1

Oxford University

Foreign Service Program 2012/2013

Explaining the Social Dimension of MERCOSUR

Elianne Elbaum

Supervisor: Dr. Christian Arnold

2

INDEX

Abstract

List if Abbreviations

Introduction 3

PART ONE: Conceptual Toolkit 4

1. Background note on MERCOSUR

2. Differentiated Integration

3. Constructivism: Explaining Change

4. Normative Life Cycle

PART TWO: Social Dimension Explained 12

1. Domestic Normative Change

2. Regional Normative Change

2.1.Emergence of new regional norms, entrepreneurs, and norm cascade

2.2.Institutionalization and internalization

Discussion and Conclusions 22

References 27

3

ABSTRACT

This paper aims at studying the emergence and deepening of the integration of the social dimension

in MERCOSUR. We argue that changes in domestic hegemonic norms, since the election of parties

of the New Left in the four member countries, transferred into the region. By using the

constructivist ‘norm life cycle’ model, we attempt to explain what brought this change and how it

impacted on the policy making process in the region.

4

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CMC Common Market Council

GMC Group of the Common Market

PSSM Permanent Secretary of Social MERCOSUR

ISM Social Institute of MERCOSUR

MMHASD Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development of MERCOSUR

CCSMASD Coordinating Commission of Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development

FCES Social and Economic Consultative Forum

PEAS Strategic Plan for Social Action

MMHAW Ministers and High Authorities for Women

SUSP Support Unit for Social Participation under the Office of the High Commissioner

SSM Social Summit of MERCOSUR

5

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 2000s South America has undergone a process of political renewal. Arguably,

MERCOSUR countries had never been ruled democratically by Left/Left to Center political parties

up until this time. This historical shift in political direction had an impact not only on domestic

politics, but also on regional politics and policies. Domestically, correcting social inequality

(improving the redistribution of income and social services) became the underlying driver of public

policy; such change was also reflected in regional policies.

We observe that MERCOSUR has since 2008 integrated more deeply a social dimension to the

traditionally trade-only policy making in the region. We aim at explaining the reasons behind the

integration of the social dimension or social policy making in the region; why it happened and why

now.

The Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), as its name indicates, was founded with the goal of

creating a Common Market in 1991 among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay by the Treaty

of Asuncion, but in the context of a much greater ambition: that of the development of the four

nations. Born in the wake of democratization and as a result of the 1985 rapprochement between

Argentina and Brazil, MECOSUR developed a new, outwardly oriented economic profile,

responding to the ‘third wave of integration’ (corresponding to the ‘third wave’ of democratization

in the sub-continent (Dabene 2009)). In 1995 the Ouro Preto Protocol established the institutional

basis of MERCOSUR, transforming it into a customs union, with a long-term goal of becoming a

common market under the umbrella of the WTO (Malamud 2010).

Traditionally the Bloc has been ‘only’ that; a custom’s union, and thus its success has been assessed

almost exclusively in terms of whether there has been more economic integration, whether intra

bloc trade and investment increased, and whether the region created positive or negative trade devi-

ation. This paper however, proposes a different approach, we propose to study Social MERCOSUR,

how the social dimension was slowly integrated in the region and as a result, we propose that the

success of the region should not be measured exclusively by the deepening of joint trade policy

making, but by the joint policy making in all policy areas integrated in the region.

We conducted this study using the constructivist outlook to explain the emergence of the social di-

mension, an approach that has rarely been used for the study of the sub-region, arguing that ideas

and identities construct integration. Thus, when ideas change, the region must also change accom-

panying those. We argue that dramatic shifts in domestic ideas, i.e. politics and policies, transfer

into shifts in regional policy making, analyzing how the shift away from neoliberal norms, hege-

monic during the 1990s, into post-neoliberal norms had an impact not only in domestic politics but

also in regional policies.

Furthermore, these changes in regional policies were transformative to the region; the social

dimension, is leading to new found patterns of cooperation and deeper integration; not necessarily

away from the commercial dimension but in addition to it. While since 1991 the Bloc has gone

through many cooperation-stagnation patterns, generally measured by having the commercial

6

dimension as the yardstick to assess how successful integration was. Moments of stagnation, were

seen as the absence of cooperation among member states on issues of joint trade policy, and

explained as responding to different explanatory variables, inter alia: lack of identity of the Bloc

(Oelsner 2012), playing out of 'traditionally' conflicting lobbying sectors (automotive industry or

sugar producers), and the existence of bilateral cleavages (i.e. Paper mills issue between Uruguay

and Argentina). However, new found cooperation trends need to be analyzed using not only trade

barriers but also barriers to social and political integration to explain these patterns of cooperation-

stagnation.

This paper is organized as follows. Part one describes the analytical framework applied to

understanding how the social dimension was progressively integrated in MEROSUR. Part two

focuses on the normative shift, first at the domestic level and later on at the regional level. The first

section explains the normative life cycle, which is the constructivist model applied to explain

normative change. Section two explains the emergence of domestic new norms underpinned by

values of social justice and participation. Section three explains normative domestic to regional

normative transference, explaining how the mechanisms of transference worked in MERCOUR;

who were the key agents and platforms and how institutionalization consolidated the process.

Finally, in the conclusion and discussion part we summarize the overall findings and present

debates and questions that MERCOSUR scholars will need to consider in the future for the more

accurate study of MERCOSUR.

PART ONE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Conceptual Toolkit

1.1. Background note on MERCOSUR

In order to conduct a study of MERCOSUR, and specifically to analyze the process through which

the social dimension is integrated, we first need to briefly make sense of the inner workings of the

Bloc; highlighting its history, objectives, institutions, and its policy making procedures.

The transition to democracy during the 1980s in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, saw the

creation of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), in a process labeled as ‘open

regionalism1. Open regionalism meant that MERCOSUR aimed to combine regional preference

with extra-regional trade openness, responding to the imported neo-liberal economic model,

hegemonic during that time. In other words, MERCOSUR was a product of its time.

Member countries agreed on the Asuncion Treaty that the ultimate objective of MERCOSUR, as

stated on the opening paragraph of the Treaty’s Preamble, was: “The widening of the current

dimensions of the national markets, through regional integration, constitutes a fundamental

condition to accelerate the development process with social justice.” Paragraph 6 also emphasizes:

“improving the living conditions of all the population in all member states.” This is to say, that

1As it was described in most joint-presidential declarations from 1995 until 1999 during MERCOSUR Presidential

Summits

7

MERCOSUR was created as a means to accelerate a process of development with social justice,

aiming at improving the living conditions of the population of all member states. Alas, this

objective was often very narrowly understood, as the focus during its commercial only stage was on

the advancement of trade policy making, thus disregarding the many other fundamental aspects of

development.

Commercially the Bloc was successful in increasing intra-state trade in 300% and inflows of

Foreign Direct Investment2 from 1985 to 2009 (Malamud 2010) and until today. MERCOSUR has

remained an intergovernmental regional institution composed by organs led by appointed

representatives (political and technical) of member states without direct election. The highest

authority is the Consejo del Mercado Común (CMC), made up of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and

Ministers of Finance; followed by the Grupo del Mercado Común (GMC), the executive organ in

charge of implementing the decisions passed by the CMC; the Trade Commission (CCM), the

Secretariat (SM), the Economic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES), the MERCOSUR

Parliament, and the Permanent Review Tribunal (TPR). Only the SM, which is made up of

MERCOSUR bureaucrats and the FCES, which is made up of civil society organization are not

made up of appointed national representatives. Institutionally, the architecture is rather complex and

has more than 300 organs, all of which depend on the two decisive organs for instructions: the CMC

and GMC (the latter, which in turn, reports to the CMC).

Institutionally, MERCOSUR is an intergovernmental regional organization which resembles the

international organization polity, since its membership is acquired by states who subscribe to its

foundational treaty and it has a soft and weekly legalized legal order with a decision-making rule

based on consensus. Notably, however, it has a timid state-like ‘separation of powers’, manifested

in the CMC-GMC (executive), Parliament (legislative), and TPR (judicial), and its governance

capacity is much less anarchic, than that of the UN or any of its agencies.

This is to say that MERCOSUR resembles an international organization in its membership,

delimitation, authority, and legitimacy. It does not however, in terms of its governance capacity,

and constituency relations. Starting with its commercial dimension and timidly, on its social

dimension, MERCOSUR has public policy making capacity, intervening directly in the market and

social relations. Furthermore, the distance between policy recipients and policy makers is much

shorter in the case of MERCOSUR than in the case of a typical international organization. A Forum

like the FCES, the many technical working groups, the Unit of Participation (under the

MERCOSUR High Commissioner), and the Social Summit of MERCOSUR (CSM), shorten the

gap between the institution and its constituency, help to build a community, and allow for the

creation of a MERCOSUR citizenship.

Now that we have seen the structure of MERCOSUR; its objectives and institutional design,

fundamental to understand the workings and grand objectives of having a regional organization, we

shall look more deeply into how the social dimension was integrated in the region, and how the

flexible architecture of MERCOSUR allowed for that change to happen.

2 The notion of being a bloc based upon the premises of open regionalism attracted significant amounts of foreign capital. The size

and growth prospects of the region’s economies, the possibility of free access to the enlarged market, and expectations of expansion

to other South American states all contributed to making Mercosur an important FDIdestination (Oelsner 2013: 123). We shalll not

forget, the neoliberalization policies that were being implemented nationally, which were also a detemrinant factor i n attracting FDI.

8

1.2. Differentiated integration

In order to understand how the social dimension was integrated in the region, it is first necessary to

know how dimensions are integrated in the region. As we have mentioned before MERCOSUR

resembles more the international organization polity rather than the state polity, but this definition is

not accurate enough, does not enlighten us enough, in order to be able to understand how integrated

different policies are regionally.

One of the most salient studies that have been conducted recently is that of Leuffen et al (2013),

where they analyze the nature of the EU and measure the level of integration of different policy

areas. Drawing from the findings reached by Leuffen et al (2013), regarding what kind of a polity

the EU is, they conclude that the EU is a new kind of polity; a polity characterized by a system of

differentiated integration (different from that of the international organization and the state), arguing

that while all policies (or dimensions) are discussed at the regional level, different dimensions vary

in the centralization of functions at the regional level. This is to say, that different policies have

reached different levels of centralization, or different levels of vertical integration. This level is

determined by where the decision making process takes place (the decision ‘locus’), whether at the

state level or at the EU level. Consequently, while there are policies that have reached all

centralization at the regional level (the case of the Euro, where the majority of decision making

happens at the regional level), there are other policies that remain state centered (like university

requirements, for which decision making remains exclusively at the state level).

For this reason, in order to grasp what differentiated integration is, and advance in the study of

regional polities, such as the EU or MERCOSUR, it is necessary to measure the level of

centralization, in other words, the number of decision that are made at the regional level for

different policies in order to assess the current status of the integration process (Leuffen et al

2013:8). Thus, the multidimensional approach of differentiated integration seems not only to

capture better the current architecture of the polity, but also offers a valuable indicator to measure

the current state of integration of the different policies.

In the case of MERCOSUR, this measuring system also seems to depict more accurately the current

status of policy making in the region. 'Differentiated integration' not only fits MERCOSUR better

as a general description of the ‘beast’, but also gives greater space for in depth analysis of its

recently acquired ununiformed geometry. MERCOSUR since the 2000 has started to exhibit

vertical differentiation; in that for different policies, decisions are taken at different levels. While

there is a certainly centralization or vertical integration in trade policy, manifested in the current

status of MERCOSUR as a Custom’s Union (for example in decision such as the Common External

Tariff, the need to negotiate international agreements within the MERCOSUR geometry, and

different commercial protocols), for the majority of other policy areas the decision locus remains at

the state,. This is not the case however, for the social dimension, where decision are made both, at

the regional level and state level.

The social dimension is the umbrella term used in order to allude to the set of policy decisions

regarding education, culture, health, social security, and human rights. An analysis of the social

dimension then, indicates that, while the majority of the decisions regarding social policy are made

at the state level in all member countries, there has been a slow yet steady, increase in decisions

made at the regional level (in the CMC specifically) regarding these policy areas. If we look at

9

figure one, we see that since 1991 the number of decisions regarding social policy taken in

MERCOSUR has increased from two in 1991 to eleven in 2012. This implies that there has

certainly been an upwards trend towards the verticalization of the social dimension at the regional

level, and that this trend began to deepen in 2008 and continued to increase in the following years.

Furthermore, the verticalization of the social dimension started in the beginnings of MERCOSUR

in 1991 (with two decisions regarding education and culture), and by 2010 it reached an

unprecedented level of 12 decisions. Looking at the total amount of 27 decisions made in 2010,

twelve decisions make up a total of almost 45% of the decisions made that year by MERCOSUR

highest governing body. Thus, we can say that only measuring integration of the trade dimension

would not only neglect a big part of the integration process, but it would also be depicting a wrong

‘picture’ of the regional integration process, where there is much more integration than ‘meets the

eye’.

Interestingly, if we take one step further, and look at the content of these decisions, while many are

regulatory others were aimed at creating institutions with the mandate of providing technical and

political information to the governing body to be able to make more and better informed social

policy decisions in the future. two clear examples of this was the creation of the Meeting of

Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development in 2000 and the founding of the Social

Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) in 2007, with the mandate of informing and advising CMC, on the

steps that need to be taken in order to integrate social policy further (Decision CMC 03/07).

Creating institutions for this purpose, certainly speaks of the will of the regional institution to

continue the trend initiated in 2008, towards the deepening of the integration of social policy.

To conclude, different integration patterns for different policy areas ought to be taken into account,

in order to assess the success/failure of the integration process. Additionally, the emergence of the

social dimension, currently at its initial stage but certainly with the outlook of much further

integration, given its recent institutionalization, speaks of new patterns of cooperation and a new

kind of integration process in MERCOSUR.

Figure 1. CMC Norms

Source: MERCOSUR Secretariat, updated in 2013

10

1.3. Constructivism: Explaining Change

So far we have seen that there has been an increase in the verticalization of the social dimension.

Now, how can we explain such emergence? We argue that using a constructivist perspective

approach allows us to better understand change, throwing light on how it happened and why. In

order to comment on change, we first need to introduce some conceptual definitions of the tools

used by the constructivist approach, to then use those as the foundation for our explanation.

Constructivism is comparatively a new addition to the theories of regional integration (Leuffen et al

2013: 84). This approach emphasizes the intersubjective phenomena and the social context for the

study of regional integration (Christiansen et al 2001), both aspects which had been left behind in

material-only analyses of integration (especially by liberal intergovernamentalism, the latest

regional theory). Constructivism claims that ideas and discourses matter to integration (Leuffen et

al 2013). Ideas not only shape the thinking and actions of individuals, but also of entire social

groups. They shape social preferences, interactions, and outcomes; they condition how actors see

interdependence and how they chose to deal with it (Leuffen et al 2013: 86). There are two ‘kinds’

of institutionally shaping ideas: instrumental and principled. Instrumental ideas are those used for

problem-solving and assessing causes and consequences of phenomena; principled ideas are the

underlying values and norms that guide actions.

For the purpose of explaining the increase in integration of the social dimension, we will focus on

principled ideas, or in other words, on the normative aspects of domestic and regional politics. But,

first, what is a norm? There is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of

appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). In other

words, a given identity (that which expresses who we are and what unifies us) is built with the

shared behavioral patterns which define who belongs to our group and who does not.

Constructivist scholars, usually indicate that there are two types of norms: regulative norms, which

order and constrain behavior; and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or catego-

ries of action (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, there is the prescriptive nature to norms,

which by definition, means that there are no bad norms from the vantage point of those who pro-

mote it. Norms most of us would consider ‘bad’ (i.e. racial superiority, divine right, imperialism)

were once hegemonic because some groups believed in their appropriateness (that is, in their

‘goodness’), and others either accepted it as obvious or inevitable or had no choice but to accept it.

This is to say that while old norms might be seen as ‘bad’ in the present they were seen as ‘good’ or

as the appropriate standard of behavior, when they were hegemonic.

Then, how do hegemonic norms change? Why do people start to not accept the hegemonic norms

and decide to change them? What triggers change and how does change happen?

1.4. Normative Life Cycle

Figure 2. Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Skkink 1998:896)

11

Norm Emergence Norm Cascade Internalization

Stage 1 Tipping Stage 2 Stage 3

Point

First, from a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the international

distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior are what

give the world structure, order, and stability. But if instead of structure, order and stability we want

to explain change, how would that happen? In an ideational international structure, idea shifts and

norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norm influence may be understood as a three-stage pro-

cess or a norm ‘life cycle’ (see figure two). The first stage is ‘norm emergence’; the second stage

involves broad norm acceptance or ‘norm cascade’; and the third stage involves internalization. The

first two stages are divided by a threshold or ‘tipping’ point, at which a critical mass of relevant

state actors adopt the norm. This process explains how norms emerge, coexisting for some time

with old hegemonic norms, until they ‘win the race’ and become hegemonic.

For the purpose of explaining change we adopt the Finnemore and Sikkink model of norm ‘life cy-

cle’ and apply it to understand domestic and regional normative change. While the authors argue

that this mechanism explains how new global norms emerge, we argue that it is equally relevant to

explaining normative change in domestic and regional spaces. Clearly, the agents and actors change

as we change the structural levels (from the global to the regional and domestic), but we believe

that the overall mechanism is still useful to explain how normative change comes about. Thus, we

will work then under the assumption that this process is valid and explanatory for domestic and re-

gional change and hope to make a case for it throughout the paper.

Finnemore and Skkink (1998) indicate that world historical events such as wars or major depres-

sions in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms. Ideas and norms

most associated with the losing side of a war or perceived to have caused an economic failure

should be at particular risk of being discredited, opening the field for alternatives.

During this first stage, that of ‘norm emergence’, the characteristic mechanism to ensure that norms

emerge is to make sure of the existence of norm entrepreneurs and platforms where these entrepre-

neurs can work. The norm entrepreneurs function as key players in order to convince a critical

mass of decision makers to embrace these new norms.

The second stage, that of ‘norm cascade’, is more characterized by a dynamic of imitation as the

norm leaders attempt to socialize other decision makers to become norm followers. After what the

authors call a ‘tipping point’, the moment in which a key number of decision makers are ‘convinced’

to embrace the normative change, norms cascade through different groups and agents in a more

imitative manner (with less effort required by the norm entrepreneurs) until the end of the norm

cascade stage.

12

At the far end of the norm cascade, norm internalization occurs. At this final stage, norms acquire a

taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate. This is where the new

norms become the new standard of appropriate behavior and old standards become obsolete and

even illegal in some cases (Finnemore and Skkink 1998: 895).

Norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents, or norm entrepreneurs, having

strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community (Finnemore and Skkink

1998: 896). They are critical for norm emergence because they frame issues (using language that

names, interprets, and dramatizes them) to resonate well with the broader public but also with poli-

cy makers; creating alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest. Put simply, they

make people believe in the issues or they frame the issue in a certain way that people’s beliefs are

contemplated. Furthermore, since new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in

a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of

interest, norm entrepreneurs are key players in the transitional period.

Another key aspect for normative change is the existence of organizational platforms. All norm

promoters at the international level need some kind of organizational platform from and through

which they promote their norms. For international norms these could be NGOs or other transnation-

al organizations. In our case these platforms come from intra-MERCOSUR, and they were built by

and for norm entrepreneur to fulfill their purpose.

Olsener (2012) defines an ‘institution’ as: “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defin-

ing appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations”. While norms are iso-

lated single standards of behavior, institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are

structured together and interrelate; they represent a collection of practices and rules (Finnemore and

Sikkink 1998: 892). Notably, however, institutionalization is not a necessary condition for a norm

cascade; institutionalization may follow, rather than precede, the initiation of a norm cascade pro-

cess, but it will definitely have to occur before norm internalization.

When the third stage in achieved, that of internalization, we can then say that the new norm has won

‘the battle’ among the many other competing norms, especially old norms that were fighting to re-

main hegemonic. While the methods that have led to internalization of global norms are not the

same at the regional and domestic level, since to internalize a norm in the world seems like a much

more like a titanic task than regional or domestic internalization, we still argue that the process of

institutionalization is highly relevant in our study and that it serves to demonstrate how new norms

become internalized. This does not mean, that they are no longer debated, but it means that they

have achieved a certain ‘for granted’ status by being embedded in the national and regional level

architecture and policy production; gaining the stability that internalization requires.

13

PART TWO: SOCIAL DIMENSION EXPLAINED

We argue that change in domestic norms purported a change in regional norms. The social

dimension (underpinned by the new norms) appeared first in all four member countries and it was

only then that it was transferred to MERCOSUR. We propose to analyze both changes in the

following way: 1. explaining how that norm cycle model happened domestically, where new norms

replaced old norms; 3. explaining how those new domestic norms were transferred to the region,

leading to the emergence and internalization of the social dimension.

1. Domestic Normative Change

During the 1990s Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay were heavily encouraged to participate in

the ‘Washington Consensus’, a doctrine described as a set of ten specific economic policy

prescriptions that constituted the standard reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing

countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World

Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. This doctrine encompassed policies in such areas

as macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, and

the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. In order to overcome the unstabilizing

hyper-inflation crises of the 1980s all countries needed to borrow heavily from these institutions,

and received in echnage this tight and restrictive economic prescription as a necessary condition to

obtain these loans. As a result, all four member countries liberalized their economies, privatized

their national enterprises, and initiated a set of neo-liberal reforms to boost economic growth.

This model of growth, understood also as a model of development, was implemented and used

throughout the 1990s until a devastating economic crisis hit first Brazil in 1999, then Argentina in

2001, and then Uruguay and Paraguay in 2002, leaving almost 40.6% of South American

population in poverty, and almost 17% of that 40% in extreme poverty conditions; this meant

almost 300 million people were living under poverty conditions by 2002 (CEPAL 2005).

We argue that citizens and political elites saw the failure of this model of development in that it did

not necessarily create social inclusion (even if it did create more economic growth) and were ready

to look for a different one, a model that would not only purport economic growth but also grapple

with the complex social inclusiveness necessary to include almost half of the population that was

excluded from this growth. We argue that it was due to the failure of the model that new norms

emerged.

While the neo-liberal model was not the only cause behind the impoverishment of the South

American population, Standing (2011) links marginalization to socio economic precariousness

associated with neoliberal economic globalization in the 1990s; which excluded almost half of the

population from the benefits of the market economy, and left little room for state intervention to

remedy it. During the 2000s, after the hardest moments of the financial crisis, new political elites

emerged, political elites that brought with them the emergence of new norms.

Different from the old neo-liberal norms that underpinned the old Right/Right to Center parties,

14

these new norms emphasized socio-economic rights and social participation. New political leaders

won on the basis of taking responsibility for fundamental aspects of human needs and well-being

that had been neglected, assuming what they called the ‘social debt’ that the neoliberal politics of

the 90s had left. The ‘New Left’ (since the Left had never been in power under democratic

conditions before) understood that states have a moral responsibility to respect and deliver the

inalienable (not contingent to the market) rights of their citizens (Grujel et al 2012: 3) and was

determined to do so.

The ‘Right to Left shift’ evidenced by the fair election of Left/Left to Center Presidents in the four

member countries (Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in 2003 in Brazil, Nestor Kirchner in 2003 in

Argentina, Tabaré Vazquez in 2004 in Uruguay, and Fernando Lugo in 2007 in Paraguay), and in

the broader context of almost every other country in the region (with the exception of Colombia and

Mexico), not only consolidated democratic values in the region, but also a rights-based governance

approach; ideas that underpin the normative shift. This type of governance draws on and learns

from a broad range of intellectual ideas and policy frameworks comprising human rights

approaches and global justice perspectives (Grugel and Piper 2009). Rights-based governance is

associated with institutional opportunities for inclusion, recognition, participation and care of those

most in need, who are often those whose rights have been most denied (Riggilozzi 2013: 3). It is not

enough to recognize that people have rights, but it is of vital importance to assume the state’s

obligations to create opportunities and capabilities to enjoy those rights (Sengupta 2000: 566 in

Riggirozzi 2013:4).

Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the majority of the ‘New Left’ politicians began their

political activism in Worker’s Unions and/or deeply rooted social movements (some were even

involved in guerilla groups during the 1960s) and as such they did not come from the economic

elites that used to rule these countries in the past, but from the social movements themselves who

were reclaiming the state’s obligation to create opportunities and capabilities for all the citizens to

enjoy the rights related to social justice and equality. This was the case of the PT in Brazil, the Wide

Front in Uruguay, the Justicialist/Peronist Party in Argentina, the Concertation in Chile, the

Movement for Socialism in Bolivia, the PAIS Alliance in Ecuador, the United Socialist Party in

Venezuela, and the Guasú Front in Paraguay.

Thus at the domestic level there was a process of emergence of new norms of state intervention to

provide social justice. The ‘tipping point’ was achieved when the ‘New Left’ won the elections in

all member countries, convincing the most important decision makers, i.e. the citizens, to elect them

and allowing them to govern with the new norms orienting their policy making.

Consequently, these norms cascaded through all government organs as the Presidents, as the main

norm entrepreneurs, made sure that the social dimension was a priority throughout their

administration. This not only happened through abundant political narrative, but also through the

allocation of an average of more than 23% of the state’s total public spending for social policy

issues (CEPAL 2005 ). Figure three depicts the social spending per inhabitant from the 1990s

onwards. In it we can clearly observe how spending increased slowly since the 1990s, it went

through a decrease during the economic crisis (1999-2004), and since 2005 has dramatically

increased and deepened in all member countries, never going back to the initial amount of spending

15

observed during the 1990s.

Furthermore, we observe that this change was deeply institutionalized by: 1. the creation of

Ministries of Social Development and Welfare in all member countries during the 2000s (except for

Paraguay); 2. the expansion of social welfare programs to cover almost 40% of the population; and

3. the reform of key policy areas to make services more inclusive (inter alia health reform,

education reform, and tax reform) and ensure access and coverage to those with less means.

Institutionalization ensured internalization, since these institutions and programs are now well

embedded in the national working of governments, and seem to have become, although debatable,

policies of state, rather than policies of the ‘New Left’ governments. It would be rather hard for

newly elected parties, not from the ‘New Left’, to undo what has been done in terms of social policy

and still get elected.

While social norms became increasingly internalized, these domestic debates about representation,

social protection, welfare provision and citizenship became bound up with strategies of

internationalization and regionalism, creating a sense that the time was ripe for the introduction of

new perspectives on integration (Rigirrozzi 2013). These new norms needed to be taken to the

region as well.

Figure three: Social spending/inhabitant (UDS)

Data from CEPAL Database.

2. Regional normative Change: the deepening of the social dimension

Constructivists hold the view that regional organizations are ideational as well as material; that

ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only

individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational fac-

tors are not independent of time and place (Ruggie 1998: 33). This means that, regional institutions

are socially constructed, which means that social realities exist only by human agreement (Searle

16

1995: 1–29; Collin 1997). This accounts for social realities being potentially ‘changeable’ and ‘con-

testable’, as well as durable; they are confined to a limited time-frame rather than to the “discrete

charm of timelessness” (Christiansen 2009).

MERCOSUR, as all intergovernmental regional institutions, is driven by domestic political elites’

views of national political-economic interests, and their agreement on how the region should be

constructed. As Duina (2004) notes, MERCOSUR is built on existing shared ‘ontological and

normative notions about the world’, carried by national actors acting regionally.

While normative content or the ‘ontological and normative notions about the world’ during the

1990s referred principally to state sovereignty, politically and economically concentric elite-led

liberal democracy, and economic de-regulation, social citizenship and social policy issues had

largely remained absent from mainstream debates about region building (Grugel 2004) until the

internalization of the social dimension at the domestic level.

Additionally, domestic norms are deeply intertwined with the workings of international norms.

Many international norms began as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of

entrepreneurs of various kinds. In addition, international norms must always work their influence

through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms. Furthermore, all these domestic influ-

ences are strongest at the early stage of a norm’s life cycle, and domestic influences lessen signifi-

cantly once a norm has become institutionalized in the international system (Finnemore and Skkink

1998).

While change was brought in constitutive norms since the mid-2000s, there was no observable

change in regulative norms. Regulative norms, those which regulate the operations of MERCOSUR

have not been altered. The Bloc still works under the same initial regulatory framework, that of the

Asuncion Treaty. The Asuncion Treaty has neither been changed, nor reformed, thus operating rules

remain constant. Agents saw change happen not by altering how MERCOSUR works, but in its

constitution, in what MERCOSUR deals with in terms of policy formulation.

We propose to study the regional norm cycle, fleshed out in five steps as follows: 1. emergence of

new regional norms due to the transference of highly valued and consensual domestic norms to the

region; 2. The appropriation of these norms by the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of

Social Development (MMHASD) who were in turn, transformed into the norm entrepreneurs, in

charge of the cascade of norms throughout the organization; 3. institutionalization of these norms in

the Social Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) and the revamping of the Social and Economic

Consultative Forum (FCES); and 4. creation of the first regional social program, which is evidence

of regional social policy per se, and thus of the internalization of the production and formulation of

social policy in the region.

2.1. Emergence of new regional norms, entrepreneurs, and norm cascade

As a result of being socially constructed and a product of its time and place, integration is a process

of community-building at its core. The first constructivist assumption is that institutional

integration depends on the strength of the transnational community: the stronger the collective and

17

the larger the pool of common compatible ideas, the more institutional integration we will see. This

is to say, that compatible social values, together with mutual responsiveness, are essential

conditions of functioning international communities (Deutsch 1957:66).

Confirming this assumption, we observe that while new similar norms that were already being

internalized in all member states, they were also being transferred to the region. These new social

norms were not only highly valued domestically, but also highly consensual and compatible among

domestic elites of the four member countries, making the normative transference occur with much

more ease. Evidence of this is the many presidential discourses and declarations that encouraged

more integration, but more integration especially through the social dimension. Consequently,

without this normative consensus the deepening of the integration of the social dimension, would

have been much more difficult.

Initially expressed by Presidents Kirschner and Lula, and later on by Vazquez and Lugo, presidents

embraced regionalism as a frame within which to articulate a development project that combines

export growth and international trade alongside social reform and a commitment to greater equality

(Sigal 2003). At the Summit of Copacabana in March 2004, Kirschner and Lula also entered into

what was termed in the press a ‘historic agreement’ to move towards a new regional model of social

democratic development. Copacabana was, pre-eminently, a politics-led summit, marking a change

in atmosphere from more technocratically oriented summits in the past (Grugel 2005: 1069). From

2005 onwards the mandate and agreement became even more powerful 3, but the instructions on

how to implement such change had to be delegated to technical bodies, which could formulate the

policies to operate on such agreements at the political level.

Before explaining the process of transference, let us make a theoretical caveat, in that we should be

careful not to confuse norm transference with norm diffusion, a very popular concept used in

constructivism. Norm diffusion is defined by Elkins and Simmons (2005) as the set of processes

characterized by interdependent, but uncoordinated decision making among states. This is

phenomenon is actually opposite to what we argue happened in MERCOSUR, where there is

coordinated clustered policy making. Hass (1992) describes coordinated clustered policy making as

the horizontal processes of international collaboration and cooperation; this is how we believe the

social dimension emerged regionally, with great agency coordination and determination to make it

happen. Coordination in this case defined norm transference.

The process of transference is one that has new norms and norm entrepreneurs deeply intertwined;

where none could prosper without each other. And as a result we shall analyze step one and step

two together. New norms agreed by Presidents were then entrusted to the Ministers and High Au-

thorities of Social Development (MHASD) to emerge at the regional level. Presidents agreed on the

emergence of these new norms regionally, but they had to delegate the agency of the ‘norm cascade’

process to other agents (i.e. norm entrepreneurs), who would push for the emergence of a regional

social policy agenda. Since these norm entrepreneurs were entrusted with the same mission at the

domestic level, by having to persuade other branches of the executive and the legislative on the

3 Asuncion Initiative about the Fight Against Extreme Poverty in 2005, Art 27 of the Joint Communique of Presidents of MERCOSUR of 2005:

“Priority to define a Social Agenda, geared towards the development of initiatives and policies to reduce the social deficit, promote human

development, and productive integration of the economies; Presidential Declaration of 2010 where it is mentioned that joint policies are the solution to shared challenges

18

concretion of operational plans for social policy, they were also entrusted to do so at the regional

level. They were the ‘natural’ choice to push for the social dimension and to make sure the norms

cascaded through the many organs and structure of MERCOSUR.

Social Development Ministers and high Authorities are in charge of making sure that during their

biannual meetings there is a plan and there are resolutions for the CMC to pass, both of which need

to persuade Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Foreign Relations (which are the ultimate deci-

sion makers in the CMC) not only to go beyond the trade dimension of integration and into a re-

gional social policy initiatives, but also to make funding available for making regional social hap-

pen. Their agency is a key factor in ensuring that CMC passes these resolutions and for the success

of the internalization of these norms in the Bloc.

Taking a closer look at the Declarations that have come out of those meetings, since its creation in

December 2000, there is a clear affirmation and reiteration of the necessity for regional governance

of the social dimension (phrase coined by Ministers and Presidents to frame the issue). The mecha-

nism of transference becomes apparent as we go through these. As early as in 2001 (their first re-

gional meeting) the Declaration was calling for regional actions to strengthen domestic action on

the social dimension: “…During this First Meeting, Ministers are working on poverty and child

labor as priority themes that are common in all countries which require urgent national and regional

action through short term and long term measures, focused on the most vulnerable population with

the transversal objectives of employment, social protection, training and education, and strengthen-

ing of citizen participation” (Record MMHASD 2001).

Ministers since their first meetings, agreed on which the priorities, focus, and unit of intervention

should be, not only in regional policy but also to be applied in national programs. They agreed on

prioritizing poverty reduction, as well as on implementing measures to eliminate child labor; and

focusing the unit of intervention in the family. Furthermore, Ministers sought to develop a joint

statistical and monitoring system, as well as the opening up of channels of communication with

civil society. Ministers transferred their domestic agenda to the regional level. The same priorities

that we observed domestically were transferred to the region by these agents who acted

domestically as well as regionally.

By 2005, Ministers were calling for a Biannual Plan, as expressed by their Declaration: “To

consolidate Social MEROCSUR through joint work of member countries, Bolivia and Chile”. The

plan not only included common and shared strategies but also the creation of a social permanent

secretariat, the adoption of a common theoretical framework, and the establishment of common

indicators to evaluate the efficiency of the Biannual Plan. Thus, social norms were then, past their

emergence stage and on their way to the tipping point.

In 2007 Ministers agreed on the creation of the Social Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM), approved a

Declaration of Principles of the Social Dimension, created the 2007-2009 Biannual Plan, and

approved a shared statistical system to monitor the effectiveness of social policy and planning. The

‘solidification’ or ‘thickness’ of social norms increased as their institutionalization deepened, thus as

years passed what, were seen as rhetorical declarations in the beginning, took the shape of an

institution as early as in 2007.

19

The success of norm entrepreneurs is seen first in the securing of the creation of the ISM, and later

the deep increase in its budget throughout the years; from USD 227,952 in 2009 to more than USD

1, 000, 000 in 2013. This proves that they convinced a critical mass of decision makers to embrace

new norms, allowing for the social agenda to deepen in its regional integration. In 2012 however,

we can see the tipping point of the cycle process, where not only the budget of ISM increased in

absolute terms (see table one), but also all member countries (including Venezuela) agreed to a

fixed yearly percentage contribution for the budget of the ISM (Decision CMC 08/11). Thus, no

more lobbying needed to be done to secure funding for ISM, and thus stability was achieved.

The beginning of the process of internalization, however, began in 2009, when the MMHASD

discussed the first regional social project per se on the social economy, after doing workshops and

trainings with the participation of civil society. This would be the first time that MEROCUSR

thought of regional social policy. It is important to highlight however, that despite the fact that the

implementation of the project is left to the national governments; the idea of social regional policy

formulated by the region for the region is actually new.

By 2010 the MMHASD was to start the norm cascade process by calling on the Parliament and all

institutions of MERCOSUR to consider the Social Dimension and the Social Principles as the main

guideline in their work and Working Groups. Ministers called for: “the creation of shared work

spaces with other institutions of MERCOSUR, especially with those dealing with the rural econo-

my, youth, elderly people, cooperatives, and decentralization” (Declaration MMHASD 2010). Re-

gional norm cascade was then launched and triggered by the Ministers of Social Development, in an

attempt to expand the scope of the norms, making them deeply intertwined, encouraging imitation

by other regional actors.

Finally in 2011 the Strategic Plan for Social Action and in 2013 the Theoretical Framework for Re-

gional Social Action were released. Both documents contribute to the patterns of internalization of

the social dimension, since they represent regional agreements on social policy, agreement that can

would more difficult to reverse. These documents contain common definitions, priorities, and

methods to start implementing social regional policy, of which the social economy program is the

first example.

Table One: Budget ISM (based on CMC Decisions 38/08; 31/09; 46/10; 08/11; 25/11; 60/12)

Year Total Budget (USD)*

2009 227,952

2010 227,952

2011 488,175

2012 489,308

2013 1,187,337

*(Argentina 24%; Brazil 39%; Paraguay 24%; Uruguay 13%; and Venezuela in 2012: 44,400 and in 2013: 229,807)

20

2.2. Institutionalization and internalization

The third step that of institutionalization comes with the stabilization of these new norms in the So-

cial Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) and the revamping of the Social and Economic Consultative

Forum (FCES). The institutionalization process began with the creation of the Social Institute of

MERCOSUR and deepened by giving it a clear vision, mission, and values which target goals of

inclusion; and with the revamping of the Social and Economic Forum of MERCOSUR (FESM),

which target goals of social participation. These two sets of core values, that of inclusion and social

participation underpin the normative shift and throughout the process of institutionalization become

increasingly embedded in the architectural and constitutive framework of MERCOSUR.

The Social Institute of MERCOSUR was initially thought as the first research center devoted to the

study of regional social policy. It was founded in 2007 to identify a wide range of rights-bearing

subjects, in addition to labor, such as children, ethnic minorities, migrants, and marginalized and

impoverished families within the informal economy (Grugel 2005). ISM arguments emphasize the

linkages between social reform and economic productivity: it is argued that social reform is neces-

sary not only for intrinsic reasons to do with the dignity of the person (i.e. so that people can actual-

ly enjoy their rights and not only be entitled to them)but also because the pace of economic integra-

tion, especially in border regions, makes coordinated social regulation inevitable if states are to re-

main legitimate and to lay claims to sovereign control over territory. In making its case, the IMS

seeks, above all, to influence policy-making debates (Grugel 2005), constructing ideas for MHASD

to inform and persuade key decision makers of their implementation.

The only way for an institution to fulfill its tasks is to furnish it with a vision, mission, and core

values under which it should operate; otherwise the institution has no sense of purpose and no way

to achieve its goals. In that sense, it is relevant to mention that ISM vision was given only recently

by the document: Theoretical Framework of the Social Dimension of MERCOSUR, released in

2013 by the ISM and elaborated in close collaboration with the Meeting of Ministers and Authori-

ties of Social Development and its executive arm, the Coordination Commission (CCMASM). This

Document gives a framework of action and a long term vision for the formulation and execution of

regional social policy.

In terms of its mission, it was clearly set out by the Strategic Plan for Social Action (PEAS), passed

by the decision CMC 67/2010, where the axis, guidelines and objectives that are to be followed in

the construction of the social dimension are expressed and also passed to other MERCOSUR organs

for their compliance. Axis 1: eradicate hunger, poverty and social injustice; Axis 2: guarantee

Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, and ethnic, racial, and gender Equality; Axis 3:

Universalize Public Health; Axis 4. Universalize Education and Eradicate Illiteracy; Axis 5. Value

and Promote Cultural Diversity; Axis 6. Guarantee Productive Inclusion; Axis 7: Guarantee Access

to Decent Employment and Workers’ Rights; Axis 8: Environmental Sustainability; Axis 9: Promote

and Ensure Social Dialogue; and Axis 10: Establish mechanisms of Regional Cooperation for the

implementation and financing of social policies.

Each of these axes has guidelines and objectives within their scope; consolidating all these topics

into one umbrella term, that of Social Action. This dimension touches upon ‘traditional’ social

21

issues, such as hunger, social justice, and worker’s rights, but adds many topics such as public

health, education, culture, employment and inclusiveness, environment, social dialogue and citizen

participation, which belong to a ‘third generation’ of social, cultural and economic rights. In the

definition of social action, which gives further impulse to what was considered a quite static ‘social

dimension’, a new impetus is given to the elaboration of regional public policy.

All the topics included in the Plan of Action touch upon the most salient and important issues in

public policy and as thus, we would be in the wrong if we assumed that these are ‘only social issues’

and not political issues. This is to say that, the emergence of the social dimension could also be

understood as a vehicle or springboard for the integration of other public policy issues at the

regional level. This tendency also mirrors the normative process that occurred domestically, where

new social norms extended horizontally through all public policy areas in the norm cascade process

gaining space for later internalization.

Concerning the values of the Institute, they are deeply embedded in the new norms that we have

analyzed throughout the paper, values of social justice, rights based governance, human

development, and democracy. The creation of the institute depicts the crystallization of those values

and the internalization of the new norms within the regional architecture.

Regarding the fourth step, the institute has finalized the formulation of the first regional social pro-

gram, a program for the promotion of the social economy in seven bordering areas of the four (now

five) member states and four associate countries. This initiative has three objectives: 1. gather in-

creased information and identify relevant actors for the social economy on the field; 2. deepen

communitarian experiences that are currently successful; and 3. Include communitarian experiences

in value chains and increase their involvement in trade chains. The project aims at enabling and

encouraging micro-entrepreneurship, based on family projects; creating spaces for communal shop-

ping (i.e. popular markets); regaining ownership of business that went under by forming coopera-

tives of organized workers groups; constructing cultural spaces and social networks for training and

support; and increasing the efficient use of microfinance and social banking (Record MMHASD

01/08 ANEX XIII, XIV Meeting of Technical Group of Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities

of Social Development of MERCOSUR and Associate States).

This project is in its final formulation stages and is to begin implementation in the beginnings of

2014. This platform opens up spaces for direct socialization with the citizens of all five countries as

well as citizens of associate countries, as it embarks on it first social project of regional characteris-

tics. Although the implementation still remains for each member state, the conception and funding

comes from MERCOSUR to MERCOSUR. This makes a difference from other social projects that

have been implemented in the region, but have either been formulated in coordination with and/or

funded by other institutions, inter alia, the EU, Spanish Agency of Cooperation and International

Development (AECID), and the Inter-American Development Bank.

For this purpose the Bloc approved a Structural Convergence Fund of almost USD 1,000 million in

2005, in order to correct intra-bloc asymmetries is highly relevant and recognizes the need to invest

in the region from the region. Since 2007 five projects have been approved (two in Paraguay and

three in Uruguay) which have focused on the promotion of structural convergence, regional

22

competitiveness, promotion of social cohesion (especially in smaller economies and less developed

regions within the five countries), and promotion of the integration process. It is within the

framework of ‘social cohesion’ that this first regional program is to obtain its funding. Replacing

historical donors to invest in its own projects and programs, is further evidence of the

institutionalization of norms.

Furthermore, the revamping of social and economic forum has also been part of the internalization

process, giving further space for civil society to participate in policy building. For most of the 20th

century citizenship in the Southern Cone was understood mainly as labor rights; democratization

since the 1980s has allowed for the articulation of a broader project of citizenship where it is con-

ceptualized more diffusely as sets of social, political, cultural and economic rights; and democrati-

zation has been accompanied by the emergence of sophisticated and dynamic civil society organiza-

tions (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000).

The approval of the Statute of MERCOSUR Citizenship in 2010 is highly relevant to recognize the

central role that citizenship is expected to be given in the internalization of new norms and in re-

gional social policy. Other evidence of this process is found in the creation of the Institute of Hu-

man Rights Policy of MERCOSUR in 2009 and the Social Participation Unit in 2010, within the

structure of the High Representative. The institutionalization of these norms of participation, also

speak of the normative change and of the democratization process in the Bloc; creating more spaces

for citizen participation is new, but there still is gap between the institution and its effective use, as

we were informed by the Director of the Social Institute of MERCOSUR.

Thin codes of citizenship and weak traditions of rights protection within Latin America have meant

that civil society groups have frequently sought support from outside the nation-state. One result of

this was an early internationalization of social protest. This has led to the creation of Latin Ameri-

can nodes within dense global networks of citizenship activism. As a result of the mobilization of

civil society across the Americas—and of the recognition by some state elites of the value of includ-

ing moderate elements of civil society in the structures of region building—there is now the begin-

ning of (weak and partial) civil society inclusion within the structures of regionalism, as a part of

the institutionalization of new social norms.

While the institutionalization of the social dimension is not yet fully completed and is still in pro-

gress, as we have just recently seen the formulation of the first regional social program, we have

definitely seen advances in the deepening of the integration of the social dimension, and in the be-

lief of the need to have a social policy regionally. All the sources interviewed, diplomats of the four

member countries, manifested they have seen the change deepen in the last few years and that they

believed that the trend will continue in following years.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

23

In part one; we analyzed the current reality of MERCOSUR, seeing that the social dimension has

increasingly been verticalized in the regional architecture. Evidence of this was the normative com-

position of MERCOSUR from 1990 until today. From very few CMC social norms in its begin-

nings to up to 45% of the norms passed by CMC being social norms in 2010.

We emphasized that we should move away from under-descriptive terms such as ‘international or-

ganization’ and move into a more descriptive an accurate term, such as ‘differentiated integration’,

which suggests that different policy areas are integrated differently within the region. Differentiat-

ed integration leaves much room for change and that is also why it is compatible with the construc-

tivist approach we put forward throughout the second part of our paper to explain normative

change.

We would like to highlight however, that our argument is far from proposing that MERCOSUR will

only be focused on social issues in the future. On the contrary, we propose that the social dimension

is added to the commercial dimension, the ‘typical’ MERCOSUR dimension. In reality, since the

global financial crisis of 2008 MERCOSUR has experienced renewed economic dynamism

(CEPAL 2011). MEROCUSR states have weathered the global crisis better than other economies,

and their recovery has taken a faster pace. In a way, this has also facilitated the emergence of a

social dimension, but it was not the determinant factor.

In part two we discuss why the social dimension emerged; what triggered its emergence and how it

happened. We then use the constructivist approach of ‘norm life cycle’ to explain these questions,

posing that the region is a dynamic ideational structure, with flexibility to adapt to new contexts and

circumstances. But more importantly, indicating that the region is heavily influenced by domestic

change and thus, political and economic change observed domestically will be reflected regionally.

Consequently, we discuss how the social dimension emerged as a result of domestic change which

then triggered regional change. In this sense, domestically norms changed with the advent of the

1999-2002 economic and financial crises; we observe the emergence of the ‘New Left’ and with it

the replacement of old neo-liberal norms (hegemonic during the 1990s) with post-neo-liberal

norms. These were then transferred to the region, by successful norm entrepreneurs who aided the

process of norm cascade and norm internalization in MERCOSUR.

Furthermore, this domestic change, which happened in parallel in the four member countries (Ar-

gentina and Brazil in 2003, Uruguay in 2005, and Paraguay in 2007) meant that there was high level

agreement on new domestic norms, based on social justice, and in the desire to transfer those to the

regional level. Consequently, Presidents of the four countries entrusted their Ministers of Social

Development to make that change happen regionally. Thus, we argue that the mechanism of domes-

tic to regional transference is clearly seen by analyzing the evolution of this Meeting and seeing

how the norm entrepreneurs acted regionally.

In 2000 the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of Social development was created, and by

2001 in its first meeting these norm entrepreneurs were creating plans, programs, and envisioning

24

the crystallization of these new norms into new regional institutions. By 2007, norms had already

emerged regionally, and they were cascading through the different organs of MERCOSUR. Minis-

ters of Social Development persuaded Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the

two key decision makers in MERCOSUR) to create the Social Institute of MERCOSUR and a tech-

nical Commission within their Meeting. Not only that but, by 2011 they had convinced all member

countries to contribute a fixed percentage for the funding of the Institute. Furthermore, the Institute

promoted the first regional social program, with funding which came from MERCOSUR, that is its

first regional social program that was formulated and funded within MERCOSUR capacities. We

argue that these two factors were the tipping point towards the norm cascade process and the begin-

ning of the internalization process for these. New post-neo-liberal norms seemed to have gained

much way compared to other competing norms, especially the old neo-liberal norms, hegemonic

during the 1990s.

Let us note that at the heart of the politics of regionalization is the attempt by actors and coalitions

to reinforce the governance of particular issues beyond the scope of national governance and poli-

tics. This rescaling is not incidental, but designed to empower particular interests, while weakening

or wholly marginalizing others. While a MERCOSUR exclusively focused on the commercial di-

mension, would benefit more greatly the exporting class in all member countries (and expect that

that wealth is ‘spilled over’ via consumption), a social and commercial MERCOSUR covers much

greater societal interests, and begins to benefit those who were neglected in the past.

Having a social MERCOSUR benefits those who were not benefitted from ‘the invisible hand’ and

helps them enter the economy. This is clearly seen in the first social economy regional project

where citizens from the four countries in seven different sub-regions will be trained to expand their

family business and helped to export their products. However, it does not only do that, but it has the

much greater objective of inclusion; allowing people to enjoy their social and economic rights and

overcoming their social marginalization. Inclusion is the grand value that underpins all new post-

neo-liberal norms and is the objective of social policy at the domestic, as well as at the regional

level.

Consequently, this study challenges three recurring assumptions that were in many of the studies

conducted on MERCOSUR: 1. That MERCOSUR is a commercial only regional institution; 2. that

Southern nations, individually and as a group, are ‘receivers’ of global norms; and 3. That

MERCOSUR is a dying regional institution (or a ‘failing development project’), expressed well by

Grugel (2005) by the questioning whether ‘‘MERCOSUR still [has] a project’’(Dabene 2004),

explaining its existence in terms of ‘‘survival’’ (Carranza 2003; Gomez Mera 2005) and

highlighting its ‘‘declining achievement’’ (Malamud 2005).

We argue that 1. MERCOSUR was traditionally a trade only bloc, but that social policy is

increasingly being verticalized and deepened. Furthermore, there is the social participation axis

within the social dimension. The more people are able to participate in economic activity the more

they will be able to participate in civic activities, reinforcing thus the democratic principles of

citizen participation in decision making. For this objective to strive, it is not only necessary that

people decide to participate, but there shall also be spaces in which people are able to participate

(more than voting once every five years for national elections). These values become central,

enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive attributes; initiatives in this direction have promoted the

25

formation and participation of civil society organizations, a tendency that marks the incipient

emergence of a bottom-up MERCOSUR, very different also from the trade-only, elite-only

MERCOSUR.

This objective of democratic reinforcement is also behind the social dimension, and is tightly tied to

a highly contentious debate that has been going on domestically in all four countries, regarding the

political v. economic MERCOSUR. The debate is, simply put, Political MERCOSUR collides and

has the potential of curbing national sovereignty. This debate is still going and MERCOSUR is tilt-

ing towards economic and very timid social governance rather than more ambitious political gov-

ernance. None the less, it would be foolish to say that the economic dimension and more especially

the social dimension are not part of the political dimension, but the debate aims at staying far from

supranationalism rather than focusing on the integration of policy areas still in an intergovernmental

manner. The fact that regulative norms have remained unchanged despite the normative shift, con-

firms the preference for intergovernamentalism.

For the second challenged assumption, we propose that autochthonous domestic norms emerged as

a result of an adaptation to an economic and political crises in the region and then transferred to the

regional level, and as such regionalism in the South is no longer seen as a neoliberal strategy at a

regional scale, but as a product of the transference of autochthonous domestic post-neo-liberal

norms.

In terms of the third challenged assumption, we argue that MERCOSUR is still a project, it is not

striving for survival, and its achievements shall be measure not only in terms of trade but also in the

other dimension that have been integrated more deeply in the last five years. In fact, quite the

opposite is true. MERCOSUR is a changing regional institution, as we saw on Part one, and as such

it undergoes certain adaptation processes. The integration of the social dimension speaks of a

project which is adapting to a new reality and context, and responding to its own needs for

development (which are related to economic growth but not only to it) with autochthonous regional

answers. The fact that the region is responsive to change, is evidence that it is still alive.

Finally, we believe that there are three questions that were briefly discussed on this paper, but that

remain greatly unexplored by the MERCOSUR literature, which are: 1. the influence of regional

norms on domestic norms, and 2. the impact of the social dimension in the regionalization process,

or in other words the effect that this process has on the overall process of regional integration in

MERCOSUR; and 3. What will be the impact of the inclusion of Venezuela as a member country in

the integration of the social dimension.

In the first case we believe that much more work needs to be conducted in order to assess what the

influence of internalized regional norms is on national norms. If we imagine a scenario were domes-

tic norms shift again, how would internalized regional social norms behave? Will they become ob-

solete? How will embedded regional norms influence them?

Regarding the second debate, we introduced throughout this study that the more compatible the

pool of ideas is, the more integration we will see. This seems to be the case, in the sense that the

more compatible ideas on a certain policy are, the more verticalization we will see of that certain

policy. Additionally as Leuffen et al (2013) indicate, Constructivism posits that if domestic reso-

26

nance of community ideas is high, that is to say, if regional ideas appeal to, or can be demonstrated

to build on, existing domestic ideas, they are accepted more easily (Leuffen 2013: 89), however the

effects on the overall regionalization process needs to be studied much more in depth to have a sys-

tematic answer to these questions.

The third question was not analyzed during our study, due to the fact that Venezuela’s admission as

a member country is so recent that it would be very difficult to analyze the consequences. However,

we certainly believe that it will have a strong impact on the integration of the social dimension, es-

pecially given the emphasis that this dimension has domestically. If we used our hypothesis, then

the inclusion of Venezuela would definitely strengthen the verticalization of the social dimension in

MERCOSUR, but only time will tell whether that will be the case.

All in all, this study argues that MERCOSUR is a vibrant regional project that is far from its death.

Throughout the analysis we hope to have depicted the new patterns of cooperation, which come in

the form of the integration of the social dimension. Following the ultimate objective of regional

integration (as it was stated in the Asuncion Treaty) that is the aspiration of inclusive development,

it would be difficult to imagine how that could be achieved without political governance. In addi-

tion, as Draibe (1996) argues, extended poverty increases social risks, such as violence, crime, and

environmental hazards, making countries vulnerable to these threats not only within their borders

but outside of them as well. It would make sense then to have regional answer to regional problems,

through regional governance. But the amount of regional response still remains to be seen.

There is still much more to be studied about MERCOSUR, and we hope that all future studies do

not only focus on the Bloc trade and finance policy, but also on the newly defining social justice

values that have begun to characterize the sub-region and will probably be the defining ones in the

future. These new found patterns of cooperation have a transformative effect in the region and will

be manifested in how MERCOSUR citizens see MERCOSUR and how they feel it.

27

References:

Acharya, A. (2004) ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional

Change in Asian regionalism’. International Organization, 58, (Spring), 239-275

Barrientos, A (2004) Latin America: towards a liberal – informal welfare regime, in: I Gough & G

Word (ed.), Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press).

Börzel, T. (2005) ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’. Journal of

European Public Policy, 12:2, 217-236

Burfisher E., Robinson S., and Thierfelder K. (2002) ‘Developing Counties and the Gains from

Regionalism: Links Between Trade and Farm Policy Reforms in Mexico'. American Journal

of Agricultural Economics, 84:3,736-748

Checkel, J. (2006) ‘Constructivist Approaches to European Integration’, Working Paper 06, ARENA

and Department of Political Science Oslo University

Daly, M. (2006) ‘EU Social Policy After Lisbon’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44:3, 461-

481

Daly, M. (2008) ‘Whither EU Social Policy? An Account and Assessment of Developments in the

Lisbon Social Inclusion Process’. Journal of Social Policy, 37:01, 1-19

Das, K. (2004) ‘Uneven Development and Regionalism: A Critique of Received Theories’.

Economic and Political Weekly, 39:54, 4917-4925

Draibe, S. (1998) ‘Mercosur: la temática social de la integración desde la perspectiva institucional’.

Publicaciones CEFIR.

Elkins, Z. and Simmons, B. (2005) ‘Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework’.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 33-51

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Poli-

tics’. International Organization, 52: 4, 887-917

Gamble, A., Payne, A., Hoogvelt, A., Dietrich , M., & Kenny, M. (1996) ‘Editorial: New Political

Economy’. New Political Economy, 1:1, 5-11

Gomez Mera, L. (2005) ‘Explaining Mercosur’s Survival: Strategic Sources of Argentine–Brazilian

Convergence’. Journal of Latin American Studies, 37: 109–140

Grugel, J (2005), 'Citizenship and governance in Mercosur: arguments for a social agenda'. Third

World Quarterly, 26: 7, 1061-1076

28

Grugel J. (2007) ‘Democratization and Ideational Diffusion: Europe, Mercosur and Social

Citizenship’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45:1, 43-68.

Grugel J. and A. Uhlin (2012) ‘Renewing Global Governance: demanding rights and justice in the

global South’. Third World Quarterly, 33:9, 1703-1718

Grugel, J. and P. Riggirozzi (2012) ‘Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and

Reclaiming the State after Crisis’. Development and Change, 43:1, 1-21

Halkier, H. (2012) ‘Knowledge Dynamics and Policies for Regional Development: Towards a New

Governance Paradigm’. European Planning Studies, 20:11, 1767-1784

Hameiri, S. (2012) ‘Theorising Regions through Changes in Statehood: Rethinking the Theory and

Method of Comparative Regionalism’. Review of international Studies, FirstView Articles, 1-

23

Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S. (2010) ‘The Implementation of EU Social Policy: the ‘Southern

Problem’ Revisited’. Journal of European Public Policy, 17:4, 468-486

Hettne, B. (2005) ‘Beyond the ‘new’ Regionalism’. New political Economy, 10:4, 543-571

Hettne, B. and Soderbaum, F. (2000) ‘Theorising the Rise of Regioness’. New Political Economy,

5:3, 457-473

Hix, S. (1994) ‘The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics’.

West European Politics, 17:11, 1-30

Hurrell, A. (2001) ‘The Politics of Regional Integration in MERCOSUR’. In Regional Integration

in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism, (ed.)

Victor Bulmer–Thomas. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London.

Kaltenthaler, K. and Frank, OM . (2002) ‘Explaining Latin American Economic Integration: The

Case of Mercosur’. Review of International Political Economy, 9, 72–97.

Katzenstein, P. (1997) ‘United Germany in an Integrating Europe’, in Tamed Power. Germany in

Europe, (ed.) Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1-48

Leuffen, Dirk, Berthold Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelfennig. ‘Differentiated Integration:

Explaining Variation in the European Union’, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print.

Malamud, A. (2001) ‘Presidentialism in the Southern Cone. A Framework for Analysis’, EUI SPS

Working Paper nº1.

Malamud, A. (2003) ‘Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for a Successful Experience’,

Finn LAURSEN (ed.) Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives, Ashgate,

Aldershot, 53–73.

29

Malamud, A. (2005) ‘Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur’.

Latin American Reseach Review, 40:1, 138-164

Malamud, A. (2006) ‘Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising Rhetoric and Declining Achievement’.

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:3, 421-436

Malamud, A. (2010) ‘Latin American Regionalism and EU Studies’. Journal of European

Integration, 32:6, 637-657

Malamud, A. & Gardini, G. (2012) ‘Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and

its Lessons’. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 47:1, 116-

133

Mansfield, E. and Solingen, E. (2010) ‘Regionalism’. Annual Review of Political Science, 13, 145 -

163

Mattli, W. (1999) ‘Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes’. Journal of European Public Policy,

6:1, 1-27

Oelsner, A. (2012) ‘The Institutional Identity of Regional Organizations, Or Mercosur’s Identity

Crisis’. International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Association

Perrota, D. and Vazquez, M. (2010) ‘El MERCOSUR de las Politicas Públicas Regionales. Las

Agendas en Desarrollo Social y Educacion’. Documento de Trabajo 010, CEFIR/INWENT

Riggirozzi, P. (2012) ‘Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New

Synthesis’. New Political Economy, 17: 4, 421-443

Riggirozzi, P. and D. Tussie (2012) The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case of Latin

America, (ed.) Netherlands: Springer

Sigal, E (2003) ‘La importancia del proyecto regional’. Comunidad y Desarrollo, 1:1, 2 – 6.

Weaver, O. (2009) ‘Discursive Approaches’. European Integration Theory, ed. Antje Wiener and

Thomas Diez. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 163-80

Wiener, A., Jørgensen, K., & Christiansen, T. (2001) ‘The Social Construction of Europe’ in

Theorising regions through changes in statehood: rethinking the theory and method of

comparative regionalism. Review of International Studies, 39, 313-335

MERCOSUR Normative:

CMC Decisions 2000-2012

GMC Resolutions 2000-2012

30

RECORDS for Meetings of Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development 2001-2012

Records of Meetings of CCMACS 2010-2012

Instituto social del MERCOSUR (2013) ‘La Dimensión Social del Mercosur, Marco Conceptual’.

Intrviews were also conducted with diplomatic representatives to MERCOSUR of the four member

countries and with the Executive Director of the Social Institute of MERCOSUR, Mr. Christian

Mirza.