The Shadows of Normative Power in Asia: Framing the International Agency of China, India, and Japan

The Shadows of Normative Power in Asia:Framing the International Agency of China, India,

and Japan*

Emilian Kavalski

While the analysis of normative power has dominated the debates in Euro-pean international relations studies for the past 20 years, this topic hashardly been broached in the analysis of Asian international affairs. Thisinvestigation aims to redress this trend by taking stock of the current state ofthe art. This exploration therefore contends that normative powers are thoseactors that are recognized as such by others. This qualifies Ian Manners’oft-quoted proposition that normative powers are only those actors that havethe ability to “shape what can be ‘normal’ in international life.” The propo-sition is that the definitions of the “normal” are not merely undertaken bynormative power, but that they emerge in the context of its interaction withothers. Recognition, in this setting, is indicated by the specific reactions oftarget states. In this respect, the issue is not merely about being and becominga normative power, but also about being recognized as one by others. Thestudy will detail this proposition by undertaking an analytical parallelassessment of normative power Europe, normative power China, normativepower India, and normative power Japan.

Key words: normative power, soft power, normative power Europe, norma-tive power China, normative power India, normative power Japan, strugglefor recognition.

* There are many individuals whose contribution – both normative and otherwise – has influencedthe shape of this research. I would like to acknowledge here the input of Jiun Bang, Yee-Kuang Heng,Ming-te Hung, Niv Horesh, Euikon Kim, Tony Tai-Ting Liu, Chengxin Pan, Yoneyuki Sugita,Tung-chieh Tsai, David Walton, Thomas Wilkins, and Brantly Womack. Also, the author wishes tothank the participants at the 2014 Asian Studies Congress (Torun, Poland), the 2014 annual meetingof the Academic Council of the UN System (Istanbul, Turkey), and the 2014 International Sympo-sium “Dynamics of the Asia-Pacific Region” at Osaka University (Japan) for their thoughtful andencouraging comments and suggestions. Gratitude is also due to the Taiwanese National ScienceCouncil for providing a generous grant (#102EFA0501066) that facilitated this research and to theGraduate Institute for International Politics at the National Chung Hsing University (Taichung,Taiwan) for providing the most welcoming and stimulating hospitality. The usual caveat applies.

bs_bs_banner

Pacific Focus, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (December 2014), 303–328.doi: 10.1111/pafo.12032© 2014 Center for International Studies, Inha University

303

Introduction

Borrowing from the designation of the 19th-century Russian statesman CountKarl Nesselrode that Asia is a context for the “tournament of [the] shadows” ofgreat powers,1 this analysis draws attention to the growing significance of (if notnecessarily contestation between) normative powers in Asia. Despite its centralityto European international relations (IR) theory, the notion of normative power hashad surprisingly little traction in the analysis of the nascent agency of otherinternational actors – especially, the explanation and understanding of the outreachof Asian actors, such as China, India, and Japan. Instead, the concept of soft powerremains the dominant framework for those seeking explanation of their increasinginfluence. There are several reasons for this development. On the one hand, owingto the perceived complexity of the EU, Asian scholars have been disinterested inengaging with the propositions and concepts of European IR. On the other hand,European IR scholars have expanded little effort to translate the applicability oftheir terminology to non-EU actors and contexts (both because of the all-pervasivenature of the EU and also because of the positioning of Asian Studies outside of theIR curriculum). At the same time, both European and Asian IR scholars havetended to frame their analysis in reaction to the dominant US IR view, which –instead of aiding – appears to have further deepened the rift, by hampering theirengagement with one another.

This study aims to redress this trend. In fact, its point of departure is thesuggestion that we are witnessing a “rise of normative powers” in global life. Suchan assertion might sound like a misnomer to some. To begin with, it can be arguedthat the behavior of all international actors – whether they be states, internationalorganizations, or non-state actors – is embedded in certain rules, standards, andprinciples of behavior. As Hans Morgenthau has discerned “all nations are tempted– and few have been able to resist the temptation for long – to clothe their ownparticular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe.”2 While noteveryone need agree with the significance of this normativity to the agency ofparticular actors, it nevertheless indicates certain value-based judgment underpin-ning their international interactions.Yet, the suggestion here is much more straight-forward – just because any international behavior can be labeled as normativeshould not lead one to assume that in fact all actors are normative powers (even ifsome of their actions have normative side-effects).

On the contrary, following Ian Manners’ oft-quoted definition, normativepowers are only those actors that can “shape what can be ‘normal’ in internationallife.” As he insists (and few would disagree) “the ability to define what passes for

1. Cited by Harold E. Raugh, The Victorians at War (Washington, D.C.: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 151.2. Hans J. Morgenthau, “Vietnam: Shadow and Substance,” New York Review of Books (16 Septem-ber 1965), p. 10.

304 / Pacific Focus

© 2014 Center for International Studies, Inha University

‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all.”3 In a similarfashion, Jay Jackson (nearly three decades earlier, but in a different context)defined “normative power” as “the potential for influencing activity . . . [through]the power of norms,” which outlines the “domain and range” of legitimate behav-ior.4 In this respect, both Jackson and Manners intuit that the reference to normativepower suggests an ability to frame what is acceptable and what is unacceptablebehavior. However, while Manners tends to prioritize the ability of an actor todefine the “normal,” Jackson stresses the legitimacy of the definitions of the“normal” – that is, this legitimacy needs to be earned.

It needs to be stressed at the outset that the notion of normative power is quitedistinct from Joseph Nye’s oft-quoted understanding of “soft power,” which isoften presented as its conceptual sibling. Nye defines soft power as “getting othersto want the outcomes that you want.”5 While many will argue that the notions ofsoft power and normative power are twin-concepts, the claim here is that theramification of the normal implies a much more comprehensive leadership ininternational life than merely getting others to want the same outcomes as you. Infact, normative power is about demonstrating palpable constitutive effects, whichgo beyond the mere co-optation and shaping of preferences of other actors empha-sized in the definition of soft power.6 Instead, others do not perceive to be followingsomebody else’s goals, but their own. This is what defining the ramifications of thenormal entails – it alters the perceptions and attitudes of target states, so that theyinternalize the perspectives of the normative power in their daily practices. Thus,the positioning of an actor as a normative power – even if such positioning is aproduct of self-construction (as we will see in the case of India) – can have asignificant bearing on that actor’s socializing capacities and ability to influence theinternational identities of its counterparts.7

It is in the contest over legitimacy that the significance of the rise of normativepowers emerges. In other words, while this offers a conceptual outline of theworkings of normative power in Asia (by examining the examples provided by

3. Ian Manners “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” JCMS: Journal of CommonMarket Studies, 40-2 (2002), p. 253.4. Jay Jackson, “Normative Power and Conflict Potential,” Sociological Methods and Research, 4-2(1975), pp. 237–239. Emphasis in original.5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs,2004), p. 5. Nye’s extended definition frames soft power in co-optive terms as the “ability of a nationto structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or define their interests in waysconsistent with one’s own nation. This type of power tends to arise from such resources as culturaland ideological attraction as well as the rules and institutions of international regimes.” See JosephS. Nye, Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NewYork: Basic Books, 1990),p. 191.6. Linus Hagström and Bjorn Jerdén, “East Asia’s Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debateand How to Avoid Them,” Asian Perspective, 38-3 (2014), p. 347.7. Ian Clark, “International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of Power,”Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7-3 (2014), p. 320.

Normative Powers in Asia / 305


China, India, and Japan), recent analyses have suggested a much wider prolifera-tion of normative agency in global life – for instance, in reference to the externaloutreach of Brazil,8 Turkey,9 Russia,10 and ASEAN.11 It could be argued that suchbroadening in the scope of the normative power research agenda offers a merereflection of the growing exposure of scholars to the ratiocination of European IR.However, such an explanation provides only a lopsided and superfluous account ofthe qualitative changes underpinning the growing interest in normative agency. Amore detailed probing of this trend will reveal that owing to the lack of clarity on“who the leading power [in IR] will be, nor what its intentions will be”12 hasushered in a palpable leadership vacuum, which has assisted the normative entre-preneurship of various international actors. Thus, going back to the context of Asia,the proposition of a rise of normative powers suggests that actors such as the EU,China, India, and Japan proffer themselves as exemplars of distinct patterns ofinternational interactions. The models they project are framed by their idiosyn-cratic strategic cultures which inform not only the cognitive frameworks of theirinternational interactions, but also the way(s) in which they practice policy-making. Thus, the expression of what is “normal” invokes certain agenda andentails power relations. Yet, what distinguishes normative power from other typesof power is how these relations of asymmetry are managed. On an instrumentallevel, normative power is “neither military, nor purely economic, but one thatworks through ideas and opinions.”13 Substantively, however, normative powers are“other empowering.”14 In other words, normative power reflects a particular qualitynot just of leadership in IR, but of the very nature of power in world affairs –namely, that it is contextually contingent and depends on social recognition within

8. Peter Dauvergne and Déborah B.L. Farias, “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Developmental Power,”Third World Quarterly, 33-2 (2012), pp. 903–917; Eleni Lazarou, “A Model in Crisis? Effects of theCrisis in Europe on the Influence of the EU as a Model for Regional Integration in South America,”paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference,Montreal, QC (16–19 March 2011).9. Emel Parlar Dal, “Assessing Turkey’s Normative Power in the Middle East and North Africa,”Turkish Studies, 14-4 (2013), pp. 709–734.10. Andrey S. Makarychev, “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power,” in Natalie Tocci, ed.,Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners (Brussels:Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 156–210. Jan Steinkohl “Normative Power Rivalry?The European Union, Russia and the Question of Kosovo,” College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper6 (2010).11. Kei Koga, “The Normative Power of the ‘ASEAN Way’: Potentials, Limitations, and Implica-tions for East Asian Regionalism,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Studies, 10-1 (2010), pp. 80–95.12. Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in AsianSecurity,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 14-3 (2014), p. 338.13. Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative PowerEurope’,” Millennium, 33-3 (2005), p. 615.14. Natalie Tocci, “Proliferating Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its GlobalPartners,” in Natalie Tocci, ed., Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union andIts Global Partners (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 9–13.

306 / Pacific Focus


a community.15 In this respect, normative power reflects “an actor’s ability topresent his own particular worldview as compatible with the communal aims.”16

This brings us back to Jackson’s definition and his insistence that tolerance is akey aspect of normative power. As tolerant international actors, normative powersare characterized by “a willingness to suspend evaluation of others’ activity,”which then triggers a specific set of “expectations by others for [a normative]actor’s conduct.”17 Thus, unlike the relationships of great powers (or even softpowers for that matter), those of normative powers – by their very nature – aredialogical. In particular, as it will be explained shortly, the recognition of anormative power is highly contingent on its relations with other actors, and theserelations, by definition, cannot be dictated by the normative power alone; “it mustbe negotiated and mutually constituted in bilateral and multilateral contexts.”18 Inthis setting, Jackson’s emphasis on the significance of tolerance reframes E.H.Carr’s intuition that “power goes far to create the morality convenient to itself, andcoercion is a fruitful source of consent. But when all these reserves have beenmade, it remains true that a new international order and a new internationalharmony can be built up only on the basis of an ascendancy which is generallyaccepted as tolerant and unoppressive.”19

The reference to a rise of normative powers inscribes itself within the project ofdecentering the study of normative power by taking it “outside of [its] Eurocentricbox.”20 The claim is that non-Western normative orders are just as legitimate asWestern ones.21 This investigation therefore acknowledges the emergence of alter-native (and oftentimes) contending conceptualizations of political goods in globallife and the appropriate way(s) for their attainment. Thus, the contention of a riseof normative powers can be interpreted as a contemporary twist on the age-oldinquiry into what a multi-polar theory of IR might look like.22 If one is to pursuesuch a study, the parallel investigation of normative powers promises to open thedoors to a contextual exploration of the intellectual foundations not only of multi-polarity, but also to the proliferation of a cacophony of normative languages inglobal life.

15. Chengxin Pan, “Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the ‘Power Shift’Narrative,” Asian Perspectives, 38-3 (2014), pp. 387–410.16. Dirk Nabers, “Power, Leadership, and Hegemony in International Politics: The Case of EastAsia,” Review of International Studies, 36-4 (2010), p. 938.17. Jay Jackson, op. cit., pp. 240–244.18. Chengxin Pan, op. cit., p. 403.19. Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of Inter-national Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 236.20. Nora Fisher Onar and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “The Decentering Agenda: Europe as a PostcolonialPower,” Cooperation & Conflict, 48-2 (2013), p. 285.21. Xiaoyu Pu, “Socialization as a Two-way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion ofInternational Norms,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5-4 (2012), p. 365.22. Kalevi J. Holsti, Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practice ofInternational Relations (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), p. 19.



The claim is that the EU, China, India, and Japan offer some of the mostconspicuous indications of the different types of normative power both in Asia andin global life. What transpires in this rise of normative powers is a “balance ofpractices” distinct from the conventional “balance for power.”23 Thus, the uneven-ness underpinning the distinct repertoires of normative power practices promotedby Brussels, Beijing, New Delhi, and Tokyo in different global locales emergesfrom the distinct logics of action informing their international agency. In otherwords, the positioning of an actor as a normative power is not stable or fixed, buthighly fluid and, thereby, demands constant and ongoing practices for its legiti-mation and re-legitimation. In such a relation and contextual framing, the notion ofnormative power can be “best understood not in terms of its quantifiable capabil-ities but within its specific social contexts. The ‘same amount’ of capability maynot translate into the same degree of power or achieve the same effect withindifferent relationships or domains.”24 In this respect, one of the central claims ofthis article is that normative power emerges as a power in context – it is not entirelyan intrinsic property of an actor, but depends on the kind of interactions it has inspecific contexts.

The suggestion is that “any power instrument becomes a potential power resourceonly if its control is seen to be valued by other actors in the interaction. Power comesout of this relation, not from the power holder alone.”25 Such emphasis on thesignificance of context comes to suggest that what is at stake are not the perceptionsor misperceptions of other actors about who is or is not a normative power, but thoseactors’ “subjective expectations and understandings, both of which are stronglyaffected by cultural settings.”26 Thus, it is the contingent (temporal and spatial)context of each interaction – rather than an actor’s perception or misperception – thatencourages an actor to interpret its partner’s behavior as that of a normative poweror not. In other words, contexts can act as a “cause,” a “barrier,” and a “changingmeaning”27 for the normative power of international actors. Normative powertherefore is not necessarily only about affecting the perceptions of other actors(which offers a rather limited scope of action), but mostly about framing theresponses of those other actors. As Erik Ringmar cogently observes, the “reaction[of other actors] is far more important than the action itself and their reaction is whatthe exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence.”28

23. Emanuel Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-restraint,and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” European Journal of International Relations, 14-2(2008), p. 203.24. Chengxin Pan, op. cit., p. 393. Emphasis in original.25. Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism, and Constructivism (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 24.26. Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics,” International Theory, 3-1(2011), p. 113. Emphasis in original.27. Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).28. Erik Ringmar, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to theWestphalian Order,” International Organization, 66-1 (2012), p. 19.

308 / Pacific Focus


The claim thereby is that normative power emerges in relation to the inter-subjective environment to which its agency is applied. Thus, the reference to a“rise of normative powers” emerges as shorthand for their “struggle for recog-nition.” As it will be explained, an actor’s capacity to define the “normal”depends on the recognition of this agency by target states. The emphasis onrecognition-in-context draws attention to the performative qualities of normativepower, which intimates that to be a normative power is oftentimes less importantthan to appear to be a normative power. The suggested rise of normative powersin global life – such as the ones of the EU, China, and Japan – indicates theirnascent contestation for such recognition. In other words, recognition becomesthe permissive context for an actor’s normative power. Before detailing thisdynamic, the following sections briefly outline the EU’s, China’s, India’s, andthen Japan’s normative power. “Normative power Europe,” “normative powerChina,” “normative power India,” and “normative power Japan” are treated hereas ideal types. While concurring that such conceptualizations are rarely counte-nanced in their purest and isolated form, it is useful to surmise the ideal types inorder to elicit the nascent struggle for recognition of normative powers in globallife.

Normative Power Europe: Still a Contradiction in Terms?

When discussing the external affairs of the EU, most commentators note itsinterdependent politico-economic framework flaunting the benefits of liberaldemocracy. Such a context informs the EU’s intent to promote the establishmentof transparent forms of governance, viable market mechanisms, and strong civilsocieties in countries around the world. These objectives are the very reasonwhy the Brussels-based bloc has been referred to as a normative power. Itsactorness – despite the hardening (even if only in rhetoric) contained in theLisbon Treaty and identification through the civilian instruments of its softpower capabilities (aid, preferential trade agreements, institutional twinning, etc.)– is still defined by the norms and values that belie the strategic interests of theEU in global life.

This understanding is implicit in the international roles of the EU – it aims to“Europeanize” the behavior of other states. Thus, and owing to the dominantfocus on enlargement, the EU’s normative power has been treated largely ascoterminous with the transformative potential underwriting the dynamics ofaccession-driven conditionality. Thereby, it was only recently that the relevanceof the EU’s ability to alter the practices of states (outside of the purview and theprospect of membership) has been given serious consideration. It seems,however, that the bulk of popular and policy attention has been captured by thedevelopment of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In this respect, thesocialization processes embedded in the exercise of normative power Europereveal clear assumptions of superiority – that is, “it is the non-EU Europe that



needs to learn to adapt,” not the EU.29 Consequently, the kind of normalizationof international affairs embedded in the EU’s normative power reflect itsassumed privileged position. In short, others are expected to comply with theprojected “European model.”

As the case of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe reveals, suchcompliance is introduced through the process of accession-driven socialization. Itis this experience that has convinced the EU of the validity of the “logic ofappropriateness” as a guide for its external strategies. Hence, it was the willinginternalization of “European identities, values, and norms by post-communistcountries that made possible the normative power of the EU.”30 It is in this settingthat the governance model implicit in the processes of Europeanization framesEU-accession as “the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and secu-rity in the world.”31

The articulation of normative power Europe makes explicit the securitizationof the integration process by and within the strategic culture of the EU. Integra-tion (by way of Europeanization) gains urgency and immediacy because its alter-native – disintegration – seems certain to unleash unpredictable dynamics thatportend the end of the project of “Europe.”32 This then leads to the prioritizationof the norms and values that allow the EU to be a normative power, because itis these standards of behavior that frame the outlines of the “normal.” In termsof Brussels’ global outreach, however, the overwhelming attention to theEuropeanization of candidate states appears to have undercut the operationaleffectiveness of the EU’s normative power in “out-of-Europe” areas. This is notleast because the EU has had very few reasons (as well as little time) to developsuch capacities while the Eastern European enlargement was still ongoing and,consequently, because of the preoccupation with the harmonization of the inter-actions among 27 Member States in the context of a protracted ratification of theLisbon Treaty. The Eurozone debt crisis seems to offer another such “distrac-tion” from the projection of effective normative power to “out-of-Europe” areas.As Michael Smith has eloquently argued,

The status of the EU as a continental model of economic and social organization might be seenas giving a strong basis for the development of European foreign policy, but in many ways thestrengths that give the EU a major role in the European order do not export easily; they are less

29. Mark Webber, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the Governance of European Security (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 161.30. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization of Central and EasternEurope (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 9.31. Andrew Moravcsik, “One Year On: Lessons from Iraq,” in Gustav Lindstrom and BurkardSchmitt, eds., One Year On: Lessons from Iraq (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004),p. 191.32. Ole Wæver, “European Security Identities,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 34-1(1996), pp. 103–132.

310 / Pacific Focus


immediately appropriate to a fluid and often chaotic world, and this means that the attempt toproject “Europe” into the global arena brings with it new risks and potential costs.33

It is in this context that the contention of normative power Europe still appears asa contradiction in terms in “out-of-Europe” areas. Brussels does not seem capableof formulating relations with countries beyond the realms of membership andprivileged partnership that would sustain the socializing influence of its normativepower. In this respect, the cultural instincts underpinning the Europeanizingmechanisms developed for prospective candidate states and neighborhood coun-tries appear ill-suited to the dynamic environment of most “out-of-Europe” areas.The complexity of global life confronts the EU with the reality where othercountries do not perceive it as a magnet. This is a qualitatively new condition forBrussels and its normative power – a situation that appears to baffle the EU and onethat it still has not addressed convincingly. Thus, used to the socialization ofpost-communist countries compliant with its normative power, the EU appearsconfused and uncertain by the lack of appeal of its values.34

In its external affairs, therefore, the EU continues to insist on the internalizationof its norms by various countries around the world, however, this is without thesupport of its explicit instruments for socialization, which are part and parcel of itsenlargement policy. This confirms the suggestion that the ability of the EU’snormative power to affect others is dependent upon its own awareness of a par-ticular kind of self.35 Thus, the socializing agency of the EU depends not so muchon its capabilities, but on the way it constructs relationships through which itsnormative power is applied in different global locales. In this respect, the EU’ssearch for a “new” external strategy (beyond enlargement and enlargement-likeinitiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership of the ENP) demands a serious reflec-tion upon the framework of its own normativity. Without such questioning (or whatothers have called “let[ting] go of its civilizational conceits”),36 the EU is unlikelyto emerge as a viable normative power beyond the geographical confines of Europeand its immediate neighborhood.

Normative Power China: Framing Harmonious Relationships

China’s expanding outreach and diversifying roles have provided a novelcontext for the ongoing reconsiderations of world politics. In the wake of the ColdWar, commentators were pondering how far Western ideas can/would spread in ageopolitical environment characterized by “the end of history.” Today, the debate

33. Michael Smith, “Between ‘Soft Power’ and a Hard Place: European Union Foreign and SecurityPolicy Between the Islamic World and the United States,” International Politics, 46-5 (2009), pp.596–615.34. Emilian Kavalski, Extending the European Security Community (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).35. Thomas Diez, op. cit., p. 614.36. Nora Fisher Onar and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, op. cit., p. 285.



seems to be about how far Chinese ideas will reach. In this setting, the focus onBeijing’s fledgling normative power suggests that international affairs need to beunderstood not only as fractures into territorially-defined spaces, but also by socialrelations and their socio-cultural and eco-historical nexus of reference.37 It has tobe acknowledged from the outset that while the study of normative power China isof recent provenance,38 the inquiry into the transformations and the transformativepotential of China’s foreign policy has become a virtual cottage industry in the lasttwo decades. In particular, there is a heated debate about whether China providesan “Eastphalian,” “example,” “model,” “mode,” or a “new paradigm” for the studyand practice of world affairs.39 Such assessments of the security, economic, andforeign policy implications of China’s rise provide the background for the outlineof normative power China offered in this section.

This distinct point of departure brings into focus the norms and values ofChina’s foreign policy. Such consideration reflects at least three distinct readingsof China’s guoqing (national peculiarities).40 These contextualizations gain signifi-cance because Chinese normative power might actually represent the most con-spicuous indication of the “return to tradition (huixiang chuantong)” dominatingthe country’s foreign policy thinking.41 Thus, regardless of their stance, the pro-ponents of China’s normative power intimate that it is informed by the longshadow of its philosophical oeuvre (especially, Confucianism, but also Daoism andthe works of numerous pre-Qin thinkers). Even the Chinese Communist Party hasbeen actively seeking to infuse Confucian principles into its Marxist underpinningsin order to increase its domestic legitimacy.42 It is not coincidental, therefore, thatthe mushrooming of Confucius Institutes around the world has become one of the

37. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).38. Emilian Kavalski, “Partnership or Rivalry between the EU, China and India in Central Asia,”European Law Journal, 13-6 (2007), pp. 839–856; Emilian Kavalski, Central Asia and the Rise ofNormative Powers: Contextualizing the Security Governance of the EU, China, and India (NewYork:Bloomsbury, 2012); Xiaoyu Pu, op. cit.; Xiaoming Zhang, “A Rising China and the NormativeChanges in International Society,” East Asia, 28-3 (2010), pp. 235–246; Brantley Womack, “China asa Normative Foreign Policy Actor,” in Natalie Tocci, ed., Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?The European Union and Its Global Partners (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008),pp. 265–300; and Yi Wang, “The identity dilemmas of EU Normative Power: Observations fromChinese Traditional Culture,” in André Gerrits, ed., Normative Power Europe in a Changing World(The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009), pp. 67–76.39. David P. Fidler, “Eastphalia Emerging? Asia, International Law, and Global Governance,”Indiana Journal of International Law, 17-1 (2010), pp. 1–12.40. Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1999), p. 18.41. Gloria Davis, “Hommo Dissensum Significants,” Social Text, 29-4 (2012), p. 30.42. Yee-Kuang Heng, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who is the Softest of Them All? EvaluatingJapanese and Chinese Strategies in the ‘Soft’ Power Competition Era,” International Relations of theAsia-Pacific, 10-2 (2010), pp. 275–304; Emilia Kavalski, “Shanghaied into Cooperation: FramingChina’s Socialization of Central Asia,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 45-2 (2010), pp.131–145.

312 / Pacific Focus


most conspicuous indications of China’s global outreach. There have been twoaspects to Beijing’s “patriotic worrying (youhuan)” about China’s capacity toattain the “ultimate perfection (da tong)” necessary for its influence to radiateoutwards.43

On the one hand, China has been keen to learn from the experience of previousgreat powers. This reflects a key aspect of current Chinese IR thinking accordingto which the dynamics of world politics represent a “succession of hegemonies.”44

On the other hand, the reflexivity animating China’s international agency has beenmuch more introspective and has tended to focus on China’s own historicalrecollection. In this respect, the lessons that are gleaned are not only from theexperience of other international actors, but also from the legacy of China’s ownpast glory and decline.45 Thus, the patterns of China’s nascent normative powerpresent an intriguing intersection of the discursive memory of the past with thecontexts of the present and the anticipated tasks of the future. In particular, China’sintrospective look recollects a normative power premised on the practices ofinteraction rather than explicit norms of appropriateness.

The emphasis on dialogue has had significant implications for the evolution ofChina’s normative power. For instance, it has promoted an understanding that aposition of leadership cannot be inflicted upon others (by force or through domi-nation), but needs to be earned (in the process of interaction). Brantley Womackargues that this attitude is crucial to understanding China’s socializing propen-sities. He singles out “respect for the other” as the “cardinal virtue” of Beijing’snormative power. Thus, by lavishing attention to countries “that normally do notget much respect,” China sets itself as a different kind of actor (if not necessarilyas an alternative model). Beijing’s insistence on “respect for the other” becomes animportant boon for its normative power:

In a world of equals, each is in a similar situation, and each can respond in kind to the actions ofothers. With symmetry, respect for others can be reduced to the Golden Rule, because in factothers can do to you what you do to them. In a world of asymmetric relationships, respect –appreciation for the situation and autonomy of the other – requires special attention. Respect forthe weaker side is not simply noblesse oblige or an act of generosity of the stronger. The weakercan only afford to be deferential to the strong when they feel that their identity and boundarieswill be respected.46

The emphasis on respect for the other intuits that Chinese normative poweris underpinned by the principle, “let others reach their goals as you reach

43. Gloria Davis, Worrying About China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 229.44. Feng Zhang, “The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of InternationalRelations,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5-1 (2012), p. 99.45. Feng Zhang, “Regionalization in the Tianxia? Continuity and Change in China’s Foreign Policy,”in Emilian Kavalski, ed., China and the Global Politics of Regionalization (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009),p. 31.46. Brantley Womack, op. cit., pp. 294–297.



yours.”47 Normative power in this respect is necessarily contextual – Chinese(especially Confucian) traditions assert that definitions of the “normal” are con-tingent and depend on “who we are interacting with, and when.”48 The individua-tion implicit in the logic of relationships suggests the profound ontologicalimplications of interactions – “the appreciation of what is important to you in termsof your own self-conception, in contrast to the general expectations that [theinternational] society may impose on you [provides] an increasing scope forself-realization.”49 This inference brings us back to Brantley Womack, who pro-poses that unlike the normative power of the EU, which is framed by the “logic ofappropriateness,” China’s normative power is framed by “logic of relationships.”Such logic:

assumes that while the future is unknown, the partners in the future are the same as in the past andpresent. Therefore, the significance of any specific interaction lies in how it shapes a particularrelationship . . . The bottom line in a relationship logic is that both sides feel that they are betteroff if the relationship continues – this is the minimum meaning of “mutual benefit.” A normalrelationship does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does requirereciprocity [i.e., respect for the other].50

What is crucial about the understanding of normative power through such logic ofrelationships is that the norms for the normal are no longer defined by the leadingstate in terms of “rights and obligations,” but emerge as “behavioral standards”accepted by the majority of participating states in the process of interaction.51 Theemphasis here is that Beijing’s normative power engages other states in the prac-tice of doing together – that is, they do as China does. This pattern is distinct fromthe security governance practiced by Western actors (especially the EU), which ispremised on the conditionality of “do as I say, not as I do.”52

Normative Power India: Lingering to Attract

The collapse of the Berlin Wall seemed to have unshackled Indian strategicimagination. Gradually, the statements of commentators and policy-makersbecame imbued with a desire to promote India as a model for appropriate inter-

47. Tingyang Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from the Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’,” SocialIdentities, 12-1 (2006), p. 35.48. Henry Rosemont, “Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons,” inPeter D. Hershock and Roger T. Ames, eds., Confucian Cultures of Authority (Albany: SUNY Press,2006), p. 14.49. Philip Nel, “Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional Powers Want,” Review ofInternational Studies, 36-4 (2010), pp. 970–971.50. Brantley Womack, op. cit., pp. 295–297.51. Xuetong Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 2012), p. 238.52. Emilian Kavalski, ed., China and the Global Politics of Regionalization (Farnham: Ashgate,2009), pp. 1–18. Emphasis in original.

314 / Pacific Focus


national behavior. The suggestion was that “India cannot wait until the rest of theworld comes to its way of seeing things or at least acknowledges India’s right to dothings its own way” – the implication being that “in a more perfect world, [NewDelhi’s] importance would be self-evident [because in] such a world each majorpower [would] act responsibly to keep order and promote justice in its part of theworld.”53

Such articulations reveal a rhetorical proclivity towards a narrative projection ofIndia as a blueprint for an alternative world order. It has to be acknowledged fromthe outset that there appears to be an important confusion between the notions of“normative power India” and “Brand India.” In particular, the latter tends to beused to infer the former. Brand India (as the term suggests) refers to the brands thatexport India’s image abroad – from the cultural products of Bollywood to theentrepreneurial endeavors of Bangalore. Too often, therefore, analysts take as theirpoint of departure the assertion that India has “earned international respect andinfluence” through its booming economy, IT revolution, and nuclear weapons.54

Brand India, therefore, is taken not only as a shorthand for the “awakening of aslumbering elephant,”55 but also as a label for a unique “unshackling of theimagination”56 that ushers in an “India unbound”57 onto the global stage.

Normative power India stands for the model of world order that India would liketo develop.58 The indiscriminating mash-up of the notions of normative powerIndia and Brand India has provenance in the post-Cold War trajectories of India’sforeign policy formulation. It is important to note here that the lack of analyticaldistinction between these two concepts lays bare the failure to problematize thenature and dynamics within which these transformations have originated. In fact,the uncritical attempt to project normative power through Brand India appears tounwittingly contribute to the descent of India’s image into pejorative stereotyp-ing.59 Such tendencies confirm the palpable hiatus between India’s self-aggrandizing perception of itself and the less flattering evaluations by others.60

53. Naunihal Singh, India: A Rising Power (New Delhi: Authors Press, 2006), pp. 50–52. Emphasisadded.54. Daniel Lak, The Future of a New Superpower (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 260. Emphasisadded.55. Vinay Rai and William L. Simon, Think India (New York: Dutton, 2007), p. ix.56. Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam, Power and Contestation: India since 1989 (London: ZedBooks, 2007), p. 85.57. Gurcharan Das, India Unbound (New Delhi: Viking, 2000).58. Emilian Kavalski, “Partnership or Rivalry,” op. cit.; Emilian Kavalski, Central Asia and the Riseof Normative Powers, op. cit.; Radha Kumar, “India as a Foreign Policy Actor: Normative Redux,”in Natalie Tocci, ed., Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its GlobalPartners (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 211–264.59. Jacques E.C. Hymans, “India’s Soft Power and Vulnerability,” India Review, 8-3 (2009), p. 259.60. Subrata K. Mitra, “The Reluctant Hegemon: India’s Self-Perception and the South Asian Stra-tegic Environment,” Contemporary South Asia, 12-3 (2003), p. 404.



Thus, very often Indian commentators allege that their country has significantlyimpacted international trends, while external observers barely take notice of NewDelhi’s agency.

The uncritical acceptance of the convergence between normative power Indiaand Brand India has reinforced the hiatus between the external and domesticperception of India’s international agency. Such a confusion of divergent notionspoints to a key aspect of New Delhi’s outlook – the palpable confusion underpin-ning its strategic outreach. Pratap Bhanu Mehta traces the origins of this phenom-enon to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, at which some of the leading Indianintellectuals at the time argued for the independence of their country on thepremise that if free, India would inevitably become a great power, but its powerwould not be projected outward (i.e., it would not be used to dominate others).Mehta interprets these arguments as an early indication of the absence of a globalobjective in Indian strategic culture. This attitude appears to have been suffused inthe narratives of non-alignment that produced a peculiar sense of sovereignty andautarky in India, which was understood as independence from the rest of the world,rather than a particular way of engaging others.61

Owing to the want of vision in India’s external relations, “commercial devel-opment and security seem to connect accidentally more often than purposefully.”62

This absence of an overarching “big idea” in India’s strategic culture leads to anunusual style of security governance – one in which New Delhi does not attemptto establish relationships with other actors by deliberately engaging them in sharedpractices. Instead, as Rodney W. Jones demonstrates, New Delhi seems determined“to wait the opponent out,” rather than initiate interactions that might lead to apragmatic compromise. Jones argues that such an approach to security governanceis embedded in the profound sense of entitlement, superiority, and presumeddeeper knowledge about the correlation of forces that distinguishes India’s stra-tegic culture. In turn, these traits engender an outlook of inevitable success as“India cannot help but prevail in the long run.”63

Not surprisingly, therefore, India’s policy-making lacks a “culture of bargain-ing.”64 Thus, rather than engaging other actors in deliberate practices for theestablishment of common understandings and shared expectations, India seemsintent on hedging its bets in order to avoid the risks associated with commitmentto relational security mechanisms. The implication then is not only that India mightremain a “rising power” for longer than its pundits portend, but also that the

61. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Still under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworksin India,” Indian Review, 8-3 (2009), pp. 213–225.62. S. Enders Wimbush, “Great Games in Central Asia,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, andJessica Keough, eds., Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: China and India (Washington, D.C.:National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), p. 269.63. Rodney W. Jones, India’s Strategic Culture (Carlisle: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2006),pp. 10–14.64. Pratap Bhan Mehta, op. cit., p. 228.

316 / Pacific Focus


analysis of the cognitive framework of its strategic culture puts it in “the class ofcountries that are always emerging but never quite arriving.”65

Therefore, as Naunihal Singh asserts, it should not be surprising that “despiteforeign policy failures and much debate over tactics, the Indian elite holds fast toa vision of national greatness.”66 The historical memory of great Indian civiliza-tions has practical impact on the country’s strategic practices. Indian officialsbelieve they are representing not just a state (or an emerging power) but a greatcivilization. In fact, few “state-civilizations” are perceived to be India’s equal.Hence, believing that India should be accorded deference and respect because of itsintrinsic (and superior) civilizational qualities, many Indian diplomats and strat-egists are wary of having to depend upon states that do not appreciate India’sspecial and unique characteristics. In fact, Nehru can be credited as one of theinitiators of this narrative of exceptionalism with his statement that India has“special rights and duties in the management of international society based on thestatus as one of the world’s major civilizations.”67

Furthermore, Indians are convinced that India as civilization has “somethingunique to offer to the rest of the world.”68 Commenting on this trend, some havesuggested that India suffers from a “post-dated self-image” – i.e., the palpableconfidence among many in India that the country is destined for great power statusdue to its glorious past and therefore they “want others to treat them as if they hadin fact already arrived.”69 However, such discursive desire is not backstopped by adeliberate practice that can turn such diplomatic rhetoric into reality through thesocialization of regional states. Instead, New Delhi appears to have been eitherunable or unwilling “to face up to the challenges and opportunities of a dynamicsecurity environment.”70 The proclamations of India’s influence have not beenmatched by comparable transformations in the ideational and institutional makeupof New Delhi’s foreign policy formulation. Thus, despite the proliferation ofdiscourses on India’s rise to global prominence, the absence of a readily availableIndian vision of global politics – a Pax Indica, if you will – prevents New Delhifrom living up to the expectations generated by such narratives.71

On the one hand, India – despite all the assertions to the contrary – still seemsunable to overcome the South Asian demarcation of its agency because of its“unfulfilled longing for identity.”72 This seems to be compounded by the lack of

65. Radha Kumar, op. cit., p. 255.66. Naunihal Singh, op. cit., p. 187. Emphasis added.67. Chris Ogden, “International ‘Aspirations’ of a Rising Power,” in David Scott, ed., Handbook ofIndia’s International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 5. Emphasis added.68. Naunihal Singh, op. cit., pp. 48–49.69. Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 49.70. Subrata K. Mitra, op. cit., p. 400.71. Emilian Kavalski, “ ‘Pax Indica’ or ‘Brand India’?” Harvard Asia Quarterly, 14-2 (2013), pp.46–51.72. Pratap Bhan Mehta, op. cit., p. 217.



consensus on “what constitutes the national interest.”73 On the other hand, the(nuclear) assertiveness of the post-1998 foreign policy stance tends to view nor-mative power from the associated unease about “soft vulnerability” – that is, thepossible fate of seeing others doing what you do not want.74 Radha Kumar explainssuch attitude as a legacy of colonialism and its impact on Indian strategic culture,which has made it “unable to distinguish between normative and non-normativeWestern behavior.”75

Thus, while India has a number of influential individuals and businesses, as aninternational actor, the country does not have an influential normative power thatcould establish India as an alternative to existing models of order. Such an assertionshould not be misinterpreted as an allegation that India does not have a respectedand significant history and cultural heritage. However, the international recognitionof this legacy (just like the recognition of its nuclear capabilities) does not amountto influence. In this respect, despite the visibility of Brand India, the narrativeconstruction of India’s current external affairs does not project a specific (if any)vision of world order that would distinguish it from other international actors withsimilar aspirations. Consequently, the international identity of New Delhi has fewdistinct attributes that prospective followers might be tempted to emulate.

Normative Power Japan: Leadership by Emulation

In March 1970, Time magazine carried a 10-page lead story tracing the gradual,but seemingly inevitable shift in international affairs “toward the Japanesecentury.” The century that the authors had in mind was the 21st century. At thetime, Japan’s impressive record of growth was considered nothing short of aneconomic miracle and likely to backstop Tokyo’s resurgence on the global stage. Inthis context, the then Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, articulated probablyone of the earliest outlines of normative power Japan, by explicitly aspiring for:“an era when Japan’s national power will carry unprecedented weight in worldaffairs.” He suggested that Japan should be a “content but not an arrogant” country,whose example would inspire “the whole world to agree that the human race is farricher for Japan’s existence.”76

While it remained unclear at the time whether Japan can indeed serve as a modelfor the rest of the world, commentators and policy-makers in Washington weretaking note and becoming increasingly apprehensive about (what they perceivedas) Tokyo’s growing independence and entrepreneurship in global life. Forinstance, already in the early 1980s some were making projections that within adecade Japan would be as intransigent as Charles de Gaulle’s France had been; and

73. Radha Kumar, op. cit., p. 255.74. Jacques E.C. Hymans, op. cit., p. 259.75. Radha Kumar, op. cit., p. 216.76. Time, “Toward the Japanese Century” (2 March 1970), p. 39.

318 / Pacific Focus


in fact hinted that Tokyo has merely been feigning subscription to shared values,for purely pragmatic considerations of economics and security.77 A decade later,Joseph Nye went as far as arguing that the United States needs to actively“manage” Japan’s economic superpower – and in fact “harness” it – if it were toremain the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union.78 Echoing thesesentiments the political economist Lester Thurow fretted that if Washington fails toact “we are all going to wind up working for the Japanese.”79 In this respect, it isnot surprising that many were quick to label Japan as not merely a challenger to USdominance, but “the enemy” in the post-Cold War period and since the two wereperceived to be on a “collision course,”80 war between them seemed anything butinevitable.81

Underpinning such assessments was the concern that Tokyo would not so muchseek to assert its foreign policy independence from Washington, but that Japancould become a lodestone for other countries in Asia (and the rest of the world) asan alternative model for international affairs that can severely undercut US influ-ence and interests. In particular, what seemed to bother US commentators was thesuggestion that Japan’s “Asian identity” prevents it from committing whole-heartedly to “the Western international order.”82 What many found particularlydisquieting was Japan’s reticence to entangle itself in global human rights issuesowing to concerns that it could “expose itself to unnecessary position-taking.”83

Thus, the potential for Japan to become a new kind of international actor – namely“a superpower without superweapons,” which has a no-strings-attached foreignpolicy stance84 – has intimated latent prospects for reframing the US/Western-setdefinitions of the “normal” in international life.

Similar to China and India, the study of normative power Japan is of recentpedigree,85 but it draws on the debates surrounding the outlines of a “Pax

77. Isaac Shapiro, “The Risen Sun: Japanese Gaullism?” Foreign Affairs, 41-4 (1980/1981), p. 62.78. Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Coping with Japan,” Foreign Policy, 89-1 (1992/1993), pp. 96–115; KennethDam, John Deutch, Joseph S. Nye, Jr and David M. Rowe, “Harnessing Japan: A U.S. Strategy forManaging Japan’s Rise as a Global Power,” The Washington Quarterly, 16-2 (1993), pp. 29–42.79. Quoted in L. Martz, “The Hour of Power,” Newsweek, 9 (1989), p. 19.80. The Economist, “Japan and America on a Collision Course,” 7644 (1990), pp. 53–54.81. George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1991).82. Isaac Shapiro, op. cit., p. 62.83. Sadako Ogata, “Japan’s UN Policy in the 1980s,” Asian Survey, 27-9 (1987), p. 965.84. Time, op. cit., p. 33.85. Yee-Kuang Heng “Beyond ‘Kawaii’ Pop Culture: Japan’s Normative Soft Power as GlobalTrouble-shooter,” The Pacific Review, 24-2 (2014), pp. 169–192; Rok Zupancic and Miha Hribernik,“Normative Power Japan: The EU’s Ideational Successor or Another ‘Contradiction in Terms’?”Romanian Journal of Political Science, 13-2 (2013), pp. 106–136; Rok Zupancic and MihaHribernik, “ ‘Discovering’ Normative Power as a State Strategy in the Framework of Security,Foreign, and Defense Policy: The Case of Japan,” Philippine Political Science Journal, 35-1 (2014),pp. 78–97.



Nipponica”86 and the implications from Japan’s “halfway to hegemon” status.87

What appears to be at the heart of Japanese normative power is a commitment toresponsible global citizenship in an increasingly interdependent world. In particu-lar, both in the context of the Cold War and after, publicizing the idea that a countrycan meaningfully shape the dynamics of international affairs without the militarymeans to enforce its will on others tends to be treated as a subversion of thedominant paradigms for explanation and understanding. As Marvin Soroos haslong insisted, the key aspect of Japan’s attempt to reframe what passes for“normal” in international life is its willingness to engage actively in the construc-tion of a peaceful and stable world order through diplomatic initiatives, the effec-tive engagement in international institutions, and the expansion of its foreign aidprogram. Thus, by setting itself as an example for “global responsibility” Japan haschallenged the mantra of power politics by promoting a cooperative agenda foraddressing global problems premised on a variety of “positive and associative waysin which governments can work together to improve the quality of life not only fortheir own populations but also for peoples of other countries; and by doing so, theyalso diminish markedly the risk of war.”88

Equally importantly, the evolution of normative power Japan reflects not merelycommitment to global responsibility, but responsiveness to the expectations andneeds of its partners.89 Thus, Japan’s commitment to “incipient multilateralism”90

– not least by championing the UN’s human security agenda in the immediatepost-Cold War period – indicated to many that the country has found a niche toexert normative power not only in Asia, but globally.91 In particular, Japan’saffiliation with the “freedom from want” aspect of human security (as opposed tothe more controversial “freedom from fear” advocated by Canada during the 1990sand which became associated with various military humanitarian interventions)allowed Tokyo to build on its longstanding development-oriented projects whileeschewing any overt commitment to political conditionality.92 The intent of theseactivities has been to validate the credibility and legitimacy of Japan’s internationaloutreach.

86. Ezra F. Vogel, “Pax Nipponica?” Foreign Affairs, 64-4 (1986), pp. 752–767.87. Kent Calder quoted in L. Martz, op. cit., p. 15.88. Marvin Soroos, “Global Interdependence and the Responsibilities of States: Learning from theJapanese Experience,” Journal of Peace Research, 25-1 (1988), p. 28.89. Richard Stubbs, “Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia,” Interna-tional Journal, 46-4 (1991), p. 667.90. Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security: Regionalization,Entrenched Bilateralism, and Incipient Multilateralism,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., RethinkingJapanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 104–132.91. Rok Zupancic and Miha Hribernik, “Normative Power Japan,” op. cit., pp. 106–136.92. Yee-Kuang Heng, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,” op. cit., pp. 275–304; Hsien-Li Tan, “Not justGlobal Rhetoric: Japan’s Substantive Actualization of its Human Security Foreign Policy,” Interna-tional Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10-1 (2010), pp. 159–187.

320 / Pacific Focus


In this respect, normative power Japan reveals Tokyo’s “intellectual and instru-mental leadership” as well as the adaptive capacity to establish itself as an inter-national “trouble-shooter” and a source of innovative solutions to globalproblems.93 The suggestion is that Japan has been able to achieve this by “tappinginto new sources of strength in order to remain a key player in Asia, just as it hasmany times before.”94 Yet, unlike the proactive underpinnings of both normativepower Europe and normative power China, normative power Japan has been farless activist in its agency. Its normative power tends to focus on promoting andsupporting international norms that are more or less already popular in the inter-national society. In this respect, what distinguishes normative power Japan is thatit aims to generate attraction by appropriating already-accepted global normsrather than promoting a particular vision of world order that would significantlychallenge any established outlook or practice.95 This is reflected both in itsespousal of human security in the 1990s96 and environmental protection in the2000s.97 More broadly, the evolution of normative power Japan confirms Tokyo’sreluctance to take positions of leadership and take responsibility for trouble-shooting issues in reaction to international expectations.98

Conclusion: Normative Power and the Struggle for Recognition

The parallel assessment of the normative powers of the EU, China, India, andJapan draws attention to one of the crucial aspects of world affairs – the featurethat the basic ontological condition of international actors is relational (i.e., thecontent of their existence as actors is constituted inter-subjectively during theprocess of interaction).99 The contention here is that contemporary world affairsare not merely about who gets what, when, and how (if they ever really were),but also about how nascent normative powers engage other actors. In this setting,normative powers need to be perceived as legitimate – i.e., their agency dependson the validation by target actors (usually through different types of complianceor conformity). The EU, China, India, and Japan are motivated by a desire to berecognized as actors that are not only capable, but who also have the right to setthe ramifications of the “normal” in global life. This is a reminder that power

93. Yee-Kuang Heng, “Beyond ‘Kawaii’ Pop Culture,” op. cit., pp. 169–192.94. Michael J. Green, “Japan is Back: Why Tokyo’s New Assertiveness is Good for Washington,”Foreign Affairs, 86-2 (2007), p. 144.95. Yee-Kuang Heng, “Beyond ‘Kawaii’ Pop Culture,” op. cit., p. 191.96. Rok Zupancic and Miha Hribernik, “Normative Power Japan,” op. cit., pp. 106–136.97. Yee-Kuang Heng, “Beyond ‘Kawaii’ Pop Culture,” op. cit., pp. 169–192.98. Richard Stubbs, op. cit., pp. 649–667; Yee-Kuang Heng, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,” op. cit.,pp. 275–304.99. Emilian Kavalski, “The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative PowerEurope and Normative Power China in Context,” Cooperation & Conflict, 48-2 (2013), pp. 247–267.



itself is not an attribute of an actor, but a relationship in which “nothing remainsfixed, neither the old basic institutions and systems of rules nor the specificorganizational forms and roles of the actors; instead, they are disrupted, refor-mulated, and renegotiated during the course of [interaction] itself.”100 Normativepowers, therefore, should be perceived as neither the “goodies” nor the “baddies”of global life. Instead, as the analyses of the EU, China, India, and Japan havedemonstrated, they are merely powers. In this respect, the contextual effective-ness of normative power is a product of design, rather than chance (let aloneosmosis).

Thus, Brussels, Beijing, New Delhi and Tokyo are learning that for their nor-mative power to be considered legitimate, they themselves are expected to behavein certain ways to earn such recognition. In other words, the viability of either the“EU model,” the “China model,” the “India model,” and the “Japan model” is notentirely dependent on Brussels’, Beijing’s, New Delhi’s, or Tokyo’s decisions, butcontingent on the interpretation of their agency by other actors. In this setting,recognition emerges as “the core constitutive moment” of international interac-tions and refers to “the communicative process in the international society of statesthrough which states mutually acknowledge the status and social esteem of otherstates.”101 The acknowledgement of this nascent struggle for recognition suggeststhat the contestation between normative powers moves beyond their relative capa-bility – i.e., it cannot be captured through the narratives of “struggle for power”. Inother words, the answer to the question “Who or what exists politically as anormative power?” is “Those actors that are recognized as normative powers.”Recognition, in this setting, is indicated by the specific attitudes, dispositions, andbehavior of target states. This then raises the question: “Under what conditions aretarget states willing to grant such recognition?” The answer provided in this studyis that normative powers are granted recognition when they deliver credible com-mitments to the intended target. In other words, defining the “normal” in interna-tional life is “essentially a collective enterprise: the ongoing if subtle interplay,between common needs and norms, and a [normative power’s] capacity to under-stand and respond to those collective aspirations.”102

In this respect, the pattern (and perception) of international anarchy is animatedby the “status insecurity” of actors.103 Such status insecurity stems from theuncertainty associated with the inter-subjective constitution of identity in globallife. Ultimately, all actors in international life have the fundamental autonomy tofollow or not follow someone’s lead. Thus, the diverse tools used to signal recog-nition or disrespect provide means for validating or casting doubt on other actors’

100. Ulrich Beck, Power in the Global Age (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2007), p. 4, ascited in Florian Schneider, “Reconceptualizing World Order: Chinese Political Thought and ItsChallenge to International Relations Theory,” Review of International Studies, 40-4 (2014), p. 702.101. Philip Nel, op. cit., p. 102.102. Richard Stubbs, op. cit., p. 652.103. Mark Webber, op. cit., p. 4.

322 / Pacific Focus


narratives about themselves.104 Recognition is both tentative and revocable,105

which attests to the “constitutive vulnerability” of international actors – especially,normative powers – “to the unpredictable reactions and responses of others.”106

This further accentuates the contextual nature of normative power – its agency“must fit the needs and aspirations of its followers;” otherwise a normative powerrisks losing its followers not because it has changed, but because the pattern ofwants and desires of its followers has.107

The struggle for recognition among normative powers is not merely “a part of,”but becomes constitutive of the complex systemic logic of global life.108 To put itbluntly, normative powers perform particular roles on the international stage andwere they not to follow the (script of those) expectations, normative powers wouldno longer be acknowledged as such. As Headley Bull has asserted, great powersneed to be “recognized by others to have certain special rights and duties.”109

Likewise, Hans Morgenthau has suggested the significance of recognition in hisavowal that the “prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That reputation, thereflection of the reality of power in the mind of the observers can be as importantas the reality of power itself. What others think about us is as important as what weactually are.”110 The legitimacy of normative power derives from and is embeddedin the practices through which it projects its social purpose in global life. As IanClark perceptively notes,

[international affairs] is always a contested normative space, and this is endemic in its nature,rather than simply the result of failure of any one attempt to overcome it. In such a contestedspace, all powerful actors have to earn their varying degrees of respect and legitimacy, and areunable to command it at will. This very unruliness underscores the pluralistic character ofinternational society and paradoxically makes the business of its practices of legitimacy all themore serious and arduous: it is the reason also why legitimacy matters so much, rather than anyreason to dismiss it as irrelevant.111

Thus, the recognition by others rests on recognition of others. In this context, thereference to normative power indicates an actor’s ability to show consideration forthe effects of its actions on others – namely, a normative power retains its status tothe extent that it meets the expectations of its followers.112 The ability to treat others

104. Axel Honneth, “Recognition between States,” in Thomas Lindermann and Erik Ringmar, eds.,The International Politics of Recognition (Boulder: Paradigm, 2011), p. 34.105. Paul H. Appleby, “Managing Complexity,” Ethics, 64-2 (1954), p. 96.106. Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 36.107. Richard Stubbs, op. cit., p. 653.108. Emilian Kavalski, “The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International RelationsTheory,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20-3 (2007), pp. 435–454.109. Headley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1977), p. 96. Emphasis added.110. Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 10.111. Ian Clark, op. cit., p. 337.112. Brantley Womack, op. cit., p. 226.



with respect allows normative powers to gain the recognition that creates thepermissive environment allowing them to define and redefine the standards of the“normal” in international life. Thus, the international identity of an actor is not justabout capabilities, but mostly about recognition – which is both an outcome and areassertion of an actor’s normative power. Status is therefore contingent upon theinter-subjective construction of identity, which “is not [only] threatened by others,but also possible because of them [as] they are always already involved in [anactor’s] identity.”113 Consequently, anarchy is not just “what states make of it,” butwhat reaction actors engender in their struggle for recognition. By outlining thenormative power of the EU, China, India, and Japan, this analysis has indicated thenascent rise of normative powers – international actors demanding recognition fortheir ability to define the ramifications of the “normal” in global life.

As it has been outlined in the preceding sections: (i) the EU has elaborated arule-based model of normative power; (ii) China has developed a relationship-based model; (iii) India has aimed to project the significance of its hoary civiliza-tion as a tool for international influence; and (iv) Japan favors a leadership patternpremised on responsiveness to the needs of its partners. Since social life neverceases its interactive dynamics and keeps on going on, there seems to be “novisible end to the struggle for recognition”114 between actors that present them-selves as normative powers. It appears that, for the time being at least, normativepower Europe remains largely a continental phenomenon circumscribed by thecontours of EU-Europe and its neighborhood; normative power Japan seems to bea niche phenomenon (in sectors such as human security and climate change);normative power India remains a confused rhetoric about the impact of its “brand;”while normative power China demonstrates a potential for a contextual redefinitionof the “normal” in different global locales. In the end, however, one needs toacknowledge that the interpretation of any particular enmeshment in global pro-cesses is subject to complex contingencies. Therefore, if it is to maintain itsrelevance, a normative power needs to remain both attuned and committed to anongoing practice of the definition and re-definition of the normal in bilateral andmultilateral contexts.

References

Adler, Emanuel, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” European Journal of Inter-national Relations, 14-2 (2008), pp. 195–230.

Alagappa, Muthiah, ed., Asian Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1998).

Appleby, Paul H., “Managing Complexity,” Ethics, 64-2 (1954), pp. 79–99.

113. Ole Wæver, op. cit., p. 127.114. Jürgen Haacke, “The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Rec-ognition,” Review of International Studies, 31-1 (2005), p. 188.

324 / Pacific Focus


Barmé, Geremie R., In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1999).

Bull, Headley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1977).

Carr, Edward H., The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study ofInternational Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

Dam, Kenneth, John Deutch, Joseph S. Nye, Jr and David M. Rowe, “Harnessing Japan: AU.S. Strategy for Managing Japan’s Rise as a Global Power,” The WashingtonQuarterly, 16-2 (1993), pp. 29–42.

Das, Gurcharan, India Unbound (New Delhi: Viking, 2000).Davis, Gloria, Worrying About China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).———, “Hommo Dissensum Significants,” Social Text, 29-4 (2012), pp. 29–56.Diez, Thomas, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative

Power Europe’,” Millennium, 33-3 (2005), pp. 613–636.Fidler, David P., “Eastphalia Emerging? Asia, International Law, and Global Governance,”

Indiana Journal of International Law, 17-1 (2010), pp. 1–12.Fisher Onar, Nora, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “The Decentering Agenda: Europe As A

Postcolonial Power,” Cooperation & Conflict, 48-2 (2013), pp. 283–303.Friedman, George, and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St.

Martin’s Press, 1991).Goertz, Gary, Contexts of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1994).Green, Michael J., “Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo’s New Assertiveness Is Good for Wash-

ington,” Foreign Affairs, 86-2 (2007), pp. 142–147.Haacke, Jürgen, “The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of

Recognition,” Review of International Studies, 31-1 (2005), pp. 181–194.Heng, Yee-Kuang, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Is the Softest of Them All? Evaluating

Japanese and Chinese Strategies in the ‘Soft’ Power Competition Era,” InternationalRelations of the Asia-Pacific, 10-2 (2010), pp. 275–304.

———, “Beyond ‘Kawaii’ Pop Culture: Japan’s Normative Soft Power As Global Trouble-Shooter,” The Pacific Review, 24-2 (2014), pp. 169–192.

Holsti, Kalevi J., Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practiceof International Relations (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991).

Honneth, Axel, “Recognition between States,” in Thomas Lindermann and Erik Ringmar,eds., The International Politics of Recognition (Boulder: Paradigm, 2011), pp.25–38.

Hymans, Jacques E.C., “India’s Soft Power and Vulnerability,” India Review, 8-3 (2009),pp. 251–263.

Jackson, Jay, “Normative Power and Conflict Potential,” Sociological Methods andResearch, 4-2 (1975), pp. 237–239.

Jones, Rodney W., India’s Strategic Culture (Carlisle: Defense Threat Reduction Agency,2006).

Kavalski, Emilian, “The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International Rela-tions Theory,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20-3 (2007), pp. 435–454.

———, “Partnership or Rivalry between the EU, China and India in Central Asia,”European Law Journal, 13-6 (2007), pp. 839–856.



———, Extending the European Security Community (London: I.B.Tauris, 2008).———, ed., China and the Global Politics of Regionalization (Farnham: Ashgate,

2009).———, “Shanghaied into Cooperation: Framing China’s Socialization of Central Asia,”

Journal of Asian and African Studies, 45-2 (2010), pp. 131–145.———, Central Asia and the Rise of Normative Powers: Contextualizing the Security

Governance of the EU, China, and India (New York: Continuum, 2012).———, “The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe

and Normative Power China in Context,” Cooperation & Conflict, 48-2 (2013), pp.247–267.

Kumar, Radha, “India as a Foreign Policy Actor: Normative Redux,” in Natalie Tocci, ed.,Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its GlobalPartners (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 211–264.

Lak, Daniel, The Future of a New Superpower (New York: Viking, 2008).Manners, Ian, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common

Market Studies, 40-2 (2002), pp. 235–258.Markell, Patchen, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).Martz, L., “The Hour of Power,” Newsweek, 9 (1989), pp. 15–31.Mehta, Pratap Bhanu, “Still under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy

Frameworks in India,” Indian Review, 8-3 (2009), pp. 213–225.Menon, Nivedita, and Aditya Nigam, Power and Contestation: India since 1989 (London:

Zed Books, 2007).Mitra, Subrata K., “The Reluctant Hegemon: India’s Self-Perception and the South Asian

Strategic Environment,” Contemporary South Asia, 12-3 (2003), pp. 399–412.Moravcsik, Andrew, “One Year On: Lessons from Iraq,” in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard

Schmitt, eds., One Year On: Lessons from Iraq (Paris: EU Institute for SecurityStudies, 2004), pp. 185–194.

Morgenthau, Hans J., “Vietnam: Shadow and Substance,” New York Review of Books (16September 1965).

Nayar, Baldev Raj, and T. V. Paul India in the World Order: Searching for Major PowerStatus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Nel, Philip, “Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional Powers Want,”Review of International Studies, 36-4 (2010), pp. 951–974.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr, “Coping with Japan,” Foreign Policy, 89-1 (1992/1993), pp. 96–115.Ogata, Sadako, “Japan’s UN Policy in the 1980s,” Asian Survey, 27-9 (1987), pp. 957–972.Ogden, Chris, “International ‘Aspirations’ of a Rising Power,” in David Scott, ed., Hand-

book of India’s International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 3–13.Okawara, Nobuo, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security:

Regionalization, Entrenched Bilateralism, and Incipient Multilateralism,” in Peter J.Katzenstein, ed., Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 104–132.

Pu, Xiaoyu, “Socialization as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion ofInternational Norms,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5-4 (2012), pp.341–367.

Rai, Vinay, and William L. Simon, Think India (New York: Dutton, 2007).Raugh, Harold B., The Victorians at War (Washington, D.C.: ABC-CLIO, 2004).

326 / Pacific Focus


Ringmar, Erik, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to theWestphalian Order,” International Organization, 66-1 (2012), pp. 1–25.

Rosemont, Henry, “Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons,”in Peter D. Hershock and Roger T. Ames, eds., Confucian Cultures of Authority(Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), pp. 1–20.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization of Central andEastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Singh, Naunihal, India: A Rising Power (New Delhi: Authors Press, 2006).Smith, Michael, “Between ‘Soft Power’ and a Hard Place: European Union Foreign and

Security Policy between the Islamic World and the United States,” InternationalPolitics, 46-5 (2009), pp. 596–615.

Soroos, Marvin S., “Global Interdependence and the Responsibilities of States: Learningfrom the Japanese Experience,” Journal of Peace Research, 25-1 (1988), pp. 17–29.

Stubbs, Richard, “Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia,”International Journal, 46-4 (1991), pp. 649–667.

Tan, Hsien-Li, “Not Just Global Rhetoric: Japan’s Substantive Actualization of Its HumanSecurity Foreign Policy,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10-1 (2010),pp. 159–187.

The Economist, “Japan and America on A Collision Course,” 7644 (1990), pp. 53–54.Tocci, Natalie, “Proliferating Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and Its

Global Partners,” in Natalie Tocci, ed., Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?The European Union and Its Global Partners (Brussels: Centre for European PolicyStudies, 2008), pp. 1–23.

Vogel, Ezra F., “Pax Nipponica?” Foreign Affairs, 64-4 (1986), pp. 752–767.Wæver, Ole, “European Security Identities,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34-1

(1996), pp. 103–132.Wang, Yi, “The Identity Dilemmas of EU Normative Power: Observations from Chinese

Traditional Culture,” in André Gerrits, ed., Normative Power Europe in A ChangingWorld (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009),pp. 67–76.

Webber, Mark, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the Governance of European Security (Manches-ter: Manchester University Press, 2007).

Wimbush, S. Enders, “Great Games in Central Asia,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, andJessica Keough, eds., Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: China and India (Wash-ington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), pp. 259–284.

Wolf, Reinhard, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics,” International Theory,3-1 (2011), pp. 105–142.

Womack, Brantley, “China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor,” in Natalie Tocci, ed.,Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its GlobalPartners (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 265–300.

Yan, Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2012).

Zhang, Feng, “Regionalization in the Tianxia? Continuity and Change in China’s ForeignPolicy,” in Emilian Kavalski, ed., China and the Global Politics of Regionalization(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 19–32.



———, “The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of InternationalRelations,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5-1 (2012), pp. 73–102.

Zhang, Xiaoming, “A Rising China and the Normative Changes in International Society,”East Asia, 28-3 (2010), pp. 235–246.

Zhao, Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from the Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’,”Social Identities, 12-1 (2006), pp. 29–41.

Zupancic, Rok, and Miha Hribernik, “Normative Power Japan: The EU’s Ideational Suc-cessor or Another ‘Contradiction in Terms’,” Romanian Journal of Political Science,13-2 (2013), pp. 106–136.

——— and ———, “ ‘Discovering’ Normative Power as a State Strategy in the Frame-work of Security, Foreign, and Defense Policy: The Case of Japan,” PhilippinePolitical Science Journal, 35-1 (2014), pp. 78–97.

328 / Pacific Focus


The Shadows of Normative Power in Asia: Framing the International Agency of China, India, and Japan

Documents

Transcript of The Shadows of Normative Power in Asia: Framing the International Agency of China, India, and Japan