1143451

Dissertation

MA(Taught) Air Power History, Theory and Practice

Word Count 11,996

1

The 1957 Defence White Paper had a seismic effect on British Air

Power. What were the main influences on its architect Duncan

Sandys?

INTRODUCTION

The popular narrative on the 1957 Defence White Paper (DWP) is

that of an ill-conceived 'bolt from the blue', largely written

personally by the Defence Minister Duncan Sandys, that, at a

stroke, destroyed the thriving British aircraft industry.

Everything from the rationalisation of the industry to the loss of

morale in the RAF to the cancellation of projects including TSR-2

have been attributed to this paper and to its author. Most

aspects of the DWP have now received thorough historical

attention,1 helped by the declassification of various archives

since the 1980s. However, Sandys the 'hatchet man', radical and

ambitious politician and enemy of the Chiefs of Staff, remains

known as the chief architect of a Paper that alone had a direct

and profound effect on the British aircraft industry; this view

can be challenged.

1 Matthew Grant, "Home Defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957," Journal ofStrategic Studies 31, no. 6 (2008): p926.

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This dissertation attempts to summarise the latest thinking on the

debate by showing the DWP in its full context, and will show how

the majority of the policies therein had in fact been formed,

albeit often in secrecy, over the previous decade. It will show

that the main objective of the DWP was in fact a reduction in the

defence budget, driven by the then Prime Minister, the achievement

of which was thought possible through two main mechanisms, both of

which were new if not unexpected. These were the impending end to

the National Service Act; and a firm move to a policy of nuclear

deterrence at the expense of conventional forces, rather than

concurrent with them. The magnitude of the force reductions -

from 690,000 to 375,000 personnel - was largely driven, in turn,

by the end of National Service. Although certain aircraft

projects - all of which were in the research and development stage

- were directly cancelled through an obscure entry toward the back

of the DWP, the work to rationalise the Industry was in fact dealt

with by later initiatives. It will also be shown to be very

unlikely that the aircraft project cancellations in the DWP were

the work of Sandys, the responsibility for R&D resting as it did

with another Government Ministry, the Ministry of Supply (MoS),

the leaders of which were generally disinclined or unable to

support air power.

3

There are many excellent books and articles that cover the period

in question. Many have dealt with the 'high politics' of nuclear

deterrence, starting in 1974 with the publication of Margaret

Gowing's two-volume 'Independence and Deterrence' and AJR Groom's

'British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons'. Later, declassification

enabled historians such as John Baylis, Martin Navias, Lawrence

Freedman, Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler to produce further

authoritative texts, the best of which is Baylis' 'Ambiguity and

Deterrence, British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964'. The works of

these writers have been mined extensively for details of the

development of nuclear policy, though they rarely 'reach down'

beyond occasional references to the Service Chiefs of Staff.

Peter Hennessy provides a lively commentary on the workings of the

'Secret State'. The British Aircraft Industry is subject of a

wealth of literature of varying quality, the most historically

robust of which is probably Keith Hayward's British Aircraft

Industry. Other more emotive and popular works were compared for

example Derek Wood's 'Project Cancelled'. The official Air

Historical Branch narrative of the period was written by Cecil

James and is a comprehensive, if perhaps biased (James worked in

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the Air Ministry over the period in question), account of the

period from the perspective of the Air Staff and Air Ministry.

Part One will introduce Sandys himself, before dealing with the

context surrounding the creation of the DWP. Sandys personal

archives are held at Churchill College Cambridge and contain a

wealth of information including papers, newspaper articles and

memorabilia. Unfortunately several important files were removed

in the 1980s - about the time of the declassification of many

Government archives and renewed interest in the period -

including, crucially, his ministerial and running papers for the

precise period in question - January to April 1957. Sandys never

published his memoirs and, although an official biography was

later commissioned by his family, it was not completed.2 Despite

this, a chronological account of his life deduced from various

books, texts, biographies and articles will show him to have been

far from a newcomer to missile warfare when he took up the post of

Defence Secretary in 1957; indeed, by this time he had spent the

majority of the previous twenty years involved in this field from

field practitioner to international negotiator. He will be shown

to have been an ambitious radical reformer who was not afraid to

2 Churchill College Archivists; Gary Love, "The British Movement, Duncan Sandys,and the Politics of Constitutionalism in the 1930s," Contemporary British History 23, no. 4 (2009): p544.

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stand on principle; indeed, when he did so in his early career he

was usually proven right. It will be shown that Sandys personal

involvement in the early development of British nuclear weapons

had an influence on the 1957 paper, but that his personal

involvement in the short period of drafting of the paper did not

extend much further than the most pressing - and interdependent -

issues of nuclear weapons, military manpower and reductions in

expenditure.

The development of British nuclear policy will be briefly charted,

as it forms the basis for the ideas contained within the DWP. The

policy of deterrence will be shown to have been a natural

progression of earlier air power concepts. The move to develop an

independent British deterrent will be shown to have grown from

uncertainty about US motives and an over-riding concern of

Churchill and others to maintain a seat at the international 'top

table'. The development of national strategy will be charted,

with reference to most of the Defence white papers and major

strategy documents of the period. This will serve to illuminate

the primary dilemma of the post-war period: that of developing

nuclear capability while still maintaining the regular force

structures that were called for by national and NATO policies

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alike, against the backdrop of a struggling economy. The British

military aircraft industry will be shown to have received scant

attention from those at the highest levels.

Having set the scene, Part Two will deal primarily with the ten

week period during which the DWP was written. This will be done

through close scrutiny of what remains of the ten drafts, or

'proofs' of the DWP, with particular attention to those sections

that had a direct impact on the future development of air power.

Where possible, attempts will be made to relate changes in the

wording to Sandys personal motives and also to concurrent external

influences, both at home and overseas, including Press articles of

the day. The relationship between Sandys and his ministers and

Service Chiefs will also be explored to ascertain what part they

played in its compilation; it will be shown that due to a

reputation of unproductive inter-service rivaly, not only were

they barely consulted but that subsequent reforms to Defence

ensured that the Minister retained his over-riding power over

major policy decisions.

Finally, Part Three will look at the direct consequences of the

DWP over the five year period that it aimed to forecast its

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'outline of future policy'. The main areas highlighted will again

be those with an impact on British air power: Defence reform, the

nuclear deterrent, rationalisation of the aircraft industry and

Research and Development (R&D). The continuing stormy

relationship between Sandys and the Chiefs will be described,

hastening reforms that led to the creation of the Ministry of

Defence. The nuclear deterrent policy will be charted through

various doomed projects, especially Blue Streak in which Sandys

had a heavy personal involvement. Rationalisation of the aircraft

industry will be shown to have been poorly managed until the point

that the MoS was subsumed into the new Ministry of Aviation in

1959 and Sandys moved across to take charge of this new more

powerful department.

Areas for further research will be indicated, particularly the

history of the Ministry of Supply which, after being disbanded in

1959, has had very little - if indeed any - historical attention.

The parliamentary subservience of this Ministry did not fit with

its remit to foster R&D, the lifeblood of British industry and, to

an extent, the economy as a whole. Finally, to conclude, it will

be shown how the 1957 Government's tactics are still in use today.

This will draw upon evidence of the recent Strategic Defence and

8

Security Review with a view to showing it in a new light based on

the experiences of 1957.

9

PART ONE. THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER - HISTORY, PRETEXTS AND

CONTEXT.

Duncan Sandys - Early Career 1935-1957

Duncan Sandys (pronounced 'sands') was born in 1908 and educated

at Eton and Oxford. His father was Conservative MP, diplomat and

British Expeditionary Force veteran George John Sandys. A New York

Times obituary described Duncan Sandys as a 'tall, elegantly

tailored man with red hair and a notorious temper'.3 Sandys

followed in his Father's footsteps and was first elected to

Parliament as MP for Norwood in 1935 at the age of 27; that same

year he married Diana Churchill, daughter of the future Prime

Minister. By this time he had already established a reputation as

an independent thinker and radical reformer, having formed the

British Movement. The British Movement was, on the whole,

unsuccessful due to lack of support and funding; however, it did

serve to enhance Sandy's reputation within the Conservative Party

proper, leading to his nomination for Norwood. A recent article

on the British Movement paints Sandys as both radical and

ambitious; the latter was also shown to have tempered the former

3 New York Times 27 November 1987. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/27/obituaries/lord-duncan-sandys-79-dead-smoothed-way-to-end-of-empire.html accessed 9 Sep 12

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as he compromised his methods in order to seek greater political

power.4

In 1938 Sandys came to prominence again in a dispute over inflated

claims by the Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha of

the number of anti-aircraft guns in operational service. A year

earlier, Sandys had been commissioned in the Territorial Army 51st

Anti-Aircraft Brigade and his close ties to air defence allowed

him to prepare a question to Parliament that was designed to

expose Hore-Belisha's false claims and show British Anti-Aircraft

Artillery (AAA) to be grossly under-strength. Churchill backed

Sandys in a move that resulted in a re-write of the Official

Secrets Act and, effectively, the end of Hore-Belisha's political

ambitions.5 This can be seen as a principled and bold move by

Sandys - one that exposed a real issue of British defensive

vulnerability to bombardment, an area in which Sandys would

specialise for much of the rest of his career.

By the time war broke out in 1939, large deficiencies in numbers

of British AAA remained, leading Churchill to call for the

production of a British anti-aircraft rocket; the project was led

4 Love, "The British Movement," p555.5 JP Harris, "The 'Sandys Storm': The Politics of British Air Defence in 1938," Historical Research 62, no. 149 (1989): pp318-36.

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by scientist Dr Alwyn Crow. The most successful type was the 'Z-

Battery' - a battery of 128 rockets or 'unrotated projectiles';

'Z' replaced the word 'rocket' for reasons of secrecy. The

commanding officer of the first battery was the now Major Duncan

Sandys. Under instruction from the War Office to develop the

weapon for use only against dive-bombers, Sandys then decided that

high level bombers were also valid for attack and, having

developed this capability in secret, he moved the battery to

Cardiff and was soon claiming his first successful (though never

verified) attacks. These claims were sufficient to move the War

Office to produce the rockets in large numbers. Assuming that his

claims were correct, Sandys determination - against his orders -

had ultimately produced a successful outcome. Unfortunately this

also required a great deal of travelling between Aberporth and

Cardiff, and Sandys' military career came to an abrupt halt when

one of his drivers fell asleep at the wheel and crashed, leaving

Sandys with a foot injury from which he never fully recovered.6

Sandys returned to politics and became Junior Parliamentary

Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (MoS). The major remit of the

MoS was oversight and control of military procurement and supply.

6 Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, Rocket (London: Hutchinson, 1957), p22-24.Martin Middlebrook, The Peenemunde Raid. The Night of 17-18 August 1943 (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982).

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Sir Phillip Joubert de la Ferte and others have speculated that

the Chiefs of Staff had been 'mindful...of Sandys previous

association with rockets' when in 1943 they nominated him to lead

the intelligence effort against Peenemunde.7 Sandys' personal

determination to forge his own path in the face of adversity -

once again at odds with his orders - is demonstrated clearly by

his handling of this task. Head of the Air Ministry's

Intelligence Branch Dr (later Prof) RV Jones strenuously objected

to Sandy's nomination believing himself to be the right man for

the job; however, he did agree with Sandys findings.8 Once

convinced by the results of photographic reconnaissance that

Peenemunde was indeed a long range rocket development and test

site, Sandys first appealed to the Prime Ministers' scientific

adviser Lord Cherwell (who reportedly did not like Sandys either

and had disapproved of his nomination; there were accusations of

nepotism)9 who 'expressed his disbelief in the theory', leading to

a refusal by the War Cabinet to sanction an attack.10 Undefeated,

Sandys summoned a panel of experts and place the evidence before

them. They consulted Dr Crow who also confirmed that such long

range was impossible to achieve; the panel also gave Sandys no

7 Ferte, Rocket, p57. ;Middlebrook, The Peenemunde Raid. The Night of 17-18 August 1943, p37.8 RV Jones, Most Secret War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), p335.9 Middlebrook, The Peenemunde Raid, p37. Jones, Most Secret War, p335.10 Ferte, Rocket, p58. Jones, Most Secret War, p343.

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support. Finally, Sandys placed the evidence before another

meeting of the War Cabinet on 29 June 1943. Cherwell, purporting

to play devils advocate11 but, given the defensive nature of his

language, evidently embarrassed at the German progress with

rockets in comparison to the British, put forward the case for the

whole programme being a hoax. In the end, Churchill accepted the

arguments of both Sandys and RV Jones and, finally, sanctioned the

attack.12 Sandys association with long range rockets did not end

there, he was again selected by the Prime Minister to chair the

Bodyline and Crossbow Committees,13 both of which were concerned

with defences against flying bombs and rockets; he remained

closely associated with this field until the end of the War.

Sandys lost his seat in the Labour election victory of 1945 but

returned as MP for Streatham upon the 1950 Conservative Party re-

election. In 1951 he was appointed Minister of Supply where

chief amongst the various military procurement programmes was the

development of nuclear weapons. By 1952 he was already claiming

that production was within 'measureable distance'.14 In 1954 he

advocated both cuts to the defence budget15 and the development of 11 Jones, Most Secret War, pp344-45.12 CAB 69-5, DO(43)5th Meeting - Minutes, dated 29 June 194313 Jones, Most Secret War, p425.14 C J Bartlett, The Long Retreat. A Short History of British Defence Policy, 1945-70 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1972), p110.15 Ibid., p105.

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medium range nuclear ballistic missiles, the lines he would take

again in 1957. Finally, in late 1954 he moved to become Minister

of Housing and Local Government where he would remain until being

called forward by Macmillan in January 1957 as Minister of

Defence.

Setting the Scene for the DWP - International Politics and

Deterrence

The concept of deterrence was not exclusive to the nuclear age.

As Michael Howard wrote in 1957, 'there is nothing new about this

doctrine. Each major power in Europe between 1871 and 1914

maintained enormous forces at split-second readiness to deter its

neighbours'.16 A draft letter from Prime Minister Attlee to

President Truman in September 1945, long before Britain fielded a

nuclear capability, shows the origins of the British deterrence

policy in pre-war debates over bombing:

I understand that the power of the bombs delivered on Nagasaki may be multiplied many

times as the invention develops. I have heard no suggestion of any possible means of

defence. The only deterrent is the possibility of the victim of such an attack being able to

retort on the victor. In many discussions on bombing in the days before the war it was 16 Michael Howard, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age," RUSI Journal 102, no. 4 (1957): p473.

15

demonstrated that the only answer to the bomber was the bomber. The war proved this to

be correct.17

Indeed, it has been shown that the pre- and post-1945 development

of air power was much along the same conceptual lines. Many of

the arguments concerning deterrence, retaliation, counter-force

strikes etc have their origins in similar arguments from the 1930s

concerning first strike capability and targeting.18 Once the

nuclear weapon, and particularly the hydrogen bomb, appeared in

the arsenal, those early air power theories - Douhet's knockout

blow - finally had a means.

The post-War Attlee government was a strong supporter of nuclear

development; a Cabinet sub-committee authorised the production of

plutonium in December 1945.19 In 1946 American isolationism was

confirmed by the passing of the MacMahon Act which effectively

ended any overt Anglo-American atomic cooperation begun under the

Manhattan Project.20 This was followed in 1947 by Cabinet approval

for the production of British nuclear weapons.21 In the same year,

17 CAB 21/405318 Richard Overy, "Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939," Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (1992): p74.19 Dan Keohane, Security in British Politics 1945-99 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), pp136-37.20 Ibid., p138.21 Ibid., pp137-39.

16

Attlee did manage to secure the secret 'UK-USA Treaty' which

established the foundation of an intelligence relationship between

the two nations, following which he also authorised a close

working relationship between the RAF and CIA which led eventually

to British involvement in the U2 flights over the Soviet Union.22

Having instigated the British programme, the Government kept it

under wraps for the period 1945-1951. It was never addressed by

the full Cabinet; indeed, the costs were entirely concealed from

the House, the members of which were heavily discouraged from

asking questions about it.23 On returning to power in 1951,

Churchill found 'with a mixture of admiration, envy and the shock

of a good parliamentarian that his predecessors had spent £100m on

it without informing Parliament'.24 Churchill informed Sandys as

Minister of Supply that until the 1946 Atomic Energy Act was

altered his Ministry would remain responsible for atomic energy

and financially accountable for it'.

In 1952, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rab Butler made it clear - as

he would again several times over the next five years - that 'the

22 John Bayliss, Ambiguity and Deterrence. British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p129 footnote 523 Keohane, Security in British Politics 1945-99, pp138-39.24 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence. Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952 Volume 1 - Policy Making., vol. 1 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974), p406.

17

total burden of production for defence and exports was greater

than the economy could bear'.25 On the other hand, pressure was

being applied by NATO, especially the US, not only to sustain

defence levels but to increase them further in the light of the

increasing Soviet threat.

Against a background of economic concerns and disagreement over

NATO strategy, the 1952 Global Strategy Paper (GSP) was called

for, and led by Sir John Slessor. What followed was what was

later to be heralded widely in secondary literature as the first

time Britain was to 'base its national security planning almost

entirely upon a declaratory policy of nuclear deterrence'. This

has since been called into question since the release of the 1947

and 1950 strategy papers which, structured in a similar way to the

1952 GSP, can both be seen to have extolled the same basic

premise: prevention of war through the deterrent effect of nuclear

weapons.26 The only barriers remaining were the final production

of operational nuclear weapons and, crucially, the means to

deliver them.

25 John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p130.26 Ibid., pp148-49.

18

It was again partly a question of the 'unreliability of the

Americans' that later drove Churchill to address the question in

1954 of taking Britain the significant step further from Atomic to

Hydrogen devices. Churchill formed the Defence Policy Committee

(DPC) to consider specifically the twin dilemmas of the H Bomb and

the requirement to cut defence spending, all this with an over-

riding concern to maintain a British seat 'at the top table'. As

Peter Hennessy points out in his book 'Secret State', this was the

start of the exercise that led finally to the DWP some three years

later. It was clear at this point, as later, that if Britain

wished - somewhat ambitiously as it turned out - to achieve parity

as the third nuclear power in order to retain a hope of

influencing the United States in its foreign policy, it could not

do so without savings elsewhere within the defence budget.

Successive governments throughout the nuclear age struggled with

the ambiguities of deterrence policy. The chief dilemma was that

if deterrence was expected to be successful, then no attack would

take place; therefore, logically, no provision was required for

air or civil defence. To fund air and civil defence was to admit

that deterrence might fail. The arguments against the requirement

for a fighter force were even stronger than those against civil

19

defence, though the latter was to be cut severely following the

DWP.27 Even if an attack did take place with ballistic nuclear

weapons, conventional fighter aircraft were powerless to defend

against them, arriving as they would from a very high trajectory

directly from space. An interceptor force could potentially deal

with an incoming fleet of Russian bomber aircraft; however, only a

few of these would have to penetrate to inflict catastrophic

damage.

Therefore the potential for a system of defence against Russian

ballistic missiles using manned fighters - or for that matter the

anticipated next generation of supersonic interceptors and Surface

to Air Missiles (SAMs), was thought remote. From a 1954

Government paper:

[against nuclear weapons] guns are valueless and even the capabilities of fighter aircraft

and guided missiles will be limited... it might be possible to develop, during the next ten

years, an air defence system which would destroy a very high percentage of attacks by

manned aircraft... it is however unlikely [that this] would give the complete protection

necessary against these weapons... furthermore... the system would be valueless when the

27 Grant, "Home Defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957," p927.

20

ballistic rocket threat develops... no such method [of defence against ballistic rockets] is in

sight.28

In 1952, as anticipated operators of the first means of deterrence

(the V Force and Blue Danube bomb) the Air Staff started a long

term plan for the successor to the V Force. This was envisaged to

be either a mach-3 supersonic bomber or an unmanned ballistic

missile. Plans for both were progressed; however, the best

information regarding ballistic weapons resided in America. In

1953 Sandys met with US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson (with

whom he would meet again on his first international engagement as

Secretary of State for Defence) and, armed with an agreement to

share technical information, returned to initiate the British Blue

Streak fixed site Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

programme.29 On 16 June 1954 the DPC further authorised Sandys to

initiate a programme for the production of hydrogen bombs.

The decision to manufacture hydrogen bombs was released to the

public in the 1955 White Paper. It was in this year that the

connections between nuclear defence policy and the potential to

reduce expenditure started to take shape. The then Defence 28 CAB 129/69, C(54) 249 Memorandum on United Kingdom Defence Policy dated 23 July 195429 Ian Clark and Nicholas J Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945 - 1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p223.

21

Minister Selwyn Lloyd attempted in the second half of 1955 to

establish a long term defence programme against the backdrop of

more 'dire warnings' from Rab Butler that prompted Eden to argue

that Britain must 'now cut its coat according to its cloth'.

Sandys left the Ministry of Supply for the Ministry of Housing and

Local Government in October 1954. Sir Anthony Eden succeeded

Churchill in April 1955, appointing Reginald Maudling as Minister

of Supply. Eden called for a further review that led the

following year to the 1956 Defence White Paper. Most of the seeds

of the 1957 DWP can be found in the 1956 Review. The fundamental

change between 1956 and 1957; however, was the dropping of the

'broken backed warfare' concept. In 1956 sizeable regular forces

were still perceived to be required in order to 'hold the

line...until the nuclear counter-offensive has broken the back of

the enemy assault.' This still offered no real mechanism for

savings.

Macmillan, now Chancellor, was clearly unappeased by this

document; the following month he wrote to the Prime Minister to

call for 'a reappraisal at the highest level of the whole basis on

which our defence policy should rest'.30 This stressed that the 30 Released later as PR(56)2, Policy Review Committee paper 4 June 1956

22

National Service Act was due to expire in 1958 and asked 'for what

situation, short of global war, was is necessary to be prepared?'.

It was this mindset - that a review of the 'whole basis' of

defence was required - that was maintained by Macmillan right

through to the 1957 DWP. Indeed, the new policy may have been set

out sooner has it not been for the Suez crisis. What did result

from the deliberations of the PRC was a six month round of intense

diplomatic activity, beginning in June 1956, aimed at winning the

support of NATO, in particular the US and Canada, for major

reductions in British forces. The PRC met for the ninth time on

25 July 1956, the day before Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal;

it did not meet again until 18 December, by which time Eden was

already in ill health.31

The reaction of the Air Staff to this work of the PRC, once

exposed to it, was interesting. The AHB narrative (albeit written

by Cecil James, himself an administrator in the Air Ministry in

1956 to whom his views have been described as 'sympathetic'32)

holds their reaction to have been generally supportive of the

Government line - owners as they were of the means of delivery.33

The nuclear deterrent in particular was however the subject of

31 James, Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1956-1963, p4.32 Ibid., xi.33 Ibid., p9.

23

heated debate and disagreement between the Services. CAS was told

that a clear exposition of the new concept, by the Air Staff, had

been accepted by the Naval Staff but vetoed by the War Office

Director of Plans.34 Consensus was not reached and the divisions

were eventually exposed to the then Minister of Defence Sir Walter

Monckton35 who, despite recognising that political guidance was

required, failed to resolve the issue.36 The British aircraft

industry itself was rarely mentioned; indeed, papers prepared for

the PRC on R&D, the lifeblood of industry and still under the

control of the MoS, had not even been considered by the time the

PRC was wrapped up prematurely due to the Suez Crisis, and perhaps

never were.37

In support of the deliberations of the PRC, the plan formulated by

the Air Staff was a memorandum on 'The Future Size and Shape of

the Royal Air Force', which VCAS submitted to the Air Council in

early June. VCAS still saw the need for both a successor fighter

to the Lightning, and for an advanced bomber to bridge the gap

between the end of the V Bomber force and the arrival of the

missile deterrent; indeed AV Roe were already in the early stages

34 Ibid., p17.35 Ibid., p18.36 Ibid., p21.37 Ibid., p30.

24

of work on the Avro 730 supersonic bomber under Operational

Requirement 330 (OR330) dated January 1956.38 This lack of

attention to R&D was to contribute to the difficulties experienced

by the RAF and Industry alike following the DWP. In the words of

Cecil James: 'the time which Ministers had given themselves to

reach decisions on defence can now be seen to have been much too

short...among the outstanding issues [when the PRC was effectively

postponed by Suez] were the ballistic missile programme and the

future size and shape of research and development'.

Back in 1950 the first studies into the rationalisation of the

aircraft industry had been initiated but abandoned; the work was

picked up again picked up in 1953. Denis Havilland, Under

Secretary at the MoS, wanted an end to 'Buggins Turn' of thinly

spread development projects and to create more economically viable

companies. In 1955 Minister of Supply Reginald Maudling argued

that the Industry should be allowed to rationalise naturally as

demand fell. He maintained this line to the end of his tenure

before 'excusing himself' from leading the MoS in the January 1957

re-shuffle, finding the very existence of the department to be

questionable as middle-man between Defence and Industry.

Maudling's successor Aubrey Jones - an economist and the last 38 Ibid., pp31-32.

25

Minister of Supply before the department was finally incorporated

into the new Ministry of Aviation (MoA) in 1959 - also warned that

'some consolidation of resources' in the industry was inevitable

but offered no direction as to how.39 The consolidation or

rationalisation of the aircraft industry was therefore 'on the

books' long before Sandys took up his post in Defence.

39 Hayward, British Aircraft Industry, p68.

26

PART 2. 10 JANUARY TO 4 APRIL 1957 - DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS;

DRAFTING AND PRODUCTION OF THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER.

Harold MacMillan replaced Anthony Eden as Prime Minister on 10

January 1957. His new Cabinet list was approved by HM the Queen

on 13 January and released to the Press the following day. Having

most recently served as Chancellor of the Exchequer, MacMillan was

clear from the outset that his priority for Defence was a

significant cut in expenditure; indeed, it was former Defence

Secretary Anthony Head's inability to agree with this policy that

resulted in Macmillan asking him to move aside and make way for

the 'hatchet man' Duncan Sandys.40 Macmillan also had a new

directive drafted, drawing on his own frustrations as Defence

Minister,41 that increased Sandys' powers over the Service Chiefs.42

From the start, Sandys followed his brief, seeking to exercise

strong hierarchical authority over the Department.43

Piecing together a narrative of the period of the Review is

problematic. Sandys' 1957 desk diary is blank for the entire

period. The crucial three months of Ministerial Running Papers 40 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p247.41 Randolph Churchill interview with Duncan Sandys, London Evening Standard 23 Jan 57; ibid., p242.42 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (london: Macmillan and Co, 1971), p188.43 A J R Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, 1974), p268.

27

were removed from the archives in the early 1980s and are kept by

his family. Several drafts of the DWP can be found in the

Churchill Archives; however, the first two are missing and few are

dated, making it difficult to relate changes in wording to actual

events. That said, at least seven of the ten revisions took place

in the final three weeks prior to publication. What is clear, in

terms of the conduct of the Review, is that from the start the

first mission was clear: to obtain support from the United States,

in particular the supply of nuclear IRBMs that would 'augment' the

V-Force and secure Anglo-American technical cooperation.

Shortly after the announcement of the new Cabinet, Sandys was

invited to Washington by US Defence Secretary Charles Wilson -

with whom he had met successfully in 1953 over plans for Blue

Streak - for meetings on 28 and 29 January.44 Most of the major

issues that eventually surfaced in the DWP were carried in the

Press even before Sandys arrived at the Pentagon, formed as many

were in the debates of previous years. On 20 January the Sunday

Times ran an article 'Britain Offered Missiles by US' in which it

speculated on a US offer of Nike-series Surface to Air Missiles

44 Michael Dockrill, "Restoring the 'Special Relationship': The Bermuda and Washington Conferences, 1957," in Decisions and Diplomacy: Essays in Twentieth Century International History, ed. Dick Richardson and Glyn Stone (London: Routledge, 1995), p206.

28

(SAMs). The following day, the Daily Mail picked up the baton with

'RAF Fighter Force to be Cut by Half' citing the same missile

systems (Nike and Talus) detailed in the Sunday Times the day

before, and adding speculation of the potential deployment to

Britain of a squadron of B-52 'H-Bombers'. Basil Liddell-Hart

produced three articles for the Daily Mirror at this time - reportedly

sent personally to Sandys on 21 January in advance of publication45

- that were very much in line with the later DWP with statements

like 'so why waste money keeping forces to defend what is

undefendable?', 'National Service must be abolished' and 'RAF

Fighter Command is no longer necessary'. A Daily Telegraph editorial

on 22 January called fighters 'virtually useless'. The Mirror's

chosen headline for the Liddel Hart articles - 'Stop Bluffing' -

was echoed by the Daily Herald (forerunner of The Sun) in its article

of 23 January: 'Stop Playing Soldiers' which began with the

statement 'There is no defence against the Hydrogen Bomb'. It

bluntly stated 'Fighter Command is redundant', and went on to call

for British nuclear expertise to be traded for US guided weapons

and ballistic missiles.

On 18 January, Harold Macmillan issued a directive to Sandys, the

Service Minsters and Minister of Supply, requiring Sandys, as his 45 Daily Mirror 22 Jan 57

29

first task, to 'formulate, in the light of present strategic

needs, a new defence policy which will secure a substantial

reduction in expenditure and manpower'. It went on: 'The Minister

of Defence will have authority to give decisions on all matters of

policy affecting the size, shape, organisation and disposition of

the Armed Forces, their equipment and supply'.46

At the second meeting of the new Cabinet on 21 January, three days

before Sandys' review was announced in the Commons, the subject of

the economy was raised and a rather loose requirement for Defence

savings of '£100-200m, including a saving of at least £100m on

production and research' was expressed by the new Chancellor Peter

Thorneycroft. Compared to the sums discussed in the Press at the

time, this seems somewhat under-ambitious: the Daily Mail on 24

January estimated savings of £300m; the Daily Herald on 23 January:

£500m; the Daily Telegraph on 22 January was more circumspect saying

the figure was 'impossible to guess' and could be £100m, £200m or

£500m. Liddell Hart proposed £700m, almost half of the entire

Defence budget.

What followed was 10 weeks of furious activity followed during

which 'many toes were trodden on, both in the service ministries 46 NA, D (57) 2 Directive by the Prime Minister dated 18 January 1957;

30

and in NATO.'47 From the start the policy was arrived at by

Ministerial committee without consultation of the Chiefs of

Staff.48 Regarding the Chiefs of Staff, the AHB narrative

describes the period as:

even more difficult...for the Chiefs of Staff than the previous summer when the Policy

Review Committee had been meeting. This is partly explained by the time factor. As it was

expected of the Government, as well as being the government's, own intention, that it

would announce a less expensive defence programme, much had to be done at a pace

which made for long hours and short tempers49

During January the Service Chiefs completed as comprehensive an

assessment as they could against the manpower targets set;

however, in doing so they assumed that all existing weapons and

weapon system development would continue, and by implication their

future replacements.50 The abolition of national service required

a reduction in manpower to 370,000; however, the Chiefs saw

450,000 as the minimum. This led to 'tensions which exceeded

those normally present between Ministers and their advisers'.51

Eventually after a series of meetings, none of which was held with

47 Bartlett, The Long Retreat, p129.48 James, Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1956-1963, p4.49 Ibid., p51.50 Ibid., p53.51 Ibid., p54.

31

the Secretary of State, the Chiefs angrily acquiesced and produced

a plan for a force size of 380,000. The decision to reduce

manpower to this level caused a significant delay in the drafting

process of the paper. Incredibly, the first face to face meeting

between Sandys and the Chiefs did not take place until 27 March,

with just over a week to go to the announcement. Indeed, at this

meeting Sandys was put under pressure by them - and agreed - to

ensure that they were not personally linked to the Paper or to any

of its strategic assumptions.52

Sandys arrived in America on 26 January. The Press on both sides

of the Atlantic were generally supportive of his tough post-Suez

line with the Americans. The New York Times used the headline 'Tough

British Negotiator' and described him as 'long a proponent of the

deterrent school of defense [sic]'.53 The News York Herald Tribune on

the same day expressed concern over proposed reductions in

Britain's commitment to NATO. Macmillan was pleased with the

results that paved the way for the Bermuda Conference between

himself and Eisenhower that took place on 20 to 24 March:

52 Ibid., p57.53 New York Times 28 Jan 1957

32

During these weeks Duncan Sandys had been in Washington as Minister of Defence and

had taken a very firm line in a talk with Dulles. Sandys had underlined the wide-spread

and deep anti-American sentiment which prevailed in Britain... I applauded Sandys firm

position, but was interested to hear that the President had asked to see him and had

expressed a desire to do all in his power to mend the broken fences.54

Sandys followed his four day visit with a short trip to Ottawa,

after which he returned to approach the NATO leadership to ask for

consent to the proposed cuts. Despite the preparatory work

undertaken in 1956, his approach did not go down well.55 SACEUR

General Norstad insisted on 5 February that thirty divisions

remain the 'strict minimum' target, and recalled that this

estimate was based on the 1954 review of the impact of tactical

nuclear weapons. This led to another intense round of diplomacy

and further significant delays to the publishing of the DWP as the

proposed force reductions were reconciled with the British

commitment to NATO.

Following the results of Sandys negotiations with the US and NATO,

Proof 3 of the DWP was presented to the Cabinet on 18 March. At

this meeting, the presentation of the Paper was deferred until no

later than 5 April and a number of points were raised. Macmillan 54 Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959, pp241-42.55 Bartlett, The Long Retreat, p135.

33

wanted the wording of the rather sparse two-line introduction

expanded to reflect his desire to portray the Review as

maintaining 'compact and efficient fighting Services' (the exact

words used in the 1956 White Paper) while also reflecting the

change in the strategic landscape caused by the nuclear threat.

The circulation of Proof 5 dated 26 March also shows that this

work was not, as is often implied, being conducted in isolation.

Fifteen copies were produced for each of the Service ministries;

individual copies were supplied to Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff

Committee Sir William Dickson and Chief Scientific Advisor Sir

Frederick Brundrett (amongst others); and several copies were sent

to the Ministry of Supply, Foreign Office and a number of other

Government departments. The distribution list of each of the

other Proofs is not included in the archives; however, owing to

the fact that Proof 5 was simply an 'interim' document, it is

likely that the distribution of the others was similar.

Proof 6 was presented to the full Cabinet including the homecoming

Prime Minister and, finally, the Service Chiefs, on 28 March.56

The Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd advised a complete re-write of

the introduction. Finance minister Viscount Kilmuir's comments go56 CAB 128/31 CC (57) 26 Cabinet Conclusions dated 28 March 1957

34

some way to explaining why Blue Streak was not mentioned at all in

the Paper: having only just secured deployments of American IRBMs,

he did not want to give any commitment to a (clearly costly)

British weapon. The Chiefs raised a single major concern: the

manpower figure of 375,000 post National Service should be

reflected as an economic and not a military target, and thus the

final paper conceded that in reaching a final figure of 375,000

'the Government have made a comprehensive review of the demands of

defence upon the economy'. Most notably, the Prime Minister

himself undertook to re-write a number of paragraphs in order to

reflect his intention to introduce the changes gradually.

An analysis of the decisions to cut future aircraft projects can

be gleaned primarily from three of the eight final chapters that

at least maintained their titles, if not their wording, between 17

March and 5 April: 'Nuclear Deterrent', 'Defence of the

Deterrent', and 'Research and Development'.57

Nuclear Deterrence.

The main thrust of this chapter was that there was 'no means of

providing adequate protection...against the consequences of an 57 DSND 6/52 - Draft Defence White Papers

35

attack with nuclear weapons', leaving deterrence as the only

viable option. The 'free world' was dependent on the nuclear

capacity of the United States, though Britain would make a

'modest' contribution by developing its own atomic and hydrogen

bombs. The capability to deliver nuclear weapons would rest with

the V-Force, to be supplemented by US medium-range missiles. One

Baldwin-esque quote remained in the paper to set the scene for a

policy of deterrence: in the event of the failure of deterrence:

'a proportion [of enemy bombers] would inevitably get through'.

Sandys handwriting is distinctive, and closer examination of his

personal entries and amendments is illuminating. He hand-wrote in

Proof 4 that the 'foremost objective of British Foreign Policy'

was in fact 'disarmament'. This entry made it to print in Proof

5, though it was later watered down to 'amongst the foremost

objectives of British foreign policy'. He also attempted to

remove the paragraph that revealed plans for British H-Bomb

testing and stockpiling, though this remained to the final

version. The writing of Proof 4 followed Macmillan's arrival in

Bermuda and initial talks with the Americans, the results of which

were clearly communicated back to Sandys as here the agreement for

the supply of US Thor missiles is added explicitly for the first

36

time. Most strikingly of all, Proof 4 also contains a handwritten

entry from Sandys that would have fundamentally undermined the

whole thrust of the new policy: 'The possession of nuclear air

power is not by itself a wholly reliable deterrent...the frontiers

of the Free World...must be firmly defended on the ground'. This

was later removed; however, it does serve to show that even Sandys

opinion was not quite aligned with the final strategy even at this

stage.

This was far from being the final version; by Proof 7, the

potential devastation of a nuclear attack was getting worse.

Blotting out a large part of the population of the major cities

became 'might well blot out of a large part of the population'.

By Proof 8, references to H Bomb development persisted, but, in

yet another of Sandys handwritten amendments the statement 'a

stock of them will in due course be manufactured' became instead

'shortly to be tested'.

The final version was published one week later on 4 April, having

been through yet another four amendments during which time all of

the explicit references to equipment were removed and a more

diplomatic tone employed, presumably by the Prime Minister, and

37

presumably to make the wording less susceptible to targeted

criticism. 'Thor missiles' was replaced by 'some [American]

medium range missiles'. Reference to 'the Hunters and Javelins'

of the RAF was replaced by 'the fighter aircraft of the RAF'.

Soviet and Russian bombers were replaced by 'enemy' bombers.

Defence of the Deterrent

The main tenets of this section were threefold. Despite the

indefensibility of the 'major cities', the enemy must not assume

he can attack without interference. There therefore remained a

requirement for a reduced fighter force, later to be replaced by

surface to air missiles, in order to defend rocket sites and

bomber airfields. Finally, research would be intensified, in

collaboration with America, on the future potential for missile

defence against ballistic rockets. By Proof 6, the only

significant change was that the fighters were to be equipped with

air-to-air guided missiles. However, on several successive drafts

Sandys repeatedly crossed out the section on ballistic missile

defence - undoubtedly the remit of R&D. Despite this, the entry

remained until finally disappearing at the eleventh hour sometime

38

between Proof 10 and publication, re-appearing as a vague

reference under the separate title 'Research and Development'.

Research and Development

Of all of the twenty two finalised sections of the DWP, it was

that entitled 'Research and Development' (R&D) that was arguably

to have the most dramatic effect and, indeed, become the most

controversial for the air power community. What is most

remarkable is that the evolution of this section cannot be

discerned from Sandys' personal archives at all; indeed, there is

evidence that it had little to do with him until the last minute.

Nor did the language or technicalities of the section bear the

hallmarks of Macmillan's political 'smoothing' process.

Drafts 1 to 5 of the DWP, through which all of the main policies

were formulated and refined, contain no mention at all of R&D, or

of project cancellations. Finally, with just one week to go to

publication, Proof 6, as submitted to the Cabinet for final

approval, contained a new section title 'Research and

Development'; however, it was not accompanied by any text. This

was the last time the full Cabinet met to discuss the DWP prior to

39

publication. If the text was seen separately by the Cabinet, no

discussion on the matter was recorded. It is only when the DWP

reached the very final stages - Proof 10 - that an insert was

attached, produced in a separate typeset to the other Proofs. The

tone and language of the new section was different, and stark:

'having regard to the high performance...of the Vulcan and Victor medium bombers and

the likely progress of ballistic rockets and missile defence, the Government have decided

not to go on with the development of a supersonic manned bomber'

'the Government have come to the conclusion that the RAF are unlikely to have a

requirement for fighter aircraft of types more advanced that the supersonic P1 [Lightning],

and work on such projects will stop.'

'The supply of American ballistic rockets will enable Britain to discontinue work on her own

first generation of these weapons and to concentrate effort in co-operation with the

Americans upon more advanced types. This will save both time and money.'58

Essentially, British supersonic fighter and bomber development

would stop and the entire future ballistic rocket programme would

be placed in the hands of the Americans. Given the popular view

of the 1957 Paper, it is perhaps also surprising that there was no

58 DSND 6/52 - 'Research and Development' Insert can be found loose inside Proof 10 of the DWP

40

mention of rationalisation of the British aircraft industry,

simply an explicit and abrupt end to all future development of

British military offensive aircraft (a single long-term project

survived for the time being: OR339, later to become TSR2). Sandys

reaction is evident through the changes made to this text as it

was typed into the final paper. It is also possible that, faced

with such far-reaching statements - and Macmillans deadline for

the DWP to be published by 5 April - that he chose only to

countermand the one project in which he had so much personal

interest. However it came about, all references to discontinuing

the British IRBM programme were struck out. The dual demise of

supersonic fighter and bomber development went to publication.

The DWP and the Ministry of Supply

The department responsible for R&D was of course the MoS. This is

undoubtedly where the last minute R&D insert originated. Its

Minister (not a Cabinet position) was Aubrey Jones. Jones had

taken over the position three months before at the same time that

Sandys became Minister of Defence. As has already been discussed,

Jones' predecessor Reginald Maudling had stepped down having found

the ministry to be dysfunctional. It is unlikely however that

41

Jones, in the space of a few months, arrived at such stark

conclusions regarding aircraft projects alone. Maudling had

previously, just over eighteen months prior to the DWP in August

1955, firmly come down in the side of Army strength and a focus on

'local and limited war' rather than nuclear deterrence. He had

supported the reservations of Mountbatten, Brundrett and Templer

in a paper to the Defence Minister that sparked such a heated

debate that the Secretary of State for Air, Lord De L'Isle, was

dismissed from the Government for 'his vigorous and partisan

espousal of the RAF case'.59 The MoS was therefore far from being

an 'air-minded' - or even nuclear-minded - organisation and while

Sandys must, and did, take full responsibility for his Paper, the

blame for damage to British military aircraft R&D must lie to some

extent at the feet of Maudling and Jones. According to Jones'

Guardian obituary 'Macmillan sacked Jones after the 1959 election,

when the ministry of supply was wound up - a surprising move,

although it was clear that Macmillan simply could not understand

him.'60

59 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p221.60 The Guardian 12 April 2003

42

PART 3. CONSEQUENCES.

Reactions in Parliament and in the Press

In his authoritative 'British Thinking on Nuclear Weapons' AJR

Groom reflected that the DWP was 'reputed to have been largely

written by the Minister himself in the space of a few weeks'. It

is now known that the great majority of the policies contained

therein pre-dated Sandys arrival as Minister of Defence, and that

the area in which he took most interest was the development of the

means of delivery of nuclear weapons, an area in which he had

played a crucial role in previous years. The Paper went on to

produce what Groom called the 'rather rare phenomenon of a real

defence debate' at the Conservative Party Conference. The

opposition reaction was 'strangely muted'. A motion of amendment

was put down stating that the opposition 'regrets the undue

dependence on the ultimate deterrent', partly due to opposition

leader Gaitskell's concern over the American nuclear 'guarantee'

to Europe.61 Indeed, the defence debate centered strongly on the

concept of nuclear deterrence. The curtailment of fighter and

bomber development, buried as it was in the R&D section, clearly 61 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p212.

43

fitted with this concept; however, the implications were not

immediately apparent.

Architect of the 1952 Global Strategy Paper Sir John Slessor was

supportive of the paper that developed many of the ideas of the

past five years: '[The DWP] introduces no basic revolution in

policy, but merely rationalises...tendencies which have long been

obvious.' The Times initial reaction to the DWP was to welcome

Anglo-American missile cooperation. However, it soon became more

critical, adopting the line that the reduction in forces was in

fact more to do with the desire to end National Service than with

a switch to an effective policy of deterrence. The New Statesman

called for a more vigorous policy of disarmament. The Economist was

initially highly supportive and called the DWP 'the most logical

and realistic piece of military policy making which has been put

to the public since the first atomic bomb'.62

Research and Development

The MoS had been created after the War to foster development and

supply to all three Services. The 'Ministry of Boots to Atoms' as

it has been called, has also been described as 62 Ibid., pp215-16.

44

'too...overstretched to give any convincing long-term lead to the

aircraft industry'.63

On 31 August 1957, as the detailed ramifications of the DWP were

still being digested by the 'qualities', the Economist went straight

to the heart of the R&D problem in a scathing attack; however, the

attack was not on Sandys, but on Aubrey Jones and the MoS:

all [British aircraft manufacturers] continue to look to the Government to finance the basic

research that is the industry's biggest need. There are signs, however, that the Ministry of

Supply too is backing out. The savings that the Ministry is making in research expenditure

are economies where they show least and hurt most. This Ministry bears a heavy

responsibility for shaping the industry's future, but those who look to it for a clear

statement of policy have so far looked in vain...at the present time the cuts being made by

the MoS have the direct effect of spinning out the time it will take to complete

investigations [aerodynamic research]. A [new White Paper from the MoS] is the only way

that the Ministry of Supply will remove the prevailing impression that its policy is dictated

far more often by individual persuasiveness, local unemployment, and hunch, that by any

deliberate appreciation of what is good and right for the aircraft industry of this country.64

63 Andrew Brookes, V Force. The History of Britain's Airborne Deterrent. (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982), p19.64 The Economist, 31 August 1957, 'Point of no Return', pp697-699

45

This connection to Maudling, Jones and the MoS has rarely been

made since. Charles Gardner in his 1981 history of the British

Aircraft Corporation took the customary line:

by the time Sandys had responded vigorously to his brief, there was nothing left to the

British airframe industry on its dominant military side save the P1 and the still uncancelled

OR 339 - the famous Canberra replacement - towards which every major design team in

the country now turned its attention.65

The popular narrative is certainly confused over the matter. In

his emotive book 'Project Cancelled', Derek Wood describes: 'Mr

Duncan Sandys...burst his bombshell with the April DWP which ruled

out fighters other than the P1'; he goes on, 'Mr Aubrey

Jones...was made of sterner stuff and agreed to the continuation

of the first five aircraft to spec F177D'.

Following the DWP, the OR339 projects were saved due the focus

being tactical air support; only later was a nuclear strike

capability added to the requirement. Other projects directly

affected were the Avro 730 supersonic bomber (OR 330), the Fairey

Delta Fighter (OR 329), and the Saunders-Roe 177 rocket-plus-jet

65 Charles Gardner, British Aircraft Corporation. A History. (London: Book Club Associates, 1981), p19.

46

fighter (OR F-155). Keith Hayward has argued that the Avro 730

and Saunders Roe 177 were 'rightly terminated'; however, he has

pointed out that the loss of developments in supersonic fighters

left a highly lucrative market open to the Americans and French

and 'left one of Britain's most successful fighter design teams

[Hawker Siddeley] scrabbling for work'. Hayward also contends

that in assuming that civil production would take up any slack in

the Industry, the Government 'missed the fact that civil and

military development was closely linked'66 - surely also the remit

of the MoS.

Both Sandys and Jones must share responsibility for the project

cancellations; indeed, it was seen by some at the time as a joint

venture, though over the years Sandys alone has become the primary

target for the critics. From the Belfast Tribune in 1966: 'the

rationalisation of the aircraft industry under Duncan Sandys and

Aubrey Jones, have all brought Short's to its present

predicament';67 from the obituary of Industrialist George Edwards

in the Guardian in 2003: 'the government's intention, principally

in the hands of two Tory ministers of the 1950s, Aubrey Jones and

66 Ibid., p71.67 http://archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk/article/11th-february-1966/6/aircraft-bleak-outlook-in-belfast accessed 21 Sep 2012

47

Duncan Sandys, was to compress the multiplicity of airframe and

aero engine companies into large, competitive units.68

Rationalisation of the Aircraft Industry

It is now widely recognised - in academic texts at least - that

the Industry prior to 1957 was overheated, inefficient, and in

need of reform and rationalisation. That said, the DWP made no

mention of such rationalisation, despite the fact that Aubrey

Jones had specifically referred to the need to do so on several

occasions, including a written answer to the Commons one week

before the DWP was announced in which he explained that some

reduction in military orders was inevitable, and that some offset

should be found through civil and export work.69 However, the

argument put forward in the DWP for the cancelled R&D projects was

in fact 'the shortage of scientists and technicians in civil

industry'.

The immediate impact on the aircraft industry was slight. Few of

the cancelled projects were at an advanced stage, and production

of aircraft such as the V-Bombers, Hunter and Javelin was still

68 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/mar/07/guardianobituaries.transport accessed 21 Sep 201269 Hansard, Written Answers, HC Deb 25 March 1957 vol 567 cc90-1W

48

building up. Indeed, the value of sales to the Government

continued to rise. Adoption of a missile-centered defence (kept

alive through Sandys deletion of parts of the original R&D

section) was, however, founded on a relatively fragile

technological base.70

Aircraft were becoming more complex and more expensive to produce

per unit, as a result of which production numbers were already in

significant decline prior to 1957. In 1954 the RAF's force of 155

aircraft cost a total of £6.1m; in 1958, 178 aircraft were valued

at £29m. In the early 1950s the industry produced 2,000 or so

aircraft a year but in 1957 it had already dropped to 968. The US

market was nine times that of the UK, and during the 1950s and

1960s US companies, supported by Government aid, accounted for 80

per cent of world production by value.71 The economies of scale

enjoyed by US manufacturers, particularly in regard to the

proportion spent on R&D, made them far more competitive. The

French industry was also gaining ground. Britain's only

successful exports between 1955 and 1964 were the Buccaneer and

Gnat.

70 Hayward, British Aircraft Industry, p68.71 Ibid., p64.

49

In August 1957, Aubrey Jones invited an inter-departmental

committee to examine the problem; the resulting report formed the

basis of the first official Government direction on the

rationalisation of the aircraft industry, announced over a year

after the DWP on 22 May 1958 to the House of Commons. The

language was weak. The Government would 'encourage' the formation

of stronger units with the general intention to 'nudge or edge the

industry to a greater degree of self-reliance'. The exact form

that rationalisation should take would be left to industry.72

Despite his position as Minister, the lack of power entrusted to

his office is evidenced again around this time by the Cabinet

decision to allow BEA to buy the Trident, a decision with which

Jones and the MoS did not agree.73

Some degree of rationalisation was in fact initiated in September

1957, when senior representatives from the eleven companies

competing for OR339 were told by the MoS that bids would only be

accepted from consortia, with one firm as designated leader.

Despite this, there were still around nine design submissions from

which the RAF selected a combination of the English Electric P17A

airframe and the Vickers Type 571 systems package to produce the

72 Ibid., pp71-72.73 Ibid., p72.

50

TSR-2 specification, the engines selected being the Bristol

Olympus due to that firm's willingness to merge with Armstrong

Siddeley and de Havilland Engines.74

Aubrey Jones' reputation as 'friend' to the Industry is also shown

to be somewhat inaccurate as, up to the General Election in 1959,

all pleas for funding and US-style launch aid from companies -

even those accompanying mergers - were rejected by him. This was

then undermined by several Government decisions to support civil

projects in advance of the Election. Finally, after the 1959

Election, the MoS was subsumed along with the Ministry of Civil

Aviation into the new Ministry of Aviation (MoA), the first

Minister of which was perhaps the natural choice: Duncan Sandys.

Also, under this new construct, aviation finally had a seat in

Cabinet.

Sandys took a very different line to Jones, and the work of

industry rationalisation finally began. Where the Industry had

effectively been left alone to arrange itself better, Sandys was

far more decisive. In November he explicitly called for a

reduction to only two airframe and two engine manufacturers,

towards which the Government would concentrate orders; furthermore74 Ibid., p73.

51

launch aid - to which Jones had objected - would be re-introduced.

Launch aid renewed the relationship between the state and the

industry in commercial projects which would rapidly expand through

the 1960s.75

With characteristic determination and self confidence, Sandys

drove through the rationalisation programme which, when complete,

was largely heralded a success - even by the companies themselves.

The remaining firms were the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC)

and Hawker Siddeley Aviation (HSA). Rolls Royce remained

independent but finally had its first competition since the 1930s

in Bristol Siddeley Engines, also a welcome economic development.

Helicopters were brigaded under Westland. The only significant

remaining 'outsiders' were Shorts that was mostly state owned

anyway, Scottish Aviation and Handley Page. The latter ceased

trading in 1970. That said, Keith Hayward sums up the

rationalisation process as a whole as over-protracted, the weakest

aspect being that the Government's strategy appeared to have been

little more than 'bigger must be better'. However, the return of

state subsidisation through launch aid, and the positive direction

from Sandys that only two companies should remain did at least

result in the British aircraft industry remaining viable by the 75 Ibid., pp74-75.

52

end of the five year timescale over which the DWP was intended to

have influence. TSR-2 was not cancelled until 31 March 1965, the

decision made under the new Labour Government.

Defence Reform

What did follow the DWP was an attempt - attributed to Sandys - to

continue to establish a more productive relationship between

Government and the Service Chiefs, leading eventually to the

creation of the combined Ministry of Defence. Preceding this

decision was a series of angry exchanges between the Chiefs and

Sandys, beginning shortly after the release of the DWP with a

memorandum that began:

'In discharging our responsibilities to HMG we are worried about three aspects of the

present conduct of defence affairs:-

(a) The method of using the Defence machinery.

(b) The failure of our views to reach all appropriate ministers.

53

(c) The failure of the Minister of Defence to consult us properly on the strategic

aspects of defence'.76

The calls were not heeded by Sandys, leading to further complaints

that continued on into 1958, a further Chiefs' memorandum in

February beginning:

We believe that you are dissatisfied with our part in the organisation for defence. We think

it opportune to say that we too are dissatisfied, that we are quite clear as to what it wrong,

and are agreed between ourselves what must be done to put it right.77

Specific items on which the Chiefs claimed to have been 'left out'

included IRBMs, the Air Defence of Great Britain and the DWP

itself. The debate and rancour continued throughout the first

half of 1958, at the height of which Sandys put forward firm

proposals for a reorganisation of Defence. However, this,

eventually - and perhaps surprisingly given his original directive

to Sandys - was watered down by Macmillan himself. Sir William

Dickson was made Chief of the Defence Staff, the powers of the

Defence Committee extended and a new Defence Board set up to

create a forum through which the Minister and Service Ministers

76 DSND 6/40, COS.1045/8/7/57 Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff for the Minister of Defence, 8 July 195777 DSND 6/40, COS.333/19/2/58 Relationship between the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff,

54

could formulate policy together. In practise these new

organisations remained overshadowed as Macmillan and Sandys

continued to hand 'down policy directives decided on after

informal consultation with advisers of their choice'.78

The Nuclear Deterrent

The initiative to deploy Thor IRBMs in Britain came from US

Secretary to the Air Force Donald Quarles in July 1956, though the

offer itself was received by Sandys from US Secretary of State

Charles Wilson.79 Macmillan removed any reference to specific

systems in the final DWP as in fact the question still remained

for some months regarding which system was actually to be

deployed: Thor or the US Army's Jupiter.80

Having initiated the Blue Streak programme himself as Minister of

Supply in 1954, Sandys remained a strong advocate throughout his

later tenure as Defence Minister. However, the programme suffered

in much the same way as all of the major ground-breaking technical

projects of the day (and this has only worsened over time) - cost

inflation and technical delays. As a 'second strike' weapon it

78 PREM 11/2228, Prime Minister to Chancellor of Exchequer, 17 July 1958.79 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p251.80 GEN 570/4, American Offer of Ballistic Missiles, 27 May 1957

55

was also seen as highly vulnerable due to the length of time it

took to erect and fill with liquid fuel.

This paper earlier alleged that Sandys attempted to remove from

the DWP the original references to H Bomb tests. Interestingly,

some light was later thrown on why this might have taken place.

On 15 October 1992 the Independent ran a story 'British H Bomb Tests

in 1957 were 'a Bluff''. This referred to an article in the London

Review of Books by Norman Dombey, professor of theoretical physics at

the University of Sussex, who, following the declassification of

US nuclear archives, offered a convincing thesis that all of the

British 'H Bomb' tests in 1957 were in fact much lower yield

'boosted fission' bombs, essentially upgraded atom bombs. He

contends that this was known by 'top nuclear scientists and inner

government circles' in which Sandys would certainly have resided.

No stranger to using inflammatory language to stress his point,

the ambitious Sandys appears nevertheless to have been nervous of

publishing what could have later been proven to be inflammatory

propaganda.

The 1958 White Paper was essentially a progress report on the

previous year's policy 'outline'. The major international defence

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development in the meantime had been Sputnik, despite which the

1958 paper was still confident that Western superiority was likely

to increase. It foresaw an international balance of ICBM and sub-

surface launched nuclear weapons and 'no reason why all of this

should not go on indefinitely'.81 To some extent this disguised

the fact that the British Government found themselves caught in an

ambiguous web of contradicting policies. Historians have argued

over whether independence or inter-dependence was the goal. It

was most likely both. There was no doubt that Britain aimed,

through use of Thor IRBMs, to cement a level of interdependence

between it and America. At the same time, a lack of confidence in

the motives behind US defence policy led Britain to continue to

pursue an independent deterrent of her own.82

On the announcement of the 1959 White paper, Sandys continued to

press ahead with Blue Streak. In his introductory speech, Sandys

re-stated his intentions with regard to the British IRBM, while at

the same time characteristically hedging his bets: 'The Blue

Streak is going ahead but we shall, naturally, continue to watch

the progress of other developments in America and elsewhere.'

Polaris had already been tested by this stage and the Royal Navy

81 Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p223.82 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p242.

57

were already lobbying hard for a submarine-launched solution to

replace the V-Force,83 the arguments for which were - and remain -

highly compelling.

By 1959 the writing was on the wall for Blue Streak.84 Sandys had

vigorously attacked the potential for other delivery systems.85 In

the end, the decision was taken out of his hands in April 1960

when new Minister of Defence Harold Watkinson cancelled the

programme as too expensive and unfit for purpose. The system

proposed to replace it was the air-launched US Sky Bolt that was

suitable to be carried by - thus extending the life of - the V

Force. This in turn was cancelled by the US before the UK

finally, and permanently, switched to the subsurface deterrent

with the purchase of American Polaris.

83 Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, p259.84 Ibid., p526. 85 Ibid., p527.

58

CONCLUSION

From 1945 to 1957, the relationship between the Government and the

Services can be shown as a power struggle. It was represented by

a cycle of Government demands for reductions in Defence

expenditure, attempts to re-shape strategy, defensive reactions

from the Services, compromise, resignations or changes of

government, and continued expenditure. The 1957 DWP represented

attempts to break all of these cycles. The Chiefs were

circumvented in the end by the Government making cuts that were

impossible to counter or reverse. Despite a debate on possible

ballot systems, there were no acceptable half measures to ending

National Service. Also, the direct cancellation of aircraft

projects, however they came about, and despite being undertaken on

the flawed premise of the future primacy of missiles was,

nevertheless, irreversible - at least for the time being.

Correctly anticipating a lack of agreement from the Chiefs,

Macmillan ensured that their power and influence over Government

was reduced by increasing the power of the Secretary of State;

this was further cemented with later reforms to the Defence

structure and the creation of the MOD. Finally, the national

59

Defence strategy was re-focussed towards deterrence and set on an

international footing, with agreed cooperation from the US, which

had the effect of elevating Defence policy firmly into the

political domain. Duncan Sandys, the tough-talking 'hatchet man',

had been an ideal agent for this process of change.

In 1945 there was nothing new about the concept of deterrence;

only the size of the weapons and the speed of reaction had changed

to make the price of failure near-instantly and globally

catastrophic. The Attlee and Churchill Governments set out to

develop Britain as both an independent and interdependent nuclear

power, the first manifestation of which was the V-Bomber Force.

By the time Sandys arrived as Minister of Supply in 1951 the V-

Bomber requirement had already been in design and development for

four years; the next development goal was a fixed-site IRBM.

Sandys proceeded to initiate the Blue Streak programme in concert

with the US, a programme that he can certainly be accused of

becoming overly protective of as the costs and difficulties

escalated leading to its cancellation in 1960.

After the Second World War the military aircraft industry thrived

and expanded; however, the writing was on the wall from the start.

60

Too many small companies were competing for too many designs, R&D

lacked coordination and the result was an expensive panoply of

aircraft - the V Force comprising three completely different types

for example. The civil airline industry would encounter similar

difficulties, especially competing with the much larger, state-

assisted manufacturers such as Boeing. The MoS was created with a

remit so wide that future aircraft R&D was never given the

attention it deserved - Sandys as Minister from 1951 to 1954 must

also take the blame for this, though further historical attention

to the MoS is required to analyse the relationship between it and

the fate of the British aircraft industry as a whole. What is

clear Reginald Maudling and Aubrey Jones failed to achieve a

coherent R&D strategy for air power, preferring to allow the

Industry to decline through natural wastage. This was hastened

through the project cancellations that were inserted at the last

minute into the DWP - articulated as they were without any

reference to a grand plan other than a vague hope that the civil

industry would 'take up the slack'. Dysfunctional and lacking any

real political power, the MoS was eventually wound up. Faced with

a expensive failing Industry, Sandys finally took control under

the new MoA and forced the Industry down to two large companies

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and restarted launch aid; however, Britain by this time had lost

the 'technological edge'.

The period of the drafting of the DWP shows Sandys to be focused

on international diplomacy, primarily with America but also with

the many NATO countries concerned with Britain's commitment of

forces in Europe. His own hand-written amendments show that he

was not necessarily in touch with the latest concept of the new

primacy of deterrence over land forces. His contribution to the

deterrent was to stick to what he knew and ensure a future -

albeit temporary - for the Blue Streak IRBM programme. There is

no doubt more to be uncovered regarding Sandys specific motives

and negotiations over this short period; however, this cannot take

place until the missing sections of his archive are made

available.

The Air Ministry and Air Staff were, of the three services, at

least risk from the DWP itself. In the short-term the nuclear

deterrent was in the hands of the RAF and would be for some years

to come, though the V-Force was never to reach the numbers

anticipated. Coastal Command and the Second tactical Air Force

were reduced as anticipated in the 1956 policy review, and

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Transport Command was largely unaffected. The Middle East, and to

a greater extent the Far East Air Forces were reduced; however,

this was again in line with expectations from 1956. Finally, the

much anticipated end to the manned fighter was postponed by a

requirement to maintain a 'reduced fighter force' and by the

survival of the P1 Lightning programme.

The influences on Duncan Sandys are clear. His previous

experience and upbringing set him out as his own man, politically

astute, unafraid to challenge and usually right in doing so. The

DWP was primarily a product of previous policies, on which was

overlaid the influences of Sandys' own previous wealth of

experience in Defence matters - particularly with regard to

rockets and missiles. His connections to the US Defence

Establishment, and in particular Defense Secretary Charles Wilson,

also played a significant role. Finally, the main political

drivers were the desires to cut costs, embrace deterrence and

distance the military establishment; these were extolled by the

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Those with least influence were

undoubtedly the Chiefs of Staff themselves.

63

Overall the DWP can be seen as an attempt to conduct grand

strategy and save the status of the country at a time of declining

power and set against a troubled economy. Its remit was enormous.

Re-building ties with America, finding a leading political role in

the Cold War, ending National Service, halving the Army, re-

defining a role for the Navy and reforming the Defence

establishment at the highest levels. Within this context, at the

level of the Secretary of State, the cutting of a few individual

and probably unviable aircraft projects was simply not in the same

league. Unfortunately, the link between military, civil and space

R&D, and the potential for this to play a positive role in

actually rebuilding the economy, was not made. The responsibility

for stressing this link rested with the MoS, an overtaxed and

disempowered organisation that in the years leading to the DWP

showed little interest in ballistic missile technology let alone

air power. It is this link that is missing from the narrative of

the era; it is hoped that this dissertation might at least provide

a strong indicator for further research.

Finally, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)

bore all of the same political hallmarks of the DWP. The

struggling economy and need for public sector cuts; Defence

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Reform: the creation of the National Security Council and moving

the Chiefs out of MOD to the Service HQs; project cancellations -

literally cutting the wings off the Nimrod MRA4; elevation of

strategy by brigading Defence and Security. Given, then, that

Defence has just undergone a similar review to that in 1957, it is

interesting to note that a word-search in the SDSR policy document

for the phrase 'research and development' returns no results...

65

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Bartlett, C J. The Long Retreat. A Short History of British Defence Policy, 1945-70. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1972.

Baylis, John. Ambiguity and Deterrence. British Nuclear Strategy 1945 - 1964. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Brookes, Andrew. V Force. The History of Britain's Airborne Deterrent. London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982.

Clark, Ian, and Nicholas J Wheeler. The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945 - 1955. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

Ferte, Sir Philip Joubert de la. Rocket. London: Hutchinson, 1957.Gardner, Charles. British Aircraft Corporation. A History. London: Book Club

Associates, 1981.Gowing, Margaret. Independence and Deterrence. Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-

1952 Volume 1 - Policy Making. Vol. 1. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974.

Groom, A J R. British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons. London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, 1974.

Hayward, Keith. British Aircraft Industry. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989.

Hennessy, Peter. The Secret State. Whitehall and the Cold War. London: PenguinBooks Limited., 2002.

James, T C G. Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1956-1963. London: Air Historical Branch, 1987.

Jones, RV. Most Secret War. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978.Keohane, Dan. Security in British Politics 1945-99. Basingstoke: Macmillan

Press Ltd, 2000.Macmillan, Harold. Riding the Storm 1956-1959. london: Macmillan and Co,

1971.Middlebrook, Martin. The Peenemunde Raid. The Night of 17-18 August 1943.

London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982.

Journal Articles

Dockrill, Michael. "Restoring the 'Special Relationship': The Bermuda and Washington Conferences, 1957." In Decisions and Diplomacy: Essays in Twentieth Century International History, edited by Dick Richardson and Glyn Stone. London: Routledge, 1995.

Grant, Matthew. "Home Defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957." Journal of strategic studies 31, no. 6 (2008): 25.

Harris, JP. "The 'Sandys Storm': The Politics of British Air Defence in 1938." Historical Research 62, no. 149 (1989): 19.

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Howard, Michael. "Strategy in the Nuclear Age." RUSI Journal 102, no. 4 (1957): 10.

Love, Gary. "The British Movement, Duncan Sandys, and the Politicsof Constitutionalism in the 1930s." Contemporary British History 23,no. 4 (2009): 16.

Overy, Richard. "Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939." Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (1992): 29.

Conference Papers

"Fifth Aircraft Production Conference at Southampton: Summaries ofPapers and Discussion at the Conference Organized by the Southern Section of the Institution of Production Engineers."Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology 29, no. 2 (1957): 3.

Newspaper Articles

Duncan Sandys Obituary, New York Times, 27 November 1987 Brandon, Henry. "Britain Offered Missiles by US", Sunday Times, 20 January 1957Monks, Noel. "RAF Fighter Force to be Cut in Half", Daily Mail, 21 January 1957Liddell Hart, Basil. "Stop Bluffing", Daily Mirror, 23-25 January 1957Appleby, John. "Defence Cuts and Why", Daily Telegraph, 22 January 1957McWhinnie, AJ and Carter, Gilbert. "Stop Playing Soldiers", Daily Herald, 23 January 1957Monks, Noel and Wakeford, Geoffrey. "Sandys goes to US on 'Cut Taxes' Mission", Daily Mail, 24 January 1957"Dulles, Sandys in Defense talks", New York Times, 28 January 1957Higgins, Marguerite. "Sandys In, Faces Arms Cuts Issue", New York Herald Tribune, 28 January 1957Goodman, Geoffrey. "Aubrey Jones", Obituary, The Guardian, 21 April2003"Point of No Return", The Economist, 31 August 1957Doherty, Peter. "Aircraft Bleak Outlook in Belfast", Tribune Magazine, 11 February 1966Tucker, Anthony. "Sir George Edwards", Obituary, The Guardian, 7 March 2003Bellamy, Christopher. "British H Bombs in 1957 'were a bluff'", The Independent, 15 October 1992

Duncan Sandys Personal Archives, Churchill College Cambridge

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DSND 19/13. Duncan Sandys, Desk Diary 1957DSND 6/40. COS. 1045/8/7/57 Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff for the Minister of Defence, 8 Jul 1957DSND 6/40. COS. 333/19/2/58 Relationship Between the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of StaffDSND 6/52 3rd to 10th Proofs Inclusive of the 1957 Defence White Paper with Handwritten NotesDSND 6/52 'Research and Development' Insert to Proof 10 of the Defence White Paper

Cabinet and Government Papers

CAB 69/5. DO(43) 5th Meeting - Minutes, dated 29 June 1943CAB 21/4053. Letter from Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman, 17 September 1945CAB 129/69. C(54) 249 Memorandum on United Kingdom Defence Policy,23 July 1954CAB 128/31. D(57) 2 Directive by the Prime Minister, 18 January 1957CAB 128/31 CC(57) 01 to 26 Inclusive, Cabinet Conclusions 1957PREM 11/2228. Prime Minister to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 17 July 1957GEN 570/4. American Offer of Ballistic Missiles, 27 May 1957

Hansard

Rt Hon Aubrey Jones, Written Answers, HC Deb 25 March 1957 vol 567cc90-1W

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