Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy: Nuclear Energy in the Federal

Republic of Germany W O L F G A N G F A C H AND EDGAR GRANDE

IN THE 1980S, the world economy was in a state of turbulence. Tech- nological innovations and economic growth were among the most import- ant "disturbing" factors, which have challenged the established competitive positions of national economics and industries. The policies of research and development of all major industrial countries have clearly been adapted to these challenges. Disregarding some national differences in emphasis, policies of research and development have been made on at least four assumptions.

Substantive Rationality in Technological Policy

First, policy-makers assumed that some of the so-called "key" branches of technology, especially microelectronics, information and communica- tions technology, new materials and biotechnology, would attain a decisive role. According to this view, this "key" technology would bring about radical structural changes in all spheres of life. As a consequence of this "technological revolution", the prevailing "industrial societies" would be transformed into "information" or "communication societies". Hence, it was argued, secondly, that a leading position in information technology would be of fundamental importance for a country's future economic competitiveness. Dependence on foreign supplies, for example in microelectronics would, it was said, be fatal because it would place a country's industrial development in the hands of foreign competitors, thereby advancing their industrial or military interests. The future of the countries failing to keep up with the most advanced standards of information technology would be bleak, their "decline into the second class" of world society inevitable. Third, in the face of the threats, government was given a crucial role in promoting national industries using "high technology". Politicians and industrialists emphatically and quite often successfully argued that the high risks and sharply rising costs of research and development should not be undertaken by the companies alone, since the country's vital interests, its very survival would be at stake. Fourth, time for public action was said to be short. Given the existing and increasingly negative balances of trade in high technology products and the accelerating speed of research and development, steps

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 15

to establish and to maintain a leading competitive position had to be taken without delay.

Such an interpretation of the challenges confronting national tech- nological policies has serious consequences. Technological policy is conceived in a "substantively" rational framework; it is thought to be capable of envisaging optimal solutions, which cannot be violated without great harm. It leans towards "big science", incorporated in "megapro- jects". The proponents of substantive rationality have in the main only one problem, which is how to promote its effective realisation. They posit a particular objective as right; the only problem for the proponents of this type of technological policy is to find the most efficient and least costly means, This is where rationality comes in. This has been the rationale behind all the well-meant advice to strengthen the government's capacity and effectiveness in technological policy, by improving the rationality of its activities, by making more rational use of its powers and resources. It accepts the objective as given; it regards its chosen means as rational. The electorate enters into these considerations only as the object of persua- sion by the government.

In our view, substantive rationality in technological policy has serious flaws. Instead, we propose an alternative model of technological policy, relying on an "emergent rationality" of politics. We will argue from the case of nuclear energy policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. This affords the opportunity to examine the way in which substantive rationality in technological policy has worked out. The advantages of such an historical case study are obvious. Whereas the contemporary advo- cates of substantive rationality maintain the uniqueness of the present situation, a closer examination of what was thought to be the "future technology" in the 1960s and 1970s clearly reveals the general pattern of this mode of thought and its shortcomings.

Emergent Rationality: Policy versus Politics

In general, the tasks of government in technological policy are thought to be two. On the one side, government should promote the discovery, development and application of "new" kinds of technology, and it should expand their economic potential. It has also to protect this technology from public interference by fostering its social acceptance.

The first task implies that government has sufficient knowledge at its disposal to develop a technological policy, i.e., to formulate reasonable goals and to choose rationally among the resources available. The second task postulates the necessity of order; it assumes that any deviation from intentions once laid down, any delay or modification of course will make the policy less rational. In this perspective, disagreement is injurious. In short, substantive rationality in technological policy asserts that there is one right way to pursue, free of contradictions and inconsistencies. This idea of substantive rationality in technological policy seems to be unre- alistic in at least two regards.

16 Wolfgang Fach and Edgar Grande

First, it is by no means proven that government has the knowledge necessary for rational choice. The failure of essentially all large-scale technological projects which have received the largest public financial support is, according to critics of technological policy, not a mere accident, but the direct consequence of government's ignorance: "In the Federal Republic, as well as in other countries, it became apparent that the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for scientific and technological policy do not have a sixth sense which could eliminate the uncertainty about the chances of success of particular technological developments. Whatever they know, they obtain from the companies [to be subsidised]. TM

Second, the limited powers or capacities of government is another shortcoming of substantive rational policy. There is a remarkable agree- ment among almost all advocates of technological policy that the govern- ment's capacity to adhere steadfastly to the rules of substantive rationality is seriously limited. Economists have repeatedly complained about the "opportunism" of politicians who are responsive to the "prejudices of voters" and about the "administrative hurdles" established to reduce technological risks. Welt-meaning advocates of "grand strategies" them- selves complain of an alarming deficiency of political effectiveness and rationality. The policies of government are not, in fact, designed accord- ing to a "master plan"; they are the result of a patchwork. There is no doubt that substantive rationality is an ideal that does not correspond to reality. This is all the more true as technological policy has been an issue which stirs not only sober, well-informed criticism, but also passionate, even "fundamentalist" opposition.

When the government cannot act in accordance with the principles of substantive rationality, there is a tendency of critics to deny its activities any rationality whatsoever. This is the characteristic which underlies most of the current criticism of government. Such criticism ignores, however, that politics can lead to relatively rational results while pursuing a plurality of aims simultaneously, some of which may even be contradic- tory. The outcome of such pursuits fails to meet the standards of substantive rationality since they are unknown at the beginning and unintended by any single participant or bloc of participants. Yet, a policy which embraces compromises among conflicting ends and interests and which does not insist upon intentional, centralised action may also be said to be rational if, in retrospect, its solutions are considered to be "on the right track". Rationality in such activities is more common than substan- tive rationality. This approximation to rationality is the emergent product of processes which are uncontrolled and uncontrollable from a single centre. This is what we call "emergent rationality".

1 Donges, Jtirgen B., "M6glichkeiten und Grenzen staatlicher Technologiepolitik", in Streit, Manfred E. (ed.), Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen 6konomischer und politischer Rationalitiit (Wiesbaden: Gabler, 1988), p. 152.

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 17

The rationality of emergent solutions, of outcomes which are "the results of human action but not of human design", 2 is familiar to economists and theorists of science. Economists praise the virtues of the "spontaneous order" brought about by the "invisible hand" of unplanned economic transactions? Michael Polanyi conceived scientific progress as "spontaneous movements", consisting of "essentially unpredictable steps". 4 Some social scientists have observed the emergence of organisa- tional strategies even where no single strategy has been established by a central authority? Professor Charles Lindblom has spoken of the "intel- ligence" of "incrementalism" in liberal democracies? There are implicit in these observations some common elements which appear in the making of policies. These are process, plurality and openness.

Emergent rationality is the product of a process. In the course of this process, the individual or collective aims and interests of the participants in a widespread debate are generated, formulated and transformed. The final, composite result of these independent efforts may be said to be rational. A plurality of goals is an essential presupposition of this emergent rationality. The pursuit of this plurality of goals is not organised and guided by a common, substantive aim. In any large society, there is a plurality of goals independently pursued by the various participants. In a liberal democracy, rationality is to be found not only in parliaments, governments, administrations and courts but in the competition of political parties, interest groups, "citizens' action committees" and all other kinds of movements. These all participate in the process of forming objectives and selecting the means to pursue them. The complexity is further increased by the constant shifting of means and ends under the cover of constantly repeated formulas--such as "public interest". The access of economic considerations, scientific findings and social sen- sibilities to the process of decision-making gives rise to a state of "fluidity", which makes it all but impossible to discern between input and output in any meaningful way (as taken for granted by conventional measures of effectiveness). This "design" stands the test of rationality not by perfectly realising initially fixed aims, but by adapting itself to a permanently shifting environment.

Liberal democracy is undoubtedly a fundamental precondition for the emergent rationality in politics. Its "intelligence" does not ordinarily provide clear and unambiguous solutions in situations of conflicting values

2 Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), p. 122.

3 See Hayek, Friedrich A. yon, Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol. I: Rules and Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

4 Polanyi, Michael, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory", Minerva, I (Autumn 1962), pp. 62, 65.

5 Mintzberg, Henry and McHugh, Alexandra, "Strategy Formation in an Adhocracy', Administrative Science Quarterly, XXX (1985), pp. 160-197.

6 Lindblom, Charles E., The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965).

18 Wolfgang Fach and Edgar Grande

and imperfect knowledge. It can offer no more than a "regulative idea" or a general orientation. Nevertheless, this is the only way in which technological policy can be constituted. Nuclear energy, to take the most prominent example in recent history, is a clear case in point.

To be sure, nuclear energy is not the only "future technology" with which technological policy must deal. The history of technology policies in recent decades is also a history of "white elephants" which failed to conform with initial objectives2 They all share a common characteristic, namely the failure to attain what may be called the point of no regret. Usually, such conclusions--very much as in the outcome of voting-- balance different lines of reasoning coming from different sections of society. The question of technical safety has been pondered, commercial disappointments have been taken into account, aspects of social "compat- ibility" and political acceptability have played a part. The calculus is rather vague, but this need not blur its outcome. As for nuclear energy, Germany has indeed nothing to "regret", although it has been said to have gambled away its future many years ago by fostering "too much" anti-nuclear resentment.

Bearing in mind that "the analysis of the problems of nuclear power is a pathfinding undertaking", 8 we may begin with the case of nuclear energy. It has indeed been the "forerunner" case with the longest history, a history characterised by the failure of substantive rationality and the demonstration of the merits of "emergent rationality".

Emergent Rationality and Technological Policy: The Case of Nuclear Energy in West Germany

Even a superficial examination of the history of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 the "future technology" of the 1960s and 1970s, will reveal striking similarities to the present situation of informa- tion technology. Information technology seems to have just passed through the first stages of governmentally supported innovation.

Nuclear energy rose in the middle of the 1960s to an issue of the highest urgency for the federal government. Having taken the first steps into this technology about ten years earlier, the political leaders decided to enter the "take off" phase. This decision reveals the pecularities of substantive rationality and its inadequacy in the case of nuclear energy.

7 See Schnaars, Stephen P., Megamistakes: Forecasting and the Myth of Rapid Technologi- cal Change (New York: Free Press, 1989).

8 H~ifele, Wolf, "Hypotheticality and the New Challenges: The Pathfinder Role of Nuclear Energy", Minerva, XII (July 1974), p. 317.

9 See Radkau, Joachim, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Atomwirtschaft 1945-1975 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983); Keck, Otto, Policymaking in a Nuclear Program: The Case of the West German Fast Breeder Reactor (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1981); Fach, Wolfgang und Simonis, Georg, Die Sttirke des Staates im Atomkonflikt: Frankreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1987).

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 19

Progress, although conceived primarily in terms of economic develop- ment, was also strongly influenced by non-economic values or ends. Military considerations, among others, played an important role. Those who were in charge of modernising the economy were unable to separate themselves from the substantive rationalism of military thought. The prominent position accorded to breeder technology rested on this bias. Scientists, although for different purposes, reasoned in the same way. They thought of an ideal end and of a unilinear substantively rational way to attain it. Time and again, it was their forecasts and recommendations which prompted politicians to "take the next step". The optimism of scientists and of scientific technologists more than once replaced sober analysis or economic calculations. Problems were regarded as solved as soon as they were solved "in principle". The ideal was unrealistically conceived. It was thought of as multifarious but internally consistent. Atomic energy was generally praised as a cornucopia which would pour its blessing over the whole realm of the economy and beyond. From the huge steel trust to the smallest household, no one could afford or would be willing to do without it, not to mention those deserts, polar zones and other inhospitable regions which so far had been excluded from civilisa- tion and which now, by the use of nuclear energy, could be transformed for unambiguous human benefits.

The necessity of nuclear energy was overestimated. The time allowed for its realisation was brief and success seemed imminent. The idea that it was urgently necessary arose from the belief that international competi- tion did not permit technological "laziness". Later on, the "American challenge" seemed to loom on the horizon. It was also thought that the rapid increases in the rates of consumption of other sources of energy would result in a fatal "energy gap". Hence, the supply of nuclear energy had to be increased greatly and rapidly. Necessity was matched by possibility. For example, some experts said that in the 1960s, up to 80 per cent of electricity would be produced by nuclear power. Hence, anxiety and euphoria spiralled upwards together.

The immediate financial costs did not appear to be great. It was moreover thought that the grand end of inexpensive and unproblematical nuclear energy could be readily realised. There were high expectations that the technological means were on the verge of realisation. Vested interests, especially of scientists and engineers engaged in nuclear research, led to distorted accounts of the availability of the required technology. They outdid each other in declaring that "breakthrough" was imminent, if only everybody agreed on backing the project with deter- mination. Every obstacle was interpreted as an opportunity. Every technical problem still unsolved could be and in fact was interpreted by someone as an opportunity not to be missed. If "we" were the first ones to overcome the difficulty, the economic returns would be considerable and worth all the necessary additional investment.

20 Wolfgang Fach and Edgar Grande

In short, no one among those influential in research of nuclear energy and its development and production--neither conservatives nor liberals, neither managers nor trade union leaders, neither administrators nor scientists--had any doubts about the beneficial future of nuclear energy, even if the strength of conviction varied among them and over time. The heyday of the development of nuclear energy was managed in the manner of a "closed shop". The public at large did not interfere. For about a decade, not the smallest sign of protest could be discerned.

This period of unqualified optimism in nuclear energy reached its peak and came to an end roughly at the same time, i.e., in the early 1970s with the first world-wide oil crisis. When oil prices very rapidly increased and the oil supply became more uncertain, every industrial country, including the Federal Republic of Germany, decided to expand its capacity for producing nuclear power drastically. A huge construction programme was decided upon with the intention that, in the long run, nuclear power would become the most important source of energy. Expenditure on research and development in nuclear energy increased tenfold from DM440 million between 1956 and 1962 to DM4.5 billion from 1977 to 1980.

At the same time, resistance to the development of nuclear energy became very strong. Starting from a single geographic point in Wyhl, a small village and prospective site of a nuclear power-plant, it spread over all of Western Germany, roughly concentrating on the path of the plants under construction. Spectacular conflicts between policemen and demon- strators became common in the news programmes on television, present- ing the anti-nuclear issue to a public already confused by courts which did not at all agree on the legal conditions for building and running nuclear power plants. Complications increased when scientists joined in the controversy, taking very divergent positions. Within the political parties, especially within the Social Democratic Party, conflicts emerged on the desirability of the use of nuclear energy. These internal conflicts, in turn, were nourished by the rise of the "Greens". 1~ Political conflicts produced important effects within the bureaucracies and courts involved, which could no longer be sure which of the positions under discussion would represent the "public interest". The situation reached a dramatic climax when the state government of Lower Saxony confessed publicly that it was not politically strong enough to carry through its decision to build a nuclear waste-disposal site at Gorleben, although, in its own opinion, this would have been an important step towards a modern national system of energy supply.

The growing protest against the production of nuclear energy was a prelude to the "sudden death" of the programme in the late 1970s. Quite

10 See Hfmsler, Jtirgen, Der Traum wird zum Alptraum. Das Dilemma einer Volkspartei: Die SPD im Atomkonflikt (Berlin: edition sigma, 1988).

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 21

obviously, the substantive rational approach employed did not work. The policy did not take into account the attitude of all sections of the public; and it did not take into consideration that opinions and preferences might change in the course of its execution. The political leaders took for granted that the electorate would accept the programme; organised public opposition outside parliament came as a total surprise to them. From the perspective of substantive rationality, the government's failure to carry out the nuclear energy programme must have appeared very irrational. We think that such a view is incorrect.

The West German way of dealing with nuclear power in the end produced a reasonable result--not despite of, but because of the many irrationalities afflicting the procedure. Furthermore, the results of the "chaotic" process at work seemed to be better adapted and adaptable to the situation of the West German economy and society than the perfect realisation of the initial plans would have been. The smooth execution of the programmes designed in the 1960s would not have led to a more substantive solution but to one which was less so. Its consequences would have been: an overcommitment of society to a source of energy which, according to present knowledge, can only serve as a provisional solution in the middle term; an overinvestment by industry in a product the demand for which fell significantly short of initial expectations; and, finally, an underestimation of the complex safety problems of nuclear energy. Some of these negative consequences can be observed in coun- tries where nuclear energy policies have not been confronted with a successful anti-nuclear movement. France, for example, the country with the highest rate of consumption of nuclear energy, built up a huge overcapacity; and the Eastern European countries, although less depend- ent on nuclear energy, have been burdened with serious safety problems. By comparison, the political process in West Germany allowed a higher degree of complexity and reversibility.

"I believe that, over the long run, society will benefit from opposition movements which question potentially risky innovations. ''11 Professor Allan Mazur's opinion appeared in 1975 to be definitely a kind of heresy; it has, however, turned out to be true even in a broader sense. For not only technological risk, but economic uncertainty and "cultural" irritation as well, were dealt with in a relatively effective manner.

The Philosophy of Emergent Rationality

One case study does not support the conclusion that opening tech- nological discourses to the wider public must inevitably lead to rational results. It does, however, justify a critique of substantive rationality,

1~ Mazur, Allan, "Opposition to Technological Innovation", Minerva, XIII (Spring 1975), p. 81.

22 Wolfgang Fach and Edgar Grande

which apparently does not take into account the social "embeddedness ''12 of technological progress. The example of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic of Germany exposes hidden but fortunate relationships and unintended but positive effects; in short, it demonstrates the virtues of emergent rationality.

The development of nuclear energy in West Germany was an open "enterprise" in several respects. In content, the policy was transformed several times, starting with an unconditional priority to expand the production of nuclear electricity, and ending with a prudent strategy of keeping open a maximum of alternatives. Politically, nuclear energy was dealt with by a "closed shop" of insiders in the early states, then became relevant for a slowly growing circle of participants, and finally integrated even fierce opponents. In terms of time, decision-making was stretched over many years, stubbornly avoiding a point of no return. Neither the procedure nor the result was planned in any way--or rather they were planned in a different way by those who considered themselves to be "experts". In other words, it is the pattern of an "open society" in Popper's terms 13 which accounts for the occurrence of emergent rationality.

Rationality emerges from plurality, and plurality, by definition, is a particularly slow method for the making of decisions. It is true that "distinctive critical voices, raising questions from different points of view, provide an excellent correction to the dogmatism of narrow perspec- tives". 14 Listening to those voices and pondering various questions, however, takes time. Pluralism requires an institutional "order with s l a c k " , 1S first of all. What applies to society as a whole is even more relevant for the process of innovation--science, research and develop- ment continuously require moments of reflection and chances of revision, i.e., "leisure", albeit constrained by discipline. 16

If on the other hand, the "voices of alarm ''17 are right and time must be saved by every means, then there is no time for unhurried leisurely reflection. According to the philosophy of "acceleration", there is a tyranny of deadlines, created by the relentless competition among "enter- prising" countries striving for industrial superiority. In this vein, "world leadership" and "technological gaps" have unfailingly been used as

12 Polanyi, Karl, "The Economy as Instituted Process", in Dalton, George (ed.), Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economics: Essays on Karl PoIanyi (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 139ff.

13 Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).

14 Oksenberg Rorty, Amelie, "Varieties of Pluralism in a Polyphonic Society", Review of Metaphysics, XLIV (1990), p. 11.

15 Connolly, William E., Politics and Ambiguity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 113.

16 Riiegg, Walter, "The Academic Ethos", Minerva, XXIV (Winter 1986), pp. 393ff. 17 Nelson, Richard R., " 'World Leadership', the 'Technological Gap' and National

Science Policy", Minerva, X (July 1971), p. 391.

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 23

vehicles for establishing a "national science policy", channelling huge amounts of monetary and human resources into allegedly critical experi- ments of "big science" with precise deadlines. Nuclear energy is only one example, where "driving ahead at full speed" was a common maxim among national elites---even though a more detached ("leisurely") interpretation of the facts would have led to quite a different conclusion. Twenty years ago, Professor Richard Nelson assessed the situation of the United States, saying that "there certainly is no urgency in the matter". His assessment was based on easily accessible, correctly calculated, widely neglected data: "Various studies have reached quite sanguine conclusions regarding the supply of energy in the short run and in the proximate future . . . . The available cost- benefit studies suggest that the intensive programme planned by the Atomic Energy Commission for the next 15 years is a poor investment at this time. ''~8 It was indeed.

Nevertheless, an alarmist mood was again about to create a "white elephant". More than any other country, France, the most "rationalistic" of all Western political systems, fell prey to the costly criterion of speed. Western Germany, on the other hand, has demonstrated how a notori- ously "slow" country can be up-to-date. "German history", one observer concludes, "is a good example of how fast a technological gap can be closed, if the labour force is well qualified and if the market is large enough. ''19 As it turns out, leisurely reflection is far from lameness. Speed has nothing to do with effectiveness--Germany made its biggest mistake in nuclear energy policy when, in the mid-1960s, it rushed into the fast- breeder business, because of rumours that the United States had come close to producing this reactor type in series. 2~

How can modern societies make sure that they are not hurrying into risky and wasteful technological enterprises? Are there safeguards against the sirens of progress and industrial superiority? Which conditions must prevail if the emergent rationality is to have more than a random chance of providing better solutions?

The debate on science and technological policy has offered several answers to these questions. The first answer shifts responsibility to science and the scientific community. The "republic of science" could be a prime candidate for this function, not because it is the locus of "truth", but because of its procedures which have close affinities to emergent rationality. 21 Scientific progress, according to Michael Polanyi, cannot be

~8 Ibid., p. 397. In the same vein, Mr John Maddox had argued years earlier in favour of a gradual and reversible approach in the development of nuclear energy and called for a reassessment of the programme's objectives; See Maddox, John, "Choice and the Scientific Community", Minerva, II (Winter 1964), p. 156.

19 Radkau, Joachim, Technik in Deutschland: Vom achtzehnten Yahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt, a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), p. 23.

20 See Keck, O., Policy-making in a Nuclear Program, op. cit. 21 See Watkins, John W. N., "Epistemology and Politics", Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, LVIII (1957-58), pp. 79-102.

24 Wolfgang Fach and Edgar Grande

planned deliberately. Instead, it must be conceived as a "joint result which is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it about. Their coordination is guided as by 'an invisible hand' towards the joint discovery of a hidden system of things. Since its end-result is unknown, this cooperation can only advance stepwise, and the total performance will be the best possible if each consecutive step is decided upon by the person most competent to do so. ''22 In order to do the job, this system of procedures depends on a specific pattern of authority. Only if "the body of scientists, as a whole, does uphold the authority of science over the lay public", ~ can the logic of scientific discovery regulate the process of scientific progress.

In large-scale technological enterprises, however, both the autonomy and the authority of the scientific community have been eroded from two sides. On the one hand, scientists voluntarily have left the "republic of science" and have become engaged in "trans-scientific communities" which include industrialists, public administrators and politicians. Scien- tific research, economic calculations and political interests have become inseparably intermingled. On the other hand, the "lay public", self- designated "experts" and agitated citizens, have forced their entry into the "republic of science", challenging established authorities and procedures.

Under these conditions, the "republic of science" could no longer claim to be the "science court ''24 of last resort. This is not to say that science should not have a voice in the debate. Yet, the traditional authority of science in what is a matter of trans-science, fails to settle the disputes between competing claims of "truth", differing assessments of risks, alternative paths of progress and divergent objectives. But how can experts, expert critics and laymen be reconciled if the latter, for whatever reason, are not willing to submit unconditionally? How can the openness of debates be ensured without leaving them indecisive or unsettled?

To solve this problem, Dr Wolf H/ifele, an ardent advocate of nuclear energy, came forward with an interesting proposal on how to organise public debates of this kind in a rational manner. In his view, there is every reason to include the public and to stimulate a broad discussion on technological options. Regarding the social costs involved, and conceding that "the objections raised by certain parts of the large public must therefore be taken seriously",25 the republic of science must become more responsive to society at large. The controversy about nuclear energy, in his opinion, offered a singular opportunity--and indicated the urgent necessity--to design a new style for the resolution of conflicts attuned to the present conflict and future ones of a similarly explosive force. The

z2 Polanyi, M., The Republic of Science, op. cit., p. 55. Ibid., p. 60.

2~ Mazur, Allan, "Science Courts", Minerva, XV (Spring 1977), pp. 1-14. 25 Hfifele, W., "Hypotheticality and the New Challenges", op. cir., p. 307.

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 25

optimal way of "embedding" technological progress into society is said to be the "formalised debate": "To facilitate a general debate on these issues a high level of formalisation appears to be necessary. Abstract and complex problems beyond human experience and everyday life must be dealt with." And, the proposal continues, only "the formalised confronta- tion with the antagonist's arguments, when the licensing body is acting in full responsibility, permits the kind of analysis needed for the design in a particular case". 26

Once nuclear energy has passed the test of a formalised confrontation and proven to be superior to alternative sources of energy supply, "it will be fully legitimate to proceed with what will then be truly large-scale development of nuclear power". 27 The "formalised debate" thus manages to couple science with society without damaging it: by cutting through an otherwise endless and formless discourse it makes sure that a final decision is achieved. By imposing rigour, it reduces fears and hopes to costs and benefits.

The logic of this "calculus of consent" is evident, but so are its costs and limits. First, closure which sets out on and persists in a determinate path replaces learning by doing. In "megaprojects" on a national scale, the decision "to start" determines the future and narrows the scope of future alternatives significantly, regardless of whether any new preferen- ces and changed conditions appear. There is a loss of flexibility. Second, closure in the sense of restriction of admission to participation in the "formalised debate" neglects those other parts of the larger public whose desires and apprehensions elude the calculus imposed. These feelings, if left to themselves, do not simply vanish; rather they become bottled up and then turn easily into uncontrolled emotions and violent actions.

Political as well as moral considerations suggest that the criteria employed in general debates on science and technology should be more complex--not simply less demanding--than "formalisation" would allow. In a word, rules not just of the scientific community but of civil society are required. Civility "is a mode of political action which postulates that antagonists are members of the same society, that they participate in the same collective self-consciousness"? 8 Equal in dignity, people may differ in everything else, including education, scientific knowledge and disposi- tion. Hence, enlightened optimism would automatically not prevail over unenlightened pessimism, nor would scientific scepticism be forced to give way to lay illusions. By and large, participants will compromise, "mega- projects" could be reduced, and resources could be allocated to alterna- tive uses, even if only for the sake of peace in society.

26 Ibid., pp. 321f. 27 Ibid., p. 315. 28 Shils, Edward, "The Virtue of Civil Society", Government and Opposition, XXVI

(Winter 1991), pp. 13-14.

26 Wolfgang Fach and Edgar Grande

Such a society need not be united by common and particular substan- tive goals. The pattern of co-existence and multiplicity of objectives is reflected best in a pluralistic society:

Multiplicity is in itself valuable, not only for the liberal reason that debate is necessary for the discovery of truth, but because a multiplicity of modes of life expressed in habits and practices are necessary for any one of them to be sound life. Like its analogy in the music, the improvisatory polyphonic mode achieves practical (rather than consensual) harmony by allowing each voice its distinctive and interactive development. Each voice articulates and develops its thematic contribution in response to the others, becoming further individuated by the interactive process. 29

Whereas the formalised debate aims at "intellectual agreement" within a restricted range of participants which binds a society as a whole, the pluralistic mode of discussion is satisfied with "agreement in practice". The formalised debate tends to aim at irreversible decisions, whereas the possibility of practical revisions is what is desirable.

The pluralistic mode of debate does not need smooth or formally elaborated procedures of political decision-making at every stage of the discussion. It does need a legal and institutional framework which allows and co-ordinates the diversity of values, preferences and interests in society and diminishes the range of their divergence. The design of such a framework is undoubtedly a difficult task. Pluralism might well lead to arbitrariness, public protest might end in violence. Still, civility can, within certain limits, absorb violence in a productive way, whereas formalisation and narrowness of participation in the debate might call for the suppression or disregard for legitimate disagreement.

In this respect, the West German experience in the field of the production of nuclear energy is instructive. The emergence of a rational solution has been a painful process in which, at times, violence has occurred. Thanks, however to its openness and institutional "slack", the federal government has managed to move the controversy into the framework of legal procedures and civil manners. What began as public chaos, ended in pluralistic confusion: bureaucracies blocking each other, contradicting courts, contentious parties, a disunited scientific com- munity, hesitating corporations, a large number of angry laymen. The constellation was far from a "formalised debate" which could have legitimated a final decision, whether in favour of or against nuclear energy. But it did secure the continuity of reflective and pluralistic decision-making, with alternative means and divergent ends constantly adapting to changing conditions and preferences.

The result, so far, has been reasonable, although it neither satisfies whole-hearted advocates of nuclear energy nor its zealous opponents. The process of emergent rationality in this case has been a process of

~90ksenberg Rorty, A., "Varieties of Pluralism", op. cir., p. 18.

Emergent Rationality in Technological Policy 27

learning undergone by the participants. It is far from certain that the lessons taught will be remembered. New technological opportunities and risks, time and again, have created new "moods of alarmism", for example, in information technology, and the claims of substantive rationality still reassert themselves in scientific and public debates.

Concluding Observations

Considered in the light of the traditional conception of rationality, nuclear energy policy in the Federal Republic of Germany has been a frustrating experience. The original policy failed to achieve the substan- tive goals initially formulated. Nevertheless, almost unwittingly a new policy was arrived at. The procedures employed in arriving at this new policy have been far from rational, violating the rules of formalised debates and legal norms. The rationale of at least some of the participants may have been dubious. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the policy, so far, have been reasonable, even more reasonable than the perfect realisation of seemingly substantive goals would have been. Rationality in this case has neither been "substantive" nor "procedural", but emergent.

In the course of the historical process, not only did the initial goals have to be revised, but the problems to be solved were themselves transformed. On the one hand, new values and preferences came to the fore which changed the acceptance of former solutions. On the other hand, new problems such as safety emerged, and previous assumptions regarding the consumption of energy and the assessment of risk ceased to be valid. In sum, the complexity of the problem at hand significantly increased. Thus, emergent rationality provided not only a new solution to an old problem, but a hitherto unknown solution to an essentially different problem.

If the development of new kinds of technology can benefit from emergent rationality, technological policy would be confronted with problems different from those discussed in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither the rational "choice" among its existing alternatives nor the rationalisa- tion of decision-making procedures would be the most serious problem. Since it is likely that decision-makers cannot be fully certain about both the exact nature of the problem to be solved and the quality of the solutions available, it seems to be more important for the effectiveness of a policy to make provision for continuously growing understanding of the problem, rather than to make a definitive decision, once and for all. 3~

30 See Kaufmann, Franz Xaver, "The Relationship between Guidance, Control and Evaluation", in Kaufmann, Franz X. (ed.), Guidance, Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1985), p. 224.