Did National Socialist foreign policy ultimately aim at world

dominion?

Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist regime is one of the most

discussed matters in modern history, due to its huge impact on

the post-1945 world. One of the most controversial issues of

National Socialism is its foreign policy, which has lead to an

exciting historiographical debate about the regime’s foreign

policy aims, influences and formulation. Hitler’s role in the

conduct of foreign affairs has been analyzed thoroughly;

however there is widespread disagreement on his role and aims

in the course of Germany’s foreign policy between 1933 and

1945. Nonetheless, most historians agree that Hitler was the

personification and spearhead of the National Socialist

movement, thus making him the main decision-making power in the

Nazi state. Nevertheless, it is important not to completely

over-exaggerate Hitler’s role in the formulation of National

Socialist ideology and subsequently National Socialist foreign

policy, as the influence of some other characters has to be

acknowledged. In order to understand Adolf Hitler’s foreign

policy, it is important to take a close look at his

personality, his vision and his actual policies.

1

Hitler had a vision, which he described very accurately in Mein

Kampf(1924) and his Second Book (1928), of the creation of an

autarchic German ‘Eurasian’ land-empire which would eventually

challenge the world for global pre-eminence. Whether this

vision was formulated in the form of a stage-by-stage plan

(Stufenplan) as some historians argue is left to interpretation,

but the claim that Hitler and the National Socialist movement

harbored global ambitions is no secret and could be proven

before they even attained power. However this essay will tackle

the question whether Nazi Germany’s foreign policy, thus its

actions and decisions, aimed at world dominion during 1933

until 1945 or whether world dominion was just an unattainable

illusion in Hitler’s head. In order to achieve this, it is as

essential to examine Hitler’s vision of a German empire as well

as post-1933 German foreign policy in order to judge whether

they constituted an actual bid for world control.

Hitler tried to implement his vision and tried to achieve

mastery of the European continent, which he considered the

first step on the road to dominate of the globe, with the 1941

attack on Soviet Russia but his foreign policy program did not

work out as he had planned. The fact that Hitler had plans for

a global German empire does not necessarily mean that Nazi 2

Germany’s foreign policy aimed at world dominion, as their

policies had to prevail in face of the dynamism of Realpolitik. In

the end, Hitler’s actions were improvisations which underwent

constant alterations in the light of changing circumstances,

however his long-term dream of a ‘thousand year German Reich’

never changed at all. Even though Hitler managed to alter the

course of German foreign policy in order to adapt it to the

realities of power-politics, his long-term dream and his

‘theories on power politics and racial ideology bore no

relation to reality’1.

In order to determine whether National Socialist foreign policy

ultimately aimed at world dominion, it is essential to first

define what is meant by ‘world dominion’ (Weltherrschaft). Hitler

was determined to make Germany a ‘world power’ again, which in

his conceptualization implied the complete mastery of the globe

and not merely equality with other world powers: ‘We do not

seek equality, but mastery’2. He identified ‘world power

status’ (Weltmachstellung) as the possession of an ‘adequately

large space on this earth’3, however something far off from

1 Hillgruber, p.72 Michaelis, p.3333Hitler, p.373

3

world domination.4 ‘World dominion’ advocates a situation of

absolute international pre-eminence, whereas ‘world power

status’ suggests there to be a number of world powers including

Germany.

Before analyzing Nazi foreign policy, it is essential to

examine Hitler’s personality, as this provides useful insights

into the dictator’s ideas and ambitions. Adolf Hitler was a

‘power-drunk’, whose appetite for supremacy and domination was

insatiable, and therefore his foreign political attitude was

often contradictory, irrational and not as coolly planned as

people might think.5 The idea of Hitler as a thoroughly

thinking mastermind has to be discarded in favor of a more

exact picture of Hitler as an irrational megalomaniac with ‘a

strong gambler’s streak in his personality’6, who used ‘the

means of his racial policy as well as the methods of his

ruthless war conduct as the ends in themselves’7. Aigner

depicts the German dictator as incapable of differentiating

clearly between ‘a philosopher’s speculations, a visionary’s

effusions and a politicians’ down-to-earth practical aims’,

4 Michaelis, p.3485 Aigner,p.2556 Hiden, p. 1197 Haulner, p. 20

4

which further complicates to examine his aims and ideas.8 He

was delusional in his unshakable, fanatical determination to

make Germany powerful again, which even gained apocalyptic

traits as can be seen by his statements that in the occasion of

defeat there was no alternative to the total obliteration of

Germany: “Germany will either be a world power or there will be

no Germany at all”9.

After having gained some insight on the Nazi dictator’s

personality and mind, it becomes easier to understand Nazi

Germany’s foreign policy goals which were based on Hitler’s

megalomaniac and all-embracing Weltanschauung. Every analysis of

Germany’s world dominion plan has to incorporate a thorough

examination of Hitler’s foreign policy program, which was based

on racial and power-political axioms.

In the 1920s, Hitler started to prepare his designs for a

future ‘German Reich’ and his clearly formulated set of ideas

of a National Socialist German empire were stated in his two

books ‘Mein Kampf’ and ‘Second Book’. As his general aims he8 Aigner, p.2579 Hitler, A., Mein Kampf, p.596

5

declared the revision of the Versailles Treaty, the union of

all German-speaking groups in one big, powerful German Reich

and the conquest of Lebensraum (living-space) in Eastern Europe.

Germany’s position in the post-WWI world was very feeble as

Hitler put it and a coalition of hostile forces could destroy

her for good. Hitler saw the struggle for existence as a

struggle for space, so that he decided that the exigencies of

German security could only be met by quick rearmament and the

possession of more land in the East, which would bring along

territorial and economic security.10 Nonetheless as much as

Hitler knew that the East was the soil of the German future, he

also knew that he would not be permitted a free hand there,

since France would definitely snatch the opportunity to attack

Germany’s flank.11 France was Germany’s arch-enemy and its

anti-German attitude was based on the motive of self-

protection, as only through the annihilation of Germany could

she maintain her world position.

Hitler did not wish to repeat the fatal errors of the

Wilhelmine Germany’s aggressive, aimless foreign policy which

ultimately brought her into conflict with the whole world.12

10 Rich, p. 511 Rich, p.812 Michaelis, p. 346

6

The trauma of a two-front-war of the First World War had taught

him that Germany had to defeat its enemies one after another

and needed strong allies. Therefore he came up with an alliance

system, designed to enable Germany to neutralize the French

threat and pursue her Lebensraum aims in the East.

Hitler knew that only a strong nexus of alliances could help

him achieve his foreign political goals and especially Great

Britain was considered crucial for the implementation of his

foreign policy program. Throughout his political career, the

German dictator displayed a ‘love-hate’ attitude towards the

British and he considered them a perfect match, on racial and

strategic grounds, for Nazi Germany’s foreign policy. His

attachments to an Anglo-German agreement were primarily

grounded in power politics, as a prerequisite for the success

of his goals. The alliance with England had been conceived

under the impact of Anglo-French differences over the Ruhr in

1922: ‘If Germany adopts a fundamentally new political

orientation that no longer clashes with England’s naval and

commercial interests, instead concentrating on Europe, then

England would have no further grounds for her hostility’13.

Hitler hoped that Britain would not only recognize Bolshevik

13 Hitler, Second Book p.167-173

7

Russia, which constituted a menace to India and Western Europe,

as her main European rival but would ultimately realize that

her real foe was America and join Germany as a ‘junior partner’

in her pursuit of world dominion. Hitler focused on the notion

of balance of power, which was ‘a function of British world

policy’14, claiming that an Anglo-German alliance would prevent

British opposition to a world dominion and open up immense

opportunities for the pursuit of Lebensraum in the East.15

Therefore he decided to assure British friendship by

demonstrating Germany had no intention of challenging Britain’s

imperial interests through renouncing on colonial and naval

objectives: “Germany would be the master of the continent,

Britain mistress of the seas”16 He considered an Anglo-British

alliance as a condition for the smooth running of his program

and perceived the alliance in terms of future conflicts with

the Soviet Union and later the US. Hitler was conscious of the

natural logic of power politics and he saw the British alliance

far more from the point of view of a medium-term aim, as he

knew that political marriages are predestined to end in a

divorce and one day Britain would be compelled to accept German

14 Waddington, p. 315 Waddington, p.416 Waddington, p. 4

8

supremacy.17 Another state that was considered vital in

Hitler’s foreign policy program was Italy, whose fascist

government ideologically akin to the Nazi regime could not be

ignored by Hitler and his party. Italy was regarded as vital

for Nazi Germany’s foreign political goals, even though the

decision on the alliance seems to have been Hitler’s alone.

Mussolini’s regime would play an essential role in dealing with

France, as well as provide strong support for Hitler’s policies

of revising the Versailles Treaty, especially in the case of

Austria.

‘World dominion’ was declaredly his ultimate objective, but

Hitler rather considered his task to lay the foundations for

world dominion by conquering the necessary Lebensraum in the

East and setting off a procedure of racial selection. His

program foresaw three stages on the road to world domination,

which started off by the attainment of domination of the

European continent, followed by expanding overseas and the

decisive duel between the German empire and America which would

lay the foundations for the third, final stage: elimination of

the US and complete German mastery of the globe. Nazi Germany

and the United States would eventually have to affront each

17 Hillgruber, p. 11

9

other, as Hitler foresaw the difficulties of a National

Socialist dominated Europe to coexist peacefully with a

capitalist American world power. The completion of the final

stage would mark the beginning of a new racial millennium over

the entire planet under the ruthless domination of the German

Aryan elite.18 The annulment of the Versailles Treaty, the

destruction of Bolshevik Russia and the achievement of ‘world

power status’ were to him but the opening stages of a

protracted struggle for world dominion, not an end in itself as

mastery of Europe was considered key in attaining global pre-

eminence. The further stages of his program, however, had to be

realized by future generations: ‘I shall no longer be there to

see it, but I rejoice on behalf of the German people at the

idea that one day we will see England and Germany marching

together against America’19.20

Hitler’s foreign policy ‘program’ envisaging reconciliation

with Britain and primarily directed towards expansion in the

East, needs by no means to be regarded as unique as the roots

of such ideas can be discovered in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine

politics.21 Hitler’s ‘Pan-German’ education can be seen in the18 Haulner, p.2519 Hitler’s tabletalk, p.14520 Michaelis, p. 35021 Hildebrand, p.20

10

fundamentals of his program (defense of German race,

expansion), however in the end he abandoned his Pan-German

position in favor of his own design.22

The one aspect that visibly differentiates Hitler’s foreign

political outlook from pre-1914 German imperialist views is the

aspect of ideology which played a vital role in National

Socialist Germany. Race, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism, far

from being mere propaganda slogans, proved to be a decisive

driving force behind NS policy and were “the very rock on which

the Nazi church was built”23. Furthermore, National Socialist

ideology based on racial doctrines, such as a vulgarized

version of Social-Darwinism, anti-communism and anti-Semitism

had a very strong influence on the state’s foreign political

ideas. Hitler’s radical views and foreign political aims were

heavily connected; for example in Mein Kampf he justifies the

Anschluss, even if it proved economically disadvantageous, on the

grounds that all people of common blood should form one

political unit.24 Nazi ideology implied the idea of an eternal

struggle for supremacy until the world’s strongest race would

have attained world hegemony: “A state, which in the epoch race

22 Stoakes, quest, p. 3423 Rich, p. 424 Hiden , p. 114

11

poising, dedicates itself to the cherishing of its best racial

elements, must someday be the master of the world’25.26

One of the pillars of the Nazi ideology was its radical anti-

Semitism, which had its roots in the political, economic and

social conditions of Europe. As already shown, there was a very

close inter-connection between Hitler’s ideology and his

foreign policy program and he began to apply his deep-seated

anti-Semitic chauvinism to foreign affairs. Two of the main

Nazi ideologues, Alfred Rosenberg and Dietrich Eckart,

introduced to Hitler the ideas of a ‘Jewish-Bolshevik world

conspiracy’ to achieve global domination and thereby provided

Hitler ‘with an international framework for the development of

his own anti-Semitic prejudices’27.28 The theory of the ‘Jewish-

Bolshevik conspiracy for world domination’ had severe influence

on Hitler’s foreign political outlook, especially in relation

to Bolshevik Russia which was not considered a German enemy

prior to 192229. Hitler however was a passionate enemy of the

communist revolution and revised his view of Russia, the

25 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 62926 Aigner, p.26527 Waddington, p. 228 Hitler considered ‘the Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ as an authentic piece of evidence for a Jewish conspiracy aiming at Jewish world pre-eminence29 Stoakes, evolution, p. 23

12

‘refuge of Bolshevism and Jewry’, which transformed the former

Tsarist Empire into Germany’s new chief enemy. The German

dictator’s fanatical belief that communism, identical with the

advent of Jewish world dominion plans, had to be uprooted in

order to overcome the international menace of the ‘cancer of

Jewish-Bolshevism’.30 Moreover the existence of a worldwide

Jewish conspiracy to conquer the world provided the National

Socialist party with explanations for the internal collapse of

Germany after 1918, for the hostile environment which she then

faced, for the threat of communist revolution and for every

government’s move which seemed likely to harm Germany.31 Nazi

anti-Semitism became a universal chauvinistic ideology

postulating a struggle for existence between the forces of good

and evil, consequently under this paradigm Germany was left

with no choice; either the Jews or Germany would dominate the

world.32 If the Jewish threat was to be confronted, Nazi

foreign policy had to plan a foreign policy on a global scale.

After having examined Hitler’s foreign political outlook, it is

important to look at National Socialist foreign policy from

1933 until 1945 in order to check whether it represented or at

30 Hiden, p. 12931 Stoakes, quest p. 21132 Stoakes, quest p. 25

13

least incorporated the ideas Hitler had expressed during the

1920s.

When Hitler came to power in January 1933, he had no clear idea

how to achieve his aims and objectives beyond the suggestion of

his alliance nexus with Britain and Italy. Furthermore his

freedom of action was circumscribed both diplomatically and

within the government itself, so that he and the party had to

focus on providing diplomatic cover for the consolidation of

National Socialist control at home. During this period of time,

there was an identity of objectives in foreign policy between

Hitler’s ideas and the wishes of the old conservative elite.33

The initial officially proclaimed aim of National Socialist

foreign policy was the peaceful revision of the Versailles

Treaty in order to change Germany’s territorial position and

catapult her back into a position of power in Europe

The launch of the ‘Four-Year Plan’ in 1936 was essential for

the rearmament, which would strengthen Germany at a time when

Germany’s economy threatened to impose internal restrictions on

her expenses. Rearmament was indispensable as it constituted a

prerequisite for the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy,

which was Germany’s main diplomatic weapon enabling her to 33 Hildebrand, p. 136

14

revise the Versailles Treaty. In the end, rearmament worked out

for Nazi Germany as it catapulted her in a position of strength

in Europe by 1937 and Hitler considered it as the first

precondition for the execution of his expansionist policies. So

all in all German rearmament had achieved what the National

Socialists were hoping for, namely to be in a position of

uncontested strength to make the arrangements for the policies

of their choosing.34 Even though German armaments in 1938-1939

were not enough to sustain a general war on two fronts, they

were suited for the kind of swift and aggressive

campaigns(Blitzkriege) aiming at limited territorial gaining

without upsetting Germany’s economy.35

It wasn’t until 1938, when Hitler assumed full control of the

military after the ‘Blomberg-Fritsch crisis’ that he can be

regarded as the ultimate leader of the National Socialist

state. Rudolf Hess described the National Socialist party’s

foreign political decision-making process in a letter as

follows: “Inside the movement the structure is such that the

Führer does consult with those he commands, but once he has

34 Weinberg for pol 1735 Haulner, p. 22

15

made a decision, he carries it out in a dictatorial manner and

is responsible only upward”36. Nonetheless other characters,

such as Joachim von Ribbentrop and Herrmann Göring, played an

influential role in the formulation of National Socialist

foreign policy. Still in the end all the policies derived from

Hitler, as he was ‘the master in the Third Reich’37.

Hitler’s alliance nexus which he had outlined so precisely in

his two books had to prevail, as Hitler’s whole foreign

political program relied on the existence of an Anglo-German

alliance. National Socialist policies tried to drive a wedge

between France and Britain, hoping to lure the British over

into their camp. Furthermore, Hitler decided to make vital

concessions on colonial and naval issues, which lead to the

signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty in 1935 and Germany

giving up on recovering her former colonies, to reassure

Britain’s naval and colonial dominance. Hitler abandoned his

colonial claims as a ‘calculated gesture of reconciliation’ to

convince Britain of his good intentions as Hitler considered

colonies not as crucial for the future of Germany as the

living-space in Eastern Europe.38 On the contrary, Britain

36 Weinberg, WWII, p.2737 Haulner, p. 1638 Haulner, p. 26

16

refused to be deflected from their main goal of a universal

European settlement involving limited treaty revisions

preserving Europe’s balance-of-power.39 By the later 1930s,

Hitler had to realize that his attempts to woo Britain into an

alliance would not succeed and he had to foresee the likelihood

of a near future totally consecrated to war.40 He had to start

thinking of Britain as an enemy and ordered the implementation

of the ‘Z-Plan’, which was to provide Germany with a navy

capable of challenging the Allied sea powers by 1944 and thus

can be seen as proof that Hitler had plans for world domination

by ordering such an enormous naval armament program. However

the ‘Z-Plan’ was never really carried out and Nazi Germany

never had a navy that was capable of challenging the Allied

powers. Another proof for National Socialism’s continental aims

is the Hossbach memorandum, the summary of a meeting on the 5th

November 1937 between Hitler and his foreign political and

military leadership, where he presented his future expansionist

strategy and expressed the need for war to achieve a European

empire which could be completed by 1945: “Germany’s problem

could be solved only by the use of force”41. This meeting marks

39 Waddington, p-1540 Rich, p. 1041 Noakes, p. 684

17

the point from where on Hitler does no longer have any

realistic hopes on an Anglo-German agreement for his plan, as

he refers to Britain and France as ‘hate-inspired enemies’42,

and forcing him to compromise on his strategy. His ultimate

objectives had to survive the constraints and pressures of

Realpolitik which went far beyond his capacity, for example in

1939 he went to war with front lines, diametrically opposite to

all his known intentions, with Russia as an ally and Britain as

an adversary.43

Nazi Germany’s alliance plans with Italy, however, developed

better than the ones with Britain. Hitler knew that by giving

in concessions on the South Tyrol he could gain Italian support

for his cause and the Anschluss. The sacrifice of the South

Tyrol was the first occasion on which Hitler gave up a vital

element of the revisionist, Pan-German program in the interest

of power-politics.44 Additionally, after his dream of an Anglo-

German alliance was shattered, Hitler and Ribbentrop concluded

an alliance with the Japanese empire. Even though on power-

political terms this alliance partner could have helped Hitler

achieve world dominion due to Japan’s huge power in the

42 Noakes, p. 683-68743 Aigner, p.25844 Noakes, p. 612

18

Pacific, the alliance never worked out as it should and was

marked by mistrust.

National Socialist Germany’s policy towards the Soviet Union

was marked by twists and turns: what started off as a hostile

relationship with the German-Polish treaty (1934) and the Anti-

Comintern Pact (1936) transformed into a friendship for their

means in August 1939 when they signed a mutual non-aggression

pact and invaded Poland together the following month.

Nevertheless, Hitler’s main objective remained the acquisition

of Lebensraum in the East through the defeat of the stronghold

of ‘Jewish-Bolshevism’ and he never gave up on this goal, so

that Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 :‘Everything

I am doing is directed against Russia, if the West is too

stupid and too blind to grasp this, I shall be compelled to

come to an understanding with the Russians, to beat the West

and then, after its defeat, to turn against the Soviet Union

with all the forces at my command’45.

Throughout the period of National Socialist rule, Hitler

regularly charged his enemies with ‘tendencies of world

45 Michaelis, p.353

19

conquest’ whereas he abstained from using terms like

‘Weltherrschaft’ in expressing his own objectives.46 He always kept

his goals very much in mind in the actual conduct of foreign

affairs, though he tended to save his ideas for the privacy of

the conference room. Nonetheless did he target his preconceived

goals to make Germany powerful again, as for example during the

first half of the war Hitler was unresponsive to any peace

imitative as Germany would merely remain a big power among

others in the postwar order. In face of shifting circumstances,

Hitler had to enforce his ideas on events rather than allow

realities to reshape his ideas.47 In the end, his ideas and

their impact on Germany’s foreign policy created a driving

force which eventually unleashed the Second World War.

Hildebrand describes National Socialist foreign policy as a

‘triangle formed by power-politics, economics and ideology’

which was striving for power and the safeguarding of its very

existence.48 Hitler’s policies can be seen as the outcome of

the intentions, but he had to adapt his policies to the

realities of the international situation, as for example his

46 Michaelis, p. 34847 Weinberg,1933-36 p.148 Hildebrand, p.11-15

20

failed attempts to woo the British into his camp. Discarding

Hitler’s ideas, which he had conceived in the 1920’s, would be

historically inaccurate as the German dictator’s consistency in

his views on the European powers proves that he did try to

implement these ideas in the German foreign policy program. Yet

even at the peak of Nazi Germany’s military successes, Hitler

was not sure whether he could conclude his first, continental

stage of his program. By the end of 1941, Germany had been

unable to defeat Russia and declared war on the USA, thus

making the dreaded prospect of a two-front-war a permanent

feature of German strategy. National Socialist foreign policy

was flawed in the sense that its foreign political ambitions

were too many, without any clear goals and only linked by one

distant, ultimate objective.49 Even though Hitler foresaw a

‘show-down’ between the Third Reich and the United States of

America, there was never any plan for a military attack on the

American continent. The execution of Hitler’s expansionist

policy was more desperately improvised than thoroughly planned,

as each action seemed to be carried out as a new situation

arose. Michaelis claims that there was no comprehensive plan

for ‘world conquest’, let alone an exact plan for the

49 Hiden, p. 125

21

subjugation of Europe.50 Nonetheless it was less his improvised

strategy than his irrational ideology which came progressively

more into conflict with a coherent conduct of political and

military affairs: “The Hitler regime was certainly capable of

generating astonishing energy but it had long been incapable of

the rational exercise of power”51

National Socialist foreign policy has led to a huge

historiographical debate, which can be divided into two

different debates: intentionalism vs. opportunitism and

globalism vs continentalism. The first discussion focuses on

whether Hitler was a haphazard opportunist in politics with no

guiding principles, just responding to a given situation

without any preconceived plan or whether he had a

predetermined, coherent foreign policy program. The view held

by historians, such as Jäckel, Trevor-Roper or Hildebrand, that

Hitler had a coherent policy plan designed to expand the German

Reich in order to gain Lebensraum in the East seems to be more

accurate compared to the opportunist, Machiavellian approach by

Broszat and Rauschnig. The second debate deals with a similar

50 Michaelis, p.335-33651 Broszat, p. 125

22

question as this essay, it wants to establish whether Hitler

had a plan for world dominion (globalists) or whether he was

only seeking hegemony over Europe (continentalists).

Globalists, such as Hillgruber and Hildebrand, argue that the

establishment of a German continental empire has to be seen as

the preliminary step in a ‘long-term plan of world conquest’52

(Stufenplan). The continentalist side, backed by Jäckel, claims

that Hitler’s undeniable goal of Weltherrschaft would have stopped

after the establishment of a continental empire in Eurasia.

Even though Hitler had some global aspirations in mind of a

‘Thousand Year Reich’, the course of National Socialist foreign

policy displayed no actual evidence of global aspirations which

seems to agree with the continentalist side of the debate. Some

‘functionalists’, such as Mason, claim that Germany’s foreign

policy was not the result of a series of deliberate decisions

but the product of the internal dynamism of Nazi Germany. Yet,

this view fails to properly incorporate the most important

figure in Hitler’s Germany namely Hitler himself.53

52 Aigner, p. 25653 DC Watt, 151

23

All in all, National Socialist foreign policy was based on

Adolf Hitler’s views as he was the spearhead of the movement

and as a dictator he implemented his objectives as NS foreign

policy had to be compatible with his Weltanschauung. Having

thoroughly analyzed Hitler’s vision of the future world it is

no secret that he harbored global ambitions and wanted to make

Germany a world power exerting dominance over the whole globe,

but Germany’s foreign policy between 1933 and 1945 did not lean

towards a world dominion. Nazi Germany’s conduct of foreign

affairs had to deal with the international situation present at

the time, which put some restrictions on Hitler’s aims as he

had to play the diplomatic game according to the rules of

Realpolitik. His aggressive pursuit of his aims went well and he

succeeded in making Germany a powerful European power again.

Nonetheless, he failed to come to an agreement with Britain,

which built the backbone of his vision, as he wrongly assessed

England’s interests by solely focusing on Britain’s maritime,

imperial interests and wrongly grasping her interests in

Europe. The foreign policy of the Third Reich never had any

concrete, rational plan for world dominion, nor did it ever aim

towards one. However, it did aim towards a European empire,

which would have created a situation of international pre-

24

eminence on the continent. Whether this continental empire

constituted a stage of Hitler’s Stufenplan is hard to say but

there is no evidence post-1933 that would support such a claim.

The ‘Hossbach protocol’ is a key document to prove ‘conspiracy

and aggression’ of the NS regime and even to prove Hitler’s

continental ambitions but it is unsuited to prove a foreign

policy program for world conquest. Hillgruber’s argument that

Hitler’s realistic objective was the achievement of ‘world

power status’ probably defines it best, as the subjugation of

the Soviet Union would have pushed Nazi Germany into a position

of world power but not world dominion. The peculiar nature of

the National Socialist movement and the irrationality of

Hitler’s regime and ideology, which played such an enormous

role in the NS state, make it especially hard to assess Nazi

Germany’s foreign policy as irrationality often led to short-

term improvisations in their conduct of foreign affairs. In

short, Nazi Germany pursued aims which had their roots in the

German pre-1914 era and were cloaked in Hitler’s racial world-

view and megalomania. In the end, Hitler was incapable of

achieving more than the opening moves of the continental phase

of his plan, as the world’s response to his program brought

about the collapse of Nazi Germany.

25

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