1
Oxford University
Foreign Service Program 2012/2013
Explaining the Social Dimension of MERCOSUR
Elianne Elbaum
Supervisor: Dr. Christian Arnold
2
INDEX
Abstract
List if Abbreviations
Introduction 3
PART ONE: Conceptual Toolkit 4
1. Background note on MERCOSUR
2. Differentiated Integration
3. Constructivism: Explaining Change
4. Normative Life Cycle
PART TWO: Social Dimension Explained 12
1. Domestic Normative Change
2. Regional Normative Change
2.1.Emergence of new regional norms, entrepreneurs, and norm cascade
2.2.Institutionalization and internalization
Discussion and Conclusions 22
References 27
3
ABSTRACT
This paper aims at studying the emergence and deepening of the integration of the social dimension
in MERCOSUR. We argue that changes in domestic hegemonic norms, since the election of parties
of the New Left in the four member countries, transferred into the region. By using the
constructivist ‘norm life cycle’ model, we attempt to explain what brought this change and how it
impacted on the policy making process in the region.
4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CMC Common Market Council
GMC Group of the Common Market
PSSM Permanent Secretary of Social MERCOSUR
ISM Social Institute of MERCOSUR
MMHASD Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development of MERCOSUR
CCSMASD Coordinating Commission of Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development
FCES Social and Economic Consultative Forum
PEAS Strategic Plan for Social Action
MMHAW Ministers and High Authorities for Women
SUSP Support Unit for Social Participation under the Office of the High Commissioner
SSM Social Summit of MERCOSUR
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INTRODUCTION
Since the early 2000s South America has undergone a process of political renewal. Arguably,
MERCOSUR countries had never been ruled democratically by Left/Left to Center political parties
up until this time. This historical shift in political direction had an impact not only on domestic
politics, but also on regional politics and policies. Domestically, correcting social inequality
(improving the redistribution of income and social services) became the underlying driver of public
policy; such change was also reflected in regional policies.
We observe that MERCOSUR has since 2008 integrated more deeply a social dimension to the
traditionally trade-only policy making in the region. We aim at explaining the reasons behind the
integration of the social dimension or social policy making in the region; why it happened and why
now.
The Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), as its name indicates, was founded with the goal of
creating a Common Market in 1991 among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay by the Treaty
of Asuncion, but in the context of a much greater ambition: that of the development of the four
nations. Born in the wake of democratization and as a result of the 1985 rapprochement between
Argentina and Brazil, MECOSUR developed a new, outwardly oriented economic profile,
responding to the ‘third wave of integration’ (corresponding to the ‘third wave’ of democratization
in the sub-continent (Dabene 2009)). In 1995 the Ouro Preto Protocol established the institutional
basis of MERCOSUR, transforming it into a customs union, with a long-term goal of becoming a
common market under the umbrella of the WTO (Malamud 2010).
Traditionally the Bloc has been ‘only’ that; a custom’s union, and thus its success has been assessed
almost exclusively in terms of whether there has been more economic integration, whether intra
bloc trade and investment increased, and whether the region created positive or negative trade devi-
ation. This paper however, proposes a different approach, we propose to study Social MERCOSUR,
how the social dimension was slowly integrated in the region and as a result, we propose that the
success of the region should not be measured exclusively by the deepening of joint trade policy
making, but by the joint policy making in all policy areas integrated in the region.
We conducted this study using the constructivist outlook to explain the emergence of the social di-
mension, an approach that has rarely been used for the study of the sub-region, arguing that ideas
and identities construct integration. Thus, when ideas change, the region must also change accom-
panying those. We argue that dramatic shifts in domestic ideas, i.e. politics and policies, transfer
into shifts in regional policy making, analyzing how the shift away from neoliberal norms, hege-
monic during the 1990s, into post-neoliberal norms had an impact not only in domestic politics but
also in regional policies.
Furthermore, these changes in regional policies were transformative to the region; the social
dimension, is leading to new found patterns of cooperation and deeper integration; not necessarily
away from the commercial dimension but in addition to it. While since 1991 the Bloc has gone
through many cooperation-stagnation patterns, generally measured by having the commercial
6
dimension as the yardstick to assess how successful integration was. Moments of stagnation, were
seen as the absence of cooperation among member states on issues of joint trade policy, and
explained as responding to different explanatory variables, inter alia: lack of identity of the Bloc
(Oelsner 2012), playing out of 'traditionally' conflicting lobbying sectors (automotive industry or
sugar producers), and the existence of bilateral cleavages (i.e. Paper mills issue between Uruguay
and Argentina). However, new found cooperation trends need to be analyzed using not only trade
barriers but also barriers to social and political integration to explain these patterns of cooperation-
stagnation.
This paper is organized as follows. Part one describes the analytical framework applied to
understanding how the social dimension was progressively integrated in MEROSUR. Part two
focuses on the normative shift, first at the domestic level and later on at the regional level. The first
section explains the normative life cycle, which is the constructivist model applied to explain
normative change. Section two explains the emergence of domestic new norms underpinned by
values of social justice and participation. Section three explains normative domestic to regional
normative transference, explaining how the mechanisms of transference worked in MERCOUR;
who were the key agents and platforms and how institutionalization consolidated the process.
Finally, in the conclusion and discussion part we summarize the overall findings and present
debates and questions that MERCOSUR scholars will need to consider in the future for the more
accurate study of MERCOSUR.
PART ONE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Conceptual Toolkit
1.1. Background note on MERCOSUR
In order to conduct a study of MERCOSUR, and specifically to analyze the process through which
the social dimension is integrated, we first need to briefly make sense of the inner workings of the
Bloc; highlighting its history, objectives, institutions, and its policy making procedures.
The transition to democracy during the 1980s in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, saw the
creation of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), in a process labeled as ‘open
regionalism1. Open regionalism meant that MERCOSUR aimed to combine regional preference
with extra-regional trade openness, responding to the imported neo-liberal economic model,
hegemonic during that time. In other words, MERCOSUR was a product of its time.
Member countries agreed on the Asuncion Treaty that the ultimate objective of MERCOSUR, as
stated on the opening paragraph of the Treaty’s Preamble, was: “The widening of the current
dimensions of the national markets, through regional integration, constitutes a fundamental
condition to accelerate the development process with social justice.” Paragraph 6 also emphasizes:
“improving the living conditions of all the population in all member states.” This is to say, that
1As it was described in most joint-presidential declarations from 1995 until 1999 during MERCOSUR Presidential
Summits
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MERCOSUR was created as a means to accelerate a process of development with social justice,
aiming at improving the living conditions of the population of all member states. Alas, this
objective was often very narrowly understood, as the focus during its commercial only stage was on
the advancement of trade policy making, thus disregarding the many other fundamental aspects of
development.
Commercially the Bloc was successful in increasing intra-state trade in 300% and inflows of
Foreign Direct Investment2 from 1985 to 2009 (Malamud 2010) and until today. MERCOSUR has
remained an intergovernmental regional institution composed by organs led by appointed
representatives (political and technical) of member states without direct election. The highest
authority is the Consejo del Mercado Común (CMC), made up of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Ministers of Finance; followed by the Grupo del Mercado Común (GMC), the executive organ in
charge of implementing the decisions passed by the CMC; the Trade Commission (CCM), the
Secretariat (SM), the Economic and Social Consultative Forum (FCES), the MERCOSUR
Parliament, and the Permanent Review Tribunal (TPR). Only the SM, which is made up of
MERCOSUR bureaucrats and the FCES, which is made up of civil society organization are not
made up of appointed national representatives. Institutionally, the architecture is rather complex and
has more than 300 organs, all of which depend on the two decisive organs for instructions: the CMC
and GMC (the latter, which in turn, reports to the CMC).
Institutionally, MERCOSUR is an intergovernmental regional organization which resembles the
international organization polity, since its membership is acquired by states who subscribe to its
foundational treaty and it has a soft and weekly legalized legal order with a decision-making rule
based on consensus. Notably, however, it has a timid state-like ‘separation of powers’, manifested
in the CMC-GMC (executive), Parliament (legislative), and TPR (judicial), and its governance
capacity is much less anarchic, than that of the UN or any of its agencies.
This is to say that MERCOSUR resembles an international organization in its membership,
delimitation, authority, and legitimacy. It does not however, in terms of its governance capacity,
and constituency relations. Starting with its commercial dimension and timidly, on its social
dimension, MERCOSUR has public policy making capacity, intervening directly in the market and
social relations. Furthermore, the distance between policy recipients and policy makers is much
shorter in the case of MERCOSUR than in the case of a typical international organization. A Forum
like the FCES, the many technical working groups, the Unit of Participation (under the
MERCOSUR High Commissioner), and the Social Summit of MERCOSUR (CSM), shorten the
gap between the institution and its constituency, help to build a community, and allow for the
creation of a MERCOSUR citizenship.
Now that we have seen the structure of MERCOSUR; its objectives and institutional design,
fundamental to understand the workings and grand objectives of having a regional organization, we
shall look more deeply into how the social dimension was integrated in the region, and how the
flexible architecture of MERCOSUR allowed for that change to happen.
2 The notion of being a bloc based upon the premises of open regionalism attracted significant amounts of foreign capital. The size
and growth prospects of the region’s economies, the possibility of free access to the enlarged market, and expectations of expansion
to other South American states all contributed to making Mercosur an important FDIdestination (Oelsner 2013: 123). We shalll not
forget, the neoliberalization policies that were being implemented nationally, which were also a detemrinant factor i n attracting FDI.
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1.2. Differentiated integration
In order to understand how the social dimension was integrated in the region, it is first necessary to
know how dimensions are integrated in the region. As we have mentioned before MERCOSUR
resembles more the international organization polity rather than the state polity, but this definition is
not accurate enough, does not enlighten us enough, in order to be able to understand how integrated
different policies are regionally.
One of the most salient studies that have been conducted recently is that of Leuffen et al (2013),
where they analyze the nature of the EU and measure the level of integration of different policy
areas. Drawing from the findings reached by Leuffen et al (2013), regarding what kind of a polity
the EU is, they conclude that the EU is a new kind of polity; a polity characterized by a system of
differentiated integration (different from that of the international organization and the state), arguing
that while all policies (or dimensions) are discussed at the regional level, different dimensions vary
in the centralization of functions at the regional level. This is to say, that different policies have
reached different levels of centralization, or different levels of vertical integration. This level is
determined by where the decision making process takes place (the decision ‘locus’), whether at the
state level or at the EU level. Consequently, while there are policies that have reached all
centralization at the regional level (the case of the Euro, where the majority of decision making
happens at the regional level), there are other policies that remain state centered (like university
requirements, for which decision making remains exclusively at the state level).
For this reason, in order to grasp what differentiated integration is, and advance in the study of
regional polities, such as the EU or MERCOSUR, it is necessary to measure the level of
centralization, in other words, the number of decision that are made at the regional level for
different policies in order to assess the current status of the integration process (Leuffen et al
2013:8). Thus, the multidimensional approach of differentiated integration seems not only to
capture better the current architecture of the polity, but also offers a valuable indicator to measure
the current state of integration of the different policies.
In the case of MERCOSUR, this measuring system also seems to depict more accurately the current
status of policy making in the region. 'Differentiated integration' not only fits MERCOSUR better
as a general description of the ‘beast’, but also gives greater space for in depth analysis of its
recently acquired ununiformed geometry. MERCOSUR since the 2000 has started to exhibit
vertical differentiation; in that for different policies, decisions are taken at different levels. While
there is a certainly centralization or vertical integration in trade policy, manifested in the current
status of MERCOSUR as a Custom’s Union (for example in decision such as the Common External
Tariff, the need to negotiate international agreements within the MERCOSUR geometry, and
different commercial protocols), for the majority of other policy areas the decision locus remains at
the state,. This is not the case however, for the social dimension, where decision are made both, at
the regional level and state level.
The social dimension is the umbrella term used in order to allude to the set of policy decisions
regarding education, culture, health, social security, and human rights. An analysis of the social
dimension then, indicates that, while the majority of the decisions regarding social policy are made
at the state level in all member countries, there has been a slow yet steady, increase in decisions
made at the regional level (in the CMC specifically) regarding these policy areas. If we look at
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figure one, we see that since 1991 the number of decisions regarding social policy taken in
MERCOSUR has increased from two in 1991 to eleven in 2012. This implies that there has
certainly been an upwards trend towards the verticalization of the social dimension at the regional
level, and that this trend began to deepen in 2008 and continued to increase in the following years.
Furthermore, the verticalization of the social dimension started in the beginnings of MERCOSUR
in 1991 (with two decisions regarding education and culture), and by 2010 it reached an
unprecedented level of 12 decisions. Looking at the total amount of 27 decisions made in 2010,
twelve decisions make up a total of almost 45% of the decisions made that year by MERCOSUR
highest governing body. Thus, we can say that only measuring integration of the trade dimension
would not only neglect a big part of the integration process, but it would also be depicting a wrong
‘picture’ of the regional integration process, where there is much more integration than ‘meets the
eye’.
Interestingly, if we take one step further, and look at the content of these decisions, while many are
regulatory others were aimed at creating institutions with the mandate of providing technical and
political information to the governing body to be able to make more and better informed social
policy decisions in the future. two clear examples of this was the creation of the Meeting of
Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development in 2000 and the founding of the Social
Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) in 2007, with the mandate of informing and advising CMC, on the
steps that need to be taken in order to integrate social policy further (Decision CMC 03/07).
Creating institutions for this purpose, certainly speaks of the will of the regional institution to
continue the trend initiated in 2008, towards the deepening of the integration of social policy.
To conclude, different integration patterns for different policy areas ought to be taken into account,
in order to assess the success/failure of the integration process. Additionally, the emergence of the
social dimension, currently at its initial stage but certainly with the outlook of much further
integration, given its recent institutionalization, speaks of new patterns of cooperation and a new
kind of integration process in MERCOSUR.
Figure 1. CMC Norms
Source: MERCOSUR Secretariat, updated in 2013
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1.3. Constructivism: Explaining Change
So far we have seen that there has been an increase in the verticalization of the social dimension.
Now, how can we explain such emergence? We argue that using a constructivist perspective
approach allows us to better understand change, throwing light on how it happened and why. In
order to comment on change, we first need to introduce some conceptual definitions of the tools
used by the constructivist approach, to then use those as the foundation for our explanation.
Constructivism is comparatively a new addition to the theories of regional integration (Leuffen et al
2013: 84). This approach emphasizes the intersubjective phenomena and the social context for the
study of regional integration (Christiansen et al 2001), both aspects which had been left behind in
material-only analyses of integration (especially by liberal intergovernamentalism, the latest
regional theory). Constructivism claims that ideas and discourses matter to integration (Leuffen et
al 2013). Ideas not only shape the thinking and actions of individuals, but also of entire social
groups. They shape social preferences, interactions, and outcomes; they condition how actors see
interdependence and how they chose to deal with it (Leuffen et al 2013: 86). There are two ‘kinds’
of institutionally shaping ideas: instrumental and principled. Instrumental ideas are those used for
problem-solving and assessing causes and consequences of phenomena; principled ideas are the
underlying values and norms that guide actions.
For the purpose of explaining the increase in integration of the social dimension, we will focus on
principled ideas, or in other words, on the normative aspects of domestic and regional politics. But,
first, what is a norm? There is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). In other
words, a given identity (that which expresses who we are and what unifies us) is built with the
shared behavioral patterns which define who belongs to our group and who does not.
Constructivist scholars, usually indicate that there are two types of norms: regulative norms, which
order and constrain behavior; and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or catego-
ries of action (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, there is the prescriptive nature to norms,
which by definition, means that there are no bad norms from the vantage point of those who pro-
mote it. Norms most of us would consider ‘bad’ (i.e. racial superiority, divine right, imperialism)
were once hegemonic because some groups believed in their appropriateness (that is, in their
‘goodness’), and others either accepted it as obvious or inevitable or had no choice but to accept it.
This is to say that while old norms might be seen as ‘bad’ in the present they were seen as ‘good’ or
as the appropriate standard of behavior, when they were hegemonic.
Then, how do hegemonic norms change? Why do people start to not accept the hegemonic norms
and decide to change them? What triggers change and how does change happen?
1.4. Normative Life Cycle
Figure 2. Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Skkink 1998:896)
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Norm Emergence Norm Cascade Internalization
Stage 1 Tipping Stage 2 Stage 3
Point
First, from a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the international
distribution of ideas. Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behavior are what
give the world structure, order, and stability. But if instead of structure, order and stability we want
to explain change, how would that happen? In an ideational international structure, idea shifts and
norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894).
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norm influence may be understood as a three-stage pro-
cess or a norm ‘life cycle’ (see figure two). The first stage is ‘norm emergence’; the second stage
involves broad norm acceptance or ‘norm cascade’; and the third stage involves internalization. The
first two stages are divided by a threshold or ‘tipping’ point, at which a critical mass of relevant
state actors adopt the norm. This process explains how norms emerge, coexisting for some time
with old hegemonic norms, until they ‘win the race’ and become hegemonic.
For the purpose of explaining change we adopt the Finnemore and Sikkink model of norm ‘life cy-
cle’ and apply it to understand domestic and regional normative change. While the authors argue
that this mechanism explains how new global norms emerge, we argue that it is equally relevant to
explaining normative change in domestic and regional spaces. Clearly, the agents and actors change
as we change the structural levels (from the global to the regional and domestic), but we believe
that the overall mechanism is still useful to explain how normative change comes about. Thus, we
will work then under the assumption that this process is valid and explanatory for domestic and re-
gional change and hope to make a case for it throughout the paper.
Finnemore and Skkink (1998) indicate that world historical events such as wars or major depres-
sions in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms. Ideas and norms
most associated with the losing side of a war or perceived to have caused an economic failure
should be at particular risk of being discredited, opening the field for alternatives.
During this first stage, that of ‘norm emergence’, the characteristic mechanism to ensure that norms
emerge is to make sure of the existence of norm entrepreneurs and platforms where these entrepre-
neurs can work. The norm entrepreneurs function as key players in order to convince a critical
mass of decision makers to embrace these new norms.
The second stage, that of ‘norm cascade’, is more characterized by a dynamic of imitation as the
norm leaders attempt to socialize other decision makers to become norm followers. After what the
authors call a ‘tipping point’, the moment in which a key number of decision makers are ‘convinced’
to embrace the normative change, norms cascade through different groups and agents in a more
imitative manner (with less effort required by the norm entrepreneurs) until the end of the norm
cascade stage.
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At the far end of the norm cascade, norm internalization occurs. At this final stage, norms acquire a
taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate. This is where the new
norms become the new standard of appropriate behavior and old standards become obsolete and
even illegal in some cases (Finnemore and Skkink 1998: 895).
Norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents, or norm entrepreneurs, having
strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community (Finnemore and Skkink
1998: 896). They are critical for norm emergence because they frame issues (using language that
names, interprets, and dramatizes them) to resonate well with the broader public but also with poli-
cy makers; creating alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest. Put simply, they
make people believe in the issues or they frame the issue in a certain way that people’s beliefs are
contemplated. Furthermore, since new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in
a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of
interest, norm entrepreneurs are key players in the transitional period.
Another key aspect for normative change is the existence of organizational platforms. All norm
promoters at the international level need some kind of organizational platform from and through
which they promote their norms. For international norms these could be NGOs or other transnation-
al organizations. In our case these platforms come from intra-MERCOSUR, and they were built by
and for norm entrepreneur to fulfill their purpose.
Olsener (2012) defines an ‘institution’ as: “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defin-
ing appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations”. While norms are iso-
lated single standards of behavior, institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are
structured together and interrelate; they represent a collection of practices and rules (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998: 892). Notably, however, institutionalization is not a necessary condition for a norm
cascade; institutionalization may follow, rather than precede, the initiation of a norm cascade pro-
cess, but it will definitely have to occur before norm internalization.
When the third stage in achieved, that of internalization, we can then say that the new norm has won
‘the battle’ among the many other competing norms, especially old norms that were fighting to re-
main hegemonic. While the methods that have led to internalization of global norms are not the
same at the regional and domestic level, since to internalize a norm in the world seems like a much
more like a titanic task than regional or domestic internalization, we still argue that the process of
institutionalization is highly relevant in our study and that it serves to demonstrate how new norms
become internalized. This does not mean, that they are no longer debated, but it means that they
have achieved a certain ‘for granted’ status by being embedded in the national and regional level
architecture and policy production; gaining the stability that internalization requires.
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PART TWO: SOCIAL DIMENSION EXPLAINED
We argue that change in domestic norms purported a change in regional norms. The social
dimension (underpinned by the new norms) appeared first in all four member countries and it was
only then that it was transferred to MERCOSUR. We propose to analyze both changes in the
following way: 1. explaining how that norm cycle model happened domestically, where new norms
replaced old norms; 3. explaining how those new domestic norms were transferred to the region,
leading to the emergence and internalization of the social dimension.
1. Domestic Normative Change
During the 1990s Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay were heavily encouraged to participate in
the ‘Washington Consensus’, a doctrine described as a set of ten specific economic policy
prescriptions that constituted the standard reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing
countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. This doctrine encompassed policies in such areas
as macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, and
the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. In order to overcome the unstabilizing
hyper-inflation crises of the 1980s all countries needed to borrow heavily from these institutions,
and received in echnage this tight and restrictive economic prescription as a necessary condition to
obtain these loans. As a result, all four member countries liberalized their economies, privatized
their national enterprises, and initiated a set of neo-liberal reforms to boost economic growth.
This model of growth, understood also as a model of development, was implemented and used
throughout the 1990s until a devastating economic crisis hit first Brazil in 1999, then Argentina in
2001, and then Uruguay and Paraguay in 2002, leaving almost 40.6% of South American
population in poverty, and almost 17% of that 40% in extreme poverty conditions; this meant
almost 300 million people were living under poverty conditions by 2002 (CEPAL 2005).
We argue that citizens and political elites saw the failure of this model of development in that it did
not necessarily create social inclusion (even if it did create more economic growth) and were ready
to look for a different one, a model that would not only purport economic growth but also grapple
with the complex social inclusiveness necessary to include almost half of the population that was
excluded from this growth. We argue that it was due to the failure of the model that new norms
emerged.
While the neo-liberal model was not the only cause behind the impoverishment of the South
American population, Standing (2011) links marginalization to socio economic precariousness
associated with neoliberal economic globalization in the 1990s; which excluded almost half of the
population from the benefits of the market economy, and left little room for state intervention to
remedy it. During the 2000s, after the hardest moments of the financial crisis, new political elites
emerged, political elites that brought with them the emergence of new norms.
Different from the old neo-liberal norms that underpinned the old Right/Right to Center parties,
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these new norms emphasized socio-economic rights and social participation. New political leaders
won on the basis of taking responsibility for fundamental aspects of human needs and well-being
that had been neglected, assuming what they called the ‘social debt’ that the neoliberal politics of
the 90s had left. The ‘New Left’ (since the Left had never been in power under democratic
conditions before) understood that states have a moral responsibility to respect and deliver the
inalienable (not contingent to the market) rights of their citizens (Grujel et al 2012: 3) and was
determined to do so.
The ‘Right to Left shift’ evidenced by the fair election of Left/Left to Center Presidents in the four
member countries (Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in 2003 in Brazil, Nestor Kirchner in 2003 in
Argentina, Tabaré Vazquez in 2004 in Uruguay, and Fernando Lugo in 2007 in Paraguay), and in
the broader context of almost every other country in the region (with the exception of Colombia and
Mexico), not only consolidated democratic values in the region, but also a rights-based governance
approach; ideas that underpin the normative shift. This type of governance draws on and learns
from a broad range of intellectual ideas and policy frameworks comprising human rights
approaches and global justice perspectives (Grugel and Piper 2009). Rights-based governance is
associated with institutional opportunities for inclusion, recognition, participation and care of those
most in need, who are often those whose rights have been most denied (Riggilozzi 2013: 3). It is not
enough to recognize that people have rights, but it is of vital importance to assume the state’s
obligations to create opportunities and capabilities to enjoy those rights (Sengupta 2000: 566 in
Riggirozzi 2013:4).
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the majority of the ‘New Left’ politicians began their
political activism in Worker’s Unions and/or deeply rooted social movements (some were even
involved in guerilla groups during the 1960s) and as such they did not come from the economic
elites that used to rule these countries in the past, but from the social movements themselves who
were reclaiming the state’s obligation to create opportunities and capabilities for all the citizens to
enjoy the rights related to social justice and equality. This was the case of the PT in Brazil, the Wide
Front in Uruguay, the Justicialist/Peronist Party in Argentina, the Concertation in Chile, the
Movement for Socialism in Bolivia, the PAIS Alliance in Ecuador, the United Socialist Party in
Venezuela, and the Guasú Front in Paraguay.
Thus at the domestic level there was a process of emergence of new norms of state intervention to
provide social justice. The ‘tipping point’ was achieved when the ‘New Left’ won the elections in
all member countries, convincing the most important decision makers, i.e. the citizens, to elect them
and allowing them to govern with the new norms orienting their policy making.
Consequently, these norms cascaded through all government organs as the Presidents, as the main
norm entrepreneurs, made sure that the social dimension was a priority throughout their
administration. This not only happened through abundant political narrative, but also through the
allocation of an average of more than 23% of the state’s total public spending for social policy
issues (CEPAL 2005 ). Figure three depicts the social spending per inhabitant from the 1990s
onwards. In it we can clearly observe how spending increased slowly since the 1990s, it went
through a decrease during the economic crisis (1999-2004), and since 2005 has dramatically
increased and deepened in all member countries, never going back to the initial amount of spending
15
observed during the 1990s.
Furthermore, we observe that this change was deeply institutionalized by: 1. the creation of
Ministries of Social Development and Welfare in all member countries during the 2000s (except for
Paraguay); 2. the expansion of social welfare programs to cover almost 40% of the population; and
3. the reform of key policy areas to make services more inclusive (inter alia health reform,
education reform, and tax reform) and ensure access and coverage to those with less means.
Institutionalization ensured internalization, since these institutions and programs are now well
embedded in the national working of governments, and seem to have become, although debatable,
policies of state, rather than policies of the ‘New Left’ governments. It would be rather hard for
newly elected parties, not from the ‘New Left’, to undo what has been done in terms of social policy
and still get elected.
While social norms became increasingly internalized, these domestic debates about representation,
social protection, welfare provision and citizenship became bound up with strategies of
internationalization and regionalism, creating a sense that the time was ripe for the introduction of
new perspectives on integration (Rigirrozzi 2013). These new norms needed to be taken to the
region as well.
Figure three: Social spending/inhabitant (UDS)
Data from CEPAL Database.
2. Regional normative Change: the deepening of the social dimension
Constructivists hold the view that regional organizations are ideational as well as material; that
ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only
individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational fac-
tors are not independent of time and place (Ruggie 1998: 33). This means that, regional institutions
are socially constructed, which means that social realities exist only by human agreement (Searle
16
1995: 1–29; Collin 1997). This accounts for social realities being potentially ‘changeable’ and ‘con-
testable’, as well as durable; they are confined to a limited time-frame rather than to the “discrete
charm of timelessness” (Christiansen 2009).
MERCOSUR, as all intergovernmental regional institutions, is driven by domestic political elites’
views of national political-economic interests, and their agreement on how the region should be
constructed. As Duina (2004) notes, MERCOSUR is built on existing shared ‘ontological and
normative notions about the world’, carried by national actors acting regionally.
While normative content or the ‘ontological and normative notions about the world’ during the
1990s referred principally to state sovereignty, politically and economically concentric elite-led
liberal democracy, and economic de-regulation, social citizenship and social policy issues had
largely remained absent from mainstream debates about region building (Grugel 2004) until the
internalization of the social dimension at the domestic level.
Additionally, domestic norms are deeply intertwined with the workings of international norms.
Many international norms began as domestic norms and become international through the efforts of
entrepreneurs of various kinds. In addition, international norms must always work their influence
through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms. Furthermore, all these domestic influ-
ences are strongest at the early stage of a norm’s life cycle, and domestic influences lessen signifi-
cantly once a norm has become institutionalized in the international system (Finnemore and Skkink
1998).
While change was brought in constitutive norms since the mid-2000s, there was no observable
change in regulative norms. Regulative norms, those which regulate the operations of MERCOSUR
have not been altered. The Bloc still works under the same initial regulatory framework, that of the
Asuncion Treaty. The Asuncion Treaty has neither been changed, nor reformed, thus operating rules
remain constant. Agents saw change happen not by altering how MERCOSUR works, but in its
constitution, in what MERCOSUR deals with in terms of policy formulation.
We propose to study the regional norm cycle, fleshed out in five steps as follows: 1. emergence of
new regional norms due to the transference of highly valued and consensual domestic norms to the
region; 2. The appropriation of these norms by the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of
Social Development (MMHASD) who were in turn, transformed into the norm entrepreneurs, in
charge of the cascade of norms throughout the organization; 3. institutionalization of these norms in
the Social Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) and the revamping of the Social and Economic
Consultative Forum (FCES); and 4. creation of the first regional social program, which is evidence
of regional social policy per se, and thus of the internalization of the production and formulation of
social policy in the region.
2.1. Emergence of new regional norms, entrepreneurs, and norm cascade
As a result of being socially constructed and a product of its time and place, integration is a process
of community-building at its core. The first constructivist assumption is that institutional
integration depends on the strength of the transnational community: the stronger the collective and
17
the larger the pool of common compatible ideas, the more institutional integration we will see. This
is to say, that compatible social values, together with mutual responsiveness, are essential
conditions of functioning international communities (Deutsch 1957:66).
Confirming this assumption, we observe that while new similar norms that were already being
internalized in all member states, they were also being transferred to the region. These new social
norms were not only highly valued domestically, but also highly consensual and compatible among
domestic elites of the four member countries, making the normative transference occur with much
more ease. Evidence of this is the many presidential discourses and declarations that encouraged
more integration, but more integration especially through the social dimension. Consequently,
without this normative consensus the deepening of the integration of the social dimension, would
have been much more difficult.
Initially expressed by Presidents Kirschner and Lula, and later on by Vazquez and Lugo, presidents
embraced regionalism as a frame within which to articulate a development project that combines
export growth and international trade alongside social reform and a commitment to greater equality
(Sigal 2003). At the Summit of Copacabana in March 2004, Kirschner and Lula also entered into
what was termed in the press a ‘historic agreement’ to move towards a new regional model of social
democratic development. Copacabana was, pre-eminently, a politics-led summit, marking a change
in atmosphere from more technocratically oriented summits in the past (Grugel 2005: 1069). From
2005 onwards the mandate and agreement became even more powerful 3, but the instructions on
how to implement such change had to be delegated to technical bodies, which could formulate the
policies to operate on such agreements at the political level.
Before explaining the process of transference, let us make a theoretical caveat, in that we should be
careful not to confuse norm transference with norm diffusion, a very popular concept used in
constructivism. Norm diffusion is defined by Elkins and Simmons (2005) as the set of processes
characterized by interdependent, but uncoordinated decision making among states. This is
phenomenon is actually opposite to what we argue happened in MERCOSUR, where there is
coordinated clustered policy making. Hass (1992) describes coordinated clustered policy making as
the horizontal processes of international collaboration and cooperation; this is how we believe the
social dimension emerged regionally, with great agency coordination and determination to make it
happen. Coordination in this case defined norm transference.
The process of transference is one that has new norms and norm entrepreneurs deeply intertwined;
where none could prosper without each other. And as a result we shall analyze step one and step
two together. New norms agreed by Presidents were then entrusted to the Ministers and High Au-
thorities of Social Development (MHASD) to emerge at the regional level. Presidents agreed on the
emergence of these new norms regionally, but they had to delegate the agency of the ‘norm cascade’
process to other agents (i.e. norm entrepreneurs), who would push for the emergence of a regional
social policy agenda. Since these norm entrepreneurs were entrusted with the same mission at the
domestic level, by having to persuade other branches of the executive and the legislative on the
3 Asuncion Initiative about the Fight Against Extreme Poverty in 2005, Art 27 of the Joint Communique of Presidents of MERCOSUR of 2005:
“Priority to define a Social Agenda, geared towards the development of initiatives and policies to reduce the social deficit, promote human
development, and productive integration of the economies; Presidential Declaration of 2010 where it is mentioned that joint policies are the solution to shared challenges
18
concretion of operational plans for social policy, they were also entrusted to do so at the regional
level. They were the ‘natural’ choice to push for the social dimension and to make sure the norms
cascaded through the many organs and structure of MERCOSUR.
Social Development Ministers and high Authorities are in charge of making sure that during their
biannual meetings there is a plan and there are resolutions for the CMC to pass, both of which need
to persuade Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Foreign Relations (which are the ultimate deci-
sion makers in the CMC) not only to go beyond the trade dimension of integration and into a re-
gional social policy initiatives, but also to make funding available for making regional social hap-
pen. Their agency is a key factor in ensuring that CMC passes these resolutions and for the success
of the internalization of these norms in the Bloc.
Taking a closer look at the Declarations that have come out of those meetings, since its creation in
December 2000, there is a clear affirmation and reiteration of the necessity for regional governance
of the social dimension (phrase coined by Ministers and Presidents to frame the issue). The mecha-
nism of transference becomes apparent as we go through these. As early as in 2001 (their first re-
gional meeting) the Declaration was calling for regional actions to strengthen domestic action on
the social dimension: “…During this First Meeting, Ministers are working on poverty and child
labor as priority themes that are common in all countries which require urgent national and regional
action through short term and long term measures, focused on the most vulnerable population with
the transversal objectives of employment, social protection, training and education, and strengthen-
ing of citizen participation” (Record MMHASD 2001).
Ministers since their first meetings, agreed on which the priorities, focus, and unit of intervention
should be, not only in regional policy but also to be applied in national programs. They agreed on
prioritizing poverty reduction, as well as on implementing measures to eliminate child labor; and
focusing the unit of intervention in the family. Furthermore, Ministers sought to develop a joint
statistical and monitoring system, as well as the opening up of channels of communication with
civil society. Ministers transferred their domestic agenda to the regional level. The same priorities
that we observed domestically were transferred to the region by these agents who acted
domestically as well as regionally.
By 2005, Ministers were calling for a Biannual Plan, as expressed by their Declaration: “To
consolidate Social MEROCSUR through joint work of member countries, Bolivia and Chile”. The
plan not only included common and shared strategies but also the creation of a social permanent
secretariat, the adoption of a common theoretical framework, and the establishment of common
indicators to evaluate the efficiency of the Biannual Plan. Thus, social norms were then, past their
emergence stage and on their way to the tipping point.
In 2007 Ministers agreed on the creation of the Social Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM), approved a
Declaration of Principles of the Social Dimension, created the 2007-2009 Biannual Plan, and
approved a shared statistical system to monitor the effectiveness of social policy and planning. The
‘solidification’ or ‘thickness’ of social norms increased as their institutionalization deepened, thus as
years passed what, were seen as rhetorical declarations in the beginning, took the shape of an
institution as early as in 2007.
19
The success of norm entrepreneurs is seen first in the securing of the creation of the ISM, and later
the deep increase in its budget throughout the years; from USD 227,952 in 2009 to more than USD
1, 000, 000 in 2013. This proves that they convinced a critical mass of decision makers to embrace
new norms, allowing for the social agenda to deepen in its regional integration. In 2012 however,
we can see the tipping point of the cycle process, where not only the budget of ISM increased in
absolute terms (see table one), but also all member countries (including Venezuela) agreed to a
fixed yearly percentage contribution for the budget of the ISM (Decision CMC 08/11). Thus, no
more lobbying needed to be done to secure funding for ISM, and thus stability was achieved.
The beginning of the process of internalization, however, began in 2009, when the MMHASD
discussed the first regional social project per se on the social economy, after doing workshops and
trainings with the participation of civil society. This would be the first time that MEROCUSR
thought of regional social policy. It is important to highlight however, that despite the fact that the
implementation of the project is left to the national governments; the idea of social regional policy
formulated by the region for the region is actually new.
By 2010 the MMHASD was to start the norm cascade process by calling on the Parliament and all
institutions of MERCOSUR to consider the Social Dimension and the Social Principles as the main
guideline in their work and Working Groups. Ministers called for: “the creation of shared work
spaces with other institutions of MERCOSUR, especially with those dealing with the rural econo-
my, youth, elderly people, cooperatives, and decentralization” (Declaration MMHASD 2010). Re-
gional norm cascade was then launched and triggered by the Ministers of Social Development, in an
attempt to expand the scope of the norms, making them deeply intertwined, encouraging imitation
by other regional actors.
Finally in 2011 the Strategic Plan for Social Action and in 2013 the Theoretical Framework for Re-
gional Social Action were released. Both documents contribute to the patterns of internalization of
the social dimension, since they represent regional agreements on social policy, agreement that can
would more difficult to reverse. These documents contain common definitions, priorities, and
methods to start implementing social regional policy, of which the social economy program is the
first example.
Table One: Budget ISM (based on CMC Decisions 38/08; 31/09; 46/10; 08/11; 25/11; 60/12)
Year Total Budget (USD)*
2009 227,952
2010 227,952
2011 488,175
2012 489,308
2013 1,187,337
*(Argentina 24%; Brazil 39%; Paraguay 24%; Uruguay 13%; and Venezuela in 2012: 44,400 and in 2013: 229,807)
20
2.2. Institutionalization and internalization
The third step that of institutionalization comes with the stabilization of these new norms in the So-
cial Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) and the revamping of the Social and Economic Consultative
Forum (FCES). The institutionalization process began with the creation of the Social Institute of
MERCOSUR and deepened by giving it a clear vision, mission, and values which target goals of
inclusion; and with the revamping of the Social and Economic Forum of MERCOSUR (FESM),
which target goals of social participation. These two sets of core values, that of inclusion and social
participation underpin the normative shift and throughout the process of institutionalization become
increasingly embedded in the architectural and constitutive framework of MERCOSUR.
The Social Institute of MERCOSUR was initially thought as the first research center devoted to the
study of regional social policy. It was founded in 2007 to identify a wide range of rights-bearing
subjects, in addition to labor, such as children, ethnic minorities, migrants, and marginalized and
impoverished families within the informal economy (Grugel 2005). ISM arguments emphasize the
linkages between social reform and economic productivity: it is argued that social reform is neces-
sary not only for intrinsic reasons to do with the dignity of the person (i.e. so that people can actual-
ly enjoy their rights and not only be entitled to them)but also because the pace of economic integra-
tion, especially in border regions, makes coordinated social regulation inevitable if states are to re-
main legitimate and to lay claims to sovereign control over territory. In making its case, the IMS
seeks, above all, to influence policy-making debates (Grugel 2005), constructing ideas for MHASD
to inform and persuade key decision makers of their implementation.
The only way for an institution to fulfill its tasks is to furnish it with a vision, mission, and core
values under which it should operate; otherwise the institution has no sense of purpose and no way
to achieve its goals. In that sense, it is relevant to mention that ISM vision was given only recently
by the document: Theoretical Framework of the Social Dimension of MERCOSUR, released in
2013 by the ISM and elaborated in close collaboration with the Meeting of Ministers and Authori-
ties of Social Development and its executive arm, the Coordination Commission (CCMASM). This
Document gives a framework of action and a long term vision for the formulation and execution of
regional social policy.
In terms of its mission, it was clearly set out by the Strategic Plan for Social Action (PEAS), passed
by the decision CMC 67/2010, where the axis, guidelines and objectives that are to be followed in
the construction of the social dimension are expressed and also passed to other MERCOSUR organs
for their compliance. Axis 1: eradicate hunger, poverty and social injustice; Axis 2: guarantee
Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, and ethnic, racial, and gender Equality; Axis 3:
Universalize Public Health; Axis 4. Universalize Education and Eradicate Illiteracy; Axis 5. Value
and Promote Cultural Diversity; Axis 6. Guarantee Productive Inclusion; Axis 7: Guarantee Access
to Decent Employment and Workers’ Rights; Axis 8: Environmental Sustainability; Axis 9: Promote
and Ensure Social Dialogue; and Axis 10: Establish mechanisms of Regional Cooperation for the
implementation and financing of social policies.
Each of these axes has guidelines and objectives within their scope; consolidating all these topics
into one umbrella term, that of Social Action. This dimension touches upon ‘traditional’ social
21
issues, such as hunger, social justice, and worker’s rights, but adds many topics such as public
health, education, culture, employment and inclusiveness, environment, social dialogue and citizen
participation, which belong to a ‘third generation’ of social, cultural and economic rights. In the
definition of social action, which gives further impulse to what was considered a quite static ‘social
dimension’, a new impetus is given to the elaboration of regional public policy.
All the topics included in the Plan of Action touch upon the most salient and important issues in
public policy and as thus, we would be in the wrong if we assumed that these are ‘only social issues’
and not political issues. This is to say that, the emergence of the social dimension could also be
understood as a vehicle or springboard for the integration of other public policy issues at the
regional level. This tendency also mirrors the normative process that occurred domestically, where
new social norms extended horizontally through all public policy areas in the norm cascade process
gaining space for later internalization.
Concerning the values of the Institute, they are deeply embedded in the new norms that we have
analyzed throughout the paper, values of social justice, rights based governance, human
development, and democracy. The creation of the institute depicts the crystallization of those values
and the internalization of the new norms within the regional architecture.
Regarding the fourth step, the institute has finalized the formulation of the first regional social pro-
gram, a program for the promotion of the social economy in seven bordering areas of the four (now
five) member states and four associate countries. This initiative has three objectives: 1. gather in-
creased information and identify relevant actors for the social economy on the field; 2. deepen
communitarian experiences that are currently successful; and 3. Include communitarian experiences
in value chains and increase their involvement in trade chains. The project aims at enabling and
encouraging micro-entrepreneurship, based on family projects; creating spaces for communal shop-
ping (i.e. popular markets); regaining ownership of business that went under by forming coopera-
tives of organized workers groups; constructing cultural spaces and social networks for training and
support; and increasing the efficient use of microfinance and social banking (Record MMHASD
01/08 ANEX XIII, XIV Meeting of Technical Group of Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities
of Social Development of MERCOSUR and Associate States).
This project is in its final formulation stages and is to begin implementation in the beginnings of
2014. This platform opens up spaces for direct socialization with the citizens of all five countries as
well as citizens of associate countries, as it embarks on it first social project of regional characteris-
tics. Although the implementation still remains for each member state, the conception and funding
comes from MERCOSUR to MERCOSUR. This makes a difference from other social projects that
have been implemented in the region, but have either been formulated in coordination with and/or
funded by other institutions, inter alia, the EU, Spanish Agency of Cooperation and International
Development (AECID), and the Inter-American Development Bank.
For this purpose the Bloc approved a Structural Convergence Fund of almost USD 1,000 million in
2005, in order to correct intra-bloc asymmetries is highly relevant and recognizes the need to invest
in the region from the region. Since 2007 five projects have been approved (two in Paraguay and
three in Uruguay) which have focused on the promotion of structural convergence, regional
22
competitiveness, promotion of social cohesion (especially in smaller economies and less developed
regions within the five countries), and promotion of the integration process. It is within the
framework of ‘social cohesion’ that this first regional program is to obtain its funding. Replacing
historical donors to invest in its own projects and programs, is further evidence of the
institutionalization of norms.
Furthermore, the revamping of social and economic forum has also been part of the internalization
process, giving further space for civil society to participate in policy building. For most of the 20th
century citizenship in the Southern Cone was understood mainly as labor rights; democratization
since the 1980s has allowed for the articulation of a broader project of citizenship where it is con-
ceptualized more diffusely as sets of social, political, cultural and economic rights; and democrati-
zation has been accompanied by the emergence of sophisticated and dynamic civil society organiza-
tions (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000).
The approval of the Statute of MERCOSUR Citizenship in 2010 is highly relevant to recognize the
central role that citizenship is expected to be given in the internalization of new norms and in re-
gional social policy. Other evidence of this process is found in the creation of the Institute of Hu-
man Rights Policy of MERCOSUR in 2009 and the Social Participation Unit in 2010, within the
structure of the High Representative. The institutionalization of these norms of participation, also
speak of the normative change and of the democratization process in the Bloc; creating more spaces
for citizen participation is new, but there still is gap between the institution and its effective use, as
we were informed by the Director of the Social Institute of MERCOSUR.
Thin codes of citizenship and weak traditions of rights protection within Latin America have meant
that civil society groups have frequently sought support from outside the nation-state. One result of
this was an early internationalization of social protest. This has led to the creation of Latin Ameri-
can nodes within dense global networks of citizenship activism. As a result of the mobilization of
civil society across the Americas—and of the recognition by some state elites of the value of includ-
ing moderate elements of civil society in the structures of region building—there is now the begin-
ning of (weak and partial) civil society inclusion within the structures of regionalism, as a part of
the institutionalization of new social norms.
While the institutionalization of the social dimension is not yet fully completed and is still in pro-
gress, as we have just recently seen the formulation of the first regional social program, we have
definitely seen advances in the deepening of the integration of the social dimension, and in the be-
lief of the need to have a social policy regionally. All the sources interviewed, diplomats of the four
member countries, manifested they have seen the change deepen in the last few years and that they
believed that the trend will continue in following years.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
23
In part one; we analyzed the current reality of MERCOSUR, seeing that the social dimension has
increasingly been verticalized in the regional architecture. Evidence of this was the normative com-
position of MERCOSUR from 1990 until today. From very few CMC social norms in its begin-
nings to up to 45% of the norms passed by CMC being social norms in 2010.
We emphasized that we should move away from under-descriptive terms such as ‘international or-
ganization’ and move into a more descriptive an accurate term, such as ‘differentiated integration’,
which suggests that different policy areas are integrated differently within the region. Differentiat-
ed integration leaves much room for change and that is also why it is compatible with the construc-
tivist approach we put forward throughout the second part of our paper to explain normative
change.
We would like to highlight however, that our argument is far from proposing that MERCOSUR will
only be focused on social issues in the future. On the contrary, we propose that the social dimension
is added to the commercial dimension, the ‘typical’ MERCOSUR dimension. In reality, since the
global financial crisis of 2008 MERCOSUR has experienced renewed economic dynamism
(CEPAL 2011). MEROCUSR states have weathered the global crisis better than other economies,
and their recovery has taken a faster pace. In a way, this has also facilitated the emergence of a
social dimension, but it was not the determinant factor.
In part two we discuss why the social dimension emerged; what triggered its emergence and how it
happened. We then use the constructivist approach of ‘norm life cycle’ to explain these questions,
posing that the region is a dynamic ideational structure, with flexibility to adapt to new contexts and
circumstances. But more importantly, indicating that the region is heavily influenced by domestic
change and thus, political and economic change observed domestically will be reflected regionally.
Consequently, we discuss how the social dimension emerged as a result of domestic change which
then triggered regional change. In this sense, domestically norms changed with the advent of the
1999-2002 economic and financial crises; we observe the emergence of the ‘New Left’ and with it
the replacement of old neo-liberal norms (hegemonic during the 1990s) with post-neo-liberal
norms. These were then transferred to the region, by successful norm entrepreneurs who aided the
process of norm cascade and norm internalization in MERCOSUR.
Furthermore, this domestic change, which happened in parallel in the four member countries (Ar-
gentina and Brazil in 2003, Uruguay in 2005, and Paraguay in 2007) meant that there was high level
agreement on new domestic norms, based on social justice, and in the desire to transfer those to the
regional level. Consequently, Presidents of the four countries entrusted their Ministers of Social
Development to make that change happen regionally. Thus, we argue that the mechanism of domes-
tic to regional transference is clearly seen by analyzing the evolution of this Meeting and seeing
how the norm entrepreneurs acted regionally.
In 2000 the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of Social development was created, and by
2001 in its first meeting these norm entrepreneurs were creating plans, programs, and envisioning
24
the crystallization of these new norms into new regional institutions. By 2007, norms had already
emerged regionally, and they were cascading through the different organs of MERCOSUR. Minis-
ters of Social Development persuaded Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the
two key decision makers in MERCOSUR) to create the Social Institute of MERCOSUR and a tech-
nical Commission within their Meeting. Not only that but, by 2011 they had convinced all member
countries to contribute a fixed percentage for the funding of the Institute. Furthermore, the Institute
promoted the first regional social program, with funding which came from MERCOSUR, that is its
first regional social program that was formulated and funded within MERCOSUR capacities. We
argue that these two factors were the tipping point towards the norm cascade process and the begin-
ning of the internalization process for these. New post-neo-liberal norms seemed to have gained
much way compared to other competing norms, especially the old neo-liberal norms, hegemonic
during the 1990s.
Let us note that at the heart of the politics of regionalization is the attempt by actors and coalitions
to reinforce the governance of particular issues beyond the scope of national governance and poli-
tics. This rescaling is not incidental, but designed to empower particular interests, while weakening
or wholly marginalizing others. While a MERCOSUR exclusively focused on the commercial di-
mension, would benefit more greatly the exporting class in all member countries (and expect that
that wealth is ‘spilled over’ via consumption), a social and commercial MERCOSUR covers much
greater societal interests, and begins to benefit those who were neglected in the past.
Having a social MERCOSUR benefits those who were not benefitted from ‘the invisible hand’ and
helps them enter the economy. This is clearly seen in the first social economy regional project
where citizens from the four countries in seven different sub-regions will be trained to expand their
family business and helped to export their products. However, it does not only do that, but it has the
much greater objective of inclusion; allowing people to enjoy their social and economic rights and
overcoming their social marginalization. Inclusion is the grand value that underpins all new post-
neo-liberal norms and is the objective of social policy at the domestic, as well as at the regional
level.
Consequently, this study challenges three recurring assumptions that were in many of the studies
conducted on MERCOSUR: 1. That MERCOSUR is a commercial only regional institution; 2. that
Southern nations, individually and as a group, are ‘receivers’ of global norms; and 3. That
MERCOSUR is a dying regional institution (or a ‘failing development project’), expressed well by
Grugel (2005) by the questioning whether ‘‘MERCOSUR still [has] a project’’(Dabene 2004),
explaining its existence in terms of ‘‘survival’’ (Carranza 2003; Gomez Mera 2005) and
highlighting its ‘‘declining achievement’’ (Malamud 2005).
We argue that 1. MERCOSUR was traditionally a trade only bloc, but that social policy is
increasingly being verticalized and deepened. Furthermore, there is the social participation axis
within the social dimension. The more people are able to participate in economic activity the more
they will be able to participate in civic activities, reinforcing thus the democratic principles of
citizen participation in decision making. For this objective to strive, it is not only necessary that
people decide to participate, but there shall also be spaces in which people are able to participate
(more than voting once every five years for national elections). These values become central,
enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive attributes; initiatives in this direction have promoted the
25
formation and participation of civil society organizations, a tendency that marks the incipient
emergence of a bottom-up MERCOSUR, very different also from the trade-only, elite-only
MERCOSUR.
This objective of democratic reinforcement is also behind the social dimension, and is tightly tied to
a highly contentious debate that has been going on domestically in all four countries, regarding the
political v. economic MERCOSUR. The debate is, simply put, Political MERCOSUR collides and
has the potential of curbing national sovereignty. This debate is still going and MERCOSUR is tilt-
ing towards economic and very timid social governance rather than more ambitious political gov-
ernance. None the less, it would be foolish to say that the economic dimension and more especially
the social dimension are not part of the political dimension, but the debate aims at staying far from
supranationalism rather than focusing on the integration of policy areas still in an intergovernmental
manner. The fact that regulative norms have remained unchanged despite the normative shift, con-
firms the preference for intergovernamentalism.
For the second challenged assumption, we propose that autochthonous domestic norms emerged as
a result of an adaptation to an economic and political crises in the region and then transferred to the
regional level, and as such regionalism in the South is no longer seen as a neoliberal strategy at a
regional scale, but as a product of the transference of autochthonous domestic post-neo-liberal
norms.
In terms of the third challenged assumption, we argue that MERCOSUR is still a project, it is not
striving for survival, and its achievements shall be measure not only in terms of trade but also in the
other dimension that have been integrated more deeply in the last five years. In fact, quite the
opposite is true. MERCOSUR is a changing regional institution, as we saw on Part one, and as such
it undergoes certain adaptation processes. The integration of the social dimension speaks of a
project which is adapting to a new reality and context, and responding to its own needs for
development (which are related to economic growth but not only to it) with autochthonous regional
answers. The fact that the region is responsive to change, is evidence that it is still alive.
Finally, we believe that there are three questions that were briefly discussed on this paper, but that
remain greatly unexplored by the MERCOSUR literature, which are: 1. the influence of regional
norms on domestic norms, and 2. the impact of the social dimension in the regionalization process,
or in other words the effect that this process has on the overall process of regional integration in
MERCOSUR; and 3. What will be the impact of the inclusion of Venezuela as a member country in
the integration of the social dimension.
In the first case we believe that much more work needs to be conducted in order to assess what the
influence of internalized regional norms is on national norms. If we imagine a scenario were domes-
tic norms shift again, how would internalized regional social norms behave? Will they become ob-
solete? How will embedded regional norms influence them?
Regarding the second debate, we introduced throughout this study that the more compatible the
pool of ideas is, the more integration we will see. This seems to be the case, in the sense that the
more compatible ideas on a certain policy are, the more verticalization we will see of that certain
policy. Additionally as Leuffen et al (2013) indicate, Constructivism posits that if domestic reso-
26
nance of community ideas is high, that is to say, if regional ideas appeal to, or can be demonstrated
to build on, existing domestic ideas, they are accepted more easily (Leuffen 2013: 89), however the
effects on the overall regionalization process needs to be studied much more in depth to have a sys-
tematic answer to these questions.
The third question was not analyzed during our study, due to the fact that Venezuela’s admission as
a member country is so recent that it would be very difficult to analyze the consequences. However,
we certainly believe that it will have a strong impact on the integration of the social dimension, es-
pecially given the emphasis that this dimension has domestically. If we used our hypothesis, then
the inclusion of Venezuela would definitely strengthen the verticalization of the social dimension in
MERCOSUR, but only time will tell whether that will be the case.
All in all, this study argues that MERCOSUR is a vibrant regional project that is far from its death.
Throughout the analysis we hope to have depicted the new patterns of cooperation, which come in
the form of the integration of the social dimension. Following the ultimate objective of regional
integration (as it was stated in the Asuncion Treaty) that is the aspiration of inclusive development,
it would be difficult to imagine how that could be achieved without political governance. In addi-
tion, as Draibe (1996) argues, extended poverty increases social risks, such as violence, crime, and
environmental hazards, making countries vulnerable to these threats not only within their borders
but outside of them as well. It would make sense then to have regional answer to regional problems,
through regional governance. But the amount of regional response still remains to be seen.
There is still much more to be studied about MERCOSUR, and we hope that all future studies do
not only focus on the Bloc trade and finance policy, but also on the newly defining social justice
values that have begun to characterize the sub-region and will probably be the defining ones in the
future. These new found patterns of cooperation have a transformative effect in the region and will
be manifested in how MERCOSUR citizens see MERCOSUR and how they feel it.
27
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