Crisis of Parties and Change of Party System in Italy

CRISIS OF PARTIES AND CHANGE OF PARTY SYSTEM IN ITALY

Leonardo Morlino

Estudio/Working Paper 1996/77March 1996

Leonardo Morlino is professor of Political Science of the Facoltà di ScienzePolitiche, University of Florence (Italy). He was Visiting Professor (Fall Semester1995) at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences of the Juan MarchInstitute. This paper is based partly on a seminar entitled "Is There a Crisis ofDemocracy in Southern Europe?" presented at the Center on November 16, 1995.

Abstract

In the early 1990s, Italian democracy has entered a phase of far-reaching

changes, particularly of parties and party system. This article proposes an

assessment of what has changed, and why, with specific reference to the most

basic features of parties (electoral performance, name, symbol, splits, alliances)

from a systemic perspective. In addition, it analyses the depth of change, the party

organization, the emergence of new models of parties and the turnover of

parliamentary leadership. Finally, the impact of party crisis and change on the

party system is evaluated and the degree of change of the same party system

assessed. The concluding remarks will suggest how the change of the party system

is related to the wider crisis of Italian democracy over the recent period, and the

possible choices of the leaders as regards the future party system.

- ¡Error!Marcador no definido. -

Half a century after its reestablishment (1945-7), Italian democracy has

entered a phase of far-reaching changes. To date, the most radical of these

concerns its parties and party system. This phenomenon in one of the five largest

European countries may be an important test of the ongoing theoretical debate on

party change. If until now the main contributions (see recently, for example,

Harmel and Janda 1994 and Harmel, Heo, Tan, Janda 1995) have essentially

focused on more limited forms of change, the interest of the Italian case lies in the

fact that it compels us to analyze more profound transformations involving the

disappearance of one or more parties and the change of the very party system

itself.

In this analysis, the two key notions which seem most useful are crisis and

change. By crisis of a party, as an intermediary and representative structure, I

mean the process by which one or more factors of a social, cultural or even

economic kind produce a detectable inconsistency1 between the existing party,

characterized by a well defined identity, organization, policy positions, and a

broadly established electorate, and also supporting interest groups. The main

empirical expressions of party crisis are a poorer electoral performance to analyze

in a systemic perspective, the change of one or more organizational dimensions,

the turnover of leadership, also at middle and local levels. The crisis of a party

and, even more likely, of more than one party causes or is caused by the change of

features within the existing party system. That is, although the causality may be

unclear and work in both directions at once, it is important to identify the systemic

aspects involved which provide us with the evidence of what has changed in the

system. The outcomes of the process, characterized by the unavoidable

interweaving of crisis of party/ies and change of the party system, may be: i)

1 Inconsistency is a catchword meaning the incongruence between the party as "supply" and the"demand" of sectors of civil society, those who previously supported the party and the new ones -that is, an inability of meeting them through the party and, therefore, a growing gap anddetachment between the two sides of political society and civil society.


simply, the overcoming of the inconsistency and crisis without any change; ii) the

change-adaptation of the party in one or more dimensions, and to different

degrees; iii) the split of the party with the concomitant creation of a new

formation; iv) the disappearance of the party; v) the emergence of a new party or

parties.

These two definitions, here briefly sketched out, provide the guidelines of

the following analysis. I begin by referring to the crisis of parties in a systemic

perspective with reference to basic features, such as electoral performance, new

name and symbol, split, alliances, and to the main explanatory factors of the crisis;

then, to assess better the depth of the change, the transformations of party

organizations and the emergence of new models of parties will be considered and

the turnover of party élite, and more particularly of their main component, the

parliamentary élite, will be explored; third, the impact of party crises and change

on the party system will be evaluated. In the concluding remarks, the problems of

the future of the party system, and the relationships between the changes of

parties and party system and the crisis and change of Italian democracy will be

addressed.

What Has Happened to the Parties? (1985-95)

Even prior to the 1994 elections, Italian parties had undergone different but

more or less radical transformations. Some parties had undergone a major face-

lift; others were in crisis and their transformation had already begun; still others

split up or broke down and virtually disappeared; brand new parties were also

established. That is, most of the possibilities envisaged above took place. The two

key phases of the change occurred in 1991 and 1994, but the apparent beginning of


the change can be traced back to the mid 1980s, when local lists flourished2 as well

as environmentalist groups. These were the first still fairly limited manifestations

of crisis as a consequence of societal discontent and dissatisfaction.

The left was the first segment of the political continuum to undergo crisis3

and profound transformation. In the case of the Italian Communist Party (PCI),

this slow, gradual process came to a head with the fall of the Berlin Wall in

November 1989. But the process of democratic integration of the PCI had at least

two previous key moments: in 1973, with the so-called strategy of the _historic

compromise_, aiming at the formation of an alliance with Catholic forces and even

with a Catholic party, Christian Democracy (DC); and in 1978-9, when the PCI

supported Andreotti's cabinet during a difficult period of terrorist attacks. Later,

democratic integration advanced and the party held important internal debates

which gradually changed its identity. But the objective presence of the USSR on

the international scene with its traditional links with the party was still seen by

some as a possible anti-democratic point of reference for Communists and a cause

for fear. The disintegration of the USSR and subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall

heralded the final stage of this break up. As a consequence, on the one hand, anti-

Communism no longer had good reason to exist;4 on the other hand, that break up

was also the definitive answer to the old internal debate on "real Socialism": the

Communist alternative had been made bankrupt.

A new party was created in February 1991 with a new name, the

Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), and new logos (see Ignazi 1992, Weinberg

1995, Baccetti forthcoming). A segment of the old PCI with more orthodox

2 Both in the national elections of 1983 and the municipal ones of 1985.

3 Of course, one of the main manifestations of the crisis is its declining electoral performance (to26.6% in 1987 from 34.4% ten years earlier, in 1976).

4 Actually, a new artificial form of anti-communism was rebuilt by Forza Italia in the 1994electoral campaign - and it also survived later on.


communist views created a splinter party, Rifondazione Comunista (Communist

Refoundation), with roughly one-third/one-fourth of the electoral size of the PDS:

5.6 to 16.1 in 1992; 6.1 to 20.4 in 1994 (see Table 1). At the same time, the extreme

left-wing party, Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy), which under

other names had been to the left of the old PCI for almost twenty years,

disappeared.

The other main aspect of the first phase of change is the formation, growth

and success of the Lega Nord (the Northern League), whose first party conference

was held in February 1991. The party is the result of an association of various

Leagues and other local lists, especially from Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont,

which all together had won about 6% in the regional and municipal elections of

1990. This new party occupied the space left vacant by the crisis of Catholic

culture following the well-known, widespread process of secularization in those

regions; it is rooted in precise territorial identities, and has been a successful way

of exploiting localist, anti-centralist, anti-party, anti-southerner positions and in

supporting the taxpayers' protest. Also the disappearance of the communist-

anticommunist

Table 1. Electoral Results in 1992 and 1994 (Lower Chamber)

1992 1994

Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Total seats

Pluralitysegment

PRsegment n. %

Rifondazione ComunistaPartito Democratico della SinistraReteVerdiPSILista Pannella

5.616.11.92.813.61.2

351071216927

6.020.41.92.72.23.5

2977911156

1138--------

40115911156

6.318.21.41.72.4.9

Cristiano Sociali 0 6 -- 6 .9

PRI 4.4 27

PSDI 2.7 16 Alleanza Democratica 1.2 17 -- 17 2.7

DC 29.7 206 Partito Popolare Italiano 11.1 4 29 33 5.2

PLI 2.8 17

Patto Segni 4.6 - 13 13 2.1

Centro Cristiano Democratico 0 32 -- 32 5.1

Forza Italia 21.0 67 30 97 15.4

Lega Nord 8.7 55 8.4 111 11 122

19.4

MSI 5.4 34 Alleanza Nazionale 13.5 86 23 109

17.3

Others 5.1 6 3.5 5 -- 5 .8

Source: Official data.


cleavage after 1989 contributed to opening up the expression of discontent among

northern middle classes, that saw the Northern League as the best interpreter of

their attitudes (see Mannheimer 1991, Belotti 1992, Diamanti 1992, Mazzoleni

1992, Segatti 1992, and Diamanti 1993).

This is an important feature that deserves to be emphasized: in Italy

moderate and deep dissatisfaction has always been much higher than in other

European countries. Though basically in line with the European trend, it grew

significantly at the end of the 1980s mainly because of the economic crisis.5 The

growth of such dissatisfaction paved the way for the success of the Leagues and

later of the Northern League, after the main impediment to its expression had

been removed: this occurred after the disappearance of the anti-communist

cleavage (see Morlino and Tarchi 1995).

These considerations also help us to understand better the crisis of

Christian Democracy. In fact, after a long period of strong electoral stability,

growing secularization, the growth of dissatisfaction with governmental parties,

partly because of deepening economic crisis, and the removal of impediments to

the open expression of discontent are the general conditions that account for the

Christian Democratic crisis.6 But the true crisis comes later in 1992-94 as the

result of two other elements: the strong delegitimizing impact of the investigation

Mani Pulite (Clean Hands), led by Milanese prosecutors, and the effect of the new

electoral laws. As concerns Mani Pulite, the media coverage of this investigation is

the main explanation of its strong delegitimizing impact, but the follow-up of this

5 The relationship between economic dissatisfaction and political dissatisfaction is shown byLockerbie (1993) for 1983-84. The Eurobarometer surveys show that, during the period 1984-94, theaverage number of people who declare themselves "not very satisfied" and "not at all satisfied" inreplying to the question "Are you satisfied with the way democracy works?" is 73.2% in Italy and44.7% in EC countries (except Italy).

6 Again the decline of electoral performance (%) illustrates the crisis: 38.7 (1976), 38.3 (1979), 32.9(1983), 34.3 (1987) and 29.7 (1992) and 15.8 (1994) if PPI and Patto Segni are added (see Table 1).


investigation, between 1992 and 1994, shows how strong and pervasive the system

of corruption and the illegal forms of party financing were. Thus, the

delegitimation deepened. The most interesting effect of the new electoral law is in

the so-called "anticipated reactions".7 That is, even before the March 1994

elections, but anticipating the anti-center impact of those quasi-majoritarian

mechanisms, the DC, already internally divided, split into different groups (see

Figure 1).

In fact, following the replacement of its party secretary in 1993 and a long

intra-party struggle, a new Partito Popolare Italiano, the Italian Popular party

(PPI) was born in January 1994. The DC's conversion was also preceded and

accompanied by schisms both to the left and right: some leaders entered the right-

wing Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance), (ex-MSI) (see below); others formed

the Centro Cristiano Democratico (Christian Democratic Center), and became part

of the center-right electoral coalition, the Polo delle Libertà (the Pole of Freedoms)

in the 1994 elections; others had already formed, in the summer of 1993, another

group, led by a former DC politician, Mario Segni; still others formed a party and

entered the leftist coalition with the name of Cristiano Sociali (Social Christians);

others left the party to become members of a tiny leftist group, la Rete (the

Network), close to the PDS; finally, a few entered the brand new Forza Italia (Go

Italy!).

As for the Socialist Party (PSI) a similar story may be told. That is, its crisis

and breakdown resulted from the direct impact of the Mani Pulite investigation

on first, the leadership, and later, the electorate. This was already evident in the

electoral campaign of February and March 1992. In fact, the first party élites to be

investigated for corruption were the Socialist ones. The second factor of crisis is

the political immobility of its leaders - first of all, of Craxi, tied by a pact to the two

7 This is the well-known notion of Carl Friedrich.


main DC leaders of the time (Andreotti, as prime minister, and Forlani, as party

secretary since 1989). In this party the crisis is also manifested, first, in the

struggle for a new secretary, actually elected in early 1993 (Benvenuto); later, in

the exit from the party of a few leaders who entered either Alleanza Democratica

or Forza Italia, when it was formed; finally, in the split up of the party after the

1994 elections into different small pieces (see Figure 1).

Similarly, the Liberals and Republicans have all suffered schisms and have

disappeared, or segments have survived with different names and symbols by

joining either the PDS-led Alleanza Progressista (Progressive Alliance) or the

centrist electoral coalition Patto per l’Italia (Pact for Italy), formed by the PPI and

the Patto Segni (Segni Pact) or even the Polo delle Libertà. After changing their

party secretary several times, the Social Democrats became such a small group

that they were virtually eliminated by the majoritarian bias of the new electoral

law.

As for the right, partly as a result of its strong performance in the local by-

elections in 1993, the MSI seized the political initiative by creating Alleanza

Nazionale (AN), along with the above mentioned tiny group from the former DC.

AN, led by the secretary of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social

Movement, MSI), Gianfranco Fini, maintained and even softened its rightist

conservative positions. Except for some small extremist groups, the secretary was

very careful in conveying a clearly defined democratic image. This was also helped

by the recruitment of conservative democratic intellectuals. In spite of this, the

continuing presence in the party of old neo-fascist middle-level élites and some

unfortunate declarations in favor of the previous fascist experience, roused the

suspicions not only of the foreign press, but also of most of the centrist and leftist

leaders (and sympathizers), and even of the members of the Northern League. The

two further decisive steps in the direction of democratic integration were inclusion

of MSI-AN in the Berlusconi cabinet after the 1994 elections, as the staunchest


ally of Forza Italia in a heterogeneous coalition,8 and the tranformation of the

party in a new Alleanza Nazionale, with its Christian-Democratic component in

early 1995. In this case, as in the case of the PDS and Rifondazione, the survival

of a minoritarian MSI because of the action of nostalgic neo-fascists is an event

that the leader of the AN and previous secretary of MSI had to evaluate positively.

In fact, it was taken as proof of the democratic integration of the party élites and

electors who entered the AN, as opposed to those who revived the MSI because of

their nostalgic attitudes towards fascism.

In the second phase of change (1992-94) the delegitimation of Mani Pulite

investigation went on and in April 1993 the stalemate among political actors, over

which electoral law to choose at the national level, was broken by a referendum

which designated a quasi-majoritarian law for the Senate. At this point the

Parliament had to approve a new law for the Lower Chamber, which was passed

in early August 1993.9 From our vantage point, however, the most important

element in this phase was the foundation of a new party, Forza Italia. At the

approach of the 1994 election it became evident that the delegitimation and crisis

of both the DC and the PSI, as well as the other tiny, moderate centrist parties

(PLI, PRI, PSDI) had created a vacuum within the vast moderate electorate.10 In

this very favorable context and after a period of incubation and secret debates, in

January 1994 Forza Italia was founded under the leadership of the television

magnate Silvio Berlusconi. Within only a few weeks of its birth, opinion polls

8 In fact, in the coalition there were Forza Italia, MSI-AN, and two smaller groups, the CentroCristiano Democratico and the Unione di Centro Democratico (see Figure 2), but also the NorthernLeague.

9 For details of the electoral laws see D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte (1993).

10 Let it be recalled here that the local by-elections in important towns in June and November-December 1993, held under the new majoritarian law approved in March 1993, had an immediatepolarizing impact, and their results, which on the whole were favorable to the leftist coalition, alsocontributed to Berlusconi’s decision to enter politics.


indicated that it would become the largest party in the new parliament.

The above-mentioned political vacuum in the center and center-right

accounts for the startling, quick surge of Forza Italia in public opinion surveys.

But the massive use of television propaganda is the additional necessary condition

for explaining both its speedy formation and success. This is a key point which

deserves to be stressed: several commentators have emphasized how the

ownership and control of three national television channels and the virtual control

of several other local networks gave Berlusconi's party an enormous asset during

the electoral campaign. In addition, he was able to exploit such an asset by taking

advantage of some loopholes in the law governing electoral propaganda. A careful,

conscious use of opinion polls also suggested to him how the existing political

vacuum in the center/center-right could be filled by the issues that later on were to

characterize his electoral propaganda. Thus, first of all, hopes of success were

grounded on the combined effect of the supply of a "new product" by an

entrepreneur with great expertise in advertising, and a demand for "new products"

emerging from civil society (see also Diamanti 1994).


Figure 1


Figure 1 presents the entire picture of party changes, beginning in 1985 -

the last electoral year when crisis and change had not yet been clearly expressed.

Maybe the most interesting consideration suggested by this map is that the two

phases of the change are very neat and delineated. Whereas the first phase is

explained by more long term factors, the second phase is accounted for more by

short term factors. In particular, the concentration of change in 1994 points out

how the elections themselves were important catalysts of the change.

No stable situation, however, was achieved even after the elections. Within

a few months, at the end of 1994 and January-June 1995, there was a split in the

Northern League with the creation of Federalists; a split of the Popular Party

between those closer to centrist positions and the secretary Buttiglione and those

closer to the center center-left led by Bianco; an alliance and a prospective fusion

of the CCD with the PPI led by Buttiglione to form an Unione Democratico

Cristiana (Christian Democratic Union),on the one hand, and with a piece of the

old socialdemocrats (European Liberals), on the other; a reshuffling of tiny

socialist groups, on the center-left, with the formation of the "Lay and Socialist

Coordination" and of parliamentary group with other socialists, republicans and

Democratic Alliance MPs, named "Democrats"; and even a split in the extreme left

of the Communist Refoundation and the consequent formation of the "Communists

for Unity" (see Figure 1).

Party Organization and Parliamentary Elites

So far the analysis has shown the whole set of possibilities envisaged at the

beginning of this article, except for the re-establishment of the same party. But to

understand better how profound the crisis of parties is, other indicators must also

be considered. In fact, the change of names and symbols or even splits and mergers


might actually have little significance. These might only be a face-lift, and nothing

more: the leaders remain the same, as do the organizations, and even the policies

pursued continue unaltered. Thus, to assess how deep was the actual crisis and

change of parties it is necessary to look at the party organization and the party

élite turnover; in spite of their possible salience it is too early to give any answer

about changes in policies. These two indicators cover different aspects. In fact, on

the one hand, the analysis of party organization allows us to consider long-term

elements, which are also emerging gradually in other European countries; on the

other hand, the change of party élites may be a short-term event, very common in

the phenomena of transition and for this reason specific to Italy during these

years.

With regards to party organization,11 the first phenomenon to stress is the

sustained decline in the presence and diffusion of parties in civil society. During

the 1970s and 1980s the partisan élites were still the main actors in Italian

politics, characterized by patronage in the allocation of resources. At the same

time, the need for a large party membership declined mainly because of a

deradicalization among the main parties (DC and PCI), a related deideologization

and the development of the political role of television after 1983, when for the first

time the private TV networks played a role in an electoral campaign. Thus, this

phenomenon, already stressed by Kirchheimer many years ago (1966), was

enormously accentuated, from the beginning of the deradicalization years (1976)

and even more so after 1983. With its estimated total membership rate (TMR),12

Figure 2 presents strong evidence for this. Thus, the presence of parties in civil

11 The following discussion is based upon research conducted by a group under the direction ofLeonardo Morlino. Preliminary (pre-1992) results of this research have been published in Katz andMair (1994). A more complete report, that will also cover the period 1992-95, will be published inMorlino (forthcoming).

12 TMR is simply the ratio between the total estimated membership of all parties and theelectorate at the moment of the elections.


society has enormously declined and has become fundamentally different.13

If the figures for each party are considered, a basic difference between

traditional parties (e.g. PCI and MSI) or their successors (PDS and AN) and new

parties emerge. In fact, on the one hand, the membership of the traditional parties

has radically declined: for example, the specific membership rate14 of the PCI was

.21 in 1963, but .09 in 1994; on

Figure 2. Total Membership Rate (1946-94)

13 This important element is only mentioned here, but it deserves to be discussed in greater depth.The key point is that since at least 1983 the presence of mass parties in civil society has beengradually substituted by the role of TV. For example, Ricolfi (1994) shows how in the 1994 electionsa relevant percentage of the vote shifted toward the center-right alliance because of the influence oftelevision.

14 This is the measure suggested by Duverger (1951), that is, the ratio between the membership ofa party and the votes won by the same party in the electoral year.


Source: Calculations on official data.


the other hand, the membership of new parties no longer has the same meaning as

for old mass parties. To put it better, they are not mass parties. Thus, for the

League, the member is a militant coopted from above, and the result is rather

close to the cadre party; for Forza Italia, he is a member of a local electoral

committee, instructed from above and with no role to play during non-electoral

years (see Table 2).

Table 2. Mership of Main Italian Parties (1984-1994)

RC PCI/PDS DC/PPI Lega FI MSI/AN

19841985198619871988198919901991199219931994

112.278119.094121.055120.000

1.619.9401.595.2811.551.5761.508.1401.462.2811.417.1821.319.305

989.708769.944690.414700.000

1.408.2081.444.5921.395.2391.812.2011.887.6151.862.4262.109.6701.390.918

-813.753233.377

140.000

300.000

180.688141.623156.520165.427151.444166.162142.344150.147181.243202.715355.000

Notes: Figures for the PDS begin in 1991; for PPI in 1994. With regard to ChristianDemocracy, in 1991 the data of 14 provinces were not considered; in 1992 there are nofigures as at the end of that year the secretary, Martinazzoli, erased all membershipbecause the data had been artificially inflated for reasons of internal competitionamong party factions; in 1993 the data of two regions (Sicily and Sardinia) and threeother provinces were lacking. The figure of Forza Italia is an estimate suggested by theparty officials, grounded on the 6.500 clubs of Forza Italia, actually in existence inDecember 1994, and the approximate estimate of 40-50 people per club; to them 5.112members of the party should be added. In the last figure of MSI/AN, 250.000 membersbelong to the Movimento Sociale Italiano and 105.000 to the 1.300 clubs of AlleanzaNazionale.

Sources: Official party data.


A second element to be stressed is the continuous coexistence of different

organizational models. Not only are elements of both the professional-electoral

party (Panebianco 1988), except in the expertise of Publitalia for Forza Italia, and

the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995) hard to see in these parties, but above all it

is impossible to see only one emergent organizational model in the party system:

as in the past, there are more than just one. Thus, since the late 1940s a mass

integration party, such as the PCI, had always cohabited with a denominational

and catch-all party, such as the DC, or opinion parties (Republicans, Liberals or

Social Democrats)(see Bardi and Morlino 1994). In the 1990s, a variety of other

models are also present, in spite of the elapsed time and of the hypothesis on the

homogenizing impact of political competition.

The PDS and Rifondazione managed to preserve the structures of the

former PCI, especially in Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria. The PCI's

heritage of offices and militants did not disappear, even though the PDS had

decided, even prior to 1991, to reduce the number of party officials and rely on a

leaner organization. It should be noted that all traditional parties implemented

similar policies of sacking party functionaries and reducing the size of party

organization, given their respective financial difficulties. As a result, in July 1993

parliament passed a law that allowed party functionaries to be pensioned off early.

Thus, on the whole, the PDS maintained some of the elements of the old mass

integration party, becoming a sort of post-mass integration party, looking for a

new model.

In contrast with the "light" party structure of the democratic left, the

League developed a strong organization manned by voluntary workers - many of

them young - from a variety of social backgrounds. It emerged as a markedly

hierarchical party with a strong leader and a central office controlling finances,

electoral campaigns and party policy. As much as possible - and even with


reference to its patterns of recruitment - the party organization is managed with

the efficiency criteria which are typical of a private business or firm. Different

organizational tenets are present in the League: it is a charismatic party, a cadre

party, and also a party-movement. In addition, since 1990 it has moved from being

a protest party to becoming a governmental party. The impact of governmental

experience and the growing autonomous role of the parliamentary party is having

very important consequences. In fact, an organization solidly rooted at local level,

but with low institutionalization at national level, was not able to bear and

overcome the strains and pressures of internal dissent. The leadership of Bossi

was itself challenged, especially on the issue of participating in the Berlusconi

cabinet. At the end of 1994, on two occasions a group of MPs split away and a

strong group opposed Bossi from within the party (Figure 1). The most important

turning point came in February-March when Bossi regained full control of the

organization, and turned it once again into a protest and movement-party. The

regional and local elections of April 1995 strengthened its leadership by showing

how Bossi was right in his position: despite the various splits and the formation of

a new party (Figure 2), all in all the League lost only a limited part of the

electorate: less than one third (2.7%) of its previous electoral strength (from 9.1 in

1994 to 6.4 in 1995).

Some of the organizational aspects concerning the League reveal how

deeply the values of entrepreneurship, efficiency, and the free market have

penetrated Italian political culture, especially in all Northern areas, as a reaction

against the inefficiency of bureaucracy and the poor quality of public services. The

same is suggested by the organization of Forza Italia. The plans for such a party

were carefully laid during the second half of 1993. The party was launched and its

organization openly built up in late January-March 1994, before and during the

electoral campaign for the March elections. The key organizational role was

performed by the staff of Publitalia, a company, which is part of Fininvest (the


conglomerate owned by Berlusconi) and which is a leading firm in advertising at a

national level. In a few days, between February and March 1994, they were able to

set up about 13,000-14,000 clubs all over Italy with about 80 people per club.

According to the official party data, they had become 6.500 in December 1994 with

about 40-50 people per club. The clubs are vertically connected to a national

association of clubs (ANFI), which are expected to suggest their political line. In an

organizational sense, Forza Italia is very difficult to define, partly because of its

binary organization: the clubs, on the one hand, and the party with its tiny

membership (all in all, 5.112 members)15, on the other. If we focus on its recent

genesis, Forza Italia can be considered a sort of firm-party, given the key role

performed by Publitalia, and the role of Berlusconi is crucial. Today, it is trying to

establish itself by maintaining all its previous set of structures, its parliamentary

party, its governmental position, and a strong, undisputed leader. However, in this

poorly institutionalized party the experience of being in office and the conflicts

with its coalition partners have brought about internal dissent and clearly

distinguishable groups, though not factions. As an additional consequence, the

MPs became a key figure in this organization in linking the centralized undisputed

leadership with the local level of the clubs.

The new Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI), a direct successor of Christian

Democracy, can no longer depend on the political unity of the Catholic vote, since

this was divided among five main groups of the left, center, and right (see above

and Figure 1). Nonetheless, despite the substantial process of secularization that

had taken place in Italy over the preceding 25 years and a more limited possibility

of influence, the PPI can still rely on support from sectors of the Church hierarchy,

the Catholic associations (AC), another Catholic group named Comunione e

15 But in June a much debated project of internal reform was proposed by Milanese leaders to givea greater role to the members and membership, and overcome the internal inconsistencies of theorganization.


Liberazione (CL), and some sectors of the Catholic worker association (ACLI) (see

also Cartocci 1993 and below). From this perspective, the PPI may be considered a

neo-denominational party. The split of the party in two will probably also imply a

split of the Catholic support in favour of both new formations.16

The far-reaching effects of internal change are also apparent when the

enormous turnover of party élites is examined, above all with reference to the

patterns of recruitment, their socio-economic backgrounds, and some

characteristics of their behavior. Since in almost all contemporary democracies the

core party élites sit in Parliament, the data on MPs elected in 1992 and 1994 are

essential to deal with these problems. First, whereas the newly elected deputies

make up 27% in 1979, 32.1 in 1983, and 28.2 in 1987, they were 42.9 in 1992 and

71.3 in 1994 (63.2 in the PR seats) (Verzichelli 1994). Actually, in only a few years

there is an almost complete turnover of the parliamentary élites: in the present

Chamber of Deputies 88.6% (558 out of 630) are MPs elected for the first time in

1992 or 1994; 5.6 were also elected in 1987; only 5.9% - that is 37 people out of 630

- have a longer legislative experience.

The turnover is very high for each party, but it is clearly higher for the new

parties: 90.4% newly elected in Forza Italia versus 61.5% in PDS. At the same

time the newly elected are also numerous whenever a party increases its vote (see

Table 1): the newly elected are 77.5 in the MSI-AN (Verzichelli 1994, 717).17 The

extent of the turnover explains why previous experience in politics or trade unions

is less prominent for deputies, who are usually younger than in previous

16 It is also worthwhile mentioning the organizational change of the Socialist Party, which placedthe party entirely in the hands of its leader, Craxi, during the 1980s. Eventually, this change wasone of the causes of the abrupt breakdown of the party when Craxi was involved in Mani Pulite. SeeDi Virgilio (forthcoming).

17 Note that these data refer to the majoritarian seats; with regard to the PR seats, the newlyelected are 54.1% in PDS, 85.7 in Forza Italia, and 59.1 in MSI-AN. This suggests that theproportional lists were also used to save the old leaders.


legislatures. In this case, too, candidates with previous political experience in local

administrations or as party leaders are more frequent in the traditional parties

than in Forza Italia or the League (see Verzichelli 1994 and Lanza 1995).

If the analysis is stopped at this point, nothing really new would emerge in

terms of party change. The most relevant conclusion would be that the patterns of

party recruitment - especially, parliamentary recruitment - is enriched by a

successful appeal to people without previous political experience, above all in the

new parties (the League and Forza Italia). Of course, this is only a temporary

conclusion: as happened to the League between 1992 and 1994, in the next

legislature the situation will change. Thus, for Forza Italia and even more so for

the League, the newcomers will decrease a great deal.

When socio-economic variables concerning MPs are analyzed, more

interesting elements appear. First of all, there is a steady increase in MPs coming

from the private sector: from 25.7% (1987) to 34.6 (1992) and 44.4 (1994).

Consistent with these figures, in the League in 1992 and 1994, and in Forza Italia

in 1994, the presence of people coming from different interest associations or also

more specific interests is strong: 34.4% in Forza Italia in 1994, with 14 MPs

coming from Publitalia and Fininvest, as well as industrial entrepreneurs, land-

owners, tradesmen (Lanza 1995, figs. 13 and 21-22).18 This aspect is also evident if

a sample of all candidacies is considered: 23% of candidates of Forza Italia are

entrepreneurs and 19% are managers, tradesmen or people from the private

tertiary sector; 7% of the candidates of the League are also entrepreneurs and 36%

belong to the other three sectors (Mattina 1994: 581).19 That is, in addition to, and

18 Almost 11% of MPs belonging to the Popular Party are members of Catholic organizations. Thisconfirms the support of the Church for PPI and lends greater justification to its definition as a neo-denominational party (see above).

19 Mattina (1994: 575) also stresses that the interest organizations are officially neutral in theelectoral contest.


in partial substitution of, the traditional lawyers or civil servants, private interests

decide to enter the political arena directly. This means that the choice made by

Berlusconi was not an isolated phenomenon; and to say the least it was imitated:

the uncertainty of these years, the anti-party sentiments or also - as in the case of

Berlusconi - the links with the previous political élite has encouraged people with

relevant personal interests to enter politics.20 The serious possibility of an electoral

victory for the "hated Communists" made it unthinkable for Berlusconi and other

entrepreneurs to maintain a position of neutrality.21 If such an attitude is

maintained even when the uncertainties of the political transition is over, then

there is actually something new in the patterns of party recruitment. Of course,

once a habit is established, it is also more difficult for it to disappear.22

On the whole, whereas the organizational analysis conducted in this section

clearly confirms the deep, long-term transformations of parties, the change of

party élites gives evident, but less conclusive indications. In fact, the data refer to

this transitional, uncertain phase of Italian democracy (1992-95), but later on the

phenomenon could be confirmed or also change, and the interest groups could

return to their business.

20 Socio-economic status is very relevant for 73% of the MPs of Forza Italia (Lanza, 1995: tab.14).

21 The national association of entrepreneurs (Confindustria), however, did not openly giveBerlusconi support and maintained an official position of neutrality. This support for him was moremanifest at the rank and file level, above all, at the post-electoral meetings of the entrepreneurassociation.

22 A high turnover usually implies a new élite with poor knowledge of the actual working ofinstitutions and, at the same time, of the problems that need to be solved. This is especially relevantin the Italian case given the high salience of the parliamentary committees in the decisional arenas.Consequences of this may be high decisional inefficacy and radicalization. Both elements haveoccurred after March 1994, but the causal relationship is difficult to prove. On radicalization see alsobelow.


The Party System After the 1994 Elections

In this section the impact of the crises and consequent changes of parties on

the party system will be evaluated, with the change of electoral system, as a key

additional variable. The most obvious question we should address is whether there

is a new party system, even if still in a transitional phase and far from being

established, or one that corresponds or is equivalent to the previous system.23 To

reply, let us consider, first, the number of parties.24 If only the parties which gained

votes or obtained a minimal percentage of seats are considered, there is

fragmentation to some extent: one or two more parties between 1987 and 1994.

But if a more precise and reliable measure is applied, some interesting aspects

emerge. That is, after a very high level of stability between 1946 and 1987,

displayed by the vote fractionalization (VF =.79 in 1946 and .78 in 1987) (see Table

3) and two very polarized elections in 1948 and 1976 (VF =. 66 in 1948 and .72 in

1976), fractionalization increased in the first phase of the crisis of parties and

party system in the early 1990s (VF= +.7 between 1987 and 1992) (Table 3). In

1994 the growth was very limited and, since the calculation is done on the basis of

23 Contrary to what some commentators have written, the change-adaptation of some parties (PCIto PDS and MSI to AN), the crisis and breakdown of others (Christian Democracy, PSI, PSDI, PLI,PRI), the formation and growth of new actors (Northern League and Forza Italia) do not allow us toaddress the question of whether the party system is the same as earlier. As suggested in the text,the question is whether an equivalent party system emerged. The previous party system wasconsidered a case of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976: 131-73), characterized by a high number ofparties (more than five) and high ideological distance, and more specifically by anti-system parties,bilateral opposition, center placement of one or of a group of parties, high polarization, centrifugalcompetition, and other less relevant, and connected features. But at least since the second half of1970s, the system began changing (see also Farneti 1983).

24 The impact of the 1994 elections on the number of parties is also carefully discussed byD’Alimonte and Bartolini (1995).


the votes cast in the proportional segment, the possible impact of the quasi-

majoritarian electoral law is not evident.

If the _effective_ number of parties is calculated with reference to the seats,

again after a very long period of stability the number became much higher in 1992

and still higher in 1994. In this case, too, the expected reduction caused by the new

electoral laws is lacking. On the contrary, unlike the VF, the increase between

1992 and 1994 is very close to that between 1987 and 1992 (see Table 3). Thus, in

April 1994 the MPs elected in the Lower Chamber belonged to at least 14 parties,

and the same happened to the Senate.

A qualitative analysis of this issue clarifies further the meaning of the

increased fragmentation, that is of the number of parties. It can be taken for

granted that the sheer number has to be related to the size of parties, as both

measures mentioned above actually do, and that the aspect to point out concerns

the composition of the Chambers and the related problems in the formation of the

cabinet and opposition. If so, the main point is that the increased number of

relevant parties derives from the breakdown of Christian Democracy. In fact, the

formation of the cabinet and its parliamentary support are usually easier when

there is a dominant or pivotal, larger party as there was in Italy up to 1987. When

the DC entered its crisis-period (1992) and then broke down (1994), three main

parties with similar strength replaced it, MSI-AN (17.3% of seats), Forza Italia

(15.4%), and the Northern League (19.4%), in addition to tiny groups (CCD, UDC

and Riformatori) (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Forza Italia with its leadership is not

able to perform the same unifying and pivotal role as the DC. It is a simple

problem of parliamentary size (see Table 1): in the previous center-left cabinets,

where the DC played a key role, a crisis could only be precipitated by the

withdrawal of the Socialists from the cabinet, whereas in the Berlusconi cabinet

with Forza Italia, the withdrawal of both MSI-AN and the League could have


precipitated the collapse of the cabinet.25 This means that it is more difficult to

maintain the coalition and consequently there is a less stable cabinet and in this

sense a higher fragmentation of governmental forces. In addition, there is a

corresponding higher fragmentation of the opposition, recorded also by the

measures mentioned above (see Table 3). It is due to the split of the leftist wing of

the Communist party when the PDS was founded, and Rifondazione won 6% of the

seats and an even greater electoral strength in some areas of the country - around

10%.

Table 3. Changes in the Italian Party System (1946-94)*

VF EP TEV I-BV

1946194819531958196319681972197619791983198719921994

.79

.66

.76

.74

.76

.75

.76

.72

.74

.78

.78

.85

.87

4.32.63.63.43.73.63.63.13.44.04.15.87.3

(42.9)22.813.34.57.93.44.98.25.38.58.416.241.4

12.94.61.01.31.41.14.5.7.3

1.15.25.8

* Vote fractionalization (VF) in 1994 has been calculated on the basis of votes cast for the proportionalsegment; in all cases the Rae’s fractionalization index (1971: 56) has been adopted. The effective number ofparties (EP) has been calculated with the Laakso and Taagepera’s formula (1979). For the EP in 1994, if oneconsiders the electoral coalitions (Polo delle Libertà, Patto per l'Italia, Progressisti, in addition to ListaPannella and other small local lists) and not the single parties, the EP is 3.6. TEV is Total ElectoralVolatility. The figure in parenthesis refers to the TEV vis-à-vis the last democratic elections before theestablishment of Fascism in 1922. With regards to inter-block volatility (I-BV), in 1994 Social Democrats(PSDI)(as it was done in 1992) and Lista Pannella have been included in the center-center/right block;

25 The crisis of the Berlusconi cabinet (April-December 1994) was caused by a no-confidencemotion of the Northern League.


Source: Official data

Thus, on the whole, even if we consider the two rules for counting suggested

by Sartori (1976: 122-3), that is the _coalition potential_ and the _blackmail

potential_ of other parties, the party system still remains a case of extreme

pluralism. But since 1992 and above all after 1994, it is more extreme since the

size of the four main parties (MSI-AN, Forza Italia, League and PDS) became

almost the same because of the breakup of the center (DC) and the split in the left.

The two laws for the elections of the Lower Chamber and the Senate did not have

the effect of reducing the number of parties, in spite of the majoritarian

component, for three evident reasons: first, the counteracting effect of the

proportional component of laws; second, the territorialization of the vote for the

different parties, that prevents the reductive impact of plurality, as is well known

(see also below); and third, the electoral agreements among the various party lists

on the distribution of single-member districts. Unless the electoral law is changed

with a double ballot and/or a high threshold is introduced, no reduction of parties

may be expected in the future.

In addition, party fragmentation appears even more problematic in the

formation of stable cabinets if the component parties of similar size pursue

different policies, that is, if number and size are compounded by a large ideological

distance among them. In mentioning this second important dimension of the party

system some elements of the previous decade have to be recalled, even if only in

cursory fashion. In fact, such a dimension can only change slowly. From this point

of view the basic features of the previous party system, defined as polarized

pluralism, were already gradually changing since the mid 1970s. Following a

process inaugurated for the left in 1973 with the strategy of _historic compromise_,

the integration of extreme parties had been fully accomplished by 1995. The


change of PCI into PDS in February 1991 and of MSI or MSI-AN into National

Alliance (AN) in January 1995 are the points of arrival of this integration. Even

the Communist Refoundation cannot help but recognize the democratic

institutions, which at this moment have been in existence for half a century.

Thus, the anti-system parties26 that have charactered the Italian party

system for decades no longer exist. Bilateral oppositions have also disappeared.

For the first time the Right represented by the MSI was in office in the Berlusconi

cabinet and the opposition came from the center and the left. To be sure, the

coalitional capability of the PDS may also be taken for granted, not only because it

gave crucial support to the cabinets in the difficult years of terrorism in 1976-79,

but also remembering its very short participation in the Ciampi cabinet27 and its

support for the Dini cabinet, formed at the end of January 1995.

There is no longer a center occupied by one party because of the crisis and

the fragmentation of Christian Democracy. However, there are weaker center

parties: together with the two PPIs, there are the tiny group led by Segni and

some center-leftist groups. The PPI itself, relatively better rooted in society and

consequently potentially more solid than the other tiny parties which are simply

élite groups, split on the problem of defining electoral alliances: with Forza Italia

and Berlusconi or in the center and, in some cases, allied to center-leftist parties.

The end of anti-system parties, the disappearance of bilateral oppositions, a

center no longer occupied by one big party, such as the DC - all this means a

smaller ideological distance and the existence of an ongoing process of

deradicalization of parties. At the same time, the delegitimation of traditional

26 The definition of anti-system party is that suggested by Sartori (1976: 133): a party which"undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes", and "would not change - if it could - thegovernment, but the very system of government".

27 They changed their minds in a few hours, maybe because they were afraid of internal criticismand attacks from the extreme left.


governing parties, the creation of new parties and the discontent of civil society

have all brought about an enormous increase in volatility: both the total volatility

(TEV) and the volatility between left and right or inter-block volatility (I-BV)(see

Table 3). To trace similar figures, the TEV between 1922 and 1946 has to be taken

into account. This means an enormous growth in competition precisely at a

moment of democratic crisis, transition and, consequently, of uncertain rules.28

All this causes a new, opposite process of radicalization. This phenomenon

is characterized, first of all, by the attempt of rightist and center-rightist parties to

recreate an artificial cleavage between communists and anti-communists. The

term is obsolete, but it still belongs to the collective memory of Italians and,

therefore, if successful thanks to party propaganda, this cleavage may reduce the

competition and will keep people in the moderate, rightist camp. Second, there is a

substantial problem for the new forces establishing their identities and political

space, and it concerns the League and Forza Italia in their relationship with civil

society. Such a problem is compounded by the low institutionalization of these

parties with their internal divisions and conflicts. Third, accentuated verbal

violence in political discourse throughout 1994 and 1995 also shows the strength of

the conflict over which model of majoritarian democracy should be implemented,

which governmental institutions should be created, even over what kind of

electoral laws to have, and over what solutions should be given to the problems

arising from the enormous public deficit in terms of changes in welfare

institutions, with particular regard to pensions.

28 The TEV is partially explained by the presence of new parties. However, the analysis of 1994elections shows more precisely how the competition is much higher in the South and in the districtsof Senate vis-à-vis the Lower Chamber. See Bartolini and D'Alimonte (1994:649).


Figure 3. Electoral Poles Along Left/Right, 1987


Source: Official electoral data.


Thus, there is an effect of bipolarization,29 as a result of the electoral law

and the crisis of DC and PSI: Figures 3-4-5, where the changing electoral strength

of the poles is measured,30 show such a phenomenon and the consequent profound

change of the left/right profile, particularly after 1992. There is also a process of

deradicalization as a result of the democratic integration of all parties and, at the

same time, a new radicalizing process for the reasons mentioned above. If

bipolarization is reinforced by this new radicalization, the tendency towards a new

polarized pluralism, without anti-system parties and a strong, central actor, but

with a few center forces, might be consolidated so that center parties will have

more opportunities to play alone and exploit their pivotal position vis à vis the

other parties or alliances; if, on the contrary, the radicalization is overcome thanks

to the solution - even a partial one - of the main substantive problems or also to

the moderating action of leaders, the bipolarization will remain strong, but

moderate competition gives room to rightist and leftist alliances, and the center

parties have little chance of growth and, at the same time, are forced into allying

with one side or the other.

Another element completes the picture. Both the crisis of Christian

Democracy and the impact of an electoral law with single member districts have

brought to the fore an old tendency of Italian politics, namely the territorialization

of the vote (see, e.g. Cartocci 1987). In the North of Italy (Piedmont, Lombardy,

Veneto, Friuli), there are the strongholds of the League; Emilia, Tuscany, Umbria

29 Here I make a distinction between polarization, as increasing aggregation around electoralpoles (if there are two, it is a bipolarization), and radicalization, as increasing distance amongpolitical positions in a stronger conflict. When the two phenomena overlap, a tendency towardspolarized pluralism (see fn.21) is set in motion. Sartori (1976:131ff.) does not make this distinctionsince he does not need to do so. Conversely, as shown in the text, in the transition from polarizedpluralism to moderate pluralism (and vice versa), or to a neo-polarized pluralism, the differenceseems useful.

30 The poles have been measured simply placing the various parties, with their electoral strength,on a ten-point scale on the grounds of their traditional self-placement along the left/right dimension.


and other areas of the center are dominated by the left; in the South (Puglia, Sicily

and other areas of Campania) there is the strong presence of the extreme right in

alliance with Forza Italia. In other words, a sort of territorial pluralism has clearly

emerged, characterized by four Italies (see, recently, Ricolfi 1994) with different

economic problems and difficulties, too. Such a territorial pluralism complements

and defines better the existing extreme pluralism with regards to the center. In

fact, not only does it add another conflictual dimension to the left/right, it also

creates room for a center party with local identities, e.g. the League, that at this

point is not compelled to look either for allies or for more moderation in its policy

positions.

After the Change, the Choice

In the mid 1990s the parties are far from being internally stabilized and

other changes are expected: the various splits at the end of 1994 and the first

semester of 1995 show such a fluidity. The party system is one of fragmented or

extreme pluralism, which should remain basically stable if a strong electoral law

with reducing effects is not approved; and even if this is so, such reduction will

only come in the middle term.31 But the new radicalizing drives which have

emerged, if further strengthened, may stabilize a neo-polarized pluralism, which

may be helped by the political - not only electoral - differences of the various areas

of the country. That is, in the party system the number of parties may remain

stable, but the patterns of competition are still unsettled, and they are very

unlikely to become well defined if the same crisis of Italian democracy is not

overcome.

31 The electoral history of the Fifth French Republic is evidence of this.


In fact, the change of party system and parties is strictly interwoven with

the crisis of Italian democracy. At least since the end of the 1960s in Italy, there

has been a latent crisis laced with dissatisfaction and discontent, which had never

previously emerged - first, because of the existence of parties not fully integrated

in the democratic regime, both on the left and right, and later because of

terrorism. When this situation gradually faded away during the 1980s, the crisis

gradually became a manifest crisis as there was no longer any constraint to the

open expression of discontent and protest for the moderate opinion of the middle

classes and of all the propertied interests. At this point all the conditions for

change existed. As stated above, this came with a few fortuitous external events,

such as the Mani Pulite investigation, to which we should add the referenda of

1991 and 1993, that provoked the change in the electoral laws (see Morlino and

Tarchi 1995).

By way of conclusion, it is possible to speculate as to future developments of

the party system. On the basis of this analysis the political and institutional

choices of party leaders will mainly be responsible for these developments. First,

leaders who choose to moderate and accommodate or to exacerbate political

conflicts or to establish some alliance rather than others will push the party

system in different, opposing directions. Second, the approval of a different

electoral law, such as the double ballot, and the establishment of a strong

premiership would strengthen the drift toward moderate pluralism, also by taking

away political space from center parties. In contrast, the maintaining of the

present electoral laws and the approval of direct election of the head of the state

(or, also, of the chancellor) would leave more room for radicalization and

consequently the establishment of a neo-polarized party system. If no choice is

made, the present phase of uncertainties with both centripetal and centrifugal

tendencies will be prolonged with no challenge to democracy as such, but with

serious problems in terms of policy performance. Yet, in a fourth scenario, the


decisions on the crucial problem of maintaining or dismantling welfare institutions

to curb the enormous public deficit may well provoke reactions from civil society,

the delegitimation of forces which at the moment are poorly institutionalized, and

new crises and changes in parties. Again much depends on the decisions, or non-

decisions, that the party leaders will be able to make.


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Figure 1. A Left-Right Map of Traditional and New Parties (1985-95)*

1985 1987 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

DP ................................................................................................ PRC.........................................................................................................................................................................................................

Communisti per l'Unità ..

PCI............................................................................................... PDS.........................................................................................................................................................................................................Rete.........................................................................................................................................................................................................

PSI ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Laburisti ...........................................................................Socialisti Italiani ..............................................................Part.Soc. Riformista.........................................................Cristiano sociali................................................................Alleanza democratica.......................................................

Verdi Sole che ride

Verdi.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Verdi Arcobaleno

PR .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... Riformatori .......................................................................

Lista Panella ......................................................................................................................................................

Patto Segni...................................................................................................................

PPI (Bia)...........................

Liga Veneta................................................................................. Lega Nord...............................................................................................................................................................................................

LegaLombarda

Federalisti.........................................................................

PRI......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

PSDI ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Socialdem..........................................................................Liberali Europei ...............................................................PPI. . . . . . . . . . . .

DC..........................................................................................................................................................................................................Unione Democratico-Cristiana ...

CCD...................................................................................


Forza Italia .......................................................................UDC ..................................................................................

PLI .........................................................................................................................................................................................................Feder.liberali ....................................................................

AN ....................................

MSI-DN ................................................................................................................................................................................................. MSI-AN............................MSI...................................

* For the meanings of the acronyms see the text. The dotted lines suggest the continuity of the same party; the arrows the relationships between the previous party and thesuccessor one, mainly at an élite level; the point of departure of the arrows the moment when the split or the merger is carried out.

Crisis of Parties and Change of Party System in Italy

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