Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249

Fisheries management in Central Maluku, Indonesia, 1997–98

Irene Novaczeka, Juliaty Sopacuab, Ingvild Harkesc,*aHolland College, Charlottetown, PEI, Canada

bCollege of Forestry and Environmental Science, State University of New York, Syracuse, NY, USAc Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Community Development, North Sea Centre, 9850 DK Hirtshals, Denmark

Received 2 April 2001; accepted 21 April 2001

Abstract

Interviews with government staff responsible for fisheries management in Maluku, Indonesia in 1997–98 revealed problems incapacity, and an emphasis on economic development rather than management. The traditional institutions which persisted in somevillages to regulate the access and withdrawal rights over key inshore species, were also disjunct from government departments. Theperiod following December 1998 is marked by political upheaval, legislative change that (in theory) decentralized governance over

inshore waters, and violent unrest centered in Maluku. All these make the data collected in 1997–98 of historical interest. The stateof fisheries management in Maluku remains undefined, pending further legislative reform and peace that will allow governments andcommunities to negotiate and implement new institutional arrangements. r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Marine management; Indonesia; Decentralization; Legislative reform

1. Introduction

In Central Maluku, natural resources are managedunder a traditional system of rights and rules called sasi[1–4]. In 1997–98, research into the status of commu-nity-based fisheries management in Ambon, the LeaseIslands and part of Seram (Fig. 1) revealed that sasi wasunder stress and facing threats that could conceivablycause its demise [5]. As a part of the work ofcharacterizing the context of and outside influences onthe local management institution, data were collectedconcerning the activities and attitudes of governmentdepartments having jurisdiction over various aspects offisheries management and development. At that point oftime, President Suharto was still in power and formalfisheries management was primarily the domain of ahighly centralized national power structure. Since then,Suharto has been removed from power and in 1999dramatic legislative changes were set in place (Law 22,1999) that in theory devolved powers of management ofcoastal waters to the provinces and districts [6].

Unfortunately, the potential positive impact this mighthave had on local fisheries management institutions hasbeen overshadowed by the devastating ethnic andreligious conflicts that have prevailed in Central Malukusince December 1998. Thus, these findings are nowhistorical in nature, with the future reality of fish-eries management in the region being difficult topredict.

2. Methods

Maluku province in eastern Indonesia is known as theprovince of a thousand islands. In fact there are 1027islands, covering about 10% of the entire area of theprovince and occupied by about 1.8 million people (1990census). The research area, Central Maluku, includestwo administrative districts, namely Kabupaten MalukuTengah and Kotamadya Ambon. It is located at 21500–31500 South Latitude and 1261550–1281450 East Long-itude. Research was focused on the islands of Ambon,Seram, Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut. Interviewswith the various government bureaus involvedin fisheries control, management and enforcement(Table 1) took place in 1997–98, in Ambon city(provincial capital of Ambon Island), in Masohi (district

*Corresponding author. Jaagpad 36, 2394 CN, Hazerswoude

Rijndijk, Netherlands. Tel.: +31-71-3415042.

E-mail addresses: inova@isn.net (I. Novaczek), ansye@hotmail.

com (J. Sopacua), iht.harkes@12move.nl (I. Harkes).

0308-597X/01/$ - see front matter r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

PII: S 0 3 0 8 - 5 9 7 X ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 1 6 - 1

capital of Seram Island), and in the sub-district offices inthe islands of Haruku and Saparua. In addition,published documents detailing law and policy werereviewed. Information regarding the perception ofpeople in coastal villages of Central Maluku was drawnfrom the interviews with village government officials,traditional leaders and fishing families, that wereconducted as part of a larger study on the localmanagement institution, sasi [5].

3. Results

3.1. Formal jurisdiction over marine waters prior to thepassing of Law 22, 1999

Under national law, the sea and all its resources were(and still are) considered to be the property of thenational government of Indonesia. National fisheriesand coastal management consisted of rules and regula-

Fig. 1. Map of Central Maluku. Source: Adapted from Peter Loud, 1997.

Table 1

Respondents interviewed to gather information on fisheries management in Central Maluku in 1997–98

Topic Method Place Department Number of

interviews per

department

Government management

structure at provincial,

district and sub-district

levels

Semi-structured interviews Ambon city (provincial

capital); Masohi (District

capital); Saparua Island,

Haruku Island (sub-district

offices)

BAPPEDA (Planning) 4

Dept. of Forestry 2

Dept. of Fisheries

Provincial 1

(Sub-) District 8

Dept. of Transport 4

Law Bureau 1

Environment Bureau 1

Police 3

Navy 2

Total 26

I. Novaczek et al. / Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249240

tions administered by more than 20 largely uncoordi-nated ministries [7,8]. The consequences of poorlyorganized management structures at the national levelcould be seen in terms of confusion, lack of informationand poor motivation at provincial and regional levels.Efforts to redress the problems included the establish-ment of a national, multi-ministerial body (DKN)charged with coordinating marine development andconservation policy. There was already pressure towardsdecentralization and the national government wasencouraging provinces to back up national law bydeveloping more detailed and locally appropriateprovincial legislation. Under Act No. 24, 1992, onspatial planning, regional governments were given themandate to zone coastal areas and to establish manage-ment plans in consultation with village level govern-ments. In 1997–98, policy-makers were attempting toclarify whether the zonation of territory could beextended into the sea, giving the province powers tozone marine waters for various commercial andconservation purposes. As of 1998, consultation withthe village level on coastal zonation and planning hadbarely begun. Also, comprehensive operational rules atthe provincial level were still lacking for most nationallaws pertinent to coastal management. Maluku pro-vince, however, had developed some regulations, forinstance those prohibiting the mining of coral, thecutting of mangroves and the capture of dolphins.

3.2. National laws affecting artisanal and small-scalefisheries

National level laws that, if enforced, affect Maluku’sartisanal fishers stem largely from two pieces oflegislation: Law No. 9, 1985 on Fisheries and theAgriculture Minister Decree No. 607, 1976 concerningfishing zonation. Consequent to these laws, the use ofdestructive gear types such as explosives and poisonswere prohibited. An inshore fishing zone was designatedfor use by small-scale and artisanal fishers, and meshsizes in nets were regulated. All meshes had to be over25mm, whereas seine nets for tuna and skipjack were toexceed 60mm. Fish habitats including coral reefs,mangroves and sea-grass beds were specifically pro-tected under the Biological Resource Conservation ActNo. 5, 1990. Forty eight marine mammals, birds, crabs,shellfish and coral species were declared protectedspecies, including some that were at that time commonlyharvested in Maluku i.e. turtles, dugong, coconut crab,top shell, giant clams and a number of other edibleshellfishes. A few marine protected areas were also setup, including Pombo Island in Haruku Strait in CentralMaluku. However, the majority were ‘‘paper parks’’with little or no effort made to manage or protectthem.

3.3. Key management issues

In spite of its huge marine territory, Indonesiahistorically has no separate Department of Fisheries.In 1998, Fisheries was a division under the Departmentof Agriculture. The country was divided into ninefisheries resource management areas, two of which laywithin Maluku province. For each area there was anannual exercise of setting Total Allowable Catch, whichwas in turn linked to the standard fisheries managementconcept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Anattempt was also underway to determine the maximumeconomic yield (MEY) and maximum social yield(MSOY).

Officially, the Fisheries Agency was in favor ofresponsible fisheries, but in reality there was tremendouspressure to increase fishery-based income and employ-ment as rapidly as possible, especially through increas-ing the industrial fleet targeting pelagic fish in the deep-water EEZ (V. Nikijuluw, pers. comm. 1998). The 1997MSY estimate for the nation was 6.1 million tonnes, andgovernment statistics suggested that the catchesamounted to only 40% of this potential yield. Also,according to government statistics, Maluku provincealone had a standing stock of fish and shrimp totalling2.74 million tonnes. MSY, calculated as 50% of stock,was therefore estimated to be 1.37 million tonnes. Totalcatch in 1997 was only 24.4% of the theoretical MSY,leading the national government to promote an expan-sion of the industrial fishery.

However, the reliability of the government figurescould be questioned. One major problem with thenational expansionist policy and with the process ofsetting catch limits was that calculations of potentialyield were extrapolations from stock assessments con-ducted in the early 1980s. These old data wereaugmented with catch statistics that were limited intheir coverage and often of unknown or suspect quality(Proceedings of the National Conference on the Role ofCommunities in Coastal Resource Management inIndonesia, 1996).

LIPI, a national research institution, had plans todevelop and introduce a system sometime in the future,but as of 1998 Maluku had no coherent, comprehensiveand reliable system for collecting catch data [9]. It waswidely acknowledged that fishing boats from otherprovinces and countries frequently failed to land theircatches in Maluku, preferring to trans-ship at sea. Thus,these catches would go unrecorded. Hence, despitehaving, in theory, a large available fish biomass, severalimportant commercial stocks were in fact already over-fished and declining in Maluku (Governor Latukonsina,pers. comm. 1998).

A second key issue was the lack of enforcement powerto defend Indonesia’s vast EEZ from illegal fishing byforeign and domestic boats, including live fish traders

I. Novaczek et al. / Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249 241

using potassium cyanide. This illegal fishing alsocontributed to the total of unrecorded fish catches [10].

The third key issue was one of allocation: the need tobalance industrial scale fisheries serving export marketswith the need for local food security and employmentfor coastal communities. In the Agriculture MinistryDecree No. 607, 1976 Indonesian waters were dividedinto zones in an attempt to reserve inshore waters for theartisanal and small-scale sectors. Under this law, vesselsover 5GT were prohibited from fishing within 3 miles ofshore; vessels over 25GT had to operate over 4 milesfrom shore; and vessels over 100GT had to stay 5 milesfrom shore. Small boats were free to enter the offshorefishing grounds at will. This was one of the laws that wasnot effectively enforced, with the result that clashesbetween the industrial sector and coastal communitieswere increasingly common [11]. Those behind the drivefor further expansion of industrial fleets failed toacknowledge this problem.

3.4. Agencies involved in fisheries management anddevelopment in Maluku

The planning board, BAPPEDA, is a coordinationinstitution under the national planning board BAPPE-NAS. In 1998, BAPPEDA held a strategic position forcoordinating the development of various sectors in theregion, including fisheries, and had offices at bothprovincial and district levels. The provincial office ofBAPPEDA was also the governor’s office. The provin-cial governor held two positions: he was the head of theprovincial government as well as the provincial repre-sentative of the Minister of Internal Affairs. BAPPEDAhad a close working relationship with the Department ofInternal Affairs.

BAPPEDA at that point had largely concerned itselfwith the expansion of fisheries rather than with manage-ment or conservation. The department was also incharge of environmental impact assessment. However,assessments that took place were typically very narrow,not cross-sectoral.

In Maluku, attempts to rationalize fisheries develop-ment policy led BAPPEDA to develop the conceptcalled ‘‘Gugus Pulau and Laut Pulau’’. Under thisscheme, the province was divided into eight clusters of

islands (the Gugus Pulau), with the Laut Pulau being theareas of open sea between these clusters. In 1998, thesedivisions were still only poorly defined areas on paper,and were not operational management units. Oneproblem that the provincial planners faced was thatthe administrative boundaries of districts and sub-districts did not coincide with ecological boundaries.

Among its many tasks, BAPPEDA had to overseefisheries development project planning. However, muchof BAPPEDA’s energy tended to be directed towardslarge international development projects rather than thesmaller programs for fisheries development. Once theplanning of a fisheries project had been completed byBAPPEDA, implementation would be left to the Fish-eries Agency, which also had economic development asits first priority. So, in practice, there was no coordinat-ing body focused on coastal and marine resourcesmanagement and protection.

The various agencies and institutions involved in thefishery resource management system in Maluku could beclassified into two major groups; both groups werecoordinated through BAPPEDA (Table 2). Group I wasthe group of institutions directly involved in the fisheryactivities and dealing with the supply of skilled humanresources in the marine and maritime areas; the supplyof maritime facilities such as ships, harbors, and otherequipments; facilitating training; and the provision ofnecessary funding (according to formal regulations).Group II was a group of institutions that dealt withmarine and fishery problems as a subset of their duties.In addition there was the national research institute,LIPI, which was to provide information to policymakers. LIPI had a regional research center in Ambon.

Twenty-six key respondents from various govern-mental institutions at provincial and lower levels, wereinterviewed to identify their roles in fisheries develop-ment and management, and the strengths and weak-nesses of each agency (Table 3). Roles were tabulatedunder the following management functions: (1) informa-tion gathering and provision, (2) project planning, (3)project implementation, (4) evaluation of projects(physical and legal aspects), (5) enforcement of fisherieslaw, (6) funding of projects, (7) routine fisheries policyimplementation, and (8) issuing permits and licenses andcollection of taxes and fees.

Table 2

Government bodies involved in fisheries management at the provincial level (1997–98)

BAPPEDA

Group I Group II

Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan) Dept. of Internal Affairs (Dep. Dalam Negeri)

Dept. of Transport (Dep. Perhubungan & Dirgen Perhubungan Laut) Dept. of Forestry (Dep. Kehutanan & Dirgen PHPA)

Navy (TNI Angkatan Laut) Environment Bureau (Biro Lingkungan Hidup)

Police (Polisi Republik Indonesia) Law Bureau (Biro Hukum)

I. Novaczek et al. / Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249242

Table 3

Government agencies involved in fisheries management in Maluku provincea

Institution Level Management function Strengths Weaknesses

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

BAPPEDA

(Planning Board)

Provincial * * * * * * The only coordination

body at the provincial

level

Limited capacity for

cross-sectoral impact

assessments

Focus on large

development projects

District * * * * * * The only coordination

body at the district level

Limited capacity for

cross-sectoral impact

assessments

Focus on large

development projects

Fisheries Agency

(Dept. of

Agriculture)

Provincial * * ** ** * * * * Human resources

available

Limits of authority not

clear

Means and operational

budget limited

Staff not highly skilled

District

(Kotamadya)

* * ** ** * * * * Human resources

available

Authority unclear; not

autonomous from

provincial office

District

(Kabupaten)

* * ** ** * * * * Human resources

available

Autonomous (in theory)

Authority unclear

Budget and means limited

Scientific data limited

Sub-district * * * * * Close to the field

programs and projects

Authority limited

Means limited

Budget limited

Human resources limited

(quantity and quality)

Top-down system

Staff motivation poor

Police Province and

District

* * The only investigation

body (KUHAP)

Limits of authority

unclear relative to Navy

Human resources

available

Motivation low

Means limited

Operational budget small

Sub-district ** * * Officers available at the

village level

Authority unclear

Motivation low

Means limited

Operational budget small

Human resources limited

(quantity and quality)

I.Novaczek

etal./MarinePolicy

25(2001)239–249

243

Navy Provincial * ** * * Human resources

available

Operate only at the

provincial level

Full authority (SK

Pangab)

Patrol deep water areas,

not inshore

Means available Collaboration and

coordination with police

weak

Budget available

Good reputation in the

community

Dept. of

Transport

(Perhubungan

Laut)

Provincial * * ** ** * * * Human resources Motivation poor

Operational budget

available

Supporting means limited

Authority (supported by

law)

District * * ** ** * * Authority Motivation poor

Means limited

Operational budget small

Human resources weak

Sub-district * * * * Close to the activities Authority insufficient

Money and means limited

Human resources

inadequate

Environment

Bureau

Provincial * * Human resources

inadequate

Weak laws

No role in coordination

Jurisdiction and authority

unclear

Relationship with

environment section of

BAPPEDA confused

Dept. of Forestry

(Resource

conservation

section)

Provincial * * * * * Direct authority under

CITES to protect

endangered species

Budget and means limited

Motivation weak

Jurisdiction unclear

Limited to protected

species and national

parks; no input into

fishing quotas

Table 3 (continued)

Institution Level Management function Strengths Weaknesses

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

I.Novaczek

etal./MarinePolicy

25(2001)239–249

244

The interviews revealed that information gatheringand dissemination was performed by all agencies withthe exception of the police. The planning of fisheriesdevelopment projects involved BAPPEDA, all levels ofthe Fisheries Agency, the Law Bureau, and villagegovernment heads. Depending on the type of theproject, provincial and district levels of the Departmentof Transport and the resource conservation section ofthe Department of Forestry might also be involved.Interestingly, the Environment Bureau did not identifythis as one of their areas of activity. They only becameinvolved during the implementation of a project, alongwith BAPPEDA, the Department of Forestry, theDepartment of Transport, the Fisheries Agency, andregional, district, and village government heads. Ingeneral, the Environment Bureau was a very weakplayer, not in the least because its area of jurisdic-tion relative to the environment section of BAPPEDAwas unclear. Most agencies (except for the Environ-ment Bureau and Law Bureau) had a responsibilityfor evaluating physical and legal implications ofprojects, but evaluation and feedback for a new projectplanning was also an area of extreme weakness in thesystem.

Formally, enforcement was a shared responsibility ofthe police, the navy and the Fisheries Agency. TheDepartment of Transport played a role in enforcinglicensing regulations, whereas various governmentoffices facilitated reporting of offenses or, in the caseof village chiefs, applied sanctions available under localgovernment and sasi rules.

Funding for fisheries development either camefrom BAPPEDA, the Fisheries Agency and Departmentof Forestry or was supported by local governmentcoffers. Most agencies performed routine managementtasks, while licensing and collection of fees andtaxes were the special purview of the Fisheries Agencyand Department of Transport. The EnvironmentBureau, Department of Forestry and provincialand district government offices were not directlyinvolved in day-to-day fisheries management tasks.The conclusion of these findings was that there was aclear need for communication and coordination amongagencies.

Key findings from the interviews of government staffwere as follows:

* There was no special institution to manage coastaland fishery resources. The management aspects weredivided among a range of institutions. This causeddifficulties in coordination.

* Authority seemed to be an important factor in themanagement process. Because of the top-downapproach, determination of limits of authority hadto precede any decision and often nothing was donewithout explicit approval from a higher level.L

aw

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.

I. Novaczek et al. / Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249 245

* Limited human resources and poor motivation verymuch affected all levels of the management system.

* Staff in every agency and at every level revealed a lackof knowledge of fisheries law and managementprinciples.

* Limited equipment, facilities and funding hinderedmanagement and enforcement functions. Budgetaryproblems were most critical at the lower (sub-district)levels, which greatly hindered both enforcement andthe transfer of training and information at the villagelevel.

* Sustainability of resources and habitat were lowpriorities compared to the expansion and develop-ment of fisheries.

* Better scientific data and greater cooperation withresearch institutions and universities were deemed tobe essential in order to support the managementsystem.

* Technical guidelines from the national levelwere inadequate. For example, national instruc-tions to collect taxes on shellfish were notaccompanied by instructions on implementing sucha tax.

* Since the village could carry out many fisheriesresource management functions, it meant that intheory the village held an important role in themanagement process. However, a legal basis for thevillage role, and in particular for the adat institution,sasi, was not explicitly provided. Government staffacknowledged the strategic position of local govern-ments as implementing agents but also tended to seevillage chiefs as being incompetent in resourcemanagement.

* Fisheries management issues were not of centralconcern to village chiefs, who had heavy workloadsand were mostly concerned with economic develop-ment.

* Control by the navy was difficult because they werefound only at the provincial level and tended to focuson international piracy and deep-water fisheriesinfringements.

* Cooperation between the navy and the police as wellas with the army (Babinsa who may be present invillages) was not optimal.

* The enforcers (police and navy) were importantplayers. In many cases infractions that were not dealtwith properly caused other problems to arise (forinstance, bad relations with community leaders)which hampered management.

3.5. Implementing fisheries policy

Implementing fisheries policy included two centralactivities: (1) the process of establishing a plan for adevelopment project, and (2) the process of producing afisheries law.

3.5.1. The process of establishing a development projectplan

As stated in the Governmental Decree on coordina-tion of development planning in the regions (PP No. 6,1988), BAPPEDA had to integrate all the developmentplanning within the region so as to minimize environ-mental impacts and ensure sustainability of resources. Inthe planning process, called P5D, BAPPEDA coordi-nated the macro planning, whereas technical institutionsestablished the micro plans. A proposed project thatcould disadvantage a community and which offered noappropriate compensation, could be rejected by theprovincial or district government.

The establishment of the Regional DevelopmentManagement and Planning Orientation (P5D) startedwith the collection of ideas from village governmentsand proceeded as follows:

1. Village level. Various village stakeholders had thechance to suggest their ideas through the VillageDevelopment Deliberation (Musbangdes). Thesecould include ideas for development of fisheries.

2. Sub-district level. Ideas from the village were intro-duced to the Permanent Work Region Unit (UDKP),which would select ideas for project development.

3. District level. Representatives from relevant sectoralinstitutions (such as the Fisheries Agency) presentedtheir planning, including suggestions for coastaldevelopment at a Development Coordination Meet-ing (Rakorbang I).

4. Provincial level. At a higher level DevelopmentCoordination Meeting (Rakorbang II) proposalsfrom all of the districts and from the provinces werereviewed to ensure that provincial and district levelprojects supported one another.

5. The final work programs were reviewed by theRegional House of Representatives (DPRD) and ifapproved, were announced as development projects.

Since the process started at the village level, it seemeda bottom-up approach. In reality this was not the case.What was finally approved after the lengthy rounds ofselection and project development could be far from theoriginal proposal. Ideas from a village could be droppedentirely. Another problem was that only formalgovernment structures were involved to the exclusionof informal ones. At the Musbangdes level, input fromlocal stakeholders was coordinated by the formal villagestructure (LKMD) assisted by a representative from thesub-district level. Traditional leaders and kewangmembers involved in a local sasi institution could beinvited by the village government to discuss andparticipate in the planning process as individuals.However, even though it was the kewang who specifi-cally dealt with the village resources, they could notformally represent their position as an institution.

I. Novaczek et al. / Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249246

3.5.2. The process of producing a fisheries lawThe process would start with an academic draft put

forward by the appropriate technical institutionFwhichin this case was the Fisheries Agency (at the provincialor district level). To establish the draft, the FisheriesAgency consulted with other government institutions.Again, because the traditional law enforcers (thekewang) were not recognized by the government therewas no room for them to instigate the process or draftideas.

Once the academic draft was completed, the FisheriesAgency proposed it to the Governor, routed through theHead of the Law Bureau (Department Dalam Negeri)for legal examination. In the review process, the LawBureau considered higher-level regulations related to theproposal, assessed the advantages and disadvantages,and then invited the Fisheries Agency to cooperativelypresent the proposal. In the next stage, the Law Bureauwould call for a meeting with the Regional RegulationsPre-planning Reviewing Team1 (Tim Pembahasan PraRancangan Perda) to discuss the proposal.

After several rounds of examination, the team woulddecree the proposal as a Regional Regulation Plan(Rancangan Perda) to be sent to the regional House ofRepresentatives (DPRD) for approval. With a Letter ofIntroduction from the Governor the proposal would besent to the DPRD who would then form a SpecialCommittee (Pansus) to process the Rancangan Perdafurther into a decreed Regional Regulation (Perda).2

3.6. Licensing

Access to particular fishing grounds was arrangedthrough fishing licenses. Foreign and domestic industrialvessels over 30GT deployed in Eastern Indonesia couldobtain fishing licenses directly from the nationalgovernment in Jakarta. Vessels of 10–30GT werelicensed by the Fisheries Agency at the provincial level.Smaller boats (under 10GT) were dealt with at thedistrict level.

Artisanal fishers did not need a license to fish withhand-lines, spears, traps or simple nets. Commercialoperators had to obtain permits from the Department ofTransport. This department regulated the placement offloating lift nets (bagans) and fish aggregating devices(rumpons) and issued permits for boats to operate out of

a particular harbor. Interviews with staff in theDepartment of Transport revealed that in general theysimply stamped forms and collected fees. There was littleattempt to consciously manage or control where andhow the commercial boats operated.

Decree No. 51, 1997 of the Ministry of Agriculture,defined the rules for the deployment of fish aggregatingdevices (referring to both rumpons and lift nets). FADswithin 3 nautical miles from shore were regulated by thedistrict government; devices between 3 and 12 milesoffshore were regulated by the province; and deep waterFADs by the National Directorate of Fisheries.

3.7. Enforcement

Due to the immensity of the coastline, the nationallaws as well as provincial regulations were ofteneffectively unenforceable. This was a major problem inMaluku with its multitude of small islands. Fish andturtle traders exploiting endangered species or usingprohibited gear types could easily bribe enforcementofficials or simply operate in places where the patrolboats never went.

Enforcement was officially in the hands of the Navy(which operated at a provincial level) and the police.There was a special water police squad to deal withfisheries offences. In theory, the police could rely on thenavy for assistance with infrastructure (e.g. speedboats)but in practice our interviewers were told that theagencies did not work together. Problems noted werethat the boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibilitywere not clear to the staff in district offices; the level ofawareness and concern of the police regarding fisheriesissues was minimal; and infrastructure and funding wereextremely limited. Any action taken was reactive, notproactive.

Another problem with the police was that they wererarely present in a fishing village to patrol or to arrestoffenders. Furthermore, the police were commonlyperceived by villagers to be less legitimate, less impartialand thus trustworthy than local traditional enforcementagents (kewang) or the village government.

3.8. Communication and collaboration between villageand higher levels of management

Although there appeared to be a form of co-manage-ment, in reality, the government departments and villagelevel institutions (village government, sasi authorities)operated in isolation from one another. Sometimesinformation trickled down from the national level to thevillage, but there was no mechanism for feedback, socommunications on fisheries issues between the nationaland local level were limited. National prohibitionsagainst blast fishing and the use of poisons werereasonably well known at the village level but other

1The Team was led by the Regional Secretary (Sekwilda) and

consisted of the following members: Sekwilda assistants, BAPPEDA,

Social Politic Directorate, Finance Bureau, Economy Bureau, Envir-

onment Bureau, Government Bureau, Fishery Agency (Dinas Perika-

nan) and other related institutions as required.2 If the Fisheries Agency was in urgent need of a Law, they could ask

the Governor (for Level I purposes) or the District Head/Bupati (for

Level II Purposes) to give out a decree/statement that could be used as

a law in principal for their urgent need.

I. Novaczek et al. / Marine Policy 25 (2001) 239–249 247

regulations, including the identity of endangered andprohibited species and the boundaries of marine parksand protected areas, were virtually unheard of.

Also, when it came to fisheries issues, relationshipsbetween the village, district and provincial levels werenot close. The Fisheries Agency had an extension staff(three in Haruku, two in Saparua, and one in NusaLaut) whose job was to convey information at thevillage level. However, they usually acted in response toa request rather than proactively. They assisted com-mercial operators to renew their licenses, but in ourinterviews with artisanal fishers we found that they werevirtually invisible to this sector. Extension staff hadattempted to influence fishers to stop using destructivefishing gears, but in their own estimation this programhad failed to make any difference. Instead, they felt thatproviding gear and motors to groups of fishermen andpromoting aquaculture were the ways to effect change.Their ability to deliver such assistance was, however,very limited. The extension service was strapped forfunds and found it difficult even to cover transportationcosts for field visits.

According to our respondents (officials), the villagegovernment and in particular the village head (kepaladesa) have a formal role in management (Table 3). Inmany cases, however, management at the local level washampered by a lack of means, time and motivation. In apolitical climate of top-down decision-making, manylocal leaders were reluctant to be proactive, preferring toact only when directed by a higher authority. Thus, verylittle was likely to happen outside the official, centrallyprogrammed activities. At that time, in the Suharto era,there was no approval for any non-governmental,grassroots fishers’ organization or union whose activitiesmay have filled the vacuum.

The importance of community institutions in resourcemanagement was only acknowledged in the earlyeighties, when environmental awards were presented tothe villages of Ihamahu (1982) and Haruku (1984) inrecognition of their local sasi institutions. However, thiswas not followed up by concrete action to formalize arole for community traditional institutions in resourcemanagement.

While not entrenched in formal law, the traditionalmanagement rules of sasi were often allowed andencouraged to flourish because fisheries staff recognizedthat official means were not sufficient to controlMaluku’s huge marine territory. Fisheries Agencypersonnel had positive opinions of sasi as an institutionand wanted to see some move towards formalizing therights and responsibilities of local management bodiesthrough development of a provincial law (Perda). Theyalso attested that in their dealings with commercialoperators, they would insist that these fishers respectlocal sasi rules and pay whatever access fees wereimposed by local governments.

From a government perspective, the involvement ofthe kewang was an efficient and cost-effective arrange-ment. The kewang had intimate knowledge of the localarea and of the character of the fishers being regulated,they provided an enforcement service to the governmentwithout cost and lived next door to the resource that wasunder protection or management. In addition, many ofthe government staff originated from coastal villagesand valued the traditional ways. However, it was alsotrue that in the opinion of Fisheries Agency staffinterviewed, the competence of the average village head,in terms of education level and experience, was verylimited. This apparent degree of condescension and lackof appreciation for local knowledge no doubt hinderedany effective move towards power sharing.

4. Conclusions

When documented in 1997–98, Indonesian fisheriesmanagement was complex, multi-agency, and top-down.Ultimate power was retained at the national level andprovincial and lower levels were unable either to manageresource exploitation or to conserve resources.

The national government was faced with the difficulttask of controlling a vast marine area and multitudes ofislands and offshore reefs. Yet, enforcement of nationalfisheries regulations was lax and there were seriousdeficiencies in government management agencies interms of motivation, coordination, knowledge, infra-structure and funding support. At the same time,fisheries exploitation and marketing systems encouragedover-fishing and the use of destructive gears [5]. Therewas no provincial body that focused specifically onmarine resource management and conservation and thathad power to coordinate the many agencies bearingmanagement responsibility. BAPPEDA, which couldhave played this role, had many other sectoralresponsibilities. Besides, it was focused on developmentrather than management and conservation; it was weakin areas of evaluation and inter-sectoral coordination,and it had no presence at the district level. Also, amongthe other agencies, limits of power and jurisdiction wereoften unclear.

Even though government staff generally agreed thatthe role of the local community in fisheries managementwas essential, there were no legal provisions for them toactively participate. Legal researchers pointed out thatunder various national laws the village heads had res-ponsibility to ensure that local resources were managedto provide an optimal income for the community. Yet,traditional management systems (sasi) were not recog-nized. The kewang and other traditional authorities longinvolved in enforcement and management had no legalposition and were effectively isolated from regional andprovincial management structures and planning. The

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development of fisheries policy and regulations werelargely controlled from the center and passed down toprovincial, district and sub-district levels. Developmentschemes focused on intensification of resource exploita-tion, and not on sustainability. Suggestions for manage-ment developed at the village level (Haruku) couldhardly get through to the national level.

Over-fishing of several key stocks and drasticallydeclining artisanal catches [5] indicated a clear need for astrong management system. Otherwise, Maluku’s po-tentially rich fisheries as well as the village levelinstitutions would be strained and threatened withcollapse. Since 1998, conditions at the village level havebecome much worse, and civil strife has literallyremoved all the fishing villages from Central Maluku.However, at the national level, advances have beenmade in devolving powers over management of inshoremarine waters down to the provincial and district levels[6,12]. It remains to be seen whether an effective co-management regime, one that respects local tenurialrights and identifies a legal space for village levelinstitutions, can emerge from this troubled region.

Acknowledgements

The fisheries management structures in CentralMaluku were studied as a part of the Fisheries Co-management Project of ICLARM/IFM in collaborationwith Yayasan Hualopu and Pattimura University inAmbon, Indonesia. The research was funded byDANIDA, IDRC and the Netherlands’ Government.

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