Charting into New Waters: Towards ASEAN Political-Security Community 2015 Marlouize E. Villanueva
Abstract
As the deadline of the ASEAN Community Blueprint approaches, it is important
for academics and policy-makers in the Southeast Asian region (SEAR) to
reassess the process of integration that the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) is taking. As ASEAN takes a step further into realizing its vision
of “deeper community”, this paper interrogates the SEAR’s prospects for
integration into a political-security community in which relationship between
members of a community is regulated by norms and an institutional mechanism
for pacific settlement of disputes at a regional level. It primarily argues that the
role of political-security norms and identity is quintessential in SEAR’s
integration in the political-security dimension. Accordingly, a constructivist
framework of analysis is employed in assessing the prevailing regional norms and
identity in relation to the formative function in regional integration. Using
documents review and content analysis of other related studies, this study shall
focus on how these constructivist components can shape the ASEAN Political-
Security Community (APSC) by 2015 as envisioned in the APSC Blueprint.
After discussing the formation and reformulation of “shared political-security
norms” as explicated in ASEAN’s political-security regional instruments, it
demonstrates how the prevailing political-security norms in ASEAN play a
facilitative or constraining role in substantiating and operationalizing the APSC
Blueprint. This study concludes with addressing the issues of material
heterogeneity, mismatch between the existing norms and the demanded norms by
the APSC, and the semantic issue of the term political-security.
Keywords: ASEAN, SEAR, Political-Security Norms, Amitav Acharya, Political-Security
Community
2
Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its inception on the 8th
of
August 1967 by virtue of the Bangkok Declaration explicitly holds that a primary raison d‟être
of the organization is to maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability and further
strengthen peace-oriented values in the region. Cognizant of this shared vision of the ASEAN,
various declarations and treaties have been issued by the ASEAN towards the aim of creating a
regional community that will ensure the cultivation of an environment of enhanced cooperation
and confidence among member-states. This vision of a political community has been concretely
manifested in the ASEAN Concord II and ASEAN Charter - the creation of ASEAN Political-
Security Community (APSC) as one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community.
Based on the various regional documents signed and entered into by the ASEAN
member-states, the norms of respect for sovereignty, self-determination, inter alia, and the
ASEAN Way of non-interference, consensus-building, and consultation have dominated the
affairs of the organization. With the value of norms being placed into the limelight and the
acknowledgement of the lack of material structures of the ASEAN (Acharya, 2008), ASEAN as
an organization remains to be exposed to being charged as mere rhetoric rather than being
practiced (Jetschke & Rüland, 2009).
Amitav Acharya, a prominent scholar on the study of SEAR, sees the ASEAN as a
“normative regionalism” – a region that places a great preponderance on the role of norms and
identity in the formation of a regional community rather than a community seen more as an
economic trading bloc or a mutual defense bloc. Being described as “normative regionalism”,
this paper will look into the growth and development of the ASEAN and trace the development
of the norms in which it is assumed to be founded on. As the deadline of the ASEAN
Community Blueprint nears, it is of vital importance that the academe reassesses the process of
integration that the ASEAN is taking. As ASEAN takes a step further into realizing the vision in
which it has espoused since its birth, it will be quintessential to identify the role of norms in a
community overarched with the interplay of norms and identity in the process of political-
security integration.
3
This paper will focus on Southeast Asia as its locale of study. Southeast Asia is a region
in Asia comprised of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, East Timor, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. For the purposes of this paper, the
political identity of the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be the object of
analysis. By virtue of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN is the legal persona that represents the
Southeast Asia as a geographical unit.
How should we understand ASEAN?
Being a region “without a great power” (Simon, 2008:264), ASEAN is an interesting
region with the admission of states with harsh domestic policies (i.e. Vietnam, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, and Cambodia) which subsequently imperils the organization‟s international stature.
Simon (2008) has particularly considered the Asia-Pacific region as a region of particular
asymmetry, describing it as a region of asymmetry because the powder keg of conflict is found
in the North and South Asia while the region‟s multilateral institutions designed to mitigate and
loosen the tensions is found in Southeast Asia. In addition to this, the Asian region, especially
the Southeast Asian region has been described as “more diverse - culturally, politically,
religiously, economically – than... Western Europe.” (Sheridan, 1999: 5). It is in this light that
the growth of Southeast Asian regionalism in the form of the development of ASEAN has been
subject of study due to the inherent perplexities of the region and the dynamics of global order
especially in this era of globalization.
In response to the issue laid on the onset, this paper seeks to present the relationship of
shared norms of the ASEAN to the accomplishment of the ASEAN Political Security Blueprint
2009-2015, documenting challenges and drawing implications for the ASEAN‟s pursuit of
enhanced regional cooperation and integration as envisioned by the ASEAN Charter. This paper
will present the formation and reformation of political-security norms as being etched in various
ASEAN documents vis-a-vis the growth and development of the region. Furthermore, this paper
will identify facilitating or constraining factors that norms play in relation to the attainment of
the goals of the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015. In conclusion, this paper will present policy
recommendations to address such identified factors.
4
The scant number of literature about the APSC has been usually describing APSC or
ASEAN integration and regionalism using neoliberal, neorealist, liberal institutionalist, or neo-
functionalists frameworks. Some scholars have seen ASEAN regionalism as being framed and
are dependent on international law (Jones, 2008; Lin, 2010). Moreover, the organization has
been studied on the role of material structures and institutional set-ups in the maintenance of
order in the region, thus using the neo-realist framework. Even further, the study of ASEAN
development is skeptically viewed, seeing it with a “clouded future” (Khoo, 2004:49). Thus, it
has identified ASEAN cooperation as culturally limited (Narine, 1998; Jetsche and Rüland,
2009).
In order to face the challenges of globalization and regionalism, ASEAN integration
through the signing of the ASEAN Charter has been seen as a step to create formal institutions
same as the European Union. The forging of the ASEAN Charter renders legal persona on the
ASEAN based on the framework of international law and is presumed to aid the ASEAN‟s aim
on the creation of an integrated community (Lin, 2010). The Charter has also been seen as the
catalyst of the ASEAN integration as it is through the Charter that institutional arrangements are
being placed to facilitate this gradual shift (Tan, 2008). Confidence over institution-building is
even high to the point that it calls for “enhancing mechanisms that promote the integration of a
single market are more in keeping with the prudential ends of building regional cooperation than
any abstract rationalist assault on the sovereignty of member states.” (Jones, 2008).
With the development of ASEAN especially with the formation of its Charter, ASEAN
has also been seen as both a “regime” and “institution” (Narine, 1998:41), making ASEAN
integration analyzed using neo-realism,/neo-liberalism and constructivist approaches. However,
ASEAN has evolved into its current form contrary to neo-liberal notion of regionalism which
posits that regionalism can be attained through intensified institution building and spillovers.
Neo-liberalism assumes that institutions and structures in regional organizations reduce the
possibility of cheating and reduce transaction costs among its member-parts. However ASEAN
instead has avoided the creation of well-defined institutional structures or quasi-legal obligations
(Ibid.). The lack of such institution-building makes neo-liberalism insufficient in explaining this
perceived enhanced integration in the ASEAN region.
5
This lack of material structures as a circumstance in explaining ASEAN regionalism does
not only affects the use of the neo-liberalist framework. Neo-realism finds difficulty in
explaining this assumed political-security regime as ASEAN avoids channelling its efforts in a
creation of a “military security regime” but instead creates a security regime based on
diplomacy. However, Michael Leifer argues that the creation of such diplomatic regime within
ASEAN is “adjunct” to the great power balances, evidently arguing in favor of balance of power
inherent in neo-realist discourse (Leifer, 1996, cited in Acharya, 2005).The lack of stable and
formal institutional arrangements within ASEAN has been attributed to the lack of strong and
common interests that may pave way to the creation of such structures (Narine, 1998).
Normative regionalism, as Acharya describes ASEAN, is regionalism tailor-fitted in the
constructivist perspective. Normative regionalism is described as regionalism founded and based
on norms and identity rather than the common processes of regionalism as discussed above.
However, ASEAN‟s normative regionalism is not always deemed to be facilitative in the process
of integration. ASEAN‟s respect for democratic ideals and the Westphalian concept of
sovereignty has tagged the region‟s “zone of peace” as espousing “illiberal peace” (Kuhonta,
2006:339). The norm of non-interference hinders the perfusion of democratic values into the
region as the region continues to uphold democracy despite diversity of political systems and
types of government within the region.
The idea of normative regionalism can be vividly reinforced with the existing conflict
resolution mechanisms present in ASEAN – the “ASEAN Way”. The ASEAN Way is
characterized with emphasized informality, consultations, consensus, and organizational
minimalism (Acharya, 2005). Being founded on the unique cultural heritage of Southeast Asia,
the ASEAN Way has fundamentally shaped political socialization and communication among
member-states, eventually creating the collective identity essential in a region founded on shared
norms and identity.
Despite the claim of the successful formation of an ASEAN identity as a basis for
integration, scholars continue to argue that such ASEAN identity has not yet fully taken shape
due to the cultural diversity among ASEAN member-states. The organizational governance
6
founded above the platform of ASEAN identity is seen as exclusionary from weak ASEAN
citizenship. This dissonance eventually reflects the misrepresentation of the ASEAN of its ideals
(Jones, 2004). Moreover, constructivist study of ASEAN has been critiqued for creating an
“illusion” that the organization is a purposeful organization facilitating community-building and
cooperation, thus making the analysis of the study disengage from the primary motivator of state
action: power and self-interest (Jones & Smith, 2007, cited in Jetsche & Rüland, 2009).
The legal instruments issued by the ASEAN since its inception can be described as
documents that have formally recognized norms springing out from cultural and historical
common ground within the geopolitical region. The shift from an organization widely based on
informality to formal organization with the signing of the ASEAN Charter has been a move to
compensate the lack of strong common interest within the region as identified by Narine (1998).
These norms in return have created the regional identity in which ASEAN heavily relies on,
making the ASEAN integration a normative regionalism. Despite the institutions and structures
established in ASEAN, analyzing the region using neo-realism or neo-liberalism is deemed to be
incompletely incapable as a region relying on collective norms and identity are not given deep
consideration by the abovementioned frameworks though such frameworks recognize the
existence and effect of norms and identity. Furthermore, Narine (1998) has indicated that even
though ASEAN does not have the strength in the material sense, it has made an important
contribution in the normative aspect of international society.
Research Methodology
As this paper looks into political socialization among the member-states of the ASEAN
and the formation of norms as a product of such, it uses the official regional instruments of
ASEAN as primary sources of data. This paper will also be using literature sourced out from the
library and online journals regarding ASEAN Regionalism and the APSC as secondary sources
of data.
To determine the diversity of ASEAN member-states, this study looks into the following
details. First, in terms of economic diversity, it will obtain the real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI) of each member-state. Cultural
7
diversity is determined by the ethnic and religious demographics of every member-state. Lastly,
political diversity is examined through the classification of governments and the Democracy
Index. Commonalities in the region are identified using academic journals and books as
secondary sources.
Two sets of documents are used: the first set of documents to determine the political-
security norms of ASEAN are: a) 1967 Bangkok Declaration; b) 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom
and Neutrality Declaration; c) 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord I; d) 1976 Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; e) 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty; f) 2003
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II; and g) 2007 ASEAN Charter. Secondary sources such as
books and journals are also used to determining the historical context of the abovementioned
documents. The second set to identify the demands of political-security integration are: a) 1976
Declaration of ASEAN Concord I; b) 1997 ASEAN Vision 2020; c) 2003 ASEAN Concord II;
d) 2009 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration; and e) APSC Blueprint 2009-2015. Norms will be
identified based on the actual text of the documents.
Using the constructivist framework, this paper stitches the relationship between the
existing political-security norms and the norms demanded by the integration. Basing from such
identification, this paper then formulates necessary conclusions as to the implications brought
about by the established political-security norms to the accomplishment of the political-security
community as prescribed by the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015. Lastly, this paper will present
possible recommendations to address issues identified in the accomplishment of the APSC.
Diversity in ASEAN: An Overview
The ASEAN as a regional organization has played a substantive, if not pivotal, role in the
development of events in the Asia-Pacific region during the peak of the Cold War. Reemerging
from the remnants of the defunct Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), MAPHILINDO,
(Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ASEAN
has endured the Cold War tensions that has engaged almost half of its existence as an
organization and is facing the challenges of the intensification of globalization and its
discontents. The Southeast Asian region (SEAR) is characterized as a region of economic,
cultural, and political diversity. For the purposes of this study, economic diversity is reflected
8
based on the member-states‟ real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and human
development index (HDI). On the other hand, cultural diversity is reflected on the demographics
of religious and ethnic populations of each of the member-states. Lastly, political diversity is
reflected in their type of government and Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit.
Democracy Index classifies states as 1) Full democracies; 2) Flawed Democracies; 3) Hybrid
Regimes; and 4) Authoritarian Regimes. The classification of states is based on scores on five
areas namely: 1) Electoral process and pluralism; 2) Functioning of government; 3) Political
participation; 4) Political culture; and 5) Civil liberties.
In terms of economy, the gaps are wide as reflected by the differences of real GDP per
capita and HDI between and among member-states. Singapore leads the ASEAN in terms of
economic growth and development with real GDP per capita of $24,947 (2005 US $ value) and
ranks 30th
globally in terms of HDI at 0.855. With the available data, Cambodia lags in GDP per
capita with $672 while Myanmar ranks 149th
out of 185 countries in terms of human
development. The gap in terms of real GDP is vividly apparent as Singapore (the highest in
terms of GDP per capita) has more than fifty (50) times GDP per capita than Cambodia (the
lowest in terms of GDP per capita). In terms of human development, two member-states of the
ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam and Singapore) experience very high human development, one
experiencing high human development (Malaysia), majority of the member-states experience
classified as experiencing medium human development (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia), while only one experiences low human development
(Myanmar).
On cultural diversity, the SEA region serves as the melting pot of diverse ethno-linguistic
groups. Most ASEAN countries are dominated by ethnic groups that are Malay or related to
Austronesian peoples (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines). Geographically, member-states
who are dominated by Austronesia ethnic group are insular with the notable exemption of
Singapore. On the other hand, the peninsular member-states of ASEAN are comprised of
different ethnicities brought about by its geographical connection to mainland Asia. Sino-Tibetan
ethno-linguistic group dominate Myanmar (as represented by the Bamar population) and
Singapore. Furthermore, Thailand and Lao PDR are dominated by Tai-Kadai ethno-linguistic
9
group. Lastly, Vietnam and Cambodia share the same ethno-linguistic group, the Austro-Asiatic
group.
In the religious aspect of the cultural heterogeneity of ASEAN, almost all in the region
has been dominated by religions that are distinctively oriental. The peninsular region of ASEAN
has been home of Buddhism. Majority of the population in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand
follow Buddhism, though not indicated as to what specific branch of Buddhism (Theravada or
Mahayana) each member-state is dominated. Singapore, an insular member-state, is also
dominated by Buddhism. Insular ASEAN member-states such as Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
and Malaysia are dominated by Islam. Only Brunei Darussalam among all Islam-dominated
member-states has recognized Islam as its official religion. Notably, only Philippines has a
dominant Roman Catholic population in the region while atheism dominates the population in
Vietnam.
On political diversity, four out of ten ASEAN member-states have a monarchial type of
government. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand follow a constitutional
monarchy where the hereditary monarch is the head of the state while having their respective
prime ministers as head of government. Two of the five self-proclaimed communist countries in
the world are in ASEAN namely Lao PDR and Vietnam. Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore,
and recently Myanmar, follow the republican form of government wherein the head of state and
government is elected at large by an electorate like in Indonesia, Myanmar, and the Philippines
or the head of state is elected by popular vote while the head of government is elected by
legislative parliament such as the case of Singapore. According to the Democracy Index 2012,
four ASEAN member-states (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines) have been
classified as flawed democracies, observing a common low grade on political participation.
Political participation does not only cover voter turn-out during elections but includes
participation of minorities in the electoral process, membership into political parties, and interest
and engagement of citizens in political activities. Singapore and Cambodia are classified as
hybrid regimes that are identified as governments with lacking formal democratic structures such
as elections, weak civil society, and rule of law, and the repression of free press and the
questionable independence of the judiciary. Both member-states scored high on the functioning
of government while scoring low on political participation. Both countries, having functioning of
10
government as its highest score, is then assumed that it has a strong legislature, politically
independent, efficient in the use of government powers and may enjoy popular support of the
population. Lastly, the communist member-states of ASEAN (Vietnam and Lao PDR) and the
post-military junta government of Myanmar scored lowest in the Democracy Index, thus being
characterized as authoritarian regimes. These regimes, as described by the Democracy Index
2012 report, are characterized as “outright dictatorships,” absence of independent institutions on
arbitration and adjudication, defunct formal democratic institutions, disrespect for civil liberties,
and the nonexistence of free press. In ASEAN member-states that follow the communist rule,
election process and pluralism is nil as their respective communist parties are the only legitimate
parties to run for office and the other political parties that seeks to exist are considered illegal.
However, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR scored high in the area of political culture as it is
assumed that they have a strong degree of political and societal cohesion, a perception on the
idea of a strong leader that bypasses legislature and elections, and the widespread belief in the
importance separation of church and state.
Convergence within ASEAN: Common bonds in History
G.W and S. Lindsay Gong (1981) has clearly presented this commonality within the
region in terms of its common historical experience. They have noted that the response of the
member-states towards the global forces imposed to the region has been part of their cultures in a
process of syncretic compromise. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans to establish colonies in the
region, the SEA region has been culturally and politically diverse and dynamic region as trade,
intermarriage, migration and forging of political alliances takes place between and among
kingdoms (Solidum,1981:131-132), even describing SEA as a multi-cultural and multi-centered
collage (G.W. & Gong, 1981:44). Moreover, similarity in the conduct of daily life of people,
language, architecture, values, and behavioral forms are evident since before, especially in
language as the bearer and a basic element of culture (Solidum, 1981:132).
The European Order was the first international order identified by G.W. and S. Lindsay
Gong (1981) that affected the region. With the arrival of the West in their “civilizing mission” to
the SEA, this multiplicity of cultures has been subjugated under the superior European
civilization, for the purposes of facilitating trade and the conduct of international relations in a
context of mercantilism and imperialism. The intrusion of foreign armies to Southeast Asian soil
11
was met by individual communities rather than collectively. G.W. and Gong (1981) has cited the
case of the Spanish invasion of the Philippines where there were no “stirrings of a Southeast
Asian regional unity to confront the foreign powers.” The Western model became the standard
of civilization and anyone who rejects the European mission will lose its independence.
This imposition of the standard of civilization through colonization is seen not only to
have implications to the economic or political concerns of that time but it made fundamental
changes to the religious and cultural heritages that has permeated through SEA communities.
The rearrangement of socio-cultural and political institutions brought about by the establishment
of colonies in SEA has apparently uprooted vestiges of endemic culture that had proliferated in
the region before the European conquest. Traditional system of power based on religion and
personal interest has shifted to secular and territorial governments. The colonial era, thus have
divided the SEA region rather than to consolidate it through the delimitation of territorial borders
regardless of cultural boundaries. However, the divide and conquer tactics of the Western
colonizers in the end have given a “perceived similarity of their experience…common
resentments and aspirations” (Ibid: 49).
The Japanese Order was the second order that dominated over the region is in the form
of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Second World War. The continuous
denial of the West to recognize the East especially Japan‟s efforts to meet the “standard of
civilization” has reached a point that Japan denounced the European order and instituted its own.
This Japanese Order nurture and glorifies Asian cultural development and regional identity (Ibid:
51). This cultural order however is not void of its value as a mechanism for political control as
the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere places the other Asian cultures under the helm of
Nippon. This cultural order, though Asian, remains to be politically and culturally foreign to the
region (Ibid: 53). Nevertheless, this has amalgamated the common resentment of SEA nations
against colonial rule with its imposed “standard of civilization.” Though the cultural order was
not sustained because of the excesses and the inherent imbalances in war, the attempt to create
the Pan-Asian identity has strengthened the SEA nations‟ resentment to the European order and
ignited the nationalist aspiration for self-determination and independence.
With the conclusion of the Second World War, the liberation of SEA by the Europeans
did not reestablish the old European that was dismantled by the Japanese. As G.W. and Gong
12
(1981) has presented social consciousness in Europe and experience with self-confident
nationalists in the colonies were emphasizing the moral inconsistencies of democracy at home
and colonial rule abroad (Ibid: 54). Though nationalist movements in the region call for their
detachment from Europe, they remain to be subject to international law of the twentieth century,
which remains to be heavily influenced by the European order. In addition, nationalist
movements in the SEA region are results of colonial education and administration mingled with
the obligation of building nation-states under a Western-inspired international law. It is in this
reason that SEA nation-states are far detached from the pre-colonial order in which they should
emulate. Thus, the struggle for identity in the ASEAN region continues to be a challenge as
individual member-states are faced by the challenge of reconnecting with their primordial roots.
As discussed on the onset, G.W. and Gong (1981) has identified three complex
challenges that ASEAN member-states are facing vis-à-vis its historical background. First,
ASEAN member-states face the challenge of unifying political and cultural groups disarrayed in
their own respective boundaries. Second, they also are faced with the challenge of political,
economic, and cultural independence and security amidst external forces. Lastly, the member-
states should synergize foreign forms of governance and political systems with traditional and
endemic systems of which the modern systems are superimposed.
Discussion
With the diversity and commonalities presented, it is proven that the region lacks the
preconditions needed to push the member-states to form a regional association on the very onset.
As proven by its history and scholarly literature, the ASEAN region has been exemplified as a
region of cultural, political, and economic diversity from kingdoms and sultanates of the pre-
colonial era to the republics, constitutional monarchies, and communist countries of the 21st
century. As an excursus, this diversity itself can be seen as a condition that leads to the lack of
common interest that will push the integration further. However, the alternative view of diversity
as an asset of the region and the common history that the region has experience is one of the
primary foundations of its deliberate community-building efforts. In constructivism, the use of
common history ties and an accommodative view of diversity of ASEAN is part of the
imaginative mechanism in community building.
13
Furthermore, Solidum (1981) also asserts that the community grows as the interactions of
the component units are reduced to habitual, predictable terms, and this frequent interaction
enhances trust and confidence among members than other units in which they do not share a
common culture. Because ASEAN itself is materially deficient, its cultural and political
heterogeneity since before and even until now, the inadequacies of commonality among the
member-states then is constructed through interaction (Acharya, 2001: 47). Norms sourced out
from these cultural, political, and historical ties in the background of diversity is a source of
member-states on looking into possibilities for the future of the association, including the
prospect of further integration in the basis of such ties. Such preponderance of commonality
above diversity has strengthened the perception of a “realm of possibility” in the political set-up.
Though ASEAN is seen as an emulation of the European model of regional integration (i.e. the
European Union), the preconditions, and even the current composition in which the ASEAN
region thrived is quite different, taking the common colonial experience and the heterogeneity of
cultural, political, and religious systems into consideration. However, the European impact into
the region has made the region cling itself into the West-dominated international regime. This is
further amplified by an international system of dominated by international law that is of Western
origins. Thus, it is inevitable that the ASEAN integration is faced with striking a balance
between the insurmountable European influence against the push linking towards the region‟s
and each of the individual member-states‟ primordial tie – its connection to its precolonial past.
Identifying Facilitating and Constraining Norms in the ASEAN Political-Security
Documents
Since 1967, the ASEAN has undeniably been into constant interaction among its
member-states thus creating norms that has dominated the association until now. The
complexities of these norms as reflected by the evolution of the declarations and treaties crafted
are indeed dynamic as it continues to reshaped based on the intra-mural interaction of member-
states vis-à-vis flow of power across the region and its neighboring areas. Amitav Acharya in his
book Constructing a Security Community in ASEAN (2001) has classified ASEAN norms into
four namely: 1) non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes; 2) regional autonomy and
collective self-reliance; 3) doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of states; and 4) rejection of
14
an ASEAN military pact and the preference for bilateral defense cooperation. He has also
exhaustively provided the background of each core category as presented thereafter.
Non-use of Force
It is noticeable that all declarations and treaties entered by the member-states include in
their provisions its adherence to the UN Charter. The norm of non-use of force and pacific
settlement of disputes and doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of states are enshrined in
Article 2 of the UN Charter. With the failure of ASEAN‟s predecessors (ASA and
MAPHILINDO) to avoid the diffusion of conflict, it was inevitable for the fledgling organization
to look for recourse to prevent another Konfrontasi-like engagement to take place. As discussed
by Chua (2001), Konfrontasi was the period of diplomatic and political row between Indonesia
and Malaysia that involved military mobilizations over territorial claims, especially in Borneo.
Sukarno‟s Konfrontasi was perceived by Britain as an impediment to Britain‟s “grand design” of
decolonizing colonies “east of the Suez”, thus actively preventing Indonesia from hindering
Malaysia‟s consolidation of its federation. The forfeiture of American aid to Indonesia has
instead boosted the latter‟s relations with the Soviets and Chinese. The bipolarization of relations
between the Malaysia and Indonesia vis-à-vis its adjunction to Great Power rivalry has been the
precursor in which the non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes has been seen as a
foundation of ASEAN norms.
Regional Autonomy
On the other hand, the norm of regional autonomy and collective self-reliance can be
traced to the history of the SEA nations and the reasons for the disintegration of prior regional
organizations. As explained in the previous section, the history of SEA has been intimately
molded by regional orders imposed to the region by foreign powers. To avoid this adjunction of
the association towards Great Power rivalries, it has been explicit in all documents studied that
the association seeks to be independent from external control and the want to pursue a “shared
destiny.” The 1967 British decolonization of its territories “east of Suez” and US President
Nixon‟s announcement of avoidance of another land war in the region because of the harsh
lesson it received from the Vietnam War has stimulated ASEAN member-states to fend on
themselves for their individual security. Acharya (2001) has cited cases wherein member-states
15
acted on these external moves by Great Powers. Thailand‟s push for a more independent foreign
policy and its pursuit towards regionalism became more vivid. Philippines also started to re-align
its Asian identity with its neighbors and shy away with the image of it as USA‟s client. On 1968,
Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam (cited in Acharya, 2001:53) commented with the
withdrawal of Western forces was bringing “to an end nearly two centuries of dominant
European influence in the region,” and that the region “must fill what some people call the power
vacuum itself or resign itself to the dismal prospect of the vacuum being filled from the outside.”
The possible reliance to foreign governments and external security commitments posed a
serious risk towards the internal stability of domestic regimes of the respective member-states.
The epitome of such disastrous effect is the case of US intervention and active participation
during the Vietnam War. Such involvement of the US did not only involve the loss of many lives
and destruction of property but has undermined the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese
government. It did not only stirred public opinion in the US homeland but the event also has
marked the indecisiveness of Western intervention in stabilizing domestic regimes held under
siege by insurgencies. Though not a direct military intervention, another example of such
undermining effect of US meddling with domestic affairs is that of the Marcos era during the
period of martial law. The financial support that the US has given to Marcos that went to massive
corruption within the ranks of government and cronies made Philippines plummet into
deplorable economic and socio-cultural conditions. Coupled with a staggering financial debt and
political instability, this gave rise to reigniting communist insurgency that was previously
quelled during the Magsaysay administration. The US support towards the Marcos did not wither
until the eve of People Power that instated Corazon Cojuanco-Aquino, the widow of the
assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino, as president of the republic. This support of the
US to the dictatorial regime has left a bad aftertaste to Philippine society, especially to left-wing
activists, even up to now. The manifestation of such ideal of regional autonomy was enshrined in
the 1971 ZOPFAN and the 1995 SEANWFZ. Both instruments have expressed the continuous
desire of the region towards neutralization as a path towards regional development. However, the
ambiguity of the language of ZOPFAN is a clear manifestation of the conflicting views of the
member-states towards relations with great powers. Acharya (2001) said that the ZOPFAN was a
product of consensus and met an eventual stumbling block with “Malaysia‟s and Thailand‟s
disenchantment with external security guarantees”, Indonesia‟s persistent position on non-
16
alignment, Singapore‟s position in the need for external security linkages, and Thailand‟s,
Singapore‟s and Philippine‟s need of US forces in the region. On the other hand, the SEANWFZ
was seen as a leap further to the realization of ZOPFAN despite the reluctance of Great Powers
to accede to the treaty, as it was detrimental to their geopolitical strategy. As Acharya (2001: 56)
places it, ZOPFAN was further undermined by ASEAN‟s post-Cold War pursuit of a regional
security framework, which would „engage‟, rather than exclude, the outside powers. This
engagement itself is a double-edged sword: it may either address the issue of delimiting the role
of outside powers in the region and use the organization as a collective leverage against an
outside power that will unilaterally impose its interest or it may further increase the influence of
outside powers in the affairs of the association.
Non-interference in State Affairs
In connection to the norm of regional autonomy, the norm on non-interference in the
affairs of States, or the respect for internal sovereignty, has been interconnected with the
collective commitment of ASEAN member-states to the survival of its non-communist regimes
from communist attempts to destabilize it. The presence of “resiliency” or “stability” in all
documents of ASEAN shows that the non-interference in internal affairs was considered as „if
each member nation can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal
threats, regional resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its
overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts‟ (Wanandi, 1981; as cited in Acharya,
2001). According to former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (cited by Jones, 2009),
“While ASEAN‟s declared objectives were economic, social and cultural, all knew that progress
in economic cooperation would be slow. We were banding together more for political objectives,
stability and security.”
This common perception of communist insurgency as a threat to national resiliency then
shows another quality of ASEAN member-states in the time in which this norm was formally
upheld: the prevalence of weak states and the lack of regime legitimacy that is constantly under
attack by communist subversive activities. Acharya (2001) cites various situations where the
doctrine of non-interference took place. Ranging from ASEAN‟s silence during the Marcos
17
regime and the People Power in the Philippines to the admission of Vietnam and Myanmar as
members of the association despite their communist and militaristic political systems
respectively, ASEAN practiced non-interference in the affairs of the member-states by not
critiquing other member-states in how they handle their domestic affairs and to be non-
discriminatory in the admission of new member-states. The doctrine of non-interference was
further reinforced by an issuance of statement by ASEAN foreign ministers on 9 January 1979
(as cited in Acharya, 2001) which urges member-states to “respect each other‟s independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political system” and “refrain…from interfering in each
other‟s internal affairs, and from carrying out subversive activities, directly or indirectly, against
each other”. However, with the settling down of Cold War tensions, the doctrine of non-
interference has shifted to “open and frank discussions” (Katsumata, 2004). Katsumata (2004)
has identified that the change of such interpretation of the doctrine of non-interference was
brought about by the rise of new global challenges in areas such as environment, economic
disruption (especially the case of the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis), terrorism, drugs, and
transnational crime. The doctrine of non-interference has been flexed after Cold War tensions as
issues that need humanitarian intervention, especially in cases where human rights atrocities are
at peak, are deemed as not of internal affairs of the State. It is in this global normative shift that
inspired Thailand and the Philippines to push for this flexible interpretation of non-interference
as both value human rights and democracy. Moreover, Katsumata adds that the doctrine of non-
interference stands to be valueless in times of economic crisis, especially that of the Bangkok
Financial Crisis. The doctrine of non-interference thus has changed overtime in response to
global stimulus vis-à-vis domestic concerns of various ASEAN member-states.
Preference for Bilateral Defense Cooperation
However, despite not tagging the organization as a military block unlike the NATO, this
does not mean that the member-states cannot engage in bilateral defence agreements with other
states. The ASEAN Concord I of 1976 assures the “continuation of cooperation on a non-
ASEAN basis between the member states insecurity matters in accordance with their mutual
needs and interests.” Bilateralism in security has been seen as a preferable option rather than a
multilateral defence arrangement because, according to Malaysian FM Mohamad Ghazali Shafie
18
(as cited in Acharya, 2001), agreements of multilateral scope tends to converge and settle with
the lowest common denominator while bilateral arrangements may reach levels that are
„mutually acceptable‟ and is „pursued as far as possible‟.
The ASEAN Way
Aside from the four core categories Acharya has identified, ASEAN has socio-cultural
norms that have dominated the organization despite its bumpy history. The ASEAN Way, coined
by Gen. Ali Moertopo of Indonesia, has been characterized by Singaporean Foreign Minister S.
Jayakumar as a process that “stresses informality, organization minimalism, inclusiveness,
intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolution of disputes”. The ASEAN
way traces its origins to the methods of decision-making within Javanese village societies.
ASEAN Way adheres to the principles of musyarawah (consultations) and mufakat (consensus).
Currently under the 2007 ASEAN Charter, the values of musyarawah and mufakat are explicitly
stated in Article 20.
Solidum identifies three factors that led to the emergence of ASEAN way namely: 1)
organizational structure and procedures; 2) principles adopted from earlier regional attempts at
cooperation; and 3) known cultural similarities. The formal inclusion of the principles of
musyarawah and mufakat as the basis of decision-making, thin institutionalism, and the multiple
mechanisms to assure confidence-building in ASEAN is a manifestation that the institutions of
the organization are soft in order for informal socio-cultural norms being observed,
notwithstanding the possibility of not reaching into solid conclusion. Moreover, Solidum (1981)
adds that the ASEAN Way comes from the stand of ASA heads that „only Asian solutions which
contain Asian values are legitimate‟. The very way that ASEAN diplomacy is conducted through
informality and flexibility and the lack of Western “formality” and “legalism” shows an
underlying value of confidence-building as important in the affairs among member-states.
19
Discussion
The evolution of political-security norms, based on the data presented and analyzed, is a
product of continuous interaction between member-states of ASEAN. However, it should be
noticed that the legal-rational norms of ASEAN are framed after a Western-model international
law contextualized in SEA while the socio-cultural norms of sprang from its inherent and shared
cultural and historical ties and socialization among ASEAN elites. As external events are
expressed in material form (such as US-Sino-Soviet interaction and contestation of power), the
political-security norms facilitate and shape how each member-state perceive the material
stimulus. Moreover, these norms do not only mold what member-states do perceive but also as to
how the organization collectively makes a common position on issues. However, it is to be taken
note that norms itself are not determinative of subsequent action rather norms constitute the basis
for actions based on the logic of possibility and appropriateness rather than the logic of
consequences. This logic of appropriateness is deemed conducive in organizations where
mechanism for punishing deviant behaviour is thin. Moreover, ASEAN political-security norms
play not only to regulate behaviour among member-states (like the case of admonition of military
exercises in ASEAN, or escalating diplomatic rows over territorial contestations), but also
constitute their identity. The term ASEAN Way itself is a constitutive effect that the norms of
musyawarah and mufakat dominate the conduct of relations between ASEAN, notwithstanding
its expected regulatory effect to the affairs of the association. This process of using the ASEAN
Way as a distinctive identity of the organization strengthens its regulatory effect as such identity
is not only expected by the member-states but by the international society as a whole.
Identifying the Demands of Political-Security Integration
In order to identify and understand the demands of political-security integration of
ASEAN, it is quintessential to discuss the contents of documents that posit the formation of a
political-security community in ASEAN. These documents are: 1976 ASEAN Concord I, 1997
ASEAN Vision 2020, 2003 ASEAN Concord II, 2009 Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the
Roadmap for ASEAN Community 2009-2015, and the Roadmap for ASEAN Community 2009-
2015 with a particular focus on the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015.
20
ASEAN Concord I
The first mention of an integrated community can be traced back to the signing of
ASEAN Concord I (AC I) on 1976, together with the TAC. AC I, foresaw the concerns that
member-states will face such as domestic stability, promotion of social justice and improvement
of standards of living and resilience over disaster response. Together with the norms of the
ASEAN that has upheld since 1964 and the rhetoric of an ASEAN identity, the association
formed the AC I as a plan of action that covers political, economic, social, cultural and
information, security cooperation. In the political-security dimension of the declaration, it calls
for the meetings of the Heads of Government when deemed necessary, the signing of TAC and
respect for the ZOPFAN (see previous sections and chapters for discussion), improvement of
machinery for political cooperation, possibility of ASEAN Extradition Treaty (seen as a possible
response to the charging of insurgents that cross borders), and the harmonization of views,
coordinating positions, and the possibility of taking common actions. Also, it is in this
declaration that security issues or concerns by individual member-states are encouraged to be
addressed through bilateral agreements among other member-states or non-ASEAN states.
Further explanation of this has been presented in the previous section.
ASEAN Vision 2020
The ASEAN Vision 2020 (AV 2020) was signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 17
December 1997. AV 2020, recognizing the achievements of the association that has attained
thirty years since its inception on 1967, increased economic prosperity, and upcoming entry into
the 21st century, has foreseen the organization, in summary, as „a concert of Southeast Asian
nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability, prosperity, bonded together in partnership in
dynamic development and in a community of caring societies‟. It also calls for enhancing
economic cooperation through close coordination in economic policies, accelerate liberalization
of trade and the focus of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) as the center of trade in Asia-
Pacific, develop technologies to increase economic productivity, and pooling of technological
expertise and manpower. Moreover, the AV 2020 foresees that the ASEAN will be able to
narrow down income inequalities, holistic human development without discrimination,
elimination of poverty and hunger as basic problems, strengthening of familial ties and of civil
society. AV 2020 also commits member-states to environmental sustainability, expansion of
21
ASEAN rules and conduct to the solution of non-traditional security issues such as environment
degradation and campaign against illicit drugs and human trafficking. AV 2020 also sees the role
of ASEAN in the international fora advancing its common interests and the strengthening of its
relations with Dialogue Partners and other regional organizations. This advanced prospect of the
region is seen to become reality by the year 2020.
ASEAN Concord II
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (AC II) was signed on 07 October 2003 at Bali,
Indonesia. The AC II has reiterated its renewed commitment towards strengthening economic
and social stability and ensuring national development through affirming “Prosper thy Neighbor”
policies. Moreover, this document has reiterated the value of consensus and non-interference in
continuous cooperation among ASEAN member-states. It is in AC II where the member-states
have declared the creation of the ASEAN Community with three pillars namely political and
security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation. The three pillars
address the areas of concern presented by AC I. Though the AC II reiterates the points reiterated
by AC I, the distinctive addition is the elaboration of visions and principles of every field of
cooperation. ASEAN Security Cooperation (ASC) is „envisaged to bring ASEAN‟s political and
security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one
another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.‟ (ASC II,
2003). The ASC also reiterates the avoidance of the association to form a SEATO-like defence
regime, but rather a security community based on norms that extend to political, economic, and
socio-cultural dimensions of the association. The ASC also invokes the principles of TAC as the
foundations of the conduct of affairs in ASEAN, increased cooperation with ASEAN partners
and other regional organizations, and intensified response to non-traditional security issues.
Moreover, the ASC seeks to innovate in the promotion of stability in the region through „norms-
setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.‟
(Ibid).
Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration and the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015
The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration was signed on 01 March 2009 in Cha-am Thailand.
With the ASEAN Charter 2007, the „crowning achievement‟ of the association, conferring legal
22
personality to the association and the fostering of strengthened institutional arrangements, the
member-states reaffirmed its position on intensifying the process of integration through cutting
the deadline for integration to 2015 (as declared by the 2007 Cebu Declaration) and execution of
the plans of integration such as the Hanoi Plan of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration,
and the Vientiane Action Plan. The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration, in conclusion, has
consolidated all blueprints for community-building of the three pillars of ASEAN Community
into one document which is the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015. For the
purpose of this research, this study will only focus on the first pillar of ASEAN Community
which is the APSC.
Though mainly a reiteration of the principles adhered by the ASEAN as categorized by
Acharya (2001) and as discussed in the previous section, the APSC Blueprint skews the design
of the APSC as principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and
promotion and protection of human rights, and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN
Charter. The APSC also envisions a community that is „people-oriented‟ wherein it calls for
sectors to participate and benefit in the process of integration and community-building. It
upholds the ZOPFAN, TAC, and SEANWFZ as instruments that foster confidence-building,
preventive diplomacy, and pacific settlement of disputes; norms that have prevailed the
organization since its inception. The Blueprint describes the APSC in three characteristics
namely:
A) Rules-based Community of shared values and norms;
b) Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with shared responsibility for
comprehensive security; and
c) Dynamic and Outward-looking Region in an increasingly integrated an
interdependent world.
ASEAN sees that a rules-based community, through the respect of democracy and human
rights vis-à-vis the rights and obligations of member-states, equates to the formation of shared
values and norms. Furthermore, increased political cooperation is said to increase the sense of
solidarity of political cultures, history, and culture among member-states. The Blueprint further
23
states that such solidarity can be further attained through the shaping and sharing of norms
within ASEAN.
In the area of security, ASEAN adheres to the design of comprehensive security that does
not only cover traditional security concerns but also non-traditional security concerns that affect
the lives of the peoples of ASEAN across borders. ASEAN considers confidence-building
measures and preventive diplomacy as integral parts of conflict prevention. In order to bolster
confidence-building measures, regular voluntary meetings of defence ministers are instituted to
develop an environment of confidence, free flow of information and security perception, and the
compilation and sharing of best practices of member-states.
Discussion
With the gist of the documents presented above, two commonalities are observed as to
the development of the norms demanded by the foreseen political-security community. First,
political-security integration calls for the intensified and rapid building of formal institutions.
This is manifested in the documents through: 1) Institutionalization of formal organizational
bodies especially in the ASEAN Charter and the APSC Blueprint 2009-205; 2) Intensification of
ministerial level and senior government official meetings in the different areas of focus; and 3)
Recognition and the accommodation of Dialogue Partners in the development of ASEAN,
especially in the ARF. However, the ASEAN Way of organizational minimalism hampers these
building of institutions for the political-security community. Second, demand for respect of
democracy and rule of law permeates throughout the instruments for the political-security
community despite the diversity of the association‟s membership, with particular focus on
member-states classified as “authoritarian regimes”. The recognition of an increasingly
integrated world by the ASEAN documents implies the necessity of the association to adopt
“universal values” of democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights. Thus, the
introduction of certain political-security norms such as democracy and the rule of law are not
only indicative of a thrust towards increase in the rate of institution-building but also the
retranslation or even withering of certain socio-cultural norms shared by the ASEAN to
accommodate the formation of a more integrated political-security community by 2015.
24
Charting into waters without a sail?
The study of the political-security norms and ASEAN indeed is a complex issue that the
time and space in this paper is not sufficient to present the variety of data and the multiplicity of
its interpretation. This study used historical-descriptive design and content/document analysis as
its methodology in investigating ASEAN treaties and declarations and secondary sources of data
such as academic journals and books. As informed by the constructivist framework, this study
seeks to present the relationship between the current political-security norms and the attainment
of the APSC 2015. Based on the foregoing discussions, this study concludes that the current
political-security norms of ASEAN will not complement with the demands of integration due to
variety of factors.
First, the evolution of political-security norms within ASEAN is instituted based on
contexts different from the current demand of political-security integration. This is clear in the
case in the doctrine of non-interference. As presented, the doctrine of non-interference was
instituted in response to the challenge of the perceived communist subversion of weak non-
communist regimes. The widespread norm of respect of human rights and democracy as stated in
the APSC Blueprint 2009-2015 seems to be problematic especially in member-states having a
low rating in Democracy Index (i.e. Vietnam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR). Also, the continuous
change of translation of the doctrine of non-interference has been observed throughout the
development of norms in the region. Compared to other core categories of norms Acharya (2001)
identified, the norm of non-interference has continuously changed from protection against
foreign support to destabilization attempts against domestic regimes, to „open and frank
discussions‟ during the post Cold War era. The norm of non-interference (with a particular focus
on the norm of non-discrimination) may emplace material structures (such as wide economic
gaps) that may bog down the process of integration. Furthermore, this norm of non-interference
will be transformed further with the injection of democracy, rule of law, and human rights as
primary norms that will be enforced in APSC. As previously discussed, it is unavoidable to claim
that ASEAN‟s norms are “adjunct to Great Power balances as claimed by Leifer (1996).
However, this adjunct relationship is not determinative of ASEAN action nor the formation of its
norms. Norms are a product of interaction between and among members of a particular
community. Though all member-states of the ASEAN may receive the same external stimulus,
25
they individually perceive it differently and act based on its evaluation. Such perception is
shaped by both material and non-material structures. Later on, existing norms act as constraints
as to how ASEAN will collectively act on such external stimulus, thus a clear manifestation both
of the constitutive and regulatory effects of norms.
Second, ASEAN political-security norms continue to be patterned to Western value-
systems; however it is translated into contextualized definitions through socialization among
member-states and the inherent socio-cultural norms in the region. Moreover, the attempt to
create the APSC 2015 looks more of an ASEAN-ized aspiration of political integration of the
European Union. This means that APSC looks forward into the creation of a comprehensive
security arrangement and a continuous adherence to the ASEAN way coupled with
institutionalized mechanisms to ensure pacific settlement of disputes (through the enhanced
dispute settlement mechanism patterned after the TAC and ASEAN Charter), creation of offices
to respond to security concerns, and institutionalized meetings of senior government officials.
However, this posits a serious problem as to the balance between the increasingly legalistic and
formalistic approach towards ASEAN integration and the traditional ASEAN Way that has made
the association distinct from other regional organizations.
Third, the material conditions within ASEAN remain to be heterogeneous, making the
rhetoric of common historical and cultural ties insufficient if the association seeks to further
cooperation and bring it to a „higher plane‟ . This is further amplified by the recognition that the
AEC and ASCC are “closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing” (ASEAN Concord II, 2003).
Though this study focuses on the political-security dimension of the ASEAN Community 2015,
it will be illogical to unilaterally reject the implications of the other pillars of ASEAN integration
to the APSC, especially the AEC. It has been noticed that the majority of the content of the
documents pertaining to ASEAN Community has been on the economic cooperation and the
thrust towards enhancing the role of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This stumble block as to
ASEAN‟s quest towards regional economic integration will also pose a problem to the political-
security dimension.
Lastly, the term “political-security” itself is semantically problematic, as the flexibility of
political-security norms may be able to complement the aims of political integration but not
security integration. As the APSC also focuses on the concept of non-traditional security, it will
26
be quintessential to differentiate the characteristics of both traditional and non-traditional
security concerns. With respect to non-traditional security concerns such as climate change
adaptation, human trafficking, transnational crimes, inter alia, it is to be taken note that such
concerns may not be addressed individually or bilaterally as patterned after traditional security
arrangements. Should ASEAN further enhance integration in terms of political-security, it must
embark itself into intensified institution-building, requalification and reassessment of values and
norms and thickening of existing structures. Furthermore, if the organization needs to assert its
position in the region, ASEAN needs to step up its cooperation in terms of military power.
Though relatively weak than other states surrounding the area in terms of military might, intra-
mural military coordination will at least respond to security concerns that are immediate in the
region, especially non-traditional security issues.
Thus, ASEAN is charting into new waters on a ship without a mast, without a sail. Noble
the intentions may be, the region is not yet ready to bring political cooperation to a higher plane
in a form of a political-security community. With the diversity of the region and the lack of
socialization in terms of inculcating the norms espoused by the APSC Blueprint, the region
remains to be in rough waters, especially in this time where inequalities are great and the power
rivalry between China and US persists. Faithful to the constructivist framework, this frequently
changing material environment within and outside of the region may not be able to create norms
complementary enough to harmonize views and action. ASEAN‟s normative regionalism gives
place preponderance on the value of norms and identity which subsequently are created through
continuous interaction and socialization among States. No matter how ASEAN will row its ship
towards its charted destination, it will have a hard time in rowing through the seas with ever
changing waves and currents.
As to policy recommendations, ASEAN should move the deadline for integration to a
later deadline due to wide inequalities present in the region. ASEAN should give more time to at
least narrow down inequalities both economic and political that the region continuously
experience. It is in this way that the harmonization of views and the formation of norms and
identity will be easily facilitated as this period of levelling off will also provide more time for
socialization among ASEAN member-states.
27
Second, commitment towards enhanced regional integration should be reassessed as not
all ASEAN member-states are completely capable entering into further regional integration.
However, this should also be limited by the norm of avoiding Western legalism and formalism in
regional integration.
Lastly, this study recommends that ASEAN should find ways to stimulate grassroots
participation by not limiting itself to Track One and Two Diplomacy. The problem with Track
One and Two Diplomacy is only limited to the political elites of the association which is mainly
comprised of high government officials and reputable members of civic society and academe. It
is through grassroots participation, capitalization of ASEAN in its rhetoric on “people-oriented”
values, and through citizen diplomacy that the political-security community-building measures
be realized, making the dominant ASEAN norms trickle down to the level of the mass population
of ASEAN member-states. This requires the further intensification of the inculcation of ASEAN
into the educational systems of member-states and making the organization more visible to the
citizenry.
To further improve the outcome of this study, the researcher highly suggests using other
frameworks in the study of the political-security norms of ASEAN. The inherent diversity of
theories and frameworks in international relations provides ample opportunities for researchers
to look into other variables and its subsequent relations. Moreover, the constructivist framework
itself is insufficient in explaining material structures that are void of social value such as
positivist economic studies on AEC and other pillars of ASEAN Community. As International
Relations Theory is both explanatory and constitutive, other lenses provide other perspectives on
what is there to know about the world outside and on how humans can acquire such knowledge.
The variety of epistemological and methodological alternatives will allow scholars to constantly
study on the matter and keep the discourse going, offering new ideas and newer perspectives.
Lastly, another recommendation for the improvement of this study is to widen the scope
of documents to be studied while narrowing down the number of variables to be studied.
Researchers may opt to focus more on one norm of the ASEAN and widen the scope of
documents that the researcher will investigate. This includes newspaper clippings of foreign
newspapers, statements, communiqués, proceedings, reports, and technical plans that may not be
accessible online. Researchers must find other ways to look for such data outside libraries and
28
even ask for such documents from credible offices. This will provide an in-depth analysis of a
particular norm that plays an integral part of the socialization of ASEAN member-states.
Reference
Acharya, A. (2001). Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
problem of regional order. London: Routledge.
______. (2005). Do norms and identity matter? community and power in Southeast Asia‟s
regional order. The Pacific Review. 18(1). 95-118.
______. (2009). Arguing about ASEAN: what do we disagree about?. Cambridge Review of
International Affairs. 22(3). 493-99
Capie, D. & Evans, P.(2007). The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Updated 2nd Edition). Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies. Retrieved September 10, 2013, from Project MUSE database.
Chua, LuFong. (2001). Konfrontasi: Rethinking explanations for the Indonesian-Malaysian
Confrontation, 1963-1966. (Masters Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
). Retrieved from
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/8260/50333375.pdf?sequence=1
G.W. & Gong, S. L. (1981). Cultural Development in a Treaty Region: The Case of ASEAN in
Historical and Global Perspective. In Anand, D.P. & Quisumbing, P.V. (Eds.) ASEAN:
identity, development, and culture. (41-67). Quezon City: UP Law Center & East-West
Center Culture Learning Institute.
Ganesan, N. (2001). Rethinking ASEAN as a security community. Asian Affairs. 210-26.
Janssen, S. (2010). The World Almanac & Book of Facts 2010. New York: Infohouse Publishing.
Jetschke, A. & Rüland, J. (2009). Decoupling rhetoric and practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN
cooperation. The Pacific Review. 22(2).179-203.
Jones, D.M. (2008). Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas of
democracy in Southeast Asia. InternationalAffairs. 84(4).735-756.
29
Jones, L. (2009). ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: a quest for social
order. Retrieved from Nuffield College Politics Working Paper:
http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/politics/papers/2009/Jones.March2009.pdf
Jones, M.E. (2004). Forging an ASEAN identity: the challenge to construct a shared destiny.
Contemporary Southeast Asia. 26(1). 140-154.
Katsumata, H. (2003). Reconstruction of diplomatic norms in Southeast Asia: the case of strict
adherence to the “ASEAN way”. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 25(1). 104-121.
Katsumata, H. (2004). Why is ASEAN diplomacy changing? From “non-interference” to “open
and frank discussions”. Asian Survey. 44(2). 237-254.
Khoo, N. (2004). Rhetoric vs. reality: ASEAN‟s clouded future. Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs. 5(2). 49-56.
Kuhonta, E.M. (2006).Walking a tightrope: democracy vs. sovereignty in ASEAN‟s illiberal
peace. The Pacific Review. 19(3). 337-58.
Lin, C.H. (2010). ASEAN charter: deeper integration under international law. Chinese Journal of
International Law. 821-37.
Narine, S. (1998). Institutional theory and Southeast Asia. World Affairs 161(1). 33-47.
Office of the Historian. (2010). Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Retrieved from US State
Department Website: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/SEATO.
Sheridan, G. (2000). Asian values, Western dreams: understanding the new Asia. Australia:
Allen & Unwin.
Simon, S. (2008). ASEAN and multilateralism: the long and bumpy road to community.
Contemporary Southeast Asia. 30 (2).264-92.
Solidum, E. D. (1981). Role of Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating the ASEAN Way. .
In Anand, D.P. & Quisumbing, P.V. (Eds.) ASEAN: identity, development, and culture.
(130-145). Quezon City: UP Law Center & East-West Center Culture Learning Institute.
30
Son, N.H. (2011, May). The ASEAN political security community: challenges and prospect.
Paper presented at the International Conference on ASEAN Vision 2015: Moving
Towards One Community, Taipei (5-12). Vietnam: Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
Tan, E.K.B. (2008). The ASEAN Charter as “legs to go places”: ideational norms and pragmatic
legalism in community building in southeast Asia. Singapore Year Book of International
Law and Contributors. 171-198.
Thao, N.H. (2003). The 2002 Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South ChinaSea.
Ocean Development & International Law. 34. 279-85.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2012). Democracy index 2012: Democracy at a standstill.
London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.
UNDP. (2013). Human Development Report 2013. New York: UNDP.
World Bank. (2013). GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$). Retrieved from The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?display=default
World Bank. (2013). GDP per capita (current US$). Retrieved from The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries?display=default
Top Related