The Malpractice of Rationality in International Relations

The Malpractice of “Rationality” in International Relations Rationality and Society 27(3): 358–384 [2015]

Uriel Abulof, [email protected]

** Post-Refereeing Version. Click here for the final version **

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the misuse of “rationality” in academic and political discourses, focusing on the Iranian nuclear project. The concept of rationality is ubiquitous; scholars, pundits and practitioners turn to it, sometimes unwittingly, to describe, explain and predict. When concerning concrete security and foreign policies, however, this praxis borders on malpractice: rationality-based descriptions are largely either false or unfalsifiable; many observers fail to explicate the meaning of “rationality” they employ; and the concept is frequently used politically to distinguish between “us and them.” Empirically, I show that rationality has played an opaque and excessive role in the Western accounts of Iranian nuclear policy. Both ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ have frequently, but faultily, turned to rationality / irrationality to explain Iran’s moderate / belligerent nuclear policy and its susceptibility / resistance to nuclear deterrence. The malpractice of “rationality” in discussing such matters has become a bad habit, which is best uprooted.

Keywords: rationality, rational choice theory, foreign policy analysis, nuclear proliferation, Iran, deterrence, discourse analysis

http://www.princeton.edu/%7Euabulof/

mailto:[email protected]

http://rss.sagepub.com/content/27/3/358.abstract

Abulof / The Malpractice of “Rationality” in International Relations

2

[Is Iran rational?] That is a great question. I’ll tell you that I’ve been confronting that question since I came into Central Command in 2008. And we are of the opinion that the Iranian regime is a rational actor.

And it’s for that reason, I think, that we think the current path we’re on is the most prudent path at this point …

– US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, 19 February 2012 (Zakaria, 2012)

Introduction

Is Iran rational? Rather than supply an answer I would query the value of the question for understanding, and addressing, Iranian nuclear policy. My aim is to expose and scrutinize the use, or rather misuse, of “rationality” in Western academic and political discourses, focusing on the last-decade debate over the Iranian nuclear project. Rationality here signifies the concept as well as the theoretical perspectives it inspires. That the boundaries between the two often seem blurred is indicative of the winding, and diverging, road the idea of rationality has taken over time and across disciplines.

The debate over the merits of using “rationality” in the study of international relations (IR) has not abated. While some hold it indispensable (Bueno De Mesquita, 2010; Snidal, 2012), others are more critical (Carlsnaes, 1992; Farkas, 1996; Hudson, 2007; Stein, 2012; Walt, 1999). Still, the pervasive and persistent usage of “rationality” in political science (Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010:60) and IR (Maliniak et al., 2012:26) is beyond dispute. While acclaimed caveats to the use of rationality in foreign policy analysis have left their mark (e.g. Allison, 1969), “rationality” remains ubiquitous in this field. Some 40% of all scholarly references to “foreign policy” allude to “rationality”—and this ratio goes up to more than half of pertinent academic publications in the 2000s.1 Reasserting the limits of employing rationality to analyze concrete security and foreign policies (hereafter FPA) may not be a lost cause, but it has certainly turned out to be a Sisyphean task.

This paper joins in this task, suggesting that the IR malpractice of rationality comes at a high cost, in and beyond academia. First, some of the more pervasive uses of “rationality” in IR are simply either false or unfalsifiable (Shapiro, 2005). While suitable for the research agenda of certain brands of rational choice theory (RCT), even in IR, it is distinctively detrimental for FPA. RCT has much to offer, but with clear limitations (Elster, 2007; Mintz and Derouen, 2010). Second, many employers of “rationality” fail to explicate clearly what they mean. All too often we talk past each other, employing the same concept with incompatible conceptions, even distinctly different epistemologies (Macdonald, 2003); we fiercely debate completely different things. Third,

1 These findings are based on Google Scholar queries: a search for “foreign policy” yields about 1.4 million articles overall (excluding patents and citations); 520 thousand since 2000. Omitting “rationality” (“-rational -rationality”) cuts the result by about 42%.


3

“rationality” has effectively become an appraisive concept, not least in economic and political discourses (Walsh, 1996). Far from being value-free, “rationality” is loaded with normative connotations, and is often employed to denote those actors whom we can trust, or at least predict their behavior, as opposed to the unreliable and erratic, hence “irrational,” other. Fourth, the malpractice of “rationality” has impaired not only academic research but actual policies as well. Since academic and political discourses of normative concepts often mesh (Jackson, 2007), tracing both is invaluable for deciphering—and subsequently rectifying—this malpractice (Author 2013a). Finally, and here I have only impressionistic evidence, in part corroborated by a growing awareness of my own failings, “rationality” occasionally creeps into our discourse unwittingly, becoming an unreflective habitus of sorts. Consequently, the current use of “rationality” is more a burden than asset in FPA.

This paper discusses the malpractice of “rationality” theoretically and empirically. The theoretical section posits that rationality has become an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie, 1955), and clarifies rationality’s blurred boundaries by identifying its key parameters. I do not offer here a new theory of rationality in IR. However, by elucidating the myriad and often incompatible roles “rationality” plays in the scholarship, I aim to achieve two goals: First, substantiating my claim that “rationality,” as practiced in IR, often assumes an unwarranted role, exceeding its theoretical remit and practical merits; specifically, it is a misfit for FPA. Second, classifying rationality’s multiple roles in the scholarship should help clarify the “terms of the debate” so as to facilitate constructive deliberation and encourage us to be specific about what concept of “rationality” we employ, why and how.

The theoretical discussion sets the stage for examining rationality-based discourses on Iranian nuclear policy. This case study was chosen both for its contemporary importance and for the saliency of rationality-based accounts in its analysis. Is Iranian nuclear policy amenable? Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? I do not attempt to resolve these questions either affirmatively or negatively, nor do I purport to reveal Iran’s nuclear motivations and their implications (on this see Author 2013b). Instead, by examining rationality-based accounts of Iranian nuclear policy, I opt to show how rationality has been used, and misused, to answer these important questions. I show that experts and practitioners employ rationality (or irrationality) to explain both Iran’s moderate (or belligerent) nuclear policy and its susceptibility (or resistance) to nuclear deterrence. They have framed rationality as an innately contributory condition (necessary and often sufficient) for both nuclear moderation and nuclear deterrence. I argue, however, that rationality is not a sufficient, nor even a necessary condition, for moderation and deterrence; likewise, belligerence and resistance do not require irrationality. Immersing ourselves, as General Dempsey suggests, in answering whether or not Iran is rational might not be the best way to decode its policy and decide how to address it.

The Contested Contours of Rationality

In his classic treatise on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison (1969) posited the rational actor model, alongside the organizational and bureaucratic models, as a key lens for FPA


4

(Allison, 1969; Allison and Zelikow, 1999). The rational actor model still informs much of FPA theorization, serving as a baseline for alternative models (Hill, 2003; Mintz and Derouen, 2010:57-96; Yetiv, 2011). Rationality has indeed much to offer IR, and below I note some of these benefits. However, I primarily seek to explicate their concomitant limitations in FPA. To benefit from rationality’s merits, FPA must obviously be well aware of its remit. However, this task has become quite complicated with rationality effectively become an “essentially contested concept”: its significance is widely recognized and demonstrated by its omnipresence, but its “proper use … inevitably involves endless disputes” (Gallie, 1955:169).

This section addresses these contestations about rationality’s proper use by identifying its contours along the following “four fronts”: (1) The purpose, or function, of ascribing rationality: Is it descriptive/explanatory, prescriptive or subjunctive? (2) The subject of rationality: What, or who, is rational: the choice, the act, or the choosing actor? (3) Cognition: What is the quality of the cognitive decision-making process: minimal (calculative intentionality) or optimal (expected-utility)? (4) Rationale: Is rationality merely instrumental, that is, agnostic about the logic of human action and its motivations or does it substantially inform them (instrumental/substantive rationality)? The section evinces the controversies along these four fronts (Table 1).

Table 1: Rationality’s Contested Contours Purpose Subject Cognition Rationale

Prescriptive Subjunctive Choice / Act

Individual Minimal (calculative intentionality)

Instrumental (motivation-agnostic)

Descriptive Explanatory State-Actor Optimal (expected-utility)

Substantive (material maximization)

1. Purpose: Descriptive, prescriptive, or subjunctive rationality?

What is the purpose (or scholarly function) of ascribing rationality? Two aims are plain: describing/explaining or prescribing (wherein the actor or act either is, or ought to be, rational). Stein (1999:212) observes a curious shift: “What started as a normative enterprise has become a positive one. Tools once created to improve the quality of otherwise imperfect human decision making are now being used to explain choice.” But this trend is more intricate. In principle, many contemporary RCT scholars agree that “rational-choice theory is first and foremost normative. It tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible” (Elster, 1989:3). Still, in practice, RCT scholarship abounds in descriptive and explanatory analyses (Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010; Lovett, 2006).

The descriptive-prescriptive schism should not obfuscate rationality’s third purpose: rationality “as if” it were real. I refer to this as subjunctive rationality. It is pervasive in RCT, especially in formal modeling (Morton, 1999). Accordingly, actors “behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns,” much like “the density of leaves around a tree” is determined “as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws…”—this subjunctive


5

“formula is accepted because it works,” not because it is a truthful account of reality (Friedman, 1953:21,19,18; cf. Nagel, 1963). On a larger scale, decisions may then be aggregated in order to understand collective actions as if they were decided by rational individuals, even when it is not so (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994:75).

Subjunctive rationality is neither descriptive nor prescriptive, neither objective nor subjective. Depending on its specific actual usage, it may be false, probable, indeterminate, or true. Subjunctive rationality offers important benefits. It fosters creative puzzles and theorization, otherwise hard to conceive. Its employment may moreover be predictive, and if correlative to desired goals, make for prescriptive claims. But these potential benefits of subjunctive rationality do not change the fact that it is not descriptive, let alone explanatory: “‘As-if’ explanations do not actually explain anything” (Elster, 2007:25; see also Macdonald, 2003). Postulating subjunctive rationality as explanatory may commit the argumentum ad consequentiam logical fallacy: deriving an argument from desirable or undesirable consequences. Fall, however desirable, is not caused by the leaves’ rationality.

This fallacy lurks in FPA, for while the rational actor model implicitly follows RCT’s clear preference for either subjunctive or prescriptive rationalities (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:3, 24), FPA’s explanandum is usually very real and concrete, enticing the use of descriptive (and explanatory) rationality. However, as game theorist Herbert Gintis (2009:237) rightly insists, “rational actor model applies to choice situations where ambiguities are absent, the choice set is clearly delineated, and the payoffs are unmediated,” and not to complex “deliberative choices,” which forms the crux of FPA.

2. Subject: Rational choice, act, or (state) actor?

What, or who, is the subject of rationality: Does rationality pertain to the choice, the act, or the choosing actor? Most economists, following RCT, ascribe rationality to the choice and occasionally to the act. In IR, however, the “rational actor model” is more prevalent (Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Yetiv, 2011). Admittedly, this schism may be rather facile. After all, if the decision-makers’ choices are overwhelmingly rational, that rationality transposes easily onto the decision-makers, as an almost innate virtue.

The disciplinary divide goes deeper when it comes to a closely related question: Should we posit the state as a “rational, unitary actor”? Herein lies a deeper divergence between RCT and the rational actor model—and their resonance in economics and IR, respectively. Economists, through RCT, mostly subscribe to methodological individualism, and presuppose the rationality of individual persons, not of collectivities, let alone the state. As Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem showed, a group of rational people may often decide and act in an irrational way.

Several IR scholars adhere to methodological individualism (e.g. Bueno De Mesquita, 2010). However, many IR scholars instead hold that “the nation or government, conceived as a rational, unitary decision maker, is the agent. This agent is anthropomorphized as if it were an individual person with one set of preferences (a consistent utility function), one set of perceived choices, and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative” (Allison and


6

Zelikow, 1999:24). While few IR scholars explicitly view “the state as person” (Wendt, 2004), many, especially realists, subscribe to the “double subjunctive” of holding the state as-if rational and as-if unitary.

This double subjunctive might stretch the merits of “as-if” postulations, but when explicit, explicated and conducive to the research task, it is scholarly valid. The tasks of FPA, however, may not be among the best suited to this double subjunctive rationality. FPA, partly driven by Allison’s critique of the rational actor model, mostly goes against state anthropomorphism, preferring “actor-specific theory” over “black-boxing” the state (Hudson, 2007).

3. Cognition: Minimal or optimal rationality?

What is the meaning of rationality? The answers, I argue, span two dimensions: one pertains to how decisions are made (the quality of the cognitive decision-making process); the other to why certain decisions are made (the possible supremacy of material rationales). The cognitive continuum extends between minimal and maximal rationalities. Minimal rationality signifies calculative intentionality: purposeful behavior that relates means to ends in a given context. Conversely, maximal, or full, rationality signifies perfect choice, following the linear sequence of carefully formulating goals, using complete information to identify options, consequences (cost-benefits and likelihood), and probabilities, and finally ranking them to maximize expected utility.

Most RCT scholars shy away from either minimal or maximal rationalities, opting instead for optimal rationality—which is neither perfect nor necessarily successful—and often include constraints, such as costs of information search (Stigler, 1961). Optimal rationality, however, still includes most or all of the following core contentions: purposive action (actors are motivated by goal-oriented behavior), consistent preferences (manifested as transitivity and invariance—ranking preferences and keeping them steady), and utility maximization (selecting the most beneficial alternative) (Macdonald, 2003:552). While both RCT and the rational actor model often subscribe to optimal rationality (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:17, 49-50), RCT, as noted, is much more theoretically insistent on viewing optimal rationality as either subjunctive or prescriptive.

RCT critics argue that minimal rationality is unfalsifiable, while optimal rationality, let alone maximal, is false. Minimal rationality seems rather banal, since it comes close to equating rationality with humanity, or at least with sanity. As von Mises (1996:19) notes, “Human action is necessarily always rational. The term ‘rational action’ is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such.” Conversely, optimal rationality may seem almost non-human, since no human can fully conform to its stipulations. Taken to the extreme, animals, much more than humans, may appear as if fully rational, since their behavior often conforms to evolutionary game-theory expectations regarding optimal fitness (Hurley and Nudds, 2006). Indeed, optimal rationality has been repeatedly refuted as an accurate depiction of reality, evincing deep discrepancies between certain RCT subjunctive expectations and actual human behavior (the Traveler’s Dilemma is especially revealing; Basu, 1994).

Thus, decision-making literature abounds in bounded rationality, which typically shuns RCT (Bendor, 2010), foreshadowing the cognitive turn in FPA (Jervis, 1976; Steinbruner, 1974).


7

Behavioral economics (most notably prospect theory) has further underlined the role of cognitive and emotional biases (Kahneman, 2003). This is especially demonstrated in volatile, complex, and perilous circumstances, as highlighted by “poliheuristic”/synthesizing scholarship in IR and FPA (Gordon and Arian, 2001; Mercer, 2010; Mintz and Derouen, 2010; Vertzberger, 1990; Yetiv, 2011). The mounting evidence against optimal rationality led some to conclude that “there is no longer any doubt about the weight of the scientific evidence; the expected-utility model of economic and political decision making is not sustainable empirically” (Jones, 1999:297). To conclude, as long as it remains subjunctive and prescriptive, optimal rationality has many merits; once it transgresses into descriptive and explanatory realms, it is much harder to defend.

4. Rationale: Instrumental or substantive rationality?

Conjoining the cognitive dimension of meaning is the “rationality as rationale” continuum, which extends between instrumental and substantive rationalities. Instrumental rationality is agnostic about motivations, whereas substantive rationality presumes material self-interest and utilitarian power-seeking as the main, if not sole, human reasoning, sidestepping faith, ideology, and morality (Johnson, 1996; Kacelnik, 2006; Mintz and Derouen, 2010:58-59). For instrumental rationality, even the “will to survive” (placing the highest motivational value on life itself) need not be a prerequisite of rationality. Conversely, substantive rationality intrinsically favors the ‘transient body’ over the ‘eternal soul.’

RCT generally subscribes to instrumental rationality and shuns substantive rationality (Elster, 2007; Zagare and Kilgour, 2000:39ff). For example, Gintis (2009:1) insists that rationality “requires only preference consistency,” and can thus readily accommodate social and moral motivations. Quackenbush (2004:94) likewise notes, “Instrumental rationality is only concerned when whether [sic] people act in accordance with their motivations, regardless of what those motivations may be,” and rightly points out the benefits of this approach. In principle, the application of rationality in IR could follow suit—embrace instrumental rationality and remain silent on motivations (Bueno De Mesquita, 2010). In practice, as we shall see, this is not always the case.

Sociology provides alternative solutions to the rationality-rationale conundrum, typically opting for a nominal/categorical (rather than binary) scale. For example, rationality may be ascribed to rationales that are both justifiable and refutable in the eyes of the choosing actor. Convictions and actions that the actor holds as inherently unfalsifiable might then be seen as non-rational, rather than irrational (Etzioni, 1988). Alternatively, we may follow Max Weber’s typology of rationales as non-hierarchical rationalities: practical/instrumental (utilitarian self-interest), theoretical (abstract meanings, e.g. religious rationality), substantive (value-rational), and formal (universally applied rules) (Kalberg, 1980). However, such solutions effectively dispense with the concept of rationality in favor of rationales.

Substantive rationality, like optimal rationality, is empirically challenged. To be sure, the view of humans as “material maximizers” is partly true. Few, however—not least RCT scholars—submit it delivers the complete picture, especially if posited as explanatory rather than subjunctive.


8

For example, concluding a life-long engagement with RCT, Elster (2007:5, 26) states, “I now believe that rational-choice theory has less explanatory power than I used to think. Do real people act on the calculations that make up many pages of mathematical appendixes in leading journals? I do not think so … the empirical support for rational-choice explanations of complex phenomena tends to be quite weak.” Indeed, as with optimal rationality, substantive rationality too lends itself more easily to non-humans: chimpanzees have shown themselves to be “material maximizers” and insensitive to fairness, thus much more effective than humans in the “ultimatum game” (Jensen et al., 2007). Accordingly, scholars have ventured into synthesizing material motivations with, inter alia, self-interest, emotional dispositions, and moral commitments, as well as social incentives and constraints (e.g. Etzioni, 1988; Lupia et al., 2000).

Conversely, instrumental rationality’s indifference to motivations, which is the predominant RCT view, allows it to dismiss falsificationist accusations—“How can RCT ever be falsified? It cannot be. But it is not supposed to be the sort of thing that can.”—so the mistake lies with the question itself, “stemming from the view that the goal of RCT is to provide intentional explanations of social phenomena” (Lovett, 2006:248, 263).

Yet, this “mistake” is perfectly understandable. RCT is indeed largely about how, not why, people choose what they do. Still, intentional explanations are what many political scientists, not least in FPA, consider the thrust of their work (Cottam, 1977; Hudson, 2007). After all, even if you know “how” people choose, without understanding the “why,” you cannot divine “what” they choose, let alone assess the implications. Balancing costs and benefits and opting for the best available choice may partly reflect how actors decide, but without explicating the actor’s own values—which imbue “costs and benefits” and “best choice” with actual meaning—and the content of the choice, wherein FPA’s interest lies, remains opaque.

Minimal and instrumental rationality can be virtually ascribed to any actor or action—Jeremy Bentham and Mother Theresa are equally selfish and (instrumentally) rational. But this observation can hardly aid us in understanding their beliefs, decisions, and actions. FDR and Adolf Hitler were both democratically elected, took office in 1933 amidst a grave economic crisis, and were most probably concerned with their own success however defined. But it is that very self-definition (possibly their own self-identification) that underlined their motivations and drove their actions, with their subsequent, profoundly distinct, implications.

This may explain why many RCT scholars transgress their self-proclaimed domain. Indeed, as a large survey of RCT scholarship recently demonstrated, while RCT experts often “emphasised that their assumptions in general and their ascriptions of particular understandings and reasons to actors in particular were not meant to be realist, most nevertheless presented them as providing an account of actors’ actual reasons and motivations” (Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010:54). Similarly, in IR, most realists and many liberalists hold political actors as “material maximizers,” who subscribe to utilitarian self-interest (Rousseau, 2006). Duties and deities, for example, do not figure high in such rationality-based accounts.


9

Given this continuous confusion it seems worth reiterating and further explicating the limits of instrumental rationality in uncovering motivations. The most intricate, and often most interesting, aspects of FPA are those that entail dilemmas: consciously wavering between two or more alternative goals, or between alternative paths to the same goal (or a combination thereof). Instrumental RCT cannot, and does not purport to aid in analyzing real dilemmas. That we often wrongly attribute such capacity to RCT is partly the result of mislabeling. The most obvious example is the prisoner’s dilemma. In its classical formulation it is more a tragedy than an actual dilemma, as there is no wavering between goals (say, minimizing jail time and friendship) nor between different means—confessing is clearly the way to go. It is as much a dilemma as using your GPS to get to a party as quickly and safely as possible and being given three routes, with one the quickest and safest. This is not what most foreign policy decisions are like.

***

Rationality’s contested contours do not suggest that rationality is a dead-end concept and its theories futile. There is much to like in the concept of rationality as well as in its theorization and practical employment (Bueno De Mesquita, 2010). Prescriptive rationality urges policy makers to develop a more informative and deliberative decision-making process. The subjunctive postulation can engender fruitful insights, which are often predictive and falsifiable. RCT’s methodological individualism unpacks collectives and can help observe their inner dynamics. Formal RCT may further crystalize key social problems (e.g. collective action). RCT is invaluable for understanding how people think, and certain models, especially the strategic-choice approach, can provide key cues on the interactions of actors’ preferences (Schelling, 2008 [1966]). And in FPA, if properly employed and supplanted, “the ‘rational actor’ model can act as a kind of Occam’s razor, cutting back the explanatory undergrowth” (Dumbrell and Barrett, 1997:18).

How may we pluck the fruits of rationality research and avoid its pitfalls? We begin, I suggest, by recognizing the concept’s four contours, and their distinct merits and limitations. We proceed by adopting certain “terms of use” for employing rationality, rules designed to help us stop talking past each other. These “terms of use” include the explicit explication of rationality’s sort, scale, and scope. We should clarify (1) the type/s of rationality we use (along the four contours), (2) the way rationality is measured (e.g. as binary or nominal), and (3) the extent of its applicability (e.g. to everyone or to some, always or sometimes?).

We should explain, for example, why we opt for descriptive rationality while RCT eschews it; why we have decided to treat “the state as person” rather than subscribe to methodological individualism; or why we posit rationality as a binary variable, with actors or actions as either rational or irrational. Regrettably, these “terms of use” are not always followed, and when rationality’s “rules of evidence” are likewise sidestepped, the results can be unfortunate.

Rationality to the Rescue?

Moving from theory to practice, this section traces rationality-based accounts in analyzing Iranian nuclear policy, focusing on the decade leading up to the 2014 Vienna talks. By “rationality-based accounts,” I mean arguments substantiated by alluding to rationality, either as a


10

concept or as a theory. In discussing “Iranian nuclear policy,” I focus on its driving rationales (the overall logic of action and the key specific motivations) as well as on the involved risks (via nuclear deterrence).

In my analysis, I address the accounts of both experts and practitioners. To be sure, politicians do not apply the same rigorous standards that academics should. However, while distinguishing between these discourses, there are good reasons to analyze both in making sense of the malpractice of rationality. Theoretically, there exists “a mutual interpretative interplay between social science and those whose activities compose its subject matter—a double hermeneutic” (Giddens, 1984:xxxii). As we study society, our analytical concepts, and interpretations thereof, often permeate society itself, becoming part of the public discourse. Practically, analyzing both discourses in the case of Iran’s nuclear policy evinces the resonance—and malpractice—of “rationality” among scholars and practitioners alike; both turn to it to base claims on concrete security and foreign policies. Normatively, the confluence of both discourses and their convergence in the malpractice of rationality underscore our academic responsibility to improve our own discourse and extend this change to the political milieu (e.g. Ish-Shalom, 2013).

My purpose is not to ascertain the real motivations behind, and possible implications of, Iranian nuclear policy (Author 2013b); nor do I offer comparisons or syntheses of rational choice accounts with other FPA models, such as groupthink, cognitive analogies, and government politics (Yetiv, 2011). I also do not purport to exhaust all extant literature on Iranian nuclear policy, much of which does not involve rationality-based accounts. Instead, I qualitatively focus on accounts that do.

How high will Iran climb the nuclear escalation-ladder? Will it defy international pressure and proceed with enrichment; will it go further and develop nuclear weapons? Could Iran then leverage them to expand its power, and might it eventually use them? This puzzle has naturally preoccupied experts and policy-makers over the last decade. Unfortunately, many accounts have sought to resolve it by “rationalizing” Iranian nuclear rationales and involved risks, that is, they ascribed rationality (or irrationality) to Iran in order to ascertain the overall logic and specific motivations behind, as well as the potential and probable dangers of, its decisions and conduct.

In analyzing rationality-based accounts of nuclear policy, we need not divorce nuclear rationales from risks: the reasons a state has for going nuclear may well affect its behavior once in possession of nuclear weapon. Still, for analytical purposes, the first part of this section deals mainly with Iranian nuclear policy in the safer rungs of the nuclear escalation ladder, before obtaining nuclear weapon; the second part with the more perilous phase of deterring a nuclear Iran. My aim in this meta-analysis of Iranian nuclear policy is not to side with either the “optimists” or the “pessimists”—both make reasonable claims—but to scrutinize their accounts, showing why and how rationality is used, often misused, and occasionally (politically) abused—to substantiate them. These accounts rarely explicate the sort, scale, and scope of their view on rationality (the proposed “terms of use”), and so impede constructive debates about both their descriptions and prescriptions. My task here thus also involves uncovering their implicit conceptualizations. Each


11

part first probes the practical content of these accounts and then proceeds to examine their theoretical context.

1. Rationalizing rationales: Is Iranian nuclear policy malleable?

The hallmark of “rationalizing” Iranian nuclear rationales is the false dichotomy between rational pragmatism and ideological extremism. The debate is framed around “the original question of the fundamental character of Iranian foreign policy, specifically the extent to which it is driven by ideology, as opposed to a rational and pragmatic approach to advancing the national interest” (Saghafi-Ameri, 2009:137). This dichotomy posits rational realism and irrational idealism as innately opposing poles, pulling Iran’s foreign policy in clashing directions: political pragmatism vs. militant extremism. It effectively predicates extremism, and nuclear adventurism, on irrationality, while suggesting that rationality breeds pragmatic moderation. The policy implications are obviously immense; for example, Israel “must first make a carefully informed judgment on Iranian rationality,” since “the wisdom of any considered Israeli preemption will ultimately depend upon choosing correctly” (Beres, 2012).

This framing typically employs minimal rationality (calculative intentionality) and substantive rationality (material maximization), often anthropomorphizing the regime or the state. Some hold Iran to be rational on both dimensions. Accordingly, “Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach,” by acting “in a roughly purposeful fashion to advance its interests;” and all its rationales are subordinated to the regime’s most fundamental material interest: “its own survival” (Sebenius and Singh, 2012:58, 60). Thus, “despite the role [of] ideology and religion,” even “a nuclear Iran will be a rational actor,” driven primarily by “the desire to survive” (Wilner, 2012:19). Others, like former US presidential candidate Mitt Romney, seem to anthropomorphize Iran as irrational on both dimensions, being “a crazed fanatic” led “by the mullahs, by crazy people,” which, out of ideological hatred to the US, may well resort to a nuclear attack against it (Mother Jones News Team, 2012). Conversely, US President Obama said he “believed Iran’s leaders could make a rational calculation, under the pressure of harsh sanctions, to give up their nuclear ambitions” (Landler, 2012).

The last two statements are but a few of many examples, some of which I provide below, attesting to the potential political misuse, even abuse, of “rationality” in the debate over Iranian nuclear policy. While it is obviously impossible to ascertain the real intentions behind such proclamations, their employment by politicians suggests that they probably regard these views as resonating well with public sentiment, thus politically beneficial. The Iranian nuclear project is not unique in this regard. Labeling a rival proliferating country as “irrational” is a common reaction. Such was the response to China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s by both the US (Mcnamara, 1967) and India (Telang, 1969). While during the early 1970s Sino-American rapprochement was matched by a more “rational” US take on China, the latter was still depicted by the USSR as “a widely irrational state” (Smith, 1972).

Israeli ascription of “rationality” regarding Iran has often been more sophisticated. For example, some officials depicted the Iranians as rational in one dimension, irrational in another:


12

Iran may behave in a calculative manner (minimal rationality), but be perilously prone to ideological rationale (substantive irrationality). Dore Gold, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, distilled this fusion: “The Iranians have irrational goals, which they may try and advance in a rational way” (Rudoren, 2012). The irrational rationale is ideological: the belief in the Mahdi’s return, which “introduced an enormously irrational factor into the Iranian nuclear equation” (Gold, 2009:218; see also Amuzegar, 2007; Beres, 2012). Israeli representatives to the United Nations echoed this synthesis: “The delusional statements of Iran’s leaders are not those of crazy people, but rational fanatics with irrational hatreds” (Erdbrink, 2012): they are purposeful, but ideologically driven and therefore dangerous.

Iranian substantive irrationality drove senior Israeli policy-makers to be highly skeptical of the prospects of diplomacy and sections swaying Iran to take a more moderate approach. Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu stated he cannot count “on Iran’s rational behavior,” and defense minister Ehud Barack explained that the sanctions are unlikely to succeed since Iran is not “rational in the Western sense of the word, meaning people seeking a status quo and the outlines of a solution to problems in a peaceful manner” (Rudoren, 2012). Some experts, such as Bernard Lewis, have taken Iranian substantive irrationality as presaging graver consequences, including actual nuclear attack against the ideological foe, Israel (World Tribune, 2008).

The dichotomy between rational moderation and ideological extremism has not necessarily led observers to conclude that the latter predominates. Indeed, while both sides draw on (ir)rationality in building their arguments, “nuclear optimists have outranked nuclear pessimists both numerically and in most discursive venues” (Seliktar, 2011:204). Granted, one person’s optimistic scenario—a nuclear but deterrable Iran—might be another’s horror. Still, on a scale, some are more hopeful than others (for numerous examples see The Middle East Institute, 2009).

While the pessimist accounts typically resort to either minimal irrationality (insanity) or substantive irrationality (ideology), optimist accounts usually ascribe rationality to Iran on both dimensions. Some dismiss the pessimists’ foreboding of catastrophe based on Iranian irrationality as itself driven by ideological “irrational anxieties of Western ultra-Zionists” (Cole, 2009:205). Optimists insist that Iran is a “rational actor,” which may thus “pursue a more pragmatic tone with the United States” (Barzegar, 2009:30). Iran’s past foreign conduct suggests that it is not “an irrational actor,” prone to “nuclear fanaticism” (Joshi, 2012:84). Instead, “for all its religious bombast, it was making rational strategic calculations,” and Iran’s “leadership remains rational today” (Logan and Carpenter, 2007). Most experts suggest that considering the many and mounting external threats that Iran (and especially its regime) faces, developing nuclear weapons “is a rational response in Iran’s eyes,” and part of “a rational defensive doctrine” (Islam, 2012:71, 75; see similarly Sebenius and Singh, 2012; Wilner, 2012). Iran may not be as rational as the West; still, Iran will avoid weaponization since “both sides are rational actors, although the Iranian rationality has its own limits given the sensational nature of its culture” (Amirahmadi and Shahidsaless, 2013:156).


13

Predicating moderation on rationality is rhetorically practiced by many decision makers, often without clarification of what exactly they mean by rationality. The epigraph by General Dempsey is revealing. Sanctions and diplomacy can dissuade Iran from enrichment, let alone weaponization, since Iran is rational. In subsequent clarification, Dempsey reiterated his assertion, further demonstrating the prevalent binary perspective on rationality: “The alternative is almost unimaginable. The alternative is that we attribute to them that their actions are so irrational that they have no basis of planning” (Clifton, 2012).

Predicating moderation on rationality echoes in the words of Dempsey’s peer, the IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz: “If the supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wants, he will advance it to the acquisition of a nuclear bomb … I don't think he will want to go the extra mile. I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people” (Harel, 2012). Meir Dagan, the former chief of the Israeli Mossad, likewise sees Iranian nuclear policy as malleable, since the regime “is a very rational regime … no doubt they are considering all the implications of their actions” (60 Minutes-CBS, 2012).

As some of the examples above show, analyses of Iranian nuclear policy do not always personify Iran (or its regime). Some unpack it to determine the network of, and balances between, individuals and groups that together shape the regime’s nuclear policy. Such accounts are seemingly consonant with Allison’s (1999) bureaucratic model, rather than the rational actor model. In practice, however, while highlighting the intra-regime wrangling and bargaining, such accounts often relocate the actors’ motivations from the fight over prestige and power (as in the bureaucratic model) to the discussed dichotomy. Takeyh (2009:4, 236,238), for example, sets the stage for his extensive analysis by clearly distinguishing between pragmatic “rational calculations” and “the pull of ideology,” which “obstruct[s] Tehran’s path toward realism” and “undercut[s] Iran’s promise of moderation.” Focusing on this “usual interplay between ideology and pragmatism,” he expounds the friction between the “ideological militants,” led by Ahmadinejad, and the “pragmatic realists,” led by the like of Ali Larijani, the parliament’s speaker.

Overall, the rationality-based accounts provide insights into Iranian nuclear considerations, making persuasive claims on both sides of the nuclear aisle. Still, employing rationality to corroborate these claims is inapt. These accounts typically involve one or more of the problems discussed in the theoretical section (Table 2). Virtually all of the accounts use rationality as descriptive, even explanatory, rather than prescriptive or subjunctive. Most observers moreover personify Iran or its regime, instead of discussing the rationality of individual leaders. Many do not examine the cognitive dimension, and when they do, they unanimously reach the banal conclusion of minimal rationality. Finally, while some accounts subscribe to instrumental (agnostic) rationality, others interpret it as substantive. The latter seem especially prone to hold Iran as irrational. Notably, scholars and practitioners alike share these fallacies.

Table 2: Rationality-Based Accounts on Iran's Nuclear Policy / Scholars and Practitioners Subject Cognition Rationale Individual Iranian Minimal Optimal Instrumental Substantive


14

Iranian Leaders

Regime / State

(calculative intentionality)

(expected-utility)

(motivations agnostic)

(material maximization)

Amirahmadi & Shahi.. S R R R B. Lewis S I Barzegar S R R

Blight & Lang S R Evron I I

Logan & Carpenter S R R Saghafi-Ameri S R

Sebenius & Singh S R R Steinberg I Takeyh S R / I Waltz S R R Wilner S R

E. Barack S I J. Chirac S R M. Dagan S R

P. Dempsey S R R B. Gantz S R D. Gold S R R I

B. Netanyahu S I B. Obama S R R

D. Romney S I S = the ascribed subject of rationality; R = subject is held as rational; I = subject is held as irrational

Beyond the clear mismatch between these rationality-based accounts and valid RCT, they do not employ the suggested “terms of use,” and thus engage in debates prone to misconceptions. One is the argumentum ad consequentiam fallacy: we want Iran to be rational thus malleable, otherwise sanctions and diplomacy will fail and we might go to war. The underlying dichotomy—rational moderation vs. ideological adventurism—provides a feeble scientific base for analyzing Iranian nuclear policy.

The said dichotomy is valid only if the decision makers themselves held reason and ideology to be innately irreconcilable. Most leaders, most of the time, will think (or say) no such thing. For decision makers, policy is the marriage of principle and practice. Even the most ostensibly ideological practitioners would typically hold their political decisions to be real and reasonable, pragmatic in the original Greek sense of “relating to fact.” At the same time, decisions are seldom understood by their makers to be divorced from principled ideas (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). After all, “rationality itself must rest on a ground of values which it can neither produce nor discover on its own” (Binder, 1971:40).

This is not to argue that ideology is not distinctively important in foreign policy, only that it is not antithetical to rationality or pragmatism. Labeling decision makers as rational often reveals more about our own ability to predict their behavior (and seeming motivating preferences) than


15

about their capacity to reason. Moreover, even if ascribing rationality to Iranian leaders in order to understand their nuclear rationales were accurate and useful (which it is not) and even if the ideology–rationality dichotomy were viable (and it is not), there is nothing in rationality—as either minimal or optimal, instrumental or substantive—to suggest that it engenders moderation or that extremism is predicated on ideology (Breton, 2002; Lake, 2002; Wintrobe, 2006). Unless we resort to tautology—defining moderation as pertaining to (our notion of) rationality—the latter does not account for moderation, and ideology does not explain extremism.

Indeed, it is indicative that Khamenei himself explicitly turns to what many regard as Iranian substantive irrationality to explain why Iran will not develop nuclear weapons: “What prevents Iran from seeking a nuclear weapon is not the fear from America, but the religious and Islamic belief which prohibits producing, using, or threatening by these weapons.” Khamenei then points to “Washington’s irrationality” on the nuclear issue, evinced by “the contradiction between the US Administration’s statements and acts” (Al Manar TV, 2013). Indeed, leveraging “rationality” to distinguish between “us and them” is practiced by both the West and “the rest.”

2. Rationalizing risks: Is a nuclear Iran deterrable?

The risks entailed by a nuclear Iran are usually analyzed through the prism of deterrence, effectively asking: Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? Here again, answers diverge with both parties often basing their claims on rationality.

First and foremost among “optimists” is Kenneth Waltz. While in his classical treatise he employed rationality as subjunctive and prescriptive (see above), in the Iranian debate he renders it descriptive and explanatory, subscribing to minimal and substantive interpretation. Waltz (2012) argues that Iranian leaders are rational—they are not “mad mullahs” but “perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders”—and are thus perfectly deterrable. “It doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons … whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation” (Sagan et al., 2007:137). Blight and Lang (2012) similarly conclude that “Israel need not fear Iran” since the former has “overwhelming nuclear superiority” and “Iran’s leaders are rational.” Thus, if we “assume that a nuclear Iran will be a rational actor,” then Iran should be effectively influenced by “the logic of deterrence” (Wilner, 2012:19). Western decision makers have mostly averted such overt optimism so as not to signal acquiescence to a nuclear Iran, but some have disclosed this syllogism: Iran is rational thus deterrable (e.g. former French President Jacques Chirac, cited in Sciolino and Bennhold, 2007).

“Pessimists” counter that a nuclear Iran will pose great danger to both its immediate Mideast environment and global stability. Some, wisely I believe, prefer to either sidestep the question of rationality (Sagan, 2006) or else highlight that it does not suffice, since malfunctions, mistakes, and misuse as well as opaque decision-making and volatile circumstances may come at an especially high price (Edelman et al., 2011; Eisenstadt, 1999; Kroenig, 2012; Sagan, 1994; Sagan et al., 2007). Others turn to both substantive and optimal irrationality to circumscribe the possibility of deterring Iran, since “extreme ideological positions and distorted and paranoid perceptions of the adversary’s intentions might lead to irrational decisions during times of crisis”


16

(Evron, 2008:54). However, most rationality-based pessimists—experts and practitioners alike—focus on Iran’s substantive irrationality. For example, Gerald Steinberg proposes that Iran defies nuclear stability, as practiced in the Cold War, the latter being “primarily an ideological conflict, without the irrationality flowing from religious zealotry” (The Morningside Post, 2012; see also Gold, 2009; in Seliktar, 2011 and more above). Similarly, Netanyahu claims that Iran transgresses the logics of nuclear deterrence and will not “behave like any other nuclear power” since it is led by “a fanatic regime that might put its zealotry above its self-interest,” and “glorifies blood and death, including its own self-immolation” (Goldberg, 2009).

That many accounts explain deterrence by rationality is hardly surprising, as rationality informs much of the scholarship on deterrence (for literature reviews see Lupovici, 2010; Quackenbush, 2011). It also underpins the concomitant “nuclear peace” thesis (Rauchhaus, 2009), which holds that “nuclear weapons are in fact a tremendous force for peace and afford nations that possess them the possibility of security at reasonable cost” (Waltz, 1990:731). While limitations of scope prevent substantial engagement with the vast literature on deterrence, three problems of “rational deterrence” should be stressed: rationality is insufficient for deterrence; unnecessary for deterrence; and, in its optimal/substantive interpretation, inapplicable.

Jervis (1979:299) once astutely noted that “rationality may be neither necessary nor sufficient for deterrence.” To briefly expound the argument, then first, rationality is indeed insufficient; for example, it cannot guarantee against preventive war, “second-strike” vulnerability, and accidental or unauthorized use (Russell, 2003; Sagan, 1994). Second, and rather fortunately, rationality may not even be necessary for deterrence. Granted, as with the previously discussed proposition (“rationality makes moderation”), tautology provides a way out: “Rational leaders would be deterred via mutual nuclear threats because, by definition, they would be irrational if they were not so deterred” (Payne, 2001:18). Indeed, if we define deterrence as entailing our reading of rationality, the latter becomes essential for the former. But if we clearly distinguish the two concepts, defining deterrence simply as “dissuading by threat,” then deterrence works well without rationality: a cat may hiss and arch its back to make itself appear larger so as to ward off a dog, yet one would rarely ascribe rationality to either the cat or the dog, let alone hold their rationality as explaining why that feline deterrence worked.

Third, inferring causation requires rationalities of a more precarious sort. Quantitative studies can safely draw, whether explicitly or implicitly, on minimal, instrumental, and often subjunctive rationality. Conversely, rationality-based arguments that delve into causation entail rationality as descriptive and explanatory as well as more optimal and substantive. To deter, actors should credibly communicate their capability and commitment to strongly retaliate against aggression. Given the necessary capability (mainly robust second-strike arsenals), deterrence’s other three Cs (credibility, communication, and commitment) seemingly depend on both optimal rationality (to process information, rank preferences, and maximize utility) and substantive rationality (so that the threat of material retaliation is deemed sufficiently painful). According to classical deterrence theory, such apt rationality should provide for stabilization via mutually assured destruction (MAD) logic (Freedman, 2003).


17

The problem, however, is that, as noted above, explanatory, optimal, and substantive rationalities are exactly the sorts of rationalities that have been empirically refuted. This is especially troublesome for the nuclear peace thesis, which postulates the universality of nuclear deterrence (Sagan et al., 2007:137). Deviant behavior such as suicide terrorism—which, on average, is executed by the relatively well-off—may still conform with instrumental rationality (Caplan, 2006; Trager and Zagorcheva, 2006) but seems to fly in the face of universalizing claims regarding optimal and substantive rationality: “Notions of maximization of anticipated benefits cannot account for such behaviors, and ad hoc moves to maintain rational utility at all costs result in a concept of rationality or utility doing little explanatory work” (Atran, 2003:1539; see also Caplan, 2006). Consequently, the universal proposition of the nuclear peace thesis has been substantially challenged from the cognitive-process perspective, evincing the limitations of rationality (Morgan, 2003; Stein, 2009), as well as from a refined RCT perspective (for example, via game theory), concluding that “deterrence remains, at best, tenuous and fragile, and is never the only rational possibility” (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000:252).

Conclusions

Among the various “bad habits” that permeate our discipline, few are more pervasive, or perilous, than the malpractice of “rationality.” The concept is a misfit for analyzing, and addressing, concrete security and foreign policies; and we use it often without explicating its meaning, rendering our deliberations less insightful while allowing practitioners to abuse it for political purposes. Iranian nuclear policy and the attempts of Western experts and practitioners to cope with it are a case in point.

This paper is a plea for change, not a blueprint for indictment. By evincing, theoretically and empirically, the malpractice of rationality and clarifying its contested contours, I wanted to advance an informed discussion of its merits and limitations for FPA in general, and regarding the case of Iran in particular. This paper did not aim at, and its scope does not allow for, developing an alternative model to decipher foreign policy motivations. Still, I would like to very briefly note one such alternative, which gauges not the rationality of actors or actions, but rather “the reasons that individual actors themselves give for their policy preferences” (Hollis and Smith, 1986:269)—a reasoned choice theory, so to speak. It could be initially informed by a two-step inquiry: first, regarding the decision-makers’ degrees of reflexivity about the subject matter, that is, the extent to which they debate and reason ends and means; second, regarding the decision-makers’ self-perceived “degrees of freedom,” that is, the extent to which they hold themselves as agents capable of coping with, manipulating, and even changing the structures in which they operate.

Arguably, as structural realists should be quick to point out, certain structures, such as those made of uranium, may be harder for actors to (believe they may) overcome. Still, the key is analyzing the psychological, discursive, and behavioral parameters that would allow us to learn about the decision-makers’ own reflectivity and self-perceived efficacy. Deciphering this process of “agentation” may reveal much about the self-perceived possibility, and actual prospects, of an actor transgressing a seemingly robust structure, such as MAD.


18

In hindsight, with regard to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara claimed, “It was luck that prevented nuclear war.” All the leaders were “rational individuals: Kennedy was rational; Khrushchev was rational; Castro was rational. Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies. And that danger exists today.” He concluded, “Rationality will not save us” (Morris, 2003:59). I agree.


19

References

60 Minutes-CBS (2012) The Spymaster: Meir Dagan on Iran's Threat, 16 September 2012. Al Manar TV. (2013) "Imam Khamenei: Iran Doesn’t Seek to Own Nuclear Weapons Due to

Religious Beliefs." Al Manar TV, 17 February 2013. Allison, Graham T. (1969) Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American

Political Science Review 63 (3):689-718. Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban

Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman. Amirahmadi, Hooshang, and Shahir Shahidsaless (2013) Avoid Repeating Mistakes toward Iran.

The Washington Quarterly 36 (1):145-162. Amuzegar, Jahangir (2007) The Ahmadinejad Era: Preparing for the Apocalypse. Journal of

International Affairs 60 (2):35-53. Atran, Scott (2003) Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science 299 (5612):1534-1539. Barzegar, Kayhan (2009) The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus. World Policy Journal 26

(3):21-30. Basu, Kaushik (1994) The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory. The

American Economic Review 84 (2):391-395. Bendor, Jonathan B. (2010) Bounded Rationality and Politics. Berkeley: University of California

Press. Beres, Louis René. (2012) "Two Ways Israel Can Deter a Nuclear Iran." U.S.News, 15 August

2012. Binder, Leonard (1971) Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: Princeton

University Press. Blight, James G., and Janet M. Lang. (2012) "How Castro Held the World Hostage." New York

Times, 26 Oct 2012, A.33. Breton, Albert, ed. (2002). Political Extremism and Rationality. New York: Cambridge University

Press. Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce (2010) Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models. In The

International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Allen Denemark. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Caplan, Bryan (2006) Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model. Public Choice 128 (1-2):91-107.

Carlsnaes, Walter (1992) The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis. International Studies Quarterly 36 (3):245-270.

Clifton, Eli. (2012) "Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Stands by Assessment That Iran Is a Rational Actor." ThinkProgress, 1 March 2012.

Cole, Juan Ricardo (2009) Engaging the Muslim World. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cottam, Richard W. (1977) Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study.

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Dumbrell, John, and David M. Barrett (1997) The Making of Us Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. New

York: St. Martin's Press.


20

Edelman, Eric S, Andrew F Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery (2011) Dangers of a Nuclear Iran-the Limits of Containment, The. Foreign Affairs 90 (1):66-81.

Eisenstadt, Michael (1999) Living with a Nuclear Iran? Survival 41 (3):124-148. Elster, Jon (1989) Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality. New York:

Cambridge University Press. ——— (2007) Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. New

York: Cambridge University Press. Erdbrink, Thomas. (2012) "Iran: Upgraded Missile Introduced." New York Times, 22 August 2012,

A.7. Etzioni, Amitai (1988) The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. New York: Collier

Macmillan. Evron, Yair (2008) An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability. In Israel

and a Nuclear Iran : Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense, edited by Ephraim Kam, pp. 47-63. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies.

Farkas, Andrew (1996) Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis. International Studies Quarterly 40 (3):343-361.

Freedman, Lawrence (2003) The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Friedman, Milton (1953) Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gallie, William B. (1955) Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

56:167-198. Giddens, Anthony (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.

Berkeley: University of California Press. Gintis, Herbert (2009) The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral

Sciences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Gold, Dore (2009) The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West. Washington, D.C.:

Regnery Pub. Goldberg, Jeffrey. (2009) "Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran—or I Will." The Atlantic, March 2009

[updated 2 April 2009]. Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,

Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gordon, Carol, and Asher Arian (2001) Threat and Decision Making. Journal of Conflict

Resolution 45 (2):196-215. Hampsher-Monk, Iain, and Andrew Hindmoor (2010) Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence:

Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place? Political Studies 58 (1):47-65. Harel, Amos. (2012) "IDF Chief to Haaretz: I Do Not Believe Iran Will Decide to Develop

Nuclear Weapons." Haaretz, 25 April 2012. Hill, Christopher (2003) The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave

MacMillan. Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith (1986) Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making.

British Journal of Political Science 16 (3):269-286.


21

Hudson, Valerie M. (2007) Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub.

Hurley, S. L., and Matthew Nudds, eds. (2006). Rational Animals? New York: Oxford University Press.

Ish-Shalom, Piki (2013) Democratic Peace : A Political Biography. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Islam, Md Thowhidul (2012) The Logic Behind Iran's Uncompromising Nuclear Policy. Asia Journal of Global Studies (1-2):68-78.

Jackson, Richard (2007) Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse. Government and Opposition 42 (3):394-426.

Jensen, Keith, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello (2007) Chimpanzees Are Rational Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game. Science 318 (5847):107-109.

Jervis, Robert (1976) Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——— (1979) Deterrence Theory Revisited. World Politics 31 (2):289-324. Johnson, James (1996) How Not to Criticize Rational Choice Theory. Philosophy of the social

sciences 26 (1):77-91. Jones, Bryan D. (1999) Bounded Rationality. Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1):297-321. Joshi, Shashank (2012) The Implications of a Nuclear Iran. Whitehall Papers 79 (1):75-129. Kacelnik, Alex (2006) Meanings of Rationality. In Rational Animals?, edited by S. L. Hurley and

Matthew Nudds, pp. 87-106. New York: Oxford University Press. Kahneman, Daniel (2003) Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics.

The American Economic Review 93 (5):1449-1475. Kalberg, Stephen (1980) Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of

Rationalization Processes in History. American Journal of Sociology 85 (5):1145-1179. Kroenig, Matthew (2012) Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option. Foreign Aff.

91 (1):76-86. Lake, David A. (2002) Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First

Century. Dialogue IO 1 (01):15-29. Landler, Mark. (2012) "Obama Says Option to Strike Iran Not a 'Bluff,' but Cites Repercussions."

New York Times, 2012 Mar 03. Logan, Justin, and Ted Galen Carpenter (2007) Evidence Suggests Iran Wouldn't Pull Nuclear

Trigger. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Lovett, Frank (2006) Rational Choice Theory and Explanation. Rationality and Society 18 (2):237-

272. Lupia, Arthur, Mathew D. Mccubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, eds. (2000). Elements of Reason:

Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, Cambridge Studies in Political Psychology and Public Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lupovici, Amir (2010) The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—toward a New Research Agenda. International Studies Quarterly 54 (3):705-732.


22

Macdonald, Paul K. (2003) Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory. American Political Science Review 97 (4):551-565.

Maliniak, Daniel, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney (2012) Trip around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries. Williamsburg: TRIP Project.

Mcnamara, Robert. (1967) "Text of Speech on Anti-China Missile Defense and U.S. Nuclear Strategy." New York Times, 19 September 1967, 18.

Mercer, Jonathan (2010) Emotional Beliefs. International Organization 64 (01):1-31. Mintz, Alex, and Karl R. Derouen (2010) Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. New

York: Cambridge University Press. Morgan, Patrick M. (2003) Deterrence Now. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. New

York: Cambridge University Press. Morris, Errol (2003) The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. Mcnamara

(Transcript). Morton, Rebecca B. (1999) Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal

Models in Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mother Jones News Team. (2012) "Full Transcript of the Mitt Romney Secret Video." Mother

Jones News, 19 September 2012. Nagel, Ernest (1963) Assumptions in Economic Theory. The American Economic Review 53

(2):211-219. Payne, Keith B. (2001) The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington:

University Press of Kentucky. Quackenbush, Stephen (2004) The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory. International

Interactions 30 (2):87-107. Quackenbush, Stephen L. (2011) Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand? Review of

International Studies 37 (02):741-762. Rauchhaus, Robert (2009) Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach.

Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2):258-277. Rousseau, David L. (2006) Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social

Construction of Realism and Liberalism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Rudoren, Jodi. (2012) "Defense Minister Adds to Israel's Recent Mix of Messages on Iran." New

York Times, 27 April 2012, A.8. Russell, Richard L. (2003) The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail. Journal of

Strategic Studies 26 (1):136-155. Sagan, Scott D. (1994) The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and

the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. International Security 18 (4):66-107. ——— (2006) How to Keep the Bomb from Iran. Foreign Affairs 85 (5):45-59. Sagan, Scott, Kenneth Waltz, and Richard K. Betts (2007) A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or

Courting Disaster? Journal of International Affairs 60 (2):135-150.


23

Saghafi-Ameri, Nasser (2009) Iranian Foreign Policy: Concurrence of Ideology and Pragmatism. In The Iranian Revolution at 30 (Viewpoints Special Edition), edited by The Middle East Institute, pp. 136-138. Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute.

Satz, Debra, and John Ferejohn (1994) Rational Choice and Social Theory. The Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):71-87.

Schelling, Thomas C. (2008 [1966]) Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sciolino, Elaine, and Katrin Bennhold. (2007) "Chirac Strays from Assailing a Nuclear Iran." New

York Times, 1 February 2007. Sebenius, James K., and Michael K. Singh (2012) Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An

Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations. International Security 37 (3):52-91.

Seliktar, Ofira (2011) Assessing Iran's Nuclear Rationality: The “Eye of the Beholder” Problem. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2 (2):188-206.

Shapiro, Ian (2005) The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Hedrick. (1972) "Soviet Acts to Counter Nixon' S Trip to China." New York Times, 15 February 1972, 4.

Snidal, Duncan (2012) Rational Choice and International Relations. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, pp. 85-111. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Stein, Arthur A. (1999) The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell, pp. 197-228. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Stein, Janice (2009) Rational Deterrence against Irrational Adversaries? No Common Knowledge. In Complex Deterrence : Strategy in the Global Age, edited by T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz, pp. 58-82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stein, Janice Gross (2012) Psychological Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, pp. 195-219. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Steinbruner, John D. (1974) The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Stigler, George J. (1961) The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy 69 (3):213-225.

Takeyh, Ray (2009) Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. New York: Oxford University Press.

Telang, G. M. (1969) "China's Nuclear Plans." The Times of India, 3 January 1969, 8. The Middle East Institute, ed. (2009). The Iranian Revolution at 30 (Viewpoints Special Edition).

Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute. The Morningside Post. (2012) "Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained?" The Morningside Post, 8

October 2012.


24

Trager, Robert F., and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva (2006) Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done. International Security 30 (3):87-123.

Vertzberger, Yaacov (1990) The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Von Mises, Ludwig (1996) Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. 4th rev. ed. New York: Foundation for Economic Education.

Walsh, Vivian Charles (1996) Rationality, Allocation, and Reproduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. (1999) Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies. International Security 23 (4):5-48.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1990) Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. The American Political Science Review 84 (3):731-745.

——— (2012) Why Iran Should Get the Bomb. Foreign Affairs 91 (4):2-5. Wendt, Alexander (2004) The State as Person in International Theory. Review of International

Studies 30 (2):289-316. Wilner, Alex S. (2012) Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and Its Terrorist Proxies.

Comparative Strategy 31 (1):18-40. Wintrobe, Ronald (2006) Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. New York:

Cambridge University Press. World Tribune. (2008) "Scholar: Mad Doctrine Does Not Apply to Iran (Bernard Lewis' Address

to the Jerusalem Conference)." World Tribune, 25 February 2008 Yetiv, Steven A. (2011) Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making in the Gulf Wars. 2nd

ed. Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins Univeristy Press. Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour (2000) Perfect Deterrence. New York: Cambridge

University Press. Zakaria, Fareed (2012) Watch GPS: Martin Dempsey on Syria, Iran and China, 17 February 2012.

The Malpractice of Rationality in International Relations

Documents

Transcript of The Malpractice of Rationality in International Relations