m 1

••I>JODArb61( um

samjeLagsmaL1989

Reykjavik 1989

1.1

Efnisyfirlit:Kynning a ranns6knarsvi~i:

Gestur Gu~mundsson:

ideigJunni:

fvar J6nsson:

JEskulybsranns6knir

Felagslegeignariormgegn einkavreOingu

Meginpema: Trekni/Jr6un og verkmenntun:

Cynthia Cockburn:

Jane Barker og Hazel Downing:

Gestur GuOmundsson:

Erlendur hluti:

fvar J6nsson:

stenaatok. hagsmunasamt6kog vibhald karlveldis

Ritvinnsla og breytingar akarlveldisstj6rn skrifstofunnar

Verkmenntun (slendinga

Hegemonic Politics andCapitalist Restructuring

11

ivar Jonsson:

Hegemonic Politics andCapitalist Restructuring

IntroductionThe capitalist world is developing through a transitional phase in whichsocial and industrial realations and modes of production are transformedthrough class struggle which is international by nature. But the forms ofthe restructuring of capital accumulation are country specific, dependingon the particular social, political and economic conditions in each country.

I this paper we will analyze three different paths of developmentanticipated in Japan, Sweden and UK. The discussion starts with ananalysis of the nature of the capitalist state in terms of our concept of'hegemonic politics'. In part two we will discuss the thesis of a fundamental

216

1 Pj6{)mal-Arb6kumsamftHagsmaI1989

break in the history of capitalismwhich the theoriesof 'flexible speciallza-tion' and 'flexible firm' claim is takjng place today. We argue that there islittle or no evidence of such a break and that the forms of the presentcapitalist restructuring mustbe analyzed in terms of the social and politicalrelations that are generated by the nature and crisis of post-war'Ford isms'. RnalJy I in part three, we argue that 'Post- Fordist' developmentwill treat lndastrial realations and the regimes of capital accumulation inJapan, Sweden and UK differently: Japanese society is characterized byincreasing 'Europeanization' and due to the strength of nee-corporatiststructures in Sweden and the increasing power of public employees, thewelfare state will be secured. But due to antagonist industrial relations inUK and the specific character of the balance of power of industrial andfinancial capital, British restructuring will be characterized by even further"hberalizaticn" and industrial decline.

Content:

IntrocUctio n.1.The Capitalist State.

1. 1. Marxist approaches to the capitalist state.1. 2. Mainstream approaches to the capitalist state.1. 3. Hegemony and the capitalist stale.

2. PhasesofCapttalist Development and Different FormsoftheState. Technological EvolutionorRevolution?

2. 1.15 the techno-economic base changing? Thecases 'flexible firms'and 'flexible specialization'.2.2. The socio-political conditions of fordism and its crisis.

a) The social base of fordism.b} The political conditions of fordism.c) The crisis of ford ism.

3.Post-Fordist Restructuring and its Historically SpecificConditions: Japan, Sweden and UK. .

3. 1. The structural conditions of restructuring.3.2. The cunjunctural conditlons of restructuring; hegemonic politics.

4. Concluding Remarks.

217

Pj60mal-Arb6kumsamft§Jagsmal1989 Pj06mal- ArbOk um samfelagsmal1989

1.1. Marxist approaches to the capitalist state.

The formation of the state as an abstract institution, separate from thesocial and economic interests of civil society, is historically a relativelyrecent invention. As K. Marx analysed in his Critique of Hegel'sDoctrine of the State 1 , it is only with the development of the material,capitalist relations of civil society that this separation emerges, or ashe puts it:

in the len inlst theories of state-monopoly-capita lism in which1he contem-porary capitalist state is presumed to be an instrument eX monopolycapaal.s These theories culminated especially in the late-capitalist era.

There are fundamentally three main trends in the marxist dispute, i.e.firstly lhose who tend to reduce the forms and functions of thestate to thecapitalist mode of production and secondly there are those who empha-sise the determination of the state forms and function by class struggle

. and finally there are those who, inpractice, tend to analyse tIE autonomyor inertia of the state. If one, following B. Jessop (1983a), calls the first on'capita Itheoretical approach', the second one 'class theoretical approach', we can call the third one 'state theoretical approach'." It is especially thefirst one and the last one that tend to fall into abstract theoretcisrn, in thesense that while the 'capital theoretical approach' tends 10 derive and

.reduce state forms and functions tothe reproduction afthe captalist mode01 production and thereby miss the dynamics of the torrnationot the stateby the struggle of social movements and the moments of inertia of thepolitical institutions, the 'state theoretical approach' tends to abstractdiHerent moments of 'social life' or civil society and squeeze into atheoretical framework of the autonomous? field of the state so that theconcept of the state looses its analytical validity as it is stretched to coverall ideological and political institutions that maintain social cohesion andby doing that, reproduce the capitalist sociallormation (B. Jessop, 1983a,19). As for the 'class theoretical approach' the risk here is to reduce socialconflicts to the level of production as actors are presumed lobe 'classesfur sieh' rather than 'collective subjects fUr sieh' or complex processesdetermined by multiplicity of social factors, i.e. social actors such as 'thenew social movements' that appear and gain increasing importance asdominant systems of production fall into social and economl: crises.

But one has to keep in mind that the validity of analyses isdeterminedby the level of abstraction and ahhouoh one may argue for thevalidhy ofthe 'capital theoretical approach' B in the long run, for 'real analyses' ofconcrete socio-economic formations abstract derivations are of littlevalue, furthermore their validity is determined post festum; in actualsituations where the forms of the state and poutical practicesare createdand/or reproduced in reality, the social and political aspects of theeconomic level and vice versa are indispensable for any useful andpractical analysis.

This is, in a way. confirmed by Marx's and Engels's own wrtings on thecapitafist state. As B. Jessop (1983a, 24) puts it:

"The separation of civil and political society appears necessarily as theseparation of the political citizen, the citizen of the state, from civilsociety and from his own real empirical reality: for as an ideal politicalentity (Staatsidealist) he is a quite different being, wholly distinct fromand opposed to his actual reality. Civil society thus manufactureswithin itself the same relation between state and civil society that wehave. already found in bureaucracy: (K. Marx 1975,143-4).

The same train of thought is to be found in his "materialist approach tohistory" as he prefers to call the "guiding principles" (K. Marx 1971, 20) ofhis general methodological framework for analysing the dynamics andtendencial laws that shape the forms of societal institutlons and societiesin history. We are refering to Marx's famous "fifteen propositions" in hisPreface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Here Marxemphasises that the superstructure in society': i.e. the state and socialrelations, are overdetermined by the economic base", But as one can seefrom his ' historical' analyses of class struggle, in The EighteenthBrumaire (K. Marx 1973) and The Civil War in France (K. Marx 1974),classes and political practices are not simply reducible to the character-isitics of the economic base or functions that satisfy its needs:'

Unfortunately Marx never developed a complete theory of classes andclass struggle as his class analyses were determined by the level ofabstraction depending on the objects of analyses in question and he diedbefore he had approached that level of concretization in his work onCapital. Nor did he develop an adequate theory of the capitalist state andthat problem has haunted marxist analyses ever since Marx died.Roughly one can claim that until the 1960s economic determinismdominated marxist theories of the state, Le. instrumentalist theories thatanalysed the capitalist state as means for the realization of economicinterests of the capitalist class or dominant fractions of that class as e.g.

?l~ '110

Pj66mal .•Arb6k urn samtelagsmal1989

"This is emphasised by Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Programmeof the German Social Democratic Party. For he argues that, whi!e onecan generalise about the "present society' across national bounda-ries, it is im~ssible to do so about the 'present state', Thus whereas _capitalism could be found in all 'civilized countries' and varies only in~s degree of development, the form of the state changes with ecchcountry's border and differs between the Prusso-German empire andSwitzerland, between England and the United States. However,although Marx concludes that "the present state" is thus a fiction', healso argues that modem states share certain essential characteristics.This follows from the fact that, despite their motley diversity of form,states in civilised countries all stand on the ground of modern bour-geois society."The problem of 'real analysis' of the capitalist state is not only 10

analyse the nature of the reciprocal, 'dialogical' rather than dialectical" ,relations between firstly the inertia 01 state institutions, secondly theneeds of different modes of production in the socio-economic formationin question and finally the dynamics of social conflicts as all threemoments are interwoven moments of the process of development of thesocio-economic formation - but analyse the overdetermination of thatprocess by the structural development 01 the phases of capital accumu-lation and the position of the economy in question in the internationaldivision of labour in which are included the effects and structural con-straints of the size of the economy and its developmental stage.

Already in his early writings Marx highlighted the inertia or relativeautonomy of the state by analysing ns particular interest vis-a-vis thenumerous particular interests in/of civil society, as embodying the univer-sal interests of those particular interests. But as it is the development ofparticular interests in civil society that generate the illusion of the state astheemtxxliment of universal interest, the interest ofthe state bureaucracyis to reproduce the existence of particular interests (K. Marx 1975, 106).Furhtermore, he comes to a revolutionary conclusion as he claims Ihat thestate can only embody universal interest when particular interests of civilsociety are abolished, i.e. when the particular interests really become the·universal interest (ibid., 109).

To reduce the existence of tha state and its separation from civilsociety to the existence of separate, particular interests in civil society,and to anatyse the reproduction of the existence of the state in terms ofthe reproduction of the existence of particular interests in civil society isa quite different level of abstraction compared with analysis of the

'220

Pj6()maJ - ArbOk urn samftf!lagsmt1l1989

'concrete' forms and functions the state takes so as to reproduce the'concrete' particular interests in civil society. ~

As we have highlighted above Marx and Engels were incomplete" inthis respect. On the on side they tended to reduce the panicular interestsof civil society to the antagonist interests of capital and labour in thecapitalist mode of production and its tendency to produce deepeningpolarisation in the class system", On the other side they emphasise the'active' struggle of diHerent classes in conqu ering the state so as to realizetheir objective interests. Here we refer to the historical and politicalwritings and The German Ideology in which they write:

"The state, divorced from the real interests of individual and commu-nity, and at the same time as an illusory communal life always based,however, on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglom-eration - such as flesh and blood, language, disvision of labour on alarge scale and other interests - and especially ... on the classes,already determined by the division of labour, which in every such massof men separate out and of which one dominate all others. It followsfrom this that all struggles within the slate, the struggle betweendemocracy, aristocracy and monarchy, the struggle forthe franchise,etc., etc., are fought out among one another ... Further ~ follows thatevery class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination,as is the case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the oldform of society in its emirety and of domination itself, must first conquerfor itself poliHcal power in order to represent its interests in tum as thegeneral interest, which in the first moment it is forced to dO.H ((K. Marxand F. Engels 1976, 53 • underlines I.J.).

Obviously Marx and Engels are here dealing with historical analysesat the forms of societal development on a very abstract level, but it isespecially the last sentences that are of relevance as a point of departurefor'real analysis' of the functions and forms of the stale in particular stagesof the development of particular socio-economic formations.

1.2. Mainstream approaches to the capitaliststateIn view of a historical approach like this, i.e. analysing social forms andrelations in 'real analysis' as a part of ongoing processes of societaldevelopment· one will not find the mainstream analyses of political

221

Pj6()mal~ Arb6k um samfeJagsmal1989

science of much use. In this mainstream discourse, political instltuionsare abstracted as an autonomous sphere which, when analysed, is moreorless reduced to an instrumentalist version of the concept of power, andespecially in the case of anglo-saxon political scientists, their field andconceptualization consists of the two problems of power and the state.R.A. Dahl (1970) defines politics and political aspects for example in hisstandard textbook Modern Political Analysis, as human relationships thatinvolve toa significant extent, control, influence, power or authority. Andpolitical systems are defined as persistent parternsot these relationships(ibid., 6). Dahl writes: '

"Ever since Aristotle's time, the notion has been widely shared that apolitical relationship in some way involves authority, ruling, or power.For example, one of the most influenctal modem social scientists .. ,Max Weber •.. postulates that an association should be called political"if and in so far the enforcemem at its order is carried out continuallywithin a given territorial area by the application and threat of physicalforce on the part of the administrative staff," Thus, atthouoh Weberemphasised the territorial aspect of a political association, like Aris"!"toUe he specified that a relationship of authority or rule was one of itsessential characteristics," (ibid .• 4-5).

And he adds:

••.• a leading contemporary political scientist Harold Lasswell, defines"poi(tical science, as an empirical discipline, (as) the study of theshaping and sharing of power" and "a political act (as) one performedin power perspectives .••.{ibid., 4}.

For Dahl, political science deats a fortiori with political systems, i.e.patterns of power relations rather than processes. Furthermore, theemphasis is on the political system as a pattern that is a distinct systemamong many systems which constitute society (ibid., 6-9) (in this respecthe echoes system-theory). But, more importantly, this political system isanalysed in an external way as features that can be compared and mayvary in different societies, but political relations are not seen in an internal

. way as part of the social totality which is a developing process". As aconsequence this, approach is descriptive and empirical. designed forcomparative studies.

In the post world war era and until the late 1960s positivist view of the

')')')

Pj6tJmal- Arbok urn sarnfeJagsmaJ 1989

social sciences dominated in the West. The aim was quantitative com-parative methods and specialized sciences with clearly distinct fields ofstudy and with emphasis on statistical methods. But these specializedsocial sciences were also put in a pragmatic context, to be used in~ove~n:e~tal "scie~ce policy" .as a part of long term aim of buildinginterdiscipnnary protects, covering aUspheres of SOciety, integrated bythe general systems theory •which divided reality into systems which wererelated to each other in an information flow of in-put/demand and out-put'(suppfy cr. T, Parsons) (see E. Dahlstrom, 9).

The concept of power is fundamental to the analysis of politicalscience. But this concept is though defined differently by different schol-ars. But the most usual definition of power in mainstream political scienceis probably in line with Laswell's deflnhion: power is ihe fact of taking partin decision-rnakinq" or definitions that refer to the decision-rnakinqprocess (N. Poulatzas 1975, 104). Implicit in this definition is a similarthought as in the democratic theories 01 the 1950s and 1960s (see C.B.Macpherson): individuals "or groups enter the abstracted and distinctpolitical system or decision-making process and act rationally and goaloriented. The very existence of the distinction between the politicalsystem in its contemporary form is 'normalized'; i.e. not seen as aconsequence of particular, historical structures of social relations" (pri-vate ownership of capital, laws of value and market relations andgeneralized division of labour between intellectual and manual labour ineconomy and inlot the state apparatuses". Or as N. Poulantzas puts ~:

"The fundamental defect of this conception, at least in the frameworkof a society characterized by class conflict, is that (i) it succumbs to avoluntarist conception of the decision-making process, through disre-garding the efteciveness of the struc1ures, and it is not able exactly 10locate beneath the appearances the effective centres of decisioninside which the distribution of power works; and (ii) it takes as aprincIple the 'integrationist' conception of society, from which theconcept of 'participation' in decision-makinq is derived." Ibid., 104).

In the consensus theorist approach ofT. Parsons's structural function-alism, power is reduced to "the capacity to cany on certain functions (i.e.taking part in decision making - I.J.) to the profit of the social systemconsidered in its entirety." (Ibid,. 105). The defect of this definition,besides the circularity of functionalist reasing. is that it reduces theconcept of power to reproductionaJ functions or the "profit of the social

Pj6l>mal- Arb6k urn samtelagsmA/1989

system" and consequently misses the hof conflicting agents, the result of wh p enom~non of power as relationsfor the system in question. Furtherm:r:e c~nlhets may be malfunctionalterms of analyses of periods of devel .fhis concept IS not promising indevelopment to anothsr.» opment from one stage of societal

Onthe bases of this laswellian con ..the hollow debate and empirical a I cept, political scientists are stuck in'elnes' are many and difternet' ~~:SIS of ~hetherthe decision-makingR.A. Dahl) orfew or even onl o~e I erent fields (the plu~~list view, e.g.n?t (the elitist view, Mosca, ~reto' ~ ~:e se:n as stratified and others?Ispute depends on definitions of p~ri' Ight Mills etc.}. The result of thisIn the political system; i.e. the distri~ IC~ resour~~s and ~hei: distributionorganizational apparatuses, control ~~~~ of poHtIC~1S~lff,nme, wealth,use force etc. (see e.g. R.A Dahl 1970 communIcations, capacity to'aciual' or 'potennar as acto~s do "I ' 52). Furthermore power may beresources to have influence, it is ~nonecessan/Y have to use their pol~icalresources which they can use (a ugh that t~e opponents know ollheirc~~ital can goon investment stri~e~·~~r:de unions c?n call for strikes andelItIsm dispute is based on a h Ii O~~h we claim that the pluralism-presuming that the concepts of ~~;' rt,f'ed problematic, we are notproblem of paJilical power can't be red~a resources ~re .of no use, Thefull meaning and function can f bCed to these crrtena alone as theirstructural constraints of the actio~~ Yf e/n~erstood in the context ofhas to base the analyses on th 0 po mea actors, In this context one

e concept of hegemony.

1.3. Hegemony and the capitalist statA n~n:determinist and non-functionali e .capitalist slates. i.e. a non-reducti' . st way of analysinq particualarcapitalist states _analyses the stat 0(nI51.approach to 're~J ~nalysis' ofas syntheses or 'becoming' f e as it does other SOCIalInstitutions)t I a struC1ural condhion d .

s rugg e of social forces and indo 'd I s an actions andfunctions and its fields and deg IVIf ua 5, that both define its forms anddefined as 'relational'. reeo autonomy. Such an approach is best

A 'relational' approach in the abo .preaches as it synthesises the djalectfc;~sense supersedes other ap--I.e. structures as conditions of diH tw~en st~ctures and actions,tendential 'laws'. B.Jessop (1983~;eh~~~vntral acnons a~d as based onhegemony that seems valuable f' eloped a relational theory ofcompared with the three other m ~r real ~nalysis' of the capitalist stateinstrumentalism, structural' ndalOfmarxist app~oa~hes to the state, i.e.

Ism a arm-determInation224 .

Pj60mal-Arb6kumsamfelagsmal1989

The core 01 the instrumentalist approach is the idea that the state isemployed by capital to promote its interests at the expense of otherclasses or social forces, be it individual capitalists, particular firms,specific fractions or sectors of capital, or the capitalist class as a whole ..The rule of capital is empiricly established by exposition of class back-ground and affiliation of the state elite (comprising career politicians andpublic empclyees) and those individuals and firms that take part in theformation and implementation of Govenrment policies. Furthermore it isestablished empirlcly by analyses of what immediate economic interestsdifferent policies realize as they are implemented. But what is common tothese sociological and political studies is the view of the state as being aneutral tool, which is equally accessible in principle to all political forcesand can also be used for any feasible governmental purpose and as aconsequence the empirical analyses tend to be based on the limitedscope of political resources alone. .

The 'structuralist' approach is based on the idea that the power of thestate elite is limited to the extent that policies that disturb the laws of themarket, its competitive logic~ will lead to investment withdrawal. Suchstrikes can occur in the private dommestic sector, affecting financing ofthe public sector and. depending on the stage 01 'liberalization', leadingto flow of financial capital to loreign markets, all three factors leading todecelerating multiplier efiecls and undermining the competitiveness 01domestic capnal.

The 'lorm"determination' of state policies relers to the very structureof the state it::.ell which is presumed to ensure that the interests 01capitalare realised in policy-making and implementation. So, what we get is the'structural selectivity' of state policies. and as a consequence, the statecan not be seen as a neutral instrument, equally accesseble to all socialforces and equally adaptable to all ends. The state has an in-built, formdetermined bias that makes it easier lor capital to influence it and morereadily mobilised for capitalist policies. The form·determination of thestate refers to phenomena such as the dependence of the state on taxrevenues or loans generated within the private sector, dependence dueto the exclusion of the state from the productive core of the economy.Furthermore the rechtsaatlich constitutional form and formal equality andfreedom reinforces the real inequality and political alination of wage-labour in civil society. Parliamentary politics and functional representationand other forms 01class collaboration, depending on national consensusand legititmacy of the existing economic order, determines the scepe ofstate policies. Furthermore, the way in which the bureaucratic system in

225

PjMmaf. ArMk um samteJagsmaJ 1989

capitalist societies is unequally accessible to ordinary people comparedwith established interests both in terms of the forms of administrativepractice and institutionalised interest mediation. affects the formation ofstate policies. Form-detennination refers also to the indirectness of legaland monetary trams of state intervention in the economy which makesstate dependent on the compliance of business. And finally it refers to theinsulation of economic and repressive organs of the state from eHectivepopular and legislative control so that state activities crucial to theinterests of capital generally never face serious confrontation.

As B.·Jessop(1983 aand b) has highlighted theshortcomingsofthesethree approaches need to be superseded. The instrumentalist approachmust be criticized for a lack of validity of the variables that are presumedto reflect the correspondence between the functions of the state and theinterests of capital. Firstly, the sociological reductionism of this approachis misleading as the social background of politicians, oHicials and eco-nomic spokesmen is wide and their position on particular political issuesof interests of capital is wide as well. Secondly, the interests at particularcapital can not be reduced 10 the interests at capital in general as theconditions of reproduction of the capitalist mode of production are part ofadeveJoping process otthe socio-economic formation in question and asits teleolooy is only established post festum, different interests of diHerentcapitals are only established as general interests in and through politicalstruggle. As a consequence the stale has problems in choosing what kindof coalitions with which particular capitals will correspond with presentand future general interests of capital. It should further be emphasisedthat the problem becomes more acute the more serious social andtechnological stalemate characterises the economic and political situ-ation in particular socio-economic formations. In other words, the situ-arion of socia-technological stalemate on the micro level of individualcapital reflects higher levelof economic/profit risks so that, and therefore,the politicalrisks of the state are rnultlplled." Let's call this phenomenon'the mirror eHect of socia-technological stalemate. Lastly, the instrume-nalist approach ignores the eHects of the state forms 'on the process ofrepresentation and the ways in which the interests of capital can beaffected and redefined through changes in the state system and/or thebalance of pomical forces within which capitalists must manoeuvre.

One of the main shortcomings of the structuralist approach is that itreduces the actions of the state elite to the function of stabilizing theeconomic order and by that doing, overlooks the importance at ideologicaldomination as the state elite has to agreeon developmental strategies for

226

Pj60rncH- Arbok urn samte/agsmfII 1989

capital accumulation. Or, let us add, the situation of social and techno-economiC stalemate has to be overcome and wide rang.ingconsensus onsocial and techno-econmic paradigm has to be establ.lshed, .

B. Jessop (1983b. 141) has criticized the structurahst approach as,itsamphasis on structural constraints not only suqqests that accumulationis the overriding priority of the state elite but also Implies tha~the state canalways reproduce the complex requirements for accu~~~atlon as long aspoliticians have the will to do so. It overlc:oks the poSSibilityt~at the stateelite might have its own sui gene~s ~nterests and also Ignores .thepressures facing them from non-capitalist forces. And Jessop adds.

~lt.also implies that something in the torm Of. th~ capitalist ~tatesomehow ensures the potentially crises-free realisation of the politicalconditions needed for capitalism to prosper and even assumes thatthese conditions are essentially consistent rather th~n p~tentlallycontradictory. Moreover, in so far as it is the self-perceived Interestsof business that enqenaer these constraints, this approac~ mu~tassume a well-defined course 01 accumulation wh~se obstru~tlon Willtrigger, in quick succession, an investment stnke br capital andremedial action by the state elite. Such an assurr:ptlon overl,oakspotential contradictions among lh~ needs of capital and f.alls t~percieve the existence of competing accumulation strategies favoured by different business interests. It also neglects the time-lagsinvolved inGovernment attempts at steering the economy and b?o~t-ing business confidence as well a~. ign?ring the structural hml!sinherent in such indirect forms of political interventIOn as changes Enthe legal and fiscal systems. Finally ... we must also note that theideological domination of business cannot be taken fO.rgranted norreduced to a question of the contingent instrumentall~atl?n of the'means of mental production' in the hands of caonaust Interests.Ideological domination needs expl~ini~g ",,:it~.the same degree ofsophistication as political class oominauon. (ibid., 141).

The approach of 'structural selectivity' or'form-determiantion' empha-sises the manner in which the structure of the st~te syst~m ensures ~hatthe interests of capital are realised inpolicy-making ~nd Impleme~tatlon.Although it is a significant advance cQ~,pare~ :-,rth sturct~ralls~ andinstrumentalist approaches. rt has been enticed (IbId., 142) for Ignoring towhat extent form problematises function, i.e. how t~e t~rm of the statelimits its possibilities of realising the interests of capital, indeed bureau-

227

Pj60mal- ArbOk um samfelagsrmil19B9

cratic procedures can often be counter-productive for capital and areoften vehemently criticized by the representatives of capital. This ap-proach also ignores the problems capital has in building and securingpolitical grounds and coalitions among different fractions of capital andthe state elite.

Following these critical points we would arguethat atheory of the statein caphaltst social formations has to take into account conflicts within thestate as well as conflicts out side it: t he state has to be analysed as intemaland external relations of power and realized policies as a result of balanceof power of social forces, balance that is determined by potential andstrategic actions of social forces situated in tactical contexts overdeter-mined by diverse structural and conjunctural forces of which forms of thestate are only one 01 the determinants." By 'balance of power of socialtorces' we mean the relative power and capacity 01 the ditterent socialforces to exploit political resources to organize support or oppositionagainst state policy, instutions and forms of regulation and for or againsteach others strategies. i.e. on the basis of the existing distribution ofpolitical resources. It is through 'hegemonic polhics'" that particularclasses or fractions of a class realize their long term interests throughbuHdingcoalitions, of1enad hoc, on the political level, using their politicalresources among which the coercive powers of the state mayor may notbe.

Asa consequence, realized policies are to be analysed as social andeconomic interests mediated through processes of 'hegemonic politics'.We can analyse at least 8 moments of this mediation in capitalist socio-economic formations; i.e. social contradictions and/or 'imputed interests',social forces and interest representation, distribution of political re-sources. ideological apparatuses, stale and tempo of affluency, stateforms and state apparatuses, the state elite and finally state policies andforms of intervention. Let's briefly describe these moments of interestmediation.

Firstly there are social and economic contradictions that generateinterests that are potentially represented, i.e. 'imputed inlerests'." Thesecontradictions are economic, political, !=leo-demographic/regional andsccial-reproductcnal. As all socio-economic formations are character-ised by different, coexisting modes of production, some or one of whomare/is the dominant rnodeis), economic contradictions and 'imputedinterests' arediHerent in diHerent socio-economic formations. Briefly wecan mention here contradictions between small and big companies (anddifferent sizes of the mass of surplus-value leading to different rates of

228

Pj6lJmal- ArbOk urn samtelagsm;;U 1989

capital accumulation), contradictions between different brances of indus-try, industrial and financial capital and fractions of capital (and differentrates of profit). wealth distribution between labour and capital (and ratesot exploitation), forms of ownership, power relations in firms (industrialdemocracy and internal management strategies) and gender relations inthe firms or at work

Secondly, as a sub-category of social contradictions, we have politicalcontradictions that refer to unequal access of different groups to thecollective decision making process in political parties, interests groups orthe state. Such political contradictions or 'imputed political interests' mayconsist of a) alternative forms of collective political organisation such asparJiamentarism, fascist dictatorship, communist dictatorship, nee-cor-poratlsrn, sccial-libetarian system of workers councils etc. Or b} they mayconsist of gender power relations on the collective level. Furthermore c)they may consist 01alternative interests of different political issue groupsor social minority groups. .

The third category of 'imputed interests' refers to gee-demographic orregional interests and consist of wealth distribution between regions,power relations, inter-regional ownership relations and consumer inter-ests.

Finally there are interests or contradiction in the field of reproductionof labour or the social field. These refer to consumer interests of familiesor households on the goods markets, contradictions in community andfamily planning, relations of social status and individual or collectiveleisure activnies in clubs, particular societies etc.

The second moment 01 interest mediation that determines the contextof 'hegemonic politics' is the structure of social and political forces, i.e.organised groups that represent and attempt to realise social contradic-tions or 'imputed interests'. Such groups may be political parties, interestgroups of capital and/or labour, socialminorhygroups, issuegroups, 'newsocial movements' etc..20

The third moment of interest mediation is the distibution of politicalresources, i.e. the distribution of political skill, time, wealth, organizationalapparatuses. control over communications, capacity to use force etc ..Unequal distribution of political resources is one of the factors thatdetermines the chances of different social and political forces to realisetheir represented interests.

Besides the factors of social forces and distribution of political re-sources, the success of attempts to realise represented interests. isinfluenced by the fourth factor, i.e. the structure of ideological appara-

229

Pj60mal- Arb6k um ssmteteqsms! 1989

tuses and .the state 01 existing ideology.:!1 Here we are not only reteringto t~e med~a. ~u~as well to t~e ~tructure of ideological discourses throughwhich subJectlvit~ and social identity generates (c.f. E. Laclau and C.MouHe), th~ funct!~n?t scienc~ as ideology as a part of technocracy andbureaucratic speclalists and rts function of legitimating structures ofauthority ( c.f. J. Ha?ermas 1971) and also the phenomenolgy andpatterns. Of. con.s~mphon through which the individualist subjectivity oflate-capitalism IS produced ( c.f. J. Hirsch and R. Roth, 89-94).

lntersts are fifthly .mediated via the state and tempo of affluency, i.e.the lev~1 of eccnorruc growth and social mobility (intra- and/or intergenerational), as these factors affect peoples views and consciousnessof social relations and the level of consensus.

. Sixthly, stale forms and selectivity and the power postilion and whatkind ~f sta~e apoaraurses do exist in particular socia-economic forma-nons. IS an Important factor in interest mediation and 'hegemonic politics'.As the development of state apparatuses tends to lag behind thestructural development of socia-economic formations, as they are indeedthe. r.esult of the balance of power of social forces in the past, hegemonicpolitics b~o~e mo~ecomplicated in periods of societal restructuringwhen social mnovanons and the institutional framework of the socio-economic formation is the target of conflicts between social forces. At thesame .tim~, in such periods of restructuring, the efficiency of dominantorgamsallon of the relations between the state and social forces dirnin-ish~s (c.f. the mismatch between nee-corporatist structures and the 'newSOCialmovements').

!he seve~th factor, the state elite or those who actively take part inpohcy formation ot the state. is an important factor to the extent thatrecruitment, quality and education (ct. orthodox thinking) of its membersleads to unequal influence on policy formation by the diHerent socialforces.

Finally the last moment in the process of interest mediation is theresultinq policies and forms of intervention.> State policies and interven- .tlon~ may work again~t tendencies towards 'uneven development' andare Important factors In analysis of 'real uneven development' (Cf. lvarJ?nS~n,198~). But The ~rocess of interest intermediation is the 'strategicsrtu~tlon o! ~Ifferent SOCIal forces on which they work in their attempt tor~ahz~ t~elr rnte:ests. De~~nding on their evaluation of the 'strategicsituation the SOCIalforces lorn short term coalitions and collaborate witheach other so as to realize their long term interests. In this context we cananalyse 'hegemonic projects' and 'hegemonic politics'.

')1""

Pj66mal- Arb6k um samtelagsmal1989

The term 'hegemony' is a descriptive term that refers to the structureof power relations between the social forces, i.e. rt describes the existingbalance of power between these forces, but does not explain theformation otthis balanceorthe power relations between the social forcesin particular social formation at particular moment in history. We will usethe concept of 'hegemoniC politics' to analyse the process of formation ofhegemony in which social forces define and work on their strategicsituation, attempting to realize their represented interests.'

Obviously, the interests of social forces can theoretically be defined adinfinitum andlor ad absurdum. but what counts is a definition of a matrixof interests that are of relevance for the object of analysis, i.e. here thestructural development of social formations and regimes 01capital accu-mutation." The center of analyses in that field is the dynamics ofaccumulation strategies and heqernonic politics. The accumulationstrategies of diHerent capitals are diHerent as their interests are different,but generally they will attempt to inl1uencethe development of investment(both qualitatively in terms ot techno-economic paradigms, and structu r·ally in terms of sectoral and regional investment) and in terms ofinfra structure investment. They will also attempt to influence t he develop-ment of the public sector in terms 01 the level of taxation and publicexpenditure, and regulation of accumulation in terms of the level of'liberalization' of labour, goods and financial markets and in terms of workconditions and formation 01 wages They will also attempt to influence thedevelopment of the qualrtative nature of the labour-force through privateor public training and education. In short it is a question of economicgrowth models.

There is a great space of contradictions between the interests of thedifferent capitals within this general and abstract framework and it isindeed thorugh the process of hegemoniC politics that coalitions areestablished and compromises are made in which different capitals acceptshort term concessions tor long tenn interests. But as these compromisesare vulnerable to internal and external economic and political changes,strategies and compromises are constantly being rs-assesed (see B.Jessop 1983 b, 149). . .

It follows that the resulting dominant growth models are under con-stant pressure of being actively reproduced, but the precondition for sucha reproduction is the reproduction ofthe underlying hegemoniC relations.It is on the basis of a 'hegemonic project' that the hegemonic relations areesfablished and reproduced. As B. Jessop has highlighted:

231

Pj6{)mal- Arb6k um samfelagsmaJ 1989

"In broad terms hegemony involves the development of a specific'hegemonic project' which can resolve the abstract problem of con-flicts between particular interests and the general interest. Thisinvolves the mobilisation of support behind a concrete, national-popular programme of action which asserts a general interest in thepursuit ot objectives that, explicitly orimpliCilly, advance the long-terminterests of the hegemonic class (fraction). and which privilegesparticular 'economic-corporate' interests compatible with this pro-gramme, whilst derogating the pursuit of other particular interests thatare inconsistent with it. ... hegemonic projects can be principallyconcerned with various non-economic (even it economically condi-tioned and economically relevant) objectives such as military expan-sion, moral regeneration, social reform. or political stability. Moreover,whilst accumulation strategies are oriented primarily to the relations 01production and, hence, to the balance of class forces, hegemonicprojects are typically oriented to broader issues grounded not only ineconomic relations but also in civil society and the state, and musttherefore take account of the balance among all social forces, howso-ever these may be iden!ified and organised." (8, Jessop 1983 b, 155).The realization of a 'hegemonic project' requires the establishing of a

'power bloc' that is strong enough 10 work successfuny on the process andmoments of interest mediation to establish and reproduce necessaryinstitutjonaJ framework and 'policy paradigm' for a permanent growthmodel. The concept of 'powerbloc' refers to the collaboration of dominantsocial forces with the strongest power positions, usually economic socialforces or representatives andzor interest groups of capital. There is ashifting balance of power within the power bloc as different groups playthe Ieadership role within it in different periods, i.e. different groups playthe 'hegemonic role' in different periods {N. Poulantzas, 1975, 141).z.s Itshould be emphasised here that the 'power bloc' and the hegemonicgroups or class fractions within it, is not the same thing as those in chargeof state institutions, but it is the groups and social forces that manage toexploit political resources.to realize their interests (ibid.,' 249).

It is the aim of the hegemonic fraction or sociallorce of the power blocto gain economic hegemony and realize its long term economic interests.This requires the support from other fractions of the politically dominantsocial forces. But economic hegemony has to be distinguished fromeconomic domnation and economic determination in the last instance asthese two last mentioned moments represent structural constraints forhegemonic politics. As B_Jessop puts it:

232

Pj63ma/~Arb6kumsamfeJagsmal1989

"The exercise of economic hegemony through the sucessful elabora-tion of such [accumulation LJ.} strategy should be distinguished fromsimple economic domination and from economic determination in thelast instance by the circuit of industrial capital. The heart of the circuitof capital is the production process aself ,.. This means that theperformance of productive (or industrial) capital is the ultimate eco-nomic determinant of the accumulation process and that the real ratesof return on money capital {including credit} and commercial capitaltaken as.awhole (and thus abstracted from competition) depend in thelong term on the continued valorization of productive (or industrlat)capital. Economic domination can be enjoyed by various fractions ofcapital and occurs when one fraction is able to impose its particular"economic corporate" interests on the other fractions regardless oftheir wishes and/or at their expense. Such domination can derivedirectly from the position of tHerelevant fraction in the overall circu it ofcapital in a specific economic conjuncture and/or indirectly trorn theuse 01some form of extra-economic coercion (including the exerciseof state power). In contrast, economic hegemony derives from eco-nomic leadership won through general acceptance of an accumulationstrategy. Such a strategy must advance the immediate interests ofother fractions by integrating the circuit of capital in which they areimplicated at the same time as it secures the tong-term interests of thehegemonic traction in controlling the allocation of money capital todifferent areas of investment advantageous to itself. Thus, whereaseconomic domination could well prove incompatible with the contin-ued integration of the circuit of capital and result in the tong-rundevalorization of the total social capital (owing to lis adverse eflects onindustrial capital as the ultimate determining moment in the overallcircuit), economic hegemony is won through the integration of thecircun and the continued expansion of industrial capltal even where anon-industrial fraction is hegemonic. It is only through a systematicconsideration of the complex forms of articulation and disarticulationof economic determination in the last instance, economic domination, and economic hegemony that we will be able to understand theequally complex dynamic of the capitalist economy." (B. Jessop 1983c,91-2).

The relation between these three moments, economic determination,economic domination and economic hegemony is a question of the longterm overdetermination of hegemonic ponies by the structural develop-

233

Pj6~mal-ArbOk um samftHagsmal1989

ment of the circuit of capital accumulation and the uneven developmentof different capitals and sectors (industrial, financial and commercialcapital).2fl But it is in the 'conjunctural' short term context that difierentsocial forces struggle for their interests and different fractions of capitalstruggle for different accumulation strategies. It is in this context thathegemonic projects are important as their role is to define and createsupport for a notion of 'the general will' that will supersede the particularinterests of different capitals. Such a task may require the work of othergroupS and people than that of the particular capital(s) in question. It is inthis context that the role of 'organic intellectuals' and technocraticspecialists is important. Or as B. Jessop puts it:

"once we recognise the organisational and managerial dilemmas con-fronting capitalist associations (especially peak organisations) in pro-moting anything beyond the interests that particular capitals happento have in common for the moment, it is quite reasonable to expectother agencies to be the key forces in the elaboration of accumulationstrategies. The 'organic intellectuals' of capital could well be foundinstead among financial journalists, engineers, academics, bureau-crats, party politicians, private 'think tank' specialists, or trade unionleaders. This suggests the need to consider how accumulation strate-gies acquire hegemony within the capitalist class, and to examine theconsequences of a lack or crisis at an hegemonic accumulationstrategy. Such investigations could include capitalist associations butwould not be exclusively concerned with them." (8. Jessop 1983 b,160).

And again:

-In broad terms hegemony involves the interpellation and organizationof difierent "class-relevant" (but not necessarily class-conscious)forces under the "pOlitical, intellectual, and moral leadership" of aparticular class (or class fraction) or, more precisely, its political,intellectual, and moral spokesmen. The key to the exercise of suchleadership is the development of a "hegemonic project" which canresolve the abstract problem of conflicts between particular interestsand the general interest. In abstract terms this conflict is probablyinsoluble because ofthe potentially infinite range of particular interest.Nonetheless, it is the task of hegemonic leadership to resolve thisconflict on a less abstract plane through specific political, intellectual,

234

Pj60ma/w Arbdk um samtelagsmal1989

and moral practices. This involves the mobilization of support behinda concrete, national-popular program of action which asserts a gen-eral interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitlyadvance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) andwhich also privileges particular "economic-corporate" interests com-patible with this program. Conversely those particular interests whichare inconsistent with the project are deemed immoral and/or irrationaland, insofar as they are still pursued by groups outside theconsensus,they are also liable to sanction. Normally hegemony also involves thesacrifice of certain short-term interests of the hegemonic class (frac-tion), and a flow of material concessions for other social forcesmobilized behind the project. It is thereby conditioned and limited bythe accumulation process ... While accumulation strategies are di-rectly concerned with economic expansion on a national or interna-tional scale, hegemonic projects can be concerned principally withvarious non-economic objectives (even if economically conditionedand economically relevant). The latter might include military success,social reform, political stability, or moral regeneration. MorMver, whileaccumulation strategies are oriented primarily to the relations ofproduction and thus to the balance of class forces. hegemonic projectsare typically oriented to broader issues grounded not only in economicrelations but also in the field of civil society and the stale. Accordinglyhegemonic projects should take account of the balance among allrelevant social forces, however these may be organized. It is in thissense that we can refer to hegemonic projects as concerned with theMnational-popular" and not simply with class relations. Lastly, given thedifferentiation between the value form and the form of the state as wellas the differential scope and content of accumulation strategies andhegemoniC projects, there is obviously room for some dissociation orinconsistency between them in specific conjunctures. In general itwould seem obvious that accumulation and hegemony will be mostsecure where there is a close congruence between particular strate-gies and projects." (B. Jessop 1983 c, 101).

There are many possible forms of such hegemonic projects, as we will,in some periods, find similar versions of the same fundamental he-gemonic projects, such as e.g. versions of the late-capitalist keynesianwelfare state vis-a-vis recent monetarist experiments, or they may reflectmore.c1early historical specificity of particular social formations such asthe Icelandic projects of extending the fishing limits to 12, 50 and 200

235

Pi66ma/~Arb6k urn samtelagsma! 1989

miles in recent decades with the consequent 'cod-wars' against the Brtts.And these hegemonic projects will be successful depending on historicalcircumstances (as ego monetarism won support from the historicalexperience of t~e collapse of social-democratic policies in the 19708 andclashes between rank-and-file workers and the leadersot the labourmovement and the social-democratic parties).27

But what are the general pre-conditions for a successful hegemonicproject. 8. Jessop emphasises three fundamental factors:

-its structural determination, its strategic orientation, and ijs relation toaccumulation. The structural determination of hegemony involves thestructural privileges insCribed in a given state form (including its formsof representation, intervention, and internal articulation), for someforces and their interests at the expense of other forces and interests... the "structural selectjvhy~ of the state." (8. Jessop 1983 c, 101).

Strategic orientation involves fundamentally three areas of political,intellectual, and moral leadership.

"First. it involves the integration of various strategically significantforces as subjects with specific "inIerests" and the repudiation ofahemalive interpeJJalions and attributions of interest. Second, it jn~volves the formulation of a general. "national-popular" project whoserealization will also advance the particular "economic-corporate" inter-ests perceived by subordiante social forces. Finally, it involves thespecification of a "po Iicy pa radjgm" wij hin wh ich conflicts over compet-ing interests and demands can be negotiated without threatening theoverall project."(ibid, 102).

Concerning the relationship between hegemonic project andaccumu-lation, he adds:

."Third, ij should be emphasised that there is no compelling reason toexpect that hegemonic projects should be directly economic in char-acter or .give priority to economic objectives. But it is important torecognize that successful pursuit of a hegemonic project will dependon the flow of material concessions to subordinate social forces andthus on the productivity of the economy." (ibid., 102).

As the history of capitalism has seen many and diHerent kinds of236

Pj66ma/~ Arbok um samtelagsmal1989

. emonic projects and some are m~reaccumulation stratecies an~ h~~e countries and not others, dependingfrequent in partlcularpe.nods In ~ I division of labour, it seems necces-on their position in the l~ema!IOna e emonic politics by analysing thesary to concretize our discussion of ~h9 emonic politics by the structuralover-determination ofthe moments 0 it ~accumulation in the history ofdevelopment of the phases of cap acapitalism.

237

Pj60mal· Arb6k urn samfelagsmal1989

2. Phases of capitalist development anddifferent forms of the state. Technologicalevolution or revolution?The histo.ryof capitalism is characterized by shifting regimes of capitalaccumlatlon, techno-economic paradigms andnational and internationalac~mulati?n ~trategies. Generally we can say that the task of economicpolJcY-n:akm,9In the capitalist countries has been to adjust to increasedintemationalisation of capital accumulation, organising counter-effects toth.e'~endencyof 1h.erate of profit to fall' and/or competing away of profitswithin the K?n~ratleffs and/or organizing increased socialization of capi-tal accu~udatlon_ Th~re are many accumulation strategies that havec~aractenzed economic and developmental strategies in different coun-tries, b~l perhaps the best-known examples 01accumulation strategies atthe nat~on~1level are strategies like "import substitution" and "exportpromotion growth models developed in Latin America and more recentlysucceded by the so-called "export substitution" modeL Other nationalex~mple5 include ~hefascist notion of Grossraumwirtschaft (ct. Japan'sAsian Co-Prosperity Sphere). the postwar West German development ofthe M~el D~tschl~nd strategy, the attempt at British banking capital to~ubordl~ale Induslna.1capil~l 10 its long-term strategy of restoring the~n.lematlonaleconormc domination of "City~Interests after 1945, Japan'sn~hc~~ntry and sl~ongarmy" strategy from the Melji Restoration through

to rtsmlhlarydefeat In194.5, Japans's postwar strategy of peaceful export-led gro~h u~der the aegis of state-sponsored finance capital trusts,andthe natronalist strategy of indicative planning and modernization inpos~ar France. At the international level the pax Britannica and paxAmenc~na an~ can be mentioned, and most recently. the proposals fora pax trilateralis or a new, international Keynesianism oriented to theNorth-South problem." (B. Jessop 1983 c, 94).

The histo.ryof capitalism teaches us that despite the common struc-tural constraints t.hatintemationalcompetition and technological develop-ment puts on national accumulation strategies, the resulting strategies ineach country depend on conjunctural contexts or the immediate momentsof h~emoni9 politics. The same goes forthe forms of the state. Indeed,the lntro?uctlon of ~aylorist technology and restructuring of the capitalist~nomles, followmg the economic crisis 01 the 1930s, led to verydifferent forms of.the state, i,e. fascist dictatorships as opposed to new-de~1and keynesian welfare-states. These different results or forms ofadjustment. depended on the differrent mediations of the structural

238

.Pj6i}ma /. Arb6k urn sarnteJagsmal1989

constraints by the different matrixes ot the conjunctural moments ofhegemonic politics in each case.

2.1. Is the techno-economic base changing?The cases of 'flexible firms' and 'flexible speciali-zationIn the contemporary era of post-fordist restructuring of capital accumula-tion, we should therefore expect country-specific forms of the state andaccumulation strategies resulting from the present restructuring, follow-ing the crises of taylorism and the present economic crises. Methodologi-cally this means that forms of the state and forms of regulation in theconcretized cases of 'real analyses' can not be reduced to or derived fromabstract models of the ideal typical forms at technological regimes ofcaprtal accumulation as the technological base is only one of the factorsthat shape concrete social and political forms. Such forms are onlytendencial and depend on the real existing conditions of hegmonicpolitics, The forms that the technotogical base takes are determined by'real' existing socio-pofaical contexts that shape the qualitative relationsbetween capital and labour {level of skills, power relations, work condi-tions etc.). Indeed, although international competition determines thecondhions of capital accumulation on the national level, it is equally truethai accumulation strategies and developmental strategies of governe-merits affect the position of economies' position in the internationaldivision of labour and hence can, depending on the resulting leveleconomic growth, experiment with more various potential forms oftechnology and technological restructuring. Therefore analyses of tech-nological development have to be based on analyses of 'real unevendevelopment' (as we discuss in lvar Jonsson 1988).

The fundamental problem of analyses of the contemporary restructur-ing of capital accumulation boils down to whether analyses of the post-tordist restructuring are based on evolutionary perspectives or revolution-ary/radical break perspecives. While the former perspectives take the realcondijions of capital accumulation as in 'real analyses' as the point ofdeparture, the latter take a theoretical comparison of futurological con-structions of technological and social relations as the point of departure.We will in the following analyse post-Iordlst restructuring first in terms ofthe empirical evidence of a new wave of spreading crafts-production, asit is nowadays almost a taken for granted reality in the liHerature ontechnical change, and secondly, in the next part of this article, we will

239

Pj6tJmaf- Arb6k um samfefagsmal1989 Pj6i5mal-Arb6kum samfelagsmaJ 1989

"The OECD says that the overall impression is stabif~y in small-firmmanufacturing employment. but 'where the share of small firms hasrisen the change can best be described as marginal, being less than3 per cent" {ibid., 169).

side as a result of poor performance of the large firms. In UK, for instance,small-firm employment rose from 13.5 per cent of total employment in1968 to 21.1 per cent in 1982, but the absolute level of employment hasvaried very little, rising from 981000 in 1968 to 1.9 million in 1976, butsince then it has remained stable. Since 1976 large-firm employment(firms employing over 1000 workers) has fallen by over 1 million to 6million. So the recent rise in the relative share of small-firm employmentis almost entirely due to downturn in big business {C. Leadebeater and J.Lloyd, 169-70}. Furthermore, evidence from USA indicate that. whereservice employment has been relatively increasing in recent years (andconsequently small-firm employment), such increase is due to contract-ing out by big business rather than job creation. In that case increasingsmall-firm employment is a part of a long term trend in the capitalisteconomies (ibid., 170),31 ,

But to argue thatthe increase in small-firm employment is insignificantin manufacturing and even service as well, and by that doing, that 'break-theorists' exaggerate the trend'ot development towards economic sys-tems dominated by small, flexible firms in the capitalist countries. is notto argue against trends towards a polarization of the labour market andthe economy. Indeed, in the present crisis the trends seem to be towardsdualism of small and big firms and dualism of core and periphery on thelabour market.

As R, Kaplinsky argues, 'systemofacture', or the computerization ofplanning, manufacturing and marketing into a integrated whole, strength-ened by 'just-in- time' management strategies, results in a new form ofexploitation, in which big firms are secured faster growth on the groundsof monopolization of those parts of the overall labour process, thatgenerate relatively greater value added, i.e. the knowledge intensiveparts such as planning, design, R&D and marketing, while small firmsand/or sub-contractors compete intensively for increasingly stricter con-tracts in terms of prices and location (R. Kaplinsky 1985). Furthermore,big firms and MNCs exploit information technology in products andproduction processes much faster than small firms (R. Kapiinsky 1984,124-5) with consequent difHerences in the level of value added.

Much litterature has' been produced recently that. at first glance,seems to support the thesis of growing dualization of the labour market,but this thesis does not hold water as, firstly, it is difficult to analysewhether it is a temporary phenomenon, resulting from the generation ofthe huge reserve army ofthe unemployed by the present economic crisis,or a characteristic of a permanent structural change. Furthermore it is

?41

analyse post-tordist restructuring and its potentials in terms of its socio-political determination. Finally, in the part then following we will discussthe ideological function of the theses of 'flexibilitization' of production (l.e.the theses of 'the flexible firm' and 'flexible specialization') in terms of thestruggle for a new dominant hegemonic project.

The methodological dilemma crystalizes clearly in th e litterature on therelations between the new technology, flexible specialization and emerg-ing post-tordist societal relations. In the case at the break approach it ispresumed - whether it is the management and 'manpower studies'linerafure (ct. Atkinson 1984, see A Poolert, 44) or 'smaJJis beautiful' left-reformist litterature (cf. M .J. Piore and C. Sabel) - that the new technologywill lead to more flexible goods markets as well as flexible labour marketsand quick markets' adjustment to changing demand, as production will bedecentralized and fragmented resulting from the presumed dominance ofsmall firms in capitalist economies. Indeed markets are seen as the primesubject of restructuring and fundamentaly seen as a progressive forceshifting the politcal scene back to the wonderlands 01 classical capitalismandlor pre-marxian 'utopian socialism' (i.e, the socialism 01 Proudhon,St-Simon, Fourier elc.).28

Theories like these have not only been critized for their ideologicalcontent (A. Pollert), but they seem to exaggerate the developing trendsin the capitalist industrial economies towards flexible specialization anddualist economy. Intheir analysis of the small-firm sector and the informaleconomy in the OECD countries, C. Leadbeaterand J, Lloyd (1987, 168-184) emphasise that until now the growth of the small firms sector hasbeen minimal in manufacturing in the OECD, but the growth of the smallfirms sector can be taken as an indicator of the trends of development orgrowth of flexible specialization. Relering to an DECO study from 198529

,Leadbeater and Lloyd conclude that: .

But it can not be denied that the relative size of the small firm sectorin terms of employment has been increaSing in the OECD countries inrecent years, but this has to be seen as, on the on side, a part of the longterm structural change of the capitalist economies, in which the. servicesector has been growing relative to manulacturinq," and on the othert'),1("\

Pj66m~l- ArbOk um samfefagsm~fI989 Pj6l':Jmafa Arbok urn samfelagsma11989

difficult to say what the responses of the labour movements will be if thethesis tums out to be true in·the future. Let's have a quick look at thematter.

The potential du allzation of the labour market is twofold. Theoretically,on the one side, there are capital/labour relations and polarization withinfirms between on the one hand the 'core' staH that is highly skilled, wellpayed and with long terrncontracts and on the other hand low skilled staH,relatively badly payed with or without long term contracts. On the otherside there are capital/capital relations and the polarization between firmsand sub-contractors, i.e. one the on hand between big, high income, high·tech systemofacture companies and small batch SUb-contractorswhetherfirms or individu als having long or short term contracts (for a casestudy see F. 8elussi). Diagrams 1 and 2 highlight these relations ofprodudion.

In theory everything is possible and this is true for these potentialrelations of diHerent capitals and labour. But what counts in the contextof analysis of the development from one socio-economic phase of thehistory of capitalism to another is the empirical evidence as socialformations and regimes of capital accumulation do not fall upon reality asmanna from a pure platonic heaven. Concerning the present restructuringof forms and social relations of capital accumulation in the capitalistcountries, it is important to look at the evidence of the claimed increasedflexibility and sub-contracting of labour and the subsequent "altemativefutures".

There are, in this domain, at present. two widely discussed theses ofthe 'flexible firm' in management policy (J. Atkinson) and 'flexible speciali-zation' (M.J. Piore and C.F. Sabel 1984). The first one is based on a thesisof the spread of new management policies that lead to increaseddualisation of the labour market between the 'core' and 'periphery', whilethe other is based on the alleged spread of 'flexible specialization' and'crafts' paradigm in restructuring of production. •

A. Pollert (51-5) has analysed, in the case of UK. the increase in'peripheral' work on the labour market in recent years, i.e. 'non-standard'contractual work, deviating from tnt! flJlHirTle norm. The indicators shelooks at do not confirm the thesis of a substancial increase in 'peripheral'work and hence of a fast spread of the 'flexible firm' in manufacturing.Temporary work, according to Pollert peaked in 1979, declined rapidly inthe recession, but resumed an upward trend in 1982~3, such that by 1935it had regained the level of the mid-1970s. Furthermore Pollert writes:

Diagram 1.Oapnal/labour relations

~

core sub-contractors, sub-co ntracto rs,firms firms individuals

labour lower inccrnex,'"

long term pllimacontracts Mime

highlyskilled short term pltime

contracts fllime

lang term pltimecontracts fllima

lowskllied short term pltime

contracts fllimE

,v !owerIncome

Diagram 2.Caprtallcapita! relations

~

core sub-contractors sub-contractorsflrms firms individuals

capital <,.,

lower incomecontracts contracts contractslong short long short long shortterm term term term term term

core Hrm

suo-contractors.firms

sub-contractors,individuals

\ lowerincome

Pj6()maJ- ArbOk um samfeJagsmaJ 1989

"The most recent study of temporary work (Casey, 1987)32 providesfurther evidence of the absence of significant change in the use oftemporary work. Excluding the 12.5 per cent on special employmentmeasures (1984 Labour Force Survey), there was 'no real growth inthe period 1983 to 1985. In 1983 temporary workers not in specialschemes made up 5.5 per cent of the labour force; in 1985 they madeup 5.5 per cent' ... There is thus little evidence that there has been anoverall increase in temporary work, and ITS appearance may well bethe cyclical response witnessed in previous periods. Sectoral variationgives little support to a view of overall restructuring, and also highlightswhat the generalisation obscures: the importance of changes in thepublic service sector ... In 1984, fixed-term contracts were morecommon in the publicsector services than elsewhere and the educa-tion sector was responsible for half of these" (A. Pollen, 52).

Between 1981 and 1986 the proportion of part-timers in the workforcegrew by 2% to 23%, according to A. Pollert. And, from 1983 the onlyemployment growth was an increase in temale employment in the servicesector. which was almost entirely part-time work. But interestingly inmanufacturing part-time employment declined from 7.6 to 6.7 percent inthe period 1979-86. Refering to a study by Millward and Stevens, Pollertclaims that they found that outworking, tree-lancing and nomeworkingdeclined in big firms between 1980 and 1984 due to contraction inmanutacturing and as a consequnce, there is little evidence 01 the growthof this kind of 'peripheral' workers.

Sub-contracting is perhaps the most commonly mentioned indicator ofIhe alleged spreading of 'flexible firms'. But even here the evidence isneg at ive. As Pollert highl ights, the Warw ick IRRU Company Level Su rvey19883:1found that 61 per cent of establishment respondents reported nochange inthe level of su bcontracting over the previous five years. Rather,subcontracting was already extremely widespread; 83% of establish-ment managers reported that they subcontracted out at least one service.and 39% of this group contracted out three more services.

Finally, refering to a TUe survey from 1986,34 Pollert claims thatconcerning self-employment IT appearsthat:

"62 per cent of this increase was in the service sector, 20 per cent incon struction, 10 per cent in aqricu Iture and 8 per cent in manufacturing..• between 1981 and 1984 the number of people who were self·employed in their main job grew by 442,000 to 2.6 million, or from 9.2

244

PjtMma/~ Arb6k urn samMlagsmcH 1989

to 11 .2 per cent of total employment ... While this may be associatedwith redundancy, it does not seem to be associated with flexibilitystrategies in large companies. ~(A. Pollert, 54-5).

The harvest is poor as well when one digs for evidence of the allegedgrowth of a 'core' on the labour market. Taking 'functionaillexibility' andthe extent of multiskilling as an indicator of the growth or decrease of a'core', A. Pollert (55) emphasises that research indicates that mostoccupatioual flexibility is confined to the production/maintenance boun-dry, with little change to multiskilling in engineering and craft areas.Furthermore, citing a trade union based study,:l5 she concludes that:

u'in spite of the impression created by a small number of widetypublicised case studies ... a full range of flexible working practices arenot frequently implemented'. Many 'flexibility' agreements were only'enablinq' not faits-accomplis. Nor was there, apart from rare excep-tions, evidence of a 'corein terms of improved job security. fl(A. Potlert,56).

In another studycrted by A. Pollert (55-6), the IDS Study 360 of capital-intensive manufacturing industry>. it is claimed that companies havewidely different a irns as co mpet it ive pressu res vary between sectors. SkjJIrequirements are dependent on widely different technologies. More skill,different skill, less skill, can all be legitimate objectives according 10 thisstudy. Indeed, generalizations about moving towards a small, highlyskilled and highly flexible workforce may fit one company and be contra-dicted by the pressure towards a Quite different workforce in another.

There is not much evidence for the spread of the 'flexible firms'concluding from these studies, and as A. Pollert emphasises, where therehas been major restructuring, this has been led by the state as employer. In the private sector, sectoral continuity is far more in evidence thanchange WITh little evidence ot polarisation between an 'periphery' and aprivileged 'core'(A. Pollert 56).

As we tum to the 'flexible specialization thesis'(M.J. Piore and C.F.Sabel, 28·35 and 258-80) we are confronted with the question of thealleged decline of mass production, mass markets and decentralizationof industry. This thesis takes it that computerization of production makessmall batch production ever more competitive and competent in respond-ing-ever quicker to ever changing demand on markets. With the right kindof industrial relations, i.e. class collaboratist relations; small firms, with

245

Pj66mal- ArbOk um samfelagsmal1989 Pj66mal·ArbOkum samteJagsmal1989

Flexible specialization is a system of 'crafts' production as opposed tomass production, that has its historical forms in past and present history.There are, accordingto Piore and Sabel (31-5), three types of institutionalframeworks that foster flexibility and engourage permanent innovationthrough the reshuffling of resources, Le. municipalism, welfare capitalismor paternalism and familial ism.

Municipalism is a system of territorially disperrsed production cen-tered on and coordianted by an urban seat. It is characterized by smallunits of production and modest capital requirements. The most famousexample, according to Piore and Sabel is the Lyonese silk industry, theSaint-tJienne ribbon, hardware, and bicycle industries and substantialsectors of the Solingen cutlery and Remscheid edge-tool industries.These industries were confederations of small shops, each specializingin a phase of production, such as weaving, polishing, and forging, Butcoordination of the production process as a whole was done by either amarcharrt-rnanutacturer or a large firm: The merchant-manufacturersupplied credit and raw materials to the sub-contractors and took chargeof selling the final product; the large firm assembled the final procluct aswell as supplying credit and raw materials (ibid., 32) .•

The modem counterpart of municipalism is what Piore and Sabel call'regional conglomerations' such as the specialized industrial districts ofnorth em and central Italy, the New York garment district and in the pastthe European regional centers of Birmingham, Solingen, and Lyon. Noneof the enterprises is dominant in this model, according tothem, and theirrelations are defined by series of relatively short-term contracts, in whichthe roles of the parties are always shifting. But within these industrialdistricts there are also institutions that facilitate the recombination of the

productive enterprise such as trade associations, unions, guilds, andcooperatives .tor purchasing materials, marketing regional products,secunnc credit on favourable terms for members and supplying semifin-ished products whose manifacture permits economies of scale, But thereis more to these 'regional conglomera ions' than these economic institu-tions as, although no single institution formally links the productive unitsas a group, the cohesion of the industry rests on a "more fundamental~ense of community, of which the various institutional forms of coopera-non are more the result than the cause" (ibid" 265). Piore and Sabel arehere referingto ethnic ties such as among Jews and Italians and Chineseand Hispanic groups in the New York City garment industry with employ-ers' and unions active in their members' ethnic communities. In the caseof the Third Italy of small firms, shared politics and religion play the samerole. In the communist areas as for an example Emilia-Romagna andTuscany:

widely skilled workforce, will be able to produce ever increasing variety ofsmall quantums of goods at ever decreasing costs, given that theindustrial relations will lay the grounds for a flexible-specialization-paradigm of production that will secure continous improvements ot thecomputerized·small-batch-production-technology, The emphasis is onindustrial relations as the draught-horse of industrial innovation, whileprices do not work as an allocative mechanism because:

"Innovation is fostered by removing wages and labor conditions fromcompetition, and by establishing an ethos of interdependence amongproducers inthe same market, flexible specialization succeeds only bymoderating price fluctuations". (M,J, Piore and C.F. Sabel, 272),

w:nany of the .workers and entrpreneurs are craftsmen who opposedfirst the Fascists and then the reassertion of employer dominance inthe large shops, Many of the small factories that benefited from thew~ve o~.decentralization in the 19705 were, in fact, founded by left-wing militants who had been purged from the large factories in the1950s and used their severance pay to start theirown businesses. Therole of the Left among the entrepreneurs has been reinforced ... by thedetermination of the Communist Party to bind the petits bourgeoisieinto an alliance, making it inaccessible 10 fascism. Analogous themesin the Christian Democratic Party ... encourage similar bonds betweenworkers and managers in Cbristian-Dernocratc rural areas, such asthe Venetian provinces." (ibid., 266)

Welfare capitafisrncrpaternalisrn is a very diHerent system comparedwith municipalism and regional conglomerations, in the sense that itrefers to production processes that require expensive equipments thatindividual artisans can not afford, but still require artisan skills andflexibility. This system is different from assembly line mass production asfirms that fall under this category are "really groupings of artisans' shopsunder one roof (ibid., 33) according to Piore and Sabel. As examples ofthis type, they mention specialty-steel plants of Saint-Etienne. Firms ofthis type often dominated the localities where they were situated andadoPt~ prog:3'!1S ?fwelfare capitalism orpateralism that provided manyof the same istitutlons that the small producers provided through the

246 247

PjDrlmal- ArbOk um samteJagsmal 1989

'!1un~i~a,1 government creating "extraordinary network of social institu-tlOn~ (IbId., 34) such as :Chools for training in skills. oJd~age homes,public baths: wo~er h~uslng, ,societies for maternity care. societies toprevent and l~yestJ~at~ rndustnal accidents, As an examplethey mentionthat "Th~ calico pnntlng firms at MUlhouse are the classic exampleAlready rn, 1822 the leading firms had founded, at their own expens~(though ,With th~ approval of the municipal council they controlled) acours~ ,In chemist'!' a~d research laboratory" (ibid., 34) as weJl asorganlzmg the services Just mentioned,

!he mod~m counterpart of paternalism are the 'solar firms' with the~rbrtlng suppliers and 'workshop factories', Unlike mass producers theserrrns d~ not produce long runs of standardized products exploiting

economies otscale, although their.size results from high capital require-ments, of their products. These firms are internally organized like acolfectJOn of workshops. According to Piore and Sabel:

"Despite their large size, the. modem "solar" and worxsboo firms tre-quenlly treat external suopners as COllaborators, not subordinatesSubcontractors retai~ considerable autonomy; and unlike the mas;pro~ucer, t~e solar firm depends on subcontractors for ad' .solvinq design nd d . Vice In

, a pro uction problems, because it generally doesnot produce In.-house what it SUbcontracts, An example is the BoeingCompany, which does not, pr~duce either the engines that power itsairplanes ormuch oltheaVlOnlC equipmentlhat holds themoncou0her.examples are the farm-equipment and construction-maChj:!~firms I~ the American Midwest .., Parts of General Electric functionaccordmg to these principles~. (ibid" 268),

Finally. they a~alys~ f~mjJja~ism in which flexible use of resources isba~ed on the family. Ths ':: the Intermediate type in which production is~erther as concentr~t~ ~s In the case of patemalism nor asdispersed asIn th~ ca~e of ~unlclpallsm. This system is characterized by small ormec"u~ SIzed fIrms specializing in component manufacturing productionoceratons and b~sed on confederation of firms owned by diHerentmembers of a famIly. in the cas~. mentioned by Piore and Sabel, of thestrategy of Alfred Motte. Roubaix, France in the 18505

"The sys,teme Mone. was to pair each family member who had comeof a~e with an expen.enced technician from one of the family's firms;provide these two with start-up capital (most of which was held, of

248

Pj6tJmc'JI- Arb6k urn sam felagsmal1989

course, by the family member), and have them establish together acompany that specialized in one of the phases of production that wasstill needed. The new firms often found markets outside, as well asinside, the family, but their financial and emotional ties to the lineagemade them dependable partners, even in difficult times," (ibid., 34-5).

The modem counterpart of familial ism are the 'federated enterprises'the prewar Japanese zaibatsu, and the looser postwar federations ofJapanese enterprises, Economically the federated enterprises are inter-locked by mutual holding at one anothers stocks and interlocking boardsof directors, Sometimes these firms share financial and marketing facili-ties, but the group is not as integrated as the mass-production corpora-tion, and their members are not hierarchically arranged. Socially thesefederal ions depend on the family or their substitute:

"The zaibatsu originally expanded out of family-run merchant houses,and workers were literally adopted into the bloodline. The modemJapanese federation does not attempt to establish legal family ties withits work force; but employees continue to think of their relation to theorganization as familial." (ibid., 267).

This approach seems to suHer from some important methodologicalproblems. Firstly it over-ernphasises social relations of cohesion such asthe ethnic and regional ties, while it underrates the importance ofcontradictory interests of big firms and small firms, capital and labour, andindividuals and families. As a consequence it can hardly be expected togenerate realist analysis ot the dynamics of the formation of difiere,ntaccumulation strategies, and it is indeed hard to see how one can buildsuch analysis on these grounds. In this respect the marxist concept ofmodes of procuctlon" is more helpful, but only insofar as it takes intoaccount the factors of cohesion highlighted by Piore and Sabel andindeed the various social relations we mentioned above as we discussedhegemonic politics, i.e. insofar as it is not economic reduction ist.

Secondly, this approach does not take into account the lime factor, as~does not take into account the effects that increased competition amongsubcontractors tor contracts with the core or solar firms. would have ontheir relations of collaborationlsubo rd inali on (cf. Kaplinsky's contributiondiscussed above).

Thirdly. ij does not take into account relations of exploitation betweenthe-core orsolarfinns and the periphery in conglomerations and soJarfinn

249

PjO{)ma/a Arb6k um samtelagsmal1989

systems as IT tends to forget uneven development and different rates ofgrowth of the different parts of these systems in terms ot monopolizationofthose parts that generate the highest level of value added such as R&D,design and rnarketinq.

In short this approach is inadequate both as a discriptive tool and fordynamic analysts. But, furthermore, as a futurological thesis it leaks likea peat-box. Rrstly, as we have already highlighted above: There is noevidence of a fundamental restructuring of the economy in terms of agrowth of the small firm sector shifting towards flexible specialzation.

Secondly, there is not much evidence of the decline of mass produc-tion, indeed the reverse is likely to be the case as systemofacture lays thegrounds for even more planned mass production than ever before. Thesuccess of japanese automobile and electronic industries is due to a formof flexible specialization based on exploitation of small firms organized injust-in-time management that has made higher level of product differen-tiation possible. Although small firms play important role as subcontrac-tors in this system, it does not mean thaI the production process as awhole is not mass productive by nature; the alternatives of productdifferentiation are themselfes standardized so that with systemofacturethe standarization of products reaches higher level, systemized bycomputer aided management, design and planning of which the role of thesmall subcontractors is only one part.

Furthermore, one has to take into account both the sectoral and globalperspective in analysing developmental trends of modes of production interms of mass production, small batch production of intermediate goods,and one-off production of very sophisticated, otten large scale, productsor projects. Indeed the history of capitalism is characterized by unevenspread of best practice technology between sectors and countries andmass production has been the base of the fastest growing sectors in thiscentury. While mass production predominated in sectors such as chemi-cal and pharmacutical industries, electronics and automobile industries,small batch production dominates intermediate and machine tool indus-tries. It is especially in the intermediate goods production and machinetool production that some Third World NICs are increasingly conqueringgrounds by exploiting forms of mass production, being one of the mainfactors causing the 'small country squeeze' (see e.g. [var J6nsson 1988),Even japanese mass production is increasingly squeezed by foreigncompetition

"which for mostJapanese means South Korea 'doing Japan' on Japan

250

PjMmal~ ArbOk um samf~lagsmaf 1989

with lowlabourcosts, hightechnologyplagiorized from Japan, a highlyeducated workforce and fanatically hard work ...An (Official)literacy of96 per cent, an average work week of fifty-seven hours, productivityincrease by 40 per cent since 1980, the capture of the "biggestimported-car share in Canada, the low pricing of such electronicsproducts as TVs and videos, the success of ships (14 per cent of theworld market) and steel" (C.Leadbeater and J. lloyd, 147).

By not taking the long-run sectoral view into account A. Pollert,following J. Woodward's work, over-simplifies the picture as she pre-sumes that there is no such thing as a clear cut parad igm of 'Fordist massproduction' in 20th century capitalism, as:

"Types of technology, their organisation into different systems of pro-duction, and types of labour processes cannot be conllated into singleparadigm; the empirical evidence is far more complex. Within thelarge. technologically advanced firm associated wtth primary sectorproduction and which Pior~ and Sabel identify with mass production,a variety of technoloqies and production systems exist, depending onthe nature of the product market." (A. Pollert, 57).

Altbouqh this may be true for individual firms and micro level analysis ona narrow time scale, this picture can not be generalized to long-runstructural and sectoral development in whichparadiorns change the roleof dominance as analyses of uneven sectoral development showJll.Furthermore, keeping in mind the increased intemationalization of theproduction process incontemporary capitalism, one comes to the conclu-sion that the locus of exploitation of mass production changes spatially orgeographically and as a consequence, by missing the historical impor-tance of mass production, one can easily slip into a Eurocentric,or rather,"Occidentocemric" and biazed approach to the technological change.Indeed, one misses the qualitative nature of this development, i.e. theglobalization of capital accumulation.

However, A. Pollert is right in emphasising that:

••••even if we confine the argument to developments in assembly-lineproduction, there is substantial evidence that even within flow-linetechnology, product diversification takes place without prolongeddelays or increased skills. Multi-model and mixed-model lines can beused either to change the products or vary a basic model (Bennett.

251

Pj6rJmal ~ArbOk um samtelagsmal1'989

1986: 89)39 '" Murray (1983).40 points to improvements in stock control.Gough (1986; 64)41 observes that even the much quoted example ofBenetton, 'produces most of its clothes bleached, the colour variationbeing added as the final staqe'," (ibid., 58)

Thirdly, the alleged decline of mass markets and growing fragmenta-t ionof markets is misleading, As we have already emphasised, the growthof systemofacture elevates standardization and diHerentiation of prod-ucts to a higherleveJ of mass production. Indeed as A. Pollert hughlights,one can look at a whole range of industries that are based on mass andlarge batch production and continue to sell wefJto large markets: fOCX:!,drinks, flat-pack furniture, DIY goods, toiltries, records, toys - i.e. mostconsumer goods. And she continues, following J. Gough (1986):

"the focus on a fragmentation 01 demand as a root of crisis, mistakescause for effect. Fragmentation is part of marl<:etingstrategy, which isone way (along with price competition, which cannot be said to beobsolete lor all the claims 01 the FS school) to deal with the problemof overaccumulation. This leads to the other major misconception inthe analysis of a decline in mass markets; the substitution of a totallyarbitrary conception of saturation in use values, lor a crisis in therealisation of exchange values. The crisis of overaccumulation isreduced to a crisis in.mass markets. Markets, and the tastes of the'sovereign consumer' ... are as crucial to the FS analysis as they aretothe neo-classical world view." (A. Pollert, 60-1).

2.2. The socio-political conditions of fordism andits crisisNow, if there is little or no evidence of a shift towards the 'flexible firm' or'flexible specialization', what does this discussion or dispute mean torclass struggle, hegemonic politics and the formation of accumulationstrategies? Answering these questions requires analysis of a) the poten-tials of the social construction of the new technology, b) analysis of the

. relationship between the social value structure generated by the growthand crisis of the fordist regime of capital accumulafion and the balance ofpower of social forces, and finally c) analysis of the techno-economicphases of capital accumulation and forms of the state. We will discuss c)in the following part 3 and approach it by concretizing the analysis bylooking at three diHerent paths of restructurinng of capityal accumulation,i.e. the Swedish, Japanese and British ways.252

Pj6()mal.ArbOk urn samfelagsmaJ1989

In analysing the potentials of technological development one caneither analyse the possibilities it makes in theory and analyse thealternative and different forms of production and social relations bydeducing from the technological base. This is the path utopian andfuturological analyses step, drawing pictures of possible worlds accord-ing to veiled or manifest ideological presumptions and presuming thatsomehow the piC1urewillaHect the political practices of thedifferent socialforces (c.f. Piore and Sabel 1984 and A. Gorz 1982 and 1985).

Or one, can approach the problem by analysing the potentials oftecnoloqcal change as a dialectical process in which the economic andsocial forms of technical change potentially generates, aredetermined bythe actual balance of power of social forces, in the sense that powerstructures and political practice determine the discovery of technologicalpotentials and the representation of the resulting interests generated bythese technological potentials.'

Taking this second path as a point of departure one would start on ahigh level of abstraction and analyse the ideal forms of technologyaccording to the interests of those social forces that most directly shapetechnological development and then concretize the analysis by adding ton analysis ot the context or factors of International competition andposition of different economies and capitals within the framework of theinternational division of labour.

As we have discussed above, there is little or no evidence for afundamental restructuring of the capitalist economies in line with the'flexible firm' and 'flexible specialization' theses. As a consequence, thechances for the growth of the small firms sector in manufacturing is exag-gerated which can lead to ignorance of the potential of increased controlby capital over markets and the development of social and politicalrelations; l.e, with the new information technology, systemolacture andplanning, there is the potential of more centralization of economic andpolitical power in the hands of capital then we have hitherto seen But, thispotential is not purely technological, in the sense of exploitation ofresources tor planning by capital and to some extent the spread ofindividualism and decrease of membership of trade unions, due to thelimited increase of the small firm sector, but rather on the one side theunderlying breed of individualism generated by the consumerism offordism, and on the other side the crisis of the trade union movement andsocial democracy following the coJlaps of keyneesian policies in the197.05. These are the main factors that shape the basis of the cornernpo-rary struggle between the different social forces for anernatives in post-

253

Pj6{)mal- Arb6k urn samteJagsmal1989 Pjo{Jmal- Arbok um samftMagsmal1989

fardist forms of social and political relations.There is a strong pressure for increased flexibility on the labour

markets as well as other markets and for de-requlation in the capitalisteconomies following the shift to neo-classical and monetarist policies inthe 1980s. This requires the breakdown of what is left of fordist regulationof capital accumulation as it developed on the bases of spreading massproduction and keynesian policies mediated by the balance of power ofsocial forces inthe post war era. As a resu ij 'real' post-fordisl developmentis determined by the dialectical process of interaction between transfor-mation of the technological base and pressure for adjustment to interan-tional competition, transformation of the existinq fordist institutionalstructure, and struggle for different accumulation strategies by the diller-ent social forces.

The main elements of the tordist regime of capital accumulation arethe spread of taylorist mass production and keyensian policies. Theessence of this regime is the attuning of mass production and massconsumption through keynesian anti-cyclical policies and the class col-laboratist (and in North-Europe nee-corporatist) regulation of the forma-tion of wages and incomes of the households through social transfersetc..0i2 This requires transtorrnation of the relations between the state andsocial forces and a particular instilutional structure of regulation.

Roughly the history of capitalist industrialization has led to increasingcapitalization of the unon-economic~ spheres of western societies, associal, cultural, and political life has increasingly become part of thepreconditions of the reproduction of capital accumulation. In this processthe role and sphere of the stale has expanded continuously as mediatorof the dialectical development of the diHerent spheres of society andcontradictions between national and international capital accumulation,as capital accumulation is increasingly more diHicult to regulate throughthe "pure" market laws and competition between individual capitals. Thisparadox has increasingly culminated in the 'legitimation crisis' of thecapitalist system, i.e. as the deepening contradiction between the privateownership of capital and increasing socialization of tbe process of capitalaccumulation (c.f. J. Habermas 1976 and J. Hirsch and A. Roth 1986).

Fordism has developed as a particular period within this overallhistorical process and has shaped the social and political forms of thematerialization of this process. On the social side the impact of fordism,through tayJoristtechnology and mass consumption, has, roughly speak-ing. been intensification of the individualization and atomization effects ofthe process of capitalization of social relations. This process has led to

254 .

increased commercial (or exchange-value) forms of social relations,segmentation of the working class and 'statization' of social relations.

Capitalization has, in terms of the development of social relations, ledto the 'reification' (c.t. G. Lukacs. 1971 , 83) of the world view not only inthe sense that it is particularized and a-historical, but also that market orexchange relations are fetishized as the 'subject' of history and have indominant bourgeois ideology the same role as 'god' had infeudal society.This follows from the breaking up of the pre-capitalist, 'Gemeinschaft',relations as iodustrialization and 'rnoderrnzation' leads to concentration oflabour in the industrial towns and waoe-labour increasingly becomes thebasis afthe reproduction of labour. The preconditions of thedevelopmentof the ford is! era in the history of capitalism are - besides the techno-economic base and the diffusion of taylorist technology and the 'new' fastgrowing industries of this century - to be deduced from the developmentof the socio-political base of contemporary capitalist countries, i.e. a) thesocial base of the structure of classes and stratification, b} the develop-ment of the political base andjnterest representation in fordism.

a) The social base of fordlsmFive features of the social base are most important, i.e. capitalization andsegmentation of labour; the growth of the 'new middle classes' anddeepening stratification of the working force; the process of urbanization;the spread of the bourgeois nuclear family; and finally the diffusion of thefordist individualist 'subjectivity',L The social structural development of capitalization, in terms of thespread 01 wage labour has in the main followed similar course in thecapitalist countries although the time and speed of the transformationwas/is diHerenLln the 'late coming' Germany, as an example, the portionof wage earners (die Lohnabhangigen) in the private and public sector(Arbeiter, Angestellte und Beamte) in the population as a whole hasincreased steadily as the proportion of the self-employed hasdecreased.In 1882the latter category was 26% while in 1925 it had decreased to 16%and to 10% in 1983. The portion of the wo~ing population working in theagricultural sector has decresed from 30% before the second world warto around 5% today . Today approximately 90% of the W-German POPuw

lation is dependent in one way or another on wage labour (J, Hirsch/A.Roth,54).li... Alongside the spread of wage labour, the development of the class ofwage earners has been characterized by increasing segmentation interms of occupation, income, skill, sex and regionaVdemographic criteria.

255

Pj60mal.Arb6k um samfelagsmaJ 1989

Th~ devel.opment has seen stagnation and then decrease of the portionof industrial-workers of the total work force at the same time as theadministration, social services and private service sectors have ineresed.The proportion of industrial workers as portion otthe pool of wage-earnersin Germany fell, as an example, from 97% in 1882 to 49% in 1977. (lbid.,54) ..c:l Fundamentally the long term development of the social structureof the capitalist countries is characterized by two processes of structuralchange that work simultaneously, l.e. on the one side there is the macro-structural change of the increasing importance of the tertiary sector(services), onthe othersidethere isthe micro-structural changeofthe theincreasing ratio of whiteJblue collars in the firms. This ratio has been~ncreasingsteadily during this century and still is so that in manufacturingIn the USA as an example, the ratio between on the one side administra-tive, technical, and clerical employees and on the other side productionand maintenance workers increased from 0.34 in 1966 to 0,47 in 1966.This developmental trend is highlighted in table 1.

Table1.The relative increase of white collars inmauntacturinq:the ratio between production and maintenance workers and administra-tive, technical, and clerical employees as % otwage earners and salariedemployees in manufacturing

1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986a b a b ab ab a b

72.5 27.5 71.2 28.8 70.1 29.9 68.0 32.0 67.9 32.171.6 28.4 66.9 33.1 65,9 34.1 65.7 34.3 64.S 35.2

74.4 25.7 74.0 26.0 70.6 29.4 71.9 28.180.1 19.9 76.3 23.7 75.B 24.5 72.6 27.4 72.2 27.875.4 24.6 72.8 27.2 71.9 28.1 70.6 29.4 70.0 30.0

a" b'·USA 74.4 25.6Japan 73.2 26.8CanadaFinland 81.3 18.8Denmark 76.2 23.4

~ Production and maintenance workersU Administration. technical. and clerical employees.Source: OECD a: Labour Force Statistics; 1966-86; Paris t 968.

The growth of the 'new middle classes' of serivce and administrativeemployees and public sector employees , alongside 'the deepeningstratification of the working force between skilled workers and office staffand un- or low skilled workers and office staff. deepened further thesegmentation of the labour force. Furthermore, gender segmentationintensified further this development of the segmentation of the labour

256

Pj6()mal· Arb6k um samfelagsrmH 1989

force as the relative level of the qualification or skill of women remainedstagnant while male workers have on the whole improved in qualification:In Germany in 1925 70% at male workers were un- or low skill workerswhile in 1970 Ihey were 40%. The qualification level of female workers hasimproved only very slightly. In additlon the stratification of the workingforce has become even more complicated by the ethno-dirnensionwnich~.as come.in addition to the exploitaion of immigrant workers (ibid., 55).llL. Followm~ th~ uneven development of capital accumuation the proc-e~~ of urbanization led not only to the concentration of the population incities, but-to laster growth of metropolitan cities than other cities.~Alongside the capitalization of labour as wage labour, this demographicdevelopment changed the social basis of Ihe reproductionof labour. Childcaring and caring ofJlor the old and sick and minimal education that hadbeen the, responsibility of the 'extended' family (or 'Gross' family) or thecommu~rtles of the feudal sociey, became the responsibility of thebourqeois 'nuclear' family that became the dominant family form'. As thisfamily form is incapable of ~atisfying these social needs. the s}ruggle forthe welfare Slate became important part of the struggle of the wage-earners.lY... The spread of the bourgeoiS nuclear family was an important factor ofsocialization of workers that mediated the supression, self-negation. andnormalization of the taylorist labour-process ((bid., 56). With it emergedthe modern residential system organized on the basis of the privacy of thenu.clearlamily, with standardized, functionally organized flats (eat. sleep,children) and rooms of private self-presentation (saloon and sitting-room). With increasingly higher living standards and with rationalizationand industrialization 01 farming, the "proletarian" workers' environmenta~d class c~lture gave way to the "house-owners'w culture as increasinglybIgger portion of the labour force owned their own houses which becamethe centre-piece 01 social living. The flat alongside the private car becamethe centre-piece of the fordist model of mass consumption.

Increased productivity 1 economic growth and stronger power positionof I~bour i~ the late-capitalist era led to shortening of the working week,which agam led to expansion of leisure. Leisure time is increasingly spentinIon mass produced and privately consumed forms of activities withmass media and TV (with socially biazed and individualist ideologicalcontent) which is increasingly becoming more centralized alonside thephase of internationalization of satellite broadcasting. -45

y.. Segmentation of the working classes, private mass consumption inthe burgeois nuclear family and leisure time have produced the strctural

257

Pldtimal .•ArbOk um samtelagsma/1989

conditions of atomization afthe individuals and individual households andlay the structural grounds for the social-psychological individualist 'sub-jectivity'. It is in this context that the 'narzisistic culture' emerges as anatural product of the paradox of fordism which is crystalized in thecontradiction of the disciplined worker vis-a-vis the pleasure-hungryconsumer. With it developes the 'identity-search' and presentation inindividualist leisure activities such as presentation of the self throughfashion and 'looking-yaung-fetish', body culture such as body-buildingand sun-saloons (ibid., 59-62).

The social structural base of the segmentation of the working classesand privateconsumeris mofthe rnodel of the nuclear family and this socialpsychological framework produces the individualist and a-political worldview which constitutes the framework forthe dominant social values of thefordist era. Paradoxically, it is this consumerism that the trade unions andthe social democratism in the West have taken part in fostering, that hasfostered the individualism that is the fruitful soil for the neo-liberalisrn thattoday is undermining the wellare system and political regulation in/o! thefordist regimes of capital accumulation (but the grow1h of neo-liberalismis only the tip of the iceberg that shakes the foundations of tordism as wewill discuss below).

b) The political conditions of fordism. Four aspects are especially important in the development of fordistpolitical regulation, i.e, the characteristics 01the occupational structure inthe fordist era and centralization 01 capital and labour; the statizalion ofsocial and political relations: the centralization of political partiers andfinally the development of voting patterns.1. Among the main features of fordism is an extensive increase inconcentration and centralization of capital, especially in the 'new' fastgrowing fordist industries in this century and increasing monopolization inthe industrialized capitalist countries. The process of concentration ofcapital can be seen by comparing the share of the largest firms of totalvalue added. The share of the 100 largest companies of total value addedintheUSAwas 194723%, 197233'% and 197634%. The share of the 100largest companies in the UK of total net output was 22'% in 1949, but hadreached 39% in 1972 (see C. FreemantJ, ClarklL. Soete, 137). InJapanin 1960 the top 100 firms in manufacturing had the share of 2~/o ofmanufacturing output. while in 1970 they had 30% (P. Armstrong! A. Glyn/J. Harrison, 217). Concentration of labour follows the concentration ofcapital and it is 1he concentration of labour especially in the 'new

258

f:Jj60mtil- A rbok um samfeJagsmtil1989

industries' and industries important for export, that comprise the materialbasis on which the highly centralized trade unions were established. Thefollowing bureaucratization of the trade unions was one of the precondi-tions of the peak level class collaboration and (neo-corporatist forms of)interest mediation. that characterized/es the fordist system of wageformation although the extension of its development was different in thedifferent capitalist industrialized countries. being most fully developed inthe N·European countries and the small European countries (ct. P.Katzenstein and S. Lash/]: Urry). Peak level determination of wageformation aridthe expanding system of social transfers in the capitalistcountries in the post war era, helped smoothing out business cycles andreduced conflicts on the labour market (cf. R. Boyer. 1985).

With the diffusion of wage labour, the relative homogenization oflabour, and, especially in the post war boom era, the increased. socialmobility and decreased activity of the rank-and-file members of the tradeunions, the trade unions increasingly were characterizad by bureaucracy(and the historically determined 'iron law of oligarchy' ( c.t. R Michels).They grew and became colossal institutions dominated by the bureau-cratic apparatuses surounding the leadership which increasingly was cutof from the daily life of the rank-and-file. The trade unions becamebureaucratic, professionalized service institutions that, in the ideologicalconsensus context of the post war boom, functioned as instruments ofeconomic interest control in the policy making process of the capitalisteconomies (J. Hirsch and R Roth, 70).

But it does not tallow that the trade unions have been 'incorporated'into the capitalist system as mere instruments afcapital accumulation andthe state. The collaboration of the trade unions, employers organizationsand the state is an 'active' collaboration, conjuncturally determined, inwhich the trade unions take part in economic and social policy making,depending on what they get out of it. And what they get out of it dependson, on the one side, on the definition of policy aims that depends on thelevel of militancy of the rank-and-file members in the process of interac-tion between them and the leadership. And on the other side it dependson the conjunctural strategies of the employers and the state. As aconsequence, the mediating and bargaining role of the leadership andapparatuses of the trade unions consists of mediating the interests of ontheon side between capital and labour in termsof income and other formsof exploitation ot labour, and on the other side mediating between thewage and salary earners and the state or the political system. But theconjunctural context of the realization of this mediating function is

259

PiMma/~ ArbOk um samMJagsma/ 1989

overdetermined by the long term structural development of capital accu-mulation and the postion of the economy in question in the internationaldivision of labour, as the scope of bargaining is determined by existingfates of prom and economic expectations (see H. Kastendiek, H.Kastendiek and H. Reister for analysis of the W-German case in thisrespect).iL Besides these structural and organizational characteristics of labourin fordism, there are further preconditions of the fordist regime of capitalaccumulation, 'statization' of social and economic relations is one of itscornerstones. 'Statization' refers to the expansion ot the role of the stateand governmental bodies in, on the one side, satisfying social ne;ds andin social planning. and on the other side, in economic state-intervention-ism. Besides the phase of statization, especially in N-Europe, neo-corporatist class collaboration is one of the fundamental elements of thefordist system of pofitical regulation.

With industrialization and its accompanied social structure, and partlyas a consequence of class struggle, the state increasingly took part insatisfying the social needs that the nuclear family was incapable ofsatisfying,46 This took place in the form of the expansion of the welfarestate which stabilized the economy both in terms of aggregate demandand conflicts on the labour market (c.I. R. Boyer 1985).

In terms of capital accumulation, the main functions of the fordistsystem of political regulation were, on the one side, to improve and adjustthe domestic conditions of capital accumulation to the requirements ofinternational competition, and on the other side to steer and bendaggregate supply and demand towards the 'optimum equilibrium' positionof the national economy. Besides social policy. the political regulationtook place in policy fields such as income distribution, conditions of work,and manpower or employment policies. It also look place in fields liketechno-economic stu rctura I adjustment (linking togethertechnoiogy pol-icy and structural development), industrial relations on the micro or firmlevel (especially in North- and Mid-Europe with systems qf co-determina-lion and employee representation on management levels), and structuraldevelopment on the mezo level of different branches of industry. Further-more it concerned infrastructural development as condhionot productionand exploitation of nature and environmental issues.

This regulation - in which the state bureaucracy and the state playedincreasingly more important role in terms of financial measures, law andregulations besides using traditional policy tools in the field of fiscal andmonetary policy - was based on the emergence of a close collaboration

260

Pj6{)mal- Arbdk um samtelagsma11989

between the state and/or governments. capital and labour on the peakleveL, particularly in the case of the North-European countries BRD,Austria, and the Scandinavian countries). where neo-corporatism devel-oped in a tripartite form and less so in the duo-corporatism ot state andcapital cousboration such as in the USA and UK and especially in France(c.L S. Lash/J. Urry 232-85. P.J. Katzenstein 1986 and J. Hirsch and R.Roth 1986, 65).This neo-corporatist collaboration was determined by thesocio-political structural development of the capitalist social formationsand the extent of tts development was determined by the historicalspecific corditions in the different countries, of which the most importantf actor was the relative strengths of the trade unions and social-democ raticparties in the balance of power of social forces (c.t. L Panitch 1981).iii, The political parties increasingly beca me bu reaucratized like the tradeunions. The disappearance of the traditional social milieus of the classes,the process of individualization, and expansion of the 'new middleclasses' undermined the determination of the political parties by socialmilieus. Economic concentration and shrinking of the class of the petitburgeoisie has weakened theold "bourqeois" parties. The decline of theorganic relations between 'civil society' (social milieu, religious. socialistand bourgeois societies) and the political parties led to bureaucratizationand rationalization of the party apparatuses; the modem parties basedon mass- membership. socially heterogenous members' and voters anddiscourse with no direct reference to particular interests or pressuregroups ("the peoples' party") (J. Hirsch and R.Roth, 68).

The main trends are similar in all the capitalist countries. J. Hirsch andR. Roth have summarized the transfonnation of the German party systemin the fordist era as follows:

"The transformation of the parties into buraucratic machines that,instead of having theirbase in independent political-social milieus, arebased on amorphous mass of isolated and passive members andvoters, led to important change in the functions and capacity. Socialstructural differences, societal processes of disintegration and thediminshing of traditional, first and foremost religious "cleavages"eased the selective-tactical relations with societal interests. Theserelations were easily broken up and reformulated wrth the help ofmass-communication and propaganda and advertizng techniques .. "Consumer advertizing dominate party propaganda and electioncampaigns. Persons and contents can be bought as strategicallydiversified consumer goods .... The braking up of the relations with the

261

Pj6t}maf- Arb6k urn samtelagsrmlf 1989 Pj66mal- ArbOk um samfefagsmaJ 1989

social milieus, buraucratization, and professionalization led to inde-pendence of1he party apparatuses and generation of clientelism andcarrierism as motives for participation. The particular interests of theprofe~sional. party cadres became more important. Consequentlyselecton of Interests and "de-ideologizing" narrow elections' strate-gies (Stimmaxiomierungsstrategien) became the prime principles ofthe strategies at the parties". (ibid., 69).

Wit~ the ?oreaucratic centralization of the political parties. incre~sed~tate fln.ancmg of their activities, legal privileges, and monopoly oflnformallo~, strength end the position of the party leadership vis-a-vis ther~n~-ancl-flle ~embe.rs, local branches, interests groups and fractionswithin the parties. This development at the parties:

Table 2.LeftpercentageofvaiidvotesineighteenOECDcountries. 1900-80,byreUgion .

religion

catnore

Split(a) Europe

"pointed to characteristic change of t he intra party policy making proc-esses which appeared in a fundamental "disjunction" between theparty .and ~ovemment policy (i.e. govememental policies are sys-temahcly dlHerent from what the appropriate party organs decide) anda structural d~minance of the party leadership and the "party ingovernment", I.e. the top of the administration. The control capacitythat the, (govemmenH party(ies) aquired through the administrationwas an Important result of the process of statization. With it the priorityof "systernsteerinq" vis·a~vis "interest consideration" could be estab-lished in the policy and interest realization process .... I.e. it becameeasier to regulate social conflicts that rose from the structural adjust-ment to world market requirements. The bureaucratic and statizedmass integration party proved to be the regulation technical means ofincreasing submission of the policies of the national state under thedynamics of the world market." (ibid., 69-70).

~ The voting patterns in the capitalist countries was an important factorfnth~de~elopment of the fordist structure of political reguJ?tion. Followingthe diffusion of wage labou rand the process of incresing conce ntrati on oflabour, the working class became an important factor in the developmentot the capitalist political systems following the extension of the suffrage tothe.wo~mg classes. W. Korpi{37 -8) has analysed the development of lett-voting '~ some of!he main capitalist countries in this century. He defineslett ,voting a~ votrng socialdemocratic parties and parties to their left.Splinter parties from the social democratic parties towards the right areexcluded from his definition of the left. His results are shown in table 2.

262

(b) 'Newnations'

Protestant

Other

BeforeWorld War 1 Interwar 1946-60 1961-80

Austria 23 41 48 48Belgium 23 38 42 34"Franca 13 32 43 41Ireland 10 12 15Italy 18 26 35 41

Germany 31 40 34 41Netherlands 13 25 36 33Switzerland 16 28 30 28

Australia 37 45 50 47~ 35 48 44New Zealand 5Canada 0 3 13 17USA 4 5 1 0

Denmark 26 39 45 46Finland 40 39 48 46Norway 15 36 52 50Sweden 13 46 52 51

UK 5 33 48 45

Japan 32 41

Source: W Korpi: Democratic Class Struggle, 38.

In his study Korpi concludes that the relative strength of the left partiesin the years bef6re World War 1 reflects the degree to which suffrage wasextended to workers. Around the end of the war universal and equalsuffrage for men existed in all the countries except Japan. The increasein left voting peaked around the end of World War 2 if the voting figuresare analysed on year-by-year basis, according to Korpi (38). so that theyears after the war have seen a long term trend of decreasing left votingalthough there are exceptions from this if one looks at the countriesseparately, Japan has seen strong trend towards increasing left voting inthe 1960sand 1970s.The same goes forGermany, Ireland, Italy, Canada

263

Pj66mal- Arb6k urn samtelagsma11989

and Denmark. Generally one can say that those countries with over 36%left voting in the third period have seen decline, except Denmark.

Class identity vis-a-vis social mobility and increasing affluence areimportant factors in explaining the increse and decline of left voting. As S.L~sh and J. Urry (21~) highlight, the traditional explanation of relatively'hIgh levels of left voting was that a considerable majority of the manualworking class voted for the left, and indeed there is some correlationbetween left voting figures and levels of unionization in each society astables 2 and 3. indicate.

Table 3.Averagepercentageunionization of the Jabourforce 1945-76

Sweden 71Austria 55Australia 50Denmar1< 49Belgium 47Norway 46

UK 44New Zealand 42Finland 39Ireland 36Germany 35Netherlands 30

Japan 27USA 27Canada 26Franca 25Italy 23Switzerland 23

Source: W. Korpi, 40,

W. Korpi found in his studies of the relationship between level ofunionization and 'class voting' in his 18 OECD countries sample, that the'e~els of un~o~density covaried in the 19705 with the index of class votingwith a coefficient of 0.71. (W. Korpi, 34-6). The index of 'class voting' andthe 'Alford index' is defined as the difference between the percentage ofnon-manual workers voting for left parties subtracted from the perc-entageof manual workers voting for left parties. The index of class voting in 18OECD countries in the 19705 is to be found in table 6.4.TabJe4.Index of class voting in the 1970s.

Finland 54 UK 35 Switzerland 21Denmark 47 AUstralia 33 USA 18Sweden 45 Belgium 27 Italy 17Austria 44 Japan 27 Netherlands 17

~ N. Zealand 43 Germany 26 Ireland 16Norway 39 France 21 Canada 4

Source: W. Korpi. 35.

264

r

I!1j!I,

Pj6lJmal- Arb6k urn samfeJagsma11989

Obviously this index is biazed as it reduces class as a determinant ofvoting behaviour to the manual non-manual dichotomy. As a consequn-ece its explanatory power diminishes with changing composition of theclass structure in the capitalist countries. As the white collar occupationshave become more taylorised and as the expansion of the public sector"and attempts to cut it in the 1980s to have led both to taylorization of whitecollar workers and increased militancy of the 'non-manuals' in the 1980s(S. Lash/J. Urry, ch. 8). analysis based on definition of class voting asdiscussed above are increasingly becoming invalid. This does not meanthat class voting as an independent variable of voting patterns is obsolet,it means that the class-base of class voting has to be redefined.

We take it that class voting is a fundamental c1eaveage in explainingvoting patterns in the fordist era and as the cleaveage of religion isapparently declining (W. Korpi, 36-7), the decline of left voting has to beanalysed in terms of the development of the sectoral bases of class votingitself, the development of social mobility and aHluence in the capitalistcountries as well as the emergence of 'new' social and political interestsand forms 01 representation.. Class identity or class consciousness and unionization has slowly

declined as a consequence of the sectoral increase in middle classoccupations and as a consequence of increased permananent unem-ployment following the present economic crisis. Having in mind theexpansion of service and administration in the occupational structure ofthe capitalist countries highlighted above, one should not be extremelysurprised to find out that unionization, and hence class identity, isdeclining as such development should be expected from the fact thatunionization in these areas of the occupational structure is traditionallylow (a situation which is changing with increased militancy in the publicsector). The sectoral ditterences in unionization are highlighted in table 5.Besides the sectoral effects on unionization, the economic present crisistends to diminish membershipoftrade unions following increased unem-polyment. This development has been regional within each country.Taking UK as an example. unio n members hip has declined by 2.25 mill ionsince the late 19705 (S. LashJJ. Urry 106) or over 8% of the total labourforce. But, as spatial division of labour is rather clear in terms of regionsin UK (ibid. 93-109), and unempolyment is unevenly distributed overthedifferent branches of industry. there has been llattening out of member-ship between different areas following the decline of the traditional manu-facturing sectors as well as trend of capital to move out of traditionalcentral cities (cf. S. Lash/J. Urry. 106-7)

265

Pj60mal- Arb6k um samtelagsmal1989

The overall picture that one can conclude from table 6 is that thereseems to be a correlation between increasing unemployment and de-creasing membership once unemployment has reached certain criticalpoint In the case of UK the turning point is in 1979 as unemployment over4% since 1976 was apparently permanent despite the fact that this wasa period of Labour government (i.e a Labour Party government with itsstrong organizational relationship with the trade unions). In the USA theturning point is between 1974 and 1975 with unemployment increasingfrom 4.lWll to 5.5%. In the Netherlands thetuming point is around 1980and 1981 as unemployment reached· 6% and increased to 8.6%. InAustralia thetuming point is in 1975 as unemployment jumped from 2,8%in 1974 to 4.8 in 1975. Generally, the more permanent unemploymentseems to have come, the more the eHects on membership seems to be.

Class identity is declining in terms 01 membership statistics, but otherfactors aHect class voting as well. Increased social mobility and affluencehas its ideological impacts on left voting. As S. Lash and J. Urry highlight(212), analysis of the February 1974 election in UK showed that homeowners were 2.35 times more likely than council tenants to vole Conser-vative.ln Britain home ownership incresed from 29% in 1950 to almost 6%currently (ibid., 360 tn. 78). Furthermore the same analysis showed tnathouseholds with more than two cars were 1.78 times more likely to voteConservative than those without a car (ibid., 212),(7. With higher living-strandards and the growth of consumerism, private forms of provisiongradually become the "natural way of lile" and as a consequence classiddeology looses its importance as determinants such as indjvkjiuallcollective modes of provision gain importance. Furthermore with higherlevels of affluence local issues become more important relative to'national' issues reflecting the provision of basic needs.

France has not seen as clear signs of class and partisan dealignmentalthough the1981 may mark a new trend. There was some fall in boththese measures, according to S. Lash andJ. Urry (218), as only 38% ofthewhite-collarworkers supported Giscard d'Estaing in the second ballot.compared with the 53% vote for de Gaulle in 1965. The crass base of thelett wing parties voters is changing in France as in the other Europeancountries. There is a long term decline in communist voting and supportfrom industrial workers at the same time as working class membership ofthe Socialist Party declined from 44% in 1951 to 19% in 1973 and itssupport among the working-class vote has declined as it has increasinqtybecome ·de-proletarianized' middle class party (ibid .• 218-9). In the caseofW~Germanyclass voting has been declining too. While class voting. on

266

,,• J

1~·1':

Pj66mal· Arb6k um samfeJagsmal1989

.:

Tab'-eS. . end IoymentPercentage oi Wfl ion membersh~ unemp

Australia Garmany Japan Netoorlands N. Zealand UK USA44 221971 rn' 2.8 5.8u"·

34 45 221972 m 43

3.1 5.52.2u 2.634 45 221973 m 45 2.2 2.2 4.8u -2.335 36 ·46 22

1974 m 462.7 0.1 2.1 5.5u 2.e35 37 47 21

1975 m 46 33 243.2 B.30.24.8 4.0 1.9 5.2

20u35 37 471976 m 45 33 7.65.5 0.4 4.84.7 4.0u 35 37 49 201977 m 43 34

0.3 5.2 6.95.6 3.9 5.3 20u ~22 35 36 501978 m 43 351.7 5.1 6.02.2 5.3u 6.4 3.739 501979 m 35 22 35

2.1 5.4 L9 4.6u 3.3 40 4835 22 341980 m2.0 6.0 2.2 5.6u 3.3 39 4535 22 321981 m2.2 8.6 3.6 9.0u 4.6

40 43221982 m 2.4 3.5 10.4u 39 42 161983m 5.6 11.2 9.5

u 151984 m 43 7.4

U 8.9

. bership as apercentage of totallabourforca; source OECD:m = trade union mem . 123Structural Change and Econornc pe~~r:f~~~ur fO~; source:DECO: Labour•• u = unemplOYfmlnt as percentage 0 aFores Statistics 1966-1986,30·1.

,..!

267

Pj6lJmal-ArMkumsamfelagsmal1989

a Alford index, scored 30 in 1953thefigurewas 1 0 in 1983, partly becauseof a considerable increase in SPD voting among non-manual workers: in1956 four·fifths of SPD voters were manual workers while in 1976 theycounted for 53% (ibi., 218).

Following the decline of class voting with decreasing unionization andgrowing individualist consumerism as well as 'localization' of politics,partisan alignment has declined. This development undermines thefordist centralization of political power and peak level forms of decisionmaking, as long term collaboration between capital, labour and govern-ments becomes more uncertain. Increasing electoral volatility in thecapitlaist countries has replaced the rather stable patterns of electionoutcome inthe fordist era. In Britain as an example, thetwo major parties,Labour and the Conservative Party, took 96% of all votes cast in 1955; in1983 they took 70%. In Sweden party volatility has increased as well.Election Surveys conducted since 1956 measuring the proportion ofvoters switching parties between two consecutive elections was 7% in thelate 1950s, but had increased to 19% between the 1973-76 elections and17% in the 1976-79 elections (W. Korpi, 134-7). In the USA partisanshiphas been declining at the same time as political apathy is increasing. Thiscan be concluded from the turnout of those actually voting in presidentialand congressional elections. The highest turnout was reached in 1963when 63% of the electorate voted. By 1980 it.had fallen to a mere 53%.This development is to be explained by weakening of party loyalties anddiminishing belief ingovemment responsiveness and effectivity (So Lash!J. Urry, 217).

The final important factor in analysing the development of votingpatterns in the capitalist countries in the fordist era and trends thatundennine the centralization of the political parties is the emergence of'new social movements' representing interests that the main streamparties have found difficult to deal with in terms of their centralized'national level politics'. Indeed environmental movements, anti-nuclearmovements, womens movements and the green movements, all empha-

. sising de-centralization and 'localization' of politics as well as sexualequality, have gained strength inside and/or outside the main-streamparties. In Britain third party voting has been increasing in recent decades,despite speculative voting that the British constituency produces as it isblazed towards the two main parties. liberal Party support peaked in1860,65%, fell to 3% in 1951, but reached 25'% in 1983 (ibid., 214). w·Germany has seen a substantial increase in third party voting, mostinterestingly forthe Greens. In the 1983 Bundestag election they gained

268

Pj66maJ- ArbOk um samhHagsmaJ 1989

5,3% of the votes, 4 years after the party was established. In Sweden, inthe 1988 parliamentary elections, the Environmental Party - the Greensgot 5.5% and 20 MPs out of 349,7 years after it was establish~d (~j60~if.11/1988,49). In Iceland the environmentalist and de-centrahzatlonahstWomens Party gained over 10% of the votes in their second parliamen-tary elections in 1987 and in 1988they had reachedover30% inthe polls.

e) The crisis of fordismFordism as a regime of capital accumulation in USA and W·Europe,characterized by higher levels 01 centralization of capital and politicalinstltutuions.: parties and the state, faced a deepening crises in the late19605 and 19705, crises that resulted from the long term structuraldevelopment of international trade and intemationalization of capitalaccumulation: falling rates of profits and the maturation of tayloristtechnology; increasing prices of third world raw material and increasingpressure tram Newly Industrialized Countries (NiCs) of SA· Asia (Japan,Hong-Kong, Taiwan, S-Korea and Singapore): increasing class andideological struggle: increasing environmental problems: de-centraliza-tion and relocation of capital; decline 01 the power postition of the"traditional' political parties and changing balance of power between thediHerent blocks 01 trade unions within the trade union movement as awhole, and finally. following these structural changes, diminishing powerpos ft ion of the 'national' state and governments.i. The structural development of capital. International trade increasedsteadily in the post war boom era, following liberalization of inter~ationaltrade and increasing exploitation of economies of scale. OECD importsand exports of manufactured products48 increased annually by 16.7%(imports) and 16.g<'/o (exports)in the period between 1964 and 1973,decreased to 15.7% (imports) and 15.3'% (exports)in the period 1973-8,and slacked to 6.8% (imports) and 6.6"10 (exports) in the crisis period1978-85. The respective figures for the world imports were 17.2%, and16.1%,16.3% and 17.5% and finally 7.4% and 5.4% (GECD b 1988,92and 121). But trade between the main industrialized capitalist countriesincreased faster than trade between lately developed countries anddeveloped countries, as table 7. indicates. Furthermore trade betweenthe EEC countries has increased fast as well as table 6.8 indicates.

269

Pj6rJmaf. ArbOk um samtefagsmaJ 1989

Table 7.International trade as a percentage of dom estic consumption,total manufacture

UK EEC~ USA JapanTrade as apercentagedomesticapparent 1959·60 '73-4 1959·60 '73·4 1959-60 '73-4 1959-60 '73-4consumption

Ext. imports 17.03 29.03 7.56 10,12 3.28 7.95 6.02 7.09from LOCs 3.64 3.35 1.46 1.62 0.73 1.93 1.16 1.80from Des 12.41 24.42 5.53 7.53 2.53 5.66 4.74 4.61Ext. exports 20.78 27.74 15.96 18.56 5.08 8.39 14.10 16.71

Source: R. RothwalVW. Zegveld, 37.

TableS.Intra--EECtrade

% ct rotat exports % 01 GOP

1958 1982 1958 1973 1982

FR of Garmany 36 48 6 9 13Franca 28 49 3 8 8Italy 34 46 3 7 10Netherlands 57 72 22 29 35

BLEU 53 71 17 35 43United KIngdom 20 41 3 6 9Ireland 84 71 21 25 33Denmark 56 49 16 10 13Greaca 50 46 4 5 5

EUR 10 35 52 5 ·10 13

Source: P. Teagu9, 64, .

It is indeed interesting and needs to be highlighted, that tableS shows.in terms of export. that the EC-market has become less important for small

270

Pj6fJmal. ArbOk urn samfeJagsmal1989

countries (excluding the Netherlands) and the peripheral countries withinthe Ee, over the period from 1958 to 1982. This is of significanceconceming the question of the advantages and disadvantages thesmaller countries, such as Iceland and the Scandinavian countries, facewhen considering to join the EC.

Besides these structural changes in international trade in terms ofincreased trade between the Des themselves and the EECs, the in-creased exploitation of economies of scale and internationalization ofcapital led to increasing intra-industry trade as is indicated in table 9., i.e.the proportion in the different countries of the sum of exports and importswithin particular industries in total exports and imports of the countries inquestion. Increasing intra-industry trade reflects increasing specializa-tion within industries, "most obviously because a global market, in whichproducts can be differentiated without sacrificing scale economies, iscapable of sustaining a large number of competing suppliers." (OECD1987a.272)

Table 9.Adjusted intra-industry trade, all commodities(averages}

Percentages

1964 1967 1973 1979 1985

Canada 37 49 57 56 68

United States 48 52 48 52 72

Japan 23 22 24 21 248 elgiumtLuxemburg 62 66 69 73 74Netherlands 65 66 63 65 67

Germany 44 51 60 60 65France 64 67 70 70 72Italy 49 45 ·54 48 55United Kingdom 46 55 71 80 76

Australia 18 17 29 22 25Mean of

above countries 46 49 55 55 60

Source: OEeD 1987a 273.

The pressure to exploit economies of scale led to increasing interna-tionalization of capital and investment as well intemationalization of trade.But the failing rates of profits together with the increasingly high level of

271

Pj6tJmal- Arbdk urn samtelagsmal1989

internationalization of capital led to a restructuring of firms both in termsof 'globalization' and relocation. Table1 0 showestrends in direct outwardforeign investment of selected industrialized countries between 1960 and1980. Outward foreign investment as a percentage of gross domesticfixed capital formation, increased, in terms of these countries, from 2.1 %in 1960 to 2.9% in 1980. But. as table 6.11 showes, the proportion of totalforeign investment that is invested in the developed countries themselveshas increased at the same as it has decreased in the developing cou ntries(a phenomenon that alongside the changing structure of internationaltrade as indicated above and the consequent multiplier effects, acceler-ates the tendency towards uneven development of developed and ThirdWorld countries).

Table10.An IndexoftheSignifjcanceoftheOutward Foreign DirectInvestment Flow of Selected Countries, 1960 ~1980

Direct Investment flows as a percentage of gross domestic fixed capitaltcrmation, average between:

Source country 1960-62 '63-5 '66-8 '6S- 71 '72-4 75-7 '78-80

United States 3.0 3.5 3.6 4.0 4,0 4.5 4.7Canada 0.9 1.1 1.1 1 1.7< 2.3 1.6 4.6

United Kingdom 5.0 4,6 4.2 6.2 9.0 7.2 7.6West Gennany 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.5Franca 2.22 1.3 1.1 O.B 1.3 1.4 1.9Italy 2.03 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.64Netherlands 5.2 3.1 5.0 6.1 7.4 6.9 4.2Belgium &Luxemburg ·5 0.8 1.9 2.2 1.B 3.0Sweden 1.1 1.8 1.5 2.9 3.0 3.6 1.4

Japan 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.1 • 1.0 0.8Australia 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.3 0,9 1.2

total 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9

Source: J.M. StopfordlJ.H. Dunning, 11.1 For 1967·8; 2 For 1961·2; 3 For 1962 4; For 178·9; 5 lndidcates data notavailable.

272

.Pj6(}mal.ArbOk urn samfelagsmaJ 1989

Table 11.Stock of Directlnvestmentfrom Abroad by Major RecipientCountry or Area, 1960-80

Percentage 01 total, end of:

Host country 1960 1971 1978 1980

Developed countries 67.3 65.2 69.5 71.1

United States 13.9 8.4 11.B 15.5

Canada 23.7 16.8 11.9 10.3

Western Europe 22,9 2B.S 37.7 37.7

Of which:UK 9.2 8.1 9.0 '0.2

AusttraliaiS. Africa 6.6 10.0 6.6 6.2

Japan 0.2 1.5 1.7 , .5

Developing countries 32.3 30.9 27.8 26.6

Latin America 15.6 . 17.8 14.5 14.9

Alrica 5.5 5.3 . 3.1 2.B

Asia 7.5 4.7 7.0 6.9Southern Europe 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9

Middle East 2.8 2.1 2.3 1.9

Other unallocated n.a. 3.9 2.6 2.2

total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: .M. Stoptord/J.H. Dunning, 12.

These statistics indicate the changing pattern of location of foreigndirect investment that is changing towards 'near market' investment, t.e.to the rich western markets (an investment policy that is the bases of abetter exploitation of the new technology and 'systemo-facture' by theTNCs cf. R. Kaplinsky 1985). But direct foreign investment has not onlychanged intermsoflocation, its volume has changed sothattoday foreigndirect investment plays a considerable role in the development of someeconomies with the consequent effects on the 'national' structure ofpower relations or balance of power of the state and social force~ in theeconomies in question. The impact of direct foreign investment IS evenmore. than the figures indicate as power is concentraded in relatively few

273

Pj6tJmaf-ArbOkum samtelagsmal 1989

hands in this field as can be seen from the tact that less than 5% of allM~~s - the 500 largest corporations - ccont tor at least 80% of all foreignaHlllates and about t.he same percentage of international production (.M.Stopford/J.H. Dunrunq, 3). Table 12 highlights the increasing role offoreign direct investment in the main capitalist economies compared withgross domestic fixed capital formation.

Table 12.Inward direct investmenfflowsas a percentage of gross domesticfixed caprtal fonnation of selected countries, 1960-80.

Average between:

Host country 1960-2 1963-5 1966-8 1969-7t 1972·4 1975·7 1978-80

Unrted States 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.2 2.1Canada 6.8 3.1 4.4 4.6 2.5 0.6 2.0United Kingdom 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.9 4.5 3.1 4.4Wast Germany , .5 2.6 2.7 1.6 2.8 1.5 0.8France 1.41 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.5 2.4Italy 2.61 3.0 2.1 2.4 2.0 1.5 0.2Netherlands 2.5 3.4 4.1 6.3 6.0 3.0 2.4BelgIum& luxemburg n.a. 3.62 4.1 5.9 6.8 6.2 5.7Sweden 0.8 1.5 1.9 1.6 0.7 0.3 0.5

Japan 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1Austratia 8.3 9.5 7.8 9.3 5.6 4.0 6.0

total 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.7

Source: M. StopfordlJ.H. Dunning,14.1 For 1961 -2. 2 For 1965.

lrcreaslno intemational trade, internationalization of capital and in.crea~i~g opening of the capitalist economies has shiftied away thecondrUons for keynesian anti-cyclical policies and as a consequenceexaggerated the crisis of fordist regulation resulting from maturation offordist technology and falling rates of profits. Reflationary, keynesianmeasures to stimulate growth in one economy become increasingly lesseffective with the 'liberalization' of trade, as increased aggreg ate demand

274

Pj6tJmal-Arb6kumsamfelagsmaf1989

leads to increased imports and thus does not lead to as fast increase inproductivity and multiplier effects, as can be expected in closed econo-mies. As a consequence of lack of increase in productiriy, inflationtendencies are therefore structurally determined and governments arefaced with choosing between serious problems of balance cipayment ordevaluation of exchange rates which leads to even further ncreases ininflation. As the role of the slate is structurally determined ood limited inthis sense. the political conditions for keynesian social dermcratic classcollaboration-are seriously damaged and as a consequence, lordistpolitical regulation is undermined. Indeed first stagflation, then increas-ingly negative balance of payments and debt are some of the maincharacteristics of the declining phase of fordism. In terms 01 the balanceof payments, the DECO as a whole moved from a surplus of 0.3% in 1973to a deficit of -0.3% in 1981. to some extend as a result of the increasingoil prices (P. Armstrong/A. Glyn/J'Harrison. '338). In the period between1960 and 1973 gross debt of general government was in the average37.5% of GOP in the European 10 countries while it increased in terms ofthe European 12. "from 48.1 % to 63.2% in 1988 (EEC estimate). Interestpayments of the public debt of the European 12 increased as a perce~t-ageof GDP from 3.8% in 1981104.8% in 1988 (EEe estimate) (Cornrnis-sion of the European Communities 1987).

Furthermore, the increasing debt burden has le-d to a considerableexpansion of financial capital and increased its profit rates relative 10industrial capital", a development which has changed the power balanceand reduced the power of the core fordist sectors relative to national andinternational banks and financial corporations. This development hasfurther undermined the socio-economic power base of forc:lis! politicalregulation and fOnTISof state intervention, culminating in lhe monet~ristshift in the economic policies 01 the capitalist economies (for analysis ofthe debt crisis and shifting power base, see E.A. Brett 1983 and S. Lash!J. Urry ch. 7 and 8}. The increase in the financial sector's share as.apercentage of GOP of selected DECO countries in the recent ~ears.lsshown in table 13. while tables 14. and 15. estimate non-financialbusiness borrowing 1962-86.

275

Pi66maJ~Arb6k um samfeJagsma11989

Table 13.Financial sector's share as percentage ofFinanciar institutions and insurances

1970 19755.93.94.54.5

19806.34.64.55.3

19857.44.75.716.91

United KingdomUnited StatesGermanySwitzerland2

4.23.23.6

1 1984; 2 Excluding insuranceSource; OECO 1987b. 29

Table 14.Businessborrowing1 asapercerrtaqe offixed investment, 1962-73

. 1962·67·1968-721973

USA15.427.236.1

France32.331.840.8

UKn.a.

. 5.28.3

Germany231.933.841.2

Japann.a29.4339.2

1 Business borrowing is the diHarenca between savinq (including transfers) andfixed investment. Refers 10 non-financial corporate and quasi-corporate sector,2 lncluses unincorporated enterprises31970-2.

Source: P. Armstrong/A. Glyb/ J. Harrison. 265.

Borrowing by the non-financial corporate and quasi corporate sectorincreased steadily in the 1960s and reached its peak around 1975. Thissteady growth in the borrowing/investment-ratio followed decreasingrates of profits as well as low or negative real interest rates in line withkeynesian anti-cyclical policies. Around 1978~9the present high interestrate era started which signaled the end of the keynesian era and fordistpohlcal regulation with the ccnsequern attempts by governments to cutpublic spending although unemployment was increasing.· The overallscenario, in terms of the changing balance of power between industrialand financial capital. is that the 1980s has culminated in the hegemonicdominance of financial capital with the consequent deregulation andinternationalization otfinancial capital and the monetary sector. In Britain

276

:1

Pj6tJmaf -ArbOk urn samtelagSmBl1989

•.•~r

•...e-Ql

EQl

mCIl •'-<.0°eo0.. ••.. .-Or--(J0l..!. •••Q'ICIl -'::J c:0-..2-c'ic: Eco '-Ql 0e~0:0..0..••• ClJo (JIJ"Ciii Q)- ><u-1::-l'I:l rtlI:: rtl- 0I:: •..;;::0)CQo Q)crn

- c:a0_- cC'l(ll

• C l,IIn- •...•.•• 3:: cpQlOc..::ot:~c:a 0 en.-alca

•m-q-qr--.N .•••::;l:"":r-.:-.tcr:icici~.- •...NNC"}

Mo,U1U1a;lCOC"lt.ria:iNa:ioci~'-NNM-q

eo~<.Or--.NM;::;1IiC"i..£..£Mr...:~...-NC')'<;fC')N

OOlOONI,()0c:it.OmC"icOcO~_ C')LI)C')C')

0<.0: •..•Ll)C'l "'tC'lN'<:rIlia:iaiO'lr--N-C')C')C')'-

r--.M~C'101O'lmai"":~-.:ic:ri""';!:-...- NC') .••.(")

...."<t01.,..(,)<:O~1Ii<"'i..or--:..£cri_ .•.•• N",,(")LI)

"",OCl(")Nr--.Lfl::9 u:ici1lia:iu:iN~- •...•M N "" '7 to

lOV~ltlNM(D"'" .""'Nr...:«iM- NNI.i') r;")"T '7

lOf';O"<ttO(")-.:t . M ....r--~I.i')C;;~~:.::fC")~-.:t_O:~C?~r--C")""'C\Io=J~O• CO) -.:t~lON

C\JO:~~~~~"",.-1'-"",(.00'1<:0.• N"- CO) C'1l.O N

r:::~~o:~~~OlO'1U)u)""'"<tO~".... M(")'<tUi

.-N

moC")

277

P;MmA/-Arbdk urn samfelagsmal1989

the shift appears inthedeveJopment towards positive net lending in termsof the sectoral categorization above, as a result of factors such asincrasing real operating surplus, lower taxes, increasing real interestrates and speculative motives, decreasing real gross fixed capital forma-tion, and as a result of funds flowing abroad, especially to USA followingReagan's high interest rate policy and the strong dollar (J. Tomlinson, 17and W. Keegan).

The internationalization of industrial and financial capital that we haveonly briefly described here, is even more essential or structurally irnpor-tant than we heave sofar highlighted, The proper conceptualization foranalysis of the development of the international economy is 'globalization'ratherthan simple internationalization as the very structure of the firms inquestion is changing, Firstly, muttinalional companies are developingaway from the pattern of close conlrolofforeign affiliates ordaughter tirrnsby nationally bound mother firms: secondly, the present crisis and highinterest rate era has forced industrial capital or firms not only to mergeintra sectorally, but to merge inler-sectorally as well, which has led toincreasing merge of industrial and financial capital as industrial firms have"bouqht" their way to financial capital by buying shares in banks; thirdly,the exploitation of 'systemo-facture' has layed the technological groundsfor the 'globalization' of capital accumulation (cf. R. Kaplinsky 1985 and1984),

Thehislorical development of capitalist firms in terms of internationali-zation can be described, in a ideal type form, as S. Lash and J. Urry (89)have done and is shown in figure 1, The first phase, A, refers to thehistorical slage of the rise and growth of competitive capitalism, in whichsmall firms aredominanl and the medeot productiondevelopes from craftproduction via manufacture to large scale industrL The second phase, S,sees the emergence of monopoly capitalism which developes from thecompetitive stage to the centralized fordist stage with the spread oftaylorist.large scale industry and the consequent regulation of aggregatedemand and consumption. The third phase. C, refers to the presentemerging stage of globalized monopoly capitalism in which the centrali-zation of capitat takes new forms that are charcterized by higher level ofcross sectoral and cross geographical investment and higher levels ofmonopolization of the knowledge intensive parts of the overall, increas-ingly international process of production, with the consequent intensifica-tion of international division of labour following the diffusion of systerno-facture.

278

Pj6rJmal ~ArbOk um samfeJagsmal1989

Figure 1.. lat' .from small firm to globalizationFonnsofcapitalaccumu ion:

Source: S. lash/J. Urry, 89.

",. d nase C in terms of 'disorganizedS. Lash and J. Urry ~ave a,nalyse p tualization as this phase is to be

capitalism, which is a mtsleadinc ~nc~p r ed and organized capitalism,analysed in terms of new forms 0 cl.en/an~rom the 'organized' stage ofalthough ditferent forms of centra tza 10. . .capitalism, i.e. stage B of monopoly capitalism:

, lzed apitalism, a further kind of"In the third stage (C), dlsorg~mz l~ from some developing aenterprise is to be found. !hls r~s~ ~es 0 erate more independ-'polycentric' structure as their S~bsl~lan att~m emerges, Certain ofently, and a mUltidivis~nal.orgamzatlonoal ~nto the crucially importantthese polycentric multinationals devel P f hich themselves'global corporations' as they take over other Inns w

279

PjMm;j/ ~lutx5k um sam telagsma/1989

are operating muttinationally. firms often producing quite differentproduct~ and based on different industrial processes. The attachmemto any single economy becomes more tentative, as capital expands(~~d. contracts) on a global basis. A much more complex spatial~lVlSlOn of labour develops in which different parts of different procuc-tion proc:esses are separated off and develop within different nationaleconomies, ~ep~nding. in part at least, on relative wage rares andwcrkerorcancaton. The spatial division of labour, which in the earlierphases resuns from the unplanned pattems established by a conski-e:able n~mber ~f ':galfy separated enterprises, becomes underdisorqaneed caprtalism alergely planned development internal to thevast global corporation." (S. LashfJ. Urry, 89~90, underlines f.J.).

T.Me phase of globalization has appears clearly in the changedrelations between the 'mother-firms' and their subsidiaries:

"In 1950, 76 per cent of the leading 180 American multinationals and86 per ce~t ot the leadinq 1,35 European mu ltinationals had subsidiarynetworks manly SIX countnes or less. By 1970 these figures had fallento 5 per ~ent and 23 per cent r~spectjvely, as corporations pursuing aworld-v.:,de strategy expanded rnto dozens of countries ... The massiveexpansion of the new international division of labour has partlystemmed Iro?1the establishment of 'world-market factories' in various'fr~ production zo~es' offering all sorts of exemptions, reliefs, prefer-ential rates, lax holidays and the like, Partly also it has stemmed fromthe .more general a.ttractiveness of low-cost production possibilities ina Wide ran.ge of Third World countries. For example. Phillips' employ-ment outsld.e Western Europe and the USA rose from zero in 1964 1013 per cent In 1970 and 19 per cent in 1976. More generally. between1972 and 19n there w~s a.marked increase in overseas productionby the largest 200 multinationals: the proportion rose from 25.3 percentto 30.7 percent '" as 'peripheral Fordism'became established on~ wide. scale ... by 1980 over 50 per cent of employment in telnternational che~IC~ls industry was accounted for by global ratherthan merely rnuhinatlonal corporations." (ibid., 90).

~ut .the situ~t~n is not that .industrial capital is globalizing, financialcapital IS globaliZing as well. ThIS follows both from the internal structuraldevelopment of capitalism and historical circumstances. Refering tostructural aspects, factors to be emphasised are: 1) decreasing invest-

280

Pj6t>maJ-ArMk um samteJagsmal19E1J

ment opportunities on the national level as a con~equ~nceoi.thepresenteconomic crisis which has caused out1low of financial capital In somecountries and increasing public and private debt in general inthecapitalistcountries: 2) and increasing intemational transactions following incresedinternational trade and intra-industry trade; 3) the effects of interest ratevariation, the floating 01exchange rates, and the generallberalization ofexchange controls, which generated short-term capital flO1lsand furth~r.more the deregulation of banks from the 19605 onward: 4) the partialindustrialization of certain Third World economies and the resultinginvestment and recycling requirements; 5} transaction between entitiesof multinational and global corporations; and 6) the need for financing themassive merger boom of the late 1960s. Historical factors to be high·lighted are: 1}the financing of substantialtradewith EastemEurope. mostof which had to be orchestrated by western banks, and 2) the oil criseswhich both necessitated enormous sums of finance (lor I\e oil producerfor infrastructure, forthe oil consumer to pay for higher prces, and for thegovernments of consumer ·CO!,.lntriesto pay for the resuling paymentsdeficits) and which generated extraordinarily increased revenues depos-ited in London and in the other leading banking centres.. Developments include, according to S. Lash and J. Urry (202): 1}.Theextension of international branch networks, particularly by Amencanbanks in Western Europe; and in retaliation in order not to lose busi~ess,by European banks in North America and elsewere: 2) The torrnanon ofinternational banking groups, such as EBIC (founded 1970), Orton(1970), Europartners (1971),Inter-alpha (1972),01 which.tor exa~ple. allthe major British banks are constituent members; 3) The estabhs~m~ntof international consortia banks 10serve a particular area.or a certain kindof business, or a particular sort of industry: by the mid·1970s there wereabout 60 such banks with over half based in London serving the Euro-money market. .' .

The phase of intemationalization and globallzatlon of capital gener-ated the emergence of the 'Eurocurrency' or Eurodollar markets thatconstitute an important material base forthe increasing rela:ivein~epend.ence of international financial capital, outside the regulation of lnterna-tional financial markets by the Bretton Woods system and IMF. TheEurocurrency stemmed from the offshore lnvestme~t by American com-panies in Europe in the post war era. These companies needed to borrowmoney fortheir investments in Europe, they would bo rrowt he money fromEur{)pean banks, but the amounts would be denominaJed in dollars. Asa consequence the loans and the banks making sucl1loans were not

281

Pj6tJmal· ArbOk um samfelagsmal1989

subject to regulation by either the American or the European governmentwhere the European bank was located. Essentially the 'Eurocurrency'was/is not money but transactions of 'corporate' debt and today a form ofthe investment and accumulation crisis of industrial capital. The maincenter for this rapidly growing financial market was the City in londonwhich had Significant advantages due to long established confidence,accumulated know-how and experties due to experience from the BritishEmpire, and due to its relative independence from industrial capital.

The Eurocurrency markets have expanded drasticly. As S. Lash andJ. Urry put it:

"The external claims of the Eurocurrency banks rose from $44 billionin 1969 to $810 billion 1980. It is estimated that the assets of thesebanks now exceed the annual value of all intemationallrade through-out the world. Even by 1980 it was calculated that the Eurodollardeposits were equivalent to three or lour times the entire money stockof the USA. By 1983 the IMF calculated that the gross debt in theEurocurrency market was almost $3000 billion, the growth rate havingbeen something like 20 per cent per annum throughout the 19705. Itis also worth noting that there has been a major growth of theEurobond market as well, that is, of new borrowing through longer-term marketable bonds. One further point to note here is that only asmall proportion otthis financial dealing is related to direct commercialneeds. It is calculated that something like $250 billion changes handseach day in the world financial markets. Hogan and Pearce50 calculatethat this is 20 times the activity that could be attributed to therequirements of trade and investment." (Ibid .. 204-5).

Besides this development of internationalization and globalization ofproduction, trade and financial capital, another aspect otthe developmentof capital itself has undermined the 'national' base of the fordist politicalregulation. namely the relocation of production on national level. Therelocation strategy undermines the organizational basis of fordist regula-tion insofar as the concentration of labour is reduced and consequentlythe basis of centralization of the trade union movement.

We have already mentioned above the long term demographic trendof relatively decreasing growth of the biggest cities in the capitalistcountries. But this trend follows not simply increasing emphasis amongthe general public on "healthier and more human environment" andsuchlike, rather people follow investments as capital relocates and

282

Pj~mal· Arb6k urn samfelagsmal1989

. d ction in order to undermine labour militancy and organi-disperses pro U I . fit' h avy industryzalion As table 16 indicates, the average size 0 pan s ~n e.in UK ~nd USA reduced by over ~8°~oand 27% r~spectlvely In the ye!rsbetween 1958161 to 1970173, while In Germany rt reduced by over 5 }"o.

Table 16..Manufacturing plant size, 1958-73

Median number of employees 1958-61 1970-73

All ManufacturingUKGermanyUSA

470350390

440410380

Light industriesUKGermanyUSA

220120'190

240140210

Heavy industriesUKGermanyUSA

114011401110

8201030

810

Source: P.Armslrong/A. GlynJJ. Harrison, 392.

UK for which systematic data are available, the share of net~nufact~rin output contributed by the largest hundr~ plants crept only

~pafrom9to 1 ~ percent during the fifties and sixties, while that C(?b~dtnb3u9t~)edt' . pedupfrom22t041 percent I I.. .

~~:~~~~~=~~~:~~r0/:~~i~9plant size, aIOngside.rela!i~e~ i~~~~. external costs and the new technology, was th~ aim 0 ~ e ..~;ntrol Indeed there is a relation between plant size and strike~tct~~

K i~1971-3 ~nly O.2percent of plants with between eleven a~ w~~ employees had strikes, while 75.8 per cent of those empIOY~~;:~than five thousand did, days lost per thousand employees ~er

. I ('bid 393) A Rannie" analysed the relation between3708 respecuve y I., . . . . '1 di thatthere is a reverseestabIiShmentsizeandindustnala~lon,co~cdU m~ I ctivity as table 17relation between establishment size and In usrtia alndlcates,

283

Pj60ma/§ Arbok um samtelagsmal1989 Pj6fJmal.Arb6kumsamfelagsma/1989

2 8 13 27 33 50 74 77

"Thesmailerthe firm, the lowerthe wage, according totheOECD. Thedifferential is widest inthe USA where small-firm employees get 57 percent of the wage of comparable workers in a large firm. In Japan thedifferential narrows to n percent, and in most of Europe it is narrowerstill. Health-insurance plans were available to 35 per cent of Americansmall-firm workers in 1983 and pension plans to just 17 per cent. Over85 per cent of large-firm workers had access to these benefits. TheDECO concludes that a worker is more likely to be fired from a smallthan a larg~ firm. Average job tenure with small firms was four and ayears in 1983 compared with nine years in large firms." (C. Lead-beater/J. Lloyd, 171).

Table 17.The reverse relation between establishm.sizeand industrial action

Establishments experiencing any type of industrial action-by number of manual workers:%-aga Elxperiencing any form of industrial action

Size 1-9 10-24 25-49 50-99 100-' 99 200·499 500-999 1000+

Source: A. Rannie, 149.

But, there is also a reverse relation between firm size and the level ofunionization. C.Leadbeater and J. Lloyd claim that big firms are far morelikely than small firms (100 employees or less) to have their staffunionized. In the USA 88% of small firms are non-union. in France 82%,Ja~a~ 8~% and UK. 65% (C.Leadbeater/J. Lloyd, 174-6). Analysi'nguruonization of establishments, A. Hannie" highlights the same trend inunionization as is indicated in table 18.

Given these relations between firm and establishment size andindustrial activity, level of unionization and wage costs, one should not besurprised that capital would tend to relocate production and diminish plantsize. P. Armstrong, A. Glyn and J. Harrison are not cought in the open inthis respect:

All EstablishmentsIndependent EstablishmentsEstabllshmants that werepart of a group 58 28 55 68 • 81 92

,~Within the advanced countries, capital has migrated away from areaswith strong traditions of industrial militancy. In the United Kingdom, ashift away from conurbations to smaller towns began in the sixties.Labour relations almost certainly played a part. In the United Statesmanufacturing has been attracted to the Southern 'Sunbelt' stateswhere labour organization is weak ... More work has been 'put out' tosmall management embraced 'decentraHzed production' as a con-scious antidote to working-class strength, especially after the HotAutumn' [19£.8 - r.J.]. Small factories could often avoid union control,state measures to protect workers (important parts of the Statute ofWorkers' Rights do not apply in firms employing less than fifteenworkers), and taxes and social security contributions. In the Modenaarea of Italy the number of small workshops quadrupled between 1963and 1975" (P, Armstrong/A. GlynJJ. Harrison, 293-4).

Table 18.Establishment size and unionization

~roponion of Establishments that recognised manual unions in relation tomdependence (percentages)

(Private Sector only)Number at manual workers employed

Total 1·24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200+50 25 43 63 78 9131 16 24 50 66 67

Source: A. Rannie, 149. To sum up: The present economic crisis, the internationalization andglobalization of production, trade and financial capital has underminedthe usefulness of keynesian, anti-cyclical policies as well as the balanceof power between industrial and financial capital as the potitico-econornicconditions of the hegemoniC pestiton of industrial capital cracked and withit one of the preconditions of the fordist system of political regulation.Furthermore, the increased internationalization of capital accumulation

285

In addition to these effects of firm and establishment size on industrialactivity and unionization, wages tend to be a function of size as well. AsC+eadbeater and J. Lloyd put it:

284

Pj6dmaJ-ArbOk urn samfelagsmal1989

and rel~ation of production on national as welf as international levelun~errmn~ the organizational basis and centralization of the trad~unlo.nswhich furtherunderrnined the tardist system of pojijical regulation.Havm~ .analysec,lthe structural reasons in the development of capital for!.hecnsrs of fordism we can now tum to the labour side.11. Ih7 st.ructural d.evelopmeot of labouc, The internationalization andglo?allzatlo~ of ~apJtalhas not led to a corresponding growth of counter-active ornaruzatlonal forms of labour on the international/evel neither interms of super-national organization of the trade union movement noronsuper-state level.S<Asa consequence fordist political regulation has notbeen able to match the increasing power of multinational capnat. Butwe~~ness of labour on the in~ernatjonaJ.leveJis to be expected the powerposmon of labour on the national level IS worsening.

The Ion.9term decline of the basis of fordist political regulation boilsdow~ to: Flr~lIy, the decline of class based culture 01 the working class,!he proletarian ~ult~re' t~at gav~. ground as the level of aHluencyrncreased ~nd WIth It social mobIlIty and the isolated petit-burceolsnuclear family and the 'house owners.culture' became predominant. Asa consequence the cultural bases of the reproduction 01 class based~alues an~ id~logi~s crumbled. Secondly, the growth of consumerism,r.e. of the. l~dlVJdualistforms consumption that keyenesian and social-?e~rat~ mccn:e redislirbution has fostered, has generated the reitied,~n.dlvl~uahst~U?I~tivity that not orily produces and reproduces theISlolatlngna:Z'Slstlcculture as was diSCUSSed above, but at the same timehas undermined the class identity and social values that was one of theco~erstones of the power base 01 the trade unions in the fordist era,Thirdfy, the power base of the core fordist trade unions has reduced, aswe have analysed above, as a result of the relative decrease of manualwo~e~s and th.e core fordist sectors in the total labour force of thecapitalist countries, fo~lowingincreasing 'tertiarization' of the economies.F.ourthly, .~emographlc development, i.e. the relative decline of thebIggest. cities and incresing spatial diHusion at the labour force andproduction and diminshing plant size, has undermined the centralizationof !~e trade un~ns and hence the 'labour side' conditions of fordist~Iltlacal regu lation, Fifthly, fordist politicaI regulastion was further under-mmed by the present econo.miccrisis as it has diminished the power baseof the trade unions follOWing the decline of membership in absolutenumb~rst as ",:e, have analysed above. But, furthermore, an importantfactor IS the cnsrs of keynesian policies and social-democratism in thepresent economic crisis that culminated in the 'neo-classication' of

286

Pj66mal- Arb6k urn samflHagsma11989

governmental policies in the 19705 with the resulting cuts in the publicsector and attempts to reduce wage increases, led to severe clashes andwild-cat strikes between the partyltrade union leadership and rank and filemembers of the trade unions and the left wing parties in question with theconsequent demoralization of left wing social forces and growth of neo-liberalism. Finally, sixthly, following the increasing socialization andstatizatlon of capital accumulation, the public sector has grown fast as apercentage of the total labour force of the capitalist countries as we haveanalysed above. This development has undermi ned the power position ofthe core tordist trade unions and undermined class pohtics as publicemployees trraditionally tend to be relatively "a-political". But with thesocialization of capital accumulation and growth of the wellare slate,pubtic employees have increasingly been faced with the contradictions ofcapital and labour and following the present attempts to cuts in the publicsector,there militancy has incresed and there are signs that the inititativein struggle on on the labour market is moved away from the core tordistunions to the unions of public employees (which predominantly arewomen) (see S. Lash and J. Ur'ly, 232·84).

The crisis of lordism has not only resulted from these structuraldevelopments of capital and labour. The structural development of boththe capitalist state and politics has furthermore undermined the fordistsystem of political regulation.iii. The structural development of the state and politics. The crisis of lordistpolitical regulation was, besides the factors mentioned above, generatedby the transformation of the political structures in the post war era. .Elrs.tjy,as we have analysed above, an important factor in the decline of potiticalstructures of fordism was the decline of left voting following the long termdevelopment of the sectoral class basis of the voters. Higher levels ofaffluence and social mobility tended as well to reduce class identity orclass consciousness and left voting. Secondly, the crisis of keyenesianpolicies and social-democratic practice in the 19705 and increasing 'neo-classication' of government policies, severe conflicts between the rank-and-file of the labour movements and the social democratic parties led tospreading feeling of hopelessness and decline of socialist and social-democratic values and hence growth of neo-liberal and fascist and racistideologies. Thirdl!!, the crisis of keynesian policies and growing lack ofconfidence in govemments' abilay to deal with the economic and socialcrisis led to increasing electoral volatility that further undermined thematerial base and rationality of centralized policy formation inthe capital-ist coontries. Fourthly, the decline of socialist and social-democratic

287

Pj60mal .•ArbOk um samtelagsmal1989

values ~resulting from the declineof class based 'proietarina' culture andrise of bourgeois house-owning, isolating, individualist cu Iture of consum-erism that the collectively (i.e. both by keynesian governments andsupported by the trade unions) produced aggregate optimum demandand heavy advertising generated - undermined in the long run the fordistsystem of political regulation both inthe sense that it undermined the classbased political identity of leh voting and support tor the trade unions andin the sense that alternative movements to the politically narrow mindedgrowth policies of grew out of the social and environmental crisis offordism. New alternative values of the new social movements thatthreatened the ruling system of interest representation with new issuemovements, new political parties and new forms of representation de-manding political de-centrauzatlon, realization of ecological aims anddemolishing of patriarchal and authoritarian forms in political and every-day life ..Ei.t1.tl1yar:dfinally, the changing sectoral base of the working forceand classes undermined the 'old' hegemony of the export and fordistsectors within the working class as a whole, with the growth of the servicesector and the public sector. This development undermined the inititiverole that the hegemonic groups within the wori<ingclass had and weakendthe power position of labour in general, but the growing militancy of publicsector workers points at new hegemonic relations within the workingclass, changing base of political initiative and hegemonic politics in thefuture. The strength of these groups depends on the growth and size ofthe public sectors and welfare state in each country and the organizationstrength of labour and as consequence the 'post fordis!' restructuring ofcapital accumulation will be mediated diHerently according to the specificfeatures of hegemon ICpolitics in each country .In the following last section01 this article we will examine three main diHerent 'ideal' (or ratherideological) paths of restructuring in the capitalist countries that can bededuced from the different institutional bases 01 hegemonic politics inthese countries, i.e. Britain, Japan and Sweden.

288

Pj6tJmal- Arb6k um samteiagSma11989

3. Post-fordist restructuring and its historicallyspecific conditions: Japan. Sweden and UK .The new technology and 'sytemofacture' does not.only make mecha~lza-tion of the labour process on a higher level than hitherto known possible,with the computerized integration of production, design, manage~entand marketing on global scale, it has as well the twofold ~oten~lal ofmaking planning of the labour pro~ess either m.or~centr~llzed In thehands of capital and indeed centraitzed on a qualitatively higher lev~1ofcentralizationthan ever known sofar or atternatively more de-centralizedboth in terms of smaller more autonomous production un~s and in t~r.msof decreasing alienation of individuals born in their production an? politicallife. The balance between these two potentials is realiz~d In actualhegemonic politics so that the forms of technology ~nd Its uses .aredetermined by the conjunctural balance of power of SOCial== partIGu.-lar to each country and its long tsrm structural overdeterrnmatron by theirposition in the international division of labour.

The extent to which capital ano labour markets are de-regulated andmade more flexible depends on the balance of power of la.bour andcapital, l.e, on the structural and politic.~1 res?u~ce.s thaI national andmultinational capital is capable of exp!ol~lng ~ls-a-vls the labour m.o~e.rnents and opposing social forces. This will depend on l~e. eXlslnginstitutional framework of capital accumulation and the v:ay It IS tra~s~formed, i.e, on the country specific nature of the regime of caprtalaccumulation in question. .'

We will in the following compare the British and Swedish c~ses ~rt.h theJapanese one. The Japanese case is the one = the thr~ In which therestructuring is most clearly dominate? by capuat and Indeed by bigcapital or the big conglomerations. This feature IS du~ to the ditterentstructure of the Japanese regime of capital accumnulation. To co~parethe three cases and analyse the likely outcome of t~e restructunnq ofcapital accumulation, we will have to analyse the different regimes ofcapital accumulation by comparing structural ~lement~ su.Cha~: 1) t~erole of foreign investment In the economy '.n ~u~stlon,. 2} f~nanc~aldepEmdency/indepency of domestic capital vls-.a·vls .forelg~ .Ilnancialcapital; 3) the relations between ind~stria:l. and financial capital; 4} thelevel of internationalization of domestic caprtal; 5) the level of co~entra~tion and centralization of capital; 6) the relatio~S between the ~lg andsmall firm sectors; 7) the relations between capital an~ the state. 8) .thedominant ideological and cultural framework; 9} the micro-level capital-

289

Pi06maJ- ArM/( um samfelagsmal1989

labour relations; 10) the role of the welfare state; 11) the level of atfluency,social mobility and economic growth; and 12) the organizational strengthof interest groups and social forces.

3.1. The structural concHtionsaf restructuringi. The role of toreion iovestment.

The role of foreign investment in the japanese economy is relativelylow compared with the other two cases (see table 19 and Appendix 2). Interms of the number of persons employed in the manufacturing sector ofthe host country by foreign owned firms, the share as percentage is 1.B%(1978)fnJapanwhileij is 13.5%(1978) in UK and 5.7% (1976)inSweden.As a consequence the economic and political power of domestic capitalis greater in terms of influencing the formation of accumulation anddevelopmental strategies. This is important in terms of the determinationof the role of the state vis-a-vis capital accumulation in Japan and theactive collaboration between capital and the state as we will touch uponbelow.ii. Financial dependency and the relatioos between ioduSlda! and fioan:cial caprtal

Financial dependency of domestic capital vis-a-vis foreign financialcapital is lower in Japan than the other two countries, so that thecollaborationbe!weendomeslic financial and industrial capital tends to becloser which further strengthens the active collaboration between capitaland the state in Japan. As table 20 shows, the Swedish and Japaneseeconomies are less dependent on foreign financial capital than the British.In terms of liabilities, which is the best indicator here, Sweden has thelowest ratio of liabilities as a percentage of GOP, 5.2'% while Japan has5.9'%. The UK ratio is 71.3% which reflects the role of the City as aninternational financial market, but that postmen changes the nature of theBritish financial market compared to the financial markets in the othercountries, as the British market will tend to speculate more in short termfinancial market profitiability rather than long term industrial profitability.Table 20 approaches even closer the position of industrial capital vis-a-vis international financial capital. Here we compare the ratio of cross-border bank credit to non-banks by residence of borrower to gross fixedcapital formation in the non-financial corporate and quasi-corporateenterprises sector, Lethe former as a percentage of the latter. In 1986 thisratio was 7.5% in Japan, while in Uk it was 58.2<'10 and in Sweden the ratiowas even bigger 59,8%. Table 21 shows interest rates in these countriesas well. It is interesting to note that the more non-bank capital depends on

290

II~!

il

Pj66mal •.Arb6k um samfelagsrmil1989

Table19.IndicesoftheShareof Foreigrrowned Finns in the ManufacturingSectoraf Japan, Sweden and UK.

Foraiqn-Ownad firms as a percentage of total manufacturing.Firms which are more than 50% foreign-owned

No. of Investm. inpersons Pro- value Wages and . gross cap.amp!. duction added salaries Profits form. Assets

Hostcountry Year % % % o/c, % '% %

Japan 1972 1.9 3.8 6.0 4.21973 2.0 3.8 4.2 4.11975 1.8 5.11978 1.6 4.2 6.9 4.2

Sweden 1974 4.8 5.2 5.0 5.2 3.2 4.51975 5.7 6.81976 5.7 7.3 6.5 6.3 6.5 3.0 5.519n 6.5 6.1 8.5 4.2 4.3

UK 1971 10.3 14.2 13.3 11.8 16.21973 10.8 15.3 14.7 12.5 15.81975 12.4 '6.7 '6.4 17.91977 13.9 21.2 22.51978 13.5

Source:J.M. StoptordlJ.H. Dunning: Multinationals; Company Performanceand Global Trends; Macmillan Publishers; London 1983. (labia 2.2).

291

Pj6(jmal- ArM/( um samtelagsmal1989

intemational financial capital markets, the higher are the interest rates.Furthermore, the relationship between industrial and financial capital isunusually close compared with the other industrialized countries. AS J. N.Behrman highlights:

"Thirteen City banks together are large enough to extend one-quarterof all loans and discounts made by financial institutions (both publicand private) in Japan. They are principaJly tied to large corporations(keiretsu). Each keiretsu has a principal bank on which it relies forfundi~ advice on investment and operating positions. This principalbank IS not the only source of funding, but it is the one to which the~mpany turns in time of expansion or need. This relationship is soImportant that one keiretsu, which refused to adopt such a closerelationship. lost significant market position when it got into diHicuhiesand could not secure adequate financing ... Traditionally, the keiretsuhave relied on loans rather than equity, Fncreasing the ties to Ihe~anks: today this pattern is shifting somewhat, with increasing self-ftnancing by the companies." (J.N. Behrman, 89).The close relationship between industrial and financial capital in

Japan and increasing self-financing is an important factor in explainingIhe low level of external financial dependency of Japanese capital, andlayes the gorunds for more long term planning in investment and produc-tion, which is one of the main characteristics of the Japanese economycompared with other industrialized caphaJisteconomies.

Table 20.External financial depende nceof capitalExternal positions of aUreporting banks vis-a-vis individualcountriasin June 1986according to the Bank of International Settlements.

Assets as liabillties as total as %Assets % 01GOP Liabilities % 01 GDP total GDp· of GOP

Japan 210.711 10.8Sweden 21.572 16.5UK 311.647 56.9

114.7886.783

391.166

5.95.2

71.3

325.49928.355702.813

1,956131548

16.6421.65

130.08

• Billion of dollarsSources: DECO: External Depbt; Definition, Statistical Coverage and Methodo/~ogy; table 4 a page 56; Paris 1988;Central Bank of Iceland: Hagt(J/ur ManatJarins; Reykjavik 1988.

292

Pj60maJ- Arb6k um samtelagsmal1989

Table21.External financial dependenceoft he non-bank sectorcress- border bank credit to non -banks by residence of bo rrower as apercentageof gross fixed capital formation of the non-tinanclal corporate and quasi-corporateenterprises' sector 1986.

A'cross- border bank

credit to non-banks byresidence of borrower

82 C [).l PGross fixed capital A as % Lending Gov.-formation of the non- of 8 rate mantfinancial corporate and 1986 bondquasi-corporate sector yield

1986---~----------------~-----------------------------JapanSwedenUK

16.2910.1624.36

307.34216.98141.854

5.3 5.91 4.9459.8 14.18 10.2658.2 10.83 10.01

1 Billions 01 USS; Source: IMF: tntemeuoae; Financial Sietistics; Yearbook 1988.zBillions 01 USS:; Source: OEeD: National Accounts 1974-1986; Pans 1988. Theoriginal figures are in the currency of the respective countries and the Swedishand Japanese figures have been changed into US dollar according 10 ths averaqscurreencyunits perUSSofdailyfigures in 1986 as calculated by OECD: EconomicSurveys 1986/87. The Japanese ligures are based on the J986 June rate at theyen per US$ according to the same source. The respective rates ar: SKrper US$= 7.1236: The pound per USS == 0.6822; The yen per USS ~ 167~8261.J Lendinq rate == interest rates of short and medium term financing; Governmentbond yields == yields to to maturrty ot government bonds or other bonds that wouldindicate longertarm rates, Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics; Yeer-book 1988.

iii The level of internationaljzalion of domestic capital.The UK regime of capital accumulation is characterized by

muchgreater internatinalization of capital than the Swedish and particu-larly Japanese regime of capital accumulation. The rateol direct outwardinvestment flows as a percentage of gross domestic fixed capital fonna-Hen was in Japan in the average in 1960~62 0.5%. In this period the ratewas 1.1% in Sweden and 5.0% in UK. The 1969-71 average figure forJapan had decreased to 0.4% while the Swedish figure had increased to2.9% and the British one to 6.2%.1978-80 the British figure had increasedto 7.6% while the Swedish one had decreased to 1.4% and the Japanesefigure to 0.8%. The British outward investment flow peaked in 1972-4, 9%,

293

Pj6lJmal·.4rbOk urn samMlagsmaf 1989 Pj66miH- Arb6k urn samtelagsmal1989

~hile the Swedish outflow of capital peaked in 1975-7, 3.6% and theJapanese in1972-4, 1.1% (J.M. SropfordlJ.H. Dunning table 1 6 page11). ' . ,

It goes for atl of the three countries that the trend towards increasedi~te~ationaliz~tion slowed down in the late 1970s, but there is a qualita-t!ve dinerence In tem;s of the role of investment abroad, as the Japanesef~gures are subst~ntlaJly lower than the British and even the Swedish!,gures a~ well. ThIs ~eans that Japanese capital is more willing to lnvestat home, a ~actthat IS to be explained by the particular Japanese system

of ~lIaborahon be~ween the state and financial and industrial capital informmg long term Investment and innovation policies (see J. Zysman,J.N. Behrman and C. Freeman 1987). There may have been a slightch~nge in the rela~jve fig~re~ in recent years, because of the high yenpolicy th~t the leading capitalist countries have pressed on Japan, but wehave no figures as yet concerning this matter and the difference betweenJapan and the countries is so striking that recent trends towards in-creased outflow of capital are not to be expected to change the picture inany fundamental way. .

Another way of analysing the level of internationalization of capitalwou~ be to com~ar~ the n~mber of multlnational companies among lhe500 bIggest multrnatlonals In a particular year. In 1981 USA counted for242 MNCs, while UK had 67 of the biggest MNCs. The population of UKwas 56 618 000 in 1985 while the Japanese population was120 235 000in 1984,. acc:ording to OECo: Economic Surveys). A~hough the Japanesepopula!lon IS more than two times the British one, Japan had only 62MNCs rn 1981. Sweden with the population of 8358 000 in 1985 had 16MNCs amonq the top 500 (J.M. Stopford/J.H. Dunning, table 4.2, page52). ~. If we ~ompare MNCs per million inhabitants in the respectivecountnes. we frnd that the ratio for Sweden is 1.91, while the UK figure is1.18 and the Japanese one is 0.52. Again we find that the level ofinternationalization of the Japanese capital is far lower than in the othertwo ~ntries. But, with reference to the statistics on outllowof capital,?wedlsh MNCs are likely to be bigger than UK MNCs .•IV, The leyel of cQocentratioo and centralization of capttal,

The level of concentration and centralization in the three countries isgreat. although British capital was later than the other two economies tobecome as centralized through mergers. But, centralization in terms ofthe close a~ multiple ties between industrial and flancial capital that hasde.va.loped rn Sweden and particularly in Japan, has not developed inBritain. .

It was not untilthe inter-war years that centralization of capital and thegrowth of the modem form of ~rganizatio,n ~ firms with function~ny-departmentalized and 'managenal.enterpnse structure~ (Characterize?by scattered stock ownership and salaried managers In the top POSI-tions).53 This was the period when Britain saw the greatexpansl~n of her'new industries', especially chemicals, but also electro-techmcal andengineering and vehicle production (8. Lash/J. Urry, 46and 5~):Th~ y~ar1918~ 19 witn essed a su rge of bank merge rs from which the British big fiveclearing banks emerged (ibid., 51 ). As a conseq~nece bot~ i~ustrial andfinancial capital developed fast towards increasmg centralization ..But. ~swe mentioned above, there has never developed a. close relationshipbetween financial and industrial capital in UK, to the same extent as InSweden and Japan.; the City in London is chara~erized by. much mO.reemphasis on short term rather than long ter~ lending strategies due to Itscommercial nature, or as G. Ingham puts It:

"London's role in the worid system may be seen as the specializationand near monopolization 01the commercial activities which are .basedon the existence of international economic exchanges ...The City hasnot simply dealt with Britain's exchanges with other states, but ha:performed a wide range of fiunctions for the world system as a whole(citation in S, Las~/J. Urry, 48).

These services include the financing 01 trade, the insurance of com-modities, transport and trade agreements, and dealing in foreign ex·change (ibid., 49). , .

There was a close relationship between Industrial, merchant andfinancial capital in Sweden already from very early o~ (lbid., 30.-1). I.ntherestructuring of industrial capital in the inter-v.:ar penod, Swedish, finan-cial capital played crucial role. The restructunng led to a steep Increasein the concentration of industrial capital, which by some accunts led to thehighest level of concentration of any western cou.nt~ by the end of th.e19505. The concentration and increased centralization took pl.ace viatakeover of sizable numbers of industrial firms by the banks (lbrd:,34).The Stockholm's Enskilda Banken (the 'House of walle~berg) hadsystematic intentions regarding industrial takeovers, and with success.After the 1932 crash of Ivan Kreuger's indu strial empire, the Wal.lenbe~gsreorganized and controlled major parts of Swedis~ industry IncludmgASEA (almost from the company's origin), L.M. Encsson, SKF, St.oreKoppaberg and what was to be Electrolux. Other banks were forced lnto

295294

Pj66mal- ArbOk urn sarntelagsmal1989

such aquisitions (ibid., 35). The centralization of capital in Sweden ischaracteristicly cemented by powerful families. As J. Scott puts it:

"In Sweden, fifteen families and two corporations have majority own-ership in 20 large industrial companies employing almost half of thoseemployed in private industry. The Wallenberg family controlled sev-enty companies, including Electrolux, Scania. Saab. Swedish Match,Alta-Laval and SKF, employing 20 percent of private empoyees ... Anofficial investigation for 1963~4 discovered that the twenty largestshareholders in each of the top 282 companies held between 41 and86 per cent of the stock. The study concluded that the degree ofconcentration was so high that 'In no company quoted on the stockexchange were more than ten shareholders required to obtain themajority of votes' (J. Scott, 71-2).

Indeed. in 1963 seventeen family groups of owners had majority.dominant, or strong minority interests in companies which accounted for36 per cent of manufacturing industry. The Wallenberg family alonecontrolled 15% (ibid., 120-1).

Centralization and concentration of Japanese industrial and fianancialcapital was high even earlier on in Ihe industrialization phase 01 theJapanese economy. Here. as in Sweden family groups are important inthe centralization of capital. Predominant in the first decades of thiscentury were the four zaibatsus Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitorno andYasuda. In the 1920s and 1930s the controlling families moved away fromprivate and majority ownership to minority control and so were able todraw on outside capital wit hout giving up cant rof. Compan ies of a combineor zaibatsu were operated colJectiviely tor the advantage of the topholding company (ibid .• 92). Furthermore:

"The holding company was invariably a ba nk, and the companies com-prisingthecombine were linked through ownership, interlocking direc-torship, intra-combine credit relations and centralized tradingrelations ...ln 1946 the big tour accounted for 25 per cent of capital injapanese companies, with further 16 per cent og industrial capital bythe next six largest groups. Today thirteen largest combines accountfor 75 per cent of the sales of the top 170 firms" (ibid., 92).

The US attempted to break up the zaibatsus in the years following theSecond World War, but all four major groups and many of the smaller ones

296

Pj6lJma/. Arbok urn samteJagsmaJ 1989

remain important today. The degree of coordination within the combinesis far less, however, and the old family holdings are often matched by theholdings of outsiders. But, the banks remain the foci of the groups thoughthey are not dominated by particular families and their relationships toother financial and industrial companies within the combines are neitherso close nor so exclusive as in the past. As a consequence, instead ofzaibatus combines take the form of keiretsus. i.e. groups with multiple tiesand a low degree of internal coordination (ibid., 92-3).

Concentration of capital increased severly in the post war boom era inUK. In 1949-the larcest t 00 companies' shareoftotal net output was22%.In 1978 ~ was 39% C. FreemanlJ. Clarke/l, Soete, 137). The level 01concentration of Japanese capital is high as well. The share of manufac-turing output by top 100 Japanese companies was 22% in 1960 and hadincreased to 30% by 1970 (P. Armstrong/A. Glyn/J. Harrison, 217). Eversince the restructuring of capital in the 1930s and particularly since theearly post-war boom era, the tevet of comcentration of capital in Swedenis even more striking than in.the Japanese case as we have highlightedabove.v, The relations between the bio and small firm sectQrs,

The relations between big and small firms are not only important for bigfirms in terms of flexibility in production and marketing. but as a source ofhigher level of exploitation and surplus value. The accumulation strate-gies of Japanese big business is not only characterized by the minorityholding of shares in companies and the close, rnuhiple ties that havedeveloped parallel with it, but also by the management strategy releredto as '[ust-in-tirne management' (R. Kaplinsky , 983). Following thisaccumulation strategy, the Japanese industry is divided on the one sideinto the big firm sector characterized by long term job security for labour,and on the other side, large part of industry is made up of sub-contracting'marginal firms' in wich the workers are not treated quite as well (J.Cornwall, 266). Half of the entire manufacturing output in Japan is madeby small subcontractors for large enterprises, i.e. companies with morethan 300 employees. Something like 70% of the output of these smallfirms goes to the large enterprises (C. Handy, 90). The Japanese Garmaker provides a typical example of the huge triangle of small firms withthe large enterprises on the top, according to one study, On average, itstates, the Japanese car maker has 36000 sub-contractors, of which allbut a thousand are small enterprises (ibid., 90).

This Japanese model is seen by some big firms in UK and Sweden asan ideal for future organization of capital accumulation, but as we have

297

Pj6l}mal- Arbdk um samtelagsmal1989

seen above. the trend towards 'flexible firm' and 'flexible specialization' isgreatly exaggerated in the European ecoonomies. There is a greatdifference between these countries and Japan in this respect. As table 24shows below, small firms with 99 employees or less stand for 47.1% ofemployment in the manufacturing sector in Japan, while the figure forSweden is 26% and 20.3% for UK.vi. The relations between capital and the state.

The role of the public sector in Japan, Sweden and Britain is verydiHerent. The welfare state of labour in terms of social expenditure. ismost developed in Sweden and least in japan. Although the public sector,as a percentage 6f GOP, is largest in Sweden54, it does not follow that therelative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis capital is that much greater. Toanalyse state-power we will have to analyse the qualitative nature of therelations between the state and capital or firms. The power of statebureaucracy vis-a-vis the financial system and its influence on investmentis crucial in this context. i.e. as a means 01 realizing developmentalstrategies.

The role of the state in Japan in the post-war era in the fortmation ofaccumlation strategies, has been fundamentallydiHerent from the role ofthe state in Sweden and UK in two respects: On the one Side the state andgovernments have influenCed the structure of the financial system inJapan in such a way, that governments have been able to influencesectoral investment in accordance with their long term growth policies. Onthe other side it has played active and determining role in the formationand direction of innovation policies of industrial capital. In short it has beenableto play an active and determining role in the development of sectoralinvestment and innovation in Japan. Let's analyse the matter briefly.

These are the main features of the Japanese financial system: firstlyit is a credit based system; secondfy it is primarily structured to financeindustry; thirdly prices in crucial markets are determined by governmentand; fourthly the central bank is not independent. but follows the policy ofthe Ministry of finance. (J. Zysman, 245 and 249). The securines marketsin Japan do not and have not traditionally played a significant role inraising funds for industry. Indeed. stock issues represented only 3.8% of .company funds in 1968. The stock market is not a means of raising newfunds for industry from the household sector, it is characterized bycompany interlocking stocks, i.e. company stocks are increasingly heldby oth er banks and other co mpanies. Furthermore, as governments keepinterest rates low by fixing rates on new issues at levels below thoseprevailing on the secondary market a nd by preempting for itself, the bond

298

tII

tftt

I!

PjOdmal M ArbOk um samMlagsmal1989

market does not work as an important source for flew funds. But ase~tensjve bank financing of corporate financing is available so. compa-rues and governments do not have to worry (ibid., 245)

As bank credit is the main source of new funds, companies aredependent on the banks because of high levels of debt. Indeed, thepercentage of owner equity to total capital decreased in manufacturingfrom 31.4% in 1950 to 19.9% in 1970 and it goes forall industries that thisratio decreased from 26.9%. in 1950 to 16. t% in 1970 (ibid., 246). But itis the industry that has been the main user 01 bank funds as the marketis neither squeezed by government public debt, which is low, nor by highhousing investment. As J. Zysman highlights, the industry orientation ofthe banks is clear and can be seen from the tact that in 1973 USAcorporations held 32%, of loans to nonfinancial borrowers, whereas inJapan the figure was 73% (ibid., 246). The major supplier of the bankfunds has been the household sector.

The Japanese financial system is a bank-oriented, credit-basedsystem of corporate finance in which the government exerts detailedcontrols over prices in a multitude of markets. The government alsoinfluences interest rates indirectly as it encourages flow of funds throughinstitutions that can be controlled or whose lending habits can bepreidicted. As J. Zysman puts it

"The control of interest rates is crucial to the strategy of selectiveallocation and gives the government influence over the economy'sfinancial flows. The market is kept in disequilibrium, which means thatprices do not clear the market. Controlled prices and selective inter-vention in industry go hand in hand." (ibid .• 24&7).

Governments, consequently, rely on administrative control more thanmarket forces and control allocation of funds while keeping funds flowingthrough institutions that can be controlled or that, like mutual banks andcredit associations and cooperatives, will channel it to a known group ofborrowers (ibid., 247). With its control of the financial markets the state iscapable of directing the flow of funds and investment into 'key' industrieswith high growth rates. Let's analyse briefly the structure of the state'soverdetermination of the close relationship between financial and indus-trial capital. ~

Firstly, Japanese banks do not expand their lending that exceedes themultiple of deposits and equity capital by borrowing on money markets.Insteadlhey borrow from the central bank to increase liquidity. Secondly.

299

Pj6(jmal- Arb6k umsamtelagsmaJ 1989

as ~ndust~al financing is based on bank lending and alternative marketsfor industrial funds ~re underdevelo~ed, the companies can only go to thebanks for fu nds. Thirdly, the level of Interest rates is deliberately kept lowto reduce the costs of manufacturing exports and stimulating investmentP~es .in all but the very short-term money markets are artificiallymantained bygovemme:rt. "The i.nte~estrate policy leads to overor heavydemand for fu~s an? this snuation rncreases the strategic power of thegovernment, as it ?efrnes the orderin which the demand is met. Fourthly,the government mfluences the rationing of the banks vis-a-vis thecompanies, by its control of the funds of the central bank that the banksborrow as the central bank follows the policies of the Ministry of FinanceAs J. Zysman puts it .

"since part of the bank's funding must come from the central bank the~anks th~~selves are in an implicit waiting line ...Money is ...allocatedIn a ~peclflC amount to a specific bank chosen by the central bank [au-thorities] from amongs! those wishing to obtain high-poweredmoney ... ln Japan the ratronal banker must wish to follow the lead ofthe centr~1 bank. The govemments industrial priorities of growth andexports will be met. The banks entangled with selected sectors will beconstrained by their ability to fund their loans, though banks in othersectors 01 the economy will be." (ibid., 248).

. The mechanism of the Japanaese financial system has been summa-nzed by H. Ueno as follows:

us roadly speaking, the total supply of funds in Japan was cant rolled bythe Bank of Japan, the level and structure of interest rates wereartificially regulated by the Ministry of Finance, and private funds wereallocated ', under the guidance of public financial institutions, by citybanks wblcn competed for market shares. In this process, the Bankof Japan followed the guidelines of the Economic Planning Agencyand the M ITI and determ~ned th~ total amount of funds so as to satisfyt~e deman~s = growth industries. At the same time. the Ministry ofFinance maintained the low interest policy inasmuch as the policy didnot lead to large deficits in the balance of payments or to sharp pricerises," (quoted in J. Zysman, 250).

Besides the inffuence of the state over the financial system theJapanese state has significant influence on the development and direc-

300

Pj6l'Jmaf· ArMk urn samtelagsmal1989

tion of industrial innovation in Japan. The state has had strong initiativein promoting coordinated technology policy in Japan for a very long time.The main characteristics of such a policy were evident already before theFirst World War, i.e. a policy that aimed at stimulating the growth ofmanufacturing industry (C. Freeman 1987, 32). The main featuresincluded: "a strong impetus from central governmentto promote moderni-zation of the Japanese economy; identification of education and trainingas key factors in this modernisation; intense efforts to import andwhenever possible to improve upon the best available technology in theworld; and close co-operation between government and large industrialconcerns" (ibid., 32), The strong power position or relative autonomy ofthe state vis-a-vis the financial system after the Second World War hasstrenglhened the power position of the state in directing the accumulationstrategies of the big enterprises into 'voluntary' collaboration betweencapital and the state in forming long-term developmental strategies forcapital and supporting 'externalities' (or 'social capital') forthe intensifica-tion of capital accumulation (25-year, constantly revised developmentalplans based on visions 01future growth sectors and declining sectors andmeasures 10 promote the reallocation of investment from the latter to thefanner sectors (J.N. Behrman and K. Fukushima)). The strong powerposition of state bureaucracy vis-a-vis capital. i.e. strong compared withthe power position of the state in the British and Swedish context, hasgenerated a dynamic relationship between the slate bureaucrats andtechnocrats and the enterprises. State technocrats enthusiastic in theirrole of promoting the adoption of advanced technology, have developedclose, formal and informal relationships with university scientists andtechnologists as well as with the enterprises. As a consequence theybecame exceptionnalu well informed about broad trend of new develop-ments and were well-placed to form an overall view or 'vision' of what wasrequired. Continous consultations formal and informal wilhthe Japanesescientific and technological community was gradually systematised andis one 01the fundam ental factors in the success althe M ITI in restructuringthe Japanaese Economy (C. Freeman 1987,36).

The MITI (Ministry of Intemational Trade and Industry) played a crucialrole in establishing a 'structutalist' developmental vision on the govern-mental level. In the immediate post-war period the Bank of Japanpersisted on the free-trade doctrines of the classical school and advo-cated developmental policies based on 'comparative advantage' and a'natural' path to growth. But on the whole the bureaucrats and theiradvisors at MITlprevailed.lt was MIT! that gave the line forthe strategies

301

Pj6l'Jmal. Arbdk um sam te/agsmaJ 1989

?f the e~terprises concerning investment and intensification of industrialmnovanon,

~here have been four main stages in the post war policies of MITI: Inthe first one, t~e reconstruction period 1945-59, the influence of M ITI wasthrough physica! controls and allocations giving priority to key industriessuch a~ energy, steel and chemicals. and to the import and developmentof fOrd~st n:ass and tlow pr?ductfon technology; In the second period ofconsolrdat~on 1960-9, physical shortages and capital constraints were nolonger senous problems and a policy of active trade liberalisation waspursued. Jn~te~d of using direct means, long-term strategic goals werepursu~ by I~dlrect means such as fiscal and financial incentives. In 1963a Iordist policy was developed and consistently followed thereafterbased ~n the one side on the 'income elasticity criterion' focusing on th~reculation of,dema~d and on the other side on the 'productivity increaserate cnte~on .Iocusinq on supply and productivity. In the third period, thatof consoh~atron 1970.-9 MITI clearly recognized that the days of fordistaccun:ul?IJOn strateoies were doomed and that enerqy-intensivs andmaterial mtensive growth, based on heavy investment in mass and flowproduct!D.n techniques, was reaching its limits. In the MITI's pre-oil crisis: 971 '~Islon of MITI Policies in the 19705' a shift to knowledge intensiveInd~stnal structure was proposed; in the fourth period since 1980 thepolicy of knowledge intensive developmental strategies took clearers~ape and M ITI promoted a whole ra nge of measu res directly concerned~tth the development of the computer industry, the telecommunicationIndustry and the semiconductor industry (ibid., 37-8).. In the con!ext.of thecJose ~lIaboratjon between the state and capitalI~ the. coordination ~f alloc~tron of funds for investment through thefmarclal system and. mnovanon promoting policies of governments andstate bureau~racy with the resulting socialization of risks, an innovativeenlre~reneun~1 culture developed, out of which developed a mangamentp~rad.Jgm that IS fund~n:entally di.Herent from the dominant fordist para-dIgm In the other capitahs.t countnes. The experience of the attempts inthe 1950.5 to develop the Industry without foreign investment or transferof.bJuepnnts for product ~nd process design, was important in gernerating!hlS manageme nt P?radrgm. Here the experienceof 'reverse engi neerinq'In J.ap.an.was c~U1al a~ Japanese industry developed the practice ofaSSImilating aD~ ImprovIOa imported technology. C. Freeman (1987,40-43) has summanzed the resutts ofthis 'reverse engineering' for Japanesemanagemer:t paradigm (unfort~n~t~ly C. Freeman does not take clearlyenough the Impact of the pecuhantres of the Japanese financial system

302

Pj66mal- ArMk um samfelagsmal1989

and the socialization of risk in Japan). Firstly. Japanese management,engineers and workers grew accustomed to thinking 01the entire produc-tion process as a system and of thinking in an integrated way aboutproduct design and process design. Ahhough Japanese firms made feworiginal radical product innovations, they did make many incrementalinnovations and redesigned production processes wich mproved pro-ductivity as well as quality. Secondly - following the soclajzation of risk-they grew accustomed to risk taking way of thinking and to the idea of'using the factory as a laboratory', There was 'a close collaborationbetween research and development departments and production engi-neers and those in process control in research and development.

"The whole enterprise was involved in a learning and developmentprocess and many ideas for improving the system came lromthe shopfloor. The horizontal flow. of information became a characteristicfeature of the Japanese style of rnanaqernent.i.jand] the integrativeeffect of learning by creative reverse engineering conferred a majorcompetitive advantage 011 many Japanese firms," (ibid., 42).

Thirdly, 'reverse engineering' required close collaboration betweenthe firms and sub-contractors providing diHerent parts of the whole pro-duction process of the diHerent products. The prolonged learning processdid much to facilitate the high degree of co-optation with subcontractorswhich emerges for example in the 'just- in-time' system: fourthly, 'Reverseengineering' fostered as well great emphasis on quality .11was not only Iheincreased information flow within enterprises and between enterprisesthat generated improvements in quality, but there was deliberate andintense pressure from MITI to restructure enitre industries for suchimprovements.

But MITl did not only undertake measures to restructure capital onsectoral level and restucture industries for quality purposes. Japanesestate interventionism, i.e. as a welfare state of capitaVfirms, was alsodeveloped regionally. This regional state intervention is important con-cerning the development of the close and dynamic relationship betweenbig firms and small sub-contractors. As C. Freeman puts it:

"Regional policies have consistently sought to strengthen technologi-cal capability throughout the country, particularly in small and me-dlurn-sized firms. There are nearly 200 'prefecture laboratories' (i.e,

. an average of four in each prefecture) which offer reseaech and

303

Pj6l'Jrna/·Arb6k urn samtelagsmaJ 1989

technical advisory services, varying with the structure and needs oflocal industry" (ibid., 36).

The role of the state in UK and Sweden are very different from what wefind in Japan, indeed different in different ways. The British case is thoughfurther from the Japanese one than the Swedish case. The British stateis weak vis-a-vis realizing structuralist policies. It can neiher lean on theproper institutional framework to direct investment into growth industriesnor on power over the financial system.

The structure of the British financial system (J. Zysman, 189-201) isvery diff.erent .fr~m the Japanese one. The Bank of England, althoughnationalized, IS Independent from government policies and its role islimited to the execution of aggregate monetary policy, i.e. to the controlof j~~eresls and supply of money. The British financial system hastradItIonally served two gods. that of the international money market andof domestic financing, indeed the earnings of the City of London'sfinancial dealings are a significant contribution to the balance of pay-ments, and maintaining the financial community as a service export is alegitimate and important concern of the government. Furthermore

"there is a clear institutional bent toward the international and away. from the domestic. Until recently the Bank of England had no industry

policy group 10 consider the problems and needs of industry and to'acrnmister policies explicitly aimed at satisfying those needs." (ibid., .200).

The structure of the British financial system is geared towards shortterm lending ratherthan long term and, as aconsequence, it is disinclinedto industry in other ways as well. Roughly the British financial system iscomposed of saving insitutions, such as insurance company pensionfunds as well as investment companies and individuals that buy securi-ties. Merchant banks arrange the offerings and commercial banks lendthe money for short-term needs. The securities markets and investinginstitutions are the center piece of the British financial system. And these

.markets are structures in a way that does not generate inter-sector andcoordinated long term investment policies such as the Japanese have.The British financial system is a complex and competitive market in whichlarge numbers of investors and savers meet in the marketplace, where nosmall group of institutions can dominate. It is based on multiplic~y andspecialization of the financial intennediaries. Furthermore:

304

Pj60maf- Arb6k urn samtelagsmaf 1989

"Several of the markets, particularly the retail banking market, are ineffect oligopolies. Yet in Britain power in one financial market, such asbank lending, does not translate into power in other markets, such asthe security or money markets. The result is that businesses seekingfunds do not face a single set of capital suppliers who can exert powerin their affairs." (ibid.• 190).

A~hough the role of individuals in securities markets has decreased inrecent decades, it has not led to decreased compartmentalisation of thefinancial system. The markets are increasingly dominated by pensionfunds, insurance companies and unit trusts. Between 1963 and 1980 theportion at securities held by individuals dropped from 54 to 37 percent andby the year 2000 institutions are expected to expand their holdings tobetween 70 and 85 percent at the value of United Kingtom equities (ibid.,190-1). .

The relative importance of the securties markets can be seen bycomparing the securities markets in UK and France. In 1975 bondsfigured 43% of GOP and equities 41%, in Britain, while in that same yearthe figures for France where 16% and 11% respectively (ibid., 191). Butthe importance of investing institutions in financing in UK leads to aqulitative difference in the structure of the financial system and the wayit works. As can be seen from table 22, the share of investing institutionsin liabilities and claims with Ihe non-financial sector (in 1975) is doublethat in Japan and exceeds the USA ligure.

Table 22.Share of investing institutions in liabiHtiesand claims withthenon-financial sector, end 1975 (%).

Country liabilities Calims

GermanyFranceItalyJapanUnited StatesUnited Kingdom

20.011.3

6.916.032.339.5

13.09.32.6

15.031.2·24.4

Source: J. Zysman, 192.

The compartmentalization and low degree of mutual, inter-sectoral

305

PiMrnal-ArbOk urn samtelagsmal1989

holdings in the industrial and financial sectors which characterizes theBritish economy, leads to a bias towards short-term lending rather tahnlong term and 'arms length relations' between industrial and financialcapit~l, i.e. financial capital does not actively and directly influence long~erm ln~est~ent of industry. This bias has structural impact on industrialInnovation In UK as innovative small and medium sized firms havepro?I~~s in financing long term research and development and hencetlexibility and the rate of restructuring tends to be low. The situation forfirms becomes even more acute in times of crises when restructuring~~uires medium and long term loans more than ever. As J. Zysman puts

"The B~tish banks ... have not made any attempt to raise long-termmoney In the bond market, as a strategy of medium-term industrialfinance would require. Larger British companies themselves havedirect access to the bond market for long-term debt finance. Smallerfirms are generally agreed 10 lack reliable sources of medium-termcapital and plausibly could benefit from innovative financing arrange-~ents. Comparative ~tudies show that German banks borrow moneyIn the bond rnarketwhich they then lend locompanies, and that Frenchbanks I~nd on to industry on the basis of short-term deposits. Thereason IS not that German and French bankers are srnar ter and betterrisk-takers than British bankers, but that the structure of the financialsystem constraints banks diHerently in each of the three countries."(ibid., 193).

The problem British firms have in borrowing for long-term investment~an be seen from the national ratio of internal funding and equity to fixedInvestment. British companies finance expansion from savings and thesale of equity, not from credit. In fact, German,Japanese, and Frenchfirms invest more than they save from potits and get the rest of their fundsfrom borrowing (ibid .• 193). •. . In short, the British !inancial system is structured in such a way that itIS Incapable of allocatmg funds for long term investment in a way thatwould coordinate the financing of investments that would optimize long-term competitiveness of industry. Furthermore. the British state doesneither have the grips on the financial system nor the govemmentalinstitutions to fill this gap in the British regime of capital accumulation. TheBritish government does not control channels of borrowing and lendingwhich would facilitate the selective manipulation of credit allocation by the

.,nA

Pj~mal- ArbOk um samtelagsmal1989

political executives. Institutions such as parapublic banking insfflutionssimply do not exist in UK. As J. Zysman highlights:

"The public sector collects a very small percentage of the nationalsavings; the recently established postal savings system, tor example,represents less than one-tenth of 1 percent of national savings. Moreimportant, such institutions are rivals to the highly developed privatebanking system. Indeed, such institutions as Finance Corporation forIndustry, Industrial and Commercial Finance Company, and EquityCapitat for Industry were established as the Bank of Englandsresponse to outside pressure and were intended to preclude moreextensive government intervention ... These financial institutions ...are in fact collectively owned by the private financial institutions andthe Bank of England. The National Loans Board, which administerslending to nationalized companies, is an administrative rather thandecision-making body, ~(ibid., 197).

So, when the government. lqcking the means to manipulate the financialmarkets to any extent, intervenes in these markets, it generally does sothrough reserve requirements or open market operations, both of whichpreserve the market characterof the system. Hence, it affects the volumeof bank lending either by imposing requirements on reserves the banksmust hold or by buying or selling government issues in the market. Thesesales increase or decrease the liquidity of the system. The central bankannounces the direction it expects interest rates to move and in anticipat-ing other financial institutions act on those announcements (ibid., 198).

Governments have no governmental bodies that can be used torealize selective policies at substantial investment in chosen sectors.Regional planning institutes, such as the Regional Economic PlanningCouncils, have only limited sphere and the National Enterprise Board,which the previous Labour government established to invest in a widerange of enterprises inthe private sectorto introduce a public involvementand to stimulate expansion, has been curtailed by the present govern-ment of Margareth Thatcher. The govemment has limited its role tofacilitating the transfer of technology from the universities to commercialenterprises and charged it with disinvestment of all its company shares(Ezra, 50).

But, the BrITish state does not only lack the institutional means torealize and develope coordinated investment policies. It lacks as weJltheright mentality of its bureaucrats, i.e. mentality that would foster collabo-

307

Pj6lJma/R ArbOk um samMlagsm:il1989

ration and personal links between the state and industry. The problemstems from what may be called the 'Oxbridge disease'. Interventionistpolicies run against the training and tradition of the bureaucracy; indeed,an almost instinctive resistance to the selective use of state power seemsbuilt into the norms of British civil service (J. Zysman, 202). JohnArmstrong argues that the anti-interventionist attitude is a product of theOxbridge generallst training. As he puts it:

"Once an administrative elite socialized in accordance with the Oxbr-idge prescription was firmly established, the administrators them-selves aquired an interest "inperpetuating the noninterventionist roledefinition. An interventionist position would have revealed the specificinadequacies of their training, disrupted their corporate solidarity, andreduced their status in a general elite. Each element of their adminis-trative set1ing{rural nostalgia, oral examinations, etc.) is defendedbecause it is part of the system which perpetuates these Interests. Atthe same time, rejection of the disturbing elements (e.g., an elitetechnical corps) prevents feedback which might aher tha system." (J.Armstrong: Economic Administrative Elite, quoted in J. Zysrnan, 202).

The result 01 the tack of institutions, links between the stale bureau-crats and Ihe right kind of training 01these bureaucrats, is that the Britishcivil service lacks the technical skills required to deal with the problem 01lone-term structural development of industry and the economy as awhole. As a consequence lacking the technical skills or a sources ofexpertise intemal to the bureaucracy, if and when the state has to takemajor decisions concerning industrial investment (such as recently con-cerning the North-Sea oil production), the civil service depends oninformation and views of the private firms. Policies are conducted in anarm's-length administrative fashion through the agencies of privatecompanies (J. Zysman, 203). Arid, as there does not exist any coordi-anted developmental strategy for the economy as a whole, the govern-ments have traditionally conducted the limited interventions they haveimplemented, on a case-by-case basis but without attempting to reorientthe economy (ibd., 204-5). The nature and function of the limited Britishinterventionism is there for very different1rom Japa nese interve ntionism.

The role otthe post war Swedish state can be put somewhere betweenthe the Japanese and British states, although ~s structuralist policieshave developed fast in the direction of the Japanese developmentalstrategies in the 19705 and particularly in the 19805. But this concerns

308

Pj66mal· ArbOk urn samtelagsmaJ 1989

only the measures to direct investment into high-technology Sectors bymeans of particular programs that the state bureaucracy, capital and tosome extent labour have developed; the Swedish state does not have astrong power postition vis-a-vis the financial system as we have seen inthe japanese case.

The central bank in Sweden, the Bank of Sweden, has in the post warera acted in accordance with general keyneseian, anti-cyclicaJ polciesand its sphere has been limited to the control of interest rates and supplyand liquidity of money. The central bank has not been used to controlinvestment via the banks and according to long-term developmentalplans as we learnt from the Japanese case above. Investment has beendirected by capital itself much more than the state. Like in Japan, butunlike the British case, the Swedish financial system is characterized bygreat centralization of financial capital and industrial capital through theholdings of the banks in industrial firms. This situation stems from thewaves of takeovers in the 1930s. Besides the banks, the pension fundsare also important in long-term investment in industry, as they haveinvested heavily in big firms Suchas e.g. Volvo. Indeed the share of Iong-term credit institutions in liabilhies and claims with non-financial sector isunusually high compared with other industrialized, capitalist countries."The share of such institutions will likely to increase even substantially inthe future. due to the Wage-Earners' Funds and Meidner plan accordingto which part of compensation of employees is accumulated in specialfunds thaI are used to buy shares in firms (S. Lash/J. Urry, 241). The LO(the Swedish TUG) originally in 1976 aimed to buy rnajonty of shares inat least target firms, but the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, has limitedthe buying ot shares in companies bought by the wage-earners' funds to8% og shares in individual companies and 5% of the total shares of thestock market (LO 1988). As a consequence the power position of thelabour movement vis-a-vis financial capital has only slightly improved andthe funds function more as extra funds of venture capital than powerresources.

Like the Japanese post-war pojticat regime the Swedish politicalregime has been very stable compared with other capitalist industrializedcountries (e.g. only 7 inidviduals have held the position of primeministerfro the last 50 years). The state bureaucracy is also Characterized by smallbut very eHieient governmental departments oriented towards the prepa-ration of legislative and political activities (OECD, 1987c, 68). Policyformation concerning social, technological and economic developmenthas been based on the principle of tripartite interest mediation or neo-

309

Pj6r>ma/~Arb6kumsamtefagsmaI1989

corporatism and sectorism, under the political hegemony of the SOP, thesocial-democratic party. Roughly, Swedish economic policy followedkeynesian anti-cyclical policies and aggregate demand control in thepost-war era until the early 19705. As a response to the deepeningeconomic crisis and the consequent crisis of keyenesianism, the empha-sis in economic policy turned to increased structuralist policies.56 Thestructuralist policies of the 1970s were characterized by 'defensivestructuralism' as governments attempted to rescue crisis ridden sectors.suchthe Ship-building sector and textile to save jobs and the regions. Theeconomic policies of the 19805 have been characterized by increasing'realist structuralism'. Subsidies for the ailing industries have been cutand the Swedish krona was devalued drasticly in the early 19805. But partof the "extra profits" that capital gained from the devaluation was freezedin 1984 in the form of "Renewat Funds" kept at the central bank andalkx::ated to firms for the purposes of training staH and research anddevelopment (these funds amounted to approxiamately 5000 to 8000million SKr in 1986 and their income stems from 10%, ot profits of firmswhose profits exceeded SKr 0.5 million. Allocation is decided on by tradeunions andthe Swedish Council of Industry (SIND)} (ibid.. 13 and 70; alsolvar Jonsson 1988, 24-31).

Structuralism was late to emerge in institutional forms in Swedencompared with Japan. It was not until 1967 that a special ministry ofindustry was established in Sweden and a special investment bankowned by the state was also established in that same year. Next year astate owned research and developmental company was established topromote R&D in firms, especially in the public sector. That same yeartheNational Board for Technical Development (STU} was eslablisehed tosupport technological R&D, foster collaboration between firms in techno-logical R&D and support industrial development. In 1977 the parliamentpassed a bill for the promotion of industrial innovation. especially inmanufacturing. The emphasis was on coordinated, long-term researchprojects. As an example the research project ~General Advancement ofKnowledgen was/is oriented towards industrial and social developmentand organized in the form of many at least five year sub-research anddevelopmental projects {in 1986-7 this project amounted to 43.1 %oftotalpublic R&D funding (OEeD, 1987c, 25).

In an Act from 1977 a network of regional development funds, intendedto assist small and medium-sized finns in dealing with all sorts ofproblems, management, financing and marketing. The loan grantingcapacity of the funds was extended in 1982, and a new type of financial

Pj66mal ~ArbOk urn samfelagsmaJ 1989

support was created in the form of venture cepit.a!. In 1973 the .govern-ment started to use tax policy as a means to motivate R& D, but it. turnedout to be ineHicient taxes as means of R&D policy was cancelled In 1982

(ibid., 12}.Rather than using indirect measures such as taxes the govemm~nt

has increasingly used direct measures to promote R&D coolaboranonbetween the state and capital. This has increasingly.take~ th~ !orm ofleding venture capital; establishing research centers In umversrtle~ thatfirms can collaborate with conceming R&D and consultancy; science .parks and; funding concrete R&D proj~s. In 1983 S~U suggested anational micro-electronics programme In order to raise the level ofcompetence within Swedish industry .. Special emphasis was put oncustom-designed circuits. At the same time ST~ an.d a num?er of otheragencies began to work on a more comprehen~l~e iniormauon technol-ogy programme, which more than Skr 1000 mdl~on are spe~t on alone(ibid., 13). In 1985 there were 79 centers and SCience parks In Swedenwhile there were only lew in 1980 (ibid., 46-7).

Besides developing the welfare-state ofcapital in thes~ direct forms,i.e. the institutional organization of the socialization of,capital ac~umula·tion, the educational system, particularly the university e~ucatlon, hasbeen restructured to be of better use for capital accumulation. In a 1975Riksdag (parliament) bill, all university undergraduate-courses were to belinked to research and research training on graduate level was ~ocomprise at least four years. In 1976 the five main research ,councilsunder the Ministry of Education were reduced to thre~ to In~reasecoordination (ibid., 14). A government bill in 1979 made it PO~slble .toruniversity lecturers to devote themselves to re.sea~c~ lor a cert~ln periodby financing their leave of absence from teac~Jng (ibid., .15), This openedthe possibilities for lecturers to work rTI?re directly f~r .f~rms. .

Finally, the retraining of labour, to Increase ,flexibility of labour, hasbeen substantially socialized in Sweden as IT was. d.ev~loped as aresponse to incresed unemployment in the 1970s. T~IS I~ dlf1eren: fromthe Japanese case where retraining of staff takes pnrnarily place I~ t~efirms. Public expenditure on adult training for the labour market IS In

Sweden over tour times that of UK as table 23 shows.yii, Dominant jdeoloQical and cuttural framework. .. ...

Unlike Britain, Sweden and Japan are late-comers In Industnall~atlonas the latter countries industrialized late in the 19th. century and In theearly 20th. century. Conflicts and antagonist ~nterests, generated bycapitalist relations of capital and labour and reqionally uneven develop-

311

Pj6lJmal- Arbdk um samtelagsmal1989

Table 23.Public expenditure on labour market training programmes in 1987In per cent of GDp57

Denmark 0.52Finland 0.27Norway 0.07Sweden 0.49

Canada 0.22Frnnca 0.27Garmany 0.29Italy 0.01Japan 0.03Un~ed Kingdom 0.11Un~ed Slates 0.11

Greece 0.20Ireland 0.56Portuqal 0.22Spain 0.10

Sourca:OECO: Employmant Outlook'988; Paris' 988.

me~tof ~apital accur:nul~tion:have not been 'institutionalized' (in the widesoc,lologlCal sense) In historical and cultural forms in the latter countriesas I~ UK. Industrial relations in Britain are characterized by adverserelatlO~s compared with Japan and Sweden (J. Cornwall, 284·5, for~nalysl.softhe ~apanes,~'Continental Eruopean and UK/USA systems ofindustrial relation). Bntlsh society is characterized by more cultural?Ieavages t~an Sweden and Japan. The British population is character-~ed by regIOns that are more diverse in terms of dialects and evendltf~rent languages, different histories and economic structures of itsregions, t~an the r~ions in Japan and Sweden. The latter countries are?haraC!e~ez~ by hIgher degree of monoculture, Japan due to its lateIndust~alizatJon, its former strictly organized feudal society and isolationas ~n Island and Sweden due to its smallness as well as late industriali-~atlon. Monocutture tends to reduce antagonist forms of interest media-tion. 'Viii. Micro-level captlal-Iabour relations,

The relations between capital and labour in the firms is very different

312 -

PjMmaJ - ArbOk um samtefagsmaJ 1989

in Japan compared with Sweden and UK. As we have already highlighted,Japanese capital had exploited horizontal forms of management togreater extent and long before firms in the other capitalist countries, ThisdiHerence stems from the experience of 'reverse engineering'. But powerstructures in firms are one thing and income structures another. Wagelevels are lower in Japan than in Sweden and UK58, while profit shares arehigher in Japan" so that the rate of explanation tends to be higher inJapan than in the other two economies. This is due to, on the one side,the greater importance of small and medium sized firms in Japan (seetable 24), but wages and strike activities tend to be lower the smaller thefirms are (see table 25 on the relation between enterprise size and wagelevel and the discussion above on strike actvity and its correlation toenterprise size), On the othe r side wag es are closertied to profits in Japanthan in the other two countries". Furthermore, labour is less flexible inJapan than in UK and presumably in Sweden as well, as job tenure islonger in Japan than in other capitalist industrialized countries. Table 26shows the distribution ot 'Job tenure in some of the main capitalistindustrialized countries. Average job tenu re, defined as the lengt h of timea person has been employed continously by the same employer (OEeD1984,56-7), is 8.6 years in UK (1979) while it is 11.7 years in Japan(1982). The figure for those who have worked for 20 years or more for thesame employer is 21,9% of the labour force in Japan while it is 12.1 % inUK, but the difference between males and females in Japan is greater interms of job tenure than in UK.

The result of the importance of the small firm sector in Japan is aweaker trade union movement on the national level and hence weakerposition of labour on micro, company level. As a conse-quenc~ it is easierfor capital to tie the income of employees to phases of the buslnes~ cycleand press labour costs down while profit shares are high. The result IS alsogreater motivation tor employees in the big firm sector which is c~aracter-ized by long term job tenure and hence it is easier for capital in this sectorto experiment with horizontal forms of management structures. Further-more, management is able to develop 'company culture' that leads tohigher degree of integration of on the one side the employees' private a~social life and on the other side the interests of the company. Thisemerges not only in the form of paternalist welfare payments of t~e firms,but in the form of extra job activities of the company employees In clubsand leisure activities. Indeed, it is difficult to describe the process ofindustrialization in Japan with the traditional sociological concept of<mOdernization' which refers to the individualization of social relations,

313

PjMJmal- ArbOk urn samffHagsmal1989

Table 24.Distribution of employrnent by enterprise size:A thewholeprivate economy; 8 manufacturing sector.

Percentages

Enterprise size (number of persons ermloyed)

Small Medium Large Total1·19 20·99 100499 500+ Aand 8

(very small) respect-A B A B A 8 A B ively

Australia- 12.6 17.4 21.3' 48.6 100.0Austna=« 26.2 17.4 20.9 19.6 19.4 24.9 33.4 38.2 100.08elgiu~ 25.0 12.1 20.9 20.7 21.5 25.8 32.6 41.3 100.0DenmaM<q 9.21 25.9 29.6 35.3 100.0"Finland" 9.1 14.B 18.5 57.6 100.0FranceM 19.7 8.7 22.3 19.0 18.7 22.B 39.2 49.4 100.0Germanya 15.1 24.7 60.2 100.0"Ireland" 25.9 36.3 37.9 100.D"ita It 24.S 29.1 46.4 100.0"Japan=s 38.S.\" 27.8~ 17.5' 19.3' 16.5 19.6 27.1 33.3 100.0Luxembourg'" 7.7 11.5 25.8 55.0 100.01Netherlands'" ,

25.9 13.0 22.7 21.6 51.4m 65.4m 100.0Sweden<.,g·'15.6 10.2 12.4 15.8 13.3 19.8 58.6 54.1 100.0UKb 20.3" 13.4 66.3 100.0USNh 21.6 4.9 18.5 11.3 12.4 12.8 47.S 71.0 100.0

Source: OECD: Employment Outlook, Paris 1985.a) 1982;b) 1981 ;c) 1983; d) 1980; 8) 1979;1) 1977;g) Wageeamersandsalariedemployees only; h) In the figures forthe private sectorthe service sector is onlypartially covered; I) Data for Sweden include public sector; j) 6-19; h) 6 +; k)1-29; /) 30-99; m) 100 + ; n) 1-99; 0) 20 + .

314

Pj6i)msf - ArMk um samfeJagsmcH 1989

Table25.Average of wages by fim:' size-Percent ot wages in enterpriseswith 500 persons or more

EnterpriselE.astablishment size(number of persons employed)

10-99 100-499 500+

Belglul1""t' 1976 78.1 SS.7 100

[)enrnali<£ 1978 93.2 97.3 100

Franca" 1978 62.9 86.3 100

Germany<" 1978 89.7 92.2 100

i978 65.4 92.7 100Italy<'Japan" 1982 77.1 82.~ 100'

luxemoourg<1978 74.5 78.7 100

USN 19B3 57.0" 73.!l 100

ECO' E I men! Outlook; Paris 1986. .Source: 0 . mp or I d L embourg the data are by establishmenta) For Denmar1<. germany, Ita.y an ux and th~ United Statas, they are bysize, while for Belgium, France, Japan I •.•...rs in manufacturing' c) Hourly

. . b) H rly pay for manua worxs '.enterpns8 size; ou . f turing' d) Monthly scheduled eamlngspay tor male manual w~rkers I~ manu ~or ex~ludin agriculture): e) 100-999;tor regular employees In the pnv~te S~or w;ge and S;lary earners in the privataf) 1000 +; g) Usual ~eekty earnings .sector (excluding agnculture); h) 1·99,

315

Pj66mal.'Arb6k um samfelagsmal1989

...~ M lilNC/) co CC! MOl

::> OJ ~;i CO r-.:oi.•.... .-O'l "<tID::x:: r--- In "<t •..•

::J en -.:ir-.: o.:i""":N"<t N -r-N

C <'1 •.•• r---III CD co N-vo c» c:ri-.:i a::i r-...:oi

(")Il) .- .•...

.Ql N<DOlr-; I"-: COlD(p en -.io.:i

ClJ N"<t en a:iN

i'ii•... -iii co col.t):::I O'Jco lD co

or,;( .•... cO...j- ,....; NeDC") CD •...

.c'C--.-c:lU•..."-::JoQ,l.c

c:I1la.I1l-:I

jJ)oC<Il..u,

316

..C\Ico,Ol

CDa:i

.- O'lu:i"":'(\IN

OC')doC\I \I)

C\I 00 ~lDj"... Il)O'l LOci r-...: ~.....;

C\I"'1" .•...

CD coli)j"... Ol ~C\!Ol ,....:,....: ,....:

•..•M C\I•••• C")N_

Pjo{)mal- ArbOk um samtelagsmal1989

increasing dIfferentiation of roles and the spread of formal rationality(what G. Lucaks retered to as 'reification'). Industrialization in Japan ischarcterized by Jholism' in which the company claims the whole personand organizations are not based on the strict formal rationality of clearlydefined roles organized in hierarchies as we find in the Occident. As C.Deutschmann puts it:

.• It becomes apparent in the policies of recruitment. In contrast toWeberiap bureaucracy, when hiring new members the Japanese firmdoes not lay stress on professional qualifications but on social andcultural [as well as political - I.J.] background ... The personal back-ground of the candidate will be scrutinised, including his religious andpomical views, his parents' educational style, as well as the tidiness ofthe parent's bathroom. The successful candidates will be invitedtogether with their parents to a highly ritualistic inductionceremony ...before starting work the new members will pass a kind oftraining camp. doing hea'O' physical work, hardship tests (like mara-thon and night courses) and spiritual exercises ...The training process,which is conducted almost exclusively in the firm. is conceived, notonly as effort to acquire functional qualifications but as a process ofmoral socialisation into the community of the firm, which continues theprimary socialisation of the family. The main responsibilty for thesesocialisation tasks is borne by the immediate supervisors, who adopt,a fatherly role towards the younger members of the group and look.afterlhem not only in work related matters but also in regard to privateproblems ...The involvement ... can go as far as arranging marriagesor even as far as adoption. The ... Intra-firm socialisation process aimsat ... strong identification ...with the community of the firm ... whichoverrides an externalloya~ies. It is substantiated by the enormouSscope of training: permanent employees receive not only specialtraining for particular jobs but pass through numerous jobs across theentire firm, thus learning the interconnections of workprocesses in thewhole finn. The embeding of vocational training in a process at moral

, socialisation into the work group, in tum prevents qualificationsbecoming individually crystallised and hence becoming the basis ofMegoistic" status claims. This also explains why firms exclusivelyprefer to recruit school and university graduates whose personalitiesare considered to be still open to educational formation. If possible,

_firms avoid recruiting mid-career applicants, who are suspected ofbeing uncooperative and "selfish". "(C. Deutschmann, 1987, 44).

317

Pj6lJmaJ-ArbOk um samtelagsmal1989

Furthermore, the Japanese firm's claim on total loyatty can be foundin the practices surrounding working hours:

"Not only are working hours in Japan longer than in Europe and theU:S.A., ~t above all less calculable. As a rule, employees are onlygIVen notice on the same day about the amount of overtime they areexpected to put in. As a consequence regular private duties outsidethe firm are practically precluded. Even during their spare timeemployees are engaged in manifold social activities with their col-I~agues or in r.ecreational programmes which are organised by thefirm. In many firms every department elects a "recreation leader" or"recreation monitor" who is responsible for mobilising his colleaguesfor excursions. picnics, visits to beergardens and athlelic contests.Whoever refuses to participate has to anticipate the subtle but severesanctions ot his peer group. In short, a formalised separation otworking hours and leisure time in Japanese firm, which would providea real foundation for the mutual indifference between person andorganisation, is unthinkable. H (ibid., 45-6). '

The weak power position of labour in Japan compared with the othertwo countries, emerges in the relatively underdeveloped collective wel-fare system. The effects of the underdeveloped wellaresystem increasesthe power position of capital on the micro company level as paternalistsocial securities payed by the companies becomes an important powerres?urce of capital vis-a-vis the emploees, i.e. directly as wage compen-sation become Important part of the empoyees' income in the present aswell as future and indirectly as empoyees have little to depend on it sackedbecause of strike activities or organizing the staff against the company.Let's have a brief look at the welfare systems in the three countries.ix, The role of the welfare state and interest mediation,

The Japanese welfare system in terms of social expenditure isunderdeveloped compared with the one in UK and particularly theSwedish one and its structure is different. Social expenditure as percentof GOP was 8.0 in Japan in 1960 and had increased to 17.5 in 1981~ Thefigures for UK were 13.9 and 23.7 and for Sweden 15.4 and 33.4r7spectively (OECO 1985, 21). The annual growth rate of social expen-dIture as percent of real GDP was in Japan in the average 8.6 1960-75and 4.7 in the period 1975-81. The respective figures for UK are 2.6 and1.0 and for Sweden 4.0 and 1.0 (ibid., 21). But the emphasis in social

318

PjMm,H .•Arb6k urn samfelagsmal1989

expenditure is different in the three co~ntries ..In.1981 Japans~ent 28.6.%of her social expenditure on education. Britain spent 24.57'0 of SOCialexpenditure on education in 1981 j while the Swedish figure was 19.8%.The share of expenditure on health is different in the three countries.Japan spent 26.9% of social expenditure on Health in 1981.while Britainspent 22.8% and Sweden 26.6%. As for pensions share Japan :pent27.4% in 1981 while Britain spent 31.2% and Sweden 35.3%. FinallyJapan spent 2.3% of her social expenditure on unemployment com?~n-sation in 1981 while Britain spent 5.9% and Sweden spers 1.5% (ibld.,24). Japan sp-ends the least of the GDP on pensions, accoming to thesefigures, i.e. 4.8% of her GDP, while UK spends 7.4% an? S\lleden 11.8%.It we look at expenditure on health in the same way we find eetthat Japanspends 4.7% of her GOP on health while Britain sperds 5.4% andSweden 8.9%. The figures for education are as follows: Japan spends 5%of her GOP in this field of social expendnurewhile Britain spends 5.8% andSw·eden 6.6%.

It follows from these figures that the independence cI labour fromcapital in terms of education, health and pensions is ~reat~ in Swede~,less in UK and least in Japan. This structural base IS veryrmportant In

analysing the different power base of the trade unions in l~e threecountries and their possibilities of mobilizing the rank and file. ThediHerent power positions of trade unions and left wing parties in the th~eecountries is a fundamentallactor in the formation of successful strateqiesof labour vis-a-vis the accumulation strategies of capital in too present eraof economic crisis and attempts to restructure capital accumulation.x. The level of afflueocy, sociMobjlrty aod economic grc"ph. ,

The higher the level of aflluency and the more equally nabonal Incomeis distributed the more likely is social unrest to be low. The level ofaffluency and social mobility is furthermore likelY,to influence ideologi?aldevelopment as we discussed above concernmq decresed left wingvoting as a consequence of increased aHluency. . . .

The level of affluency in terms of GDP per capita IS <fiferent In UKcompared wit h the other two countries. In 1986 per capita in??me. was16 115 US$ in Japan and 15.659 US$ in Sweden while theBnllSh figurewa·s9.690 US$(CentraIBankof Iceland).ln 1965 GDPper~pitawas 861US$ in Japan, 1.818 US$ in Great Britain and 2.549 US$ In Sweden (~.Korpi 165). These figures are overdetermined by the rate of economicgrowth. Average annual growth rates of GDP,was 10.3%in Japan and2.7% in UK in the period 1960-70. In the penod 1960 -69 the averageannual growth rate of GNP in Sweden was 4.4%. In 1970-80 the average

319

PjOllmal- Arbdk um samMlagsmal 1989

annual GOP growth rate in Japan was 4.7% while it was 1.8% in UK. Theaverage annual growth rateoftheGNP in Sweden was 2.5% in 1970-79.The average annual rowth of GOP in the period 1979-84 was 3 g0lc .Japan, 1.6% in Sweden and 0.6% in UK (C. FreemantJ ClarkIL S' °t

ln

148'L M'" 19 . . oe e,I • joset .87,~8; OECO:Economic Surveys; Japan, Paris 1987).

.Cornparinq dlHerent socio-economo formation one would expectthat n goes l~ gener~l that the higher the rate of economic growth theI~ss oppostrton aoamst t.he existing regime one would expect, i.e,~'v~n .that the stn:ctu re of Income distribution and absolut level of GNPIS. slmll~r, As the flgur~s above indicate the growth rate has been much~lgher In Jap~n than In the other two countries so that the individualsIn Japan are, likely to have experienced much faster growth of incometha~ people inthe o.t~ertwo ~ountries and therefore opposition againstcaprt~1 and the polltlcal regime is likely to be much weaker in Japanthan In S~eden. and UK. This is indeeo the case as we will see whenwe examine evidence of strike activity and inslability on the lab~an:et ?el~w. Let's have a brief look at the structure of inca:;drsl.nbut.lOnIn t~e three countries. In the early 19705 the highest post-tax l~omedecJle g:~p stood tor27.8% of total income in Japan while~heflgurewaS23.91t,.m UK and 18.6% in Sweden, i.e. when family sizeIScou.nte~ lor (F., Geirsson, 62-6) (The figure for post-tax and socialbenefrt adjusted Income distribution had increased to 28.3% in UK in19~1 (?E~D 1985b, 210)). Another way at comparing income distri-b~tIO~lln drHer~nt cou.ntries is ?y ~sli~ating it with the 'Gini coeffi-oent that estimates In~ome distribution in terms of a scaJe rangingfrom 0 (complete equalrty~ to 1 (complete inequlity). By using thatparameter we find out that In the 1970s income distribution of pre-taxIncome of households was more equal in UK than in Sweden andJapan as the G!nicoefficients were 0.34 (1973),0.35 (1972) and 0.35(1972) respectively (S. Olafsson 1984, 89 and DECO 1985b 225)Thes~ ~~ures are.di~ere.nt H,we look at post- tax distribution of in'come~!he G,"II~medlstnbutlOn IS least equal in UK with 0,318, more equalInJapanwrth 0,31 ?and most equal in SwedenwithO.302(F. Geirsson,62~6). Finally th~ flg~res change still more when income distribution isadjusted to family size. In that case the Ginis are: Japan 0,336, UK0.327 ?nd Sw~en 0.271 (ibid" 62-6). Being the best indicator of theactu~1mco~e distribution and living standards of the masses, the lastme.ntloned figures show that Sweden is the most egalitarian societywhile J~pan is least eqalltarian out of the three countries. But com-pared with the 0 ECO average th ese three cou ntries are rat her similar

320

.Pj60maJ· Arb6k um samfeJagsmal 1989

in terms at income distribution in the post war era although there hasbeen increasing difference in terms of per capita GOP. As inequalityis increasing in UK and the feel.jng of decresing social fairness is likelyto be spreading, social unrest is likely to increase, The situation isdiffferent in the other two countries and hence the strategic situationfor regimes to realize their particular accumulation strategies in so faras social unrest strengthens and is motivated by opposing socialforces to undermine the strategies of the dominant regimes.But the Gini-coefficients refered to above do only estimate aggregate

distribution ot income. The picture of distribution of income is diHerent ona more disaggregated level. As table 27 indicates, there is a greaterdiffeence in income in terms of wages and salaries differentials onsectoral level than the figures above indicate. Table 27 shows coefficientsof variation in average wages and salaries for 3- to 4 digit manufacturingindustries where the difference is greatest in Japan and much lower in UKand tower still in Sweden. According to the table wage differentialsdecreased in Japan in the '19705 and the same goes for Sweden, butincreased slightly in UK (ana much faster in USA). Wage differentialsincreased in Sweden in the early 1980s in the period of the right wingregime (the "bourgeois regime" as the Swedish social-democrats label it).We presume that the fundamental factor in explaining these differentialswould be the strength of trade unions on national level which is overde-termined by the size of the small firm sector, size of the national labourmarket and the level of unemployment. Consequently the great wagediHerential in Japan is due to the big size of the small firm sector,increasing differentials in Sweden in the 1980s and UK in the 1970s aredue to increased unemployment, but the increase in wage diHerentials inUSA is much greater than in UK and Sweden which has to be explainedby high levels of unemployment in USA in the context of a nationally weaktrade unions62 ,

xi. The organIzational strenoth of interest oroups and social forces andthe stability of the oolhical reOime.

Finally, as one of the fundamental elements of the structural conditionsof hegemonic politics we will examine the different systems of industrialrelations and interest mediation in Japan, Sweden and Britain. There isa great difference in the political systems of the three regimes of capitalaccumulation in the sensethatthe UK is charcterized by the least stabilityof the political regime, As table 4 above shows the index of 'class voting '63

was lowest in Japan in the 19705, i.e. 27, while the the figure for UK is 35and Sweden 45 (W. Korpi, 35). The pattern issimilarconceming left wing

321

Pj66maJ-Atbdk um samtelagsmal1989

Table 27.

Industrywagedi!1erentials;~~cientsofvariatjon in averagewagesandsalanesfor3-to4-dlgit manufacturing industries

Country 1958 1961 1964 1970 1973 1979 1980 1982 1983

Japan 35.5 34.0 34.0USA 21.4 24.2 22.3 21.6 23.7 26.8 27.1 w

Franca 16.7 24.0 23.9 21.6 22.7UK 20.1 20.2 20.4Sweden - 15.4 14.1 13.6 12.8 13.0 13:8 14.3

source: OECD: Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, 135.

voting. Left percentages of valid votes in the period 1961-80 was in theaverage 41o/~inJapan,.45% in UK and 51'% in Sweden (see table 3 aboveand W: Korpi .•3.B). Agam, when we examine the level of unionization theresun IS a similar pattern. In the average in the period 1956-76 thepercentage of unionization in Japan was 27%, in UK 44% and 71% inSweden (ibid., 40).. ~he diHerent power position of the social forces in the three countries,I.~. In terms of polit~cal parties and the trade unions, has generateddlH~rent systems of Interest mediation with different relations betweenca~rtaJ, Iabour andtha stale. The pattern is also similar in this repsect: UKbeln~ srtuated between the two poles of Japan and Sweden. The weakposuon of trade unions in Japan on national levefC has led to thed~velopment of '.corporatism without labour' {T.J. PempeLtK. Tsunekawa}With t~e extensvs C?lIaboration between stale and capital, while theS~ed~sh system 01 Interest mediation is characterized by extensivetripartite system of state bureaucracy, capital and labour on rnezo- andmacro level and sectorallst cotlaoaration of capital and labour on rnocrolevel. The development of the Swedish system was determined by thestreng~h of the centralized labour movement and stable and high level oflett ~otmg that ge~erated stability of the political regime dominated by theSocial- Dernocrauc Party. The post warpolilical regime in Japan has beencharacterized by great stability as the ruling Liberal-Democrats has notbeen seriously challenged since it was established in 1955 (W.G. Bea-sley, 311). This party is heavily supported by capital as

••...business associations •.•. channel huge sums fromtheirconstituemco~panies in to party funds. For example, the largest of them,Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations) provided the

322

Pj6tJmal· A rb6kum samfefagsmal 1989

Liberal Democrats with no less than 6,000 million yen for use in the1971 elections to the upper house of the Diet and local assemblies."(ibid., 312-13).The Liberal Democrats are only opposed by the splitted opposition of

the Communists, Socialist Party, Social-Democratic Party and the Bud-dish party Komeito (ibid., 313-17). .

The British systemof interest mediation must be srtuat~~ betwe.en th.eother two. Due to the British two party system the political regime IS

unstable as gavemments are formed (even without majority of the votes)and change relatively frequently. As a consequence, althouoh the level ofunionization is relatively high long term tripartite collaboration does ~otdevelop. The compartmentalzation of finan~!al and .industrial cap~alfurther undermines the stability of the political regime. Th~ relat.l~estagnation and decline at the British econo~y incr~ases. the instabilitytrend even further as social unrest and strike acnvny IS much moreextensive in GB than in the other two countries. Indeed UK saw t~ehighest rate at industrial disputes in 1965-74 in terms ~l days lost Instrikes per 1000 people employed was highest. The UK figure was 743while the Japanese one was 243 and the Swedish one was 46 (J.Cornwall, 251 ).Inthe period 1974-83 the figure for UK was ~63,396 forSweden and 116 lor Japan (i.e. 1974-81 lor Japan. Keep In mind thatthere was a right wing government in Sweden 1~76-81) {E~: EurostatReview 1974-1983}. The following diagram highlights the dlf1erence ofthe systems of interest mediation in GB, Japan and Sweden.

Diagram 3.Systems of industrial relations.

Macro Mezo Microtripartite duopantle tripartite f:juoparttle tripartite buopartrte

Adversary UK UK UK UKrelattons of UK UKcapital andlabour

CollaboratistSweden Japanrelations of Sweden Japan Sweden Japan

capital andlabour

323

PfrjlJma18 Amok urn samftHagsmaJ 1989

T,he dlapram highlights the difference in the systems of industrialrelations In Japan, Sweden and UK. The main difference between theBritish system and the others is the adverse relations between capital andlabour that, along with the instability in the political regime, excludespattems of tripart~e class collaboration. The compartmentalization offinancial and industrial capital, the structure of state bureaucracy and theB~ish financial ~ystem furthermore excludes the develpment of a duop-anne collaboraton between capital and state and hence in the 19805formalist necrliberalist accumulation strategy has followed the crisis ofkeynesian policies. The main difference between Sweden and the othertwo c~>lmt:ies is the stability of the social-democratic polhical regime andthe tripartite form of class collaboration, The Swedish tripartite system isdeveloped even on the micro/firm level as we saw concerning theR,enewal Funds and in the developement of small firms on regionalleve!.

. LIke the ~apane~e system the Swedish system is characterized by~lIaboratlst relations. but the latter is characterized by duopartne rela-tions between state bureacracy and capita' on the macro and mezo levelsand duo partite collaboration of capital and labour on micro level due thecompany basis 01the organization of labour and the weakness ol tradeunions on national level.

As we have have discussed above, the labour movements in Swedenand G8 have suHered from organizational crisis in the 19805. Thesolidarity waqepclicy and centralizationotthe Swedish labour movementhas been under attack, but, as we analysed above, this is due to atemporary shift of the balance of power within the labour movement as aconsequence of the sectoral development of the economy in which thepower position of the manual workers in 'key industries' has beendiminishing while the service and public sector employees are increas-ingly playing the leading role in wage development. The British labourmovement has also suffered from attacks on its centralized powerstructure and indeed the pressure for 'single union' deals has beenincreasing in recent years. The conflicts related to single union agree-ments led to the expulsion of the EETPU from the Tue in 1988, a unionwith approximately 3.7% of the TUe total membership (J. Waddington,10). But a~hough the British labour movement suHers from attacks on itsorgainzational structures we will have to keep in mind that safar singleunion deals are relatively rare and represent only the fringe of the labourmarket and the extention of such agreements depend on such uncertainfactors as on the one side the temporary decline of union membership(TUe membership declined from 13.2 million in 1979 to 10.6 rnilllon in

324

Pj6rJmal.ArbOkumsamfelagsmaI1989

1986 (ibid., 9)) which is generated by the prese,nt cris,is o! the Britisheconomy, On the other side the present thatcherrte regrme IS by natureonly temporary and the power of the TUe depends on Labour govern-ments for the realization of its policies. But the temporaryness of thepower position of the labour movement does not change th~ insta~lenature of British political regimes and the instable system of industrialrelations in UK so that, as before, a new Labour government will producea situation of unstable, adverse and deformed tripartite class collabora-tion followed by unstable, adversary and inconsistent adversary duopar-tite system of industrial relations.

3.2. Theconjuncturalconditionsotrestructuring~hegemontc politics. . .As we analysed above. from the empirical evindenceofthedlffusJOn ofthe'flexible firm' wemust conclude that there is no evidenceofa fundamentalchange of the structure ot ~he rnanutacturinq sector. The bulk ?f theincrease in the small firm sector is due to contracting out of prevrouslyindoor services by big firms and the public sector and it is = du~ to thelong term sectoral development of the caprt,al1st ~nomles whrc~ hasemerged as the growth of the pt ivate and public service sectors: B,ut,ln~hecontext of economic crisis, high levels of unemployment and diminishinqpower resources of the labour movement capital pr~sses increasingly fO.rincreasing 'flexibility of labour markets'. Hence, caprtal attempts to exploitthe situation of the weak power postiton of the labour movement. 10restructure the social conditions and institutional framework of capitalaccumulation and de-regulate labour markets. The success of such post-fordist (or rather 'back to pre-lordist') restructuting wil.1d~pend on, theconjunctural hegemoniC politics of capital and labour which IS determmedby country specific conditions.. '

We have emphasised the structural differences of the three regimesof capital accuulation highlighting the struct~ral d~Heren~es in t~e rel~-lions between different capitals, particualrly financial and industrial C~PI-tal, between capital and the state and between c~pit~l.a~ labour. Ha~tngthe analysis above in mind, ~ would be overslmpl,rflcatlOn to c~nsl.de~attempts towards restructuring of capital accumulatron as l~apantZatlonas we have seen that the structural relations between caprtal and stateand industrial and financial capital in UK are very different from what is thecase in Japan. The same goes for Sweden as the trip~rt.ite ~ystem inSweden and the level of state interventionism and socialization at thereproduction of capital and labour is fundamentally different from the

325

PJoomBJ -ArbOk um samtelagsm;U 1989

situation in Japan as well as UK. We will now analyse the differentrestructuring paths anticipated for Japan, Sweden and UK on the groundsor the structural moments analysed above.L The Swedish case...

. Th~high level of socialization of the reproduction at capital and labourISa,nd If!1portant po~er resource torthe labourmovement in Sweden vis.a-VIS caJtals~ncemlOg h~em~njcpofitics and the formation of particularcountry specfc hegemontc projects. The SOCialization or externalities ofthe capital accumulation in Sweden makes Sweden attractive as a locusof capital accumulation. Despite the high level of taxation, the context ofwell educated work force, high Jevel of expenditure on R&D and stateparticipation in industrial innovation programs as well as socialization ofretraining of la,bour, makes Sweden attractive in terms of high valuea~d~ production and hence high rate of capital accumulation, Thissituation slrengthens the power position ot labour vis-a-vts internationalcapital whether domestic or foreign, The great extent of socialization ofthe reproduction of capital and labour is turthermore a structural powerresaource of labour and left wing parties as Ihe Size of the public sectorgenerates. strong unions of public Sector employees that build strongarmor agaInst attacks on Ihe welfare state.

As we hig~lighted,in tab,les 2? and 21, Swedish capital is relativelydependent on rntematlonal financial capital. This situation is important forthe power position of labour in terms of the pressure tram foreign banks,the IMF and lhe Wond Bank to implement neo-ctassical J,X)Jicies,But asthe 'realist structuralism' ;n Sweden has been successful in minimizingunemployment and restructuring key industries of importance for expoft65, the social democratic govemment has been able to defend the welfaresystem and increase flexibility on labour markets largely on the terms otthe policies of the labour movement.

Swedish caphal is highly centralized as we analysed above and as acons~uence the pow~r position of capital is unusually strong. But thisp?wer IS match~d ~Y h~ghly centralized labour movement .with unusuallyhigh level.of UntOnIZatlon, The Labour movernem alongside the SocialDemocratIc Party dominate the polrticaldiscourse which in the context ofunusually stable political regime further strengthens the power position oft~e labour movement. The development at the Wage Earners' Funds willslightly cha~ge the structural basis of the power position of capital andlabour and Indeed weaken the basis ot the centralization of Swedishcapital as these funds will to limited extent change the structure of theSwedish financial system.

326

Pj66mal- ArbOk um samteJagsmal1989

As wesaw in table 24, the smaJ tirmsector in Sweden is relatively smalland and as unionization is legally obligatory the n~atj~e e,H~ct,sof thesmall firm sector on the power position of trade unions IS minimized.

Finally, the size, effectiveness and ',?alist struct~ralist' roleot the ~t.ateand the stability of the soclal-dernocratic, communt,s,t supported pol rtlCaIregime (despite recent increase in electo~al volatility) strenqthens t,hepower poshion 0 t labour vis-a-vis th,e formation 0,'a~u mu lation strat~~lesof capital as it is a significant factor In the ~etermlnatlon of the real politicalconditions and balance 01 power of capital and labour.

The balance of power of capital and labour in Sweden is t~ere10re suchthat the restructuring of capital accumulation on the baSI,Sot the newtechnology is unlikely to lead to fundamental de-reg~latl?n of la~rmarkets or cuts in the welfare state, Rather, the centralization of caprtaland labour and their respective strong power position, is likely to lead torestructuring path that will defend the welfare state o,t labour at th,e s~melime as the welfare state of capital in the form of 'realist strucluralJ~m w~llbe strengthened and hence the socialization of capital accumulation Willbe extend ed. ' ~ii. The British case '. .

The context of hegemonicpolilics isverydifterent m U,K ~mparedwrthSweden, Financial capital plays the hegemonrc role Within the block ofcapital and dominates industrial capital. The adverse industrial relationsand structure of the state constitute the structural conditions ,of the neo-classical hegemonic project which emerges as the Thatcherrte stra~~yand regime. The crisis of keynesian policies and the weak power posmonof the Labour Party and the labour movement excludes temporarely thepossibiHty at a 'realist structuralist' restructuring of capital accumulationas a politically relevant accumulation and developmenta! str~tegy. In-deed the alternative economic policy of the Labour Party 15 stili char,ac.teriz~d by simple anti-cyclical keynesianisrn in li~e of the neo-classicalsynthesis (J, Tobin; J, Harrison/ll. Morgan;lvar Jonsson 1987):

But, despite high levels of unemployment and the we~k pOSltl?n of thelabour movement, the labour movement and the left wmg partres h~vebeen remarkably successful in defending the welfare state= and with-standing attempts to de-regulate the l~bour market (~Ithoughthe govern·ment has partly succeeded in attackmg the. cen~rahzed ,power of !r~d~unions by putting restrictions on secondary plcketinq and dem?Cratlzmgelections of union officials, the closed shop, the holdng of st~lke ballotsand restrikting the existence and use of political funds (J. Tom~Jnson.' 19).

But.the strategic situation of the British labour movement vis-a-vis the

327

Pj6lJmal- Arb6k um samtelagsmaJ 1989

PO~~ibility of re~lizing 'realist structuralism' is disadvantageous as thepoHtJCO-economlC structural basis is lacking. Indeed the context ot theIo~ term ~nomic decline of Britain (M .W. Kirby), the compartmentali-zat~n ~t capital, the structure of the British state and the high level offor~rgn Investment u~dermines attempts to develope tripatite neo-corpo-==S.tructu~es. In th IS context!he power pes ition of dam estic and foreignfmanclal capital becomes relatrvely stronger compared with theothertwoca~e.s so t.hat the pressure by the IMF and World Bank for neo-classicalpolicies WIll be the more difficult to withstand ..

Like in Sweden the small firm sector is small and as such does notweaken the power position of labour compared with the Japanese casebut the Io~ ~evel of unionization compared with Sweden undermines th~power poSitIon ofthe.'a~u~ movement, but this isa temporary phenorns-non as the level of uruornzation on aggregate level is a function of the levelof unemployment ratherthan the development otthe size of the small firmsector since that development is a function of contracting out by big firmsth~ .waves of which are generated by Ihe development of the economiccrisis" . .

Finally, the level of social expenditure is lower in UK than in theaveraoe in the DECO countries68

, so that the power position of trade~nlOns are not supported in this sense 10the same extent as is the case~nSw~en ans hence their power position is relatively weaker. But theInstabIlity of the British political regime and the instable balance of powerof labour and capital is bound to generate a developmem on the Britishlabou.r markett hat will be characterized by Shifting periods of neo-classcat attempt to de-regulation followed by re-regulation within the!~ameworkof thepolieies of keynesian neo-classical synthesis of Labour.ttl, The Japanese case,

The Japanese case is already characterized by de.regulated or highlyflexible labour markets and weak labour movement due to the size of thesmall firm sector and underdeveloped welfare system. But as we haveseen, the 9:owth of social expenditure is greater in Japanthanin the othertwo coubtnes. and as a consequence, the power position of labour will~treng1h.en and !he soc~o·economic development is likely to be character-ized by m<:reasl~g '.Europeanization' of the Japanese regime of capitalaccumulation. ~Nen tha~ t.he restructuring of US and European capital willstrengthen their competItIveness, a process accelerated by increasingintegration and Ilberalization of EC markets (J.H. DunninglP. Robson andJ. Cantwell) and competition with 'sun-rise countries' is hardening, as aconsequence the growth rates of the Japanese economy wtIJ decrease

328

Pj6tJmal· ArbOk um samtelagsmaf 1989

. relatively to the growth rates of her competitors, class struggle willincrease and possibly lead to strengthening of the power of labourmovements on national level. .

Indeed, the pressure on the Japanese fordist regime of capitalaccumulation is increasing and may disorient and introduce a degree ofanomie in the Japanese self-disciplined labour relations. As C. Lead-beater and J. LLoyd emphasise, fyrstly there are some signs of stronger-than-usual push by unions for more unity in the fractured Japanese labourmovement and for more leverage over companies. Secondly the high yenwhich will make exporting tougher and is already cutting the profits of thebig manufacturers. Thirdly, foreign competition, ~hich for most Japan~semeans Sooth Korean 'doing aJapan' on Japan With low labour costs, hlQhtachnology plagiarized from Japan, a highly educated worl<force andfanatically hard work. Fourthly, the export of capital, stimulated by the highyen, placing further strains on·the loyalty of a labour force that may seework needed to preserve to see its own luJlemployment shunted overseasto preserve foreign rnarkets jC. Leadbeater/J. Lloyd, 147).

4. Concluding remarksThe discussion above has been based on the main thesis that the viewthat contemporary capitalist restructuring is leading to a 'post-fo:dist'development is fundamentally rnisleadinq. Firstly because ~here !s ~oempirical evidence that supports a theory of lund:ne~ta! bre~k In capitalistdevelopment in which 'flexible firms' are changmg industrial structures.Secondly, because the 'flexibilizalion thesis' fails i~ seeing the i~pact of'systemofacture' as a means of mcreasinq centralization of capital andstandardization 01 mass production on a higher level than has charact~r-ized fordist production. Thirdly, the advocates of the 'flexibilization thesis'and lett wing 'academic reformists' fail to analy.se structural developmentin a realist way as they fail to analyse the soclet~l power structures andthe balance of power of social forces that determine the content and formof technological development. Fourthl~, we havede~e~Ped a frame~Orkfor such analysis in terms of analysis of the capitalist s.t~te an~ .he-gemoniC politics' in which the emphasis is on country specitic COnd~lon~of technological development as one otthe fu ndamentat mome.nts Of. realregimes of capital accumulation partia..rlarfordifferen~ economies, FIfthly I

different contexts of hegemonic politics generate ditterent paths of therestructuring of capital accumulation and as a consequence we wouldanticipate different paths of developm~nt that.roughly mu~~be .analy~~das: i, the dualist path of adverse industnal relations and politkalinstability

329

Pj6l>mtJ!w ArlxSk um sam fe lagsmal 1989

characterizinq UK/USA development; ii. tripartite development charac-terizing Swedish development and countries characterized by neo-corporatist interest meditation and; iii. the dualist 'corporatism withoutlabour that characterizes Japan and countries with relatively strongstates and high level of centralization offinancial and industrial capital, butweak labour movement and left wing political parties.

Appendix

Indices of the Share of Forelqn-owned Firms in the ManufacturingSector of Selected Host Countries. .

Foreign-0wned firms as a percentage 01 total rnanutacturlnq.. Firms which are mora than 50% foreign-owned

Numbar ct Investmentpersons value Wages! in grossemployed Prod. added salaries Profits capital tor- Assets

rnationHost country Year 010 0/0 %, DfQ % % 0;."

A Big industrialized capitalist countries:

Canada 1972 52.41974 43.1 51.1 51.0 46.1 53.91975 44.3 56.2 64.81976 45.119n 56.61980 46.0

France 1973 19.4 24.11975 19.0 27.8 24.5 21.6 29.4 24.7

W-Germany 1972 22.4 25.11976 16.8 21.7 22.1

Italy 1977 18.3 23.8Japan 1972 1.9 3.8 6.0 4.2

1973 2..0 3.8 4.2 4.11975 1.8 5.11978 1.8 4.2 6.9 4.2UK 1971 10.3 14.2 13.3 11.8 16.21973 10.8 15.3 14.7 12.5 15.81975 12.4 18.7 16.4 17.9

330

Pj60mal. Amok um samtelagsmaf1989

Foreign-Owned flrms as a percentage of total r:nanufacturing.Firms which are more than 50% foreIgn-owned

Number of Investment

persons value Wages! In grossemployed Prod. ad<led salaries Profits capital !or- Assets

rnation

Host country Year 0/0 0/0 % 0/0 0/0 % %

t977 13.9 21.2 22.5

1978 13.5USA 1974 3.0 4.0

1977 3.1B, Small industdaHzed capl1alist countries

Australia 197213 23.6 28.7 . 34.3 31.3 42.0

Austria 1973 20.1 22.1 22.5 21.9 20.4

1976 21.8 22.7Belgium Hl68 18.3 33:1)

1975 33.0 44.01978 38.0

Denmar'l<. 1971 8.0 5.01976 B.8

Finland 1972 2.81976 3.2 2.7 3.5

1977 3.3 2.7 3,5

Norway 1974 7.8 12.9 11.0 B.6 7.0 10.0

1975 7.2 8.9 9.2

1976 7.2 10.81977 6.7 10.4 10.1 6.3

Sweden 1974 4.8 5.2 5.0 5.2 ·3.2 4.51975 5.7 6.B1976 5.7 7.3 6.5 6.3 6.5 3,0 5.51977 6.5 6.1 8,5 4,2 4.3

Q Newly industrialized capitalist countries

Argentina 1972 31.0Brazil 1969 42.0

37.4

1974 49,0 37.01975 37.9 35.8

Gre~ 19n 25.5Hong Kong 1971 11.0

331

Pj6ljmal .•ArbOk um samfeJagsmal1989

Foreign-Owned firms as a percentage of total manufacturing.Firms which are more than 50% foreign-owned

Number of Investmentpersons value Wages} in grosselTllloyad Prod. added salaries Profits capital 10r- Assets

mationHost country Year % % % % % % %

Portugal 1975 7.0 9.6Singapore 1975 67.2 81.9 75.7 85.31978 68.5 82.7 78.4 66.8Spain 1971 11.2

$-Korea 1974 7.6 11.01978 9.5

D. Deyelopina cSlotlalist countries

GhanaIndiaMalaysiaNew Zeal.NigeriaPeruThailandTurney

197419731971

1969170 33.01968·19691970 9.01974

SO.O13.0

SO.O

70.046.0

41.0

S-Africa 1972 40.0

Source: J.M. Stopford/J.H. Dunning: Multinationals; Company Performanceand Global Trends; Macmillan Publishers; London 1983. (table 2.2).

332

PjOlJmat· ArMk urn samtelagsmal1989

Notes:1 K. Marx: Early Writings; Penguin; Books Ltd. London 1975.2 Superstructure is defined by Marx as legal, political, religious, artistic andphilosophical terms- in short ideological forms. (K. Marx 1971,20-21).3 Defined by Marx as "relations of production appropriate to a given stage in thedevelopment of their material forces of ptoduction" (ibid .• 20).41n his The Civil War in France Marx, foran example, analyses 7 classes i.e, thefinancial aristocracy, the industrial bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, the peas-ants, the ideologists, the proletariat and the lumpen-prcletariat. In his and F.Engels's Manijesto 01the Communist Party, ths lavel of abstraction was different• as they were -analysing the diach ronic developma nt of cap nallsrn especially with.relernece to Germany and not' real analysis' • and thera the classes were onlytwo: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Marx intended to analyse classes as apart at his analyses inlof Oapital, but the manuscripts broke off as he approachedthat stage; he died soon attar. See K. Marx 1981, 1025 and R. Rosdolsky.5 There are many versions of this train of thought in the marxist discourse/disputeon Ihe capitalist stale, but it is beside the point to analyse them here. For anex1ensive analysis, see B. Jessop 1983a.6 To mention but few raprasentalivas of these different trands we should mentionK. Marx in his Capital, D. Lapple, E. Altvater, B. Fine and L Harris as represen-tatives of the 'capital theoretical approach'; K. Marx in hIS historical writings, A.Gramsci, B. Jessop and J. Hirsch(recent works) as representatives of the 'classtheoretical approach' and; N. Poulantzas. E. Laclau and C. MauNe as reprassn-tatives of the 'stale-theoretical approach' emphasising the inertia ottha state andpoliticallideological institutions.7 Although the althusserian theories of the slate, in theory proclaim the relativeautonomy of the state, in practice the allhusserians analyses presentthe state asan autonomous instnuion. See J. Holloway and S. Picciano 1979.B This train 01thought can be found in Max Weber as he presumed that the classpostion detrmines 'status' in the long run, see M. Weber9 With the term dialogical we rafer to a concept 01causality thai is based on theidea of totality that is detarmined by feedback relationship between subjective andobjective factors sothat the resulting torrns depend on the way actors experienceand 'life' or 'actively interiorize' theirpractical situation andthe objective structuresin which thayfind themselves and work on. For extensive discussions 01this trainof thought see 8.g. I. Craib and H.G, Gadamer. By contrast he term 'dialectical'is traditionally based on 'mechanist' concepts of causality.10 Which does not mean that they were inconsistent11 Hera we have in mind their Manhestc of the Communist Party and Marx's(1976) Capital Vol. 1, 929. .12 For an analysis of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' ralatlons and the concept of totality,see J. Israel, part 2; also H. Reichelt on Marx's idea of capital as autonomoussubject subsuming social relations in its process of sen-valorization and also K.

333

Pj6lJmal- Arbdk um samfelagsmal1989

Mar,( 1~76,.255 a~d 1974, 459-60 and 409-10 on capital as autonomous subjectof valorization which produces and reproduces ~s own conditions of existence(i.e. the 'intrinsic' relations of capital).!3As Marx p~ts ft, the distinction between the state orpoliticallife and civil societyIS to be explained by the fact that the individuals are atomized in their relations toeach other in capitalism and act in an egoistic way. As a consequence the socialnature of their civil life never appears directly but mediated by the market and Ihestate '. See k. Marx 'sCritique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State (1975,143-4) andH. Relche~, 49-94). .14 On the knowledge power or monopolization of specialized knowledge ot thestate, see N. Poulantzas 1978, 54-62.15 It w.0uld be difficult, to say the least, to use a concept of power like that inanalysing re~olutonaryperiods such as that 01e.g. Russia in the decades leadiingto the revoltion of 1917 and analysing power relations of different socio-politicalforces and political partles.16 The risk taking situation for capital and polltlcal actors is minimized once atechno-economic paradigm is established and lnstitulonalizao so that economicand political predictions are mora in line with actual results,17 l~ our definition of the relational approach we emphasise more strongly thecontingency of potential political forms and actions than 8. Jessop (1983b, 143)~s he wmes:." ... state power as revealed in the conjunctural eNicacy of slatelnt~rvenllons IS a form-determined condensation ot the balance 01politicallorces.This appfO~Chputs the form of the slate at the heart of any analysis 01 politicalrepresenl~llon andlorstate intervention in so farthe complex lorm olths Slate as~n mstitunona! ensemble shapes and conditions the whole political process. But~also oirects ~tt.entionto the differential constitution of the various forces engagedIn struggle wrthm, as well as outside, the state and 10 the diverse structural andconjunctural factors that determine their relative weight. In this sense the:relalional' approach stands at the intersection of the otherlhree approaches andInvolves modifications in each.18 Note that we use 'hegemonic politlcs' as an 'activist' concept instead of'hegemony' which is a descriptive, analytical concept which only abstracts thestructural aspects of.hegemonic politics but not reflect its strategic nature.19 ~e concept of 'potentially represented interests' or 'imputed interests' isbasicly the same as G, Lukacs's concept of 'irrq:::lutedclass consciousness' as••..t.heappr~~ria.teand rational reactions 'imputed' (zugerechnet) to a particulartypcal position In the process of production. This consiousness is thereforeneitherthe sum northe average of what is thought orfelt by the single'individual~~ho m~e up the cl,ass· (G.lukllcs, 1971,51) . But our 'potentially representedInterests are not wider than Lukacs's class reductionism allows,ZO By 'new social movements' we mean movements that are not part oHhs centralsystem of interest r:nooiation in a particular 'regime of capital accumulation', butemerge as alternatIVes to 1his system as its crisis deepens, Following the social,

334

Pj6ljmaJ - ArbCk um sam felagsmaJ 1989

cultural and environmental crisis afthe taylorist era 01 late-capitalism, new socialmovements emerged besides and often strongly opposing its system of interestmediation. lack of democratic decision making and class collaboration, opposingmonopoly capital and the production of needs, military production etc, Such 'newsocial movemnts' alongside trade unions and tracfional political parties arefeminist movements, regionalism, ecological movements, student movements,hyppies and punks and anti-milittary or anti-lrrperiallst movements.21 By 'Ideology' we mean ideas andbellets that people have at particulartime, andnot "a systematic pattern of political thought .., se~-conlained and se~~sufficient·(c.f. R..M. Christenson et.al., 11) as it is only academic people and politicalscientists that think in terms at the grand ideologies - such as 'communism','leninism', 'scctal-dsrrccrattsm'. 'liberalism' etc.- but the general public does not(c.t. D. CampeU 1964).22 B. Jessop has analysed these main periods in the history of forms ofrepresentation and intervention in capitlaismorformal complemantarity betweenintervention and representation as he calls it. First is liberal capitalism which ischaracterised ~yclear-cut institutional differentiation between the economic andpolitical spheres so that the economy operates within the limits 01 rnarxatrationality and the state ideally adopts laissez-taire stance. The second phase issimple monopoly capitalism emerging with the development ofprivate meso-levelconcertation and the growth of formal and substantive state support. It isassociated with the supplementation of liberal parliamentarism with corporatistterms of representation and implementalion of policies which are increasingly adhoc and discriminatory in character. FinallY,with the emergence of slate monop-Olycapitalism. forms of intervention are marked by expansion of the role of slatecredit, laxation. and nationalisation; the expansion of the state's directive func-tions in all areas to match the growing substntive interdependence of formallyautonomus enterprises, branches, and national economies; the growing impor-tance of the economic role of lhe state as compared with its strictly politicalfunctions in securing law and order and defending its territorial integrity; and therelative decline 01 rational-legal administration according to the rule of law infavour of ad hoc, selective, and discriminatory action oriented to spacdiceconomic objectives (B. Jessop 1983,238·9).23 The problem is in the last analysis a meta-critical problem ot a defintion ofrelevance.ltseems obvious that mterest groups such as "Friends of the dogs' orMacintosh owners societies are not as iflllO rtant for our object of analysis as saytrade unions. The relevance of such "peripheral" social forces depends on theextension of the object of analysis or level of abstraction and then only on someaspects. See e.g. L. Allhusser/E. 8alibar: Reading Capital, 34-69,and LAlthusser. For Marx 61-218, also M. Scrtven: Truisms as the Grounds forHistorlcal Explanation, T, S, Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and P.Feyerabend: Against Method.25 As N. Poulantzas analysis, 'power blocs' emerge hist0 rically as a result of the

335•

PjOlJmal- Arbok urn samteJagsmal1989

separation ofthestate and economy in the historyof capitalism. He defines 'powerblocs' like this: "(i) the power bloc constitutes a contradictory unity of politicallydominasnt classes and fractions under protection of the hegemonic traction; (Ii)the class struggle, the rivalry between the interests of these social forces, isconstantly present, since these interests retain their specfic charactarol antago-nism. These are the two reasons why the notion of 'fusion' cannot give a properaccount of this unity. ~(N. Poulantzas 1975, 239).26 "In general terms we can say that an accumulation strategy that is not to bemerely 'arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed' musttake account of the dominant formof the circuit of capital-liberal, monopoly, orstate monopoly; of the dominantformof the intemationalisation of capital. commercial, banking; industrial; of thespecific intemational context confronting particular national capitals; of thebalance 01economic forces at home and abroad; and 01the margin of manoeuvreentailed in the productive potential of the domestic economy, Within theseconstraints there will typically be several economic strategies that can be pursuedwith contrasting implications lorthe different Iractions and dominated classes. W S.Jessop 1983 b, 1SO).27 As B.Jessop puts rt: "To suggest that hegemony wins almost"universal supportis misleading ... The problem can be clarified by distinguishing between "onanation" and "two nation" hegemonic projects, Thus "ona nation~stfategies aim atan expansive hegemony in which the support of lhe entire population is mobilizedthrough material concessions and symbolic rewards (as in ·social imperialism"and the "Keynesian-welfare stale" projects). In contrast, "two nations" projectsaimat a more limiled hegemonyconcemed to mobilize the support 01 strategIcallysignnicant sectors of population and to pass Ihe costs of the project to othersectors (as in fascism and Thatcharism). In periods of crisis and/or limited scopeof material concessions, the prospects tor a "one nation" strategy are restricted(unless il involves a perceived equitable sharing 01 sacrifice), and "two nations"strategies are more likely to be pursued, In addition, where the balance of forcespermits, such strategies may also be pursued during periods of expansion andmay, indeed,bea precondition of successful accumulation. In both cases itshouldbe noted that "two nations" projects require containment and even repression 01the "other nation" at the same lime as they involve selective access and conces-sions forthe more favoured "nation": (9. Jessop 1983 C, 103-4). In the Icelandic'case we have an example of 'one nation' project in the 'cod-wars',28Let us emphastss here we do not accept the mandan ijlstinction between'scientific socialism' and utopian socialism in terms at philosophy of science. Weuse the term utopian here to refer to visions of the future that emphasise smallscale production and small units of production.29 OECO: 'Employment In Small and Large Firms: Where Have the Jobs ComeFrom?'EmploymentOutlook; Paris 1985.30 In the period 1973-81 sextoral employment changed as follows in the maincapitalist countries as follows:

336

Pj66mal-ArbOk um samMlagsmaJ 1989

Millions

USA JAPAN EUROPE#7i:gncullure ·0.1 ·1.5 -1.9Industry 2.0 0+ 1 -4.1Services 13.4 4.6 6.0

Total 15.3 3.2 0.0Labour force 19.2 3.8 4,6Unemployment 3,9 0.6 4.6

# France, lIaly, UK and W-Germany,Source: P.Armstrong/A. Glyn! J. Harrison: Capitalism Since Wand War II.

31 As C. Leadbeater and J, Uoyds put it "A recent report by analysts at theNational Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIS) in Washington confirmsthat this development has played an important role since 1979. 'If you look at therelationship between consumer spending on services and xervice employment,it remains rainy close till 1979; 'Then, with no apparent increase in consumerspending, service employment goes up, This means that extra demand forservices must have been coming tram somewhere, and the natural explanationis big business cantracting out: says the NFIB's William Dennis. (ibid" 170).32 Casay: The extent and natura of temporary work in Great Britain in PolicyStudies, Vol. B 1987,

33 A. Pollert is here retaring to P, Marginson et.al.: Beyond the Wor1<place;Blackwell; Oxford 1988,

34 TUe: Labour Force Trends; unpublished paper by the TUe from 1986according 10 Anna Pollen.35 LRO: Flexibil~y Examined in Bargaining Report; Labour Research Depart-ment; London,3610S: Flexibility at Work in IDS Study 360; Income Data Services; London 1986.37 Fallowing E. Salibar we can, on a very high level of abstraction, analyse thefundamental elements of any mode of production, but the historical constructionot the forms of the relations of these elements define the different kinds of modes01 production as pre-capitalist and/or different kinds of capitalist modes ofproduction:"(1) labourer;(2) means of production;(i) object of labour;(Ii) means of labour;(3) non-labourer;(A) property connexion;(B) real or material appropriation connexions:" (in L. Afthusser and E. Salibar,215). -

337

Pj66mal- Arb6k um samfelagsmal1989 Pj6lJmal-Arbok um samfelagsmal1989

38 See 9.g, C, Freeman/J, Clarkll. Soets (1982, ch. 7) for an anlaysls of fast andslow growing sectors in the main EEC economies in the post war era, the fastestgrowing sectors being the relatively 'technology-intensive' sectors (a.g., chemi-cals, plastics, electrical and electronic ewquipment instruments and communica-tions} and indusliras meeting the ch ang ing pattern of consumer demand for goodsw~h high income elastlcltlss (e.g., cars, consumer durables, drugs .stc. Theoutput growth rates of tlabour proiductivity in hese industries was nearly twice ashigh as the overall growth rate in labour productivity, The output growth rates theslowing ordecJining sectors (agricultural products, textiles. clothing, shoes, solidfuels) was well below the average for the economy as a whole.(127-31).Competing away of profits leads incrased standardisation of production, technicalintensity of the processes of production or increased organic composition ofcapottal and increased overall industrial concentration as tte life cycle ofindustries matures. In relation to the postwarKondratieff boom Freeman/J, ClarkiL. Soete point at tndustrial concentration in the USA and the UK that increased,in terms of share of total value added by the 100 largest companies. from 23%in the USA in 1947 to 3¢% iri 1976 and 22% in the UK in 1949 to 39"/" in 1978.(ibid., 136-7). That mass-production has been the rule or paradigm in thedevelopment of investment in production technology can be presumed from thedevelopment of the gross capital stock-labour ratio (or roughly the organiccomposition of capital) in the post war era. Average annual growth of productivrtyin manufacturing in Germany. France. l1aly, UK, USA. Canda, and Japan was5.0%.in the period 1960·73. according to P. Armstrong/A. Glyn/J. Harrison {19B4,249. 457·8}. In the same period the average growth rats of the caprtal-labourratiowas 3.2%. But the capilaVlabour ratio was drtlerenl in drtfernt sectors of thedifferenl caphalist economies. Taking Denmark as an example: in 19741his ratiowas as follows in the different sectors: Raw materials and processing 0.48;manufacture of food and beverages 0.3: manufacture 01textiles, wearing appareland leatherproducts 0.16; manufacture of wood and wood products 0.24; manu-facture of chemicals and plastic products 0.38; manufacture of non-metallicmineral products 0.29: terro and metal casting 0.72; manufacture of fabricatedmetal products, machinery and equipment 0.16; other industry 0.1; the economyas a whole 0.23 (O.K. Kirkeby,339-41).39 O. Bennett: Production Desjqn Systems; Butterworths: London 1986.40 F. Murray: The Decentralisation of Production and the Decline of Mass-Collective Worker in Capital & Class 19, 1983.41 J, Gough: Industrial policy and socialist strategy in Capital& Class 29" 198642 See e,g. J. Eatwell and R. Boyer in H.L. Wattel and J. lehmbruch and P.C.Schmitter (1982) and P.C. Schmitter and J. Lehmbruch (1979.43 In another study similartrends areto be noted tor USA. In the year 1900 white?collar workers were 17.9% oftha employed labourtorce, in 1940 they were 31.1%,while in 1980 they were 52.;20/0. Manua! workers (except farm and mineworkers)counted 35.8°/" in 1900,39.8% in 1940, ans 31.7% in 19S0. Service workers were

9.0% in 1900, 11.7% in 1940, and 13.3% in 1980. Farm and rnineworkers were37.5% in 1900,17.4% in 1940, and 2.8% in 1980. Sea S. Lash ano J, Urry 1987,120.44 S. Lash and J. Urry {19B7,117} hava provided the following table 10 showpopulation growth trends in the USA:Popu Iatlon growth rate, Incentral cHies.,metropo Iftan bala nea, and noo-metropoll-tan areas: 1900 to 1980 (averagaannual rate per1 ,000 population)

Period USA Central MetropoHlan Differential non-rnetropot-total cities balance between balance itan areas

and central-citygrowth

city growth

1900-10 19.3 29.3 32.8 3.5 15.41910-20 14.3 23.1 28.6 5.5 9.41920·30 14.6 19.6 35.6 16.0 7.41930-40 7.0 5.0 14.1 9.1 6.31940:50 13.5 13.0 -...30.4 17.4 5.81950·60 16.9 10,2 39.5 29.3 7.61960·70 12.5 6.2 23.7 17.5 11.71970·BO 10.8 -0.1 16.5 16.7 14.4

45 Foranalyses otthegrowth andeontent analyses of mass media see J. Curran!A. SmithiP, Wingate; Jrrpacts and Influences. For analyses ot the developmentof centralization and internationalization of mass media and communicationcapital see S. MacBride et.al.: Many Voices, One World; Communication andSociety - Today and Tomorrow (chapter 4).

46 As M. Sawyer puts it:"Sythe end of the 1930s, in most Western European counries, the foundations ofthe wellarn state had been laid in the sense that there was some state provisionof, andJor involvement in, Old-age pension arrangements as well as in heallh,unemployment. and industrial injury insurance. These provisions were, however,generally limited in coverage, and would often apply only to better-paid, manualworkers in manufacturing, mining, and construction industries. Thus, non-manualand lower-paid manual workers in th ese sectors, as well as workers in agricultureand services, were often excluded. by the end of the 1970s the population ofWestern Europa was, w~h only few exceptions, covered by universal old-agepension systems (usually arranged through public or quasi-public institu-tions), unemployment, sickness, and industrial injury insurance schemes, childbenetit provision, and in most countries. disability pensions.· (M. Sawyer, 1985,190).

338 339

Pj6lJmal- Arb6k urn samtelagsmal1989

Sawyer has drawn the following table to show the trends at expansion of publicexpenditure on the weHare state in terms 01 the share 01 transfe rs and subsidiesto households in output (in percent of GDP at current prices):

1955-7 1967-69 1974-76France 13.2 16.8 19.9Germany 12.0 12.0 15.4

Italy (9.7) 15.3 19.4

UK 6.1 9.3 11.3Austria 10.2 13.3 13.8Belgium 9.4 13.6 lB.1Denmark 7.1 10.4 14.4Finland 5.4 7.8 9.0Ireland 6.5 7.9 12.9Netherlands 8.1 17.2 25.3Norway 6.6 11.4 16.0Swaden 7.4 ".2 , 7.1Switzerland 5.2 7.8 12.1

Average 8.2 11.8 15.7SOurce: M. Sawyer 1965.191.47 Because 01 the British consliluency system the 'neighbourhood eHeet' isimportant in explaining voting patterns as the class composition 01 the ccnsitu-ency is more important factor predictability wise than class positions of theindividuals (S.LashIJ. Urry, 213). This factor not generalizable to other countrieswith ditterent constituency systems,480ECD all countries imports and exports of manufactured products, total (SITC5+6-68+ 7+8) annual compound growth rates (per cent).49 AS S. lash and J. Urry put it: "IN the USA, for example. the prom share ofproductive capital and of circulating (financial, trade, ground·rent, petroleum andcoal, transport. communication and services) were approximately the same in themid-1960s, butby 19B2tha lormerhadlallen to less than one-quarterof its earliershare and the latter had risen by nearly 60 per cent. In Britain (using non-comparable statistics) the profits of financial corporations rosa as a proportion 01net corporate income from about 10 percent in 1968 to nearly 60 percent in 1980;in France the increase was from 10 pereant to about 25 percent, and in Germanyfrom 20 per canl to 50 per cent." S. Lash/J. Urry, 208. .50 W.P. Hoganll.J. Pearce: The Incmdible Eurodollar; Unwin; London' 984.51 refering to W. OanielJW. Millward: Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain;Heinemann; London 1983.52 Such a super-state organization can be expected from the cooperation ofsocial-democrats and communists within the EEC and European Parliament, butuntil now it has only been in the very preliminary form. See D. Sassoon: Europe'sLeft: the new continental blend in Marxism Today may 1986.

340

Pj6fJmSI-.ArbOk um samtelagsmal1989

53 A.D. Chandler has analysed manament strategies and structures in athreefold taxonomy: Firstly there is the 'personal entsrpriseln which theowner-manager has few other start who have close personal relations wrth theowner. Secondly, the 'entrepreneurial enterprise' typically corrortses soma 20-50 managars, who stand in impersonal relationship 10 the owning family inwhose hands company shares are still cantralized and the managing directoris often from the family. Finally, Chandler defines the' managerial enterprise'as done above. See S.Lash/J. Urry. 44.54 Public consumption in pe r cent of GOP in 1985 was 9.3 in Japan.28.0 inSweden and public current expenditure on goods and services was 21.0 percent of GOP Tn UK in 1986 according to DECO: Economic Surveys.55 Shares of long-teon credit lnstltutlons In lIablUtles andclalmswtlhthe non-flnancial sector, end 1975 (percent)

country .' Liabilities Claims

West GermanyFrancettalyNetherlandsSwitzertandSwedenJapanUnrted StatesUnited Kingdom

23.532.929.919.52.4

41.822.8

7.921.4

12.88.29.15.01.32.8

11.05.54~9

Source: J. Zysman, 336.

56 We can roughly distinguish between on the one side 'torrnalist structural-ism' relering to the use 01 the term 'structuralist policy' by neo-classicists,which is no mora than a restatement of the orthodox idea of perfect competi-tion and pure market clearing and the Ricardian idea of comparative aovan-tage in international trade. According to this 'formalist structuralism' optimumoutput is produced by fiberalisation and de-regulation 01 markets (d. OECD1987a). On the other side there is the 'institutionalist structuralism' whichrefers to non-market attempts and measures to change the function andresources of economic and social institutions and systems as a necessarycondition of optimum economic output. 'Institutionalist structuralism' IS either'defensive structuralism' or 'realist structuralism' as the former attempts todelend sectors orfirms in the short run for gains in the long run orfor socialreasons while the latter moves I13S0UrcaS from oocfining or slow growthsectors to sectors with high growth rates.57 D!3fined in OECD: Employment Outlook 1988 as: KLabour market tr<:fining(other than special measures for youth and the disabled), including subsis-

341

Pj6t:Jmal-Arb6k um samteJagsmal1989 Pj6lJmal- ArbOk urn samfeJagsmal1989

1974Japan 47.1Sweden 30.5UK 21.2

197643.218.920.1

197843.715.225.5

198043.722.420.4

198242.023.822.1

198442.332.925.3

198641.732.731.6

60 According to J. Cornwall, 265, earnings in japanese industry are made upof three cornoonents of which the contractual earnings are about two-thirdsand bonuses a little less than one-third (contractual earnings 67.3%, overtimepay 6.0% and special cash payments 26.6%). As a consequence employees'income varies with the phases of the business cycle. But. lhe fluctuations inlabour costs WOI'X against unemployment tendencies.61 The 'Gin; coefficient estimates the difference between actural distribution ofincolTI9 where the population or iccorns earners are divided into e.g. ciecilesranging from the lowest decile 10 the highest income decile and hypotheticaldistribution of income by which income distribution is completely equal. Thesacale ranges-from 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete inequality). See M.Sawyer: Income Distribution and the Welfare State in Boltho: EuropeanEconomy.62 Although the intra-sectoral distribution is less egalitarian in Japan than inthe other two countries, egalrtanansim seems to be great in Japan on intra-firm level. The Japanese Labour Ministry's latest survey bears out this pointaccording to C. Leadbeater and J. Uoyd (148): "At 22 when university gradu-ates first join companies, they get a Im~eless than skilled workers 01 the sameage. a little more than unsk.illed worxers, At 30 the differences in monthly payare very small, skilled workers harding a differential of less than 1.1 per centover unskilled and the managerial grades also drtferentiated by less than 1.1per cent over skilled workers. Even the largest differential, between managersand unskilled workers, is less than 1.2 per cent. At 40 the differenllals havewidened slightly to over 1.1 and nearly \.2 par cent between al1grades and 101.3 per cent bottom to top: at 53. at or near peak earrunqs for all grades. rt isover 1.3 per cent between grades and 1.B per cent bottom to top. The annualbonuses show larger differentials at all grades. but even at the 53-year-Oldpeak it is Jess than 2.5 per cent. This extraordinary closeness is unique amongadvanced capitalist states." But there are some cracks in the Japanesemanagerial structures as "big corporations are creating new departments inwhich software engineers are placed and paid more than their1ellows . abreach of the norm." (ibid" 147).63 The index of 'class voting' and the 'Alford index' is defined as the dif1erel1cebetween the percentage of non-manual workers voting for left parties sub-tracted from the percentage of manual workers voting for left parties.64 As W.G. Beasley (1981.313) highlights. in 1971 34% oj the labour forcewas unionized and members of the Japanese trade union movement werenearly 12 million. But. there were 60000 unions so that the average size of theunions was under 200 members (in the USA the average size was 95000merroars). What is more, four-fifths were enterprise unions. comprisingworxers (and sometimes management) of a single firm or plant. Only coal min-ers and seamen (and in a slightly ditlerent sense, teachers) have achieved anational craf1 union of the kind that is normal in the West. according toBeasley, ~AII this makes it difficu~ to harness the strength of the movement for

343

tence allowances to trainees and tho cost of courses, mostly for unemploydpersons. Subsidies to employers for in-firm training are also included, butemployers' own expenditure lor training their employees is not. The categorycovers only training that is funded by the public for reasons connected withlabour market policy. It excludes training provisions available to all adults, aswell as ganarallax credits and other non-selective supports of enterprisetraining.58 According to GECD: Economic Surveys; Japan (Paris 1986) the hourlylabour costs of production workers was as follows in 1975.1985 and 1966:

International comparison of hou rty labourcosts of production workers In 1975 and 1985

In dollars

1975 1985 1985Valued in ex- Valued inchange rates exchange ratesin 1985 in May 1986

Japan 3.05 6.45 9.22Canada 5.86 10.89 10.81France 4.60 7.74 9.80Germany 6.35 9.82 12.97Italy 4.65 7.73 9.66

Belgium 6.41 9.22 12.03Netherlands 6.58 8.92 11.80Sweden 7. t 8 9.62 11.58

Hong Kong 0.76 1.18 1.78Korea 0.37 1.41 1.38Taiwan 0.39 1.45 1.50

59 Gross operating surplus as a percent 01 gross value added in manufactur-ing was as follows in the 1970s and 19805 according to OECD: National Ac-counts 1974·1986 (Paris 1988): •

342

PjOCmal-Arbdlwm samteJagsmaJ 1989 Pi~ma/~ .4rbOk urn samMlagsmal1989

political ends, or even for economic ones. Sohyo (General Councf of TradeUnions), having over 4 million members, has fairly conslstenny supported theSocialist Party. notably its left wing, whereas the next largest association.Domei (Japan Federation of Labour), only about haN Sohyo's size, supportsthe mddla-of-ths-road Democratic Socia fists .• (W.G. Beasley, 315).65 "The variety of Schemes established in SWeden since the 19705 to supportinnovati, and the success of Swedish industry on world markets in recentyears, with a wide range 01 high technology products, has underlined that theindustrial adjustment process is both a raquiraroant and a real possibility. Afurther indicator at success lies in the growth of the contribution on industrialexports In GOP, from 24 per cent in 1970 to 34 per cent In 1983, and in thepositive technological balance at payments (for licences and royalties) _Sweden being ana of the few net exporters of technology in the OECD area:(OECD 1987c, 70). Indeed, employment in R&D intensive industries increasedfrom 30.9% in 1964 to 40.90;., in 1984, while employment in capital intensiveprocess industries decreased in the same period from 20.5% to 17.5% and theshare of raw malerial indusmes ocresed trom 22.9% 10 21.0";" in 1964-~ (LLundberg, 25).66 Indeed in 1980 total outlays of government amounted 45.1% of GOP andhad increased to 48.0% in 1984 (OECD: Structural Adjustment and EconomicPerformance, 344). .67 Furthermore it can be argued that lha service sector, the main site 01 smallfirms, will be curtailed by 'domestic C3prtal' that will make serf-servicing athorne more anractive with decreasing prices 01nousehcio equiprnents. Seee.g. C. Leadbeater/J. Lloyd. 180).68 OECD: Social Expenditure 196fJ..1990; Problems of growth and control; 21.

Bibliography:L Althusser. For Marx; Vintage Books; New York 1970.L AlthusserlE, Bafibar: Reading Capital; New Left Books; London1977.P. Armstrong/A. GlynlJ, Harrison: Capita/ism Since World War If; The Makingand Breakup of the Great Boom; Fontana; London 1984.J. Atkinson: Manpower Strategies for Flexible Organizations in PersonnelManagement! August 1984.J. Atkinson: A Flexible Future: Britain's Dual Labour Force in Marxism Today,Vol. 30 no. 4 1986.W.G. Beasley: The Modern History of Japan; Third Ravised Edition; Weiden-fald and Nicolson; London 1981.J.N. Behrman: Japanese Industrial Policy: A Vieew from Outside in J.N.BehramnlR.E. Driscoll: National Industrial Policies; Oelgeschlager, Gunn &Hain, Publishers, Inc; Cambridge. Massachusens 1984.A. Boltno: The European Economy; Growth and Crisis; Ox1ord UniversityPress; Ox1ord 1985.F. Belusst Benetton, Information Technology in Production and Distribuuon; aStudy 01the Innovation Potential of tteontonet Sectors: SPRU OccasionalPaper Series No. 25; SPRU Unlverstty of Sussex 1987.R. Boyer: The Innuanca of Keynes "on French Economic Policy; Past andPresent in Ht,Wanel: The Policy Consequaces of John Maynard Keynes;M,E. Sharpe; New York 1985.E..A. Bran; International Money and Capitalist Crisis; Heinemann; London1983.D. CampaU et. al.: The American Voter; John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; New York1964.J. Cantwell: The Reorganisation of European Industries ANer Integration inJournal 01Common Marker Studies Vo. XXVI, no. 2. 1987; Basil Blackwell;Oxford.Ce ntral Bank 01 Iceland: Hagtmur mfmaOarfns; Reykjavik 1988.J. Comwall: The Conditions for Economic Recovery; london 1983.I. Craib: Existentialism and Sociology. Cambridge University Press; London1976.A.M. Christenson et. al.: Ideologies and Modem Politics; Thomas Nelson andSons Ltd.; London 1972.Commission at the European Communities: European Economy no, 331987.J. Curran/A. SmithlP. Wingate: Irrpacts and Influences; Methuen; London1987. ,R.A Dahl: Modem Political Analysis; Prentice-Hall, Inc.; Englewood Cliffs;New Jersey 1970. _E. Dahlstrom; Samhallsvetanskap och praktik; studiar ; samhallelig kunskap-sutveckfing; Publica; Stockholm 1980.H.G. G?damer: Philosophical Hermeneutics: Cambridge University Press;

344 345

Pj6lJmaJ. Aftxjk urn samffHagsmaf 1989 Pj66maJ- Arbdk um samfelagsmal1989

London 19n.Detschmann: The Japanese Type of Organization as a Challenge to theSociological Theory 01 Modernization r Thesis 11 or. 17 1987.J.H. Dunning!P. Robson: Multinational Corporate Integration and Regional Eco-nomic Integration in Journal of Common Market Studies Vo, XXVI, no, 2, 1987;Basil Blackwell; Oxford.EEC: Eurostat Review 1974-1983; Luxembourg 1986.F, Engels and K. Marx: The Manifesto at the Communist Party in Urvafsritnr.1; Heimskringla; Aeykjavfk 1968.Lord Ezra: Privalisation: A Middle Course ln :J. Neuberger (ad.):Ptivstisstlon .•.Fair Shares tor AlJorSelfing the Family Silver?, Papermac; London1987.P. Feyerabend: Aga;nst Method; Verso; London 1979.C. Freeman: Technology Policy and Economic Performance; Lessons fromJapan; Pinter Publishers; London 1987.C. Freeman/J, ClaM. Soe1e: UnerrpfoYfT1Qnt and Technicallnnova.tion; AStudy of Long Wav8s and Economic Development; Frances Pinter; London1982.K. Fukushima: Public Use 01 Private Interests: Japan's Industrial Policy inBehrarnn/Rfi. Driscoll: Na.tional Industrial POlicies, Oelgeschlager, Gunn &Hain, Publishers, Inc; Cambridge, Massachusans 1984.H.H. Gerth/C.W. Milts (eds.): From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology: OxtorcUniversity Press; New Yorx 1978.A. Gorz: The Division of Labour, The Harvester Press Ltd.: Sussex 1978.A. Gorz: Farewell to the Working Class; An Essay on Post-Industria) Socist-

ism; Pluto Press; London 1982.A. Gorz: Wege ins Paradies; Rothbuch Verlag; Berlin 1985.J. Haberrnas: Scien~ as kteology in Towards a Rational Society;Heineman: London 1971.J. Habermas: Legitknation Crisis; Heineman; london 1976.C. Handy: The Future of WorK: WhatJobs wi/I there be? What will life be Ijke? Whatneeds to be done?; Basil Blackwell; London 1985.J. HarrisonlB. Morgan: Hatterslsy's economics in Capital & Class no. 26 1985,J. Hirschi R. Roth: Des NeUB Gesicht des KapitaJismus; Vorn Fordismus zumPost-Fordismus; VSA~Verlag; Hamburg 1986,J. Holloway/S. Picciano (ed.): State and Capital; A Marxist Debate; EdwardArnold; London 1979.IMF:./nternationaI Financial Statistics; Yearbook 1988.J. Israel: SprtJXets diaJektik och diaJektikens sprtJ.k, Esselta Studium: Lund1980.B. Jessop (a): The Capitalist State; Marxist Theories and Methods; MartinRobertson; Oxford 1983.B, Jessop (b): The Capitalist State and the Rule of capnal; Problems in theAnalysis of Business Associations in West European Politics, no. 1 1983.

346

B. Jessop: Accumulation Strategies, State Forms and Hegemonic Projects inKapfta.lista.t no. 10 1983.Ivar Jonsson: Thatscherisminn 09 elnahagskreppan in R9tturno. 3 & 4 1996.lvar J6nsson: Keynesismmn ur kreppu ikreppu in Retturno. 2 1987.Ivar J6nsson: Twkni/Jr6un 09 sarrKeppnissta6a; smarfki og nyja twknin;Felaqs- og hagvrsindastofnun fslands; Reykjavik 1988.R. KapJinsky: Automation; Harlow 1984.R. KapJinsky: Changing Patterns of Industial Location and IntemationalCorrpetltion: The Rote of TNCs and the Impact of Micro-Electronics r E.A.D.1.Bulletin no. 1 1985.H. KastendielOH. Kastendieki H. Reister. Institutional Strategies for TradeUnion Participation: An Assessment of lhelncorporation Thesis in O. JacobilB.JeSSOp/H. KastendiekIM. Regini; Economic Crisis, Trade Unions and theState; Croom Helm; London 1986.P .J. Katzenstein: Small States in World Markets; Industrial Policy in Europe;CometJ University Press; Ithaca 1986.W. Keegan: Mrs Thatcher'S Economic Experiment, Penguin; London 1984.MW. Kirby: The Decline of British Economic Power since 1870;l. Lundberg: Intemationell konku[!ens och omvandling; Tidan; Stockholm1988.OK Kirkeby: Marxismen som ekonotrssk vkienskep: Roskilde Univarsitatsfor-lag; RoskiJde 1979.W. Korpi: The Democratic Class Struggle: Routledge & Kegan Paul; London1983.T. S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; The University of ChicacoPress; Chicaco 1970.E. Laclau/C. MauNe: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy; Towards a RadicalDemocratic Politics; Verso; London 1985.S. LashiJ. Urry: The End of Organized Capitalism, Polity Press; Cambridge1987.C. Leadbeatar/J. Lloyd: In Search of Work; Penguin; Harmondsworth 1987.J. Lehmbruch and P.C. Schmitter: Pattems of Corporatist Policy Making;SAGE; Beverly Hills; California 1982.G. l.ukaks: History and Class Consciousness; Merlin Press; London 1971.LO.: 3 Years with Employee Investment Funds; An Evaluation; LO. Stock-hoim 1988.S. MacBride et.al.: Many Voices, One World; Communication and SOCiety -Today and Tomorrow, Kogan Page/Unipub/uNESCO; London 1983.C.B. Macpherson: The Life and Times of Uberasl Democracy, Oxford Univer-sity Press; Oxford 1979. _E. Mandel: Late Capftalism; New Left Books; London 1976E. Mandai: The Second SlulTp; A Marxist Analysis of Recession in theSev8(Jties; New Left Books; London 1978.K. Marx: Early Writings; Penguin; Books Ltd. London 1975.

347

Pj6rJmal- ArbOk um samtelagsmal1989

K. Marx: Gruridrisse; Penguin; Books Ltd. London 1974.K. Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Lawrence andWishart; London 1971.K. Marx: Surveys from Exile; Penguin Books Ltd.; Harmondswoth 1973.K Marx: The First International and After, Penguin Books Ltd.; Harmond-sworth 1974.K Marx: CapitalVolurne 1; Penguin Books Ltd.: Harmondsworth 1976.12K. Marx: Capita/volume 3; Penguin Books Ltd.; Harmondsworth 1981.J. Mazier: Growth and Crisis - A Marxist Interpretation in A. Boltho: The.European Economy; Growth and Crisis, Oxiord University Press; Oxford 1985.J. Mendner: Technologische EntwickJung und Arbeitsprozess; Fischer Tasch-enbuch Verlag GmbH; Frankfurt am Main 1975.R. Michels: Political Parties; Free Press; Glencoe 1958.OE CD: Employment Ourtook;Paris 1984 .DECO: Employment Outlook; Pans 1985.OECD: National Accounts 1971-83; Paris 1985.OECDb: OECD Economic Studies. no. 4 1985; Paris 1985.OE CO: Social Expenditure 1960.1990; Problems of growth and control, Paris1985.DECO a: Structural Adjustment and Economic Performancs; Paris 1987.OECD b: Economic Surveys 198611987; United Kingdom; Paris 1987.OECD: OECD Economic Outlook; nr. 41 1987OECD c: Reviews of National Science and Technology Policy; Sweden; Paris'987.OECD: External Debt; Definition, Statistical Coverage and Methodology, Paris1988; I

OECD a: Labour Force Statistics; 1966-86; Paris 1988.OECD: NationalAccounts 1974-1986; Paris 1988.OECD b: The Newly industrialising Countries: Challenge and Opportunity forOECD Industries; Paris 1988. .S. Olatsson: ls/enska Veffer6arkerfm; Lflskj6r og stjOmmat, unpublished paper;Department of Social Science; University of lealand.L Panitch: Trace Unions and the State in New Let: Aeviewno. 125. 1981.T.J. Pe~lIK. Tsunekawa: Corporatism without Labour? The .lapanesa Anom-aly in Scmitter/Lanmbruch 1979. .M.J. PioratC. Sabel; The Second Industrial Divide; Possibilities for Prosperity;Basic Books Inc.; New Yorl< 1984. . •A. Pollert: Dismantling flexibility in Capital & Class No. 34 198B_N. Poutantzas: State, Power, SociaHsm; New Left Books; London 1978.N. Poulantzas: Political Power and Socia] Classes: New Left Books; London1975.A Rannia:Smalf Firms, Big Problems: The Pol~ical Economy of Small Busl-nesses In CapftaJ & Class no. 25; london 1985.

348

II

II

Pj6lJmaJ- ArMk um samtelagsmaJ 1989

H. Reichelt: Kapitalbegrebets fogisKe struktut hos Karl Marx; Forlapet Mad usa;Viborg 1978.A. Rosdolsky: Kapitalens tilbfivelseshistorie; bind 1 og 2; Modtryk; Aarhus1975.A. RothweliNV. Zegveld: industrial lnnovation and Public Policy; Preparing forthe 1980s and the 1990S; Frances Pinter LTD.; London 1981.D. Sasscon: Europe's Left: th9 new continental blend in Marxism Today may1986.M. Sawyer: Income Distribution and the Welfare State in A. Boltho: TheEuropean Economy; Growth and Crisis, Oxiord University Press; Oxford 1985.M. Scriven: Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations.p.e. Schmitter/J. Lehmbruch: Trends Towards Corporatist Interest-Mediation;SAGE; Beverly Hills; California 1979.J. Scott: Corporations. Classes and Capitalsim, Hutchinson 01 London1979.M. StopfordlJ.H. Dunning: Multinationals; Corrpany Performance and GlobalTrends; Macmillan Publishers: London 1983.P. Teague: The Anarnativa Economic Strategy: A Time to go European inCspite! & Class no. 26: London "986.J. Tobin Keynes's Policies in Theory and Practice in H.L. Wattel.J. Tomlinson: Monetarism: Is there an Alternative; Non-Moneterist Strategies forthe Economy, Basil Blackwell;O:dord 1986.J. Waddington: Business unionism and traqmentanon WIThinthe rue in Capital& Class no. 36 1988.H.L Wane!: The Policy Consequnces ot John Maynard Keynes; M.E. Sharpe;New York 1985.J. Zysman: Govemment. Markets, and Growth; Financial Systems and thePolitics of Industrial Change: Cornell University Press; tlhaca and london 1983.Pj6tJ1ff no. 11 1988; Felagsutgalan; Reykjavik.

349