Diaspora in Conflict - A Nigerian Case Study

MCGILL UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Role of the Nigerian Diaspora in Civil Conflict

A Case Study

Sandra Aigbinode Masters in Political Science Research Paper

April 15, 2011

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Introduction

The development of African diasporas is a historic phenomenon dating as far back as pre –

modern times.1 In our globalized world, diasporas have become forces shaping the interactions between

countries, regions, and continents. One of the central forces in the modern world is the ease of

transportation of people, movements, and ideas, which have all resulted in transnational linkages that

have increasingly highlighted the role of diasporic communities in domestic level politics.2 In the African

context, there is ample empirical evidence demonstrating that migrant communities have come to play

an important role in the evolution of ethnic conflict in a number of African countries (Koser 2007;

Mohamoud 2006). Indeed, in the context of globalization, diasporas have come to play an important

role in political outcomes. Many diaspora seek an active role in the resolution or continuation of their

homeland conflict. Nevertheless, the link between diaspora and civil conflict resolution remains largely

neglected in the burgeoning literature on the causes and consequences of civil and ethnic conflict.3

It is important to note here that there is no consensus in the literature regarding whether

diasporas uniformly contribute to the civil conflict. Scholars like Collier (2000) emphasize the negative

impacts that diaspora can have on homeland politics through theories like the “greed and grievance

approach” which argues that diasporas finance rebellions either because of greed (since conflicts can be

financially viable) or grievances felt continually by the diaspora.4. On the other hand, scholars like

Mohamoud (2005) accentuate the potential positive contributions of diasporas and their organizations

1 Colin Palmer, “Defining and Studying the Modern African Diaspora.” The Journal of Negro History, Vol 85, No ½, (Winter -‐ Spring 2000): 27 – 32. 2 Jacob Bercovitch. A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution in Smith and Stares, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace – Makers or Peace – Wreckers? New York, US: United Nations Press, 2007. 3 Jacob Bercovitch 2007. 4 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers. 56, no. 4 (2004): 563 – 565.

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since they have better familiarity with their home countries combined with life experiences in their host

countries which make them neither wholly external nor internal.5 While this lack of consensus exists,

this paper maintains that the size and composition of the diasporic community coupled with the political

opportunities available for these groups are imperative elements for determining when it is that

diaspora groups play a more positive or negative role in home politics. I hope to examine this claim by

exploring three inter-‐linked questions at different levels of analysis: the origins and evolution of

Nigeria’s diasporic community; the latter’s role in influencing state-‐level politics in Nigeria; and, finally,

examining the question of whether their influence in civil conflict is primarily political, economic, or

cultural. In other words an analysis of the Nigerian diaspora’s engagement in the international level, the

level of the state (i.e. political systems), and the level of civil society (i.e. civil conflict) will take place. An

analysis of the Nigerian diaspora’s role at different levels of analysis allows for a better understanding of

the causal role of diasporas in the spiral of conflict.

In methodological terms, Nigeria is a useful case for three reasons. First, it has one of the largest

diaspora communities in Africa dating back to over 200 years ago.6 There is no consensus on the exact

number of Nigerians who live outside the country and the estimates vary widely, from a massive 20

million (Vanguard News Archives 20107; ThisDay Live News 20108) to 17 million (Onwubiko 2009; Cyber

News Feed 20109), to about 1.13 million (see Appendix 1 -‐ United Nations Development Program 200910).

5 Awil Abdullah Mohamoud “Mobilizing African Diaspora for the Promotion of Peace in Africa.” Policy Report for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sub-‐Sahara Department, Amsterdam: SAHAN Research Bureau (2005) 6 BBC London “Nigerian London” May 26, 2005. www.bbc.co.uk 7 Give Citizens in Diaspora the Right to Vote.” Vanguard Newspaper Archives June 21, 2010. “http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/06/give-‐citizens-‐in-‐diaspora-‐the-‐right-‐to-‐vote-‐arp/#. 8 Chuks Okocha. August 4, 2010. “2011: You Can’t Vote, Jega Tells Diaspora Nigerians.” ThisDay News Archives. http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/2011-‐you-‐can-‐t-‐vote-‐jega-‐tells-‐diaspora-‐nigerians/81735/. 9 Emeka Cyprian Onwubiko. Dec 10, 2009. “China as a Metaphor for Africa.” Social Science Research Network; “A Golden Nugget Buried Abroad by Nuhu Ribadu,” Cybernewsfeed. July 30, 2010. 10 United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2009 in Blessing Mberu, “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migration Information Source. June 2010. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=788.

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The bases for some of these estimates are unclear and so I use estimates derived from World Bank

reports based on market surveys. According to these reports, at least 6 million Nigerians live in the

United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) combined. 11 For most educated Nigerians, the US and

the UK have been the top destinations and according to 2003 data, researchers from the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that Nigeria has the second – highest

percentage of highly skilled expatriates in OECD countries after Taiwan.12 In addition, other Anglophone

African countries, such as Ghana13 and Sudan have some of the largest Nigerian populations with Sudan

being home to the biggest Nigerian diaspora to date (see Appendix 2)14.

Economically speaking the Nigerian diasporic community is the largest recipient of remittances

in Sub – Saharan Africa15. The country receives nearly 65 percent of officially recorded remittance flows

to the region and 2 percent of global flows. The Central Bank of Nigeria began collecting data on

remittances in 2002, and reported approximately US$2.26 billion in remittances for 2004. 16 Like other

countries in the region, underreporting of remittance flows to Nigeria is common as a result of the huge

informal economy present which some estimate counts for 50 percent of total flows to the country. 17

Current Presidential Candidate for the April 2011 ongoing elections, Mr. Nihu Ribadu, stated just a few

months ago during a speech that the sheer numbers of Nigerians abroad (which he sites at 17 million)

makes them “the fourth significant and potential power block in relation to the social and political life of

the country.”18 All of these figures highlight the significant number of Nigerian diaspora abroad and their

11 Raul Hernandez-‐Coss, Chinyere Egwagwu Bun. 2007. “The UK-‐Nigeria Remittance Corridor: Challenges of Embracing Formal Transfer Systems in a Dual Financial Environment. “ World Bank Publications, Washington:DC. 12 Blessing Mberu. “Nigeria: Multiple Forms of Mobility in Africa’s Demographic Giant.” Migration Information Source. June 2010. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=788. 13 Raul Hernandez-‐Coss, Chinyere Egwagwu Bun. 2007. 14 Mberu 2010. 15 Raul Hernandez-‐Coss, Chinyere Egwagwu Bun. 2007. 16 Raul Hernandez-‐Coss, Chinyere Egwagwu Bun. 2007. 17 Raul Hernandez-‐Coss, Chinyere Egwagwu Bun. 2007. 18 “A Golden Nugget Buried Abroad by Nuhu Ribadu.” Cybernewsfeed 2010.

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relevance, yet the role of the Nigerian diaspora in home politics and civil conflict is very rarely studied

and remains largely ignored in the diaspora literature. According to Adebayo (2010), “the history of

Nigerians in Diaspora is begging to be written.” (12)

Third, Nigeria has experienced two ethnic-‐based civil conflicts since independence in 1960. The

first was the conflict in Biafra that pitted Igbos against Yorubas and Hausa-‐Fulanis. The second, and

more current conflict, is the conflict in the Niger Delta which also has assumed the character of an inter-‐

ethnic conflict. In this respect, comparing the early conflict at a time when the Nigerian diaspora was

relatively small and the present conflict wherein hundreds of thousands of Nigerians live and work

abroad allows me to adjudicate between two separate ethnic conflicts across two distinct historical

periods in Nigeria.

My primary hypothesis is that the minimal role of diasporic communities did not obstruct the

eventual termination of hostilities in the Biafra conflict, while the far more significant involvement of the

diaspora in the Niger Delta conflict has played a role in prolonging the civil conflict. In other words, the

small size, cultural make up (Biafrans vs. Nigerians), political climate (including the presence of a military

regime), and consequently, the political orientation of the 1960’s diaspora, tempered the Biafra civil

conflict over time; while a much larger diaspora population (also meaning more diaspora organizations),

a different cultural make up, an open political climate, and the political orientation of the current

diaspora has fuelled or at the least not ameliorated the civil conflict that is ongoing. Fundamentally, this

paper takes an historical institutional approach.

Conceptualization

Several scholarly works contribute to our broad understanding of the concept ‘diaspora’ as it

relates to international politics. The classic definition of diaspora rests basically on Sheffer’s (1986) three

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proposed criteria: the dispersed group must hold a distinctive collective identity across international

locations; the group must have some internal organization of its own; the group in dispersion must keep

ties with the homeland, be it symbolic or real. 19 This definition has seen modifications over the years

given the changing realities of migration in more recent times. First, the notion of voluntary migration

has been included as in Cohen’s (1997) diasporic communities; and second, by easing the requirement

of internal organization since it is a collective identity that keeps diasporas together in contemporary

terms.20

The conceptual foundation used in this paper draws from the definition presented by Smith and

Stares (2007). They more or less assume diasporas as social groups that (i) settle and establish

themselves in another country and (ii) are internally heterogeneous.21 Diasporas are seldom constituted

by one single factor other than the broadest of connections to a specific homeland. Another assumption

is that diasporas intervene in conflict when they can, based on respective power relations between

diasporas and their home and host country. 22 Diasporas without access to power of some sort do not

intervene in conflicts.

Research Methodology

Process tracing is a very useful qualitative method for case study research. Alternative

quantitative approaches suffer from the confusion of correlation and cause. Research relating to conflict

processes benefit from tracing the processes through a systematic framework for the comparison and

evaluation of context -‐ mechanisms involved. Consequently, the research methodology employed in this

paper is that of process tracing through the use of primarily secondary sources. I will utilize a number of

19 Rainer Baubock, Thomas Faist. “Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories, and Methods” Amsterdam University Press 2010.pp 76 20 Rainer Baubock, Thomas Faist 2010 21 Hazel Smith and Paul Stares “Diasporas in Conflict: Peace – Makers or Peace – Wreckers?” NY: United Nations Press, 2007. 22 Hazel Smith and Paul Stares 2007.

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relevant secondary sources in exploring my three inter – linked research questions at different levels of

analysis.

First, in analyzing the question on the origin and evolution of Nigeria’s diasporic community, a

critical review of related materials including literatures, journals, and textbooks on this topic is

employed. Second, to understand the diaspora’s role in influencing state – level politics in Nigeria, this

paper employs extensive case studies conducted on various Sub – Saharan African diaspora populations,

including Nigeria, to allow for a comparative approach. Additionally, archival data which contain

materials in my areas of interest (diaspora, civil conflict, socio – economic development, and political

participation) is used extensively for this research question; the archives come from various sources

including Nigerian newspapers, international news outlets, Nigerian diaspora organizations, televised

interviews and documentaries. The sources of the television interview and news archives include BBC

news archives, Aljazeera news archives, Punch Nigeria news archives, Sahara Reporters archives,

ThisDay newspaper archives, and The Guardian newspaper archives. These news articles and documents

are readily accessible on the websites of each of these media outlets as well as on social networks like

YouTube particularly for the interviews. In addition, organization reports, articles, and other

unpublished documents from the websites of a multitude of active diaspora groups based in London and

North America including AFFORD, and NIDO, some of the biggest Nigerian diaspora networks, are

utilized. Third, in examining the question of whether their influence in civil conflict is primarily political,

economic, or cultural, the secondary sources used include, existing survey data conducted in Sub –

Saharan African countries by Africa Recruit, Africa Foundation for Development (AFFORD), the World

Bank, UNDP, and the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics. A limitation of my research lies in the use of primarily

secondary data as a basis for the conclusions reached in this paper which can impact the validity of the

information provided.

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Related Literature

In light of the increasing rate of out migration of Africans over the last three decades, scholars of

African politics have begun to pay increasing attention to the role of diasporas in local politics.23 On the

one hand, some authors have emphasized the need to overcome reified notions of diasporic

communities by recognizing that there is a plurality of African diasporas.24 While the early literature on

the subject maintained a singular form of identity formation embedded in the history of African slavery,

more recent scholarship has unpacked the ethnic, social, and occupational status of migrant

communities in order to examine more precisely the latter’s role in the politics of the home countries.

Political Culture Approach

Scholars who utilize the political culture approach such as Smith (2007), have persuasively

argued that analysis of specific diasporas needs to take place rather than over – generalizations about

what diasporas may or may not contribute to conflict.25 Smith (2007) argues that not all diasporas have

the same capacities, opportunities, and motivations to intervene in conflict; moreover, they may have

very different objectives. 26 Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to

political action, that is, the political culture which Verba (1977) defines clearly as “the subjective

orientation to politics.”27 For example, these scholars emphasize the cultural consequences of diasporic

communities that come from ethnically divided countries by highlighting the role that some diasporas

play in hardening ethnic identities in ways that impact local politics. Lampert (2009) provides a case in

point through his analysis of London – based Nigerian diaspora communities; he argues that these

communities continue a transnational politics of belonging that reproduces a pervasive and insidiously

23 Emmanuel, Akyeampong “Africans in the Diaspora: The Diaspora and Africa.” African Affairs, 15, 2000. 24 Khalid Kosner “African Diaspora and Post Conflict Reconstruction” in Smith and Stare 2007. 25 Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, 2007. 26 Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, 2007. 27 Sidney Verba, “Comparative Political Culture” in Gabriel Ben – Dor “Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1977 p. 45.

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divisive politics of belonging that is widely seen to undermine the Nigerian peace project.28 This

approach is very useful for our analysis as it highlights the way in which these Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa –

Fulani diaspora organizations abroad affect civil conflict by introducing new conceptions of ethnic

identity in ways that result in further ethnic divisions which exacerbates conflict.29

Political Economy Approach

Other scholars like Medani (2002) and Collier (2004) take the political economy approach that

emphasizes the financial and economic linkages that can result in the financing of local militias in

countries like Somalia and Nigeria in ways that fuel civil conflict and even, in some cases, state collapse

in some parts of Africa.30 These scholars also focus on the importance of remittances to sustain the

population, and its practical importance for homeland development, as well as economic strategies that

host and home countries can implement to create incentives for diaspora involvement economically.31

The Political Economy Approach has proven useful for this paper by analyzing the role of remittances in

financing rebel organizations in conflict – ridden remittance economies like Nigeria. It also has the

advantage of explaining why some rebel organizations are able to succeed in exacerbating conflicts like

the ND conflict, while others fail in the context of differential access to funds like the Biafran war.32

Historical Institutional Approach

The historical institutional approach is the most useful in that it takes into account the reasons

why diasporas decide to intervene in civil conflicts, and how this involvement can evolve in

28 Ben Lampert “Diaspora and development? Nigerian organizations in London and the transnational politics of belonging.” Global Networks 9, no. 2 (2009): 162 – 184. 29 A shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes identity formation as constant thus ignoring the reality that diasporas can play a different role in domestic politics over time. Despite the salience of ethnicity in Nigeria, through the cases of the Biafra war and ND conflict, we see this shifting role of diaspora in civil conflict. 30 Khalid Medani “Financing Terrorism or Survival?: Informal Finance and State Collapse in Somalia, and the US War on Terrorism.” 2002; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 2004. 31 Maria Koinova “Diasporas and Conflict During the Post – Conflict Reconstruction of Divided Societies.” 2007. 32 However, this approach remains largely descriptive in that it too does not address why diasporic communities decide to take sides in these civil conflicts, and how this support can vary over time with important consequences for how and when war’s end.

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unpredictable ways over time. Furthermore, it takes into consideration both economic and cultural

factors while tracing the history of diaspora involvement. A useful subgroup within the “historical

institutional approach” is the “conflict cycle approach;” it not only takes history seriously but also argues

that the role of diasporas in civil conflict actually changes vis-‐a-‐vis shifts in the phases of the conflict.

Scholars like Lund (1996) and Bercovitch (2007) provide elaborate frameworks that analyze the patterns

of influence at each given stage in conflict including but not limited to measures diasporas can or cannot

take in the conflict emergence phase, conflict continuation phase, conflict escalation phase, conflict

termination phase, and post – conflict restructuring phases.33 Related to the phase of a conflict are

possible arenas in which diaspora may exercise influence. According to Bercovitch (2007), there are four

basic arenas in which diasporas can exercise influence in the course of conflict – political, military,

economic, and socio – cultural. A diaspora group may focus on one arena over the others or maintain a

balance in all areas; there also can be variations in the efforts put into each of these arenas throughout

the course of the conflict. The combining of the phases of conflict with the possible arenas of influence

results in a comprehensive framework for analyzing diasporas in conflicts. Consequently, this essay takes

an “historical institutional approach.”

This research contributes to the debate in two ways. First, in empirical terms it shows the

important role that diasporas play in civil conflicts. Moreover, by looking at two distinct periods my

research contributes to the important question of why this involvement can help to reduce civil conflict

on the one hand, while exacerbating civil conflict at other times. Second, in policy terms my work

contributes to the debate over what the most optimal role diasporas should play in those cases where

the “sending” country is undergoing civil conflict.

33 Jacob Bercovitch “A Neglected Relationship” in Smith and Stare 2007; Al – Ali Nadje “Gender, diasporas and post – Cold War Conflict.” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares 2007; Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts.” United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996.

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The First Diaspora Era

There is an outstanding amount of literature on the slave trade, the abolition of the slave trade

and slavery in various parts of Africa, including Nigeria, that contribute immensely to our understanding

of the issue but this is not the focus of this paper. 34 However to understand the processes of the

Nigerian diaspora conception, one must connect African histories (local as well as regional) with the

subsequent historical experiences of those taken as slaves to the Americas. It is important to point out

at the onset that the slave trade was not the only source through which African peoples were dispersed

all over the world. Some voluntary migrations may have taken place before the era of the slave trade

and have certainly been going on since its abolition. Nevertheless, the slave trade was by far the most

important factor which dispersed African peoples and their cultures all over the globe at the outset.

Quantitatively therefore, the trade can be treated as the origin of the diaspora.35 The demography of

Trans – Atlantic migration is very well studied; research suggests that the trade in enslaved Africans

exceeded 12.5 million people, not all of whom arrived, but of those who did, most crossed the Atlantic

in the 150 years after 1680. 36

Analyzing the specific beginnings of the ‘Nigerian diaspora’ from the slave trade era is very

complex as many scholars point out the difficulty in pinning the cultural background of enslaved Africans

in the Americas to specific cultural zones and traits in their African origins.37 Most of modern day Nigeria

were a part of both the Bight of Benin (Yoruba ethnic groups) and the Bight of Biafra and its hinterland

(now South Eastern Nigeria). The Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra were both major exporting

regions, both of which were among the top three supplying regions of captives along with West –

34 A.E. Afigbo 2006. “The Abolition of the Slave Trade in South Eastern Nigeria.” Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. 35 Joseph E Inikori. "The Origin of the Diaspora: The Slave Trade From Africa." Tarikh, 5, no. 4 1978. pp. 1-‐9. 36 Paul Lovejoy. 2000 “Identity in the Shadow of Slavery.” Continuum International Publishing Group. 37 Sandra Green in Lovejoy 2000, pp 87

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Central Africa. According to some authors, the majority Igbo of the Bight of Biafra hinterlands were the

largest single African group arriving in North America and several Caribbean destinations for much of

the eighteenth century.38 About 1.7 million people were transported from the Bight of Biafra alone over

the course of the Trans – Atlantic slave trade, the vast majority (1.5 million) after 1700. 39 Most

important to us is that this history provides us with an understanding of the conceptions of the Nigerian

diaspora, of which while some returned to Africa, others remained abroad creating some of the diaspora

we now see as part of those that made up the Biafran era diaspora.

The Evolution of the Nigerian Diaspora

Prior to 1914, there were three distinct ethnic groups living life independently of each other

until the British colonial masters, in what was called the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern

Protectorates, brought them all together into one single unit called Nigeria. 40 The failure of colonialists

to consider the cultural incongruity of the people they were putting together brought about the inter-‐

ethnic conflicts that ensued shortly after independence with the British colonialists gone.

The struggle for independence created a unifying goal of liberation which allowed ethnic

identities become less salient. By 1960, Nigeria successfully gained its independence and naturally, the

differences that had always existed in their ways of life, culture, and ideology, resurfaced. 41 There were

a series of military coups, civil disturbances, and the final straw that broke the camel’s back was the riots

of 1966, in which thousands of people from the east (Igbos) who were living in the northern region were

massacred in cold blood by their northern Nigerian counterparts. 42 These killings convinced the

38 Ugo Nwokeji. “The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African Society in Afigbo 2006. 39 Chambers in Paul Lovejoy 2000 40 Alfred Obiora Uzokwe. “Surviving in Biafra: The Story of the Nigerian Civil War: Over Two Million Dead.” Lincoln, NE, US: iUniverse Press, 2003. 41 Uzokwe 2003 42 Uzokwe 2003

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easterners that they were no longer welcomed outside the eastern region and as thus easterners

dwelling in the west and north fled back home to their native east region. In 1967, the eastern region

declared their secession from Nigeria to form a new nation which was to be called Biafra.

The then government of Nigeria led by General Yakubu Gowon, declared the secession illegal

and mobilized a monstrous agglomeration of armed men made up of Hausa and Yoruba peoples (the

other two dominant ethnic groups in the country), to fight against the volunteer force representing the

Biafrans. According to Frederick Forsyth (1969), “never in modern history has a war been fought

between armies of such disparity in strength and firepower as the Nigeria/Biafra conflict.”43 A 30 -‐

month civil war in which well over two million Biafrans died (mostly from starvation) and many refugees

created was the end result of the Biafran war.44 Even following such a devastating war, accounts of

Nigerians and more specifically Biafrans either as refugees or otherwise migrating abroad to live is few

and far in between. There is very limited information on this. In its place, many authors refer to Nigeria

as in effect, an Ibo diaspora as those Igbos who had to flee their homes in northern and to a lesser

extent western Nigeria, principally took refuge in Igbo ‘homeland’ regions not devastated by war. In

fewer cases some went to neighboring West African states or further afield; “there were also a limited

number of Biafran/Nigerian war ‘refugees’ who managed to escape to Europe and the US.” 45 This led to

the transformation of Igbo communities within the UK and US, which became places of information,

news, and fund raising for the ‘Biafran cause.’

As stated earlier, the war created local refugees but not a significant diaspora that migrated to

elude the war. Outside of the limited refugee population that escaped abroad, the population of

43 Frederick Forsyth. 1969. “The Biafra Story.” Penguin Books, Middlesex, England. pp. 112. 44 BBC News Archive. (Jan 3 , 2000). “Secret Papers Reveal Biafra Intrigue.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/589221.stm 45 Ola Uduku. “The Socio – Economic Basis of a Diaspora Community: Igbo by Ike.” Review of African Political Economy. 2002, No. 92:305

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Nigerian diaspora abroad was little. Majority of the Nigerian diaspora that can be spoken of during this

period were either a small group of elites or sponsored students.46 After independence, the emerging

elites moved mainly to the United Kingdom due to the legacy of colonial ties, for educational pursuits,

and in a few cases for administrative matters.47 The rate of return for most of these groups was high as

according to Jerome (1978), they had an “obligation to restore the declining fortunes of families who

financed the trip abroad and issued instructions to ‘go and return.” (378) Once they had achieved the

goal for which they came, there was no reason to stay. Jerome (1978) points out that although the rate

of return was rapid for the elite, the non – elite, mostly students were faced with the dilemma of

working semi – skilled jobs to make ends meet which made their dream of returning home much more

difficulty. In any case, most Nigerians educated abroad in the 1960s and 1970s readily came home after

completing their education to be assured plum jobs in the civil service or the burgeoning oil and private

sectors of the economy. 48

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (first President of Nigeria), and Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa (first Prime

Minister of Nigeria) are some examples of elites that were opportune to live abroad and returned home

rapidly following the completion of their mission abroad. Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa spent some time

abroad studying at the Institute of Education of London University. He was one of the few educated

people of his time in the North, and as a result quickly became involved in the politics of that region

upon the completion of his studies and his return home.49 Another founding father and a Biafran was Dr.

Azikiwe. He fled to his home in Eastern Nigeria where he was overtaken by the secession of Biafra.

Never an enthusiast of secession, he served reluctantly in an undefined capacity on a number of

46 Uduku 2002. 47 Mberu 2010. 48 Mberu 2010. 49 Raph Uwechue. “Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future. P188

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missions abroad for the Biafran regime. 50 “Azikiwe was Biafra’s biggest international celebrity, and as

one of Africa’s best – known and earliest nationalist leaders, he was granted direct access to African

heads of state, several of whom had been personal friends for more than twenty years.”51 Breaking with

Colonel Ojukwu (Governor of the Eastern Region) on the question of a negotiated settlement, he went

into voluntary exile in London in September 1968. A year later, he came out openly for a peaceful

settlement on the basis of a united Nigeria.52

Outside of diplomats, state elites, and sponsored students, there are limited records to show

that there was a substantial Nigerian diaspora living abroad during this period. And for most, the rate of

return was very high after the completion of their missions and goals. This diasporic community greatly

contrasts the diaspora of the 1980’s and 1990’s that was created as a result of the economic crisis and

on-‐going conflicts at home.

The Final Diaspora (Conflict -‐ Generated Diaspora)

Nigerians left the country in the 70’s and 80’s but the rate of emigration accelerated in the

1990’s. This rapid migration trend of professionals and students has led to what is now being called the

“Nigerian Brain Drain.”53 Structural degradation from the pervasiveness of ethnic conflicts has increased

the flow outward, both as young people cannot find satisfactory university placements and as their

older counterparts ultimately opt to leave Nigeria in search of a better life. They do so for many reasons,

but the biggest push factors according to research is that the opportunities to make a living in Nigeria

50 Raph Uwechue. “Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future.” Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2004, pp. 195 51 John Stremlau. 1977. “The International Politics of the Civil War, 1967 -‐ 1970. Princeton University Press, Princeton:New Jersey. P 131 52 Raph Uwechue 2004. 53 “The Nigerian Diaspora.” NigerianDiaspora.com. http://www.nigeriandiaspora.com/diaspora.htm.

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are unstable and the conditions for obtaining or practicing meaningful work are increasingly difficult.54

According to Uduku (2002), the nature and character of the Nigerian diaspora has also changed

substantially since unlike the past, “few want to return immediately to Nigeria given its deteriorating

economic and political [situation].”55 In essence, there is now a more permanent nature of residence

away from ‘home’ in the diaspora.

The events taking place today in Nigeria some argue are sadly very reminiscent of similar

occurrences that precipitated the secession of Biafra and the civil war in 1967. Presently, there is a

heightened sense of insecurity and intolerance within Nigeria. Many feel neglected and marginalized

today just as was the case prior to the Biafra civil war. The incidents of politically and religiously

motivated killings are occurring at an alarming rate and creating fear within the country.56 The Niger

Delta (ND) conflict has been ongoing for well over four decades, with the conflict intensifying

tremendously in the last two decades. The conflict has assumed the character of an inter-‐ethnic conflict

given the alienation that the Niger Delta peoples feel from the rest of Nigeria. Violence has reached an

all-‐time high with incidences of kidnaps, car bombs, and violent protests, becoming more prevalent.

The ND conflict is simply put, another illustration of the ‘resource curse’ that plagues resource

rich countries. There is now strong evidence that states with abundant resource wealth perform less

well than their resource – poor counterparts, but there is little agreement on why this occurs.57 From the

author’s experience, it is quite common to hear laymen on the streets of Nigeria today say that they

wished that water had been discovered instead of oil because of the paradox of plenty that is so evident

today. Before the discovery of black gold (crude oil) in commercial quantity in the Niger Delta,

54 Rachel R Reynolds. “We Are Not Surviving, We Are Managing: the constitution of a Nigerian Diaspora along the contours of the global economy.” City and Society 2008, 16, no. 1. Pp 1 – 23. 55 Uduku 2002 56 Uzokwe 2003 57 Michael L. Ross. 1999. “Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics, 51:2:297 – 322.

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agriculture was the dominant occupation of the people in that area. Crude oil was later discovered in

the Niger Delta in 1956 and since then, exploration and exploitation of this resource by the government

and MNOCs has resulted in environmental degradation, soil impoverishment, pollution, loss of aquatic

life and biodiversity, to name a few of the negative impacts of their activities.58 In addition, the lack of oil

revenue flow into the region makes matters worse. The crisis in the ND region has thus been attributed

to the inability of the oil companies and the government to adequately mitigate the consequences of

their activities in the region. The capital intensive technologies used by the oil companies for example

has failed to generate employment for the local population since only a few skilled workers are needed

to operate the machines used. As a result of such failures to assuage their harmful presence in the

region, civil society groups have proliferated in recent years to fight for, what they refer to as ‘their

right’.

Scholars have pinpointed the origin of the conflict and most argue that it started in 1966 when

Isaac Adaka Boro led a rebellion with his Delta Volunteer Service against the Federal Government and

formed the Niger Delta Republic.59 Although the rebellion was quickly crushed, that event brought about

a certain consciousness in the minds of the people. This consciousness awareness of the suffering and

deprivation faced by the ND peoples then led to the championing of justice for the ND by local leaders

like Saro – Wiwa and Henry Okah in the 90’s. Following repressive measures by the authoritarian

governments at the time such as the hanging of Saro – Wiwa and nine others in 1995 by General Sani

Abacha, tactics have since become more violent. Various militant groups have sprung up and civil society

has proliferated tremendously.

58 P.B Eregha. and I.R Irughe. “Oil Induced Environmental Degradation in the Nigeria’s Niger – Delta: The Multiplier Effects. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 11, 4, (2009): 160 – 175. 59 Hasan Tai Ejibunu. “Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis: Root Causes of Peacelessness.” EPU Research Papers. http://www.epu.ac.at/epu/research/rp_0707.pdf Last visited April 26, 2010.

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The methods employed by the civil society groups have essentially been dictated over time by

the expediencies of the regime type and disposition.60 Following the 1999 Constitution and the

Petroleum Act that was passed which centralized all of the oil wealth to the Federal Government,

methods utilized by the ND groups shifted from organized peaceful protests and litigation that

dominated earlier periods, to violent protests, car bombs, kidnapping, and arms struggle. 61 About 200

adult expatriates alone have been kidnapped in the Niger Delta since the start of 2006 and 15 are still

being held by various armed groups.62 From the author’s experience, travelling home during the holidays

in the last three years has become a major security concern because of the tremendous increase in the

kidnapping of expatriates and students coming in from abroad during the holiday season; ransoms are

now seen as a way to make money that they believe was stolen from them in the first place. State

response to civil society militancy and confrontations has become more suppressive, and coercive.

Curfews are now imposed, random arrests made, armed police roam the streets, and state of

emergency is consistently threatened. All of this has further alienated the ND peoples, instilled distrust

against the state, and has led these groups to pursue more militaristic methods.

Given the growing instability of the country, the rate of emigration to other parts of the world

has grown exponentially. As mentioned earlier, although there is no consensus on the exact number of

Nigerians who live outside the country, the estimates all maintain it at over a million Nigerian diaspora

around the world.63 According to Orozco 2006, those like the United Nations that posit that there are

approximately 1.1 million Nigerians living outside their home country plainly fall short of the reality. Just

in West Africa, the trend of Nigerian migration is substantial – in Ghana alone there are at least half a

60 Ikelegbe A. 2001. “Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39:3:437 – 469 61 Watts M. 2004. “Resource curse? Governmentality, Oil, and Power in the Niger Delta.” Geopolitics, 9:1:50 – 8 0. 62 Prime Defence 2010. “Kidnap, Ransom & Extortion.” Prime Defence. http://www.primedefence.com/kidnap_ransom.htm. Last visited April 20, 2010. 63 “Give Citizens in Diaspora the Right to Vote”; Okocha. 2011; Hernandez-‐Coss and Egwagwu Bun. 2007.

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million Nigerians. 64 This estimate does not even account for the large number of Nigerian migrants in

countries like Sudan and South Africa that have some of the highest Nigerian diaspora abroad. These

figures help build a more realistic estimate of far more than one million Nigerians living abroad.65

Given the remarkable increase in the number of Nigerian diaspora abroad, accordingly there has

been a proliferation of Nigerian diaspora organizations abroad which range from religious associations,

ethnic-‐based groups, to more pan – Nigerian development organizations. This is in turn has made their

potential to impact home politics much stronger than ever. Thus far, this essay has given detailed

accounts of the conception of the Nigerian diaspora and its evolution over time in an effort to clarify the

opportunities, goals, motivations, and make – up of the diasporic communities at a given time. Taking

into consideration all of these factors allows for a better analysis of the roles that the Nigerian diasporic

communities have played over time in home politics. The following sections examine how, why, and

what, the Nigerian diaspora contribute to home politics.

Nigerian Diaspora Influence on State-‐level Politics

The Nigerian Diasporic Community of the 1960’s

The participation of the Nigerian diaspora in state level politics during the Biafra war period was

relatively limited due to many factors including, the oppressive nature of the military regime in power;

the overt ethnic nature of the conflict creating an unequal two – sided support raising battle; and the

limited number of diaspora population and diaspora organizations abroad at the time.

Firstly, during the Biafra war, the system of government – a military regime along with multiple

coup d’états provided little political opportunity for civil involvement in politics not to talk of the

64 Manuel Orozco AND Bryanna Millis. October 2007. “Remittances, Competition and Fair Financial Access Opportunities in Nigeria.” United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 65 Manuel Orozco AND Bryanna Millis. October 2007.

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involvement of those abroad in state politics. Like any social movement and civil society organization

requires access points to the state to effectively participate in politics, diaspora organizations and

communities abroad required the political opportunity to participate in politics at home. A closer look

at the political processes of the 1960’s alludes to the lack of access points for non – state agents even

within Nigeria to participate in politics. In January 1966, Azikiwe the first President of the country was

removed from power in a military coup by Major General Aguiyi -‐ Ironsi; shortly after in July of the same

year, General Ironsi himself was overthrown and killed by a group of northern officers after which

General Yakubu took power. General Yakubu himself was later overthrown in another coup. The Biafran

Civil War (July 1967 – January 1870) took place during this military labyrinth.

It is evident that the nature of the regime played a tremendous role in halting diaspora

participation if we analyze the changes in diaspora participation following the brief interlude of civil rule

which provided them political opportunity to participate. From 1979 to 1983, Nigeria had a very short -‐

lived return to civil rule in which Igbos in the diaspora helped fund ethnic Igbo ‘Peoples Club’

movements which was a precursor to the unbanning of political parties. The Peoples’ Club movement

became part of the Eastern dominated Nigerian People’s Party which captured the most seats in the two

Igbo States in the 1979, and 1983 elections, before the coup d’état and reinstatement of military rule

later on in 1983. 66

The use of ethnic hostility by former strong leaders to support authoritarian tendencies is well

known. Those in favor of authoritarian regimes argue that democratic traditions has progressed the

furthest in countries that have the fewest serious ethnic cleavages and progressed more slowly or not at

66 Uduku 2002

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all in those that are deeply divided.67 Although arguable, the argument is made that for ethnically

diverse societies, allowing too many voices in state politics can lead to more ethnic based rivalry and

worrisome competition; thus, the presence of a strong military regime during this period, which offered

little or no avenue for civil participation, can be credited as being one of the major reasons why the

Biafran war only lasted for three years and not longer.

Secondly, the ethnic make – up of the diaspora and diaspora organizations at the time served as

a hindrance to their level of influence in home politics as it weakened their financial capacity to

contribute specifically to the Biafran side of the conflict. The adage that “there is power in numbers;”

and that “united we stand, divided we fall” are both very suitable for understanding the impact that this

factor had in explaining the restricted influence on home politics of the Nigerian diaspora in the 1960’s.

To start, the conflict was blatantly ethnic based -‐ the people who vigorously supported the Biafran cause

were mainly Igbos. Indigenes of both the south west and the North were either vehemently opposed the

Biafrans or were indifferent.68 Thus, ethnic salience was at its peak both within the country and outside

among diaspora groups. Given the modest diaspora population of the period, they could not afford to

let ethnic divisions take hold within their networks; unfortunately, this was not the case. The lack of

trust between “Nigerians” and Biafrans” meant a reduction in funds available to be sent home by the

few existing diaspora organizations. While mass donations supported the Nigerian side of the conflict

since they had everyone else outside of the Igbos on their side, donations were sent to a lesser extent to

the Biafran side; this essentially created an imbalance in the fighting ultimately leading to Biafra’s defeat

and the conflicts’ short – life span.

67 Donald Horowitz. 1993. “Democracy in Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy. Volume 4, Number 4. Pp 18 – 38. 68 Kole Ahmed Shettima. “Nigerian Pro – democracy Movements in the Diaspora.” Paper presented at the ISA Conference in Washington, DC, February 1999. http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/shet.htm.

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There was indisputably a transformation of Igbo communities especially within the UK and US.

With the war against Nigeria, “one’s relationship with one’s hometown and with other Igbo kin was all

that could be assured.”69 There are examples of Igbo groups in Europe who had working relations with

other Nigeria ethnic group associations. However during the war, circumstances changed, and there is

evidence of in-‐fighting within multi – ethnic networks. For example, the Igbo Union in Liverpool broke

off relations with the Nigeria Union who were supporting the federal side of the war.70 This as

mentioned earlier reduced not only their financial capacity but it also diminished their fund raising

networks. Uduku mentions an important fact when he states that the Igbo identity came to the

forefront starting from then on and it has had a long term effect on the diaspora community abroad:

“This phase of diaspora Igbos initiated the contemporary organization of the Igbo unions.” 71 The

ethnically homogenous diaspora associations abroad today are perhaps a legacy of the Biafra era since

ethnic salience came to the forefront from then onwards as those issues were never dealt with and the

grievances remain.

Thirdly, as mentioned previously, the population of the diaspora was relatively few compared to

what we see today. It was limited to state agents on missions, students, and a narrow group of elites

who could afford it. Regarding their influence on state level politics, there is hardly any account of

outside Nigerian diaspora participation in state politics during the Biafran war. Despite the international

nature of the secession, given that the Biafran state targeted the international community with a public

relations campaign against the Nigerian Government, interactions were typically between the Nigerian

government, the Biafran government, and other African and foreign governments who were either

willing to support or were against the secessionist movement.

69 Uduku 2002 p 305 70 Uduku 2002 71 Uduku p 306

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Individuals in the diaspora during the civil war and its aftermath simply increased their length of

stay abroad until they could return home safely; for others, the war served to delay and eventually

result in some families and individuals giving up on the idea of returning to Nigeria. The oil boom that

followed in the following years however was enough to ensure that most Igbos’ living abroad returned

to Nigeria eventually.72 When the diaspora did return home, they were more likely to immediately

spend time living and re-‐establishing contacts in their home towns. They would pursue development

plans for home towns, invest in small and medium scale industry, and participate in all sorts of

rebuilding efforts. 73 They would also pursue various private sector jobs as a result of the oil boom.

An interesting way, albeit more latent means, in which the Nigerian diaspora participated in

state politics was through providing some of the political elites of the time. As a matter of fact, quite a

few political elites in office were foreign educated individuals trained in public administration and other

related fields who later returned home and got involved in politics. There were innumerable links

between Nigeria and educational institutions abroad which prepared the diaspora for engagement in

politics in various capacities. One of such programs was the special relationship between the Royal

Institute of Public Administration in London and the Nigerian Institutes of Public Administration.74 The

examples presented earlier on President Azikiwe, and Sir Tafawa Balewa are but a few examples of such

political elites. In addition, there are accounts of other individual elite members of the diaspora that

participated in state politics and were consequently jailed for their involvement. Such prominent leaders

and political activists in the diaspora where those like Chinua Achebe a renowned novelist, Wole Soyinka

a Nobel laureate, and Chris Abani, a poet and novelist. Accounts of participation by diaspora community

72 Uduku 2002 73 Uduku 2002 74 Olajide Aluko. 1981. “Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy.” George Allen & Unwin Publishers Ltd. UK: London. P 52

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groups and organizations are rare in the literature. In its place, the role that prominent individuals like

those listed above are well discussed.

Perhaps one factor that can account for the small number of elites who were able to impact

state politics lies in the sheer lack of diplomatic and political missions in the 1960’s compared to the

numbers post 1980’s. According to Aluko (1981), the Nigerian government did not realize the

importance of propaganda in diplomacy. While the number of Nigeria’s overseas missions early in 1966

was just 36, other neighboring countries like Ghana had well over 62. 75 The Biafrans on the other hand

did relatively better and took more advantage of propaganda through missions abroad which baffled the

Nigerian government. They stressed their fear of ‘genocide’, and redefined the determination to resist

in terms of Biafra’s “self – reliance.” However, despite focusing on an international audience, the base of

the propaganda movement remained largely local and not via diaspora organizations. Cyprian Ekwensi,

the internationally renowned author and the former director of Information Services for the Eastern

Region was the head of Biafra’s Overseas Press Service in 1968. His responsibilities included the

censoring of all nonofficial news stories transmitted from Biafra and the forwarding of all propaganda

for distribution not to Nigerian diaspora networks but to a Geneva public relations firm, Markpress

News Feature Services, owned and operated by an American.76

Other significant international players that supported the Biafrans during the war years included

religious institutions especially Catholic Church member associations, the Vatican, and the World

Council of Churches who all made serious attempts to mediate the Nigerian dispute by dispatching

envoys and issuing joint appeals to the federal and Biafran governments and to the entire international

75 Aluko. 1981. 76 Stremlau. 1977

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community. 77 All things considered, the strong external influence of governments, religious institutions,

and foreign press institutions, all with the goal of mitigating the conflict in some sense, took the place of

diasporas (who usually possessed grievances), which ultimately quickened the conflict resolution phase.

Concisely, the minimal role of diasporic communities did not obstruct the eventual termination of

hostilities in the Biafra conflict.

The Nigerian Diaspora of the 1980s to Present

On the other hand, the final era of the diaspora dating from the collapse of the Nigerian

economy in the 1980s and the escalation of the Niger – Delta (ND) conflict in the mid-‐1980s to the

present has played a more substantial role (positive or not) in home politics as a result of these factors:

their sheer size, the transition to democracy, the presence of weak state institutions, a more resource-‐

based conflict, and the role of supranational factors like globalization and technologies.

Firstly, unlike the 1960’s, there are millions of Nigerians living abroad. Remarkably, it is

estimated that one in every five Africans around the world is Nigerian.78 Not only has their total size

grown exponentially but the composition of the diaspora population varies widely. These new migrants

have arrived as students, professionals, investors, diplomats, refugees, dual citizens (the younger

generation), and the list goes on. This in turn has created various channels and avenues through which

diaspora members can organize themselves. It is not uncommon to hear of Nigerian Student

Associations at various universities, such as York University’s Nigerian Student’s Association here in

Canada; various ethnic based and pan – Nigerian associations in almost every big city in the world

including Montreal and Toronto; Nigerian professional associations like the Association of Nigerian

77 Stremlau. 1977. P 115 78 Unicef. “UNICEF Nigeria.” www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries_1320.html

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Physicians in the Americas;79 and religious associations such the Redeemed Christian Church Group all

over the world with over 79 parishes in Canada alone.80 Beyond such particular interest groups,

Nigerians (and Ghanaians) figure prominently in pan – African diaspora development organizations, for

instance the London – based NGO the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD).81

Moreover, the number of political diaspora organizations has also seen a remarkable increase in

the last two decades. Given the longer duration of their stay abroad, more and more Nigerians are

investing their time and effort in making these diaspora organizations more effective. According to NNPS

2004, “some momentum for change has been building since the transition to democracy in 1999 […].

Increasing numbers of Nigerians in the diaspora are willing to return and contribute to the economy.”82

What’s more is that there is more of an interest on the part of the Nigerian government in the

diasporas’ potential contribution to national development. 83 Consequently political organizations such

as several chapters of NIDO (Nigerian in the Diaspora Organization), which has an office based in the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been established by the government. A Special Assistant to the

President on Nigerians in the diaspora was also appointed. 84 Now, all Nigerian organizations in the

diaspora are advised to organize themselves and link up with NIDO branches all over the world. The

Nigeria National Volunteer Services (NNVS) is another government agency, which has been established

to reinforce bonds with the Nigerian Diaspora in order to more effectively use their skills and knowledge

and reverse the brain drain. These state created diaspora organizations raise very interesting questions

for our comparison between the two eras. Whereas diaspora organizations in the 1960’s were mostly 79 Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americans. 2011. www.anpa.org . 80 Redeemed Christian Church of God North America. http://www.rccgna.org/pad/home/parishes/canada. 81 Hein de Haas, 2006. “International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in Countries of Origin – The Case of Nigeria.” Working Papers Migration and Development Series Report No. 6. International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, UK. 82 NNPS 2004 pp 13 in Hein de Haas, 2006. 83 Hein de Haas, 2006. 84 Hein de Haas, 2006.

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non – state led or sponsored, in more recent times more state – created, state – led, and state -‐

sponsored diaspora organizations exist. Although these organizations add onto the political

opportunities that are available for diaspora contribution to national development, they are also viewed

with suspicion by other diaspora groups for many reasons. For one, they receive all of the government

funds, diplomatic visits, and general attention from the Nigerian state over non – state affiliated groups

despite their ineffectiveness and corrupt practices. This behaviour discourages the will and desire of non

– state diaspora groups to participate effectively in state -‐ level politics since there is almost no

recognition of their positive contributions.

Another problem that arises regards the ambiguous mandate of the heavily funded state – led

diaspora organizations. All of the initiatives listed previously albeit sound on paper lack effective

implementation. According to Haas 2006, “it is unclear how NIDO and NNVS function in practice, and no

(independent) evaluations are available.” 85 Ambassador Keshi during the 2010 National Diaspora Day

Conference made reference to the ineffectiveness of these initiatives:

“NIDO, especially NIDO America is still engulfed in its leadership crisis, a crisis that has plagued the organization right from its inception. Although there are a number of NIDO chapters around the world, in terms of membership, they are insignificant. They remain ineffective, more because of their limited understanding of the federal government’s initiative to involve the Nigerian Diaspora in the country’s development.”86

It is this political disengagement between the Nigerian diaspora and the state that has halted

the potential effectiveness of such political associations. Similar to unaccountable foreign aid being dead

aid given it’s potential to worsen existing situations,87futile political associations can make diaspora

unwitting partakers in the social and political ruins of the country. Weak management of limited

85 Hein de Haas, 2006. 86 Ambassador Joe Keshi. July 27, 2010. “Nigerian Diaspora Initiative: Where are we and where are we going?” Paper presented at the 4th National Diaspora Day Conference. Minna, Niger. 87 See Dambisa Moyo, March 21, 2009. “Why Foreign Aid is Hurting Africa.” The Wall Street Journal Archives, New York.

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resources and weak policies soon lead to counterproductive contributions to home politics and some

have argued that the persistence of the ND conflict is but one example of this counter productivity.

According to Sahara reporters, in the last decade, NIDO has been involved in a myriad of corruption

scandals including but not limited to: the jailing of NIDO-‐Europe’s President in 2007 for perpetrating

medial fraud; the 2008 major “diaspora village” land scandal in which members of NIDO claim the

leaders of the organization duped them over the land allocated to the organization by the Obasanjo

regime; and the recent petitions put forward by NIDO members against the selling of ‘NIDO’ to former

Nigerian dictator, Ibrahim Babangida and against adopting Babangida as the presidential candidate of

the group in the upcoming elections. 88 Concisely, what we see is that although the diaspora’s sheer size

gives them more of chance to significantly contribute to home politics, the weakness in the

implementation process of government initiatives has either limited their contributions or channeled

their contributions towards more corrupt practices as is the case with NIDO, one of if not the biggest

diaspora network.

Secondly, the transition to democracy in the 1990’s provided the political opportunity for

diaspora engagement in state level politics. Contrary to the 1960s where military regimes dominated the

political sphere, Nigeria witnessed a more pluralistic structure of governance in 1999. That year brought

about an unprecedented change to Nigeria’s political condition like never seen before. Immediately

following the death of Abacha, one of the most brutal dictators in the many years of military rule in

Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian Yoruba from the south, was elected president of Nigeria. This

was the first time in over twenty years that Nigeria had experienced a democratically elected

government. Consequently, there was more room for discourse during this period since that was one of

the selling points for why Nigeria had to adopt democracy. Ukoha puts it clearly when he writes that

88 Sahara Reporters. May 28, 2010. “Diaspora Day Scam: IBB Tears NIDO Apart.” Sahara News Archive. http://www.saharareporters.com/news-‐page/diaspora-‐day-‐scam-‐ibb-‐tears-‐nido-‐apart.

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“the restoration of civilian rile terminated the period of ‘suspended animation’ and afforded aggrieved

groups the opportunity to go back to the[ir] issues.”89

As scholars like Obisienunwo and Nmehielle put it, this was a period where everybody was busy

reasserting group or ethnic rights in a democratized Nigeria.90 There was indisputably more openness of

the political system for challengers than had ever existed in Nigeria’s history. Thus, the ND issue

resurfaced like never before. Following the 1999 Constitution and the Petroleum Act that was passed by

the democratic government which centralized all of the oil wealth to the federal government, methods

utilized by the ND groups shifted from organized peaceful protests and litigation that dominated earlier

periods, to violent protests, car bombs, kidnapping, and arms struggle. 91 Like the local populace,

diaspora groups abroad especially those affiliated with the ND region shared in the grievances. Stating

the obvious, homeland grievances and conflicts also directly affect the lives and well – being of the

diaspora despite the fact that they are far away from the conflict zones; as such, these diasporas may

have similar incentives and motives for wanting to initiate and intensify conflict like the local populace.

A good example of this is the Ijaw Foundation (and its 23 member diaspora organizations);92 it is

a platform for collective action by all Ijaws and Ijaw organizations in the diaspora. Based in America, it is

an ethnically homogenous organization dedicated to attaining self – government for the Ijaws as the

only solution to the Niger Delta conflict. The Ijaws are the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria with

most of them living in the Niger Delta region. In the words of this organization of Ijaws in the diaspora,

89 Ukoha Ukikwo. 2003. “Politics, ethno – religious conflicts and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 41: 115 – 138. 90 Vincent Obisienunwo and Orlu Nmehielle. 2004. “Sharia Law in the Northern States of Nigeria: To Implement or Not to Implement, the Constitutionality is the Question.” Human Rights Quarterly 26.3 p. 735. 91 Watts 2004 92 Ijaw Foundation. “Instrument Establishing Ijaw Foundation.” http://www.ijawfoundation.org/

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Nigeria is an illegitimate state and an ungrateful Nigeria. 93 They argue that the Ijaws are victims of

discrimination and oppression; the Nigerian government is committing an ecological genocide against

the Ijaws; and the Ijaw peoples are being treated as colonial subjects; as such they have the right to self

– defense no matter the cost since this is a ‘battle of good against evil.’94 This is but one example of civil

society organizations dedicated to diasporas that has taken advantage of the political opening provided

by the change to democracy. This is another illustration of the way in which the diaspora that was

created post 1980’s has been able to contribute to home politics, although in a more negative way

which has perpetuated the conflict.

Politically speaking, the most significant way through which such diaspora organizations

participate in state politics is through lobbying. Framing the issue through extensive use of propaganda

abroad via media, and throughout diaspora communities, in addition to partaking in lobbying activities

are examples of diaspora actions that have perpetuated the ND conflict.

The third factor that has allowed for more diasporic engagement in state level politics is

interestingly the presence of weak state institutions. Bearing in mind the significant increase in the

diaspora communities abroad, the weak state institutions that were able to somehow deal with

grievances of the Biafran war both within Nigeria and abroad are now having to deal with not only past

grievances from the civil war but also new grievances created from the ND conflict, and of course those

from the existing religious conflicts that pervade the Nigerian society. It is the frustration with the

Nigerian government that has led members of the diaspora abroad to seek alternate ways through

which they can have a say in homeland politics. In essence, the weakness of the state institutions has

aggravated members of diaspora who are now using any means they can to put forward their grievances.

However, the problem with this is that rather than encouraging positive diaspora contribution to home

93 Izon Ebe Seri Keni Wenimo. “Self Government for the Ijaws is the Solution to the Niger Delta Conflict.” Ijaw Foundation. http://www.ijawfoundation.org/self_government.htm. Last visited April 26, 2010. 94 Izon Ebe Seri Keni Wenimo, 2010.

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politics, these growing grievances against the state manifest themselves in ways that further undermine

the state and ultimately add more fuel to fire.

Fundamentally, conflict arises where institutions are too weak to prevent grievances from

exploding into full – fledged conflicts. According to Ambassador Keshi during his keynote address at the

May 2010 inauguration ceremony for the Calgary NIDO chapter, weak state institutions and the lack of

state capacity have indeed hindered the effective participation of Nigerians in the diaspora. “Most of the

complaints are at the State level where obligations entered into are not honored, in some cases access

to decision makers are unnecessarily delayed, or denied.” 95 The lack of seriousness within the Nigerian

government to engage the diaspora and match rhetoric’s with commitments is leading diaspora

engagement more towards the civil society level and less towards state level politics. The problem with

this is that given the volatile situation in the civil sphere and the weak state institutions that are unable

to regulate all of the activities at that level and in the informal economy, more opportunities to do more

harm than good exist.

A good illustration of the impact of weak state institutions on diaspora contribution towards

more harmful channels is that of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) leader,

Henry Okah. Currently facing terrorism charges as a result of the Oct 2010 bombings during the

Independence Day celebrations, Mr. Okah, a Nigerian born Niger – Delta native, who emigrated to South

Africa with his family during the conflict, continues to be a prominent leader in the ND struggle through

establishing, continuously funding, and arming MEND fighters. In an interview conducted by Al Jazeera

with Okah in November 2009, when asked if he was contributing to the violence, Okah responded saying,

95 Ambassador Joe Keshi. May 8th, 2010. “Keynote Address Delivered to Nigerians in the Diaspora Calgary, Alberta, Canada.” Presented on the Ocaassion of the Inauguration of the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO), Canada, Calgary Chapter. www.nidocanada.org

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“Don’t look at it like I am contributing to the violence, I am participating in a fight for my right.”96 He

goes on to say that they are tired of talking and talking to various government officials and seeing no

changes surface. Now they are ready for action. It is not at all uncommon to hear sentiments like this

throughout the Niger Delta. The weakness of state institutions in reality does not halt diaspora

participation but instead can channel their desire to contribute towards more negative goals.

Fourthly, an important distinction to be made between the diaspora of the 1960’s and that of

the 1980’s as it regards their involvement in state level politics is the difference in the nature of the

conflict -‐ the former being unquestionably ethnic-‐based and the latter being more of a resource-‐based

conflict while assuming an inter – ethnic character as well over time. As mentioned previously, the

Biafran diaspora and its organizations had very little impact on state level politics for many reasons with

the most important being the lack of financial capacity to strongly influence home politics because of

the divisive nature of diaspora organizing abroad. For the 1980’s diaspora, although just as many

ethnically homogenous organizations exist as there are Pan – Nigerian organizations, Nigerians have

discovered that they can unite and mobilize their community abroad more effectively by pursuing

causes together.

According to Adebayo 2010, since the creation of NIDOA in 2001, the diaspora recognize the

value of a pan – Nigerian organization. Subsequently, many cities have hammered together a federation

or an umbrella organization to help bring Nigerians together. In Georgia, for instance, the Alliance of

Nigerian Organizations in Georgia (ANOG) was established making it the first state – wide federation. In

its 2010 strategic plan, ANOG lists 21 organizations as members; among its members are diaspora

96 Al Jazeera 2009. “Al Jazeera’s exclusive interview with Nigeria’s rebel leader – 01 Nov 09. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47yGCz_QZRg

Aigbinode 33

groups based on ethnicity, gender, and professionals, but all under a pan – Nigerian organization.97

These organizations are able to send petitions to the central government of Nigeria on behalf of the

diaspora on issues ranging from voter’s rights in the diaspora to proposals for development programs.

This is one relatively effective impact that the recent multi – ethnic diasporic organization schemes have

had on state politics. Contrary to conventional wisdom, diasporic politics has the potential to temper,

rather than exacerbate, domestic ethnic conflicts. The participation of ethnic diasporas in this case, that

is, in shaping policy, is a force of social integration and political inclusion.

The reality that the ND conflict is a resource struggle more than it is an ethnic one remains very

important as this element of the conflict also poses its own challenges as it regards diaspora’s

efficacious involvement in state -‐ level politics. The greed that resource wealth introduces (the resource

curse) in countries like Nigeria with its oil wealth is as much a problem for diaspora as it is for the local

populace. In such a mono – product economy controlled mostly by the state, everyone wants a share of

the ‘national cake;’ and with the pervasive institution of neo – patrimonialism in Nigeria, members of

the diaspora like those at home are faced with the dilemma of being honest in their dealings with the

state or selling their ‘support’ for lucrative government patronage. Despite living away from ‘home,’

members of the diaspora do at times seek government contracts for projects and lucrative state

employment opportunities which can challenge the extent to which they can be effective participants in

state politics. The examples discussed earlier concerning the various corruption charges being faced by

members of NIDO’s leadership team across the world is illustrative of this problem.

Finally, extraordinary improvements in information technology have had a profound differential

impact on the effectiveness of diaspora engagement in home politics. During the Biafran war era, what

97 Akanmu Adebayo, 2010.

Aigbinode 34

can be termed elementary information technology existed. Communication was not as easily accessible

although the Biafrans really did take advantage of clandestine radio stations. But this last wave of

diaspora has taken advantage of the availability and accessibility of technology. Extensive coverage of

events back at home through various media outlets keeps them in the loop; the internet allows them to

voice their concerns without physical presence in the country; and the use of social media has allowed

diaspora groups to easily establish meeting locations, recruit more followers, and coordinate

movements. A very recent example of virtual diaspora participation is in the use of social media by the

Nigerian diaspora for the ongoing elections this April. The Nigerian diaspora are trying to help make the

country’s ongoing election process credible by commenting below YouTube videos of election sites and

calling in to complain of any election fraud they witness on the videos. 98 As a matter of fact, diaspora

members reported alleged rigging by election officials during last week’s legislative voting in Rivers state.

One group of Internet Nigerian diaspora activists called “Enough is Enough Nigeria” is using both Twitter

and Facebook to encourage voting, as well as discuss the process, and point out any irregularities.99

Overall, we see a significant difference in the Nigerian diasporic community’s engagement in

state – level politics between the 1960’s diaspora and the final diaspora wave. This difference is

accounted for by taking into account the significant role that the following factors play in determining

diaspora’s capability for effective contribution: the size of the diaspora, the ethnic composition of the

diaspora, the nature of the regime in power, and the role of supranational factors. The findings suggest

that while the 1960’s diaspora had very limited influence on state – level politics, the recent diaspora

contributes to a much greater extent to state – level politics. However, this extensive participation by

the recent diaspora has in most cases been more detrimental than it has been positive because of weak

98 Nico Colombant. April 14, 2011. “Nigerian Diaspora Seeks Credible Elections Using Social Media.” Voice of America News. http://www.voanews.com/. 99 Nico Colombant. April 14, 2011. “Nigerian Diaspora Seeks Credible Elections Using Social Media.” Voice of America News. http://www.voanews.com/.

Aigbinode 35

state institutions that have both failed to truly embrace the potential benefits of diaspora involvement

in politics, and have failed to deal with ongoing grievances within the diaspora which again threatens

the cohesiveness of such groups. In general, the Nigerian diaspora’s engagement in the level of the state

informs us that the most optimal role diasporas should play in cases where the “sending” country is

undergoing civil conflict is in helping to strengthen state institutions that can better encourage effective

participation.

Nigerian Diasporas’ Economic Influence in Civil Conflict

Now switching to the level of civil society, diaspora participation through remittances is an area

in the African diaspora literature that more attention has been paid to given the significant role that

remittances play in supporting the economies of the developing world. According to a World Bank

report, “Workers’ remittances provide valuable financial resources to developing countries, particularly

the poorest.”100 Newland 2004, Mercer et al. 2008, and OECD Publishing 2005, are but a few examples

of scholars who deal with the role that diaspora remittances can play in alleviating poverty, encouraging

development, and increasing investments.101 These remittances can sometimes also be the only means

of survival as Medani 2002 points out using the case of Somalia: “approximately 40 percent of all Somali

urban households rely on such funds.” 102 Sander 2003 points out however that while interest in

remittances has been growing, Africa still receives the least attention and Sub – Saharan African in

particular remains largely neglected due to the relatively low share of global remittance flows to the

100 World Bank. 2005. “Global Development Finance: Mobilizing Finance and Managing Vulnerability.” The World Bank, Washington, DC. pp. 28 101 Kathleen Newland. 2004. “Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin.” Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC; Claire Mercer, et al. 2008. “Development and the African Diaspora.” Zed Books Publishers. UK; OECD Publishing, 2005. “ Migration, Remittances, and Development.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Publications. 102 Khalid Medani, 2002.

Aigbinode 36

continent through formal channels.103 On the reverse, diaspora economic engagement especially in

developing nations facing conflicts can exacerbate the conflict as opposed to alleviating situations.

Medani 2002 emphasizes the financial and economic linkages that can result in the financing of local

militias in countries like Somalia in ways that fuel civil conflict and even, in some cases, state collapse in

some parts of Africa.104 The same pattern is evident in both the cases of the Biafran war and the ND

conflict and as such is worth discussing.

Diasporic Communities of the 1960’s

Biafra is not only remembered as one of the worst humanitarian crises on the continent, but

also as a tragedy that gave rise to the concept of international responsibility to protect. If it had not

been for foreign donors including diaspora, the Biafra war would have led to the death of far more than

the two million that died mostly due to starvation and disease. Aid was also very crucial to prevent the

collapse of the secession attempt and ultimately the lack of funds according to the Commander of the

Biafran Army, Alexander Madiebo, was the reason why they eventually lost the war.105

According to Perouse de Montclos (2009), relief and mission organizations were the primary

source of foreign exchange (£4.3 million), followed by the French secret service (£2 million) and then

donations from the Igbo diaspora overseas (£750, 000), and finally Igbo diaspora in other parts of

Nigeria (£100,000). 106 Of the $250 million in aid provided to Biafra, it was estimated that 15 percent was

directly spent on military items. This was equivalent to the amount of hard currency spent on weapons

103 Cerstin Sander. October 9 – 10, 2003. “Migrant Remittances in Africa: A Regional Perspective.” Prepared for the International Conference on Migrant Remittances, London, UK. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF3/Resources/1588024-‐1152543209834/II_C.Sander_Migrant_remittances_in_Africa_a_regional_perspective.doc. 104 Khalid Medani. 2002. 105 Marc – Antonie Perouse de Montclos. 2009. “Humanitarian Aid and the Biafra War: Lessons not Learned.” Africa Development, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1. 106 Lindsay 1969 in Marc – Antonie Perouse de Montclos. 2009.

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by the Nigerian Federal Government during the whole of the war. 107 Interestingly there is evidence to

suggest that some of the donors, i.e. the British Government, were aware that the continuous funding of

the war through humanitarian aid would extend the war and at one point even considered cutting off

aid so as to let the Nigerian side win and ultimately terminate the conflict. 108 The unwelcomed side –

effects of humanitarian aid is evident not only in the Biafran case, but also in the 1980s in Somalia and in

Southern Sudan in the 1990s. Although the Biafrans did not need foreign aid to start the war in 1967,

the presence of funds by foreign governments and various diaspora groups helped in sustaining the

conflict up until there were no longer any funds left to sustain the conflict. An analysis of the ND conflict

leads to the supposition that the ND conflict has been sustained and even exacerbated because of the

longer and higher remittances it receives. Given the more favorable conditions of the present, including

the ease with which money can be transferred with technology as well as the increased and more united

diaspora populations abroad; more and more money is being channeled to the ND conflict.

The Final Diaspora Wave

In Sub – Saharan Africa, Nigeria is the single largest receiver of remittances from abroad. As a

matter of fact, Nigeria receives between 30 and 60 percent of remittances of the entire Sub – Saharan

region of Africa, depending on estimates (see Appendix 3).109 According to Afolayan (2009), remittances

from Nigerian nationals living abroad prior to 2004 was under USD 2.0 billion; this figure grew rapidly to

USD 2.3 billion (2004), USD 5.5 billion (2005), USD 10.6 billion (2006) and USD 18.0 billion (2007). 110 This

increase took place despite the high transfer fees that averaged 10 percent of the total of remittance

transfers. The Central Bank of Nigeria estimated the figure for remittances in 2008 at USD 19.2 billion. In

107 Marc – Antonie Perouse de Montclos. 2009. 108 Lindsay 1969 in Marc – Antonie Perouse de Montclos. 2009. 109 Manuel Orozco. 2003. “Worker Remittances in an International Scope.” Working Paper commission by the MULTILATERAL Investment Fund of the Inter – American Development Bank. 110 Adejumoke Afolayan. 2009. “Migration in Nigeria – A Country Profile 2009.” International Organization for Migration (IOM) Publishers, Geneva, Switzerland.

Aigbinode 38

2009, owning to the financial crisis, the trend reversed and remittances dropped to USD 9, 585

million.111 Although a good percentage of these remittances tend towards households for consumption,

and for investments both by the recipients and remitters, research conducted on the ND suggests that

these external funds go towards funding ND militias and their networks. Since rebellions may not be

able to raise funds from conventional sources, they must look elsewhere; two potential sources of

finance that are common place in such conflicts as the ND are foreign governments and diasporas. 112

“An unusually clear example was the financing of Renamo in Mozambique by the government of

Southern Rhodesia.”113

To understand why it is that diaspora partake in funding conflicts, Collier’s ‘greed and grievance’

model sheds light on the ways in which these two factors influence diaspora decisions to fund conflict.

The greed model considers the rational calculations made by individuals on the profits of war. According

to scholars who utilize the greed model, ongoing conflict reflects elite competition over valuable natural

resource rents, concealed with the fig leaf of collective grievance. 114 Although Collier focuses on the

greed motives of government officials and foreign corporations, the same can be said for some

Nigerians living abroad. Diasporas with funds continue to finance rebellions so as to continue to benefit

from the financial viability of conflict, i.e. through the sale of arms and ammunitions and other dealings

in the informal and black market economy which has proliferated in the region. In essence, as much as

members of the diaspora are a source of funding, they sometimes are also motivated by profit.

The grievance model provides a more convincing argument for why the Nigerian diaspora fund

conflict. This model sees diaspora economic contributions to conflict as justice seeking from political

repression, and horizontal inequality (that is the inequality between groups, rather than the vertical

111 Adejumoke Afolayan. 2009. 112 Collier and Hoeffler 2000 pg 10 113 Collier and Hoeffler 2000 pg 10 114 Murshed, S.M. and Tadjoeddin, M.Z.; 2007. “Reappraising the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict.” MICROCON Research Working Paper 2. University of Susex.

Aigbinode 39

inequality that exist amongst an ethnically homogenous population). These grievances include but are

not limited to, political grievances including issues of corruption and misappropriation of funds;

economic grievances including lack of employment opportunities in the region and overall feelings of

deprivation; environmental grievances as a result of the oil spills and gas flares that have devastated the

ND community; and social grievances resulting from bad public services in the area and feelings of

frustration and hopelessness because of the idleness and joblessness that pervade the region. Grievance

conscious diaspora like MEND leader, Henry Okah, see funding these militia groups as their ‘quest for

justice’ no matter the cost. “Even though diasporas hatred may not significantly influence attitudes

among the much larger population […], their finances can offset the depreciation of rebellion – specific

capital, thereby sustaining conflict risk.”115 The research on conflict – generated diasporas points to their

role in reinforcing, exacerbating, and prolonging violent conflict since they usually are also less willing to

compromise because of traumatic memories.

Although there is some evidence to suggest that wealthy Nigerians, diasporas, and foreigners

with sights on crude oil or for grievance reasons are funding organizations like MEND116, finding

concrete evidence on those who fund these groups and the amount of funding that these groups receive

from supporters has been scarcely reported in the literature for obvious security reasons. The Al jezeera

interview mentioned earlier with MEND leader Henry Okah is a case in point. When asked if he directly

funds or provides arms to the militant, he responded with a grin, saying: “I have no such funds.”117

To conclude, there has been a significant increase in the amount of remittances into Nigeria in

recent years; the Nigerian diaspora is more involved in sending money home either out of responsibility

to family members in this terrible economy; as financial security for themselves through partaking in

115 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 2004. 116 Ofonime Umanah and Bassey Udo, Adeola Yusuf. 25 May 2009. “Nigeria: War in Niger Delta – MEND blows up Chevron Flow Station.” http://allafrica.com/stories/200905260154.html. 117 Al Jezeera Archives 2010.

Aigbinode 40

investments; for greedy motives by financing rebellion; or simple as a result of grievances against the

Nigerian government, causing them to fund militia groups. In any case, the unchecked remittances being

made by members of the diasporas in such large amounts these days can be but one reason why the ND

conflict has been sustained for so long. Conflicts die out when they have no money to continue to fight

the opponent which in this case is the wealthy Nigerian state; yet the ND conflict has persisted and

intensified in the last few years meaning that they are being sustained through funds from inside and

outside the country. With the ease of transportation and communication in this technological age, we

can expect to see more and more funds being channeled back to Nigeria of which some will indisputably

go towards more criminal agendas. The link between diaspora and civil conflict should not be

undermined.

Findings

Thus far, this paper has examined the extent to which the Nigerian diasporic communities

influence home politics and the conflicts that pervades the Nigerian society. By comparing the strength,

composition, and political orientation of the 1960’s Biafran war diaspora with the more recent wave of

Nigerian diaspora’s from the 1980’s, some inferences can be made regarding the causal role of diasporas

in the spiral of conflict.

First, this analysis finds that indeed the Nigerian diaspora of post 1980’s are more in number,

more ethnically heterogeneous, and their composition varies more widely, than that of the 1960’s. As a

result, their influences on home politics differ significantly from that of the earlier period. Whereas the

diaspora of the 1960’s, especially the Igbos, were more engaged at the level of civil society through their

economic contributions to the relief efforts in Biafra, the 1980’s diaspora are engaged extensively both

at the international stage where they now reside for much longer periods, and at the civil society level

through provided far-‐reaching economic contributions in remittances. Where the real difference lies is

Aigbinode 41

in the political realm; whereas the 1960’s diaspora engaged to a much lesser extent in state – politics

given the authoritarian nature of the regime among other factors, the 1980’s diaspora have taken

advantage of the openness of the regime and their large numbers, and so continue to put forward their

grievances directly to the state. Supranational factors like the improvement in technologies have also

allowed them to better organize in order to better assert their demands. Thus at the state – level,

various voices are being articulated, which some do argue has created an open space for dissention

leading to more dissatisfaction and eventually helping conflict in such a heterogeneous ethnically –

divided society.

For both waves of diaspora however, the political opportunities remain relatively weaker

because of the persistent weakness of state institutions. Although the political system is more open

today, and more initiatives on ground to involve diaspora in home politics, the weak state institutions

make these opportunities more abstract than anything else. As discussed, initiatives like NIDO, and the

appointment of a special assistant Diaspora Affairs,118 remain ineffective because their roles are vague;

it is unclear how they function in practice; and the institution of neo – patrimonialism continues to

foster corruption which further weakens their capabilities. Diaspora participation however is not the

problem; instead, better management of existing institutions and more respect by the state of the

diaspora and its potential to contribute is necessary. In view of all of this, diaspora engagement is lowest

overall at the state – level.

Third, this analysis finds that the Nigerian diaspora do indeed contribute to the spiral of conflict

especially through providing remittances that help sustain and exacerbate the conflict. The Biafran

diaspora contributed significantly through offering humanitarian aid of which a noteworthy percentage

118 Sahara Reporters January 26, 2011. “Jonathan Appoints Ojuwku’s Wife, Bianca, as Special Assistant.” Sahara Reporters. http://www.saharareporters.com/news-‐page/jonathan-‐appoints-‐ojukwus-‐wife-‐bianca-‐special-‐assistant.

Aigbinode 42

(15%) was used to purchase military items. For the present wave of diaspora, their economic

contribution to conflict is more worrisome. The ease with which money can be transferred nowadays as

a result of technological advancements as well as growing frustration with the state’s incapacity and

ineffectiveness all make diasporas channel their contributions towards more illegitimate activities like

financing rebellions. Overall, diaspora participation is strongest at this civil society level as a result of the

large amount of remittances being sent back home.

Finally, the primary hypothesis of this paper was confirmed. We find that the minimal role of

diasporic communities in the 1960’s did not obstruct the eventual termination of hostilities in the Biafra

conflict, while the far more significant involvement of the diaspora in the Niger Delta conflict has played

a role in prolonging the civil conflict. The Biafran war came to an end admittedly due to lack of funds and

very limited support financially and otherwise compared to the Nigerian side of the conflict; the ND

conflict on the other hand continues to receive ongoing substantial economic, and military contributions

from unconventional sources including from sympathetic diasporas. In addition, given the more open

political system, diaspora groups and others in society are able to participate now more than ever in

home politics allowing for more dissention against the ineffective state. Since these weak state

institutions are unable to deal with all of the contention on the national sphere, this ultimately leads to

more frustration by diaspora groups and other Nigerians, furthering existing conflicts.

Future Prospects

Progressively, more attention is being paid to diasporas in the literature as more governments

come to realize the potential for significant contribution by their migrant communities. Indeed, in the

context of globalization, diasporas have come to play a very important role in political and social

outcomes in their home countries. To take full advantage of their diasporic communities, the Nigerian

Aigbinode 43

government needs to make some necessary changes to allow for more effective participation of their

diaspora groups.

In terms of political involvement, by acknowledging the contribution of diaspora groups,

governments can better take advantage of them. More attention needs to be paid to the actual

implementation of existing initiatives that focus on engaging diaspora groups. Things should be done in

a more structured and formal manner, and in a way that there is more accountability by those put in

high ranking positions within these new government-‐led umbrella diaspora institutions. Furthermore,

more needs to be done to encourage diaspora participation at the state – level in a more effective

capacity to reduce their grievances and encourage productive participation.

Political conditions and provisions including but not limited to allowing diasporas residing

outside to vote in elections and referendums; allocating space for diaspora participation in nation

building exercises such as in constitutional committees; acknowledging the contribution of the diaspora

at policy level; and creating more transnational political opportunities are some ways through which

diasporas residing outside can better participate and have a stake in the political process consequently

facilitating more positive contributions to home politics. Taking better advantage of the advances in

technology should be considered. Diaspora’s can participate in all of these policy initiatives through

virtual participation. Virtual participation refers to the involvement of the diaspora in Nigeria’s capacity

building without requiring any physical relocation.119 Global telecommunication networks in this 21st

century allows for an interactive, networking community between Nigerian diasporas and people in

119 Jessica A. Adefusika. 2010. “Understanding the Brain – Drain in the African Diaspora: Focusing on Nigeria. Senior Honors Projects. Paper 164. http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/164

Aigbinode 44

Nigeria. The involvement of diaspora is weakest in the political sphere and as such more attention needs

to be paid to this area.

Economically, the diaspora is very engaged in improving home development and encouraging

economic growth. Monitoring existing economic structures through which remittances are made can

help in ensuring that these remittances go towards more positive missions as opposed to towards

funding militancy and state collapse. Host countries can also do their part to encourage more

remittances towards development projects in home countries by creating incentives, removing tariffs,

and possibly providing tax breaks for such contributions. This way, diasporas have more of a stake at

home and as thus will be more interested in upholding home unity and peace. All of these initiatives can

change the extent to which diaspora matter.

Aigbinode 45

Appendix 1:

Nigeria's Emigrant Population, 1960 to 2010

Year Number (in thousands)

1960 94.1

1990 447.4

2005 972.1

2010 1,127.70

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2009.

http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=788

Aigbinode 46

Appendix 2

Nigerian Emigrants by Country of Residence (percent of total), 2000-2001

Aigbinode 47

Appendix 3: Remittances to Major Remittance Recipient Countries (2000)

Share

Country in Region Region Worldwide Indiaa 73% 15% Mexicoa 34% 8% Phillipinesa Chinaa

43% 43%

8% 8%

Turkeya 27% 6% Egypta 35% 5% Spaina 20% 4% Portugal 19% 4% Moroccoa Bangladeshb

20% 12%

3% 2%

Jordanb 17% 2% El Salvador Dominican Rep

9% 9%

2% 2%

Greece 10% 2% Nigeriab 65% 2% Yemenb 12% 2% Main countries 75.00% SOURCE: aCentral banks of each country; World bank, bWorld Development Indicators 2002

Aigbinode 48

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Diaspora in Conflict - A Nigerian Case Study

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