Foreign Policy in Dialogue

Volume 7 - Issue 19

The New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union

Perspectives from the European Commission,France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova

http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de

a project sponsored by

Foreign Policy in Dialogue

A Quarterly Publication on German and European Foreign Policy

Edited by Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch

Volume 7 - Number 19 Trier, Germany July 27, 2006

Foreign Policy in Dialogue ISSN 1862-7692 (Printed edition) ISSN 1862-7706 (Online edition) Imprint Chair for Foreign Policy and International Relations University of Trier Universitätsring 15 54296 Trier, Germany Phone: +49 (0) 651 201 - 3179 Fax : +49 (0) 651 201 - 3821 E-Mail: dap@deutsche-aussenpolitik.de Free access to the Online edition at: http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue19.pdf About the Project Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De This internet project on German foreign policy was established in 1998 at the Chair of International Relations at Trier University and is funded by the ASKO EUROPA-FOUNDATION . Its mission is to respond to the increasing interest in Germany's foreign policy by improving research, analysis and teaching in this field through the use of the internet.The project also aims at strengthening the democratic discourse on German foreign policy among researchers and analysts, decision-makers and the wider public. Our information services integrate media perspectives, official documents and secondary analyses. The project is presently headed by Marco Overhaus. Current staff members are Kirstin Hein, Benjamin Koltermann, Anna Katharina Meyer, Daniel Tost and Peter Klassmann. Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.

Our Content-Partner for this publication is

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Contents I. The New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union

Editorial ............................................................................................................................. - 3 - By Marco Overhaus

The Development of the European Neighbourhood Policy .............................................. - 7 - By Rutger Wissels

France and the European Neighbourhood Policy............................................................ - 17 - By Maxime Lefebvre

The German Impact on the European Neighbourhood Policy ........................................ - 26 - By Iris Kempe

Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy ........................................................... - 34 - By Piotr Buras and Karolina Pomorska

European Neighbourhood Policy – The Perception of Ukraine...................................... - 44 - By Iryna Solonenko

The European Neighbourhood Policy – The Perspective of Moldova............................ - 52 - By Anneli Ute Gabanyi

II. Book Review

Franz-Josef Meiers (2006): Zu neuen Ufern? Die deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungs-politik in einer Welt des Wandels 1990-2000, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh................. - 58 - Reviewed by Marco Overhaus

III. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Contributions

1. Official Resources and Documents ............................................................................. - 61 -

2. Policy-Papers/ Analyses/ Media-Reports.................................................................... - 65 -

3. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet .................................................................... - 66 -

4. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy .............................................. - 67 - IV. About the Authors .......................................................................................................... 70

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I. The New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union

Editorial

By Marco Overhaus

Policies of the European Communities towards its neighborhood have been a crucial

supplement to the integration process, especially since the end of bipolarity in Europe and

with the rising political ambitions of the European project. In the 1990s, much of the

neighborhood policy towards the aspiring countries from Central Eastern Europe was

identical with enlargement policy, with the aim of preparing them for eventual membership.

A Southern Dimension was added in 1995 towards the countries of the Mediterranean basin

(the Barcelona Process), though it was held separate from the Eastern Dimension and did not

include an accession perspective.

Since the turn of the millennium, traditional European neighborhood policies have been put

under pressure by profound changes inside and outside of Europe. The big-bang enlargement

to ten new member states was completed in May 2004. Externally, it transformed the

neighborhood of the EU, which now includes Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Near East

(Malta, Cyprus). This heightened concern about political grey areas and different layers of

economic prosperity and integration in the geographical area between the EU und Russia.

Internally, the most recent enlargement contributed to enlargement fatigue in West European

societies which makes the accession of further countries beyond Bulgaria and Rumania,

which received a firm accession perspective, politically controversial and thus difficult

(Turkey, the Western Balkans).

Other external developments have reinforced the importance of neighborhood relations for the

EU and at the same time complicated them. Against the background of a new security

environment after September 11, 2001, the European Security Strategy of December 2003

acknowledges the importance of “security in our neighbourhood” and envisions the creation

of a “ring of responsibly governed states” around the EU. Relations between the Union and

Russia (as well as between NATO and Russia) have become closer since the terrorist attacks

of September 2001, a process which has been seen with some skepticism in Eastern and South

Eastern Europe. The “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia have further reinforced those

countries’ determination to push towards a “European perspective”.

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In 2002 and 2003 the EU responded to these internal and external changes with the initiation

of a new “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP). Its principal aim is not only to integrate

the former neighborhood policies towards the southern and the eastern periphery under a

single and coherent framework, but to induce further political and economic reforms in those

countries, without offering them a perspective on full membership in the EU. In this context,

the ENP can also be seen as an effort to partially define the (geographic) finality of the

European integration process. The ENP´s comprehensive outreach, as well as its conception

as an alternative to membership, have triggered much political and academic debate within

and outside the EU. This issue of Foreign Policy in Dialogue adds to this debate by offering a

comparison of perspectives from the European Commission, from France, Germany, Poland,

Ukraine and Moldova.

In the first contribution, Rutger Wissels, who is director in the European Commission

responsible for coordinating the Neighbourhood Policy, offers an overview of the ENP,

focusing on its innovative elements as compared to the policies and instruments which had

been available before, and responding to some of the criticisms which have been directed

against the ENP so far. Most crucially, in his view, the ENP offers EU partner countries “a

new kind of relationship, going beyond cooperation to include closer political links and an

element of economic integration.” As regards the most common criticism, namely the lack of

a membership perspective, he argues that “to focus on what the EU is not offering these

countries is neither helpful nor very relevant. What is important is what the ENP does offer

(…).”

Maxime Lefebvre stresses that France, as a Mediterranean country, has always been a vocal

proponent of stronger relations between the EU and the countries of northern Africa and the

Near and Middle East. Accordingly, Paris has stressed the Southern Dimension of the ENP

and tried to counterbalance the shift of the EU’s attention towards the east, which inevitably

occurred after EU enlargement in 2004. At the same time, Paris has been an outspoken

skeptic (though it is not alone in this respect) of further enlargements of the EU and thus

welcomes the conception of ENP as an alternative to full membership. From a functional

point of view, Lefebvre identifies energy policy as an important area of concern within the

ENP because “[e]nergy and geopolitics are strongly linked to each other.”

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Iris Kempe puts Germany’s perspective on the ENP in the broader context of three traditional

German objectives of its Eastern Policy: maintaining good relations with the Kremlin

(sometimes referred to as “Russia First” policy), playing an advocate’s role on behalf of the

Central Eastern European Countries (especially Poland), and coordinating German initiatives

with its European and transatlantic partners. While the German focus has been on Ukraine

and Belarus (much less so on Moldova), partly due to lobby groups within the German

political context, the difficult task of entertaining good relations with these countries and

Russia has led, according to Kempe, to a wait-and-see policy which lacks far-reaching and

long-term visions.

By contrast, Poland has been an unequivocal supporter of the Eastern European countries still

outside of the EU. Piotr Buras and Karolina Pomorska specify three central Polish goals vis-

à-vis the ENP: to create an Eastern Dimension of the EU analogous to the Northern

Dimension which was initiated by Finland, support for the principle of (self-)differentiation

among the target countries of the ENP, and support for the membership aspirations of Ukraine

(and Belarus in the long run). Against this background, Poland has been rather dissatisfied

with the ENP. From the Polish perspective, it should not rule out an accession perspective.

For Warsaw, it also includes too many, and too diverse, countries, some of which aspire for

membership while others do not. In sum, Buras and Pomorska concede that Poland’s view on

the ENP has been geared towards the realization of national interests, and has thus been rather

instrumental. Yet the authors also see a learning process of Polish elites that policy-making in

the EU requires considerable efforts of consensus-building.

This Polish criticism towards the ENP is also reflected in Iryna Solonenko’s contribution on

the neighborhood policy of Ukraine. Kiev does not wish to be put into the same bracket as

Belarus, Morocco or the other Mediterranean countries and clearly misses the eventual

accession perspective (even more so after the Orange Revolution). Despite those misgivings

from the Ukrainian point of view, the country has adopted a pragmatic approach towards the

implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As Solonenko stresses, Kiev sees it

as “a short term and intermediate framework and has tried to make the best use of the

opportunities offered by the ENP.” This was even reinforced after the change in the

presidency from Kutchma to Yushchenko when the new government started to conceive of

the Neighbourhood Policy as a valuable tool for internal, economic transformation in its own

right.

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Finally, Anneli Ute Gabanyi analyzes the role of Moldova in the European Neighbourhood

Policy. While she emphasizes the country’s strong European identity and clear impetus

towards European integration, she also acknowledges that it still looks like the Problemkind

of Europe. The Republic of Moldova is generally viewed in Western Europe as “a place

generating all the potential risks listed in the 2003 EU Security Strategy paper.” Chisinau’s

approach towards the ENP is in many ways similar to that of Poland and Ukraine. While it is

critical of the missing membership perspective and the broad geographical framework it is

also willing to approach the ENP pragmatically. But Moldova resents being included in the

group of western NIS (Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union) because it sees

itself as a country belonging to South Eastern Europe (where most countries do have a mid or

long-term accession perspective). Moreover, Moldova would prefer a higher profile of the

European Union as regards the conflict over Transnistria.

As Wissels stresses, the ENP represents an important improvement of previous instruments in

relations between the EU and its neighborhood. It offers incentives for political and economic

reforms through the perspective of partial integration into the Union’s Internal Market and a

better implementation of agreed policies through more detailed benchmarks and timetables.

At the same time, however, the contributions in this volume also convey an idea of how

different the perceptions, interests and expectations concerning the European Neighbourhood

Policy still are among Brussels, the older member states, EU newcomers and the

neighborhood countries themselves. It is thus difficult to see the ENP as a static, long-term

policy alternative to EU membership, which creates a “ring of friends” around the EU and

thus helps cementing the geographical finalité of the European Union in the long run. Rather,

it can be taken for granted that Ukraine, Moldova (and maybe also Belarus after a political

system change) will continue to strive for membership in the club. It might also be that

traditional notions of membership and non-membership will increasingly become blurred, as

relations with neighbors begin to extend into the Internal Market, while political and security-

related cooperation becomes even more flexible than it is already the case within the EU

today (e.g., flexible forms of cooperation, opt-outs etc). In the end, the development of the

European Neighbourhood Policy might thus well evolve along a similarly open-ended logic as

that of the European integration process itself. Where the neighborhood ends might become as

uncertain as the definitive political boundaries of Europe.

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The Development of the European Neighbourhood Policy

By Rutger Wissels1

Reasons for Initiating the ENP

Once it became clear that ten countries would join the EU in 2004, the focus in European

capitals, EU institutions and some of the soon-to-be member states shifted from internal to

external policy issues. Enlargement raised several important questions, such as how the

enlarged EU would interact with – and be perceived by – its new neighbors? To what degree

would the presence around the Council table of new member states which share a border with

Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova alter EU policy towards these countries? To what degree

would this more intense interest in the eastern neighbors cause a rebalancing of political or

financial attention away from the southern neighbors?

In 2003 these reflections led to the publication of a European Commission Communication2

on what was then referred to as ‘Wider Europe’3. In this paper, the Commission proposed an

ambitious new vision of an enlarged area of peace, stability and prosperity encompassing the

wider neighborhood of the EU, a “circle of friends”, a shared neighborhood founded on

common values and deeper integration. Taking account of reactions to the “Wider Europe”

document, such as the request by the Southern Caucasus countries to be included, as well as

of internal and external developments in the interim, the Commission published a further

document in May 2004. This Strategy Paper, endorsed by EU member states, remains the

definitive policy statement on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The ENP addresses those countries which share a land or maritime border with the EU.

Starting from the south-west, these are the countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria,

Tunisia), the Mashreq (Libya, Egypt), the Middle East (Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian

Authority, Lebanon, Syria), the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and

Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus). In the case of Russia, the largest of the EU’s

neighbors, our relations are not covered by the ENP, but by the EU-Russia Strategic

Partnership4. While Belarus, Libya and Syria are potentially covered by the ENP. Yet the

1 This article was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the

European Commission. The author thanks Mary Teresa Moran. 2 All key documents are available at : http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm3 A name eventually dropped for linguistic reasons, replaced by the term European Neighbourhood Policy. 4 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm

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precondition for benefiting from this policy is to have contractual relations with the EU,

something which is currently not the case for any of these three countries. The EU has various

types of relations with them, but so far not in the ENP framework.

Why did the EU consider it necessary to develop, at that moment in time, a particular policy

for its neighbors? Was (and is) such a policy necessary? Why did the European Union not

simply continue with established relationships - Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

(PCAs) in the case of the eastern neighbors, Association Agreements and the Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership in the case of the southern neighbors? The answer is partly

strategic and partly practical.

In strategic terms, the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 refers to the

European interest “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European

Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and

cooperative relations (…)”. The challenges facing Europe and its neighbors in today’s world

come from poverty, insecurity, violent or frozen conflicts, population explosions, resource

shortages and failures of governance. These situations create conditions where migratory

pressures rise, organized crime flourishes, and where conflicts can arise while extremism can

grow. These threats require enhanced engagement by the EU towards its neighborhood to

promote reforms that improve life for our neighbors and for our own citizens. There is no

doubt that it is in the EU’s interest to have a zone of increasing prosperity, stability and

security on its borders, the area where its influence is greatest. Although developed before the

2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands, the ENP in fact addresses some of the concerns

raised by EU citizens, i.e. managed migration, fighting cross-border organized crime,

reducing the causes of extremism, ensuring stable energy supplies and, more generally,

supporting a process of economic globalization that is accompanied by increasing prosperity

and higher social and environmental standards of our trading partners.

In practical terms, a new policy framework and new instruments were considered necessary

partly in order to address weaknesses in the existing frameworks and instruments, and also to

address the new challenges now faced by the EU and its partners. The existing relationships

were, understandably, a product of their time. The PCAs had been ‘negotiated’ throughout the

1990s with much weaker partners and generally did not include much prioritization or

sequencing of reforms (expertise the EU was only to gain herself during the 1990s). The

Association Agreements, although in some cases more recent, did not adequately cover those

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issues on which the EU needed to work with in its partners in a post-9/11 world, most notably

fighting terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The

multilateral nature of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership meant that some efforts, e.g. those

to create a truly regional market, were held back by less reformist participants. Compounding

the difficulties, the legal bases governing the EC instruments designed to support these

relationships – for instance TACIS and MEDA – were themselves becoming outdated and

unwieldy. In sum, there was a need to create something new – which was the reason to initiate

the Neighbourhood Policy (and now, pending adoption, the “European Neighborhood and

Partnership Instrument” –or ENPI- to support it).

A New Kind of Partnership

The EU offers partner countries a new kind of relationship which includes closer political

links and an element of economic integration. In addition to more classical assistance and

trade benefits, it offers support to meet EU norms and standards as well as assistance with

reforms that will stimulate economic and social development. As an innovation, the European

Union also offers to open some of its internal policies and programs and, ultimately, when the

partner country is able to do so, a stake in the EU’s own Internal Market. For their part, ENP

partners accept precise commitments, which can be monitored, to strengthen common values

such as the rule of law, democracy and the respect for human rights, to promote market-

oriented economic reforms, and to cooperate on key foreign policy objectives such as counter-

terrorism and the non-proliferation of WMD.

The ENP Action Plans

ENP Action Plans are the primary instrument of the Neighbourhood Policy. They are

negotiated on a bilateral basis with each partner country. Building on the existing contractual

relationship (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreements) these are

political documents containing agreed statements on medium-term reform priorities. They

usually cover five year periods - except those for Israel, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova

which have an initial period of three years. The ENP Action Plans are based on common

principles and are organized within a framework common to all ENP countries. Following a

general introduction setting out the EU offer, more detailed sections typically cover:

• Political dialogue and reform;

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• economic and social reform and development;

• trade, market and regulatory reform;

• cooperation on issues relating to justice, freedom and security;

• cooperation and reform in sectors such as transport, energy, information society,

environment, science and research;

• “people-to-people” areas such as civil society, education, public health, cultural

cooperation.

While sharing this common framework and structure, the individual Action Plans are

differentiated in order to take account of the specific circumstances of each neighbor, its

national reform processes and its relations with the EU. For instance, Moldova enjoys

asymmetric trade preferences because it is not able to sustain a total opening of its market to

EU goods and services whereas there are plans to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with

Ukraine once it has joined the WTO. The ENP Action Plans are comprehensive partnerships

for reform, covering a wide range of issues of interest to the EU and the partner country, yet

they also identify a limited number of clear priorities. While inspired by similar documents

elsewhere (Accession Partnerships in Central and Eastern Europe or the Europe Partnerships

with the Western Balkans), the ENP Action Plans are distinct because they are the product of

a genuine negotiation process with partner countries. Each is unique, the product of

compromises, which is already becoming a strength of the process. This creates a stronger

sense of ‘ownership’ of the document in the neighborhood countries and in some cases they

are adopting it as (e.g. Moldova) or linking it to (e.g. Jordan) their national reform strategies.

International financial institutions are also adapting their own country strategies to align them

with the ENP Action Plans precisely because they are ‘owned’ by the partner country. As

partners become actively engaged in negotiating and implementing the Action Plans, their

expectations and priorities become clearer and they formulate their own goals more precisely

– all of which will prepare them for a deeper political and economic relationship with the EU.

A New Form of EC Assistance: ENPI

The Action Plans are backed by financial and technical EC assistance. As part of a wider

reform of EC financial assistance, a single instrument will be the basis for financial assistance

to ENP countries, replacing MEDA, TACIS and other existing programs from which these

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partner countries benefited. The “European Neighborhood and Partnership5 Instrument”

(ENPI) will be more flexible than its predecessors and will focus in particular on supporting

the implementation of the Action Plans, making it a fully policy-driven instrument. In so

doing, it will go further than promoting sustainable development and fighting poverty and

encompass, for instance, considerable support for measures leading to progressive

participation in the EU’s Internal Market. ENPI will bring a radical simplification of

procedures and substantial gains in efficiency. The funding available for the ENPI during the

budget period 2007-2013 will be just under 12 billion Euro – an increase of 32 per cent in real

terms above the amounts available for the period 2000-2006. Another innovation is ENPI’s

focus on cross-border cooperation through joint programs bringing together regions of

member states and partner countries sharing a common land or a maritime border. In a new

departure for the EU’s relations with these neighbors, the EU will also draw upon elements of

its “transition toolbox” to support these neighbors’ reform efforts. Legislative approximation

and regulatory convergence (where relevant) as well as support for institution-building will be

supported through mechanisms such as exchange of experience and long term twinning

arrangements with EU member states. Extension of the twinning mechanism is underway -

projects have already begun with Mediterranean partners - and the TAIEX6 program became

operational for ENP countries in July 2006.

Trade Incentives

Preferential trading relationships are also on offer to ENP countries. Depending on the

country, this means either autonomous trade preferences or participation in the Generalized

System of Preferences (GSP), free trade agreements or the goal of a regional free trade area in

the Mediterranean, and support for WTO accession. Trade relationships are not limited to

trade opportunities, however. They also include trade facilitation to assist partner countries to

take advantage of these opportunities. For instance, apart from assistance and advice on

reforming customs services and procedures – so that certified goods can be accepted in the

EU – assistance is also available to harmonize with relevant EU standards and regulations,

e.g. on food safety and labeling, so that the product in question can then move freely into the

EU market. Some partners are even choosing to go beyond the alignment necessary for trade

5 The ENPI will support the implementation both of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership and the ENP. See

Commission of the European Communities (2004): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. Brussels, September 29, 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com04_628_en.pdf

6 Technical Assistance for Information Exchange of the Institution Building unit of Directorate-General Enlargement of the European Commission. Twinning is described at:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/institution_building/twinning_en.htm

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purposes, as is the case with Jordan’s intention to take wider elements of the veterinary/

phyto-sanitary acquis for reasons of domestic consumer protection.

The offer of a “stake in the Internal Market” is a novel concept. It is based on the idea that

there are large gains to be made from focusing on regulatory convergence and technical

obstacles to trade rather than only focusing on obstacles at the border, which has been largely

the case so far. This process will stimulate trade in new areas and provide opportunities for

increased investment and growth. Obtaining this “stake” must be seen in a long-term

perspective, not least because the EU’s Internal Market is a moving target. It will also largely

depend on the willingness and capacity of each ENP partner to make the necessary progress.

It therefore cannot be precisely defined in advance as it is up to the countries themselves to

ultimately help define what their stake might be. For instance, the free movement of capital

would mean partners dismantling their capital controls and restrictions – which experience

has shown can only be done gradually and under well-established conditions (such as a

strengthened financial sector, macro-economic stabilization, prudential frameworks etc.). The

very process of reform, that is the gradual implementation of the structural and regulatory

reforms agreed in the ENP Action Plans, will already bring partner countries some of the

advantages of the Internal EU Market, such as less burdensome procedures to get access to

the market for their goods. Trade liberalization will lead to efficiency gains and spur

competition on local markets. Improved capital movement will increase ENP partners’ access

to financing and support investment and growth.

Other Incentives

In addition to more traditional elements such as assistance and trade opportunities, the ENP

also brings other innovative elements to the table. Partner countries will have the opportunity

to participate in certain Community programs and Agencies. Some of the countries have

already identified areas in which they want to be involved. Israel, Morocco and Ukraine, for

instance, are involved in the Galileo project. Almost all partners have indicated interest in the

EU’s education and research networks (TEMPUS, YOUTH, CORDIS). Some will be

interested in specific sectoral issues, e.g. the European Environment Agency, the European

Maritime Safety Agency, the Common Aviation Area, telecommunications and transport or

energy networks. In each case, it will depend on the partner country’s own priorities, set out

in the ENP Action Plans, and on the implementation of reforms to what extent it will be

possible to participate in and draw benefit from involvement in these programs or Agencies.

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Common Foreign and Security Policy

While this contribution has focused on classical “first pillar” elements so far, the ENP is also

important, because it combines elements from across all three pillars of the EU under the

framework of a single coherent foreign policy. For instance, the ENP includes political

dialogues on a wider range of issues than in the past, the use of CFSP instruments such as EU

Special Representatives (e.g. for the Southern Caucasus, Transnistria and the Middle East)

and the offer of involvement in certain missions of the European Security and Defense Policy

(e.g. Morocco’s participation in the ALTHEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina). There is

good working cooperation between the European Commission services, responsible for day-

to-day implementation and monitoring, and relevant staff in the Council Secretariat and EU

Special Representatives. The ENP is obviously closely related to, and coherent with, other EU

policies such as the European Security Strategy, development policy, work with sub-Saharan

countries on migration as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, to which it is a

welcome complement and reinforcement. The ENP Action Plans also contain commitments to

regional and sub-regional cooperation which may help to indirectly address the underlying

causes of some of the frozen conflicts in the European neighborhood, as well as explicit

support for ongoing efforts to resolve such conflicts.

Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Any policy, no matter how well-designed and novel the instruments and no matter how much

money or other incentives are available, is only as good as its implementation. For this reason,

joint monitoring mechanisms are an integral part of the ENP. These mechanisms include not

only regular informal contacts between the country and the Commission but also a network of

subcommittees meeting at expert level (civil servants from the Commission and partner

country) at least once a year. The ENP “piggy-backs” on existing institutional structures of

the PCAs or Association Agreements, except where they had to be established for new issues

covered in the Action Plans, e.g. on human rights, democracy and governance. The precise

title and configuration of the sub-committees differs from country to country but usually they

cover political issues and human rights, trade and industry, agriculture and rural development,

macroeconomic issues and structural reforms, social issues, the environment and transport

and energy. Subcommittees assess progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan – in some

cases based on more detailed Implementation Tools (as for Moldova and Ukraine) containing

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more precise sub-steps and agreed deadlines. These subcommittees report to the formal

Cooperation or Association Committee meetings (consisting of senior officials) and the

Cooperation or Association Council meetings (at ministerial level) which take place once a

year. The monitoring process is largely managed, on a day to day basis, by the European

Commission.

In addition to this joint monitoring of progress by the EU and the partner country, the

Commission will prepare its own implementation reports to the Council. A partial report was

already published in November 2005,7 pending publication of the first Progress Report which

will cover the first two years of implementation of the ENP and the first seven Action Plans.

Although it is still relatively early, progress can already be seen. Significant political

momentum has been created as the implementation of the first seven Action Plans (with

Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine) has begun.

Some countries have made their ENP Action Plan the centerpiece of their own domestic

reform strategy while others see the ENP as a means of accelerating their reform programs

(e.g. Jordan’s linkage with its own National Agenda). Five more ENP Action Plans are about

to be finalized (with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon). In the case of

Ukraine, progress has also been made on market economy status, visa facilitation and energy

issues, as well as on the EU Border Assistance Mission between Moldova and Ukraine.

Preparations are well-advanced for the introduction of the new ENPI cooperation programs

from January 2007.

Expectations Inside and Outside of the EU

As would be expected, reactions to the ENP differ on the part of individual EU member states

and partner countries – attitudes are as diverse as the partners’ situations. Much academic

comment to date has focused on the “lack” of an accession perspective for some of the

countries, on the differences between the countries or regions included in the European

Neighbourhood Policy, and on the enormity of the challenge of promoting transition in the

absence of an accession perspective as the ultimate carrot (or stick in case of its denial).

7 See Commission of the European Communities (2005): Communication to the Commission. Implementing

and promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels, November 22, 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/sec_2005_1521_en.pdf

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Yet it is neither helpful nor very relevant to focus on what the EU is not offering these

countries. What is important is what the ENP does offer. The fact is that the ENP applies to

countries which do not have, or do not currently have, an accession perspective. It is a

distraction when parts of our neighborhood are viewed through an enlargement lens as this

only leads to protracted, unanswerable and counter-productive discussions of whether or not

country A or B will, one day in the future, in a different political and economic environment,

have a realistic perspective of joining the EU. Many of those now asking for closer relations

are not on track for membership or are very far from meeting its requirements. The real

question for these countries and for the EU is how to support these countries’ political and

economic transition as a goal in its own right. The focus on what the ENP is not also ignores

the substantial economic assistance and, more importantly, the EU’s proven experience in

supporting transition and the other innovative incentives on offer. The focus on the

differences between regions/ countries ignores the fact that there were many differences

between the historical, political and legal situations of the countries of Central and Eastern

Europe in the early 1990s, at the start of their transition processes, as there are now between

the countries of the ENP. Moreover, such a focus also does not recognize the similarities in

the transition processes that countries from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean now face.

There are quite often more similarities between countries from (geographically speaking)

opposite ends of the neighborhood than with their own regional neighbors. For instance,

Ukraine has more in common with certain reform-oriented Mediterranean countries than with

its immediate neighbor Belarus.

The question of what will come after the current ENP Action Plans will largely depend on the

implementation of agreed reforms. The European Commission originally suggested that the

next step might be the negotiation of European Neighbourhood Agreements to replace the

present agreements (PCAs and AAs). Work is currently beginning on an Enhanced

Agreement to replace the existing PCA with Ukraine, a model which would then be on offer

to other ENP countries as and when they reach the necessary degree of convergence through

implementation of their reform commitments.

Conclusion – Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Offer Enough?

The incentives and support which the ENP is offering are a substantial support to the

transition processes in partner countries. Indeed, much of what is offered is beyond what has

ever been offered to third countries before. Only time will tell whether the countries seize

16

upon the opportunities and choose to take advantage of them. It is our partners’ willingness to

reform that will determine the success of the policy. The purpose of the ENP is not to impose

reform from the outside but to encourage and support the countries’ own reform efforts. The

ENP is a dynamic process, designed to respond to and reward progress, working together

towards a zone of prosperity, stability and security. The pace and speed at which our

neighbors’ relationships with the EU are deepened through the European Neighborhood

Policy is a question of their capacity – with which the EU is well-positioned to help – and

their political will, for which there is no substitute.

17

France and the European Neighbourhood Policy

By Maxime Lefebvre8

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was a brilliant invention of the Prodi

Commission in 2003, merging relations with the new “eastern neighborhood” (following EU

enlargement to ten Eastern and Central European countries in May 2004) and the already

existing “southern neighborhood” of the European Union. Basically, it meant that countries of

the CIS area (Commonwealth of Independent States) would not be treated as new potential

candidates, but as long lasting “neighbors” in the same category as the south Mediterranean

countries. The ENP is fundamentally linked to the geo-political and -economic organization

of the broader European continent. Ambitions in the east and in the south as well as the

relationships with Russia and the Muslim world are fundamental issues not only for the EU as

such, but first and foremost for its member states which have their own priorities, ideas and

concepts. France is not an exception to this and, while seeking compromises with its partners,

has a specific approach towards the European Neighbourhood Policy. The three central

elements of this approach concern the detachment of the ENP from further enlargements, the

southern dimension of the ENP and relations with Russia.

Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement

France has been supportive of the new policy towards the eastern neighbors as long as it did

not include a “European perspective” for these countries. The first major issue for Paris is

thus to stop the continuing expansion of the EU towards the eastern and south-eastern

direction. Especially since the failed referendums in France and the Netherlands about the

European Constitution, which was explained among other reasons by an anxious questioning

about European identity and European boundaries, both countries have become the most

cautious ones regarding the further enlargement process. President Jacques Chirac even

introduced the requirement of a national referendum for future EU enlargements into the

French Constitution. His intention in doing so was to disconnect the issue of Turkey’s

accession from the debate over the European Constitution, though it was not enough to finally

prevent its rejection.

8 This article was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the

French government.

18

France has – successfully – tried to put the issue of absorption capacity at the center of the

debate on enlargement. It has also tried to limit every possible ambiguity in the common EU

language towards the eastern neighbors. In the Action Plans with Ukraine and Moldova, for

example, which were concluded at the beginning of 2005, it was agreed after long debates

that the EU “acknowledges” those countries’ European aspirations. Because of the political

pressure following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine also received a language by which the EU

“welcomes its European choice”. Unlike Poland and other new member states, France has

opposed a drift towards the more authoritative expression of a “European perspective” (such

as the one offered to the Balkans in 2000). France sees the upcoming negotiation about an

enhanced agreement with Ukraine with the same reluctance. Although France is particularly

sensitive to this question, it is by no way isolated with its orientation. Mediterranean and

Benelux member states are following the same course. Also the UK and Germany, which

generally see the perspective of further eastern enlargements more positively, recognize the

present obstacles. Difficulties and setbacks in the reform process in Ukraine do not improve

Ukraine’s case in Brussels.

At the same time, Chirac and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder supported

political and economic reforms in Ukraine in general and the demands of protesters during the

Orange Revolution to have fair elections in particular. They also tried to moderate Russian

President Vladimir Putin’s reactions to the political crisis in Ukraine. France supported the

Solana/Ferrero-Waldner proposals from the EU to strengthen the relationship with Ukraine at

the beginning of 2005. It agreed to the action plans with Ukraine and Moldova. It also

supports an enhanced agreement with Ukraine which will replace the current Partnership and

Cooperation Agreement. Moreover, France is less worried than Germany about visa issues,

but requested a raise in the visa fees because of the general introduction of biometric visas

which are much more expensive to issue. This measure is not directed specifically against the

East, however. France accepted that countries with a European perspective and other eastern

neighbors (like Ukraine) should benefit from large visa facilitations and from lower prices for

visas.

Some major concerns of France relate to trade aspects, in particular regarding Ukrainian

agricultural and metallurgic exports. When it came to give Ukraine the status of market

economy and to define a “deep and comprehensive free trade area” with this country, France

expressed real concerns and obtained some pledges from the European Commission that the

Community’s trade interests would be duly defended.

19

Concerning Moldova, there would be many reasons not to leave this mostly Rumanian

speaking country aside while Rumania will be joining the EU and while the Balkan countries

have received a European perspective. But Moldova is a small, poor and divided country

(with the separatist territory of Transnistria) and the pressure for its accession to the EU is not

very high. France has supported the new EU engagement in border and customs issues

between Moldova and Ukraine (through the EU Border Assistance Mission), and with some

delay has decided to participate in the mission. This mission increases the chances for a

settlement of the Transnistria conflict, although France, like many other member states, would

not support an EU military engagement without an agreement between the parties concerned,

which probably requires a policy shift in Moscow (because of the Russian support to

Tiraspol’s regime).

Belarus is not a democracy and, as long as the dictatorship remains, the relationship with the

EU is largely frozen. In case of democratization in this country, there would surely be a strong

demand from new EU member states to recognize Minsk’s European aspirations and even to

give it a European perspective. Regarding Belarus, France was among the countries (like

Britain, Germany and the new member states) which imposed a hard line against the

Lukachenko regime before and after the flawed presidential elections of March 2006 (in

particular through visa bans and the freezing of assets targeted against the individuals

responsible for the repression and the fraudulent elections). France was all the less

embarrassed because of the allegedly bad relationship between Lukachenko and Putin. France

also supported a proactive EU policy to avoid broad economic sanctions and isolation of the

country and its population.

The Caucasus countries – especially Georgia and Armenia, which need international support

against hostile neighbors (Russia in the case of Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan in the case of

Armenia) – would also like to come closer to the EU. France has supported the launching of

new Action Plans with these countries within the ENP framework, but once again it is the

most reluctant country to accept a reference to “European aspirations” in this context in order

to avoid any ambiguity about the perspective of joining the EU. As a member of the OSCE

“Minsk Group”, Paris also plays an important role in the negotiations on the Nagorno

Karabakh conflict and acknowledges like many other member states the importance of

Moscow’s role to solve this “frozen conflict”. Beyond the bilateral elements of the European

Neighbourhood Policy, France has also adopted a constructive approach towards plurilateral

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forums such as the GUAM cooperation (consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and

Moldova) or the Community of Democratic Choice.

At Stake: Coherence of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy

One important reason for France being so reluctant on further EU enlargement is the fact that

it has not lost the political ambition for the EU and fears that further expansion would lead to

less consistency of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Against this background, an interesting debate has developed in Brussels about giving the

eastern neighbors a possibility to align themselves with CFSP statements and decisions. This

possibility is traditionally given to candidate countries for accession in order to give them the

time and opportunity to adapt to the CFSP rules and mechanisms. Iceland, Norway and

Liechtenstein, as members of the European Economic Area, also enjoy this possibility (which

is not the case for Switzerland). As a matter of fact, all these countries have aligned

themselves with nearly all CFSP statements and decisions.

CFSP alignment has also been offered to Ukraine and Moldova. More than one year after the

conclusion of the Action Plans, the track record is quite disappointing. Ukraine, for example,

refused to align itself on major EU decisions regarding Uzbekistan, Belarus and Iran, thus

putting its alleged Western orientation into question. Such disappointments also occurred with

Moldova which did not align itself on hard EU decisions vis-à-vis Belarus, while preserving

its trade in agricultural products with this country.

The French government has raised this problem in Brussels and has tried to alert its partners

to the risks of incoherence in the EU foreign policy. CFSP alignment does not give a veto

right to the beneficiary countries. It only means that these countries may or may not align

themselves with EU positions. Every country in the world can align itself with another

country’s or with the EU’s position, but CFSP alignment procedures have a more systematic/

mechanical nature and aligned countries appear by name in the EU statements. It may seem

positive if a maximum of countries aligns itself with EU positions. But giving these countries

a choice to align or not to align, without any obligation, also means a kind of “CFSP à la

carte” which can dilute the political coherence of the common foreign policy.

21

The Mediterranean Policy

Historically, culturally and by geographical location, France is a Mediterranean country, a

maritime power and has thus - along with other southern members of the EU - emphasized the

southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. More specifically, it is concerned

that the ENP can potentially create a divergence between the East (asking for a European

perspective) and the South (being more and more left outside of European developments).

Paris urges its EU partners, not least Germany, to avoid a deepening of these potential

dividing lines and will surely continue to be supportive of a strong association of

Mediterranean partners to the economical and political organization of the European

continent.

For France, the Mediterranean Sea is not only a question of maritime openness. It is also a

question of cultural identity. France has kept strong political and cultural links especially with

Morocco and Tunisia as well as with Lebanon, while the relationship with Algeria has

suffered from the war of independence. Today, the control of immigration from across the

Mediterranean is of special concern to France in the context of relations between the EU and

northern Africa.

France hosts both an important Jewish and an important Arabic-Muslim community and the

escalating conflict between Israel and the Palestinians caused serious tensions between these

communities in 2001. This is surely one factor explaining France’s strong engagement in the

Near and Middle East. Paris has supported the existence and security of Israel since the very

beginning. It was the first trade partner of Israel and the first source of foreign investment in

the country. While aiming at securing Israel’s existence within its internationally recognized

borders, France has been advocating the creation of a Palestinian State since 1982, a position

which was later adopted by the European Union. France is the most important single donor

country to the Palestinians. When the EU aid was suspended in 2006 following the formation

of the Hamas government in Palestine, France successfully advocated the creation of an

international assistance mechanism to help the Palestinian authority survive. Of course,

France also strongly supports the international diplomatic efforts towards a peaceful

settlement in Palestine within the framework of the “quartet” (US, Russia, UN and EU).

As a Mediterranean power France is more clearly committed to a coherent and global policy

towards this region than Germany and the UK. For all those reasons already mentioned, it

22

supported the Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona Process launched in 1995 which is based on the

objective to create an area of stability, prosperity (including a free trade area in 2010), and of

human and cultural contacts. France knows the complexity and the diversity of the Arabic

world and the necessity of encouraging a regional approach with the tools of the EU.

There is no doubt that the Eastern enlargement meant a shift of EU priorities and resources

towards the new member states. In the 1995-1999 period, the Mediterranean countries

received approximately 4,5 billion Mecus, compared to the same amount for CIS countries

and seven billion Mecus for the candidate countries. During the 2000-2006 period, France

strongly defended the Mediterranean countries’ interests, which were promised 5,35 billion

Euro compared with three billion for the CIS countries.

In the preparation of the 2007-2013 financial perspective, France wanted to prevent a further

shift from the South to the East in the financial allocations provided through the new

neighborhood instrument. It did not manage to convince its partners to ensure a geographical

sharing inside the instrument, which was hardly compatible with the principles of unity and

conditionality in the neighborhood policy. But it strongly lobbied to preserve the existence of

regional policies such as the Barcelona Process. Paris finally received a political commitment

from the European Commission that the initial financial allocations would be based on the

existing proportions between East and South (approximately 2/3 for the South and 1/3 for the

East while the South does not include Turkey and Cyprus anymore and the East will not

include Central Asia)9. Only the growing of the funding – that is the newly available

resources in the years to come – will depend on the conditionality criteria (the readiness of

countries to set and implement objectives agreed with the Union).

The result of the negotiation was not too bad for French objectives and interests. Still,

globally speaking, the last EU enlargement creates a clear shift of resources eastwards. During

the next financial framework (2007-2013), the 100 Mio. inhabitants of the new member states

(including Bulgaria and Rumania) will receive 150 billion Euro (only through regional funds).

The 100 Mio. inhabitants of the candidate countries (Turkey and the Balkans) will receive 10

billion Euro (as pre-accession aids). And the 400 Mio. inhabitants of the southern and eastern

9 See Chirac, Jacques (2005): Speech by Mr Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, on the occasion

of the Euro-Mediterranean Summit. Barcelona, November 28, 2005. http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2005/speech_by_mr_jacques_chirac_president

_of_the_french_republic_on_the_occasion_of_the_euro-mediterranean_summit-barcelona.32226.html

23

neighborhood (including Russia) will only receive 10,5 billion Euro through the new

neighborhood instrument.

The Russian Factor

France has a long tradition of good relations with Russia which was also maintained by

General de Gaulle and, after the end of the Cold War, François Mitterrand. It was also a factor

shaping French foreign policy in more recent controversies over U.S. policy towards Russia

and over the war against Iraq where Paris aligned with Germany, Russia and China to oppose

American policy. At the same time, relations between the West and Russia have also become

more difficult because of the issue of democracy and the growing authoritarian tendencies in

Moscow. The Euro-Atlantic reconciliation following George W. Bush’s reelection, the

replacement of Gerhard Schroeder by Angela Merkel in Berlin, and the likely departure of

President Chirac next year have made the “Euro-Asiatic axis” obsolete. This, however, does

not derogate the strategic importance of the French-Russian and the French-German

relationships.

From the French perspective, there is no contradiction between the ENP and a special

relationship with Russia. As long as a European (membership) perspective for the eastern

neighbors is not the issue, France is willing to strengthen this relationship while also

strengthening the strategic partnership with Russia. The choice for the EU is not between

Russia and its neighbors. By the same logic, the choice is not for these countries to be either

in the European or in the Russian sphère d’influence.

Russia has sought a special status in the European Neighbourhood Policy. It does not want to

be treated as a simple “neighbor” as Ukraine or Moldova, but insists on its special position as

a “strategic partner”. While launching the ENP, the EU proposed a kind of special partnership

with Russia through four “common spaces” (economy, internal/ external security, education

and culture). This was a French-German idea in the tense context following the war against

Iraq and it took shape through four French-German “non papers”. Negotiations were launched

in 2003 at the St. Petersburg summit and were concluded in May 2005 in Moscow. Since

then, and although the Merkel government has so far put a higher emphasis on the issue of

democracy and human rights in its relationship with Russia, French-German cooperation

concerning relations to Moscow remains good.

24

Energy policy has become an important aspect of the European Neighbourhood Policy and of

relations between the EU and Russia since Moscow decided to cut the supply of gas to

Ukraine and other client countries. This crisis has shown how dependent European countries

still are from Russian gas. As a consequence, the EU has started to develop an energy strategy

which includes an external component. The diversification of supplies plays a major role, in

particular through countries of the European neighborhood. France is not as dependent on

Russian gas as other partners, because it already imports major flows from Norway and

Algeria. But many other neighboring countries also play a role in the transit of oil and gas to

the European markets. 80 per cent of Russian gas exports to the EU go through Ukraine; the

Caucasus countries are transit countries for the oil and gas of the Caspian Sea (see the Baku-

T'bilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-T'bilisi-Erzurum pipelines), and other pipelines could carry

these Caspian hydrocarbons further to the EU (e.g. the Nabucco gas pipeline through the

Balkans; and the Odessa-Brody-Plock oil pipeline). Also the new gas pipeline between Russia

and Germany through the Baltic Sea contributes to the diversification of transit routes,

although Poland and the Baltic States saw it as directed against them.

For France as well as for other EU member states, the difficulty is to combine a common

external energy strategy with bilateral relationships with the supplying countries (e.g. long

term supply contracts). Until now, Russia used the bilateral links to get access to European

distribution companies and give individual European companies access to the exploration and

exploitation of oil and gas fields. German companies have made a lucrative deal with Russia

on that basis. France has not yet done so, but should do it although the Russian gas is of less

strategic importance for it.

Energy and geopolitics are strongly linked to each other. One of the major strategic issues at

stake in the European Neighbourhood Policy is to make the common rules prevail over the

use of power. Especially Russia should accept the principles of reciprocity, transparency and

equality as embedded in the Energy Charter. In energy as well as in other sectors, it is the

interest of France and of its partners to embark its neighbors in a structure of common rules

and principles.

Conclusion: Building a Consensual Neighbourhood Policy

France has its own point of view, its own interests and priorities, in the European

Neighbourhood policy. Basically, these orientations are not subject to intensive domestic

25

debates in France, possibly with the exception of Russia. It is likely that a new French

president would appear less friendly to Putin than Chirac has been. But the good quality of

French-Russian cooperation, the primary interest for the southern neighborhood, and the

averseness to further eastern enlargements will certainly continue.

The Neighbourhood Policy should be kept separate from the issue of enlargement (at least for

now). Yet the European integration process can not be regarded as distinct from the

rapprochement between neighboring countries. With specific difficulties, this applies to the

South as well as to the East. What is at stake in the European Neighbourhood Policy is to

overcome dividing lines in the broader European and Mediterranean area, to expand the

democratic, economic and social principles ruling the EU, to transform this zone which

includes a billion inhabitants, into an area of shared values, common rules, peace, and of

shared prosperity. Despite different approaches, all EU member states should have an interest

in this major geo-political and geo-economical ambition.

26

The German Impact on the European Neighbourhood Policy

By Iris Kempe

The rainbow revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine drew inspiration from, and were oriented

towards, Western values and norms. One of the most important objectives driving the new

wave of post-Soviet transition has been the desire to join Euro-Atlantic structures. The goal of

becoming an EU member is no longer limited to foreign policy declarations, but forms a key

component of the domestic reform agendas of these states. The unexpected dynamism of

democratization and reform emerging from Eastern Europe has put pressure on Western

policymakers to develop solutions that go beyond the current agenda of EU enlargement

which ends with a Union of 27 or 28 member states. Since 2002, European institutions have

been reacting to pressure from the new member states, first and foremost Poland, as well as

from the countries in the EU’s eastern neighborhood by declaring and implementing a new

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Without the support from some of the old EU

member states these efforts will be of limited relevance, however. Germany has traditionally

had a pro-active policy towards Eastern Europe. This contribution focuses on German

interests and actors involved and on the potential impact of German foreign policy on the

European Neighbourhood Policy.

Germany: A Traditional Driving Force in Eastern Policy

Berlin’s current obligations and interests in shaping relations with Eastern Europe are

influenced by the legacies of World War II. These include the post-war existence of two

German states; the geographic realties following reunification that led Germany to become a

Central European player; Germany’s economic position in the region; and, last but not least,

the German tradition of driving Eastern policy within Western alliances. Chancellor Willy

Brandt’s famous Kniefall at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial in December 1970, the Treaties of

Moscow and Warsaw in the same year and the Basic Treaty that established mutual

recognition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic

in 1972 were important milestones in this context. Pro-active German Eastern policy was also

reflected in Bonn’s strong economic support for the Russian Federation.

Germany was also the driving force in bringing the Central European states back to Europe.

The German government played a central role in pushing the EU enlargement process forward

at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, when the EU decided that the associated

27

countries in Central and Eastern Europe would be offered membership. As a result,

enlargement was no longer a question of “if” but only of “when.” Again, Germany succeeded

in combining three strategic objectives: maintaining good relations with the Kremlin; playing

a decisive role on behalf of Central European countries, particularly Poland; and coordinating

German initiatives with its European and transatlantic partners. In addition to Germany’s

geographic position, historical development and political agenda, German Ostpolitik is also

traditionally driven by economic interests. In 1980, Central European countries accounted for

4.9 per cent of West Germany’s exports and 4.6 per cent of its imports. By 2003, these figures

increased to 12.1 per cent and 14.3 per cent, respectively, and were expected to increase

further in 2004, the latest year for which estimates are available, by 16.5 per cent and 18.5 per

cent.10

After the latest EU enlargement in May 2004, the pressure from Ukraine to gain EU

membership and the interest of the new EU members put the challenge to shape neighborhood

relations once more on the European agenda. Recent German Eastern policy has been

characterized by similarities with Willy Brandt’s historic Ostpolitik, far-reaching but highly

personalized relations with Soviet/ Russian heads of state, and leadership in the process of EU

Eastern enlargement.

Initiation of the ENP: Key Actors in Germany

Up to now, German foreign policy in the area of European Neighbourhood Policy has been

driven by a combination of actors from the German Foreign Office and the Chancellor’s

Office. During the past decade, German chancellors have favored a “Russia first” approach

that has involved close personal relations between Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin, and

between Gerhard Schroeder and Vladimir Putin. This personalization of policy bypassed

institutional policy-making avenues and highlighted engagement at the top level between

major powers, while relegating more multilateral approaches to secondary status. The foreign

ministers had little alternative but to cede Eastern policy to the Chancellor’s Office while

formulating their own agenda beyond the “Russia first” approach.

For example, during his term as foreign minister, Joschka Fischer placed a strong emphasis on

conflict management in the Balkans. Other Foreign Office policies, such as a focus on 10 Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2005): Außenhandelsdaten. http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/aussenwirtschaft,did=5688.html;

and Cologne Institute for Economic Research (2005): Deutschland in Zahlen 2005. Cologne 2005, p. 41.

28

developing a new European Neighbourhood Policy, have sought to take a more differentiated

approach towards Eastern Europe as a means of counterbalancing the “Russia first” strategy

and of putting the concept into a broader European framework. Under the guidance of the

then Policy Planning Staff directors Georg Clemens Dick and Piotr Switalski, German and

Polish policymakers proposed a common foreign policy agenda for the enlarged EU that

encompassed a new neighborhood policy, transatlantic relations and the EU’s impact on

globalization.11 Even before the European Council declared its intention in November 2002 to

elaborate a new Neighbourhood Policy, the Polish-German initiative had already outlined the

initial objectives. The document designated Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia as

neighborhood countries. By including Russia, Polish and German policy planners sought to

maintain the strategic balance in Europe while avoiding the threat of new dividing lines. In

practical terms, the initiative suggested that the enlarged EU should take a differentiated

approach towards its new neighbors based on their varying levels of transition, and proposed

a broad range of policies based on functional cooperation. For example, institutional linkages

between the enlarged EU and its neighbors should be based on broadening the European

Economic Area. Another example of Germany’s effort to create an institutional framework

for a new Ostpolitik involved the cooperation among France, Germany and Poland within the

Weimar Triangle. Even though the Weimar Triangle’s importance has decreased, its potential

for revitalization in the future should not be underestimated.

Beyond the ENP: What to Expect from Germany

Ukraine as Signpost for the European Neighbourhood Policy and Beyond

In autumn 2004, the Western world – including Germany – was surprised by the Orange

Revolution in Ukraine. A democratic opposition movement driven by Western democratic

values suddenly fulfilled longtime Western demands that had hindered Ukraine from

becoming a part of European institutions. Suddenly, when policymakers and policy shapers in

Berlin, Paris or London were asked about Ukraine’s prospects for joining the EU and other

Euro-Atlantic institutions, references to Ukraine’s lack of democracy were not sufficient to

justify a negative answer anymore. In light of the new strategic challenges coming from Kiev,

the German Bundestag conducted a debate on “Strengthening Democracy in Ukraine” on

December 1st, 2004. All of the speakers – including representatives from both the former

11 See Auswärtiges Amt (2003): Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge

für eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien. Juni 2001 – Mai 2003. Berlin/ Warsaw.

29

ruling coalition as well as the opposition – tended to highlight three main aspects. First,

speakers insisted that elections must take place according to Western democratic standards.

Second, some parliamentarians, such as Angel Merkel and Claudia Nolte of the Christian

Democratic Party (CDU) and Gernot Erler of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), argued in

terms of a “European framework.” That is, they maintained that domestic policy

developments in Ukraine needed to be oriented towards European values, that crisis

management should be conducted under the aegis of EU representatives, and that European

decision-makers needed to provide a positive signal regarding the integration of Ukraine into

European structures. With regard to the European Neighbourhood Policy, Claudia Nolte

argued that the concept contains only limited, and therefore insufficient, openness towards

Ukraine. Third, the parliamentary debate focused on Russia. Most of the speakers, among

them Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, highlighted Russia’s position in connection with the

Ukrainian election crisis. From this perspective, the crisis in Ukraine would be impossible to

resolve without Moscow’s support.

On October 21, before the first round of the presidential election, the German Bundestag

urged the Ukrainian government to hold free and fair elections, emphasizing their importance

both for Ukraine’s future as well as its relations with Russia and the European Union. After

the second round, during which obvious falsifications were exposed to the international

public, Bundestag members from all parties supported a petition criticizing the outcome of the

elections and demanding free and fair elections according to OSCE standards.12

While most German declarations on Ukraine reflected the existing European approach that

demanded democracy in Ukraine and avoided concrete commitments on Ukrainian

membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions, individual German policymakers sought to initiate a

new debate. One of the most prominent contributions in this context came from Wolfgang

Schaeuble. Underscoring Ukraine’s history, culture and geographic position, he argued that

Ukraine – and under certain conditions Moldova and Belarus – should be offered a “European

perspective.” 13 Schaeuble further stated that European policymakers would miss a crucial

opportunity to have a positive impact on the future of European integration if they failed to

12 See Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Antrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen und der

FDP: Fälschungen der ukrainischen Präsidentschaftswahlen. Drucksache 15/4265. Berlin, November 24, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/042/1504265.pdf

13 Schaeuble, Wolfgang (2005): Die europäische Integration voranbringen. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. January 27, 2005.

http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~E65F84084F8954D3981F1AE2B28A26D76~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

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take advantage of the current situation. Unfortunately, however, Germany’s domestic agenda,

together with the escalation of the “visa scandal” in late 2004, hindered the formulation of

additional forward-looking positions that, like Schaeuble’s, could add dynamism to

Germany’s general encouragement of democratic transitions in Ukraine and other countries of

the former Soviet Union.

The ENP and Policy towards Belarus and Moldova

While Ukraine provides an example of the spread of European values, the lack of democracy

in other countries, particularly Belarus, confronts European decision-makers with the

challenge of guaranteeing stability and security beyond the EU’s borders. There is a strong

political lobby in Berlin directed towards Belarus, both in terms of seeking historical

reconciliation for the destructions of World War II as well as for promoting future democratic

structures in the country. Within the Bundestag, the Belarusian agenda has been supported by

members of the CDU (Claudia Nolte), the SPD (Ute Zapf, Gernot Erler), and other parties.

Prior to the Belarusian elections in 2000, 2004 and recently in March 2006, the Bundestag

adopted resolutions demanding free and fair elections according to OSCE standards.14 The

resolutions called for the support of the democratic opposition and increased cooperation with

academic institutions in Belarus including the European Humanities University operating in

exile in Vilnius. The ongoing human rights violations in Belarus have also led Bundestag

members to issue statements of solidarity with victims of the authoritarian regime. On

February 2, 2006, on the eve of the Belarusian presidential elections Alexander Milinkevich,

the front running candidate of the democratic opposition, was received by the German

chancellor and foreign minister in order to stress the importance of free and fair elections

according to OSCE standards.

German-Belarusian relations are also characterized by grass-roots cooperation. About 800

German NGOs are engaged in a wide range of activities in Belarus, including charity,

historical memory and reconciliation, city partnerships, technical assistance, youth exchanges

14 See Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Plenarprotokoll 15/129. Zusatztagesordnungspunkt 16: Belarus vor den

Parlamentswahlen und dem Referendum. Berlin, September 29, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/15/15129.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2000): Antrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP:

Wahlen in Belarus. Drucksache 14/4252. Berlin, October 10, 2000. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/042/1404252.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2006): Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen:

Belarus vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2006. Drucksache 16/816. Berlin, March 7, 2006. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/008/1600816.pdf

31

and so on. Quite often, German interest in grass-root activities is much higher than the

authoritarian regime of President Lukashenka is willing to tolerate, and activities are

obstructed by administrative chicanery of all kinds, such as through the denial of visas. Since

1997, the “Minsk Forum,” organized annually by the German Embassy in Minsk in

cooperation with the German-Belarusian society and supported by numerous other donors,

serves as a meeting point for the German lobby for Belarus where a broad variety of issues

concerning Belarusian domestic developments and international cooperation are discussed.

In 2005 the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle announced its plans to launch

an information program for Belarus called the “Belarusian Chronicle.” The European

Commission supports the project with a 12-month grant of 138.000 Euro, starting November

1st, 2005. The broadcast’s overall objective is to increase the Belarusian public’s awareness of

democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, freedom of the press and human rights. The Belarusian

opposition criticized the initial decision to run the program primarily in Russian language,

arguing that the German decision lacked the necessary empathy for the culture and political

relevance of Belarusian language.

Moldova, another focal point of European Neighbourhood Policy, is culturally, historically

and geographically less related to Germany than Belarus and Ukraine. Nevertheless, some

German policymakers, such as Michael Zickerick, the former German ambassador to

Moldova, and Bodo Hombach, the former Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-

East Europe, have expressed particular support for the integration of the Republic of Moldova

into European institutions. The strategy of German elites toward Moldova is framed primarily

within the European agenda rather than focusing on stronger bilateral relations, even though

the German embassy is one of the few Western diplomatic representations in Chisinau. All in

all, Moldova has never been a high priority within Germany’s Eastern policy, and further

German engagement depends strongly on individual advocates such as Zickerick or

Hombach.

Conclusions and Future Prospects

As a traditional driving force of Eastern policy, Germany confronts the challenge of

developing and implementing a European Neighborhood policy that takes into account both

the recent changes inside the region and the crisis of European integration following the

French and Dutch constitutional referenda. The change of the German government in the end

32

2005 has offered an opportunity to reassess German foreign policy priorities. Already during

the election campaign, both the personality-driven “Russia first” approach and the question of

elaborating and implementing a Neighborhood Policy beyond the EU approach became issues

of debate. After the elections, the Grand Coalition agreed on a broad spectrum of foreign

policy goals relating to Eastern Europe15. The coalition agreement declares that relations with

Russia should be based not only on common interests but also on common values and should

be conducted on both the bilateral and the European level. Supporting Ukraine on its path to

Europe is formulated as another priority.

At the same time, however, the coalition agreement as well as the subsequent implementation

of Eastern policy of the Grand Coalition displays contradictory priorities so far. Due to the

difficulties encountered in promoting Turkey’s EU candidacy as well as the current

constitutional crisis confronting the EU, Germany appears unwilling to adopt the Polish

position that seeks to offer Ukraine the prospect of future EU accession. As regards the

relationship with Russia, early remarks of Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier pointed

to a continued emphasis on economic and energy-related interests, e.g. when he praised the

significance of the Baltic Sea pipeline for bilateral relations but neglected the challenges and

risks of upsetting Polish and Lithuanian interests. 16

By contrast Merkel has emphasized sensitive issues such as the state of democracy and civil

society in contemporary Russia. She also visited Poland as the fourth country on her

inauguration trip - even before she traveled to Moscow – and discussed a wide range of issues

including historical legacies which still burden the bilateral relationship and contemporary

topics of European integration such as the EU’s financial outlook from 2007 to 2013.

After more than half a year in office, one could label the Grand Coalition’s approach to

Eastern policy as “Russia first plus Poland”. On the one hand, Berlin’s current top-level

foreign policy makers are taking a more differentiated approach as compared to their

predecessors, considering both the particular position of Russia and new challenges related to

the Neighborhood Policy. On the other hand this policy has also led to a “wait and see”

15 See CDU, CSU and SPD (2005): Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. November 11, 2005, p.

147. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Koalitionsvertrag/koalitionsvertrag.html16 See, for instance, Steinmeier, Frank-Walter (2005): Speech at the German Institute for International and

Security Affairs. Berlin, September 21, 2005. At the time of this speech, Steinmeier was still Minister of State in the Chancellor’s Office.

http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1428

33

approach and to the lack of far-reaching visions or solutions regarding the future of EU

eastern enlargement, the geographic limits of the EU, or alternative institutional prospects for

democratic newcomers such as Ukraine – and potentially Belarus – within the European

architecture.

The forthcoming German EU presidency in the first half of 2007 offers the opportunity to

focus Eastern policy on some specific issues: a reliable and sustainable energy partnership

with Russia that also considers the interests of the neighborhood countries; reassessing the

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European

Union, which technically expires in November 2007; and, last but not least, developing the

European Neighbourhood Policy into an attractive approach to cooperation.17 In fact, German

diplomacy has already undertaken the first steps in this direction. In July 2006 the planning

staff of the German Foreign Office made a proposal to establish a “European Neighbourhood

Policy Plus” with Ukraine, Moldova, potentially Belarus (after democratic reforms there) and

the countries of the Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.18 The overall goal of the

“Neighbourhood Plus” strategy is to guide transition in the countries concerned and to avoid a

security gap between Europe and Russia. Thus, Berlin’s policy planners have also suggested

linking the ENP-Plus proposal with a reassessment of relations between the EU and Russia.

Even if ENP-Plus still does not include membership prospects, the strategy clearly

differentiates between the importance of European neighbors and just being a neighbor of

Europe.

17 Kempe, Iris/ Smith, Hanna (2006): A decade of Partnership and Cooperation in Russia-EU relations.

Perceptions, Perspectives and Progress – Possibilities for the Next Decade. Helsinki and Munich. 18 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006): Berlin entwickelt neue Nachbarschaftspolitik für die EU. July 3,

2006. http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~E2FDB15D2F5084C19B6D27

D5C1C72DDA1~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html

34

Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy

By Piotr Buras and Karolina Pomorska

The Eastern Focus of Polish Policy towards the ENP

The policy of the European Union (EU) towards its neighborhood has always been a subject

of vital interest for Poland. Ever since the Polish decision-makers have started to perceive the

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an opportunity rather than as a constraining

factor to their own national foreign policy, Eastern Europe clearly became the priority area for

Polish input into the CFSP. As a consequence both of geographical location and historical

experience, the Poles tend to pay an utmost attention to the stabilization and independence of

their immediate neighborhood. In addition, since the EU accession of ten new member

countries on May 1, 2004, Poland has the longest external frontier of all EU member states

which further enhances its interest in the EU’s efforts to develop a common policy towards

these countries.

Nonetheless, Poland’s attitude towards the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been

marked by a high degree of ambiguity. This is true despite the fact that Poland, even before

the formal accession to the EU, had been one of the first countries to remind its partners of the

need to develop a common policy towards the ‘new’ (eastern) neighbors. The principal aim of

this contribution is to explore the Polish position with regard to the ENP and explain the

reasons behind its formulation. It is argued that the strong regional emphasis on its own

neighborhood and its preference for eventual EU accession of Ukraine are the main factors

determining the ambivalent Polish attitude towards the ENP.

The priorities of modern Polish foreign policy were formulated in 1990 after Poland gained its

full sovereignty. One of the main challenges to face at that time was to redefine relations with

the states of the post-Soviet space. Policy choices were made in accordance with the concepts

already formulated in the 1960s by Juliusz Mieroszewski and Jerzy Giedroyc in the Parisian

“Kultura”, who advocated supporting an independent Ukraine. An active policy towards the

eastern neighbors was perceived as interconnected with the Polish-German relationships and

the principle of a balanced engagement with the West and the East. The Polish political elites

soon recognized the fact that better relations with their eastern neighbors also meant gaining a

stronger position within Western Europe.

35

After the initial “dual-track” policy, designed as an attempt to maintain a balance between

Moscow and the Newly Independent States (NIS), a new and more active approach was

formulated in 1994. Its aim was to build up good relations with the states of special

significance for Poland: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Kazakhstan and Moldova.

The success of the policy was to be judged by the state of affairs with Russia and Ukraine.

Relations with the latter were characterized as a strategic partnership of crucial importance

which was later reflected in the role of Poland as an advocate of Ukraine’s closer ties with the

EU. This background has to be taken into account when considering the Polish attitude

towards the ENP.

'Eastern Dimension': Europe Enlarged but Open

The central role attributed to the eastern neighbors in the Polish foreign policy thinking led to

a great emphasis put by the Polish public opinion and officials on the need not to “close the

door behind us” after EU enlargement. As early as in 1998, Professor Bronisław Geremek, in

his speech inaugurating Poland’s EU accession negotiations, called for the creation of an

“Eastern Dimension” of the EU. Many politicians and scholars have since then spoken in

favor of Poland taking the initiative in developing this idea. The National Security Adviser,

Marek Siwiec, claimed that Poland’s role within the EU would be that of a player, not a

follower. This could become “the Polish specialty in the EU” and the field where Poland “had

no competition in Europe”, as stated by Marek Karp, director of the Centre for Eastern

Studies. An added value which Poland was bringing to the EU was its expertise on the region,

underpinned by its long historical experience in this context.

It was not long before the Polish government joined the debate as well. The “Eastern

Dimension” became part of the official discourse and was explained in a non-paper of the

Foreign Ministry in 2003 and later also in a speech by the minister of foreign affairs in

February 2003 during a conference on “The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy” in

Warsaw.19 After joining the EU, Eastern Europe was to become “the most important strategic

challenge for Poland”.20 Polish diplomats were assigned the goal of raising the problems of

19 See Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2003): Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Speech delivered in Lublin, UMCS.

Lublin, March 24, 2003. http://www.msz.gov.pl/24,marca,2003r.,-

,Polska,w,Unii,Europejskiej,wystapienie,Ministra,SZ,Wlodzimierza,Cimoszewicza,-,Lublin,,UMCS.,1320.html

20 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2004): Polska w zamęcie świata. In: Gazeta Wyborcza, June 12-13, 2004.

36

the region on the EU agenda, as the Union was criticized for being ineffective towards

Belarus, unable to solve the Transnistrian conflict or not doing enough to decrease democratic

deficits in Ukraine. However, the very concept of the 'Eastern Dimension' outlined in the non-

paper did not prove to be successful. As admitted later by Polish diplomats, it was not

pragmatic enough and did not take into account how the EU actually works internally. For

practical reasons, the idea was abandoned after Poland joined the EU, but its main

assumptions still determine to a large extend the Polish contribution to the European

Neighbourhood Policy. This contribution has been characterized by three central aims.

First, Poland was determined to launch the idea an independent “Eastern policy” of the EU.

Undoubtedly, a blue-print for this endeavor was the “Northern Dimension” advocated by

Finland. It was not only seen as a useful tool for managing urgent problems in the region, but

also as a way to up-load the Polish foreign policy agenda to the European level and, in turn, to

upgrade the country’s role in the EU. Initially, Poland interpreted the “Northern Dimension”

as a potential competition to the Polish ideas, but after joining the EU a pragmatic shift of

strategies occurred. The Poles soon began to cooperate with the Finns on their common goal

of raising the importance of the region on the EU agenda. Cimoszewicz declared in 2003 that

"the Eastern Dimension would be complementary to the Northern Dimension of the EU. I

believe that it can use the experience of the Northern Dimension as well as other policies of

the EU towards adjacent regions".21

Second, the Polish government argued that relations with the eastern neighbors should be

differentiated within the overall framework of such an Eastern Dimension. The policy should

be based on three pillars: community, governmental (including bilateral policies of the

member states) and non-governmental. Support for the differentiation was clearly motivated

by the fact that the Eastern Dimension would encompass countries like Russia, Ukraine or

Belarus which sharply differ from each other in terms of democratic and economic

development as well as of their attitude towards Europe.

http://www.msz.gov.pl/12,czerwca,2004,r.,-,Polska,w,zamecie,swiata,-

,artykul,Ministra,W.,Cimoszewicza,w,Gazecie,Wyborczej,1450.html21 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2003): The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View,

Speech at the Conference “The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”. Warsaw, February 20, 2003. http://www.msz.gov.pl/20,lutego,2003r.,-

,The,Eastern,Dimension,of,the,European,Union.,The,Polish,View.,Speech,by,Wlodzimierz,Cimoszewicz,,Polish,Minister,of,Foreign,Affairs,,at,the,Conference,The,EU,Enlargement,and,Neighbourhood,Policy,,Warsaw,,20,February,2003,1305.html

37

Finally, the main objective of the Eastern Dimension, as formulated by the Polish

government, was to enable the East European partners such as Ukraine and Moldova (but

potentially also Belarus) to join the Union when/ if they were willing and ready to fulfill the

membership criteria. Warsaw did not hesitate to admit that "Poland is a strong advocate of the

European aspirations expressed repeatedly by Ukraine and Moldova”.22

ENP: Overcoming Borders or Creating New Ones?

Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that the document of the European

Commission: “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our

eastern and Southern Neighbours” (dated March 11, 2003) did not satisfy the Polish

government. In this respect an earlier idea, known as the New Neighbours Initiative (NNI)

from November 2002, which encompassed only Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, was much

closer to the Polish preferences. Instead of drawing from the Polish idea of an “Eastern

Dimension”, the concept of “Wider Europe” changed the character of the initiative by

including a wide range of different states with and without aspirations to EU membership.

In fact, the initial idea behind “Wider Europe” ran exactly in the opposite direction than the

concepts advocated by Poland. The European Neighbourhood Policy has had the intention to

separate the question of prospective membership (“high-politics”) from managing every-day

relations with the neighbors in a variety of policy fields (“low-politics”).23 In the view of

high-ranking officials in Brussels, the ENP was not aimed at promoting any further EU

enlargement but, to the contrary, to exclude the accession perspective for the neighboring

countries. The main incentive which the EU offered participating states, as outlined in the

Strategy paper on “Wider Europe”, was “the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market

and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods,

services and capital”. Romano Prodi24 promoted the concept of "sharing everything but

22 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2004): Europe enlarged but open. Statement at the OECD Council. Paris, April

22, 2004. http://www.mfa.gov.pl/April,22,,2004,-

,„Europe,enlarged,but,open”,Statement,by,Wlodzimierz,Cimoszewicz,Minister,of,Foreign,Affairs,of,the,Republic,of,Poland,at,the,OECD,Council,,Paris,2063.html

23 See Smith, Karen E. (2005): The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy. In: International Affairs 81(4), p. 757-773.

24 See Prodi, Romano (2002): A Wider Europe – A proximity Policy as the key to stability. Speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Brussels, December 5-6, 2002.

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm

38

institutions” and Guenter Verheugen25 described the ENP as “distinct from the issue of

possible further enlargement. It concerns countries to which accession is not on the agenda”.

Opinions such as these, voiced by leading European politicians, remain the sources of Polish

reservations towards the ENP. The attempt to develop a “circle of friends“ in its

neighborhood is warmly welcomed by Warsaw but Poland is also rather instrumental in

putting the “European perspective” – which in the Polish discourse is often equated with a de-

facto promise of future accession – on the European Union’s agenda. From Warsaw’s

perspective, the neighboring countries of the Eastern Dimension should not become “eternal

partners” as Foreign Minister Meller26 put it recently. The reluctance to address enlargement

inhibits, in the Polish view, reform incentives in the neighboring regions. The “European

perspective” is seen by the Poles as the best way to motivate countries to undertake reforms

and stick to the commitments made towards the EU. This conviction is a lesson learned by

Poland itself during its own accession process. “Arguably, prospects of membership have

proved to be the most efficient instrument in foreign policy-making of the EU”, as Poland's

deputy foreign minister pointed out.27

From the beginning, the ENP has been criticized by the Poles for mixing states with and

without “European aspirations”. While Ukraine or Moldova are, as indicated above, clearly

perceived in Poland as potential members of the EU, this is certainly not true for countries

like Libya or Algeria. Hence, the ENP is not only of limited use for the Polish long-term

foreign policy goal of promoting Ukrainian EU accession but in political terms it could be

even a threat to it as it locates Ukraine in the group of Mediterranean countries excluded from

EU membership. In the context of the broad geographical scope of the European

Neighbourhood Policy there is also a visible tension between the Polish preference for the

“Eastern Dimension” and the interests of the Mediterranean EU countries which focus their

activities on the southern neighborhood.28. Most importantly, Poland has felt uneasy about the

financial distributions to the east and to the south. While the South-Mediterranean countries

received 2,4 billion Euro from the MEDA program in the period 2000-2003 and 41 Mio. Euro

from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, the eastern partners were

25 See Verheugen, Guenter (2003): EU Enlargement and the Union’s Neighbourhood Policy. Speech delivered

at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. Moscow, October 27, 2003. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/verheugen-russia-eu_enlargement_and_the_union_en.pdf26 See Meller, Stefan (2006) Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2006. Presented at the session

of the Sejm. Warsaw, February 15, 2006. http://www.msz.gov.pl/Policy,2155.html27 See Truszczyński, Jan (2005): Shaping the EU's Eastern Dimension: the Polish View. Lecture delivered at

the opening of the 15th edition of the College for New Europe (International Cultural Centre). Kraków, July 15, 2005.

28 See the contribution of Maxime Lefebvre on the French perspective in this volume.

39

given only 1,33 billion (TACIS) and 19 Mio. Euro respectively.29 Concerning the balance

between east and south, Poland has argued that “the Eastern Policy should not be [a]

counterweight [to the Southern policy], but should be equally important”.30

It is important to note that the positions as outlined above are based on a broad inter-party

consensus which is also shared by public opinion. The non-governmental sector in Poland,

most notably the Batory Foundation in Warsaw, is engaged in developing concepts for the

European “Eastern policy” which are broadly discussed in the Polish media. The foundation

also organizes workshops for politicians and experts in Poland and abroad. Despite the

criticism it is only partly true that in Poland "no one really knows what the ENP is about" as

two Polish experts commented.31 The ENP and the Action Plans were officially welcomed as

the first step in the right direction. Similarly, Poland often supports the position of EU

institutions as they promote a more active policy towards the region. In this sense, Poland

clearly wishes to see the ENP as an instrument preparing the countries for future membership

(and not as its substitute) and thus uses this framework to launch initiatives which serve to

achieve this goal. This led some commentators to the conclusion that a certain

“Europeanization” of Polish Eastern policy is already taking place.32 Polish engagement in

the negotiations of a New Financial Perspective of the EU is an important example of this

pragmatic approach. In a way, Poland has managed to use the ENP as a platform for

transferring funds from the south to the east. However, after completing this task, one can

doubt the further usefulness of the ENP for Poland.

In line with its openness towards the Eastern neighbors, Poland has also advocated the

extension (under certain conditions) of the ENP to Belarus which was excluded by the

European Commission from the initiative due to the political situation in this country.33 This

Polish position, which was not endorsed by other member states, aims primarily at

maintaining ties with the Belarusian civil society which should not be too heavily disturbed

by the political course of Lukashenka’s regime. The fact that there is a 400.000-strong Polish

29 See Cieszkowski, Anrzej (2004): Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec wschodnich sąsiadów - wkład Polsk. In:

Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004. Warsaw, p. 111 30 Rotfeld, Adam D. (2005): Wschodnia polityka Unii Europejskiej: wkład Polsk. In: Wągrowska, Maria (Ed.):

Unia Europejska i Europa Południowo-Wschodnia, Conference Proceedings. Warsaw. 31 Osica, Olaf/ Trzaskowski, Rafal (2005): Poland. CFSP Watch 2005, p. 3. http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2005/CFSP%20Watch%202005%20Poland.pdf32 See Lang, Kai-Olaf (2005): Polen und der Osten. SWP-Aktuell 22. Berlin, May 2005, p. 5. http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=128733 See Cieszkowski, Anrzej (2004): Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec wschodnich sąsiadów - wkład Polsk. In:

Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004. Warsaw.

40

minority living in Belarus is an additional argument for the Polish government and public

opinion alike not to cut-off societal contacts.

Ukraine: Beyond the ENP

The critical Polish attitude towards the ENP is very much focused on Ukraine. Poland is

rightly perceived as one of the most energetic supporters of closer Ukrainian relations with

the EU. As some delegates from the old member states admit, together with Lithuania,

Warsaw has played a key role in keeping Ukraine high on the EU agenda since it started

participating in the CFSP. The official Polish position states that Ukraine should be allowed

to negotiate its entry into the EU as soon as it is ready to do so. This is also related to the

Polish position regarding the absorption capacity of the EU. Polish diplomats argue that such

a condition was not required when the decision of Polish accession was taken. Hence, unlike

some other member states, Poland argues that the internal reforms are not a necessary pre-

requisite for granting aspiring countries the status of accession states.

The first step to bring Ukraine closer to the EU would be the signing of an Association

Agreement which goes beyond the current ENP framework. This is why Poland in 2003

promoted the idea of giving the Action Plans for Ukraine and Moldova the form of

“Partnerships for Association”. They would prepare these countries to negotiate Association

Agreements with the EU after the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) will

have expired. Poland thus supported the Ukrainian preference to make the Association

Agreement a priority objective in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. However, the other member

states did not share this view. From the Polish perspective, the imbalance between the

eagerness of the EU to associate with Mediterranean or even South-American countries on the

one hand and the refusal to grant a similar status to Ukraine on the other was striking and

subjected to criticism.34 For Poland it is beyond any doubt that Ukraine, as the Polish minister

for foreign affairs explained, "has got the right to have the same perspective as Turkey".35

34 Cieszkowski, Anrzej (2004): Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec wschodnich sąsiadów - wkład Polsk. In:

Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004. Warsaw , p. 107. 35 Rotfeld, Adam D (2005): Eine bittere Lektion - Außenminister Adam Rotfeld über das Engagement seines

Landes in der Ukraine, die EU-Politik gegenüber Osteuropa und das Verhältnis zu den USA. In: Der Spiegel 9/2005.

http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Eine,bittere,Lektion,-,Außenminister,Adam,Rotfeld,über,das,Engagement,seines,Landes,in,der,Ukraine,,die,EU-Politik,gegenüber,Osteuropa,und,das,Verhältnis,zu,den,USA,-,der,Spiegel,9,2005,2372.html

41

As far as Ukraine is concerned, it is striking that the ENP offers only limited opportunities of

carrying out Poland’s Eastern policy agenda. As a result, the most important initiatives go far

beyond the ENP framework. Poland was, for example, lobbying in favor of granting Ukraine

the status of a free market economy (MES), which succeeded during the British EU

presidency in the second half of 2005. Other issues include visa-facilitation for Ukrainian

citizens and the starting of talks on the establishment of a free trade area between the EU and

Ukraine (after the latter’s accession to the World Trade Organization). Poland also launched

the ideas of a scholarship program for Ukrainian students to come to the EU, a training

program for Ukrainian officials in Brussels and the concept of a European university in Lviv.

Together with his German colleague, Joschka Fischer, these ideas were presented by Foreign

Minister Rotfeld during their joint visit to Kiev in March 2005.

Perhaps the most important Polish contribution to the broadly defined neighborhood policy

are its constant efforts to keep Eastern policy high on the EU agenda. It was a joint Polish-

German initiative in October 2004 to include the provision that the “EU treats Ukraine as the

key neighbour and strategic partner” and that the “Council supports Ukraine's European

aspirations"” in the conclusions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. This initiative was

reported to be strongly supported also by Visegrad, Baltic and Scandinavian states.

Characteristically, the Polish Minister Cimoszewicz said on this occasion that whereas the

Action Plan for Ukraine, which was being prepared at that time, is an important document, it

should not be the only instrument in the relationship between the EU and Ukraine.

The importance of paving the way for a more substantial interest of the EU in Ukraine is not

at least the lesson from Poland’s role during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November

and December 2004 which proved to be a big success of Polish diplomacy. Poland not only

successfully played the role of a mediator in the post-election conflict but also managed to

“upload” this question to the EU level. It was the Polish President Kwaśniewski who

convinced the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, to undertake

negotiations with the conflicting parties and asked then German Chancellor Gerhard

Schroeder to explore the intentions of the Russian authorities with regard to the Ukrainian

domestic crisis. Making the other European capitals sensitive towards “Eastern issues” will

certainly remain the central Polish foreign policy goal. Otherwise, as a German expert

admitted, “when the situation in Ukraine becomes stable - which is clearly desirable - Ukraine

42

may again fall in the ‘indifference trap.’”36 The Ukrainian crisis also reinforced Polish beliefs

in the usefulness of multilateral European initiatives and the CFSP. Geoffrey Edwards (2006)

is certainly right saying that “the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a turning point, leading

many [Central Eastern European Countries] to take the CFSP and the High Representative

seriously”.

Nonetheless, the aftermath of the “Orange Revolution” was a somewhat less successful story

for Polish diplomacy. It did not manage to convince their European partners to consider a

more forceful response to the events in Ukraine. The Action Plan was signed without any

significant alterations and the Ten Points added to the Council Conclusions from February

2005, arguably, also fell short of Polish expectations. Nonetheless, it seems that the Poles

learnt the lessons on their own mistakes and shifted strategies towards a more low-key and

pragmatic approach in Brussels. After an initial period of adaptation, Polish policy-makers

discovered that negotiations in Brussels were based on consensus building and attempts to

“keep everyone on-board”. Taking this into account, Poland started to build informal

coalitions with other “like-minded states” and pursued a “small steps” approach: supporting

the EU-Ukraine political and security dialogue, advocating visa-facilitation and a prompt

conclusion of negotiations over the FTA.

Conclusions

“Neighborhood policy” is one of the central concerns of modern Polish foreign policy which

in turn makes Poland’s attitude towards the ENP a much more sensitive issue than in most of

the other EU member states. After joining the EU, Poland assumed the role of an advocate for

Ukrainian EU aspirations. Drawing Ukraine closer to the Union and granting Kiev the

prospect of EU membership is part of the Polish raison d'etat and the main foreign policy

goal after accession to the EU and NATO was completed. Consequently, as long as the ENP

does not address this crucial issue of Polish foreign policy it is not likely that Poland will full-

heartedly share its objectives or priorities and contribute to its development. Rather, as it has

been observed so far, it will seek to use it as a platform to promote the idea of “keeping the

door open” and to enhance the financial assistance to its Eastern neighbors. Still, it seems that

in the Polish view, there is not much space left for new initiatives after agreement on the

European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) was reached, which will serve as the

integrated financial mechanism of the ENP. There is an impression in Poland that the ENP is

36 Lang, Kai-Olaf (2005): Berlin, Warszawa - wreszcie wspólna sprawa. In: Tygodnik Powszechny 3/2005.

43

in a phase of stagnation and is not likely to gain any new dynamics soon. Poland will then

continue to conduct its Eastern policy in order to push it step-by-step beyond the ENP and to

influence the European discourse by means of bilateral initiatives and arrangements.

The record of Polish diplomacy so far is a rather balanced combination of success, failure and

disillusionment. Its most remarkable success was the pro-active policy during the “Orange

Revolution” or supporting Ukraine to acquire the MES. Poland was less successful in its

efforts to promote a more sustainable European response to the events in Ukraine or generally

in advocating a more privileged approach to the east within the ENP. This disillusionment

came with the acknowledgment of the „rules of the game” in Brussels, where a broad

consensus is needed not only in the context of the CFSP. Old member states clearly welcomed

the expertise and experience that the Poles brought to the negotiation tables, but expected a

pragmatic input into the discussions and the readiness of Poland to accept compromises.

Hence, Polish diplomacy already discovered that future initiatives need to be supported by

other member states and thus preceded with intense consultations and lobbying efforts. The

influence of Polish representatives on policy substance still remains difficult to determine

beyond the evident impact on keeping the Eastern Dimension high on the EU’s external

relations agenda.

44

European Neighbourhood Policy – The Perception of Ukraine

By Iryna Solonenko

Introduction

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was launched in May 2004, offers a new

framework for relations between the European Union and its neighbors. From the perspective

of the EU, this approach, which includes both eastern and Mediterranean neighbors, is well

grounded and reasonable. It reflects the need to accommodate the foreign policy interests of

member states within the common framework of the EU. From the perspective of Ukraine, the

ENP is a disappointment, however, because it includes the country into the same group as

Morocco and other Mediterranean countries which do not have a clear European perspective

as is the case with Ukraine. Such a perception of the ENP was evident from numerous

statements and comments by Ukrainian policy-makers and analysts.

Nevertheless, Ukraine - among other neighbors of the EU apart from Russia - accepted this

new policy instrument and took its implementation seriously. Although the political elite in

Ukraine was not satisfied with the long-term prospects of the ENP, it realized that without it

and successful implementation of the ENP EU-Ukraine Action Plan37 any further

rapprochement towards the EU, which ultimately includes an accession perspective for

Ukraine, would be impossible. Therefore Ukraine accepted the ENP as a short-term and

intermediate framework and has tried to make the best use of the opportunities offered by it.

This approach coincided with a shift of European policy taking place after the Orange

Revolution when Ukraine’s policy towards European integration became a tool of internal

political and economic transformation.

The ambiguity of the ENP and the lack of clear priorities in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan can

also be seen as an opportunity, because despite its character as a regional policy it follows an

individual approach which depends to a large extent on progress and the initiative of

individual ENP countries. In fact, the progress Ukraine has made over the last year already

opened the door for a new stage of EU-Ukraine relations and put Ukraine in some ways ahead

of other ENP countries. Yet, it is still unclear how far the relationship will develop and where

37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2005): EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005 – 2007. http://www.mfa.gov.ua/data/upload/publication/mfa/en/2820/planeng.doc

45

the real limits of the ENP’s flexibility lie. 2008 will be a decisive year in this context when

the first Action Plan will expire and a new EU-Ukraine Agreement will substitute the current

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Starting from 2008, Ukraine can either move

to a new stage of its relationship with the EU, which would have a very different quality, or

remain one of many countries within the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Ukrainian Perceptions before the Orange Revolution

From the beginning, Ukraine followed the development of the ENP concept with scrutiny.

When the British and Danish foreign ministers came up with the idea of granting Ukraine,

Moldova and Belarus a “special neighborhood status” (New Neighbours Initiative) in April

2002, Ukraine’s reaction was not a positive one. President Kuchma declared that

neighborhood status was useless unless it would open the prospect of Ukraine’s accession to

the EU38. At that time, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for European

Integration, Borys Tarasiuk, interpreted the initiative as an attempt to avoid a clear answer to

Ukraine’s aspirations regarding EU membership. Later on, as the initiative developed and the

day before the Communication of the European Commission entitled “Wider Europe –

Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors”

was published in March 2003, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

claimed that Ukraine was not satisfied with the status of being a special EU neighbor.

As the European Commission started preparatory work on the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, the

President of Ukraine issued a decree “On Organizing EU-Ukraine Summit” in August 2003.

According to the decree, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was charged with the task to

develop a draft EU-Ukraine Action Plan aimed at creating a free trade zone between the EU

and Ukraine and at adopting an Association Agreement to be presented during the EU-

Ukraine Summit in October 2003. The Ukrainian government had a specific type of

Association Agreement in mind – a Europe Agreement which was offered to Central East

European countries which later became EU member states. This over-ambitious goal was

never taken into consideration, however. The process of negotiations on the ENP EU-Ukraine

Action Plan resulted in a much more neutral formulation according to which a “new enhanced

agreement” would ultimately depend on the progress of implementation of the Action Plan39.

38 See Kuchma, Leonid (2002): Statement by the President Leonid Kuchma during the plenary session of the II

European Economic Forum. Salzburg, September 16, 2002. 39 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2005): EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005 – 2007. http://www.mfa.gov.ua/data/upload/publication/mfa/en/2820/planeng.doc

46

The start of negotiations over a Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine was made

conditional on Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and appeared as

a clear incentive in the 10-point supplement to the EU-Ukraine Action Plan40.

In the process of the negotiations on the Action Plan, Kiev’s leadership faced the dilemma of

accepting the text of the ENP Action Plan proposed by the EU or refusing it altogether,

because it offered little added value to already existing policy arrangements. In the process of

negotiations, Ukraine only convinced the EU to accept some of its minor proposals which did

not affect the structure and overall content of the ENP Action Plan. The decision to accept it

was based on the understanding that the EU was not ready to offer any alternative. In

addition, Ukraine understood that the asymmetrical relationship with the EU (in terms of

leverage during negotiations) was a normal practice, which all accession countries had to

accept as well. As one representative of the European Commission mentioned in a private

conversation with this author, the EU approach in negotiations with third countries aspiring

for EU membership can be characterized as “take it or leave it”. This is probably the major

reason why Russia decided not to join the European Neighbourhood Policy as it wanted to

preserve an “equal footing” in its relationship with the EU.

After the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was released and approved by the Council of the EU in

December 2004 together with six other ENP Action Plans, Ukraine was quick to react. The

next day, on December 14, 2004, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

said that his country was not satisfied with the Action Plan because it was far from meeting

Ukraine’s expectations. He emphasized Ukraine’s wish to acquire market economy status, to

start negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement, as well as the signing of a number of

agreements on political, economic, energy and security cooperation. In addition, the

spokesman declared that the ENP Action Plan did not take into consideration the political

changes in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution.

Ukraine’s Perception after the Orange Revolution

With the change of the domestic situation following the Orange Revolution, the ENP Action

Plan was called into question by the new Ukrainian leadership which saw itself as a new

40 See Council of the European Union (2005): EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council Eighth Meeting. Brussels, 21

February, 2005. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/83804.pdfCentre for European Policy Studies (2005): CEPS Neighbourhood Watch, Issue 1. Brussels, February 2005, p. 4. http://www.ceps.be/files/NW/NWatch1.pdf

47

democratic elite and claimed that the document negotiated with the old leadership did not suit

the “new” Ukraine anymore. Ukrainian policy-makers hoped that after the Orange Revolution

the EU would revise the document. When the newly elected president Viktor Yushchenko

introduced his Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk on February 8, 2005, he declared that

“Ukraine is not a neighbor of the EU, but a centre of Europe (…) and it is a diplomatic task to

change the EU’s approach”.41

Nevertheless, the new Ukrainian leadership also realized the limits of this approach, which

were reflected in the 10 points offered by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs,

Javier Solana, and its Foreign Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner after the Orange

Revolution. Without going as far as to offer a membership prospect to Ukraine, these 10

points offered to Ukraine new incentives such as EU support for Ukraine's WTO accession

and granting Market Economy Status, the starting of negotiations on a facilitated visa regime

for Ukrainians, increasing EU assistance, including in the fields of democracy, the rule of law,

legislative approximation, support for the strengthening of civil society and people-to-people

contacts, and additional funding from the European Investment Bank. More importantly, the

new Ukrainian leadership understood that the key for a successful relationship with the EU is

Ukraine’s domestic reform agenda. As a result, Ukraine signed the ENP Action Plan

supplemented with the 10 points on February 21, 2005.

Ukraine’s policy towards European integration changed after the Orange Revolution and has

differed from the policy under Kuchma’s presidency. Under Kuchma, Ukraine’s policy

towards European integration was mainly seen as foreign policy, which was not supported by

a domestic reform agenda. Besides, Ukraine’s so called multi-vector foreign policy was rather

contradictory. A very evident and banal example was Ukraine’s decision to join the Single

Economic Space with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in September 2003, which envisaged

the creation of a customs union and supranational institutions in the medium-term

perspective. This decision contradicted declared Ukrainian objectives towards the EU. In a

nutshell, European integration was used as a means to legitimize Ukraine’s political elite in

the eyes of policy-makers from the EU and the West in general.

After the Orange Revolution and the signing of the ENP EU-Ukraine Action Plan in February

2005, the Ukrainian authorities made it clear that they were aware of the necessity to develop

an internal dimension of the country’s European policy. Thus, the government created the

41 Ukrainian Monitor, February 14, 2005.

48

position of a vice-prime minister for European integration and adopted a draft National

Strategy of European integration. Even though it soon became clear that the new post did not

have the authority, portfolio and staffing to fulfill the declared objectives, the decision to

create it was a clear demonstration of political will to change the approach towards European

integration. Moreover, the Ukrainian government adopted the practice of developing annual

roadmaps to implement the ENP Action Plan. The first roadmap for 2005 was adopted in

April of that year. The roadmaps for 2005 and 2006 contain a detailed list of activities to be

undertaken in order to fulfill the objectives of the ENP Action Plan, such as further

strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions, promoting democracy and the rule

of law, accession to WTO, removing trade restrictions and improving the investment climate,

legislative approximation and other elements. It is important to mention that civil society

organizations have been involved in the process of developing the scoreboards and in

monitoring their implementation.

In sum, Ukraine’s political elite which came to power after the Orange Revolution understood

the benefits which a successful implementation of the ENP Action Plan would bring for

Ukraine and that it could raise the issue of EU membership at a later stage. In this period,

Ukraine’s policy towards Europe has been characterized by a stronger focus on internal

political and economic reforms, transparency and involvement of civil society.

The EU-Ukraine Relationship in 2005-2006: Potential for a Differentiated Approach

within the ENP

On the part of the EU, the European Neighbourhood Policy was mostly seen as an alternative

to enlargement. Indeed, as the draft report on the ENP of the European Parliament states “not

all the problems in Europe and its neighbourhood can be solved by enlarging the EU, and

therefore [there should be] an ambitious, differentiated and substantial neighbourhood policy

as an alternative for those who cannot and do not wish to join but are nevertheless aligning

themselves with the European project and are minded to take part in it.”42 By offering the

neighboring countries to share with it “everything but institutions”43, the EU intends to

support transformation towards democracy, the rule of law and market economy. It is

therefore natural that within the ENP the EU offers Ukraine opportunities for advanced

42 European Parliament (2005): Draft Report on the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004/2166(INI)). April

14, 2005, p. 5. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pr/562/562256/562256en.pdf43 The formula expressed by the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi.

49

cooperation which were not possible before. Moreover, development of the EU-Ukraine

relationship during this period shows that ENP contains a strong potential for differentiation

among ENP countries.

For Ukraine, three policy projects stand out which from 2008 on could ultimately bring its

relationship with the EU to a new level. Those projects are a dialogue on visa facilitation,

negotiations on a Free Trade Area and on the new “Enhanced Agreement” which is supposed

to substitute the current PCA in 2008. Ukrainian government officials and experts are well

aware of these opportunities. Having realized that the EU’s approach has its limits, especially

in the context of the failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands

and member states’ reluctance to talk about further enlargement, Ukraine has accepted what

the EU has to offer. This, however, does not mean that Kiev gave up its demand of a long-

term membership perspective.

Visa Facilitation

In November 2005, the EU and Ukraine launched negotiations on visa facilitation aimed at

simplifying visa procedures and at allowing easier access to visas to certain categories of

Ukrainian citizens (like journalists, students, university teachers, businessmen etc.), including

the possibility of long-term multiple-entry visas (for the duration of up to five years). By the

end of May 2006, two rounds of negotiations took place and two more are still to take place.

Although provisions of the new visa agreement will not effect most Ukrainian citizens –

according to experts over 90-95 per cent of Ukrainian citizens will not fall under those

categories of citizens stipulated by the agreement – this will still be an important sign of

openness on the part of the EU. Moreover, the categories of citizens to be effected by the

agreement are in fact those who have relevant travel documents and are frequent travelers.

The signing and entry into force of this agreement will already put Ukraine ahead of other

ENP countries (citizens of Israel enjoy a visa free regime with the EU, but the EU-Israeli

relationship has a very different context). At the same time, the visa dialogue does not foresee

a removal of Ukraine from the Union’s visa “black list”, which is an important shortcoming.

Free-Trade Area

The current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine already

contains the prospect of creating a free-trade area between the EU and Ukraine. However, this

50

project has only become realistic with the ENP EU-Ukraine Action Plan. The 10-point

amendment to the Action Plan stipulates that negotiations over the free-trade zone between

the EU and Ukraine can start as soon as Ukraine becomes a WTO member state. Given that

Ukraine is preparing itself to make this happen by the end of 2006, preliminary consultations

between Ukraine and the EU have already started.

In 2005, the European Commission contracted the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy

Studies (CEPS) to conduct a feasibility study on the creation of a free-trade zone between the

EU and Ukraine. The report released by CEPS in 2006 proposes that the best approach

towards EU-Ukraine trade/ economic cooperation would be a deeper Free Trade Agreement

(or an “FTA Plus”). It should go further than the classical model of an FTA (for instance, the

model the EU has applied towards its Mediterranean partners), while falling short of the level

of economic cooperation among the countries of the European Free Trade Area. While it is

not yet clear what will be envisaged by the mandate of the European Commission for

negotiations over the free-trade area, the potential agreement between the EU and Ukraine

would offer greater access to the EU market for Ukrainian products and would stimulate the

further modernization of Ukraine’s economy.

Towards an “Enhanced Agreement”

The ENP EU-Ukraine Action Plan already contains the provision that its successful

implementation would lead to the signing of a new “enhanced” agreement between the EU

and Ukraine to substitute the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The start of

negotiations was made conditional on holding free and fair parliamentary elections in Ukraine

in 2006. After this was realized and recognized by the EU as such, preliminary consultations

on the agreement are supposed to start soon. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds

the position that Ukraine should be offered the same type of Association Agreement as the

Europe Agreements offered to Central East European Countries. From Kiev’s perspective, the

important thing is that the preamble of the Agreement would recognize Ukraine’s long-term

prospect of EU membership. This position of the Foreign Ministry is reflected in several

official statements. At the same time, Ukraine does not yet have a clear vision of the concrete

contents which the future agreement should have even though this will be very important

from a practical perspective.

51

These elements of cooperation outlined above make EU cooperation with Ukraine different

from relationships with other ENP countries and show that the Neighbourhood Policy

contains a substantial degree of flexibility and a differentiated approach within the uniform,

but very general, framework. If these elements are successfully negotiated to offer Ukraine a

deeper integration in specific sectors of political and economic cooperation, Ukraine might

enter a new quality of its relationship with the European Union in 2008. In addition, starting

from 2007 the new financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership

Instrument (ENPI), which will replace TACIS for the eastern neighbors of the EU and MEDA

for its southern neighbors, is to be in place. The fact that these policy projects will coincide

offers a very different framework for the EU-Ukraine relationship. However, the quality and

content of this framework will depend on concrete cooperation results and the negotiations

over the above-mentioned projects between the EU and Ukraine during the coming years.

To conclude, Ukraine was not satisfied when the ENP was initiated and did not manage to

have any serious influence on the content of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. However, the

Ukrainian government has understood that focusing exclusively on the membership

perspective would not bring positive results and thus accepted the cooperation projects

offered in the ENP framework. Yet Ukraine has still to realize that the ambiguity and

generality of the ENP framework offer opportunities for ever deeper cooperation between the

EU and Ukraine. The fact that Ukraine has made some progress in its policy towards

European integration as compared to the situation before the Orange Revolution and in

implementing the ENP EU-Ukraine Action Plan already paved the way for negotiations over

agreements on visa facilitation, a free-trade zone and a new contractual framework. The depth

and quality of cooperation within these projects and ultimately the quality of the EU-

Ukrainian relationship after 2008 will to a large extend depend on Ukrainian diplomacy being

proactive and innovative. Of course, it will also depend on the overall political climate both

within Ukraine and the EU.

52

The European Neighbourhood Policy – The Perspective of Moldova

By Anneli Ute Gabanyi

In the perception of the EU, the Republic of Moldova does by no means fit the ideal type of a

well-governed state - quite the contrary is true. The country, which will be a direct neighbor

of the EU after Romania's accession, seems to generate all the potential risks listed in the

2003 EU Security Strategy paper. Moldova is perceived as a weak state with arbitrarily drawn

borders and a defective national identity. Devoid of energy resources and with an economic

structure highly dependent on Russian deliveries and export markets, Moldova has been

exposed to strong economic and political pressure from Moscow since achieving its

independence in 1991. Following initial reform efforts which had earned it membership in the

World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Moldova is currently leading the list of the

poorest nations in Europe. Poverty and the collapse of the state welfare system have caused a

severe social crisis, prompting a considerable number of able-bodied citizens to leave the

country in search of labor abroad.

Yet, Moldova equally holds a potential to become a success story for the Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. In the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy

(ENP), the Republic of Moldova represents a special case. It has a strong European identity

and a clear and unequivocal impetus to join the European Union. To date, European

integration is the major political project rallying the country's political elites and enjoying the

support of 70 per cent of the population. There are at least three reasons for this enthusiasm:

• Geographically speaking, Moldova is the ENP country located closest to the future

western border of the EU;

• Moldova's majority population shares its cultural and linguistic identity with several West

European (Latin, Roman language speaking) peoples;

• Moldova borders on Romania, the country of which it was part before being occupied by

the Soviet Union in 1940.

However, unlike the Baltic states which were annexed by the Soviet Union under the Secret

Protocol of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin-Pact, independent Moldova, which had equally been a

victim of the Pact, did not get the same Western support to move closer to NATO and the EU

as the Baltic states. Instead, it was forced to join the Commonwealth of Independent States

53

(CIS) shortly after breaking away from the Soviet Union in 1991. Its special European

vocation prompted the Republic of Moldova to move closer to European and Western

institutions than the rest of the CIS states, however. In 1995, Moldova joined the Council of

Europe and as early as 1997, Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi expressed his country's

wish to start negotiations on an associate partnership with the EU expressing the country’s

hope for a future full membership.

For a decade, neither Moldova’s wish for a rapprochement with the EU nor the 1992

secessionist civil war and the illegal Russian military presence on its territory induced a

change in the EU’s policy of benign neglect vis-à-vis this country. Like most of the CIS

states, Moldova signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU in 1994 which

entered into force in 1998. It was not until 2002, when the EU set the time frame for the

integration of Romania by 2007, that Moldova came into the visor of the CFSP - but not as a

state earmarked for future integration, but as a fragile, ill governed, poor and conflict-ridden

country in the EU’s vicinity which was in need of stability and security.

The Moldovan government greeted the publication of the EU Strategy Paper entitled „Wider

Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern

Neighbours“ on June 11, 2003, with great satisfaction. It was also associating great hopes on

the EU’s declared willingness to engage in the solution of the frozen conflict in Transnistria

and in post-conflict reconstruction work. Moreover, Moldova saw positively the prospect of

being offered the opportunity to participate in the common EU market. From the very start,

however, there has also been disappointment concerning the lack of an integration perspective

and the fact that Moldova was included into the group of western CIS states. Historically and

geopolitically, Moldova perceives itself as a South-East European country which should be

given a different and a more differentiated treatment within the framework of the ENP.

This did not, however, prevent the administration in Chisinau from taking advantage of the

opportunity to enter into a contractual relationship with the EU. It became the first ENP

country to finalize negotiations on an ENP Action Plan on February 21, 2005. Political

observers in Moldova appreciated the fact that by concluding the Action Plan, Moldova had

engaged in a new type of co-operative relationship with the EU which was structured along

the lines of the Copenhagen criteria (set up in 1993 to assess prospective EU accession

countries). Moreover, the Action Plan offered the prospect of a stronger EU engagement in

conflict solution in Transnistria. At the same time, observers expressed reservations about the

54

still hesitant manner in which the EU took over responsibilities in conflict resolution and the

lack of concrete benchmarks for evaluating the implementation of the Action Plan. They also

criticized the lack of responsibility on the EU’s side in an otherwise bilateral document.

The EU and Moldova still differ in their respective evaluation of the results achieved so far in

the implementation of the Action Plan. While agreeing on the progress made by the

Moldovan authorities in implementing the Plan, the EU sees the Moldovan government as

lagging behind its efforts of reforming the legal system and the public administration, curbing

corruption and safeguarding human rights and press freedom. Occasionally, questions are also

asked in the European Commission or in Parliament circles about the irreversibility of the

country’s pro-European stance and in particular on the credibility of its Communist President

Vladimir Voronin. Reference is made to the fact that to this date, Moldova has not, like

Georgia, announced its intention to leave the CIS, that it has not supported the EU

condemnation of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and that the government has not applied

for membership in NATO.

On the other hand, the EU has fulfilled a number of Moldovan desiderata. In the economic

field, the EU accepted Moldova into the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) “Plus”

scheme - the EU equivalent to the Most Favored Nation's Clause which offers better access to

the EU’s Internal Market. In order to be granted autonomous trade preferences by the EU for

a number of its export products, Moldova will have to reform its system of country of origin

certification and to consolidate its customs administration. The EU also promised Moldova

more technical and financial aid under the provisions of its 2007-2013 budget. One of the

most urgent issues on Moldova’s agenda has been to achieve a more favorable visa regime for

certain categories of its citizens in the EU. Talks between EU and Moldovan officials on this

issue have just started. For its part, the government in Chisinau had already promised to

renounce the visa regime for EU citizens starting on January 1st, 2007. Recently, Moldova

also fulfilled the EU demand of signing an agreement on air transport services with the EU.

Another important achievement for Moldova under the Action Plan was to receive EU

support for joining regional structures and organizations. Based on its historical ties and

cultural affinities, Moldova has long tried to achieve closer integration with regional

organizations in South Eastern Europe. In 1996, Moldova was a founding member of the

South East European Co-operation Initiative (SECI). It has enjoyed observer status within the

South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) since 1999. With active Romanian

55

support, Moldova became a member of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe; it also

holds observer status in the Athens Process for establishing a regional energy market in South

Eastern Europe. In April 2006, the Republic of Moldova joined the Central European Free

Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside the two future EU members Bulgaria and Romania and

the Western Balkan countries Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro as

well as the UN administration of Kosovo, all of which have an EU integration perspective.

Moreover, Moldova became a full member of the SEECP in May 2006.

Since the signing of the bilateral Action Plan with Moldova, the EU has implemented a

number of significant changes in its policy vis-à-vis the country. This new EU policy was

prompted by a number of changes in the regional political environment such as the hardening

of Russia's overall foreign policy stance, the openly aggressive stance adopted by the regime

in Transnistria and the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. Last year, the EU appointed a

Special Representative for Moldova, whose task is to contribute to the settling of the conflict

in Transnistria. Moreover, the European Commission opened its delegation in Chisinau. A

Border Assistance Mission started its work along the Transnistrian border with Ukraine.

Together with the USA, the EU was also granted observer status in the negotiation format on

the Transnistrian Conflict.

Moldova's principal stumbling block in the country’s integration process into the Euro-

Atlantic organizations is the frozen conflict between the central government in Chisinau and

the separatist, self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic. For quite some time, Western

Chancelleries viewed the conflict as a mainly ethnic conflict caused by Moldova’s alleged

merger plans with neighboring Romania. The half-hearted endeavors undertaken by the

OSCE to solve the conflict actually contributed to the division of Moldova’s territory

becoming permanent and cemented the de-facto independence of the self-proclaimed

Transnistrian Republic and its separatist structures. This conflict is the root cause for

Moldova’s main security problem - the inability of the state to exercise sovereign control over

the country's territory and borders, with very negative repercussions for the consolidation of

the state, its economic and social policy and international relations.

As a result of the EU’s recent involvement in conflict resolution in Moldova, awareness of the

true nature of the conflict, the competing interests of the players involved (Russia in

particular) and the possibility of the “frozen conflict” turning into a dramatic crisis has grown

among EU officials. Russia’s attempts to blackmail the government in Chisinau into

56

compliance by raising the price of its gas deliveries to the highest level in the CIS, by closing

its market to Moldovan wine exports and by openly supporting the secessionist threat of the

Transnistrian leadership do not bode well. It remains to be seen how the EU member states,

increasingly aware of their own dependency on Russian gas deliveries, will react if the

Transnistrian conflict would take a violent turn.

Conclusion

For the Republic of Moldova, EU integration is the prime national option and the main

foreign policy strategy. Although President Voronin once mentioned the year 2009 as the date

envisaged for his country's accession to the EU, Moldovan leaders are generally realistic

enough to reckon with a much later date. EU integration is not only viewed as a goal in itself

but as the country’s only road to modernization and democratization along the lines of the

European model. This is why Moldova's European Strategy, an internal document, is

structured in accordance with the 31 negotiation chapters upon which accession to the EU is

based. There is a growing awareness in Moldova that adopting the EU Acquis - even in the

absence of a clear integration perspective - will improve the country's legal framework, lower

the risks for foreign investors and facilitate trade with EU member states as well as with

Central and South East European countries. The country’s medium term strategy consists of

reaping the highest possible economic benefits from the European Neighbourhood Policy and

of gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market. Politically, Moldova will persist in

its endeavor to take a shortcut towards EU membership by seeking ever closer regional

integration with the South East European countries which were granted an (albeit) distant

integration perspective.

From the very beginning, the Moldovan government had been aware of the interests and goals

of the EU Neighbourhood Policy which contrasted with the country’s own expectations. The

EU is basically pursuing a policy of democratization and stabilization by exclusion, whereas

Moldova is interested in gaining a perspective of ultimate inclusion in the EU structures. For

the EU, Moldova is a testing ground of its CFSP in the new geopolitical environment of the

CIS space. In case of a failure of this policy, the main risk is a loss of credibility. Moldova, by

engaging in a course of rapprochement with the EU, incurs considerable security risks and

economic losses as demonstrated by the recent price hikes in Russian gas deliveries to

Moldova and the closing of the Russian wine market to Moldovan exports. From the EU’s

point of view, the risks emerging from Moldova can be minimized primarily by addressing

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the country's imperfect transition and by assisting it in the process of democratization and in

its legal and market reforms. Moldova, which lacks control over parts of its territory and

borders as a result of the secessionist conflict, tends to overstate the impact of the

Transnistrian conflict as an impediment to reforms. As a result, the EU’s and Moldova's views

tend to differ with regard to the sequence of measures to be taken under the Action Plan:

Whereas the EU insists on faster steps towards Europeanization and political/ economic

reform, Moldova presses first for stabilization to support sustainable reforms.

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II. Book Review

Franz-Josef Meiers (2006): Zu neuen Ufern? Die deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik in einer Welt des Wandels 1990-2000, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh

Reviewed by Marco Overhaus

Today there is no lack of studies (theoretically informed or otherwise) on German foreign

policy. Yet, there have been few (if any) studies to date which systematically cover the most

important aspects of German security and defense policy since re-unification. In this context,

the book of Franz-Josef Meiers, which was written as a professorial dissertation, fills an

important gap in the literature.

The author, who has written extensively on the topic since the early 1990s, offers an

analytical, empirically-rich overview of four interrelated issue areas, each of which is

dedicated a chapter of it’s own: Germany’s role in the construction of a Common European

Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance in

the 1990s, the country’s increasing commitments in multinational crisis management

operations (from the initial out-of-area debates to the Kosovo intervention 1998/1999) and

finally the efforts to reform the German armed forces.

The empirical chapters are introduced by and embedded in a theoretically informed

framework of analysis and complemented by an historical contextualization which briefly

sketches the most important internal and external developments which shaped German

security and defense policy during the Cold War. On this basis, the study’s stated purpose is

to identify the factors which determined the behavior of united Germany in the area of

security and defense policy and to induce more general patterns and statements from this.

Specifically, Meiers raises research questions related to the following three dimensions: a.)

Continuity versus change of German security and defense policy, b.) the degree of its external

versus internal (societal) determination and c.) the assessment of the German leadership role

(between the willingness to lead and the “reflex” to avoid leadership).

The author considers four major theoretical approaches of international relations and foreign

policy analysis in order to structure and summarize the existing literature on German foreign

policy post re-unification and to derive testable hypotheses from each of them: defensive

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realism, rational institutionalism, democratic liberalism and societal constructivism. While the

study’s own assertion seems to be more ambitious in terms of a theoretically guided analysis

and even theory testing, it already becomes clear at this point, however, that the emphasis is

in fact on empirical analysis. The discussion of the theoretical approaches is kept rather lean

and mainly oriented towards selected authors in the analysis of German foreign policy. Meiers

dispenses with a more thorough discussion of the theoretical approaches and thus basically

ignores potential overlaps and complementarities among them. This is true, for instance, with

respect to defensive realism (Grieco’s voice opportunity hypothesis) and rational

institutionalism which have considerable overlap when a country’s external “security

pressure” (or external threat perception) is low as has been the case for Germany throughout

the 1990s. The same holds true for more recent efforts of building bridges across theoretical

paradigms (rationalism versus constructivism).

Empirically, the author draws three major conclusions which are related to his research

questions. Firstly, he holds that continuity rather than change was the dominant characteristic

of German security and defense policy between 1990 and 2000 while those changes which

took place were mainly driven by outside factors. This was the case both for Germany’s

increasing contributions to multinational crisis management operations and for the (rather

modest) efforts to adapt the structure of Germany’s armed forces to the changing external

exigencies. Secondly, Meiers concludes that – in contrast to the Cold War era – German

security and defense policy was no longer primarily determined by outside factors and

expectations but increasingly by internal, societal constraints. According to the author, this is

reflected in situations when external and internal demands contradicted each other. More

often than in previous times, the latter trumped the former as is epitomized in the area of

Bundeswehr reform where domestic values and norms have so far prevented its

transformation into a professional intervention army despite expectations by Germany’s

partners (most notably France and Great Britain) to do so. Finally, Meiers identifies a

distinctly German pattern of assuming or avoiding a leadership role. While Germany was

willing to take the lead (often together with France or the United States) in non-military

dimensions of security policy – especially the political-institutional aspects of the CESDP and

NATO – it was quite reluctant to do so in areas of purely military functions.

Meiers uses the hypotheses deduced from the four theoretical approaches to account for this

behavioral pattern and identifies a “division of labor” between them. While defensive realism

turns out to be of little explanatory value across the issue areas, rational institutionalism and

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democratic liberalism seem well suited to account for the German leadership role in non-

military aspects. By contrast, social constructivism explains accurately why German decision-

makers were so reluctant to assume a leadership role when it comes to purely military

dimensions of security and defense policy but has problems to account for German leadership

in the non-military areas. Against this background, the author concludes that German security

and defense policy can only be fully explained by combining the relevant theoretical

approaches. In this reviewer’s opinion, it would have further strengthened the analytical

dimension of the book had Meiers also offered potential avenues to integrate the theoretical

approaches, which unfortunately he fails to do (e.g. as regards the combination of rationalist

and constructivist approaches to account for foreign policy change). At this point, the coarsely

meshed theoretical framework of the study also turns into an analytical desideratum.

In sum, the book offers one of the most detailed and comprehensive accounts of German

security and defense policy published to date, covering the principal institutional frameworks

(EU and NATO), German military deployments and the reform of the Bundeswehr from 1990

to 2000. With his book’s empirical richness, Meiers is able to identify long-term behavioral

patterns of German policy in security affairs and the driving internal and external factors that

lie behind them. Unlike many other contributions, the book goes beyond rather crude

statements on Germany’s reticence in areas with military implications and draws a

differentiated picture of German leadership or non-leadership on specific aspects of the issue

at hand. In doing so, the book offers a valuable baseline and a more profound historical

understanding to analyze German security and defense policy well into the new security era

after September 11, 2001.

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III. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Contributions

This section contains relevant documents which our authors refer to in their respective

contributions. The indicated internet sources (URLs) were checked on July 26, 2006. We do

not claim to give a full compilation of all relevant sources on the issue at hand.

1. Official Resources and Documents

Auswärtiges Amt (2003): Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert. Beiträge für eine neue Weltordnung. Gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Studien. Juni 2001 – Mai 2003. Berlin/ Warsaw. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Minsk (2004): 10 Jahre Deutsch-Belarussische Beziehungen. Eine Bilanz. Berlin/ Minsk. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Minsk (2006): Pressemitteilung Nr. 4: Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier trafen den einheitlichen Kandidaten belarussischer Oppositionspartien Alexander Milinkevitsch in Berlin. Minsk, February 3, 2006. http://www.minsk.diplo.de/de/Besuch_20Milinkewitsch_20BK,property=Daten.pdf CDU, CSU and SPD (2005): Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. November 11, 2005. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Koalitionsvertrag/koalitionsvertrag.html Chirac, Jacques (2005): Speech by Mr Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, on the occasion of the Euro-Mediterranean Summit. Barcelona, November 28, 2005. http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2005/speech_by_mr_jacques_chirac_president_of_the_french_republic_on_the_occasion_of_the_euro-mediterranean_summit-barcelona.32226.html Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2003): Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Speech delivered in Lublin, UMCS. Lublin, March 24, 2003. http://www.msz.gov.pl/24,marca,2003r.,-,Polska,w,Unii,Europejskiej,wystapienie,Ministra,SZ,Wlodzimierza,Cimoszewicza,-,Lublin,,UMCS.,1320.html Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2003): The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View, Speech at the Conference “The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”. Warsaw, February 20, 2003. http://www.msz.gov.pl/20,lutego,2003r.,-,The,Eastern,Dimension,of,the,European,Union.,The,Polish,View.,Speech,by,Wlodzimierz,Cimoszewicz,,Polish,Minister,of,Foreign,Affairs,,at,the,Conference,The,EU,Enlargement,and,Neighbourhood,Policy,,Warsaw,,20,February,2003,1305.html Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2004): Europe enlarged but open. Statement at the OECD Council. Paris, April 22, 2004.

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http://www.mfa.gov.pl/April,22,,2004,-,„Europe,enlarged,but,open”,Statement,by,Wlodzimierz,Cimoszewicz,Minister,of,Foreign,Affairs,of,the,Republic,of,Poland,at,the,OECD,Council,,Paris,2063.html Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (2004): Polska w zamęcie świata. In: Gazeta Wyborcza, June 12-13, 2004. http://www.msz.gov.pl/12,czerwca,2004,r.,-,Polska,w,zamecie,swiata,-,artykul,Ministra,W.,Cimoszewicza,w,Gazecie,Wyborczej,1450.html Commission of the European Communities (2003): Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. Βrussels, March 11, 2003. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf Commission of the European Communities (2004): Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper. Brussels, May 12, 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf Commission of the European Communities (2004): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. Brussels, September 29, 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com04_628_en.pdf Commission of the European Communities (2005): Commission to support independent broadcasting in Belarus. IP/05/1063. Brussels, August 24, 2005. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1063&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en Commission of the European Communities (2005): Communication to the Commission. Implementing and promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels, November 22, 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/sec_2005_1521_en.pdf Council of the European Union (2005): EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council Eighth Meeting. Brussels, 21 February, 2005. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/83804.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2000): Antrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP: Wahlen in Belarus. Drucksache 14/4252. Berlin, October 10, 2000. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/042/1404252.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2003): Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Irmgard Karwatzki, Hermann Gröhe, Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU. Drucksache 15/2069. Berlin, November 24, 2003. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/020/1502069.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Antrag der Fraktionen der SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP: Den Weg zur Einheit und Demokratisierung in der Republik Moldau unterstützen. Drucksache 15/3052. Berlin, May 5, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/030/1503052.pdf

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Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Antrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen und der FDP: Fälschungen der ukrainischen Präsidentschaftswahlen. Drucksache 15/4265. Berlin, November 24, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/042/1504265.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU. Berlin, September 2, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/036/1503670.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Irmgard Karwatzki, Hermann Gröhe, Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU: Menschenrechte in der Republik Belarus. Drucksache 15/2638. Berlin, March 5, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/026/1502638.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Plenarprotokoll 15/129. Zusatztagesordnungspunkt 16: Belarus vor den Parlamentswahlen und dem Referendum. Berlin, September 29, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/15/15129.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Plenarprotokoll 15/144. Zusatztagesordnungspunkt 1: Die Demokratie in der Ukraine festigen. Berlin, December 1, 2004. http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/15/15144.pdf Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Ukraine zu freien and fairen Wahlen unter internationaler Beobachtung drängen. Berlin, October 21, 2004. http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/hib/2004/2004_252/03.html Deutscher Bundestag (2006): Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Belarus vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2006. Drucksache 16/816. Berlin, March 7, 2006. http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/008/1600816.pdf European Parliament (2005): Draft Report on the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004/2166(INI)). April 14, 2005. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pr/562/562256/562256en.pdf Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (1972): Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. Bonn, December 21, 1972. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/print_document.cfm?document_id=172 General Affairs and External Relations Council (2002): New Neighbours Initiative. Brussels, November 18, 2002. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st14/14078en2.pdf Geremek, Bronisław (1998): Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Geremek on Opening of Poland's Negotiations on Membership in the European Union. Brussels, March 31, 1998. http://www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1998/1/2.html Kuchma, Leonid (2002): Statement by the President Leonid Kuchma during the plenary session of the II European Economic Forum. Salzburg, September 16, 2002.

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Meller, Stefan (2006) Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2006. Presented at the session of the Sejm. Warsaw, February 15, 2006. http://www.msz.gov.pl/Policy,2155.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland (2003): Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Non-paper,with,Polish,proposals,concerning,policy,towards,the,new,Eastern,neighbours,after,EU,enlargement,2041.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2005): EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005 – 2007. http://www.mfa.gov.ua/data/upload/publication/mfa/en/2820/planeng.doc Olechowski, Andrzej (1994): Presentation of Polish Foreign Policy in 1994. Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Olechowski in Sejm. Warsaw, May 12, 1994. http://www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1994/2/5.html Prodi, Romano (2002): A Wider Europe – A proximity Policy as the key to stability. Speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Brussels, December 5-6, 2002. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm Rotfeld, Adam D (2005): Eine bittere Lektion - Außenminister Adam Rotfeld über das Engagement seines Landes in der Ukraine, die EU-Politik gegenüber Osteuropa und das Verhältnis zu den USA. In: Der Spiegel 9/2005. http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Eine,bittere,Lektion,-,Außenminister,Adam,Rotfeld,über,das,Engagement,seines,Landes,in,der,Ukraine,,die,EU-Politik,gegenüber,Osteuropa,und,das,Verhältnis,zu,den,USA,-,der,Spiegel,9,2005,2372.html Rotfeld, Adam D. (2005): Wschodnia polityka Unii Europejskiej: wkład Polsk. In: Wągrowska, Maria (Ed.): Unia Europejska i Europa Południowo-Wschodnia, Conference Proceedings. Warsaw. Steinmeier, Frank-Walter (2005): Speech at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Berlin, September 21, 2005. http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1428 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter (2006): Rede an der Mohyla-Akademie. Kiew, February 28, 2006. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2006/060301-ReiseUkraine.html Truszczyński, Jan (2005): Shaping the EU's Eastern Dimension: the Polish View. Lecture delivered at the opening of the 15th edition of the College for New Europe (International Cultural Centre). Kraków, July 15, 2005. Verheugen, Guenter (2003): EU Enlargement and the Union’s Neighbourhood Policy. Speech delivered at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. Moscow, October 27, 2003. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/verheugen-russia-eu_enlargement_and_the_union_en.pdf

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2. Policy-Papers/ Analyses/ Media-Reports

Barcz, Jan (1992): Niemcy – Polska: Miedzy szansa a wyzwaniem. In: Kuzniar, Roman (Ed.): Krajobraz po transformacji. Srodowisko miedzynarodowe Polski w latach dziewiecdziesiatych. Warsaw. Centre for European Policy Studies (2005): CEPS Neighbourhood Watch, Issue 1. Brussels, February 2005. http://www.ceps.be/files/NW/NWatch1.pdf Cologne Institute for Economic Research (2005): Deutschland in Zahlen 2005. Cologne 2005. Cieszkowski, Anrzej (2004): Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec wschodnich sąsiadów - wkład Polsk. In: Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2004. Warsaw 2004. Edwards, Geoffrey (2006): The New Member States and EU Foreign Policy Making. EKEM Hellenic Center for European Studies, 3/2006. http://www.ekem.gr/pdf/Edwards%20rev.pdf Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006): Berlin entwickelt neue Nachbarschaftspolitik für die EU. July 3, 2006. http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~E2FDB15D2F5084C19B6D27D5C1C72DDA1~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html Gromadzki, Grzegorz (et al) (2005): Po rewolucji pomarańczowej: relacje EU-Ukraina do wiosny 2006 roku. Warsaw, May 2005. http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/orange_pl.pdf Kempe, Iris (2005): Od Európskej politiky susedstvu k novej Ostpolitik. Potenciálny vplyv nemeckej politiky. In: Medzinárodné Otázky, 4, 2005. Kempe, Iris/ Smith, Hanna (2006): A decade of Partnership and Cooperation in Russia-EU relations. Perceptions, Perspectives and Progress – Possibilities for the Next Decade. Helsinki, Munich. Kowal, Pawel (Ed.) (2002): The EU's “Eastern Dimension” - An Opportunity for or Idee Fixe of Poland’s Policy? Warsaw. http://www.ipp.md/files/Calendar/2003/Atelier7/4_Pawel%20Kowal_03_10_2004.pdf Kubicek, Paul (2005): The European Union and democratization in Ukraine. In: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 38, p. 269-292. Kupiecki, Robert/ Szczepanik, Krzysztof (1995): Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1918-1994. Warsaw. Lang, Kai-Olaf (2005): Berlin, Warszawa - wreszcie wspólna sprawa. In: Tygodnik Powszechny 3/2005. Lang, Kai-Olaf (2005): Polen und der Osten. SWP-Aktuell 22. Berlin, May 2005. http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1287

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Maksymiuk, Jan (2005): Belarus: The German Broadcaster makes Waves with Russian Language Plan. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty. August 21, 2005. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/411e7fba-6f1d-4f45-ab67-71a27905fbca.html Osica, Olaf/ Trzaskowski, Rafal (2005): Poland. CFSP Watch 2005. http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2005/CFSP%20Watch%202005%20Poland.pdf Pięciak, Wojciech (2005): Najpierw Ukraina! In: Gazeta Wyborcza. Febrary 10, 2005. Schaeuble, Wolfgang (2005): Die europäische Integration voranbringen. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. January 27, 2005. http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~E65F84084F8954D3981F1AE2B28A26D76~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html Schmid, Fidelius/ Zepelin, Joachim (2006): Merkel plant neue Nachbarschaftspolitik. In: Financial Times Deutschland. June 15, 2006. Smith, Karen E. (2005): The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy. In: International Affairs 81(4), p. 757-773. Zagorski, Andrei (2005): Russia and Germany: Continuity and Changes. In: Russie.CEI.Visions, 6, IFRI, Paris, September 2005. http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/zagorski_anglais.pdf 3. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet

Botschaft der Republik Moldau in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland http://www.botschaft-moldau.de/ Botschaft der Republik Polen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland http://www.botschaft-polen.de/ Botschaft der Ukraine in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland http://www.botschaft-ukraine.de Deutsche Botschaft Chişinau http://www.chisinau.diplo.de/ Deutsche Botschaft Kiew http://www.kiew.diplo.de/ Deutsche Botschaft Minsk http://www.minsk.diplo.de/ Deutsche Botschaft Warschau http://ambasadaniemiec.pl/ European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/ Federal Foreign Office: European Neighbourhood Policy

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http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/Aussenpolitik/Regionalabkommen/Nachbarschaftspolitik.html European Humanities University, Vilnius. http://www.ehu-international.org/ Governmental Portal of Ukraine, Kiev http://www.kmu.gov.ua/ Minsk Forum VIII, Berlin http://minsk-forum.dbg-online.org/ Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX), Brussels http://taiex.cec.eu.int/ The Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw http://www.batory.org.pl/ 4. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy

Bartels, Henning (2006): Deutschlands Interessen zwischen USA und Russland. In: Europäische Sicherheit, 55(5). http://www.europaeische-sicherheit.de/Ausgaben/2006/2006_05/Kommentar/2006,05,komm,.html Baasner, Frank (2006): France-Allemagne: le tournant générationnel post-réconciliation. In: Revue des deux mondes, 2, p. 57-63. Bielawski, Martina (2006): Die Metamorphose deutscher Außenpolitik. In: Welt Trends, 14(50), p. 78-81. Brok, Elmar/ Sauer, Frank (2006): Europa rechnet sich! - Warum die EU für Deutschland unverzichtbar ist. In: KAS-Analysen und Argumente, 24. http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/analysen_und_argumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_7252_1.pdf Clement, Rolf (2006): Deutliche Akzente zur Sicherheitspolitik. In: Europäische Sicherheit, 55(3). http://www.europaeische-sicherheit.de/Ausgaben/2006/2006_03/02_Clement/2006,03,02.html Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (2006): Was soll die EU im Kongo? In: Internationale Politik, 61(6), p. 84-90. Elo, Kimmo (2006): Deutsch-russische "Strategische Partnerschaft": eine kurzsichtige Strategie oder Handeln im Interesse Europas? In: KAS-Zukunftsforum Politik, 71. http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/zukunftsforum_politik/7_dokument_dok_pdf_8056_1.pdf Franzke, Jochen (2006): Netzwerke für Demokratie statt Achsen mit Autokraten für einen Neuansatz deutscher Ostpolitik. In: Welt Trends, 13(49), p. 125-133.

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Fraude, Andreas (2006): Die Außenpolitik der DDR. Erfurt. Hacke, Christian (2006): Mehr Bismarck, weniger Habermas. In: Internationale Politik, 61(6), p.68-77. Hanifzadeh, Massoud (2006): Deutschlands Rolle in der UNO 1982-2005. Marburg. Hellmann Gunther (Ed.) (2006): Germany's EU Policy in Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanization by Default? Houndmills, Basingstoke. Herzinger, Richard (2006): Ein Dogma muss vom Tisch. In. Internationale Politik, 61(4), p. 66-75. Karp, Regina (2006): The new German foreign policy consensus. In: The Washington Quarterly 29(1), p. 61-82. Krech, Hans (2006): Deutsche Außenpolitik für die strategische Sicherung der Erdöl- und Erdgasreserven für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 2050. Berlin. Mackenstein, Hans (2006): Germany and East-Central Europe: Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of EU Enlargement. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, 11(2), p. 289-290. Mazur, Zbigniew (2006): Deutsche Ostpolitik und Polen. In: Welt Trends, 14(50), p. 107-109. Nabers, Dirk (2006): Die Reform des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinigten Nationen: Japan und Deutschland auf getrennten Wegen? In: Japan aktuell 13(1), p. 51-58. Niedhart, Gottfried (2006): Die Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik. München. Pajon, Christophe (2006): L'impact du politique sur la coopération militaire franco-allemande. In: Défense nationale, 62(2), p. 34-40. Rahr, Alexander (2006): Schröders Russlandpolitik ist richtig! In: Welt Trends, 14(50), p. 93-94. Reutter, Werner (2006): Who’s afraid of Angela Merkel? In: International Journal, 61(1). Singhofen, Sven C. (2006): Strategische Partnerschaft oder neue Konfrontation? Die Zukunft der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen. In: KAS-Arbeitspapiere, 159. http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/arbeitspapiere/7_dokument_dok_pdf_8532_1.pdf Thies, Jochen (2006): Die bleibenden außenpolitischen Verdienste von Rot-Grün. In: Die Neue Gesellschaft/ Frankfurter Hefte, 3/2006. Umbach, Frank (2006): Europas nächster Kalter Krieg: Die EU braucht endlich die GEEP; eine gemeinsame Politik zur Energiesicherheit. In: Internationale Politik, 62(2), p. 6-14. Weigl, Michael (Ed.) (2006): Folgenlose Nachbarschaft? Spuren der DDR-Aussenpolitik in den deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen. Münster.

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Wilhelm, Andreas (2006): Aussenpolitik. München. Velliadis, Hannibal (2006): Metaxas – Hitler. Griechisch-deutsche Beziehungen während der Metaxas-Diktatur 1936-1941. Berlin. Vogel, Bernhard (2006): Die Versöhnung zwischen Polen und Deutschland. In: KAS-Auslandsinformationen, 5/2006. http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/auslandsinformationen/7_dokument_dok_pdf_8538_1.pdf

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IV. About the Authors

Piotr Buras will hold a scholarship of the Volkswagen Foundation from October 2006 and associate with the Center for International Relations, Warsaw. Anneli Ute Gabanyi is a Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. Iris Kempe is a Senior Research Fellow and expert on Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus at the Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich. Maxime Lefebvre is Councellor at the French permanent mission to the EU. Marco Overhaus is Research Associate and Project Manager at the Chair for Foreign Policy and International Relations, University of Trier, Germany. Karolina Pomorska is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies at Loughborough Univeristy, United Kingdom. Iryna Solonenko is Director of the European Program at the International Renaissance Foundation (Soros Foundation) in Ukraine. Rutger Wissels is Director responsible for the European Neighbourhood Policy in the European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations.