Global Liberalism vs. Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics

Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in InternationalPoliticsAuthor(s): Fiona B. AdamsonSource: International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 547-569Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699674 .

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International Studies Review (2005) 7, 547-569

Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in

International Politics'

FIONA B. ADAMSON

Department of Political Science, University College London

Over the past decade, a vibrant international relations (IR) research agenda has developed around the role of norms and the dynamics of normative change in world politics (for reviews, see Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Desch 1998; Hopf 1998). From an initial concern with demonstrating that "norms matter" (for example, Katzenstein 1996) to more recent research that delineates the specific actors, mech- anisms, and causal processes by which particular norms come to be accepted by actors in the international system (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998: Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Risse 2000), the study of international norms has emerged as a core constructivist concern in IR. Despite this progress, however, one cannot fail to note that the constructivist research agenda on norms and normative change appears to be curiously ill-equipped to shed light on many recent developments in world politics, such as the use of violence by ideologically motivated actors and transnational networks or the role of religion and culture in international affairs. Ironically, it is the work of someone far removed from the social constructivist research agenda-Samuel Huntington (1996) in The Clash of Civilizations--who generated the most public debate in the 1990s on the role of ideational factors in world affairs. And, in the aftermath of September 11, Hunt- ington's controversial thesis appears to resonate even more strongly, while the "meat and bones" of the mainstream constructivist research agenda-the benign power of international norms, global civil society, and strategies of communicative action, argumentation, and persuasion--appear to have lost some of their sway.

This essay will argue that the failing of social constructivism to grapple with some of the issues that have come to the fore in world politics over the past several years is the result of two theoretical limitations that have constrained the constructivist research agenda. The first can be referred to as "the liberal bias" of mainstream social constructivism, in which constructivists concerned with normative change in world politics have overwhelmingly focused their attention on a relatively narrow range of cases-on the actions, discourses, beliefs, and strategies used by liberal actors promoting liberal norms in the international system. They have, thus, uni- versalized strategies of norm promotion through the study of only a small subset of the contending norms and actors that compete for attention in international society and have lost sight of the fact that liberalism is only one possible ideological framework that can be used for framing political action.

The second limitation in the current research agenda is a lack of theory regarding the relationship between individual agents and global ideological structures--a disconnect between the structural theories of the international system and the micro-

'This essay builds on a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, 2004. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31, 2003. The author would like to thank Peter Mandaville, Thomas Risse and Jack Snyder, Sidney Tarrow for comments on this earlier version.

O 2005 International Studies Review. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.



548 Global Liberalism versus Political Islam

practices of individual actors involved in the promotion of normative agendas in world politics. This disconnect has led to a rather apolitical view of "norm entrepreneurs" as being essentially free-standing moral agents, acting on individual con- science, rather than actors who are deeply embedded within particular ideological and geopolitical configurations in world politics. These two shortcomings are ulti- mately intertwined in that the liberal bias of the constructivist research agenda reflects the ideological structure of global liberalism within which it is embedded-a structure that has not yet been self-reflexively theorized about by liberal constructivists.

As a means of overcoming some of these limitations, this essay proposes a model of the international system that can be used to situate norm entrepreneurs explicitly within the broader sets of global ideological structures shaping the processes of normative mobilization. The international system, as will be argued below, is best conceived of as neither a socially thin Hobbesian anarchy, on the one hand, nor a fully developed Habermasian public sphere, on the other, but rather as an evolving, but still only partially institutionalized "global structure of political opportunities." Such a framework provides a possibility for beginning to map out the types of systemic-level political opportunity structures that individual agents draw upon in their attempts to promote normative change in world politics. Although the essay identifies at least three types of systemic-level political opportunity structures that shape the dynamics of norm promotion in world politics (namely, discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunity structures), it will focus on discursive opportunity structures, and particularly on ideologies as overarching structures of meaning that are drawn upon by entrepreneurs in their attempts to affect normative change in world politics.

The concept of political opportunity structures, of course, has been widely used as a means of mapping institutional and ideological environments in the study of domestic social movements and contentious politics (see, for example, Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The concept is also increasingly finding its way into IR as a means of theorizing about transnational social movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998:31). But it has yet to be fully embraced by IR theorists as a means of theorizing about the structure of the international system itself. As the author ex- pects to demonstrate below, mapping changes in the international structure of discursive opportunities should be as important to social constructivists engaged in research on normative change and norm promotion as mapping changes in the international balance of power is to realists. Such an exercise provides social constructivists with a means of integrating the literatures on top-down and bottom-up approaches to normative change in world politics, while also providing the possibility for a more robust theoretical statement about the role that structural power and political ideology can play in the diffusion and contestation of international norms.

A macrolevel ideological structure of "global liberalism," with its geopolitical and institutional underpinnings and concomitant political opportunity structures, currently dominates world politics (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Hovden and Keene 2002), but it is not the only ideological structure that inhabits the contemporary global political arena. Political Islam is also a contender in many regions, with its own geopolitical and institutional underpinnings and its own global circuits that may overlap geographically but operate relatively independently of the circuits and networks that define the structure of global liberalism. In a sense, these two overarching ideological frameworks constitute distinct "lifeworlds" within the same international system, providing their own competing sets of systemic-level discursive opportunities for differently situated norm entrepreneurs. Neither can systemic- level structure be reduced to either its cultural or its geopolitical underpinnings; nor can either structure be studied in terms of being "located" in one particular

2For an analysis of the translocal dimensions of global Islam, see Peter Mandaville (2001).



FIONA B. ADAMSON 549

region of the world. Both structures are composed of networks and institutions that are global and that overlap and interpenetrate various states and regions.3

This essay is organized as follows: First is a brief survey of recent constructivist theorizing on norms, which argues that such thinking has been characterized by a liberal bias and that it has undertheorized the role of global structures. The second section of the essay lays out an alternative framework for understanding the process of normative contestation in international politics by incorporating insights from the literature on political mobilization and contentious politics to examine the international system as a "structure of political opportunities." Incorporating the notion of political opportunity structures into systemic-level theorizing provides a means of moving the social constructivist research agenda on norms in a direction that allows for a more dynamic approach to explaining and understanding normative change in world politics. The third section of the essay undertakes a brief case study of the competing claims that have been made by liberal and Islamist norm entrepreneurs who entered post-Soviet Central Asia in the decade following the end of the Cold War. In doing so, this section indicates that the "clash" between secular liberalism and political Islam in this region is less a product of the resurgence of traditional culture or civilizational enmities than an example of the local manifestations of two competing infrastructures of political opportunities that provide both ideational resources and material support to individual norm entrepreneurs. It is the global matrix of liberal and Islamist discursive opportunity structures rather than culture, individual moral or religious convictions, or an intercivilizational competition that best accounts for patterns of norm diffusion in Central Asia following the end of the Cold War. The fourth and final section of the essay concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of the argument that has been made for both theory and policy in a post-September 11 world.

The Constructivist Study of International Norms: Moral Agents and Absent Structures

With the end of the Cold War, a space was opened up in IR theory for the revival of the study of ideational factors in world politics. The peaceful end to the US-Soviet geopolitical rivalry and the role played by civil society groups and their appeal to human rights norms in the transformation of Eastern Europe were events that appeared to challenge the dominance of material explanations for macrolevel changes in the international system (Wendt 1992; Risse-Kappen 1994; Evangelista 1999; Thomas 2001).4 Over the course of the 1990s, research on the role that norms and ideas play in world politics burgeoned. Studies showed that committed activists, behaving according to their moral convictions and principles and promoting their ideas in effective ways, could affect significant changes in international politics. These coordinated actions had, it appeared, resulted in such changes in world politics as increased compliance to human rights norms by states, the demise of apartheid in South Africa, strengthened environmental protectionism, and a reduction in the acceptability of using land mines in conflict zones around the world (Sikkink 1991; Klotz 1995; Wapner 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Furthermore, campaigns motivated by normative principles, as opposed to material interests, were shown to not necessarily be a new feature of international politics. For example, contemporary transnational advocacy networks had their precursors in earlier transnational campaigns that successfully managed to abolish slavery in the United States and end practices of footbinding in China (Keck and Sikkink 1998:39-78).

3Neither, for example, can be reduced to any particular regional configuration or territorially bounded "security community" (see Adler and Barnett 1998).

4For a counterargument, however, see, for example, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth (2000).




The catalysts of such transnational campaigns to promote normative transformation in international society were committed individuals, motivated not by material incentives or instrumental goals, but rather by "shared principled ideas or values" (Keck and Sikkink 1998:30). The international norms that provided the inspiration for such global campaigns were actively created by individual "norm

entrepreneurs" who were driven by "altruism, empathy and ideational commitment" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:898). According to Martha Finnemore and

Kathryn Sikkink (1998:898), "ideational commitment is the main motivation when

entrepreneurs promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values embodied in the norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their well-being." Furthermore, international norms, it was claimed, could transcend cultural and political contexts, achieving resonance because they speak to "basic ideas of human dignity common to most cultures" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:907; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Activists motivated by moral and ethical concerns promoted normative change through various strategies, such as the use of information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16-25). To be effective, norm entrepreneurs must be able to frame their concerns in ways that resonate with their target audience and to draw upon cultural and other symbolic materials in the process of framing and of engaging in "strategic social construction" (Khagram, Sikkink, and Riker 2002). They must be able to persuade the targets of their normative claims by engaging in individual speech acts and through the use of effective techniques of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion (Risse 2000).

In this bottom-up model of how norms are diffused in world politics, it is the skills of the individual agents, the coordinated actions of morally committed individuals, and the nature of the norms being promoted that lead to normative

change in international politics. The norms that "win out" are either inherently more appealing or convincing to their targets or they are promoted by individuals who are armed with more powerful rhetorical skills. Following general trends in IR, especially given the influence of rational-choice theory, the study of international norms has increasingly involved analyzing processes of normative change in international politics as the outcome of the aggregated activities of morally committed

sovereign individuals in a world in which the power of international structures

appears to have disappeared along with the Cold War.

Moral Agents and the Problem of the Liberal Bias

This emerging consensus on the dynamics of normative change in world politics captures many important aspects of norm diffusion in world politics. At the same time, it is rather bold in its claims of offering a generalizable model for under-

standing how norms are diffused. Drawing from cases that are almost all instances of actors promoting liberal causes, based in (or connected to networks in) Western liberal democracies, during periods of liberal hegemony, it purports not to explain how liberals in Western industrial democracies go about promoting normative

change, but the general process of normative change itself. Interestingly, there are very few studies by constructivists of the promotion of "nonliberal norms" in world politics, such as nationalism or religious fundamentalism. This, of course, is a standard critique of constructivism that is often made by realists and other skeptics, but it does point to the selective nature of the case study work on norms that has been carried out in the constructivist research agenda on norms.5

5For example, most treatments of the use of nationalist ideology and exclusionary norms during the 1990s were undertaken in security studies and were not tied directly to work in social constructivism (see, for example, Snyder 2000). A notable exception in this regard is the work by Stuart Kaufman (2001).




Even as a framework for understanding the diffusion of liberal norms in world

politics, however, this general model is problematic. In its revolutionary stages, for

example, liberalism was no less violent than other ideologies, and some argue that it continues to be in its hegemonic form (see, for example, Robinson 1996; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). The original use of the term "terrorism" stems from the French Revolution and "in its original context was also closely associated with the ideals of virtue and democracy" (Hoffman 1998:15). Ideological conviction and moral commitment have played important roles in motivating many "norm entrepreneurs" in

campaigns of violence and terror. One need only think of the articulated motivations of members of the Red Army Faction in Germany in the 1970s or of individual suicide bombers in the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, in many respects, the political phenomenon of terrorism can be viewed as the ideal case

study for constructivists interested in the role of ideational factors as motivating forces on world politics. As Bruce Hoffman (1998:43, emphasis in the original) writes:

the terrorist is not pursuing purely egocentric goals-he is not driven by the wish to line his own pocket or satisfy some personal need or grievance. The terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes that he is serving a "good" cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency-whether real or imag- ined-which the terrorist and his organization purport to represent.

Because of these various concerns, one could argue that it is problematic to make a

generalizable argument about the determinants and character of normative change in world politics by looking at such microlevel factors as the motivations of individual norm entrepreneurs, the nature of the norms being promoted, or an individual agent's skill in the logic of argumentation. Even though all these factors

may indeed be shown to be at play when one traces any particular case of normative

change in world politics, the overall outcomes of normative mobilization and contestation in world politics and the strategies that are used by individual norm en-

trepreneurs cannot be determined without examining the relationship that such

micropractices have with the macrostructures that define the international system at any given point in time (Ruggie 1998:27).

Moral Agents and the Absence of Structures

The turn toward microlevel explanations of norm dynamics in world politics typ- ifies the general shift away from structural-level theorizing in IR. Structural the-

orizing has been critiqued of late as being too vague and too deterministic to be

helpful in shedding light on particular instances of normative transformation. At the same time, however, one of the core claims of social constructivists is that the international system is also an ideational structure-that it "consists fundamentally of shared knowledge" that should, in theory, affect patterns of behavior of individual agents (Wendt 1999:31). In what follows, we will review three notions of structure that have been used by social constructivists to date: the international

system as a space of anarchy, the international system as a world polity, and the international system as a public sphere. Even though all three notions capture some elements of system structure that are relevant for understanding patterns of change in world politics, none provide a dynamic structural framework that can be used to examine how shifts in structural opportunities and constraints over time affect patterns of normative contestation in world politics.

In the eyes of most constructivists, the fact that the international system is an anarchic structure does not predetermine how individual agents will behave. An- archy, as Alexander Wendt (1992) has argued, "is what states make of it." The absence of a world government does not mean that material factors will always shape individual agents' behaviors. Rather, shared understandings or interpreta-




tions about how to respond to anarchy (cultures of anarchy) can emerge at the

systemic level (Wendt 1999). Some would argue that the very fact of living together in an "anarchical society" may create the necessary conditions for actors to experience a common, if socially thin, lifeworld (Bull 1977; Risse 2000:14-15). Yet, anarchy as a structural ordering principle does not in and of itself provide scholars interested in normative change in world politics with much explanatory leverage. Anarchy provides the context in which agents can engage in intersubjective signa- ling or communicative action, but it does not predetermine either the content or the strategy deployed during interactions between agents (Wendt 1992; Risse 2000).

Another structural approach that focuses not on anarchy but on the structure of world culture can be found in the work of sociological institutionalists (see, for

example, Finnemore 1996b; Boli and Thomas, 1999). World polity theorists and others argue that the international system has a common culture; they also specify the content of that culture. States are not just simply actors within the structure of

global culture; they are actually produced by that culture (Meyer et al. 1997). Sociological institutionalists thus specify the content of the norms that will be adopt- ed by actors in world society: they will "be congruent with liberalism and capital- ism" as well as with other values, such as the belief in rational progress (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:907).

Sociological institutionalism provides a useful starting point for embedding normative action in world politics within a structural context and has been highly influential on the IR research agenda on norms and normative change in world

politics (Finnemore 1996a, 1996b). Yet, as Finnemore (1996a: 138) has pointed out, sociological institutionalism is too deterministic in its approach to global norms. At times, the argument of sociological institutionalists appears to preclude any role for

agency, with its portrayal of a world in which "Weberian rationality is marching relentlessly across the earth, leaving in its wake a marketized, bureaucratized world of increasingly similar forms." Like mainstream liberal constructivism, sociological institutionalists have a difficult time accounting for the emergence of patterns of normative behavior in world politics that do not conform to the strictures of a global culture based on rationality, progress, and liberal values.

Between the indeterminacy of anarchy and the overdeterminacy of world polity theory, a number of social constructivists and other scholars interested in normative

change in world politics are turning to other models of structure. Much of this work at least implicitly argues that international structure is increasingly coming to re- semble the structure of a world state-that is, that we are moving from an international system defined by anarchy to one defined by the institutional context of a domestic hierarchy (Shaw 2000; see also Wendt 2003). In such environments, it is assumed that actors share common expectations and knowledge and that political discourse can be structured by and channeled into legitimate avenues of institutionalized expression (Waltz 1979; Risse 2000). Whether because of increasing institutionalization and the emergence of embryonic forms of governance (Keohane 2002), the existence of an expanding democratic "zone of peace" in the world

(Risse-Kappen 1995; Cederman 2001), or US hegemony that undergirds a liberal world order (Ikenberry 2001), the international system appears to provide suffi- cient infrastructure for the emergence of a "global civil society" (Colas 2002; Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003) or an "international public sphere" (Lynch 1999; Risse 2000; Mitzen 2005). Because of processes of globalization and international institutionalization, we live in a world that is increasingly structured by institutionalized structures of governance rather than the raw power politics of anarchy (Ruggie 1998; Keohane 2002). Because of this, we can conceptualize the international system as having features that are similar to domestic politics and that make it conducive to examining the process of communicative action between agents that takes place within an international public sphere.




These arguments are suggestive and promising, but still problematic. Thomas Risse (2000:14-19), for example, although making a case for the utility of viewing discursive interaction in world politics as something akin to communicative action taking place within a public sphere, still notes the difficulties involved in directly importing the Habermasian notion of the public sphere into IR. The conditions that allow for an ideal speech situation to occur, including a common lifeworld and the absence of power and coercion as obstacles to "truth seeking" through argumentation, simply do not, as yet, hold in world politics--although one must also note that critics of Habermas' theory of communicative action claim that these conditions also do not hold at the domestic level. The Habermasian public sphere is, essentially, a liberal space or a space, at least, that is undergirded by liberal principles. It is a space that is inhabited by sovereign, equal, rational individuals, who are engaged in "truth seeking" via processes of argumentation and discursive interaction rather than through coercion or force. Linked with sociological insti- tutionalist theory, it provides a useful means of theorizing structure for the purpose of understanding liberal transnational movements that originate in liberal democratic settings. Yet, as Risse (2000:15) points out, it may be most useful to think of particular spaces in the international system, such as the European Union, as con- stituting common lifeworlds that create the conditions for the emergence of a public sphere or to think of an international public sphere as a possibility within a future international system that has developed a deeper sense of collective identity and level of institutionalization than as yet exists. The international system is not yet a Habermasian public sphere, but neither is it a socially thin Hobbesian anarchy. In the following section, let us explore a more useful means of conceptualizing the international system: as a structure of political opportunities.

The International System as a Structure of Political Opportunities A less deterministic means of theorizing the role that international structure plays in norm promotion and normative change is to borrow the concept of political opportunity structures from the literatures on social protest, social movements, and contentious politics and to import them into IR theorizing about systemic-level structure (Tarrow 1998: McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Opportunity structures can be defined as:

elements in the environment [that] impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it. The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they com- mand, but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behaviour. (Eisinger 1973:11-12)

Such a definition provides a starting point for beginning to understand how the activities of individual norm entrepreneurs are shaped by "structured fields of action" in the international system as a whole (Cerny 1990:597).

The notion of systemic-level opportunity structures that are not fixed, but rather change over time, provides a powerful means of conceptualizing the organizational structure of the international system as a whole. Like other recent work in IR, the concept of the international system as a collection of political opportunity structures represents an attempt to model the relationship between agents and structures as one that is not static, but rather dynamic and dialectical (see, for example, Cerny 1990, 2000; Bernstein 2000).6 It is a less parsimonious, yet more subtle and flexible,

60On the agent-structure relationship in international relations, see Wendt (1987) and David Dessler (1989).




concept than either hierarchy or anarchy, and one that provides a template for

investigating a wide range of incentives and constraints on the behavior of actors

pursuing political goals in the international system. Political opportunity structures

represent "sites of power" or structural incentives and constraints that can be drawn upon by norm entrepreneurs to either generate or constrain collective action.

Potentially there are many features of the international system that could be described as systemic-level opportunity structures. Here, however, three types of matrices of systemic-level opportunity structures that may be useful for theorizing the structure of normative action in world politics will be sketched out; these are discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunity structures.8 Discursive and institutional opportunity structures have been used to explain differences in patterns of political mobilization and social movements across domestic settings; geopolitical opportunity structures is a concept that is unique to the international

systemic level of political action.

Discursive Opportunity Structures

Discursive opportunity structures is a concept that has recently been introduced into the study of social movements (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Ferree et al. 2002) as a means of mapping the symbolic, cultural, and ideational resources that exist in a given environment and that are available for political entrepreneurs to draw upon when engaging in processes of strategic framing (Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 1986; Khagram, Sikkink, and Riker 2002). Individual entrepreneurs do not exist in a vacuum, but are rather embedded within structures of meaning. The structures of meaning within which individual entrepreneurs operate can influence the content and type of claims that are made by agents within any particular political space. They, thus, have constitutive qualities that structure political action and

shape the terms of debate. The discursive structure of the international system is rife with contradictions

and inconsistencies. It, therefore, does not provide a consistent script for actors, but rather a normative toolbox and ideational resource pool that can be deployed in

pursuit of political objectives. One can, for example, delineate competing discursive

opportunity structures and dominant and subordinate discourses that exist at the level of the international system and that change over time. These discursive opportunity structures exist as overarching frameworks of meaning or ideological frameworks.

Liberalism is one such ideological framework that provides individual norm en-

trepreneurs with discursive opportunity structures to draw upon for framing their normative claims. As sociological institutionalists have pointed out, liberalism provides a language of rights, equality, rationality, and progress that local norm en-

trepreneurs can draw upon in framing their claims. Liberal ideology undergirds the political and legal systems of the major industrial democracies of the world and the legal framework of the United Nations system. Yet, despite its hegemonic influence, it is not the only ideological framework that can or has existed in the international system; indeed, it is possible to empirically trace how the availability of different dominant, subordinate, or competing ideologies in world politics have shaped the way in which normative claims are made over time.

70On sites of power, see David Held (1995:159-188). 8These three types of opportunity structures, one could argue, loosely correspond to the three major paradigms

of systemic-level theorizing-institutionalism, constructivism, and realism. See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (1993:69-80) for another attempt to broaden theorizing on international structure by using the

concept of "interaction capacity," which includes a mix of technological infrastructure, shared norms, and institutions.




During the nineteenth century, other "structures of meaning" such as nationalism, anarchism, and socialism competed with liberal internationalism as tenable political world views, each with its own set of discursive resources and organizational structures that could be drawn upon by individual norm entrepreneurs. Nationalism continues to provide discursive opportunities for claims-making that are often at odds with claims grounded in a liberal framework. Etel Solingen (1998), for example, has shown how much of contemporary politics over the past decade can be understood as a competition between liberal internationalist coalitions and what she refers to as nationalist "backlash" coalitions. If one examines the framing of normative claims throughout the Cold War, norm entrepreneurs in many parts of the globe were as likely to frame their claims in terms of Marxist- Leninist ideology as they were to draw upon liberal ideology as a discursive resource. Since the end of the Cold War, the practice of framing normative claims in terms of Marxist-Leninism has all but disappeared. Moral claims that were framed in the discourse of Marxism during the Cold War, for example, have increasingly been framed in the discourse of human rights and identity politics since the end of the Cold War.9 At the microlevel, individuals may (or may not) have been person- ally motivated by the same feelings of altruism or notions of equity and justice during and after the Cold War. Yet, macrolevel patterns in the framing of individual claims in terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology cannot simply be reduced to changes in individual moral convictions over time. Rather, they are traceable to changes in the discursive opportunity structures that exist at the level of the international system.

Institutional Opportunity Structures

Social movement theorists make a distinction between the ideational resources and the institutional resources that individual political entrepreneurs can draw upon (Feree et al. 2002). Similarly in IR, scholars interested in normative change have been as concerned with the role played by institutions in the international system as they have been with ideational factors. As Risse-Kappen (1994) has noted, ideas are not simply free floating. Their effects depend on how and to what extent they come to be embedded in institutional structures. The nature of institutional opportunity structures in the international system changes over time and these changes can be measured empirically-for example, by looking at increases in the number and impact of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) since the late nineteenth century (Murphy 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In some cases, international organizations and NGOs act as agents that socialize other actors, including states, to accept new norms (Finnemore 1996a). In other cases, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have pointed out, international organizations and NGOs provide organizational platforms that can be used by norm entrepreneurs to promote interests, agenda-setting activities, and the formation and deployment of new norms.

International NGOs, such as those in principled issue networks, can also provide a means for weak nonstate or societal actors within states to mobilize and exert pressure on their domestic regimes if institutionalized channels of access are blocked at the domestic level--a process that Keck and Sikkink (1998:12-13) refer to as the boomerang pattern. Local grassroots organizations, civil society groups, and social movements increasingly frame their concerns in ways that will attract the

9Two concrete examples in this regard are the normative claims made by Kurdish activists in the 1980s and 1990s and the claims made by indigenous populations in Latin America during the same time period. In both cases, claims that were framed using a Marxist-Leninist ideology in the 1980s were reframed as claims that drew upon discourses of human rights, cultural rights, indigenous rights, or the antiglobalization movement during the 1990s. For a general discussion of how groups "market" their claims in world politics, see Clifford Bob (2001). (For a discussion of the Kurdish case, see Adamson 2002b; for a discussion of the Latin-American case, see Brysk 1993, 2000.)




political and financial support of powerful international organizations such as Am- nesty International or Greenpeace (Bob 2001). If institutional channels for affecting political change are blocked at the level of the state, individual entrepreneurs turn to the institutional opportunity structures that are available to them outside the state, at the level of the international system.

International organizations and international NGOs are, thus, opportunity structures that can be drawn upon and that help shape the calculations of actors in world politics. Political entrepreneurs wishing to make claims at the level of the international system can draw upon the resources of international organizations. At the same time, if they do so, they will be constrained to frame their message in ways that fit within the institutional culture of the organization. In most cases, but not ex- clusively, this institutional culture has been open to either liberal or nationalist claims. Political entrepreneurs who promote norms that do not conform with the dominant liberal institutional culture of international organizations will have to adjust their normative claims or alternatively draw on other institutional infrastructures-which are often informal-as platforms for promoting their normative claims. This accounts, in part, for the use of other strategies of contention and agenda-setting (including violence) by norm entrepreneurs who do not have access to formal institutional channels at the level of the international system-a pattern that was also seen in domestic settings before the development of institutionalized processes of claims making in liberal democratic states.10

Geopolitical Opportunity Structures

A third type of political opportunity structure that has not been analyzed by social movement theorists involves geopolitical opportunity structures. Both realists and Gramscians view normative configurations in world politics as deriving from the structure of global power relations and the interests of great powers (see, for example, Robinson 1996; Krasner 1999). Social constructivists, for the most part, have tried to downplay the role that geopolitics plays in norm diffusion--arguing that norms often trump rather than are shaped by geopolitical interests.11

A more realistic view, however, is that geopolitical configurations do not, in and of themselves, determine patterns of mobilization by norm entrepreneurs in world politics; rather, they provide structural incentives and constraints. Returning again to the example of the strategies adapted by norm entrepreneurs during the Cold War, we can see a number of attempts by individual norm entrepreneurs to play one superpower off against another in their quest for resources and political support during campaigns for normative change.12 Following the end of the Cold War, nonstate groups had to turn increasingly to other sources and resources for support, such as private actors, diaspora populations, or international NGOs (Bob 2001; Byman et al. 2001). Even international NGOs, which can be instrumental as resources for nonstate actors articulating normative claims, can be heavily influ- enced by a country's own geopolitical interests or directly receive funding from government agencies.13

In reality, there is a relationship among discursive, institutional, and geopolitical structures of authority that provide the systemic-level opportunity structures that

loFor a discussion of the relationship between claims making and institutional development, see Charles Tilly (1979, 1984).

"1See, for example, Risse-Kappen's (1995) argument regarding the influence of Europe on the United States. 12An interesting example in this regard were the leaders of the FLN during the Algerian War of Liberation, who

designed a global strategy that was intended, among other things, to court both the United States and the Soviet Union as a means of putting pressure on France to pursue decolonization (see Connelly 2002).

13See Bob (2001) on how large international NGOs shape the claims made by smaller groups, and see Sarah Mendelson and John Glenn (2002:4ff.) for a discussion of the role played by the United States and the European Union in funding NGOs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.




entrepreneurs can draw upon. Both the international institutional order that emerged in the world following WWII and its ideological content of "embedded liberalism" were undergirded by US power (Ruggie 1982; Ikenberry 2001). The post-Cold War "liberal consensus" on globalization, democratization, and the creation of market economies is similarly undergirded by US hegemony. The mixture of discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunities that makes up what one could call "global liberalism" provides an environment that is conducive to the articulation of some claims in the international system and not others. Global liberalism is, of course, internally varied and dynamic. Contestations over norms occur all the time within frameworks that are defined by sets of liberal opportunity structures. Yet, the international system as a whole is only partly defined by liberal opportunity structures, and this is what makes the international system different from a Habermasian public sphere.

The rest of this essay will draw on the framework that has been outlined in this section to show how the activities of two different sets of individual norm entrepreneurs who entered into Central Asia during the 1990s were shaped by larger sets of opportunity structures that existed at the level of the international system. The focus of attention will be on "liberal" and "Islamist" norm entrepreneurs. An argument will be made that both sets of entrepreneurs were embedded in internally variegated discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunity structures that existed at the level of the international system rather than within any single particular state. Comparing the activities of liberal and Islamist norm entrepreneurs allows us to place the activities of individual norm entrepreneurs within their broader structural context and in so doing to move beyond the "liberal bias" that has dominated the study of international norms in IR to date. (The reader should note that the term "Islamic" is used very broadly here to refer to overtly political Islamist movements as well as to avowedly apolitical Islamist renewal movements.)

Competitive Normative Mobilization in Post-Soviet Central Asia, 1991-2001

With the end of the Cold War and the independence of the central Asian republics14 from the Soviet Union in 1991, a variety of nonstate actors quickly entered post- Soviet Central Asia, each seeking to promote its own normative agenda. On the one hand, NGOs based largely in Western liberal democracies entered the region to encourage the development of an indigenous civil society, the strengthening of human rights norms, environmental protection, and women's rights. These nonstate actors were part of a wave of organizations that moved into the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to provide "democracy assistance" in the wake of the end of the Cold War (see Carothers 1996, 1999; Mendelson and Glenn 2002).

In the same time period, however, a number of non-Western Islamist groups moved into Central Asia to establish a base and to mobilize popular support for a different set of norms. These actors promoted "Islamic values," which were often explicitly contrasted with the "Western" or "secular" values that were being promoted by liberal norm entrepreneurs. The norms being promoted included the Islamicization of Central Asian society and, in some cases, the establishment of an Islamic state. These norm entrepreneurs were tied to global networks of Islam that had their origins in various countries in the Middle East, Pakistan, Turkey, and other states.

14The Central Asian republics are Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Even

though the discussion in this section is general and applies to a certain extent to all of the republics, there is a

significant variation in the region, and most of the analysis is derived from examining political developments in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan has had a totalitarian regime in power since the end of the Soviet Union. Tajikistan has had a civil war, followed by postconflict reconstruction that successfully integrated Islamists into a broader government. For a more detailed discussion and background, see Adamson (2002a).




In addition to the liberal and Islamist organizations, other nonstate actors, such as Turkish nationalist organizations and Christian evangelicals and missionaries, also quickly sent representatives to Central Asia to promote their own ideational agendas. All of these organizations shared a similar view of the post-Soviet space as a kind of tabula rasa that was ripe for norm promotion and diffusion. The case of Central Asia in the 1990s, thus, provides an interesting example of competitive norm mobilization. Indeed, the argument can be made that competitive norm mobilization in post-Soviet Central Asia cannot be understood through a focus solely on the motivations and activities of morally committed individuals; nor can it be analyzed as a cultural or religious resurgence in the region. Similarly, normative contestation in the region cannot be understood merely as a product of factors such as the existence of a liberal-rational "world polity" or US hegemony.

Competitive norm mobilization in the region is essentially a political process, in the sense of David Easton's (1953) definition of politics as being about "the authoritative allocation of values." However, in the 1990s, it was not a political process that was occurring primarily at the domestic level, which is still, for the most part, extremely authoritarian.15 Rather, it is a local manifestation of a political contestation that is essentially global in which individual actors draw on discourses, devise strategies, articulate claims, and put forth political agendas in response to the existence of structures of political opportunity that exist at the level of the international system as a whole. Let us take a look at the competing claims and strategies of both the liberal democracy assistance networks and the Islamist networks in the region, showing how each is related to broader sets of political opportunity structures that exist at the level of the international system.

Democracy Assistance Networks in Central Asia and the Structures of Global Liberalism

During the 1990s, a number of norm entrepreneurs and NGOs seeking to promote democratic values, civil society, and the broader process of political and economic "transition" entered into post-Soviet Central Asia. This group was part of a larger wave of "democracy assistance" and "democracy promotion" activities in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following the end of the Cold War. Some of the organizations involved in this wave of "democracy promotion" activities included the Open Society Institute, the Eurasia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, East-West Women's Network, and the American Bar Association, among others (Ruffin and Waugh 1999; Mendelson 2001, 2002; Mendelson and Glenn 2002).16 Although democracy assistance and promotion in Eastern Europe and Russia included such activities as the design of electoral systems and support for new political parties, the activities carried out by organizations in Central Asia were more mod- est, because of the repressive nature of the regimes in the region and other factors, such as the low level of economic development.

Unlike Eastern Europe or the Baltic states, however, in which an emerging civil society was influential in helping shake off Soviet dominance, Central Asian states and societies did not press for an end to Soviet rule, but rather attained their independence almost reluctantly. The post-Soviet Central Asian republics were also far removed from the densely institutionalized environment of Western Europe and did not look to Europe and the West as their only model of development. They also have a predominantly Muslim population and, arguably, a different political culture. Mendelson and Glenn (2002:10-11) have characterized the Central Asian states as "unintegrated" as compared with the "integrated" states of Eastern

15For an overview of domestic political conditions that affect norm entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s, see Adamson (2002a). For overviews of political developments in the region, see Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (1997) and Olivier Roy (2000).

16Parts of this section of the essay are based largely on research published in Adamson (2002a).




Europe. "Integration" is defined as embracing "norms, ideas, and practices common to the democratic states of Western Europe and North America."

As such, democracy assistance in the Central Asian region took on a character different from that in Eastern Europe. Much of the democracy assistance focused

specifically on the goal of building up an indigenous civil society in the region, particularly on the creation of an independent third sector composed of local ad-

vocacy NGOs, such as professional organizations, women's organizations, and environmental groups. The logic behind these efforts was that funding local and

independent advocacy NGOs helps build independent civil society interest groups, which, in turn, provide the impetus for democratic reforms or transition.

Norm promotion by liberal norm entrepreneurs in Central Asia has been marked by a number of characteristics that have been prominent in the literature. For example, individual norm entrepreneurs have been generally highly motivated by personal convictions and a desire to help people in the region. They are often idealistic and driven more by altruism than by material interests. Similarly, the

strategies that norm entrepreneurs use in the region loosely correspond to such

strategies as persuasion, socialization, and what Keck and Sikkink (1998) have referred to as "information politics." Liberal norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince the local population of the benefits of creating independent civil society organizations and interest groups, and attempt to socialize both members of the society and the regimes to prioritize such issues as human rights concerns, press freedom, and other components of liberal democracy.

For example, Western NGOs in Central Asia have engaged in socialization processes by sponsoring exchange programs that bring Central Asian elites to Western countries on short-term trips and by exposing Central Asian elites to Western ideas and norms by sponsoring conferences, seminars, and partnership programs. In addition, Western liberal norm entrepreneurs have attempted to provide tools for increased access to information and ideas in Central Asia by, for example, providing computers, internet hookups and access, and training to individuals in the region.

Perhaps the most widespread and influential activities in the region have involved the provision of training and incentives for local groups to set up their own

indigenous NGOs in the region. Organizations such as Counterpart International and the Eurasia Foundation have provided seed money, grants, and training for individuals to learn how to run Western-style NGOs. In the mid-1990s, hundreds of new NGOs were being created in the region each year, although many of these could be more accurately described as money-generating operations for the pur- poses of acquiring grants (see Bivens 1997).

Hand in hand with fostering the creation of Western-style "grassroots" NGOs in the region has been a concerted campaign for legal reform in countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Local NGOs that were supported by democracy assistance networks-such as The Foundation for International Legal Cooperation, International Center Interbilim, and the Krygyz Bar Association--have all been

part of a local NGO coalition that was influential in developing a new regulatory framework for NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, which some claim "may be the only genuinely successful case of effective legislative lobbying by domestic NGOs in the region" (Horton and Kazakina 1999:39). In Uzbekistan, as well, a consortium of international assistance organizations drafted new NGO laws in 1998. In April 1999, Uzbekistan became the first country in the region to adopt a completely new law aimed only at NGOs; the new law allows for the establishment of philanthropic foundations and simplifies registration procedures (Remias 2000:20).

In the process of promoting a democratic transition in the region, Western liberal norm entrepreneurs did not act individually but were embedded in a set of international political opportunity structures that could broadly be defined as the discourses, institutions, and geopolitical interests that make up the matrix of global liberalism. The normative goals that these actors espoused accorded with liberal




principles regarding what constitutes a desirable political order. The majority of democracy assistance organizations have their headquarters in advanced industrial democracies; their overall organizational structure, mission, macrolevel strategies, and programs reflect this context (Carothers 1997). The goals of international assistance organizations operating in Central Asia also reflect the larger geopolitical context within which they operate. Democracy promotion is a key component of US foreign policy; a large number of democracy assistance organizations in the region are funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) or other US government agencies and international organizations.17 Since the Central Asian republics gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, tens of millions of dollars have been spent by the United States and European governments to promote democratization in the region. In 1998 alone, USAID spent more than 11 million dollars on democratic transition programs in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation for Uzbekistan and Krygyzstan). In addition to international NGOs and states, international organizations were heavily involved in processes of socialization in the region. For example, the UN Devel- opment Program, faced with a mandate to distribute its small grants and micro- credit programs through "grassroots NGOs," had to first go about establishing those very NGOs in the region before training them on how to apply for and distribute grant money.

Often, the goals of the norm entrepreneurs who entered the region did not immediately resonate within the local context in Central Asia. Programs in the region were designed according to liberal principles. Yet, when these programs were transported to Central Asia, they often had perverse effects. Examples include promoting civil society by providing grant money for NGOs through open competitions without taking into account that individuals in the region might collude in the competitions, use the grant money to fund their own personal patronage networks, or promote women's rights in the region by establishing programs that many women could not even attend because of severe restrictions on their movement. Highly motivated norm entrepreneurs soon found that liberal principles collided with local imperatives. NGO offices designed to promote liberal values, for example, often could not be physically set up or registered with the government without engaging in some form of bribery or corruption.

There have been some notable achievements of liberal norm entrepreneurs in Central Asia. For instance, there is now a burgeoning third sector in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that is increasingly recognized as a local player by both the government and the population. Indeed, many of the NGOs that have been supported by democracy assistance programs have attained a high degree of success. Democ- racy assistance programs support projects that have empowered local women's groups to engage in community organizing and to publish original research. They provide computers, internet access, and other infrastructural improvements in the region, and sponsor education, training, and exchange programs that are pro- ducing a new Westernized elite in the region. Yet, after more than a decade of activity in the region the activities of liberal norm entrepreneurs have not been as successful in affecting large-scale structural changes, nor have they significantly strengthened grassroots democracy. Instead, there is a trend toward consolidation of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule in the region, coupled with the strategic incorporation of some of the institutional features and discursive trappings of democracies.1s Despite attempts by international actors to strengthen civil society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by supporting the development of a third sector and

70On the geopolitics of democracy promotion, see William Robinson (1996). The most comprehensive survey and evaluation of US democracy assistance programs is found in Thomas Carothers (1999).

18For a description of this regime-type pattern and the challenges it poses to democracy promotion, see Martha Brill Olcott and Marina Ottoway (1999; see also Zakaria 1997).




independent civic advocacy groups, arguably more popular opposition to authoritarian regimes in the region has come from Islamist movements than from a vibrant Western-style NGO sector.

Islamist Networks and the Global Structure of Political Islam

During the same period of the 1990s, while Western democracy assistance organizations, tied largely to the United States and Western European states, entered central Asia, a group of Islamist nonstate actors also began to enter the region to engage in another process of norm promotion. "Among the first new visitors to the independent Central Asian Republics," writes Ahmed Rashid (2002:5), "were Is- lamic missionaries from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and elsewhere, who helped build hundreds of new mosques and distributed free copies of the Koran translated into Russian and other native languages."

These norm entrepreneurs included groups as varied as the popularly known "Wahabbis," who advocate a strict brand of Islam, to Turkish groups such as the "Nurcus" promoting a more moderate version of Islamism arising out of the domestic context of Turkey. These entrepreneurs made their claims by framing them in terms of Islamist discursive opportunity structures, drew on resources from Islamist international NGOs and informal networks, and in some cases received resources and contracts from states to assist them in the process of norm diffusion in the region. Even though some of these groups had radical political agendas, such as the establishment of an Islamic state and sharia law in the region, others were more interested simply in the promotion of Islamist norms-in the re-Islamiciza- tion of a predominantly Muslim society that had experienced decades of religious suppression under Soviet rule. The re-Islamicization of society was to be promoted through the support of Islamic institutions, such as mosques and schools, and much like the Western democracy assistance efforts, through processes of "socialization." The process of re-Islamicization, thus, was a broad normative agenda that spanned a continuum from cultural revival to the enforcement of new social norms (such as dress codes) to the establishment of a new political order based on Islamic law. The most radical of the Islamist organizations, as Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev (2000:22) have observed, argue that "the sharia should be elevated from principle to everyday practice."

At least three strands of Islamism entered into Central Asia during the 1990s; each was tied to broader global networks that operated within the context of a structure of political Islam. Yet each represented different types of claims and strategies.19

"Wahhabism," Militant Islam, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) The first of the groups of Islamist norm entrepreneurs in the region belonged to the strand of networks known as "Wahhabism," which was heavily funded by sponsors in the Arabian Gulf region and that had already made inroads into the region via Afghanistan in the late 1980s.20 They represented a militant, radical, and purist form of Islam that was linked to networks in the Arabian Gulf as well as regional and global networks of militant Islam, some of which became loosely linked into a configuration that would come to be associated with al-Qaeda. Fol- lowing the end of the Soviet Union, more contact emerged between these militant

19Here, for reasons of space, one major movement in the region will not be discussed, that is, the Islamic Party of Revival (IRP), its role in the war in Tajikistan, and its inclusion in the postconflict settlement in Tajikistan. The

trajectory of Tajikistan has been significantly different from the other states in the region (see Rashid 2002:95-114). 20The IPR was organized in the Soviet Union in 1990 and later was a party in the civil war in Tajikistan. Members

of the party spanned both Central Asia and the Caucasus (see Ware et al. 2003).




groups and Islamic networks in the former Soviet Union. In Chechnya, they helped fund the war; in Dagestan, they built their own mosques, controlled fourteen madrassas (Islamic schools), had their own publishing house, communicated with networks abroad through their own satellite link-up, and funded the studies of dozens of young men in Islamic madrassas and universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Malaysia, Jordan, and Pakistan (Ware and Kisriev 2000).

In Central Asia, the Wahhabis fed into two different movements: the Islamic Party of Revival (IPR), which was one of the parties to the civil war in Tajikistan, and networks of Islamists that eventually emerged to form the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1998. Throughout the 1990s, these "Wahhabi" groups had a particularly strong foothold in the Ferghana Valley region, which cuts across Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There they built schools and mosques and provided social services that the Central Asian states were failing to deliver, well funded through their ties to such groups as the Ahl e-Sunnah movement in Saudi Arabia, which funneled at least $1.3 million into the Ferghana Valley region within the first 2 years of independence, and the Jamaat-i-Islami movement in Pakistan (Thomas and Kiser 2002:92).

Throughout the region, groups linked into this radical and militant version of Islam had explicitly political goals-from throwing off Russian control in Chechnya to toppling the government of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. Its adherents also included the use of tactics of violence, such as insurgency and terrorism, as part of their strategy of promoting a radical Islamist agenda in the region. Groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by Juma Namangani, organized a serious of guerrilla attacks in 1999-2001 and were accused of carrying out a bombing campaign in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent. They also used coercive strategies to raise money for their campaigns, including kidnapping foreigners and local officials (Thomas and Kiser 2002:93). Core members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekis- tan received their training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and Namangani fought in Afghanistan during the US-led campaign in 2001, where he was eventually killed by the US military. Thus, this strand of militant Islam is viewed as posing a serious security threat to the region by the regimes in power and, in the wake of September 11 and the US-led campaign in Afghanistan, is under attack in the region, because of its explicit links with al-Qaeda.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) al Islami and Radical Islam

A second group of Islamist norm entrepreneurs who entered the region during the mid-1990s were members of the global Islamist network HT. Like the militant Islamists connected with Wahhabism, this group espouses radical political goals, including the unification of Central Asia and other Muslim states and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate and, eventually, an Islamic world order. The organization Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in the 1950s in Jordan with ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Rashid 2002:118). The organization publicly renounces the use of violence. The radical political goals of the HT are to be achieved through the strategy ofjihad, but not through the use of violence. As one HT leader in Uzbekistan explained, "the HT wants a peaceful jihad, which will be spread by explanation and conversion, not by war" (Rashid 2002:133-134). Despite not advocating violence, the movement is viewed as a serious security threat by the authoritarian regimes in the region and is seriously repressed, with more members of HT in jails in the region than any of the other Islamist movements (Rashid 2002:115).

HT is a global movement, that having been outlawed in most of the Middle East, operates largely from Europe, especially the United Kingdom and Germany. Its organizational headquarters are in London, where it raises money and trains re- cruits. It has been very successful at mobilizing support in the United Kingdom,




where it operates openly and holds conferences. It runs a sophisticated and information-packed website that is available in a number of languages, including English, German, Danish, Russian, Arabic, and Urdu.21 In Central Asia, HT operates within a cell structure and is connected to other cells and networks in Europe, Turkey, Egypt, North Africa, and Pakistan. The cells are called daira and largely consist of study groups that seek to spread Islamist norms and the message of the HT, which is laid out in detail on its website. Members of cells are expected to go out and become norm entrepreneurs themselves--creating new underground cells, a strategy of norm diffusion that is appropriate to the highly repressive at- mosphere in which it operates in Central Asia. The other techniques it uses are the publishing of so-called night letters, which are tracts that are pushed under people's doors at night, a strategy that was also used by the Taliban in Kabul, along with posters and leaflets to advertize their banned message (Rashid 2002:121).

Although the HT operates openly in Great Britain and Western Europe, it is banned in Central Asia and is viewed as a serious threat to regimes in the region. Despite being banned, however, its popularity appears to grow with every individual who is jailed. In summer 2001, it was estimated that there were over, 5,000 members of HT jailed in Uzbekistan alone. Its constituency in Central Asia, much like Western Europe, is made up largely of young, college-educated men, laborers, and teachers. Its appeal cuts across ethnic groups, with its membership consisting of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz (Rashid 2002:124-126). It appears that the more the governments of the region repress the movement, the stronger it grows.

Moderate Islam and the Turkish Nurcu and "Fethullahcilar" Movements

Another strand of Islamist entrepreneurs who entered the former Soviet Union in the 1990s were moderate Islamists from Turkey. Most prominent among this group has been the so-called Fethullahcilar, an Islamist organization that is one of several branches of the Nurcu movement in Turkey and is headed by Fethullah Guelen.22 The Nurcu branch of Islam is a modernizing movement that traces its roots back to the late Ottoman period in Turkey (Mardin 1989). Fethullah Guelen's network dates from the late 1970s and has steadily grown in Turkey over the past 25 years. The movement has its own newspapers, TV station, hospitals, schools, financial institutions, and businessmen's and journalist's associations.

The Fethullahcilar promotes a moderate, reformist, and apolitical agenda, em- phasizing education, self-development, and spiritual renewal. The organization claims to promote a specifically Turkish form of Islam, although its networks are global, with charity organizations and schools in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and elsewhere. The organization, which is largely funded by wealthy businessmen from Turkey, was one of the first to move into Central Asia and the Caucasus after the fall of the Soviet Union. In early 1992, they mailed out thou- sands of copies of their newspaper, Zaman, and sent teachers and missionaries to the region. By the mid-1990s, they had approximately 200 schools throughout the former Soviet Union, most of which were public-private partnerships, funded largely by businessmen's associations in Turkey.

The schools are not Koran schools or religious schools; rather, they provide a Western-style education that emphasizes the sciences, computer skills, and foreign languages. Instruction is provided in English, in addition to Turkish and the titular languages of the republics. The schools are extremely competitive and popular, and they attempt to provide a "moral" education to the students, if not explicitly a

21The website is www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org. The description in this section of the essay is taken largely from the website and from Rashid (2002:115-136).

22This section of the essay is based on field research conducted in Turkey and Uzbekistan, the results of which are summarized in Adamson (1997).




religious education. The schools also sponsor exchange programs with Turkey and feed into Turkish universities.

Unlike other Islamist movements in the region, the Fethullahcilar, with some ex- ceptions, have been largely tolerated because of their willingness to work with regimes in Central Asia and their commitment to promoting moral development and civic responsibility in students while not teaching religion (at least officially) in their schools. The main exception is in Uzbekistan, from which Fethullah Guelen's movement was expelled in the late 1990s. As such, their schools are popular among the local populations, and they are not considered to be a threat to governments in the region.

The movement, as a whole, views itself as offering a moderate version of Islam- ism that is compatible with the demands of a liberal democratic society. Indeed, the Fethullahcilar are sometimes referred to as the 'Jesuits" of Central Asia. Their phi- losophy has been summed up as an attempt "to save the students attending secular schools from atheism, and the students attending the madrasas (religious schools) from fanaticism" (Chakir 1990:78). They are, thus, one of the few Islamist groups in the region that appear to offer a middle path between Islamic radicalism and Western secularism.

"For the majority of the people in Central Asia," Rashid (2002:5) notes, "independence from the Soviet Communist system did not immediately translate into an urge for democracy, the market economy, or Western culture and consumerism, as was the case elsewhere in the former Soviet Union." At the same time, the varieties of Islam that are being promoted in the region are also, for the most part, not indigenous but are rather part of a global structure of political Islam. Central Asia has a long history of being dominated by Sufi practices and of promoting a tolerant and open form of Islam.

As is the case in some of the other ex-Soviet republics that have a Muslim majority, much of the population appears to prefer neither a Western-style democracy nor an Islamist state, but rather a return to a socialist state (see the survey data in Ware et al. 2002). Islamist norm entrepreneurs are, for the most part, viewed as external actors in the region in much the same way that liberal norm entrepreneurs are viewed as foreigners promoting an externally determined agenda. One individual, commenting on the most militant Islamist groups in the region, summed these feelings up by saying: "Wahhabism is only a cover-up.... They are anarchists, nihilists deep down.... Since they want to make it sound honorable, they come up with religious slogans. In the present situation it was a suitable slogan. If the situation changes they'll choose a new slogan. In the twentieth century it was the slogan of the class struggle" (see Ware et al. 2003). This local observer points out the extent to which the normative claims made by individual agents must always be understood in relation to the larger global structures in which they are embedded.

Conclusions: Competing Norms in a Global Structure of Political Opportunities

This essay has argued that the study of norm diffusion and norm promotion in IR has focused on a limited number of cases and has, as a result, been characterized by a liberal bias. Liberals are not the only type of norm entrepreneurs that currently operate in the international system; yet, very few studies have been performed on the norm promotion activities of norm entrepreneurs from outside Western liberal democracies. Indeed, a focus on the motivations and strategies used by individual norm entrepreneurs misses the larger picture: patterns of norm diffusion in world politics cannot be understood apart from the systemic-level context in which they occur. A useful way of theorizing this systemic-level context is as a global structure of political opportunities that change over time.




Global Liberalism represents one matrix of discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunity structures that norm entrepreneurs are tied into. Political Islam constitutes a parallel, but not wholly separate, set of internally variagated discursive, institutional, and geopolitical opportunity structures that provide resources for individual norm entrepreneurs to draw upon. In Central Asia, democracy assistance networks and Islamist networks are more than simply two different kinds of transnational advocacy networks. Rather, they appear almost to inhabit two different "lifeworlds" that exist simultaneously in the same geographic space-both in Cen- tral Asia and in the world as a whole. Mapping these lifeworlds as structures and resources that individual agents can draw upon in norm promotion activities is a useful way of expanding the constructivist research agenda beyond the study of norm promotion campaigns that originate only in Western democracies.

The two different structural matrices that inform the norm promotion activities of liberals and Islamists in the Central Asian region cannot be reduced to their discursive, institutional, or geopolitical components independently. None of the three elements are determinative, but rather they are potential resources that can be drawn upon in the process of norm promotion by agents in the region. And, of course, these structural matrices are vastly unequal and can change over time. The commencement of the "war against terrorism" in Fall 2001, for example, has af- fected the types of resources available to some of the most radical Islamist organizations in Central Asia and considerably weakened their ability to operate. Similarly, the strength of militant Islamist networks and opportunity structures that were available to Islamist norm entrepreneurs during the 1990s cannot be understood without tracing the role that many states, including the United States, played in funding and supporting Islamist organizations during the Cold War as a means of challenging the spread of communism in the Middle East or, in the case of Afghanistan, of directly challenging the Soviet Union.23

In the post-September 11 environment, social constructivists have been relatively silent about such issues as political Islam or the use of violence by ideologically motivated actors in world politics. This essay has presented one framework that constructivists can use to move beyond the study of liberal actors in world politics to address such issues. By modeling the international system as a structure of political opportunities characterized by competing ideological frameworks, it is possible to expand the research agenda on the diffusion of international norms away from a focus simply on when normative concerns trump material concerns and, instead, to begin to look more closely at how competing normative claims in world politics are actually tied into broader systemic-level discursive, institutional, and geopolitical structures. As noted earlier in the essay, politics-even at the global level-is not just about competing interests; it is also essentially about "the authoritative allocation of value" (Easton 1953).

Whereas the Cold War was marked by a competition between liberal and Marx- ist-Leninist claims, it appears that, increasingly, a competition between liberal and Islamist claims is occurring in many parts of the world. This competition, however, is neither a product of cultural resurgence, a civilizational clash, nor changes in the principles motivating individuals. Rather, it is a product of different matrices of opportunity structures that, to date, have operated in very different "lifeworlds" in world politics. The challenge for the future, then, is to see what can be done to ensure that normative contestation between norm entrepreneurs in these different lifeworlds can take the form of argumentation and debate within the common framework of an emerging international public sphere as opposed to resulting in a normative contestation carried out by other means.

23For an overview of how US recruitment, financing, and training of Islamist militants to fight in Afghanistan helped build up a global movement of militant Islamists, see John Cooley (1999).




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Global Liberalism vs. Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics

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