Gabriel Tarde and a Neo-Monadological Account of Constituent Power (2009 unpublished)

Faculty of Arts & Philosophy

Sjoerd van Tuinen

Mannerism in Philosophy

A Study of Gilles Deleuze’s Development of Monadology into Nomadology, of Leibnizian Approaches to the Problem of

Constitution, and of Deleuze’s Concept of Mannerism

Proefschrift voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van Doctor in de Wijsbegeerte

2009

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... V

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1 From Harmony to Consistency ............................................................................... 11

1.1 Mounting a Witch’s Broom ............................................................................................... 11 1.1.1 Why Leibniz? .......................................................................................................... 11 1.1.2 Affirmative Reading: Problems and Solutions ................................................... 13 1.1.3 Leibniz’s Theological Exigencies ......................................................................... 16 1.1.4 A Reconciliatory Reading ...................................................................................... 17

1.2 A Logic of Events ................................................................................................................. 22 1.2.1 The Principle of Sufficient Reason: the Concept as Signature of the

World ....................................................................................................................... 22 1.2.2 The Principle of Indiscernability: Extension, Intension, and

Comprehension ...................................................................................................... 25 1.2.3 Expressionism: Absolute Rationalism versus Cartesian Relativism ............... 28 1.2.4 Inhering Predicate-Events: Towards a Logic of Sense ...................................... 32 1.2.5 Judging Events: Compossibility, Convergence and Divergence, Open

Whole, the Virtual ................................................................................................. 36 1.2.6 The Problem of Individuation: Modal Distinction, Analysis and

Synthesis, Conceptual Power ............................................................................... 42 1.2.7 Vicediction and Contradiction: Becoming, Ideal Multiplicities,

Counter-Actualization ........................................................................................... 46 1.3 Components of Philosophy: Self-Reference, Endo- and Exoconsistency,

Personae ............................................................................................................................... 57 1.4 Folding to Infinity ............................................................................................................... 72

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1.4.1 The Fold between Philosophy and Non-Philosophy: a Concept for the Baroque ................................................................................................................... 72

1.4.2 The One and the Multiple: Neoplatonic Sources of the Fold and the Univocity of Being ................................................................................................. 73

1.4.3 Folds in Leibniz: Force, Perception, Interexpression and the Allegory of the Baroque House ............................................................................................ 84

1.4.4 The Baroque Gesamtkunstwerk: Form and Matter of Expression, Modulation, Harmony ........................................................................................... 91

1.5 Localizing the Global ........................................................................................................ 100 1.5.1 The Problem of Incarnation: Spatium, Situs, Vinculum Substantiale ......... 100 1.5.2 A Body without Organs: Assemblage, Molecularity, Diagonality,

Abstract Machine ................................................................................................. 112 1.6 A Leibnizian Concept of the Brain ................................................................................. 125

1.6.1 The Brain as Plane of Consistency ..................................................................... 125 1.6.2 A Quadripartite System of Folding: Resemblance, Actualization,

Realization, Calculus ........................................................................................... 131 1.6.3 Psychophysical Folds: Chaos, Bergson, the Middle, Animism and

Materialism, Thought .......................................................................................... 149 1.7 Conclusion: an Almost Schizophrenic Tension ............................................................ 165

1.7.1 Memories of a Leibnizian: the Problem has Changed .................................... 165 1.7.2 A Deconstruction of Rationalism: the Play of Principles ............................... 168 1.7.3 Leibniz AND Deleuze: a System in Heterogenesis ........................................... 174

Chapter 2 Leibniz and the Problem of Constitution ............................................................ 181

2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 181 2.1.1 Deleuze and Phenomenology ............................................................................. 181 2.1.2 Phenomenological Folds ..................................................................................... 183 2.1.3 Phenomenological Readings of Leibniz ............................................................ 188 2.1.4 Leibniz and the Politics of Constitution ........................................................... 190

2.2 Heidegger and Deleuze on the Folds of Thought and History ................................... 194 2.2.1 Deleuze and Heidegger ....................................................................................... 194 2.2.2 From Parmenides to Heidegger: the Identity of Being and Thought in

the Zwiefalt ........................................................................................................... 197 2.2.3 Sources of the Zwiefalt: Addendum to a Footnote ......................................... 200 2.2.4 The Foundation as Fold: Heidegger’s Excavation of Leibniz ......................... 204 2.2.5 Univocal Being and the Ground: Leibniz, Heidegger and Deleuze ............... 209 2.2.6 Topology of Being: The Fold as Key to Heidegger’s Philosophy of the

Event ...................................................................................................................... 216

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2.2.7 Topology of Thought and Geophilosophy: Taking the Fold Out of Phenomenology ................................................................................................... 222

2.3 Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze vis-a-vis Leibniz ............................................... 235 2.3.1 From Phenomenon to Event .............................................................................. 235 2.3.2 The Problem of Appurtenance and Animal Monadology .............................. 240 2.3.3 The World and the Monad’s Condition of Closure According to

Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze ............................................................................... 247 2.3.4 The World and the Monad’s Condition of Closure According to

Heidegger and Deleuze ........................................................................................ 260 2.4 Transition........................................................................................................................... 261 2.5 Tarde and a Neo-Monadological Account of Constituent Power .............................. 264

2.5.1 Evolutionism + Monadology = Speculative Sociology ..................................... 265 2.5.2 The Discovery of the Molecular ......................................................................... 269 2.5.3 Mimetic Microsociology: Imitation, Opposition and Invention and the

Analysis of Flows .................................................................................................. 275 2.5.4 The Microphysics of Possession: Sociologizing the Vinculum

Substantiale .......................................................................................................... 280 2.5.5 Belief and Desire as the Schematizing Forces of Life ..................................... 286 2.5.6 Biopower from Tarde to Foucault ..................................................................... 291 2.5.7 The Leibnizo-Tardean Brain in Societies of Control and the Problem of

Subjectivity ........................................................................................................... 296 2.5.8 Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................... 304

Chapter 3 Deleuze and the Problem of Mannerism ............................................................. 311

3.1 Mannerism as Practice and Perspective ........................................................................ 311 3.2 Mannerism according to Art History ............................................................................. 313 3.3 Mannerist Visions of the World ..................................................................................... 317

3.3.1 Mannerist Painting from Michelangelo to Bacon ........................................... 317 3.3.2 Mannerism and Baroque ..................................................................................... 329 3.3.3 Mannerism in Cinematic Noopolitics ............................................................... 338 3.3.4 Generalized Stylistics and the Mannerism of Sobriety .................................. 347

3.4 Intermezzo: Deleuze’s Mannerist Approach to the History of Philosophy ............. 357 3.5 Mannerist Conceptions of the World ............................................................................ 365

3.5.1 Mannerist versus Essentialist Logic .................................................................. 365 3.5.2 The Unity of Essence and Style .......................................................................... 372 3.5.3 Mannerist Ethics: A Genealogy .......................................................................... 382

3.6 Conclusion: Caught Up in a Kind of Serpentine ........................................................... 395 3.6.1 Summary ............................................................................................................... 395

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3.6.2 The Problem ......................................................................................................... 400 3.6.3 The Solution ......................................................................................................... 403 3.6.4 Critique .................................................................................................................. 405 3.6.5 Epilogue: Opportunities for Further Research ................................................ 409

Afterthoughts on the Fold as Operative Concept ................................................................ 413

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... 419

References ................................................................................................................................ 423

Chapter 2 Leibniz and the Problem of Constitution

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respond to the dominant reality … You don’t reach the BwO, and its plane of consisten-cy, by wildly destratifying.” (ATP 160) On the body without organs, there is no nication between individual consistencies, there is nothing in common, except for cisely their pre-individual or transindividual becoming.164 Similar to what Deleuze calls “a life”, an individuation must be strictly distinguished from individuality, which is only the unshareable residue of the individuating event, constituted by what is in itself an impersonal and pre-individual processual effectivity whereby the virtual continues to become actual. Monadic subjectification is a place and moment within the machinic movement of the fold. It is but a repetition of the world dedicated to a future difference. In the words of those non-phenomenological philosophers that are present throughout The Fold, a “process of imitation” dedicated towards “inventions” (Tarde), a tion” of the past in a “tendency” towards the future (Bergson) or a “concrescence” of subject and world directed at “the miracle of creation” (Whitehead). Of these three phi-losophers, the first is perhaps the most influenced by Leibniz, or at least acknowledges to be so. As an alternative to phenomenological theories of constitution, the next sec-tion consists of an investigation of his theory of pre-individual and impersonal constitu-tion.

2.5 Tarde and a Neo-Monadological Account of Constituent Power

The monads, daughters of Leibniz, have come a long way since their father. … Will you excuse me this metaphysical debauchery, befriended reader? Gabriel Tarde, Monadologie et sociologie, 1893

164 “There is no longer the sense that one’s own self is all that one can ever know, but rather that until one does know one’s self, one can know nothing else. It is not then a Socratic ‘know thyself’ in order to accept oneself, but rather a Nietzschean overcoming of self through comprehensive knowledge and understanding of that self, what made it possible and what can unmake it.” Arnott 2001, 121. And: ”One does not thereby give up on the possibility of community altogether, but one rather acts in such a way that a community might be in-augurated according to altogether different conditions”. Arnott 2001, 122.

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2.5.1 Evolutionism + Monadology = Speculative Sociology

In an extraordinarily speculative essay from 1893 called Monadologie et sociologie, Tarde argues how “[d]ifference is the alpha and omega of the universe”, since it is always the first and the last term of a series in which all similitudes are “nothing but inevitable intermediaries between more or less unobtrusive elementary diversities” (MS 73). The entire book can be read as a critique of substantialism and the identity of being:

“To exist is to differ; difference, in one sense, is the substantial side of things, what they have most in common and what makes them most different. One has to start from this difference and to abstain from trying to explain it, especially by starting with identity, as so many persons wrongly do. Because identity is a minimum and, hence, a type of difference, and a very rare type at that, in the same way as rest is a type of movement and the circle a type of ellipse. To begin with some primordial identity implies at the origin a prodigiously unlikely singularity, or else the obscure mystery of one simple being then dividing for no special reason.” (MS 72-3)

In other words, following Leibniz Tarde upholds that difference is the “sufficient son” (MS 38) of everything that exists, its essence and final aim, even if what exists shows a great deal of similitude. Difference explains not only why something exists rather than not, but also, less dialectically and infinitely more important, why this rather than something else. Instead of following a dialectics of opposition, difference must be affirmed in itself: “Two things which are opposed, inversed, contraries, have for their proper character a difference which consists in their similitude itself, or, if one prefers, a resemblance that consists in differing as much as possible.” (OU 44) This lenge to explain similarities on the basis of their differences and not the other way around has obviously paved the way for Deleuze’s distinction of “the new dialectic” (DR 26) of vicediction165 found in Leibniz from the dialectics of contradiction found in Hegel. (DR 308n15) It is also what Tarde recognizes in Leibniz’ monadology: a universe not built from atomic identities, but from an inexhaustible and tumultuous multiplicity of dencies and infinitesimal differences. Infinitesimal differences are “the key to the entire universe” (MS 37): “The source, the reason of being, the reason of the finite, of what is

165 “Gabriel Tarde described dialectical development in this manner: a process of repetition understood as the passage from a state of general differences to singular difference, from external differences to internal differ-ence – in short, repetition as the differentiator of difference.” DR 76. “All of Tarde’s philosophy may be pre-sented in this light: as a dialectic of difference and repetition which founds the possibility of a microsociology upon a whole cosmology.” DR 314n3.


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separated, lies in the infinitely small, in the imperceptible: such is the deep conviction that has inspired Leibniz and also us transformists.” (MS 38)

The reference to transformism (cf. MS 91) is a reference to the evolutionary sciences of the late 19th century such as they also influenced Bergson and in which differentia-tion came to be regarded as the motor of all creativity. Accordingly, everything that is has evolved not because of external differences as in mechanicism or epigenesis, nor motivated by a predesigned aim as in finalism or preformism, but from internal differ-ences. (MS 93-4) Tarde’s aim is to combine this “great and beautiful principle of differ-entiation” with that of “universal coordination” (MS 71).166 Yet he does so not in the utilitarian and organicist conception of social Darwinism à la Herbert Spencer, whom he fiercely criticizes for a functionalism that explains nothing but must itself be ex-plained.167 Rather, by adopting a monadological approach he is able to cross evolution-ary biology with infinitesimal calculus. For Tarde as for Leibniz and later Bergson, finitesimal calculus generalizes the theory of life into a “panvitalist”168 concept of crea-tive evolution. Leibniz’s dynamism resolves the tension between the continuum of phe-nomena – the principle of continuity – and discontinuity of primal elements – the prin-ciple of indiscernability – by putting a virtual continuity into the ultimate discontinuity. It differs from mechanicism precisely insofar as by way of the infinitesimal it enfolds a vital force into inert matter as the condition of the new. Sustained by infinitesimal culus, it describes a world infinitely divided into substance-forces which in their turn

166 This aim of Tardean sociology has been well formulated in an edited book from 1990, Studies in History, Eco-nomics and Public Law, produced by the Faculty of Political Science at Columbia University: “Tarde’s aim is to do for society what ‘natural-selection’ did for Biology, the law of gravitation for Astronomy, the law of the con-servation of energy for physics; to attain a conception which allows us to grasp in coordination, and place in rational relations, a mass of facts which are otherwise meaningless, and which swamp our minds with their multiplicity.” 167 In his discussion of Hume and his work on “Instincts and Institutions” (1955), Deleuze defines “the paradox of society” as follows: “we are always talking about institutions, but we are in fact confronted by procedures of satisfaction - and the tendencies satisfied by such procedures neither trigger nor determine the procedures. Tendencies are satisfied by means that do not depend on them. Therefore, no tendency exists which is not at the same time constrained or harassed, and thus transformed, sublimated – to such an extent that neurosis is possible. What is more, if needs find in the institution only a very indirect satisfaction, an ‘oblique’ satisfac-tion, it is not enough to say ‘the institution is useful,’ one must still ask: useful for whom? For all those who have needs? Or just for a few (the priviliged class)? Or only for those who control the institution (the bureau-cracy)? One of the most profound sociological problems thus consists in seeking out the nature of this other instance, on which the social forms of the satisfaction of tendencies depend. ... The institution sends us back to a social activity that is constitutive of models of which we are not conscious, and which are not explained either by tendencies or by utility, since human utility presupposes tendencies in the first place.” DI 20, H 44-9. Put differently, the question is always “how does the synthesis of tendences and the object that satisfies them come about?” DI 21. 168 Alliez, MS 15, 11-20; Martin, OU 26-8.

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are infinite according to their movement, thus implying both an infinity of degrees in all forms and their continual transformation.

This overcoming of Cartesian dualism of matter and soul is neither achieved through a new theory of correspondence nor by postulating a common source (which would merely turn duality into a trinity), but rather by posing “resolutely that matter is of the soul, and nothing else” (MS 43-4). This is not another kind of idealism saying that the entire universe, including other selves, is mine. Rather, Tarde’s solution is radically mo-nadological: the entire exterior universe is composed of souls or incorporeal becomings other than mine, but fundamentally similar to mine.169 Hence he proposes “a spiritual monism that leads us to a universal psychomorphism” (MS 49-50) without any “anthro-pomorphism” (MS 43) and – subscribing to Leibniz’s principle of uniformity which says that “there is life and perception everywhere” and hence “everything will be the same as here”170 – argues that “once being in itself is similar, at bottom, to our own being, and thus no longer unknowable, it becomes affirmable.” (MS 44) The exterior world is not an illusion or representation, but a reality made up of affects like (although not equal to) our own. Hence no matter how small, in each material body there is a soul. This vitalist panpsychism differs from Spinozist animism only insofar as instead of one unique sub-stance there are only individual souls, substance-forces, such that individualism equals pluralism.171 In this way, as we shall see, he not only discards of the Kantian object=x172, the thing in itself, he also actualizes Leibniz’s monadology with regard to contemporary science, astronomy, chemistry and physical geography in particular.173

169 Jean Milet cited in Alliez, MS 22: “One doesn’t present the world in the image of man; one rather demands in man an image of the world. For man is nothing but a priviliged example of the ‘universal psychism’.” 170 Letter to Sophie Charlotte 8 May 1704, Woolhouse & Francks 2006, 221. 171 Alliez, MS 28. 172 This is how Tarde’s argument proceeds: “Accepting to say that we don’t know the being in itself of a stone, of a plant, and at the same time to continue saying that they are, is logically inconsistent; the idea that we form of those entities, it is easy to show it, has for content our mental states, and since if we empty those men-tal states there is nothing left, we either say nothing more than this content when we affirm the existence of that unknowable substantial X or we are in fact forced to confess that in pretending to say something else, we are saying nothing at all. But if the entity in itself is similar, in effect, to our own being, it can be affirmed since it is no longer unknowable.” MS 44. 173 Tarde constantly underlined that he was not so much a Leibnizian as it was modern science that brought him to a conception of open, coeternal monads no more chimerical that ‘collective self’ or ‘collective con-sciousness’. As Andrew Barry and Nigel Thrift point out in their introduction to the special issue on Tarde of Economy and Society (2007, 511-14), both the social and the natural sciences studied objects that are in continual process of transformation and whose changing form depended on a whole series of specific conditions, events and interactions. They understand three aspects to Tarde’s conception of the relation between sociology and the natural sciences: analogy (especially that of propagation/diffusion to explain the laws of imitation, adap-tation and opposition), heterarchy (no science is more fundamental than another) and relationality (Tarde’s rejection of atomism).


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There is, however, one major difference between Leibniz and Tarde’s “renewed mo-nadology” (MS 56): the latter’s “metaphysical Darwinism”174 replaces Leibniz’s pre-established harmony of ultimate elements closed in upon themselves with “open mo-nads that inter-penetrate reciprocally instead of being exterior to one another.” (MS 55) Whether from the perspective of physics, biology or sociology, the ultimate elements of a science are never indivisible entities (except with regard to their specific science (MS 36)), but always thoroughly heterogeneous compositions, “socialities” or “societies”. Hence Tarde does not resolve the continuous in an elementary discontinuity of atoms, but rather puts the continuous in the ultimate discontinuity. We cannot explain micro-structures on the basis of emergent macrostructures (pre-established harmony would indeed be such a macrostructure), as if there existed a scale of increasing complexity on which the higher level explains the lower. Rather, we go from social individuals to vital cells to the molecules of inorganic chemistry to physical atoms and then to whirls, vor-texes, vibratory rhythms – but no matter how far we extend our analysis, we’ll always run into “something infinitely complicated in every aspect” (MS 77). For Tarde this means that monads can no longer be considered as isolated substances. A ‘sociological’ modification to Leibniz’s ‘psychology’ is necessary that has clearly paved the way for Deleuze. This is possible by incorporating the Newtonian discovery of action at a dis-tance into monadology (MS 34):

The atom – to say the truth, as a natural result of the further development of this point of view as suggested by the law of Newton (which in vain one seeks to explain time and again by movements of ether) – ceases to be an atom; it is a universal milieu or aspiring to become so, a universe in itself, not only a microcosm as Leibniz wanted it, but the entire cosmos as conquered and absorbed by a single being.” (MS 57)

Following Tarde, we are dealing not with a world of perfectly individuated atoms closed in upon themselves, but with a “social world” in constant molecularization and plication, a world made up of open monads that continually undergo transformations and transsubstantiations. Monads now interact with each other directly and each is ing acted upon both by the infinitesimal Other within and by influences coming from without. The social both exists as a process of stratification of “societies” or “agglomera-tions and conglomerations” of monads such as classes, states and other collectives, yet also subsists and insists as a preindividual and impersonal field of pure potential, such that “[i]n the bosom of each thing, there resides every other thing real and possible”

174 Latour 2002.

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(MS 58).175 Within the finite there is always the infinitesimal such that at the heart of things there is an elementary but unlimited diversity – “mon(a)des”176; not a unity but a multiplicity of tendencies, waves and molecular fluxes: “an exuberant richness of varia-tions and unheard-of modulations” (MS 78). An individual is never homogenous but a product evolved out of a “primordial nebulosity” (MS 71), a “diversity, and not unity” that is “at the heart of things” (MS 78), a “quirkiness (bizarrerie)” that is “the social ele-ment, a true chaos of discordant heterogeneities” (MS 74).177

2.5.2 The Discovery of the Molecular

After Difference and Repetion, Tarde returns in A Thousand Plateaus where he is paid age in the plateau entitled “1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity” (ATP 216, 218-9, 548n10, 575n34) for keeping to a rigorously ‘flat’ ontology of the social. Unlike Emile Durkheim, his contemporary and main opponent, Tarde sought the object of sociology not in a great collective representation transcending its members – the Social differing in nature from the mental or psychic – but immanent to the myriad of associations that constitute or compose any stable phenomenon, thus initiating a Copernican revolution in sociology which has never really taken place. Deleuze compares the polemic between Tarde and Durkheim to that between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier: Durkheim shaped the project of sociology as an examination of the coercive constraint and tion of social structures on the formation of human subjects. Hence the social was pri-marily conceived of on a juridical model.178 According to what Peter Sloterdijk has called Durkheim’s Schmeichelsoziologie, there exists a “collective consciousness” or “collective self” that is irreducible to the psychology of its members, organized as it is around util-ity and division of work. It is this supraorganic functionalism that served both to rein-force the social and human sciences in their struggle against psychologism and vali-dated the dialectic of individual versus collective. Tarde, on the other hand, not only

175 “If it wasn’t for the social, societies would forever remain unchanging.” Lazzarato, MS 133. 176 Alliez, MS 10. 177 Lazzarato underlines the closeness of Tarde to Simondon due to the internal cause of differentiation: “one could say that the virtual determines in being a ‘metastable equilibrium’, a difference of ‘potential’ which prevents being of being equal to itself.” Lazzarato, MS 117. 178 As Deleuze writes in Foucault: “what is common to both republics and monarchies in the West is that they raised the whole entity of Law to the status of the assumed principle of power, in order to give themselves a homogeneous representation of jurisdiction: the ‘juridical model’ became the blueprint for all strategies. … Foucault shows that the law is now no more than a state of peace than the result of a successful war: it is war itself, and the strategy of this way in action, just as power is not the property of the dominant class but the strategy of that class in action.” F 30.


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refuses to take society as being of a higher or more complex order than the monad, he also refuses to take the individual human agent as the real stuff of which society is made. It follows that Durkheim and his school – that is indeed, most of French sociology up to Bourdieu179, with an important offshoot in the linguistic structuralism of Saus-sure180 – were mistaken when they blamed Tarde for psychological reductionism. As Bruno Latour puts it, “Tarde is heterarchic through and through”181 and the big or the whole is not superior to the monads but only a simplified account of an infinitesimal variation. Whereas Durkheim’s collective consciousness is based on the Aristotelian as-sumption that the result must be more complex that its conditions, precisely the re-verse is valid for Tarde. (MS 68-85) Indeed, Tarde is such a consequent ‘reductionist’ that he does not respect any border between nature and society at all, as if the latter would be more complex than the first whereas in fact the reverse seems much more likely, and the word society must be attributed to any association or aggregate.182 Thus the social fact is never to be regarded as a thing, rather “every thing (chaque chose) is a society, each phenomenon is a social fact”183 such that “[a]ll the sciences seem fated to become branches of sociology”184 (MS 58, OU 42).

179 Bourdieu would later call Durkheim the “Galileo of the social sciences”. See Wacquant 1995, cited in Alliez 2004. On Bourdieu and Tarde, see Lazzarato 2002, 284-8. 180 Lazzarato compares the critique of Meillet and Saussure by Mikhail Bakhtin to that of Durkheim by Tarde. Bakhtin recognized in the relation between langue and parole the method of an “abstract objectivism” of which the references are constituted by “the sociological school of Durkheim” and their differences between the social and the individual. Bakhtin cited in Lazzarato, MS 136-7. 181 Latour 2002. 182 A similar heterarchy can be found in Deleuze. For this reason, it is not unproblematic when Deleuze is read as a theorist of ‘emergence’, as is very popular today. Smith puts it very clearly: “If radical novelty can be dis-tinguished from emergence, however, it is because emergence implies the production of new quality at ever higher ‘levels’ of complexity in a system, whereas the concept of the new in Deleuze – as well as Whitehead and Bergson – implies conditions in which novelty becomes a fundamental concept at the most basic ontologi-cal level.” Smith 2007, 3. 183 Whereas Durkheimians investigate relations between things, Tarde sees things as relations. It is this ‘em-piricist’ stance that makes him immune to the threat of transcendence: “Mr. Durkheim seems to gravitate towards some sort of theory of emanation. For him, I repeat, the individual facts that we call social are not the elements of a social fact, they are only the manifestation of it. Sociology does not mean ontology. … Are we going to return to the realism of the Middle Ages?” LLS 62-3. 184 This is the motto of a “hypothesis fingo” under which the entire Monadologie et sociologie was written and which explains why many people working in science studies feel so close to Tarde: “Hypothesis fingo. What is dangerous in the sciences, are not close-knit conjectures which are logically followed to their ultimate depths and their ultimate risks; it is those ghosts of ideas floating in the mind. The point of view of universal sociol-ogy is one of those ghosts that is haunting the mind of present-day thinkers. Let’s see first where it can lead us. Let us be outrageous even to the risk of passing for raving mad. In those matters, the fear of ridicule would be the most antiphilosophical sentiment.” MS 65.

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The only thing that makes human societies different from those of physics or biology is that without great effort we are able to see them “from the inside”. We can thus easily verify that no “collective self” takes over from the mesh of monads:

“If we look at the [human] social world, the only one we know from the inside, we see the agents, the humans, much more differentiated, much more individually characterized, much richer in continuous variations, than the governmental apparatus, the system of laws and beliefs, even the dictionaries and the grammars which are maintained through their activities. A historical fact is simpler and clearer than any mental state of any of the actors [participating in it].” (MS 69)

Contrary to an argument for psychologism, Tarde proposes a “sociological psychol-ogy”185, an “interpsychology” or “intermental psychology” that includes a “vegetal psy-chology”, “cellular psychology”, even an “atomic psychology” (MS 46). By posing the social as objective structure the question of togetherness has not at all been solved. Rather, a relative homogeneity is always born from heterogeneity. (MS 70) In fact the bigger a society grows, the simpler it becomes (MS 69): “order and simplicity are simple middle terms, distillators where the elementary diversity is sublimated and powerfully transfigured.” (MS 76) A sociological psychology or “microsociology”186, a term by which Deleuze & Guattari seem to refer to the Chicago School in sociology from the seventies of the last century, should not only explain how a functional whole can be possible and how it is actually realized, it must also account of the “instability of the homogenous” (MS 70), that is, the continuous variation of the ‘masses’. In other words, Tarde, like Leibniz, Bergson or Deleuze, is committed to an ontology of relations of movement and tendency187 or duration188. His method is that of an “archaeology”189 and even a statis-

185 Lazzarato, MS 104. 186 “Tarde invented microsociology and took it to its full breadth and scope, denouncing in advance the misin-terpretations to which it would later fall victim.” ATP 219, DR 314n3. This is what, according to Deleuze, mi-crosociology consists of: “As Gabriel Tarde said, what one needs to know is which peasants, in which areas of the south of France, stopped greeting the local landowners. A very old, outdated landowner can in this case judge better than a modernist. It was the same with May ’68: those who evaluated things in macropolitical terms understood nothing of the event because something unaccountable was escaping.” ATP 216; this is a reference to Tarde’s proposal to “generalize the method of Abbé Rousselot in all its essential features, through the collaboration of a great number of trustworthy observers. Let twenty, thirty, or as many as fifty sociolo-gists, from different sections of France or any other country, write out with the greatest care and in the great-est possible detail the succession of minute transformations in the political or industrial world, or some other sphere of life, which it is their privilege to observe in their native town or village, beginning in their own im-mediate surroundings.” SL 198. 187 “The concept of tendency is used metaphorically. One could grant desire to a wave or a species as well as to an idea. This means that isolated, individual forces adopt a common direction. These forces are part of the innumerable beings of which each milieu is composed.” LI 77-8.


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tics190 of heterogeneous tendencies which must give a genetic account for everything that actually is, and also, in the same way, of everything that becomes.

This difference in ontological reference between macrostructures and microstruc-tures reflects the distinction Deleuze & Guattari make between macrohistory and mi-crohistory, between the state apparatus and the war machine, between the molar and the molecular or between macropolitics and micropolitics as two “different systems of reference, depending on whether it is an overcoded segmented line that is under con-sideration or the mutant quantum flow.” (ATP 221, AO 279-96) Although each society is

188 “To endure (Durer) is to change: duration, time, is only par et pour events; and the self, the duration of the person, is only par et pour the series of interior states.” EM 392. 189 Tarde calls his method an “archaeology” and contrasts it with “history”: “Below the surface, in some way, of the violent and so-called culminating events that are spoken of as conquests, invasions, or revolutions, the archeologists show us the daily and indefinite drift and piling up of the sediments of true history, the stratifi-cations of successive and contagion-spread discoveries.” LI 91. And other than macrohistory, microhistory therefore knows “no assignable limit to the archeological decomposition of civilizations”. LI 99. In this sense Tarde’s archaeology forestalls what Foucault would later call an “archaeology of the present” and Deleuze and Guattari call “geophilosophy”. 190 For Tarde, statistics is not a means to compare societies synchronically, but a way of making visible the transformation of social entities over time through infinitesimal variation. Statistics could thus take the form of an archaeology of contemporary life, an archaeology of the present in which the focus is not on communi-ties or societies but on the sites, spaces, material forms and curves of variation. “Hence the importance of statistics, providing it concerns itself with the cutting edges and not only with the ‘stationary’ zone of repre-sentations.” ATP 219, cf. Antoine 2001. Perhaps this difference can also be explained by comparing instantane-ous exposure in photography to the high frequency of images in cinema. A series of instants conceal the dy-namics at micro-level. Recording at high frequency can lead to film, but only on micro-level. Recordings of aggregates are not thinkable because they do not exist as observable unities. High frequency representations of aggregates hardly give interpretable differences (due to mistakes of measurement and lack of measurable difference). But even if at low frequency there are few differences and greater stability, this is not because they are more real than the supposedly ‘false’ changes at micro-level. On the contrary. Differences in a series of an aggregate, being a matter of molar equilibrium or balance between molecular entries and exists, hide the dynamic movements of reality and so distort its perception. Only a the micro-level the true dynamics of real-ity can be perceived. Tarde has developed his concept of statistics in close analogy with the statistical inter-pretation of irreversible developments in thermodynamics, especially as developed by Augustin Cournot. Thus, in Psychologie Economique he argued that not just populations but individuals could be distinguished by whether they could be characterized by closed curves (in which imitation was the rule) or open curves (where invention existed) and new possibilities emerged. Other curves in which there was temporarily no rate of change pointed to the existence of unstable equilibria: “Plateaus, let me add, are always unstable equilibria. After an approximately horizontal position has been sustained for a more or less prolonged period, following the appearance of new auxiliary and confirmatory or antagonistic and contradictory inventions, the curve begins to rise or fall, the series begins to grow or diminish.” LI 116. Thus even the notion of plateau, of which Deleuze & Guattari state explicitly is adopted from Bateson who spoke of “a continuous plateau of intensity”, can already be found in Tarde. Alliez 2007. It bears witness to how the molecular, as opposed to molar aggre-gates, could lead to an understanding of the indeterminacy of long-term social change and the emergence of new social phenomena or new stratifications.

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“plied” into rigid segments, it is nonetheless suffused by a supple fabric without which its rigid segments would not hold and would not come about. The segments must rather be said to depolarize and repress a multiplicity of virtual becomings. As Tarde writes:

“The types are nothing but restrains, the laws nothing but dams opposed in vain to the spilling over of revolutionary and intestine differences, where the laws and types of tomorrow are secretly elaborated and where despite the superposition of their multiple yokes, despite chemical and vital discipline, despite reason, despite celestial mechanics, end one day as the men of a nation, in order to sweep away all the barriers and to turn their debris itself into an instrument of a superior diversity.” (MS 80)

Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari hold that there not only exists a social stratification of “classes” organized around the binary organization of a line that distinguishes them (man/women, upper class/lower class, city/country etc.) and that maintains each as a rigid system. The same social groups can also be regarded as composed of masses that constantly feed into each other. Although these ontological references differ in kind, they are nonetheless immanent to each other. Masses deterritorialize classes but also render them possible. As Leibniz argued against Locke: “if we meant literally that things of which we were unaware exist neither in the soul nor in the body, then we would fail in philosophy as in politics, because we would neglect to micron, imperceptible change.”191 And just like, in Leibniz, the soul is equipped with the two qualitatively dif-ferent faculties of apperception (macroperceptions) and appetition (microperceptions) and the apperception of hunger is only conscious hunger whereas the appetitions are vectors corresponding to a thousand specific hungers, Deleuze and Guattari write:

Take aggregates of the perception or feeling type: their molar organization, their rigid segmentarity, does not preclude the existence of an entire world of unconscious micropercepts, unconscious affects, fine segmentations that grasp or experience different things, are distributed and operate differently. There is a micropolitics of perception, affection, conversation, and so forth. If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or [socio-economic] classes, it is evident that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double reciprocal dependency between them. For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes. (ATP 213)

191 New Essays preface 58.


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In other words, there is an ontological difference between an individuation by haecceity like a band and a perfectly individuated ‘social’ group. Instead of ‘micro’ meaning ‘indi-vidual’. it refers to “mobile and non-localizable connections” (F 74) in a mass that is not yet individualized, for “[o]ne is a mass all alone” (MM 130-1) just like two is – as Deleuze famously held – “already quite a crowd” (ATP 3). Classes crystallize masses and masses are constantly leaking or flowing from classes.192 As in the distinction between primary and secondary matter, their difference is not one of size, but of nature, yet “there is just as much social-Real on one line as on the other.” (ATP 215) In terms of Leibniz, between the organism and the molecular transports that take place between organisms there is no contradiction, but a reciprocal presupposition. They are inversely related yet strictly complementary, since each is a function of the other. Politically speaking this means that a politics of segmentarity is never enough.193 Of a politics which

“operates by macrodecisions and binary choices” one must say that “the realm of the decidable remains very slim. Political decision making necessarily descends into a world of microdeterminations, attractions, and desires, which it must sound out or evaluate in a different fashion. … Problems are always like this. Good or bad, politics and its judgments are always molar, but it is the molecular and its assessment that makes or breaks it.” (ATP 221)

In analogy, historical reconstruction should not set out from the decisions by political protagonists, but from the dynamics of molecular differentiation and molar integration through which a whatever multiplicity (multiplicité quelconque, N 179) is captured in individuals and collectives.

192 “Mass movements accelerate and feed into one another (or dim for a long while, enter long stupors), but jump from one class to another, undergo mutation, emanate or emit new quanta that then modify class rela-tions, bring their overcoding and reterritorialization into question, and run new lines of flight in new direc-tions. Beneath the self-reproduction of classes, there is always a variable map of masses.” ATP 221. 193 Thus about the Cold War they wrote that “the more balanced things are between East and West, the more destabilized they become along the other, North-South line. … The two great molar aggregates of the East and West are perpetually undermined by a molecular segmentation causing a zigzag crack, making it difficult for them to keep their own segments in line.” Today, after the end of the era of great external threats, it is even more true that we have both “a macropolitics of society” and “a micropolitics of insecurity” to sustain it. ATP 216.

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2.5.3 Mimetic Microsociology: Imitation, Opposition and Invention and the Analysis of Flows

We can distinguish at least four basic assumptions in Tarde: The real emerges from the possible, without the latter transcending in any way the first, through contingency. The real is articulated by resemblances and differences. The philosopher and the social or natural scientist should study these resemblances and differences in their repetition. The nature of the prevalent repetition is different in physics (vibration), biology (hered-ity), and sociology (imitation). The social fact par excellence is imitation and ‘psychoso-ciology’ has therefore as its object the laws of imitation.

According to Tarde, two notions are crucial for a microsociological description of all human social life: imitation and invention, which indeed relate to each other like repeti-tion and difference. (DR307n15) It is only imitation, he argues, that can explain the se-ries of similitudes that explain the functioning of institutions; yet it is only invention, a singular rupture with these series that forms the genetic reaons for the institution or constitution of these institutions. This means, firstly, that if there is anything like socia-bility or social cohesion it is neither a social contract nor some kind of superorganism or encompassing functional organization, nor is it solidarity, communication, meaning, a primary gift, social economic reciprocity or pressure. Rather, the most fundamental regularity of social life is founded upon the similarity of the mannerisms of its partici-pants, especially good manners but also their ways of living in general. The constitutive element of society – “the stuff out of which societies are made” (LI 388) – is imitation and hence a society is resemblance pure and simple: “There is nothing properly social, to say the truth, but the imitation of compatriots and ancestors in the largest sense of the words.” (MS 81) Secondly, sociology is not the study of a given social body, but of “evolution[s] by association”, where “to associate means to become similar, that is, to imitate” (MS 81n1). Social relations, that is, relations of similarity, are produced through the ‘contagious imitation’ of innovations propagated by association and variation in association. Hence in order to explain a social regularity, that is, to find its reason, one must always look for the pre-social or a-social invention that renders it possible.

But doesn’t Tarde reintroduce the distinction between the social and the individual in this way? The Durkheimians interpreted the play of invention and imitation in Tarde’s monadic sociology as a psychologism. Invention would then be strictly individu-al and imitation an imitation between two individuals. But in fact, Deleuze and Guattari argue, these processes have to do not with individual psychology but exclusively with flows or waves. It is true that the social field comprises a multitude of constituted indi-viduals, but it is never constituted by them. In itself it remains completely impersonal and preindividual. Arguing against Durkheim’s “reification” of social relations, Tarde compares the process of imitation to “a kind of social water-tower, where a continuous


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water-fall of imitation may descend.” (LI 221) Just as in Leibniz the transcendental field knows only the laws of convergence and divergence, imitation is nothing else than the connective propagation of a flux and invention the disjunctive synthesis of imitative fluxes.

In order to understand how these syntheses are produced, in L’Opposition Universelle (1897) Tarde proposes a third analytical category which explains why chains of tion are always subject to “universal variation” (EM 391-422): the “universal opposition” or “the eternal problem of war” (OU 42) that results from the interference of different flows. All “renovating initiatives” propagate through processes of imitation and tion until they meet contradicting fluxes of propagation in a field of interferences of different imitative flows. In the concise summary of Deleuze & Guattari: “Imitation is the propagation of a flow; opposition is binarization, the making of binary flows; tion is a conjugation or connection of different flows.”194 (ATP 219) Ultimately, the en-tire universe is a periodic system perpetually out of phase: “The universe is full of multi-form rhythms intertwined to infinity.” (OU 115) In this system an event or invention appears like a universal crystallization or concrescence in a singular consistency. But it is impossible for one invention to attain a total victory. History, according to Tarde, is nothing but a succession of conflicting imitative flows. Flows are created, exhausted, or transformed, added to one another, subtracted or combined. Each successful, that is, widely propagated invention is already a melange, a compromise, and remains fully new only until it meets competition. Everything starts from the infinitesimal, from the tual combinatory of an infinity of possibles. Inventions are infinitesimal gestures which form waves both beneath and beyond the level of the individual and only very few of them will actually become successful and widely imitated. In this sense society is no less cruel than Leibniz’s baroque world: “the universe is a hierarchy of partial wholes.” (OU 57) The most classic example can be found in fashion, of which it is the paradoxical character that it is created even as it is followed. In fashion, an invention – perfectly illustrative indeed of immanent constitution – is imitated precisely in order to satisfy the desire for change and contrast195, yet nowhere on a human scale are sacrificed more

194 Deleuze & Guattari explain the difference of a connection and a conjugation as follows: “‘Connection’ indi-cates the way in which decoded and deterritorialized flows boost one another, accelerate their shared escape, and augment or stroke their quanta; the ‘conjugation’ of these same flows, on the other hand, indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight, performs a general reter-ritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of a single flow capable of overcoding them.” ATP 220. In terms of Deleuze-Leibniz: whereas the latter establishes the conjunction or sedimentation of a world, the first produces ever new disjunctive syntheses and new worlds. 195 In Tarde there is in fact a whole series of constitutive paradoxes such as invention and imitation, variation and uniformity, distance and interest, novelty and convervatism, unity and segregation, conformity and devia-

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germinal inventions. (M §75) This also explains Tarde’s great relevance for economics.196 The germinal life of innovation is the source of all changes, but when an invention is accumulated it loses its newness and becomes dead capital. Similarly, when the elite of a society, at the source of a current of imitation or ‘social water’, does not continue to propose novelties and rests on the old inventions which increasingly imitated by the lower classes, then one can say that its great work has finished and its decline advances.

Tarde’s tripartite mechanism of imitation, opposition, invention is clearly reminis-cent of the Hegelian scheme of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, yet in various ways also radically different and much closer to Deleuze-Leibniz. Long before René Girard’s analy-sis of the conflictual play of mimetic desire, Leibniz presented an understanding of a society that exists only in its living mirrors, that is, a society made up of a series of ef-fective illusions, a pure resemblance inscribed or invested upon a surface covered by inflections effectuated among an infinity of reflecting and imitating individuals, each of them re-injecting simulation into reality where it sets to work.197 The singularity of each monad is constituted precisely by the anamorphic manner in which it varies or deforms a common world and by which it introduces a new element in its effectuation. On the one hand, the new is always produced unilaterally, before all reciprocal exchange. In language, for example, “[t]he word has not begun by being exchanged. It was given at the beginning as a command, that is, a kind of action of priestly or monarchic function, eminently authoritarian” (LIfr 221-2). Yet on the other hand, as soon as it starts to propagate, this word passes through ever new micro-dialectical oppositions and hence undergoes vicedictory metamorphoses – Tarde speaks not of vicediction but of “co-adaptation” (OU 55). These oppositions are thus not of the order of Hegel’s dialectical dualisms, which for Tarde are infertile captures of multiplicity. The unilateral ately implies the omnilateral. Micro-oppositions contain no negativity whatsoever but appear between two positive yet heterogeneous elements between which it produces a becoming-indiscernible. (OU 58-62) They are “not contradictions but escapes” (ATP tion, change and status quo, revolution and evolution, of which the two process are usually tackled separately but never as a whole. Cziarniawska 2007, 126-9. 196 See the special issue on Tarde of Economy and Society from 2007: “Labour and capital are revisited along the way and Tarde points to the lack of continuity between repetitive labour and economic change. The germ, as an analytical resource, is trapped between pure repetition, endurance and continuity on the one hand, and on the other, pure vibration, pure potential. The challenge for economists stands precisely at this crossroad. The continuity and repetition of the cotyledon is measurable, but it is not a good candidate to account for econo-mies’ relentless changes. Vibrations are the origin of the economy, but they escape any measure when they are observed in their purest form of a potential.” Lepinay 2007, abstract; cf. Latour & Lépinay 2008. 197 In a similar fashion, Deleuze already praised Hume for being one of the first to having “the problem of pow-er and government in terms of credibility, not representativity.” DI 168. Bergson also argue that society exists solely due to the “story-telling function”. B 108. As Deleuze would confirm much later: “We ought to take up Bergson’s notion of fabulation and give it a political meaning.” N 174.


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220): each is an infinitesimal passage that “opposes nothing and serves no purpose” yet forms “the final end of all things” (OU 445, cited in DR 314n3).

The first real difference with Leibniz, from an ontological point of view, is that if monads are no longer closed, this implies that each invention is ultimately nothing but a further imitation or combination of other inventions, such that the individual remains open to a multiplicity of potentially infinite, “dividual” (ATP 341-2) processes of individuation. It becomes impossible to designate an origin(al), since each copy is already a model for the next copy: “At the ground of every thing, there are all possible and real things.” (MS 58) In a field of interference, in which flows constantly contradict and adapt to each other, each invention is therefore first of all an ‘inter-vention’: all production is social. On the one hand, just as in Leibniz an individuation always emerges as an answer to a concrete problem or as sufficient reason for the new:

“Every possible invention actualizes one of the thousand possible, or rather, given certain conditions, necessary, inventions, which are carried in the womb of its parent invention, and by its appearance it annihilates the majority of those possi-bilities and makes possible a host of heretofore impossible inventions. These latter inventions will or will not come into existence according to the extent and direc-tion of the radiation of its imitation through communities which are already illu-minated by other lights. To be sure, only the most useful, if you please, of the fu-ture inventions – and by the most useful I mean those which best answer the problems of the time – will survive, for every invention, like every discovery, is an answer to a problem.” (LI 45)

But on the other hand, because these problems are undetermined multiplicities selves the vague expressions of certain indefinite wants … capable of manifold tions” (LI 45) there is inherent to all imitation “the tendency to free itself of tion” (LI 250). For precisely because imitation proceeds through interference of tesimal differences without original, repetition is always subordinated to difference in-stead of the other way around: “repetition as the differenciator of difference” (DR 76). This means that inventions do not go from the possible to the real, as from a precon-ceived model to its actual realization by means of elimination or limitation (as in Leib-niz’s pyramid), but actualize a virtuality of differential relations distributed over tesimal tendencies by integrating or setting in motion a process of molecular affiliation “that makes a world of this chaos” (LLS 595): “an open-ended series of small but specific and irreversible changes that bring about the evolution and multiplication of societies” (ATP 216).198

198 Milet summarizes Tarde’s Leibnizianism in three principles: “To exist is to differ”, “To exist is to pass from the possible to the real” and “To exist is to integrate the infinite in the finite”. Milet 1970, 145-61.

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These differences between Leibniz and Tarde can be further elucidated by the prob-lem of entropy discussed by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense. The problem of entropy is that “[a] world may be infinite in an order of convergence and nevertheless may have a finite energy, in which case this order would be limited.” (LS 110) Although in Leibniz each individual is a power of renewal, its potential energy – it’s capacity for new clear and distinct perceptions – falls to its lowest level when it dies, that is, when its living present relative to the past and future of the surrounding world is over and when its conscious-ness diminishes and its body involutes irreversibly. This confirms common sense, in which the question whether the world “itself has a surface capable of forming again a potential of singularities is generally resolved in the negative” (LS 110). For Leibniz the world is constituted in the vicinity of individual Essences which occupy or fill it and these Essences, when no longer creative themselves, will exclude all newness that might lead to their own transformation. Even despite Leibniz’s reassurance in “The Radical Origination of Things” that “due to the infinite divisibility of a continuous whole, due to the abyss of things, there will always be sleeping parts which have to be awakened and brought to what is greater and better, in a word, to a better civilization”199, chronologi-cal time is irreversible.200 Yet, as Tarde wonders, if each individual repeats the world-brain-surface in the same spatio-temporal order, then “how can anything except bore-dom be born from the hymen of the monotonous and the homogenous?” (MS 79-80, OU 44) On the other hand, if essences are not a priori given and, as Tarde claims, at the heart of things is an irreducible multiplicity, then doesn’t the repetition of ‘original dif-ferences’ not lead to an ever greater diversity in the actual world?

In terms of Tarde, the problem of entropy is: If the social is actualized through imitation, then why doesn’t it become ever more homogenous? Or put quite differently, how can imitation be the condition of the new? Just like Leibniz, Tarde upholds that in the world there is conserved a fixed quantity of potential energy. But this is no longer conceived of as the totality of energy in the world but of the irregularity of the world, as in Nietzsche-Deleuze’s eternal return of the Same taken as differenciator of difference as opposed to all similarity:

199 See §1.2.5. 200 Hence in Creative Evolution Bergson argues that Laplace’s formula applies equally well to mechanism as to Leibniz’s God based on a finalistic interpretation of the universe: “An intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces with which nature is animated, and the respective situations of the beings that compose nature – supposing the said intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis – would embrace in the same formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past, would be present to its eyes.” Cit CE 38, on Leibniz and the reduc-tion of time see CE 39-44.


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“Thus there will be nothing in the world but a same quantity of irregularity, so to say, only appearing in the most changing forms … The original irregularity reflects the derived irregularities, its enlarged images. From which I conclude that, if the idea of Repetition dominates the entire universe, it doesn’t constitute it. For at the basis there is, I belief, a certain sum of innate, eternal and indestructible diversity, without which the world would be a platitude indifferent to its immensity.” (LI 413, cited in Alliez, MS 27)

On the one hand, then, Tarde confirms that “[t]he progress of civilization ... consists of facilitating the more and more integral realization, less and less mutilated, of an indi-vidual and unique plan (plan) by the entire mass of the nation” (MS 97). But on the other, he contrasts “a cold splendour, a pure regularity” with “the bizarre grace, with the complexity of all the living in their beginnings” (MS 98), and it is these inexhaustible beginnings that will make our civilization open up to a “universal difference, such that Progress would be seen in terms of change and not change in terms of Progress.”201 (EM 395, 397-8)

2.5.4 The Microphysics of Possession: Sociologizing the Vinculum Substantiale

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze summarizes the difference between Durkheim and Tarde by paraphrasing Whitehead’s famous statement that the abstract, i.e. a ‘society’, explains nothing but is what must itself be explained202: “Tarde criticizes Durkheim for assuming what must be explained – namely, ‘the similarity of thousands of men’. For the alternative – impersonal givens or the Ideas of great men – he substitutes the little ideas of little men, the little inventions and interferences between imitative currents.”203 (DR

201 This vision of progress is described by Zourabichvili as a “becoming universal of singularities”. Zourabichvi-li, TP 10-1. 202 Moreover, as Dosse points out, Deleuze’s reading of Tarde isn’t just an exercise in social ontology. Instead of asking ‘what is a society?’, he asks ‘how do we live in society?’, ‘where do we live?’, ‘how do we inhabit the earth?’, ‘how do we live the state?’ etc. Dosse 2007, 258. 203 In A Thousand Plateaus we find a similar wording: “Durkheim’s preferred objects of study were the great collective representations, which are generally binary, resonant, and overcoded. Tarde countered that collec-tive representations presuppose exactly what needs explaining, namely, ‘the similarity of millions of people.’ That is why Tarde was interested instead in the world of detail, or of the infinitesimal: the little imitations, oppositions, and inventions constituting an entire realm of subrepresentative matter.” ATP 218. And as Tarde put it himself: “This conception is, in fact, almost the exact opposite of the unilinear evolutionists’ notion and of M. Durkheim’s. Instead of everything by the supposed supremacy of a law of evolution, which compels col-lective phenomena to reproduce and repeat themselves indefinitely in a certain order rather than explaining

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314n3) The reference to the little men is not a reference to Foucault’s work on “The Lives of Infamous Men”, which was only published in 1977 and which was indeed one of Deleuze’s favourite texts of Foucault. (N 108) Rather, in Monadologie et sociologie Tarde has replaced Leibniz’s concept of minute perceptions with that of the “small persons (petites personnes MS 43)” and “infinitesimal citizens” (MS 83).

If for Leibniz there can only exist a perceiving mind if it is connected to a body capa-ble of certain affections, then for Tarde this implies that although an invention is always connected to an individual that takes the initiative – a singularity that polarizes, canal-izes and actualizes – within a society no individual can act or even think without the collaboration of a great number of other individuals: “beyond a certain degree of corpo-real smallness, intelligence is impossible” (MS 52) since “left to itself, a monad can do nothing.” (MS 66) For example, if the concept of genius is still relevant, then only be-cause minds of geniuses are critical or singular inventive sites within which catalytic relations between different imitative currents are forged. “A genius”, as Sainte-Beuve said, “is a king who creates his own people.” Genius, as Maurizio Lazzarato explains by drawing an important parallel to Marx’ notion of “general intellect” and post-Fordist labour, is a question of inter-cerebral assembling.204 This can be illustrated by Tarde’s discussion of scientific invention, which always presupposes a great number of tants and necessarily proceeds unconsciously:

What does it mean for us to say that any psychic activity is linked to a bodily apparatus? Only that in a society, no one may act socially or reveal himself in any specific way without the collaboration of a great many other individuals, most of the time ignored. The obscure workers (travailleurs obscures), who, by accumulation of small facts, prepare the appearance of a great scientific theory formulated by a Newton, a Cuvier, a Darwin, compose in a sense the organism of which the genius is the soul; and their works are the cerebral vibrations of which this theory is the consciousness. (MS 66, SL 78)

Monads have a “tendency to assemble” (MS 66) or to organize. Hence for Tarde as well as, in retrospect, for Leibniz, the problem of embodiment is a sociological problem. But the organism Tarde speaks of is in no way composed of part-whole relations. Instead of society being an organism or “collective self”, we must understand that an organism is only an association, and a very specific one indeed, of little persons. (MS 67-8) From the

lesser facts by greater, and the part by the whole – I explain collective resemblances of the whole by the mass-ing together of minute elementary acts – the greater by the lesser and the whole by the part. This way of re-garding phenomena is destined to produce a transformation in sociology similar to that brought about in mathematics by the introduction of infinitesimal calculus.” SL 35. 204 Lazzarato 2002, 259-60.


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perspective of microsociology an association, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, is not a molar entity, but a molecular assemblage. Its “microtexture” not only differs in scale, but also in kind from the weaving of, for example, the State. (ATP 229) Tarde, larly, acknowledges that “the infinitesimal differs qualitatively from the finite” (MS 39). Each of the “obscure workers” may therefore well have a mental capacity just as great, or even greater, than their beneficiary, since although there is little intelligence in the functioning of a social body, to render this functioning possible much intelligence is necessary indeed205:

“[L]ittle intelligence is needed to explain the social work of bees and ants. … but to produce the organisation of these insects itself, even if infinitely superior in complexity, richness and adaptive suppleness, in all of their works, there is necessary a great deal of intelligence and intelligences.” (MS 52)

In each specific assemblage or “sociality” they are irreducible to the whole. Of all societies we must say therefore that

their components, soldiers of those various regiments, provisional incarnations of their laws, pertain to them by one side only, but through the other sides, they es-cape from the world they constitute.206 This world would not exist without them; but they would subsist without it.207 (MS 80)

205 Again it must be stressed that no invention is based on pure originality. Rather, at the root of innovative processes is a germinal innovation, an “infinitesimal germ” (MS 98) that can only be retained under a form that is deprived of its originality. In other words, to be successful it depends on a kind of (co-)productive pla-giarism that is no less intelligent that the origin. For example, Tarde argues that when a scientific idea is in-vented, “its imitators are not only rivals, but its collaborators”. MS 98. And as Deleuze and Guattari will affirm: “Theft is primary in thought” (DR 200), since “[y]ou don’t make an atomic bomb with a secret, any more than you make a saber if you are incapable of reproducing it, and of integrating it under different conditions. Propagation and diffusion are fully part of the line of innovation; they mark a bend in it.” ATP 405. 206 “A captain doesn’t hesitate to sacrifice ten thousand men in order to save hundred thousand men. Here the interests are of the same nature. But do they have a common measure? No, because they do not form a quanti-ty. For every soldier, life is everything.” EM 414. As Riley has pointed out, in terms of morality Leibniz has in fact a higher estimate of the individual than of the collective. Since God produces the best compossible world, it follows that while the whole is as perfect as it can be, each individual part (including particular men) might be better in itself, if not considered in its relation to the entire system. Riley 1988, 9. 207 In other words, monads can be organized in a society, but if the society dies, the monad does not. An indi-vidual consciousness, such as the mind of a great inventor, is only the “passing triumph of an eternal element that escapes, by exceptional favour, the infinitesimal obscurity, and comes to dominate a people of brothers that have become its subjects” whereas death is only the diminuition of consciousness, but not of the brain: “the gradual or immediate dethronement of this spiritual conqueror”, its being involuted, or “delivered over to nudity”, once more. MS 101-2.

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It is up to a “microphysics”, to follow Deleuze & Guattari’s use of Foucault’s term208 (ATP 228), to describe both how associations are produced and resistances persist. Should we say that instead of a global organization – an “ideal accord” such as that of pre-established harmony – what captures the little persons temporarily and provisionally in a specific assemblage is a local but real relation of domination that remains exterior to its terms? That is, the equivalent of Leibniz’s vinculum substantiale209, of which it was the function to transport substantiality from the simple to the composite – a “superaddi-tion” – in such a way that simple substances are left in tact when they enter into a com-posite, whilst nonetheless changing the latter’s nature?

A third time Deleuze turns to Tarde is indeed in the penultimate chapter of The Fold, following his argument with Husserl and preceding the discussion of the vinculum. (TF 109-10) Husserl, despite replacing transcendental subjectivity with a social life world distributed over monadic individuations, nonetheless reinstates the essences that he ought to have bracketed in the first reduction insofar as these individuations retain the form of veritable centres of appurtenance now raised to the level of the transcendental in the second reduction. From a Deleuzean perspective, the reason for this sleight of hand is that Husserl misses the substitution of the problematics of ‘having’ for that of ‘being’ that is crucial to the Leibnizian account of embodiment and social relations. In-deed, Husserl is interested only in the upper level of Leibniz’s baroque house and forgets 208 The theory of the “microphysics of power” is a theory of foci of power that are discontinuous and diffused throught the social field without it being possible to identify any global mechanism underlying this process of production, which consequently assumes the appearance of a veritable spontaneous generation. As Foucault puts it: “Mechanisms of power in general have never been much studied by history. History has studied those who held power – anecdotal histories of kings and generals; contrasted with this there has been the history of economic processes and infrastructures. Again, distinct from this, we have had histories of institutions, of what has been viewed as a superstructural level in relation to the economy. But power in its strategies, at once general and detailed, and its mechanisms has never been studied.” Foucault 1980, 51. “We all know about the great upheavals, the institutional changes which constitute a change of political regime, the way in which the delegation of power right to the top of the state system is modified. But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.” Foucault 1975, 38-9. In Discipline and Punish Foucault defines his concept of mi-crophysics thus: “The study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on the body is con-ceived not as a property [of a subject in power –svt], but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attri-buted not to [subjective –svt] ‘appropriation’, but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, function-ings… In short, this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilige’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them.” Foucault 1977, 26-7. 209 This suggestion has been made by Alliez, MS 20.


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the lower level, on which everything works according to a strictly horizontal causality of propagation and diffusion. Hence Deleuze invokes Tarde who, as it turns out, is an important intermediate link between Nietzsche and Leibniz, since he was the first to point to the great elemental shift in philosophy from ‘being’ to ‘having’ that is inherent to Leibniz and the baroque “crisis of property” (TF 110). Perhaps one can say that Tarde, although he no longer needs the vinculum, is able to develop his panpsychism or versal animism into a materialism just like in Leibniz there is a complete idealism that is at the same time perfectly reconciled and even in need of a complete realism?

This is how Tarde formulated it:

All of philosophy until now has been founded on the verb to be, and to discover its definition seemed to be the philosopher’s stone. One can affirm that, if she would have been founded on the verb to have many sterile debates, many stagnations of the mind could have been avoided. – Of this principle, I am, it is impossible to deduct, despite all the subtlety of the world, another existence than mine; from there, [there follows only] the negation of exterior reality. But pose from the outset this postulate: I have as fundamental fact, then the had and the having are immediately given as inseparable. (MS 86)

Already indicative of what in chapter four we’ll argue to be Deleuze’s substitution of mannerism for ontology, Tarde proposes a transition from investigating manners of being to manners of possessing, each manner effectuating and individuating a whole field of power relations: “Since thousands of years, one catalogues the diverse manners of being, the diverse degrees of being, and one has never had the idea to classify the verse spaces, the diverse degrees of possession. Yet possession is the universal fact, and there is no better term than that of acquisition to express the formation and growth of any being.”210 (MS 89) A being is nothing but a degree of having, only apparently sta-tionary, an actualisation of an infinite potential: “that hollow abstraction, being, is never conceived but as the property of something, of another being, itself composed of properties, and so on indefinitely. At the bottom of all the content of the notion of ing, there is the notion of having. But the reciprocal is not true: being does not make up all the content of the idea of property” (MS §87). With Leibniz, we’ve seen that tion is a question of intrinsic properties, of having and not of being: for ‘I am thinking’ he substitutes ‘I have diverse thoughts’. This is even more clearly the case with the body, which, other than the predicates included in the subject, is an extrinsic property and hence subject to “factors of inversion, turnaround, precariousness, and temporali-

210 And in L’Opposition universelle, Tarde distinguishes between “manners of feeling, of being affected, indepen-dently of all judgments”: “manners of believing and manners of desiring. Here you have the great division.” OU 269-70.

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zation.” (TF 110) It is here that attributes or predicate-events are realized such that a dominant subject (a soul) is enveloped in its properties (its body). For Tarde, this means that all action is not executed by a subject but first of all takes place as the event by which one or several subjects are ‘possessed’, but which is itself produced by the vibra-tory movement of the universe in which “each molecule of the solar system, for exam-ple, has for its physical and mechanic property … all the other molecules” (MS 88). What actually exists is only a selection of all the relations of property that are possible and that subsist virtually, such that it must be acknowledged of all beings that “they can belong in a thousand different manners, and each of them can aspire to know new ners of appropriating its equals” (MS 91).

The replacement of being with having opposes monadology to idealism, in particular to the “essential sterility, the mutual neutralisation of oppositions which burns up any properly political ideal, any dream of social Renaissance (palingénesie)”211 (MS 94), found in Hegel, whose work represents for Tarde “the last word of the philosophy of being” (MS 87). Instead of a dialectical history that takes place between being and non-being, Tarde holds that these are merely differing terms in a common field of potential. (OU 46) Instead of “history”, there is only “variation” (OU 53). What takes the place place history is a field filled with encounters of fluxes; micro-oppositions or micro-conflicts of possession in an infinitely multipolar field of interference. It can therefore again be stressed that “universal opposition” of having is not the dialectical opposition of being:

Being and non-being, the self and the non-self: infertile oppositions that make us forget the true correlatives. The true opposite of the self is not the non-self, but the mine; the true opposite of being, that is, the having, is not non-being, but the had.”212 (MS 87, cited in TF 110)

For example, Tarde accepts no opposition between being a master and being a slave in the Hegelian sense. The idealtypical unilateral or extra-social possession of the slave by the master is but a first step towards the realization of a social or reciprocal bond, the latter being “superior to the first” (MS 92). It remains completely virtual in itself as long as it is not actualized from either side of the relation of possession: “one is only what one has: here, being is formed or the passive self is, by having” (DR 79). In actual prac-

211 “Palingenesis” was a term by which counterrevolutionary political philosopher Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776-1847) referred to the successive regenerations of the society, and he incorporated a progressive or evo-lutionary vision of Christianity in his work even as he insisted reverently that Christianity was forever immut-able. 212 And in a similar sense: “We say neither other life nor nothingness, we say non-life without prejudging any-thing. Non-life, much less than the non-self, is not necessary non-being.” MS 102.


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tice, as Deleuze therefore writes, “power is practiced before it is possessed”213 and “the line of variation doesn’t pass between masters and slaves, nor between the rich and the poor.”214 (F 71) Instead of starting with a master-identity and a slave-identity that are pre-given, both sides are always already ‘possessed’ by the same vinculum, further in-flecting and counter-actualizing it in ever new variations with other lines of possessions that interfere with it. This is Tarde’s definition of a society: “the reciprocal possession, under extremely varied forms, of all by each” (MS 85). Hence at the basis of all actual relations lies a constituent power of the socius, a social abstract machine or “Ecu-menon” (ATP 50), based on the fact of association. As Deleuze will confirm much later, via Foucault: “Power flows through the ruling class no less than through those who are ruled, in such a way that classes result from it, and not the reverse. The State or Law merely effects the condensation of power which capitalism always deterritorializes. Classes and the State are not forces, but subjects which align forces, integrate them globally, and perform the relation of forces, on and in the strata.” (TRM 249) Hence the pertinence of the Spinoza’s great political problem, picked up by Wilhelm Reich and then by Deleuze and Guattari, that men fight ‘for’ their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation.215 (AO 29, SPP 9-10)

2.5.5 Belief and Desire as the Schematizing Forces of Life

Given the myriad of tendencies and their roots in micro-conflicts of possession, Tarde’s sociology is simultaneously an inter-psychology of natural “avidity”, as long as it is knowledged that this “avidity”, like Deleuzean desire, is not the privilege of human souls but can be attributed to anything at all. When something tends to exist, when a possibility tends to realise itself, this means that, according to the model of propagation in a field of interference, it tends to “universalize itself” (MS 95). In physics this self-

213 This rule of thumb summarizes Deleuze-Foucault’s critique of the six traditional “postulates of power”: property, localization, subordination, essence or attribute, modality and legality. F 25-30. 214 As Tarde confirms, monads are themselves constituted in relations of possession; they are themselves “pos-sessed” by what they imitate and interpossess one another: “they can be proprietors without being agents, but they cannot be agents without being proprietors”. MS 89. 215 Or more extensively, in discussion with Foucault: “How is it that people whose interests are not being served can strictly support the existing power structure by demanding a piece of the action? Perhaps, this is because in terms of investment, whether economic or unconscious, interest is not the final answer; there are investments of desire that function in a more profound and diffuse manner than our interests dictate. But of course, we never desire against our interest, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it. We cannot shut out the scream of Wilhelm Reich: the masses were not deceived; at a particular time, they actually wanted a fascist regime!” DI 212.

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propagation happens through the vibratory process of “ondulation”, in biological life the genetic expansion moves through “generation”, and in human societies there is the contagious process of “imitation”. In each case, some virtuality seeks to diffuse itself throughout an “ether” or “elastic milieu” in a geometric progression.216 (MS 72)

The notion of diffusion is taken from physics, where it means interpenetration of substances. It follows from Tarde’s Newtonian modification of the monad, following which an atom ceases to be an atom and becomes a “universal milieu” or something that aspires to be so (MS 57), and, as a qualitative multiplicity defined by its affects, becomes subject to transformations along its path of conquest (MS 93). The social field is a field of power (virtus, potentia as opposed to potestas), a vectorial field distributing the flows that make up its ondulations. Opposing the logic of adaptation dominating the social evolu-tionism of Spencer, Tarde further explains his notion of co-adaptation or what Deleuze calls vicediction by insisting that “each being wants, not to be suitable to (s’approprier à) exterior beings, but to appropriate them (s’approprier les).” (MS 89) To appropriate some-thing is to make it partake of a universalist project. According to Tarde, the child is “born despot” (MS 96) and even the minutest of persons are essentially egoists. (MS 52) Each monad must be equipped with an omnivorous appetite217 to acquire the entire world, en masse and by masses, as its requisite. A monad, therefore, is not a microcosm, as Leibniz wants it, but the cosmos in its entirety as conquered and absorbed in a proc-ess of individuation (MS 55-8, LLS 231). Each monad is a “future history (histoire future)”: “Each historical individual” is “a new humanity in project, and all of his individual ing, all his individual effort” is nothing “but the affirmation of this fragmentary univer-sal that he carries within.” (SL 128) Or as Deleuze says: the Other is a possible world, a people to come. Each individuation is an avid “pocket (foyer)” of connection that makes something tip over from the virtual into the actual: “the specialty of each of the ele-ments, being a veritable universal milieu, is being not only a totality, but a virtuality of a certain type, and incarnating in it a cosmic idea always called upon, but rarely destined to, effectively realize itself.” (MS 93) The cruelty of Tarde’s logic of propagation, “the bizarre and horrifying character of reality” (MS 93), presupposes a plurality of agents of the world.218 The victory of the one is the defeat of the other, such that everything tends towards the limit of what it is capable of and exterior solidity is only another word for resistance. This is the radical perspectivism that brings Tarde close to Nietzsche: “The

216 Kinnunen 2001. 217 Tarde interprets Leibnizian appetite as literally as possible such that he compares biological processes of nutrition with those of religious conversion, apostolic propaganda, or army recruitment. MS 99-101. 218 “The virtualities being given, we cannot affirm the effective necessity of phenomena which result from their encounter without affirming at the same time the necessity of other phenomena which maybe never have been, nor will ever be, yet which would have been if other encounters would have taken place.” LLS 159.


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psychologists have been right, more right even than they supposed: there is no exterior reality except insofar as it resists to us. … When one says that matter is solid, it is as if one says that it is indocile; it is a relation of it to us, not from it to it” (MS 97).

Yet what is this “avidity” or “will” or “force” to invent and imitate? In the sciences of his time, Tarde recognizes an attempt to push to the limit Leibniz’s subordination of Cartesian mechanicism to a dynamism of physical forces corresponding to psychic per-ceptions: “science tends to pulverize the universe, multiplying beings indefinitely” (MS 43) such that we end up with a real continuum of infinity divisible particles, yet simul-taneously they do so by “spiritualizing the dust” (MS 55) into which the baroque world and the substantiality of being disintegrates and hence by instating an ideal continuum as its condition of possibility. (TF 87) Yet since monads are no longers closed, mo-nadological psychophysics simultaneously leads to a “rejuvenation of the monism of Spinoza’s substance”, as is also the case, for example, in the philosophy of hauer and his students”219. (MS 48, LLS 88) What these authors have in common with Leibniz is a noumenal psychomorphism of will, in which the world is nothing but the latter’s objectivation.220 The world is a reality of the same nature as our passions and desires, but without these affective forces being in any sense restricted to human ties. Rather, everywhere there are microbrains and ‘partial subjects’: animism = materi-alism.

For Tarde, the Schopenhauerian concept of will is a hybrid made up of the double psychophysical “forces” of belief (croyance) and desire (désir), static cognition and namic willing. These two forces are the two quantitative variables that determine the qualitative affects of monads no matter whether physical, biological or social. Through “molecular cohesions and affinities” they form “the ultimate foundation of all material substance” (MS 50). Imitation, invention and opposition employ and organize the prepredicative or antepredicate flows of belief and desire: “Infinitesimal imitation, oppo-sition and invention are therefore flow quanta marking a propagation, binarization or conjugation of beliefs and desires.”221 (ATP 219) Together, belief and desire are the “logi-cal and teleological” modalities of the universal avidity that determines all vibratory, hereditary and imitative flows no matter how small their duration. (LLS 94-6) Desire expresses the volitive aspect (desire or repulsion, wills expressed in passions and “in-

219 Tarde explicitly refers to Eduard von Hartmann. 220 This interpretation of Leibniz as a precursor to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche was also at stake in Heidegger, who dedicates a whole chapter of Nietzsche II to Leibniz under the sign of “Drang” and “Die Zusammen-gehörigkeit von Wirklichkeit und Vorstellen”. Heidegger 1998, 397. 221 Following a distinction that was dear to Tarde’s maitre Cournot desire, belief and their inventions are the causes of history whereas imitation, opposition and adaptation are the conditionst hat transmit the effects produced by the causes through social life. Milet 1970, 193-238.

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tentions”) of an affective force; belief its intellectual side222 (affirmation or negation, “unconscious judgments” expressed in percepts, concepts and “institutions”). Although they can and must be separated, belief incessantly nourishes desire, which in turn nour-ishes belief. Belief is the credit which is given to a set of representations or evaluative judgment. Desire indicates the reinvestment of confronting beliefs in a perpetuated value-creation. In other words, belief is the condition of imitation and the convergence of series, whereas desire is the condition of invention or nomadic change and the diver-gence of series. (MS 45-8, OU 65-6) In Leibnizian terms: desire is the force by which a monad changes itself and with itself the others (appetite); belief is the force by which it distinguishes other monads and itself from others (point of view). Other than in Leibniz however, these forces are neither social in themselves (pre-established harmony) nor can they be attributed to the individual (substance). Their impetus comes neither from the inside nor from the outside, but from what Deleuze calls a more radical Outside – more distant than any exterior and yet more intimate than any interior. This means that, if in the representationalist system of Leibniz the infra-conscious perceptions (the appetitions) must somehow be subordinated in their distribution to the conscious resentations and reflective degrees of perceptions they constitute (apperceptions) and hence all direct action of one monad on another is excluded in favour of a purely ideal causality of the universal order of interior expressivity (still held up by Husserl), then in Tarde this ideal and qualitative organisation is itself explained by a materialist (power) and quantitative (the forces of desire and belief) organisation. Instead of a unity consti-tuting a world with multiple aspects, the multiple itself becomes constitutive.

Leibniz defined the nature of the monad as affective, as a perceiving sui generis gardless of consciousness. The soul is not a thing or element, but an affective force, and so is the rest of the universe. With Tarde, this “pure sensation” becomes the “point of application” (OU 65) of belief and desire as the two irreducibly social “powers” (EM 240) of the soul, each qualitative sensation or affect having “a particular polarisation of belief and desire stored up in each of its elements” (LIfr 96). It is in this way that he turns a

222 As an alternative to the formal logic of external qualities, Tarde proposes the immanent constitution of logic and life in a “social logic” of internal qualities which describes a kind of statistical power of judgment such that natural, biological and social laws (those of vibration, generation and imitation) are described at the service of forces instead of forces at the service of natural laws (MS 96) and such that even “the movements of bodies”, produced by molecular flows of belief and desire, “are nothing but kinds of judgments or designs formed by the monads” (MS 45-6). Similarly, he argues that “a nation state is a complex syllogism”. LLS 145, 20, 86-7. This example illustrates how Tarde differs from a more vulgar social constructivism: not the social order constructs a logic that should be criticized and debunked by the sociologist; rather, the state is a prod-uct of the unconscious but constitutive logic of life itself. In Tarde’s own words, the mistake is precisely “to look for the solutions to the problems of physics and life in the objectivation of belief and not of desire”. MS 48.


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monad into a social fact: “I desire, I believe, thus I am.” (MS 87) Again, however, it must be stressed that the ‘I’, defined by its sensations, is not a self-identical entity, but, cause it is constituted by the irreducibly social forces of belief and desire and hence mains irreducibly multiplicitous. This is entirely accepted by Deleuze and Guattari, who write that flows of beliefs and desires are the “veritable social quantities, whereas sen-sations are qualitative and representations simple resultants”. (ATP 219) Or: “There is only desire and the social, and nothing else” (AO 29), such that “the general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows” (AO 262).

What Tarde proposes is the materialist notion of the social as “unconscious” and – with Deleuze – impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field characterized only by “our two faculties of believing and desiring”. Together, these faculties are “the com-mon source of all judgment and all notions” (MS 45). For example, instead of space and time as the a priori forms of intuition, he recognizes in the social quantities of belief and desire not only the transcendental formative forces of our understanding, but also of all sensation223: “belief and desire play exactly the same exterior role as space and time with regard to material elements” (MS 45). Tarde explicitly refers to Bergson’s Time and Free Will as a similar argument for the capacity of a transcendental (inter-)psychology224 to measure the quanta of qualitative sensations which remain independent of the ulty of consciousness.225 (LI 145-6n1) Like a “third man”226 between Nietzsche and Berg-son, Tarde substitutes for the modern dualism of the receptivity of sensation and the spontaneity of the understanding or intuition and concept a monism of affect in which understanding and sensation co-appear as mere differences of degree and in which af-

223 For example, in his essay called “La Croyance et le Désir” Tarde summarizes his argument in the following two points: “1. At the bases of internal phenomena, of what they are, an analysis pushed to its limits discovers nothing but three irreducible terms: belief, desire and their point of application, pure sensation – extracted, by abstraction and hypothesis, from the mass of propositions and volitions in which it is engaged. 2. The first two terms are innate forms or forces and constitutive of the subject, the molds in which it receives the raw material of sensations. They are the only two categories which one has not considered, probably because they are invisible to the eye, and the only two, I belief, that deserve this name.” EM 267. 224 For a contrast of Tarde with Husserl on the issue of “transcendental psychology” in terms of “social logic”, see Schérer, LLS 21-4, who later adds: “Belief and desire: these two forces, these two pillars at the entrance to the system of Tarde, and which support it, are psychic yet without putting up a simple psychology. They are not only facts of experience, but principles of reason. Or better, reasons for experience, which simultaneously provide access to the experience of reason.” LLS 27. 225 Moreover, Tarde gives the same example of intensive quantities as Bergson when he says that we must understand the intensive or qualitative nature of these quantities “in the same sense of a rising or sinking of temperature”. LI 268. 226 Alliez names Tarde as the “Third man” between Nietzsche and Bergson. Cf. DI 296n46, where Deleuze sug-gests that, despite differences, there can be discerned a Tardean influence in Bergson. On Tarde’s translation of Nietzsche’s philosophy of values into a sociology of values, see Lazzarato, MS 113-6. On the differences be-tween Tarde and Bergson, see Lazzarato, MS 145-9 and Lazzarato 2006a, 184-7.

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fective forces struggle, compose and incorporate according to an interchange of com-mand and obeyance determined by the differences in power that define them. Hence Tarde’s categories of belief and desire are like the convex and concave side of the same lense investigating the field of forces in which relations of power and their infinite variations find their consistency ‘in-between’ these categories. (OU 62, 51, 54) The two sides correspond to the Kantian division of receptivity and spontaneity, to the Spinozist or division of to affect and to be affected, or to the Nietzschean division between active and passive force227: “Spontaneity and receptivity now take on a new meaning: to affect or to be affected.” (F 71) Desire and belief are, together, the two basic vectors or “pow-ers” of possession which schematize the becoming of reality itself.228 This is to say that if our qualitative sensations or “psychic phenomena are results that are radically different from their conditions” (MS 53), this is precisely because these conditions are quantita-tive and do not belong to the psyche or private transcendental subjectivity, but, being both social and innate, make up a social schematism: “every thing” – even space and time, as Leibniz never ceased to argue against Newton – “is a society, every phenome-non is a social fact” insofar as “everything moves to the rhythm of one and the same desire, founded on the differential relation of flows having no assignable exterior limit, and where capitalism reproduces its immanent limits on an ever widening and more comprehensive scale.” (AO 239)

2.5.6 Biopower from Tarde to Foucault

Ultimately, what Deleuze recognizes in Tarde is a vitalism in which everything is cally constituted through the composition of affective forces that realizes a collective subject – what Deleuze and Guattari call an assemblage (agencement). The constituting infinitesimal elements are not atoms, but qualitative multiplicities, relations (folds) and relations between relations (folds-of-folds), or to put it in a more Nietzschean sense,

227 Deleuze summarizes Foucault’s “profound Nietzscheanism” in relation to the concept of power as follows: “we should not ask: ‘What is power and where does it come from?’, but ‘How is it practised?’ An exercise of power shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces (to which it is related) and to be affected by other forces. To incite, provoke and produce (or any term drawn from analogous lists) constitute active effects, while to be incited or provoked, to be induced to produce, to have a ‘useful’ effect, constitute reactive affects. The latter are not simply the ‘repercussion’ or ‘passive side’ of the former but are rather ‘the irreducible encounter’ between the two, especially if we believe that the force affected has a certain capacity for resistance.” F 71. 228 Hence the titles of two of Tarde’s most political or ‘diagnostic’ books: Les transformations du pouvoir (1899), which applies the categories of imitation and invention to phenomena of mondalisation and democratization, and Les Transformations du droit (1899), which does the same for juridical phenomena.


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forces. Constitution is ethical once there are no other juridical or moral laws other than the social laws instituted by forces tending toward their immanent and reciprocal limit. (MS 96) In this way possession or power would constitute itself positively and not inter-diction and repression. Durkheim had posed the transcendent autonomy of the social in the form of a stable system of norms that are imposed upon their individual subjects as constraints. But in Tarde we discover an entire ontology not of supra- but of preindi-vidual flows or anomalous forces and this is what makes him so close to Foucault or Deleuze. For Tarde a social relation is imposed by de facto intermonadic persuasion, im-plying both the spontaneity of individuals and their social constitution in the bottom-up enforcement of de jure civil order. One could therefore

“explain the natural laws, the similitude, repetition of phenomena and the multiplication of resembling phenomena (physical waves, living cells, social copies) by the triumph of certain monads that have willed these laws, imposed these types, posed their yoke and deceit on a people of monads that is thus unified and subjugated, but all born free and original, all as avid as their conquerors of domination and universal assimilation. Just so space and time, the laws, and other entities fantastic and adrift would find their seat and their point of application in recognized realities. They would all have begun, just as our civil laws and politics, by being projects, individual designs.” (MS 57-8)

Tarde gives many examples of this immanent social constitution, but perhaps the most important are the models of pastoral power and of disciplinary power as they have also been analyzed by Nietzsche and Foucault, in particular the model of the religious thority of priests over their fidels. (MS 96-100) The main point is that power is never primarily exercised on the basis of contradiction and coercion. As Deleuze, following Foucault, points out against traditional concepts of power – according to which power is pyramidically structured according to the single relation of obedience and command –, this structure itself presupposes disciplinary mechanisms already acting on souls and bodies in what Tarde calls a “multiplicity of social drama’s” (SL 75, translation modified by Lazzarato, 2006, 172). What Foucault has called the “paradigm of confinement” of disciplinary societies refers precisely to the biopolitical strategies that manage the formed matter, the life of a particular human multiplicity, through gridding, confining, composing and serializing. The architecture of the panopticon renders possible a per-fect propagation of disciplining power. It completely composes the space and time, or rather, the beliefs and desires of the prisoners. Something similar happens in other forms of enclosure such as the school, the factory, the hospital, the office, or the army. In each case, discipline forms confused, functionless or dangerous multitudes into or-

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dered classes and specific types of subjectivity such as labour force. On similar terms, many of Tarde’s recent commentators have argued that belief and desire are not only the basic forces of an affective vitalism, but also of a political vitalism or “biopower”.229

It is therefore hardly surprising that in Deleuze´s Foucault we find yet another refer-ence to Tarde. It appears at a crucial moment of his discussion of the concept of the gram. Foucault had invented the notion of the diagram in connection with our narian societies, where informal biopower, a set of relations between forces which con-stitute predominant strategies of power230, manages the life of a population by dividing it up and regulating its smallest detail, seeks to reproduce the “conditions of its exis-tence”. The panoptic prison is such a diagram: an “abstract machine” that maps the “non-localizable”, “informal”, “non-stratified” relations between the completely stract points of a human multiplicity. (F 34, 72-4) In Deleuze’s reading, power’s grammatic nature is such that it is the “non-unifying immanent cause” of the strata or historical formations of a given society without being reducible to it. Every diagram, he writes, is a “spatio-temporal multiplicity” that is actualized in a historical society with its social field structured by power strategies231, but although it is coextensive with this field it does not represent it, since precisely because power is unformed, the diagram is also “intersocial”, that is, in a transversal relation to any actual society insofar as the social field is constantly evolving regardless of existing forms: “[i]t doubles history with a sense of continual evolution.”232 (F 35, 85)

229 Hence Lazzarato explicitly aims to “reintroduce” Tarde in a “current of thought that runs from Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergson and close to us reaches Simondon and Deleuze”, a current of thought which he calls a “new naturalism”. Lazzarato 1999, 105. Cf. Schérer, “Homo ludens – des stratégies vitales”, LLS 15-56. On elan vital and creative evolution in Tarde, see Milet 1970, 178-90. 230 “These power-relations, which are simultaneously local, unstable and diffuse, do not emanate from a cen-tral point or unique locus of sovereignity, but at each moment move ‘from one point to another’ in a field of forces, marking inflections, resistances, twists and turns, when one changes direction, or retraces one’s steps.” F 73. 231 In Foucault, Deleuze therefore distinguishes the diagram from “strategies”. The latter explain how a social field functions and refer to its composing forces, but they do not explain the formation or structuring of this social field: “One cannot say that a social field is self-structuring, or that it is self-contradictory. A social field strategizes, it is self-strategizing (hence a sociology of strategies, as in the work of Pierre Bourdieu).” TRM 248, F 36. We must be careful to distinguish this sense of social constitution from the social constructivism de-fended by Bourdieu. Whereas the latter explains the constitution of individual judgments by referring to al-ready formed values of a social structure, for Tarde the individual and the structure are functions of the same unformed process of constitution. (And thus he can hardly be blamed for ontological individualism, as the Durkheimians did.) Or with Deleuze, one should contrast the role of the concept of strategy within Foucault’s microphysics of power to Bourdieu’s transcendental sociology of strategies. F 142n7. 232 The diagram continually produces “networks of alliances” different from well-formed structures such as those based on hierarchy or relations of exchange, since, as Deleuze writes, “the alliances weave a supple and transversal network that is perpendicular to vertical structure; define a practice, proceeding or strategy dis-


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Deleuze’s point is that Foucault is closer to Tarde than to structuralists such as Lévi-Strauss or Bourdieu, since for him the concept of the diagram explains what for others already functions as explanans: the fact that power relations determined in a function can be explained by having recourse to a bundle of microphysical relations without any overall mechanism regulating the infinitesimal modes of its exercise. (F 36) It is indeed through Tarde that Deleuze is able to deal with what he reckons to be “a sort of neo-Kantianism unique to Foucault.”233 (F 60, 69, 74, 82, TRM 245-8, 251-2) For Deleuze, the concept of the diagram is analogous to the schematizing function of the faculty of imagination in Kant, yet instead of mediating between two forms, the spontaneity of the understanding (determination) and the receptivity of sensibility (the determinable), the diagram is now taken to be the informal dimension in the two forms distinguished by Foucault, the spontaneity of statements and their proper conditions and the receptivity of visibilities and their proper conditions. The human sciences (the production of statements) are not simply born from prison (the architecture of visibility, of the gaze), since both these sciences and prison presuppose a similar schematizing diagram with-out which neither would be able to function. (F 74) Hence Deleuze makes Tarde’s notion of the social schematism return in Foucault in the guise of biopower as the diagram-matic becoming of social reality itself. Although together statements and visibilities are the two forms that determine a given historical society and that find their common cause in the power strategies to which they belong in mutual presupposition and co-adaptation, there is between them a diagrammatic biopower which is more primordial than any existing strategy and which functions as a pure determinability, like the brain and its innate ideas: “a multiplicity of relations between forces, a multiplicity of sion which no longer splits into two and is free of any dualizable form.”234 (F 84)

tinct from any single combination; and form an unstable physical system that is in perpetual disequilibrium instead of a closed, exchangist cycle.” F 35-6. 233 Deleuze summarizes Foucault’s differences with Kant in a way that seems to be valid for his position as well: “the conditions are those of real experience (statements, for example, assume a limited corpus); they are on the side of the ‘object’ and historical formation, not a universal subject (the a priori itself is historical); all are forms of exteriority.” F 60. 234 According to Deleuze, the diagram is a multiplicity of diffusion because it is coextensive with the social field, like a map which “at every moment passes through every point, ‘or rather in every relation from one point to another’ … like the cause of the concrete assemblages that execute its relations”. F 36-7. The diagram is a map of relations between forces – or more Heideggerian, “a map of destiny” (F 36) – but it is not a map that merely represents the world, reducing it to existing strategies of power. Instead, the diagram, insofar as it is repeated everywhere, doubles reality wit hits own becoming. Thus it forces us to think “in terms of moving lines” which “do not merely compose an apparatus [assemblage] but pass through it and carry it north to south, east to west or diagonally.” TRM 338-9, F 37. In Foucault-Deleuze, these lines are “curves of statements” and “curves of visibilities” (the dual Formations of knowledge, which equal Tardean ‘plateaus’) but also “lines of force” (strategies of Power) and finally “lines of flight” (practices of the Self), each of which passes through

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Similar echoes of this hybrid of Kant and Tarde can be heard throughout Foucault. (F 36) The diagram is continually presented as a process of differentiation that acts as “the non-unifying immanent cause that is coextensive with the whole social field”, an imma-nent cause being a cause “realized, integrated and distinguished in its effect.”235 (F 37, 68, 82, 86) Between the determinable and the determined, “between abstract machine and concrete assemblages”, between a multiplicity of “virtual, potential, unstable, van-ishing and molecular” relations of power and the “macroscopic whole capable of giving form to their fluid matter and their diffuse function” there is a relation of mutual pre-supposition: “law is the integration of illegalisms” (F 37, 85). Even the vocabulary of dif-ferentiation/integration, however, seems to be unequivocally adopted from Tarde, where the term integration is used to avoid understanding the constitution of social

singular points or differential values that are integrated in concrete assemblages. This notion of the diagram as map also reminds of Anti-Oedipus, in which machinic desire, instead of being intentional, is graphical, draw-ing lines, tracing connections, establishing assemblages, thus producing its own object and inscribing itself on the surface-plane of the body without organs as social form of production. AO 10. Finally, it reminds of the Tardean concept of statistics central to which is not the representation of stable aggregates but the infinite-simal changes in the production process of the real (see footnote §2.5.2n190). For example, according to Deleuze a statement or a visibility is such a statistical curve. If Foucault investigates the “regularity” of the statements of a given age, this is not in order to represent an average, but rather to discover “the whole statis-tical curve” (F 4) by which this regularity is produced (everything must always have actually been said). AZ-ERT or QWERT are such curves, since they are multiplicities that “have no set linguistic construction, yet they are statements”. F 2. Each statement-curve is a series that “continues until it passes into the neighborhood of another individual point, at which moment another series begins, which can either converge with the first one (…) or else diverge (…). It is in this sense that a curve carries out the relations of force by regularizing and aligning them, making the series converge, and tracing a ‘general line of force’: for Foucault, not only are curves and graphs statements, but statements are kinds of curves or graphs.” F 78. Thus, AZERT, according to Deleuze, is a statement-curve that is not an average, but an expression of a historical strategy of power that interlaces it with its outside, a visibility-curve (F 79): “AZERT, on the keyboard, represents the focal point of power or of power-relations between the letters of the French alphabet, depending on which one crops up, and the typist’s fingers, depending on which one is used.” F 12. In terms of The Fold, AZERT is a monadic func-tion that, as a stratum, expresses the world in a manner that corresponds to its unique degree of power, i.e. to its innate ideas: “an infinity of indeterminate states is given (already folded over each other), each of which includes a cohesion at its level, somewhat like the improbability of forming a word by chance with separate letters, but with far more likelihood with syllables or inflections”. TF 7, 10. 235 Power is a differential relation between forces, while institutions are agents of the integration and stratifi-cation of forces. The first consists of abstract potentialities or minimal differentiations, i.e. differential rela-tions determined by diagrammatic singularities; the latter are their actualizations (or differenciations) into dualist or centralized forms of organization such as those of the state or capital which capture and integrate the microtexture of forces within their institutions (F 73-80): “ultimately this realization and integration is a differentiation: not because the cause being realized would be a sovereign Unity, but on the contrary because the diagrammatic multiplicity can be realized and the differential of forces integrated only by taking diverg-ing paths, splitting into dualisms, and following lines of differentiation without which everything would re-main in the dispersion of an unrealized cause.” F 37-8.


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quantities either as a totalization or as a simple generalization. A statistically measured quantity should rather be understood as integration of small differences, small varia-tions, in accordance with the model of integral calculus. Subjectivity, for example, is nothing but the “integration of innumerable differentials called individual variations” (MS 38), that is, a finite institution emerging as a particularly formed case of an infinite and continuous diagrammatic process of differentiation. Yet for both Tarde and Deleuze-Foucault, this type of subjectivity never remains self-identical, but forms a process of pure creativity, since, due to the interferential nature of the social field, “in-tegration actualizes or operates only by also creating divergent ways of actualizing, and by dividing itself up among them.” (F 77)

2.5.7 The Leibnizo-Tardean Brain in Societies of Control and the Problem of Subjectivity

It is well known that Deleuze radicalizes Foucault’s position and perhaps goes further than the latter would probably have been willing to go. For Deleuze biopower does not signify only the political government over life, but life itself is acknowledged to be rectly or immediately political. It is equally well known that, contrary to Foucault, he accords a constitutive primacy to desire over power (ATP 530-1n39, TRM 122-34). Here we shall argue that this makes him a Tardean more than a Foucauldian.236 Although, as Foucault has described, a certain subjectivity is constituted on the inside of the finements, this subjectivity almost always remains subordinate to the procedures of al-ready institutionalized power, such that it is precisely the virtuality of life – desire – that is confined outside and subordinated to reproduction – enfermer le dehors, confining the “Outside”, as Blanchot put it. (F 43) Lazzarato puts it thus: “Disciplinary societies operate like Leibniz’s God. They allow only one world to pass into reality.”237 What is

236 In terms of Foucault and Deleuze’s dispute over the concept of desire: whereas Foucault wonders how, giv-en all the “power arrangements which are no longer content to be normalizers” since “they tend to be consti-tuents” (TRM 123) such that our desires are marked by a lack that only a play with pleasure can overcome, resistance or countervailing action is still possible, Deleuze holds that desire is itself constituent and escapes from all predominant power strategies: “for me, a society, a social field does not contradict itself, but first and foremost, it leaks out on all sides” (TRM 127). Whereas belief objectifies, desire has no object but produces its own object. Desire includes no lack and precisely for this reason pleasure could only bring its productivity to a halt. As Tarde argues, “the object of desire – or its effect; action – is always a change” (EM 391) and hence plea-sure is at bottom nothing but “a lake where a current gathers, but where it doesn’t stop, since it is nothing but a passing harmony, a transition ascending between the variety from where it is born and the renovating activ-ity into which it immerges” (EM 394). 237 Lazzarato 2006a, 177.

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confined by the dispositifs of power, according to Deleuze, is the power of metamorpho-sis and becoming. Yet it was Tarde who had already announced the impossibility of this radicalization or immanentization of biopower: “all the laws and all the rules, the chemical discipline, the vital discipline, the social discipline” are mere “checks added to this omnivorous appetite of all being and meant to curb it.” (MS 96) Hence Deleuze finds in this early sociologist an important inspiration for the problem of the possibility of resistance even against today’s actualized forms of domination within the dispositive of biopower.238

In Tarde as well as Deleuze, the problem of resistance equals the problem of subjecti-vation equals the problem of the new. For Tarde, all resistance proceeds through inven-tions. To resist means to form a relay to the imitative currents and molar organizations of belief and desire. An invention happens precisely “by breaking for several instants the chain of surrounding imitations, and by putting itself face to face with nature, with the universal, represented, reflected outside as it is elaborated in myths or knowledge, in rites or industrial procedures.” (TP 80) Imitation, on the other hand, is subordinated to the generality of laws. Although no two men are unlike, it is still unidentical men that live together, who agree upon common rules of life, and who are fired at times with a common spirit and cooperate in common action. No matter how much collective forces subjugate individuals under general forms, therefore, this never happens without also triggering new processes of subjectivation, reopening new processes of individuation. “It is certain that difference produces harmony and in its turn harmony engenders dif-ference, and so forth.” (EM 396, 404) Precisely because each individual is a microcosm that contains an infinite reserve of being that exceeds its own self-identity and that never ceases to universalize itself, it must be affirmed that beneath all established forms of sociality and individuality what takes place is an ongoing “internal revolt” that feeds upon the a-social disposition in every little being. (MS 82) In other words, there is al-ways an innate, or at least “genitally innate” (Artaud) or – with Deleuze and Guattari –

238 Perhaps one can say that Tarde’s vicedictory dialectic already forestalled the necessity, underlined by Fou-cault, of finding an alternative to the logic of contradiction in terms of struggle and resistance: “If one accepts that the form – both general and concrete – of struggle is contradiction, then clearly everything which allows the contradiction to be localized or narrowed down will be seen as a brake or a blockage. But the problem is precisely as to whether the logic of contradiction can actually serve as a principle of intelligibility and rule of action in political struggle. This touches on a momentous political question: how is it that since the nineteenth century the specific problems of struggle and the strategy of struggle have tended so constantly to be dis-solved into the meagre logic of contradiction? … In any case, one must try to think struggle and its forms, means and processes in terms of a logic free of the sterilizing constraints of the dialectic.” Foucault 1980, 143-4.


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natal239, difference which subsists and insists, that is, which continues to “differentiate” (MS 69). Indeed, as Tarde knew well, without dissidences and oppositions no new initia-tives would ever emerge.240 We are all born different and dissident, appertaining to a social assemblage from one side only, dispositioned to expand our proper milieu regard-less of it. Again we see why, in order for there to be a world, the monad is for-the-world, being only half-open, and not fully in-the-world, as in phenomenological Weltoffenheit. Without this a-sociality automatically pointing to conflict (MS 90), it is our innate, yet pre-individual heterogeneity made up of “rebellions without a program”, which, on a molecular level, guarantees at least partially our independence from the molar organ-ism or vinculum in which we have been captured. And it is no surprise that those who have the loosest connections to existing forms of sociality are also the most creative, although they are what Leibniz calls defect monads, or as Tarde says, “monstrosities” (EM 400, OU 65), since they have no function in an organic whole yet are equally real: “The poet and the philosopher essentially, and secondarily, the inventor, the artist241, the speculator, the politician, the tactician: they are in sum the terminal flowers of any national tree.”242 (MS 76) Yet one may wonder what remains of their force of invention in a time of ever increasing flexibility and ever looser social ties, in a time when pro-activity, self-assertativeness and creativity is functional more than ever, and in a time when biopower itself becomes ever more rhizomatic.

239 In A Thousand Plateaus, in the chapter on the refrain, Deleuze and Guattari propose the concept of the “nat-al”: “The natal is the innate, but decoded; and it is the acquired, but territorialized. The natal is the new figure assumed by the innate and the acquired in the territorial assemblage. … The natal has a consistency that can-not be explained as a mixture of the innate and the acquired, because it is instead what accounts for such mixtures in territorial assemblages and interassemblages. … The natal stretches from what happens in the intra-assemblage all the way to the center that has been projected outside; it cuts across all the interassem-blages and reaches all the way to the gates of the Cosmos.” ATP 332. Cf. Stengers 2007, 333: “the power of the Natal: it is necessary to belong in order to depart, in order to embark on an adventure”. For a further devel-opment of the concept of “natal difference” in relation to Hannah Arendt’s notion of belonging (Interesse) and Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of “natality” with the aim of freeing and pluralizing ontological difference from a flipside perspective to Heidegger’s sein-zum-Tode, see Van Tuinen 2007 & Van Tuinen 2009. 240 “It is thus from the depths of organic life (and even further, we believe) that, in the midst of our cities, spurt the lava of discord, the hate and envy that sometimes submerges them. … The source of rebellions is, effective-ly, at the same time that of rejuvenations.” MS 81. 241 Unsurprisingly, art functions as the generalized source of invention in Tarde’s work, whereas he also dis-tinguishes the fine arts as a special case of the first. On Tarde’s aesthetics in relation to questions of sensus communis and “universal sensation”, see Antoine 2007, and on art as the creation of new values, see Schérer, LLS 48-54 & Lazzarato, MS 150 & Lazzarato 2000. 242 If a society is a tree, then life is the rhizomatic excess over this tree: “the habitual overflowing of the cur-rent of Being and Life; they are born from all our harmonies, natural or social, like the leaves born from the trees, but only to re-cover them.” EM 400.

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In many of his interviews Foucault was of course the first to indicate that since the Second World War we have more and more left behind the disciplinary societies of the 18th and 19th century, that is, societies operating by organizing major sites of confine-ment. Extrapolating from his scattered remarks on the present, Deleuze, following Wil-liam Burroughs, has diagnosed new developments as the coming about of a “control society” of continual monitoring outside of institutional boundaries. The walls of the disciplinary institutions or the Weberian ‘iron cage’ have been broken down such that nothing is left alone in a society of working at home, house arrest as alternative to cus-tody, electronic tagging, home care, continual assessment of children followed by con-tinuing education during adulthood, permanent competition in health and pharmaceu-tical culture, body culture, genetic engineering, risk assessment, general self-capsularization and automobilization, omnipresent security, information and communi-cation technology, GPS, biometrics etc. etc. Whereas spatial confinements function as molds, controls function through temporal modulations or self-transmuting moldings in which no activity is ever finished. A new plasticity and functional indifference of subjec-tivity guarantees that one is capable of constantly switching between different forms of discipline which are ever more intimately dispersed through our lives, like “coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal transmutation.”243 (N 179) Thus our situation is somewhat like a social monadology in which an individual monad increasingly straddles different possible worlds. We do not form part of a single popula-tion but belong to different societies at once, even to such an extent that, as Tarde knew, there are no individual monads, each monad being always already collective and overflowing with molecular fluxes that permeat us from all directions. In other words, control no longer neutralizes the difference and repetition of the agitating multitudes by filtering them into individual identities, but, as has also been demonstrated by Hardt & Negri in Empire (2000), now intimately contaminates our “dividual” (N 182) processes of subjectivation through the infra- and transindividual dissemination of its system of domination: there is no Outside yet we do not yet know what a crowd can do.244

From the perspective of his last works, what interests Deleuze in Tarde is the ing contemporaneity of the latter’s understanding of the intimate constitution of social life as opposed to the sociologies of molar structures found in Durkheim and Weber. Much more than disciplinary societies, today power is exercised precisely through the

243 On Tarde and Simondon’s concept of modulation as a diagram of the flexibility of production and subjectiv-ity in Deleuze, see Lazzarato 2006a. Deleuze himself prefers to invoke Kafka’s The Trial as a witness of this tran-sition from disciplinary societies to control societies, where the reader can experience a juridical transition from “apparent acquittal (between two confinements) in disciplinary societies” to “endless postponement in (constantly changing) control societies”. N 179. 244 Hardt & Negri 2000, 22-7.


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means of transmission, contagion and propagation of currents of desire and belief as described by Tarde: hyperconsumerism.245 This contemporaneity of Tarde can be fur-ther stressed if we take into account another key element of his sociology that might have deeply influenced both Deleuze’s politics and his Leibnizianism, although he does not refer to it: the theory of the social brain.

According to Tarde, a “society, if it is not comparable to an organism, it is comparable to a privileged organ: the brain. Social life is precisely the extraordinary exaltation of cerebral life.” (LLS 65) Like a society, Tarde repeatedly points out, a brain is not re-stricted to the human individual. It is not even restricted to an organism, although it is teeming with local organisms. Whereas the organ, as Tarde explains in close tion of Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, is “the unique incarnation of harmony” (EM 402, 404), the brain is precisely not an organ, but a diagrammatic “plane”246 in constant chaosmosis: “If we open the brain, what do we see? Such chaos!” (EM 417) If social tions are not organic, explained by the shared community of a functional whole, this is because, according to Tarde, they belong to brains in a relation of power, each brain propagating its avidity, which, confirming Leibniz’s thesis that all force is spiritual, is made up of the forces of belief and desire. Desire and belief are the flows that traverse a “dividual” or “interindividual” brain – the individual being still too organic and cal masses lacking a proper plasticity (both are molar entities) – and their propagation, binarization or conjugation by imitation, opposition and invention are like the synapses and dendrites that organize it. Hence Tarde envisions the social field as a “gigantic brain-state” (MS 51), made up of intra-cerebral relations and inter-cerebral oppositions (LLS 203), full of individual micro-brains which he calls monads and which continuously produce new syntheses according to rhythms, refrains, conjunctions and combinations, disjunctions and adaptations such that the social is produced bit by bit and without fi-nality. In fact, a society isn’t so much an organism as it is the organism that resembles

245 In the conclusion to his Laws of Imitation Tarde describes how the flow of imitation from above to below unavoidably had to end sooner or later in the demise of feudal societies and in the propagation of democratic equality. Each imitative action thus prepares the conditions in those subjects which imitate for ever more reciprocal imitations – “from absolutism to self-government”. LI 372; Tarde quotes Jefferson’s term in English. Combined with the increase of speed in the means of transport and growing density of population, this demo-cratization leads Tarde to prophecy how the entire Earth globe will be contaminated by this process. “Let us suppose that all these conditions are combined and that they are fulfilled in the highest degree. Then, whe-rever a happy initiative might show itself in the whole mass of humanity, its transmission by imitation would be almost instantaneous, like the propagation of a wave in a perfectly elastic medium. We are approaching this strange ideal.” LI 370. This elastic milieu indeed comes very close to the constant modulations governing over the global societies of control as described by Hardt & Negri in Empire. 246 Tarde even proposes the idea of a continuum of the universal forces of desire and belief between “senti-ments”, “percepts” and “concepts”. LLS 81.

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the political organization of a state, which, in all its chaotic virtuality, in its turn is more like a brain:

“Let us suppose that all citizens of a state without exception adhere fully to a program of political reorganization born in the brain of one of them and more specifically in a point of this brain, then the entire recasting of the state on the basis of this [cerebral] plane, instead of being successive and fragmentary, will be brusque and complete.” (MS 40, cf 46, 51)

For example, we’ve already seen how, by way of an adhesive vinculum, one genial brain can yield its power over thousands of other brains in an “organism of which the genius is the soul; and their works are the cerebral vibrations of which this theory is the con-sciousness”. Yet this organic assemblage is always only the actualization of a myriad of possible infra- and inter-cerebral relations that seem to serve no social organization at all. As Tarde constantly stresses, not everything is actual in the brain. Just like in Borges’ Library of Babel in each historical episode there are implied new possibilities and new combinations, in each brain there are other brains, the brain being merely “the milieu of all logical combinations” (LLS OU 34). Tarde describes the resisting moment of the brain in terms of a micro-opposition within each individual, a minuscule hesitation be-tween adopting and rejecting the imitation of a new model.247 (SL 79) In other words, the brain is not organic, but machinic or diagrammatic, and it becomes a subject as soon as it breaks with the blind processing of imitations in order to introduce something new, to think, to produce a disjunctive synthesis. Yet even the effect of subjectivation is pro-duced by a spiritual automaton, as Leibniz says, and hence, for Tarde and Deleuze, the socius is one great ongoing production, an “Opera-machine” or abstract machine of which the individual brains are little cogs248: “In sum, society is, or every day becomes,

247 “The real elementary social opposition must be looked for in au sein meme of every social individual, every time he hesitates between adopting or rejecting a new model that is offered to him, a new locution, a new rite, a new idea, a new school of art, a new conduct. This hesitation, this tiny internal battle, which is reproduced in millions of exemplars at each moment of the life of a people, is the infinitesimal opposition and infinitely féconde of history; it introduces in sociology a tranquil and profound revolution.” LLS 79, OU 37. 248 “The social machine is literally a machine, irrespective of any metaphor, inasmuch as it exhibits an immo-bile motor and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart, elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the task to be performed are distributed. Coding the flows implies all these operations. This is the social machine’s supreme task, inasmuch as the apportioning of production corresponds to extractions from the chain, resulting in a residual share for each member, in a global system of desire and destiny that organizes the productions of production, the productions of recording, and the productions of consumption. Flows of women and children, flows of herds and of seed, sperm flows, flows of shit, menstrual flows: nothing must escape coding.” AO 142-3. And: “We are misled by considering any complicated machine as a single being; in truth it is a city or a society, each member of which was bred truly after its kind.” AO 285.


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uniquely a great collective brain of which the small individual brains are the cells.” (LLS 218)

Now are not today’s control societies, based on the intimate, mass medial production of sociality through direct transfer and intimate suggestibility from brain to brain in a machinic field of “actions and inter-cerebral reactions” (MS 28), the perfect materialization of this hypothetical vision? According to Deleuze, we live in a “self-consuming city-brain”: “bodies in Nature or people in a landscape are replaced by brains in a city: the screen’s no longer a window or door (behind which…) nor a frame or a surface (in which…) but a computer screen on which images as “data” slip around.” (N 76, C2 265) The city is not a great physical repository in which everything continues its organic life, it is no longer Augustine’s or Leibniz’s ‘city of God’, but, as in Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange, a state recast on the basis of the brain as multiplicity of spatiotemporal relations: an immense cerebral system of “continuous control and instant communication” (N 174):

“Clockwork automata, but also motor automata, in short, automata of movement, made way for a new computer and cybernetic race, automata of computation and thought, automata with controls and feedback. The configuration of power was also inverted, and, instead of converging on a single, mysterious leader, inspirer of dreams, commander of actions, power was diluted in an information network where ‘decision-makers’ managed control, processing and stock across tions of insomniacs and seers”249 (C2 264-5).

With this thesis on the societies of control and its social machinery, Deleuze sketches a situation similar to Tarde’s thought experiments in which the brain increasingly coincides with its Outside: the intermonadic plane of immanence of the city. Yet if creative in(ter)ventions are still possible, and Deleuze’s entire philosophy obliges us to proof that this is the case, the key will nonetheless have to be found in the brain.

Deleuze repeatedly emphasizes that it is not information technology, psychoanalysis or linguistics we should turn to for principles of resistance, but recent developments in microbiology.250 (TRM 283) He is clearly fascinated by the concept of the brain as a rela-

249 Elsewhere, Deleuze explains “how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine – with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermodynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies.” Yet he immediately adds that “the ma-chines don’t explain anything, you have to analyze the collective assemblages of which the machines are just one component. Compared with the approaching forms of ceaseless control in open sites, we may come to see the harshest confinement as part of a wonderful happy past.” N 175, 180. 250 For example, the problem is not of an ideological nature but of a noological nature: “Foucault does not in any way ignore repression and ideology; but as Nietzsche had already seen, they do not constitute the struggle between forces but are only the dust thrown up by such a contest.” F 29. Instead, what is important is some-

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tively undifferentiated mass in which habitual connections and rhizomatic circuits, “brain waves” or “shock waves” are traced out and invented. (N 149) For Deleuze, the brain is in fact nothing but the schema or diagram of all inventivity: “thought, the brain, is the set of non-localizable relations” doubling all actualized becomings and establish-ing a “transverse continuity or communication” between them. (C2 121-5) This concept of the brain can also be connected to Bergson251, when Deleuze adopts the definition of the brain as an interval that complicates the relationship between excitation and re-sponse, or to Leibniz, for whom the brain becomes subject or is folded into an interiority as soon as it produces a singularity by breaking with the series of the world. This is how he describes the functioning of the brain in conversation with Antonio Negri:

The key may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control. … This is nothing to do with going back to ‘the subject,’ that is, to something invested with duties, power, and knowledge. One might equally well speak of new kinds of event, rather than processes of subjectification … Or we can simply talk about the brain: the brain’s precisely this boundary of a continuous two-way movement between an Inside and an Outside, this membrane between them. … What we lack most is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, it’s been taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume. … Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a people. (N 175-6)

thing that can also be discovered in Tardean sociology: the constant ‘feodalization’ of the brain, the way in monads are captured under organic vinculi and become the “vassals” of a dominant monad. MS 93. See also Martin in OU 37. 251 On the intercerebral interval between intelligence and sociability in Bergson, see B 108-111. In a discussion of the superiority of the human being from the perspective of creative evolution, which would consist of man’s unique capacity “to express naturing Nature”, i.e. to trace out an open direction of differentiation that is able to express a Whole that is itself open, Deleuze argues this is not due to man’s capacity of entering into society. Although “sociability (in the human sense) can only exist in intelligent beings”, it is not itself “grounded on their intelligence: Social life is immanent to intelligence, it begins with it but does not derive from it.” In fact, just like “a small intracerebral interval” between action and reaction makes intelligence poss-ible, “another intercerebral interval between intelligence itself and society” allows man, “with a leap, to break the circle of closed societies”. On the one hand, intelligence breaks with society “primarily in the name of an egoism that it seeks to preserve against social requirements”; on the other hand, this egoism is precisely what allows for “a variability appropriate to human societies”. By means of the intercerebral interval, there is pro-duced what Deleuze calls a “creative emotion” which consists of the embodiment of cosmic memory, an Out-side, even if this only happens with certain privileged, for non-social or non-organically organized, souls: “from soul to soul, it traces the design of an open society, a society of creators, where we pass from one genius to another, through the intermediary of disciples or spectators or hearers.” B 110.


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The world is lost because the individualizing intimacy of control has made it ever more difficult to belief in the power of embodiment, that is, the power of becoming or meta-morphosis invested in the molecular relations crowding the brain. Yet creativity implies a new people and would be nothing without it. A new people is a new fold of the social brain: “A people is always a new wave, a new fold in the social fabric” (N 158). Perhaps we should interpret Deleuze’s remark on the missing “belief in the world” in similar terms as those with which he has interpreted Leibniz’s theodicy: as an attempt to regain faith in the potentiality of the world, to “create confidence” or “belief” (C2 170-3, 201-2) in biopower and hence in the possibility of “a new community, whose members are ca-pable of trust or ‘confidence’, that is, of a belief in the world, and in becoming.” (ECC 88)

If Leibniz’s great cry for sufficient reason was a cry for a foundation, then perhaps this problem of belief was Tarde’s and Deleuze’s “cry”. Between Leibniz and Tarde-Deleuze, however, the problem has changed. The problem of the new now refers to no-madic processes of individuation rather than sedentary distributions. Instead of monadic communities that “run the risk of reproducing … the rigid” (ATP 228), contemporary nomads are “an ambulant people of relayers rather than a model society” (ATP 377). Like monads, nomads, as Deleuze never ceases to stress together with the anthropologist Laroche, do not move in time and space but actualize or distribute space-times. (DR 36, ATP 380) They are not in the world, but for the world, roaming the desert. And instead of being supremely individuated individuals, they always belong to crowds or packs as irreducible multiplicities or haecceity assemblages. For Deleuze all invention is therefore a co-production; all constitution is collective, even to such an extent that substance-forces are no longer subordinate to the Law (of pre-established harmony), but that laws become functions of forces. To engender the real is to engender the collective – this is what the theory of the immanence of constituent power points at. Instead of pre-established harmony, the problem has now become a matter of laying out new vinculi, like synaptic connections synthesizing disparate elements, consolidating them in an assemblage and giving consistency to their community: localizing the global. Doesn’t Deleuze himself already present his own project of philosophy as a “relay system” (TRM 285), as a counter-thought attesting to an absolute yet “extremely populous” solitude, “a solitude already intertwined with a people to come, one that invokes and awaits that people, existing only through it, though it is not yet here” (ATP 377)?

2.5.8 Summary and Conclusion

We have started by discussing the way in which Tarde, in the evolutionary sciences of his time, found a reason for renewing the project of a monadology, although not out making an essential modification that effectively inverts the Leibnizian system of representation in a way that is very similar to Deleuze’s ‘diagonalization’ of the horizon-

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tal-vertical distribution of Leibniz’s baroque house in terms of different/ciation as the – literally complicated – amalgam of psychic differentiation and mechanic propagation. Monads are no longer to be conceived as closed individuals but as socially differentiated processes of individuation such that a psychomophism is simultaneously a sociomor-phism pushes to the limit Leibniz's idea of force animating an energetic but sub-representative matter.

This renewal of monadology leads Tarde towards his “discovery” of what Deleuze and Guattari call “the molecular”. If, from a Leibnizian perspective, “the molar” is the domain that consists of organic centres of individuation, then the molecular is the domain of inverted and temporary appurtenances, that is, of inorganic matter-flow. The state versus the crowd. In sociology, this division is reflected by the opposition between Emile Durkheim and Tarde. Whereas the first represents a sociological substantialism in which the social, as the object of sociology, is an objective “thing”, irreducible to psychology or metaphysics, the latter radicalizes the view that “every thing is a society, each phenomenon a social fact”, such that the object of sociology is precisely the relational and constitutive domain at work in all other disciplines (physical, chemical, biological, social or psychological) without there being any essential difference between the natural and the cultural or between the natural and the political. Hence instead of limiting sociology to molar structures and organisations, at least implicitly always based on the juridical model, Tarde develops a “micro-sociology” that investigates the genetic relations by which existing structures are themselves constituted. This opposition also corresponds to Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of which the ontological referent is not constituted by the “global” or “sedentary” divisions – in other words, the divisions of what Deleuze-Guattari call macropolitics –, but the “molecular” or “quantum” flows of a “micropolitics”, even if one never appears without the other. From the perspective of the problem of constitution, what is at stake for both Tarde and Deleuze and Guattari is not the individuals and their social contracts, but pre-individual or trans-individual and hence irreducibly social singularities and the space-time in which they can co-exist.

The social in Tarde bears strong resonances with what Deleuze has called the tran-scendental field. Both hold that in order to gain access to the transcendental, one has to return, albeit under new conditions, to Leibniz, and not to the transcendental philoso-phy of Kant or Husserl, or the organicist sociology proposed by Durkheim. Under Tarde’s modification of the monadological conception of the world, the social is a great irrigation system with currents, undercurrents and countercurrents in constant flux. These fluxes are made up of the two force-quanta of desire and belief and can be lyzed into three categories: imitation, opposition and invention. Together, these three categories account for the myriad of infinitesimal interferences between different flows. A society or association, as an actualization of the social field, is not a molar entity in itself, but only a series of imitations among its participants. This series is always suscep-tible to a myriad of interferences with other series such that there is a continuous


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duction of divergences. Each time two series meet, there appears a “micro-opposition” or “infinitesimal difference” from which a new series will emerge. Hence Tarde’s tics of “universal opposition” is closer to Leibnizian vicediction than to Hegelian con-tradiction between molar identities. (OU 46) Other than in Leibniz, however, the indi-viduals no longer count as the source of inventions and hence as the genetic condition of a society. Rather, each individual is already a dividual multiplicity, permeated by a thousand imitative flows and continually undergoing metamorphoses in ongoing proc-esses of pre-individual and trans-individual individuation. Hence the social field is crowded by a “universal variation” no longer restricted to the “illegitimate” – as Deleuze says, since it is always imposed ‘from above’ – limitation to conjunctive sis, and each dividual “force” of invention, as it is imitated in interference with all the other flows, is now free to propagate itself according to its own limits.

Leibniz’s theory of the vinculum substantiale allows for an understanding of intermonadic relations not in terms of ideal expression, but in terms of real union. It prefigures a Tardean microphysics of “cohesions of molecular affinities” (MS 50) or of the “tendency of monads to gather together” (MS 66). Just as for Leibniz organic bodies are realized in adhesive bonds that capture monads that are in constant flux, Tarde holds that each actual social organization, a “sociality” or what Deleuze and Guattari call a collective assemblage, is produced as a temporal relation of possession in which a number of imitative individuals (or more precise: processes of individuation) temporarily appertain to a dominating inventive individual (a becoming-dominant), without the first being in any sense reducible to the latter, since each monad contains an infinite reserve of potentiality independent of all actually existing social configurations. Tarde thus recognizes in Leibniz how philosophy replaces the element of having for that of being. A body is a relation of possession, a power relation that remains external to its terms and says nothing about the essence of the elements that are ‘possessed’ by it. A vinculum or power relation never features between already crystallized individuals such as masters or slaves, but instead is a neutral event, realized from different perspectives and according to highly diverse processes of individuation and counter-actualization – or as Tarde says, “counter-repetitions” (OU 53) – that effectuate a social field made up of ever “moving and perpetually reshuffled relations among monads” (TF 110).

Each process of individuation, Tarde explains by drawing an immediate connection between Leibniz and Schopenhauer, is like a will or principle of avidity in its own. Each individual thus seeks to possess the entire universe and actually possesses those viduals that imitate its inventions. Yet because there is an infinity of individuations, each of which tending to universalize itself, each undergoes transformations at every confrontation with another’s will. Of each individuation it must therefore be said that it both possesses and is possessed. To possess and to be possessed, like Spinoza’s to affect and to be affected, correspond in Tarde to the basic vectors of desire and belief as the

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two psychophysical component forces of avidity. Together, they are the spontaneous and receptive faculties, irreducibly social, that schematize life. Or in terms of Foucault-Deleuze, they are the diagrammatic forces that constitute the forms of existence; or with Agamben, the ‘forms of life’.

When Deleuze in Foucault presents the latter as a thinker of constituent power, he does so by reinterpreting the latter’s manifestly Kantian inspiration in terms of the Tardean schematism. What Foucault calls biopower is equated with what in Tarde is the social field: “the a priori element, a microagitation” (F 85). Although Deleuze readily admits that Foucault was not particularly influenced by Leibniz (N 151), and the same seems to be the case vis-à-vis Tarde, the schematizing forces of the social field appear as the diagrammatic differentiation of singularities, which are integrated – or in expressionist terms, “explicated” –in social formations, and in their integration always further differentiated – “complicated” and “perplicated” –, in a continuous evolution doubling all actual history. Just like a microsociology with its field of minuscule power relations perpetually out of phase doubles macrosociology, in Foucault a microphysics of informal force-force relations doubles the modernist political framework of civil society. (F 85)

The extraordinary contemporaneity of Tarde and his relevance to the study of biopower is striking, especially from the perspective of the intimate, intra- and intercerebral constitution of today’s mass media societies: Since we no longer live in the disciplinary societies of early modernity such as they were investigated by Foucault, but in “societies of control” (Deleuze 1995), there can be no illusion of a secluded intersubjective “lifeworld”. Our consciousness (sensation) has turned out to be merely a field of forces and the unconscious has turned out to be the immanent rule in the constitution of the real. Phenomenology, with its reliance on consciousness and common sense, can therefore no longer be the transcendental science of constitution. Instead, Tarde, by adopting and adapting the Leibnizian singularity of the inter-monadic brain as the social field in all its constitutive intimacy, offers us an approach to constituent power that is radically non-phenomenological and also, perhaps finally, as Alliez has suggested, political, since the question he seeks to answer is precisely how the brain can become a subject that breaks with the circuits of control, and hence bring about something new. Finally, immanent constitution means that power struggle is never over and resistance in the informal domain of micro-conflicts between strategies always remains necessary. As Tarde puts it, with the optimism that is so characteristic of his Leibnizian impetus but contrary to the latter’s strict division of right and power, there is no common Law that provides the common measurement for the utility of each of its parts and no court that provides common justice for each of Society’s members:

“the idea of a perfect or absolute distributive justice, the harmony dreamt of by righteous hearts, is inapplicable to the world; it judges with the nature of the things that it repudiates. Who will proportion fair-mindedly the wage for the


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work of Michelangelo to the salary of a mason? And even if this proportion and all the others than one can foresee would be discovered and realized tomorrow, which would be a progress, wouldn’t there remain an inescapable iniquity of ral advantages, and an iniquity yet more inefficable and more fundamental that constitutes the progress, the kind of most happy men of tomorrow compared to those of today? … Progress pursues it and progress denies it. These two ideas ter-destroy each other. There exists nothing but relative justices and opposed, combating morals, of which the strongest prevails, I would like to say the most proper to favorize the deployment of human difference” (EM 406-7).

This then is the constituent power of the socius according to Tarde: The mutual tions of property, force and the social faculties of belief and desire are not only the real origins of all the things that exist, but also make up their common limitation. To consti-tute the real is to constitute the collective, on the condition that the notion of society, still reminiscent as it may be of what Deleuze calls the baroque socius even if its mony is no longer pre-established but always provisory, is liberated from the tion of real interaction, real relational activity, and real intermonadic productivity, and that monadic force, what Tarde calls avidity or desire, is allowed to go to the limit of what it is capable of, such that this limit is constituted immanently and at once in direct interference with all the others rather than being transcendently imposed.252 “The prob-lem of society”, and of hence of justice, as Deleuze already argued in his early work in Hume, “is not a problem of limitation, but rather a problem of integration.”253 (H 39-40)

252 In Spinozist terms: “On what condition do we attribute to a finite being, which does not exist through itself, a power of existing and acting identical to its essence? Spinoza’s reply would appear to be as follows: We affirm this power of a finite being to the extent that we consider this being as part of a whole, as a mode of an attribute, a modification of a substance. This substance itself thus has an infinite power of existing … All of Spinozist agrees in conferring on finite beings a power of existence, action and perseverance; and the very context of the proof in the Political Treatise emphasizes that things have their own power, identical with their essence and constitutive of their ‘right.’” EPS 90-1. Or in terms of Difference and Repetition: “There is a hierarchy which measures being according to their limits, and according to their degree of proximity or distance from a principle. But there is also a hierarchy which considers things and beings from the point of view of power: it is not a question of considering absolute degrees of power, but only of knowing whether a being eventually ‘leaps over’ or transcends its limits in going to the limit of what it can do, whatever its degree. ‘To the limit’, it will be argued, still presupposes a limit. Here, limit (peras) no longer refers to what maintains the thing under a law, nor to that on the basis of which it is deployed and deploys all its power; hubris ceases to be simply condemnable and the smallest becomes equivalent to the largest once it is not separated from what it can do. This enveloping measure is the same for all things … This ontological measure is closer to the immeasurable state of things than to the first kind of measure; this ontological hierarchy is closer to the hubris and anarchy of beings than to the first hierarchy.” DR 37. 253 As Deleuze explains, for Hume societies and institutions are never contracts. It is rather the other way around, since according to Deleuze Hume proposes a radical change in the practical way the problem of socie-ty is posed. Whereas from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century the famous theories of the limiting contract

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Given a primordial diversity of innate differences, this cannot but lead to the full de-ployment of difference in a society of which even the debris itself becomes the complicit of a superior diversity.

and law posed the problem of society in terms of the curtailing of egotisms, for Hume the problem is not egot-ism but the partiality of our sympathies. “Society is no longer conceived as a system of legal and contractual limitations, but as an institutional invention: How do we invent artifices, create institutions that force the pas-sions to go beyond their partiality, producing moral, juridical, and political feelings (for example, the feeling of justice)?” DI 167. And: “Before being the types of community that Tönnies described, family, friendship, and neighborliness are, in Hume’s work, the natural determinants of sympathy.” H 38. But whereas egoisms have to be limited by the structure of society, sympathies must be integrated inside a positive totality: “What Hume criticizes in contractarian theories is precisely that they present us with an abstract and false image of society, that they define society only in a negative way; they see in it a set of limitations of egoisms and interests in-stead of understanding society as a positive system of invented endeavors.” H 39. Hence justice is produced socially: “justice is a schema, and the schema is the very principle of society. ‘[A] single act of justice, consid-er’d in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and ‘tis only the concurrence of mankind, in a general schema or system of action, which is advantageous.’ The question is no longer about transcendence but rather about integration.” H 36. And: “Justice is not a principle of nature; it is rather a rule, a law of construction, and its role is to organize, within the whole, the elements, including the principles of nature. Justice is a means. The moral problem is the problem of schematism, that is, the act by means of which we refer the natural in-terests to the political category of the whole or to the totality which is not given in nature.” H 40-1. And: “In short, the moral conscience is a political conscience: true morality is politics, just as the true moralist is the legislator.” H 41.

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Abbreviations

Works by Gilles Deleuze H Deleuze, Gilles, 1991, Empiricism and Subjectivity. An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Hu-

man Nature, transl. Constantin V. Boundas, NY: Columbia University Press. NP Deleuze, Gilles, 2006, Nietzsche & Philosophy, transl. H. Tomlinson, NY: Columbia

University Press. KCP Deleuze, Gilles, 2003, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara

Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. PS Deleuze, Gilles, 1973, Proust and Signs, transl. R. Howard, London/NY: Allen Lane

The Penguin Press. B Deleuze, Gilles, 1991, Bergsonism, transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam,

New York: Zone Books. EPS Deleuze, Gilles, 1997, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, transl. Martin Joughin,

New York: Zone Books. DR Deleuze, Gilles, 2001, Difference and Repetition, transl. Paul Patton, NY / London:

Continuum. LS Deleuze, Gilles, 1990, The Logic of Sense, transl. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale,

London/NY: Continuum. SPP Deleuze, Gilles, 1988, Spinoza Practical Philosophy, transl. R. Hurley, San Francisco:

City Lights Books. AO Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix, 2003, Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia,

transl. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, London/NY: Continuum. K Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix, 1986, Kafka. Toward a Minor Literature, transl. D.

Polan, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. D Deleuze, Gilles, 2002, Dialoges II, transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam,

NY/London: Continuum.

Abbreviations

420

MM Deleuze, Gilles, 1979, “Un manifeste de moins”, in: Bene, Carmelo & Deleuze, Gilles, 1979, Superpositions. Richiard III suivi de Un manifeste de moins, Paris: Les edi-tions de minuit, 85-131.

ATP Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, 1987, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizo-phrenia, transl. by B. Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

FB Deleuze, Gilles, 2004, Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation, transl. Daniel W. Smith, London/NY: Continuum.

C1 Deleuze, Gilles, 1986, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

C2 Deleuze, Gilles, 1989, Cinema 2: The Time Image, transl. Hugh Tomlinson & Robert Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

F Deleuze, Gilles, 1988, Foucault, transl. by Seán Hand, University of Minnesota Press.

TF Deleuze, Gilles, 1993, The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque, transl. Tom Conley, Min-neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

N Deleuze, Gilles, 1995, Negotiations. 1972-1990, transl. Martin Joughin, NY: Columbia University Press.

WP Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix, 1994, What is Philosophy?, transl. H. Tomlinson & G. Burchill, London/NY: Verso.

NI Deleuze, Gilles, 2001, “Nietzsche”, in: Pure Immanence. Essays on a Life, transl. A. Boyman, New York: Zone Books.

DI Deleuze, Gilles, 2004, Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, ed. D. Lapoujade, transl. M. Taormina, New York: Semiotext(e).

TRM Deleuze, Gilles, 2006, Two Regimes of Madness. Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, transl. Ames Hodges & Mike Taormina, New York: Semiotext(e)

ABC L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, DVD, Paris: Editions Montparnasse. CGD Deleuze, Gilles, Course Notes, available at:

http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommaire.html. Works by Leibniz AK Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Berlin: Akademie Verlag

1923 – [?]. GP Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1875-1890, Die philosophische Schriften, ed. C.J. Ge-

rhardt, Berlin/Hildesheim: Georg Olms. L Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1989, Philosophical Papers and Letters, edited and transl.

Leroy, E. Loemker, Dordrecht: Kluwer. DL “Discourse on Metaphysics”, in L 303-30. M “Monadology”, in L 643-53.

421

Works by Gabriel Tarde PP Penal Philosophy, 2001, transl. Rapelje Howell, New Brunswick: Transaction Pub-

lishers. LI The Laws of Imitation, 1962, transl. Elsie Clews Parsons, Gloucester MA: Peter

Smith. MS Monadologie et sociologie, 1999, Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond. LLS La logique sociale, 1999, Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond. OU L’Opposition universelle, 1999, Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond. SL Les lois sociales, 2002, Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond. EM Essais et mélanges sociologiques, 1895, Lyon: Storck/Paris: Masson. TP Les Transformations du pouvoir, 2003, Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond. Other Works KSA Nietzsche. Friedrich (1999). Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bän-

den, ed. G. Colli & M. Montinari, München: De Gruyter/dtv. CE Bergson, Henri, 1998, Creative Evolution, transl. Arthur Mitchell, New York: Dover

Publications. MM Bergson, Henri, 2004, Matter and Memory, transl. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott

Palmer, New York: Dover Publications. CM Bergson, Henri, The Creative Mind. An Introduction to Metaphysics, transl. Mabelle L.

Andison, New York: Dover Publications. Hua Husserl, Edmund, 1950-, Gesammelte Werke (Husserliana), Den Haag/Dordrecht:

Martinus Nijhoff. MO Heidegger, Martin, 1984, “Moira”, in: Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Phi-

losophy, transl. David Farrell Krell & Frank A. Capuzzi, San Francisco: Harper Row, 79-101.

SG Heidegger, Martin, 1997, Der Satz vom Grund, Stuttgart: Neske. PP Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1962, Phenomenology of Perception, transl. Colin Smith,

London/NY: Routledge. VI Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1968, The Visible and the Invisible, transl. Alphonso Lingis,

Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

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