1

Tokikake Ii

HIST 505

November 28, 2013

Historical Facts versus Memory: The Intellectual Battle of Enola Gay Exhibition

Roughly 20 years ago, American public questioned the

definition of an ideal museum. From the early 1990s, curators at

the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum planned the

exhibition of World War II in 1995 titled The Crossroads: the End of

World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. The curators

considered that the exhibition had two major objectives: first,

it sought to commemorate the 50th-year anniversary of the end of

the war; in second, it sought to challenge the grand narrative of

the decision of the atomic bombings. In order to pursue such

missions, the curators planned to display the Boeing B-29

Superfortress Bomber Enola Gay while presenting the atrocities of

the bombings through the images and descriptions of the damages

the bombs inflicted. Yet, they met fierce opposition from World

War II veterans and the Congress. From the veterans’ perspective,

the exhibition damaged their glory. The Congress criticized the

museum as disgrace to the national identity for defying the

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traditional recognition of the bombings. Under the criticism, the

curators were severely forced to alter the content of the

exhibition by leaving out all the provocative artifacts and

descriptions. This intellectual battle of the museum occurred as

the curators could not balance between the presentation of

historical facts and the collective memory of the Pacific War.

Memory and Public History:

For any historiography, there are two narratives: a

narrative based on factual information and a narrative based on

historical memories and myths which public associated with a

certain event. In the ordinary academic historiography,

historians and other scholars present their argument based on

analysis of primary sources. In the case of public history, the

sphere of interpreters of an historical event encompasses all

non-academic people. In fact, Franco defines the public history

as “history for the public, of the public, by the public, and

with the public.”1 As the public becomes an actor rather than a

receptor, the characteristics of the public often plays an active

1 Barbara Franco, “Public History and Memory: A Museum Perspective.” The Public Historian 19, no. 2 (Spring 1997), 65.

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role in the creation of public history. Historians often seek to

analyze a certain event to generate an interpretation that

encompasses a much broader context. As in the case of the atomic

bombings, scholars have used the bombings to examine its overall

impact on World War II.

Unlike such case, non-academic people tend to use their

memories and values to construct a historical interpretation, as

Launius argues that they “see history as personal and family

oriented, rather than as a national master narrative.”2 As the

memories and experiences have individual differences, public

history often contains numerous interpretations to a historical

event. Yakel explains that “memory is social and what is

remembered is a result of culture and tradition…Remembering… is

constructed through interaction and dialogue among

people.”3Through the interaction, various types of interpretation

based on individual experiences coagulate to form collective

memory. For example, most people have defined 9.11 Attack through2 Roger D. Launius, “American Memory, Culture Wars, and the Challenge of Presenting Science and Technology in a National Museum.” The Public Historian 29, no.1 (Winter 2007), 22.3 Elizabeth Yakel,“Museums, Management, Media, and Memory: Lessons from the Enola Gay Exhibition.” Libraries & Culture 35, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 296.

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their memory of their day of the incident. As they discuss the

tragedy, the collection of individual memory facilitates the

spread of shared ideas that the public have had towards the

event. In fact, the collective memory acts as a powerful force

that allows individuals and groups to identify and define

themselves within the context of an event.4 At the same time,

subjectivity shapes the public history as memories, which often

do not necessarily contain solid factual information, becomes the

main driving force for the synthesis of historical

interpretation.

Grand Narrative of the Atomic Bombings and the “Good War”:

Interpretation of the atomic bombings became and still is

the epitome of the large disparity between the historical facts

and collective memory. As soon as World War II ended, the notion

that the atomic bombings helped end the war quicker with fewer

casualties spread throughout the nation. The publication of the

Secretary of War, Henry Stimson’s article titled “The Decision to

Use the Atomic Bomb” in Harper’s Magazine in February 1947 set the

definitive case for the reason behind the bombings. First,

4 Launius, 22.

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Stimson claimed that the government had no alternatives but to

use atomic bombs. Second, he argued that revision of the

unconditional surrender clause was not in the US government’s

plan as the Japanese government denied the acceptance of the

Potsdam ultimatum.5 In hindsight, both of the arguments were

false. The US government actually did seek for alternative

measurements for the termination of the war, especially the

modification of the strict demand for the surrender. In fact,

Stimson and other government officials became the vocal advocates

for the change of the ultimatum. As Miscamble notes that Admiral

William Daniel Leahy and Secretary of War John J. McCloy sought

to advise President Truman to soften the demand to allow Japan to

retain its monarchy.6 Nonetheless, Stimson never included such

accounts in the article.

Most importantly, the Stimson report became the template for

the myth that the use of the bombs saved millions of lives.

Initially as one of the alternatives to the atomic bombing, the

5 Robert Jay Lifton, Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 107. 6 William D. Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Cambridge University, 2011), 52.

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US government planned Operation Downfall that included attacks on

Kyushu region of Japan, called Operation Olympic, from November

1, 1945, and Tokyo in the subsequent Operation Coronet from March

1, 1946. The Joint Chiefs, including General Marshall and Admiral

William D. Leahy, calculated the American casualty estimates in

the first month of the invasion to Kyushu region as about

31,000.7 Yet, Stimson wrote that if the American government had

executed the mainland invasion, “the major fighting would not end

until the latter part of 1946 [and] might be expected to cost

over a million casualties, in American forces alone.”8 This

estimate had no solid background as most officials even during

the war did not have a definite casualty rate. The government

officials continuously inflated the estimates and started to use

both the casualty and death estimates interchangeably. In fact,

the consultant of Stimson, W.B. Shockley estimated that Americans

would not only suffer 1.7 to 4 million casualties, but also

400,000 to 800,000 deaths.9 In the post-war period, President 7 J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of AtomicBombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina, 1997), 36.8 Lifton, 109.9 Robert P. Newman, Enola Gay and the Court of History (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 11.

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Truman cited Stimson’s estimates and gradually inflated them to

justify the government’s use of the atomic bombs: “a quarter of a

million American lives” (1948); “one-half million casualties”

(1949); “millions of lives” (1959); “125,000 American lives and

125,000 Japanese Youngsters” (1963).10 The repeated use of

wrongful estimates by the government officials established the

dominant mythical narrative of the atomic bombings.

At the same time, the cultural image of World War II in

America also reinforced the grand narrative of the bombings. In

1984, historian Studs Terkel coined the term “Good War” to define

the public image of the war. In the portrayal of “Good War,”

America fought the war under the united righteous cause to save

Western civilization and democracy.11 In reality, the image did

not accurately depict the truth of the war by ignoring the war’s

darker aspects such as the bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, and other

major Axis cities, as well as Japanese-American internments in

10 Walker, 103-104.11 Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1998), 250-251.Chizuko Tezuka, “An Analysis of the Japan-U.S. Perception Gap Regarding the Atomic Bombing from the Perspective of Silence and Silencing.” Ibunka Communication Kenkyu 14, (2002), 84.

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America. Yet, Boyer explains that such somber realities did not

“cast much of a shadow in either the public memory or the media’s

treatment of the war.”12 The romanticized version of World War II

perfectly matched with the justification of the atomic bombings.

In fact, the US government deliberately shaped the collective

memory of the “Good War” and the atomic bombs through the ex post

facto use of exaggerated casualty estimates and press

censorship.13 This collective memory continued to haunt American

public and thus became the main source of conflict when the Enola

Gay exhibition sought to challenge the myth, as the destruction

of the traditional narrative was unimaginable for both the

Americans who lived through the war and the their subsequent

generations.14

History of the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum

(NASM):

The Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum (NASM) opened

in 1976. Yet, the history of this particular museum went back as

far as right after the end of World War II. In 1946, the war

12 Boyer, 251.13 Yakel, 296.14 Ibid., 296.

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veterans led by the US Army Air Forces Commander Henry H. “Hap”

Arnold, and a Congressman Jennings Randolph demanded Congress to

establish the National Air Museum. The opening of the museum was

delayed due to the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, the fundamental

agenda of the museum remained the same. The veterans and Congress

sought to create the museum in order to honor American military

contribution to the society and thus to reinforce the collective

memory of World War II. Often, they applied the mission statement

of the Armed Forces Museum to the Smithsonian Institution:

The Smithsonian Institution shall commemorate and display the contributions made by the military forces of the Nation…The valor and sacrificial service of…the Armed Forces shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the present and future generations of America.15

From the veterans’ perspective, the artifacts at the museum did

not simply represent the human effort for technological

advancement, but also signified the cultural and technological

power of America. The NASM had long followed this agenda by

hosting exhibitions that would “instill pride in the unmistakable

triumph of American technology,” such as the Wright Flyer and the

15 Yakel, 281-282.

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Spirit of St. Louis.16 As the NASM generally focused only on the sheer

presentation of the heroism and awe associated with artifacts, it

did not offer detailed verbal explanation that would both enhance

and challenge the visitors’ historical understanding.17 For

example, Stanford historian of technology Joseph J. Corn

described that the artifacts at the NASM’s “Milestone of Flight”

gallery section became “veritable icons that the museum

unabashedly celebrated without raising any historical questions

about their significance.”18

Upon the appointment as a director of the NASM in 1987,

Martin Harwit, who at the time was an astrophysicist taught at

Cornell University, sought to change the tradition of the museum.

Around the moment, curators at Smithsonian Institutions in

general started to regard that the museums could reflect the

perspectives of various groups of people and also could help the

visitors construct a new idea of a nation.19 This trend resulted16 Edward T. Linenthal, “Anatomy of a Controversy,” from History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, ed. Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 22.17 Ibid., 25-26.18 Ibid., 22.19 Ibid., 22.

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from the outburst of revisionists and post-modernists movement

that challenged top-down views and grand narratives within

historical fields in general. In fact, social historians replaced

old curators at most museums and sought to present exhibitions

that downplayed the celebratory theme and emphasized historical

debates.20

Harwit was one of those scholars who believed in this new

notion. As compared to previous directors, he had a distinct

background that characterized his vision. Born in the former

Czechoslovakia, he experienced the both sides of World War II as

his family members became the victims of Nazi concentration camps

and he became an US Army officer who monitored nuclear testing in

the South Pacific after he earned US citizenship.21 Through his

bicultural identity, he sought to present objective analysis and

encouraged his colleagues to extend their historical research

rather than simply to exhibit artifacts.22 From before the Enola

Gay exhibition, Harwit actively sought to offer historical

interpretation to artifacts in order to depict larger social

20 Yakel, 282.21 Ibid., 284.22 Ibid., 284.

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theme. For example, he renovated the V2 rocket exhibition by

adding descriptions and photos that shed darker realities such as

civilian deaths caused by the rockets.23

Scripts of the Enola Gay Exhibition and the Oppositions:

From as early as 1991, the curators at NASM started research

for the Enola Gay Exhibition. Harwit had confidence in making the

exhibition as objective and informative as possible, as he

explained that it would “give a balanced account of the decision

to drop the bomb, the 509th Composite Group, the missions

themselves and the aftermath.”24 In order to fulfill the agenda,

Harwit and other curators seemingly had thorough planning of the

exhibition. First, both he and the chairman of NASM Aeronautics

Department, Thomas Crouch, visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan

in 1993 in order to obtain Japanese artifacts. Again, Harwit

expressed his objectivity as he told then Hiroshima mayor Takashi

Hiraoka that while he sought for artifacts that “told touching

human stories…of the atomic bomb explosion…the museum was not in

a position to make political statements, so that the advocacy of 23 Linenthal, 26.24 Thomas F. Gierlyn,“Balancing Acts: Science, Enola Gay and History Wars at the Smithsonian,” from The Politics of Display: Museums, Science, Culture, ed. Sharon Macdonald (London: Routedge, 1998), 201.

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the abolition of…nuclear weapons was not a message.”25 Second, he

also formed the exhibition’s advisory committee that included

both the voice of scholars and World War II veterans: for

scholars, Martin Sherwin, Edward T. Linenthal, and Barton

Bernstein and others who all are brilliant diplomatic historians;

for representing the veterans, Air Force historian Richard

Hallion, Air Force Magazine editor John T. Correll, and several

veterans of the 509th Composite Group.

The first 300-page script for the exhibition titled The

Crossroads: the End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War,

which was finished in January 1994, contained 5 parts: “A Fight

to the Finish” focused on end phase of World War II and the

background of the Pacific War; “The Decision to Drop the Bomb”

described the development of the bomb and its use; “Delivering

the Bomb” portrayed the execution of the bombing accompanied with

Enola Gay bomber; “Ground Zero” depicted the atrocities of the

bombed cities using artifacts from Japan; “The Legacy of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki” focused on the diplomatic impact of the

bombs from the Cold War period.

25 Linenthal, 33.

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The script contained ideas that challenged the grand

narrative “to encourage visitors to make a thoughtful and

balanced re-examination of the atomic bombings.”26 In the first

section, it made a bold claim on the Pacific War:

Japanese expansionism was marked by naked aggression and extreme brutality…[contained information on the Rape of Nanking, biological experiments on humans and other Japanesecruelties]…Japan attacked US bases at Pearl Harbor…Thus began a wider conflict marked by extreme bitterness. For most Americans, this war was fundamentally different than the one waged against Germany and Italy – it was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their unique culture against Western imperialism.27

Then in the second section, it questioned the legitimacy of the

decision of the bombings by presenting alternative ideas and

lower casualty rates: “Would the war have ended sooner if the

United States had guaranteed the Emperor’s position?” “How

important was the Soviet Factor…?” “Was the Invasion inevitable

if the atomic bomb had not been dropped?” “Was the decision to

drop the bomb justified?”28 In order to balance between the

honoring of the veterans and the presentation of challenging

26 Richard H. Kohn, “History at Risk: The Case of the Enola Gay,” from History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, 146.27 Judgment at the Smithsonian, ed. Philip Nobile (New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995), 3.28 Kohn, 151.

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interpretations, the third section of the script also introduced

the 509th Composite Group’s valor and even videotape recording

that featured the crew members from the two bombers.29 The fourth

section presented the horrific impacts of the bombs with pictures

of the victims and artifacts, such as a watch that stopped at

8:15AM as well as coins and bottles that fused from the heat

blast of the bomb.30

In contrast to the curators’ agreement to the script, the

veterans and military-related individuals vehemently opposed to

the script. In April 1994 issue of Air Force, John T. Correll first

criticized the “vengeance” portion of the script that it

deliberately emphasized the presentation of “women, children, and

mutilated objects from the Ground Zero” while demeaning Americans

who fought the war.31 Even though the beginning of the paragraph

that lead to the word “vengeance” did inform the visitors about

the Japanese brutal conducts, Correll disregarded it and left it

out when he published the quote. Then, even though the fourth 29 Mike Wallace, “The Battle of the Enola Gay,” from Hiroshima’s Shadow, ed. Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz (Stony Creek, CT: The Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998), 321-322.30 Linenthal, 31-32.31 Judgment at the Smithsonian, xxxi.

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section of the exhibition would have naturally contained the

depiction of the Japanese victims more in quality as it focused

on the impact of the bombs, Correll argued that the exhibition

contained victimhood consciousness and did not depict the

Japanese aggression graphically as a counterpart to the

bombings.32 Also, Air Force Association (AFA) saw the script as

offensive to the veterans. The institution’s executive director

retired General Monroe Hatch Jr. wrote Harwit than “museum treats

Japan and the United States as if their participation in the war

were morally equivalent…Japan…was the aggressor.”33 Then, the

veterans and critics sought to bring back the mythical casualty

estimates of the war. The script’s estimates based on the current

historiography – which was around 30,000 to 50,000 casualties –

but the veterans pushed for the “million casualties” theory.34

Congressional Opposition and Cancellation:

The accusation to the exhibition quickly grew to the point

in which the curators could not handle. It soon became the

political issue when the American Legion and Air Force

32 Wallace, 318.33 Judgment at the Smithsonian, xxx.34 Lifton, 282-283.

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Association sought for Congressional support on the opposition

movement. Congressmen, especially the Republicans which had

recently regained its popularity in 1994, lambasted the

exhibition. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich argued that

“Enola Gay was a fight…that [most Americans were] sick and tired

of being told by some cultural elite that they ought to be

ashamed of their country.”35 Moreover, numerous Congressmen made

a resolution that threatened to sanction the Smithsonian staffs

if the curators did not modify the script.

Eventually after having had more criticism from media, the

curators at NASM had to yield to the opposition forces. After

meetings with the members of the Tiger Team, which was a second

research group formed mostly by the veterans, the curators

rewrote the entire script to accommodate the atomic bomb

narrative that the veterans wanted. For example, it removed the

word “vengeance” and replaced it with pro-American description:

“it was a war to defeat a vicious aggressor, but also a war to

punish Japan for Pearl Harbor and for the brutal treatment of

Allied prisoners.”36 According to a historian and a Smithsonian 35 Kohn, 162.36 Linenthal, 44.

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curator Stanley Goldberg, the American Legion was able to reflect

its views on the casualty estimates by negotiating with Harwit as

use a figure of 229,000.37 Eventually, the curators, including

Martin Harwit and Smithsonian secretary Ira Michael Heyman, were

forced to resign and to scrap the exhibition, after the

Congressional petitioned for the resignation of Harwit and the

severe budget reduction of the institution.

Factors that Caused the Failure:

According to Yakel, museum in definition should seek to

“explore broad contexts of important events…to include

complexity; to stimulate viewer interest and evoke controversy;

to educate as well as commemorate; and to combine the best recent

scholarship.”38 This signifies that the museum intrinsically

contains the source of controversy. Yet, presentation of a

controversial matter is one of the essential and beneficial

objectives of a museum. Often, museums become the embodiment of

personal and collective memory as the audience visits them to

make cultural connection to artifacts. They have to present

artifacts in a way that can both reinforce and challenge the 37 Gierlyn, 207.38 Yakel, 286.

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memory and grand narratives. This means that exhibitions in

general can and should reassure and provoke the visitors at the

same time. By this understanding, the curators seemed to have

success on the Enola Gay exhibition script as it contained

information that both supported and questioned the traditional

interpretation of the atomic bombings.

Yet, the curators could not follow the definition of museum

standard. Mayr notes that “a museum will not deliberately offend

its audience [and it] must have the communication skills to

present controversial material inoffensively.”39 The curators in

fact did offend numerous people even though Harwit emphasized the

balance for the exhibition. Professor Preble Stolz analyzed that

NASM staffs did not fully realize the emotional significance of

the grand narrative.40 From the veterans’ perspective, the script

contained full of challenging materials that would undermine not

only their glory but also their collective memory and the value

of their lives. In fact, Hubert R. Dagley II, a director of the

American Legion, described that the veterans felt that the script

39 Otto Mayr,“The ‘Enola Gay’ Fiasco: History, Politics, and the Museum,” Technology and Culture 39, no. 3 (July 1998), 466.40 Linenthal, 39.

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“said their lives had been purchased through racism and

treachery, that their last fifty years were counterfeit.”41

Then, the curators opposed to the traditional minimal

approach on label descriptions of artifacts. Up until Harwit took

his position at NASM, the museum adopted this approach under the

notion that the artifacts would innately “speak” their value.

Instead, he and other curators sought to offer more elaborate

descriptions that allowed the visitors to understand different

views on the atomic bombings. By definition, as label

descriptions should be concise and deliver the most information

in the fewest words.42

Yet, the curators failed to follow the basics as they did

not make the most out of limited space for labels. Especially,

while they presented Japanese artifacts and barrage of questions

that challenged the grand narrative, some historians who

participated in the research committee argued that the script did

not offer enough and accurate information to support the

alternative interpretations. Historian Martin Sherwin concluded

that the exhibit lacked numerous significant documents – such as 41 Ibid., 39.42 Mayr, 465.

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Stimson’s diary that indicated the American diplomatic gain over

the Soviet Union upon the use of an atomic bomb – that offered

the mindset of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President Harry

Truman for the decision.43 Another historian, Mike Wallace,

claimed that the script gave no answers to the questions that the

curators originally posed: it discounted the diplomatic factor of

the bombings by saying that scholars rejected such argument;

while mentioning the fundamental difference of Americans between

World War II and the Pacific War, it never explained the racism

that both Americans and the Japanese had to each other.44

Not only these issues brought dissatisfaction over the

script, but also the NASM’s fundamental organizational problems

resulted in the failure of the exhibition. Right from the

beginning of the creation of the script, the participants in the

project consistently had indecisive opinion on the intent of the

exhibition. The Secretary of Smithsonian Robert McCormick Adams

had inconsistent views. He opposed to the script claiming that

the exhibition should commemorate the end of the war while he

43 Martin J. Sherwin, “Memory, Myth and History,” from Hiroshima’s Shadow, 348.44 Wallace, 320-321.

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told Thomas Crouch that the plan was in good shape.45 Crouch was

torn in between the two main objectives – the war commemoration

and the public education – as he wrote Harwit that

Do you want to do an exhibition intended to make veterans feel good, or do you want to have an exhibition that will lead our visitors to think about the consequences of the atomic bombing of Japan? I don’t think we can do both.46

Historians also had complex views on the purpose of the

exhibition. Martin Sherwin opposed the idea of commemoration as

he regarded both the exhibition and the 50th year anniversary of

the end of the war as the moment when Americans and the Japanese

to mourn to establish a better future relation.47 The lack of a

solid main purpose signifies that the research committee members

lost its focus thus resulted in the creation of a rather flawed

outline.

Lastly, the relations between the Smithsonian Institution

and its parenthood organization became one of the most

fundamental reasons behind the failure. In general, museums have

to give up some of their autonomy as they are mostly financially

dependent upon the higher authority such as nonprofit 45 Linenthal, 34.46 Judgment at the Smithsonian, xxviii.47 Sherwin, 347.

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organization, enterprise, affluent, and government.48 As in the

case of Smithsonian Institution, the Congress is the parent

organization as it funded 75% of the Institution in the 1990s.49

On top of this fact, the Air Force Association had significant

influence on the NASM for it initiated the establishment of the

museum. Financially, these conditions meant that the museum was

naturally susceptible to the pressure from the government to cut

the budget in order to express the opposition to the museum’s

conduct. Moreover, the fact that the NASM had governmental

organizations as the main contributor limited the extent on the

museum’s intellectual quest. In John Bodnar’s theory on public

history, presentation of national themes through government-

supported institutions and ceremonies creates the “official

memory.”50 The logic perfectly applies to the case of the Enola Gay

exhibition. Through the use of authority, the veterans and the

government pressured the museum to follow the grand narrative of

the bombings.

48 Mayr, 463.49 Shuji Inoya,“Smithsonian Genbakuten Ronsou o Kenshou Suru (Analyzing the Smithsonian Atomic Bomb Exhibit Controversy),” Kagaku to Shakai o Kangaeru Doyou Kouza Ronbunshu 1, (May 1997), 57.50 Launius, 21-22.

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The Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum became the

epicenter of controversy when the curators planned the Enola Gay

exhibition. Ever since World War II ended, the narrative that the

atomic bombs ended the war quicker and saved numerous lives

became dominant in American society. At the 50th year anniversary

from the end of the war, the curators sought to challenge this

idea by outlining the exhibition that seemingly contained more

accurate historical facts. Yet, they met harsh criticism as the

veterans and the government could not accept the interpretation

that would jeopardize their collective memory. While the

exhibition resulted in a failure both due to the adamant response

from the critics and the curators’ mishandling, the lesson of the

debacle passed on to the Smithsonian staffs of current generation

as they became “more professional and sophisticated about meeting

public and scholarly expectations.”51 Moreover in January 1997,

the Society for History in the Federal Government (SHFG), along

with numerous academic associations such as American Historical

Association (AHA) and Organization of American Historians (OAH),

51 Laura Hein, Akiko Takenaka, “Exhibiting World War II in Japan and the United States since 1995,” Pacific Historical Review 76, no. 1 (February 2007), 80-81.

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established an exhibit standard guideline in order to protect

historians and museum administrators’ academic rights upon the

exhibition planning.52 Thus, even though the original Enola Gay

exhibition was cancelled, the curators’ hope to bring challenging

ideas did succeed in the end.

52 Victoria A. Harden, “Museum Exhibit Standards: Do Historians Really Want Them?” The Public Historian 21, no. 3, The National Council on Public History: Reflections on a Twentieth Anniversary (Summer 1999), 93,106, 109.

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Inoya, Shuji. “Smithsonian Genbakuten Ronsou o Kenshou Suru (Analyzing the Smithsonian Atomic Bomb Exhibit Controversy).” Kagaku to Shakai o Kangaeru Doyou Kouza Ronbunshu 1,(May 1997): page 56-71.

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______. “History and the Culture Wars: The Case of the Smithsonian Institution’s Enola Gay Exhibition.” The Journal of American History 82, no.3 (December 1995): page 1036-1063.

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