Consequences of economic transformation on labour market and poverty risks: comparison among...

Consequences of economic transformation on labour market and poverty risks: comparison among Milan, Rome and Naples,

GUIDO CAVALCA

XI EURA CONFERENCE, Milan, OCTOBER 9-11, 2008

1

Consequences of economic transformation on labour

market and poverty risks: comparison among Milan, Rome

and Naples.

Guido Cavalca

Università di Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy

[email protected]

Keywords: Labour market, Poverty, Social change

Introduction

The economic transformation, which took place in the capitalist economies in Europe and in other parts of the

“Western world” during the Seventies and Eighties, had strong consequences on societies and on cities where

social change occurred first and in a sharper manner (Mingione 2005).

Creative industries have played a very important role in the successful transformation from a Fordist to a post-

fordist system (Musterd and others 2007). Therefore, knowledge-based cities lead that process and represent an

important point of view on its social effects.

Indeed, one of the main issues of the international debate regards the possible negative effects of the economic

change on the living conditions of some „weak‟ social groups, like young people, migrants and low skilled

workers.

Sassen (1991) with the „global cities‟ pattern, but also Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) with their revised ‟Dual

city‟ hypothesis or Wilson (1987) with the „underclass‟ theory, argue that the recent economic development

affects urban society, generating a polarization between high skilled professionals and low skilled workers.

Others underline that different inequalities‟ and poverty‟s patterns exist among cities and that the social structure

is more complex than the „dual city‟ model argues (Mingione 1991). This approach, even if referred to the

specific case of global cities (London and New York and later other cities), has anyway influenced the debate on

postfordist cities.

Beck (1986), as well as other authors (Sennet 1998, Bauman 2001, Giddens 1990), identify new the risks of

post-modernity, such as individualization, as an alternative or supplementary model to the class approach.

This paper aims to contribute to this debate, analysing some Italian urban contexts.

We‟ll focus on the three Italian urban areas (the cities and the provinces around them) of Milan, Rome and

Naples, which represent three outcomes of economic development‟s and social changes‟ impact on cities. Milan


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is beyond doubt the best Italian example of a successful city in knowledge-based economy, passing from a

typical industrial city to an affluent post-industrial one; Rome, the bigger and capital city in Italy is a dynamic

city and it‟s trying to go towards the creative pattern; Naples is the more important city in the Southern Italy with

a scarce (public) industrial heritage and a current critical economic and social situation, facing in particular

structural unemployment and underdevelopment of service sector.

The approach on social change proposed by Mendras and Forsé (1991), in particular the focus on relations

between macro and meso/micro-level, plays a key role in order to interpret how economic transformations affect

individuals and social groups‟ concrete life and not only the social structure.

Using the data of a recent survey conducted in some urban areas in Italy1, we‟ll try to point out some main

characteristics of social change, labour market transformations, inequalities and poverty and how these

transformations differ among cities. This data set allows to analyse social transformations and individual

opportunities and risks during the last decades, comparing generations within cities and social groups among

cities, trying to identify how the post-industrial and knowledge based economy affect social conditions of

inhabitants and the difference among successful and un-(or less) successful cities.

1. Urban labour market transformation

Traditionally Italy is divided in two macro-area (three if considering the so called „Third Italy‟, the industrial

district located in some northern-centre regions) from an economic and social point of view. Northern Italy is

characterized by a very dynamic economy and labour market, thanks to the development of industries during the

fifties and sixties and later on as consequence of the transition (in some case through periods of economic crisis)

to post-industrial economy and a successful transformation of industrial production. The Central regions are in

that sense approaching that positive situation. The Southern macro-area suffers of economic, financial and

infrastructural problems and seems to keep that distance from the rest of Italy.

Also taking into account the urban areas this differentiation still holds true.

Considering in particular the labour market, it has to be underlined that the main question is the lack of job

supply in the Southern regions and urban areas. That part of Italy is traditionally underdeveloped; the industrial

development had been supported by public subventions and had never been able to develop locally and the

principal perspective for southern workers was to move towards the so-called “Industrial triangle” in the

Northern cities of Milan, Genoa and Turin, where the siderurgy, metal and engineering, textiles and auto

industries needed more labour forces than these urban areas could offer. Informal economy and the related job-

supply have always played an important role in the Southern social system.

In Naples the process towards an advanced service economy is far from being achieved: as shown in table 1,

Milan and Rome, even if with a different development‟s degree, have a large part of employment in the

knowledge based sectors.

1 The research project “Le tendenze al mutamento della società italiana (2003-2005)” („Change‟s trends of Italian society‟)

involved seven urban areas (Milan, Florence, Rome, Ancona, Naples, Bari and Cosenza), conducting a survey (2004) on

representative samples.


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Tab. 1 Sectors of knowledge-based economy by local units and employees (% of total) in the province of Milan,

Rome and Naples

Milan Rome Naples

Local

Units Employees

Local

Units Employees

Local

Units Employees

Publishing 0,45 0,85 0,41 0,48 0,15 0,19

Manufacture of television and radio

transmitters and apparatus for line

telephony and line telegraphy

0,23 0,82 0,19 0,41 0,15 0,27

Software consultancy and supply 1,67 2,20 1,29 2,83 0,52 0,91

Data processing 0,88 0,84 0,68 0,60 0,45 0,38

Telecommunications 0,08 0,96 0,10 2,05 0,05 1,09

Monetary intermediation 0,56 2,57 0,51 2,91 0,43 1,66

Legal, accounting, book keeping and

auditing activities; tax consultancy;

market research and public opinion

polling; business and management

consultancy; holdings

7,52 4,21 8,08 3,55 7,13 2,62

Architectural and engineering of

personnel 4,74 1,72 4,43 1,43 3,23 1,04

Advertising 1,05 0,93 0,58 0,31 0,25 0,14

Labour recruitment and provision of

personnel 0,24 1,38 0,07 0,71 0,03 0,41

Source: Census 2001 Istat (8. Censimento dell’Industria e dei Servizi)

Many indicators can support these statements about different economic patterns in Northern and Central Italy

contrasting with the Southern urban areas. The ones related to labour market are particularly interesting, because

they show directly the consequences of economic trends on socio-economic conditions and social structure

(labour and social inclusion; class division and change) and indirectly – in particular if used with other indicators

and a socio-economic background knowledge – the „social regulation of work‟, i.e. the combination of social,

economic and juridical rules, which allow a specific form of work be compatible with social needs, promoting

therefore social inclusion.

2. Labour market participation

A basic comparison among the three cities shows clearly the cleavages described.

In Naples unemployment and low female participation are impressive, typical of a weak labour market and

suffering social situation. Rome and Milan, even if with some differences, approaches the mean European

standards thanks to an increasing female participation and a low level of unemployment. An example helps to

appreciate the dimensions of that difference: among women aged 30-34 the distance between employment rates

in Naples on the one hand and in Milan and Rome on the other reaches around the 30 percent.


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Tab. 2 Activity, employment and unemployment rate (15-64 y.o) - 2004

Activity Employment Unemployment

M F M F M F

Milan 78,1 61,8 75,0 59,2 4,0 4,3

West-Northern Italy 77,2 58,0 74,6 54,5 3,2 6,0

Rome 76,0 59,2 71,2 55,3 6,3 6,6

Central Italy 75,2 55,5 71,4 50,8 4,9 8,3

Naples 75,7 37,6 60,1 28,5 20,6 24,2

Southern Italy 69,9 37,5 61,9 30,1 11,4 19,6

Italy 74,4 50,4 69,7 45,3 6,2 10,1 Source: survey‟s data for urban areas; Istat-RTFL for the macro-areas (italics)

We‟re going to describe the transformation of urban labour markets during and in consequence of the transition

between the industrial and the post-industrial phases.

Milan appears the more dynamic city, thanks to the rapid change of the production system, whereas Naples

seems to be dramatically stable: if unemployment decreases, is only because of a “discouragement effect”

(unemployed, who do not trust to find a job, become inactive on the labour market) and doesn‟t mean an increase

of job supply; the young women (except for the high educated) continue to stay mostly out of labour market and

the main social risks seem to be the “old” forms of workers‟ exploitation more than the new forms of unstable

job.

The radical change occurred in the European labour market entry, in particular among women, involves some

Italian areas more than others. With regard to the last generations we expect a postponed transition to work and a

massive growth of female participation in Milan and Rome and a static situation in Naples.


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Graphs 1 Labour market entry of women in Milan, Rome and Naples – comparison among generations

Naples

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34

Rome

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34

Milan

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34

Up to 1949

1950-59

1960-69


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As the graphs show, Naples does not experience any relevant change in female labour market: the majority of

women keep on staying out of paid work, reinforcing the industrial household‟s model of male breadwinner,

who indeed is at risk of being unemployed. The last generation of women living in Milan and Rome, on the

contrary, accelerates the social change: only 20% of women aged between 35 and 442 in Milan and 30% in

Rome do not enter in the labour market with a consistent decrease in comparison with the decade and the

generation before.

Maintaining the observation on young-adult women in the three urban areas, we focus on the two

patterns of women social role, which are clearly opposing Milan and Rome on one side and Naples on the other.

Among women aged 25-35 almost half of the sample has already left home in Milan and Rome and 40% in

Naples. Their labour market condition in the new households is interesting. In the north-central urban areas they

are mostly working, whereas in Naples the half of them are housewives. Milan in particular shows an extremely

work-oriented social behaviour: largely more than the 80% of women, also among the ones who‟re still living

with their parents, is employed. The image of Milan so far is of a post-industrial city, with a very high work

participation, which steers the household structure towards a new pattern, particularly innovative for the Italian

case, the „two-income households‟.

Tab. 3 Occupational structure – women 25-35 y.o.

Milan Rome Naples

Left home

(46,1%)

Employment 86,0 75,9 39,4

Unemployment 1,8 6,3 6,1

Housewifes 8,0 15,2 51,7

In education and other inactives 4,2 2,6 2,8

Total 100 (49,7) 100 (48,8) 100 (40,4)

Still with parents

(53,9%)

Employment 84,1 70,0 39,9

Unemployment 4,3 10,9 26,0

Housewifes 12,3

In education and other inactives 11,6 19,1 22,0

Total 100 (50,3) 100 (51,2) 100 (59,6)

In order to analyse the social change, we worked on a dynamic analysis of women‟s mobility towards activity in

the labour market, comparing two generations, dividing individuals between the ones with some working

experience and the ones never entered in the labour market.

As we can observe in the table 4, women mobility towards an active role is higher in Milan than in Rome and

even more than in Naples, where only less than a third of women has work experience and a never-active

mother.

Also considering the young-adult women (30-44 y.o.), the level of change towards involvement in the labour

market is lower in Naples than in Rome and Milan.

2 It‟s actually the youngest generation which has completed the potential transition to work.


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TAB. 4 Intergenerational female transition from inactivity to activity

Tertiary

education

Upper

secondary

education

Lower

secondary/prime

education

Total

Milan immobile active 38,4% 33,2% 23,9% 30,2%

mobile active 52,3% 49,3% 40,4% 46,1%

immobile inactive 6,0% 11,1% 24,5% 15,9%

mobile inactive 3,2% 6,4% 11,2% 7,9%

N 281 639 678 1598

Rome immobile active 44,9% 31,3% 16,0% 28,2%

mobile active 44,4% 43,9% 33,1% 40,0%


mobile inactive 4,5% 7,8% 13,7% 9,4%

N 243 537 468 1248

Naples immobile active 32,8% 11,4% 3,8% 10,3%

mobile active 56,3% 40,5% 15,7% 29,4%


mobile inactive 3,8% 10,9% 13,1% 11,0%

N 183 405 689 1277

It‟s very interesting to observe the role played by education: if we consider graduate women the differences

among the three Italian cities in regard to this specific form of mobility disappear. Taking into account 100

women with tertiary education living in Naples, 56 are or have been in the labour market even if their mothers

never worked and only 6 maintain the same position of their inactive mothers. Then the educational inequalities

in the southern city strongly affect the social roles and opportunities; the highest level of education plays the role

of social improvement‟s tool for women. In fact, we also know that high educated women living in Southern

Italy, not only tend to work instead of being housewife, but also reach similar labour market performance as the

other European women, in terms of activity, employment and unemployment rates (Eurostat, Regional Labour

Market Statistics3)

This radical and differentiated transformation has to be set into a more general frame of social change,

which affects the transition to adulthood. Among the last generations all the relevant stages are postponed in the

individual biographies, in particular for the high educated subjects: studies completion, first job4, work

stabilization5 and home leaving are shifted forth (Benassi and Novello 2007

6).

This is a general phenomenon which includes all the Italian larger cities; the postponement of leaving home is

particularly important in the Italian context and has to be analysed together with the other elements of transition

to adulthood.

The age of becoming independent from parents is traditionally high, because of typical social norms, but also of

the social regulation‟s model of work and unemployment. On one hand, in fact, many young Italians tend to wait

at home for the “right” job (in terms of stability and income), according to the Italian pattern of labour market

3 Eurostat website:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomere

f&open=/reg/reg_lmk&language=en&product=EU_MASTER_regions&root=EU_MASTER_regions&scrollto=102 4 First job is considered the first workplace after that activity in the labour market has become the main one. Then small jobs,

which are usually the first experiences in the labour market, are excluded. 5 It‟s the first stable and regular work place as the subject perceived it. It is a proxy indicator of stabilization, because the

perception of what a stable and regular job is changes over time. 6 The authors analyse the stage of leaving home as part of the transition to adulthood, using the same survey‟s data on Italian

cities.

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/reg/reg_lmk&language=en&product=EU_MASTER_regions&root=EU_MASTER_regions&scrollto=102

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/reg/reg_lmk&language=en&product=EU_MASTER_regions&root=EU_MASTER_regions&scrollto=102


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entry (Reyneri 2005; Gallie and Paugam 2000). The „familistic‟ Welfare regime (Ferrera 1998, Esping-Andersen

1999, Mingione 1999) drives them to stay at home, protected by one or two working parents and by the local

social network. A similar social mechanism protects unemployed young people from poverty (Reyneri 2005).

The extension of the cohabitation with parents, together with the postponement of the other biographical steps

towards adulthood, reinforce the role of family as the key element of social integration in Italy, also in the more

affluent, dynamic and changing urban areas.

3. Social structure and social mobility

The difference in economic development among the three cities should affect also their social structure and

social mobility.

We expected to find out a larger high-middle class (professionals, entrepreneurs and managers) in Milan and

Rome than in Naples, because a knowledge-based city needs more qualified people working in the advanced

economic sectors.

Some differences, indeed, emerge in the social classes‟ composition, but this information has to be crossed with

the economic/production sectors, as they are shown in Tab. 1. The main distinction, in fact, has to do with each

class‟s composition (in term of economic sector and type of contract) than in its extent, which slightly

differentiates among cities.

Tab. 5 Social classes (%)

Milan Rome Naples Total

Professionals - entrepreneurs 10,8 10,6 11,8 11,0

High middle class (management) 7,7 8,0 4,9 7,1

White collars middle class 49,7 51,3 44,7 48,8

„Traditional‟ middle class 7,5 8,1 9,5 8,2

Workers class 24,3 21,9 29,1 24,9

Total 3691 2519 2326 8536

As a second step we look at the inter-generational and intra-generational social mobility. Cities, which succeeded

in economic transformation and need nowadays qualified expertise and labour demand, should be more dynamic

than others, giving more opportunities to improve one‟s social position. In Milan and Rome a higher social

mobility is expected taking into account both individuals in respect to their parents and individuals‟ career.


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Tab. 6 Intergenerational absolute social mobility (%)

Parents’s class/

Current class

Professionals

- high middle

class

White collars

middle class

„Traditional‟

middle class

Workers

class Total

Milan

Professionals - high middle class 47,6 39,7 2,3 10,4 100,0

White collars middle class 25,3 60,2 4,9 9,6 100,0

„Traditional‟ middle class 22,9 42,5 14,0 20,5 100,0

Workers class 14,1 42,1 8,3 35,6 100,0

Total 23,1 45,6 7,4 23,9 100,0

Rome




Workers class 12,2 44,3 7,7 35,8 100,0

Total 22,7 48,2 6,0 23,1 100,0

Naples




Workers class 10,8 31,8 6,6 50,8 100,0

Total 17,3 41,4 7,7 33,6 100,0

Milan shows the highest rate of both inter-generational and intra-generational mobility. According to our data

almost half of the interviewed in Milan (46%) moved upwards compared with their parents‟ social class and 40%

conserved the same position. In Rome the social mobility is rather lower but similar, whereas Naples shows, as

seen before, a higher level of stability, which is obviously a bad signal. In the southern city, in fact, almost the

half of the sample stays in the same social class of their parents and the upwards movement is considerably low

(36%).

Tab. 7 Intergenerational social mobility rates (%)

Immobility rate

Upwards mobility rate

Downwards mobility rate

Milan 39,6 46 14,5

Rome 42 41,8 16,2

Naples 46 36,1 18,0

If we consider the intra-generational mobility the difference in social dynamic among cities is similar: almost a

third of the interviewed in Milan and Rome improve their position in the social hierarchy, in Naples only one

fourth. Also in this case the southern city shows the highest level of social immobility, which involves more than

2/3 of the sample, the 10% more than in Milan.

Tab. 8 Intragenerational social mobility rates (%)

Immobility rate

Upwards mobility

rate

Downwards

mobility rate

Milan 58,9 32,1 9,0

Rome 63,1 29,0 7,9

Naples 68,1 22,6 9,3


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4. How risks change

One of the main issues about post-industrial cities regards the living and work conditions of low classes and low

skilled workers, who are presented as the other side of the coin of globalization. On the “main” side we

frequently see the international managers, their brilliant levels of living around the world. The “bad” size,

involves the economic and social conditions of manual workers in industrial and service sectors and, among

these, migrants. Their activities integrate the high skilled and intellectual working activities of professionals and

managers living in the steering international cities (Sassen 1991).

From another point of view the post-industrial (or global) living style and living conditions are described as

critical to a larger extent, involving not only the low classes, but also the middle and higher classes, which, even

if they‟re possessing the main part of national or urban resources, run a risk of economic and social difficulties,

and even poverty, stronger than during the industrial phase (Beck, Sennet, Bauman).

According to Beck (1986) and Mayer (2003), individuals in post-industrial cities make experience of instability

in every social sphere, work, social relations, family and economic conditions, which ineluctably complicate

their whole biographies. During the Fordist phase it was quite easy to resume and design a model for an

occidental citizen, differentiating at most between men and women.

This change of biographic trajectories influences also the subjective perception of living conditions and this will

be handled by the analysis.

In this part of the paper the analysis will be shifted on “objective” and subjective work and economic conditions,

in order to answer the question whether a knowledge-based city like Milan (and in part Rome) has changed its

pattern of inequalities and social risks as an effect of structural transformations. The hypothesis is that in

Postfordist urban contexts the instability in labour market and the economic risks have increased – at least in

some part of the urban society, if not at every social level. Moreover, the gap between risk‟s patterns in Milan

and Naples, considered as extremes in the Italian case, should be greater than before, because of the successful

post-industrial economy in the first case and the dramatic stability in the other. We expect to find a “new” and a

“traditional” set of inequalities, the first as typical of knowledge-based cities, the second of an underdeveloped

city.

Finally, we‟ll try to find evidence about the Beck‟s hypothesis of „the society of risk‟, obviously without any

pretence to be exhaustive, focusing on the labour market frame.

4.1 Unstable job, precariousness, insecurity

First of all, we deal with work instability and the concept of precariousness, often discussed by social sciences

and very popular in the public debate.

The idea that new generations are at risk of lasting unstable jobs is far from being proved empirically. So far it‟s

possible to argue that young people have to pass through new forms of unstable job and in this sense they‟re less

„safe‟ than their parents who worked during the Fordist period. The question is, indeed, whether the new

economic system creates a whole generation at risk, in other words whether this phenomenon is really

widespread – within every social class and educational level or concentrated in some – and, finally, which are

the real consequences.

We can draw three possible outcomes for the case of a knowledge-based urban economy (here Milan).


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First of all, if instability affects mainly the manual workers, it should be possible to strengthen Sassen‟s point of

view; if it involves the whole society or a large part of it, Beck‟s hypothesis will be supported; finally, if work

instability regards the young managers and professionals more than the others, it could be argued that this kind

of instability is not a classic form of inequality, but a „worthy risk‟. In this last case, in fact, the professional and

economic goal, which lies at the end of a hurdle racing of temporary, bad paid and irregular jobs, is valuable in

terms of income (not necessary of work place‟s stability: self-employment). Furthermore, the possible fall is

often cushioned by social relations and family.

Unstable work can take a “post-industrial” form (new kind of formal temporary jobs) and a steady form,

which is the informal (off-the-books) employment, which have been used also during the high regulated Fordist

period.

Milan offers more opportunities of stable jobs than Rome (with a small difference) and Naples, but the spread of

regular temporary employment is very similar in the three cities, in particular among men (between 7 and 8%; it

varies between 12 and 16% within women).

What really makes a difference is the irregular employment in Naples, which affects a similar proportion of

labour force and has not been strongly reduced by temporary job, unlike its promoters claimed.

Both forms of instability involve young people in Naples but differentiated among social levels: informal jobs

concern the ones with secondary and tertiary education whereas the irregular employment is stronger among

people with primary and low-secondary education with a manual employment (workers and „traditional‟ low-

middle class – „relative autonomous middle class‟ according to Sylos Labini‟s definition (1974) – as traders and

handicraftsmen).

Irregular employment is extremely low in Milan and plays a role only among young women.


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Tab. 9 Type of employment by age and urban area

14-30 31-40 41-50 50 + Total

Milan

M

Stable 74,8 93,7 98,3 97,2 92,0

Temporary 23,5 5,7 1,0 2,1 7,1

Irregular employment 1,8 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,9

N 226 351 297 282 1156

W

Stable 69,0 87,6 91,2 93,8 85,8

Temporary 26,5 10,8 8,1 5,6 12,4


N 200 362 284 144 990

Rome

M

Stable 70,6 88,9 98,5 93,7 89,9

Temporary 26,9 7,7 1,0 3,9 7,8


N 119 235 206 206 766

W

Stable 57,9 82,5 93,3 90,6 82,4

Temporary 37,6 17,5 6,2 7,2 16,1

Irregular employment 4,5 0,5 2,2 1,5

N 133 223 194 138 688

Naples

M

Stable 65,3 88,0 91,7 90,7 85,7

Temporary 16,0 6,3 5,2 4,9 7,3


N 144 192 229 226 791

W

Stable 59,0 76,9 86,9 96,5 78,9

Temporary 26,0 19,7 11,1 15,3


N 100 147 99 86 432

Temporary jobs are concentrated among young people, women and highly educated, but equally distributed

within classes.

Then, they could be considered mostly a tool (maybe unwanted and undesirable, at least a “necessary evil”) for

young, highly educated subjects who want to achieve a high social level and work satisfactions, probably with

good chances and some risks of failure.

We can figure a profile of temporary workers in the three cities: a young manual worker and a young

professional under 30 y.o. who are making experiences on the labour market and who could use their educational

and working skills to improve their position and, if possible and with more chance in Milan, to move towards a

higher class.

Instability can also be hard, such as in periods of unemployment or even low income and furthermore without

any possibility to leave home and to start a family. These problems are well-known and related to the

postponement of transition to adulthood. At the same time, not all young people working with temporary

contracts have that kind of skills and for them the risk of the so called “entrapment” is definitely higher.

Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that among young people temporary employments tend to be a path to

precariousness, whereas among adults work instability definitely means precariousness.

Among people aged 31-40 y.o. the quote of temporary employment decreases strongly in every considered urban

area and among older men living in Milan and Rome it becomes insignificant. So, instability starts to be

problematic when we consider adults in Naples and, most of all, women.


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Instability is strongly related to gender‟s inequality, because women with the same age and skills of men run a

higher risk of having an instable position even after 30 y.o. and that can be considered a form of precariousness.

The level of female work instability is quite uniform among cities and seems to be stronger than men‟s one

related to the level of education.

Tab. 10 Type of employment by level of education and urban area

Tertiary

education

Upper-

secondary

education

Compulsory

education Totale

Milan

Men

Stable 89,5 92,7 92,6 92,0

Temporary 9,3 7,0 6,0 7,2


N 257 532 367 1156

Women

Stable 76,7 90,1 86,8 85,9

Temporary 20,2 9,1 11,1 12,4


N 253 504 235 992

Rome

Men

Stable 91,4 88,9 89,8 89,8

Temporary 8,1 9,2 5,8 8,0


N 186 380 206 772

Women

Stable 77,3 83,7 85,4 82,1

Temporary 22,7 14,4 12,2 16,4

Irregular employment / 1,9 2,4 1,5

N 198 368 123 689

Naples

Men

Stable 91,4 88,6 80,3 85,9

Temporary 7,3 9,0 5,5 7,3


N 151 332 310 793

Women

Stable 80,4 82,0 68,1 79,2

Temporary 19,0 12,8 15,9 15,5


N 153 211 69 433

The older generations could have experienced not only the already existing forms of instability, like informal

job, fixed-term or training contracts, but also the new forms of temporary contracts recently stated7. It‟s self-

evident – and the survey‟s data confirm it – that young people are particularly affected by the new flexible

contracts; on the contrary empirical evidences are required to argue that the new generations are more exposed to

instability than their parents and grandparents.

We tackle that question using retrospective information on events of instable jobs.

7 The first important reform law was carried through in 1996. It stated the so called “interim job” and forms of „collaboration‟

(contract of services).


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TAB. 11 Fixed-term employment – n. of events

70s 80s 60s 50s until 40s Total

Milan Never 44,6 61,1 73,2 80,9 69,6

1-2 41,2 28,9 21,1 14,2 22,8

+3 14,2 10,0 5,7 4,9 7,5

N 148 339 299 492 1278

Rome Never 51,1 61,5 68,5 79,0 68,2

1-2 33,0 25,9 24,3 15,3 22,6

+3 15,9 12,7 7,2 5,7 9,2

N 88 205 181 262 736

Naples Never 52,2 58,2 76,4 75,4 68,8

1-2 30,4 32,3 16,6 18,2 22,8

+3 17,4 9,5 7,0 6,4 8,4

N 46 158 157 187 548

The increase of fixed-term employment over the decades is very strong: a half (even more in Milan) of people

born during the Seventies and the Eighties and active in the labour market have almost one experience of this

kind of contract. Among young and young-adult people (15-34 y.o.) the high educated are more exposed to

fixed-term jobs.

As expected, an even more dramatic increment involves the interim employment (not shown in the tables), but

it‟s concentrated among women in Rome and Naples, whereas in Milan it follows a similar trend between

genders. Among young people (15-34 y.o.) the lower is the education level the more frequent is the experience

of interim employment, the opposite relation just seen for fixed-term employment.

Tab. 12 Fixed-term and interim employment by education level (18-34 y.o.) – n. of events

Tertiary

education

Upper-secondary

education

Compulsory

education Total

Milan

fixed term 68,9 51,3 43,5 55,5

N total 45 78 23 146

interim 14,9 17,7 25,0 18,0

N total 47 79 24 150

Rome

fixed term 53,3 54,3 28,6 50,0

N total 30 46 14 90

interim 3,2 8,5 21,4 8,7

N total 31 47 14 92

Naples

fixed term 41,7 66,7 16,7 46,7

N total 12 21 12 45

interim 41,7 4,5 8,3 15,2

N total 12 22 12 46

Irregular work doesn‟t increase among young generations in Naples, where it‟s more pervasive, but it does in

Milan, slightly and among men, and in Rome, in a stronger manner and in particular among women. As we have

just underlined, irregular employment is at most 1-2% of the whole employment in these two cities; this suggests

that black jobs are a common but transitional condition in Milan and Rome, whereas they represent a real risk of

precariousness in the case of low educated women in Naples.


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Tab. 13 Irregular employment – n. of events

70s 80s 60s 50s fino 40s Total

Milan Never 68,9 68,7 71,4 73,5 71,2

1-2 14,9 19,4 17,8 18,2 18,0

+3 16,2 11,9 10,8 8,4 10,8

N 148 335 297 490 1270

Rome Never 53,3 59,0 61,8 65,0 61,1

1-2 17,4 22,4 20,8 21,7 21,1

+3 29,3 18,5 17,4 13,3 17,8

N 92 205 178 263 738

Naples Never 44,4 48,1 42,8 55,2 48,6

1-2 28,9 30,1 30,2 27,3 29,1

+3 26,7 21,8 27,0 17,5 22,3

N 45 156 159 183 543

4.2 Transition to stable job (stabilization)

The transition from the first job to stability8 is normally fast („Fast stabilization‟): almost the 2/3 of the sample or

more (75% in Milan; 70% in Rome; 65% in Naples) do it within a year and 6% (5% in Naples) finds a stable job

even before starting working as the main activity („Early stabilization‟; in concrete: a small job during

educational period becomes the stable one). The rest, less the ¼ of the sample (23%), increasing among the low

level of education, required almost 1 year to find a stable job („Slow stabilization‟, on the average it took 6 years

in Milan, more than 7 in Rome and rather 8 in Naples.

Tab. 14 Typology of stabilization process

Born 60-69 45-59 <45 Total

Milan

Slow stabilization 18,3 17,8 22,7 19,5

Fast stabilization 74,4 75,9 72,8 74,5

Early stabilization 7,3 6,3 4,5 6,0

N 698 922 753 2373

Rome




N 482 602 490 1574

Naples




N 384 561 355 1300

According to the data, the pattern of transition to work has not changed a lot over the economic periods. The

rapid stabilization seems to be rather stable trough generations in the three cities9. The only remarkable change is

the increase of the smallest subgroup of people who found a stable job very early, as they were still living with

parents and during the educational period. Then, from this point of view it cannot be argued that precariousness

and even instability are actually growing, even if the events of instable (and irregular) jobs are increasing, as

seen in the last paragraph.

8 See note 4 and 5. 9 People born after ‟69 was excluded from this analysis, because the majority of them were still living at home and this

information has been collected only on the householder and the possible partner. The ones who have already left home could

not be representative of the whole age group and in any case the results related to them go in the same direction.


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Also considering people who need more time to find a stable employment (the second larger group in the

sample), the trend seems even to improve: the average time of stabilization has decreased.

Tab. 15 Transition to work-stabilization (average n. of years)

Generation Years‟ average N

Milan

60-74 5,7 93

45-59 5,6 113

<45 7,3 127

Totale 6,3 333

Rome

60-74 5,6 89

45-59 6,7 99

<45 9,9 122

Totale 7,7 310

Naples

60-74 7,7 110

45-59 8,1 137

<45 8,4 90

Totale 8,1 337

Finally, even if the way to find a stable job is becoming more complex – more and shorter jobs – and the risks of

„entrapment‟ in instability exist, in particular for women and low educated, precariousness is not growing in

general and the new generations have to face new situations, conditions and risks, but seem to meet with

problems and find solutions as well as the older generations.

In order to make the analysis the more complete as possible, we can use another proxy indicator, the

duration of the current employment10

. We find out a confirmation that the increasing instability has limited and

specific bad effects, which have to be identified precisely, in order to avoid to lump everything together and to

find the right solution in term of policies.

In every considered city the graduates (in Rome also people with upper secondary education) experience more

stability, as their current job last proportionally longer than the others.

10 The duration of current employment is expressed by an index which eliminates the influence of different lengths of

education and employment careers. The index is the relation between current employment‟s length (in years) and the whole

work career (difference between age and first employment‟s age). It obviously reduces also the effect of education, as the

longer an individual keep on studying the shorter is normally his/her work career (in particular if the career is calculated

starting when work becomes the main activity). The higher is the score the more lasting is the current employment.


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Tab. 16 Index of current employment‟s duration (all ages)

Index Average N

Milan

Tertiary education 0,82 511

Upper-secondary education 0,79 886

Compulsory education 0,66 572

Total 0,76 1970

Rome




Total 0,83 1351

Naples




Total 0,84 1118

The higher educated, even if through a fragmented pathway (fixed term contracts), find more stable jobs than the

less skilled people, who, on the other hand, experience worse instability (interim jobs and irregular employment).

In terms of occupational levels the relation follows the same scheme: low and manual workers and also the

traders and handicraftsmen have the less continuous employment, on the other hand the professionals and upper

middle class have the more lasting jobs. And that holds also among young and young-adult people aged between

18 and 34.

Then, we figure out two different instability‟s outcomes. The first, often favourable, involves high

skilled workers (among them the creative workers), who cross many instable jobs and achieve to find a regular

(in term of time continuity) and normally well-paid job, even if not necessarily safe in terms of contract. The

other one, the risky, regards the low educated workers, with risks of entrapment in instability – considered as

lasting employment insecurity – and precariousness – defined as job instability after the age of 30 y.o. (an

arbitrary threshold, which however fits the Italian case) with economic and social consequences in terms of

capabilities‟ constraint. This condition involves in particular low educated women in the three cities (more in

Naples, but in a significant amount also in Milan and Rome).

The social structure of a „creative‟ urban context seems to have changed fast, but the risks‟ pattern appears to be

rather similar, changing but smoothly. The inequalities follow the classic social cleavages, education and class

structure, on one hand, and gender, on the other, which combine with each others; here social change and some

new paths of risks, related at most to labour market‟s reforms, come into play. Some of them involve again

women and lower social classes, the others tend to meet the high skilled workers, also the new social classes

linked with knowledge-based economy. But in this last case it‟s rather difficult to talk of diffuse precariousness‟s

danger and consequently of „Society of Risk‟.

4.3 A Society of Risk? On Beck’s hypothesis

The last part of the analysis on instability and risk try to verify the Beck‟s hypothesis, even if only in relation to

employment.


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The index used to analyze the labour market instability counts all the events related to work and inactivity, more

precisely each transition from a labour market condition to another (employment and type of job, unemployment,

inactivity), standardized for the labour market career‟s length11

.

The index as a whole doesn‟t vary among cities, but, looking at education level, social class and generations,

some interesting aspects come out.

In every considered city the labour market instability increases proportionally to social level (education and

occupation), inversely to age and among women, and in Milan these relations are much stronger. In brief, the

social profile of the highest level of instability is a graduate young woman working as professional/self-

employed and living in Milan (index value = 0.82, the general average = 0.2).

Tab. 17 Index of labour market‟s instability (generations and social profiles)

Generations and social profiles Index average N

Milan

60-74 0,39 1019

Graduate woman 0,82 157

Compulsory education w/m 0,21 240

45-59 0,12 960

Graduate w/m 0,12 171

<45 0,11 791

All 0,22 2770

Rome

60-74 0,40 684



45-59 0,12 623


<45 0,08 532

All 0,22 1839

Naples

60-74 0,30 546



45-59 0,12 605


<45 0,08 390

All 0,17 1542

On one side, this evidence supports the idea that working instability has involved the whole last generations

(within people aged between 30 and 45 y.o. have the index is higher than in the whole sample), on the other side,

the social features do matter a lot, as the lower classes make experience of a limited labour market instability, a

bit higher than the older generations but strongly lower than their coetaneous of higher social level.

Beck‟s hypothesis is only partially supported by this analysis on labour market. Instability is increasing and

individuals‟ biographies are less predictable and standardized than before, as Mayer (2003) proved more

precisely.

Anyway, it appears difficult, almost in the Italian case, to define a creative city like Milan as generally risky,

whereas this is the case of Naples as a traditionally underdeveloped urban area.

11 The sum of all kinds of jobs, of all the unemployment‟s periods and, in case of women with children, the possible leaving

and returning to work, was divided with the labour market career, started with the first job as principle activity and possibly

stopped with retirement. This index is a proxy measure of labour market transition per year.


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We can argue that more people are (and fell) unsafe than before (Sennet 1998, Bauman 2001), but we still find a

large part of society living with standardized and stable work biographies and therefore limited risks. And at the

same time, different social classes run different kind of social risks, also with very different chances of coping

with them.

Other question is to understand if well-being is increasing, declining or stable; in this sense there is also the

tendency to mythicize the fordist period.

4.4 Poverty perception and ‘economic mobility’

The last point of the paper regards the risk of poverty and its change over generations, which is normally hard to

measure on an urban level.

This survey on social change in Italian cities has collected information on subjective poverty, i.e. the individuals‟

perception of their economic conditions and of their parent‟s households.

Nowadays in Milan the economic conditions seem to be strongly better than in Naples and Rome at every social

level and age.

Tab. 18 Current economic conditions by social class

Professionals -

high middle

class

White collars

middle class

„Traditional‟

middle class

Workers

class Total

Milan

Rich/very rich 17,4% 4,9% 4,7% 1,9% 7,1%

neither rich nor poor 79,8% 88,1% 88,3% 82,5% 84,9%

poor/very poor 2,8% 7,0% 7,0% 15,6% 8,1%

N 1199 2406 383 1260 5248

Rome

Rich/very rich 12,0% 4,5% 5,2% 1,0% 5,3%


poor/very poor 3,3% 6,7% 5,2% 17,8% 8,5%

N 870 1896 233 937 3936

Naples

Rich/very rich 9,2% 3,4% 0,8% 1,1% 3,4%


poor/very poor 7,4% 11,5% 13,4% 32,2% 18,1%

N 802 2036 381 1703 4922

Using the same method adopted to analyze the social mobility, it is possible to represent the mobility of

subjective economic conditions, which can be considered a proxy of the dynamic impact of economic trends in

these urban areas.

As expected Milan seems to be the more dynamic city and this confirms the evidence about social mobility. In

the Northern city, in fact, the upwards mobility involves a quarter of the sample, in Rome 16% and in Naples

only 13%; the downwards mobility in the southern city hit another 13%, more than Rome (9%) and Milan (8%).

The stable subgroups are similar in the three cities, involving more than 2/3 of the population.

Tab. 19 Economic mobility rates (%)

Immobility rate

Upwards

mobility

Downwards

mobility

Milan 71,1 20,8 8,1

Rome 73,6 16,8 9,6

Naples 74,1 13,0 12,9


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We can argue that the higher class in Milan is not only larger than in Rome and Naples, but also more affluent

and more „open‟. In that sense Milan seems to offer good opportunities to every social level, but in particular for

people able to face instability and with high skills.

Tab. 20 Absolute economic mobility (%)

Economic conditions of

parents‟

houshold/current

economic conditions

Rich/very rich neither rich

nor poor poor/very poor Total

Milan

Rich/very rich 33,5% 63,2% 3,3% 100,0%

neither rich nor poor 5,1% 89,5% 5,4% 100,0%

poor/very poor 6,2% 75,4% 18,4% 100,0%

Total 7,2% 84,8% 8,0% 100,0%

Rome

Rich/very rich 26,5% 70,4% 3,2% 100,0%


poor/very poor 1,4% 73,5% 25,1% 100,0%

Total 5,4% 85,9% 8,7% 100,0%

Naples

Rich/very rich 23,6% 69,1% 7,3% 100,0%


poor/very poor 0,8% 52,7% 46,6% 100,0%

Total 3,6% 78,3% 18,1% 100,0%

Milan has always been that kind of city, which offers work and good perspective, in particular if compared with

the southern context. It‟s difficult to state if the knowledge-based economy simply represents the continuity of

the tradition, even if in other forms, or if it adds new features.

So far, it is only possible to combine this last evidence with the others in order to draw some general

observations.

Conclusions

In terms of employability Milan differs from the other two cities: as knowledge-based city it offers more

possibilities to find a qualified job, in particular in the „creative sectors‟, and good chances to improve the social

level. In Milan the job instability is concentrated among the high skilled young people, who, on the other hand,

have good chances to find a regular and well paid job.

In conclusion, it can be argued that new forms of instability and precariousness do exist, but the main social and

economic risks cannot be related only with the creative economy or, more generally, with the advanced service

economy. Even the new forms of instable jobs seem to father similar inequalities to the ones of the industrial

period. The empirical results presented in this paper suggest, in fact, that the new kinds of temporary

employment, which are strictly related to the Postindustrial economic system, are not creating more risks, but

they probably shaped differently the same social inequalities. The instable jobs, for example, seem to be risky for

low educated people and women, who were at risk also during the Fordist economic system because of low

income, the former, and scarce labour market participation, the latter. The young unskilled workers actually run

more risks of being unstable than their parents, but the more advanced the economic system is, the less they are

likely to be trapped into instability. Therefore, direct links between advanced service economy and social risks

cannot be drawn.


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Moreover, the evidence about the three urban areas indicate that the low class of unskilled workers have more

chances to improve their social level and economic conditions, if they live in a „creative‟ city like Milan than in

Naples, where the old forms of inequalities and workers‟ exploitation are still strong.

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