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Dressing and Impressing Hegemony

Dress Reform and Hegemonic Masculinity in Interwar Iran

Paper for MESA Annual Meeting, November 24, 2014

Sivan Balslev, Tel Aviv University

The 1927 Dress Law: (Re)dressing Patriotism, Hygiene and Beauty

On December 27 1927, a dress law that applied to "All the male citizens of Iran, who are not

required to wear special clothes due to their governmental employment" compelled them "when

inside the Kingdom, to wear the uniformed dress. All those in the service of the state, including

in the judiciary and administration, must wear the special clothes of the judiciary or the

administration. When not on duty, they must wear the uniformed dress". The law further

stipulated those exempt of the uniformed dress: clergymen and religious authorities of all

religions, who received government permission. The law was to be implemented by March

1929, with rural areas receiving an extension of another year if necessary. Offenders were to

be fined and even jailed for several days. On January 23, 1929, the cabinet decreed that the

uniform dress (to be called the Pahlavi dress) would include the Pahlavi hat in a uniform shape

and plain colors, a shirt or jacket either with a straight or a down turned collar and trousers -

long, short or tight around the ankles. The tying of shawls was forbidden.1 The reason for the

dress law, as stipulated by Reza Shah himself was twofold: to bring about unity among the

ethnically diverse Iranian population and to close the gap between Iranian men and their

western counterparts, showing both parties that Iranians were the equals of westerners.2 The

dress law thus served two of Reza Shah's most important goals: nationalization by uniformity

and modernization through westernization.

1 Taghiyr-e Lebas Va Kashf-e Hejab Beh Revayat-e Asnad (The Change of Dress and Unveiling

According to the Sources) (Tehran: Markaz-e Barresi-ye Asnad-e Tarikhi-ye Vezarat-e Ettela'at, 1999),

10–20. 2 Patricia L. Baker, “Politics of Dress: The Dress Reform Laws of 1920-30s Iran,” in Languages of

Dress in the Middle East, ed. Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (Richmond: Curzon, 1997),

180–181; Houchang E. Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor’s New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-

Building under Reza Shah,” Iranian Studies 26, no. 3–4 (1993): 209–233.

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The implementation of the dress law necessitated punitive and educational measures

alike. The press was enlisted to educate its readers and persuade them of the benefits of the new

dress, the daily Ettela'at playing a significant role in the campaign. No item of dress needed

greater justification than the Pahlavi hat. Hats were of great importance to Iranian men, as they

were visual markers of social distinctions and affiliations. Imposing the Pahlavi hat aimed at

erasing these past distinctions and affiliations and replacing them with new ones. The burden

of the new hat was most strongly felt among tribesmen whose distinctive headgear marked

tribal affiliation. The introduction of the Pahlavi hat coincided with other measures that were

meant to weaken the political and military power of the tribes and replace their loyalties to tribe

and clan with loyalty to the state and the Pahlavi dynasty.3 It is therefore hardly surprising that

resistance to the new hat was most pronounced among the tribes. Another group, which much

resented the new headgear and led some of the protests against it, comprised men of the

religious establishment. Their turban was a marker of religious credentials and lineage

descending from the Prophet. Additionally, the Pahlavi hat was problematic in regards Islamic

etiquette, since it prevented proper prostration during prayer and imitated the appearance non-

Muslims.4

Justification of the enforced use of the Pahlavi hat was formulated in nationalist,

economic and medical terms. An article in Ettela'at, published before the signing of the Dress

Law, combines all of these. The article opens by expressing the opinion that the design of the

cardboard hat (kolah-e moqava'i – probably referring to the Qajar hat) common among "us the

Iranians" probably originated from a Turkmen tribal hat (kolah-e pa pakh) that changed in form

and material over the years. The author opines that the sums of money leaving Iran to foreign

factories which manufacture the materials of felt, cardboard and Astrakhan wool, of which

traditional hats were made, reached the amount of no less than two million Tuman a year, thus

damaging the national economy. Woolen hats, made of raw material bought from the

3 Majles protocols, Seventh session, meeting 15, p. 13 4 Stephanie Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921-1941

(New York NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 175–186.

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slaughterhouses of Bukhara, were a drain on the economy. The author goes on to suggest that

traditional hats had no medical benefits and were harmful in the hot sun of Iran. Unlike

traditional hats, the Pahlavi hat was both similar to "ancient Iranian hats" and better suited to

the Iranian climate, since its visor prevented sunlight from hitting the eyes directly. He also

notes that some of the Pahlavi hats are manufactured locally, and recommends that both

decision and hat makers assure that these hats will all be manufactured from Iranian materials.5

The adoption and nationalization of western attire, now termed the "national dress" or

"Pahlavi dress", was advocated in this and similar articles by reinventing its origins and tracing

them back to pre-Islamic Iran, as well as by praising its local manufacturing. Simultaneously,

traditional hats were de-nationalized by attributing their origins to Turkmen tribes and

presenting them as harmful to the national economy. This process of nationalization meant that

the only dress appropriate for a patriotic Iranian man, and thus for any "proper" Iranian man,

was the western styled dress decreed by the new law.

In addition to nationalist arguments, the change of dress was advocated on scientific

and medical grounds, and discussed in medical terms. Such reasoning was voiced by elite men,

whose western education allowed them to appropriate both modern medical knowledge and

science. An article in Ettela'at, one of a series of articles concerning customs and manners

(Adab-e Mo'asherat) elaborates on the "unhealthy and harmful" dress of different areas and

ethnic minorities.6 The "ugliness of limbs and bad form" of Iranians is criticized and the author

suggests that a change of dress may bring about the restitution of the male body itself.

Traditional clothes and their wearers were associated with ugliness and ill health, whereas the

wearers of the "national dress" were supposedly healthy and conformed to a new standard of

male beauty.7

Another Ettela'at article by A. Shirvani, exemplifies the links between dress, health

and beauty. Shirvani quotes a "wise tailor" on the medical, aesthetic and moral aspects of the

5 "Kolah" (The Hat), in Ettela'at, 21/8/1927 6 "Adab-e Mo'asherat", in Ettela'at, 30/12/1928 7 "Adab-e Mo'asherat", in Ettela'at, 30/12/1928. The author further claims that the ancient Iranians

wore very simple clothing: trousers, a shirt, shoes and cummerbund.

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new dress. Traditional loose outer garments, the "tailor" opines, hid filth and vices. When the

'aba is gone, the dress under it must be kept clean, from shirt to underclothes. Clean clothes

facilitate keeping a clean body and a clean body is healthy (salem). The healthy body is to keep

the mind healthy, and if the minds of Iranians are kept healthy, all their troubles and misfortunes

are to be overcome. Among the damages caused by traditional garments Shirvani lists the

wrinkled faces of young men (due to wearing brimless hats that do not protect from the sun),

stooped backs, up drawn shoulders, narrow chests and "nearly dead" feet, all resulting from

being wrapped in an 'aba and a qaba and wearing open shoes. In reality, the bodily deficiencies

described above could be both the natural result of old age or of a life of physical hardship and

toil. Thus, the ugly body was imagined as both old and of a specific social and occupational

background. The deformed bodies of traditionally dressed men conformed to descriptions of

the bodies of men outside the hegemonic elite.8 Filthy and unhygienic bodies were not

exclusively attributed to the poor or to tribesmen, but to the traditional elites as well. A letter

by a female writer to Ettela'at echoes the tailor's criticism of the unhygienic condition of

traditional male garments, even among men of the highest social standing:

In the past, when you walked in the alleyway you would see thousands of stains on

the clothes of highly placed men. And those who were distinguished of the first class

would wash once every fifteen days or once every month. A thick beard was the sign

of their high status and under their expensive and badly sewn clothes they would wear

a dirty undershirt and their hats were surrounded by a black halo of fat and sweat. The

mark of the iron, that from the point of view of cleanliness hygiene and refinement is

crucial for clothes, was not seen among the clothes of urban aristocrats.9

In the summer of 1934, Reza Shah took his only state visit outside Iran, to Ataturk's

Turkey. The Shah was very much impressed with Ataturk's modernizing reforms, and with the

westernized appearance of Turkish men who wore fully brimmed hats. During his visit, he

8 "Vahdat-e Lebas" (The Uniformity of Dress), in Ettela'at, 29/12/1928 9 Maliheh Adibaf, "Lebas Nemayandeh-ye Aabru va Heysiyyat-e Shakhsi va Ejtema'i Ast" (Dress is the

Agent of Personal and Social Honor and Prestige), in Ettela'at, 27/7/1935

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issued an order that all Iranians who work outdoors must wear full-brimmed hats, to protect

themselves from the sun. On July 8, 1935, the cabinet issued a decree making the full-brimmed

hat obligatory for all men, thus replacing the Pahlavi hat. Whereas the dress law of 1927 aimed

at creating uniformity and a sense of unity among Iranian male citizens and at making them

look like westerners, the introduction of the brimmed hat focused mainly on the second

objective. Unlike the Pahlavi hat, whose epithet clearly denoted a national unified look, the new

hat was designated "International Hat" (Kolah-e Beyn ol-Melali) and promoted the regime's

attempt to present Iran as part of the western world.10

Ettela'at considered the possibility of abandoning the Pahlavi hat in favor of a full-

brimmed European hat as early as November 1933. The following article discusses the merits

of the brimmed hat. The article presents the aesthetic aspects of the hat in a written "interview"

with an anonymous "painter". This section vividly demonstrates the association between health

and beauty. The painter gives a lengthy answer when asked on the Pahlavi hat, called here a

"single-visor hat" (note how when the hat is criticized, its affiliation to the monarch disappears):

My opinion regarding the single-visor hat [kolah-e labeh dar] is that this form of hat,

[when worn with] non-military clothes and especially turned-down collar (such as a

jacket and the like) is very far from aesthetic [besyar az estehtik dur ast]. Since it is

impossible to detach the military and uniform aspect from this hat's shape, the only

case in which it does not contrast with the law of the harmony of forms [qanun-e

tavafoq-e ashkal] and does not offend the eye of the aesthete is [when it is worn

alongside] an Arabic collar [meaning a Nehru collar – s.b.] buttoned all the way up, a

leather belt and matching boots. Examine closely most of the passersby in the street

and you will see the following shape: a narrow neck coming out of a saggy collar with

open buttons and the bottom part askew. Above it – a yellow, thin and sickly face. The

passerby [who wears] this hat, which is characteristic of the attire and face of action

10 Chehabi, "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes," 216.

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and power, wears it according to chance sometimes [tilted] upwards, sometimes

crookedly and sometimes places it over his eyebrows.

The arms coming from rounded shoulders hang limply and swing unsteadily hither

and thither. The legs of the trousers hang wrinkled and shapeless and curl from under

the jacket. Imagine this neck and face and this hat – you will admit that this hat does

not fit [men who are] not soldiers.11

The painter depicts the unsavory image of the "passersby" in the street as incongruous

with the Pahlavi hat. The hat was affiliated with military appearance, as soldiers of the Iranian

army were the first to wear it as part of their uniforms.12 It must be worn with uniforms, or at

least with uniform-styled clothes, which must be kept orderly and clean, and be worn by healthy

and upright men. The painter's contempt of the masses originates both from their deformed

bodies and their failure to imbue western dress practices. Here again, the association of body

and dress is manifest. A distance separates the masculine model the dress law aspired to create

from the actual appearance of Iranian men who were uneducated in the manner in which these

clothes were to be worn. Western attire could denote power, order and cleanliness, only when

the men who donned it were aware of how to do so: from buttoning their shirts properly to

wearing their hats in the right angle, to making sure their trousers were properly ironed.

The interweaving of nationalism, health and aesthetics in the discussion on the dress

reform concerned the body of the hegemonic man and literally incorporated hegemonic

masculinity. The "real" man was now identifiable by the westernized national dress he donned

and that rendered his body both healthy and beautiful. Furthermore, the habitus of men educated

according to western norms made them familiar with the practices dictated by the wearing of

western clothes. The manner in which they wore the suit and the hat demonstrated their cultural

capital and strengthened their hegemonic status in Iranian society.

11 E. (Probably Ebrahim) Khajeh Nuri, "Mashhudat Goftani – Qaziyeh-ye Kolah" (It Is Evident – The

Hat Issue) part 2, in Ettela'at, 4/11/1933 12 Stephanie Cronin, The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910-1926 (London/New York

NY: I. B. Tauris, 1997), 208.

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State Power, Social Hegemony and the Enforcing of Westernized Dress

The dress law is usually (and rightfully) interpreted as part of Reza Shah's project of Iran's

nationalization and westernization that touched on various aspects of Iranian political, social

and cultural lives.13 I would argue that the stipulations of the dress law could expose how it

supported the construction of a national image, which materialized in the body of a modern

male citizen who abided by a new model of hegemonic masculinity. The new national image

both based itself on this hegemonic masculinity and entrenched it, by making it an "official"

model condoned by the state. The dress law did not create a neutral male appearance. The

wearing of a European suit was associated with a specific group of elite men with western

education who wished to reconstruct their society in the image of their own masculinity. This

masculinity was urban, secular and elitist and was formulated in contrast to previous models of

a religiously defined masculinity.14

The inculcation of hegemonic masculinity through the dress laws supported the

inculcation of social and political power relations as well.15 The regime's ability to enforce the

daily practices it deemed necessary and the coercive means used by its representatives

strengthened the hierarchical relations between state and citizen. With Reza Shah's rise to

power, many elite men held positions of power in the government and administration.16 The

dress law brought to the fore their newly achieved political power as well as the cultural clout

of their model of westernized masculinity by constructing it as a role model to be emulated.

This did not go unchallenged. As already noted, the dress law met with opposition from both

the clergy and tribal chiefs who objected to the attempt to abolish their tribal characteristics and

identifications.17 Smaller scale resistance to western hats was also evident. An article that

reveals the extent of the resistance includes the reminiscences of a man who, together with

some young friends, decided to wear a brimmed hat as early as 1925. During the first weeks of

13 Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns, 161. 14 Minoo Moallem, Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Politics

of Patriarchy in Iran (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2005), 71–72. 15 Ibid., 65. 16 Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns, 162–163. 17 Baker, "Politics of Dress," 182.

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wearing the new hats, his friends and he were beaten constantly in the streets and their

persecution lasted until military men started wearing the Pahlavi hat, and it became a source of

pride.18

Violent resistance in the form of demonstrations or attacks of men wearing westernized

clothes was but one of several tactics of subversion pursued against the dress law, alongside

evasion, negotiation and compromise. In a short story by Rasul Parvizi the narrator describes

the early days of the dress reform in Shiraz, where he grew up. Schoolchildren continued to

come to school in their traditional attire, despite repeated demands to change into a suit and a

Pahlavi hat, until the vice-principal applied the scissors to their robes, turning them into short

shirts. Meanwhile on the streets, a gang of ruffians, supported by the clergy, would beat up men

who wore the Pahlavi hat and tear their hats. One way of dealing with the situation was wearing

a turban and a cloak over the suit, taking them off and putting on the Pahlavi hat when entering

an office or a school.19 Similarly, in an article written in 1931 the author complains that civil

servants who were supposed to wear the "national dress" usually hanged their jackets behind

their desks, wearing them only when fearing inspection. Their departmental heads usually did

the same and did not provide their employees with a good role model.20 It is obvious, then, that

even members of the administration who were most inclined toward the new westernized

appearance did not always adopt it in full, despite governmental inspections. Indeed, the change

was not simple even for some high-ranking members of the government. Mehdiqoli Hedayat,

Iran's prime minister and a deeply religious man, had to be scolded by the Shah himself before

conforming.21 In the rural areas, entire villages would sometimes use a single collective hat,

worn when one of the villagers had to go to town.22

Other men attempted to negotiate with the government for permission to keep wearing

traditional garments, a permission reserved for certain positions in the religious establishment.

18 E. (Probably Ebrahim) Khajeh Nuri, "Mashhudat Goftani – Qaziyeh-ye Kolah", in Ettela'at,

19/10/1933 19 Chehabi, "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes," 230–231. 20 M. Khatat, "Malbus-e Vatani" (The National Dress), in Ettela'at, 1/3/1931 21 Chehabi, "Dress Codes for Men," 220. 22 Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1921, 48.

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In a letter to the Presidential Cabinet (riyasat-e vozara), a certain Agha Seyyed Ali Qomi, a

notary (mahzar), asked to pass on a "recommendation" (towsiyeh, meaning a request for special

treatment) on his behalf to the minister of justice, so that the minister would take care of his

matter. Qomi asked to be allowed to wear "regular" ('adi) clothes at his notary office, and

clerical clothes that would "fit his position" when out of the office. According to an annotation,

Qomi was a teacher of princes (mo'alem-e shapurha), which explains why he could ask for this

special treatment.23 His case demonstrates how the dress law helped create a new hierarchical

relationship between the government and the religious establishment. Religious practitioners

had to get government approval of their religious credentials, subjecting them to the new

bureaucracy. An unintentional result of the law was that it established a visible distinction for

the small group of state-approved clerics, thus contributing to their consolidation as a distinct

social and political group.24

Different strategies of resistance and subversion of the dress law persisted well into the

late 1930s and are described in Heydar Radjavi's autobiographical short stories. In a story titled

"Good Songs, Evil Songs", he describes a cleric who recited lamentations of the martyrs

(marsiyeh) in his neighborhood in Tabriz. Unlike younger marsiyeh khans who would sing and

weep in their street dress, this cleric, Amirza Hasan, hid his turban and robe in a bag carried by

his mule, and donned them indoors, in the houses of the believers.25 In another story, "My

Father's Wardrobe", Radjavi's elderly father (in his seventies at the time) consents to wear his

single western suit, bought for him by his son, in cold weather, and covers it with a qaba.

Usually he wore the qaba over traditional clothes, and since it resembled an old fashioned

western overcoat, he could not be accused of breaking the law.26 Revealingly, the father's

behavior is a source of embarrassment for Radjavi and his brothers:

23 Mohammad Hosein Manzur ol-Ajdad, Siyasat va Lebas: Gozideh-ye Asnad-e Mottahed Ol-Shekl

Shodan-e Albeseh, 1307-1318 (Politics and Dress: Collection of Documents on the Uniformed Dress,

1928-1939) (Tehran: Sazman-e Asnad-e Melli-ye Iran, 2001), 154–155. 24 Chehabi, "Dress Codes for Men," 225. 25 Heydar Radjavi, French Hats in Iran (Washington DC: Mage Pubishers, 2011), 118. 26 Ibid., 48–50.

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…the way he dressed made him look centuries old to me. His traditional garments

looked ridiculous, I thought to myself. All my friends' fathers whom I met wore more

regular clothes…God, I prayed, why couldn't I have one of those fathers who shaved

their beards and wore a suit and tie?...It is hard to understand it now, but Agha's

appearance must have been an embarrassment to every member of my family who was

alive when I was born…My oldest brother Kazem, a poet, a staunch follower of Frangi

ways, and an aspiring teacher in modern schools, must have felt it more than the other

family members. When he graduated from the Teachers' Training College in Tehran,

and got his first pay check as a teacher, he observed the old tradition of spending it on

substantial gifts for parents. His gift for Agha was a nicely tailored suit…Frugal Agha

couldn't let the suit go to waste, but he made sure to wear it only on cold winter days,

so he could conceal it under his nondescript, traditional overall, the qabaa, which

made him look like images in my school books of twelfth-century scholars.27

Radjavi's short stories demonstrate both the failures and the success of the dress law.

On the one hand, young men became so accustomed to western dress that traditional garments

seemed to them "ridiculous" and "twelfth-century", while suits looked "regular" (a perception

that is also apparent in Seyyed Qomi's letter to the authorities as well as in other similar

documents28). On the other hand, traditionalist men would find ways to bypass the law, and

after Reza Shah's abdication, some of them returned to their traditional garments, while

allowing school children who already had their suits made for them to continue wearing them.

But, then again, school teachers and other young men kept wearing the modern garments even

after the abdication.29

Radjavi's story describes new types of Iranian men and their responses to the dress

reform. Men who resisted it and tried to hang on to traditional attire, which not so long ago was

considered the norm, were now dubbed old-fashioned, reactionary even. Men who in earlier

27 Ibid., 48–49. 28 Manzur ol-Ajdad, Siyasat va Lebas, 77, 155. 29 Radjavi, French Hats in Iran, 29–30.

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periods were named "westernizers" (farangimaab or fokoli) now became "regular" and

"normal". The fact that the new dress code of westernizers, far from common in Iran during the

early twentieth century, was accepted as "regular" in the 1930s may demonstrate the dynamics

of hegemonic masculinity. Westernized men became the model of an appropriate masculinity,

and their appearance became "normal" and desired rather than ridiculed or denounced as

mimicry. Their status was supported by the advocacy of the new style in the media, art and

literature but also by the actions of the state.

The regime's response to the various forms of opposition consolidated new power

relations between it and men of the traditional elites, and bolstered the hegemony of the new

model of masculinity. Policemen would tear turbans off respectable men's heads, trample on

them and send the men on their way bareheaded. Tearing off men's headdress was an act of

emasculation. Enacted by a figure of authority, this was also a familiar form of punishment and

public humiliation.30 The inability to respond to this challenge impinged on the masculine

identity of men who traditionally held positions of power and honor in society, and

simultaneously entrenched the power of government representatives. In fact, such actions were

used before the dress reform, in order to demonstrate the regime's superiority and power over

tribal populations. A 1925 report by a representative of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the

province of Khuzestan mentions how Iranian soldiers were harassing the Arab population of

Mohammareh, tearing "kerchiefs" off men's heads and forcing them to wear a hat, and

ridiculing them for not understanding Persian.31 Another such report mentioned that on the day

in which the dress law was enforced (March 21, 1929), policemen patrolled the streets of

Abadan and Moahmmareh, took off the hats of men who did not comply with the law, threw

the Arab style headgear over roofs and tore apart old style kolahs. Furthermore, government

representatives refused to examine any complaints made by men who did not wear the Pahlavi

hat.32

30 Shirazi, "Manly Matters." 31 British Petroleum Archives, ARC96465, 28/7/1925 32 British Petroleum Archives, ARC70029, March 1929

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In addition to the coercive means employed to enforce westernized dress, which

demonstrated the power of the new regime and the men holding positions of power in it, the

dress law facilitated a more subtle assertion of the hegemony of westernized men. The change

of dress - and of hats in particular - entailed a change in everyday practices, practices already

adopted by these men. Their acquaintance with the new practices, which resulted from their

western education and acquaintance with European lifestyle, meant that such men did not have

to go through the process of learning and acquiring new social norms and were spared the

mistakes and embarrassment such mistakes could cause. They knew how to dress and behave

correctly in different social circumstances and could feel at ease in social gatherings and public

events. Unlike them, men used to traditional attire and practices had to adjust to new clothes,

which they often found indecorous and indecent, and to relearn how to act in public.

The difference between the two groups of men is well illustrated in the two portraits

below. Figure 1 is of Mohammad Khan As'ad, a student of the famous painter Kamal ol-Molk.

His appearance is impeccably western, from the pointed tips of his mustache to the wavy hairdo,

to the tie and leather shoes. This young man's westernization was carried to perfection already

in 1915, the year in which the photograph was taken. Figure 2, however, offers quite a different

visage of westernization. While the anonymous painter does wear the Pahlavi hat, a jacket and

a tie, the impression is of a man in the middle of an acculturation process. He wears traditional

fabric shoes, his trousers folded slightly too high above the ankle, his fingertips blackened by

ink or henna. Of the two men, it seems clear who is better informed in the ways of western

attire. Mohammad As'ad, we can assume, did not need to change the dress he was accustomed

to following the dress reform. This is not so easily assumed regarding the second painter.

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Figure 133 - Portrait of a Mohammad Khan As'ad Figure 234 - Portrait of a Painter

One of the most debated practices concerned the etiquette of hat wearing. Traditionally,

Iranian men covered their heads all day long, but the wearing of westernized hats entailed

practices of removing one's hat indoors and when greeting others.35 These practices were

discussed and elaborated on, in articles in Ettela'at, as well as in official circulars that were

meant to teach the new etiquette to government employees. Some articles rejected the notion

that wearing a hat indoors was a national tradition, and had to be preserved in the name of

patriotism. In an article titled "Is Keeping a Hat On among the National Traditions?" (Aya

Kolah Bar Sar Dashtan Jozv-e Rosum-e Melli Ast?) Gh. Moqaddam opines that the matter

became a source of friction between "a group of modernizing gentlemen [aqayan-e

motejadedin] and several traditionalists [kohneh parastan]". While the latter believed it to be a

national tradition, the first claimed that it was in fact not known when and how this became the

habit of Iranians. Furthermore, modernizers believed that since this habit was "ugly and

damaging" it should not be preserved and it was better to adopt the practices of "civilized

nations". The new practices of dress were also better suitable to the changing daily lives of

Iranians:

33 Parisa Damandan, Portrait Photographs from Isfahan: Faces in Transition, 1920-1950 (London; The

Hague: Saqi; Prince Claus Fund Library, 2004), 170. 34 Ibid., 172. 35 Chehabi, "Dress Codes for Men," 211.

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But if we say that for a long period Iranians used to sit on the floor and eat, or when

entering a room, out of respect they would take off their shoes and only then enter the

room, or attend meetings and visits wearing tall hats, a shawl, a cloak and a turban,

and now as a result of becoming familiar and having contact with highly developed

nations [melal-e raqiyeh] have changed this way of living according to the demands

of time, it cannot be said that they did not preserve their national traditions. There was

a time when an Iranian could wear loose trousers and sit on the floor and eat but today,

it would be ridiculous to sit on the floor with ironed baize trousers, or remove one's

shoes when entering a class, a cinema saloon, a coffeehouse or on a visit. 36

Thus progress, sartorial practices and modern activities such as cinema going are linked

together. The "traditionalists" are vilified as inhibiting Iran's progress and are ridiculed for their

devotion to habits the writer considers harmful and superstitious. The change of hats and habits

was attributed to the social group of the "enlightened" or to the "modernizers" (motejaddedin)

and gained a positive connotation. Those resisting the change were described as "fanatics",

"ignorant" and "rabble".37

The possibility of wearing various types of hats, which emanated from the 1935 decree

made it necessary to elaborate on the different types and their uses. Two articles discussing the

etiquette of hat wearing specify different types of hats – from the bowler and cylinder hats to

Panama hats and the beret, the occasions in which they were to be worn, as well as who were

to wear them: children were to wear berets or pith helmets in summer. Men were advised to

wear a black jacket, striped trousers and bowler, Canotier or Panama hat when invited to lunch

or tea. Doctors, scientists and other respectable men were allowed to dress in this manner on

other occasions as well. Politicians, diplomats, first-rank teachers and scientists were advised

to wear a black frock coat and striped trousers with a bowler or top hat for meetings, exhibition

openings, conferences and funerals. It is obvious then, that the attempts to impose uniformity

36 Gh. Moqaddam, "Aya Kolah Bar Sar Dashtan jozv-e Rosum-e Melli Ast?" (Is Keeping a Hat On

among the National Traditions?), in Ettela'at, 8/11/1932 37 Fakham Behzadi, "Tabdil-e Kolah" (The Change of Hat), in Ettela'at, 7/7/1935 , Mr. Shahrudi,

"Taghyir-e Kolah" (The Change of Hat), in Ettela'at, 11/8/1935

15

in dress did not abolish the visual markers of status in society. One system of sartorial

differentiation, stressing ethnic origins, religious affiliation or locality, was merely replaced by

a new system that emphasized occupation and profession and had a distinct temporal aspect in

singling out types of dress for the time of the day and for irregular social events.

Conclusions

The introduction and promotion of the dress reform in Iran was accompanied by two parallel

and sometimes contradictory rhetoric and sets of arguments. On the one hand, dress was

endowed with an immense importance and items of it were elevated to markers of Iranian

national identification. Western suits and hats were named "Pahlavi" or "National", and were

endowed with an imagined pre-Islamic Iranian history. Furthermore, sartorial change was to

herald a change in male bodies, from a bent, sickly and filthy body to an upright, healthy and

clean one. At the same time, there was an effort to present the change of clothes as a matter that

had no influence on authenticity and national identity. Hats and clothes, claimed some

commentators, were not what made a man an Iranian or a European. To try and reconcile these

two contradicting arguments, it was claimed that westernized clothes were to make Iranians

more like Europeans in thought and daily practices, without changing their national affiliation

and authenticity.

The dress reforms of 1927 and 1935 also demonstrate well the conflation of interests

of the state and the modernizing hegemonic elite during Reza Shah's period. The power of the

state also preserved the position and hegemony of this elite and the model of masculinity it had

long advocated together with other reforms. The assertion of state power, manifest in the

administrative and coercive measures taken to implement the dress law, buttressed the

hegemony of this elite and its westernized masculinity. The presence of many men with western

education in the state bureaucracy meant that they were among those who shared in the state's

power. They benefitted from the widening ranks of state administration, which provided many

of them with government jobs, as well as from the promotion of a hegemonic masculinity

modeled according to their own masculinity.

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The new rules of dress and set of manners aimed at replacing the old systems of

sartorial differentiations. They emphasized new hierarchies, based on modern professions and

pastimes. Old figures of authority, previously endowed with respectability and power were

replaced by new ones: doctors, scientists and diplomats. Part of the authority of these new men

in power stemmed from the fact that they had better control over the new sartorial and

behavioral norms, and were thus presented by the press as more advanced, progressive and

modern.

The dress reform and the changes in sartorial repertoire fixed the position of the elite

as a standard against which other men were measured. They had already appropriated the

embodied cultural capital gained from modern education and an acquaintance with western

practices and norms. Many of them were used to wearing European clothes and were familiar

with the manners and practices required from the wearers. Thus, while these changes

undoubtedly confused and destabilized men of other groups - sometimes exposing them to

discomfort, public humiliation and anger, not to mention financial difficulties - those who

benefited from the reforms had much less to adapt to, and could slip more comfortably into the

new masculine identity promoted by the regime.

It is therefore important to note the tactics employed by men who did not belong to the

westernized elite, and for whom the dress law was not a welcomed change. These men made

adaptations to western dress, which made it more suitable to the aesthetic norms they were used

to. They subverted the law by wearing traditional but legal overcoats over their now illegal

clothes. They also negotiated with government official, trying to receive an exemption from the

law. Sometimes, they were willing to sacrifice their lives, demonstrating against the new

clothes. The result of these various tactics of negotiation was sometimes a hybridized

appearance – borrowing from both European fashion and Iranian sartorial traditions. Rather

than the creation of a society in which appearance was uniform, new and subtler differences

were created and new styles of male attire existed side by side.