“Why did a young man who was neither poor nor oppressed, who had received a decent education, a man who had never had trouble making friends; why would such a man turn into a holy warrior?””What we know of the 7/7 extremists: Second generation. Some have been well-educated, others less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some well integrated in the UK, others not. Most single but some family men with children.” “All we know is they killed in the name of Allah and his prophet. Quite why they did so is harder to explain”-Official account of London bombings, and Theo v Ghogh bnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqw

The EU Counter Terrorism Strategy

A failure to prevent a new generation of terrorists from arising

Capstone

June 17th 2009

Faryda Hussein

2

i

Contents Abstract ..............................................................................................................................................3

Prologue .............................................................................................................................................4

Introduction........................................................................................................................................5

Religion............................................................................................................................................. 10

Poor Integration, Political Participation and Underrepresentation .................................................... 12

Discrimination, Marginalization and Stigmatization ........................................................................... 14

Socio-Economic Background and Relative Deprivation ...................................................................... 15

Social Identification and Network Dynamics ...................................................................................... 17

Psychological Characteristics ............................................................................................................. 19

Personal Experiences ........................................................................................................................ 22

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 24

Epilogue ............................................................................................................................................ 26

References ........................................................................................................................................ 27

3

Abstract The following paper is an analysis of the European Union’s Counter Terrorism Strategy and in

particular the Counter Radicalization Strategy. It analyses the effectiveness of the EU in countering

the radicalization of Muslims in Europe based on the root causes of Islamic radicalization. The root

causes have been identified by extensive research of Muslims in Europe, mainly based on interviews

with non radicals, radicals and those affiliated with extremism and terrorism. Concrete examples are

taken from policies existing in the Netherlands. It is claimed that the EU is unsuccessful in preventing

a new generation of terrorists from arising since it fails to understand the target group. The measures

taken to prevent radicalization are therefore off target, ineffective and possibly even likely to foster

radicalization.

4

Prologue I was almost coming to an end of my studies. It took my quite some time to get into college (I blame

it on an identity crisis I had in high school), but now it was time for me to show what I had learned in

the past three years at UCM. However, I wanted to make more out of Capstone than just writing

another paper. First I decided to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then I decided to write a policy

for Obama on how to pursue the War on Terror, but after some friendly advice of people I consider

wise I decided to go for something less ambitious. All I knew is that I wanted to write about

terrorism. While brainstorming and ‘googling’ I came across a conference announcement at the

European Commission in Brussels: Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law. I sent an

email, inviting myself, and after making my title sound a little bit more important than ‘just married’ I

received a confirmation. So off I went. Two days later on my train ride back, while reading through all

the gathered material and looking at the guest list, I realized I had been sitting amongst quite some

important people. Mainly white, male, non-Muslim, but nevertheless important. Powerful. They had

all presented data, ideas, problems, strategies and findings related to Islamic terrorism and

radicalization. They had come together to tell each other how to deal with the highly potential new

generation of radicals and terrorists: young, Muslim, second generation, not feeling home in Europe,

not feeling home in country of parents. So… I was one of them. I then decided to analyze the

effectiveness of ‘their’ strategy and see how well they are able to deal with people like me. I started

thinking about why Muslims, like me, could turn radical. I realized I knew quite some of those

‘potential radicals’. But was I right when I claimed that it had nothing to do with religion? That unlike

what was asserted in Brussels, poverty had nothing to do with it? And how come none of these

important people mentioned anything about the pride of Muslims? If only they knew my dad, they

would understand that Muslims will never give up their dignity; that they are too prideful to admit

that their failure is their own fault. But even though I thought so much and believed to know so much

about this target group – after all, I am part of it – I decided to take the academic challenge and do

some research myself. I wanted to find out why this target group is so likely to radicalize and how to

most effectively tackle this. I also decided that if it turns out that I my assertions are correct, I am

going to meet those important powerful men again and tell them how to deal with people like me.

5

Introduction Since the September 11 attacks in the United States a new type of terrorism has become the

centre of attention. The media, academic research, policies and security services have been

introduced to terrorism with an Islamic background. Nearly eight years later Europe has suffered

from three events which turned the focus to its own territory. The Madrid and London bombings and

the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands made many wonder what Islamic

terrorism is, and more importantly, how to tackle this. The European Union, as a result of the attacks,

developed a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted by the European Council in December

2005. The main aims are to gain a better understanding of terrorism with an Islamic background and

to minimize another attack on European soil (EU, The European Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005).

The focus of the Strategy is on threats coming from abroad as well as threats coming from within its

own borders, also known as ‘home-grown terrorism’. The Strategy serves as a framework for

member states to develop their own strategies and requires cooperation on a national, European

and international level. The Strategy’s commitment reads: “To combat terrorism globally while

respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom,

security and justice” (EU, The European Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005). It is divided into four

pillars known as prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The first pillar deals with the prevention of

new recruits to terrorism; The second aims to improve the protection of the potential targets –

European citizens; the third pillar pursues and investigates existing networks and their members; and

the fourth aims to improve the capability to respond in case of a terrorist attack. The first pillar,

‘prevent’, is the most important one. The other three depend on the formulation and

implementation of the first. The prevent pillar deals with the prevention of terrorism by ensuring

that a next generation of terrorists will not be established. Hypothetically, if the prevent pillar

succeeds in its goals, terrorism will cease to exist which means that the other pillars are superfluous.

The prevent pillar mainly deals with eliminating the root causes of terrorism, which is directly

connected with radicalization. Though not every radical is a terrorist, every terrorist has gone

through a process of radicalization (TTSRL, 2008). Therefore, the need to identify the root causes and

preventing radicalization as well as recruitment are crucial in the EU’s combat of terrorism. The EU,

recognizing the importance of the prevent pillar, developed a separate strategy to achieve the goals

of this pillar: the European Union’s Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment. This

strategy outlines how the European Union and the individual Member States can combat

radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and remains part of the overall EU Counter-Terrorism

Strategy. The main target group, defined by the EU and supported by the member states, is the

6

Muslims living within the European Union since they form the potential home-grown terrorists. A

special group is the second generation of Muslim immigrants. They show the highest potential to

turn radical (EU, The EU strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2007;

BZK, Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011, 2007; Silber, 2007).The strategy has three

core objectives. The first objective deals with the practical steps an individual must take to become

involved in terrorism. The ease of becoming involved is being scrutinized. The result of globalization

such as the ease of transferring money, of travel and communication contribute to the access to

radical information and training. Disrupting such activities means that the behavior must be spotted.

This requires, for example, effective monitoring of the internet and intelligence gathering on travels

to conflict zones. The second objective targets extremist propaganda and aims to undermine the

view that there is a clash between the Islam and the West. It aims to do so by ensuring that

moderate voices are empowered by engaging Muslim organizations in the opposition against groups

like Al-Qaeda. The third objective is designed to react to conditions in society which may create an

environment for radicalism. The EU therefore aims to eliminate structural factors which support

radicalization, to target inequalities and discrimination, promote intercultural dialogue, work to

resolve conflict and promote good governance (EU, The EU

strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to

Terrorism, 2007; EU, The EU strategy for Combating

Radicalisation and Recruitment - Implementation Report, 2007).

The ‘prevent’ pillar and its counter-radicalization strategy deal

mainly with the disruption of already existing networks in order to prevent these networks of

drawing more people into terrorism. However, the initial and missing step requires preventing that

individuals obtain the desire to access radical information or stand open to be recruited. Though

radicalization and recruitment are closely related, terrorist networks only achieve the recruitment

when individuals are receptive to this and have thus already gone through a process of radicalization.

The underestimated focus within this pillar is thus the identification of the root causes. This is

however more easily said than done. Much research has been conducted on these phenomena and

results are in many cases not based on empirical findings. To assess the effectiveness of the EU

Strategy, the root causes identified by EU affiliated organizations as well as research conducted by

non EU affiliated academia will be used. The Counter Radicalization Strategy will be analyzed based

on the research findings and as such the effectiveness of the measures will be assessed. Concrete

examples will be given by using the Netherlands as a case. The reason why the Netherlands is used as

a case is because the European Counter-Terrorism Co-coordinator asked the Netherlands to take the

initiative of countering radicalization on a local level (BZK, Operationeel Actieplan Polarisatie en

Radicalisering, 2008). The Netherlands is further leading in the implementation of the Counter-

“The London bombers were mainly second generation British citizens” ii

7

Radicalization Strategy. The current threat level in the Netherlands according to the Dutch National

Coordinator for Counterterrorism is ‘substantial’. It states: “There is a real chance that the

Netherlands will face a terrorist attack”1. The latest Terrorist Threat Assessment describes the threat

as ‘substantial’, the second highest of the four possible levels (minimal, limited, substantial and

critical).2 The fact that a terrorist threat is considered to be substantial implies that an effective

strategy is required in order to minimize the threat. The Netherlands can therefore function as a

reliable case in this analysis. Where possible some suggestions will be provided. Research stemming

from the EU is derived from the Strategy papers, the Action Plan, the Implementation Plan, the

European Commission’s Expert Group on violent radicalization - which was established for the sake

of providing the EU with advice on this Strategy - and the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and

Xenophobia (EUMC). Other research used is predominantly based on empirical findings derived from

interviews with the target group and data on the demographic background of individuals affiliated

with radicalization and terrorism.

In order for the EU to be effective in combating radicalization of Muslims living in Europe, the

EU needs to understand the target group. Though the EU has made an attempt in understanding

Muslims and has defined several root causes of radicalization, the EU fails to fully comprehend the

Muslim identity. Too little research has been conducted by the EU and not enough effort has been

made to understand the process of radicalization Muslims go through. The result is that the EU is off

target. This was especially apparent during a conference at the European Commission in Brussels this

year. Several research institutes and important professionals were invited to present their results on

Muslim radicalization and terrorism. From the 95 invited guests, 3 came from a Muslim background,

of which one was a journalist and another a student. The guests had come together to explain how

and why Muslims in Europe turn radical (European Commission, 2009). In the following sections it

will become clear that the EU does not have a good enough understanding of the Muslim identity to

explain radicalization. Consequently, the Strategy is not effective enough and more importantly, the

Strategy is likely to generate the opposite effect. When the Counter Radicalization Strategy does not

achieve the goal to prevent another generation of terrorists from arising, the overall Counter

Terrorism Strategy will not achieve its goals either. The following analysis therefore claims that the

EU is ineffective in preventing a new generation of terrorists from emerging since it fails to

comprehend the target group. The findings which will be presented below show that the EU puts too

much focus on religion where Islam in itself plays only a minor role in the radicalization of Muslims in

1 Retrieved from http://english.nctb.nl/

2 Ibid

8

Europe; Poor integration is understood as a causal factor which is not incorrect yet the focus should

be the consequence of this, which is low participation in society. Pushing for integration like forcing

immigrants to learn the language is not effective if those immigrants are not stimulated to

participate in society; Though the EU recognizes that Muslims are underrepresented on a political

level, inadequate measures are taken to overcome this and/or ensure that Muslims can find a

democratic outlet for their dissatisfaction as well as regain their trust in the government; The socio-

economic background is not well understood. Poverty does not play an as big of a role as

conventional wisdom claims. Rather, relative deprivation and lack of hope for an improved situation

are causes to radicalize; The EU is also not doing enough to prevent discrimination, stigmatization

and marginalization; The role of social groups and networks are misunderstood; The EU overlooks

causes at an individual level like psychological characteristics, emotions and experiences. This leads

to miscommunication and not getting the message across effectively. It is important to note that no

factor can explain radicalization in itself. Only a combination of factors will lead a Muslim to

radicalize. Most factors outlined below are connected to each other. The EU should therefore ensure

that all factors are targeted to achieve the desired goals.

Before the research findings are presented and the analysis is made, it is important to

understand the discussed phenomena – radicalization – as well as its relation with the Islam. The

explanation of these phenomena is mainly based on a study by Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie.

They conducted extensive research on the radicalization process of Muslims in Amsterdam. This

study was initiated by the Dutch Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) and currently

serves as a basis for the Dutch counter radicalization policies. The findings are based on interviews

with mainstream Muslims in Amsterdam as well as the Hofstadgroep, which is the group affiliated

with the murderer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.

Radicalism is generally defined as ‘going to the root, fundamentally or drastically deep’

(Slootman, 2006). The AIVD , the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service of the government, defined

the concept as ‘The (actively) pursuing and/or supporting deeply fundamental changes in society,

which could become a danger for (the continuation of) democratic rule of law (goal), possibly

through the use of undemocratic methods (means), which could impair the functioning of the

democratic rule of law (effect)’ (Pressman, 2006). Slootman et al. use this definition in their study

and describe it in terms of legitimacy. They view radicalization as a process due to an increased loss

of legitimacy for democratic society. The final outcome of this process is extremism, which is

characterized by the violent appliance of principles to achieve the desired change. The process is

further defined by Slootman et al. as consisting of three phases. The first is called ‘crisis of

confidence’ which refers to the broken confidence which existed between a group and figures of

9

authority. A specific policy in the disadvantage of the group could be the reason for the broken

confidence. The result of this is the development of counter-culture and the formulation of criticism

in ideological terms. The second phase is titled ‘legitimacy of conflict’ during which the legitimacy of

the (democratic) system is subject to discussion. The formed counter-culture develops an alternative

system based on its own ideology. The frustration about the existing system is used to de-legitimize

the ideology behind it. The last phase is the ‘legitimacy crises’ during which the criticism of the

existing system is extended to society as a whole. The general population is dehumanized. The

opposition also develops a new morality which attributes a new role to them: combatants fighting

evil. The new movement is by the end of these three stadia isolated from the rest of society it

attempts to fight beholding its own reality of their environment (Slootman, 2006). This last phase is

the end of the radicalization process and the start of extremism, which involves the use of illegal

methods to realize the desired change (Gielen, 2009).

Islamic extremism is inspired by salafism, fundamentalism and Islamism (Slootman, 2006).

Salafism refers to orthodox Islam. Salafi followers attempt to live as piously as the prophet

Mohamed. They want to be perfect Muslims and want to return Islam to its initial roots.

Fundamentalism refers to absolutism, infallibility and dualism. Fundamentalists believe, with

certainty, that Islam is the only truth. They also create an absolute division between Muslims and

infidels, good and evil and tend toward apocalyptic ideas meaning that they believe their struggle

with the evil will resurrect the good. Islamism refers to a combination of fundamental Islam and a

fight against imperialism, colonialism and modernization. Islamists view Islam as the ideal foundation

for society and strive for an Islamic state with Islamic law. Islamic extremism is a combination of

these three strands and can be characterized by a set of convictions (BZK, 2004): Islam is under

attack; Political elites (whether Muslim or not) have contributed to the marginalization of Islam;

Religious leaders who ignore the situation of Islam are committing treason; Islam must return to its

pure roots – a literal interpretation of Islam is required; Islam is superior to any other religion or law

and should be foundation for new state system; True believers must actively bring about the desired

change (Slootman, 2006). Where Islamic radicalization is actually not so religious, Islamic extremism

is. These two terms should not be confused when trying to understand the role of Islam.

In the sections to follow the root causes of radicalization will be discussed. The extent to which

the EU understands the root cause will be presented as well as the lack thereof. Based on those

findings an analysis of the EU and Dutch measures will be made.

10

Religion Islamic radicalism has just been explained and the distinction has been made with

extremism. The latter is clearly more violent but the focus of the strategy is to ensure that it does not

get that far. The exact role and position of Islam in itself should therefore be well understood in the

radicalization process in order to tackle the problem.

The EU acknowledges that Islamic Fundamentalism is only represented by a small part of

Muslims worldwide (EU, The European Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005). It is mainly described as

an ideology rather than a religion. The EU, however, does not state whether this orthodox religious

interpretation is considered to be one of the many interpretations of Islam, whether it is merely a

political ideology or whether it is not a cause but used as a justification for a different goal. It does

recognize the importance of politics in combination with religion and emphasizes that not all

religious Muslims are interested in becoming involved in politics (Alonso, 2008). The EU does not

mention where it believes the religious aspect to come into play in the process of radicalization. For

example, whether religion drives people to become radical, whether religion turns radicals to

terrorists or whether religion justifies terrorism, is not clearly identified by the EU. Marc Sageman, a

psychologist, independent researcher on terrorism and writer of

“Leaderless Jihad” studied the background of 172 individuals

affiliated with Islamic terrorism. According to Sageman, the

amount of religiosity varies per generation. He distinguishes

three generations, which he calls waves of terrorism. The first comprises those who provided the

leadership and foundation of Al Qaeda. Two-thirds had come from religious families. The second

wave consists of those who joined the Islamic-Socialist terrorist movements in the 1990s. They were

driven by the suffering of Muslims in other regions such as Chechnya and Bosnia and inspired by the

alleged heroes of the first wave. A third of this wave is considered to be religious or from religious

backgrounds. The third wave Sageman defines as the post-Iraqi invasion generation. Members of this

wave who live in the West are to most extent the second generation or children of Muslim

immigrants. This is also the main target group of the EU around whom the policies and strategies are

formed. Only a very small minority of this third wave is religious (Sageman, 2008). But as explained

earlier, religion plays a different role for different religious groups as well, not just generations. The

Salafis strive to live their lives as piously as possible aiming to be just like the prophet Mohamed.

They promote a return to pure Islam, the way it was in the time of the prophet. They are therefore

not necessarily radical. But the Salafis can be divided into apolitical, political and jihadis (Buijs, 2006).

The apolitical respect the democratic system and are not interested in politics or political change.

The political salfis strive for change but do so by using the means available to them in society as well

“All we know is they murdered in the name of

Allah and his prophet”

11

as evangelism. They desire an Islamization of society but are strong opponents of using coercive

measures to achieve this. The last group, jihadi salafis, are the only undemocratic and possibly

violent salafis. Jihadi’s are Muslim extremists who propagate violence against those they consider

enemies of Islam (M. Zannoni, 2007). They believe most Muslims to be corrupt and believe it to be

their duty to kill the unbelievers. Buijs et al. explain that the first two strands of Salafism can form a

barrier against the third one from emerging (Buijs, 2006). Where a common assumption is that

religion itself plays a large role in radicalism and terrorism, the findings of Slootman’s study show

that the very orthodox Muslims are the most unlikely to turn politically radical or pose a threat to

democratic society in Europe. However, politically radical Muslims (so with a Muslim background

rather than practicing Muslims) are likely to turn radical in their beliefs once they have already

radicalized politically. The Muslim identity may thus play a role in becoming politically radical yet

radicalization is mainly triggered due to other factors than religion. Islam is used by the politically

radicalized as a justification tool (Slootman, 2006). Hence, religion only comes into play for a larger

degree at a later stage. Religion is as such concluded to play a minor role as a causal factor but a

larger role as a catalyst. Understanding the role of religion in radicalization is important when policies

are formulated. Not only can a wrong understanding be ineffective, it can also result in the opposite

effect. The EU does not have an understanding of the role which religion plays. One of the measures

of the EU is to limit activities of key actors in places of worship. Putting the focus on mosques and

actors within the mosque without understanding exactly what role religion plays, can cause other

Muslims to feel discriminated against if those measures are to their disadvantage. Slootman et al.

give an example of such a misunderstanding. One police officer called another police officer to ask

for assistance since he saw a large group of Muslims in public. He stated that they looked radical,

since they were wearing traditional clothing and the men had beards. The police officer felt

threatened by this and wanted to take action, yet not alone. It was only when the second police

officer calmed him down stating that it was Ramadan, a holy fasting month for Muslims, and that the

Muslims had probably just come back from the mosque without any radical intentions, that the first

decided leave the group alone. The second police officer explained that during Ramadan some

Muslims turn more orthodox than during the rest of the year (Slootman, 2006). Had the first

policeman interfered in the Muslim group or if the second officer did not differentiate between

religious orthodoxy and radicalism they might have offended the group of Muslims. The effect of this

and how such an offense may turn Muslims radical will be explained in a different section. Important

is that the EU measure can only be effective if the EU understands the role of religion and does not

cause another factor to come into play, for example discrimination or injustice. Another measure the

EU aims to achieve with regard to religion is putting in place a legal framework to prevent incitement

and legitimization of hatred. This measure also requires a proper understanding of how religion plays

12

a role in legitimizing violence. The majority of the Muslims believe that violence is not legitimized by

Islam. Very few mosques would preach violence. Moreover, it should be made clear that when

Imams speak about a punishment, for instance, that homosexuals should receive 100 lashes, this

punishment is by the majority of Muslims understood to be carried out by God and not by them

(White, 2002). This should hence not be considered incitement to violence. A third measure related

to religion is to develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing issues and avoid the linking of Islam to

terrorism. This measure is very important in countering radicalization since through this measure a

better understanding of Islam and its link to radicalism and violence will be achieved (EU, The EU

strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2007). The non-emotive lexicon

can however only be developed correctly if the role of religion is properly understood. A ‘radical

Muslim beard’ is a term which a government official like a police officer in Amsterdam cannot use if

radicalism is to be countered effectively.

Poor Integration, Political Participation and Underrepresentation Poor integration and underrepresentation are described as the most prominent political

factors. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and

Xenophobia conducted interviews with Muslims living in the

European Union. Many respondents felt that they were not a

priority for policy makers and perceive there to be a lack of a

genuine attempt to get Muslims involved. Muslim communities are further poorly integrated in

Western societies which results in a lack of active participation (EUMC, 2006). There are several

issues at hand here which need to be specified. According to the EUMC the argument is that

participation in society is in correlation with radicalization (EUMC, 2006). The factors to which this

lack of participation can be attributed are said to be poor integration and underrepresentation.

Other factors may however also contribute to this lack of participation in society which then leads to

an increased likelihood of radicalization, such as Europe’s generous welfare system, at least, this is

what the New York Police Department argues based on a comparison between U.S. and European

radical Muslims: “Generous welfare systems coupled with immigration laws that do not encourage

the assimilation of these largely Muslim communities into European culture and society have

exacerbated the speed in which radicalization has spread within the European continent” (Silber,

2007). Political participation is, however, not reported in EU documents as a cause leading to

radicalism. The EU further does not mention the role of underrepresentation in radicalization. In

Slootman’s study political representation is mentioned as a possible basis for conflict. Based on the

interviews it is concluded that many Muslims would like to see a better representation of Islam in the

“Some apparently well integrated in the UK, others

not”

13

political spheres (Slootman, 2006). The importance of this factor is based on another important

aspect – trust in the government. This aspect is further dealt with in more detail in the following

sections. The same study also illustrates that Muslims have, on average, a high interest in politics but

show relatively low numbers of political participation such as voting behavior. Nevertheless, the

Muslims interviewed do express their interest in making their voices heard and convey that they feel

there is no outlet for them (Slootman, 2006). The EU aims to empower moderate voices, but not

necessarily at a government or policy level. In the Netherlands many local initiatives aim to increase

intercultural debate and bring people with different backgrounds closer together (Amsterdam,

Investeren in mensen en het stellen van grenzen, 2006). Such initiatives do create a more tolerant

society but does not change the dissatisfaction of Muslims when it comes to political issues.

Measures should therefore aim to contribute to the representation of Muslims at, for example, the

local and national levels. According to data, Muslims are still highly underrepresented in

governments at the local, national and EU level. Muslims blame this on the disinterest of the

government to give them a voice (Slootman, 2006; EUMC, 2006). An example of such a failure and

lack of desire to stand behind this EU measure is “the House of Islam” which was supposed to be

established in Amsterdam in 2007. The aim of this project, initiated by a Muslim association called

Marhaba, meaning ‘welcome’ in Arabic, was to create a house in which the culture and religion of

Islam would be presented. It would further serve as a platform for inter-cultural debate, the

empowerment of Muslim voices, entertainment, art and create an understanding between different

religious backgrounds in the Netherlands. Job Cohen, mayor of Amsterdam, believed this project to

assist in countering radicalization. Parliament opposed the financing of the project claiming that it

was too religious. The House never came into being (Wout, 2006). The consequence of this is broken

confidence between the Muslims and figures of authority and may likely lead to the first phase of

radicalization: ‘crisis of confidence’.

This is just an example. But based on the answers given by the Muslims interviewed, it can be

concluded that there is not much trust in the government (Slootman, 2006; Alonso, 2008). Combined

with the underrepresentation of Muslims in the political domain the question is: how can Muslims

show their discontent with politics without democratic tools available to them? Whether real or

perceived, Muslims feel that they are not given the chance to change their situation. Physically and

culturally integrating them in society does not necessarily increase their trust in the government or

give them hope for political change.

14

Discrimination, Marginalization and Stigmatization According to the EUMC report, Muslims often experience discrimination and marginalization

at various levels such as employment, housing and education. The report also shows that Muslims

are frequently subject to stigmatization and vulnerable to stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes,

especially in the media. Globalization and modernization are also said to play a role on the cultural

level. Cultures are intermingled and no longer ‘protected’ by borders. Due to a closer connection

between cultures, conflicts are more likely to arise (EUMC, 2006). The report prepared by the Expert

Group states that alienation caused by, for example, marginalization, can lead to an identity crisis of

the individual and further to frustration. When the individual would, for instance, experience

obstacles for entry into mainstream society this could turn the individual against this society (Alonso,

2008). The EU thus recognizes the danger of marginalization, stigmatization and discrimination.

Sageman confirms this. From the studied individuals 78% were not fully embedded in their host

society. The majority was born outside the country in which they radicalized and many others were

from a second generation of immigrants. They were hence cut off from their cultural roots and as

such marginalized (Sageman, 2008). Where marginalization does not have to be anyone’s fault but

simply a result of a situation – immigration – combined with actual or perceived discrimination,

Muslims may view themselves as purposely or unfairly

marginalized. Whoever is to blame for the marginalization of

Muslims, when individuals are excluded from the mainstream

social order, their vested interest in the mainstream society will, for a large degree, be lost (Silke,

2008). The result is an increased interest for their own community leading to a distinction between

the in-group and the out-group, also known as the ‘us-them paradigm’. The effect of group formation

and the ‘us-them’ paradigm is further discussed in the next section.

In Slootman’s study, more than half of the interviewed Muslims in Amsterdam, 53%, consider

the current political debate about Islam to be conducted too negatively. 51% of those are willing to

do something about this. The desire to change the debate is especially high amongst Muslims with a

Moroccan background, namely 61%. From the Muslims who are willing to do something about the

debate, 2% is willing to use violence in order to achieve that goal (Slootman, 2006).Although 2%

constitutes a very small number of possible violent individuals, a majority of the Muslims are not

satisfied with the position of Islam in the current political debate. This could lead to a disinterest in

mainstream society or, even worse, an aversion to the Dutch society as a result of perceived

discrimination. If the EU wants to be effective in ensuring that the 2% who are willing to use violence

does not increase, it needs to give the unsatisfied Muslims another opportunity to influence the

debate. The Netherlands does not provide this. In Slootman’s study, for example, one of the

“Some have been well-educated, others less so”

15

statements posed was “Amsterdam politics offers me enough opportunities to give my opinion on

policy and decisions”. The answer given the most was ‘disagree’ (Slootman, 2006). Two other

statements related to discrimination were: “In your opinion, how do you think the average inhabitant

of Amsterdam thinks about Moroccans?” The two most given answers were “Negative” and “Very

negative”; “Do you sometimes feel discriminated against due to your ethnic background?” Answers

were “Sometimes” and “Often”. These answers show that Muslims in the Netherlands do not feel

that they can influence the political debate and that they feel discriminated against. The EU needs to

ensure that these feelings are decreased in order for Muslims to keep participating in mainstream

society. But the measures taken in the Netherlands do not focus on giving moderate Muslims the

opportunity to stand up for themselves at the point they feel discriminated against (BZK,

Operationeel Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering, 2008).

Socio-Economic Background and Relative Deprivation According to the EUMC report Muslims have, on average, a higher unemployment rate and

are overrepresented in low-paying sectors of the economy. Moreover, their educational

achievements are below average. Migrants from Muslim countries, on average, also suffer from

poorer housing conditions and show a greater vulnerability and

insecurity in their housing conditions (EUMC, 2006). The

European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalization

recognizes the relationship between the social-economic background of Muslims in Europe and the

possibility of radicalization. The Expert Group claims that the background in itself does not

necessarily lead to radical ideas but that the ‘absence of prospects for a good future’ can result in a

greater likelihood to feel attracted to a radical ideology (Alonso, 2008).

Relative deprivation refers to the perceived deprivation of a person in comparison to others,

a previous condition, expectations, ideals or standards expressed by a leader (TTSRL, 2008). So, it is

the discrepancy between what people consider to be duly entitled to and what they actually have or

expect to obtain which leads to a perception of deprivation. To put this in perspective, the EUMC

report states that Muslims are economically and education wise in a worse off condition compared

to others. If this factual situation is perceived by those Muslims as a situation less than what they are

rightfully entitled to, we can speak of relative deprivation. When this is combined with a perceived

absence for a good future, in other words, if the Muslims in such a situation also believe there is no

prospect for an improved situation, the probability of finding radical ideas appealing increases

(EUMC, 2006). Data of terrorists show that most of the European radicals stem from lower social-

economic backgrounds. But although there is a correlation, no causal relationship has been found

“Some genuinely poor, others less so”

16

between poverty and terrorism. According to Sageman’s study, violent Islamic radicals stem from all

social-economic classes. Economic deprivation alone is therefore not considered a cause of

radicalization. Sageman does relate the social-economic background to another factor –

responsibility. He argues that those without a responsibility to a family or a job are more likely to

stand open for radicalization. However, this argument only applies to the second and third wave, as

defined by Sageman earlier. Most terrorist from the second wave had jobs but lower jobs compared

to their school peers. Most of them also married into the jihad: their wives were related to other

terrorists. The third wave and also the main target of the EU strategy, is largely unskilled and

unmarried (Sageman, 2008). The factor ‘lack of responsibility’ is therefore not a root cause in itself

but creates an environment for the individual in which he becomes more vulnerable to radical ideas.

Responsibility can also be explained in terms of the one to blame for the condition of these Muslims.

Muslims are most likely to be receptive to radical ideas when they believe that their disadvantaged

position can be blamed on society or the political system rather than when they believe the relative

deprivation to be their own responsibility (Buijs, 2006). This partly has to do with the aspect of honor

inherent in Islamic culture. A failure can be experienced as a loss of dignity. In order to ‘step away’

from the shame, an external entity is given responsibility (Silke, 2008; Fattah, 2009). More on honor

and dignity will be explained in a later section. Ferrero explains the

role of failure this in terms of radical organizations. His study of

radical organizations shows that they turn more radical or extreme

when they face failure. This could also be argued for in terms of an

individual and linked back to ‘an absence of prospects for a good future’ (Ferrero, 2005). This also

explains why the second generation of Muslims in Europe forms a greater threat than their parents.

The first generation considers itself a success. Compared to their peers in their country of origin they

are better off. They make more money, have bought houses in their own countries and are

considered lucky. The second generation does not compare themselves with peers in the country

from which their parents immigrated, but compare themselves with their peers in the Netherlands.

The socio-economic position of the second generation is worse compared to native Dutch of the

same age. This division increases the likelihood of Muslims to turn against the Dutch society,

especially when they lose hope in the system (Hamdy, 2009).

The difference between the first and second generation is therefore important to understand

when counter radicalization strategies are formed. Amsterdam, which is leading with regard to such

policies, still focuses too much on Muslims in general by, for example, trying to integrate the first

generation more into mainstream society (Amsterdam, Voortgangsrapportage Wij Amsterdammers,

2005). Mandatory language courses and better job opportunities for the first generation are created

“Most single but some family men with children”

17

to achieve better participation of Muslims. The measures are not wrong but off target and do not

need to be a priority in countering radicalization. It is the second generation which needs to be

included in society by creating job opportunities and better education. In Rotterdam language

trainings for the first generation are also part of the measures and much focus is put on the language

used in mosques (Rotterdam, 2005). This mainly affects the first generation. The second generation

does not attend mosques as frequently as the first (Silber, 2007).

The measures also focus too much on the integration of Muslims in mainstream society. No

measures focus on creating a better future for the next generation of Muslims. The national policy

does aim to create more jobs for the target group but the missing aspect is a better job (BZK,

Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011, 2007). Muslims are still overrepresented in lower

sectors of the economy. Increasing jobs in this sector does not take away relative deprivation. Apart

from that, the measures should aim at making the target group realize that the political system is not

the only source contributing to the disadvantaged position of these Muslims and should thus not be

given sole responsibility for their ‘failure’. It is important to ensure that the second phase of

radicalization is not reached: ‘legitimacy of conflict’. Their frustration should not be an excuse to de-

legitimize the democratic system.

Social Identification and Network Dynamics The EU recognizes the importance of social identification in terms of radicalization. However,

the Expert Group distinguishes between the role of social identification in religious and political

radicalization. It states that religious radicalization is ‘closely intertwined with identity dynamics’ and

thus individual, while political radicalization is ‘boosted by […] feelings of inequity’ and a result of

collective dynamics. Feeling connected to a camp which is (believed to be) left behind, the report

states, creates an environment prone to political radicalization (Alonso, 2008; TTSRL, 2008). Those

belonging to a group which is believed to be cast aside by society and/or left behind in the

advancement of mankind, will develop mutual distrust for those not belonging to their camp: in-

group versus out-group. This ‘us-them’ paradigm, the report claims, is prone to group-thinking and

group dynamics which favors the ‘subordination and individuality to a group identity’. A tool used in

such radical networks to achieve this is propaganda. This shows that the EU understands the role of

social identification and network dynamics yet only in terms of groups once they have already been

formed. It lacks an understanding of why individuals are so keen to be part of a group (Alonso, 2008).

A satisfactory social identity is crucial in understanding radicalization. The extent to which an

individual is affiliated with a group and accepted by that group plays a role in the decision to

“a man who had never trouble making friends”

18

radicalize or not (Coolsaet, 2008). When rejected by the group or perceiving a rejection, the

individual attempts to identify with something else. In case of young Muslims in Europe, they often

experience an identity crisis as they do not feel connected to their parents and the roots of their

parents, for example Morocco, yet at the same time feel rejected by the Dutch society. This hybrid

identity results in an identity crisis. In some cases a connection with the Ummah - meaning

‘community’ but is usually referred to as the Community Of Muslims around the globe - gives them a

satisfactory social identity. On the other hand, when the group connection is strong, for example the

connection between young Muslims in a European country, they will experience any threat as a

threat to their identity which is determined by the group. If the group is strongly connected due to its

shared identity as Muslims, any threat, real or perceived, will be experienced as a threat to its

Muslim identity. This implies that the new Muslim identity – different from the Muslim identity

‘given’ to them by their parents or country of origin – is reshaped as a result of the (perceived)

rejection by society. The need to belong to a group and need to seek for that lost Muslim identity is

initially not religious, neither political but the outcome of a ‘clash of culture’. Only when all those

individuals with a Muslim background formed a group, would the Muslim identity develop and would

the aforementioned group dynamics play part in the radicalization process (Coolsaet, 2008).

Networks influence individuals in various ways and their tendency to radicalize. Most

importantly, Bakker argues, is the similarity of networks which breeds connection, known as

homophily (Bakker, 2006). He argues that people are willing to invest in relationships with those who

share their opinions and beliefs. Adopting the attitudes and behavior of others in the network is an

example of this investment. Homophily networks tend to develop social norms which prescribe

accepted behavior and enforce conformity. Rewards and punishments are regulated by these social

norms and as a result individual group members are willing to make significant sacrifices on behalf of

the group. The result is that radical ideologies and behavior can easily develop and extend through

social mechanisms like homophily and social norms (Bakker, 2006). It is clear that groups and

networks have a strong influence on the behavior of individuals and the counter radicalization

measures should not deviate from disrupting radical networks. However, it should be realized that

blocking access to such groups does not change the desire of the individual to belong to that group.

One of the most prominent objectives of the EU Strategy is to prevent individuals from

turning to radical groups. In the first objective of the strategy several measures are laid down to

counter this such as monitoring groups, mosques and the internet. However, the measures are

aimed at stopping people from gaining access to the groups rather than aiming to make the

formation or joining of such groups less appealing. By ensuring that people do no travel to conflict

zones or monitoring radical prone environments such as mosques and prisons the desire to belong to

19

a group with a similar identity is not taken away. More importantly, the desire to seek for a group

and turn more inward is likely to increase. Though homophily groups which were formed as a result

of a (perceived) rejection by society are not necessarily violent, they are more prone to feelings of

distrust to the overall society and governments. Therefore, with a policy aiming to disrupt networks

and limiting the access to groups or key environments, the adverse result is triggered. The target

group will feel even more rejected by society and distrust in policy makers will increase. This became

apparent in Slootman’s study. Some Muslims had responded that they felt as though they were not

allowed to be Muslims anymore because they were banned from going to places they felt affiliated

with such as community centers or mosques (Slootman, 2006). The Netherlands also puts great focus

on already existing groups rather than the identity of individuals who are most likely to form or join a

radical group (Hirsch Ballin, 2008). On a national basis measures mainly include the monitoring of

internet, observation and registration of potential radical groups and the monitoring of mosques.

Some groups and mosques have been given restrictions based on assertions rather than proof and

are still being investigated (Hirsch Ballin, 2008). It is important that before such measures are taken,

a clear understanding is formed by the professionals dealing with this. The example of the two police

officers indicates that without a good understanding unnecessary measures may be taken. If that

happens, the affected group may perceive such an action as injustice or discrimination and be more

prone to radicalization. An example of this is the ‘prohibition to gather’, the gathering in larger

groups in streets, which is not allowed in some municipalities (CCV, 2008). This measure, which was

not initiated by the counter radicalization strategy, does affect radicalization. When these Muslim

groups are told to split up, it is often perceived as a threat to the identity of the group. In an

interview conducted with second generation Muslims with different ethnicities, they all confirmed

that when police officers told them to split up into smaller groups when walking in the streets they

perceived this as discrimination against their Muslim or foreign identity. Some even stated that this

turned them against the system or Dutch society as a whole (Nahimana Ulimwangu, Mahmoud,

Hussein, & Elkhoudari, 2009). This is an indicator of the third phase of radicalization. The formed

counter culture not only loses legitimacy in the democratic system but the frustration is extended to

society as a whole. At this point religion will start to play a larger role since any threat is perceived as

a threat against their Muslim identity. Policies against these groups will therefore simply increase

their distrust in the government as well as their aversion to mainstream society (Slootman, 2006).

Psychological Characteristics The EU focuses primarily on groups. Individual characteristics are not sufficiently taken into

account. In order to understand the target group it is an utmost priority to understand the identity of

20

the individuals who are part of this group. Though right extremists and Muslim extremist group show

similar causal factors (Gielen, 2009), the identity of the individuals should not be overlooked.

Moreover, it should be clearly understood which factors should be attributed to group behavior and

which to psychological characteristics.

Haidt and Graham describe five psychological foundations of morality that affect the way

someone forms a worldview. Their theory is formed around the culture war between the

conservative and liberal political parties in the United States but also forms as a basis for

understanding the culture war between Islam and the West. Their line of argument is that depending

on the psychological foundation of morality a worldview is formed. Based on this worldview an

individual identifies itself but consequently also identifies the other and forms an understanding of

justice. The five foundations are Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, In-group/Loyalty,

Authority/Respect and Purity/Sanctity. These foundations are culturally dependent but form the

worldview of an individual. For instance, the extent to which a culture values harm and care

influences individual virtues and vices such as kindness and aggression. And community based

societies will value fairness different from individual based societies (Haidt, 2006). Depending on the

culture, these foundations are prioritized in a different order by the individual. Haidt and Graham’s

main point and title of their work is that ‘conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not

recognize’. Conservatives, they argue, value the latter three foundations more than the first two.

Liberals, on the other hand, prioritize the first two. Since their worldview is based on the moral

foundations they prioritize, they view themselves and others in that light. The result is that the two

opposing groups are not on the same wave-length, so to say, and as a result communicate across

each other (Haidt, 2006). The same can be said for Muslims associating themselves with the culture

surrounding their religion, and the Western policy makers. The policy makers, who are from mainly

non-Muslim backgrounds, may decide on a policy which would be applicable to a group attributing

the same amount of value to these foundations as they would. Yet the relevant target group bases its

understanding of morality and justice on different foundations. The result is at best a

misunderstanding but at worst counter-effective as a policy may trigger other factors increasing the

likelihood of radicalization.

Based on the findings of Slootman’s study, Muslims in Amsterdam more often hold a

dichotomous worldview meaning that they divided the world in ‘us’ and ‘them’. Factors behind this

way of viewing the world remain uncertain but based on answers given by Muslims it should be

taken into account that the mindset of the target group is different from the non-Muslim policy

makers (Slootman, 2006).

21

The focus of the Strategy is primarily the environment rather than the individual (EU, The EU

strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2007). Although the

environment to some extent shapes the psychological characteristics of an individual, eliminating

factors in the environment is not sufficient to counter radicalization within the individual. The EU’s

focus on the groups and networks is not necessarily wrong yet psychological characteristics should

not be overlooked. Where the EU ascribes loyalty to the social environment, Haidt and Graham argue

that loyalty is a psychological characteristic (Haidt, 2006). Though loyalty may be more present in one

culture than another, an individual will maintain these characteristics when taken away from that

culture. An individual who gives more value to loyalty, authority and purity is more prone to join a

group and sacrifice for the group. It is thus not only the group which causes the individual to show

loyalty or respect for the authority of the group. The Strategy’s focus is therefore off target since it

does not adequately take into account individual characteristics. Moreover, one of the aims is to ‘get

our message across more effectively’ (EU, The EU strategy for Combating Radicalisation and

Recruitment to Terrorism, 2007). In order to achieve this, the EU needs to understand the mindset,

paradigm or worldview of their target group.

The counter-radicalization strategy of the Netherlands focuses on the training of

professionals who deal with radicalization. Those include teachers, police officers, youth workers and

staff from municipalities (VNG, 2006). Those professionals are taught what radicalization entails, how

to take notice of it and how to deal with it (NCTb, 2006). This is done through ‘manuals’ which are

distributed by the government to the municipalities and through master classes. During one of the

recently organized master classes, which attracted professionals from various municipalities, the

Intelligence Services, the National Police and teachers, the identity and root causes of Muslim

radicalization were explained. This was done by two non-Muslims. One speaker was a professor from

Leuven, Belgium, and the other a young Dutch-British lady who had written a book on Right Wing

and Muslim radicalization. Neither based their findings on interviews with Muslims (Master Class

Radicalisering, Identiteit, Beleid, 2009).The professionals present were taught that radicalization is an

individual’s search for identity. Islamic radicalism was further explained to be religious, rather than

political. Religion was stated to cause radicalization rather than a catalyst of already radical Muslims.

Indicators of radical behavior were said to be exclusion from mainstream society, aversion to those

not affiliated with Islam, the usage of the terms ‘halal’ (allowed) and ‘haram’(prohibited) and a

dominant radical religious theme in, for example, educational assignments. (Master Class

Radicalisering, Identiteit, Beleid, 2009). In manuals given to municipalities these same indicators are

mentioned. These manuals further point out ‘external features’ such as headscarves and beards and

‘group loyalty’ to be a sign of radicalization (VNG, 2006). From a non-Muslim perspective, these

22

indicators seem reasonable. During the master class the professionals present nodded, made notes

and discussed the indicators which they had observed in their fields. From a Muslim perspective

these indicators are off target and too simplistic. Any Muslim can be regarded a radical when these

indicators are the measurements.

Personal Experiences The EU recognizes the role of previous experiences to some extent. The Expert Group Report

mentions that unjust encounters with authority will lead to distrust of that authority. The focus lies

on trust and distrust rather than the experience. It argues that distrust in authority leads to a

breakdown of bonds with the mainstream society which results in alienation and frustration.

Radicalization is a likely consequence of this. Where the distrust in authority derives from is not

elaborated on in any of the reports or strategies and other than ‘encounters with authority’ no other

personal experiences are mentioned as a cause of radicalization (Alonso, 2008).

The extent to which humiliation plays a role in the process of radicalization is contested.

Marc Sageman argues that it does not play a role, at least not in the West (Sageman, 2008). Jessica

Stern argues that it does, especially in the Middle East, and that

having experienced humiliation may result in a desire to revenge

and restore the lost dignity (Stern, 2003). Here it is argued that

humiliation also plays a role in the West. This is based on two

things. The first is the argument that humiliation is part of the Islamic culture. Therefore, it does not

matter where the Muslim lives to feel humiliated, even if Western society is not a shame-based one.

This is confirmed by a government research on honor related violence in schools. Nearly 70% of the

cases were related to Islam (Kuppens, 2008). The second argument is that since Muslims in the West

still feel connected to Muslims around the globe, humiliation experienced by Muslims in, let’s say,

Palestine, will result in the same emotional feelings as if the humiliation was directly experienced.

Direct or indirect humiliation will thus still result in the same emotions and likely reactions.

K. Fattah and K.M. Fierke elaborate on the causes and results of humiliation in an Islamic

context and explain why humiliation provides such a powerful motivation for political violence. They

start off with two assumptions about emotion. First, they argue that emotion is a rational measure of

value which influences a reaction. This is based on Nussbaum’s argument that emotion involves an

evaluative judgment which involves the thought of an object (e.g. a person or an ideology), combined

with a thought of the object’s salience or importance to one’s own survival and flourishing. For

instance, the emotion felt when someone’s mother dies differs from the emotion felt when that

“In a few cases there is evidence of trauma in early

life”

23

same person’s mosque is closed down by the non-Islamic government. Though the emotion felt for

the mother may be stronger, the importance of the mosque in this person’s survival (of identity)

could be given more value. Moreover, the ‘responsibility factor’ comes into play gain. Where the

death of the mother cannot be blamed on anyone to take revenge on, the closure of the mosque

can. An emotional reaction to the closure of the mosque is therefore, according to Fattah and Fierke,

more likely to occur. The second assumption is that emotion is inherently social or relational since

emotions are given a meaning by the culture of that society. The meaning attributed to an emotion

therefore differs per culture. Fattah and Fierke define humiliation in terms of dignity and a prior

equilibrium. All humans possess dignity and any loss thereof is in relation to the previous state of

dignity experienced as a lowering in status. Both humiliation and betrayal involve a loss of dignity

compared to the equilibrium (Fattah, 2009). Though article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights states that all humans are equal in dignity (GA, 1948), Islam attributes a special value to

dignity and Arab culture even more so (Fattah, 2009). Karamah, dignity in Arabic, is an absolute and

natural right for every human being. In Arab culture dignity is a deep-seated and highly emotional

social concept as dignity determines the worthiness of one’s life. Dignity is often even seen as more

important than life. This is especially apparent in the many propaganda statements of Muslim

terrorists where the call Muslims around the globe to “defend the honor of the Ummah with their

lives” (Silke, 2008). Attempting to restore dignity when lost is thus considered to be a matter of life

and death. And if dignity cannot be restored by using legitimate tools, perhaps because they are not

present, the tendency to use violence evolves (Fattah, 2009) (Stern, 2003).

The EU Strategy aims to correct unfair and inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims,

discuss issues to avoid linking Islam to terrorism and promote good governance. These measures

ensure that emotions are not triggered which may lead to violent reactions by Muslims. None of

these measures, however, are formulated around the knowledge that emotional experience in

general and humiliation in particular are a root cause of radicalization (Alonso, 2008). Not knowing

that a personal experience such as humiliation affects the identity of the target group may lead to

unexpected consequences. In Slootman’s study one of the interviewees explained how a personal

and humiliating experience with a teacher lead him to stop going to school. He explained that many

teachers told lies about Islam and were making fun of God. He experienced this as an insult and did

not want to go to school anymore. He further claimed that “those people [the teachers making fun of

Islam] make you an extremist” (Slootman, 2006). The reason why this is so important to point out is

because the counter radicalization strategy of the Netherlands involves many professionals who are

in charge of countering radicalization by observing behavior and reporting radical behavior to

established information points at, for example, the municipality or the national government. When a

24

professional does not possess the needed information to observe radical behavior or even triggers

radical behavior unintentionally, no information or incorrect information is received at the

government. This leads to inaction or ineffective action.

Conclusion The focus of the prevent pillar is to prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging.

The counter radicalization strategy is developed to achieve this. However, the current strategy will

not be able to decrease the present ‘substantial threat’ in the Netherlands since it fails to understand

the causes behind radicalization and to a large extent also the importance of understanding them.

The objective and measures outlined in the Strategy may be able to make it more difficult to join a

radical or terrorist network but the Strategy fails to take away the desire to join such a network. The

Strategy should take a step back and first understand the people it is trying to deal with. The main

target group of the EU Counter Radicalization Strategy are the Muslims in Europe and in particular

the second generation. Radicalization is a process which strives for fundamental changes in society

by using undemocratic means. In order to counter the radicalization of this target group it is

important to know what changes in society they are looking for. This requires a good understanding

of this specific group. Not just as a group but also as individuals. Where the EU defines root causes

related to Muslims in Europe in general, the findings are too simplistic and off target. The EU does

not differentiate between Islam and the Muslim identity of second generation Muslims in Europe.

Islam is not the cause of radicalization but used as a justification to turn against Western society once

radical ideas have already emerged. The factors behind this resent against society are, however,

political, economic, social and an aspect of psychological characteristics inherent in Islamic culture.

Politically the EU and the Netherlands are not doing enough to integrate the Muslims, especially

politically. There is a lack of trust in the government and Muslims are politically underrepresented.

Most important is that Muslims currently feel that they cannot change their political situation, at

least not democratically. Where the Netherlands and especially Amsterdam, is working hard to

include young Muslims into mainstream society by organizing cultural events, leading to a better

understanding within society, these Muslims are not empowered to change their disadvantaged

situation. This leads to the first phase of radicalization: ‘crisis of confidence’. Muslims are also socio-

economically worse off than the average European and overrepresented in the lower paying sectors.

The EU should therefore not merely create more jobs but also increase their possibility to obtain a

higher status socio-economically in order to overcome relative deprivation. Further, discrimination,

stigmatization and marginalization needs to be tackled. The EUMC reports systematic discrimination

of Muslims in Europe. Important to realize is that the result of discrimination, stigmatization and

25

marginalization, is the victimization of Muslims and the second phase of radicalization: ‘legitimacy of

conflict’. Only when these problems are eliminated the Muslims can no longer blame their

disadvantaged position entirely on external factors, such as the system or society, but will need to

take a critical look at their own qualities. All these factors contribute to the desire of the young

Muslims to form a group and turn their backs to the rest of society. Disrupting those groups will only

make the connection between the Muslims stronger, as well as their distrust in the system and

dislike of mainstream society. Europe first generated the feeling that Muslims cannot be part of

mainstream society, as a result of the lack of integration, political underrepresentation, relative

deprivation, stigmatization and discrimination. But when the Muslims ‘accepted’ their fate, formed a

community together and excluded themselves from society, they are being labeled as radical and the

EU aims to dislocate the groups. The result is that those Muslims also feel that they cannot be

Muslim anymore. Even though their ‘being Muslim’ is not associated with Islam religiously but

associated with other individuals who also belong to the group because of their Muslim background.

The threat is thus perceived as a threat against their Muslim identity. This leads to the final phase of

radicalization: ‘legitimacy of crises’. The measures should therefore not focus on disrupting the

groups or prohibiting access to them, but the measures should aim at making mainstream society

more appealing for those groups. It should further be understood that Islamic culture still influences

the mindset of Muslims living in Europe. Their worldview and emotional triggers are not the same as

the non-Muslim policy makers. Particular measures may thus be perceived different from the

intention.

The EU does not have a good enough understanding of their target group in order to

effectively counter radicalization. In Brussels at the European Commission, non-Muslims agreed on

the identity of Muslims and during the master class in the Netherlands, the ones doing the explaining

did not base any of their work on empirical research. The EU implemented a strategy and is teaching

professionals how to deal with potential radicals without understanding the identity of these

individuals. The Muslims community is not involved enough in tackling this problem. The EU Counter

Radicalization Strategy is ineffective and more importantly, likely to generate the opposite effect if

the EU does not increase the understanding. The current strategy will not be able to prevent a new

generation of terrorists from arising. It is therefore concluded that the overall Counter Terrorism

Strategy fails.

26

Epilogue Now that I have done all the research I can state that a lot I already knew. Simply because I am a

young, Muslim, second generation citizen in Europe. Then why were there so few Muslims in

Brussels? Why are Muslims not involved enough to prevent a new generation of terrorists from

arising? Not only is the strategy ineffective, it is also inefficient. It took many of those important

people years to come up with their findings, which are not even all correct. Why not just ask the

potential radicals?

While writing this Capstone and doing research I gathered lots of information irrelevant for

the thesis but interesting nevertheless. I learned a few new words related to Islamic radicalism, such

as ‘salafi trousers’, which are some sort of baggy Capri’s, similar to what camel riders wear and

recently adopted by the female fashion world. However, Salafi Trousers are an external feature of

radicalization (according to the Dutch). Professionals can therefore use this as an indicator. Talking

about professionals, only they are trained to signal radical behavior and report this. There a special

phone numbers for reporting this so I decided to call and ask some questions. The only person in

charge, a Dutch person, was on vacation. There was no one else to take the call. So what if I wanted

to report a group of Muslims wearing Salafi Trousers?! But seriously, I do hope that the counter

radicalization strategies of the EU and the Netherlands will use more information than what they

base their measures on at the moment. The indicators used to spot radical behavior are so simplistic

that nearly every young Muslims fits the profile. Especially me. One of the indicators is ‘a frequent

presence of Islamic themes in educational assignments’. Now that my last assignment at UCM is also

related to Islam, I neatly fit the profile.

27

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Bjorgo, T. (2009).Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. In Types of violent activists and their diverse pathways of radicalization and disengagement. Norwegian Police University College

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i Figure: EU logo and Hofstadgroup logo ii Quotes in boxes are from the official account of the London bombings and murder of Theo van Gogh. See reference T. Bjorgo