Political Behavior, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1991

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

Tamar Liebes, Elihu Katz, and Rivka Ribak

A study of the conditions under whic h parents reproduce their political ideologies in their adolescent children, conducted in Israel, shows that (1) parents do reproduce their politi- cal outlooks, (2) there is a greater likelihood that hawkish parents will have like-minded children than dovish ones, and (3) whereas the reproduction of doves is dependent on higher education, hawks reproduce regardless of their level of education, authoritarian- ism, or religiosity'. The data are from 400 parent/child interviews. Cohort and intrafamily analysis are used to explain the change from generation to generation and the continuity and change within families. Clues to the tendency to move right are discerned in (1) the relative hawkishness of parents of 18-year-olds who are about to begin their army service, (2) the relative complexity, of the dovish position, (3) the continuous Israeli-Arab conflict into which Israeli adolescents are born, and (4) the rise of the ideology advocating Israel's right to the territories conquered in 1967.

I t is wide ly thought that Israel i society is moving r ight and becoming more religious. A t t i t ude surveys and e lect ion s tudies (Katz and Levinsohn, 1989; Liebes , 1987) suggest that younge r peop le are more hawkish than the i r e lders , a l though this is not the case for religiosity. W e wish to pin- po in t these ques t ions by compar ing paren t s and the i r adolescent ch i ld ren direct ly , in t e rms of t h r ee d imens ions of r ight and left. The two realms jus t m e n t i o n e d - - h a w k i s h n e s s and f u n d a m e n t a l i s m - - c o n s t i t u t e two of the clas- sic d imens ions of a r ight- lef t typology. A th i rd d imens ion is the deg ree of au thor i ta r ian ism in social relat ions, and a fourth d imens ion has to do with economic conserva t i sm ranging from laissez-faire to welfarism. Whi l e we have no data on this last d imens ion , the pa ren t -and-ch i ld in terviews that were conduc ted in the s u m m e r of 1988 among a r ep resen ta t ive sample of

Tamar Liebes, The Smart Institute of Communication, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. Elihu Katz, The Smart Institute of Communication, Tile Hebrew University, Guttman Institute of Applied Social Research and the Annenberg School of Communications, Univer- sity of Southern California. Rivka Ribak, Department of Communication, University of Cali- fornia, San Diego, California.

The study of ideological continuity between generations and within families is part of a project that examines the negotiation of political identity of adolescents through the interac- tion of family, television, and peers (Liebes, 1987), sponsored by the Spencer Foundation.

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0190-9320/91/0900-0237506,50/6 © 1991 Plenum Publishing Corporation

238 LIEBES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

400 Jewish families in Jerusalem with adolescent children permit us to ad- dress the three other dimensions, and to ask (1) how the generations com- pare on each of them, (2) how parents compare with their own children, and (3) how the three dimensions relate to each other.t

In each family, one parent and an adolescent child (ages 12-18) were asked the same set of questions with reference to themselves, their per- ceptions of each other, and their perceptions of the general public? The object is to examine both the overall differences between the generations, and the extent to which the children resemble their parents ideologically, or, in other words, the extent to which, and the conditions under which, parents of a particular persuasion succeed in raising children in their own image.

COHORT AND LINEAGE

In order to analyze these conditions, we apply both cohort analysis, com- paring the aggregated political attitudes of parents and adolescents (Hess and Torney, 1967; Sigal, 1970), and lineage analysis, comparing the atti- tudes of parents and their own adolescents (Greenstein, 1965; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Lane, 1959; Renshon, 1977). Cohort analysis places heavy emphasis on the historical context in which a particular generation is raised as the dominant determinant of its political culture (Tedin, 1974). If the two cohorts are similar in the distribution of attitudes, one must look fur- ther to lineage analysis to see whether this continuity reflects successful intrafamily "reproduction," or whether some other influence has arranged for the two generations to be alike, for reasons other than parental socializ- ation. Such external influences may range from adolescent rebellion to ran- dom or other influences.

ff the cohorts are dissimilar, the generational change may be due either to intrapersonaI life-cycle influences, which are typically temporary, or to external historical influences that affect the younger generation. Such co- hort changes, however, must also be reflected in the intrafamily context (Cutler, 1977). In such circumstances, it is of particular interest to examine families that succeed in reproducing their children ideologically even in the face of strong counterinfluences. Alternatively, social and historical trends can help to explain the "failure" of some families to reproduce themselves ideologically, when the adolescents of these families move off in the direc- tion of their peers.

In their study of intergenerational continuity in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, Jennings and Niemi (1981) illustrate the utility of combin- ing these types of analysis. Our attempt to do so here--albeit somewhat differently--will make certain comparisons possible between the two soci- eties.

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

TABLE I. Hawkishness Scores of Parents and Adolescent Children

239

Hawkishness Score Parents Children

1 (most dovish) 28% 9,2% 2 16 13 3 18 15 4 25 23 5 (most hawkish) 13 27

100% 100% N = (351) (376)

Israel has long been known as a small, familistic society with high politi- cal stability both before and after the election of 1977 when the balance of power shifted from Labor to the more right-wing Likud (Katz and Levin- sohn, 1989). On the other hand, there is every reason to expect the politi- cai attitudes of the younger generation to be different from those of their parents inasmuch as they were born into the realities and anxieties of the "greater Israel" and the surge of nationalism that followed the wars of 1967 and 1973.

DISTRIBUTION OF PARENT AND ADOLESCENT GENERATIONS ON THE THREE RIGHT-LEFT DIMENSIONS

To compare parents and their adolescent children on the hawk/dove di- mension, we constructed a scale based on four questions: willingness to relinquish occupied territory for peace, acceptance of the proposal to "transfer" the Arab population from the territories occupied since the 1967 war, hatred of Arabs, and a measure of affinity to four political blocs on the right/left spectrum? Dichotomizing each of the questions and scoring par- ents and children separately, Table 1 shows that the adolescents, on the whole, have indeed moved to the right of their parents.

The table shows that 27 percent of the adolescent generation scores as "hawkish" on the scale of four questions compared with 13 percent of the parents. A scalogram analysis of these questions suggests that it is the ques- tion of "hate for Arabs" which contributes most to the children's increased hawkishness. But the other questions discriminate as well: for example, 52 percent of the parents compared with 64 percent of the adolescents are unwilling "to return territory for peace."

Adolescents are not more religious than their parents, however. In fact, the opposite is closer to the truth, as Table 2 shows?

There is no substantial difference on the dimension of authoritarianism. When asked "To what extent do you believe that a child should respect his

240 LIEBES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

TABLE 2. Religiosity of Parents and Adolescent Children

Parents Children

Fully Observant 28% 19% Largely Observant 16 18 Somewhat Observant 38 40 Not Observant At All 19 23

100% t00% N -- (395) (395)

parents' opinions and not argue with them even if he thinks otherwise?" parents are only slightly more liberal than their children: 28 percent give permissive answers compared with 22 percent of the children.

These three right-left dimensions are in fact correlated. Among the par- ents, authoritarianism is related to religion (.31 monotonic) and relinquish- ing territory for peace (.33). Moreover, there is a strong relationship be- tween religion and relinquishing territory (.56): The observant are much opposed to yielding territory. The correlation within the adolescent genera- tion is even higher, as will be shown below.

This coming together of the three dimensions is of interest in light of research on the authoritarian personality (Christie and Jahoda, 1954). It is of interest, too, in the light of the history of Zionism where fundamentalist Jews used to be uninterested in Israeli control of territory (and, indeed, uninterested in the State), although more modern religious elements shared the Labour Party's moderate settlement policy. Following the Six Day" War, a messianic and irridentist spirit swept through large portions of the religious community'.

ARE PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN SIMILAR?--IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

Let us now classify parents according to their political attitudes and ask to what extent their own children resemble them. Unlike what was done above--where the aggregate of all parents and the aggregate of all adoles- cent children were compared--we here look at pairs of parents and chil- dren asking, for example, what is the likelihood that an adolescent child of a dovish parent will be as dovish as his/her father or mother. 5

Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness"

Compare the two extreme positions in Table 3A, considering the ques- tion on relinquishing territory {br peace. Among hawkish parents who are

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

TABLE 3A. Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness": Relinquishing Territory

241

Child Would Parent Would Relinquish Relinquish All Most Some Little None

All 13% 10% 2% 2% 3% (16) Most 33% 29 6 8 3 (41) Some 33 31 28 18 13 (87) Little i0 15 24 28 15 (76) None 10 15 40 45 67 (180)

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N = (30) (52) (100) (65) (143)

not willing to return any territories at all ("none"), two-thirds of their ado- lescent children think as they do. At the other extreme, only 13 percent of children of parents who would relinquish "all" territories for peace share their parents' extreme dovish views. In other words, extreme hawks are five times more likely to "keep" their children than are extreme doves. It is also remarkable that within each category of parents, adolescents are much more likely to have moved to the right of their parents than to the left of them. For example, children of parents willing to return "some part" of territories are eight times more likely to move to the right of their parents than to the left. Table 3B presents the same data in a more condensed form.

Overall, Table 3B gives evidence that about 40 percent of parental posi- tions are reproduced exactly in the adolescent generation. Calculating the "expected" rate of reproduction shows that this is significantly above the number that would be dictated by the marginal distribution of attitudes in

TABLE 3B, Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness": Relinquishing Territory

Child Would Parent Would Relinquish Relinquish Most Some None

All/most 42% 8% 6% Some/little 45 50 27 None 13 42 67

100% 100% 100% N = (82) (175) (143)

(57) (163) (18o)

242 LIEBES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

TABLE 4. Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness"

Child's Hawkishness

Score (4 Questions)

Parent's Hawkishness Score (4 Questions)

Pure Doves Mixed Pure Hawks

Pure doves 54% 9% 2% (70) Mixed 34 62 37 (164) Pure hawks 12 29 61 (91)

100% 100% 100% N = (94) (190) (41)

the two generations had they been randomly paired (X 2 = 109.69; p < .001). Altogether, it can be said that (1) adolescent children who depart from parents move right more than left, and (2) that hawks do better than doves, presumably because they have the assistance of peers in the genera- tional move to the right. In other words, it takes more effort for a dove to keep his/her child, given the generational change, than it does for a hawk.

In summary form, albeit less dramatically, Table 4 presents the "repro- duetion" rates for each of three groups of parents classified on the hawkish-

hess scale (of 4 questions) mentioned above. The table shows that each of the three grouped types reproduces more

or less to the same degree, although the pure doves do least well of the three. It is again apparent that recruitment to the pure-hawk position stems from parents who are "mixed." Among the children of the 190 "mixed" parents, three times as many move right as move left. Note, too, that the distribution of the three types in the younger generation is mark- edly more right than the distribution in the parent generation; we will take up this question below.

Additional evidence that the children are more "consistent" than their parents can be seen in the correlations among the questions that make up the hawkishness score. For example, the correlation between hatred for Arabs and willingness to relinquish territory is .53 for parents and .64 for the children. All pairs of correlations among the four hawkishness questions show higher correlations for the children. 6

Reproduction of Religiosity

By dichotomizing religiosity, Table 5 shows that secular parents "keep" virtually all of their children (90%), while religious parents do so only 72 percent of the time. Thus, it is evident that the traffic is more away from religion than toward it, giving rise to a question about the popular image of

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

TABLE 5. Reproduction of Religiosity (%)

243

Parent

Child Religious Secular

Religious 72% 10% (146) Secular 28 90 (249)

100% 100% U = (172) (221)

a movement of "'return" to religion and roots. There may, of course, be such a return, but at least numerically, it is outnumbered by those who are moving away.

Reproduction of Authoritarianism

The reproduction rate for authoritarianism--measured, as before, by at- titude towards a child's right to disagree with parents--shows little differ- enee in the reproduction rate of authoritarian and permissive parents. Each group appears to reproduce at the same rate, namely about 55 percent.

To summarize, in this section we have found that (1) hawkish parents have a better chance to reproduce their attitudes than dovish parents; (2) secular parents have a better chance than religious parents; (3) there is no significant difference between the reproduction rate of authoritarian and permissive parents. But it should be borne in mind that our measure of authoritarianism may be biased, by its dependence on one question alone, and by its requirement of valid self-perceptions on a subject that has a socially desirable "correct" answer.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING REPRODUCTION

What conditions enhance the reproductive abilities of hawkish or dovish parents? Let us now examine the possibility that the other dimensions of right-left affect these rates. Table 6 compares the reproduction of hawks and doves under conditions of parents" (self-defined) authoritarianism. Our hypothesis is that dovish parents might do better under conditions of lesser authority. Of course, we already know that authoritarianism and hawkish- ness (relinquishing territory) are correlated.

The table shows that hawkish parents are indeed more likely to repro- duce hawkish children when they are also authoritarian (72% vs. 61%). The expectation that dovish parents will "keep" their children better when they

244 LIEBES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

TABLE 6. Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness" (Relinquishing Territory) by Authoritarianism-Permissiveness of Parent

Parent

Permissive Authoritarian

Child Dove Mixed Hawk Dove Mixed Hawk

Dove 40% 12% 2% 45% 6% 8% Mixed 51 49 37 34 50 20 Hawk 9 40 61 21 44 72

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N = (53) (86) (54) (29) (88) (88)

are permissive is not confirmed directly, but note that when dovish parents are permissive they are half as likely to have hawkish children than when they are authoritarian (9% to 21%).

To summarize, the marginals of the table remind us of the correlation between authoritarianism and hawkishness; dovish parents are more likely to be permissive than hawkish parents. We add to this previous knowledge that hawks reproduce even better when they are also authoritarian. Educa- tion strongly affects the likelihood of reproducing doves, but not hawks (Table 7). About 80 percent of the hawks "keep" their children regardless of level of parents' education. Among doves, however, parents with more

TABLE 7. Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness" (Relinquishing Territory) by Education of Parent

Parent's Education

11 Years or Less 12 Years 13 Years or More

Child Dove* Hawk Dove Hawk Dove Hawk

Dove 39% 22% 37% 20% 69% 19% Hawk 61 78 63 80 31 81

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N = (23) (79) (76) (86) (90) (37)

"Dovishness" and "Hawkishness" are dichotomized so as to have enough cases in each cell.

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION 245

than secondary school reproduce at a rate of 69 percent, whereas dovish parents with lesser education reproduce only at the rate of 38 percent. The same thing is true, we find, for the reproduction of another issue on the liberal/conservative continuum, namely, attitudes toward censorship. As in the case for attitudes on the hawk/dove index, we find that parents who are for censorship "keep" their children, while antieensorship parents do so primarily when they have higher education.

An even stronger correlation exists between religious commitment and the likelihood of reproduction both of doves and hawks (table not shown). Among religious parents, hawks have a high chance of reproduction (74%) compared to nonreligious hawks (55%). Nonreligious doves have a far greater chance than religious doves to reproduce themselves; the ratio is 5:1 (52% to 9%), but nevertheless the nonreligious doves do no better than the nonreligious hawks. We observed the correlation between religiosity and hawkishness earlier, and here we see that religion affects not only atti- tudes but the likelihood of their reproduction.7

FAMILY CHANGE AND SOCIETAL CHANGE: A SOCIOLOGICAL NOTE

It is important to take note of the fhct that differential rates of reproduc- tion of an attitude within families do not necessarily represent generational differences at the societal level. Recall, for example, Table 3 on the repro- duction of hawkishness. As we have pointed out, parental hawks are much more likely than doves to reproduce their own attitudes in their children. But the marginal distributions of parents and children are only little changed thereby. In other words, it is possible for change to take place on the family level where the overall distribution of the two generations re- mains unchanged, and by the same token, it is also possible for the same rate of reproduction to apply to different groups but for the marginal distri-

TABLE 8. Reproduction of Authoritarian Attitudes: Censorship

Parent

Child For Censorship Against Censorship

For censorship 72% 53% (260) Against censorship 28 46 (136)

100% 100% N = (261) (135)

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TABLE 9. Reproduction of Hatred for Arabs (%)

LIEBES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

Parent

Hate All, Hate Only a Few, Child Most, Some None at All

Hate all, most, some 61% 38% (179) Hate only a few,

none at all 39 62 (220) 100% 100%

N = (115) (284)

butions to remain unchanged. These patterns are the joint product of the marginal distributions in the parent generation and the rates of change.

As examples of the phenomenon, consider the following two tables. The first (Table 8) shows that parents who are for censorship (when these atti- tudes are dichotomized) reproduce at a higher rate than those who are against (72% to 46%), but the marginals remain unchanged in the two gen- erations. By contrast, dichotomizing hatred of Arabs shows (Table 9) that parents reproduce hate and nonhate at the same rate, but that the propor- tion of hate among the younger generation is higher than that of the par- ents. This is easily explained by noting that although both groups of parents are giving up 38 percent to 39 percent of their children, the marginal dis- tribution of parents is such that the prejudiced parents are losing fewer children absolutely (39% of 115) than the unprejudiced parents (38% of 284). In other words, the unprejudiced parents are contributing more chil- dren to prejudice than the prejudiced parents are losing.

This suggests that we must take into account not only the rates of change within families but of overall generational stability and change. Someti.mes it seems as if "society" is arranging things so that the social structure re- mains stable (or changes) independent of the changes within families. Thus, even small rates of change in large subgroups can result in major inter- generational change. In short, we must be aware not only of the social psychology of family dynamics but of the sociology and demography of co- hort change.

REPRODUCTION AND AGE OF CHILD: BEGINNING THE SEARCH FOR THE EXPLANATION OF CHANGE

Let us put aside for further investigation the question of whether we need one explanation, or two, for the move right; that is a soeiopsyehologi-

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION 247

cal explanation and sociological one. While this may be an important ques- tion, the fact is that most of the observations we have made--both at the individual level and the societal level--reveal that the children generation is moving to the right of the parent generation, as far as hawkishness is concerned.

We have learned, so far, that the reproduction of hawks is more likely under conditions of authoritarianism and religiosity, and that doves seem to "need" higher education in order to reproduce themselves. In seeking to formulate an explanation for why the children move right, a first answer that suggests itself is that there are more parent hawks, and also that the syndrome hawk-authoritarian is more prevalent than dove-permissive, and therefore, even if the two reproduction rates were identical, the hawks seem to do much better. But the two reproduction rates are not identical: The hawks do better than the doves. Why is this?

One answer is that the doves seem to require very special conditions to reproduce in this society. Only when the parent is well educated do doves have a real chance (70%) and even then they do somewhat more poorly than most hawks. Hawks seem to do well under almost any conditions, suggesting that the dominant syndrome is influential even under ostensibly "unfavorable" conditions, such as higher education.

In considering the conditions conducive to reproduction, we asked our- selves whether age affects parental influence, on the assumption that chil- dren might be more vulnerable to peer influence as they get older, and that peers, of course, are more representative of the generational climate.S If so, we should find that the doves are at an increasing disadvantage as their children grow older since they must compete increasingly with the predominantly hawkish environment of their children's peers. Table 10 ex- amines rates of reproduction by age.

TABLE 10. Reproduction of "Dovishness" and "Hawkishness" (Relinquishing Territory) by Age of Child (%)

Age of Child 12 14 16 18

Parent Parent Parent Parent

Child Dove Hawk Dove Hawk Dove Hawk Dove Hawk

Dove 53% 23% 56% 19% 48% 18% 52% 23% Hawk 47 77 44 81 52 82 48 77

10---6% '100% 10"--6% ]~% 10---6% 1 0 0 % 10---6% 10---6% N = (51) (44) (48) (42) (66) (60) (27) (62)

248 LIEBES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

According to Table 10, there is no dit~rence in reproduction rates at different ages of adolescent children. The hawks reproduce at about 80 percent, and the doves at just over 50 percent, regardless of the age of the child. The most reasonable inference is that parental influence reaches its maximum before the age of 12, and that the hawk-rate differential is evi- dent from that time. This finding seems to contradict those theories that locate political socialization--in the sense of the crystallization of political attitudes--in the period of adolescence (Jennings and Niemi, 1968). Na- tional difference in the extent of politicization is an alternative explanation. Moreover, as was demonstrated above, it is not just isolated attitudes with which we are dealing but a syndrome of attitudes (for which we are using "relinquishing territory" as an example) that the children hold more consis- tently than their parents. This finding, like those of Cohen, Adoni, and Drori (1983), also calls the influence of adolescent peer groups into ques- tion, but leaves open the question of the relative influence of parents, school (teachers and fellow students), and television at an earlier (precogni- tive?) stage.

Further examination of this table leads to the strange finding that al- though the children don't move further right as they get older, the parents do! Note that at each level of children's age, the parents are evenly divided between doves and hawks, except at age 18, where parent hawks outnum- ber parent doves by a ratio of more than 2:1. At first glance, this curious shift might be though to reflect the greater likelihood that religious chil- dren of age 18 are at home (i.e., exempt from the army). Since the sample design required both a child and a parent to be home in order for a family to qualify for inclusion, and since we know the relationship between reli- giosity and hawkishness, this would explain--if t rue--the "increase" in the proportion of hawk parents. Although this proves to be the ease, it is not, however, an adequate explanation.

While religious families are indeed overrepresented among the 18-year- olds, the increase in hawkishness characterizes the nonreligious parents rather than the religious ones. That is to say, if one compares religious parents of each of the age-groups in Table 11, the degree of their hawkish- ness hardly changes. In eontrast, there is a sharply increased proportion of hawkishness among the nonreligious parents of the 18-year-olds. This leads us to propose that parents of 18-year-old children, faced with their chil- dren's entry into the army, may be adjusting their attitudes in order to decrease dissonance both between themselves and the army and between themselves and their (more hawkish) children. If true, this means that the children, ironically, may be socializing their parents, rather than vice versa! Hawkish attitudes are "in," certainly in the children's generation, and are more "appropriate" to the role of parent of a soldier.

IDEOLOGIGAL REPRODUCTION 249

TABLE 11. "Hawkishness" of Parents by Parent Religiosity and Age of Child

Age of Child 12 14 16 18

Parent Parent Parent Parent

Hawkish Replies (%)~ Relig. Sec . Relig. Sec . Relig. Sec . Relig. See.

"Relinquish" 64 35 67 33 63 38 73 64 "Transfer" 50 18 38 18 50 25 50 41 "Hate" 23 18 33 19 39 30 26 41 N = (42) (57) (42) (57) (38) (62) (52) (48)

Each line of the table gives the percent of hawkish replies to one of the three questions from the index of"hawkishness," For question wordings, see Note 3,

WHY CHILDREN MOVE RIGHT? SOME FURTHER EXPLANATIONS

In conclusion, we propose the following ideas as a working hypothesis: 1. The starting point, as we have said, is that the parents' generation is

~tself more right than left. But why is this so? A major answer may be found in the political upheaval of the 1970s when the second generation of immi- grant groups from Asian-African countries "rebelled" against the traditional hegemony of Labour, and put the Likud into power in order to redeem the lost honor of their parents, who were not adequately represented in the political system. This move to the right on the part of the Eastern groups who are gradually outnumbering the Western groups may or may not have begun as an ideological issue, but it has become one, augmented by the basic mistrust of Arabs ("we know them"). These voices are joined by the new-right voices of religions and other groups who responded to the Six Day War with messianic fervor. The loss of Labour's sense of mission and an unfortunate series of economic and military failures also helped strengthen the right.

2. The right seems to enjoy an advantage of ostensible cognitive sim- plicity. Doves have to steer a careful, complex course between the tradi- tional Zionist commitment to territory and the desire for some kind of rec- onciliation with the Arab neighbors, which also implies a readiness to take security risks. Refusing the complexity of this position, the right sees the Jewish/Arab conflict as a zero-sum game, either "them" or "us." The right considers itself the true continuation of the Zionist ideology. It is believed that young people find the consistency and simplicity of the right more appealing. ~

3. We have seen that higher education is the prime condition under which doves reproduce themselves. Since the majority of the population

250 LIEBE$, KATZ, AND RIBAK

does not yet have access to postsecondary education, the doves are at a further disadvantage. Higher education implies greater tolerance of com- plexity.

4. It might be objected that we cannot be certain that parents are social- izing their children ideologically if it is the case that Israeli families tend to congregate in communities that are demographically rather homogeneous and presumably also like-minded. While it is difficult to sort out these two sources of influence, it is nevertheless also the case that children attend mixed schools and community centers and are exposed to other influences. Furthermore, if hawks and doves may be assumed to live in equally like- minded communities one cannot explain the differential rates of ideological reproduction that characterize hawks and doves. Therefore, parents seem a better bet than communities. On the other hand, we do not wish to attrib- ute exclusive influence to parents, since we are especially interested in those parents--doves, in particular, who fail to reproduce their ideology in their children. It is at this point that we have recourse not so much to the overall community but to the community of peers who are, indeed, more hawkish, as we have noted. Unfortunately, however, no direct data on peer influence are available in this study.

5. Another source of possible influence on political socialization is televi- sion, with or without the mediation of parents. Even though it is quite common to believe that television has an antiestahlishment bias, it may be that television is contributing to the move right by personalizing the plight of the Israeli side of the conflict and depersonalizing the Arab side. Chil- dren, more than their parents, are dependent on television news.

6. From other data in this study, we observe that children who move right believe their parents to be more right than their parents claim to be. If the children are correct in this perception, it may be that the parents' replies to our questions are dictated by a different sense of social accep- tability. In other words, it may be that in matters such as "hate" and "trans- fer" the children find it legitimate to say what their parents think (but won't say). That children move to the right may thus reflect a generational change in the acceptability of the most extreme parts of hawkish rhetoric.

NOTES

1. Because the number of children in families may vary, the sample is representative only of Jerusalem parents--those who have adolescent children--but is not representative of all children, Parents are representative of Jewish residents in the municipality of Jerusalem including outlying neighborhoods. A parallel study of Arabs was conducted in Nazareth. The sampling protocol of the Guttman Institute of Applied Social Research that conducted the field work directs interviewers to the household of the persons chosen at random from automatic voting registration lists; within the household an interviewee is chosen from adult persons at home on the basis of a modified Kiseh procedure. Substitutions tbr refusals mad absentees follow a next-door rule. In the present case, the additional requirement of

IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION 251

presence at home of both a parent and an adolescent child made for a high rate of substitu- tion.

2. The ethnic origin of hawks and doves--hawks being more of Asian-African origin--sug- gests that the hawks have more children. Since the study design calls for only one child per parent, had we taken account of the likelihood that hawks have more children, were the example to be representative of children, we probably would have found an even higher ratio of hawks to doves in the younger generation.

3. The questions are as follows: (1) "What concessions would you be willing to make in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) in order to reach a peace agreement with the Arab states? 1. return all the territories, 2. return most of the territories, 3. return some part, 4. return a small part, 5. return nothing." (2) "Some people say that the problem of the Palestinian population in the territories threatens the democratic character of the State. If the territo- ries continue to be governed by Israel, what should be done to preserve the democratic character of the state? 1. give equal right to the Arabs in the territories, 2. cause most of/ some of the Arabs to leave, 3. yield most or all of the territories." (3) "Do yon hate Arabs? 1. yes, all of them, 2. yes, most of them, 3. yes, some of them, 4. only a few of them, 5. don't hate Arabs at all." (4) "Which of the following political/ideological movements do you identify with? 1. the labor movements, such as Ma'arach, Mapam, Ratz, 2. centrist parties, such as Shinui, Liberals, 3. parties that are to the right of center, such as Likud, Tehia, 4. the religious parties."

4. It is also of interest that there is a correlation between religiosity and political affiliation. Asked to name their political affiliation, religious parents choose "parties of the right" and "religious parties" while nonreligious parents choose "parties of the left" three times more often as the religious, but a substantial proportion of them also choose "parties of the right":

Feel "'close" Fully and Somewhat Observant to Parties of Largely Observant and Nonobservant

"Right" 54% 42% "Religious" 27 - - "Center" 4 12 "Left" 15 46

100% 100% N = (173) (224)

5. We have found no differences in our sample (consisting of equal number of fathers and mothers) between father/child and mother/child correlations.

6. The question regarding "hatred of Arabs" to which two-thirds of the parents answer "not at all" contributes heavily to the different distribution between hawks and doves in Tables 3B and 4. These are the correlation coefficients (monotonic):

Hatred/ Hatred/ Hatred/ Relinquish/ Relinquish/ Tl~nsfer/ transtbr transfer affiliation transfer affiliation affiliation

Parents .53 .50 .55 .79 .80 .77 Children .64 .71 .68 .82 .87 .83

Note that the largest differences between children and parents is the correlation of hatred and transfer.

252 LI£BES, KATZ, AND RIBAK

7. Of course, it is possible that religion operates directly on the child rather than via the parents' religiosity. There are too few cases in tile sample to allow us to control religiosity of both parents and child.

8. Binyamini (1982) suggests that Israeli children, unlike adolescents in Western countries, revert from adolescent nonconformity at about age 16.

9. It is certainly true that their images of Arabs reveal this oversimplification; they do not appear to distinguish between Arab citizens of Israel and Arabs in the occupied territories (Van Leer, 1987).

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