Charting into New Waters: Towards ASEAN Political-Security Community 2015 Marlouize E. Villanueva

Abstract

As the deadline of the ASEAN Community Blueprint approaches, it is important

for academics and policy-makers in the Southeast Asian region (SEAR) to

reassess the process of integration that the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) is taking. As ASEAN takes a step further into realizing its vision

of “deeper community”, this paper interrogates the SEAR’s prospects for

integration into a political-security community in which relationship between

members of a community is regulated by norms and an institutional mechanism

for pacific settlement of disputes at a regional level. It primarily argues that the

role of political-security norms and identity is quintessential in SEAR’s

integration in the political-security dimension. Accordingly, a constructivist

framework of analysis is employed in assessing the prevailing regional norms and

identity in relation to the formative function in regional integration. Using

documents review and content analysis of other related studies, this study shall

focus on how these constructivist components can shape the ASEAN Political-

Security Community (APSC) by 2015 as envisioned in the APSC Blueprint.

After discussing the formation and reformulation of “shared political-security

norms” as explicated in ASEAN’s political-security regional instruments, it

demonstrates how the prevailing political-security norms in ASEAN play a

facilitative or constraining role in substantiating and operationalizing the APSC

Blueprint. This study concludes with addressing the issues of material

heterogeneity, mismatch between the existing norms and the demanded norms by

the APSC, and the semantic issue of the term political-security.

Keywords: ASEAN, SEAR, Political-Security Norms, Amitav Acharya, Political-Security

Community

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Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its inception on the 8th

of

August 1967 by virtue of the Bangkok Declaration explicitly holds that a primary raison d‟être

of the organization is to maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability and further

strengthen peace-oriented values in the region. Cognizant of this shared vision of the ASEAN,

various declarations and treaties have been issued by the ASEAN towards the aim of creating a

regional community that will ensure the cultivation of an environment of enhanced cooperation

and confidence among member-states. This vision of a political community has been concretely

manifested in the ASEAN Concord II and ASEAN Charter - the creation of ASEAN Political-

Security Community (APSC) as one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community.

Based on the various regional documents signed and entered into by the ASEAN

member-states, the norms of respect for sovereignty, self-determination, inter alia, and the

ASEAN Way of non-interference, consensus-building, and consultation have dominated the

affairs of the organization. With the value of norms being placed into the limelight and the

acknowledgement of the lack of material structures of the ASEAN (Acharya, 2008), ASEAN as

an organization remains to be exposed to being charged as mere rhetoric rather than being

practiced (Jetschke & Rüland, 2009).

Amitav Acharya, a prominent scholar on the study of SEAR, sees the ASEAN as a

“normative regionalism” – a region that places a great preponderance on the role of norms and

identity in the formation of a regional community rather than a community seen more as an

economic trading bloc or a mutual defense bloc. Being described as “normative regionalism”,

this paper will look into the growth and development of the ASEAN and trace the development

of the norms in which it is assumed to be founded on. As the deadline of the ASEAN

Community Blueprint nears, it is of vital importance that the academe reassesses the process of

integration that the ASEAN is taking. As ASEAN takes a step further into realizing the vision in

which it has espoused since its birth, it will be quintessential to identify the role of norms in a

community overarched with the interplay of norms and identity in the process of political-

security integration.

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This paper will focus on Southeast Asia as its locale of study. Southeast Asia is a region

in Asia comprised of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, Indonesia,

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. For the purposes of this paper, the

political identity of the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be the object of

analysis. By virtue of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN is the legal persona that represents the

Southeast Asia as a geographical unit.

How should we understand ASEAN?

Being a region “without a great power” (Simon, 2008:264), ASEAN is an interesting

region with the admission of states with harsh domestic policies (i.e. Vietnam, Lao PDR,

Myanmar, and Cambodia) which subsequently imperils the organization‟s international stature.

Simon (2008) has particularly considered the Asia-Pacific region as a region of particular

asymmetry, describing it as a region of asymmetry because the powder keg of conflict is found

in the North and South Asia while the region‟s multilateral institutions designed to mitigate and

loosen the tensions is found in Southeast Asia. In addition to this, the Asian region, especially

the Southeast Asian region has been described as “more diverse - culturally, politically,

religiously, economically – than... Western Europe.” (Sheridan, 1999: 5). It is in this light that

the growth of Southeast Asian regionalism in the form of the development of ASEAN has been

subject of study due to the inherent perplexities of the region and the dynamics of global order

especially in this era of globalization.

In response to the issue laid on the onset, this paper seeks to present the relationship of

shared norms of the ASEAN to the accomplishment of the ASEAN Political Security Blueprint

2009-2015, documenting challenges and drawing implications for the ASEAN‟s pursuit of

enhanced regional cooperation and integration as envisioned by the ASEAN Charter. This paper

will present the formation and reformation of political-security norms as being etched in various

ASEAN documents vis-a-vis the growth and development of the region. Furthermore, this paper

will identify facilitating or constraining factors that norms play in relation to the attainment of

the goals of the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015. In conclusion, this paper will present policy

recommendations to address such identified factors.

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The scant number of literature about the APSC has been usually describing APSC or

ASEAN integration and regionalism using neoliberal, neorealist, liberal institutionalist, or neo-

functionalists frameworks. Some scholars have seen ASEAN regionalism as being framed and

are dependent on international law (Jones, 2008; Lin, 2010). Moreover, the organization has

been studied on the role of material structures and institutional set-ups in the maintenance of

order in the region, thus using the neo-realist framework. Even further, the study of ASEAN

development is skeptically viewed, seeing it with a “clouded future” (Khoo, 2004:49). Thus, it

has identified ASEAN cooperation as culturally limited (Narine, 1998; Jetsche and Rüland,

2009).

In order to face the challenges of globalization and regionalism, ASEAN integration

through the signing of the ASEAN Charter has been seen as a step to create formal institutions

same as the European Union. The forging of the ASEAN Charter renders legal persona on the

ASEAN based on the framework of international law and is presumed to aid the ASEAN‟s aim

on the creation of an integrated community (Lin, 2010). The Charter has also been seen as the

catalyst of the ASEAN integration as it is through the Charter that institutional arrangements are

being placed to facilitate this gradual shift (Tan, 2008). Confidence over institution-building is

even high to the point that it calls for “enhancing mechanisms that promote the integration of a

single market are more in keeping with the prudential ends of building regional cooperation than

any abstract rationalist assault on the sovereignty of member states.” (Jones, 2008).

With the development of ASEAN especially with the formation of its Charter, ASEAN

has also been seen as both a “regime” and “institution” (Narine, 1998:41), making ASEAN

integration analyzed using neo-realism,/neo-liberalism and constructivist approaches. However,

ASEAN has evolved into its current form contrary to neo-liberal notion of regionalism which

posits that regionalism can be attained through intensified institution building and spillovers.

Neo-liberalism assumes that institutions and structures in regional organizations reduce the

possibility of cheating and reduce transaction costs among its member-parts. However ASEAN

instead has avoided the creation of well-defined institutional structures or quasi-legal obligations

(Ibid.). The lack of such institution-building makes neo-liberalism insufficient in explaining this

perceived enhanced integration in the ASEAN region.

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This lack of material structures as a circumstance in explaining ASEAN regionalism does

not only affects the use of the neo-liberalist framework. Neo-realism finds difficulty in

explaining this assumed political-security regime as ASEAN avoids channelling its efforts in a

creation of a “military security regime” but instead creates a security regime based on

diplomacy. However, Michael Leifer argues that the creation of such diplomatic regime within

ASEAN is “adjunct” to the great power balances, evidently arguing in favor of balance of power

inherent in neo-realist discourse (Leifer, 1996, cited in Acharya, 2005).The lack of stable and

formal institutional arrangements within ASEAN has been attributed to the lack of strong and

common interests that may pave way to the creation of such structures (Narine, 1998).

Normative regionalism, as Acharya describes ASEAN, is regionalism tailor-fitted in the

constructivist perspective. Normative regionalism is described as regionalism founded and based

on norms and identity rather than the common processes of regionalism as discussed above.

However, ASEAN‟s normative regionalism is not always deemed to be facilitative in the process

of integration. ASEAN‟s respect for democratic ideals and the Westphalian concept of

sovereignty has tagged the region‟s “zone of peace” as espousing “illiberal peace” (Kuhonta,

2006:339). The norm of non-interference hinders the perfusion of democratic values into the

region as the region continues to uphold democracy despite diversity of political systems and

types of government within the region.

The idea of normative regionalism can be vividly reinforced with the existing conflict

resolution mechanisms present in ASEAN – the “ASEAN Way”. The ASEAN Way is

characterized with emphasized informality, consultations, consensus, and organizational

minimalism (Acharya, 2005). Being founded on the unique cultural heritage of Southeast Asia,

the ASEAN Way has fundamentally shaped political socialization and communication among

member-states, eventually creating the collective identity essential in a region founded on shared

norms and identity.

Despite the claim of the successful formation of an ASEAN identity as a basis for

integration, scholars continue to argue that such ASEAN identity has not yet fully taken shape

due to the cultural diversity among ASEAN member-states. The organizational governance

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founded above the platform of ASEAN identity is seen as exclusionary from weak ASEAN

citizenship. This dissonance eventually reflects the misrepresentation of the ASEAN of its ideals

(Jones, 2004). Moreover, constructivist study of ASEAN has been critiqued for creating an

“illusion” that the organization is a purposeful organization facilitating community-building and

cooperation, thus making the analysis of the study disengage from the primary motivator of state

action: power and self-interest (Jones & Smith, 2007, cited in Jetsche & Rüland, 2009).

The legal instruments issued by the ASEAN since its inception can be described as

documents that have formally recognized norms springing out from cultural and historical

common ground within the geopolitical region. The shift from an organization widely based on

informality to formal organization with the signing of the ASEAN Charter has been a move to

compensate the lack of strong common interest within the region as identified by Narine (1998).

These norms in return have created the regional identity in which ASEAN heavily relies on,

making the ASEAN integration a normative regionalism. Despite the institutions and structures

established in ASEAN, analyzing the region using neo-realism or neo-liberalism is deemed to be

incompletely incapable as a region relying on collective norms and identity are not given deep

consideration by the abovementioned frameworks though such frameworks recognize the

existence and effect of norms and identity. Furthermore, Narine (1998) has indicated that even

though ASEAN does not have the strength in the material sense, it has made an important

contribution in the normative aspect of international society.

Research Methodology

As this paper looks into political socialization among the member-states of the ASEAN

and the formation of norms as a product of such, it uses the official regional instruments of

ASEAN as primary sources of data. This paper will also be using literature sourced out from the

library and online journals regarding ASEAN Regionalism and the APSC as secondary sources

of data.

To determine the diversity of ASEAN member-states, this study looks into the following

details. First, in terms of economic diversity, it will obtain the real Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI) of each member-state. Cultural

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diversity is determined by the ethnic and religious demographics of every member-state. Lastly,

political diversity is examined through the classification of governments and the Democracy

Index. Commonalities in the region are identified using academic journals and books as

secondary sources.

Two sets of documents are used: the first set of documents to determine the political-

security norms of ASEAN are: a) 1967 Bangkok Declaration; b) 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom

and Neutrality Declaration; c) 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord I; d) 1976 Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; e) 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty; f) 2003

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II; and g) 2007 ASEAN Charter. Secondary sources such as

books and journals are also used to determining the historical context of the abovementioned

documents. The second set to identify the demands of political-security integration are: a) 1976

Declaration of ASEAN Concord I; b) 1997 ASEAN Vision 2020; c) 2003 ASEAN Concord II;

d) 2009 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration; and e) APSC Blueprint 2009-2015. Norms will be

identified based on the actual text of the documents.

Using the constructivist framework, this paper stitches the relationship between the

existing political-security norms and the norms demanded by the integration. Basing from such

identification, this paper then formulates necessary conclusions as to the implications brought

about by the established political-security norms to the accomplishment of the political-security

community as prescribed by the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015. Lastly, this paper will present

possible recommendations to address issues identified in the accomplishment of the APSC.

Diversity in ASEAN: An Overview

The ASEAN as a regional organization has played a substantive, if not pivotal, role in the

development of events in the Asia-Pacific region during the peak of the Cold War. Reemerging

from the remnants of the defunct Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), MAPHILINDO,

(Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ASEAN

has endured the Cold War tensions that has engaged almost half of its existence as an

organization and is facing the challenges of the intensification of globalization and its

discontents. The Southeast Asian region (SEAR) is characterized as a region of economic,

cultural, and political diversity. For the purposes of this study, economic diversity is reflected

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based on the member-states‟ real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and human

development index (HDI). On the other hand, cultural diversity is reflected on the demographics

of religious and ethnic populations of each of the member-states. Lastly, political diversity is

reflected in their type of government and Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Democracy Index classifies states as 1) Full democracies; 2) Flawed Democracies; 3) Hybrid

Regimes; and 4) Authoritarian Regimes. The classification of states is based on scores on five

areas namely: 1) Electoral process and pluralism; 2) Functioning of government; 3) Political

participation; 4) Political culture; and 5) Civil liberties.

In terms of economy, the gaps are wide as reflected by the differences of real GDP per

capita and HDI between and among member-states. Singapore leads the ASEAN in terms of

economic growth and development with real GDP per capita of $24,947 (2005 US $ value) and

ranks 30th

globally in terms of HDI at 0.855. With the available data, Cambodia lags in GDP per

capita with $672 while Myanmar ranks 149th

out of 185 countries in terms of human

development. The gap in terms of real GDP is vividly apparent as Singapore (the highest in

terms of GDP per capita) has more than fifty (50) times GDP per capita than Cambodia (the

lowest in terms of GDP per capita). In terms of human development, two member-states of the

ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam and Singapore) experience very high human development, one

experiencing high human development (Malaysia), majority of the member-states experience

classified as experiencing medium human development (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia,

Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia), while only one experiences low human development

(Myanmar).

On cultural diversity, the SEA region serves as the melting pot of diverse ethno-linguistic

groups. Most ASEAN countries are dominated by ethnic groups that are Malay or related to

Austronesian peoples (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines). Geographically, member-states

who are dominated by Austronesia ethnic group are insular with the notable exemption of

Singapore. On the other hand, the peninsular member-states of ASEAN are comprised of

different ethnicities brought about by its geographical connection to mainland Asia. Sino-Tibetan

ethno-linguistic group dominate Myanmar (as represented by the Bamar population) and

Singapore. Furthermore, Thailand and Lao PDR are dominated by Tai-Kadai ethno-linguistic

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group. Lastly, Vietnam and Cambodia share the same ethno-linguistic group, the Austro-Asiatic

group.

In the religious aspect of the cultural heterogeneity of ASEAN, almost all in the region

has been dominated by religions that are distinctively oriental. The peninsular region of ASEAN

has been home of Buddhism. Majority of the population in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand

follow Buddhism, though not indicated as to what specific branch of Buddhism (Theravada or

Mahayana) each member-state is dominated. Singapore, an insular member-state, is also

dominated by Buddhism. Insular ASEAN member-states such as Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,

and Malaysia are dominated by Islam. Only Brunei Darussalam among all Islam-dominated

member-states has recognized Islam as its official religion. Notably, only Philippines has a

dominant Roman Catholic population in the region while atheism dominates the population in

Vietnam.

On political diversity, four out of ten ASEAN member-states have a monarchial type of

government. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand follow a constitutional

monarchy where the hereditary monarch is the head of the state while having their respective

prime ministers as head of government. Two of the five self-proclaimed communist countries in

the world are in ASEAN namely Lao PDR and Vietnam. Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore,

and recently Myanmar, follow the republican form of government wherein the head of state and

government is elected at large by an electorate like in Indonesia, Myanmar, and the Philippines

or the head of state is elected by popular vote while the head of government is elected by

legislative parliament such as the case of Singapore. According to the Democracy Index 2012,

four ASEAN member-states (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines) have been

classified as flawed democracies, observing a common low grade on political participation.

Political participation does not only cover voter turn-out during elections but includes

participation of minorities in the electoral process, membership into political parties, and interest

and engagement of citizens in political activities. Singapore and Cambodia are classified as

hybrid regimes that are identified as governments with lacking formal democratic structures such

as elections, weak civil society, and rule of law, and the repression of free press and the

questionable independence of the judiciary. Both member-states scored high on the functioning

of government while scoring low on political participation. Both countries, having functioning of

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government as its highest score, is then assumed that it has a strong legislature, politically

independent, efficient in the use of government powers and may enjoy popular support of the

population. Lastly, the communist member-states of ASEAN (Vietnam and Lao PDR) and the

post-military junta government of Myanmar scored lowest in the Democracy Index, thus being

characterized as authoritarian regimes. These regimes, as described by the Democracy Index

2012 report, are characterized as “outright dictatorships,” absence of independent institutions on

arbitration and adjudication, defunct formal democratic institutions, disrespect for civil liberties,

and the nonexistence of free press. In ASEAN member-states that follow the communist rule,

election process and pluralism is nil as their respective communist parties are the only legitimate

parties to run for office and the other political parties that seeks to exist are considered illegal.

However, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR scored high in the area of political culture as it is

assumed that they have a strong degree of political and societal cohesion, a perception on the

idea of a strong leader that bypasses legislature and elections, and the widespread belief in the

importance separation of church and state.

Convergence within ASEAN: Common bonds in History

G.W and S. Lindsay Gong (1981) has clearly presented this commonality within the

region in terms of its common historical experience. They have noted that the response of the

member-states towards the global forces imposed to the region has been part of their cultures in a

process of syncretic compromise. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans to establish colonies in the

region, the SEA region has been culturally and politically diverse and dynamic region as trade,

intermarriage, migration and forging of political alliances takes place between and among

kingdoms (Solidum,1981:131-132), even describing SEA as a multi-cultural and multi-centered

collage (G.W. & Gong, 1981:44). Moreover, similarity in the conduct of daily life of people,

language, architecture, values, and behavioral forms are evident since before, especially in

language as the bearer and a basic element of culture (Solidum, 1981:132).

The European Order was the first international order identified by G.W. and S. Lindsay

Gong (1981) that affected the region. With the arrival of the West in their “civilizing mission” to

the SEA, this multiplicity of cultures has been subjugated under the superior European

civilization, for the purposes of facilitating trade and the conduct of international relations in a

context of mercantilism and imperialism. The intrusion of foreign armies to Southeast Asian soil

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was met by individual communities rather than collectively. G.W. and Gong (1981) has cited the

case of the Spanish invasion of the Philippines where there were no “stirrings of a Southeast

Asian regional unity to confront the foreign powers.” The Western model became the standard

of civilization and anyone who rejects the European mission will lose its independence.

This imposition of the standard of civilization through colonization is seen not only to

have implications to the economic or political concerns of that time but it made fundamental

changes to the religious and cultural heritages that has permeated through SEA communities.

The rearrangement of socio-cultural and political institutions brought about by the establishment

of colonies in SEA has apparently uprooted vestiges of endemic culture that had proliferated in

the region before the European conquest. Traditional system of power based on religion and

personal interest has shifted to secular and territorial governments. The colonial era, thus have

divided the SEA region rather than to consolidate it through the delimitation of territorial borders

regardless of cultural boundaries. However, the divide and conquer tactics of the Western

colonizers in the end have given a “perceived similarity of their experience…common

resentments and aspirations” (Ibid: 49).

The Japanese Order was the second order that dominated over the region is in the form

of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Second World War. The continuous

denial of the West to recognize the East especially Japan‟s efforts to meet the “standard of

civilization” has reached a point that Japan denounced the European order and instituted its own.

This Japanese Order nurture and glorifies Asian cultural development and regional identity (Ibid:

51). This cultural order however is not void of its value as a mechanism for political control as

the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere places the other Asian cultures under the helm of

Nippon. This cultural order, though Asian, remains to be politically and culturally foreign to the

region (Ibid: 53). Nevertheless, this has amalgamated the common resentment of SEA nations

against colonial rule with its imposed “standard of civilization.” Though the cultural order was

not sustained because of the excesses and the inherent imbalances in war, the attempt to create

the Pan-Asian identity has strengthened the SEA nations‟ resentment to the European order and

ignited the nationalist aspiration for self-determination and independence.

With the conclusion of the Second World War, the liberation of SEA by the Europeans

did not reestablish the old European that was dismantled by the Japanese. As G.W. and Gong

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(1981) has presented social consciousness in Europe and experience with self-confident

nationalists in the colonies were emphasizing the moral inconsistencies of democracy at home

and colonial rule abroad (Ibid: 54). Though nationalist movements in the region call for their

detachment from Europe, they remain to be subject to international law of the twentieth century,

which remains to be heavily influenced by the European order. In addition, nationalist

movements in the SEA region are results of colonial education and administration mingled with

the obligation of building nation-states under a Western-inspired international law. It is in this

reason that SEA nation-states are far detached from the pre-colonial order in which they should

emulate. Thus, the struggle for identity in the ASEAN region continues to be a challenge as

individual member-states are faced by the challenge of reconnecting with their primordial roots.

As discussed on the onset, G.W. and Gong (1981) has identified three complex

challenges that ASEAN member-states are facing vis-à-vis its historical background. First,

ASEAN member-states face the challenge of unifying political and cultural groups disarrayed in

their own respective boundaries. Second, they also are faced with the challenge of political,

economic, and cultural independence and security amidst external forces. Lastly, the member-

states should synergize foreign forms of governance and political systems with traditional and

endemic systems of which the modern systems are superimposed.

Discussion

With the diversity and commonalities presented, it is proven that the region lacks the

preconditions needed to push the member-states to form a regional association on the very onset.

As proven by its history and scholarly literature, the ASEAN region has been exemplified as a

region of cultural, political, and economic diversity from kingdoms and sultanates of the pre-

colonial era to the republics, constitutional monarchies, and communist countries of the 21st

century. As an excursus, this diversity itself can be seen as a condition that leads to the lack of

common interest that will push the integration further. However, the alternative view of diversity

as an asset of the region and the common history that the region has experience is one of the

primary foundations of its deliberate community-building efforts. In constructivism, the use of

common history ties and an accommodative view of diversity of ASEAN is part of the

imaginative mechanism in community building.

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Furthermore, Solidum (1981) also asserts that the community grows as the interactions of

the component units are reduced to habitual, predictable terms, and this frequent interaction

enhances trust and confidence among members than other units in which they do not share a

common culture. Because ASEAN itself is materially deficient, its cultural and political

heterogeneity since before and even until now, the inadequacies of commonality among the

member-states then is constructed through interaction (Acharya, 2001: 47). Norms sourced out

from these cultural, political, and historical ties in the background of diversity is a source of

member-states on looking into possibilities for the future of the association, including the

prospect of further integration in the basis of such ties. Such preponderance of commonality

above diversity has strengthened the perception of a “realm of possibility” in the political set-up.

Though ASEAN is seen as an emulation of the European model of regional integration (i.e. the

European Union), the preconditions, and even the current composition in which the ASEAN

region thrived is quite different, taking the common colonial experience and the heterogeneity of

cultural, political, and religious systems into consideration. However, the European impact into

the region has made the region cling itself into the West-dominated international regime. This is

further amplified by an international system of dominated by international law that is of Western

origins. Thus, it is inevitable that the ASEAN integration is faced with striking a balance

between the insurmountable European influence against the push linking towards the region‟s

and each of the individual member-states‟ primordial tie – its connection to its precolonial past.

Identifying Facilitating and Constraining Norms in the ASEAN Political-Security

Documents

Since 1967, the ASEAN has undeniably been into constant interaction among its

member-states thus creating norms that has dominated the association until now. The

complexities of these norms as reflected by the evolution of the declarations and treaties crafted

are indeed dynamic as it continues to reshaped based on the intra-mural interaction of member-

states vis-à-vis flow of power across the region and its neighboring areas. Amitav Acharya in his

book Constructing a Security Community in ASEAN (2001) has classified ASEAN norms into

four namely: 1) non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes; 2) regional autonomy and

collective self-reliance; 3) doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of states; and 4) rejection of

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an ASEAN military pact and the preference for bilateral defense cooperation. He has also

exhaustively provided the background of each core category as presented thereafter.

Non-use of Force

It is noticeable that all declarations and treaties entered by the member-states include in

their provisions its adherence to the UN Charter. The norm of non-use of force and pacific

settlement of disputes and doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of states are enshrined in

Article 2 of the UN Charter. With the failure of ASEAN‟s predecessors (ASA and

MAPHILINDO) to avoid the diffusion of conflict, it was inevitable for the fledgling organization

to look for recourse to prevent another Konfrontasi-like engagement to take place. As discussed

by Chua (2001), Konfrontasi was the period of diplomatic and political row between Indonesia

and Malaysia that involved military mobilizations over territorial claims, especially in Borneo.

Sukarno‟s Konfrontasi was perceived by Britain as an impediment to Britain‟s “grand design” of

decolonizing colonies “east of the Suez”, thus actively preventing Indonesia from hindering

Malaysia‟s consolidation of its federation. The forfeiture of American aid to Indonesia has

instead boosted the latter‟s relations with the Soviets and Chinese. The bipolarization of relations

between the Malaysia and Indonesia vis-à-vis its adjunction to Great Power rivalry has been the

precursor in which the non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes has been seen as a

foundation of ASEAN norms.

Regional Autonomy

On the other hand, the norm of regional autonomy and collective self-reliance can be

traced to the history of the SEA nations and the reasons for the disintegration of prior regional

organizations. As explained in the previous section, the history of SEA has been intimately

molded by regional orders imposed to the region by foreign powers. To avoid this adjunction of

the association towards Great Power rivalries, it has been explicit in all documents studied that

the association seeks to be independent from external control and the want to pursue a “shared

destiny.” The 1967 British decolonization of its territories “east of Suez” and US President

Nixon‟s announcement of avoidance of another land war in the region because of the harsh

lesson it received from the Vietnam War has stimulated ASEAN member-states to fend on

themselves for their individual security. Acharya (2001) has cited cases wherein member-states

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acted on these external moves by Great Powers. Thailand‟s push for a more independent foreign

policy and its pursuit towards regionalism became more vivid. Philippines also started to re-align

its Asian identity with its neighbors and shy away with the image of it as USA‟s client. On 1968,

Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam (cited in Acharya, 2001:53) commented with the

withdrawal of Western forces was bringing “to an end nearly two centuries of dominant

European influence in the region,” and that the region “must fill what some people call the power

vacuum itself or resign itself to the dismal prospect of the vacuum being filled from the outside.”

The possible reliance to foreign governments and external security commitments posed a

serious risk towards the internal stability of domestic regimes of the respective member-states.

The epitome of such disastrous effect is the case of US intervention and active participation

during the Vietnam War. Such involvement of the US did not only involve the loss of many lives

and destruction of property but has undermined the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese

government. It did not only stirred public opinion in the US homeland but the event also has

marked the indecisiveness of Western intervention in stabilizing domestic regimes held under

siege by insurgencies. Though not a direct military intervention, another example of such

undermining effect of US meddling with domestic affairs is that of the Marcos era during the

period of martial law. The financial support that the US has given to Marcos that went to massive

corruption within the ranks of government and cronies made Philippines plummet into

deplorable economic and socio-cultural conditions. Coupled with a staggering financial debt and

political instability, this gave rise to reigniting communist insurgency that was previously

quelled during the Magsaysay administration. The US support towards the Marcos did not wither

until the eve of People Power that instated Corazon Cojuanco-Aquino, the widow of the

assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino, as president of the republic. This support of the

US to the dictatorial regime has left a bad aftertaste to Philippine society, especially to left-wing

activists, even up to now. The manifestation of such ideal of regional autonomy was enshrined in

the 1971 ZOPFAN and the 1995 SEANWFZ. Both instruments have expressed the continuous

desire of the region towards neutralization as a path towards regional development. However, the

ambiguity of the language of ZOPFAN is a clear manifestation of the conflicting views of the

member-states towards relations with great powers. Acharya (2001) said that the ZOPFAN was a

product of consensus and met an eventual stumbling block with “Malaysia‟s and Thailand‟s

disenchantment with external security guarantees”, Indonesia‟s persistent position on non-

16

alignment, Singapore‟s position in the need for external security linkages, and Thailand‟s,

Singapore‟s and Philippine‟s need of US forces in the region. On the other hand, the SEANWFZ

was seen as a leap further to the realization of ZOPFAN despite the reluctance of Great Powers

to accede to the treaty, as it was detrimental to their geopolitical strategy. As Acharya (2001: 56)

places it, ZOPFAN was further undermined by ASEAN‟s post-Cold War pursuit of a regional

security framework, which would „engage‟, rather than exclude, the outside powers. This

engagement itself is a double-edged sword: it may either address the issue of delimiting the role

of outside powers in the region and use the organization as a collective leverage against an

outside power that will unilaterally impose its interest or it may further increase the influence of

outside powers in the affairs of the association.

Non-interference in State Affairs

In connection to the norm of regional autonomy, the norm on non-interference in the

affairs of States, or the respect for internal sovereignty, has been interconnected with the

collective commitment of ASEAN member-states to the survival of its non-communist regimes

from communist attempts to destabilize it. The presence of “resiliency” or “stability” in all

documents of ASEAN shows that the non-interference in internal affairs was considered as „if

each member nation can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal

threats, regional resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its

overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts‟ (Wanandi, 1981; as cited in Acharya,

2001). According to former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (cited by Jones, 2009),

“While ASEAN‟s declared objectives were economic, social and cultural, all knew that progress

in economic cooperation would be slow. We were banding together more for political objectives,

stability and security.”

This common perception of communist insurgency as a threat to national resiliency then

shows another quality of ASEAN member-states in the time in which this norm was formally

upheld: the prevalence of weak states and the lack of regime legitimacy that is constantly under

attack by communist subversive activities. Acharya (2001) cites various situations where the

doctrine of non-interference took place. Ranging from ASEAN‟s silence during the Marcos

17

regime and the People Power in the Philippines to the admission of Vietnam and Myanmar as

members of the association despite their communist and militaristic political systems

respectively, ASEAN practiced non-interference in the affairs of the member-states by not

critiquing other member-states in how they handle their domestic affairs and to be non-

discriminatory in the admission of new member-states. The doctrine of non-interference was

further reinforced by an issuance of statement by ASEAN foreign ministers on 9 January 1979

(as cited in Acharya, 2001) which urges member-states to “respect each other‟s independence,

sovereignty, territorial integrity and political system” and “refrain…from interfering in each

other‟s internal affairs, and from carrying out subversive activities, directly or indirectly, against

each other”. However, with the settling down of Cold War tensions, the doctrine of non-

interference has shifted to “open and frank discussions” (Katsumata, 2004). Katsumata (2004)

has identified that the change of such interpretation of the doctrine of non-interference was

brought about by the rise of new global challenges in areas such as environment, economic

disruption (especially the case of the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis), terrorism, drugs, and

transnational crime. The doctrine of non-interference has been flexed after Cold War tensions as

issues that need humanitarian intervention, especially in cases where human rights atrocities are

at peak, are deemed as not of internal affairs of the State. It is in this global normative shift that

inspired Thailand and the Philippines to push for this flexible interpretation of non-interference

as both value human rights and democracy. Moreover, Katsumata adds that the doctrine of non-

interference stands to be valueless in times of economic crisis, especially that of the Bangkok

Financial Crisis. The doctrine of non-interference thus has changed overtime in response to

global stimulus vis-à-vis domestic concerns of various ASEAN member-states.

Preference for Bilateral Defense Cooperation

However, despite not tagging the organization as a military block unlike the NATO, this

does not mean that the member-states cannot engage in bilateral defence agreements with other

states. The ASEAN Concord I of 1976 assures the “continuation of cooperation on a non-

ASEAN basis between the member states insecurity matters in accordance with their mutual

needs and interests.” Bilateralism in security has been seen as a preferable option rather than a

multilateral defence arrangement because, according to Malaysian FM Mohamad Ghazali Shafie

18

(as cited in Acharya, 2001), agreements of multilateral scope tends to converge and settle with

the lowest common denominator while bilateral arrangements may reach levels that are

„mutually acceptable‟ and is „pursued as far as possible‟.

The ASEAN Way

Aside from the four core categories Acharya has identified, ASEAN has socio-cultural

norms that have dominated the organization despite its bumpy history. The ASEAN Way, coined

by Gen. Ali Moertopo of Indonesia, has been characterized by Singaporean Foreign Minister S.

Jayakumar as a process that “stresses informality, organization minimalism, inclusiveness,

intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolution of disputes”. The ASEAN

way traces its origins to the methods of decision-making within Javanese village societies.

ASEAN Way adheres to the principles of musyarawah (consultations) and mufakat (consensus).

Currently under the 2007 ASEAN Charter, the values of musyarawah and mufakat are explicitly

stated in Article 20.

Solidum identifies three factors that led to the emergence of ASEAN way namely: 1)

organizational structure and procedures; 2) principles adopted from earlier regional attempts at

cooperation; and 3) known cultural similarities. The formal inclusion of the principles of

musyarawah and mufakat as the basis of decision-making, thin institutionalism, and the multiple

mechanisms to assure confidence-building in ASEAN is a manifestation that the institutions of

the organization are soft in order for informal socio-cultural norms being observed,

notwithstanding the possibility of not reaching into solid conclusion. Moreover, Solidum (1981)

adds that the ASEAN Way comes from the stand of ASA heads that „only Asian solutions which

contain Asian values are legitimate‟. The very way that ASEAN diplomacy is conducted through

informality and flexibility and the lack of Western “formality” and “legalism” shows an

underlying value of confidence-building as important in the affairs among member-states.

19

Discussion

The evolution of political-security norms, based on the data presented and analyzed, is a

product of continuous interaction between member-states of ASEAN. However, it should be

noticed that the legal-rational norms of ASEAN are framed after a Western-model international

law contextualized in SEA while the socio-cultural norms of sprang from its inherent and shared

cultural and historical ties and socialization among ASEAN elites. As external events are

expressed in material form (such as US-Sino-Soviet interaction and contestation of power), the

political-security norms facilitate and shape how each member-state perceive the material

stimulus. Moreover, these norms do not only mold what member-states do perceive but also as to

how the organization collectively makes a common position on issues. However, it is to be taken

note that norms itself are not determinative of subsequent action rather norms constitute the basis

for actions based on the logic of possibility and appropriateness rather than the logic of

consequences. This logic of appropriateness is deemed conducive in organizations where

mechanism for punishing deviant behaviour is thin. Moreover, ASEAN political-security norms

play not only to regulate behaviour among member-states (like the case of admonition of military

exercises in ASEAN, or escalating diplomatic rows over territorial contestations), but also

constitute their identity. The term ASEAN Way itself is a constitutive effect that the norms of

musyawarah and mufakat dominate the conduct of relations between ASEAN, notwithstanding

its expected regulatory effect to the affairs of the association. This process of using the ASEAN

Way as a distinctive identity of the organization strengthens its regulatory effect as such identity

is not only expected by the member-states but by the international society as a whole.

Identifying the Demands of Political-Security Integration

In order to identify and understand the demands of political-security integration of

ASEAN, it is quintessential to discuss the contents of documents that posit the formation of a

political-security community in ASEAN. These documents are: 1976 ASEAN Concord I, 1997

ASEAN Vision 2020, 2003 ASEAN Concord II, 2009 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the

Roadmap for ASEAN Community 2009-2015, and the Roadmap for ASEAN Community 2009-

2015 with a particular focus on the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015.

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ASEAN Concord I

The first mention of an integrated community can be traced back to the signing of

ASEAN Concord I (AC I) on 1976, together with the TAC. AC I, foresaw the concerns that

member-states will face such as domestic stability, promotion of social justice and improvement

of standards of living and resilience over disaster response. Together with the norms of the

ASEAN that has upheld since 1964 and the rhetoric of an ASEAN identity, the association

formed the AC I as a plan of action that covers political, economic, social, cultural and

information, security cooperation. In the political-security dimension of the declaration, it calls

for the meetings of the Heads of Government when deemed necessary, the signing of TAC and

respect for the ZOPFAN (see previous sections and chapters for discussion), improvement of

machinery for political cooperation, possibility of ASEAN Extradition Treaty (seen as a possible

response to the charging of insurgents that cross borders), and the harmonization of views,

coordinating positions, and the possibility of taking common actions. Also, it is in this

declaration that security issues or concerns by individual member-states are encouraged to be

addressed through bilateral agreements among other member-states or non-ASEAN states.

Further explanation of this has been presented in the previous section.

ASEAN Vision 2020

The ASEAN Vision 2020 (AV 2020) was signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 17

December 1997. AV 2020, recognizing the achievements of the association that has attained

thirty years since its inception on 1967, increased economic prosperity, and upcoming entry into

the 21st century, has foreseen the organization, in summary, as „a concert of Southeast Asian

nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability, prosperity, bonded together in partnership in

dynamic development and in a community of caring societies‟. It also calls for enhancing

economic cooperation through close coordination in economic policies, accelerate liberalization

of trade and the focus of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) as the center of trade in Asia-

Pacific, develop technologies to increase economic productivity, and pooling of technological

expertise and manpower. Moreover, the AV 2020 foresees that the ASEAN will be able to

narrow down income inequalities, holistic human development without discrimination,

elimination of poverty and hunger as basic problems, strengthening of familial ties and of civil

society. AV 2020 also commits member-states to environmental sustainability, expansion of

21

ASEAN rules and conduct to the solution of non-traditional security issues such as environment

degradation and campaign against illicit drugs and human trafficking. AV 2020 also sees the role

of ASEAN in the international fora advancing its common interests and the strengthening of its

relations with Dialogue Partners and other regional organizations. This advanced prospect of the

region is seen to become reality by the year 2020.

ASEAN Concord II

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (AC II) was signed on 07 October 2003 at Bali,

Indonesia. The AC II has reiterated its renewed commitment towards strengthening economic

and social stability and ensuring national development through affirming “Prosper thy Neighbor”

policies. Moreover, this document has reiterated the value of consensus and non-interference in

continuous cooperation among ASEAN member-states. It is in AC II where the member-states

have declared the creation of the ASEAN Community with three pillars namely political and

security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation. The three pillars

address the areas of concern presented by AC I. Though the AC II reiterates the points reiterated

by AC I, the distinctive addition is the elaboration of visions and principles of every field of

cooperation. ASEAN Security Cooperation (ASC) is „envisaged to bring ASEAN‟s political and

security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one

another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.‟ (ASC II,

2003). The ASC also reiterates the avoidance of the association to form a SEATO-like defence

regime, but rather a security community based on norms that extend to political, economic, and

socio-cultural dimensions of the association. The ASC also invokes the principles of TAC as the

foundations of the conduct of affairs in ASEAN, increased cooperation with ASEAN partners

and other regional organizations, and intensified response to non-traditional security issues.

Moreover, the ASC seeks to innovate in the promotion of stability in the region through „norms-

setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.‟

(Ibid).

Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration and the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015

The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration was signed on 01 March 2009 in Cha-am Thailand.

With the ASEAN Charter 2007, the „crowning achievement‟ of the association, conferring legal

22

personality to the association and the fostering of strengthened institutional arrangements, the

member-states reaffirmed its position on intensifying the process of integration through cutting

the deadline for integration to 2015 (as declared by the 2007 Cebu Declaration) and execution of

the plans of integration such as the Hanoi Plan of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration,

and the Vientiane Action Plan. The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration, in conclusion, has

consolidated all blueprints for community-building of the three pillars of ASEAN Community

into one document which is the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015. For the

purpose of this research, this study will only focus on the first pillar of ASEAN Community

which is the APSC.

Though mainly a reiteration of the principles adhered by the ASEAN as categorized by

Acharya (2001) and as discussed in the previous section, the APSC Blueprint skews the design

of the APSC as principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and

promotion and protection of human rights, and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN

Charter. The APSC also envisions a community that is „people-oriented‟ wherein it calls for

sectors to participate and benefit in the process of integration and community-building. It

upholds the ZOPFAN, TAC, and SEANWFZ as instruments that foster confidence-building,

preventive diplomacy, and pacific settlement of disputes; norms that have prevailed the

organization since its inception. The Blueprint describes the APSC in three characteristics

namely:

A) Rules-based Community of shared values and norms;

b) Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with shared responsibility for

comprehensive security; and

c) Dynamic and Outward-looking Region in an increasingly integrated an

interdependent world.

ASEAN sees that a rules-based community, through the respect of democracy and human

rights vis-à-vis the rights and obligations of member-states, equates to the formation of shared

values and norms. Furthermore, increased political cooperation is said to increase the sense of

solidarity of political cultures, history, and culture among member-states. The Blueprint further

23

states that such solidarity can be further attained through the shaping and sharing of norms

within ASEAN.

In the area of security, ASEAN adheres to the design of comprehensive security that does

not only cover traditional security concerns but also non-traditional security concerns that affect

the lives of the peoples of ASEAN across borders. ASEAN considers confidence-building

measures and preventive diplomacy as integral parts of conflict prevention. In order to bolster

confidence-building measures, regular voluntary meetings of defence ministers are instituted to

develop an environment of confidence, free flow of information and security perception, and the

compilation and sharing of best practices of member-states.

Discussion

With the gist of the documents presented above, two commonalities are observed as to

the development of the norms demanded by the foreseen political-security community. First,

political-security integration calls for the intensified and rapid building of formal institutions.

This is manifested in the documents through: 1) Institutionalization of formal organizational

bodies especially in the ASEAN Charter and the APSC Blueprint 2009-205; 2) Intensification of

ministerial level and senior government official meetings in the different areas of focus; and 3)

Recognition and the accommodation of Dialogue Partners in the development of ASEAN,

especially in the ARF. However, the ASEAN Way of organizational minimalism hampers these

building of institutions for the political-security community. Second, demand for respect of

democracy and rule of law permeates throughout the instruments for the political-security

community despite the diversity of the association‟s membership, with particular focus on

member-states classified as “authoritarian regimes”. The recognition of an increasingly

integrated world by the ASEAN documents implies the necessity of the association to adopt

“universal values” of democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights. Thus, the

introduction of certain political-security norms such as democracy and the rule of law are not

only indicative of a thrust towards increase in the rate of institution-building but also the

retranslation or even withering of certain socio-cultural norms shared by the ASEAN to

accommodate the formation of a more integrated political-security community by 2015.

24

Charting into waters without a sail?

The study of the political-security norms and ASEAN indeed is a complex issue that the

time and space in this paper is not sufficient to present the variety of data and the multiplicity of

its interpretation. This study used historical-descriptive design and content/document analysis as

its methodology in investigating ASEAN treaties and declarations and secondary sources of data

such as academic journals and books. As informed by the constructivist framework, this study

seeks to present the relationship between the current political-security norms and the attainment

of the APSC 2015. Based on the foregoing discussions, this study concludes that the current

political-security norms of ASEAN will not complement with the demands of integration due to

variety of factors.

First, the evolution of political-security norms within ASEAN is instituted based on

contexts different from the current demand of political-security integration. This is clear in the

case in the doctrine of non-interference. As presented, the doctrine of non-interference was

instituted in response to the challenge of the perceived communist subversion of weak non-

communist regimes. The widespread norm of respect of human rights and democracy as stated in

the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015 seems to be problematic especially in member-states having a

low rating in Democracy Index (i.e. Vietnam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR). Also, the continuous

change of translation of the doctrine of non-interference has been observed throughout the

development of norms in the region. Compared to other core categories of norms Acharya (2001)

identified, the norm of non-interference has continuously changed from protection against

foreign support to destabilization attempts against domestic regimes, to „open and frank

discussions‟ during the post Cold War era. The norm of non-interference (with a particular focus

on the norm of non-discrimination) may emplace material structures (such as wide economic

gaps) that may bog down the process of integration. Furthermore, this norm of non-interference

will be transformed further with the injection of democracy, rule of law, and human rights as

primary norms that will be enforced in APSC. As previously discussed, it is unavoidable to claim

that ASEAN‟s norms are “adjunct to Great Power balances as claimed by Leifer (1996).

However, this adjunct relationship is not determinative of ASEAN action nor the formation of its

norms. Norms are a product of interaction between and among members of a particular

community. Though all member-states of the ASEAN may receive the same external stimulus,

25

they individually perceive it differently and act based on its evaluation. Such perception is

shaped by both material and non-material structures. Later on, existing norms act as constraints

as to how ASEAN will collectively act on such external stimulus, thus a clear manifestation both

of the constitutive and regulatory effects of norms.

Second, ASEAN political-security norms continue to be patterned to Western value-

systems; however it is translated into contextualized definitions through socialization among

member-states and the inherent socio-cultural norms in the region. Moreover, the attempt to

create the APSC 2015 looks more of an ASEAN-ized aspiration of political integration of the

European Union. This means that APSC looks forward into the creation of a comprehensive

security arrangement and a continuous adherence to the ASEAN way coupled with

institutionalized mechanisms to ensure pacific settlement of disputes (through the enhanced

dispute settlement mechanism patterned after the TAC and ASEAN Charter), creation of offices

to respond to security concerns, and institutionalized meetings of senior government officials.

However, this posits a serious problem as to the balance between the increasingly legalistic and

formalistic approach towards ASEAN integration and the traditional ASEAN Way that has made

the association distinct from other regional organizations.

Third, the material conditions within ASEAN remain to be heterogeneous, making the

rhetoric of common historical and cultural ties insufficient if the association seeks to further

cooperation and bring it to a „higher plane‟ . This is further amplified by the recognition that the

AEC and ASCC are “closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing” (ASEAN Concord II, 2003).

Though this study focuses on the political-security dimension of the ASEAN Community 2015,

it will be illogical to unilaterally reject the implications of the other pillars of ASEAN integration

to the APSC, especially the AEC. It has been noticed that the majority of the content of the

documents pertaining to ASEAN Community has been on the economic cooperation and the

thrust towards enhancing the role of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This stumble block as to

ASEAN‟s quest towards regional economic integration will also pose a problem to the political-

security dimension.

Lastly, the term “political-security” itself is semantically problematic, as the flexibility of

political-security norms may be able to complement the aims of political integration but not

security integration. As the APSC also focuses on the concept of non-traditional security, it will

26

be quintessential to differentiate the characteristics of both traditional and non-traditional

security concerns. With respect to non-traditional security concerns such as climate change

adaptation, human trafficking, transnational crimes, inter alia, it is to be taken note that such

concerns may not be addressed individually or bilaterally as patterned after traditional security

arrangements. Should ASEAN further enhance integration in terms of political-security, it must

embark itself into intensified institution-building, requalification and reassessment of values and

norms and thickening of existing structures. Furthermore, if the organization needs to assert its

position in the region, ASEAN needs to step up its cooperation in terms of military power.

Though relatively weak than other states surrounding the area in terms of military might, intra-

mural military coordination will at least respond to security concerns that are immediate in the

region, especially non-traditional security issues.

Thus, ASEAN is charting into new waters on a ship without a mast, without a sail. Noble

the intentions may be, the region is not yet ready to bring political cooperation to a higher plane

in a form of a political-security community. With the diversity of the region and the lack of

socialization in terms of inculcating the norms espoused by the APSC Blueprint, the region

remains to be in rough waters, especially in this time where inequalities are great and the power

rivalry between China and US persists. Faithful to the constructivist framework, this frequently

changing material environment within and outside of the region may not be able to create norms

complementary enough to harmonize views and action. ASEAN‟s normative regionalism gives

place preponderance on the value of norms and identity which subsequently are created through

continuous interaction and socialization among States. No matter how ASEAN will row its ship

towards its charted destination, it will have a hard time in rowing through the seas with ever

changing waves and currents.

As to policy recommendations, ASEAN should move the deadline for integration to a

later deadline due to wide inequalities present in the region. ASEAN should give more time to at

least narrow down inequalities both economic and political that the region continuously

experience. It is in this way that the harmonization of views and the formation of norms and

identity will be easily facilitated as this period of levelling off will also provide more time for

socialization among ASEAN member-states.

27

Second, commitment towards enhanced regional integration should be reassessed as not

all ASEAN member-states are completely capable entering into further regional integration.

However, this should also be limited by the norm of avoiding Western legalism and formalism in

regional integration.

Lastly, this study recommends that ASEAN should find ways to stimulate grassroots

participation by not limiting itself to Track One and Two Diplomacy. The problem with Track

One and Two Diplomacy is only limited to the political elites of the association which is mainly

comprised of high government officials and reputable members of civic society and academe. It

is through grassroots participation, capitalization of ASEAN in its rhetoric on “people-oriented”

values, and through citizen diplomacy that the political-security community-building measures

be realized, making the dominant ASEAN norms trickle down to the level of the mass population

of ASEAN member-states. This requires the further intensification of the inculcation of ASEAN

into the educational systems of member-states and making the organization more visible to the

citizenry.

To further improve the outcome of this study, the researcher highly suggests using other

frameworks in the study of the political-security norms of ASEAN. The inherent diversity of

theories and frameworks in international relations provides ample opportunities for researchers

to look into other variables and its subsequent relations. Moreover, the constructivist framework

itself is insufficient in explaining material structures that are void of social value such as

positivist economic studies on AEC and other pillars of ASEAN Community. As International

Relations Theory is both explanatory and constitutive, other lenses provide other perspectives on

what is there to know about the world outside and on how humans can acquire such knowledge.

The variety of epistemological and methodological alternatives will allow scholars to constantly

study on the matter and keep the discourse going, offering new ideas and newer perspectives.

Lastly, another recommendation for the improvement of this study is to widen the scope

of documents to be studied while narrowing down the number of variables to be studied.

Researchers may opt to focus more on one norm of the ASEAN and widen the scope of

documents that the researcher will investigate. This includes newspaper clippings of foreign

newspapers, statements, communiqués, proceedings, reports, and technical plans that may not be

accessible online. Researchers must find other ways to look for such data outside libraries and

28

even ask for such documents from credible offices. This will provide an in-depth analysis of a

particular norm that plays an integral part of the socialization of ASEAN member-states.

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