Defensive Overhead Concealment Experiment Company A ...

Defensive Overhead Concealment ExperimentCompany A, Infantry Training Battalion-West

Class 6-17This Presentation contains 48 slides

170411

“Our camouflage has always suffered from an almost total absence of such command guidance. Commanders usually speak of camouflage in such general terms as ‘camouflage is important,’ or ‘camouflage will be continuous.’ The result is that even if the men know how to camouflage they are never sure exactly what they are supposed to do”

– Major B.B. Dewitt, “Camouflage: A Neglected Art” Marine Corps Gazette, Dec 1961

“Response to air drills and paying mind to a unit’s observable footprint will become paramount for ground troops in the future.”

Major Joseph Beals “Enemy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles: A Credible Threat in Future Conflict” 2011

Overview

Introduction BackgroundScopeBLUF

FindingsTechniques for overhead concealment and their effectivenessSecondary observations of Marines in the defenseEffects of thermal observationParapet Camouflage

ConclusionLessons LearnedWay AheadSummary of ReferencesPoints of Contact

In November 2014, Russia began a limited objective war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The emergent Russian military displayed a number of new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and equipment that are of concern to the Marine infantryman. Chief among these TTPs is the deployment of low-flying, small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS).

These sUAS are used for target identification, observation, and battle damage assessment for improved multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery strikes. These strikes occurred against Ukrainian mechanized units, and Ukrainian infantry in the defense. Artillery strikes resulted in 85% of all Ukrainian casualties, and the tactics were hailed by many as a ‘new generation of warfare.’

Central to this concern is that U.S. forces have grown comfortable in our ability to ‘own the sky’ and do not train fieldcraft skills and camouflage that will increase their survivability when surveilled by enemy sUAS assets.

Background

ScopeOn 2 February 2017, Company A, Infantry Training Battalion, School of Infantry (West) conducted defensive operations in support of the 0300 program of instruction for Class 6-17. Concurrent with this, Company A conducted an experiment in order to answer the following questions:

What effective techniques can infantrymen use to prevent identification from an adversary’s small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) flying in the overhead?

Do these techniques validate the principles contained in the MCRP 3-17.6A Camouflage, Concealment and Decoys publication?

MethodologyTo assist in answering these questions, Company A solicited Training and Logistics Support Activity-West (TALSA-W) contractors to fly (1) commercial-off-the-shelf Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) “Phantom” quadcopter and (1) RQ-11B “Raven”. These sUAS capabilities, flight patterns and altitudes were selected to match similar sUAS flown by the Russian Federation in the recent Russo-Ukrainian War. The sUAS photographed four different fighting positions with different techniques of overhead concealment.

Terminology“FOV” refers to the field of view for the RQ-11B Raven. There are three main fields of view: 35.2 FOV (wide angle), 17.9 FOV (medium angle) and 6.7 FOV (narrow angle).AGL refers to ‘above ground level’. sUAS refers to small unmanned aerial systems, commonly called unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. CCD refers to camouflage, concealment, and decoys.

Administrative NoteThe training conducted by Company A contains a certain degree of ‘artificiality’. For instance, the COC is administrative in nature for staging equipment and logistical supplies as the entry level students move through the training evolution. Dispersion between the fighting positions is also a product of our training environment and dig box.

Due to the resolution for some images, this after-action is best viewed electronically. Image degradation is a problem for some sections when printed.

Scope

BLUF

• Adhering to the methods outlined in FM 3-11.3 Scouting and Patrolling and MCRP 3-17.6A Camouflage, Concealment and Decoys worked to prevent target identification from low-flying sUAS.

• Because these methods are a ‘known quantity’ Marines can: • Train camouflage and concealment techniques to prevent sUAS observation now.• Practice and enhance fieldcraft skills that focus on concealment.• Integrate fieldcraft with current counter-sUAS technologies.

• Fighting position ground signatures must be reduced in order to prevent target identification by low-flying sUAS. • Disciplined application of fieldcraft prevents position identification by creating a smaller ground signature.

Overview

Method Pros Cons

Woven Mat Effective if properly constructedMust be made on site, resource intensive (not for all terrain),

requires additional training to build, veg wilts within hours

Ghillie BlanketCould not be identified by visible or

thermal sensorsNot commercial, must be manufactured before field training

Synthetic Cammie NetLight-weight, commercial off the

shelf, you can add local vegetationNot color matched to terrain, needs to be larger

MARPAT Tarp Current standard issue Visible from all altitudes, cannot apply local vegetation effectively

Of the four experimental positions tested, only the “ghillie blanket” technique prevented target identification at all altitudes, and with both visible and thermal sensors.

Method BuiltTime to

build Weight Cost Thermal ID ID at 500 ft ID at 800 ft

ID at 817 ft/520 M to

target ID at 1100 ft

Woven Mat On Site 3 hours 15 lbs N/A Yes Yes Yes No NoGhillie Blanket Pre Built 20 hours 2 lbs $35 No No No No No

Synthetic Cammie Net Store Bought N/A <1 lbs $35 Yes Yes Yes Yes NoMARPAT Tarp Issued N/A 1.9 lbs N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Overview

Training Area Finch

Images: Google Earth

Camp Pendleton North, School of Infantry

Overview

Adjacent Unit Company A

Images: Google Earth

Range 211

Adjacent UnitCompany A Defense and COC

Experimental Positions

Overview

DJI Phantom

Findings

The primary goal of Camouflage, Concealment and Decoys is to avoid enemy detection; however, this is not always feasible. In some cases, CCD may succeed by merely preventing an enemy from identifying a target. Simply avoiding identification is often sufficient to increase survivability. MCRP 3-17.6A

Techniques for Overhead Concealment

All of the techniques for overhead concealment were evaluated through basics of camouflage outlined in 3-17.6a Camouflage, Concealment and Decoys:• Shine• Shape • Shadow • Contrast

Techniques of Concealment

Woven Mat• Manufacture on site from local vegetation and

550 cord innards• Approximately 3 hours to construct• Resource intensive• Weighs approximately 15 pounds

TTP of the Viet Cong to disguise ambush positions and spider holes. R&S units use this method to conceal hide sites.

Half of the position was left unconcealed for a ‘side by side’ comparison.


500 ft AGL 200 ft AGL

DJI Phantom DJI Phantom

Woven Mat

• Shine: There was no shine associated with the mat. • Shape: We failed to adequately camouflage the edges of the mat, giving it a distinct shape clearly Seen at 500 ft AGL (1) from the Phantom in the overhead, but more difficult to notice from the Raven flying about 520 meters away (3, 5). The flatness of the mat was an indicator when the Phantom viewed it from 200 meters away at 100 ft AGL (4). • Shadow: The mat was slightly elevated in the back, creating a shadow that was noticeable at 500 ft AGL by the Phantom (5). • Contrast: The shape of the mat stands out in contrast to the trampled terrain around it, making identification much easier. Otherwise, because local vegetation was used, there is little contrast with the surrounding terrain. 817 ft AGL

17.9 FOV520 meters to target

Raven

817 ft AGL35.2 FOV520 meters to target

Raven

100 ft AGL200 meters to target

DJI Phantom1 2 3 4

5


Ghillie Blanket• Homemade from jute, 550 cord, and two 4’x4’

fishing nets.• Approximately 20 hours to manufacture prior to

field test. It was employed in 1 hour.• Cost $35 • Weighs 2 pounds

Half of the position was left unconcealed for a ‘side by side’ comparison.

The most plentiful, reliable, and timely enemy sensors are visual. Therefore, CCD techniques effective in the visual portion of the EM spectrum are extremely important. Something that cannot be seen is often difficult to detect, identify, and target. MCRP 3-17.6A


400 ft AGL

DJI Phantom

Ghillie Blanket

• Shine: No discernable shine• Shape: While half the hole was left open for a control, the ghillie blanket’s

ragged edges left no visible shape (1-5). • Shadow: The shadows cast by the ghillie blanket appear to be similar to the

terrain surrounding it. The blanket looks rough and uneven, like the terrain around it. Image 2 show’s the shadow casted by the large parapet.

• Contrast: The ghillie blanket appears somewhat lighter when view by the Phantom at 400 ft, (1) but that seems unnoticeable to the Raven at 1100 ft AGL (5).

Raven

800 ft AGL35.2 FOV300M to target

Raven

1100 ft AGL35.2 FOV


Raven

100 ft AGL200M to target

DJI Phantom1 2 3 4

5

Synthetic Cammie Net• Off the shelf• Cost $35• 5’x9’• Tie-ties added in order to attach local vegetation

Selected because it was light weight, store bought, and would split the difference between our large, heavy cammie net and a ghillie blanket. The focus was to have something that would not require a lot of local vegetation per hole, thus reducing our foot print on the surrounding area’s resources.



400 ft AGL

DJI Phantom

Synthetic Cammie Net

• Shine: The Cammie net was conditioned with mud and sun-dried for a week to remove shine, but it was still identifiable by the Phantom (1) and the Raven (2) at 400 and 800 ft AGL respectively.

• Shape: Little local vegetation was used in order to conserve resources. The Cammie netting still appeared as a flat square regardless of distance or elevation (1-5)

• Shadow: The Cammie net was propped up but still cast an identifiable shadow from a depression in the fabric. This caused a noticeable shadow that the Raven could see at 800 ft AGL (2).

• Contrast: We kept the cammie net as ‘off the shelf’ as possible, and while the contrasting colors weren’t too visible from 800-1000 ft AGL (3, 5), the contrast was visible to the Phantom at 400 ft AGL (1) directly overhead and when the Raven was within 300 meters to target (2)

Raven


Raven

1100 ft AGL35.2 FOV


Raven

100 ft AGL200 meters to target

DJI Phantom1 2 3 4

5


MARPAT Tarp• Current standard issue• Most common method for FMF infantry units to

conceal fighting positions.

This method is the most common found in the fleet and was built to confirm or deny its ability to conceal a fighting position from overhead observation.

“This is reality in its current construct.”

Under normal conditions, very smooth surfaces stand out from the background. MCRP 3-17.6A


DJI Phantom Raven

800 ft AGL35.2 FOV

Raven

1100 ft AGL35.2 FOV

Tarp• Shine: The tarp reflected light visible to the Phantom at 500 ft AGL (1). • Shape: The tarp’s distinct shape was visible to the Raven a 800 ft AGL (3).• Shadow: The tarp’s ‘elasticity’ caused significant sagging that caused a noticeable

depression shadow visible to the Phantom at 500 ft (1) and the Raven at 817 ft (4). • Contrast: The tarp stood in stark contrast to the dirt from the parapet, enhancing

its appearance as a plain square. Additionally the smooth texture of the tarp stood in contrast to the surrounding terrain. Adding local vegetation or roughage would not solve this as the vegetation tends to slide to the depressions caused by the tarp’s elasticity (3).

100 ft AGL200M to target500 ft AGL

DJI Phantom


Raven1 2 3 4

5

Fieldcraft

While this experiment started with the idea that position identification was due to lack of overhead concealment, we made secondary observations that suggest that position identification is directly related to fieldcraft.

Basic principles of camouflage that led to position identification remained the same:• Shine• Shape• Shadow • Contrast

Additionally, there was an adjacent unit conducting defensive operations concurrent with Company A. The unit dug fighting positions different from Company A in that they did not establish skirmisher positions first.

Fieldcraft

Shine100 ft AGL

Burlap sandbags

Tan synthetic Sandbags treated with mud

Tan synthetic Sandbags untreated

ShineDJI Phantom

100 ft AGL

There is a noticeable shine from the tan synthetic sandbags used.

Burlap sandbags had no associated shine.

Some of the synthetic sandbags were covered with mud in order to reduce their shine.

Shine827 ft AGL

Synthetic sandbags, burlap sandbags, and mud-treated sandbags as seen from 827 ftAGL by the Raven from nearly 500 meters away.

The Raven’s optic has been zoomed in to 6.7 degrees.

Burlap sandbags

Tan synthetic Sandbags treated with mud

Tan synthetic Sandbags untreated

ShineRaven

827 ft AGL6.7 FOV

495 M to target

Tan synthetic sandbags untreated

Shine

DJI Phantom

400 ft AGL6.7 FOV

364 M to target

715 ft AGL10.8 FOV409 M to

target

Raven Synthetic sandbags look like light bulbs on the ground, as seen here at 715 ft AGL from 409 meters away.

The fleet unit adjacent to Company A dug positions that were different in that they did not dig skirmishers trenches.

The more closely a target resembles its background, the more difficult it is for an enemy to distinguish between the two. MCRP 3-17.6A

Shine

Mud-treated sandbags Untreated sandbags

DJI Phantom

643 ft AGL17.9 FOV

948 ft AGL6.7 FOV

RavenRaven

Detail of the difference mud makes on sandbags.

The result is below at 948 and 643 ft AGL.

SHINE• Synthetic sandbags give a distinct ground signature. The shine from

the sandbags was visible to the DJI Phantom up to 500 ft AGL and visible to the Raven at close to 1000 ft AGL.

• Some of the sandbags were smeared with mud to reduce their shine. Mud-treated sandbags greatly reduced the ground signature from the fighting position, making detection more difficult.

• Burlap sandbags have no shine and little ground signature. They should be considered as the preferred material for fighting positions. However, if a unit is supplied with synthetic sandbags, smearing them with mud should be considered the preferred method of camouflage.

Shine

Eliminating shine must be a high priority in Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys. MCRP 3-17.6A

Adjacent unit positions with no skirmishers and a much smaller ground signature.

Shape

Company A positions with skirmishers and large parapets. Easily seen due to their distinct shapes.

500 Ft AGL 500 Ft AGL

DJI Phantom DJI Phantom

<Enemy> sensors can detect targets against background unless their shape is disguised or disrupted. Size, which is implicitly related to shape, can also distinguish a target from its background. MCRP 3-17.6A

SHAPE• Skirmishers and large uniform parapets create an extremely noticeable

shape from 500 ft AGL.• Company A students’ parapets were much larger than prescribed-

sometimes as tall as 18”. This was due to the students excavating dirt from the fighting position and putting it on the parapet. It created a large ground signature.

• The unit adjacent to Company A had several incorrect positions (no skirmisher trenches). Intentional or not, the result of these positions was an greatly reduced ground signature from 500 ft AGL.

• It is recommended that the dirt from excavation be used to back fill skirmisher’s trenches in order to reduce the overall ground signature of the fighting position and keep the parapet’s size down. Individual gear can be camouflaged as necessary.

• Shape is generally the result of shadow plus contrast.

Shape

Shadow

500 ft AGL

Position identification was almost always due to shadows cast by the two-man hole, skirmishers and large parapets.

1. Woven Mat cast its own shadow as the back was elevated.

2. Ghillie Blanket3. Synthetic Cammie Net4. Tarp created a depression that

was identifiable up to 1000 ftAGL

12

3

4

Parapet Shadow

Depression Shadow

Large contained shadow from two-man hole

DJI Phantom

Shadow

Adjacent Unit

Company AThe adjacent unit did not dig skirmisher’s trenches as part of their fighting positions. This resulted in a smaller ground signature, making identification difficult. In fact their most identifying feature is the shine from their sandbags, seen here at 500 ft AGL oriented roughly north.

The shadows cast by Company A’s positions make their identification easy. On the right side of Company A’s position, it is easy to identify the shadow cast by large parapets.

DJI Phantom

500 ft AGL

Shadow

Deep shadows give positions away as seen here. The Raven flying has its optic zoomed in to 6.7 degree FOV.

Raven

600 ft AGL

Contained shadows show up much darker than their surroundings and are easily detected by an enemy. MCRP 3-17.6A

Shadow

Shadow• Shadows caused position identification up to altitudes of 1000 ft AGL.• “Dispose of all soil from the fighting hole not used on the parapet. Carry the soil away

in sandbags or shelter halves. Dispose of it under low bushes, on dirt roads or paths, in streams or ponds, or camouflage it.” Marine Rifle Squad . It is unreasonable to think that an infantry company can dispose of their dirt in such a manner without the area itself becoming noticeable to low-flying sUAS.

• Back filling skirmisher trenches with dirt from the two-man hole will cut down the shadows from the position.

• The primary mission of any overhead concealment should be thought of in terms of eliminating both shadows cast from the fighting position, and shadows contained with in it.

Contrast

600 ft AGL35.2 FOV

Raven

Large ground signature due to Marines carelessly excavating their two-man positions. By continuing to place dirt on their parapets, they are creating large, key ground signatures that make position identification easy to sUAS, as seen here at 600 and 800 ft AGL

Raven

800 ft AGL35.2 FOV

Contrast

Contrast

1. Woven Mat position had dirt excavated that made the shape of the mat more identifiable. 2. Ghillie Blanket position was carefully camouflaged and care taken during excavation. The result was limited contrast between excavated dirt and the surrounding ground.3. Synthetic Cammie Net position was not ascarefully camouflaged and is apparent in stark contrast between the surrounding vegetation and the excavated dirt4. Tarp position’s dirt was almost exclusively excavated toward the rear. In addition to the long skirmisher’s trench, the result is an easily identifiable position.

1

2

3

4

Raven

817 ft AGL17.9 FOV

Contrast

Ground signature due to contrastCompany A positions are easily identified due to their contrast with the ground.

The adjacent unit’s fighting positions are much harder to detect. Their smaller size, combined with more disciplined dirt control, led to the uncovered positions being extremely hard to detect at 1000 ft AGL, distance to target 520 M

Raven

1000 ft AGL32.5 FOV520 M to target

Adjacent UnitCompany A

Contrast

Contrast• The contrast from “top soil” and “excavated soil” is noticeable to the

Raven at 800 ft AGL. • Marines should retain sod from initial excavation of the soil and use this

sod on the parapet and any surrounding terrain to break up the outline caused by the contrasting dirt.

• This sod can also be used to conceal the contrasting dirt in the back-filled skirmishers.

Secondary Observations Conclusions

• Discipline in fighting position construction and camouflage reduces ground signature.

• Smaller ground signatures prevent position identification. • Concur with Infantry Officer’s Course Talon Reach VI AAR: “Renewed

instruction and development with regards to ensuring effective cover/concealment from above and increased eyes to the skies is now required in the current environment.”

Effects of Thermal Observation

Many sensors operate as well at night as they do during the day. Therefore, darkness does not provide effective protection from surveillance. Passive sensors are very difficult to detect, so assume they are being used at night. Do not allow antidetection efforts to lapse during the hours of darkness. For example, conceal spoil while excavating a fighting position, even at night. MCRP 3-17.6A

Thermal EffectsWhen viewed with no camera zoom (left photo), fighting positions on the ground were difficult to detect with thermal optics.

When viewed with a ‘medium zoom’ (14.1 FOV, right photo), thermal effects in the fighting positions were clearly seen, specifically with the synthetic cammie net, the tarp, and the woven mat.

The photos were taken at aproximately. 1700, and were not subject to direct sunlight at the time however both the tarp and synthetic cammie net were in the sun all day. Additional night testing would be beneficial to understanding the lasting thermal effects of these materials.

Lessons Learned: Thermal Effects

1056 ft AGL31.5 FOVWhite Hot

Raven

1000 ft AGL14.1 FOVBlack Hot

Raven

Tarp


Raven 800 ft AGL14.1 FOVBlack Hot

Ghillie Blanket


Cooler dirt excavated from inside the two-man hole was easy to identify. Additionally, dirt thrown out of the position photographed as thermally different from the surrounding vegetated terrain.

Use sod from initial excavation for use on the parapet, surrounding camouflage, and for overhead cover (if built).Untreated synthetic sandbags are clearly seen under thermals.

1056 ft AGL31.5 FOVWhite Hot

Raven 580 ft AGL14.1 FOVWhite Hot

Raven

The adjacent unit’s smaller two-man holes are much harder to detect even though the Raven was flying 470 feet lower than the left image and photographed this position with it’s camera zoomed to 14.1 FOV.

The untreated sandbags used for their positions are the primary means of identification.


Unit After Actions indicate that covering fighting positions with a standard issue tarp make fighting positions “significantly harder to detect” with thermal imaging.

When tested, Company A had the opposite experience. The standard issue tarp and the synthetic cammie net both put off significant, detectable signature and distinct shape. Both forms of concealment had been in the sun all day, yet are detected as distinctly different than the surrounding ground.

1000 ft AGL14.1 FOVBlack Hot

Raven

Tarp


Ghillie Blanket

Woven Mat

• Excavated soil was thermally detectable and stood in contrast to the surrounding vegetated terrain when view under 1000 ft AGL or when the camera was zoomed in.

• Untreated synthetic sandbags were thermally detectable up to 1000 ftAGL when the sUAS viewed the defense from an angle or when the sUAS camera was zoomed in.

• The fighting positions concealed with a tarp, synthetic cammie net, and woven mat were thermally detectable. They photographed as cooler than the surrounding terrain.

• Direct overhead flight patterns are the primary means of calling for fire with sUAS at night. “Since terrain association with a thermal imager would be difficult at best, and the risk of the UAS being shot down at night is significantly reduced, it is likely the UAS operator uses the ‘fly-over-the-target’ method to <identify> the target.” Integration of Unarmed Aerial Systems with Russian Artillery

Thermal Effects Conclusions

Should the sUAS operators adopt a ‘nape of the earth’ and ‘forward observer’ operational TTP, then frontal, 360 degree camouflage still needs to be effective.

The Ghillie Blanket and Synthetic Cammie Net positions are barely visible from the Phantom 350 feet away at about 10 ftAGL.

Parapet Camouflage

DJI Phantom

Looking West Approximately 350 ft

Frontal camouflage was successful at disrupting identification by the DJI Phantom when the Phantom flew just above an adjacent finger, approximately 350 ft east of Company A’s position.

• Principles and practices in the MCRP 3-17.6A work to prevent target identification. The application of the methods contained in this reference will aid in preventing target identification by S-SUAS.

• Fighting position ground signatures must be reduced in order to prevent target identification by low-flying sUAS.

• Disciplined application of fieldcraft prevents position identification by creating a smaller ground signature. • Thermal signatures from synthetic materials was visible up to 1000 ft AGL.• Shine from sandbags was visible up to 1000 ft AGL• Distinct shadows were visible up to 1000 ft AGL.• Back-filling skirmishers trenches with dirt from the position will help eliminate shadow, and help control the

dirt from excavation. Adding dirt to the parapet only aids in position identification.• Controlling dirt from excavation will reduce the position’s ground signature, and aid in preventing target

identification.• Retain all sod and use it for camouflaging the parapet, gear, or filled skirmisher trench.• A ghillie blanket was the only method that prevented position identification at all altitudes tested with both

visible and thermal sensors. • In the defense, LP/OPs should be tasked with sUAS detection. They should be placed along expected “battle

positions”, observer-controller positions or outside the 200 meter audible range. • METT-T and terrain analysis can assist in planning for LP/OPs. These should be placed outside the 200 meter

audible bubble, and tasked with providing early detection for low-flying sUAS.

Lessons Learned

• Leverage sniper platoons in order to tap their expertise on camouflage• All victor units train to incorporate and refine camouflage in their field

training plans. • All testing and training should focus on ‘red cell’ sUAS. • Further testing on position identification from ranges further than 500

meters, mimicking a sUAS on a reconnaissance mission. The focus of this test set should be the distance-to-target at which position identification occurs.

• Early detection is crucial. While technologies and TTPs are developing, LP/OPs can be tasked with sUAS early audible detection and reporting.

• Fighting positions need to be observed at night with thermal optics.• Anything that detects or amplifies should be considered for testing

sUAS detection:• AN/TPQ-50 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar• Parabolic microphones for audible detection• Observe low-flying sUAS with thermals

Way Ahead

“During training exercises-the real proving ground-camouflage receives too much lip service and not enough real effort to initiate, test, and develop sound concepts and procedures. Camouflage remains the forgotten weapon.”

Lt J.W. Rider Camouflage Without Discipline Just Isn’t Marine Corps Gazette Apr 1964

“The majority of UAS employed today and in the near future will not have an organic attack capability. Instead, they are used to detect and identify target for other weapons systems, such as artillery. These systems can be defeated simply by eliminating their ability to detect their targets. Commanders at all echelons must emphasize camouflage, concealment and deception/hardening resourcing and training. Relatively simple solutions such as camouflage and

smoke, can have a significant impact on threat UAS operations with minimal effort t required by friendly forces.” U.S Army Counter-Unarmed Aircraft System Strategy Extract, 2016

“In some cases, CCD may succeed by merely preventing an enemy from identifying a target. Simply avoiding identification is often sufficient to increase survivability.”

MCRP 3-17.6A

Points of Contact

The point of contact for this after action is Sergeant Chad Skaggs [email protected] Company A Combat Instructor

Infantry Training Battalion-WestCaptain PJ Long [email protected] Company A Company CommanderCaptain Michael Davidson [email protected] ITB Operations Officer

Training and Logistics Support Activity-WestErnest Cardenas [email protected] NAVAIR PMA-263 Group 1 UAS

Class 6-17LCpl WrapePvt TimberlakePFC ChamberlainPFC Ruocco

mailto:[email protected]




References

Item Title Source Author Reference Date

1 Talon Reach VI Exercise AAR MCLLMajor George Flynn, Captain Andrew Krebs, Captain

Conner Gentil 15-17 Sept 2015

2 Camouflage: A Neglected Art Marine Corps Gazette Major B.B. DeWitt Dec-61

3 Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group 17-Jan

4 MCWP 3-11.2 Marine Rifle Squad U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Marine Corps Ch 5, 5-27 2-Nov

5AAR for Battalion Field Exercise 1 from 18 October to 28

October 2016 MCLL Second Battalion, Sixth Marines Pg 8 16-Oct

6 Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy Extract U.S. Army 16-Oct

7Integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems within Russian

Artillery Fires Bulletin Lester Grau, Chuck Bartles Pg 31 May-June 16

8 Talon Reach VII Exercise AAR MCLLMajor George Flynn, Captain Andrew Krebs, Captain

Conner Gentil 16-Jun

9 Camouflage Without Discipline Just Isn't Marine Corps Gazette Lt JW Rider Pg 50 Apr-64

10 Enemy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Marine Corps University Maj Joseph T. Beals 2011

11 Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War The Potomac Foundation Dr. Phillip Karber July-15

12 MCRP 3-17.6a Camouflage, Concealment and Decoy U.S. Army November-17

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