; keeping united pressureon Iran, ideally with the United States rejoining theJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Irannuclear deal); accelerating progress byacknowledged nuclear weapons states in meetingtheir disarmament obligations under Article 6 of theNPT, consistent with minimum requirements fordeterrence; moving forward on negotiations to extendthe New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NewSTART), which is slated to expire in 2021; andbringing India, Pakistan, and Israel into the NPT. Achieving progress on this extensive agenda willrequire modifications of existing U.S. policy. Forinstance, the Trump administration would need toreverse its opposition (made explicit in the 2018 U.S.Nuclear Posture Review) to the CTBT. It would needto negotiate a replacement for the INF Treaty withRussia, which the administration repudiated, ideallyone that expands its provisions to new signatories,notably China. Third and perhaps most important, theUnited States needs to beware lowering the thresholdfor the use of nuclear weapons. In its 2018 nuclearposture review, for example, the Trumpadministration suggests that it reserves the right tocounter catastrophic cyberattacks with nuclearweapons, a position that could help detercyberattacks but might contribute to nuclearinstability.

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These steps are necessary but not sufficient. Anyefforts to govern new and potentially transformativetechnologies must take account of the possibility ofthose technologies exacerbating risks in the nuclearrealm. Governments will also need to developinternational regimes that reduce the likelihood ofcyber-intrusions threatening nuclear weaponsinfrastructure, as well as cogent cyber deterrencestrategies and broader norms against devastatingcyberattacks from state and nonstate actors alike. Nuclear powers also need to build more robustsystems of command and control to preventaccidental nuclear war. In 1979, a watch officerawakened then-U.S. Undersecretary of DefenseWilliam J. Perry to inform him that 200 Sovietintercontinental ballistic missiles were inbound to theUnited States. “For one heart-stopping second Ithought my worst nuclear nightmare had come true,”he later recalled. It turned out that somebody hadinserted a training tape into an early warning systemcomputer. Perry himself has proposed one potentialreform to reduce the chance that false alarm leads toArmageddon: Shift the United States—and inprinciple other nuclear powers—away from relianceon vulnerable land-based ICBMs for deterrence, andfocus primarily on sea and air-based weapons. Whilehardly failsafe, this would reduce some of the timepressure of having to launch within minutes due tothe “use it or lose it” dynamic at play. In addition, theUnited States will need to work with other nuclearpowers—not just Russia—to ensure that nuclearweapons are kept off so-called “hair trigger” alert. But other reforms are also needed, to insert greaterchecks and balances into nuclear attack decisions.Structures of command and control, after all, are onlyas good as their commander and controller. U.S.nuclear doctrine is particularly problematic in thisrespect. It places extraordinary authority in the handsof a single person to decide the fate of millions,potentially billions, in a single moment of crisis.Whatever his or her judgment, temperament, state ofmind, senility, or sobriety at that instant, the Presidentof the United States has the power to order a nuclearattack, with no more than a few minutes ofconsideration in the case of a retaliatory strike.Today, that person is Donald J. Trump.

Reliance on any one individual to take the mostfateful decision in human history is deeplyproblematic. While this may be inevitable in atotalitarian state like North Korea, it collides withdemocratic principles in a nation like the UnitedStates. In an effort to introduce some Constitutionalchecks and balances into such decisions,Congressman Ted Lieu (D-CA) two years agointroduced the “Restricting First Use of NuclearWeapons Act of 2017,” which would require acongressional declaration of war before the Presidentcould order a (non-retaliatory) nuclear strike. Othershave forwarded alternative proposals. Humanity’s ultimate objective should be to rid theworld of these destructive devices. That has been theanimating vision of the Global Zero campaign and themotivation behind the Treaty on the Prohibition ofNuclear Weapons. Negotiated in 2017 with strongsupport from transnational civil society, thatconvention prohibits states parties from developing,testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring,possessing, or stockpiling nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices. It will enter into forceninety days after the fiftieth nation has ratified it. As President Barack Obama recognized in hiscelebrated Prague speech of spring 2009, completenuclear disarmament is unrealistic in the near or evenmedium term. It remains a goal for a distant horizon.However, that should not leave the United States andother nuclear weapons states off the hook. It isincumbent on all of them to adopt policies that reducethe value of nuclear weapons as a currency of powerin world politics; to consider how innovations inartificial intelligence, cyberspace, outer space, andother arenas might undermine the dynamics ofdeterrence; and to avoid escalatory rhetoric andpolicies that risk spiraling out of control and imperilingmillions.

Patrick, S, "The Lingering Specter of NuclearWar", Council for International Relations,

7/3/19, www.cfr.org/blog/lingering-specter-nuclear-war

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Could climate change worsen global conflict?

There is a region in the Middle East known as theFertile Crescent. It includes parts of what are nowTurkey, Iraq and Syria. In ancient times, it was knownas a birthplace of farming. But the area is not sofertile anymore. Marshlands that covered much of thearea have largely dried up. Between 2007 and 2010,the region saw very little rain. It suffered the worstdrought seen since scientists began keeping recordshere. Climate change didn't cause the drought, but itprobably made it worse. Crops failed. People wenthungry. Many people moved from rural areas tocities, crowding the urban areas. A year later, civil war broke out in Syria. That war isstill being waged today. Was climate change to blamefor the conflict? Scientists do not all agree. But plentyof studies have suggested that such conflicts couldbecome more likely in communities stressed by theweather extremes that are expected to emerge in awarming world. Climate change is already affecting humancommunities in many ways. It's been crowding outsome regions as sea-level rise shrinks the size ofislands and wipes away some coastal towns. It’sbashed and destroyed towns and cities with severeweather or mega-wildfires. It’s started bringingdisease and job-robbing heat to some regions. It'seven changing what foods are available to eat. Sherri Goodman is a security expert and boardmember with the Center for Climate and Security inWashington, D.C. “Climate change is a threatmultiplier,” she says. “It aggravates existing tensionsaround the world,” she explains. “And makes existingthreats worse." What about Syria?Goodman points to Syria as a good example. Whenfarmers and herders moved to the cities, there wasn’tenough food, water and housing for everyone. Thisadded to the existing political problems. And thatstressed people, making them angry, scared andtense.

“There were a lot of forces in the mix,” she says. “Butit’s been well documented now that the climate-aggravated drought was one of the factors that led tothe unrest we’ve seen in that country.” By causing people to move within their homecountries or to new ones, extreme weather and sea-level rise can be climate triggers of conflict. And inregions such as the Arctic, melting sea ice can lead toglobal powers competing for control of waterways andnatural resources, Goodman adds. But we shouldn’t be too quick to assume that climatechange is causing war, some experts caution. Peopleoften exaggerate the link between climate andconflict, says Jan Selby. He’s a professor ofinternational relations at the University of Sussex, inEngland. Selby investigated claims that climate change had ledto the Syrian civil war. Many studies had over-simplified the situation, he found. They assumed thatdrought was the biggest reason people moved tocities. In fact, his team found that bigger causes werepoverty, the depletion of groundwater resources andconflict on Syria's borders. Nor was that all. Certaingovernment policies expanded the agriculturalindustry beyond its capacity. For example, he notes,government-funded projects to build massiveagricultural infrastructure created pressure toincrease wheat production beyond what wassustainable. That’s true, too, for other studies of climate andconflict, Selby says. Changes in weather, especiallydrought, often get blamed for migration and socialunrest. "This is wrong,” he says. In fact, even in rural, developing areas, globaleconomic factors play a role. What types of economicfactors? He’s referring to changes in fuel and fertilizerprices, for instance. Those can hurt a farmer’sincome. So can higher costs of transporting farmgoods to market. And taxes imposed by localgovernments or militias can push farmers over theedge. “Too often,” he says, “analysts ignore this andmistakenly treat drought as the main variable.”

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Colin Kelley tends to agree. He’s a climate scientist atthe International Research Institute for Climate andSociety. It’s at Columbia University in New York City.Kelley also is an author of a key study on the role ofclimate-related drought in Syria’s civil war. “There are a lot of ways conflict can occur. And all ofthat was true for Syria,” he notes. But, he adds, in thiscase, it's clear that environmental stress added toother pressures. Kelley’s study found clear signs in Syria that climatechange had worsened the region’s drought. He alsofound that the agricultural crisis this caused added tothe pressures on an already unstable country. “All ofthese things are related,” he says. If you look at onlyone of them, "you’re only getting part of the picture.” There may be bias, tooThere’s still a lot people don’t know about howclimate may be linked to conflict, says Tobias Ide. Heworks at the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig,Germany. There, he studies issues that play a role inpeace and conflict. Ide reviewed 124 studies that looked at possible linksbetween climate and conflict. All had been publishedbetween 1998 and 2017. And in them, he found whathe terms a sampling bias. By that, he means, theresearchers were more likely to study areas that werealready violent, that were easy to visit or both. Moststudies focused on Africa and the Middle East. Otherareas of the world, like South America and Oceania,were hardly studied at all.

Focusing only on violent areas can make theconnection between climate and violence seemstronger, he argues. If the goal is to learn how tosuccessfully adapt to climate change, scientistsshould look at a broad range of examples, he says. Ide is now focusing his research on efforts atenvironmental peace-building. These are programs inwhich shared environmental challenges actually bringcountries together. In these places, people cooperateto solve their problems.“ Even under pressure and environmental stress,” henotes, “there are cases where people, or groups orcommunities, which have been in conflict in the past,team up and manage these challengescooperatively.”

Loomis, I, "Could climate change worsen global conflict?", Science News for Students, 23/5/19, https://www.sciencenewsforstudents.org/article/could-climate-change-worsen-global-conflict

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Threading on thin ice? Conflict dynamics on the KoreanPeninsulaIn 2018, both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) willmark the 70th anniversary of the establishment oftheir separate governments. This is a sad reminderthat much remains frozen on the Korean Peninsula.For one, families have been separated andcommunication channels between the two Koreanpopulations are almost non-existent. Yet, stability isprecariously established by an Armistice that wassigned in 1953 and that was never replaced by apermanent peace mechanism. Moreover, NorthKorea’s rapid nuclear development has contributed totensions and uncertainties, and the Six-Party Talks,originally designed to ensure the denuclearisation ofthe peninsula, has been at a standstill for almost10 years. The Korean story is thus a prime case tostudy the dynamics of a frozen conflict and this articlecontributes to the existing literature and analysis offrozen conflicts by suggesting looking at peaceful andviolent thawing, as well as conflict withering. In orderto so, the paper focuses on three crucial levels: (1)the micro level, the impact of the Armistice in light oftoday’s Koreas as opposed to their status andstanding at the end of the Korean War in 1953, (2)the meso level with geostrategic concernsconcentrated over sectorial policies surrounding theKorean Peninsula in a globalised world, and (3) themacro level with the changing nature of securitygovernance. It is argued that in a catch-22 motion,the thread of violent thawing maintains the conflict inits frozen state. Few places on earth remain as sensitive, exciting,dangerous, and contested as the Korean Peninsula.For the layperson, the news coming from politicians,the media, and increasingly exponentially from socialmedia can be troubling: one hears of nuclearweapons, of dictators’ ego, of sanctions, of blackmail,of human rights abuses, and of the imminence of war.For the political scientist, the Korean Peninsula is afascinating experiment: Korean people have alwayshad a unified history and longstanding monarchy withlittle political variation. Then, they were annexed andcolonised by Japan and later liberated at the end ofthe Second World War. Finally, they were separatedinto two zones of influence that would eventuallydevelop along different economic, political, andideological trajectories.

There is thus little doubt that the Korean Peninsula isan important case in history, but it also is one that isdeeply frustrating to many observers, as it remainsimpermeable to most knowledge and theories aboutpeople, governments, and conflicts. In 2003, the yearthe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)decided to withdraw from the Non-ProliferationTreaty, former US Secretary of Defence William J.Perry noted that though there were cleardisagreements on thematic in both the literature andwithin policy circles, it was not possible to avoidtalking about the notion of crisis when referring to theKorean situation. This was then, when the DPRK hadyet to test its first nuclear weapons. This was then,when both Koreas had organised family reunions toreconnect some of their oldest people, under theguidance of Republic of Korea (ROK)’s president andNobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae Jung, the artisanof the Sunshine Policy that was meant to connect andsupport the DPRK to aid its development andeventually facilitate reunification. This was then, whenno one expected the DPRK to survive its devastatingfamine, a precarious political system, and acollapsing economy. But this is now, seven decades after the Koreanpartition, three decades after the end of the Cold War,and a decade after Pyongyang’s first nuclear test.The scholarship devoted to understanding the KoreanPeninsula, its partition, its dynamics, its problems,and its future has extensive breadth and depth. Itcovers amongst others the legacy of the Korean War(Cumings 1989; Holmes 2006), comparisons betweenthe two Koreas’ political systems (Armstrong 2005;Park 2011; Kim 2004), the question of Koreannational identity and its future (Bleiker 2001;Grzelczyk 2014; Yim 2002), patterns of interactionand negotiations over the peninsula(Cha and Kang2003; Snyder 1999), security partnerships and thebalance of power (Smith 2007; Dong 2000), foreignrelations between the Koreas and great powers (Cha1997), and scenarios for the future of the peninsulaand how to avoid a nuclear holocaust (Bennett 2013;Grinker 1998; Kwak and Joo 2010).

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The DPRK’s obvious endurance and survival havenow prompted a change in scholarship: it is no longerappropriate to speak of an imminent North Koreancollapse as was the case after the end of the ColdWar (Harrison 2003; Ford and Kwon 2007). It also isno longer enough to attribute the Korean crisis tosingle factors such as the North Korean leadership,the US’s influence over the region, or China’s questfor rebalancing. Instead, theoretical creativity isfavoured since traditional approaches have not beenable to solve Korean tensions and achieve peaceover the peninsula. It is in this particular direction that this articleconsiders the concept of frozen conflict as aframework and applies it to the Korean situation. Inorder to proceed, conflict, conflict cycles, and rivalriesare revisited and applied to the Korean Peninsulatraditionally. Then, it becomes possible to define howfrozen conflict is envisioned as an analytical tool.Finally, the article considers three avenues foranalysis: the Korean Armistice (micro level),geostrategic changes over the peninsula (mesolevel), and evolving security governancecommitments and mechanisms affecting actors withinthe region (macro level). Thus, this article goesbeyond the concepts of peaceful thawing, violentthawing, and conflict withering presented in the“Introduction” to this special issue by suggesting thata vertical read is necessary: while some layers mightindeed thaw as a result of political change, diplomaticovertures, or even economic pressures, some layersare not only resistant to change but might evenharden and thicken further. At times, a thaw can alsohave an unwanted effect as melting ice does notalways freeze back in its previous shape: the recentthaw the world witnessed during the 2018PyeongChang Olympics games in South Korea withthe visit of the North Korean delegation led by KimJong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong might have renewedhopes of talks, but it has also raised expectationsregarding North Korea’s leadership, thus changingthe original frozen ground parties will most likelyreturn to once the Games are over.

In the context of the Korean Peninsula, we thussuggest that any move toward more positivetransformative scenarios (peaceful thawing or conflictwithering) will be curtailed by the possibility of violentthawing, which in this case is the usage of nuclearweapons over the peninsula. Yet, the threat ofnuclear use is also the very reason why militaryintervention on the peninsula has yet to take place. Intractability and instability on the KoreanPeninsulaThe roots of instability and conflict on the KoreanPeninsula are usually traced to the Korean division in1945. They have also been cemented by a bitter warfollowing the North’s invasion of its southern brotherin 1950. When looking at the peninsula under thisparticular light, the story of the Korean conflict is oneof a common people divided into two states. It is, inessence, the story of inter-Korean relations and howthe two countries have grown apart from one another,politically, and economically but especially as people,because of the inability to find a permanent peacesolution to replace the 1953 Armistice. Yet, this onlyrepresents a very small part of the Korean story: justas an iceberg, the roots of instability and conflict onthe Korean Peninsula are not about the Koreandivision, because this division occurred because ofexternal pressures and not because of the initial needof a particular group within Korea to secede, forexample. Indeed, the Koreas had always, before theirdivision, existed as one since the Kingdom of Sillaunified the peninsula through its conquest of Baekjeand Goguryeo in the seventh century (Kim 2012). The Kingdom of Korea’s own history is calm, as onlya handful of dynasties succeeded one another, withits last dynasty, Choseon, in place from 1392 until1910. Choseon could have remained a ratheranonymous part of the world if not for geopolitics:trapped between a powerful Chinese empire and abelligerent and modernising Japan, Korea was aprime location for ship layovers.

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Foreign interference from neighbours looking toexpand their power forced Choseon to question itsown policies as elites teetered between orthodoxvoices committed to preserve Korean customs andtraditions and heterodox voices calling formodernization and especially engagement via openborders (Oberdorfer 2002). But ultimately, Choseondecided to close itself to foreign influence and thismeant that Korea had little opportunities to learn tounderstand the international modern world in thetwentieth century. When Tokyo annexed Seoul in1910, Korea had thus few if any foreign allies to counton for support or to ask for help (Choi 1967). Thesituation was very different at the end of World War II:the newly created United Nations was ready tospread its wings, and Allied powers wanted to makesure Japan would not rise again over Asia. As aresult, Korea was now seen as a geopolitical assetthat needed to be defended. So, when the DPRKinvaded the ROK in 1950, the United Nations voted tointervene, a first in its history and only one of twocases of military retaliation with the 1991 Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait. Two years of combat devastatedboth Koreas and created an international relationsconundrum that still remains nowadays: though it isoften assumed that the Korean War was a conflictbetween the two Koreas, it was hardly the case sincethe United Nations’ forces, while led by the USA andvastly supplied by American soldiers, were mannedby 20 other nations. The Armistice that was signed on27 July 1953 was thus not a bilateral agreementbetween the two Koreas. It was instead signed by theUSA on behalf of the United Nations Command, bythe Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and North, andby the DPRK’s own Korean People’s Army. The ROKis thus only a party to the Armistice by virtue of itsparticipation to the United Nations Command troopcontingent. The Korean War is an important event in thepeninsula’s history since it solidified the schism thathad already started to develop between the twoKorean states as they each elected their own leadersin 1947 and developed their discrete constitutions.Both countries received extensive help before, during,and after the Korean War, thus making the Koreanconflict an international entanglement.

Down south, the USA became Seoul’s most importanteconomic, political, and military support, as Koreaturned into one of the spokes within the military hubWashington had started to develop in Asia (Cha2010). Up north, both the People’s Republic of China(PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) furnished the DPRK with military equipmentand preferred access to their own economic systems(Ji 2001; Szalontai 2005). Political shifts during theCold War and changing military postures andpositions meant that any development on the KoreanPeninsula would resonate beyond its borders:tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul wouldirremediably involve the USA, often the UnitedNations, and quite consistently other regional powerssuch as Russia, Japan, and China. By the end of theCold War, the Korean state of affairs no longerinvolved finding a permanent solution to the Armisticesince many other crisis erupted in the Armistice’swake: these included tensions between Japan andthe DPRK (Japanese citizens had been abducted byPyongyang in the 1960s and 1970s to serve aslanguage instructors), terrorist acts committed byPyongyang onto Seoul (the 1983 Rangoon bombingduring a South Korea visit, the destruction of SouthKorean flight KAL858 by a North Korean agent),tensions and confrontations around the DemilitarizedZone (DMZ) (the 1976 Axe murder attack by NorthKorean soldiers), or heavy systems confrontations(1996 submarine incident when North Koreanintruded into South Korean waters). There are plentyof conflicting elements present on the KoreanPeninsula nowadays, with North Korea’sdevelopment as weapons producer to many countriesin the Middle East with ballistic missiles in the 1980sand 1990s, or Pyongyang’s own nuclear programmegrowth, adding even more salt to an already long-seeping wound. What we see through this briefhistory overview is a tangled web of events thatoperate as nested relationship: according to MichaelHowlett (2009), policy elements usually fall within amicro, meso, and macro level. This framework will beadapted later in the paper to conduct an analysis ofhistorical engagements.

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But to understand and analyse the Korean Peninsula,both Korean affairs specialists and the conflictresolution literature are also a cornerstone tounderstand the Korean Peninsula. Yet, using the termconflict, or crisis, or tension is far fromstraightforward, especially within the Korean context.Charles Hermann (1950) talked about a crisisrequiring elements of threat as well as an element ofsurprise, along with the fact that parties only have ashort window of opportunity to make a decision abouttheir own reaction. In that sense, the definition canapply to the Korean Peninsula but there is not justone crisis in the region. Instead, there are many past,ongoing, and burgeoning crises. For Ted Robert Gurr(1980), a conflict is different than a crisis as it iscomposed of “overt, coercive interactions ofcontenting collectivities”. This surely fit the twoKoreas’ state of tensions too, but over time, directmilitary confrontations have been rare between thetwo. Thus, work done on rivalries is particularlyuseful, especially those with a dyadic focus: while it istrue that the DPRK and the ROK form the mostpertinent dyads on the peninsula because of theirhistory, the DPRK and the US’s contention over theusage of nuclear energy is a form of dyad and so isthe DPRK and Japan’s contention over the issues ofabductees. Diehl and Goertz (2000) have told us thatsuch rivalries, which they call “enduring” take time todevelop, are linked with history between the partiesand are extremely sensitive to misperceptions, thuseasily fuelling small crises bursts. Some have alsosuggested the term “strategic rivalries” which alsoinvolves states that usually regard each other ascompetitors (Colaresi and Thompson 2002). Thisdoes appear useful when considering the two Koreas,especially during the 1950–1970 period wheneconomic competition was fierce between the twoKoreas. Nowadays, it is easy to recognise thatcapitalism in the South had enabled Seoul to growand modernise exponentially. Yet, the DPRK’sdevelopment of nuclear weapons has dealt anunmistakable blow to the ROK, almost rendering itsconventional weapons irrelevant in light of such apotential for fire and fury.

But strategic rivalries usually do not need toexperience direct warfare, which appears unsuitablewhen considering the devastations that occurredduring the Korean War. In that sense, the absence ofopen bouts of warfare on the Korean Peninsulacreates a puzzle for the conflict literature sinceprotracted conflict usually requires some period ofwarfare. Essentially, the Korean Peninsula might bestbe described as a region besieged by non-protractedrivalries. The Conflict Resolution literature is helpful when itcomes to understand how a conflict or situation suchas that of the Korean Peninsula exist and can bedealt with. In theory, Snyder and Diesing (1977) havesuggested that any crisis or conflict can resemble aform of coercive or accommodative diplomacy thatwill be influenced by the fear of potential war. ForCharles McClelland (1961), acute international crisescould also be dealt with by seeking outside help suchto mediate or broker parties to de-escalate. In thecase of the Korean Peninsula, any resolution wouldalso mean accepting to engage with the DPRK as areal and legitimate actor. For Fisher et al. (1991),talking to dangerous actors or “villains” should bedone not because it is ethical but because it is theonly way to shift a potential status quo. In practice,many have suggested that the Korean situation iscomplex, and that this very complexity leads tosuboptimal results: military, ideological, and economicissues have all mixed to create a heady andexplosive cocktail that lacks a conflict resolutionmechanism that can be enacted and enforced (Smith2000). Three directions have particularly beeninvestigated: negotiation strategies, goal divergence,and evolving environment. Negotiation strategies are problematic, especiallywhen it comes to dealing with Pyongyang as theDPRK has had the habit, ever since the Armisticenegotiations, to practice agenda meddling and hasoften reinterpreted agreements after their signature(Joy 1955; Downs 1999).

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When the two Koreas talked to one another, theyoften have done so away from the negotiation tablewhere the DPRK also tend to purse a differentagenda than what is expected during formal rounds(do Kim and Hoon 1995). Parties also have divergentgoals, with one of the main issues surrounding whatthe international community wants the DPRK tobecome or not to become. Giving Pyongyang survivalassurances has thus not been a priority and haslargely contributed to insecurity over the peninsula(Kleiner 2005). A large focus has also been to sortproblems (such as nuclear proliferation) but at thesame time re-creating diplomatic ties between theDPRK and the USA, Japan, and the ROK especially(Yun 2005). Yet, these approaches have often beenconsidered in a vacuum, away from the changingrealities of the Korean Peninsula. Some noted formany years that North Korean provocations wereoften short of war, and that Pyongyang had shiftedfrom a wish to unify the Korean Peninsula under itsleadership to a strategy of economic survival awayfrom the South (Cha and Kang 2003). While on theone hand the DPRK has been noted as reverting to amilitary-first policy (French 2005), nuclear proliferationhas on the other hand clearly been noted as a way tosurvive and not a suicide mission (Sagan 1996). Thismeans, essentially, that the ice is changing: whilethere is no war, the peninsula grounds are differentevery time the DPRK test a weapon, and it isunhelpful to pigeonhole the DPRK in a specific role,as they evolve as well (Smith 2000). Is there anythingto be gained by applying this analytical lens to theKorean situation? Frozen conflict lens: questioning the Koreansituation A frozen conflict starts with an actual war and resultsin a situation that is neither war nor peace. Frozenconflicts are usually understood within a post-Sovietcontext and thus often centre on Eurasian countries.Frozen conflicts often involved great powers. Thoughfrozenness conjures images of immobility, thisactually might be a misnomer: events do occur, anddynamic interactions are possible, even though nopermanent peaceful solution has been found afterfighting has subsided (Lynch 2005).

This also means a strong potential for violenceresurgence as according to for Valery Perry, violencemight have indeed stopped, but “the underlyinginterests of the formerly warring parties have neitherbeen abated nor addressed” (Perry 2009, p. 36). Within the framework of this Special Issue, frozenconflict is defined as a protracted and post-warconflict process that has failed to reach a peacefuland stable stage between contending actors. JanLudvik and Michal Smetana particularly focus onthree transformative scenarios, peaceful thwarting,violent thawing, and conflict withering, but they stressthat conflict transformation is very elusive: more oftenthan not, parties return to a state of frozen affairs.The Korean Peninsula is a particularly salient casestudy for the furthering of the frozen conflict field.Indeed, though frozen conflicts have usually beenunderstood within European and Eurasian contexts,the post-Soviet paradigm is central to the Koreandivision and current difficulties. Soviet influence overthe Korean Peninsula both in terms of Sovietinfluence onto the DPRK as early as the 1950s andthe ensuing Cold War context that framed more of thegeopolitical context up to the Cold War’s end isimportant. The role great powers take within aparticular conflict and whether or not they are aidingor trying to prevent conflict transformation is also acrucial point to consider. Moreover, the Armisticeembodies a halted conflict, a temporary measuremeant to allow for space and appropriate time toreconcile both Koreas to the reality of their divisionand find a permanent solution to accommodate theirdivergences. What the Armistice has done, however,is stop violence, at least temporarily. The frozenconflict lens is also useful to consider in the Koreancase because of the notion of the underlyinginterests: as mentioned earlier, though the Koreasexist today in separate states because of the initialKorean Peninsula division to remove the remnants ofJapanese colonial endeavours at the end of WorldWar II, their separation is far from being the onlyissue that needs to be resolved. Hence, questions ofhuman rights, regional stability, and potentialpresence of nuclear weapons that could lead to newwarfare all simmer in the background.

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How can frozen conflicts evolve? This article focuseson three transformative scenarios: peaceful thawing,violent thawing, and conflict withering. The first one,(1) peaceful thawing, suggests that it is possible for aconflict to evolve so that only a stable peace remains.In order to do so, diplomacy and negotiations areusually favoured, with parties engaging in discussionsabout what has made them at odds with one another.There also is scope for non-state actors such asNGOs and IGOs to assist in conflict transformation.The second one, (2) violent thawing, sees theopposite motion, one where a frozen conflict to returnto a state of violent and major warfare. The third one,(3) conflict withering, sees the conflict disappear notbecause of conscious efforts to manage it and find apeaceful solution through negotiated efforts but ratherbecause of changing circumstances such aseconomic upturns or downturns, for example. Allthree options are highly relevant to the KoreanPeninsula. When considered alongside events thathave shaped the direction of Korean affairs since, in1945, they allow for a new and differentunderstanding and interpretation of conflict in theKorean context: 1. With regard to peaceful thawing, one of the rootcauses to the current situation is the Armistice: thenegotiation of a peaceful military settlement wouldremove an important hurdle to the normalisation ofthe situation in the region. Security governancechanges, however, could also be considered underthis particular outlook, with negotiated solutionsbrokered within bespoke endeavours such as the Six-Party Talks. 2. Violent thawing is the option that is currently themost feared, especially in light of the DPRK’s militaryarsenal. Yet, the very presence of nuclear weaponson the Korean Peninsula acts as a potential deterrent.Thus, violent thawing within the Korean context wouldmost likely lead to questions regarding securitygovernance. This mostly means shifting alliances anddefence commitments in light of military development.

3. Conflict withering would occur within the context ofgains derived from interdependence for example andwould thus largely rely on the nature of the NorthKorean regime to change fundamentally, yetgradually so as not lead to violent thawing. Thus,conflict withering within the Korean context wouldmost likely involve a change from a totalitarian NorthKorean state to one that opens up because of theimperatives of economic factors and one that allowsfor changes to happen. Moving past frozen land: what matters on thepeninsula?While the Korean Peninsula has been under scrutinyfor many years by researchers and policy-makers,and a multitude of angles and lenses have beenapplied to understand mechanisms, patterns,approaches, and prospects, the starting point to muchof the contemporary study of the Koreas is about thevery existence of the Armistice and its legalimplications. The Armistice is contentious because ofwho is a party to it: the actual signatories are theUnited Nations Command, the DPRK, and the PRC,which means that neither the ROK nor the USA aredirectly involved, though their engagement is obviousgiven the US’s military situation and South Korea’slocation (Yong-Joong 2002). Despite these issues, itis undeniable that had a peaceful and permanentsolution be found to end the Korean War, a number ofsecurity conundrums would have also been resolved.For one, the two Koreas would not have had todefend their own existences as legitimate entities inthe region as well as within the internationalcommunity. Their own security needs might not haveinvolved and entangled as many large powers as theydid within the Cold War context. Yet, most of the Korean Peninsula’s issues nowinvolve security needs, which have been greatlyaccelerated by the DPRK’s development of nuclearenergy and its attempts to secure a nuclear weaponsarsenal that could act as a deterrent to whatPyongyang perceives is belligerent posturing from theUSA. In parallel to these issues, most of thepeninsula has slowly entered interdependent patternsvia the Koreas’ 1991 memberships to the UnitedNations and their participation in a number ofinternational organisations.

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The Korean conflict has also been transformed frommostly bilateral engagements to engagements viamultilateral frameworks, a change that has simplyfollowed most of the negotiation developmentbecause of globalisation forces, actor diversification,and the need to manage complexity via pluralprocesses. Though Northeast Asia has often sufferedfrom an “organisational gap” and has lagged behindother parts of the world, including Europe when itcomes to multilateral processes (Calder and Ye2004), the Korean conundrum has led to thedevelopment of bespoke processes as well as theFour-Party Talks (ROK, DPRK, PRC, and USA toattempt to replace the Armistice), the 1994 AgreedFramework (an international consortium to replacethe DPRK’s nuclear reactors with light-water reactorsand to prevent dual-use and nuclear proliferation), theSix-Party Talks (ROK, DPRK, PRC, USA, Japan, andRussia to achieve the denuclearisation of the KoreanPeninsula), as well as other dialogues such as via theRed Cross to deal with the issues of Japanesecitizens abducted by the DPRK. To make sense ofthese historic events, we go back to Howlett’s threepolicy levels and adapt here to essential time markerson the Korean Peninsula. The timeline compiled hereis made of data reporting the major clashes, events,overtures, and policy decisions that have shaped theKorean conflict. Hence, it is possible to present areading of the Korean Peninsula’s major events sincethe Korean War until contemporary times, organisedchronologically but also thematically along threelevers:- The micro level, which focuses on policy actors’behaviour, finds its start with the political situation setup by the Armistice. Events tagged into this categorypertain to clashes between the two Koreas and policydecisions geared toward this significant other.- The meso level, which focuses on sectorial policyregimes. Events tagged into this category pertain tospecific geostrategic consideration involving theKorean Peninsula and outside actors but mostly in abilateral capability.- The macro level, which focuses on global securitygovernance. Events tagged into this category pertainto non-proliferation regimes such as the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency’s efforts toward non-proliferation on the peninsula or other United Nations’vehicles including sanctions.

This analysis has the advantage of consideringseveral levels of interaction instead of focusing onmore isolated and increasingly contestedexplanations to the Korean conflict lasting this long,such as the fact that the DPRK is about to collapse,the fact that China is the only power enabling theDPRK’s survival, or the fact that the DPRK is a clear,present, and imminent danger to the USA Even though the Korean War and the subsequentArmistice have left the Korean Peninsula in a relativestate of tension, a number of other factors, such asNorth Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and theentanglement of foreign powers such as the USA inbilateral Korean affairs (at times at the request of bothKorean states, however), means that the types ofconflict and crisis we see are of a “multidimensionalnature” and have, as Hazel Smith (2005) hasmentioned, numerous times, short, medium, andlong-term regional stability issues.The frozen conflict lens is useful here to chisel areading that concentrates on how core issuesbetween opposing sides might remain unresolved. Itallows for contentious dyads of a wide range ofissues, such as inter-Korean relation problems, or theUS-DPRK rhetoric and sanction relationship. Theexpectation to move beyond the frozen state wouldbe that peaceful thawing, through a mix of negotiatedcompromises between parties (sometimes even thirdparties such as states, IGOs, and NGOs), would havebeen successful by now. Issues centred on at themicro, as showed in the table, were particularlyconcentrated in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Theyhave shifted to be encompassed in geopolitical layersas time went on, and issues were often packagedtogether to try to find a potential solution. However,with the development of North Korea’s missileprogramme, and the start of its nuclear tests, most ofthe interactions that we now see are about the mesolevel and involves infighting and instability withcountries and entities beyond the peninsula. Theuncertainty surrounding North Korea’s missile andnuclear tests and capabilities also createsopportunities for violent thawing: The USA hasconsidered pre-emptive strikes and military actionsover the peninsula should Pyongyang decide tofurther its capabilities or even launch an actual bomb.

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Violent thawing is a very unlikely option on theKorean Peninsula given some of the geostrategicchanges that have occurred over the past decades:the ROK has become a very strong and courtedeconomy, and the USA is also extremely reliant onthe PRC for its own economic consumption andgrowth, and global governance as the macro level, asshown in the table, is very present on the questions ofsanctioning the DPRK or considering ways to restartnegotiations.. But change in the arrangements wesee in Northeast Asia could potentially be devastatingfor world economic balance, while a war would ofcourse have an even more tragic human impact. In acatch-22 situation, it is the DPRK’s development ofnuclear weapons and its persistence in testing themthat create the possibility and the need for violentthawing via either foreign military action or potentialmisunderstanding and miscommunication betweenvarious actors. Yet, it is the very fact that the DPRKhas managed to develop nuclear weapons thatprevents other countries from launching a militaryaction on the North. Violent thawing is to be seenhere as a by-product of geostrategic Cold Warrivalries. As for conflict withering, there are very few avenuesfor this to be realised: it would take specific changessuch as the DPRK slowly opening its economy up toa point where it is no longer seeking drastic measuresto survive. Thus, another catch-22 is unveiled here: itis the potentiality of a violent thawing via militaryconflict that prevents avenues for conflict witheringfrom materialising. Hence, at the macro level, theinternational sanctions directed at the DPRK haveslowly curtailed not only North Korean revenuestreams but also potential development andopportunities for in-depth change. For example,sanctions now severely impact education in theDPRK, especially foreign endeavours to teachbusiness practices and rudimentary capitalism inNorth Korea. Without a possibility to potential wither,there is little hope for change on the peninsula.

Conclusion There is no shortage of analysis, explanations, andopinions about the Korean Peninsula. Yet, decades ofscholarship and political practice have not managedto curtail uncertainties in the region. If anything, wenow live in more dangerous times as the DPRK hasmanaged to develop nuclear weapons, thusbecoming one more country in the internationalcommunity that has the possibility to destroy a largepart of humanity. Despite this pessimistic approach,many remain confident that a peaceful transformativescenario can be found on the peninsula. But perhaps,the best sign that the world is not on the brink of waris that as long as both Koreas have existed in theirmodern forms, the international community andespecially large powers have taken an interest inmaking sure a stalemate is achieved. Whether or notsuch as interest is motivated by personal greed orpersonal empathy is not what is at stake here. Whatis crucial, however, is that there has been muchinvestment in making sure the Korean Peninsula cangrowth and prosper, at least South of the DMZ.Applying the concept of frozen conflict to the Koreanconundrum, and indeed presenting such aconundrum as being rightfully part of the corpus offrozen conflict case, is useful, as it allows to readconflict on the peninsula in a different light, once thatallows less focus on one particular actor or theme butmore of a layered approach to difficult positions andpropositions. This article has focused on reading the Koreanconflict through three layers: conditions that pertain tothe Armistice, changes within the geostrategic natureof the Korean Peninsula especially in light ofglobalisation and interdependence, and Defencematters especially given the DPRK’s nucleardevelopment and accelerated missile developmentprogramme.

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This was then coupled with three potentialtransformation scenarios: peaceful thawing that wouldoccur through mediation, negotiation, and multilateralchannels, violent thawing that would lead to changebut via the devastating restart of open warfare, andconflict withering that would see change because it isunavoidable and inherent after an appropriate amountof time. The frozen conflict lens is particularlyappropriate to the Korean case since it is largelycomposed of rivalries and contentious sides (betweencountries for example), and it also allows for theinvolvement of many types of actors. What we find tobe most salient here is that at this point, the situationhas reached a “precarious instability” by which thefear of use of nuclear weapons and the restart of awar actually paralyses much of the situation fromthawing peacefully.

So, there might be some thawing, but it does notalways mean that the situation returns to what it wasbefore the layer of ice was created, since countriesand situations remain dynamic. This is exemplified bythe fact that if a peace treaty were to be signedbetween the Koreas, this would most likely mean thatboth Koreas would still exist as separate and notreturn to a unified pre-World War II Korea situation.Moreover, it is quite likely that the DPRK would havemore of a military might than the ROK. What, then,can we expect to see, and what would be mostadvisable? In a perfect world, conflict withering wouldeventually occur and the reasons why belligerencewas so deeply rooted would just erode. In a morerealistic world, peaceful thawing would need to bepursued with the caveat that both Koreas’ grievancesand needs must be met however difficult this might begiven domestic regime constraints.

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Conflict dynamics in the Bidibidi refugee settlement inUgandaIntroduction This article presents the results of a study conductedin the Bidibidi Refugee Settlement in the YumbeDistrict of Uganda between June and August 2018. Itexamines the conflict trends between refugees andhost communities. The aim was to understand thedrivers and dynamics of conflicts in the settlement. This article highlights the key findings of the studyand some suggestions for conflict transformation forbetter relationships. The data collection process took20 days. The methodology used for this research wasbased on qualitative study design.

Qualitative data collection was done through focusgroup discussions using interview guides, directobservation, and structured and semi-structuredinterviews with different community-level committees,such as refugee welfare committees (RWCs) and thehost population. Non-structured interviews andinformal meetings were also held to collectcomplementary information, especially with thevarious stakeholders, such as local governmentofficials, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), theOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) and other implementing partners.Direct observation was used to confirm conflictdynamics reported during interviews, for validity andreliability. This study was inspired by the conflicttransformation theory of Lederach. According toLederach, conflict is normal and dynamic withinhuman relationships and can be seen as a catalystfor growth.

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Violent conflict in South Sudan from 2013 to 2016forced over 977 746 refugees to flee to Uganda,according to statics from the UNHCR. Some 86% ofthose who fled were women and children, withchildren making up more than 60% of all refugees.The majority of these refugees were settled in theWest Nile region of Northern Uganda. Uganda is a landlocked country located in East Africaand the Great Lakes Region. It is bordered to the eastby Kenya, to the north by South Sudan, to the westby the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), tothe south-west by Rwanda, and to the south byTanzania. It covers an area of 241 038 squarekilometres. The population is estimated to be 34.6million inhabitants, with farming as the maineconomic activity. The country is also home to 56tribes, all speaking different languages and withdifferent cultural practices. Uganda’s refugee policy isone of the world’s most progressive, promotingrefugee integration rather than confinement, anddirecting aid resources to the host as well as therefugee population. Refugees and UgandaUganda ratified the Convention Relating to the Statusof Refugees in 1987. According to Muluba, thepresence of refugees in Uganda dates back to the1940s with the hosting of Polish refugees atNyabyeya and Koja in Masindi Mukono. However, in1955, Uganda became involved in a serious situationwhen some 78 000 refugees from southern DRC,Sudan and Kenya entered its borders. In 2017, WorldVision Uganda estimated that 1 064 043 refugeesand asylum-seekers lived in Uganda. World VisionUganda also estimated that 68% of this number –equivalent to 723 550 refugees – were from SouthSudan alone. Refugees from Rwanda and Burundihave also fled to Uganda. By late 2017, Uganda hadthe highest refugee/asylum-seeker population inAfrica. The West Nile region is located in the north-westcorner of Uganda. It borders South Sudan to thenorth and the DRC to the east.

The region’s ethnic groups include the Lugbara, Alur,Kakwa and Madi. Political instability in the DRC andSouth Sudan has a direct impact on the region. Themulti-ethnic profile of the area creates conflict interms of cultural difference, intermarriages andmigration to urban satellite towns. For over 20 years,West Nile was cut off from the rest of Uganda, due tothe Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency inNorthern Uganda and the Uganda National RescueFront II (UNRF II), which ended with the signing of apeace treaty between UNRF II and the Governmentof Uganda in 2002. The conflict mainly affected thedistricts of Yumbe, Koboko Arua and Moyo.8 Untillate 2000, West Nile was home to thousands of SouthSudanese refugees, who returned after the signing ofthe comprehensive peace agreement between Sudanand South Sudan in 2005. South Sudan become independent in 2011. In 2013,the internal power struggle within the ruling party, theSudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM),resulted in clashes in the capital city, Juba. Theseclashes quickly turned into targeted killings againstNuer, the ethnic group of South Sudan’s vicepresident, Riek Machar, who fled into hiding and laterbecame the leader of a rebellion against PresidentSalva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka. Civilians were regularlyand deliberately targeted in the conflict, leading tolarge-scale displacements. Unfortunately, violence continued in South Sudan.According to the Inter-Agency Regional AnalystsNetwork,9 350 000 refugees from South Sudancrossed to the West Nile region between January andOctober 2017. Because of the high influx, nine newsettlements were opened, with Bidibidi as the largest,sheltering over 285 000 South Sudanese refugees,predominantly from the Equatoria region. Most of therefugees were women. In 2017, Bidibidi wasdescribed as the largest refugee settlement in theworld. Conflict Dynamics in the Bidibidi RefugeeSettlementThe Bidibidi settlement covers an area of 250 squarekilometres. It is composed primarily of underutilised“hunting grounds”, considered by the hostcommunities as unsuitable for agriculture.

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The area consists of low, rolling hills and mostly rockysoil. Bidibidi is divided into five zones, and each ofthese zones is divided into clusters, which are furtherdivided into individual villages surrounded by hostcommunity settlements. Refugee leadershipstructures parallel Uganda’s own local governancemodel, which is composed of ascending levels oflocal councils. At the village level, there is an RWC1;at the cluster level, RWC2; and for each zone,RWC3. These are decided by elections overseen bythe OPM. The RWC at each level is headed by achairperson. Firewood and Environmental ChallengesThe conflict issue that is most significant between thehost communities and the refugee population is theissue of firewood. Collection of firewood aroundBidibidi is ad hoc, with undefined access rights toboth communities. The daily negotiation triggershostilities, tensions and perceptions of insecurity.Refugees must negotiate daily for access to gatherfirewood and biomass in the surrounding land. Thereare no formal land rights granted to the refugees, sothere is a constant risk of violence, assault andextortion on an already traumatised population. This firewood problem is multilayered. First, there isno designated area for the refugee community toaccess firewood. According to interviews, the problemis complicated by refugee women’s fear of the Aringamen from the host communities, accusing them ofgender-based violence. During interviews, Aringarepresentatives claim their intentions are oftenmisjudged, due to language barriers – for example,men often need the gathering area for charcoalproduction. While there have been consistent effortsto mitigate this problem, the issue appears unsolvableuntil land is clearly designated for firewood collectionand/or cooking fuel is provided to the refugees. Second, environmental degradation continues asbiomass is cleared in the vicinities of the refugeesettlements. Refugees are considered by the hostcommunities to be temporary visitors, who do notrespect the land or care about sustainability. Somehost community members call the refugees“insensitive”.

A non-governmental organisation (NGO) officialexplained during interviews that environmentaldegradation is a very big problem and a key way tosolve it is to plant more trees. They have been tryingto work on the problem, but need much intervention interms of planting more trees. While members of thehost communities do not relay belligerent complaintswith regard to land-sharing, questions aboutenvironmental degradation prompt angry replies.Officials in the district confirmed during interviews thatthe refugee presence has increased Yumbe’spopulation by 50%. This is a sudden and monumentalstrain on resources. The host communities are alsoconcerned about the grass, which is needed to feedlivestock. Refugees, however, cut grass for their ownuse to thatch houses – or, sometimes, they burngrass in accordance with traditional customs. A seniorUgandan official remarked during an interview:12 "The environment has been degraded. It’s beenmassive. The community needs mitigation measuresto rehabilitate the environment, which is now out ofcontrol. It will cause a lot of problems. Environmenthas many components. There were issues of bushburning. It can destroy grass, and destroy trees. Itcan also cause pollution in the atmosphere. We wanta comprehensive approach to be taken to mitigateissues related to the environment" During interviews, an OPM official confirmed thesechallenges, suggesting that agencies should considerproviding efficient cooking stoves to refugees andstep up efforts to plant trees. He indicated thatintervention was minimal and that the conflictbetween the refugees and the hosts over firewood willnot stop unless an alternative is found. Grievances over promises made by the OPM areimperative as to whether the host communitieschoose to be cooperative. Host representatives stressthat unresolved issues between the host communitiesand the OPM over land use have produced abacklash against the refugee presence within the hostcommunities. Host communities were promisedlivelihood programmes that are yet to arrive. T

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his adds to the resentment towards Ugandanadministrators, which negatively influences host-refugee relations. Local officials, in particular, notethat the infrastructure of the area was alreadyseverely underdeveloped before the settlements wereestablished. Internal Politics and DynamicsThe population of Bidibidi is relatively peaceful,despite the diversity of its inhabitants. Nevertheless,there have been isolated cases of ethnic conflict inthe settlement, related to the war in South Sudan.Low-level interpersonal conflict is also widelyreported, due to the trauma and hardship ofresettlement. The politicisation of ethnicity has been a definingcharacteristic of the war in South Sudan, and thisethnic conflict has been mirrored in the settlement.Most of the settlement residents perceive theircommunities to be on the same “side” of the war,against the South Sudanese government. However,this is not necessarily always the case. One major flashpoint in the refugee settlement iscentred on a small population of Dinkas. Mostrefugees associate ethnic Dinka groups with thegovernment of President Kiir, the leadership of theSPLA, and the ethnic Dinka Mathiang Anyoor militaryforce deployed in parts of Equatoria in 2016. Manyrefugees blame these groups for numerous atrocities.As a result, Dinkas have been singled out andisolated from the rest of the South Sudanese refugeecommunity. During interviews, it was clear thattensions over the Dinka presence have occasionallyresulted in direct violence – not only in Bidibidi, butalso in the Rhino camp settlement, as was the case inJune 2018. The gender disparity in Bidibidi influences bothrefugee interactions and domestic conflict. There aremany women living in the settlement without theirhusbands, which often leads to personal challenges.

. Men come to Bidibidi to find their wives, and insteaddiscover infidelity. War brings poverty, which oftenforces women into sexual exploitation to survive andsupport their families. Adultery also leads to conflictsamong women and affects family dynamics.According to interviews with women and refugeeleaders, significant interpersonal conflicts anddomestic abuse ensue. Depression and anxietycaused by earlier traumatic events in South Sudan,as well as alcoholism and financial stress, are seriousproblems in the refugee settlement. Land disputesLand is an emotional and contentious topic, andissues relating to resource-sharing causes feelings ofbitterness and insecurity. The host communities havedeep cultural and emotional ties to their land, whichextends beyond the issue of resources. They focustheir conversations on Ugandan actors. Thegovernment and interlocutors do not seem directlyconcerned about the refugees and the land given tothem. In contrast, the refugees interviewed are moreconcerned about sharing the land with the hostcommunities. Refugees argue that the land isimpossible to cultivate, either because it is too rockyor too close to livestock or too far from their home.This is not an issue between the refugees and hostcommunities, but rather one between the hostcommunities and Ugandan authorities,16 becausethe Ugandan authorities have not kept their promiseof compensating the host communities for the landthat was given to the refugees. As indicatedpreviously, host communities were promisedlivelihood programmes that are yet to arrive. Thiscreates further resentment and negatively affectshost-refugee relations. The presence of the refugeesand the issue of land is the catalyst for tensionsbetween the Ugandan state and its citizens. The Bidibidi settlement is located on the communalland of the Aringa people, who are governed bycustomary laws.

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In general, communal land falls under the control ofthe specific clan with historical claim to the area.Under this system, each clan has a designated “landchief” responsible for speaking on behalf of thecommunity. Most of Bidibidi is on land that was notused prior to the refugees’ arrival, as it wasconsidered unsuitable for agriculture. But this landsupported hunting, livestock grazing and charcoalproduction critical to the livelihood of the hostpopulation. The customary nature of land rights resulted inadjudication on an “as needed” basis, since landrights have not officially been designated. The landthat forms the Bidibidi settlement was unsettled on bythe host population; consequently, the refugeesituation stirred underlying disputes betweenindividuals and sub-clans over the use andboundaries of the area. These manifested in twoforms of conflict: (1) the perceived monetary benefit of land claimsnear the refugee sites; and (2) the negative effects onthose previously using the land for livelihoodpurposes, primarily charcoal production, grazing andhunting. Several interviewees brought up boundarydisputes between the sub-clans of Odravu andKululu, specifically who has the authority to makedecisions. These disputes have compromised reliefprogrammes, including the building of a health facility.Claims to land rights are being waged not only byland chiefs, but also by citizens and agencies whofalsely assert ownership. Host representatives gave different responses aboutwhether or not they were promised anything inexchange for their land. Many were frustrated,because they were not provided with “appreciation”for their generosity. The repeated use of the word“appreciation”, rather than compensation, indicatedthat an in-kind payment for the land was notexpected. One OPM official explained that his officewas constrained in its ability to fulfil all of itscommitments, due to resource deficits and ambiguityover land rights. Some respondents believed thatlocal politicians and elites were agitating the Aringaelders and land chiefs against the OPM, for their ownbenefit.

Competition for ResourcesThere is a low-intensity disagreement among thelevels of local government over control of anticipatedand actual aid resources that the host communitiesare to get 30%. The UN and OPM had set a conditionthat all implementing partners had to allocate 30% ofall aid resources (training opportunities, livelihoods,and so on) to benefit the host communities.Representatives of all levels of local councilsinterviewed in Yumbe district all argued that the“30%” of aid projects destined for the hostcommunities should be targeted to, and controlled by,the hosting village, sub-county and districtrespectively. The ambiguity of, and lack oftransparency in, the “30% rule” has created moreovert conflict over these resources. There needs tobe clarification on who is entitled to what at all levelsof implementation, to avoid the escalation of conflicts. ConclusionIn general, conflict transformation focuses onrelationships between parties. To achieve this, thereis a need for a clear mechanism for conflicttransformation – such as dialogue focusing on sharedinterests and resources, since the conflict seems tobe focused mostly on resources such as land use andaccess to firewood collection. The aid resourcesserve to bridge, but also divide, the host and refugeepopulations. There are also widening gaps around thepolitics and grievances of hosting refugees, whichcould widen if left unaddressed. However, thesechallenges could also be an opportunity to lay thegroundwork for longer-term stability and peacefulrelations, with a view towards a likely long-termrefugee presence in Yumbe district. The governmentand implementing partners should focus on clarifyingtheir position with the host communities on land use,to avoid the host communities blaming the refugees.There is also a need to train refugees on Ugandanlaws governing land and conflict management.Special attention must be paid to women – most ofthe refugees are women, and issues that affect theirdaily lives must be prioritised.

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There are some significant positive findings from theBidibidi settlement. The Ugandan government and aidagencies responded to an emergency crisis ofunprecedented scale, all the while negotiating localpolitics and mobilising emergency relief. The SouthSudan refugees, with some notable exceptions, haveintegrated relatively peaceably. There are a numberof local and international NGOs working side by sideto support both the refugees and host communities tocope with daily challenges. This is a window ofopportunity for collaboration between relevantstakeholders involved in education, livelihoods andconflict management. There is a small-scale buttertrade going on between the refugees and hostcommunities, especially between the women.Refugee women exchange food for charcoal orfirewood from the host community women. Thiscreates a sense of common need for women, whichcan further improve relationships. Some recommendations to improve stability andrelations between all communities, and to preventfurther conflict in Bidibidi and its surrounds, are: OPM should engage in talks with landowners andclan chiefs over land rights and The chiefs andlandowners are so powerful that they can be spoilersof peace. The community listens to them and truststhem. Government officials and partners should usethese local leaders as connectors of peace to buildrelationships between the host communities andrefugees. Due to the scarcity of natural resources and its impacton the environment, the Ugandan government andpartners should advocate to donors to scale upexisting projects for alternative energy. The firewoodissue needs to be resolved to avoid ongoing conflictand intimidation, by providing alternative cookingfuels that can replace wood fuel and charcoal, as wellas developing skills for the construction of Threetypes of cooking fuel that can be explored arebriquettes, pellets and ethanol.

There should be more capacity building for RWCsand local committees to hold local courts for mattersbetween hosts and refugees in terms of alternativedispute mechanisms and legal However, there is alsoa need for awareness campaigns to ensure that thelocal courts avoid adjudicating beyond theirjurisdiction. Implementing partners should use the “Do No Harm”conflict-sensitive approach, which focuses onreducing the negative effects of aid on war andconflict17 so as to minimise the drivers of conflict andfocus on connectors of peace. Communal land ownership between chiefs and sub-clan members should not be These are elders electedby the community to be the custodians of communityproperties, and the government needs to work withthem for access to any community resources.Importantly, refugees need to be provided with landfor cultivation and resources for education on landuse. Many refugees are still living with the effects of thetraumatic experience of war, which can be triggeredat any time. It is important to allocate resources suchas counselling services to respond to the trauma ofthe refugee population. Médecins SansFrontières/Doctors Without Borders has alreadyphased out its emergency response in Yumbe, butthere is still the need for such services.

Dawa, I, "Conflict dynamics in the Bidibidi refugee settlement in Uganda", African Centre for the ConstructiveResolution of Disputes, 11/2/19, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-dynamics-in-the-bidibidi-

refugee-settlement-in-uganda/

violenceViolence is often defined as physical or psychological force afflicted uponanother being. In the context of global politics, it could be seen as anythingsomeone does that prevents others from reaching their full potential. Thisbroader definition would encompass unequal distribution of power thatexcludes entire groups from accessing resources essential for improved livingstandards or well-being, and discriminatory practices that exclude entiregroups of people from accessing certain resources.

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How Oil Companies Help Fund Violence in SouthSudan Violence, Mass Incarceration, and the Myth ofMonstrosity Surviving structural violence in Zimbabwe : The casestudy of a family coping with Violence

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How Oil Companies Help Fund Violence in South Sudan

On February 20, the UN Commission on HumanRights in South Sudan issued its third report. Despitethe peace deal signed six months ago in September,it documented an increase in cases of rape andsexual violence over the past year, concluding thatthe crimes had “become quite normalized” in SouthSudan. Driving much of this is oil. According to the report, the state-owned oil company,Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet), hasdemonstrated a “total lack of transparency andindependent oversight” in its diversion of oil revenuesinto the hands of government elites. The structure ofthe company is deliberately designed to allow forautocratic control: it is run by a managing directorwho is accountable to a board of directors whosemembers are appointed by the president. To theboard, the government has appointed loyalists,particularly individuals from the National SecurityServices (NSS), which has been accused [PDF] ofhuman rights abuses. This process has allowed Nilepet‘s oil revenue to bediverted to the security services, who in turn purchaseweapons and other military equipment. In fact, amajority of Nilepet’s revenues in 2015 were used tofund over two hundred thousand soldiers stationed inconflict areas near oil fields. Further, Nilepet receiveda letter from government elites asking for $1.5 millionfor military expenses in 2016. South Sudan produces around ninety million barrelsof oil a year and the vast majority of the revenue findsits way back to political and economic elites, while,according to 2016 data from the World Bank, thepoverty rate stands at 82 percent. With oil incomeaccounting for about 98 percent of the government’sbudget, the parties in conflict have targeted oil-producing states and facilities in efforts to gain moneyand power.

The struggle has entirely neglected the needs of theaverage citizen. A report by Global Witnessdocumented how some South Sudanese must resortto the black market to obtain fuel, where prices canreach 300 South Sudanese pounds ($2.30) just to filla one-liter plastic bottle, equivalent to almost $9 agallon. Although Nilepet is under the complete control of thegovernment, it is considered a private company,meaning it is not subject to the same oversight as agovernment agency. The UN Commission on HumanRights in South Sudan advocated for increasedaccountability and transparency in oil companies,such as Nilepet, to overcome deeply-rootedcorruption in oil-rich nations. This likely requiresinternational support against corrupt practices. The U.S. Commerce Department has designatedforeign and domestic oil entities operating in SouthSudan as threats to U.S. national security because oftheir role in the conflict. These other state-ownedcompanies, which dominate oil production in SouthSudan alongside Nilepet, are the Chinese NationalPetroleum Company, Petronas of Malaysia, and theIndian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. Unlike thoseof China, Malaysia, and India, many otherinternational companies have abandoned oilproduction in South Sudan altogether. South Sudan is home to one of the worsthumanitarian crises in the world. International efforts,such as those of the U.S. Department of Commerce,are needed to call attention to the severity of theissue and push South Sudan to implementaccountability and transparency in the oil industry andamong the security services.

Munn, E, "How Oil Companies Help Fund Violence in South Sudan", Council for Foreign Relations, 14/3/19,https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-oil-companies-help-fund-violence-south-sudan

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Violence, Mass Incarceration, and the Myth of Monstrosity

Arthur Longworth is currently serving life without thepossibility of parole in Washington State. Artcommitted murder at the age of 20. Now 51, Art hasbecome a teacher, an activist, and an award-winningwriter. Several years ago, he had the opportunity tohave his clemency petition considered. Art’s lawyeroffered two main arguments. The first had to do withArt’s remarkable growth since his conviction. Thesecond concerned the horrific abuse Art experiencedas a child at the hands of his parents—and againafter the state placed him in a group home for boys. During the hearing, Art’s sister Dawn described theabuse they experienced as children: “My brother andI were tied up, locked up, stripped of our clothes,beaten till we would bleed and pass out. This wasnormal life for us.” She went on to recount astunningly sadistic pattern of starvation and abusethat persisted for years, despite the fact that she andArt routinely arrived at school malnourished andvisibly injured. Later, when Art was 11 and Dawn was 9, theirparents abandoned them. The state took custody of,and immediately separated, the two children.Eventually, state officials placed Dawn in a home witha relatively stable and caring family. But they placedArt in a group home where residents suffered regularphysical and sexual abuse. By age 16, Art had beendischarged from state custody and was living on thestreets. Tragically, Art’s downward spiral eventuallyculminated in his murder of a 25-year-old femaleacquaintance, Cynthia Nelson, and his sentence tolife in prison without the possibility of parole. In most countries, such sentences do not exist or areimposed exceedingly rarely. This is not the case inthe United States, where nearly 50,000 people havebeen condemned to die in prison on the premise thatthey are beyond redemption. But the impact of thismyth of monstrosity extends far beyond the prisonwalls, limiting our ability to develop an effective andhumane solution to the problem of violence as well asmeaningful alternatives to the policies that made theU.S. the world leader in incarceration.

For those of us who have been studying andlamenting the state of the U.S. criminal justice systemfor decades, the recent bipartisan embrace of criminaljustice reform is a welcome development.Unfortunately, calls for reform remain highly limitedand often reinforce unhelpful ways of addressingviolence. As Senator Ted Cruz explained whenannouncing his (initial) support for the SmartSentencing Act, his support for drug reform was notindicative of a new way of responding to violence: “Allof us agree, if you have violent criminals, if you havecriminals who are using guns, who are usingviolence, who are dealing drugs to children, thecriminal justice system should come down on themlike a ton of bricks.” In “pro-reform” statements like these, the currentapproach to violence is reinforced, and people whoare convicted of violent acts are more demonizedthan ever. But the apparently stark division betweennonviolent drug offenders and people convicted ofviolent crimes is largely mythical. Many of the peoplewho have been ensnared by the war on drugs havelengthy rap sheets and have long lived in closeproximity to violence, often as its victims andwitnesses, sometimes as its perpetrators. Meanwhile,people convicted of sex offenses and homicide, themost serious violent crimes, are least likely to havecriminal records and have some of the lowest rates ofrecidivism upon their release. Recent calls for criminal justice reform rest on thedemonstrably false idea that people who have contactwith the criminal justice system can be neatly dividedinto two distinct categories, and that only those in thecomparatively innocent (nonviolent) category deservereform. Drug policy reform is clearly needed andimportant. But the United States would continue toboast the largest prison population and one of thehighest incarceration rates in the world even if all ofprisoners serving time for a drug crime were releasedtomorrow.

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Observers on both the left and the right increasinglyuse the term “mass incarceration” to call attention tothe unprecedented scale of imprisonment in theUnited States. The U.S. is now home to 2.3 millionincarcerated people, 4.7 million people on probationor parole, and tens of millions who have completedtheir criminal sentence yet remain saddled withincapacitating criminal records and oppressive legaldebt. But the problem is not only a matter of scale. Atits core, mass incarceration reflects the tenuousnessof our commitment to human rights, racial equity, andsocial justice. Even more, it is a testament to ourreluctance to recognize the innumerable ways thatviolence has shaped our country, our people, and ourway of doing “justice.” Currently, fewer than one in six state prison inmatesis behind bars as a result of a drug crime, and onlyone in 26 is serving time for drug possession. Bycontrast, more than half of all state prisoners arelocked up because they were convicted of a violentoffense, and the already-long sentences imposed onpeople convicted of violent crimes in the UnitedStates have become significantly harsher. One innine U.S. prisoners are now serving a life sentence. These facts are not widely appreciated. When askedto explain our exceptionally high incarceration rates,most Americans identify elevated crime rates as theculprit. But U.S. crime rates have been dropping fordecades and are similar to those found in otherindustrialized democracies. There is, of course, one important exception to thisgeneralization: homicide. Even after fallingprecipitously, the U.S. murder rate remains three toten times higher than those in comparable countries,although it varies dramatically by geography anddemography. The homicide rate in Chicago’spredominantly black West Garfield Parkneighborhood, for example, is more than 25 timeshigher than the national average.

But our relatively high murder rate does not explainmass incarceration: Only a very small proportion ofpeople living behind bars were convicted of homicide.Instead, as a 2014 National Research Council reportshows, the unparalleled rise in the U.S. incarcerationrate is mainly the result of policies and practices thatsend more people to prison and jail, and for longerperiods of time. As prison and jail populations havegrown, conditions of confinement have too oftendeteriorated, and overcrowding, violence, inadequatemedical care, and the use of solitary confinement areincreasingly widespread. The need to meaningfully address the problem ofviolence and the criminal justice response to it isclear. Too many people living in disadvantagedneighborhoods face the threat of violence daily.Incarcerating people who commit acts of violence—people who are often from the same disadvantagedneighborhoods, and have often also been the victimof violence in the past—for extended periods ininhumane conditions is not an effective response tothis problem. Recent research shows that crime survivors agreethat current policies exacerbate rather than alleviatethe problem of violence. Reducing violence and trulyaddressing survivors’ needs will require developing amore thoughtful, preventative, and service-orientedapproach in which long-term incarceration is theexception rather than the rule. Illuminating thecentrality of violence in our collective past andpresent is a necessary step in this re-thinking, for it isonly by doing so that we can challenge the myth ofmonstrosity upon which our current criminal justicepolicies rest. The vigor with which we demonize and penalizepeople convicted of violent crimes stands in sharpcontrast to our collective failure to acknowledge theviolence upon which our nation was founded.

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In his introduction to American Violence: ADocumentary History, historian Richard Hofstaderwrote, “What is impressive to one who begins to learnabout American violence is its extraordinaryfrequency, its sheer commonplaceness in our history,its persistence into very recent and contemporarytimes, and its rather abrupt contrast with ourpretensions to singular national virtue.” American violence has included everything from theforceful subjugation of indigenous peoples, racialviolence, imperial wars, lynchings and mob violenceto innumerable forms of interpersonal violence. Ofthese, war has been the preferred focus of historians,many of whom have focused narrowly on battlefieldtactics, strategies, and so forth, often valorizing andsanitizing the use of lethal violence in the process. But it is not just historians who have been reluctant todraw attention to the centrality of violence in U.S.history. There is little public recognition of trans-Atlantic trade in human beings that led to theenslavement of 12 million Africans. The legacy ofracial violence that characterized slavery and JimCrow also lingers, while calls for reparations, continueto be unanswered. Awareness and recognition of thegenocide of Native Americans also remainsinadequate. At first glance, it appears that society has beencomparatively willing to acknowledge and addressfamily violence. The laws governing domestic tyrannyhave evolved considerably: Violence directed atpartners and children is now statutorily recognized asserious criminal behavior in all 50 states. Yet intimatepartner violence (experienced by 22 percent ofwomen and 7 percent of men) and child physical andsexual abuse (which touches one in five children)remain pervasive. Sadly, the state’s failure to provide safe haven foradults and children living in abusive situations oftencompounds the injuries associated with familyviolence. Tens of thousands of people (mostlywomen) contending with domestic violence need, butare unable to secure, safe temporary housing eachday, and their requests for services often go unmet.

Similarly, the abject failure of the U.S. foster caresystem to provide safe and nurturing environmentsfor children—more than half of whom are children ofcolor—arguably constitutes a form of violence itself. Indeed, truly reckoning with violence in the UnitedStates requires considering structural as well asinterpersonal forms of violence. Popularized by healthactivist and author Paul Farmer, the term “structuralviolence” refers to the harm and suffering that occurswhen social structures and institutions prevent peoplefrom meeting their basic needs. The U.S. has been,and continues to be, an outlier among moderndemocratic nations in terms of the degree ofstructural violence it enacts. Inequality, poverty, andlethal violence remain notably more pronounced inthe United States than in comparable countries. Andas Ta-Nehisi Coates notes, racism shapes not onlythe distribution of poverty, but also its consequences:Highly segregated urban neighborhoods withconcentrated poverty, overwhelmingly inhabited byblack people, are uniquely damaging. In short, our enthusiasm for getting “justice” for violentacts by punishing people convicted of them is notmatched by a passion for making amends for, or evenacknowledging, the centuries of lethal racial violencethat pervades our national history. Nor is ourcollective desire to condemn those convicted ofviolent crimes accompanied by an equally zealouseffort to address the interpersonal and structuralviolence that so frequently precipitate the crimes werush to denounce. No one did anything to stop theviolence that was unleashed on Art for two decades,but when he committed a serious act of violence, thestate’s response was swift, strong, and certain. The erasure of the violence that so often foreshadowscriminal conviction is a remarkable feat. Researchershave amassed a mountain of evidence showing thatpeople convicted of violent crimes, and prisoners ingeneral, are the targets of assaults, often throughouttheir entire lives. Indeed, chronic deprivation andlong-term abuse is the norm in the biographies ofthose serving time.

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Not surprisingly, research also shows that childrenwho repeatedly experience trauma and abuse are farmore likely to end up incarcerated than children whodo not. In Just Mercy, attorney Bryan Stevensonshows how the violence visited upon young peoplewho become justice-involved is so handily erasedwhen prosecutors, judges, and juries hold children asyoung as 13 criminally responsible for their harmfulacts. In such cases, the child is deemed solelyresponsible for his or her violent behavior, while therest of society is found innocent. With all complicating realities erased, the idea thatviolence is a consequence of the monstrosity of thecondemned lives on. The alternative view thatinterpersonal violence is the expression of thehistorical, structural, and social violence thatpermeates society, and of our collective failure toensure equality and protect the vulnerable—recedeswith each condemnation of the “monsters” who fill ourprisons. IT DID NOT TAKE LONG for the Washington stateclemency and pardons board to unanimously denyArt’s clemency petition. As one board memberexplained, “Some people grow up in similarcircumstances but don’t grow up in a life of crime. …You make your choice and pay the price.” Dawn’ssuggestion that her parents and the state that failedto protect Art also bear some responsibility for hiscrime fell on deaf ears. Evidence regarding Art’sdramatic maturation in recent decades was similarlydismissed as irrelevant.

We can never know what would have happened if theboard had actually considered these points. But theboard’s refusal to deeply reflect on them is indicativeof our impoverished way of thinking about violence.As long as we continue to ignore the historical andstructural violence that has shaped, and continues toplague, our country, to deny our collectiveresponsibility for it, and to insist that the sole cause ofviolence is the monstrosity of the convicted, we willnever develop a more capacious, humane, andeffective approach to violence. Developing policies that allow us to move away frommass incarceration will also require re-evaluating ourassumptions about people who have been convictedof a violent crime. Tinkering with the line thatseparates comparatively innocent drug law violatorsfrom the allegedly monstrous will do little to addressthis problem. Neither will coming down on peopleconvicted of violent crimes “like a ton of bricks.”Instead, a comprehensive re-examination of ourhistory, our penal system, and our collective responseto violence is in order.

Beckett, K, Violence, "Mass Incarceration, and the Myth of Monstrosity", The American Prospect, 18/8/16,www.prospect.org/article/violence-mass-incarceration-and-myth-monstrosity

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Surviving structural violence in Zimbabwe : The case studyof a family coping with ViolenceResearch on violence in Zimbabwe has been limiteddespite the visibility of state violence against citizensthat has been broadcast by the international mediasince 2000 (Chitiyo 2000). Zimbabwe has a history ofviolence both in the public and private spheres(Sokwanele 2006). In the public arena, pre‑colonialnarratives speak of ethnic rivalry but it is the legacy ofthe violence that was ushered in by colonialoccupation that has been instrumental in thestructural violence expressed and experienced withinthe public and private spheres that has marredZimbabwe’s post‑independence experience. What is violence ? This article addresses thisquestion by providing a situated answer. In an editeddiscussion of international perspectives on familyviolence, Malley‑Morrison (2004) suggests that we allhave implicit theories about the meanings of socialphenomenon, like violence. By implicit theory,Malley‑Morrison refers to the notion of personalconstructs of meaning about a phenomenon.According to this social constructivist view, peopleactively construct understandings about themselves,others and relationships. We are not just passivelearners of facts about the social world(Malley‑Morrison 2004). As such, implicit theoriesabout violence develop through one’s experience oftheir social environment and the stories unfoldingthere. In this chapter, I argue that family violence is amanifestation of structural violence, associated with apolitical economy that has sacrificed many of itscitizen’s livelihoods. Life in Zimbabwe has historicallybeen lived through structural violence and the natureand consequences of this violence are visible in allaspects of the social life of Zimbabweans. Using thesocial constructivist perspective where implicit theoryinforms what I view as violence, I argue thatZimbabwe’s heritage of violence in the politicaleconomy creates a breeding ground for familyviolence. Within the private sphere of home, role,expectation, status incongruency and competitionbetween family members for limited resources all putpressure on family life (Goode 1971, Campbell 1992)and this creates an environment in which familyviolence is likely to erupt.

Given the socio‑historical context of the politicaleconomy in Zimbabwe, I argue that the family is apower system of unequal members like any other but,in an environment of inherited violence and when anindividual within that system does not haveresources, he or she is more likely to use violence toget what they want. The connection of thesocio‑historical context of structural violence helps toexplain the correlation between material deprivationand family violence in the case presented in thisdiscussion. After the European invasion andoccupation of Zimbabwe, violence became an activeinstrument to entrench coercive settler power andrule. But violence also became the instrument fordislodging settler power and rule and achievingZimbabwe’s political liberation (Sokwanele, 2006).The tentacles of violence reach far and wide.Financial hardship and poverty have historically beenthe most interfering and destabilizing factors for thevast majority of the population in Zimbabwe and havecontributed to an elevation of violence on and withinthe family and at a macro level, which I call ‛structuralviolence’. I begin the chapter with the socio‑historical context ofthe political economy of Zimbabwe, which provides asummary of major issues related to the country’sstructural violence. This is followed by a familyvignette in which experience and voice revealconceptions of family violence as embedded in astructurally violent environment. The family whoseexperience is shared here was encountered in myearlier work relating to an understanding of families,their work and livelihoods in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe(Moyo 2001). However, this work did not directlyresearch violence per se but family well‑being. Theentrenchment of violence in Zimbabwean society andan encounter with a family of older adults living withan adult son who was ‛troubled and troubling’ led meto consider sharing their experiences to show thenature of structural violence as it is experienced infamily interactions. What forms does structuralviolence take within the family ? What do elders whoare experiencing violence say about it ? What doesthe child who is perpetuating the violence feel ?

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Using a case example, I recount a historicized storyof the experiences of structural violence in one family.The narrative is mainly told from the vantage point ofthree family members, the fifty‑six‑year‑old mother,the father who is in his late sixties and theirtwenty‑six‑year‑old son. The issues that areperceived to have precipitated the violence and thedifferent forms of violence provide texture to thecomplexity of violence as a social phenomenon. Theexperience of this family is situated in thesocio‑historical context of Zimbabwe to connectinterpersonal violence to structural violence. Theintention is not to generalize the experience of asingle family but to highlight the particular experienceof one family in understanding violence, a visible buthidden social problem in Zimbabwe. I have used abroad definition of structural violence to avoid a priorinormed naming of family violence but through thevignette we glean a complex understanding of what isconsidered family violence, in this context. Violence isinherited when the perpetrators are excused and thevictims are blamed for not avoiding violence(Sokwanele, 2006). Violence can also be silent andloud ; silent violence refers to the threats, thecoercion, the insults and the deep scaring that has nophysical marks, and the loud violence refers to thephysical harm to people, to their property (Chitiyo2000) and their environment including the socialenvironment of the community. Like any social phenomena, family violence must beunderstood within the socio‑cultural context in which itoccurs. Interpersonal and intrapersonal violence inZimbabwe takes place within a context of structuralviolence. Structural violence refers to a mode ofhuman relations involving the domination andexploitation in economic, social, political andpsychological terms between individuals, betweensocial groups and classes within and beyondsocieties, and globally, between entire societies (Gil1998). Examples of structural violence experiencedas personal violations and interpersonal violence arenumerous in Zimbabwe. Consider the visiblysegregated residential spaces that once entrenchedthe divide between the Africans and the whites. Now,the divide marks the material‑rich from the poor.

The organization of living space in Zimbabwe speaksto the profound consequences of the racialization ofthe political economy, meaning the use of race as ameans to foster unequal development at all levels ofsociety (Moyo 2001). The history of the racializationof Zimbabwe’s political economy gave ‛white’privileges of power in controlling the economy andpolity from colonial occupation in the 1890s untilZimbabwe’s independence in 1980. Theconsequences of this control led to devastatingsocio‑economic conditions for the African populationthat suffered massive poverty, high unemployment,poor housing and a lack of access to health care(Mandaza 1986, Moyo 2001). Unfavourablesocio‑economic conditions have a tendency to putpressure on personal and intrapersonal relationsleading to tensions and high crime rates involvingforms of physical, psychological, social,environmental, political and economic violence. In a country marred by poverty, it is not uncommonfor a person to be attacked by another on the streets.People endure insults of all sorts and pickpocketingoccurs during the constant body searches that peopleare forced to go through by state functionaries i.e. thepolice and the army and by private security guardssupposedly protecting individuals. Imagine a knifebeing held to your throat as you are ordered byassailants to hand over your purse and even theclothes you are wearing. In the privacy of one’shome, thieves working in gangs and those who makea living by hassling (otsotsi) threaten families bybreaking and entering the sanctuary of their homes.Burglaries are the order of the day. When usingpublic transportation a person’s dignity is threatenedas people are packed into vehicles like sardines.Family members, neighbours and friends accuseeach other of witchcraft, and public brawls are not ararity. In social care and public life shaming is usedas a way of care. At home and at school children arebeaten into submission. Children learn young “that itis acceptable ; it is the privilege of the perpetrator andmust be suffered and tolerated by victims. Notbecause the perpetrator is right, but because theyhave power … children learn to become victims ofsuperior force backed by the authority of a reveredinstitution” (Sokwanele 2006).

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In schools, a few select children learn how to be incharge of and discipline other children through theprefect system, which has been passed down fromthe English public school system and is the moulderof colonial officials (Ibid.). These children arepermitted to exert considerable brutality throughphysical punishment, exertion and psychologicalpunishment that often entails shaming andhumiliation. If you are the victim, you are supposed toendure such treatment as perhaps one day you willbe able to get back at those who tortured you bytorturing others. This is the inherited violence that isstructurally entrenched and carried over to the publicand private spheres so that everyday lives arecharacterized by structural violence and a mode ofhuman relations involving domination and exploitationin economic, social, political and psychological termsin everyday situations. This is not to say that this isthe norm but people have become accustomed toviolence. Outbursts of violence from the state, fellowcitizens and institutions of public life have becomepart of everyday life. However, no social violence isas humiliating as that perpetuated by familymembers, particularly one’s own children andgrandchildren. In the privacy of family life, scars ofstructural violence are more visible in interpersonaland intrapersonal familial relations. Concha‑Eastman(2001) and Okulate (2005) point out that theintentional use of force against another person inclose relationships or otherwise is now acknowledgedas a universal public‑health problem. The connectivityof structural violence and personal violence often getsmissed. Family violence in Zimbabwe must be located andanalysed within the wider context of the politicaleconomy of Zimbabwean society to understand thestructural and personal expressions of violence. TheRepublic of Zimbabwe came into existence in 1980out of the struggle for African rule that spanned overa century against white settler governments whoseroots were entwined in European imperialism andBritish colonialism. In this case, the use of physicalviolence was historic. The scramble for Africa byEuropeans, the use of force, the expropriation ofAfrican lands and the massive relocations of Africanpeoples to create «white territory» illustrate thehorrific physical violence of occupation.

The psychological, social, political, environmental andeconomic nature of structural violence is exemplifiedby the racialization of the political economy ofZimbabwe. For the most part African families andtheir livelihoods occurred within the context of aracialized society, with racialization defining theemergence of racism as a tool to exclude (Moyo2001). This became embedded in social practicesand institutions throughout Zimbabwean society for atleast a hundred years of colonial rule untilindependence in 1980. Racialization was astate‑sponsored strategy of exclusion in which theoverarching ideology was racial supremacy, wherewhat was white, urban, educated and modern wassupported while that which was African, rural andilliterate was underdeveloped. Through this ideology,most Africans were considered backward, ignorantand passive and were often treated in acondescending, paternalistic manner and weremarginalized in all spheres of social life. The lifestylesof Africans and their (distorted) culture wereconsidered inferior and given no recognition or space.A lopsided political economy resulted and with itcame massive resource inequality, the culturaldenigration of African ways of life, and ideas aboutfemininity and masculinity would also change toaccommodate the changes in social structure. This racialization has not been a constant ; it changeswith changing environments to safeguard theinterests of the dominant group (Moyo & Kawewe2002) and intersects with other categorizations ofpeople, i.e. gender, ethnicity, class, region, maritalstatus and age. It is important to note that, throughoppressive relations with people of European descentin Zimbabwe, African ethnic groups generally lostauthority to explicitly define their values, theirtraditions and customs and therefore to maintainsocietal sanctions against inter and intrapersonalviolence. Historically, since the national policingsystem in Zimbabwe was developed in a racializedenvironment to control and police Africans, there is ageneral lack of trust in these systems when it comesto curbing violence, and often Africans as individualsconfronting interpersonal and intrapersonal violencehave to take individual and/or group actions to protectthemselves.

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African ethnic groups in Zimbabwe are largely seen inthe social sciences literature as patrilineal andcollectivist in their family ideological outlook (Parpart1995, Riphenburg 1997). Gendered role expectationis part of the expressions of family ideology, for malesthe breadwinner role is emphasized and for femalesthe responsibilities are related to care even thoughwomen are expected to be economic providers too,and gender dynamics have evolved with theinstitutionalization of westernity. Elders in families aresupposed to receive acts of deference. Prior tocolonization, gender roles had been fluid but thecollision of African collectivist arrangements and theideology of domesticity created different experiences(Gaidzanwa 1996). For example, during colonialgovernments, African men were forced to work forwages in the white cities, while their wives, daughtersand sisters were required to stay home, illustratingthe domestication of African women (Moyo &Kawewe 2002). The settler economy catered mostlyto the minority white population in Zimbabwe and themajority of the population, which is African,experienced dispossession. Because of theracialization of the economy, social care at state levelwas preserved for the few, African families have thusevolved as the social security for their members,providing the indirect sanctions and support ofmembers but also providing a variety of necessities,for example, jobs, credit, capital, care for the sick andthe elderly, emotional support, and companionship.Ideally, the interdependence of family members isemphasized and family members are expected totake care of each other. Remnants of reciprocalobligations of family members remain visible in thepooling of resources, with adults supporting theyoung in the expectation that the young will take careof the old (Moyo 2001). However, these relations arealso marred in disagreement and conflict. Obligationsare not only confined to parents but to siblings andextended family members and if one is perceived assuccessful, children may be fostered with relatives toallow opportunities for education and work. Familymembers working far away from home are expectedto send remittances (Moyo 2001), but financialdependency in a collapsed economy traps somefamily members in violence.

Societal changes resulting from colonialism,urbanization, wage employment, migration, wars andpolitical destabilization, economic restructuring, andthe speed of globalization have created differentenvironments according to people’s expectations ofone another. Many families with few economic andsocial resources reproduce their livelihoods inextreme indigence resulting in a strain in familialrelations, particularly if members are not able topositively adapt to the normed cultural and genderrole expectations. Instead of banding together,conflict in families may cause the separation andisolation of its members. For example, where themale’s role was to protect family members, if this roleis undermined men respond by using violence againstfamily members to get whatever they want as is thecase at micro level with the vignette shared here.Similar threads are observable at macro level with thecurrent administration at state level. The changes that occurred post independence wereparticularly related to policies of economicrestructuring and present different sets of dynamicsfor families. At independence in 1980, radical policieswere made by the new African government to counterthe effects of colonialism in most areas of social lifeand blatant racism became intolerable (Bond 1999). Itwas clear that colonial capitalism had not served themajority of the people well, considering all thesocio‑economic imbalances during the colonialperiod. Expansion of governmental support in basicnecessities including education, housing, health care,sanitation and water became increasingly noticeablein post‑independent Zimbabwe. Direct investments inpeople were seen to be essential for the socialdevelopment of the economy. Generally, there wasimprovement in the quality of life for many afterindependence, a situation that would be reversed inthe 1990s with the institutionalization of structuraladjustment programmes that pushed for privatizationand market‑based solutions in all areas that weresubsidized by government. The decommodification ofsome basic necessities had ensured improvement inthe quality of life, for example, in education, healthcare, housing and prospects for social mobility byremoving subsidies, but poverty escalated (Bond1999).

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While concerns were about growth, equity issues andnation building, the ZANU‑PF led governmentsponsored atrocities along ethnic lines, attacking theNdebele as a minority ethnic group in Zimbabwe. Inthe international arena, problems of state violence,like the Gukurahundi atrocities, were not a topic ofpublic discussion as the international communitybusied itself with shaping Zimbabwe as a model ofsmooth transitioning from white settler rule toindependence. The extent and consequences of thisviolence remain a major public health issue. Political economic changes in the 1990s, particularlythe restructuring of the economy in an attempt toalign the Zimbabwean political economy towesternity, also brought concerns that impact alllevels of Zimbabwean society economically, politicallyand socially. The push for privatization saw thedismantling of many state‑owned businesses. Theprocess of privatization occurred within a stagnatingeconomic environment that resulted in a dramaticreduction in the quality of life for many. In the processof restructuring, public companies were privatelytransferred to individuals as private properties and thecapital was siphoned off. Bankruptcies followed andmany people lost their jobs and subsequently theirpersonal dignity as employment disappeared andincomes fell dramatically (Bond 1999). The resultingmassive unemployment and increases in the prices ofbasic commodities led to protests and sometimesviolent confrontations between the state, workers andstudents. The unemployment situation has beendepressing for youths who have just completed highschool and college through expanded educationopportunities : this population, although educated, stillcannot find employment. Shattered expectations area form of violence as they undermine a person’sphysical, psychological and social health. Increasingly, Zimbabwean youth were entering a jobmarket that only offered positions as informalworkers, if they could get the capital to start even thatkind of work. Many migrated to countries wherecapital was seen to be concentrated.

But even there jobs available to non‑citizens are oftenat the bottom end of the service sector, and as suchthe generation that came to adulthood inpost‑independent Zimbabwe has not been able torealize the value of its education and has experiencedan assault on their human dignity.Men and women sought jobs outside Zimbabwe butthe service economy in areas where capital isconcentrated usually prefers women migrants. Men’sinsecurities have mounted as they were expecting tofind employment. In the lopsided economy, genderdiscrimination favoured males while women hadcultivated self‑employment, and with the contractingeconomy were able to provide their own work (Moyo2001). Even though such work is confined to thelower rungs of the economy, it has provided a meansof survival. Male workers suffered most in theeconomic restructuring because of their reliance onpaid work (Moyo 2001). Massive unemployment andshattered expectations have resulted in frustrationsand powerlessness which have been translated intoemasculation (Fourie 2004), and led to a rise inself‑destructive behaviour (such as alcoholism) andviolence against elders to prove their masculinitywhere they have failed to meet familial expectations.With the breakdown of the economy, older adults arethe ones with some assets and resources, and haveat least had jobs and managed to accrue resourcesthat can be translated into money. However, youngeradults are the ones who are being heavily victimizedby the collapse of the economy. They have no jobsand few sources of income and have to rely on olderadults in the community. This has created massivefamilial tensions and interpersonal violence, whereculturally, care was expected by older adults from theyounger generation. The burden of care today isfalling heavily on aging parents. Added to this is theAIDS/HIV pandemic that is killing the younger adults,and care for them is also increasingly falling on theolder adults. When they die, orphaned children oftenremain in the care of older adults who will probablynot have anticipated outliving their own children letalone grandchildren. Because of the absence of anypublic support, older adults are the only safety net fortheir families. People’s scarce financial resources arebeing used up to cover basic necessities and thismeans that money tensions have also mounted asfamily members compete for scarce resources.

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These problems have largely been played out asindividual private problems because communityprotest has been met with an unsympatheticresponse from government officials who have usedcoercive strategies to redistribute land, as is seen inthe government‑sponsored commercial farminvasions (Chitiyo 2000). The current dynamics of theZimbabwean political economy reflect and entrenchstructural violence, which is expressed in somesituations as family violence, taking the form ofviolence against the elderly and family members.Sometimes the violence is « silent », at other times itis “loud” (Ibid.). Violence against elders as part offamily violence is a subject that is rarely talked aboutin public. There has been considerable discussionand efforts to stop domestic violence, particularlyviolence by domestic partners be they married or inlive‑in partnerships. Extensive efforts have beenmounted to stop violence against children butviolence against elders remains a silent subject.Hidden from the public is the violence against men,particularly in terms of material deprivation within apatriarchal‑dominated society. MaMlilo had been married to Moyo for forty‑fiveyears. At the time of the interviews Moyo was in hismid‑sixties and was retired from the Zimbabwenational army and owned a small constructionbusiness. Like many of his generation, he had beenforced to take up arms in the liberation war in anattempt to dismantle the racialized political economy.Moyo talks about a political economy that greatlydisadvantaged Africans. In his younger adult life hehad been a labour organizer and attempted topolitically engage the settler governments intorealizing the sculpturing of inequality but since theinherited Zimbabwean solution has never been toseek justice, to instil respect for dignity and protectthose who were vulnerable, he had been tortured andimprisoned for organizing for change. Moyo and hisfamily had survived the structural violence in silencebut the forcible removal of their lands to make way forwhite farms left his family with limited means to earna living and was done with such brutal force that theviolence had moved him to join the struggle forindependence. It is under these conditions that Moyojoined the liberation struggle to dislodge coercivesettler rule. State‑perpetrated violence has beenZimbabwe’s heritage (Sokwanele 2006).

Talking about the effect of this violence, Moyodescribes the separation from his family as a badtime in his life because he was not part of hischildren’s lives as they were growing up, an issuenow being raised by his son. A difficulty for Moyo wasgoing against what he perceived as the norm, «a mantakes care of his family and ‛trains’ the sons to takecare of themselves. Instead of engaging in thepersonal development of his family he had to makesacrifices (of which he is proud) to become a freedomfighter. Being in the army Moyo learnt that power isgained and retained by the use of brute force. Afterindependence, he stayed in the army as he had noother means of earning a living, but being stationed inanother part of the country was devastating for him.In his words : « I had to leave the army as soon as Icould get a reasonable pension and I wanted tobecome a family again. » This conversation highlightsthat the expectation was that both parents would helpwith parenting but because of employmentopportunities families ended up divided, withhusbands rarely sharing in the raising of theirchildren. Apparently, families experience silentviolence when spouses are not able to shareparenting. This would be a point of contention inMoyo’s family as husband and wife MaMlilo perceivedthe difficulties with their son Dingi as emanating fromthe absence of male authority in the home. MaMlilo, a feisty 56‑year‑old woman, raised her fiveadult children : three girls are living and working inSouth Africa, one older boy who still lives at home, asdo a younger boy of ten and several grandchildren.We started the conversation about the well‑being ofchildren. Moyo’s family was raising four grandchildrenand a “troubled and troubling adult son” was livingwith them. “Troubled and troubling” were Moyo’swords to describe their son, Dingi, who was 26 at thetime of the interviews and living with his parents, andhad a girlfriend and a two‑month‑old baby. Three ofthe grandchildren belonged to the daughters whowere working in Johannesburg and providing well fortheir children and Moyo and his wife. In MaMlilo’swords : “my girl children were born with free spiritsand it helped that they matured at a time that thegovernment was promoting women’s liberation… Irely on those girls as if they were men.

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That is what I keep telling Moyo that today it is not themale children who make homes it is women. It isbetter to have daughters : they work for their childrenand support them. I can never go hungry as I eat withthe grandchildren. But with the boys it is different theynever go anyway instead they bring trouble to us”.The trouble referred to here is the silent familyviolence because the son is unable to meet familyexpectations. The question that is raised here is thatmale children have been unable to figure out ways ofengaging in government‑sponsored women’sliberation. As the vignette unfolds we learn thatMaMlilo’s definition of family violence largely hingeson the son not following expected family roles. In thiscase, unlike the daughters who have managed totake care of their parents, the son was shaming thefamily by not adopting the role of “helpful” son. Wesee violence as expressed in the inability of the sonto follow family roles, a definition of violence that isoften hidden when the focus is only on physical andvisible violence. MaMlilo extended the definition of violence to includephysical and psychological abuse they as adults hadendured. MaMlilo in her spirited manner began to tellher story of coping with abuse from their son.Evidently, Dingi is the older boy in the family and assuch had been the favoured child, a son who wouldcarry the family name. MaMlilo explained : “Perhaps Itreated him differently because I was proud to have aboy. It used to be that boys where the ones whowould take care of us older parents. It used to beboys marry and their wives take care of us becausegirl children join other families. The saying was thatboys build a home. This is how I treated my boyDingi. I had expected him to be that home builder. Iprotected Dingi even in school when he got intotrouble and was beaten, I would argue for him”.Clearly, the expectation in this family was that malechildren were supposed to care for the family andaging parents, but this expectation is undermined inMaMlilo’s family, as their older son Dingi is seen asirresponsible. However, the blatant preference forfemale children as models of success andresponsibility means a revision in family ideology. Butthis revision does not appear to be going smoothly asit presents familial problems that intensify the silentviolence.

In MaMlilo’s family the male child is no longer seen asan asset because he is unable to secure economicadvantages and become a future provider. Thisgender role incongruence acts as an underlying factorin the violence between an adult male son whoperceives emasculation and is unable to fulfil theexpectation of the continuity of patrilinity. Instead,female children have become a family asset, andbearing children out of wedlock is no longer a shamebut offers continuity of families by providinggrandparents with grandchildren who can look afterthem in their old age. In the case of MaMlilo, herdaughters’ marriage and/or attachment to a malewithout secure economic standing was seen as aliability. The unkind treatment of Dingi’s girlfriend byMaMlilo, as an elder, may exemplify the revisions ingender expectations. Apparently both Moyo and MaMlilo had come to theconclusion that raising boys was a challenge after thefrustrations they felt with Dingi. He had completed hishigh‑school education and passed only a singlesubject although five passes are usually required forany further training. He had repeated his O levelexams twice and had done poorly each time. Inschool he had been a boy who was often humiliatedand in his younger years his mother had been hisprotector. Seeing that he was not gifted academically,his parents tried to push him towards being amechanic’s apprentice. Evidently, Dingi had thesupport of his parents who tried to help him become asuccessful child by supporting his education. Besideshis personal difficulties in school Dingi is among themany graduates who perceive themselves as the“sacrificed generation” who lost out on employmentopportunities and whose education could not betranslated into jobs and earnings because of thecollapse of the economy. The only jobs available toDingi and many youths were in the informal sectorand were unappealing because of the precariousnature of the work and the low wages they offered.Shattered job expectations have left Dingi confusedabout his purpose in life.

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However, Moyo, as part of the cohort of older adultswho had secured resources before the collapse of theeconomy, managed to run his one‑man constructioncompany and had even tried to entice Dingi intobecoming part of the company. To this, Dingi wasreported to have explained to his parents that he wasnot interested in becoming a dagga boy meaning theone who lifts the brick‑layering mortar. Evidently,Dingi had anticipated an office job and not manuallabour. His parents were troubled by his lack of joband income so they tried to find him work. His motherhad provided money for him to try his luck in SouthAfrica as his three sisters had found employmentthere and were able to send remittances. Jobprospects were perceived as better but Dingi wasunlucky as he got deported several times. Hesuffered the humiliation of being rounded up, beatenand tortured by the authorities, so that he wouldnever think of returning. Apparently, the violence and humiliation had not beena deterrent as Dingi tried to re‑enter South Africaseveral times before he gave up and came backhome. On his return his father managed to find him ajob through his contacts as a general hand in a smallcompany making plastic products. At the time of theinterviews (1999‑2000), both his parents were afraidthat Dingi would not keep his job because he hadproblems interacting with people and was drinkingand gambling a lot. On one of my visits to Moyo’shouse I experienced firsthand the contempt Dingi hadfor people around him. He had airs ofself‑importance, and one Saturday morning that Ivisited his family he was still asleep around 11 :00a.m. His ten‑year‑old brother explained that he hadcome home drunk at 3 :00 a.m., not caring that hehad a small child. When he got home he had startedfighting with his girlfriend. It had been quite difficult toquieten Dingi down. MaMlilo complained “you haveseen with your own eyes this is what he does, wakesup late and eats, gets cleaned up and is out againuntil midnight or the early hours of the morning. Hecomes home when we are all asleep and expects us– his old parents – to get out of bed, unlock the doorsfor him and serve him hot food. If we don’t, he startshis routine of insults and threatens to beat us”

This is the silent violence that the family has endured.Dingi seemed grouchy and never seemed to haveany sustained interaction with his family. The son’sbehaviour troubled the father who blames theinherited violence that forced him to leave his family.Moyo shared that at some point Dingi had begun toharass his mother for money, this was called “loudviolence”. When this happened Moyo had confrontedDingi who began to threaten his father with gangs.The father would not be a physical match for hisyounger son so they conceded and gave him themoney he needed to avoid insults and threats, the“silent violence”. At the time of the interviews Moyowas anxious and afraid that somebody was going toget hurt one of these days because Dingi was out ofcontrol. In Moyo’s words, “it has been troubling andtroubled moments raising boys”. Dingi's young brother related another incident.MaMlilo had been born into a large family and herextended family supports each other. One of hersisters had an adult child who has been in and out ofthe hospital because of AIDS. In the ten‑year‑old’swords : “Our mother had not been to the hospital tovisit our cousin because she was not feeling wellherself … every adult has to visit those who are ill.”Dingi’s younger brother explained that one day hewas in the city centre with his mother and they metthe relative who had been hospitalized. “It was thethree of us, our mother, Dingi and me. I remembernow he had to help with finding mealie meal and carrygroceries that is why Dingi was with us. On that tripwe met our sick cousin and our mother gave himsome money excusing herself that she was not ableto visit him in hospital. After leaving the sick cousin,Dingi jumped on our mother with words demandingwhy she had given money to the sick cousin yet shehad never given him anything. That afternoon motheravoided what would have been a potentialconfrontation in public with Dingi by just brushing hiscomplaints off”. In the younger brother’s words : “Iwas afraid that if she tried to reason with him hewould start beating our mother right there on thestreet.

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Although we are born and raised by the same motherand father and we have been taught the same lessonto respect our elders, Dingi is different. He is my olderbrother but I am afraid of him now. He was not alwayslike this”. The silent violence is mainly psychologicalabuse and the fear that familial role incongruencewould be replaced by loud violence, the actualphysical beating of the elderly mother. Seeing theboy’s distress, Moyo injected, “you see even hisyoung brother is now afraid of him. He used to be analoof child growing up. Always punished in school,humiliated by other children but we never thought itwould come to this. His girlfriend has been hit severaltimes. I am sure that child is asking herself manytimes why she attached herself to him. As we said, heworks but we have never seen a cent from him. Afterhe gets paid he goes out drinking in pubs and clubs.We don’t know what is going on with him becausenow even the cries of his baby make him angry. Canyou imagine even the cries of his own child make himall mean ?» Moyo continued to describe the effortsthey had made to help their son «MaMlilo and I havetried to take him to traditional healers (kubosiyazi) tounderstand what is going on with him. When we givehim the medicines to cleanse him, he has attacked usfor bewitching him. However, we know that thebewitching thing here is alcohol and it is shattereddreams that are destroying our son”. Clearly these parents were distressed by the actionsof their adult son. MaMlilo and Moyo in their narrativegave an impression that they were interested inprotecting their children. They had wanted the bestfor their children and were now frustrated about a sonwho had not embraced their efforts. Because he wasno longer a child the parents had indicated that theyhad reported him to the police on several times whenhe had physically assaulted them. MaMlilo’s words,“we report him to the police so that they could help usby talking sense to him because he does not listen tous anymore but we are afraid to let him go to prison.So, we are forced to find the police when things getout of hand, then he promises to listen and not repeathis deeds. We accept his apologizes and then hegoes drinking and it starts all over again”. The policeare used to finding ways to punish people but inprison there is no way of undoing the embeddedstructural violence.

At the time of the interviews Dingi’s parents werehoping that he would move out of their house and thesituation with his girlfriend having a baby seemed tosuggest that perhaps he would move on. At the sametime, his drinking and reliance on his parentssuggested that he was home to stay. In his parents’home Dingi was demanding money not only for hisupkeep but often for his drinking. Abuse of one’selders in the form of financial abuse is apparent inMaMlilo’s words : “he comes at one o’clock in themorning and he will knock and demand that we getup and open the door. He knows that it is not safearound here and we are elderly and afraid of tsotsi(gangs of thieves) but still he does not take this intoaccount. When he comes in the middle of the night hedemands food. And when there is no food for him hebecomes very aggressive. First it was banging ofdoors, then throwing things around, then it came tobe targeted at me as the person who keeps thehouse. He does not wake up until noon. And when heis up, all of us and the younger children have to bewalking on egg shells fearing that our moves willanger him”. Apparently, Dingi had physically pushed his fatherand threatened the younger children as well. MaMliloexplained that to try to keep the peace in their housethey had tried giving him what he wanted – usuallymoney. But whenever they were unable to, he wouldbecome verbally abusive particularly towards hismother who after trying to cleanse his spirit wasaccused of bewitching him, and this was why he wasexperiencing problems. The mother, in addition tokeeping house and providing food, is also expected tohave positive aura to enable children to be comesuccessful. Yet when she tries to rely on traditionalhealing, these activities are perceived as bewitchingand the violence escalates. MaMlilo explained thatrelations with her son became tense after hisgirlfriend got pregnant and moved into MaMlilo’shome. In MaMlilo’s version of things, the son and hisgirlfriend were not helping with the household choresor with the care of the grandchildren but expected herto work for them. MaMlilo felt that this was offensivebecause younger adult children were supposed torevere older people.

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MaMlilo explained that whenever she demanded thatthe daughter‑in‑law help, Dingi would be offendedand to show his disapproval of his mother wouldshove her and shower her with insults. Sometimesthe tensions escalated into violence, with the sonusing physical force against his mother and she, inturn, using objects to fight back. Again, MaMliloexplained that it was on these occasions that theyreported him to the police but for fear of him endingup into prison, she had often dropped the charges.She explained that her son had pushed her too farand after the next incident she would be likely to havehim arrested. It turned out that MaMlilo feared herdaughters’ disapproval if her own son were sent toprison as a result of her actions. In her words : “I amafraid of sending him to prison, I am afraid that theother children would not understand why his mothersent their brother to jail”. Dingi complained that he did not have a secure joband this was frustrating. Casual employment meantthat he was not able to meet his financial needs andthose of his new family. In his words, “one feelshopeless, you work but the pay is little, things areexpensive, prices of things go up everyday and thenyou come home and parents are at you for being afailure it gets difficult to handle. I know I have donewrong with the loud violence, fights and insults“.While the precipitating factors for violence against hisparents related to money matters, Dingi apparentlyfelt that parental stress about being a failure resultedin arguments that escalated into violence. Herecognized that his response was wrong but hisalcohol consumption, which he did not see as aproblem, usually led to the verbal and physicalviolence. Because of his lack of resources and his continuedreliance on his parents, Dingi felt that his mother wasdiscriminatory against his girlfriend and that she hadfavourites among her daughters. He said, the care iswith those who bring in hard currencies at the end ofthe month. Those of us without rands become nothingin this home.» The tensions of resources and statusinconsistencies are poignantly highlighted inMaMlilo’s son.

When Dingi does not have rands (foreign currency) tocontribute to his parent’s house, he uses violence toassert the resource power that he does not have.Dingi justified his ‛temper’ as he described hisbehaviour towards his mother and related an incidentthat touches on status inconsistency and silentviolence. “One day I was coming from town and I metmother with a neighbour and they were clearly talkingabout us children and mother boosting how her girlshad been successful and when I approached them,mother did not even introduce me as her son, whichshows that she does not like me but likes her girls. Tobe unacknowledged by your own parent as part of herfamily is humiliating. To complicate the situation, I later learnt that Dingihad been coping with the realization that he was HIVpositive. The unsettling issue was that his privatetroubles created havoc in the family and familymembers were only addressing the presentingviolence. Dingi survived by acting tough and drowninghis sorrows in alcohol but in the process has becomea menace to everyone in his family. Violence has to be understood within the context inwhich it unfolds. In this case, the family is a powersystem embedded in the constellation of an inheritedhistory of violence – the context of the politicaleconomy of Zimbabwe. – and structural violencebecomes entwined in familial relations. When a familymember does not have resources, or their status isundermined, they will use violence to assert power.The absence of resource ownership among youngadults, as illustrated in the example, means thatyoung adults like Dingi turn to their parents forsupport while the expectation is that older adultswould turn to younger adults for support andprotection. If Dingi’s drinking and gambling habits arenot satisfied, violence and threats are used to exhortmoney from those who are perceived as having it.Family violence is expressed in silent violence in theform of threats, shaming and humiliation but this canescalate into loud physical violence.

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The case here not only explains conflict in familyideology where a son – because of the privilege ofbeing male in a gendered society – is supposed toprovide honour to the family by showing responsibilityand protection for parents and females but also thefact that Zimbabwean society is plagued by violence.At both the micro familial level and governmentallevel, the use of violence is apparent. The son suffersstatus inconsistency as a result of widespreadunemployment and low wages and this leads to theuse of violence to assert the authority of maleness inthe family. Yet because of societal changes, the sonfinds that the family ideology is revised and he hasdifficulties coping with the new expectations. Hismother – as the family protector – does not make iteasy, and so the violence escalates. The revision of family ideology within a socialenvironment marred by violence and poverty is feltnegatively by the son, who sees himself as losingground as a result of the changes : a young adultmale is no longer sure what his role is since maleauthority is challenged by female resource ownership.MaMlilo, the older woman, does not hide the failingsof her son and even discusses the situation withneighbours. The silent violence goes both ways. Theolder parent preferred her daughters to her male childwho was seen as “being a trouble and creatingtroubles” instead of contributing to family well‑being.Failure to fulfil his manly role is not only a family issuebut is shared in the community, leading to the son’sloss of standing in his immediate family but also in theextended family and among neighbours. The loss ofthis power is compensated for by the use of violenceto assert power and get the resources he needs.

The decrease in opportunity and resource availabilityin the Zimbabwean political economy has resulted inrampant social violence as people try to survive thebrute of indigence. The link between familial violenceand poverty is shown in this case. While poverty isextreme, societal change has meant that traditionalgendered mores are also being challenged. Althoughthe situation of the daughters in the family narrativepresented here is not elaborated on, the mother’s fearof sending her son to prison speaks to furtherpsychological abuse of elderly parents who fear aloss of familyhood if the son is incarcerated. Thethreat of losing that family – particularly herdaughters’ material support in an environment wherethere is hardly any social care system for the elderly –leads elderly parents to suffer abuse in silence. Bothparents were resourceful in trying to find ways tosupport their son and to understand his problems butgiven the social environment that has a history ofviolence and no visible means of containing theviolence, it is difficult to extricate oneself fromself‑destructive habits. We conclude that the lack ofsanctions against structural violence in Zimbabwe’spolitical economy highlights a defect in society’smechanisms to address social justice.

non-violenceNon-violence is the practice of advocating one’s own or others’ rights withoutphysically harming the opponent. It often involves actively opposing thesystem that is deemed to be unjust, through for example boycotts,demonstrations and civil disobedience. Theorists argue that non-violence canoften draw attention to a conflict situation and that it could provide a fertilebasis for post-conflict transformation.

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Violence v Non Violence: which is more effective as adriver of change? Nonviolence – More than absence of violence

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Violence v Non Violence: which is more effective as adriver of change?One of the perennial themes of this blog is the ideathat crises may provide an opportunity for progressivechange. True. But I’ve always been nervous that suchhopes can forget that most conflicts cause far morehuman misery than any good that may come. This is something that Duncan and I have (non-violently) tussled about over the years. So imaginemy delight when I saw a recent report that seems toback up my caution. The International Center onNonviolent Conflict’s paper on Nonviolent Resistanceand Prevention of Mass Killings looked at 308 popularuprisings up to 2013. It found that “nonviolentuprisings are almost three times less likely thanviolent rebellions to encounter mass killings,” whichfaced such brutal repression nearly 68% of the time.The authors, Erica Chenoweth and Evan Perkoski,think this is because violent campaigns threatenleaders and security forces alike, encouraging themto “hold on to power at any cost, even ordering orcarrying out a mass atrocity in an attempt to survive.”

There is a positive lesson here, that nonviolenceworks – at least better than violence. This builds onChenoweth’s earlier study, which suggested thatbetween 2000 and 2006, 70% of nonviolentcampaigns succeeded, five times the success rate forviolent ones. Looking back over the 20th century, shefound that non-violent campaigns succeeded 53% ofthe time, compared with 26% for violent resistance. Again, there is a positive lesson – though it’d beinteresting to know the figures since 2006, when theworld appears to have become more repressive andviolent. 2017 was the 12th year, according to theUS-based Freedom House, “of decline in globalfreedom [as] seventy-one countries suffered netdeclines in political rights and civil liberties.” As theUppsala Conflict Data Program shows, these years ofpressure on rights have coincided with sharp rises inconflicts since the start of this decade. And accordingto the 2018 Global Peace Index, just out this month,“peacefulness has declined year on year for eight ofthe last ten years.” This seems to suggest that in ourviolent and challenging decade, nonviolentcampaigns have found it tough in many countries too.

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Tragically, this may breed a climate of desperation. Inanother recent article, Robin Luckham wrote that “thetemptations of violence… are even stronger whenauthoritarian regimes violently crush non-violentprotests…The turn from non-violent to violentresistance can easily open the way for more ruthlessand better armed groups to step into the politicalspaces initially opened up by peaceful protests, as inSyria and Libya.” This brings us perhaps to a less positive lesson – thatliving under tyrannies may be less worse than violentcampaigns to change them. Chenoweth and Perkoskiargue that “popular uprisings are not all alike. Some,like those in Libya (2011) and eventually Syria (2011),are predominantly violent, wherein the oppositionchooses to take up arms to challenge the status quo.Others, like Tunisia (2010), Egypt (2011), andBurkina Faso (2014), eschew violence altogether.” “Choose to take up arms”? That’s a harsh way todescribe the situation at least some armed groupshave faced. We should never forget that staterepression often drives uprisings to become moreviolent. But looking at the historical evidence in thesearticles – and at almost every conflict now – it’sdifficult to escape the conclusion that armedresistance is seldom successful, oftencounterproductive, and therefore rarely justifiable. This begs one final question which Chenoweth andPerkoski can help with. Few would now argue thatforeign countries should intervene to change regimes.But the UK Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committeeis conducting an enquiry on the prospect of militaryinterventions for a different purpose – to stop masskillings. Its chair, Thomas Tugendhat, suggested that‘The Cost of Doing Nothing’ in Syria had beenthousands and thousands of lives. I’ve never been convinced of that case in Syria,though the world’s failure to stop the genocides inRwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s was among themost shameful events of our times. But Chenowethand Perkoski highlight the danger of any kind offoreign intervention.

The likelihood of mass killings increases, theyconclude, both “when foreign states provide materialaid to dissidents… [and] to the governments themovements oppose.” In the first case, that’s becauseforeign support to oppositions encourages states toperceive them “as an existential threat.” We shouldn’t conclude that military action will neverever be justified to prevent mass killings. But weknow more reasons for caution than we once did.Every foreign action needs to be carried out with thebest possible knowledge of its consequences. That’s a harder thing to do than in the 1990s, whenthis debate first forced its way onto humanitarianagendas. According to a UN/World Bank study, therewere eight armed groups in an average civil war inthe 1950s. By 2010, there were fourteen. In Syria in2014, there were more than a thousand. While morelocal parties are fighting within borders, regionalpowers – like Saudi Arabia and Iran – as well asRussia and the US are more willing to contemplatewar, in what Robert Malley of Crisis Group calls theworld’s “growing militarization of foreign policy.” It is inthis dangerous world that the risks of military actionare higher than when the ideas of “humanitarianintervention” and Responsibility to Protect weredeveloped. I’ve never believed that pacifism is an adequateanswer to a world of atrocities that – in trulyexceptional cases – call out for an armed response.But there’s an awful lot of evidence for caution – andreason to give peace a chance.

Cairns, E, "Violence v Non Violence: which is more effective as a driver of change?", Oxfam Blogs, 12/6/18,https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/give-peace-a-chance-because-violent-change-doesnt-have-one/

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Nonviolence – More than absence of violence

IntroductionResearch on nonviolence has never dominated theacademic field of Peace Research. Compared to thefocus on violent conflicts, peaceful ones have alwaysbeen a minor sideline. The practice of nonviolencehas on the other hand developed a lot the lasthundred years. In the following we will introduce thetwo main forms of nonviolence and then go deeperinto the more nuanced views and advanceddiscussions in each of these fields. The mostinfluential use of Nonviolence in recent decades hasbeen in political revolutions. This chapter will gothrough the waves of nonviolent revolutions that havewashed over the world since the 1980s. At the endwe will try to look into the crystal ball and see whatthe future can bring. The wordNonviolence is a word we can find in very manycontexts. It is often used as a specifier for other topicsand hence followed by another word – Nonviolentaction, Nonviolent philosophy, Nonviolentcommunication, Nonviolent defence and many more.In itself it is almost impossible to define. It consists oftwo words most people regard as negative: No andViolence. In most languages it has the sameconstruction. Among the European languagesGerman stands out as a little different: Gewaltfrei(free from violence). None of them have a completelypositive connotation. In recent years some have donetheir best to introduce new concepts with a moreattractive meaning. The German Gütekraft (Good-Power) is one example. IntroductionThe history of nonviolence has two traditions withsome connecting points: The pacifistic and thepragmatic traditions. In the pacifist tradition weinclude nonviolent ideas, aspects, views and visionsfrom religions, philosophies, ethics, and lifestyles. Forpacifists no goal justifies killing other human beings.Many pacifists are against all forms of harminghumans and other living beings. The pragmaticschool regards nonviolent actions as being importantand effective as political tools, a collection oftechniques, and as means for communication, forrevolutions, for a social movement, and as a systemof defence.

Many within the pacifist school actively use themethods within the pragmatic tradition, but themajority of those using the nonviolent skills do notshare the pacifist views. In the past the pacifist traditions were larger. Pacifismhas never been a majority view, but historicallypacifist practitioners of nonviolence used tooutnumber pragmatists. In modern times we have theopposite situation. Those using active nonviolence forpragmatic reasons now outnumber pacifists. In the following we shall tell the story of both thesetraditions and distinguish the characteristics of eachof them. Then we will see where there are overlapsand describe the latest development within theresearch on and practice of nonviolence. Pacifist traditionReligious traditions tend to dominate the history ofpacifist nonviolence. Inspired by holy scriptures,gurus, gods, imams, priests and other leadingpersons from different religions there have probablyalways been groups of religious believers who werecommitted to nonviolence. Theistic pacifists believedthat acts of violence were against the will of God andhence sinful. Some authors argue that prior to the riseof the leading religions of today, other faith systemswith female goddesses rather than male gods weremore peaceful than those now prevalent. Within all religions you will find representatives whodo not find any justifications for the use of violence intheir respective scriptures and oral traditions. Butthese are usually exceptions: most religious believersjustify the use of violence as a means of defence inconflict situations, be that defence of attackedindividuals, groups or states. There is no one“correct” interpretation of holy books, but nearly all ofthem tell stories where the god(s) goes to war for agood cause and use extreme violent means againstthe enemies. Holy texts, such as The Lun Yu, WuChing, Bhagavad Gita, Koran, New Testament,Tanakh, Talmud, Tao-te-ching, Guru Granth Sahib,and Veda are all interpreted in many different wayson the question of justification of violence.

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For many followers it is just as easy to find quotationsin these texts which give good reason for the use ofviolence as it is for others to find guidance for apacifistic conviction. Within every religion we find sects that are moreconsistent pacifists than the mainstream followers.Within Christianity so-called “peace churches” suchas the Brethren, the Mennonites and the Quakers,are examples of such sects. Two religions, Jainism and Bahá’í, are very firm in their nonviolent viewsand practice. For them the philosophy of Nonviolenceis the core of their religions. The central part of a nonviolent philosophy is that theuse of violence is morally wrong; that the aims do notjustify the means. The most widespreadunderstanding of nonviolence is the rejection to killhuman beings. But most nonviolent philosophieshave a much more nuanced view than this. Theyregard all sorts of physical and psychological harmagainst human beings as violations of the nonviolentnorm. And many expand the scope to include not onlyhuman beings, but all sorts of living creatures. Somewill include the whole global ecosystem as well asmaterial objects. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi used the conceptAhimsa in his philosophy. Ahimsa occurs inBhagavad-Gita and is normally translated as“nonviolence” or “non-harm”. In the Bhagavad Gitathe concept is used narrowly, with other termsdescribing many other forms of “no injury” or “noharm”. Gandhi expands the use of it to include anumber of different injuries. In the Gandhianphilosophy it is not only a question of physical actionsbut he argued that ahimsa should be a principleguiding humans in their thoughts, word and deeds.Well aware of human nature he was clear about theimpossibility to completely fulfil such a norm, but thatdoes not make it impossible to make every effort toreduce the injury on other living creatures to anabsolute minimum.

Gandhi has wrongly been criticised for promotingpassivity, whereas he in reality he argued thatpassivity itself could be violence: “every act of injuryto a living creature and endorsement of such an actby refraining from non-violent effort, wheneverpossible, to prevent it, is a breach of ahimsa.” Thisattitude so widens the concept as to make it an act ofviolence to abstain from efforts to prevent injuriousacts, for instance suppression, manipulation,exploitation.(Næss 1974, p 48) It can be useful to add a few questions to this view.The first one is if it is universal? Shall the norm guideus in all situations and is it applicable for all humanbeings? Gandhi himself was not always clear on thispoint. There are situations in his text where he arguesin favour of putting an end to life of a living being.One example is euthanasia. He describes a situationwith a sick calf and the only way the end the terriblesuffering is by giving the calf a deadly dose of poison.He adds: “It was a surgical operation, and I should doexactly the same thing with my child, if he were in thesame predicament”.(Galtung and Næss 1955, Ch 3)This is a side of the Gandhian view on nonviolencenot widely known or accepted today. What about other exceptional cases? What ifsomeone falls in the river and cannot swim? When abrave swimmer tries to help, if the person in dangerpanics, the only way to rescue him is to knock himunconscious. Is that a violation of the ahimsa norm?Even if it includes physical violence most peoplewould easily justify such an act of unselfish and braveaction. There are similarities in some of the commonarguments for a national military defence and thesituation with someone trying to save the life of othersby inflicting some pain on them. The moraljustification for military defence includes the idea thatit can be right to sacrifice a few to save many. Fewwars have been started without someone trying tojustify them with arguments that they are carried outto defend higher values.

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The pacifist traditions do not accept such justificationsof the use of violence in war situations. Neither dothey justify slavery, colonialism, patriarchy orimperialism. These are all violent institutions justifiedby the majority just a few generations ago. Moralnorms are seldom static. They change over time anddiffer from context to context. For pacifists, it is more complicated to judge actionswhich include the harming of oneself. Many personswithin the nonviolent traditions have of their own freewill done harm to their own bodies. Fasts and hungerstrikes are two well known types of actions. Prisonersall over the world have used hunger strikes as ameans to get attentions for their demands. Gandhiwent on open ended hunger-strikes on severaloccasions. In June 11 1963 the Buddhist monk ThichQuang Duc, burn himself to death in protest againstthe war. Thich Quang Du was protesting against theway the administration of the Vietnamese PrimeMinister Ngo Dình Diệm was oppressing the Buddhistreligion during the war. Several monks and nunsfollowed him. Four US-citizens also self-immolated inprotest against the US attack on Vietnam. Theseextreme painful forms of suicides are controversial inmany respects. Within most religions actions likethese have relatively few supporters even if there is adeep respect for those who do end their lives in thisway. Many believe that such actions will be rewardedafter they pass away. It is important to understand the variations amongdifferent religious contexts when it comes to judgingactions like these. For some, like most Christians, thedeath is much more definite, than for others. For aHindu, with thousands more lives on Earth, thepassing away is much less dramatic. For Gandhi thehunger-strike was an action to show how much he iswilling to suffer for the cause he was struggling with.He was solely responsible for the action and possibledeath. When political prisoners in Christian culturesare close to dying in hunger-strikes the media andpublic opinion often blame others (for instancepolitical leaders) for the possible death of a prisoner.To die is very different processes in differentreligions.

Another factor of differences when it comes to theuse of violence is whether or not ethical normals areseen as universal. Do they apply to all humanbeings? In the western traditions there arewidespread views that norms are valid for all or none.In for instance the Hindi tradition there are differentnorms depending on your karma and cast. For aSadhu it is a norm to avoid the use of violence inevery situation, while someone from the warriorcaste, the Kshatriyas, has a duty to use violentmeans to defend his people. Gier characterizesHinduism as “relative nonviolence” and gives severalreasons for this: “(1) the prohibition against killing isrelative to the person, yogis and Brahmins taking thevow most strictly; (2) it is also relative to the occasion,such as killing in war, in self-defence, and in sacrifice;and (3) it is relative to individual self-interest.” (Gier2004, p 34) Gandhi was not advocating a traditional Hindu viewon these matters. He argued that the norm of Ahimsawas universal and he opposed the common viewamong Hindus that a military defence is a necessity.Gandhi was often in doubt and experimented withdifferent activities. He tested a number of diets,political actions and views on political and moralquestions. Most of his writings are dated. The reasonis that he was always prepared to change his mindwhen he learned new things. He told his readers that,if in his writings they found several opinions on thesame subject, they should trust the latest. This optionfor changing even your core values is important toremember when reading texts by or on Gandhi. Gandhi grew up in a home with very strong relationsto his deeply religious mother. She belonged to a sectthat combined Hindu and Muslim beliefs and shewelcomed Christians and Jains in their house. One ofthe great Jain saints of modern India, ShrimadRajchandra, settled many of Gandhi’s spiritual doubtsand was a significant personal inspiration for him:local people referred to Rajchandra as “Gandhi’sGuru”. (Hunter 2003)

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For Gandhi philosophy was not enough. His visionwas to develop and build a whole lifestyle based onnonviolent principles. He used the terms“Nonviolence for the Weak” about the pragmatic useof nonviolent techniques and “Nonviolence of theStrong” for those who committed themselves to anonviolent lifestyle. That lifestyle was a totality of selfdiscipline, undemanding lifestyle, an inner search fortruth, the use of non-cooperation against unjust lawsand decisions, constructive work, and civil courage toconfront the opponent. Among the famous advocates of nonviolence basedon a religious belief we find Leo Tolstoy, MartinLuther King and Gandhi. For them the human life hadan ultimate value, higher than everything else.Nothing was important enough to sacrifice humanlives. This faith led them to a pacifist position andguided their activities in life. For many nonviolencebecame part of their lifestyle and influenced all partsof their life. In the daily life it could decide what to eat,how to travel, what to consume, how to relate to otherhuman beings (and nature), how to act in order totake responsibility for your local community, and whatto do for leisure. People who lived with Gandhi, likeJayaprakash “JP” Narayan (Narain 1978) and Narayan Desai (Desai 1980), use the term “TotalRevolution” to describe the extensive implications of anonviolent lifestyle. Political and social revolution arenot enough; in addition there must be an innerrevolution in each individual. And both JP andNarayan Desai are clear that the change within everyindividual is by far the most difficult one. Within this lifestyle-orientation we find the mostobvious overlap between the pacifist tradition and thepragmatic tradition. Many, although not all, of thosecommitted to a nonviolent lifestyle also tends to beengaged in nonviolent actions of different sorts. Theyinclude in their lifestyle a societal engagement andtakes part in civil society activities against what theyregard as unjust, immoral or simply wrong policiesand decisions.

The pragmatic tradition The pragmatic tradition of nonviolence has its roots inthose parts of the society which has fought withpeaceful means for freedom, democracy and respectfor human rights. These tools are used bystakeholders to influence a conflict situation. Theyhave adopted different nonviolent strategies andtechniques and used them in their struggle againstinhuman ideologies, policies, systems, decisions, andlaws. Their choice of means have been more basedon what is effective than of ethical guidelines andmoral values. Even if we can trace their history backfurther, it is fair to say that they have developed andbeen used more in the last hundred years. Today themajority of those who deal with nonviolence, whetherthey use the term or not, belong to the pragmatictradition. Nonviolent techniques are frequently used in mostmodern social and political movements. Withinwomen’s networks, trade unions, environmentalgroups, solidarity movements, peace organisations,and other parts of the civil society nonviolent actionsare used regularly to promote their ideas and strugglefor their causes. Nonviolent actions are used eitherto create wider support for their goals, to directlyreach their aims or in order to prevent their opponentsfrom achieving theirs. What is meant by “nonviolence” in the pragmaticschool? It is obvious that there are diverse definitionsused by different authors and activists. Manypractitioners have never needed or wanted topropose a full and distinct definition, but when askedhave said that they “don’t use serious physicalviolence against other human beings”. Others havewider definitions. Some will exclude all forms ofpsychological violence as well. At one extreme of aspectrum we find people who merely “try to avoidkilling humans”, while at the other there are thosewho will avoid “all disturbance of the harmony in life”.The latter ones you will find among those who usenonviolent actions as a part of their lifestyle. Themajority of nonviolent activists belonging some placein the middle, but closer to “not killing” than “perfectharmony”.

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Whatever definition is used there is one more aspectof these actions we need to clarify. Is it a nonviolentaction just because it avoids the use of violence? Inthe early phase of his writing Gandhi used the term“passive resistance”. That could be interpreted asnonviolence being some form passivity; not doinganything. This is a misunderstanding we still find usedin present discussions and in media coverage ofnonviolent actions and movements. Gandhi changedthe term to “ahimsa” and the English interpretation;nonviolence. Later he used Satyagraha, with literallymeans “to keep to the truth”. The point here is that weneed to make clear what we mean by nonviolence.Vinthagen (Vinthagen 2005 p. 136-146) hasdeveloped and clarified the definition the concept. Heargues that in addition to be “without violence” it mustalso be “against violence”. It is not enough that anactivity is carried out without the use of violence. Tofulfil the criteria of being labelled nonviolence it mustin addition be done with the aim of reducing oreliminating violence. Nonviolent actions can be categorized in three broadgroups: Protests, noncooperation and interventions. Nonviolent protests Nonviolent protests are actions of peaceful oppositionbut not going as far as refusing to cooperate ordirectly intervene in the situation. The use of symbols,marches, picket-lines and protest meetings are typicalexamples of nonviolent protests. A wide variety ofactors are using such techniques on a regular basis.For more examples see chapter three in The Politicsof Nonviolent Action (Sharp 1973). A frequent goal fornonviolent protests is to communicate a message ofopposition. It can be seen as a voice against theestablishment when the formal political channels donot give them a say in the decision-making. Theprotests themselves are visual means ofcommunication, but often they are combined withslogans, symbols or catchphrases which explain themessage.

Protests are normally just one step in a chain ofactivities which leads to more communicationsbetween representatives from the opposition anddelegates from those in position. “Opposition” and“position” shall in this context be seen in a very broadcontext. It includes those in power and the oppositionin a state, but many protests are used in entities otherthan the state. Thousands of protests take place onthe local, regional and global arena every day. Noncooperation Noncooperation is well known from trade unions andtheir use of strikes. They put pressure on theiremployers by refusing to fulfil their role as producers.But these same methods are used by many otheractors and in many different contexts.To decrease or withdraw completely the normal levelof cooperation changes the power relation betweenthe actors. The main idea behind such actions is thatpolitical, social or economical power depends onsome level of cooperation. These types of power canbe influenced by changing the level of cooperation.The level of cooperation is based on several factors.Cooperation may exist because it benefits theinvolved actors or it can be based on fear of theconsequences of refusing to cooperate. The fear isnormally based on knowledge about possible forms ofpunishments. States are well known for threats ofpenalties like trials, fines, imprisonments, tortures,and death penalty. Other actors can force people tobe obedient by threats of social exclusion, withdrawalof support and – as for state actors – physical orpsychological punishment. The most frequentreasons for people’s cooperation, in addition to theself-benefit, are ignorance and unawareness. Thenorm is to obey, follow orders and regulations and notbehave differently from others. For noncooperation totake place it is necessary, but not sufficient, toremove, fear, ignorance and obedience. Nonviolent interventions Nonviolent intervention is the last of the threecategories of nonviolent actions. These are actions inwhich some form of direct involvement in a conflictsituation takes place.

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By directly intervening in situations the persons takingpart in it often expose themselves to higher risks andthe consequences can be both more immediate andmore serious. Nonviolent interventions take place inmany contexts. Someone intervening when a singleperson is attacked on the street is a small scaleexample. When members of Shanti Senainterpositioned themselves between fighting Muslimsand Hindus in Indian cities is an example on grouplevel. In the last two decades we have seen peoplefrom the peace movement act not just in their homecountry but by going to war zones. During theVietnam War most activists demonstrated in their owncities or gathered outside US-embassies around theworld. With the wars in the Balkans we saw the firstmassive wave of activists moving into the battle field.It had been done earlier, but only in small numbers. Inthe present wars in Palestine, Colombia, Sri Lanka,and Iraq the nonviolent actions inside the countries atwar are substantially bigger than in any previous war.Some of these actions are there to support the localcivil society; others are carried out as “third” partiesacting with their own agendas. Still it is important torecognize that for most wars there are no strongmovements, neither inside nor outside the combatzone. For the majority of wars the nonviolentinitiatives are still to be born. Civil Disobedience Civil disobedience is one traditional form ofintervention which deserves some extra attention. It isa form of action that often triggers strong reactionsand it is used in all cultures, many contexts and by allsorts of actors. The definition of civil disobedience isan action which fulfils the following four criteria: 1. A violation of a law or generally accepted norm2. It is done without the use of violence3. It is done in full openness4. It is done with a serious commitment A few words of explanation for each of these fourpoints will make it easier to grasp this form ofnonviolent intervention. The first one just says thatthe action is illegal or contradicts generally acceptednorms in the society. This makes it controversial andprovokes reactions from several actors.

The second criterion is the one which specifies thatcivil disobedience is a nonviolent action. Exactly whatis meant by nonviolence is debated. That no humansshall be physically hurt is commonly accepted, butmany will accept some degree of psychologicalaggression and symbolic sabotage of materialobjects. The third criterion is the one which makesthese illegal actions unique. Here there is arequirement that the people using this form of actionshall face the consequences of their activities. Theimplications of that are that the activists shall not tryto avoid being arrested or stay away from comingtrials. A public “confession” of what they have done isoften included in these actions. The last criterion isincluded in order to separate these actions from“funny” or pure spectacular activities. That the action by definition is illegal makes it verycontroversial. No establishment can ever supportsuch actions and they frequently condemn them as“anti-democratic” and dangerous. From history weknow that such actions have been used by mostmovements that have worked for more and betterdemocracy. Well known are the actions of civildisobedience used by the Abolitionist Movement inUS against slavery, the suffragists in their struggle forthe universal right to vote, the Civil Rights Movementfor equal rights for all citizens, the workersmovements for their right to organise themselves inunions, the Anti-conscription movements for theirrights to conscientious objection, and theenvironmental movement for the rights to a safeenvironment. Looking back it is obvious that the useof civil disobedience have been to the benefit of ademocratic development. Nonviolence as antithesis of violence Violence has been defined and categorized by JohanGaltung (Galtung 1969; Galtung 1990; Galtung 1996).His concepts of direct violence, structural violenceand cultural violence have their antithesis in thecontext of nonviolence.

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Direct Nonviolence Direct nonviolence is the use of nonviolent techniquesto influence conflicts without the use of violence. Thefull scale of pragmatic nonviolent methods andstrategies are integrated parts of direct nonviolence.Direct nonviolence is used to directly confront thosedecisions, laws and systems that do not treat allhumans equally. The struggle for abolition of slavery,decolonialisation, removal of patriarchal structures,resistance against wars and imperialistic policies areall full of direct nonviolence. People have used directnonviolence against illegitimate power holders andfaced armed police and military forces for hundreds ofyears. Many of them with successful results. Structural Nonviolence Structural nonviolence consists of those structures inour society that promote cooperation, reconciliation,openness, equality and peaceful actions in conflictsituations. Democratic institutions and systems areexamples of such structures. Democracy is heremeant as something much more than theparliamentarian state systems we find in manywestern states today. Consensus, inclusiveness,transparency, and accountability are importantelements in a real democracy. And these are allelements in many traditional communities. Anonviolent societal structure will to a large degree bethe result if political, economical, cultural, and socialhuman rights are fulfilled. More specifically structuralnonviolence is those parts of a society which open upfor nonviolent handling of conflicts regarding humanrights. When there is unequal distribution of basicneeds, resources, freedoms, and rights a nonviolentstructure gives people the possibility to handle suchconflicts with peaceful means. In this case, “peaceful”involves more than the tools of direct nonviolence. Itincludes many sorts of mediation, conflicttransformation, and reconciliation as well.

Cultural Nonviolence Cultural nonviolence includes those parts of ourculture that transmit traditions of nonviolent behaviorand which commemorate and honor nonviolentvalues and qualities. We can find nonviolent traditionsin most cultures, religions and philosophies. Whilerarely the dominant tendency, they still formedimportant parts of norms and systems of behaviour inrelation to other human beings and/or nature. Thenonviolent ways of handling conflicts can be tracedfar back in history. Even in times of instability and inthe midst of violent conflicts we find individuals andgroups who have approached the situation with theuse of nonviolent techniques. We have in mind herenot those who avoided conflict, but rather those whoactively took part, but with peaceful means. Oftenthey have been regarded as wise and sensiblewomen and men. Among indigenous people many ofthese nonviolent values, techniques and ethics arestill ruling their communities. Within movements,organizations, and networks many of these qualitiesare integrated and important elements.The Culture of Nonviolence has deep roots in humanhistory. Just as in today’s media, so too our writtenhistory is dominated by actions of violence. Butdespite violent clashes the capabilities to cooperatehave characterised human life since early days.Individual humans have sacrificed their lives for thecommunity on many occasions in our history.Altruistic behavior has always been regarded as arespected virtue. Human societies could not havedeveloped without a strong force of cooperation andthe capacity to solve conflicts without the use ofviolence.

Johansen,J, "Nonviolence – More than absence of violence", Jørgen Johansen, 1/1/14,www.jjohansen.net/2014/01/05/nonviolence-more-than-absence-of-violence/

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