China- Japan Relations and their Impact on India

Prerna GandhiResearch associate, CAPS

11 December 2014

INDEX1.Why ‘history’ is an issue

between China and Japan?2.Why does political hostility not obstruct s

trong economic ties between China and Japan?3.Will the East China Sea Conflict between

China and Japan ‘flare up’ or ‘cool down’ with time?

4.Will Japan revise Article 9?5.How does ‘China factor’

influence India-Japan relations?6.What does the future

hold for the big three Asian powers?

1. Why ‘history’ is an issue between China and Japan?

History & China-Japan Relations

• China and Japan are extremely old neighbours. Share history of twenty centuries.

• Events since late 19th Century have created a long baggage of historical memories that define their relations even in present day.

• Impact of history on modern day Sino-Japanese bilateral relations can broadly be divided into 3 categories :i. HISTORY AND NATIONAL RETRIBUTIONii.HISTORY AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACYiii.HISTORY AND POWER RIVALRY

i. History and National Retribution

• Japan’s numerous atrocities on China have left very bitter historical memories.

•Nanjing Massacre•Comfort Women•Treatment of POWs•Chemical & Biological Testing (Unit 731)

• Validity of Tokyo Trials is questionable. All people associated with Unit 731 were given immunity by US authorities in exchange for research conducted.

• Since 1949, abandoned chemical weapons by the retreating Japanese army have led to 2,000 deaths in China.

• Japan’s numerous apologies seen as mere statements of remorse. Further negating controversial statements by Japanese politicians on Japan’s war behaviour.

While both the Japanese Emperors (Hirohito and Akihito) have issued statements of regret, they have never truly apologized. Would a dogeza or saikerei, an uncommon deference even by daily Japanese standards by a Japanese Emperor make a difference at this stage?

ii. History and Political Legitimacy

• Both China and Japan manipulate history to instigate nationalism and maintain political power:

•CCP’s use of history to strengthen political legitimacy post-1989 Tiananmen Incident. Mao’s Victor Narrative replaced by Deng’s Victimization Narrative.

•Japan’s attempts to renew nationalism by historical revisionism. Textbook struggles have substituted debate over Article 9 in domestic Japanese politics.

iii. History and Power Rivalry• Japanese ODA instrumental in China’s growth, but ODA did not have the emotional impact of reparations.

• Whenever Japan gaining favour with the int./reg. community, China plays the history card to discredit Japan.

• Inability of Japan to resolve history issue with other neighbours- impact on Japan’s desire for greater mil. role?

• IS IT SIGNALLING? High-level Japanese political visits to Yasukuni Shrine a regular controversy during the annual Spring and Autumn festivals and anniversary of Japan’s surrender.

Founded in 1869 by Emperor Meiji, the Yasukuni Shrine located in central Tokyo commemorates about 2.5 million war dead who died on behalf of Japan in wars from 1867-1951. It isn’t just about the 14 Class-A war criminals.

DOES JAPAN AS A SOVEREIGN NATION HAVE THE RIGHT TO COMMEMORATE ITS WAR DEAD AS HEROES CONSIDERING ITS HISTORY?

2. Why does political hostility not obstruct strong economic ties between China and Japan?

No Win Scenario for Both• China and Japan both intimately connected with US. Any bilateral conflict between them will involve the entire globe.

• ‘US rebalancing strategy’ to Asia-Pacific puts China into greater international spotlight. Any action by China against Japan will make China unilateral aggressor, leading to strengthening of the US camp.

• REPUTATION ISSUE: CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE VS. JAPAN’S PEACEFUL CONSTITUTION?

• China and Japan may be big powers competing in the region, but their toughest challenges are themselves. Both face numerous domestic challenges: problems of demography, political dissension, economic, environmental issues etc.

Why the huge bilateral trade?• China and Japan -third largest bilateral trade relationship in the world - $312 billion (2013 figures).

• ‘Economic Growth’ is a major source of legitimacy for governments in East Asia.

•For the CCP to continue on with its mandate-to-rule, it needs to keep the momentum of growth going in China at all costs. Rapid Economic Growth is essential to both Chinese domestic stability and its international standing.

•In case of Japan that has yet to recover from its long-standing economic stagnation, Shinzo Abe also needs to deliver on his economic promises to remain in office.

• MUTUALLY ASSURED PRODUCTION: It’s not expected value of trade at the moment, but expectations of trade levels to be high in the future, that has led China and Japan to assign higher premium on trade.

Why the huge bilateral trade? (continued)

• China and Japan heavily intertwined in East Asian Regional Production Networks. For most countries in the region, trade in components and parts over half of their total network exports (imports).

• External demand from China crucial to Japanese Economy esp. in view of eco. downturn in West.

• No immediate plan of deserting China- Japanese businesses have started looking to ASEAN.

• China cannot single out Japanese products without crippling itself- 60-70% of China’s imports from Japan are machinery and parts needed to make China’s own products.

• Japan remains one of top 5 sources of foreign investment in China.

3.Will the East China Sea Conflict between China and Japan ‘flare up’ or ‘cool down’ with time?

Points to Note:• 2 days after China declared ADIZ- China+ Japan+ S. Korea sat down as per schedule to discuss a trilateral FTA.

• Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands- Chinese interests overlapping with America’s security obligations to Japan.

• CHINA TESTING US COMMITMENT TO JAPAN? (Article 5 US-Japan MSA)

• Varying estimates of oil & gas between Chinese sources and US EIA.

• De-escalation mechanisms: CBMs in 2007, April 2014 CUES. Nov 2014 Japan fine hike for poaching ships. HOTLINE?

• Okinawa- 410km/ 220nm away from Senkaku.• Six of China’s 10 largest commercial ports can be accessed only via East China Sea. YSEB shipping routes- 57 % of China’s trade.

4. Will Japan revise Article 9?

Article 9 of Japanese Constitution

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well

as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the

state will not be recognized.”

Article 9 Dilemma• CLAUSE 1 of the constitution raises questions on identity & legality of SDF forces and their deployment in national as well as international war like scenarios.

• CLAUSE 2 raises questions on Japan possessing sufficient weapons and its existential nuclear deterrence.

• However Article 51 of UN Charter sufficiently permits right to self-defence and collective self-defence. Article 3 wording of US-Japan MSA…. “effective self-help vs. as per constitution….”

• When the House of Councillors passed the SDF Law in 1954, it also passed the Resolution on Ban of Dispatch of SDF to Abroad.

SDF Deployment Law• 1992 PKO law- to send SDF overseas to participate in int. peacekeeping and relief operations where ceasefire was in place.

• 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law- to allow SDF to engage in support activities for operations taking place on high seas or foreign territories.

• 2003 Law Concerning Special Measures for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq- SDF participation in Iraq limited to non-combat action.

• Each time a law establishes the operating parameters- noncombat roles, rules for use of weapons in self-defence and strict time frame. New legislation is req. to extend time limits of any existing law.

• NO PERMANENT LEGISLATION: A new law is required each and every time the govt. wants to dispatch the SDF abroad.

Japan’s Security Options

US-Japan equal

alliance- ASIAN NATO?

Japanese Public Support for

Revision of

Article 9?

Japan’s right to collective self-defence?

Japan’s Existent

ial Nuclear Deterren

ce sufficie

nt?

WITH USA

MILITARIZE

PACIFIST

WITHOUT USA

Japan’s Existential Nuclear Deterrence

• In 2010, Japan acknowledged 1969 Cold War pact with US to allow US ships carrying NW to dock at Japanese ports as it was not tantamount to passage of NW on Japanese soil and that NW could be stationed in Okinawa in time of emergency.

• In 2014 Japan agreed to return over 320 kg of weapons grade Pu and highly enriched U back to US that it received during Cold War for R&D.

• JAPAN ALREADY HAS 9 TONS OF PU IN JAPAN AND 35 TONS STORED IN EUROPE.

• Rokkasho spent fuel recycling complex once operational will separate and stockpile up to eight metric tons of Pu annually.

• Japan has dvlpd M-V three-stage solid-fuel rocket, similar in design to the US LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM.

5. How does ‘China factor’ influence India-Japan Relations?

India-Japan Relations• Diff. domestic-institutional mechanisms and strategic agendas have created a rift at times due to lack of mutual/ non-mutual interests.

• The NUCLEAR ISSUE between India and Japan is dictated by Japan’s desire to be prime spokesperson for nuclear non-proliferation.

• Japan’s future behaviour towards India will largely be dictated by Japan’s relations with China and to some extent India’s relations with the US as evidenced by scenario post-2005.

• However India needs to support Japan to help it maintain strategic leverage in East Asia to ensure larger regional stability for India.

• Japan has maintained similar stand by its decision to continue ODA to India despite its own problems.

Three phases of Japanese

Engagement with India- post 1990

Post-Liberalization 1990s until 1998 Pokhran Tests• Changing International Environment coupled with change in domestic economies gained momentum with the positivity that built up with Japan’s aid to India after the BOP Crisis.

• 1998 Nuclear Tests increased Japan’s ire after India’s refusal to sign the CTBT which led to a complete breakdown.

Post- 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests in China until 2008 global financial crisis• India- US Nuclear Agreement signalled US’s approval of India.

• Volatility in political relations with China led Japanese business to be apprehensive about security of business interests in China.

Post-2012 East China Sea Conflict• Increasing Belligerent Behaviour of China towards Japan after surpassing Japan to become the second-largest economy after the US, coupled with its 2010 temporary embargo on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan- signalled to Japan that China would not hesitate to let politics to influence economics.

6. What does the future hold for the big three Asian powers?

What to look out for-• US PIVOT TO ASIA: Verbal Commitment vs. Ground Reality?

• US- JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE: Breaking or Transforming?

• BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA: US vs. China or India’s Game Changing Role?

• NEW ALLIANCES: US- Japan vs. China- Russia?• CHINA’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE: Sustainable or Temporary?

• JAPAN’S CHANGING SECURITY IDENTITY: Article 9 or Remilitarization?

• DEFENSE INDUSTRY: China vs. Japan?

Pointers for India• India is recognized for its BATTLE-HARDENED MILITARY all over the world. It is ironical that while our wartime doctrines are credibly feared, our peacetime doctrines are not taken seriously.

• Never trust Chinese stats- they are more often overstated than understated.

• LESSON FROM CHINA: “Economics First, Politics Second”. Build Infrastructure.

• While comparing Japan to Pak would be injudicious, India could use Japan to leverage China the way it uses Pak against us.

• NO NEED TO CHOSE A TEAM: India’s potential game-changing role and attraction as an ally lies in its non-aligned status and not being associated with any quest for hegemony.

Thank You