JBS, VOL XXXVII, NO 1 (SPRING 2006) 94

Distinct Mental Structures in Transitional Culture: An Empirical Analysis of Values and Identities in Estonia and Sweden

Veronika Kalmus and Triin Vihalemm, University of Tartu, Estonia

Abstract: This article examines the structures of value consciousness and self-identification in two EU countries: Estonia, a representative transitional society, and Sweden, a representative stable welfare society. The study is an attempt to operationalize Sztompka’s concept of “cultural templates” on the meso-level of analysis, by revealing latent mental structures. Our main conclusion is that the transitional culture in Estonia can be characterized by three specific mental patterns: nostalgic resignation, striving for success, and an escapist Western orientation, represented by different social groups. The process of individualization, characteristic of Western welfare societies, has taken place in transitional Estonia with delays and significant modifications.

he cultural disruption brought about by Soviet occupation and the collective cultural trauma caused by the collapse of the communist

system have activated specific cultural processes in east European societies. Neither teleological models of “catching up” with the West nor dichotomous models positing systematic differences between East and West can adequately describe these processes, as several recent elaborate sociological and philosophical analyses of the post-Soviet transitional culture (e.g., Outhwaite and Ray 2004; Sztompka 2004; Vogt 2005) have pointed out. These analyses, however, focus mostly on the macro level, a prime example being Sztompka’s concept of “cultural templates,” which uses Poland as a model.

T

At the micro level, a number of authors have examined the particular value orientations and patterns of self-categorization (ethnic group, nationality, European) displayed by residents of both transitional societies, and “old” European democracies (see, for instance, Amin 2004; Burgess 2002; Hansen 2002; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Kristeva 2001; Mikkeli 1998; Shore 2000; Schwartz 1995). Much less attention, though, has been paid to phenomena on the meso-level of analysis such as latent structures of value consciousness and self-identification, not to mention the joint structures of these mental phenomena. We define latent mental structures as collectively shared knowledge about the interrelationship between social phenomena and moral categories such as wealth, power, social recognition and salvation. These structures constitute the “cultural lenses” that people

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use to interpret and rationalize social, sometimes traumatic, events and situations (Sztompka 2004, 176). We also believe that comparative analysis and interpretation of mental structures in transitional countries and stable welfare societies can help to elucidate the specificity of transitional culture and provide an opportunity to make prognoses about social scenarios.

This article therefore attempts to operationalize Sztompka’s concept of “cultural templates” at the meso-level of analysis. In the theoretical section, we discuss some previous analyses of transitional cultures, focusing especially on how the inertia of the “old” culture has contributed to the formation of “templates” specific to these societies. Since we focus on two aspects of culture -- values and identities -- in our empirical study, we begin by giving an overview of comparative value surveys in post-socialist countries and Protestant Europe. We then discuss whether theories of individualization and transformation of collective identities in the post-industrial West can be applied when interpreting the process of social atomization in transitional societies.

The section that follows outlines the methodology of our study, which compares two European Union member states: Estonia (a transitional post-communist society) and Sweden (a stable welfare society). In the empirical part, we analyze latent structures of value consciousness and self-identification as well as the joint structures of values and identities. We also focus on the inherence of the joint mental structures in different socio-demographic groups, on the assumption that this enables us to estimate the cohesiveness of the two societies and to assess possible paths for the future.

The Transitional Cultures

Most analyses of the transformation of former Soviet bloc countries proceed from a structural and institutional basis, focusing on the economy and politics (e.g. Dryzek and Holmes 2002; Elster et al. 1998; Nørgaard 2000). However, the first sociological and philosophical analyses of the post-Soviet (transitional) culture have now also appeared (e.g. Kennedy 2002; Outhwaite and Ray 2004; Sztompka 2004; Vogt 2005). Our own analysis is based mainly on the concepts developed by Sztompka and Vogt.

According to Sztompka, stable societies are characterized by a certain cultural equilibrium embodied in traditions, values and identity. Large social and economic changes upset this equilibrium. However, “old” traditions, values and identities are still influential, because the “templates” used to interpret new and disturbing conditions are taken from the “old” cultural pool. The obsolete culture, already in the process of being replaced, thus shapes, to a great extent, the reception of the symbols, values, and identities of the new culture. Conditions or situations that

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would be fully congruent with a new culture may therefore be defined as unacceptable in the context of transition (Sztompka 2004, 165). Whether or not people define the whole change as traumatic depends on the assumed cultural frame of reference, relative to some standard of normal, orderly expectations. Sztompka (2004, 176) uses the term “cultural templates,” by which he means collectively shared symbolic and mental resources used for filtering and interpreting the facts of change.

Taking Poland as an example, Sztompka mentions several such “templates” that make it possible to rationalize and soften traumatic events and situations, interpreting them as the temporary “price” for “major victory.” The main ideals of victory in Poland were regained sovereignty, as well as a return to the West (Europe) and to the core of Western Christendom.

Henri Vogt refers to the same phenomenon when elaborating his concept of utopia and the disillusionment of transitional societies. Vogt for his part stresses the inertia of the utopian way of thinking derived from Soviet culture. Although most people (at least in Estonia) did not believe sincerely in the ideals of communism and socialism, the system in which they lived nevertheless shaped their views about society and the future. Utopia in this context is defined as “not-yet-consciousness” -- a mental mechanism which gauges the present day by reference to a future ideal. According to Vogt, the revolutions in eastern Europe were not only reactions to the weakening of the Soviet Union, but were inspired by and carried out with ideas about how life should be. He goes on to describe the transition period in terms of “disillusionment” or rejection of utopia, as members of society struggle to cope with the ambivalence of the new situation. Vogt’s analysis bears many similarities to that of Sztompka, who presents liberalism, democracy, freedom (including the freedom of choice and consumption), sovereignty, and technological development as cultural resources of the “old” system. What Vogt adds to the picture is the general utopian frame of thinking characteristic of post-Soviet culture.

While both authors agree that the facts of change are filtered through collectively shared cultural lenses (emphasizing in this regard the role of shared resources and symbols), they remind us that these “cultural lenses” are not employed homogeneously by all members of society: the same phenomenon may be interpreted in different ways by members of various social groups. Vogt cites as an example socio-economic inequality -- how people interpret competition over the division of resources. The idea that equality of opportunity does not guarantee equal results might be interpreted as “natural” and “logical,” but also as betrayal and delusion (Vogt 2005).

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In speaking of collective “cultural templates,” Sztompka notes that different social groups may “pick up” different symbols and narratives. For example, with regard to Poland he argues that:

the more groups or social categories … are objectively affected by the ‘pains of transition’ … the more they emphasize three symbolic and ethically infused cultural themes: security, equality and justice; whereas those groups that are more successful … refer rather to the idea of individual freedom and the pragmatic themes of efficiency and prosperity. (Sztompka 2004, 177)

In sum, both authors underline the importance of cultural inertia, which makes possible the parallel existence and interaction of the “new” and the “old” culture in transitional societies despite quick changes on the level of social structure and ideology. Cultural context and symbolic resources are therefore important factors in interpreting the development of transitional societies.1 Our aim in what follows is to create a meso-level framework between the general theories of transitional culture and the possibilities of empirical measurement. We have focused on two important aspects of culture -- values and identity -- in our study.

Contrasting and Similar Values of the Transitional Culture and Protestant Europe

We proceed from the view that the relationships between culture, mentality, economics and politics are mutually supportive (Inglehart 1997, 328-9), and deny explanations tending toward economic or cultural determinism. There is much empirical evidence to support this standpoint: Inglehart and Baker (2000, 32), for instance, have drawn upon multivariate analyses of data from the World Values Surveys in order to argue that a society’s culture is shaped by its entire economic and historical cultural heritage. On the dimensions of traditional/secular-rational values and survival/self-expression values, societies with a common cultural heritage generally fall into common clusters. At the same time, the position of a society on the global cultural map also reflects its level of economic development, occupational structure, and religion.

Several authors who have paid specific attention to value change in transitional cultures have added concrete explanations to this standpoint. Stamenova (1999, 63), for instance, suggests that three different factors influence value change during post-socialist transformation: the heritage of socialism, the reorganization of life strategies under pressure of socio-economic change, and globalization. The first two of these factors drive people towards materialist individualism, while phenomena consistent with

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globalization, especially economic and cultural openness of a society, bring forth post-materialist value orientations. In a further study, Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997, 250) refer to the “cultural contradictions of transition,” which open up possibilities for two different developments. On the one hand, economic growth, openness to the West and generational replacement ought to promote post-materialist values. On the other hand, economic and social constraints and growing insecurity create a strong potential basis for materialist orientations.

In March 1991 the Balticom survey collected comparative data on Estonia and Sweden using the Rokeach system of value measurement. This suggested that there was indeed a cultural potential for two paths of development. On the one hand, Estonia was characterized by a higher evaluation of materialist values related to security, wealth, and technical development, while in Sweden, universal and hedonistic values such as honesty, freedom, equality, pleasant life, and happiness were evaluated more highly. On the other hand, Estonian respondents attached more importance than the Swedes to self-respect and self-realization (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997).

On the global cultural map drawn by Inglehart and Baker on the basis of the 1995-98 World Values Surveys, Estonia ranks very high on the traditional/secular-rational dimension and very low when it comes to values of survival/self-expression.2 Sweden, in common with its Nordic neighbors, ranks very high on both value dimensions.3 Thus, contrary to what Estonians would like to believe, their value orientations are in fact still “a world apart from [those of] their Scandinavian neighbors.” (Taagepera 2002, 243) In fact, the three Baltic countries form “a group barely distinct from the Orthodox crowd,” (ibid.) being close to Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria. According to Inglehart and Baker (2000, 41), the Baltic countries’ position is due to the effect of reduced socioeconomic security during the economic decline of the 1990s. Also, as Taagepera (2002, 243) suggests, the “Balts seem to have been Sovietized mentally more deeply than they thought it possible.” At the same time, however, global trends have undoubtedly exerted a strong influence on the dynamics of transitional culture. It is to these broader trends that we now turn.

Individualization and Collective Identities

The transition narratives mentioned by Vogt and Sztompka -- freedom (including freedom of consumption), going back to the West and technological development -- have also been widely referred to in Estonia. The attitude towards the transformation that occurred in Estonia during the 1990s remains relatively positive, with 55 percent of Estonia’s inhabitants

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regarding these changes as having been beneficial for them personally (Lauristin 2004, 232). At the same time, 85 percent of respondents in a recent survey declared that the changes were happening too quickly (Vihalemm and Masso 2005). It appears, therefore, that most people in Estonia have “invested” a lot of personal resources in coping with the new situation and are rather satisfied with their achievements, but regard the challenge as being difficult. The neo-liberal reforms carried out in Estonia at the beginning of the 1990s acquired social legitimization partly through the aforementioned narratives, and partly due to the accumulated wish for human emancipation from authoritarian state dependency and predictability, which had reduced personal choices to a minimum. In this regard, free-market competition is still fetishized, while underachievement is deemed to stem from a lack of personal skills.

These legitimizing narratives support and cast specific light on the ongoing process of individualization in post-Soviet Estonian society. The term “individualization” was coined in order to define the condition of Western societies, which are supposedly characterized by subjects’ striving for personal autonomy, several choices for life projects, and little concern about the “common good” (e.g. Appadurai 1996; Bauman 2001; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Castells 1997; Lash and Friedman 1992).

Bauman (2002) attributes the fragmentation of collective identities in Western welfare societies to the complexities of the globalized late modern condition. Since “common causes of troubles” do not exist in a complex late modern society, there is little scope for collective mobilization and the formation of group consciousness. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002, xxii) concur with this assessment, arguing that “the Western type of individualized society tells us to seek biographical solutions to the systemic contradictions.”

The beginning of the 1990s in Estonia was characterized by a period of high social turbulence, when people’s social positions and life trajectories could and did change rapidly. The new logic of self-determination, described by Bauman (2001) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) as leaving the full responsibility for performance to the individual, was highly relevant in Estonian society. The duty of finding solutions and coping with the risks and contradictions produced by societal transformation was therefore individualized, and this proved traumatic for a great many people who had lived for sixty years under the communist model of the welfare state and the public discourse of “real socialism.” A new social hierarchy -- “winners and losers” of transition -- has emerged in post-Soviet Estonia: self-positioning within this imagined hierarchy correlates closely to attitudes regarding the changes in Estonia and to evaluation of consumption possibilities (Lauristin 2004). The individualized nature of

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Estonian transitional culture is also reflected in low levels of interpersonal trust4 compared to Sweden and in low participation in third sector organizations (Vihalemm and Masso 2005).

Authors analyzing Western welfare societies have discerned a new mode of individualization characteristic of late (second) modernity. The latter, they argue, has engendered a new type of solidarity and togetherness, which arises from an acknowledgment that others have similar challenges which they must meet alone. According to Bauman (2002), a desperate need for “networking” -- which he calls “affectionate sociality” -- prompts individuals to step onto the public stage. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002, 161-2) also believe that a new type of sociality will lead to spontaneous political activism, ecological movements, self-organization, volunteer work, and care for others. Their term for this is “altruistic individualism.”

Empirical research has confirmed that the new cultural forms of solidarity described by Beck and Bauman do have potential within Western welfare societies such as Sweden (e.g. Therborn 1995). By way of comparison, analysis based on single variables has shown that there is no solid basis for the formation of new, “social” individualism in transitional societies (see, for instance, the Estonian Human Development Report 2001; 2003).

Our aim is to investigate the problem of individualization by analyzing the general mental structures of Estonians and comparing them with representatives of a stable welfare society -- Sweden. Inspired by earlier analyses (Kalmus and Vihalemm 2004; Vihalemm and Masso 2004), we will pay less attention to single values and self-identifications and focus instead on general structures, by using a factor analysis of values and identities, and a secondary cross-factor analysis that brings together the structures of values and identities.

Data and Measurement

Data

Our analysis is based on collaborative and comparative surveys that were carried out simultaneously in the two countries. In Estonia, the survey covered the entire population aged 15-74. A proportional model of the general population (by areas and urban/rural division) and multi-step probability random sampling was used, with a total sample size of 1,470. In addition, a quota based on the respondents’ preferred language of communication was used to include proportional numbers of Estonian-speakers (two thirds of the population) and Russian-speakers (one third of

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the population) in the sample. A self-administered questionnaire, together with a follow-up interview, was used. The survey took place from December 2002 to January 2003.

In Sweden, the survey covered the Södertörn region,5 the area south and southwest of the inner city of Stockholm. Self-administered questionnaires were distributed and collected by mail in the period from November 2002 to February 2003. The sample was constructed as a random sample of 2,500 individuals, proportionally drawn from the population (16-74 years old), stratified by eight municipalities of the region. The original sample was reduced by seventy-eight individuals for various reasons (some respondents were deceased, had moved away before the data collection, etc.). The net sample was then 2,422 individuals and the response rate was 52.6% (1,272 persons). The material, however, has a fairly high corresponding proportion to the official distribution of people from the eight municipalities involved. This is also the case when it comes to the distribution of age and, with the exception of one municipality, when it comes to gender. The representation of immigrants in the sample is fairly good, except for two municipalities (Bolin and Notini 2005, 73).

Measures

The questionnaires distributed in Estonia and Sweden included two sets of comparable indicators of mental orientations -- values and self-identification. In order to retain the possibility of comparative analysis in a diachronic perspective, the twenty-five value indicators (Rokeach’s system of measurement) employed in the Balticom value surveys of 1991-95 (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997) were used (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the list of indicators). The values were measured on a five-point scale (from “not important at all” to “very important”). In following Rokeach, we considered single value concepts (words and expressions denoting values) to be relatively independent items, which are not built into definite hierarchies, but which can be related to one another in various dimensions or clusters. For the purpose of generalizing and interpreting our data, we used the theory of motivational types and dimensions of values elaborated by Schwartz (1990; 1996). Schwartz expanded Rokeach’s list of basic values and generated fifty-six indicators, which cluster around ten central motivational goals. The twenty-five indicators we used in our studies represent Schwartzian value clusters as shown in Table A1.

Schwartz (1990) also defined the relationship between his system of values and individualism-collectivism as a macro-level societal dimension. Two motivational goals, Self-Direction and Stimulation, and some universal values (world at peace, social justice, equality) should be more

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important to the average person in more individualist (contractual) societies. Conformity, Tradition and Benevolence should be more important in more collectivist (communal) societies. The rest of the motivational types of values, characterized by Schwartz as “collectivist” (Security) or “individualist” (Hedonism, Achievement and Power), do not display significant differentiation between societal types.

For the purposes of our study, social identity is understood as a process of signification whereby individuals and/or collectives distinguish themselves in their social relations with others (Jenkins 1996). The process of identification involves the publicly offered external definition -- called social categorization -- and the internal process of (partial) acquisition or rejection of identities, called internalization (Jenkins 1996; 2000). We have operationalized the concept of identity according to the definition proposed by the social psychologist Henri Tajfel: identity is a part of an individual’s self-conception, which derives from knowledge about one’s belonging to social groups together with the value and emotional meaning ascribed to the groups. This definition has, in addition to our own research,6 informed several empirical studies of the political and cultural identity of minority groups.

In the surveys conducted in Estonia and Sweden, identity was measured using the question: “Which groups do you feel a certain belonging to, so that you could say ‘we’ about them and yourself?” The multi-variable question included twenty-six different categories (see Table A1) from which a respondent could choose as many as he or she wanted. In this regard, the more frequently selected categories were assumed to be more rigid, and those that were used less often were deemed to carry less readily identifiable symbols.

Analysis

We proceed from Schwartz’s theory of value types and its central assumption that values with similar meanings are highly inter-correlated (Schwartz and Sagiv 1995, 101). Although Schwartz’s comparative research has, in broad terms, confirmed the near universality of the structure of value types, the number of unusual locations of single values and dynamic interrelations among the value types in his analysis suggest that some value types have culture-specific meanings. We assume that such intercultural variation in mental structures refers to cultural differences in shared knowledge about the interrelations between social phenomena and moral categories such as wealth, power, social recognition, and salvation.

In order to reduce twenty-five single value concepts and twenty-six categories of self-identification into generalized mental structures

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consisting of items with similar meanings, we used factor analysis (the principal components method with Varimax rotation). To be able to analyze and compare different factor solutions according to their natural internal structure, we used the criterion of eigenvalues over one, not any fixed number of factors, in extraction.

In order to reveal mental structures encompassing both value orientations and patterns of self-identification, we carried out secondary factor analysis -- that is, we used the factor scores resulting from the factor analyses of single value indicators and categories of self-identification as new variables for factor analysis.7 Again, we used the criterion of eigenvalues over one to determine the number of factors.

The raw data (mean scores of value scales and percentages of agreement with categories of self-identification) are presented in the Appendix, Table A1.

Results

The Structures of Value Consciousness

Table 1 reveals that the structures of Estonian and Swedish respondents’ value consciousness are quite different. The first factor in the Estonian sample comprises very different types of values, which according to the Schwartzian typology are individualist as well as collectivist and universal. As a common core underlying these values, one can detect the pursuit of personal and social harmony and recognition. Taken together, the values forming this factor are considered relatively important by Estonian respondents (see Table A1 in the Appendix).

The values that form Factor 1 in the Estonian sample belong to three different factors in the Swedish sample. One group (self-respect, wisdom, true friendship) forms Factor 3 in the value consciousness of Swedish respondents. These latter values have a common core referring to a well- balanced, mature personality with a strong social sense and network-building capabilities. Moreover, values such as justice, equality, self-realization and social recognition load relatively highly on this factor, and we have therefore labeled it Self-Respect and Social Maturity.

Another group of values from Factor 1 in the Estonian sample (honesty, mature love, family security, national security, justice, freedom, inner harmony) belongs to the same factor also in Sweden. In the Swedish sample, however, Factor 1 is more coherent: predominantly it comprises values that belong to Schwartzian clusters of Universalism and Security. The exceptions to this pattern are freedom (which belongs to the Schwartzian category of Self-Direction), honesty, and mature love

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(Benevolence). All of these values display a high mean in the Swedish sample (see Table A1).

Table 1. Value Structures in Estonia and in Sweden (results of the factor analyses).

ESTONIA SWEDEN F1 Harmony and Recognition F1 Universalism and Security

Self-respect .660 World at peace .751 Happiness 4 .634 Freedom .736

Honesty .623 Family security .724 Mature love .622 National security .680

Wisdom .593 Honesty .671 Family security 2 .553 Health .640 Self-realization 5 .551 Mature love 2 .625 True friendship .546 Inner harmony 2 .614

Justice .544 Clean environment .604 Pleasant life 4 .541 Justice 3 .552

National security 2 .463 World of beauty 2, 5 .514 Freedom .452 Equality 3 .474

Inner harmony 3 .452

F2 Hedonism, Stimulation, Achievement

F2 Environment and Physical Well-Being

Exciting life .738

Clean environment .788 Pleasant life .715 Health .782 Self-realization 3 .612

Technical development 5 .534 Happiness 1 .583 World at peace .522 Comfortable life 1 .572

F3 Orthodox Salvation F3 Self-Respect and Social Maturity

Salvation .783 Self-respect .725 Equality 4 .570 Wisdom .649

World of beauty 2 .528 True friendship 1 .502 F4 Material Well-Being and

Hedonism F4 Power

Comfortable life .727 Wealth 2 .711 Wealth .702 Power 5 .676

F5 Self-Establishment Technical development .572 Power .719 F5 Protestant Salvation

Social recognition 3 .519 Salvation .778 Exciting life .501 Social recognition 3, 4 .474

Note: The numbers in superscript indicate the numbers of factors, in which the factor loadings of the variable were also considerably high (>.3).

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Some individualistic values from Factor 1 in the Estonian sample (happiness, self-realization, pleasant life) are represented in Factor 2 in Sweden. This factor unites, without exception, five values that belong to three Schwartzian individualistic value types: Hedonism (pleasant life, happiness, comfortable life), Stimulation (exciting life), and Achievement (self-realization). Thus, the second factor in the Swedish sample expresses an orientation to post-materialism and hedonism. Taken together, these values are less highly evaluated by Swedish respondents than those that constitute the factor of Universalism and Security.

An important peculiarity in Estonian respondents’ value consciousness lies in the composition of the second factor, where universal values such as clean environment and world at peace are united with health, a Security-type value, and modernist-materialist technical development. The connection between the latter and the values whose common denominator is physical security and well-being can be explained by Estonians’ belief in technological innovation and progress, which has acquired the status of mythology in public discourses. We have to admit, however, that technical development is evaluated less highly than three other values in this factor. In Sweden, these three values (clean environment, health, and world at peace) belong to the factor of Universalism and Security, while technical development is related, more logically, to Power.

Another crucial distinguishing feature in the value consciousness of Estonian respondents reveals itself in the composition of the third factor, where traditional salvation is brought together with the universal values equality and world of beauty. Yet another value related to Universalism -- inner harmony -- loads strongly on this factor. As an orientation to universalism and collectivism rather than individualism is characteristic of Byzantine-Orthodox religious doctrines (e.g., Russian Orthodoxy), we have labeled the factor Orthodox Salvation.8 The distinctive cultural-religious substance of this value orientation reveals itself more clearly in comparison with the corresponding factor in the Swedish sample (Factor 5), which embraces two different values -- salvation and Power-related social recognition. As a common foundation underlying these values, we see the Protestant ethic based on the Calvinist doctrine of predestination (Weber 1958). This interpretation is further supported by the fact that power also loads highly on this factor. The ethical-aesthetic dimension of Protestant Salvation is represented by the high loading of world of beauty on this factor. Although the core variable (salvation) obtains a relatively low evaluation in Sweden as well as in Estonia, the different composition of the corresponding factors gives evidence of the diverse historical-cultural heritage of the two countries. The cultural layer of Protestantism and Baltic

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German cultural influences in Estonia is, however, revealed through the high loading of social recognition on the factor.

A further noteworthy difference in the value consciousness of Estonian respondents lies in the fact that wealth neither belongs to the Power-related factor, nor loads strongly on it. Instead, wealth belongs together with hedonistic comfortable life (Factor 4). In the Estonian context, these two values can be interpreted, in Inglehart’s terms, as scarcity values that are not attainable by all people. We can see that wealth, in particular, tends to be more highly valued by Estonians than by Swedes (Table A1). In the context of a transitional society, this value has a strong connotation of hedonism and consumerism (hence the label given to the factor -- Material Well-Being and Hedonism). At the same time, the structural relations between different types of capital and related values (wealth and power) are not yet reflected in most Estonians’ value consciousness. Instead, power forms a separate factor together with social recognition and Stimulation-related exciting life (Factor 5), while self-realization and technical development also have strong loadings on the factor. Since these values are linked by the common motivational aim of improving one’s social position and life-style, we have labeled the factor in question Self-Establishment. The core values of this factor are, however, considered relatively unimportant by Estonian respondents. In general one can say that in the Estonian case, individualistic values are divided between two factors, both of them dominated by a modernist worldview.

In the Swedish sample, the fourth factor corresponds almost exactly to the Schwartzian type of Power, comprising wealth, power, and technical development (the fourth Power-related value in our survey, social recognition, also loads strongly on this factor). All these values have relatively low means in the Swedish sample.

In general we have to admit that the structure of Swedes’ value consciousness is internally more coherent as well as more consistent with the Schwartzian typology of values. Value clusters formed by factor analysis of the Estonian sample do not correspond to the Schwartzian motivational types of values. The factors are, however, internally rather coherent and quite interpretable. Thus, we may say that several values do indeed have culture-specific meanings, which have probably been brought about by specific social arrangements and/or socialization practices (cf. Schwartz and Sagiv 1995, 107).

The Structures of Self-Identification

The factor structures of identities are presented in Table 2 and the frequencies of self-identification with various social groups are presented

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in the Appendix, Table A1. Table 2 shows that the groups of identification are structured into different factors in Estonian and Swedish samples.

In Estonia, the first factor can be labeled as Network Identity, which includes stronger factor loadings of the categories family, friends, colleagues, schoolmates, relatives/kin, and, respectively, Estonians or Estonian Russians. The factor structure is similar in Sweden (see Table A1), but the factor itself ranks fourth in the Swedish identity structure. The different location of factors reflects a greater strength and universality of this answering pattern among Estonian people.

The common label for the categories of the second factor in the Estonian sample could be Mental Solidarity. This factor is based on the acknowledgment of similar interests, taste preferences, worldviews, and memories of certain events. Table A1 shows that mental self-identification is internalized by nearly half of respondents in Estonia as well as in Sweden.

The third factor can be labeled as Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Social Space and Position. This factor comprises solidarities that arise on the basis of shared neighborhood (neighbors, co-inhabitants of the town/county), similar social and political position (common people, co-citizens) and the category of wider civic solidarity (all people living in Estonia). Also the meaning of generational identity and solidarity is connected with shared socio-economic position.

Table A1 shows that feelings of local, civic, and status/class solidarity are less widespread in Estonia than in Sweden. It is interesting that in Estonia, self-identification on the basis of lifestyle similarities (taste, memories) and opinions (interests, worldview) forms a separate factor, which is not intertwined with social identities on the basis of habitation, social position, etc. In Sweden the two aforementioned sets of identification categories are integrated into one factor, labeled Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Mentality and Space (Factor 1). This factor includes the categories: people with similar interests; taste; worldview; memories; people of the same generation; common people; working people; co-inhabitants of the town/county; co-citizens; neighbors.

This suggests that in the thinking of Swedish respondents, solidarities on the basis of habitation and social position are connected with similarities in lifestyle (taste, memories) and opinions (interests, worldview). This response pattern is also stronger in Sweden (where it constitutes the first factor) than it is in Estonia. Social distinction -- to use Bourdieu’s sense of the term -- therefore seems to be more apparent in the identity structure of

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Table 2. The Structures of Self-Identification in Estonia and in Sweden (results of the factor analyses).

ESTONIA SWEDEN

F1 Network Identity F1 Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Mentality and Space

Family .706 People with similar interests .740

Friends .677 People with similar taste, preferences .733

Colleagues .633 People with similar worldviews .722

Estonians / Estonian Russians .631

People with whom I share common memories or

experiences of certain events and activities

.695

Relatives, kin 3 .578 People of the same generation .583

Schoolmates .496 Common people, ordinary citizens .518

F2 Mental Solidarity Working people 2 .537

People with similar interests .720 Co-inhabitants of the town/county 3 .510

People with similar worldviews .719 People of the same citizenship 3 .484

People with similar taste, preferences .697 Neighbors 4 .406

People with whom I share common memories or experiences of certain

events and activities .672

F2 Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material

Achievement / Underachievement

F3 Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Space and Position Successful people .797

All people living in Estonia .661 People who have no luck in life .776

Co-inhabitants of the town /county .661 Entrepreneurs, owners .724 Neighbors 1 .638 Wealthy people .720

People of the same generation 2 .583 Poor people .715 Common people, ordinary citizens

6 .518 People who make decisions .709

People of the same citizenship 4 .464 F3 Pan-Regional (and Civic) Solidarity

F4 Pan-Regional Solidarity Europeans .753 Europeans .759 All people living in Sweden .696

People of Northern countries .749 Humankind .677 Humankind 3 .575 Scandinavians .669

F5 Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Achievement Schoolmates 4 .418

Entrepreneurs, owners .766 F4 Network Identity Wealthy people .745 Family .817

DISTINCT MENTAL STRUCTURES IN TRANSITIONAL CULTURE 109

Table 2 (Continued) ESTONIA SWEDEN

People who make decisions .577 Relatives, kin .782 Successful people .516 Friends .742

F6 Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Underachievement

Colleagues 3 .606

Poor people .750 Swedes 3 .530 People who have no luck in life .744

Working people 3 .405 Note: The numbers in superscript indicate the numbers of factors, in which the factor loadings of the variable were also considerably high (>.3).

Swedes. In our view, mental belonging is a sign of the individualization process in Estonia -- i.e. the acknowledgment of mental similarities is not associated with one’s neighborhood or position in the socio-economic structure.

The fourth factor in Estonia and the third factor in Sweden can be labeled as Pan-Regional Solidarity (the categories Europeans, humankind, people of northern countries/Scandinavians have stronger loadings on these factors). Table A1 shows that the feeling of pan-regional solidarity is more widespread in Sweden than in Estonia.

In Sweden, this factor also comprises the category all people living in Sweden, which indicates territorial-civic solidarity in a wider sense. In the Estonian sample, the civic category co-citizens has a relatively strong loading on the factor. Thus, civic solidarity is structurally connected with pan-regional solidarity, especially in Sweden. It is interesting that in Sweden, the factor of Pan-Regional (and Civic) Solidarity also comprises the category of schoolmates. The long tradition of multicultural civic education programs, but also increasing mobility (some education is acquired abroad), may have shaped this pattern of identification. Generally speaking, regional and civic references constitute more significant sources of the construction of social solidarities and have a stronger local connotation in the welfare society of Sweden than they do in transitional Estonia, where regional identification refers mainly to an outwards orientation.

The fifth factor in the Estonian sample comprises the categories which show material and social advancement and high status in the social hierarchy (wealthy people, entrepreneurs, decision-makers, successful people). We labeled this factor Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Achievement.

The sixth factor forms the opposite pole on the dimension of social and material success (including the categories poor people and people who have no luck in life); thus we labeled the factor Belonging on the Basis of

110 VERONIKA KALMUS AND TRIIN VIHALEMM

Social and Material Underachievement. This type of identification may be related to the metaphor of winners and losers, which is widely used in the public sphere in the sense of material prosperity resulting from opportunistic coping with changed situations versus a decline in living standards and social position after the fall of the Soviet system. It is worth mentioning that the category working people belongs to this factor, having clearly a connotation of lack of success for one group of Estonian people. The category also has relatively strong loadings on other factors, but formally it belongs to the sixth factor.

In Sweden the aforementioned sets of categories of success and lack of success form one factor (Factor 2), labeled Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Achievement/Underachievement. The frequency table (Table A1) shows that self-positioning among successful people and decision-makers is quite modest both in Sweden and Estonia, and the identification with wealthy people and owner-entrepreneurs is very infrequent in Estonia. Self-identification with poor and unlucky people was not high either in Estonia or in Sweden.

The differences in structures are significant: in the thinking patterns of Estonian respondents, wealth and social success are clearly separated from lack of social success. This means that different people accepted or rejected those categories for self-designation. In the Swedish case, by contrast, these categories are not mutually exclusive, and there is also a group which identified itself with both categories. This may be explained by the shift to more developed post-material value culture in Sweden, which Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002, 161-2) have characterized as follows: “The struggle over the distribution of material goods, which still monopolizes the public attention, has been undermined by a struggle over the distribution of rest, leisure, self-determined commitments, adventure, and interchanges with others.”

We will now turn to the analysis of the joint structures of values and identities, in order to expose the relationship between value orientations and patterns of self-identification, and to reveal clearer and more generalized mental structures of Estonian and Swedish respondents.

Mental Structures of Values and Self-Identification

Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the mental structures of Estonian and Swedish respondents differ from one other to a great extent. The patterns of consciousness amongst Estonians point to strong and clear relationships between social self-positioning and value orientations. In the first factor, an orientation towards ethical and aesthetical values (Orthodox Salvation) belongs together with the feeling of Solidarity on the Basis of Social and

DISTINCT MENTAL STRUCTURES IN TRANSITIONAL CULTURE 111

Material Underachievement and Shared Social Space and Position. This mental orientation is closely related to five main socio-demographic variables (age, ethnicity, gender, income level, and education), and is stronger among elderly people, Russian-speaking respondents, women, people with low incomes, and respondents without higher education. No corresponding mental orientation with such a strong potential for social differentiation can be found when analyzing the Swedish data, though there is an analogy with Factor 3, in which Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Mentality and Space is negatively correlated with Power. This orientation is stronger among respondents not born in Sweden, women, people with low incomes, and almost equally among the youngest (aged 16-29) as well as the oldest (55-74) respondents.

Table 3. Mental Structures in Estonia (results of the secondary factor analysis).

Factor 1 Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

Age** Lang** Gen** Educ** Inco**

Age** Lang** Inco*

Age** Gen** Inco**

Age** Lang** Gen** Educ*

Lang** Gen** Educ** Inco**

Orthodox Salvation 0.773 -0.105 0.111 0.116 -0.205 Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Under-Achievement 0.467 0.229 -0.373 -0.212 0.116

Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Space and Position 0.442 0.136

Harmony and Recognition 0.772 0.120 Network Identity -0.300 0.674 -0.128

Self-Establishment -0.127 0.759 0.149 Belonging on the Basis of Social

and Material Achievement 0.208 0.627 -0.356

Environment and Physical Well-Being -0.128 0.709

Mental Solidarity 0.299 0.309 0.212 0.589 Panregional Solidarity -0.151 0.184 0.698

Material Well-Being and Hedonism -0.194 -0.683

Note: Abbreviations in the second row stand for socio-demographic variables that are significantly related to the corresponding factors (mean factor scores differ between groups, measured by ANOVA; * p < .05, ** p < .01). Age (15-29, 30-54, 55-74); Lang = preferred language of communication (Estonian, Russian); Gen = gender; Educ = education (below secondary, secondary, higher); Inco = income (low, middle, high).

112 VERONIKA KALMUS AND TRIIN VIHALEMM

The composition of the second factor in the Estonian sample is, exceptionally, similar to that of the first factor in the Swedish sample. In both cases, Network Identity belongs together with a value orientation consisting mainly of values related to Universalism (inner harmony, justice), Benevolence (honesty, mature love) and Security (family security, national security). In Estonia, this mental orientation is stronger among young people (15-29 year olds), ethnic Estonians, and those with the highest incomes. These groups tend to have more network connections and, hence, social capital. In Sweden, the corresponding mental orientation does not have an equally clear-cut socially polarizing effect: the orientation is stronger among people with medium-level incomes and secondary education, as well as among women and people born in Sweden.

Table 4. Mental Structures in Sweden (results of the secondary factor analysis)

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Desc**

Gen** Educ* Inco**

Age** Desc** Educ** Inco**

Age* Desc** Gen** Inco**

Age** Gen**

Network Identity 0.765 -0.160 0.157 Universalism and Security 0.721 0.247

Panregional (and Civic) Solidarity 0.777 Protestant Salvation -0.216 -0.598 0.333 0.267

Self-Respect and Social Maturity 0.493 0.418 0.331 Solidarity on the Basis of Shared

Mentality and Space 0.159 0.742

Power 0.171 -0.482 0.460 Belonging on the Basis of Social and

Material Achievement / Under-Achievement

-0.170 0.731

Hedonism, Stimulation, Achievement

0.191 0.403

Note: Abbreviations in the second row stand for socio-demographic variables that are significantly related to the corresponding factors (mean factor scores differ between groups, measured by ANOVA; * p < .05, ** p < .01). Age (15-29, 30-54, 55-74); Desc = descent (born in Sweden, born outside Sweden); Gen = gender; Educ = education (below secondary, secondary, higher); Inco = income (low, middle, high).

The third factor in the Estonian sample is a clear expression of the

process of “pure” modernist individualization in this transitional society: positive valuation of Self-Establishment is connected with Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Achievement. The orientation has a strong socially differentiating potential: the factor scores are higher among young

DISTINCT MENTAL STRUCTURES IN TRANSITIONAL CULTURE 113

people, men, and respondents with the highest incomes. In the Swedish sample, Factor 4 describes a somewhat similar mental orientation, in which Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Achievement or Underachievement goes together with values related to Hedonism, Stimulation, and Achievement. The orientation is, however, more post-materialist: it does not exclude solidarity with poor people and those who have no luck in life; also, it is dominated by hedonistic values instead of Power. In Sweden, this orientation is also more characteristic of young people and men; however, it does not polarize respondents on the basis of income.

The fourth factor in the Estonian sample is unique, combining positive valuation of Environment and Physical Well-Being with Mental Solidarity. This post-materialist orientation is stronger among elderly respondents, Russian-speaking people, women, and respondents with high levels of education. In the Swedish sample, no similar orientation emerges: post-materialist values and patterns of self-identification are intertwined with other mental structures, forming no specific orientation characteristic of certain social groups.

The fifth factor in the Estonian sample expresses the socially differentiating quality of post-materialist orientation even more clearly. In this factor, Pan-Regional Solidarity is negatively correlated with Material Well-Being and Hedonism. This means that self-identification with Europeans, Northerners, and members of humankind is more common among respondents for whom wealth and a comfortable life are not important (as scarcity values), and vice versa. The orientation is stronger among people with the highest incomes, respondents with high education, Estonians, and men -- those groups which tend to have greater capital in society.

In the mental structures of Swedish people, the meaning of Pan-Regional (and Civic) Solidarity forms a cognitive opposition with traditional Protestant Salvation and correlates positively with an orientation to Self-Respect and Social Maturity. The factor scores are significantly higher among middle-age (30-54 year old) respondents, people born in Sweden, the highest income group, and respondents with higher education.

Conclusions and Discussion

Our comparative analysis of the value and identity structures of Estonian and Swedish respondents revealed three general tendencies.

Firstly, social distinction in Bourdieu’s sense seems more evident in the identity and value structures of Swedish respondents. In Sweden, the structural relations between different types of capital (in Bourdieu’s sense)

114 VERONIKA KALMUS AND TRIIN VIHALEMM

and related values (wealth and power) are clearly reflected in people’s value consciousness. In Estonia, however, the factor structure of values does not expose any shared knowledge about the relationships between wealth, power, and social responsibility.

Secondly, mental structures in Sweden seem to reflect the predominance of post-material values, as well as a good basis for the formation of new social solidarities characteristic of late modernity (that is, affectionate sociality, as described by Bauman, or altruistic individualism as envisioned by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim). In Estonia, by contrast, one can point to the predominance of modern values. The factor analyses of the Estonian sample reflect the process of “pure” individualization -- i.e. the acknowledgment of mental similarities is not linked with one’s neighborhood or position in the socio-economic structure, and is probably not regarded as a basis for common social activity. The process of late modern individualization (atomization) appears less pronounced in Sweden’s welfare society than it is in post-Communist Estonian society. Obviously, Swedish society has more cultural and social resources -- either preserved from the “old” cultural formation, or arising from new post-industrial developments -- which help to soften the processes of individualization and the risk society and to shape the new type of sociality described by Bauman, Beck, and other authors.

In the post-socialist Estonia, the inertia of Soviet culture does not favor the formation of thinking patterns that might resist the process of individualization and social atomization. The latter can be seen as a reaction to a Soviet collectivism that was imposed from the top down as a counter to the hidden strivings of individuals and to informal social structures based on close personal networks.

The value structure in Sweden can be related to the Weberian conception of the religious essence of ethics. The meaning of salvation has a strong, universally shared connection with the Protestant ethic among Swedish respondents, thereby reflecting the uninterrupted cultural continuity of the society. The value consciousness of Estonians provides evidence of the disruption of Protestant cultural heritage and its partial replacement by the Byzantine-Orthodox ethic. This can be explained partly by intercultural influences, but also by Soviet ideology, which in its collectivism, rituality, and utopian ideas had many features in common with Orthodoxy (see Taagepera (2002) in this regard). As is the case with Soviet ideology, the Orthodox ethic is characterized by ideals of community, unanimity, rejection of economic competition and also utopianism. As Chaplin (2004, 34) notes, “another aspect of Orthodox consciousness which affects the perception of the societal ideal is its eschatology. … Orthodox Christians realize that victory will not be

DISTINCT MENTAL STRUCTURES IN TRANSITIONAL CULTURE 115

achieved until Christ returns to earth.” One might add that the firm location of equality within this mental pattern fits nicely with Vogt’s idea about the utopian way of thinking characteristic of the socialist belief system, which may now have been transformed into a combination of nostalgia for Soviet-style egalitarianism and welfare, and a need for spiritual encouragement.

The secondary factor analysis brought out several “cultural templates” that distinguish Estonia from Sweden, and which may be specific to transitional culture in general.

Firstly, there is a specific mental structure expressing Soviet-Orthodox nostalgia -- i.e. values of Orthodox Salvation are connected with a sense of Belonging on the Basis of Social and Material Underachievement and Solidarity on the Basis of Shared Social Space and Position. This “cultural template” is most frequently encountered amongst the more deprived groups in Estonian society. It seems probable that some “silent” opposition to the liberal-individualistic ideology (everybody has to struggle individually to move towards the prosperous future and laggards have to blame themselves) is embedded in this mental structure. The group constructed in the public discourse as the “losers” of transition is re-worked and enriched with aesthetic and transcendental values. However, this mental pattern is not totally alienated from the “big” society, but carries solidarity on the basis of shared social space and position. The pattern seems to represent passive satisfaction with life and withdrawal from the competition over resources.

The mental pattern of nostalgia relates to some previous theoretical conceptions. Vogt describes nostalgia as a specific phenomenon reflecting cultural inertia: disillusionment with regard to the utopian idea of the Western welfare state may be transformed into nostalgia and melancholy with respect to the values of the past. Michael Kennedy, who has carried out qualitative studies in Estonia and other post-Soviet countries, also regards spiritual values as being central to the nostalgic narratives characteristic of transition culture (Kennedy, 2002).

The mental structures of socially deprived groups in Sweden are characterized by solidarity on the basis of shared mentality and social space, and by the de-evaluation of power. Spatial and status solidarity thus appear to be characteristic of socially deprived groups in both transitional and welfare societies. The strategies adopted in order to compensate for this deprivation are, however, somewhat different. In this respect, Estonian people use more traditional “cultural templates” embracing elements of aesthetization and spiritualization, which are characteristic of the Orthodox culture and echoed also in Soviet ideology.

The second specific feature of Estonian transitional culture is the strong symbolism of social and material success. This thinking pattern is

116 VERONIKA KALMUS AND TRIIN VIHALEMM

bi-polar: there can be either success or lack of success; an “interim” condition is not recognized. The “cultural template” consisting of positive valuation of self-establishment and feeling of belonging on the basis of social and material achievement is characteristic of those groups that are constructed in Estonian public discourses as “winners” -- the younger generation, the financially better-off, and men.

In Sweden, by contrast, mental structures based on the fetishism of achievement and success are not apparent. The mental structure which comprises the element of achievement also includes very different identity categories (underachievement) and a positive valuation of hedonism and stimulation rather than self-establishment. This may be explained by the more developed post-material value culture in Sweden. As Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002, 161-62) have put it: “In the age of self-determined life the social perception of what constitutes wealth and poverty is changing so radically that under certain conditions, less income and status, if they go hand in hand with the opportunity for more self-development, may be perceived as an advance and not a setback.” We may say, therefore, that cultural templates which support the formation of new late modern solidarities exist in Sweden, but not yet in Estonian transitional culture.

The third specific feature of Estonian transitional culture is connected with EU enlargement, globalization, and new regional and global identities. In both societies -- Estonia and Sweden -- the global or pan-regional identity is more characteristic of elite groups (people with higher education and/or incomes). However, highly educated Estonians can be divided into two sub-groups on the basis of the value and identity patterns they carry. These are the new elite or “winners of transition” on the one hand, and the cultural or intellectual elite on the other.

In the thinking patterns of the cultural or intellectual elite, mental solidarity and security values (Environment and Physical Well-Being) are inter-related. The pan-regional (global) identity tends to be carried by the other group, i.e. the new elite or “winners of transition.” Material well-being and hedonistic values are self-evident for this group, since they are no longer scarcity values. Factor loadings with other identity and value structures are negative or very weak. This mental structure is therefore separate, even exclusive, as it lacks any connection to other cultural templates in society. The global orientation in transitional society is a “thing in itself,” without supportive cultural context. We argue that this “global pattern” also derives from the inertia of the utopian way of thinking characteristic of the Soviet culture. The escapist Western orientation represents a mental mechanism which refers to ideas of how life should be, and correspondingly rejects the challenge of interpreting the ambivalence of the new situation in one’s own country.

DISTINCT MENTAL STRUCTURES IN TRANSITIONAL CULTURE 117

The new post-material culture in transitional Estonia therefore seems to proceed in two directions. One is represented by the “winners of transition,” for whom material well-being is not a deficit value and whose identification patterns are quite close to the “yuppie”-identification described by Joas (1996). The other direction is represented by highly-educated people who have resigned from the competition over success and material achievement and instead prioritize non-material values and mental belonging.

In Sweden, pan-regional/global affiliation (being Scandinavian, a European, a world citizen) and civic solidarity (with all people living in Sweden and schoolmates) are clearly opposed to traditional values (Protestant Salvation), but connected with self-respect and social maturity. Thus, the global “cultural template” formed in welfare society is quite different -- socially mature, post-modern, and non-exclusive. One can speculate, therefore, that there is little sound basis for the development of socio-cultural dialogue between the carriers of global/pan-regional orientation in welfare and transitional societies. The idea of being a “Northerner,” a “European,” and a “world citizen,” formed in the minds of the Estonian transitional elite, may be a new utopia.

In general, the transitional culture in Estonia can be characterized by three specific mental patterns we call “cultural templates”: nostalgic resignation, a striving for success, and an escapist Western orientation. These patterns are represented or, as Sztompka says, “picked up” by different social groups. We therefore conclude that the formation of cultural cohesion and solidarity in transitional Estonia is unlikely in the near future. Also, the younger generation has not “picked up” the cultural templates of nostalgia or the new escapist Western orientation, which can be seen as transformed forms of “old,” Soviet-era culture. The mental patterns of Estonian youth are characterized by an orientation to self-establishment, success, network identity, and the search for personal and social harmony and recognition. These mental structures indicate a degree of distancing from the Soviet cultural heritage. However, the process of individualization, characteristic of Western welfare societies, is taking place in transitional Estonia with delays and significant modifications.

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Notes

The data were collected and analyzed as part of the research projects “The Formation

of the 21st Century Media Society in Estonia” financed by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Science, and “Changing Collective Identities in the Context of Estonian Movement into the Global Space” financed by the Estonian Science Foundation (Grant No. 5845). We are grateful to Prof. Göran Bolin and his colleagues at Södertörn University College for conducting the survey in Sweden. Also, we wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

1. Outhwaite and Ray (2004) also stress the importance of local cultural resources when seeking to explain why, despite relatively similar political and economic starting positions, the transition process has taken different directions in different post-socialist countries (a more thorough analysis is presented by Nørgaard (2000)).

2. The same is true of other ex-Communist societies, and the Baltic states especially. The prevalence of secular-rational values can be seen as a result of industrialization and the secularizing effect of Communism.

3. This is to say that both secular-rational values and self-expression are highly regarded by Swedish people. The country’s high level of economic development and Protestant heritage may serve as an explanation here.

4. 70 percent of Estonian respondents state that one should be very wary of trusting other people (Vihalemm and Masso 2005).

5. Conducting the survey in the Södertörn region is highly justified for our comparative analysis: the region has a considerable number of immigrants (26.2%) and is regarded as a poorer and less prestigious part of the greater Stockholm area. Thus, the sample is not biased towards a more economically well-off sector of the capital city population, but corresponds more closely to the country as a whole.

6. We do not assume that this method fully covers the phenomenon of identity. This type of operationalization is only one way to address the problem. However, we assume that a general overview of the reception of the most commonly used categories brings out the most general lines for further ethnographic and other types of research on identity development.

7. We are fully aware that this kind of analysis produces factors that include at least one value orientation and at least one pattern of self-identification, as correlations between the factor scores of the same solution are zero. However, this method allows us to see which value orientations are related to which patterns of self-identification, and reveals more clear and generalized mental structures than an analysis of single value indicators and categories of self-identification would do.

8. This phenomenon cannot be fully explained by the ethnic composition of the Estonian population: people of Slavic origin who have Orthodox rather than Protestant allegiances form about one third of the Estonian population. The value structures of ethnic Estonians and people of Slavic origin do not differ in this aspect.

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122 VERONIKA KALMUS AND TRIIN VIHALEMM

Appendix 1

Table A1. Values and Self-Identification in Estonia and in Sweden Values (means on a 5-point scale) Self-Identification (percent of agreement) Estonia Sweden Estonia Sweden Universalism Network Identity

Clean environment 4.69 4.69 Relatives, kin 66 78

World of beauty 4.36 4.44 Family 86 85

Justice 4.52 4.73 Friends 77 80 Wisdom 4.52 4.24 Colleagues 59 75 Equality 4.27 4.51 Schoolmates 43 44 Inner harmony 4.59 4.74 Neighbors 42 55 World at peace 4.73 4.82

Benevolence Shared Social Space and Position

Honesty 4.62 4.85 Estonians/Estonian Russians/Swedes 63* 80

True friendship 4.63 4.75 All people in Estonia/Sweden 31 57

Mature love 4.49 4.78 People of the same citizenship 21 37

Tradition Co-inhabitants of the town/county 32 40

Universalism Network Identity

Salvation 3.59 2.49 People of the same generation 45 43

Security Working people 27 37

National security 4.65 4.63 Common people, ordinary citizens 28 40

Family security 4.80 4.82 Pan-Regional Solidarity

Health 4.84 4.87 People of Northern countries/Scandinavians 24 53

Achievement Europeans 16 50 Self-realization 4.38 4.09 Humankind 28 53 Power Power 2.93 2.99 Mental Solidarity

Wealth 4.13 3.46 People with similar interests 53 50

Social recognition 3.88 3.78 People with similar worldviews 49 49

DISTINCT MENTAL STRUCTURES IN TRANSITIONAL CULTURE 123

Table A1 (Continued)

Values (means on a 5-point scale) Self-Identification (percent of agreement)

Estonia Sweden Estonia Sweden

Technical development 4.19 4.11 People with similar taste,

preferences 34 35

Hedonism People with whom I share common memories 54 53

Pleasant life 4.22 4.02

Comfortable life 4.20 4.64 Social and Material

Achievement/Underachievement

Happiness 4.67 4.71 People who have no luck in life 8 11

Stimulation Successful people 15 12

Exciting life 4.10 3.96 Entrepreneurs, owners 4 12

Self-direction Poor people 16 15

Freedom 4.60 4.84 Wealthy people 2 13

Self-respect 4.55 4.26 People who make decisions 15 13

Note: * Results of the total sample. In Estonia, the results differed in split by ethnicity. In the sub-sample of ethnic Estonians, 86% indicated the feeling of belonging among “Estonians.” In the sub-sample of Russian-speaking people in Estonia, 52% indicated the feeling of belonging among “Estonian Russians.”