Flying the Pope's flag. The commercial exploitation of the Roman flag in Mediterranean mercantile...

QUADERNI STORICI 143 / a. XLVIII, n. 2, agosto 2013

FLYING THE POPE’S FLAG1

THE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF THE ROMAN FLAGIN MEDITERRANEAN MERCANTILE POLICIES

(18TH CENTURY)

L’analisi delle pratiche connesse alle bandiere navali permette di comprenderei risultati ambigui delle politiche volte a «nazionalizzare» il commercio marittimo.Si tratta di mettere in risalto le possibilità implicite prodotte dalla formalizzazionelegislativa degli usi della bandiera, domandandosi come e a quali livelli le norme sullabandiera nazionale devono fare i conti con delle legislazioni concorrenti in materia.Il contributo presente esplora tali questioni a partire dal caso pontificio nel secoloXVIII e puntando lo sguardo sulle negoziazioni giuridiche e sociali collegate allebandiere. Scegliendo un osservatorio che non coincide con il «commercio monopo-listico», questo studio cerca di ricostruire, nella loro diversità, i ruoli e i limiti delleregolamentazioni pontificie e degli intermediari istituzionali ed economici (consoli,capitani) implicati negli scambi marittimi. L’esame del caso pontificio – emblematicoper una certa debolezza statale – consente quindi di leggere con delle griglie interpre-tative più serrate i traffici nel Mediterraneo.

xAnalysing the way flags are used on ships allows us to better grasp the ambiguity

of all attempts at «nationalising» maritime trade. This raises the question of thosehitherto unthought-of aspects that proceed from the legislative formalisation of theuse of flags. In other words, how and on what levels do national regulations comeup against competition from other legislations with regard to the use of flags? Thepresent essay aims to explore this question through the example of the Papal States inthe 18th century and the study of legal and social negotiations related to the regulationof flags. By choosing an observation point beyond the «monopolistic trade», I amhere attempting to comprehend, in their diversity, the role, and limits of the Papalregulations and Papal institutional and economic intermediaries, notably consuls andship captains, as regards trade in the Mediterranean. Taking as its starting point aPapal case that was, for a long time, emblematic of a certain weakness on the partof the state, this essay proposes to densify the understandings of circulation in theMediterranean.

396 Christopher Denis-Delacour

xIntroduction

On 12 December 1999, the tanker Erika was shipwrecked off thecoast of Brittany, causing a massive oil spill. Aside from the environ-mental damage caused, the career of this ship is emblematic of currenttrends2. Chartered by a French company (Total), outfitted by a Greekfirm, manned by an Indian team, insured by an English company, andregistered in Bermuda, Erika sailed under the Maltese flag3. During itstwenty-four years of activity, it also changed name seven times, flag fivetimes, and owner nine times.

As their economic impact is significant, flag-related policies arenowadays the topic of numerous debates, and these policies apparent-ly put maritime law to the test of the logic of a globalised economicspace, one that must take different state configurations into account.At the present moment, the idea of a single law pertaining to a maritimeshipping domain that is «shared» by all governments seems to be illu-sory. The very meaning of the flag’s state has largely been called intoquestion due to the endless outsourcing of maritime affairs. Normally,a commercial ship on the high seas comes under the sole jurisdiction ofthe state whose flag it is flying4. But the merciless competition wagedby shipowners so as to reduce costs has contributed, in the 20th century,to the rise of the use of flags of convenience, allowing for legal, fiscal,and social dumping5. For this reason, nearly 45% of the world’s entirecommercial fleet is currently registered in Panama and Liberia6.

What are the consequences of this? A legal definition of responsi-bilities is currently virtually impossible in the case of disasters at sea,which can have serious environmental consequences. However, as re-gards international maritime law and the legal constructions tied tothe registration of ships, it is by no means an act of fraud to use amore beneficial or profitable flag on a vessel constructed in foreignshipyards. The phenomenon has even been institutionalised throughthe creation of bis flags-i.e., flags with a secondary registration7. Inthe case of France, a ministerial decree dated 17 June 1986 gave birthto the so-called «Kerguelen» registries (officially named TAAF, Terresarctiques et australes françaises, i.e., «Northern and Southern FrenchTerritories») for cargo ships and the «Wallis and Futuna» registries forcruise ships8. This decree was intended to counter the deflagging ofFrench ships (i.e., the use of another flag) by providing the possibili-ty of a reduction in costs, notably via the hiring of a partially foreigncrew.

Such practises are by no means new. If the current set of problemsdiffers in part from those of the 18th century, the use of the most ben-

Flying the Pope’s Flag 397

eficial flag has remained a constant in maritime trade, regardless ofnational allegiances and technical issues. The practise has been wide-spread since the beginning of the modern period, and notably withregards to Papal voyages. Although most of the attention the Romanstate has received involves religious and cultural issues9, we should notunderestimate questions related to maritime transport. With regards toissues concerning flags, tensions related both to maritime territorialisa-tion and to the lack of legal definitions of individuals had crystallised.Through the lens of the Roman case, it is possible to analyse the genesisof a policy pertaining to flags, and then to put this into perspectiveby looking at the economic actors capable of exploiting the loopholesof this policy. My analysis, rather than studying legal «transgression»,takes as its object these actors’ capacity to transform flag regulations.

xThe political space of the papal flag: a normative construction allowingfor multiple interpretations

How can we reconcile the lack of national carriers while invoking amercantilist policy that aims at active trade? This is the socio-economicequation that the Papal States were confronted with toward the mid-dle of the eighteenth century. From the standpoint of the Vatican’smaritime initiatives, the analysis of this key period, often called «re-formist»10, maps out a mercantilist perspective that is expressed in is-sues related to foreign trade: the way these initiatives were managedand administered provides examples of this perspective11.

A central character in the normative organisation of the Romanmaritime economy, the Camerlengo was also at the heart of the Vatican’sflag-related policies12. Parallel to the creation of its maritime tribunalin 1742, a redefinition of specifically maritime skills and competencieswas a significant aspect of the beginning of Benedict XIV’s papacy13.Indeed, as a result of the institutionalisation of Civitavecchia’s Conso-lato del mare, the powers of the Camerlengo over administrative mar-itime policies were strengthened by the Camerlengo’s new freedom togrant the Roman flag to trade vessels14. However, state intervention-ism tied to mercantilism arose as a source of contradiction, as it wasactually impossible to achieve the goal of active trade without a strongcommercial fleet. In the Roman case, the obviousness of this contra-diction was compounded by specific Papal features: in addition to var-ious forms of economic dependency, very few Roman vessels existed;shipbuilding activity had been reduced; and there were also few «Pa-pal» sailors on the Tyrrhenian Sea. These conditions would not allow


for active commerce without the devices of a legal-institutional con-struction.

This was the import of the later modifications made to the motuproprio of 1 March 1742. In 1749, a new decree made the stakes ofthe Vatican’s flag-related policies immensely clear15. In addition to theattempt at regaining control over the issuing of permits, and whilestrengthening the administrative framework16, the mercantilist policyconcerning the Roman passport also led to a new regulation conceivedin terms of national accounting since 174717. Aware of the fact thata local maritime workforce was missing (in 1749, the Roman state isdescribed as being scarsissimo di marinaresca (lacking seamen), an oldand well-known phenomenon, but one that people attempted to con-firm from an accounting perspective in 174718), the state’s redefinitionof flag-related policies seemed to expand the national economic per-spective via a «migratory» impulse. This term is, however, not apt withregards to maritime activities insofar as the determining social factorsof national identity are uncertain in the coastal navigations of the 18th

century. Does this situation represent the regularisation of the preced-ing one, or does it represent an actual strategy pertaining to flags?

The Camerlengo was henceforth authorised to issue the bandierapontificia (Papal flag) to foreign ship captains, which entailed a de facto«naturalisation» of the owner and his vessel, making them full sudditipontifici (Papal subjects)19. The ability of institutional actors to act out-side their territory also expanded thanks to the new role assigned toPapal consuls stationed in foreign ports. These consuls were henceforthauthorised to verify the permits that allowed the use of the Papal flag,and if necessary to issue a six-month extension when these permits ex-pired. This point deserves particular attention. Papal consuls stationedin foreign ports were now the bearers of a public prerogative, howeversmall it might seem, which involved them in the new mercantilist system.This prerogative resulted from the possibility of renewing foreigners’Roman passports, and of facilitating the process remotely. While theearlier decree (from 1747) established that the six-month extension wasonly to be granted within the jurisdiction of Papal ports, the geograph-ic, institutional, and social space of the Roman flag was now expandingaccording to interests that were no longer, strictly speaking, «intra-Pa-pal» ones. The new regulations of 1749 obviously did not represent atotal rupture with prior policies insofar as the presence of foreignersunder the Papal flag was already a reality. The essential difference laidin the institutionalisation of intermediaries charged with ensuring theadministration of activities according to criteria that redrew the atten-dant stakes. In this respect, the papacy of Benedict XIV was character-


ized by a will to renewal and a form of legal «wager», resting in parton the construction of the Roman consular network. This genesis wasintimately linked to issues concerning maritime trade, the constructionof the state, and the projection of the state outside its own territory.

xInstitutional agents and flag manipulation. The example of the tyrrhenian«Consoli Pontifici»

The flag-related policy launched in 1749 is in fact linked with con-sular aspects. The phenomenon appears with regards to the concreteapplication of Papal legislation that had quite blurry boundaries. Forit was indeed the consul who was theoretically responsible for flag reg-ulations and who was charged with applying these regulations to aninstitutional, economic, and social space that was arranged accordingto its own codes, objectives, and interests. Assuming that this spacecontributed to the structuring of a «territorial limb», the consul wasdefined as an interface between two spaces, between the state he rep-resented and the foreign port where he operated, participating in thelack of legal definition that characterised these policies. From this therefollowed certain qualities required for the consul to hold a position thatwas supposed to be defined according to significant empirical criteria.But that was in fact the source of flexible allegiances that revealed thedegree to which spaces were being divided up by the states. If the con-sul, a privileged agent of the legal, economic, and social articulation ofthe coastal space, could ultimately only be effective when serving twomasters, he still always put his own interests before all others.

At first, the way consuls were nominated was closely tied to the newflag-related policy and theoretically connected to Papal power. In ef-fect, a single authority linked the two prerogatives from 1741 onwards:the Camerlengo. The objective was clearly to control the issuing of per-mits by maintaining agents charged with guaranteeing extraterritorialadministration. Nevertheless, while the Camerlengo appointed foreignconsul in Civitavecchia who were still supposed to take local issuesinto account, the choice of Papal consuls abroad worked in a muchless autonomous way. The will to project Roman prerogatives via theintermediary of an extended network of agents came into contradictionwith the empirical nature of consular experience. In order to be effec-tive, the consul’s duty was to participate in the normative plurality ofport spaces by developing a strong institutional presence, which wasoften the source of his own irremovability from the post. In additionto adequate economic clout, the consul was an intermediary who was


sufficiently versed in local practices to be able to best defend the in-terests he represented. During the second half of the 18th century, theCamerlengo, after collecting (at times scant) the information he deemednecessary, appointed men who already had consular experience work-ing for other states, regardless of the fact that some of them still holdtheir other position at the time of their nomination. These criteria inno way guaranteed the defence of Roman extraterritoriality. However,it was via the intermediation of the consuls that the norms related toRoman flag use were enforced.

The consuls quickly sought to ensure complete management of theflag. It was a matter of claiming state prerogatives suitable for guar-anteeing legal independence, a source of great local power. These re-curring requests were specific to consuls with positions in the north-ern Tyrrhenian region, notably at Livorno, Genoa, and Marseille. Thiscomes as no surprise, for these ports together formed the economickeystone for traffic from Rome, and more broadly from the capital’simmediate coast. Assimilated in this way by the Roman power, the con-suls used the particular attention directed at this space to their advan-tage, and they manipulated the notion of active commerce to best servetheir own interests. Thus, the concession of the Papal flag followed acommercial logic that became consubstantial with the interests of Ge-noese ship captains. Reports by consul Gavi (a Genoese and a nobiledi Sarzana appointed to Livorno in October 1779 after the positionwas long vacant, and who was already consul of Liguria), attested to aLigurian fleet with Roman flags whose permits were to be renewed ona regular basis20. For example, the owner Giovanni Batta Baffico, whowas supposed to extend his permit, was clearly presented as a Genoesewho was now a naturalised Roman thanks to the decree of 174921. InMarseille, the consul Rangoni, appointed in 1770 and formerly consulof Ragusa, made efforts on behalf of captains whose ships had nothingRoman about them except their flags22. The quantifiable progress al-lowed for by this technique, however, did little to develop active com-merce, for most of the «Papal» fleet frequenting Marseille originatedfrom Ligurian ports, and specifically from San Remo and Savona – aphenomenon that reached its height in the middle of the 18th century23.Aside from the factual information inherent to consular administration,the consuls naturally went beyond the framework of their prerogativeand clearly urged the Camerlengo to issue more Roman passports toaccelerate flag-related naturalisations.


GRAPH 1. The Roman Flag in Marseille (1751-1789).Source: Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (ADBDR), Registres de l’Intendancesanitaire, séries 200 E 507-512 /515-517/524-526/535-537/543-545/549-551.x

The consul Pisoni, who had served in Genoa – in the oldest con-sulate – since 1782, unambiguously confirmed the Ligurian characterof the Roman fleet active in the Tyrrhenian Sea24. If the demands forpassports coming out of the consulate in Genoa were less numerous25,the consulate did not hide the competitive advantage of the Papal flag.The Genoese administration’s renewal of an edict aimed at limiting theright to hoist a foreign flag on Ligurian ships help us to understand theconsular interpretation26. Pisoni, by exaggerating the reach of a decreein force since 1728 and renewed at regular intervals, indicated that aliteral application of the text would make the Papal flag disappear fromthe Genoese port, since the so-called Roman vessels all belonged to theRepublic of Genoa27. This Ligurian «stranglehold» on the Papal flag iseasily explained. The Papal flag was adapted to northern Tyrrheniancoastal navigation. Yet, it was not exempt from the law of anchoragein the ports of Civitavecchia28 and Fiumicino29 – a situation that wasemphasized by the Roman legislation that was at first in disfavour withthe State’s own subjects, and that clashed with theories aimed at thedevelopment of (hypothetical) active commerce30.

In fact, the Papal flag provided the possibility of avoiding the vari-ous taxes paid both in the ports and moorings of the Republic of SanGiorgio and in the Tyrrhenian Sea: for example, the fee of 25 liras inthe case of stopping over in other Ligurian ports after a departure fromGenoa and the levy of a potential surplus of goods with regard to thevessel’s load. The Roman flag also allowed the ships to avoid – in addi-tion to consular fees in Naples equivalent to those owed by the Genoeseflag – inspections by the sbirri (police) in Genoa31. On the whole, the


Roman flag was clearly favourable for short-distance Ligurian voyages.The Roman government does not seem to have called this economicreality into question. The consuls, moreover, did not hesitate to advisegreater legal openness so as to accelerate the phenomenon: shrewd ex-perts on the weakness of the Roman fleet, the consuls attempted toconvince the Camerlengo’s administration to create a low-cost virtualfleet. Interestingly enough, the consular argument took root at the heartof mercantilist theories, notably ones that dealt with active commerce.Hence, the consul Pisoni never took offense at the small amount ofRoman traffic that originated from the ecclesiastical state as he wasprimarily concerned with the Ligurians’ ability to berth at different an-chorages of the Genoese coast by using the most suitable flag so as toavoid consular tax regulations32. His predecessor in Genoa, the consulPaganini, even proposed to lower the cost of Roman passport so as tointerest more Ligurian captains seeking to avoid visits by the sbirri33. In1788 in Marseille, the consul Rangoni painted the hiring of foreignersas something good for the Papal States’ commerce34. Far from beinglimited to the flag, the consuls’ requests became more specific, andmoved in the direction of delegating extraterritorial state power, whichwould certainly be a source of great local influence.

FIG. 1. Papal Merchant Flag (End of the 18th Century-1798).These flag reproductions were made by Roberto Breschi, a member of the Centro Italiano StudiVessillologici, and I have included them with his kind permission. The two figures representSaint Peter and Saint Paul, against a white background. While this flag was used from the secondhalf of the 16th century until the end of the 17th century, no specific rules existed for eitherthe military navy or the merchant navy. Ships often preferred to use a white flag with the coatof arms of the reigning pope. (A., Gli Stati dell’Italia centrale: Lo Stato della Chiesa – La Cittàdel Vaticano – La Repubblica Anconitana – La Repubblica Tiberina – La Repubblica Romana del


1798-99 – La Repubblica Romana del 1849, in « Armi Antiche », Parte I (1981), pp. 91-124; ParteII (1982), pp. 97-113). In 1825 the Papal government put an end to the «disorder» pertainingto the flag by establishing, with the circular of September 25, the shape, colour, and symbolsof the bandiera pontificia for the merchant navy and the fishing fleet, the military navy and thefinancial services (ASR, Camerlengato, Parte II, Titolo IX, b. 535, Marina: ‘Notificazione’ of17 September 1825 by the Camerlengo Galleffi).

FIG. 2. Papal Merchant Flag (1803-1825).Merchant flag adopted on 7 June 1815 but already in use at the beginning of the 19th century.The Papal tiara and the keys of Saint Peter, of which one was golden, are symbols that werealready in use in the 13th century. We find them all together around the 14th century, and inthis form on some Papal merchant flags at the end of the 16th century. It is thus quite likelythat this type of flag was also in use in the 18th century. As with the preceding period, the coatof arms of the pope in office was also used at the beginning of the 19th century (ZIGGIOTO,Gli Stati dell’Italia centrale cit.).x

The consul Gavi was clearly putting pressure on the Roman admin-istration in his correspondence with the Camerlengo in order to obtainthe prerogative of certifying documents in the name of the Papal States.According to him, the maritime tribunal of Livorno did not accept anydocument originating abroad, whether notarised or not, if it was not«certified» by the signature of the local consular representative (whoseduties also included possessing the national seal)35 – a regulation ap-plied in theory by all the other foreign consuls stationed in Livorno,and of course a source of revenue. Far from taking him on his word, theCamerlengo consulted the only Roman institutions in a position to sharetheir experience on the subject with him, the Consolati of Civitavecchiaand of Ancona36. The assertions of the consul Gavi were only partiallytempered by the opinions of the resident consuls (i.e., the judges) ofthe two maritime tribunals. While the Tyrrhenian side confirmed the


words of the consul, and added that, locally, the signature of registeredmerchants also certified foreign documents before the tribunal37, theinstitutional agents of Ancona disputed the legal character of the prac-tise38 – two conflicting opinions that are an invitation to examine thepotential connections between the consul Gavi and the nearby tribunalof the Consolato of Civitavecchia.

When we look into the relations between the judges of the Consola-to and the consular network present on Papal territory and abroad, it isof course the defence of local prerogatives that prevails, and little valueis set on the production of administrative documents countersigned bya consul. On the other hand, and from the perspective of close com-mercial collaboration with the institutional agent of the tribunal, theopinion of the Civitavecchia judges makes more sense. The agents ofthe free port, geographically close and economically tied to Livornineactivity, could not give up a partner of the calibre of Gavi, who wasamassing prerogatives and commercial anchorage. These different in-terpretations concerning the consuls’ functions can be explained withreference to local mercantile structures – the ties between the foreignconsuls and the judges of tribunal on the one hand, and the specula-tions enacted through the Roman flag on the other, followed differentlogics. They are, in other words, the consequences of a legal and socialfragmentation of mercantile practices on the same territory. Likewise,consular legislation proved to also be one of the major preoccupationsof the consul Pisoni in Genoa. Like Gavi, he asked to be an agent for alldocuments related to legal disputes. His words also evoke a prerogativethat all the consuls stationed in Genoa benefitted from39. By way ofcomparison, these claims are absent from correspondence sent by theconsuls of the Adriatic fringe.

Let us make no mistake about the requests of the three Tyrrhenianconsuls (Marseille, Genoa, Livorno). The institutional anchorage of ex-traterritorial origin, just like the private character of national expertise,provided a certain advantage for the administration of Ligurian trafficbearing the Roman flag as well as a legal representativity of which wefind an example in the procedures of the Consolato of Civitavecchia40;a positioning that these intermediaries forcefully defended by profitingfrom the limits of Papal administration. They were helped in this bythe institutional wait-and-see policies of the Roman government, whichalso explain the very entrenched social irremovability of consular staff.The vast majority of consuls stationed in foreign ports held onto theirposts until their deaths.

The weak experience of the Roman State in the economic manage-ment of maritime trade reinforced the phenomenon. Let us remember


that we are dealing with the early stages of the implementation of mer-cantilist doctrines, and that the consular network, just recently recre-ated, initially offered some feedback on the practical application ofnew legal instruments. It was thus a matter of compiling, assimilating,interpreting, and finally adapting and managing the new informationprovided. Let us therefore not attribute to the Roman government apurely black-and-white vision of the consular function. The Papal ad-ministration was well aware of the profits being made on the local level,but it also knew that the construction of a national fleet was practicallyat a standstill. The implementation of active commerce was thus fun-nelled through an accommodating flag policy in the context of nationalaccounting – and here, only the results mattered. A virtual navy couldinitially meet these objectives and hopefully lead to a ripple effect that,over the longer term, would allow for the development of actual activecommerce. The Camerlengo thus never took offense with the consuls atthe Ligurian presence under the Roman flag, rather, he lamented theirnumber, which he deemed too small.

In any case, the pressure from Roman government moved in thedirection of regulations that allowed for the cultivation of favourablestatistics – again, it was primarily a matter of accounting, not one ofactually generating new trade. The most important factor was thereforeto control the administrative legality of the permits, and not the peoplewho benefitted from them. Yet, and beyond the initial phase of gath-ering information and objectives that related solely to accounting, theCamerlengo’s administration only partially understood the shortcom-ings of the policy put in place in 1749. For all that, did the Roman statedesire – and did it have the means – to regulate their flag-related policy?

xRegulation, accounting, and legality: Diversity and contradiction of Ro-man flag-related policies

How should we interpret the belated enactment of the edict of13 January 1788 concerning the reduction by one sixth of the duties(sesto) on the goods imported and exported exclusively on Papal ves-sels provided that half the crew was of Papal origin41? Although it isdifficult to correlate this edict with a growing demand for flag-relatednaturalisation on the part of foreign ship captains, we are likely deal-ing with a «toning down» of the initial measures. The beneficial sestoaimed at attracting a Papal fleet that neglected Roman economic ter-ritory and at better establishing a lacking socio-professional category.Yet, the only justification for this measure was the economic promise of


a capital-centred market that was logistically pre-structured. Above all,and in addition to the fluidity of the definition of the sudditi pontificiat sea, this economic incentive once again gave a leading role to Papalconsuls abroad. Their certificates were sought after in order to provethat the loading of goods did indeed take place on a national vessel andnot via a transshipment of goods on the Papal coast (the same preroga-tive was granted to Papal customs officers)42. This system of inspectiongave these supposedly «state» agents free hand in characterising possi-ble contraband. These institutional intermediaries were therefore notchallenged when the enforcement and rolling out of these regulationsdepended on how these individuals perceived their own positions. Weare thus dealing more with transition process than with a real attemptat renewing the system related to flags. The primary objective lay else-where: it was related to accounting, but that accounting was contextu-ally inverted according to Papal coasts.

An estimate of the number of captains regularly sailing under Ro-man flag without holding the corresponding passport had already beencarried out from a territorial perspective in 174743. Nearly 40 years lat-er, we can observe the geographic expansion of the undertaking via areliance on consular intermediation. This is the import of the circularof May 1784 instructing the respective governors of Roman towns andprovinces to strengthen the inspection and control of the permits ofsudditi pontifici bearing the Papal flag44. In the preamble, the Camer-lengo makes it clear that the reasons behind his order are the numerouscomplaints by Papal consuls based in foreign ports concerning the gen-eral lack of documentary certification as well as the haphazard natureof this certification45. Taking into account an administrative territorythat was better marked out than it was in 174746, Rome was now nolonger willing to ignore the Adriatic fringe of its territory. The circu-lar also made clear that the taxes tied to the Roman passport wereto be reduced to encourage the captains to procure it. Far from en-visioning state pressure – such as the use of force – that would leadto uncertain outcomes, the Camerlengo’s administration adapted itspolitical programme to the realities on the ground; realities that dif-fered, however, from one Papal coast to the other. During the sameperiod, the Roman state had to face an antagonistic flag-related poli-cy on the Adriatic side as Roman mercantilism was in effect confront-ed with Austrian mercantilism, but in an opposite maritime and statecontext.

On 9 August 1783, the Camerlengo responded to the complaintsof the vice-consul of Zara (Zadar), Michele Neri, by noting that it wasextremely difficult for the government to understand the stakes and the


nature of the socio-economic mechanisms in the Adriatic47. The vice-consul informed the Camerlengo that a ship captain from Rimini, Mat-teo Antonuggi, had sold half of his ship (tartanone) to a merchant fromFiume (Rijeka) whose first name was Santarelli. The contract signedbetween the two individuals allowed the captain to raise both the Aus-trian and the Papal flag – a situation that the Camerlengo, after studyingthe contract and informing the Pope, judged to be legal all the same. Itwas thus recommended that no action be taken against this captain whobypassed the Roman consul via a commercial technique that was al-ready known on the Tyrrhenian side48. The fact that the highest author-ities in the Roman government were taking an interest in an individualsituation was a result of the extent of a practise that affected the eco-nomically active Papal fleet49. Indeed, the consul of Fiume, FrancescoSaverio Giommarini, warned the Camerlengo that several Papal fami-lies on the Adriatic coast had emigrated to the «Austrian» coast50. Theconsul was asked for more details, specifically concerning the numberof these families, their names, their origins, and especially the periodthat marked the beginning of this migratory movement51. The consul’scorrespondence, however, kept silent on the origin of the phenomenon.

TAB. 1. Papal Maritime Traffic in Fiume (1783-1791).

Year Number of Vessels

1783 1631784 971785 1561786 1831787 1931788 2011789 2051790 1521791 154

ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: ‘Estratti dal libro consolare’.x

In fact, for some maritime communities on the Papal coast, it wasa matter of adapting to the materialisation of a rival mercantilist poli-cy, that of the Habsburgs. In addition to the numerous extensions ofthe exemptions of the ports of Trieste and Fiume, the Empress MariaTheresa brought the latter port city under the crown of Hungary (ac-cording to the act of Corpus separatum of 23 April 1779) and, from 14February 1776 onwards, gave the city the same privileges as Trieste52.


Fiume thus became the natural outlet of the Danubian plain accordingto a new Imperial reorganisation whose initial effects were rapidly felt.From the end of 1776, the governor of Fiume demanded that the Pa-pal consul stationed there no longer be independent from the consulof Trieste53. Above all, the economic position of the Papal merchantswas now being contested, and the markets that they developed on the«Austrian» coast were being challenged. The merchants of Fiume werein effect opposed to the practice of the sudditi pontifici, which consist-ed of selling commodities at a piecework rate at the port, while the«Hungarian» government was preparing to take measures that werefavourable to the nationals54. It is thus not surprising that the consulsignalled renewed checks on permits allowing the Roman flag so as toavoid the smuggling of goods by declaring oneself a subject of the Em-pire. But it was easier for Roman ship captains to tie themselves to localsin order to gain legal benefit. These captains were simply adapting toa situation by taking advantage of the small amount of legal leeway attheir disposal; for these debates, more than a blind opposition betweentwo mercantile adversaries, focused primarily on economic reciprocity.In other words, the constraints and inconveniences caused by the liter-al application of a national policy was a means of inter-state pressureconcerning issues related to the balance of trade.

In Fiume, foreign merchants held the privilege of engaging in retailtrade, but had to pay the price (one florin per month), just like thevessels that transported commodities55. Henceforth, the citizens andresidents of Fiume, supported by the local government, claimed thatthis right was theirs alone and excluded the forestieri (foreigners)56 fromit, whereas in the free port of Ancona foreigners could conduct boththe wholesale and retail trade, both on vessels and in stores, withoutbeing heavily taxed57. The Papal merchants of Ancona even consideredpresenting their complaints to Vienna, despite the prohibition of theCamerlengo58. The point of contention was primarily the selling of grains(frumentone) originating from the Papal States. According to the con-sul, the Emperor would have learned that at Fiume the trade imbalanceof this import market was nearly 400,000 florins to the detriment ofthe Austrian side. Such an assessment, mentioned only by the consulin the sources consulted, explains the successive aggravations the Papalmerchants of Fiume were victims of – notably the increase of the sani-tary tax on imported grains. Without, however, assessing the exportswith the same degree of precision, Francesco Saverio Giommarini not-ed that the exports from Fiume destined for the Papal Adriatic coastwere far more important when they contained iron, wood, cotton, can-vas, and other products sold by a well-established network of Imperial


merchants59. The phase immediately following Fiume’s new autonomythus saw the end of a certain economic liberty and the application ofnew rules aimed at nationalising markets that were once tolerated. Itis clear that the Roman administration had to partially rely on reportsfrom the consul, who himself was jockeying for his institutional survivalin the heart of the city’s new government.

This, however, was not in line with the interests of the seafarers.Contrary to the northern Tyrrhenian situation, the Papal ship captainsvirulently clashed with the consular institution. The maritime commu-nities quickly came to understand that in order to survive in the heartof the traffic of Fiume’s free port, they had to adapt to the new legalconstraints. Starting in 1783, the consul in Fiume warned that manyowners of Roman vessels were signing «Austrians» onto their crew ros-ters or selling a third, or even half, of their vessels to merchants from theEmpire so as to raise the Imperial flag60. He also noted that a numberof families had migrated on the Austrian coast so as to take advantageof both Papal and Imperial identities.

We thus find, in the Adriatic space, the inverse of the problemspresent in the Roman space; and questions arise related to the oppor-tune lack of definition for seafarers in a given institutional framework,for these «emigrants» with a specific maritime socio-professional ori-gins. Francesco Saverio Giommarini, responding to the Camerlengo’srequest for more details on the phenomenon, even sought to criminalisethe Roman ship captains of the Austrian coast, who were all pilots andsailors. According to him, the reasons for their moving there could bereduced to two motives: to escape debt, and to marry with the localwomen so as to profit from a new nationality. He also asserted thatonce the debts were taken care of and the matrimonial advantages ex-hausted they would return to the Papal coast61. Since they were moresubject to socio-professional permeability than other groups, the consulclaimed that he could not provide precise profiles of these individuals,and asked how to act when confronted with flag-related practices thathe considered to be on the margins of legality62. For despite the vehe-mence with which he invoked, in his correspondence, the «nation» andPapal «nationals», the defence of Roman interests was clearly not oneof his priorities. Since 1778, he had been asking to levy consular rightson Roman vessels that anchored in the nearby port of Buccari (Bakar),even if they did not go to Trieste63. He also explained that he was un-able to respond to requests coming from the government of Ancona toconduct sanitary inspections (to be relayed to the Roman authorities)along with the issuing of the permits so as to better prevent epidemics64.Given that the ability to issue health permits was an influential factor


in terms of traffic, there is no doubt that the consul wished to favour alocal system without raising the attention of the Roman authorities.

This progressive divergence between consular interests and thoseof the captains culminated in an attempt at having the consul dismissedfrom his post. Since 1789, the ship owners of Ancona and Rimini hadrefused to pay consular fees in the port of Buccari, and only paid halfof those asked for at Fiume65. The consul denounced a veritable revoltby the ship captains, and the number of unpaid bills quickly grew66.The Papal owners thus set about having Giommarini replaced by goingdirectly to the governor general of Ancona67. The captains and ownersof Anconan vessels, who were engaged in important trade with the cityof Fiume, complained about the extension of consular fees accordingto the rates of Venice. As each vessel made more than thirty round-trip voyages each year, the losses, according to them, were outweighingthe profits, whereas the number of Papal owners docking in Venicehad been greatly reduced. They noted an impoverishment of the cityof Ancona. And above all else, they asserted that Francesco SaverioGiommarini should be dismissed because his relations with the govern-ment of Fiume clearly showed where his allegiance laid. He was regis-tered at the Council of Fiume, where decisions were made pertainingto the city, and he also, according to the captains, handled communi-tativi business affairs (it means the local citizen trade). He had thuscontributed to the creation of two new duties that directly concernedforeigners – a tax on shops and another on imported grains – despitethe «free» status of the port. Giommarini, like the other consuls atfault, was not challenged in his post, however, and continued to holdhis office. Until his death in May 1792, he would regularly denouncethe practises of Papal ship captains and merchants who attempted tocircumvent the new regulations68, most notably in 1790, when the gov-ernment of Fiume ordered that – when the freight rates were equal –nationals should be given preferential treatment in chartering69. ManyPapal merchants from Fiume thus built vessels on the coast of thefree port so as to raise the Imperial flag while maritime emigration in-creased. For Giommarini, this represented a new violation of his con-sular rights.

A privileged intermediary of the Roman government, FrancescoSaverio Giommarini certainly took advantage of his local moorings toobtain the job and perpetuate his institutional position. As he benefitedfrom the transformations of the status of Fiume, a new socio-economicspace opened up to him through his handling of two mercantilismsthat he was supposed to promote. By increasing foreign taxation whiledenouncing the use of the Imperial flag by Papal subjects, his actions in


and of themselves symbolised the paradoxes of the consular position.This was also the case with the ship captains and merchants who, fromone Papal shore to the other, applied the same economic techniqueson the margins of what was legal concerning flags. For if the consul ofFiume was not worried, the same cannot be said of the Adriatic shipowners who raised the Imperial flag. In this regard, the Camerlengo’sadministration seemed passive when faced with the rapid transforma-tions taking place, while the stakeholders of the practise, captains andconsuls alike, adapted their interests according to the choices at theirdisposal – choices that were not exempt from misinterpretations of thesituation70. Finally, the new normative apparatus that accompanied thegranting of the Papal flag, which began to materialise in 1749 and whichwas completed in 1788, seemed utterly ineffective for the large fleetthat navigated the Adriatic coast. From this perspective, naturalisationvia the flag, with an objective primarily concerned with accounting,proved to be a contextual legal creation that was clearly aimed at theTyrrhenian space and the «Romanisation» of maritime actors of theRipa / Greater Civitavecchia complex.

xConclusion

Far from being expressed by a stimulation of shipbuilding, anddue to a lack of state means, the balance between mercantilist aspira-tions and the practical reality of exchanges was expressed by an accom-modating and apparently inexpensive flag-related policy. This was asolution that cut both ways, however, for in allowing the mercantileworld to act on the margins of institutions and norms, the interpre-tation of fraud was emptied of all substance. The result of this wasthe contradiction of a “Roman” fleet external to the Papal territoryand closely tied to the interests of foreigners: active commerce fromthe perspective of transport but often lacking on the level of trade.The flag thus became the object of merchant speculation that tookplace on several levels of intermediation. Analysing how the authori-ties understood the phenomenon and whether they sought to put anend to it allows us to evaluate the positioning of legislators capableof manipulating institutional constraints. The interpretation of «insti-tutionalised» fraud by those who instituted it confronted the produc-ers of the norm with economic actors who expertly knew how to usethe legal loopholes at their disposal. If in this specific case economicrealities led the application of mercantilist theories astray, the conse-quences these political errors had on Roman maritime activities were


strongly felt with the normative strengthening of the following cen-tury.

Historicising the development of flag-related policies seems to beessential here. The example of a state under construction launchingitself into mercantilist politics without having the maritime means forits ambitions leads to an examination of notions of fraud, extraterrito-riality, state intermediation, and jurisdictional overlapping. The partic-ularities of maritime shipping defined a space where national claimstook shape both from the territory of origin and in the context of amaritime capacity that was, in theory, institutionally saturated. The per-sonality of the state mediator, whether consular or other, was importantin negotiating a reciprocity that depended on the balance induced bythat mediator between institutional frameworks, regulations, and therequirement of being a «national» within an extraterritorial context.

CHRISTOPHER DENIS-DELACOUR

Note al testo

1 The author would like to thank Mathieu Grenet for his take on the present reflexion onstate monopolies and the social and legal practices of maritime markets.

2 A. MALARDÉ, «Erika»: Le Naufrage de complaisance, Chatou, 2001.3 C.P. COUTANSAIS, Transport maritime: entre globalisation et développement durable, in

«Etudes», 3 (2010), p. 315.4 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed on 10 December 1982,

reaffirms this principle (L.A. DUVIC PAOLI, La Convention des Nations Unis sur le Droit de laMer: instrument de régulation des relations internationales par le droit, Paris 2011).

5 COUTANSAIS, Transport maritime cit.6 Ivi, p. 315.7 The bis flags were put into place by European countries to deal with competition from

flags of convenience. The fact of the matter is that they represented a second registry of shipsthat allowed them to refer to another labour law: for example, the Kerguelen flag involves adifferent labour code, the one in force overseas. This legal technique allows for partially foreigncrew to be hired according to the least burdensome social and fiscal laws. The bis registrieshave the same goal. But in this specific case, it is the sanctioning of extraterritoriality in the law:these registries clearly authorise the hiring of foreign crews under the national flag. These crewsdo not need to reside in the territory to which the ship is answerable, and they are recruitedaccording to the conditions specific to each state using the bis registry. This latter system alsoallows shipping companies to take advantage of exemptions from duties and taxes on crews.

8 Other European states followed suit: the registry of the Isle of Man, of Gibraltar, and ofHong Kong for Great Britain (active since 1894); the registry of the Dutch Antilles for Holland(1987); the registry of Madeira for Portugal (1989); the registry of the Canary Islands for Spain(1993) (J.-J. LAVENUE, Pavillon bis et concurrence: les enseignements de l’arrêt Firma Sloman du17 mars 1993, in M.-C. ROUAULT (dir.), Mélanges offerts à Émmanuel Langavant, Paris 1999, pp.241 and 244-247). Concerning the French legislation, also refer to Law No. 2005-412 from 3May 2005, published in J.O. No. 103, 4 May 2005.


9 The term «Roman» is not limited here (and in the rest of this essay) to the city of Rome,but is also used in the sense of «Papal». The documents consulted attest to the fact that thetwo names were equally present in maritime activities.

10 L. DAL PANE, Lo Stato pontificio e il movimento riformatore del Settecento, Milano 1959;F. VENTURI, Settecento riformatore, II La Chiesa e la Repubblica dentro i loro limiti (1758-1774),Torino 1976.

11 The mercantilist character of the reforms put in place from 1741 onwards should not beunderestimated, as they sometimes are (D. STRANGIO, Il banco del pesce e i conti della dognan aRomanel XVIII secolo, in V. D’ARIENZO, B. DI SALVIA (a cura di), Pesci, barche, pescatori nell’areamediterranea dal Medioevo all’età contemporanea, Milano 2010, p. 364).

12 The Camerlengo was the «head» of the Apostolic Chamber and the central figure of itsorganisation. He was the focal point of the administrative and economic authority of the PapalStates, and held «cumulative jurisdiction» with regard to the Chierici, Prefetti, Conservatori,Presidenti, and Tesoriere. In other words, even if these latter figures had actual fields ofcompetence and jurisdictions (e.g., the Praefectus Annonae and his court), the Camerlengo’sadministration kept hold of the various workings of the Papal administration by acting as asuperintendent. (M.G. PASTURA-RUGGIERO, La Reveranda Camera Apostolica e i suoi archivi(XV-XVIII), Roma 1987, p. 69). The Camerlengo was always a Cardinal recommended by thePope during a consistory (G. MORONI, Dizionario di erudizione storico-ecclesiastica da S. Pietrosino ai nostri giorni, Venezia 1841, vol. VII , p. 66).

13 Benedict XIV was Pope from 1740 to 1758. For more details, cf.: M. ROSA (a cura di),Enciclopedia dei Papi, Roma, 2000, vol. III, pp. 446-61.

14 The motu proprio of 1 March 1742 established the domains under his jurisdiction(PASTURA-RUGGIERO, La Reveranda Camera cit., pp. 70-1).

15 Archivio di Stato di Roma (henceforth ASR), Camerale II, Camerlengato e tesorierato,b. 4: motu proprio of 4 July 1759 (copy).

16 It was clear that permits allowing the Papal flag to be raised could be passed downfrom father to son, among brothers, or to strangers without there being any real inspectionof the issuing of the documents.

17 ASR, Biblioteca Collezioni bandi, b. 373 Camerlengo (1746-1755): «Editto sopra istendardi pontifici» from 28 July 1747 (Camerlengo Valenti).

18 According to the document, the absence of a fleet worthy of the name justified thebehaviour of the Papal shipowners who regularly broke the rules of maritime trade. This commentseems quite surprising given that it was formulated in the context of an official decree. Behaviourat the margins of mercantile rules was thus not unknown to the lawmaker. Concerning theevaluation of the number of vessels bearing the Roman flag, the edict from 28 July 1747 wasto perform the accounting of the passaporti, also called lettere patenti, permitting the raisingof the stendardo pontificio. For the Camerlengo and his staff, it was thus a matter of imposingtheir new prerogatives related to the issuing of the Roman flag. All owners who had, in thepast, obtained these documents when the Tesorierati (in charge of the fiscal management ofthe Papal States within the Apostolic Chamber) were the only ones authorised to issue them,had two months to send them to the administration of the Camerlengo, who was to reconfirmthem. After this period, the permit theoretically had no legal value. The results of this attemptat making an inventory, which foreshadowed a renewed tackling of the issue, are unknown(ASR, Biblioteca Collezioni bandi, b. 373 Camerlengo (1746-1755): «Editto sopra i stendardipontifici» from 28 July 1747 (Camerlengo Valenti).

19 Ibid. Note that on this specific point, the source of legislative inspiration was found inforeign policies («…nella maniera che sogliono praticare gli altri sovrani…»). Far from beingthe Roman government’s initiative, it was an act of imitation. Also present within the economicthought of the intellectual elite, we can find no traces of contradictory debates concerninga measure that apparently met with consensus at the time. It is thus difficult to determine


whether the potentially harmful consequences of legally manipulating the status of the flagwere taken into account.

20 These lists only contain names in the years 1780 and 1781, but the phenomenon isconfirmed by the number of the application submitted in view of renewing the passports (ASR,Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1 fascicolo 12, Livorno). The routes of «Roman» captains callingat Livorno generally left from Genoa and Chiavari, and to a lesser extent from Nice and Civ-itavecchia: Antonio Devoto, Sebastiano Raffo, Angelo Carbone, Paolo Carbone, Francesco Cic-chero, Lorenzo Cicchero, Pasquale Del Re, Antonio Gianella, Benedetto Fontanarosa, GiaccintoFontanarosa, Giacomo Copello, Giuseppe Gaiardo, Gaetano Sanguinetto, Giovanni Batta DelPino, Manuele Musso, Antonio Capoano, Giovanni Batta Baffico, Giuseppe Sciaccamara, NicolaBottino, and Pietro Levaga. In 1781, the 50 stopovers of Papal vessels in the port of Livornowere carried out by these 20 captains (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1 fascicolo 12, Livorno:«Nota dei bastimenti romani spediti dal consoli pontificio che risiede in Livorno in tutto l’anno1780, e suo ricavato di diritto consolare»).

21 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1 fascicolo 12, Livorno: letter from 3 February 1783.22 Among others, Antonio Gianella de Lerici, Lorenzo Osilia, Giovanni Batta Salamone,

Francesco Grosso, Gioacchino Nervi from Savona, Luigi Rocchino, Nicola Prato Di Giovanni,Antonio Raffi, Antonio Fontanarosa, and Bartolomeo Viale, all native Genoese who werenaturalised Romans (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 2 fascicolo 14, Marsiglia). The consulAndrea Rangoni belonged to a merchant family originally from Livorno and based in Marseille (C.CARRIÈRE, Négociants marseillais au XVIIIe siècle. Contribution à l’étude des économies maritimes,Marseille 1973, p. 928). His position was challenged until the Revolution. First accused of grossmismanagement by the Ragusan consulate of Marseille, he then went bankrupt in 1782, andended up grappling with a family scandal wherein several members of the Rangoni clan did nothesitate to incriminate him directly before the Camerlengo. The correspondence relating to thisaffair features prominently in the consulate’s documents. Andrea Rangoni was accused by hisnephew of having stolen his inheritance and squandered his wife’s dowry. Andrea Rangoni’s wifethen testified to the contrary, and begged that he be allowed to retain his office (ASR, CameraleII, Consolati, b. 2 fascicolo 14, Marsiglia: letter from 8 September 1787).

23 Consult Graph 1.24 Just like Andrea Rangoni, Giovanni Pisoni was apparently a far cry from being a source

of stability. In several anonymous letters sent to the Camerlengo after he was appointed consul,he was very critically depicted as the son of a simple servant from Genoa. His father, being quitepoor, sailed to China, where he entered into the service of the prince as a servant; he managedto earn a nest egg from the same prince after the latter’s death. He then returned to Genoaand created, with Sieur Bender, a factory of panni di seta. The business functioned quite welluntil the death of the father, who left Giovanni a substantial inheritance. Giovanni, however,was said to have squandered the nest egg and to have neglected the business, which he let anagent manage at his [Giovanni’s] expense. Giovanni Pisoni was also said to have only beeninterested in music («...s’ingerisci nelle fonzioni dove entravano musici, come pure d’ingeriscini funerali, invece curare ed attendere...»). Pisoni quickly found that his capital was used up,the furniture of his home almost all sold off, and his wife’s dowry nearly exhausted, and hechose to flee. The Genoese Senate therefore ordered an inventory of his property to repayhis debts. The curatori found musical scores worth 3000 scudi romani, and this is why he wasapparently nicknamed musico in Genoa (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 10, Genoa:an anonymous compilation of undated and unsigned letters, probably sent in 1783).

25 To our knowledge, eleven captains had recourse to the consul’s intermediation, notablytwo owners from San Remo, Antoine Calvo and Giovanni Carlo, who requested the right to raisethe Roman flag (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1 fascicolo 10, Genoa: letter from 25 April 1789).

26 More than a ban, it was a matter of better controlling the phenomenon and collect-ing some profit from it. The premises of the decree left space for institutional negotiations,with the possibility of obtaining official authorisation (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1,fascicolo 10, Genoa: «Legge, Dell’uno e l’altro consiglio proibitiva d’inalberare o far inalber-


are sopra qualunque bastimento nazionale altra bandiera che non sia della Repubblica Seren-issima salvo se non ne sarà ottenuta la permissione da Serenessimi Collegi» from 20 April1790).

27 «... se detta legge verra esattamente fatta osservare conforme si assicura non vi saraneppur uno che in avvenire arrivi in qesto porto con bandiera pontificia poiche quei pochi epiccolo bastimenti che qui ben di rado approdono con bandiera romana, sono tutti genovesi...»(ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 10, Genoa: letter from 15 May 1790).

28 ASR, Camerale III, Civitavechia, Ancoraggio, b. 839 tomo IV: ‘Regolamento stabilitodalla R. Cam. per il dazio dell’Ancoraggio da pagarsi da Bastimenti che giungono nel Porto diCivitavecchia à rata e seconda la portata e qualità de Bastimenti’ (1760). Only war buildingswere exempt from the tax.

29 ASR, Biblioteca Collezioni Bandi, b. 394 Tesoriere, 1761-1770: «Tariffa dell’ esigenza, chedovrà in avvenire effetuarsi nel porto di Fiumicino dal Ministro destinato ad esiggere l’iposizionedell’Ancoraggio per quelli Bastimenti che non spediscono Polizia a Capo Due Rami per Romaoltre l’Ancoraggio di Astura» from 21 December 1768. The tower of Astura was a hot spot forloading wood originating from the lush macchie camerali located south of the mouth of the Tiber.

30 During their stops in the port of Civitavecchia, Papal vessels encountered administrativerestrictions from which foreign vessels were exempt: «...Mi hanno essi riferito che li bastimentipontifici in questo porto sono soggesti alla visita, ed hanno le spese di ancoraggio, e patentesenza aggravio di consolato, e cosi si supponne praticarsi in ogni porto di sua santita. La bandieraspagnola, francese, napolitana, toscana, suedese, danese, maltese ed ottomana sono tutte franchein questo porto di visita, pagando soltanto le spese di porto, ancoraggio, patente e consolato.La bandiera francese, e tutte le nazioni del nord godono in Spagna la franchigia di giorni sette,espirato detto tempo, sono soggete alla visita, e le altre nazioni al giunge che fanno in quei portirimangano immediatamente...» (ASR, Camerale II Consolati, b. V fascicolo 3, Civitavecchiaconsolati affari navali e di commercio, 1779-1794). Also consult G. MIRA, Contributo alla storiadei trasporti marittimi nel Settecento. I trasporti marittimi da Ancona a Civitavecchia nel quadrodell’economia del tempo, Bari 1953.

31 L. LO BASSO, Il Sud dei Genovesi. Traffici marittimi e pratiche mercantili tra l’Italiameridionale, Genova e Marsiglia nel Settecento, in B. SALVEMINI (a cura di), Lo spazio tirreniconella grande trasformazione. Merci, uomini e istituzioni nel Settecento e nel primo Ottocento,Bari 2010, pp. 239-262.

32 «...numero i capitani e padroni che navigano in questi mari con la bandiera pontificia evari di questi approdano nelle riviere ove non hanno chi l’invigili fanno in un tutto a modo loro conabusare della patente ora alberano la Romana e dora quella bandiera piu aggrada per esserne divarie provisti e cosi ancorando in questo porto ricorrono da quel console chè piu le accomoda...»(ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 10, Genoa: letter from 15 November 1783).

33 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 10, Genoa: letter from 30 November 1782.34 Toward these ends, he requested the right to himself «naturalise» foreign shipowners

who applied (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 2, fascicolo 14, Marsiglia: letter from 30 May 1788).35 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 12, Livorno: letter from 26 January 1781.

The consul Gavi renewed his request on 9 April 1781.36 The Consolati of Civitavecchia and Ancona were the two tribunals in charge of judicial

conflicts over maritime trade, on the Tyrrhenian and the Adriatic seas respectively.37 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 12, Livorno: letter sent from Civitavecchia

to the Camerlengo by the resident consuls Michelangelo Bianchi, Giovanni Pietro Betti, andFrancesco Maria Guglielmotti on 21 March 1781.

38 «…in esso tribunale bene spesso si producono documenti provenienti da paesi esteridove residioni i consoli pontificy o di altre nazioni senza che siano legalizzati da alcun consolema soltanto col segno del notaro rogante o colla legalità dei Nunzi Apostolici o di due o tre firmedei mercanti, il di cui carattere sia cognito in questa piazza…» (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b.1, fascicolo 12, Livorno: letter sent from Ancona by Giuseppe Baldi on 9 March 1781).


39 The previous year, the consul Paganini also referred to the fact that legalising thedocuments would allow them to increase consular pensions and conform to the standard practisesof other countries. While he claimed to be wealthy enough to do without such a pension,his coadiutore Pisoni would need to ensure his own livelihood due to the small number ofPapal vessels stopping in the Ligurian port. We may, however, question the initiative of therequest by the consul Paganini, by then 87 years old and blind, and who relied on Pisoni foreverything (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 1, fascicolo 10, Genoa: letter from 30 November1782 to the Camerlengo).

40 C. DENIS-DELACOUR, Consolato del mare, Consoli et Capitani à Civitavecchia (1742-1797). L’expression institutionnelle du positionnement économique des acteurs, in «Rivesméditerranéennes», 41 (2012), pp. 161-82.

41 ASR, Biblioteca Collezioni Bandi, b. 127 (1788): ‘Notificazione sul rilascio della sestaparte delle gabelle sopra le merci , le quali tanto per la via di Mare , come per quella di Terras’introducono nelle Cinque Provincie dello Stato Ecclesiastio, e respetivamente dalle medesimesi estraggono dai Nazionali» from 13 January 1788 by the Card. Ruffo, Tesoriere Generale.

42 Ibidem, Clause III.43 The aforementioned edict from 28 July 1747 only had Roman scope. It was intended to

be published in the ports of Ancona and Civitavecchia and in the small nearby ports, as wellas in Anzio (ASR, Biblioteca Collezioni bandi, b. 373 Camerlengo (1746-1755): ‘Editto sopra istendardi pontifici’ from 28 July 1747 by the Camerlengo Valenti).

44 The Camerlengo noted that a decree would appear following this circular. That documentwas not found (ASR, Carteggio del Camerlengo della RCA, Outgoing Correspondence, Vol.16 (1784), pp. 366-7).

45 Here we can find the problematic issues related to the creation of a state category that,in the case of ship captains, covered a flexible «national» reality that was difficult to define.The circular noted that it was necessary to compile a list of all these captains with their familynames, their forenames, the number and kind of vessels leaving Papal ports, and also whetherthe captains and owners were sudditi by birth or by residence (ibid.).

46 The areas of inspection were carefully specified: ports of the region of Fermo, includingGrottammare; ports of the state of Urbino; ports of the legazione of Ferrara («…I legni che permare o per i canali interni fanno commercio di mercanzie o passageri in codesta legazione…»);Recanati; Monte Santo; Ascoli; Ancona; Fano; Civitavecchia; Nettuno; and Ravenna (ibid.).

47 ASR, Carteggio del Camerlengo della RCA, Outgoing Correspondence, Vol. 15 (1783).48 Notably in the context of activity from the port of Ripa Grande in Rome (C. DENIS-

DELACOUR, I Gaetani di Ripa Grande-Tra le città e lo Stato, essere sudditi pontifici sul mare nelSettecento, in « Quaderni Storici », 138 (2011), pp. 729-64).

49 The Roman merchant fleet on the Adriatic side was far superior in tonnage and manpowerto the fleet operating on the Tyrrhenian side (G. MARIANO, L’industria armatoriale nei territoridello Stato Pontificio dal 1815 al 1880, Roma 1961). Consult Table 1 for an overview of Papalmaritime traffic in Fiume.

50 It was a matter of the Austrian coast belonging to the Habsburgs, consisting of theenclave of Trieste to the north of Istria and, further south, the port of Fiume.

51 ASR, Carteggio del Camerlengo della RCA, Outgoing Correspondence, Vol. 15 (1783).52 Concerning Fiume in particular, consult the extremely valuable journal Fiume-Rivista

di studi adriatici, and especially G. VIEZZOLI, Contributi alla storia di Fiume nel Settecento, in«Fiume», X (1932), pp. 3-178 and XI-XII (1933-1934), pp. 61-187. For complementary works,cfr.: G. KOBLER, Memorie per la storia della liburnica città di Fiume, Fiume 1896; A. DE CORTI,Fiume dalle sue origini al 1945, Roma 2000; M. DASSOVICH, Fiume, Segna e le vicende del Quarnerointerno dal periodo medievale al 1717: i traffici altoadriatici fra rivendicazioni veneziane e contrap-posizioni di Narentani, Uscocchi, potentati assurgici, Udine 2007; M. DASSOVICH, Navigazione ecommerci nell’Adriatico del XVIIIe secolo: l’ultimo secolo del Golfo della Serenissima, Udine 2008.


53 The consul Giommarini took advantage of this occasion to request authorisation to alsobe the consul of Malta, as was the case for the Papal consul serving in Trieste (ASR, CameraleII, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 16 November 1776).

54 Ibidem.55 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: «Informazione per ricorrere alla

tassa di fiorini 12 l’anno agli esteri venditori alla minuta», no date.56 The consul specified that this related to the commerce of thirty Anconitan merchants

who ran a store in Fiume. The redefinition of the maritime forestiero was thus at the heart ofdebates arising from a mercantilist policy becoming more rigid (ASR, Camerale II Consolati,b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 18 May 1781).

57 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3 fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter by Luigi Gazzoli sent fromAncona on 15 June 1781.

58 The consul decried this initiative, making reference to the Camerlengo’s orders (ASR,Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3 fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 17 July 1781).

59 Ibidem.60 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 12 June 1783.61 «...si tratta di gente che viaggia per mare, cosi deve aspettarsi il di loro ritorno...» (ASR,

Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 29 January 1784).62 The Camerlengo told him to take example of the other consuls, without any further

elaboration (ASR, Carteggio del Camerlengo della RCA, Outgoing Correspondence, Vol. 16(1784), p. 94).

63 On this occasion, guidance was sought from the Papal consul of Venice (ASR, CameraleII, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter by Agostino Del Bene sent from Venice on 18May 1778).

64 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 15 July 1788.65 The consul denounced nine of the recalcitrant captains to the Camerlengo (ASR, Camerale

II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 13 February 1789).66 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 7 May 1789.67 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: pro memoria, no date.68 Following Giommarini’s death, the Camerlengo received a considerable number of

candidates to replace him, who either came from Fiume or from the Papal Adriatic coast.Some availed themselves of support from the members of Fiume’s sea tribunal, others of theirposition as vice-consul, or of their relationship with Vienna. It was Vincenzo Cordella who finallyreceived the position, and he was obliged to pay a pension to Giommarini’s widow. We alsolearn, at the settlement of Francesco Saverio Giommarini’s estate, that Giommarini was bornin Grottammare, a port city on the Papal coast (ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo4, Fiume: letter from 12 September 1794).

69 ASR, Camerale II, Consolati, b. 3, fascicolo 4, Fiume: letter from 10 December 1790.70 The Camerlengo was aware of the parallels between the situations on the two Papal

coasts, especially the Genoese stranglehold on the Tyrrhenian side. To Giommarini, whodenounced the double allegiance (Imperial and Papal) of Adriatic vessels, he replied: «…nelmare mediterraneo viaggiano molti legni massime genovesi per la proprietà li quali approdandonei porti si prevalgono dei consoli pontificy...» (ASR, Carteggio del Camerlengo della RCA,Outgoing Correspondence, Vol. 16 (1784), p. 94).

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