REBUILDING TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

2008

Scek’s Consulting Aues Scek

REBUILDING TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Rebuilding Transitional Federal Institutions

26 June 2008 Aues Scek 1

A Concept Note on Recruitment Processes for Somalia Diaspora

Experts



Table of Contents

1. Background ......................................................................................................................... 3

2. A paradigm shift on capacity-building policies and strategies ............................................ 4

3. Somali Diaspora .................................................................................................................. 5

4. Possible Recruitment Process .............................................................................................. 5

5. Proposed Salary - scale ....................................................................................................... 6

6. Financing Mechanisms ........................................................................................................ 6

7. Strategy of Rebuilding Somalia .......................................................................................... 7

8 Institutional Capacity Building ........................................................................................... 8

\ 10. Promoting Accountability through Civil Society and Advocacy ........................................ 9

11. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 10



1. Background

This concept note is aimed at rebuilding and strengthening the capacities of critical Transitional

Federal Institutions through the Somalia Diaspora. The capacity of the Transitional Federal

Government institutions to perform and absorb aid effectively has been limited by the lack of

appropriately qualified staff and supporting environment, such as up to date IT equipment and

software, and adequate premises. Rebuilding and retaining human resource capacity across

the board is one of the most difficult challenges facing the Transitional Federal

Government, and the development partners supporting this effort need to take this

constraint seriously. Human resource management capacity needs to be built within the

government, civil society, and the private sector if development activities are to be implemented

effectively.

The efforts done by the QUEST and ETA projects, details shown in the table below, have amply

demonstrated, the most common response from development partners has been to provide

targeted key ministries with short-term highly qualified but under paid Somalis from the Diaspora

Box 1: QUEST AND Emergency Technical Assistance Project

The projects objective is to provide technical assistance package to build the high-level technical

capacity of key institutional offices, targeting the Office of the President, Office of the Prime

Minister (Cabinet of the Council of Ministers), Office of the Speaker of Parliament and key

ministries, such as finance and planning and integrity institutions through ETA project. While Quest

concentrating on the Diaspora community was to provide technical assistance in all the areas and

supporting all public, private and civil society. This was to enable the TFG to have the immediate

technical capacity to function during a transitional period of time, until it is in a position – and has

the resources – to build its civil service capacity and until long-term plans and subsequent assistance,

such as the implementation of the findings from Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and the resulting

Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), UNTP get underway.

Specific objective: provide part-time expertise recruited from among the Somali Diaspora community

through the QUEST program or through ETA project (International consultant and Somali national

recruited locally) to the offices of the President, Prime Minister, and integrity institutions.

In Somaliland and Puntland the primary objective is to ensure that the administrations operate in a

more transparent and participatory manner, so as to enhance their credibility. This is to be achieved

by targeting 3 strategic areas, civil service reform / restructuring, the national budgeting cycle and

oversight and the administrations abilities to guide and manage the international assistance in their

respective zones.

The process was done through an agreement between the UNDP and the Government Institutions

whereby the UNDP make limited resources available to recruit experts and procure basic equipment

for limited period of time to the institutions. The offered salary for the Somali experts whether

recruited locally of from the Diaspora ranged from as low 800 (auxiliary) to a maximum of 3,000 to

highly qualified experts. The results were that most of the highly qualified experts could not be

retained at these levels of salaries.

and sometimes with highly expensive foreign technical assistance and consultants to undertake

routine bureaucratic functions. Such interventions were viewed as a temporary gap filling

emergency measures. These measures need to be reconciled with and made complementary to

the longer-term institutional development needs.



Other initiatives include those undertaken by the International Organization for Migration (IOM),

such as the Return and integration for highly Qualified Somali Nationals and the Technical

Cooperation on Migration Management Capacity.

In the Somali environment, all stakeholders from across the spectrum agree that there is no

substitute for comprehensive civil service reforms to restore public sector management

capabilities. Critical reforms include systems of governance, administrative culture, size and cost

of the civil service, the pay scales and other incentives. The TFG and key development partners

are considering taking the leadership role in addressing the special needs of the Somali public

services, underscoring the need for greater comprehensiveness and sustainability of critical

programs to be initiated and supported.

UNDP Somalia and a number of development partners are considering adopting an innovative

approach to Somalia's long-term capacity building needs, rather than a mere provision of short-

term consultants. The new approach is to offer medium-term contract to Somalis from the

Diaspora for a period of minimum of six months and up 2 years and more to highly qualified

Somalis who are interested to contribute to the rebuilding of the country.

2. A paradigm shift on capacity-building policies and strategies

An adequate institutional capacity is a perquisite for post-conflict recovery and

reconstruction in Somalia and else where. Accordingly, capacity building is a means to

achieve development in the medium to long term. In fact, it is part and parcel of a long

development process and should be integrated as fully as possible in the Somali national

development policies, plans and strategies. In this regard, immediate development goals in

Somalia's reconstruction process must be clearly defined, institutional and human resources

development should be mapped out, and a capacity building strategy identified.

The key issue for the TFG and the supporting development partners would be to assume a

leadership role in supporting the Somali government and other stakeholders to develop a

medium-term, multi-sector capacity building framework, which would be consistent with the

Somali Reconstruction and Development Framework and United Nations Transition Plan and

their long-term development vision. The former documents represent the most coherent attempt

at generating a domestic consensus on the country's reconstruction agenda. Moreover, as in the

case of some other post-conflict countries, the TFG with the support of UNDP and other

development partners ought to consider persuading the World Bank and IMF to adopt peace-

Box 2: Migration and Development The lack of qualified human resources in Somalia is one of the greatest challenges to sustainable development in the country. It is estimated that approximately one million Somali nationals left Somalia over the past three decades, resulting in a major brain drain. Many of the members of the Diaspora have acquired competencies and skills in their respective host countries, and are willing to contribute with their knowledge and expertise towards Somalia’s own development efforts. Mobilizing and utilizing human resources from the Diaspora in particular through return programmes could be of great benefit to Somalia’s recovery and reconstruction. IOM: Return and Reintegration of highly Qualified Somali Nationals



friendly economic reform programs for Somalia, including far reaching debt relief measures,

enhanced quality of foreign aid, and deliberate capacity building initiatives with measures to

promote the return of the Somali Diaspora in support of long-term development efforts and

recovery.

3. Somali Diaspora

Since the prolonged conflict, many Somali professionals and skilled personnel have migrated to

all corners of the world. As a consequence, the country has a large pool of expertise in the

Diaspora, which range from highly qualified academics, practitioners in all the fields, most of

them working with governments or private sectors, multilateral and bilateral organizations in their

adopted countries. Large numbers of these professionals and skilled personnel are willing to

return to Somalia to assist with the TFIs rebuilding, reconstruction and development of Somalia.

Naturally, each individual or groups of individuals have their own way of committing themselves

in contributing towards the achievement of these goals.

It is well known that the individuals Somalia should attract back have families abroad and social

and economic commitments in their adopted countries. To attract them back and have them

contribute to rebuilding and reestablishing of key institutions would require a strong financial

commitment from the development partners, given the fact that the Transitional Federal

Government has neither the resources nor capability to attract and retain highly qualified Somalis

from the Diaspora.

The financial support required would include providing a substantial amount of money to

pay the experts for a period of at least two to four years. Technical support requires

developing clear terms of references for each individual expert and most import the recruitment

and placement of experts in the most needed fields.

The needs of the TFG for skilled personnel cover the spectrum of all economic and social sectors.

In the circumstances, the development partners should focus on high-priority sectors initially,

including public finance management institutions, planning and international cooperation entities,

and key ministries in charge of social reconstruction such as health and education. In this context,

the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Central Bank, and the international cooperation

department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be utilized to pilot the proposed program;

and also one or two social sector ministries could be included in the first phase of the program.

4. Possible Recruitment Process

Based on the experience of a number of post-conflict countries, experts working for multilateral

organizations, such as the World Bank, African Development Bank and other agencies were

seconded to their governments for extended period of time ranging from a year to three. If their

services were deemed useful and also of interest to the institution, these experts continued to be

receive the same salary and benefits paid by the multilateral organizations. In other cases, some

other donor made the payments as per the individual's prior remuneration. Alternatively the

multilateral organizations, where the experts were working, agreed to give unpaid leave for a

specific period of time to the experts. This has been done in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Eritrea and

Kenya, among others. Many stable developing countries also benefited from similar programs of

skilled "secondees". This could be one possibility to be explored if there are Somalis working for

international organizations willing to assist their country to build capacity. The recruitment



process will follow strict merit base no preference given to any groups or individual. The first

precondition is that the candidate is employed and working in his her field of specialization.

A second alternative is that development partners could make needed resources available to the

TFG to recruit and place experts in all needed fields within the government for the agreed time

frame. Such a program could be co-managed by the TFG and development partners to ensure a

skilled and effective personnel is acquired.

A third alternative is that development partners make resources available through UNDP to hire

and place the experts on behalf of the government in areas deemed to be secure according to the

UN rules. UNDP will in turn, outsource to a reputable company with local know how, such as

the Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI), which is a regional institute that has

conducted Leadership training in PFM on behalf of the World Bank in all the areas of Somalia,

and trained Somali experts in planning and budgeting to recruit and place experts from the

Diaspora.

5. Proposed Salary - scale

The salary scales given in the table below are derived from the UNDP remuneration for both

national and international experts, plus consultancy fees particularly those related to JNA

(consultancy fees paid to Somalis from the Diaspora) the setting of appropriate salary scales

should take into account current salaries paid in other post-conflict countries including Sierra

Leone and Liberia. In addition, consideration should be given to incremental security

compensation, if the expert is to be placed in an unsecure place.

scale Academic qualifications Working experience Salary package

Level 1 Graduate BS/MS With little working experience 3,000

Level 2 Graduate MS/Diploma With few years experience 4,500

Level 3 Graduate /Diploma Five years experience 6,500

Level 4 Graduate MS/PhD With five years experience 8,500

Level 5 Graduate PhD With experience five years and

more

10,500

6. Financing Mechanisms

Mechanisms that could assist Somali Diaspora to return to Somalia for reconstruction and peace

rebuilding might include the following:

i) World Bank: Providing money for their salaries or seconding Somali’s Bank staff to

work for the Government to build capacity, this could be financed through a specific

trust that could be established for that purpose

ii) Hiring Somali Diaspora professional trainers and experts

iii) IOM program of Return and Integration of Highly Qualified Somalis nationals is

financing already, this could be expanded to cover a wider areas to increase a

recruitment drive

iv) UNDP QUEST AND ETA program that’s currently leading in the recruitment and

placement of highly qualified Somalis from the Diaspora



v) African Development Bank could as the World Bank finance for payment of salaries

and seconding Somali’s bank staff to assist in building domestic capacity for a

limited period of time

vi) Islamic Development Bank could compliment the World Bank and the African

Development Bank initiatives

vii) Interested bilateral development partners could also contribute towards this initiative

by financing a return of highly qualified Somalis residing or naturalized in their

countries

viii) Somali Government has to contribute to create a conducive environment to attract

Somalis from the Diaspora to return back

To accomplish this task it will be required that policymakers and project implementers

(government, development partners, civil society and alike) are requested to include Somalis in

their programs to employ qualified Somalis from the Diaspora. Creation of a consolidated

Database System for Somali Experts,. This will facilitate the identification of Somali

professionals to be employed in the reconstruction and peace building efforts in Somalia. Given

the increasing need for experts on Somalia reconstruction expertise more broadly, this directory

could list voluntary information of individuals who are interested in contributing their skills and

talents towards rebuilding Somalia. The main purpose of the directory would to be to provide

basic contact information with which organizations and individuals could identify persons with

relevant expertise. The ultimate goal would be match needs and capabilities as reconstruction and

peace building initiatives progress.

UNDP leading this initiative is targeting to recruit and deploy about 200 experts by the end of this

year, 300 next years and 400 the year after. The recruitment drive through QUEST and ETA is

already in its advanced stage and a number of highly qualified experts are deployed in different

areas of specializations. These target could easily achieved and even exceeded if all the proposed

mechanisms could be operationalized.

7. Strategy of Rebuilding Somalia

If development is to be considered as a set of social, economic, and political freedoms, the vast

majority of Somalis were deprived of these freedoms for the past two decades. We also know that

Somalia had already been among the poorest and least developed nations even before the civil

war in 1990.

However, the extended years of war after the collapse of the Siad Barre’s regime completely

ruined what former Somali nation had minimally accomplished for past four decades. In addition,

lack of human security led to the flight of several million Somali refugees throughout the world.

Somalia suffered from a devastating brain drain sending the country to the bottom of the human

development index. Today, Somalia is listed as one poorly performing country in human

development index, with the highest rate of illiteracy, lack of access to basic human needs (water,

sanitation and food), high infant and child mortality and lower life expectancy.

In June 2008, the Somali began a new chapter in their history. They have agreed between the

Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia to work in

partnership of the international community in implementing the Djibouti Agreement. A new

Constitution enshrining the values and ideals of Somalis is being developed. Somalis are now

taking bold steps towards reconciling and building democratic institutions that would lead to

stable and democratic country.



There are many challenges and constraints that need the sustained commitment, attention, and

resources of many stakeholders. While alerting Somali’s international partners to our common

problems of terrorism, warlordism and clanism—all of which reinforce one another—Somalis

must remind themselves of our own national obligations towards Somalia. One acute problem of

rebuilding Somalia is the country’s grave lack of human capital. Hence, it is truly time for the

Somali Diasporas to replace Somalia’s ―brain drain‖ with ―brain gain.‖

Members of the Somali Diasporas are already a major actor in the rebuilding of Somalia. A few

prominent Somali intellectuals, NGOs and entrepreneurs have returned back to Somalia and are

actively involved in public and private institutional capacity building. Other resourceful Somalis

in developed countries are expected to follow suit to fulfill their dream of helping reconstruct

Somalia.

Given Somalia’s comprehensive reconstruction and development needs in social, economic, and

political spheres, the Somali Diasporas can play a substantial role in the overall rebuilding and

development of Somalia through three main ways: 1) institutional capacity building, 2)

strengthening private sector, 3) strengthening civil society and advocacy.

8 Institutional Capacity Building

Somalia’s governance and public-service institutions are in shambles. The country’s general

challenge of state-building squarely lies in reforming, creating, and building effective institutions

to run a government. The influx of hundreds of foreign NGOs to Somalia is due to lack of local

capacity to deliver essential services to the people, the majority of whom are yet to benefit from

the ―peace dividend.‖

The Somali Diaspora should not sit back and watch this continue. It is crucial for Somalis to fully

participate in the rebuilding process of the country by joining key government institutions. This

will strengthen the capacity of government institutions subsequently enabling the government to

takeover the ownership of the rebuilding agenda for execution based on Somalia’s needs not

external prescriptions.

The government, UNDP and development partners are actively working together to place Somali

expatriates in appropriate government departments. Unfortunately up to now, a few highly

qualified Somalis have returned home and begun working with key institutions through the

QUEST/ETA programs. The rate of return can be increased if adequate resources are made

available to attract highly qualified Somalis to join the program.

The approach to be adopted will consist of enabling legal frameworks (where the government

encourage Somalis with expertise residing in developed countries to return to Somalia by offering

them incentive package that might include tax relief and other benefit), mobilizing resources

particularly from the African Development Bank, Islamic Bank, World Bank and others to second

their experts of Somali origins to the key economic ministries, such as finance and planning,

agriculture and others. This effort should be complemented by the bilateral support where

bilateral donors could provide funding to government to recruit and retain scarce skills in public

service to deliver public services efficiently to the citizens. Given the fact that at this point in time

the capability of the TFIs to recruit and retain staff is still weak it would be worthwhile



considering outsourcing part or all the recruitment and running of human resource development

to a consulting firm.

These efforts should be combined with the government working with the International Migration

Organization (IOM) to place Somali expatriates in appropriate government institutions. Up to

now the QUEST program managed to place about 100 qualified Somalis in number of ministries

and agencies and the ETA recruited some locally and a few internationally Somali experts and

placed them with the offices of president, prime minister, speaker, ministry of finance and

planning as well as integrity institutions.

9. Private Sector

Private sector during the past two decades without the central government took the place of the

state in the provision of many goods and services, including basic infrastructure. In some cases it

did even better than the state before the civil war. These include telecommunications, air transport

and money transfer. The private sector also provided essential social services with limited

coverage. In addition, although in limited cases the private sector facilitated dispute resolution,

contract enforcement, property right protection as well law and order-private resolution relying

on traditional clan customs and Islamic laws.

Unlike other conflict – affected countries, Somalia as it is today possesses a vibrant private sector

that sustains economic growth during the recovery period. For domestic, Diaspora and foreign

investors to keep sustaining growth beyond the recovery period and over the medium and long

term, however, Somalia will need a stronger and more modern legal, judicial system than the one

in place before the civil war or the one that is currently in place.

Somalia will need to continue building upon the resilient private sector that has emerged from the

two decades of civil war and lack of or weak government. Assuring security and the rule of law

would do much more fostering private sector –led growth than any action government could take.

In the medium term, through the Diaspora and donor support the government can undertake

measures to establish necessary regulatory activities to assure competition and standards that can

also help both the growth of the private sector and consumers.

10. Promoting Accountability through Civil Society and Advocacy

During recent years civil society in Somalia has emerged as an important social and political

force. Civil society organizations are today active in service provision, are contributing to peace,

reconciliation and development and have taken on many of the traditional functions of the state.

Whilst most NGOs and CSOs are concentrated in the major cities and operate in areas of

relatively security and stability, there are few national NGOs with the exception of the Somalia

Red Crescent Society. Religious groups working closely with dispora and local community are

playing increasingly significant and influential role in public life, perhaps most visibly through

Quranic schools, shari’a courts and provision of social services. While many Mogadishu based

organizations are engaged in popular peace and dialogue efforts, some of the others are

increasingly giving attention to social issues through advocacy, including political reform, human

rights and freedoms, gender equity and HIV/AIDS.



Professional associations and networks are a relatively new category of civil society actors,

though networks like the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia, Journalist Associations,

and Somali Agriculturalist Associations, the Lawyers Association and the Somali Chamber of

Commerce show that there is a growing space for these institutions. With the emergence of

government institutions, the role and nature of civil society organization will necessarily change

the shaping of Somalia. There is an important opportunity for Somali civil society in the

country of those from the Diaspora to develop and play a crucial role in strengthening

popular participation, providing channels for dialogue and debate, exerting public pressure,

raising awareness and acting to improve accountability in general. As part of this, the

potential role of Somali civil society in nation building through reconciliation efforts and service

delivery should not be underestimated but indeed built upon.

Media can also play a critical role in building democratic governance. Since 1991, there has been

resurgence in the Somali media sector, particularly with regard to newspapers, though these are

limited to an urban readership. In a predominantly oral society, it is radio stations that have

become the main tool with which to deliver information and raise public awareness. Mogadishu

has a vibrant media sector with several local radio stations and newspapers, all of which are

privately owned. There are also many websites, some with clan influences and some religious.

Whereas in South-Central Somalia and Puntland media businesses are not subject to regulation

there is in Somaliland currently only one public radio and two TV stations (one private and one

state-owned) operating, though authorizations for private radio stations are in process. Whilst

there are reported cases of poor journalistic practices and partisan behaviour, the general trend

seems to be towards a remarkably free media.

11. Conclusion

Most if not all existing program implemented in Somalia are predominantly donor – driven

policies with an aim to stabilize the country. The key challenges facing Somalia is a sustainable

growth plan as is a likelihood of reduction of donor funding, a common occurrence in post-

conflict countries. Steps are now being should taken by the authorities to ensure that Somalia will

be able to take the transition from being donor dependent to be fully functioning income

generating nation. This reduction will impact on the economy negatively, causing a drastic

reduction of needed resources.

As an alternative Somalia and its development partners, including UNDP, African Development,

Islamic Development Bank, World Bank, IOM and bilateral donors have awakened to the

development potential of the Diaspora. Diaspora is increasingly being recognized as instrument

of change, as with any fragile state, as is the case of Somalia, they are ready and stable source of

funding.

REBUILDING TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Documents

Transcript of REBUILDING TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS