From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:University of Oxford; date: 10 April 2016

Contenttype: BookContentPublishedinprint: 01July2012

Product: OxfordScholarlyAuthoritiesonInternationalLaw[OSAIL]ISBN: 9780199601813

s.IVTreatyInterpretation,21SpecializedRulesofTreatyInterpretation:HumanRightsBaşakÇali

From:TheOxfordGuidetoTreatiesEditedBy:DuncanB.Hollis

Subject(s):Treaties,interpretation—ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties—Humanrights

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:University of Oxford; date: 10 April 2016

(p.525)21SpecializedRulesofTreatyInterpretation:HumanRights

IntroductionIstheinterpretationoftreatiesregulatinginternationalhumanrightsaspecializedregime?Thisquestionisitselfopentointerpretationalongtwodimensions.First,itcouldbeunderstoodtoadvocateexceptionsforhumanrightstreatiesfromtheinterpretativeregimesetoutintheViennaConventionontheLawoftheTreaties(VCLT)andthecustomaryinternationallawitcodifies.Second,itcouldinsteadbeunderstoodtoaskifthereexistspecializedinterpretiverulesduetothedemandsofthesubjectmatterthatthesetreatiesregulate.Adiscussionofthefirstdimensionisnecessarybeforeanyanalysisoftheseconddimension(thatis,thespecificrulesoftreatyinterpretationinthefieldofhumanrightslaw).

Accordingly,thischapterstartsbydiscussingwhatitmeanstohavespecializedrulesfortreatyinterpretationinthefieldofinternationalhumanrights.ThiswillfocusfirstonwhetherhumanrightstreatiescallforspecialinterpretiverulesthatarebeyondtheVCLTparadigmandthen,second,whetherthedebateonreservationstohumanrightstreatiesconstitutesamovetowardsanexceptionalregimeforhumanrights.Inthethirdpart,attentionturnstotheinterpretivestrategiesdevelopedforhumanrightstreaties.Thissectionaimstoshowthathumanrightstreatyinterpretationisspecializedinthesensethatmakingthesetreatiesandtheirprovisions‘effective’inapplicationanimateshowhumanrightsinterpretersapproachtreatyinterpretationasawhole.Inthispartofthechapter,IshallalsodiscusshowtheinterpretationofhumanrightstreatiestakesplacewithinthecontextofgeneralinternationallawandothertreatiesthatmaybeinforcebetweenStatespartiesandwhytheforumforinterpretationmatters,beitspecializedorgeneralistinternationalbodiesordomesticcourts.

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(p.526)Thecentralargumentofthischapteristwopronged.First,humanrightstreatylawdoesnotconstituteanexceptionalregimeassomecommentatorssuggest.TheprinciplesofinterpretationenshrinedinArticle31oftheVCLTareflexibleenoughtoincorporatehumanrightstreaties,whichareasubsetofnormativemultilateraltreatiesininternationallaw. Second,internationalhumanrightslawdoeshavespecializedrulesoftreatyinterpretation.Asthechapterdemonstratesbyacloseanalysisofthestructureofhumanrightstreaties,suchspecializationstemsfromthenecessitiesoftheapplicationofthenormativeandabstractprovisionsofhumanrightstreatylawinconcretecasesandnotfromanextra-legalchoicetoelevatehumanrightstreatiestoaspecialstatus.

I.InternationalHumanrightsTreatyInterpretation:ExceptionalorSpecialized?DoesinternationalhumanrightstreatyinterpretationhaveitsowninterpretiveschemedistinctandseparatefromthegeneralprinciplesoftreatyinterpretationcodifiedintheVCLT?Or,isitaspecializedregimeduetothesubjectmatteritregulates,butoneneverthelesslocatedwithintheconfinesofArticle31oftheVCLT?

Therearesupportersofbothviews.Ontheonehand,scholarsarguethatthesuigenerisnatureofhumanrightscallsforaninterpretativepracticethatdisregardstraditionalprinciplesofgeneralinternationallaw. Ontheotherhand,therearethosewhosaythattheinterpretationofhumanrightstreatiesarespecializedandthatthisisaninevitabledevelopmentininternationallaw. Onthislatterview,internationalhumanrightstreatyinterpretationmaybenomorespecializedthan,forexample,internationaltradelaworinvestmentlaw. Intermsofpractice,thereisnoevidenceto

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suggestthatUNtreatybodies,regionalhumanrightscourts,theICJ,theILC,ordomesticcourtshavesystematicallyadvocatedeitheroftheseviews.Infact,theevidenceshowsthatthesebodiescitetheVCLTasaguidetointerpretationandthatregionalhumanrightscourts,inparticular,arecreatingtheirownspecializedrulesanddoctrinesinthecourseofinterpretingspecificprovisionsofhumanrightstreaties.

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(p.527)Differencesinopiniononthispreliminaryquestionarebetterconceivedasdisagreementsontherulesoftreatyinterpretationininternationallawratherthandisagreementsonthecorrectinterpretationsofhumanrightstreaties.WhatmakesuptheregimeofinterpretationsetoutintheVCLT?Whataretherulesofinterpretationthatareinforce?Whatconstitutesadiversionfromsuchrules?ThewayinwhichoneapproachesthesequestionsiscentraltodecidingwhethertheinterpretationofhumanrightstreatiesissuigenerisorinlinewiththeVCLT.

TheVCLT’srulesofinterpretationaresetoutinArticles31and32.Ofthesetwoarticles,Article31setsoutthegeneralrulefortreatyinterpretation.Specifically,Article31anchorsinterpretationin(a)text,(b)context,and(c)theobjectandpurposeofatreaty. ThecontextwithinthescopeofArticle31hasaspecialmeaning;itincludesthepreambleofatreaty,itsannexes,anyagreementmadebetweenallthepartiesofthattreatywhenconcludingit,andanyinstrumentmadebyanyofthepartiestothetreatyinconnectionwiththetreaty’sconclusion,butacceptedbyall.Treatycontext,accordingtoArticle31,involvesrespectbothforhistoricalcontextatthetimeoftheconclusionofthetreatytogetherwithforward-lookingcontext.TreatiesandagreementsthataresubsequentlyratifiedbymemberStates,andanyemergingtreatylaworrelevantinternationallaw,aretobetakenintoaccount‘togetherwiththecontext’.Article32furthersetsouttheoriginalintensionsofStatespartiestoatreatyasasupplementarymeansoftreatyinterpretation. Theprovisionitselfisclearinindicatingthatsuchtravauxpréparatoiresareasecondarymeanstoprovidemeaning.ThemethodofrecoveringtheintentionsofStatespartiesisameanstoconfirmtheoutcomeofaninterpretationthatfollowsArticle31ortoclarifysituationswheresuchaninterpretationleavesmatters‘manifestlyabsurdorunreasonable’.

EventhoughtheorderinwhichinterpretivetechniquesshouldbeemployedismadeclearbetweenArticles31and32,ithaslongbeendebatedhowArticle31’stripartiteinterpretiveformulaofwording,context,andobjectandpurposeshouldbeunderstood. SomecommentatorshaveunderstoodArticle31asimposingaliteralordering,wherewording,contextandobjectandpurposeshouldbeemployedasinterpretivetoolsintheordertheyappear. Thisformula,associated

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(p.528)withMcNair,suggesteda‘slidingscale’approachtowhatinterpretationentails.Interpretationisonlyrequiredwhenthewordingofthetreatyisnotclear.Inthatsense,themoreliterallyunclearaprovisionbecomes,themorenecessaryitistorefertocontext.Ifcontextdoesnotbringclarity,objectandpurposeshouldbeemployedasalastresort.

Since1969,however,therehasbeenwidersupportforaholisticapproachtoArticle31.Thisapproachemphasizestheimportanceofaninterpreter’sjudgmentastohowthewording,context,andobjectandpurposeinteractwitheachother. TheoriginalsourceforthisperspectivelieswithILCCommentariesonthedraftVCLTdescribingtreatyinterpretationasa‘singlecombinedoperation’wherewording,context,andobjectandpurposeare‘thrownintoacrucible’, whichsubsequentlyledthisapproachtobecalledthe‘crucibleapproach’.

TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)wasanearlysubscribertothecrucibleapproach.ItinterpretedArticle31inthesamewayandapplieditinthefamousGoldercaseevenbeforetheVCLTcameintoforce:

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Inthewayinwhichitispresentedinthe‘generalrule’inArticle31oftheViennaConvention,theprocessofinterpretationofatreatyisaunity,asinglecombinedoperation;thisrule,closelyintegrated,placesonthesamefootingthevariouselementsenumeratedinthefourparagraphsoftheArticle.

WhattheILCandtheECtHRhaveincommonistheirunderstandingofwhatArticle31instructstheinterpretertodo.InsteadofconceivingArticle31asamechanisticformula,theyregarditasguidingtheinterpreter’sjudgmentastowhatmeasureofwording,context,andobjectandpurposearerelevant. Inthepracticeoftreatyinterpretation,however,itmaybedifficulttodistinguishwhetheraninterpreteriscarryingoutamechanisticinterpretationorexercisinginterpretivejudgment.Thedifferencebetweentheseapproachesisoftenoneofdescriptionofthemethodoftheinterpreterratherthantheoutcomeofinterpretation.ItispossibletoconceivetheMcNairargumentaboutalexicalpriorityto‘wordingofthetext’atfacevalueasnottoofarremovedfromthatofthe‘crucible’interpretation.Indeed,itisreasonabletosuggestthatifthewordingofatreatyisveryclearandiswidelyagreedbyallinterpretersthenonedoesnotneedtocarryoutadetailedanalysisofthecontextandthetreaty’sobjectandpurpose.Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatthetreatytextisnotinneedofinterpretationorthat

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(p.529)interpretationisanactivityseparatefromunderstandingthewordingofatext. Itsimplymeansthatthemeaningthatemergesfromthetext‘fits’withthecontextandtheobjectandpurposeofthetreatysowellthattheinterpretersdonotfindthemselvesinstrongdisagreementaboutthatmeaning.

ConsidertheexampleofArticle1ofProtocolNo6totheEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(ECHR).Thisarticleconcernstheabolitionofthedeathpenalty,stating:‘Thedeathpenaltyshallbeabolished.No-oneshallbecondemnedtosuchpenaltyorexecuted.’ Thereisnothinginthistextthatisambiguous.Thefirstsentenceclearlyprohibitsapractice.Thesecondsentenceisclearwithrespecttowhomthearticlecoversandhowaninterpretershoulddealwithwhetherdeathpenaltymoratoriumssatisfytheconditionsofthefirstpartofthearticle.Inthisrespect,thereisastrongandtightoverlapbetweentheobjectandpurposeofthearticleanditswording—theabsoluteprohibitionofthedeathpenaltyintheoryandinpractice.

Suchstrongoverlapbetweenwordingandobjectandpurpose,however,isnotoftenthecaseinhumanrightstreatyprovisions—hencethecontroversyabouttherelevantregimeofinterpretation.Thisisprimarilybecausetheprovisionsofhumanrightstreatiesoftendonotlendthemselveseasilytotightwording.Theystaterightsinabstractwayswithoutstatingindetailwhattheyrequirefortheirapplication.Oneobviousexplanationforthisisthetreatynegotiationprocessandthedifficultiesofgettingagreementsoncertainwordsorconcepts. Commentatorsinotherfieldsofinternationallawwouldconcur,however,thatthisisnotnecessarilyaproblemsuigeneriswithrespecttohumanrightstreaties,butgenerallypermeatesallinternationallawtreaty-draftingprocesses.

Thereis,however,adeeperexplanationforthefrequentlackofclearfitbetweentheordinarywordingofhumanrightstreaties,theircontext,andtheirobjectandpurpose,whichmakeshumanrightstreatiesademandingcaseforinterpretation.Thisexplanationisbasedontheverynatureoftheconceptualstructureofthesetreatyprovisions.Asmanycommentatorshavenoted,humanrightstreatiesdonotcreatereciprocalobligationsbetweenStatesparties,butinsteadcreateobligations

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(p.530)forStatesinrelationtotheirtreatmentofindividualsundertheirjurisdiction. More

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importantly,thisobservationaboutthenatureofhumanrightstreatiesisadescriptivestatement,ratherthanastatementoflexferenda.

HumanrightslawprovisionsinUNandregionalhumanrightstreatiesregulatetheconductofStatestowardsindividualsbywayofassigningrightstoindividualsandcorrelativedutiestoStates.Thisisthecommonfeatureofallhumanrightstreatystructures. EachtreatytextliststherightsthatindividualsareentitledtoclaimfromStateauthorities. Theserightsareformulatedingeneralwording.Theydonotoftenincludeinformationaboutinwhatcontextstheyapply,whattypesofrelationshipstheycover,wheretheyapply,andwhatkindsofcircumstances,ifany,wouldallowtheirlegitimaterestriction.ConsiderArticle7oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR):

Nooneshallbesubjectedtotortureortocruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment.Inparticular,nooneshallbesubjectedwithouthisfreeconsenttomedicalorscientificexperimentation.

TheobligationsofStateswithrespecttotheserightsarecharacteristicallynotlistedinthetreatytextsthemselves,butratherstatedinasingle,all-encompassingprovisionthatassignsStatesdutiestorespectandensuretreatyrights. Article2(1)–(2)oftheICCPRprovideanexampleofthiseffect:

(1)EachStatePartytothepresentCovenantundertakestorespectandtoensuretoallindividualswithinitsterritoryandsubjecttoitsjurisdictiontherightsrecognizedinthepresentCovenant,withoutdistinctionofanykind,suchasrace,colour,sex,language,religion,politicalorotheropinion,nationalorsocialorigin,property,birthorotherstatus.

(2)Wherenotalreadyprovidedforbyexistinglegislativeorothermeasures,eachStatePartytothepresentCovenantundertakestotakethenecessarysteps,inaccordancewithitsconstitutionalprocessesandwiththeprovisionsofthepresentCovenant,toadoptsuchlawsorothermeasuresasmaybenecessarytogiveeffecttotherightsrecognizedinthepresentCovenant.

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(p.531)ItisnotamerecoincidencethatneithertheexactscopeofStates’rightsnortheirdutiesarespecifiedindetailinhumanrightstreaties.Thislackofprecisionisafunctionofthenon-mechanicalcontextinwhichhumanrightsclaimsarise.Humanrightstreatiesapplytoamuchlargeruniverseofsituationsthanmanyotherinternationaltreaties.Bytheirverynature,humanrightsprovisionsneedtobeinterpretedinthelightofchangingpolitical,social,andeconomicjustificationsofStatepolicies.Humanrightstreatylawinterpretershavetodecidewhichinterestsofspecificindividualsaresoimportantthattheyneedtobesafeguardedfrompoliciesthatseemtorespectormakebetter-offthemajorityofindividualsunderaparticularjurisdiction.Thekeytriggerfortheinterpretativetasktostartisaclaimonbehalfofanindividualthathersituationiswithinthescopeofahumanrightstreaty,iethatshehasaclaimgroundedinhumanrightslawagainsttheState.Doesthelackofaccesstodisabledfacilitiesinapolicedetentioncentreconstitutedegradingtreatmentwithrespecttoadisableddetaineeevenifthereisnosuchintentiontomistreatonthepartoftheauthorities? Doeshandingoutleafletsinaprivatizedshoppingmallthathasbeenhistoricallyapublicspacecomeunderthescopeoffreedomofassembly? WhatresponsibilitydoesaStatehavewithrespecttoactionsofnon-Statemilitaryforcesactinginitsterritory? Noneofthesequestionscanberesolvedsolelybyanalysing(respectively)thetextoftherighttobefreefromtorture,inhuman,ordegradingtreatment;therighttofreedomofassembly;ortherighttolifeprovisionsinvarioushumanrightstreaties.

WithrespecttoStateduties,astheterm‘legislativeandothermeasures’inICCPRArticle2(2)

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pointsout,thereisaninherentflexibilityastohowStatespartiescanrespectandensurecompliancewithahumanrightprovision. Theapplicationofhumanrightstreatiesrequirethatsuchmeasuresaregiventherequisite‘effect’.ThiscanonlybedonebyassessingwhethertheconductoftheStateauthoritiesarecorrespondingtoanappropriateconceptionoftheirdutiesunderhumanrightstreaties.

ItshouldbeclearbynowthatthecoreactivityofinternationalhumanrightstreatyapplicationinvolvessubsumingparticularsundergeneralsinthedomainoftherelationshipbetweentheStateandtheindividual.Descriptively,thismeansthatsituationswhenonlythewording(orwordingtogetherwiththetreatycontext)pavesthewayforthemeaningofthetextarelimitedbynature;thestructureofhumanrightstreatiesthemselvesdemandsanonerousinterpretiveframeworktooperate.ThisprimarilymeansthatanyinterpretingagenthastospecifywhattypesofdutiesStateshavetowardsindividualsinaninfinitenumberofsituationsandwhysuchdutiesmusttrumpotherdutiestheStateshaveunderparticular

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(p.532)conditions.Humanrightslistedintreatiesrangeamongcivil,political,economic,social,andculturalrights.Therearealsocross-cuttinghumanrightstreatiesthatfocusonalltypesofrightswithrespecttovulnerableorspecialgroups,suchaswomen,children,thedisabled,thenextofkinofthedisappeared,ortorturevictims. EachofthesetreatiesrequiresacomplexanalysisofthedutiesofStateswithrespecttodifferentkindsofrightsandwithrespecttodifferentkindsofvulnerablegroups.Suchdutiesrangefromdutiestorespect,protect,andfulfilhumanrightstodutiestopromotehumanrights. Evenprohibitiveandabsoluteprovisionsofhumanrightstreaties,mostnotablytheprohibitionontorture,showthatdutyspecificationinconcreteinstancesofanallegedviolationrequiresamoreburdensomeinterpretiveprocess.

Doesthisconceptualstructureofhumanrightstreatiesmeanthathumanrightstreatyinterpretationisallabout‘objectandpurpose’?Doesthelackofclarityofthescopeofrightsandthelackofdutyspecificationmeanthatthewording,thecontext,andthehistoryoftextsaredisregardedaltogetherattheexpenseofateleologicalinterpretation?Ifwetookthisview,mostinterpretersofhumanrightstreatieswouldbenaturalrightslawyersormoralphilosophersindisguiseforwhomArticle31oftheVCLTismerelyacloakforpursuingapurposefultypeofinterpretation.

Thisargument,however,doesnotsurviveclosescrutiny.AnimportantpartoftheresponsetothisargumentrequiresgoingbacktothehierarchicaldistinctionMcNairdrewbetweenwording,context,andobjectandpurpose.Thecrucibleinterpretationapproachrequiresthatthethreecomponentsofinterpretationfit

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(p.533)together.Itdoesnot,however,telluswhatmeasureofuseofthesemethodsconstitutesaperfectfit.Astheearlierprohibitionofthedeathpenaltyexampleshows,itcannotautomaticallybeassumedthatwordingisneverenoughtointerpretahumanrightstreaty.Inthecaseofmosthumanrightstreatyprovisions,however,thevaguewordingofrights,andtheblanketprovisionsofduties,logicallynecessitatesvisitingtheobjectandpurposeofthetreatyanditsfitwiththewordingandcontext.Thisisnot,asIhavebeencarefultoemphasize,becausethesubjectmatteris‘humanrights’asthedroitdel’hommistechargewouldhaveit,orbecausehumanrightstreatyinterpretersarenaturalrightslawyers.Onthecontrary,theargumentisfunctionalanddescriptive.Theclaimthatinsiststhathumanrightstreatieshaveanexceptionalregimeofinterpretationfavoursaveryparticular—notawidelyshared—interpretationofArticle31oftheVCLT;itfavoursahierarchicalorderingofwording,context,andobjectandpurpose.Butthecrucibleapproach,whichhasreceivedwidespreadsupport,demandsthatthewording,context,andtheobjectandpurposefit.Insum,humanrightstreatyinterpretation,regardlessofthetheoreticalorientationof

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theinterpreter,iscomplexanddemanding.Humanrightstreatyinterpretersdisagreeaboutthebestinterpretationofhumanrightstreaties. Despitesuchcriticismofactualpractice,however,theredoesnotseemtobeevidencetosuggestthatthecrucibleapproachcannotaccommodatetheinterpretiveproblemsofhumanrightstreatyprovisions.

II.TheReservationstoHumanRightsTreatiesDebate:EvidenceofanExceptionalInterpretiveRegime?Thedebateconcerningreservationstohumanrightstreatiesiscomplexandlongstanding.Ithasattractedaconsiderableamountofdebateamongstpublicinternationallawyersandhumanrightslawyers,especiallyafterthedeliveryofGeneralComment24oftheHumanRightsCommittee(HRC), reactionstothesecommentsbyFrance,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStatesin1994 andtheILC’ssubsequentworkonreservationstotreaties. Thischaptercannotdo

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(p.534)justicetothewholeliteraturethathasdevelopedsurroundingthismatter. Rather,Ifocusonthisdebateonlytotheextentitindirectlyaskswhetherhumanrightstreatybodies’andregionalcourts’interpretationsoftheVCLT’sarticlesonreservations(Articles19and20)areconsistentwithArticle31’sinterpretativeguidanceorwhether,instead,theyreflecttheadoptionofanexceptionalregimeofinterpretation.

ThedebatesurroundingreservationstohumanrightstreatiescentresontheimportantproblemofthelegalconsequencesofreservationstodulyenteredintohumanrightslawtreatiesbyindividualStatesparties. Article19oftheVCLTprovidesthatStatescanenterreservationstotreatiesuponsignatureorratification,providedthatreservationsareexpresslyenvisagedinthetreatyorifthetreatyissilentwithregardtoreservations.Thisisontheconditionthatthereservationsarecompatiblewiththetreaty’sobjectandpurpose. TheinterpretivedifficultylieswithdecidingwhetherunderArticle19oftheVCLTareservationthatisincompatiblewiththeobjectandthepurposeofatreatyisareservationatallandwhoshoulddecideonthismatterandtowhateffect.

Therearetwopossibleapproachestothisissue.Ononeaccount,thereservationsregimeisprimarilyinteractional.ItisuptoStatespartiesthemselvestodecidewhetherareservationenteredbyonepartyiscontrarytothetreaty’sobjectandpurpose.IfoneStatepartymakesthisdeterminationwithrespecttoanotherparty’sreservation,therearetwopossiblelegaleffects,either(a)thattreatyisnotinforcebetweenthosetwoStatesatall,or(b)thetreatyisinforcebetweenthetwoparties,butwithoutthereservationhavinganylegaleffect.IftheStateobjectstoareservationongroundsotherthanitbeingagainsttheobjectandthepurposeofthetreaty,thetreatywouldbeinforcebetweenthosetwoStatesminustheprovisionwiththereservation,evenifathirdStatepartyhadobjectedtothesamereservationonthegroundsthatitisagainstthetreaty’sobjectandthepurposeand,therefore,notavalidreservation.Basedonbilateralobjectionstoreservations,thisapproachleadstoafragmentationofthelegaleffectsofatreaty.

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(p.535)Onthealternative,secondaccount,Article19oftheVCLTisinterpretedsothatwhetherareservationiscontrarytothetreaty’sobjectandthepurposebecomesaquestionlexicallypriortowhetherStatescanobjecttoaStateparty’sstatement.Underthisapproach,aninteractionalregimeappliesonlyifthereservationiscompatiblewiththetreaty’sobjectandpurpose.ThislatteraccountwasfavouredbytheICJinitsadvisoryopiniononReservationstotheGenocideConvention:

AStatewhichhasmadeandmaintainedareservationwhichhasbeenobjectedtobyone

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ormoreofthepartiestotheConventionbutnotbyothers,canberegardedasbeingapartytotheConventionifthereservationiscompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeoftheConvention.

Itshouldbecomeclearbythispointthattheproblemofwhetheranexceptionalregimegovernsreservationstohumanrightstreatiesisnotreallyallthatexceptional.Ratherthananinterpretativequestionspecifictohumanrights,theissueistheinterpretationofArticle19oftheVCLTgenerally.Indeed,eitherinterpretationdiscussedabovehasconsequencesnotonlyforreservationstohumanrightstreaties,butforalltreaties,particularlythosethatdonotregulatebilateralrelations,butdemandobjectiveapplicationofprovisionstoallmemberStatesinanequalmanner.

ThereasonthattheinterpretivedisputewithrespecttoArticle19isamplifiedinthecaseofhumanrightstreatiesisprimarilybecauseof(i)thenumberofvagueandunclearreservationshumanrightstreatiesattract;(ii)thelackofanadequatepracticeamongstStatesinobjectingtosuchreservations;and(iii)thepresenceoftreaty-monitoringbodiesorcourts.Incarryingouttheirmonitoringoradjudicatorymandatestheseinstitutionshavehadtotackletheproblemofstatementsintheformofreservations,orotherwise,anddecidewhethertheyhavetotakesuchstatementsintoaccountwhenmonitoringcomplianceoradjudicating.Whendoingso,thesebodiesandcourtsarefacedwithafamiliarproblemingeneralinternationallaw,namely,thelegalsignificanceoflackofStatepractice.ItisnotclearwhetherareservationiswidelyacceptedamongstStatesbylookingatthesheernumberofobjections.Itisalsonotclearwhetheramonitoringbodyseveringoracceptingareservationisacceptedtohavetheauthoritytodoso.ThissituationissimplynotgovernedbytheVCLT.TherearenoprovisionsintheVCLTthatregulatetherelationshipbetweeninternationalcourtsortreatymonitoringbodies,ontheonehand,andthereservingStatesandthosethatobjectordonotobjecttosuchreservations,ontheother.Thisiswhytheresponseofsuchbodiestotheproblem,whenfacedwithaconcretereservation,hasprimarilydevelopedthroughthepracticeoftheseinstitutionsandsubsequentacquiescenceorreactionsfromStates.

TheECtHRhasledthewayinarguingthatithasthepowertodeterminewhetherastatement,howeverphrased,isavalidreservationornot.AccordingtotheECtHR,giventhatthereservingStatesagreethattheCourtiscompetentinadjudicatingthecasesbeforeit,thoseStatescannothavethebenefitofthat

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(p.536)statementinthecourseoftheproceedingsiftheECtHRdeemsthereservationinvalid.TheCourtalsorejectedtheinteractionalaccountaltogetherincarryingoutitsowntaskandheldthat:‘ThesilenceofthedepositaryandtheContractingStatesdoesnotdeprivetheConventioninstitutionsofthepowertomaketheirownassessment.’

ThisinterpretationisinlinewiththeICJ’sinterpretationintheReservationscaseoftheadmissibilityofreservations. Somecommentators(mostnotablytheILC’sSpecialRapporteuronReservationstoTreaties,AlainPellet)haveproposed,however,toreadtheECtHRcaselawwithrespecttoseveringinvalidreservationsasregionalcustomarylaw,ratherthanagenerallyapplicableinterpretationofArticle19oftheVCLT.Thismeans,therefore,thattheapproachofseveringinadmissiblereservationswouldnotbeavailabletoUNhumanrightsbodiesandotherthirdpartyadjudicators/interpretersoutsideofEurope. Itisnotclear,however,whetherPellet’sviewsshouldprevail.ItistruethatECHRStatespartiesappeartohaveacquiescedintheECtHR’sinterpretationseveringreservationsincompatiblewithatreaty’sobjectandpurpose.Itisalsoimportant,however,tonotethatthestructureoftheECtHRargumentdoesnotrelyexclusivelyonthesuigenerisnatureoftheEuropeanhumanrightstreatysystem,andcouldbereadasamoregeneralinterpretationofArticle19oftheVCLT. TheILC’s2011GuidetoPracticeonReservationstoTreatiessuggestsamiddleground—apresumptionofseverabilitysubjecttoaninterpretationoftheState’sintentindeterminingthelegaleffectsofaninvalidreservation—butitremainstobeseenif

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Statesandotherinternationalactorswilladoptthisapproach.

WhentheHRCissueditsGeneralComment24anddefendedthelexicalpriorityoftheobjectandpurposetesttotheinteractionalaccount,itdrewstrongcriticismfromtheUnitedStates,France,andtheUnitedKingdom.TheseStatesprimarilyarguedthatthedecisionofwhetherareservationisincompatiblewiththeobjectandthepurposeofatreatyrestswithStatesandnotwiththetreatymonitoringbodyandthustheHumanRightsCommitteedidnothavelegallybindingauthoritytoseverereservations. ThethrustoftheirobjectionsemphasizedthecentralityofStateconsenttobeboundbytreatiesandthelegalstatusofhumanrightstreatymonitoringbodiesininternationallaw.Unlikehumanrightscourts,whosejudgmentsarelegallybinding,thegeneralcomments,concludingobservations,andviewsoftreatymonitoringbodiesarenotlegallybinding.AsfarastheapplicabilityoftheVCLT’sinterpretativeregimetotreatybodies’interpretationofArticle19oftheVCLTisconcerned,therefore,thisdisputeismoreaccuratelyconceivedasoneoverhowtointerprettheextentofauthoritygrantedtotreaty-monitoringbodies.Thereisnot,inthissense,exceptionalinterpretiveregimesgoverningreservationstohumanrightstreaties,sinceArticle31ofthe

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(p.537)VCLTdoesnotfavourtheinterpretationsofagroupofStates,nordoesitregulateinterpretationfocusingontheauthenticityoftheinterpreters.

Thisdiscussionshows,therefore,thatasamatteroflexlatatheexceptionalistversusspecialistdivideispartofalargerdebateaboutthemeaningofArticles19and31oftheVCLT.WhenhumanrightstreatylawisplacedintheVCLTcontext,theinterpretationofhumanrightstreatyprovisionsorreservationstohumanrightstreatiesdonotnecessarilyturnonanexceptionalistvisionofhumanrights,butamoregeneraldebateabouttheprovisionsoftheVCLTitself.

III.SpecializedInterpretivePrinciplesintheFieldofHumanRightsTreatyLawTheprecedingsectionhasshownthathumanrightstreatiesdonotrequireexceptionalrulesofinterpretationthatarehermeneuticallysealedofffromtheVCLTregime.Onthecontrary,interpretationofhumanrightstreatiesisacaseofapplyingArticle31oftheVCLTtoaparticulardomainofinternationallaw.HumanrightscourtsoftenechothefactthathumanrightstreatiesandtheVCLTarenotcompetingframeworks.ConsiderthisECtHRstatement:

TheCourtrecallsthattheConventionmustbeinterpretedinthelightoftherulessetoutintheViennaConvention1969(Golderv.theUnitedKingdomjudgmentof21February1975,SeriesAno.18,§29)….TheCourtmustalsotakeintoaccountanyrelevantrulesofinternationallawwhenexaminingquestionsconcerningitsjurisdictionand,consequently,determineStateresponsibilityinconformitywiththegoverningprinciplesofinternationallaw,althoughitmustremainmindfuloftheConvention’sspecialcharacterasahumanrightstreaty(theabove-citedLoizidoujudgment(merits),at§§43and52).TheConventionshouldbeinterpretedasfaraspossibleinharmonywithotherprinciplesofinternationallawofwhichitformspart.

ThefocusinthissectionisonthespecializedprinciplesofinterpretationinthehumanrightsfieldasacaseoffullyapplyingArticle31.Theaimhereisnottogothroughthejurisprudenceofallhumanrightstreaties.Neitherisittodocumenttheinconsistenciesofinterpretationswithinthesameoracrossdifferentinstitutions—somethingwhichhasattractedmuchcommentary. Rather,theaimistoshowthattheapplicationofArticle31hasledtotheadoptionandelaborationofaneffectivenessapproachtohumanrightstreatyinterpretation.Inotherwords,humanrightsinterpretersacrossadiversityoftreatycontextshavecometoviewtheinteractionbetween

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wording,context,andobjectandpurposeasrequiring‘effective,real,andconcrete’protectionofhumanrightsprovisions.

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(p.538)A.TheeffectivenessapproachandhumanrightstreatiesEventhoughallhumanrightstreatieshavetheirowndistinctcontextandwording,thereisneverthelesssignificantconvergencearoundthenotionthatthecoreinterpretivetaskforanyinterpreteristomakehumanrightstreatyprovisions‘effective,real,andpractical’forindividualsasright-holdersunderinternationallaw. Thisissometimescalledtheprincipleofeffectiveness(utresmagisvaleatquampereat). Effectivenessisanoverarchingapproachtohumanrightstreatyinterpretation.Itanimatesarangeofothermorefine-grained,specificinterpretiveprinciplesdevelopedinthecontextofeachhumanrightstreaty.Examplesincludetheinterpretiveprinciplesof‘autonomousconcepts’,‘livinginstrument’,and‘practicality’intheECtHRcontext; the‘responsivenesstoAfricancircumstances’inthecaseoftheAfricanCommissiononHumanandPeople’sRights; theconsiderationofthe‘realsituation’inthecaseoftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights; andthe‘dynamicinstrumentdoctrine’putforwardbytheCommitteeagainstAllFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen. Theseprinciplesallderivefromtheinterpretiveconsensusthatinterpretationsthataredevoidofactualeffectforhumanrightsprotectionsdonotcoherewithgoodfaithinterpretationsofthewordingandcontextofhumanrightstreatiesinthelightoftheirobjectandpurpose.

AsGardinerexplainstheprincipleofeffectivenesshastwoaspects. Thefirstaspectdirectstheinterpretertogivemeaningtoeachandeverytreatyprovisionsothateachtermhaseffectratherthannoeffect. ThisaspectcomesfromthegoodfaithrequirementofArticle31.Thesecondaspectinvolvestakingateleologicalapproachtointerpretationandthisisassociatedwiththedemandsofthetreaty’sobjectandpurpose.Inhumanrightstreatyinterpretationwefindthatinterpretershavedevelopedbothaspectsofeffectiveness,oftenintandemwitheachother.

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(p.539)Thefirstaspectofeffectivenessinthehumanrightstreatycontextmeansthattheinterpretationofprovisionsshouldhaverealeffectintermsoftheconcreteandactuallivesofindividualswhoaretherecognizedright-holdersofhumanrightstreatylaw.Thatis,humanrightsinterpretationsmusthave‘practicaleffect’.TheECtHRcaseofAireyisahelpfuldemonstrationofthisaspect. Thecaseinvolvedwhethertherightofaccesstocourtinvolvedadutytoprovidelegalaid.TheIrishgovernmentarguedthattherewasnodutytoprovidelegalaidbecausetheapplicantcanexerciseherrightbyappearinginperson.TheECtHRrejectedthisargumentonthegroundsthatthehumanrightstreatiesrequireeffectiverights,notmerelyformalrights.Inawell-knownquote,theCourtsummedupthegoodfaithaspectofeffectiveness:‘TheConventionisintendedtoguaranteerightsthatarenottheoreticalorillusory,butrightsthatarepracticalandeffective.’ Accordingtothisfirstversion,effectivenessinstructstheinterpreterstoattribute‘sincerity’totheoriginalintensionsofthedrafters(iethecontext)inrealizinghumanrightsofindividuals.Thedistinctionbetweenformalisticprotectionversuseffectiveprotectionoffersananimatingreasontochoosebetweenconflictingunderstandingsofthewordingofthetext.Goodfaitheffectivenessalsorequirestheinterpretertotakeintoaccounttheabilityofexistingframeworkstoprotectindividualrightsovertime.

Thesecondversionofeffectivenessoffersadeeperaccountofwhatreallymakesahumanrightsprovisioneffective.Itisteleologicalinthesensethatitgoesbeyondananalysisofwhetheranexistingprotectionisformaloreffectiveasamatteroffactandasksthequestionofunderwhatkindsofcircumstanceshumanrightstreatyprovisionscanbetrumpedbyotherconcerns or

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legitimatelyinfringed.Thisversionofeffectivenesshingesonthequestionofwhethertreatytextsinprincipleshouldbeinterpretedinfavouroftheparticularindividualrightandexpandingcorrelatingdutiesorinfavourofthepublicinterestthatwouldrestrictornotrecognizearightoritscorrelatingduty. Acommontrendamongsthumanrightsinterpretingbodieshasbeentoadoptanunderstandingthatfavoursthefirstoptionandtherebytoassertthattheprotectionofhumanrightshasprioritytosovereignrights. The‘livinginstrument’doctrineoftheECtHR,whichdisregardstheoriginalintentofthedraftersinfavourofassessingrightsinpresentconditions,developsthisaspectofeffectiveness. TheHRC’sviewontheinterpretationofthe

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(p.540)righttolifeisagoodexampleofproblematizingoriginalintentinfavourofteleologicaleffectiveness:

notingthat…Theexpression‘inherentrighttolife’cannotbeproperlyunderstoodinarestrictivemanner,and[that]theprotectionofthisrightrequiresthatStatesadoptpositivemeasures.

Thisgeneralpreferenceforexpansiveinterpretationsofrightsanddutiesandrestrictiveinterpretationsofsovereignty,however,alsocomeswithproblems.CentralquestionsinthisregardarewhetherteleologicaleffectivenessequalsunwarrantedexpansionismandwhetherinternationalhumanrightstreatyinterpretersthatarebeyondthereachofdomesticdemocraticaccountabilityimposetheirsubjectiveviewsonStatesunderthisso-calledprincipleof‘effectiveinterpretation’.Thereisnoclearindication,however,thatthisistheautomaticoutcomeofeffectivenessinhumanrightstreatyinterpretation.ThefunctionoftheteleologicalaspectofeffectivenessinthecaseofhumanrightstreatiesisbetterunderstoodasshiftingtheburdenofprooffromtheindividualtotheStateinjustifyingtheinfringementof,orlackofmeasuresforprotecting,rights.

TheeffectivenessprinciplearticulatedbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightscomesclosesttothefull-blownteleologicalinterpretationthatscepticshaveinmind.ThisCourtholdsthatinterpretationinfavouroftheindividual(whichitcallstheprincipleofpro-homine)mustbefollowedevenifthiscomesattheexpenseofthewordingorcontext. The(former)EuropeanCommissiononHumanRights,andsubsequentlytheECtHR,wasmorecautiousindefiningtheparametersofeffectiveness.TheCommission,forexample,heldthateffectivenessrequiresseeking:

theinterpretationthatismostappropriateinordertorealisetheaimandachievetheobjectiveofthetreaty,notthatwhichwouldrestricttothegreatestpossibledegreetheobligationsundertakenbytheparties.

Herethenotionof‘greatestpossibledegree’indicatesthateffectivenessisnotaboutburdeningtheStatewithalargerangeofimpracticalorunrealisticobligationsandthattheinterpretationthatmayseemthemostbeneficialtotheindividualmaynotbechosenduetootherprinciplesatwork.Mostnotably,thedoctrineofmarginofappreciation,whichcallsfordeferencetointerpretationsofdomesticinstitutionsbasedonconcernsfortheappropriateforumtoresolveconflictsbetweenrightsand

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(p.541)publicinterest,isheldtoworkagainstpro-homineinterpretations. Inotherwords,effectivenessintheeyesoftheEuropeanCommissionandtheECtHRcutsbothways.Humanrightstreatyobligationscannotbeinterpretedinexpansivewayswithoutregardtowhetherornotitisreasonable,realistic,orlegitimateforStatestohavethesecorrelatingobligations.Effectivenessisneitherabout‘inflationofrights’norabout‘inflationofduties’.

Inlightoftheabove,couldtheoverarchingeffectivenessapproachberegardedinitselfasbeinga

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radicaldeparturefromArticle31oftheVCLT?Here,itisimportanttodistinguishthedifferentconceptionsofeffectivenessemployedbytreatyinterpretingbodies.Variouscourtsandtreatymonitoringbodiescanbecriticizedonthegroundsthatintheirapplicationofeffectivenesstheydonotpayadequateattentiontotreatywordingandcontextorthattooradicaldeparturefromthewordingofhumanrightstreatyprovisionsmakesinterpretationunpredictable.Eveninsuchcases,however,thereactionsoftheStatestothoseinterpretationsshouldbetakenintoaccount.Evidenceofcompliancewiththeinterpretationsofsuchbodies,forexample,maysuggestthatthepartiesacceptthespecialmeaninggiventothetext.

Buttherejectionofeffectivenessasanimatinghowprovisionsshouldbeinterpreteditselfdoesnotstanduptoclosescrutiny.First,thereisthequestionof‘ifnoteffectiveness,thenwhat’?Giventhevaguewordingthatisnotjustanaccidentalfeaturebutanecessityinthehumanrightstreatydomain,itisclearthatareadingthatsimplyemphasizesthewordingoftheprovisionsdoesnotinitselfofferseriousmileage.Second,theadoptionofarestrictiveinterpretationapproachnotonlysitsuncomfortablywiththeobjectandpurposeofhumanrightstreaties,butalsowiththeircontext.Theeffectivenessprincipleisnotexclusivelyaboutgivingeffecttotheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty.Itisalsoaboutinterpretingthecontextasoneof‘sincerity’onthepartofcontractingStatesintheircommitmenttotheeffectiverealizationofhumanrightsandconstrainingtheirownsovereigntytoachievethis.Effectivenessasanoverarchingapproachbothinitspracticalandteleologicalversions,therefore,isbetterconceivedasaholisticattempttoapplytheVCLTinthisdomainofinternationallaw.

B.EffectivenessandtheroleofgeneralinternationallawintheinterpretationofhumanrightstreatiesIfeffectivenessanimatesthemeasureoftext,context,andobjectandpurposeinhumanrightstreatyinterpretation,itremainstoaskhowdoeseffectivenessinteract

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(p.542)withtheadditionalrequirementinArticle31(3)oftheVCLT,requiringpartiestotakeintoaccount‘anyrelevantrulesofinternationallawapplicableintherelationsbetweentheparties’?Thereisstrongevidencethathumanrightstreatyinterpretersdothis,locatingtheirworkaspartof,andnotinisolationfrom,generalinternationallawandotherrelatedtreatiesandinstruments.Thisisinlinewithamoregeneraldutytoattempttoreachcoherenceamongstdifferentbodiesofinternationallaw,eventhoughthismaynotbepossibleineachconcreteinstance.

HumanrightsinterpretersinteractwithArticle31(3)intwodirections. First,Article31(3)mayleadtotheaccumulationofinterpretation.Second,Article31(3)mayleadtoconflictsininterpretation.Inthecaseofaccumulation,otherinternationallawobligationsortreatiesregulatingsimilarsubjectmattersserveasameansofreachingacoherentoroverlappinginterpretationofhumanrightstreatyprovisionsbycumulativelyconfirmingaparticularinterpretation.ThecomparativemethodemployedbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsandtheECtHRexplicitlypointinthisdirection. Bothcourtsintheirjudgmentsciteotherinternationaltreatylawobligations,rangingfromUNhumanrightstreaties tostatutesofinternationalcriminalcourts. Thispracticeofpayingattentiontothegeneralandregionalhumanrightstreatycontextenablesinterpreterstosolidifyandharmonizethemeaningsofhumanrightstreatyprovisions.

Second,interpretersinteractwithotherhumanrightstreatiesandthegeneralinternationallegalcontextasamatterofactualorpotentialconflict.Effectivenessandcoherencemaypullinoppositedirectionsinthesecases.Conflictimpliesthatthe‘takingintoaccount’languageofArticle31(3)ultimatelytakestheformofresolvingconflictsbetweenaparticularhumanrightstreatyandrelevantinternationallaw(includingotherhumanrightstreaties).Threefurtherspecializedrulesofinterpretationhaveemergedinhumanrightstreatyinterpretivepracticeinthisrespectthatwarrantattention.

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Forstarters,thereistheself-containedautonomousmeaningrule,whichaddressesthequestionofwhethercertainwordsraisedinvariouslegalcontextsmust

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(p.543)alwayshavethesamemeaning. Iftheanswertothisisnegative,thenhumanrightstreatyinterpretershaveanargumentfordeclaringsomeinternationallawasnot‘relevant’totheinterpretationofaparticulartreaty.Theinterpretivedifferenceindefiningtheconceptof‘jurisdiction’clausesinhumanrightstreatiesandgeneralinternationallawisagoodillustrationofthis.Ingeneralinternationallaw,jurisdictionpointstotheauthorityoftheStatetoregulateitssubjectsinprinciple. Incontrast,inhumanrightstreatylaw,jurisdictionhasbeeninterpretedtomean‘effectivecontrol’overpersonsbytheauthoritiesofanyState. Thatis,eventhoughaStatemaynothavejurisdictionoverapersoninthegeneralinternationallawsense,itmayneverthelesshavejurisdictionoverthatpersoninthehumanrightstreatylawsenseifitcanbeproventhattheStatehas‘effective’controlovertheexerciseofaparticularrightofanindividual. Thisdevelopmentinitself,however,doesnotmodifytheconceptofjurisdictioninpublicinternationallaw.Byintroducingadifferentor‘specialized’conceptionofjurisdictionviaaneffectivenessapproach,thissetsoutaparticularpathwayofinteractionwithArticle31(3).

Next,thereisthepriorityofaparticularhumanrightstreatyprovisionoverotherrulesofinternationallaw.Thismayhavetheconsequenceofdeclaringthatanotherbodyofinternationallawisnotrelevanttothehumanrightstreatyinterpretationcontext.Thepriorityofhumanrightstreatiesortheirindividualprovisionshavebeenarguedontwogrounds.Thefirstgroundinvolvesestablishingthatahumanrightstreatyprovisionisjuscogensandsubsequentlyarguingthatittakesprioritybecauseofitsjuscogensqualification. Thesecondgroundistoarguethathumanrightstreatyobligationsaremoreprominentthanothertreatyobligationsbecauseofthecomparativeprominenceofthetreaty’ssubjectmatterortheparticularnatureoftheobligationsattachedtospecificrightsinthetreaties.The2006case

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(p.544)ofSawhoyamaxaIndigenousCommunityvParaguayoftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,whichconcernedaconflictbetweenaParaguayanbilateralinvestmenttreatyandtheAmericanConventiononHumanRights,isanexampleoftheprominentsubjectmatterargument. TheCourtarguedthatthenormative-multilateralnatureofhumanrightstreatiesgivesthempriorityoverbilateralnon-humanrightslawtreatiesevenifthosetreatiespost-datethehumanrightstreatyinquestion,andtherebyruleouttheuseofthelater-in-time(lexposterior)maxim.TherationaleforgivingthehumanrightstreatyprioritywasbecauseareciprocalbilateralobligationthataStateagreestoundertakecannotoverrideanon-reciprocalobligationthattheStatealreadyhas. ThedecisionoftheGrandChamberoftheEuropeanCourtofJusticeinthecasesofKadiandAlBarakaatinvokesthenon-derogablenatureoftherighttofairtrialfortheEUasthecentralreasonforitspriorityoverUNlaw. Thissuggeststhatinterpretersmayrankprovisionsofindividualtreaties,ratherthanthetreatiesthemselves,asmoreprominentobligations.

Thereareimportantdifferencesbetweenargumentsforjuscogenspriorityandprioritybasedontheprominenceofhumanrightstreatiesorindividualprovisions.Whilsttheformerisanabsoluteformulation,thelatterisarelativeorderingwheretheprominenceofhumanrightstreatieshastobepittedagainsttheprominenceofothertreatyobligations.

Finally,thereistheruleof‘accommodation’ofrelevantinternationallawintheinterpretationofhumanrightstreaties.Unlikethefirsttworules,thisruletakesaccountoftherelevantinternationallawininterpretinghumanrightstreatieswhentherelationshipischaracterizedasoneofconflict.Theruleofaccommodationismostrelevantwhenthereisaclashbetweenhumanrightstreatiesandothertreatiesthatarealsonon-reciprocalandhaveaprominentnormativecharacter.Two

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possiblescenariosofaccommodationmayoccur.Inthefirstscenario,relevantinternationallawfullydisplaceshumanrightstreatylawbecauseitisshownthatanormativelypriordutyexistsinrelevantinternationallawandfulfillingthehumanrightslawdutieswouldrequireaStatetobeinviolationofthoseduties(inwhichcasethepriorityruleoperatesintheoppositedirection).ThemostillustrativeinstanceofthisscenarioistheinteractionbetweeninternationalhumanrightslawinconflictwithUNCharterlaw(inparticularchapter7oftheUNCharter). Inasecondscenario,someprovisionsofhumanrightstreatiesareinterpretedinlightoftherelevantinternationallawwherethatlawisshowntobelexspecialis.Conflictsbetweenhumanrightstreatyprovisionswithrespecttotherighttolifeand

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(p.545)internationalhumanitarianlaw(jusinbello)provisionsonmilitarynecessityareexamplesofthis.

Thisdiscussionshowsthattakingintoaccountrelevantinternationallawintheinterpretiveexerciseisacomplextask.Itfirstrequiresfilteringwhatconstitutesrelevantinternationallaw.Ifabodyoflawisdeclaredrelevant,itmustbedecidedwhetherthatinternationallawmodifiesorconfirmstheinterpretationofahumanrightstreatycarriedoutpriortotakingintoaccountsuchlaw.Thepracticeshowsthatotherinternationallawcanbe(i)excluded,(ii)deemedtodisplacehumanrightstreatyinterpretationaltogether,or(iii)includedaslexspecialis.Whilsttheeffectivenessprincipleremainsintactinthefirstscenario,itisweighedagainstotherinterpretiveprinciplesinthelattertwo.

IV.TheInterpretiveForum:InterpretationofHumanRightsTreatiesbySpecializedorGeneralInternationalBodiesorDomesticCourtsItmaybearguedthateffectivenessandcoherencyinteractdifferentlywhentheinterpretiveforaaredifferent.Thatis,thewayinwhichArticle31operatesisrelativetothelegalcontext.Thereissomemerittothisview,butcautionisalsoadvisedtonottaketherelativityofinterpretiveframeworkstoofar.Rather,thedifferencethattheforumbringstointerpretativestrategiesisbetterconceivedasoneofemphasisratherthanoneofkind.

Non-specializedinternationalcourtsandinstitutionsfindthemselvesinapositiontotakeintoaccounthumanrightstreatylawunderdifferentcircumstancesthanspecializedinstitutions.Asdiscussedabove,specializedhumanrightsinterpretersaremotivatedbyidentifyingthemosteffectiveprotectionfortheindividualrightholderinthelightoftheconstraintsofthewording,context,andtakingintoaccountanyrelevantinternationallaw.Generalists,however,wouldbemotivatedbyidentifyingthefullrangeofrelevantinternationallawandwouldexclusivelyfocusonhumanrightstreatylawonlyifthepriorityruleapplies.Forspecialistsinotherfields,ontheotherhand,humanrightstreatylawmayonlybeacandidateforrelevantinternationallawininterpretingtheircoredomain,beittrade,environment,orinternationalcriminallaw.Whilstthereisaforcefulcaseforspecialisthumanrightsinterpreterstodefertotheeffectiveinterpretationofhumanrightstreaties,thiswouldnotnecessarilybethecasefornon-specialisedinterpreters.Thereisemergingevidence,especiallyfromtheICJ,however,thattheeffectivenessprinciplehaspermeatedinterpretationofhumanrightstreatylawbynon-specialists. InthecontentiouscaseoftheDRCvUganda,forexample,the

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(p.546)ICJlargelyanalysedthesituationinUgandathroughthelensofhumanrightstreatylawinareasthatwereoccupiedbytheUgandanforcesaswellasinareaswheretherewasno

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occupation,butcivilianswereneverthelessaffectedbytheactionsofUgandanarmedforces.ThisanalysiswaspossiblebecausehumanrightslawdidnotconflictwithanypriordutiesthatUgandahadunderinternationallaw.

Finally,thereisthequestionofwhetherinterpretiveprinciplesdevelopedbyspecializedbodiescanhavethesamecurrencywhenreceivedbydomesticcourts.Domesticcourtsaresimilartospecializedhumanrightstreatyinterpretersinthesensethattheirinterpretivefunctionstakeplaceinthecontextofindividualrightsclaimsinmostcases. Unlikespecialistorgeneralistinternationalinterpreters,however,domesticcourtsoftenpittheeffectivenessprincipleagainsttheprinciplesofintegrity,coherency,andstabilityofdomesticlawinthelightofthedomesticlegaldoctrineconcerningtheauthorityofinternationalhumanrightscaselawinthedomesticcontext.Whilstthetransnationalistmodelsofinterpretationgiveprimacytothecaselaw,nationalistmodelsofinterpretationaremorescepticalofthedirectauthorityofinterpretiveprinciplesofinternationalcourts. Thecaseforthe‘nationalist’model’sself-containedinterpretationsofhumanrightstreatiesbydomesticcourtsinlightofthedomesticsystem’sobjectandpurposesdoesnotsurvivescrutinyundertheVCLT.Anyinterpreterisactuallyunderadutytoconsiderthetreaty’sobjectandthepurpose.Furthermore,domesticinterpretationsofaninternationalhumanrightstreatythatsignificantlydivergefromtheinterpretationsofitsfinalinterpreter(suchasaregionalhumanrightscourt)arelikelytoraisequestionsaboutwhetherdomesticcourtsenjoytheauthoritytoofferautonomousinterpretationsofmultilateralhumanrightstreaties.Ultimately,however,whethertheprinciplesdevelopedbyregionalcourtsandspecializedbodieshavedirecteffectandarelegallybindingonthedomesticinterpretationprocessdependsonthestatusofsuchinterpretationsindomesticlaw. Itisneverthelesssafetoarguethattheeffectivenessprinciplemayattheveryleasthavepersuasivevalueindomesticcourts.

ConclusionThischaptersurveyedtheexistingrulesforhumanrightstreatyinterpretation.Ithasshownthathumanrightstreatiesdonothaveanexceptionalregimeoftreatyinterpretation.Therearespecificapproachestointerpretinghumanrightstreatiestotheextentrequiredbytheinterpretivetaskbeforetheinterpreter.Inthisrespect,itisonlynaturalthattherearesomespecialrulesineachdomainofinternationallaw.Importantly,specialdoesnotmeanrulesthatareoutoftouchwithgeneral

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(p.547)internationallaw.Specialsimplymeanstheapproachesmentionedhereinareanecessityfortheeverydaybusinessofinterpretation.

Thischapterhasfurthershownthatspecialrulesofinterpretationcalledforbyhumanrightstreatieshavebeencrystallizedundertheoverarchingumbrellaofeffectiveness.Effectivenessisageneraldirectionformakingsenseofthewording,context,andtheobjectandpurposeofhumanrightstreaties.Itisdemandedbythecircumstancesofthehumanrightstreatiesthemselves,whichregulatetherightsofindividualstowhichStateshavecorrelatingdutiestogiveeffect.Inotherwords,effectivenessisnotapreferredprinciplebysome.Rather,itflowsfromtherelationshipofthetreaty’swording,context,andtheobjectandpurpose.Thisoverarchingprinciplehasgivenrisetomanymorespecificprinciplesinthecontextofeachtreatyanditsinterpretingbody,includingmediatingprinciplesthatshowthelimitsofeffectiveness.Animportantconsequenceoftheemploymentofeffectivenesshasbeentodisregardoriginalintentandformalprotectionofrightsinfavourofdynamicinterpretationandpracticalprotectionofrights.

Thechapterhasattemptedtoavoiddiscussinginterpretiveconflictsthatexistbetweendifferentinstitutionsoverdifferentrightsprovisions,aswellasjurisdictionalclauses.Instead,asamatterofageneralargument,theaimhasbeentoshowthatspecializationisaninevitableconsequence

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andthattherearegoodreasonsforwhythishastakentheeffectivenessrouteinthecaseofhumanrightstreaties.Thelastsectionturneditsattentiontotheinteractionofhumanrightstreatieswithgeneralinternationallawandotherrelevantinstrumentsandtreaties.Thisshowedthateffectiveness,non-reciprocity,andnormativehierarchyarethreekeyconceptsthatanimatehumanrightstreaties’interactionwithotherpartsofinternationallaw.

WhatthisoveralldiscussionshowsisthatArticle31oftheVCLTisaflexibleregime.Theprinciplethatitcovers—thatofcrucibleinterpretation—istooabstractnottobeapplicabletohumanrightstreaties.Whatisatstakeinhumanrightstreatyinterpretation,aswellasinotherfieldsofinternationallaw,ispreciselytoworkouthowtogivefulleffecttoArticle31inevery-dayapplications.Asthischapterhasexplained,thistaskcannotbutbecontroversial.

RecommendedReadingMCraven,‘LegalDifferentiationandtheConceptoftheHumanRightsTreatyinInternationalLaw’(2000)11EJIL489JSDavidson,TheInter-AmericanHumanRightsSystem(Aldershot,Dartmouth1996)MFitzmaurice,‘Dynamic(evolutive)interpretationoftreaties’(2008)21HagueYbkIntlL101MFitzmaurice,‘Dynamic(evolutive)interpretationoftreaties’(2009)22HagueYbkIntlL3MForowics,TheReceptionofInternationalLawintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(OUP,Oxford2010)RHiggins,‘HumanRights:SomeQuestionsofIntegrity’(1989)52ModernLRev1(p.548)MKammingaandMShenin(eds),TheImpactofHumanRightsLawonGeneralInternationalLaw(OUP,Oxford2009)LLijnzaad,ReservationstoUNHumanRightsTreaties:RatifyandRuin?(MartinusNijhoff,Dordrecht1995)LLixinski,‘TreatyInterpretationbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights:ExpansionismattheServiceoftheUnityofInternationalLaw’(2010)21EJIL585JGMerrills,TheDevelopmentofInternationalLawbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(2ndednMUP,Manchester1993)MMilanovic,‘FromCompromisetoPrinciple:ClarifyingtheConceptofStateJurisdictioninHumanRightsTreaties’(2008)8HumanRtsLRev411AMowbray,TheDevelopmentofPositiveObligationsUndertheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(HartPublishing,Oxford2004)AOrakhelashvili,‘RestrictiveInterpretationoftheHumanRightsTreatiesintheRecentJurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights’(2005)14EJIL529CRedgwell,‘ReservationstoTreatiesandHumanRightsCommitteeGeneralCommentNo24’(1997)46ICLQ390BSimma,‘InternationalHumanRightsandGeneralInternationalLaw:AComparativeAnalysis’(1993)CollectedCoursesoftheAcademyofEuropeanLaw,volIV(2),163JTobin,‘SeekingtoPersuade:AConstructiveApproachtoHumanRightsTreatyInterpretation’(2010)23HarvardHumanRtsJ1CTrindade,‘CoexistenceandCoordinationofMechanismsofProtectionofHumanRights’(1987)202RcD9DFVagts,‘TreatyInterpretationandtheNewWaysofLawReading’(1993)4EJIL499

Footnotes:Thischapterwilldiscussinternationalhumanrightstreatylawandprovideexamplesfromhuman

rightstreatyinterpretingbodiesincludingregionalhumanrightscourtsandcommissions,UNtreatymonitoringbodies,andotherentitiesthatinterpretgeneralinternationallawsuchastheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ),InternationalLawCommission(ILC),anddomesticConstitutionalcourts.Acomparativeanalysisofallinstitutionsthatinterpretinternationalhumanrightslaw,however,isbeyondthescopeofthischapter(and,indeed,thisGuide).

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TheonlyexceptionwithintheVCLTregimeasfarashumanrightstreatiesandothertreatiesofahumanitariancharacterareconcernedisArt60(5).Itstatesthatsuspensionoftreatiesfollowingmaterialbreachdoesnotapplyto‘provisionsrelatingtothehumanpersoncontainedinthetreatiesofahumanitariancharacter’.Forfurtherdiscussionofthisprovision,seeChapter23,PartII.B,585etseq.

CfDFVagts,‘TreatyInterpretationandtheNewWaysofLawReading’(1993)4EJIL499 .Thosewhoholdthisviewarefamouslycalled‘droitdel’hommistes’(humanrightists)byAlainPellet.APellet,‘“Droitdel’hommisme”etdroitinternational’(2001)1RevueDroitsFondamenteux167 .

CfJTobin,‘SeekingtoPersuade:AConstructiveApproachtoHumanRightsTreatyInterpretation’(2010)23HarvardHumanRtsJ1.

CfIVanDamme,‘TreatyInterpretationbytheWTOAppellateBody’(2010)21EJIL605;ARoberts,‘PowerandPersuasioninInvestmentTreatyArbitration’(2010)104AJIL179 .

SeewithreferencetotheHumanRightsCommittee,RHiggins,‘HumanRights:SomeQuestionsofIntegrity’(1989)52ModernLRev1 ;withreferencetotheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,AMowbray,TheDevelopmentofPositiveObligationsUndertheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(HartPublishing,Oxford2004) ;withreferencetotheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,LLixinski,‘TreatyInterpretationbytheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights:ExpansionismattheServiceoftheUnityofInternationalLaw’(2010)21EJIL585.

ForadiscussionoftheVCLTarticlesoninterpretation,seeChapter19;RGardiner,TreatyInterpretation(OUP,Oxford2008) ;AOrakhelashvili,TheInterpretationofActsandRulesinPublicInternationalLaw(OUP,Oxford2008) ;ULinderfalk,OntheInterpretationofTreaties:TheModernInternationalLawasExpressedinthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(Springer,Dordecht2007) .

ForArticle31’stext,seeChapter19,475.

ForArticle32’stext,seeChapter19,475–6.

SeeGardiner(n7)29–33.

ForaclassicaldefenceofthispositionseeAMcNair,TheLawofTreaties(ClarendonPress,Oxford1961)364–83 .CfISinclair,ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(2ndednMUP,Manchester1984)114–19.

McNair(n11)365.

SeeGardiner(n7)9–10;VanDamme(n5)619–20.

[1966]YBILC,volII,219–20[8];cfalsoILCStudyGroup,‘FragmentationofInternationalLaw:DifficultiesArisingfromtheDiversificationandExpansionofInternationalLaw’(13April2006)UNDocA/CN.4/L.682[428].

Gardiner(n7)9–10.

GoldervUnitedKingdom(Appno4451/70)(1975)1EHRR524[30].

DMMcRae,‘ApproachestoInterpretationofTreaties:theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsandtheWTOAppellateBody’inSBreitenmoserandothers(eds),HumanRights,DemocracyandtheRuleofLaw:LiberAmicorumLuzuisWildhaber(NomosVerlagsgesellschaft,Baden-Baden2007)1407.

Seeonthispointandthedistinctionbetweenneutralandsemanticconcepts,RDworkin,JusticeinRobes(HarvardUniversityPress,London2006) .

ProtocolNo6totheConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedomsConcerningtheAbolitionoftheDeathPenalty(28April1983)EurTSNo114reprintedin[1983]22ILM539,Art1.

CfHiggins(n6)6–7(raisingthepointwithrespecttoprohibitiveprovisionsoftheICCPR).

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Foranhistoricalaccount,seeBSimpson,HumanRightsandtheEndoftheEmpire:BritainandtheGenesisoftheEuropeanConvention(OUP,Oxford2004) ;foracontemporaryaccount,seeADhir,‘HumanRightsTreatyDraftingthroughtheLensofMentalDisability:TheProposedInternationalConventiononPromotionandProtectionoftheRightsandDignityofPersonswithDisabilities’(2005)41StanfordJIntlL181 .

Fordebatesonsimilarambiguityininternationaltradelaw,cfegPLinsday,‘TheAmbiguityofGATTArticleXXI:SubtleSuccessorRampantFailure?’(2003)52DukeLJ1277 ;andininternationalcriminallaw,cfGFletcherandJDOhlin,‘ReclaimingFundamentalPrinciplesofCriminalLawintheDarfurCase’(2005)3JIntlCrimJustice539–61.

MCraven,‘LegalDifferentiationandtheConceptoftheHumanRightsTreatyinInternationalLaw’(2000)11EJIL489,513–17 .

Humanrightstreatystructuresdiffer,inthisrespectfromothercategoriesofnormativetreaties,notablythoseforinternationalhumanitarianlaw,internationalcriminallaw,andinternationalenvironmentallaw.

TheonlyexceptiontothisruleistheassignmentofdutiestoindividualsintheAfrican(Banjul)CharteronHumanandPeople’sRights(adopted27June1981,enteredintoforce21October1986)1520UNTS217,ch2.

ICCPR(adopted16December1966,enteredintoforce23March1976)999UNTS171,Art7.

SeeEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(openedforsignature4November1950,enteredintoforce3September1953)213UNTS222,Art1(‘ECHR’);AmericanConventiononHumanRights(openedforsignature22November1969,enteredintoforce18July1978)1144UNTS123,Art1(1)–(2);InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(adopted19December1966,enteredintoforce3January1976)993UNTS3,Art1(‘ICESCR’);BanjulCharter(n25)Art1.

ICCPR(n26)Art2(1)–(2).

PricevUnitedKingdom(Appno33394/96)ECHR10July2001[30].

CfApplebyandothersvUnitedKingdom(Appno44306/98)ECHR6May2003[48]–[49].

CaseoftheRochelaMassacrevColombiaInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo163(11May2007)[66]–[68].

Indeed,thenewgenerationhumanrightstreatiesspecifyawiderangeofgeneralobligationsthatflowfromhumanrightstreaties.CfArt4oftheUNConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities(adopted13December2006,enteredintoforce3May2008)2515UNTS3(‘DisabilitiesConvention’).

InternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination(openedforsignature7March1966,enteredintoforce4January1969)660UNTS195;ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(adopted18December1979,enteredintoforce3September1981)1249UNTS13(‘CEDAW’);ConventionagainstTortureandotherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment(adopted10December1984,enteredintoforce26June1987)1465UNTS85(‘CAT’);ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(adopted20November1989,enteredintoforce2September1990)1577UNTS3;InternationalConventionontheProtectionoftheRightsofAllMigrantWorkersandMembersoftheirFamilies(adopted18December1990,enteredintoforce1July2003)2220UNTS3;DisabilitiesConvention(n32);InternationalConventionfortheProtectionofAllPersonsfromEnforcedDisappearance(adopted20December2006,enteredintoforce23December2010)UNDocA/61/488reprintedin(2007)14IHRR582.

Thedutyspecificationwithrespecttoindividualhumanrightstreatiesfollowsdifferenttrajectories.Forexample,theECHRandtheAmericanConventiononHumanRights,employanegativeobligationandpositiveobligationframework,specifyingarangeofdutiesonanarticle-by-articleandcase-by-casebasis.SeeMowbray(n6)7–220.TheICESCRfollowsatri-partiteconceptualframework,withdutiestorespect,protect,andfulfil.SeeCommitteeonEconomic,

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SocialandCulturalRights(CESCR),‘GeneralComment12:Therighttoadequatefood(art11)’UNDocE/C.12/1999/5.CEDAWhasafour-layerdutyframework,withdutiestorespect,protect,fulfil,andactivelypromote.SeeCommitteeontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen,‘GeneralComment28’(16December2010)CEDAW/C/GC/28.CfIEKoch,‘Dichotomies,TrichotomiesorWavesofDuties?’(2005)5HumanRtsLRev81–103.

Forinterpretivedifficultiesontorturewithrespecttoasinglehumanrightstreaty,seeIrelandvUnitedKingdom(1976)19Ybk512[163](EComHR)(ontheminimumlevelofseverity);SoeringvUnitedKingdom(Appno14038/88)(1989)11EHRR439[88]–[91](ondeportationandrealriskoftorture);CakicivTurkey(Appno23657/94)ECHR8July1999[98]–[99](onthetreatmentofthenextofkinofthedisappeared).

CfgenerallyFNiAolain,‘TheEmergenceOfDiversity:DifferencesinHumanRightsJurisprudence’(1995)19FordhamIntlLJ101 .

HRC,‘GeneralCommentNo24:GeneralcommentonissuesrelatingtoreservationsmadeuponratificationoraccessiontotheCovenantortheOptionalProtocolsthereto,orinrelationtodeclarationsunderarticle41oftheCovenant’(4November1994)CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6.

‘ObservationbyFranceonGCNo24onReservationstotheICCPR’(8September1995)CCPRA/51/40,104–6;‘ObservationbytheUnitedStatesofAmericaonGeneralCommentNo24’(28March1995)CCPRA/50/40/AnnexVI126–29;‘ObservationsbytheUnitedKingdomonGCNo24’(21July1995)CCPRA/50/40/AnnexVI130–34.

TheILC’sdecades-longworkculminatedinAugust2011withadoptionoftheGuidetoPracticeonReservationstoTreaties<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_8_2011.pdf>forthcoming[2011]YBILC,volII(2)(‘GuidetoPractice’);seealsoAPellet,‘Secondreportonreservationstotreaties’[1996]YBILC,volII(1),37 ;APellet,‘Thirdreportonreservationstotreaties’[1998]YBILC,volII(1),221 ;APellet,‘Fifthreportonreservationstotreaties’[2000]YBILC,volII(1),139 ;APellet,‘Seventhreportonreservationstotreaties’[2002]YBILC,volII,3 ;APellet,‘Eighthreportonreservationstotreaties’(2003)UNDocA/CN.4/535.

CfgenerallyCRedgwell,‘ReservationstoTreatiesandHumanRightsCommitteeGeneralComment24’(1997)46ICLQ390 ;BSimma,‘ReservationstoHumanRightsTreaties:SomeRecentDevelopments’inGHafnerandothers(eds),LiberAmicorumProfessorSeidl-Hohenweldern(KluwerLawInternational,TheHague1998)659–80 ;RBaratta,‘ShouldInvalidReservationstoHumanRightsTreatiesbeDisregarded?’(2000)11EJIL413 ;JKlabbers,‘AcceptingtheUnacceptable?ANordicApproachtoReservationstoMultilateralTreaties’(2000)69NordicJIntlL179 .

Similarly,onecouldanalyseinterpretativeissuessurroundingwithdrawalsfromhumanrightstreaties.ForadiscussionofNorthKorea’sattemptedICCPRdenunciation,seeChapter25,PartI.A,639etseq.

VCLTArt2(1)(d)definesreservationsasstatementsthatpurport‘toexcludeortomodifythelegaleffectofcertainprovisionsofthetreaty’withrespecttothereservingState.Formoreonreservations,seeChapter11.

VCLTArt19.

ThemeaningofVCLTArts20,21,and22(concerningtheentryofobjectionstoreservations,thelegaleffectsofsuchobjections,andthewithdrawalofobjections)alldependonthispriorquestion.Foradetaileddiscussion,seeFHampson,‘Expandedworkingpaperonthequestionofreservationstohumanrightstreaties,preparedinaccordancewith[UNHRC]Sub-Commissiondecision2001/17’(8August2003)UNDocE/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.2.

ReservationstotheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(AdvisoryOpinion)[1951]ICJRep15,23[10](emphasisadded).

BelilosvSwitzerland(Appno10328/83)ECHR29April1988[50]–[55].

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Ibid[47]

SeegenerallyReservationscase(n45).

[1997]YBILC,volII(2),49[83]–[85].

Hampson(n44)[35].

GuidetoPractice(n39)Guideline4.5.3.

Seen38forreferencestotheFrench,US,andUKComments.

BankovicandothersvBelgiumand16otherNATOStates(Appno52207/99)ECHR12December2001[55]–[57].

MBDembour,WhoBelievesinHumanRights?ReflectionsontheEuropeanConvention(CUP,Cambridge2006) ;KMechlem,‘TreatyBodiesandtheInterpretationofHumanRights’(2009)42VanderbiltJTransnatlL905 .

TheECtHRexplainsitsmissionasmaking‘[theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights]safeguardspracticalandeffective’.LoizidouvTurkey(PreliminaryObjections)(1995)20EHRR99,102.

DRausching,TheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,TravauxPréparatoires(Metzner,Frankfurt1978)251 .Foradiscussionofthisprinciple’soperationintheinternationalorganizations’context,seeChapter20,PartI.B.1,512etseq.

TyrervUnitedKingdom(Appnos5856/72)(1978)2EHRR1,15–16[31];ChassagnouandothersvFrance(Appnos25088/94,28331/95,28443/95)(1999)29EHRR615[100];SelmounivFrance(Appno25803/94)(1999)29EHRR32[101].

TheSocial-EconomicRightsActionCentreandtheCentreforEconomicandSocialRights/NigeriaDecisiononCommunicationNo155/96(2001)AfricanCommnonHumanandPeoples’Rights[68].

RighttoInformationonConsularAssistanceintheFrameworkoftheGuaranteesoftheDueProcessLaw(AdvisoryOpinion)Inter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesANo16(1October1999)[121];JuridicalConditionandRightsofUndocumentedMigrants(AdvisoryOpinion)Inter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesANo18(17September2003)[121].

CEDAW,‘GeneralRecommendationNo25:TemporarySocialMeasures’UNDocHRI/Gen/1/Rev.7270[3](‘TheConventionisalivinginstrument’).

SeeTyrer(n57)15–16[31];CaseoftheMapiripanMassacrevColombiaInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo134(15September2005)[104]–[108].

Gardiner(n7)159–61;Chapter19,PartIII.B,495etseq.

SeeTheCorfuChannelCase(UnitedKingdomvAlbania)(Merits)[1949]ICJRep4[29].

AireyvIreland(Appno6289/73)(1981)3EHRR305.

Ibid[24].

SeeegRDworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge2011)227–331(articulatingrightsastrumps).

Thislatterapproachresonateswiththenotionof‘restrictiveinterpretation’,whichpresumesthatthedraftersintendedtoleaveStatesfreedomofaction(orinaction)incasesofambiguity.CfegLCrema,‘DisappearanceandNewSightingsofRestrictiveInterpretation(s)’(2010)21EJIL681 .

Thisgeneralprincipleisnotwithoutproblemsasprioritydoesnotmeanabsolutepriority.CfBÇalı,‘BalancingHumanRights:MethodologicalProblemswithWeights,ScalesandProportions’(2007)29HRQ251 ;MKAddoandNGrief,‘DoesArticle3oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsEnshrineAbsoluteRights?’(1998)9EJIL510 .

SeeegLoizidouvTurkey(Appno15318/89)23EHHR513[71](holdingthatthelivinginstrumentdoctrinenotonlyappliestotheConvention’ssubstantiveprovisions,butalsotothose

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thatgoverntheoperationoftheConventionmachinery).

HRC,‘GeneralCommentNo6,TheRighttoLife’(1982)UNDocHRI/Gen/1/Rev.7128[4]–[5] .

Foranaccountofferingageneralscepticismtowardseffectivenessasasubjectiveimposition,seeMWaibel,‘DemystifyingtheArtofInterpretation’(2011)22EJIL571,582 .

Thismayoccur,eg,incasesofdeclarationsofstatesofemergencytoderogatefromprotectionofrightstemporallypursuanttoICCPRArt4.CfHRC,‘GeneralComment29,StatesofEmergency(article4)’(2001)UNDocCCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11.Or,incasesinterpretingtheICESCR’s‘progressiverealization’clauses.CfCESCR’s‘GeneralComment12’(n34).

19TradesmenvColombiaInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo109(5July2004)[173].

WemhoffvGermany(Appno2122/64)(1968)1EHRR55,75.

TheECtHRistheonlytreatybodythatexplicitlyappliesthemarginofappreciationasageneralprincipletocounterbalanceeffectivenessinsomeinstances.SeeEBenvenisti,‘MarginOfAppreciation,Consensus,andUniversalStandards’(1999)31NYUJIntlL&Poly843,844 .Foraconfineduseofthemarginofappreciationincasesofnationalityrights,seeProposedAmendmentstotheNaturalizationProvisionsoftheConstitutionofCostaRica(AdvisoryOpinion)Inter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesANo4(19January1984)[62].

Inthisrespect,humanrightscourtsareinabetterpositionthanhumanrightstreatymonitoringbodiesingivingspecialmeaningtothetextsofhumanrightstreaties.Thelegallybindingnatureoftheirdecisionsgivesadditionaleffecttotheirinterpretations.

CfGolder(n16)[29];Al-AdsanivUnitedKingdom(2001)34EHRR273[55];RighttoInformationonConsularAssistance(n59)[113].

CfAndrajevavLatvia(Appno55707/00)ECHR18February2009[75].

Foranelaborationofthesetwomodesofinteraction,seeJPauwelyn,ConflictofNormsinPublicInternationalLaw:HowWTOLawRelatestoOtherRulesofInternationalLaw(CUP,Cambridge2003)161–212 .

Withrespecttofreedomofexpressionprovisions,seeeg‘TheLastTemptationofChrist’Case(Olmedo-Bustosetal)vChileInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo73(5February2001)[69](citingSundayTimesvUnitedKingdom(Appno6538/74)(1979)2EHRR245[59]–[65]).

Soering(n35)[88](citingCAT);OpuzvTurkey(Appno33401/02)ECHR9June2009[72]–[77](citingCEDAW).

CaseofBámaca-VelasquesvGuatemalaInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo70(25November2000)17(citingtheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt).

Agoodexampleofthisistheinterpretationoftheexhaustionofdomesticremedyclausesacrosstreatycontexts.Allregionalcourtshaveconfirmedthatonlythoseremediesthatare‘effective’needtobeexhausted.VelasquezRodriguezvHondurasInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo4(29July1988)[63]–[64];AkdivarvTurkey(Appno21893/93)ECHR30August1996[66]–[69].

Asimilarinterpretiveprincipleexistsinthecontextoftherelationshipbetweendomesticlawandhumanrightstreatylawcalledthe‘autonomousconceptsdoctrine’.Thisdoctrineholdsthattreatywordshaveaself-contained,independentmeaningifthewordoverlapswiththewordingofdomesticlaw.KonigvGermany(Appno6232/73)ECHR28June1978[88]–[89].

VLowe,‘Jurisdiction’inMDEvans(ed),InternationalLaw(2ndednOUP,Oxford2006)335.

CommitteeagainstTorture,‘ConclusionsandRecommendationsoftheCommitteeAgainstTortureregardingUnitedStatesofAmerica’(25July2006)CAT/C/USA/CO/2[14]–[15];HRC,‘ConcludingObservationsoftheHumanRightsCommitteeregardingUnitedStatesofAmerica’(15

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September2006)CCPR/C/USA/CO/3[10].TheSecurityCouncil,theUNGeneralAssemblyaswellastreatyinterpretingbodiesandregionalcourtsendorsethisview.SeeUNSCRes1265(17September1999)UNDocS/Res/1265[4];UNGA,‘Respectforhumanrightsinarmedconflicts’UNGARes3319(XXIX)(14December1974);HRC,‘GeneralComment31,TheNatureoftheLegalObligationImposedonStatesPartiestotheCovenant’(29March2004)UNDocA/59/40[10];LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons(AdvisoryOpinion)[1996]ICJRep226[10]–[18](‘NuclearWeapons’);CaseConcerningArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryoftheCongo(DRCvUganda)[2005]ICJRep168,185;SergioEubenLopezBurgosvUruguay,CommunicationNoR.12/52(1981)UNDocSuppNo40A/36/40[12];Loizidou(n55)[62].

MMilanovic,‘FromCompromisetoPrinciple:ClarifyingtheConceptofStateJurisdictioninHumanRightsTreaties’(2008)8HumanRtsLRev411,416 .SomeStateschallengethisspecializedinterpretationofjurisdiction.CfegFourthPeriodicReportoftheUnitedStatesofAmericatotheUNCommitteeonHumanRightsconcerningtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(30December2011)at<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm>[504]–[505].

CaseT-315/01KadivCouncilandCommission[2005]ECRII-3649[226];CaseT-306/01Yusuf&AlBarakaat[2005]ECRII-3533[277];HRC,GeneralComment24(n37)[10].

Inter-AmericanCourtofHumanRightsSeriesCNo146(29March2006).

Ibid[140]–[141].

JoinedCasesC-402/05PandC-415/05PKadiandAlBarakaatInternationalFoundationvCouncilandCommission[GrandChamber,2008]ECRI-06531[316].

BSimma,‘HarmonisingInvestmentProtectionandInternationalHumanRights:FirstStepstowardsaMethodology’inCBinderandothers(eds),InternationalInvestmentLawforthe21stCentury,EssaysinHonourofChristophSchreuer(OUP,Oxford2009)678.

NuclearWeapons(n86)Dispositif[2c].

NPrud’homme,‘Lexspecialis:OversimplifyingamoreComplexandMultifacetedRelationship’(2007)40IsraelLRev355,395.

Seeforexample,NuclearWeapons(n86)[25]acceptingthattheICCPRcontinuestoapplyintimeofwarexceptincasesoflawfulderogations.SeealsoLegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory(AdvisoryOpinion)[2004]ICJRep106–13.

ArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryoftheCongo(n86)185.

Thereareexceptions;egConstitutionalCourtswithnorighttoindividualpetition.

SeeChapter15,PartIII,379etseq.

Ibid.

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