Bruce Mazlish Comparing Global History to World History

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Bruce Mazlish

Comparing Global History to World History

The historical profession has been slow to appreciate the importance of globalization. One reason appears to be the confusion caused by the claims of world history, which has been struggling to achieve its own identity. In its fight against more traditional, national approaches, world history has generally seen global his tory-that is, the study of globalization-as a dilution of its challenge to the establishment. Hence, world historians have tended either to ignore the new global history or to claim that it is already encompassed by what they are doing. Is their response legitimate? What exactly is world history? And what is global history?

WORLD HISTORY World history has accumulated anumber of definitions, most of themreflecting different schools of thought. The"Invitation to Membership" of the WorldHistory Association (WHA) begins with thestatement, "If you teach the whole historyof the whole world in nine short months, youknow the challenge of planning andorganizing a meaningful course in worldhistory." Although adherents of the WHA oftendeny it, the implication seems to be thatworld history is "the whole history of thewhole world," thus offering no obviousprinciple of selection. 1

Bentley, the editor of The Journal of WorldHistory, gives a more limited definition: "Myimpression is that most participants in thediscussion [about the definition of world


history] took interactions between peoplesparticipating in large-scale historicalprocesses to be one of the principalconcerns of world history." This conceptionof world history is also vague. For example,would every historian of the IndustrialRevolution (even if re stricted to onecountry) -surely, a large-scale historicalprocess-

l "Invitation to Membership" was an undated mailingfrom Richard Rosen, executive director of the WHA.


necessarily be a world historian as well,and if not, why not? Bentley continues,"Thus, world history represents (amongother things) a dialogue between the pastand the present, in that it seeks toestablish a historical context for theintegrated and interdepend ent world ofmodem times. "2

McNeill is the premier figure of modemworld history. He follows, by his ownadmission, directly in the line of ArnoldToynbee, who inspired him with anecumenical vision. But McNeill translatedthis vision into more mundane historicalpractice. His Plagues and Peoples (Garden City, 1976)is intellectual worlds removed fromToynbee's Stud y ef History (New York,1933-1954), IO v. However, although, likeToynbee, McNeill takes civilizations as hisframework of analysis, he does not construethem as hermetically closed but as open tocultural borrowings.

Ralph Linton and Robert Redfield-anthropologists-also influenced McNeill.From them came his interest in "transcivilizational encounters," which haveshaped his definition of world history asthe study of "interaction among peoples ofdiverse cultures." Long-distance trade, thespread of religions and plagues, and amultitude of other trans-civilizationalfactors have promi nent places in McNeill'sworld history. These concerns are alwaysinformed by a biological and ecologicalawareness that has no precedent inToynbee's work. Without specificallyinvoking the theory of evolution, McN eilllives and writes in its environment. The


results have been brilliant treatments ofprocesses occurring on a worldwide scale,such as the spread of disease or the emergence of military power. 3

Other variants of world history existalongside McNeill's version. The crucialvariable is the definition of world. FemandBraudel seemed to have abandoned hisfascination with civiliza tions in favor of"world systems"-that is, worlds constructedby

2 Jerry Bentley , review of Mazlish and Ralph lluultjens(eds.), Conceptualizing Global History (Boulder, 1993), H-NET BookReview (August 1995), I. Of special interest concerning thetopic at hand are the chapters in Conceptualizing Global History byWolf Schafer-"Global History: Historiographic Feasibility andEnvironmental Reality," 47-69-and Manfred Kos sok-"FromUniversal History to Global History," 93-r r r.3 William H. McNeill, "The Changing Shape of World History,"History and Theory, Theme Issue 34, "World Historians and TheirCritics," 14.


COMPAR I NG GLOBAL HIST ORY T O WOR LD HI STORY I387

trade and culture. Characteristically, hisbook, The Mediterranean (trans. Siaan Reynolds)(New York, 1972) carries the subtitle, TheMediterranean World in the Age of Philip II .

Braudel's disciple, Wallerstein, in TheModern World-System (New York, 1976), shows ingreat detail how the modern com mercial andcapitalist world came into existence. Insimilar ac counts, of course, Columbus'voyage occupies a central place, adding aNew World to an Old one. Wallerstein'semphasis in the second volume is on theseventeenth-century mercantile com petitionamong the Western European nations. His ishistory in the grand style, but with itsfeet on the ground (or, perhaps one shouldsay, in the sea).4

Carrying the world-system approach evenfurther back in time, Abu-Lughod hassuggestively argued for an earlier "systemof world trade and even 'cultural'exchange." She finds such a system in theperiod 1250-1350 A.D., which she designatesas a "crucial turning point in history."Though lacking an international division oflabor, her system connects disparate areasof the world-Europe, India, and China-throughtrade between key cities. Applying thisapproach to even earlier periods, shespeaks of the Roman Empire as the "firstnascent world system. "5

What all these variants on worldhistory-McNeill's, Braudel's, Wallerstein's,and Abu-Lughod's- share is a concern withsystemic processes and patterns among a widevariety of historical and natural phenomenathat affected diverse populations. Compared


with earlier ecumenical histories, they areless keen about making predictions, andabout tracing the course of civili zationsthrough fixed cycles. In addition, thoughforced to rely heavily on secondaryaccounts, they stay close to the scholarshipof ordinary historians, offering strictlysecular accounts (even of religion). Inshort, these accounts are serious attempts totreat historical phenomena that arise on aworld scale. And it is at this point thatthe meaning of the term "world" becomesespecially

4 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem T¥orld-System. II. Mercantilism and theCcnsolidation of the European 11/orld Economy, 1600-1750 (New York, 1980).S Janet Lipman Abu-Lughod, "The World System in theThirteenth Century: Dead-End or Precursor?" AmericanHistorical Association (Washington, D.C. [no date]), 2, 6.See also idem, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (NewYork, 1989).


388 BRUCE MAZLISH

crucial. It is the point at which apossible transition to global historyoccurs. 6

GLOBAL HISTORY As with the competingdefinitions of world history, obfuscationalso enters into the differences betweenworld and global history. In the forewordto a series edited for the AmericanHistorical Association- "Essays on Globaland Com parative History"-Adas announced a'"new' global or world history" whichdiffers in fundamental ways from itspredecessors. That difference, for Adas,led to virtually a paraphrase of McNeill'sversion. Adas' series included not only anaccount of Abu Lughod's thirteenth-centuryworld system, but also such essays as "TheColumbian Voyages" and "Gender and IslamicHistory." It offered serious and worthwhilecontributions to world history butunthinkingly misappropriated the title"Global History," which needed to bedefined afresh in its own proper terms.Even McNeill realized that somethingunprecedented was in the works, commenting,"I suspect that human affairs aretrembling on the verge of a far-reachingtransformation, " which he compared to theimportance of the agricultural revolution.7

We encounter the same intuition in animportant article by Geyer and Bright, thevery title of which, "World History in aGlobal Age," indicated the tenuoustransition taking place. In their words,

What we have before us as contemporary


history grates against the familiarexplanatory strategies and analyticcategories with which scholars havetraditionally worked. . . . This is acrisis, above all, of Western imaginings, butit poses profound challenges for anyhistorian: the world we live in hascome into its own as an

6 Despite their general disinclination to make predictions, anumber of world historians have activist interests. McNeill,for one, is concerned with environmental trends, andWallerstein's Marxist inclinations implicitly push him in apredictive direction.7 See, for example, Michael Adas, foreword to Abu-Lughod,"The World System in the Thirteenth Century," vii. McNeill,"Changing Shape of World History," 25. This is a recentcomment; as I interpret it, contextually, McNeill is talkingabout the need for a new definition of world or global historyrather than about one of his previous "transmutations."

McNeill was a participant at the first internationalconference on global history in Bellat>, io, Italy, 1991.Though, at the time, he denied any difference between worldand global history, what others said may have influenced him.Others may find this inference hazardous, but I hold to it,based on personal acquaintance.


COMPAR I NG GLOBAL HISTORY TO WORLD HISTORY

I 389integrated globe, yet it lacks narration andhas no history . . . . The central challengeof a renewed world history at the end of thetwentieth century is to narrate the world'spast in an age of globality.8

Our "imaginings" must leap from worldhistory to global history. In making thisjump, a look at the etymology of the words,world and globe, is helpful. Words are not justwhat indi viduals say they mean; they have ahistorical nature. World comes from theMiddle English for "human existence"; itscentral refer ence is to the earth,including everyone and everything on it.Worlds can also be imaginary, such as the"next world," meaning life after death, orthey can designate a class of persons-theacademic world, for instance. For many, thediscovery of the New World marked the adventof world history. More recently, a first, asecond, and a third world have beendiscerned, demarcating different levels ofdevelopment.

Such usage ill accords with the term global(one cannot substitute New Globe for NewWorld in 1492, or third globe for third worldtoday). It occupies a different valence,deriving from the Latin, globus, the firstdefinition of which is "something spherical orrounded," like a "heavenly body." Onlysecondarily does the dictionary offer thesynonym, earth. Global thus points in thedirection of space; its sense permits thenotion of standing outside our planet andseeing "Spaceship Earth." (Incidentally, earthis a misnomer for our planet; as is evident


from outer space, our abode is more waterthan earth.) This new perspective is one ofthe keys to global history.

What are the other keys? These we candetermine by dividing the definition ofglobal history into two parts. The firstfocuses on the history of globalization;that is, it takes existing processes,encapsulated in the "factors ofglobalization," and traces them as far backin the past as seems necessary and useful.The second signifies processes that are beststudied on a global, rather than a local, anational, or a regional, level. The seconddefinition is a continuation of much thatis to be encountered in McNeill's variationof world history, except that it begins inthe present, openly acknowledging itsinformed global perspective.8 Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," American Historical Review, C (1995), 1037, ro4r.


390 I BRUCE MAZLIS HThe first part of the definition-the

history of globalization is both the heartand the novelty of global history, decidingthe initial field of study and raising thequestions, What is involved inglobalization? and What are the factors atwork in our con temporary "world"? Anearly attempt to answer them stated,

The starting point for global history liesin the following basic facts of our time(although others could be added): our thrustinto space, imposing upon us an increasingsense of being in one world "SpaceshipEarth"-as seen from outside the earth'satmosphere; satellites in outer space thatlink the peoples of the earth in anunprecedented fashion; nuclear threats inthe form of either weap ons or utilityplants, showing how the territorial statecan no longer adequately protect itscitizens from either military orecologically related "invasions";environmental problems that refuse toconform to lines drawn on a map; andmultinational corporations that increasinglydominate our economic lives.9

Among other "basic facts of our time"that could be added to this list are globalconsumerism (obviously related to multinationals), human rights, the displacement ofan international politi cal system by aglobal one (the Geyer-Bright article citedearlier is especially strong in thisregard), the globalization of culture(especially music, as fostered by satellitecommunications), and so forth. What isessential to note is the synergy and


synchronicity of these various factors-theirunprecedented interaction with one another,in ever-increasing extent and force,notwithstanding the origin of them all in adifferentiated past. Globalization is thesum of their combined presences. It is areality that now affects every part of theglobe and every person on it, even thoughin widely differing local contexts. In fact,one could say that much of global historyhas necessarily to devote itself tostudying the factors of globalization inrelation to a "local" reality, which cantake many forms.

The practitioners of global history-asin, say, artificial intelligence studies-include adherents of both a strong and aweak interpretation. The former areconvinced that globalization is ushering ina new global epoch, which replaces existingattempts to contruct such periods as thepostmodern or the postindustrial.

9 Mazlish, "An Introduction to Global History," in idem and Buultjens (eds.), Conceptualizing Global History, r-2.


COMPAR I NG GLOBAL HISTORY T O WORLD HIST ORY I391

The adherents of the weak interpretationabstain from divisionary schemes, and arecontent to study the globalization processwith out further claims. For those who seeglobalization as introducing a new period,the issue of when the global epoch "began"is worth considerable attention (analogous tothe issue of when modern history began).Some opt for the 1950s and others for the1970s (I place myself in the epochal camp,and opt for the later time; more on this inwhat follows). This argument turns on thequestion of when enough synergy andsynchronicity arises to justify the launchof a new periodization.

Behind this argument is a conviction thattime and space have been compressed in anunprecedented fashion. The roots of thiscompression reach far into the past. Thedevelopment of sea vessels, from sail tosteam, cutting distance and duration, formsone thread in this account. The inventionof the telegraph, the laying of cables, theintroduction of the telephone, and then ofradio communication represent another waveof enormous changes. Now, satellites, withthe aid of computer linkages, allowsimultaneous communication between any spotson the globe-1 billion people watched thefirst step on the moon on their tele visionsets-and they can go from one end of theglobe to the other in less than a day. Itshould also be noted that with globalization has come the adoption of a uniformcalendar. 10

Another major thread to follow ismapping. Since the fifteenth century,


Ptolemaic maps have guided the opening of anew world, in which half of a previouslyunknown globe spun into perspective. Yet,forgotten in this burst of vision was thefact that large areas of that globe werestill "dark." Parts of Africa remainedunmapped until the end of the nineteenthcentury, and the poles were not adequatelyexplored until recent expeditions. Only inour time has the globe come to be more orless fully known (including the depths ofits seas). We have even seen it fromoutside, as one of many spherical bodies inspace. Our map of the globe must now takeits place as part of the mapping of outerspace.

Such brief investigations into some of theelements that enter into the factors ofglobalization indicate how they are rootedin the past. After all, global history is ahistorical inquiry, although10 Mazlish, "Introduction," in idem and Buultjens (eds.),Conceptualizing Global History, 17-20. More than 3 billion people aresaid to have seen the Coca-Cola commercials that accompaniedthe last Olympic games on television.


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its starting point is unabashedly close tothe present, newly iden tified as a globalepoch. The accounts of global historians areheavily tinged by scientific, technological,and economic "hap penings" of recent times.Whether or not one approves of thesehappenings, global history, as the study of"Wie es eigentlich gewesen," must inquireinto them.

The emergence of globalization was notsimply a matter of science, technology, andeconomics; political developments were alsorequisite. First, the competition betweenthe Soviet Union and the United States inspace was essential for the creation of ourincreasingly satellite-dependent world, withits attendant communications revolution.Furthermore, the decline of commu nismeroded the old political-ideologicaldivisions, leaving the way open for agenuinely global society, in which allcountries can and must participate, thoughdifferentially.

Modernization was primarily a Westernimposition. Some see globalization insimilar terms. In fact, they see it as“Americanization.” Others, including myself,see globalization, as a global process inwhich numerous participants are creating anew "civilization," to borrow the term fromthe world historians (for better or forworse). For example, Germany and Russia,not to mention the European Community, aremajor contributors; Japan has become almostas powerful as the United States;Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia, arestarting to make their presence felt; and


China and India are looming increasingly onthe horizon. 11

Needless to say, the course of thisglobalization is not fore ordained : Globalhistory is not Whiggish. Or, more to thepoint, the shape it will take cannot bepredicted. Like most historians, globalhistorians are aware of the contingency anduncertainty of human affairs; they are notpracticing ecumenical history. Nor are theypracticing world history in the primitivesense of "The whole history of the wholeworld." Rather, global historians, or atleast historians of globalization, are tryingto establish a more deliberate researchagenda. They know that each of the factorsof globali zation requires rigorousempirical study, and that new actors willincreasingly occupy the center ofthe historical stage-non-

11 The demise of the Soviet Union must be seen in a globalcontext. As Charles S. Maier wrote, "The Communist collapsewas a reaction to forces for transfonnation that have grippedWest and East alike, but which Western Europeans (and NorthAmericans) had responded to earlier and thus with lesscataclysmic an upheaval" ("The Collapse of Communism:Approaches for a Future History," History Workshop, XXXVIII[1991], 34-59).


CO MPAR I NG G LOBAL HISTORY TO WOR LD HISTORY I393

governmental organizations (NGos)--such ashuman-rights and environmental groups, alongwith other third-sector organiza tions;multinationals, which are almost equivalentin importance to nation-states (of the 100entities possessing the largest grossdomestic products (GDPs), forty-nine aremultinationals); and the United Nations(uN), in all its aspects, but especiallyits nascent military role.

Although global history is mainlytransnational in its subjects of study, it

would be a grave error to neglect thestudy of the nation as well. National

history merits reexamination in light ofhow the forces of globalization have

affected the nation-state, and vice-versa.Nations will not be going away. They are

still the preferred settings for largenumbers of people to organize in behalf of

common ends-protection of territory andproperty, economic production, and-last

but not least-group identity. Theliterature on the subject is vast. In

short, global history, though it seeks totranscend national history, is engaged

nevertheless with the na tion-state as amajor actor on the international and globalscene. The main focus of world history, as

opposed to global history,has been civilizations. But as globalhistorians are well aware, civilizations donot send up rockets, operate televisionnetworks, or organize a global division oflabor. Empires, the carriers of civilizationsin the past, are no more; they have beenreplaced by nation-states (more than r 8o as


of this writing and counting). Hence, globalhistory examines the processes that transcendthe nation-state framework (in the process,abandoning the centuries old division betweencivilized and uncivilized, and ourselves andthe "other"; "barbarians," that is, inferiorpeoples, no longer figure in global history,only momentarily less developed peoples). 1 2

Global history is still an emerging projectwith many aspects to study. Does it makesense, for example, to talk about adeveloping global identity? Remember thatbefore America became the United States,the original settlers had a colonialidentity that was12 Samuel Huntington's notion of an apocalyptic clash betweenIslam and the West in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of theWorld Order (New York, 1996) is a recent and ill-informed attemptto view history in terms of civilization. A notion of theconflict betweencivilizations is also current in Russia, where it takes theform of a long-standing "Eurasian" ideolOf,')', which has beenembraced by many nationalist/communist opponents of BorisYeltsin and others perceived as "reformers."


394 I BRUCE MAZ LISHonly gradually supplemented, and perhapseventually replaced, by a national one. Canthe same process occur with a globalidentity (even though it would be unattachedto a world government, which for theforeseeable future appears utopian or evendystopian)? After all, people are connectedtoday in actuality in a way that was onlypreviously dreamt of in a vague aspirationto "humanity." Will people's sense ofthemselves begin to approxi mate their truesituation? And will historians of globalhistory be forced to reappraise theiridentifications, that is, their unconsciousnational attachments and perspectives? 13

We could go on to say much more aboutvarious facets of global history, but,hopefully, enough has been sketched so asto support the assertion that it embodies anew consciousness, a new perspective-heavilyinvolved with the work of science and technology that has allowed us to view ourplanet from space, while also highlightingour earth's evolutionary and ecologicalnature that separates it from previousendeavors, for example, in world history.Exactly how it will play out in empiricalresearch will be apparent only in the workof future global historians. 14

Historians, by trade and tradition, aregenerally suspicious of theory. In globalhistory, however, theoreticalconsiderations, emanating from the social aswell as the natural sciences, areindispensable to particular inquiries.Historians are also distrustful of orindifferent to work done in otherdisciplines. In global history, multi- or


interdisciplinary orientations move frontand center. The very notion of globalizationcame from sociology. Future work will haveto engage economists, economic historians,political scientists, and historians alike.

Words do matter-in this case becausethey determine how we conceive of the workin which we are engaged. Of course,

l3 For the problem of a developing global identity, see Mazlish,"Psychohistory and the Question of Global Identity," PsychohistoryReview, XXV (1997), 165-176.14 Some indications of global history's direction are alreadyapparent. Four international conferences have taken place. Thefirst conference, "Conceptualizing Global History," alreadycited, was held in Bellagio, in 1991 (see Mazlish and Buulrjens(eds.], Conceptualizing Global History); the second, "GlobalCivilization and Local Culture," in Darmstadt, Germany, in1992; the third, "Global History and Migrations," in Hong Kongin 1994 (see Wang Gungwu (ed.], Global History and Migrations [Boulder,1996]); and the fourth, "Food in Global History," in Ann Arbor, in1996 (see Raymond Grew [ed.], Food in Global History [Boulder,forthcom ing]). Future conferences on "Global History and theCities" and "Mapping the Multinational Corporations" are also inthe offing.


COMPARI NG G LOBAL HIST ORY TO W OR L D HISTORY I395

arbitrary definitions can be attached to theterms world and global history. And however wedefine them, ambiguity will cling to theseterms, as well as overlaps. Still, if workis to go forward effectively, it isessential that we also be as clear aspossible about the differences. There isspace enough for world history to operatewithout taking an "imperial" turn toencompass global history in its domain .Greater definitional precision will alloweach subfield of history, the world and theglobal, to flourish independently. Althoughworld history and global history exist on acontinuum, we must realize that we cross asignificant boundary when we enter upon thehistory of globalization, or, moresuccinctly, global history.

(2)

In the past few decades, studies in and of globalization have expanded exponentially. Itshould be noted before we continue that majorstrides have been taken in the field of transnational history. Though still operatingin a nation-state framework, the practitioners of transnational history have taken a cosmopolitan viewpoint. Foremost in this regard has been the work of Akira Iriye and Rana Mitter, along with that of Pierre Yves-Saunier. 1

Similar strides have been made in world history. Led by Jerry Bentley (now, alas,

1


deceased) and his Journal of World History, the field is well represented in courses (both at the high school and university level). Partly, this is because anyone can teach it; Africanists as well as Americanists. Partly, of course, because it correlates with the desire to go beyond eurocentrism. Among its present leaders are Patrick Manning.

Returning to global history and new global history, the question of periodization looms large. When does increased interconnection and interdependence occur so as to justify the new rubric? My own position is that a rupture takes place after WW II. It was Karl Jaspers who first realized that that war marked an axial period. As he said, “It was the Second World War which first accorded full weight to the contribution from everywhere, to the globe as a whole. The war in the Far East was just as serious as that in Europe. It was in point of fact the first real world war.” 2

Add to this fact the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in 1945 at Hiroshima, and we have another factor making for globalization—no territorial borders are secure. Further technological developments—especially the launching of satellites and the spread of personal computers—make for an unprecedented increase in interconnectivity and interdependence.

At the same time, the challenges to Humanity have become increasingly global, for example,

2 Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschiche, quoted in Martin Albrow, The Global Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 75.


in the form of climate change or ecological exhaustion. Unfortunately, global institutions to deal with them are sadly lacking. In this regard, we are still in the nation-state era.

One of the prerequisites for dealing with global problems is the development of an increased sense of Humanity as a common identity, adding to that of our local, tribaland national identities. In a path-breaking article, “Panathropoi. Toward a Society of All Humanity “ (Globality Studies Journal. Issue 59, Vol. 20123), the sociologist MarthaVan Der Bly puts forward the thesis that, owing to the human propensity to cross boundaries and to explore, the move to abolish the differences between “us and them”is inexorable though not inevitable.

Such a “global identity,” of course, is heavily dependent on the education we give people around the world. Until now, history has been mainly in the service of the nation-state, instilling patriotism. With global history, we face another possibility. Such progress will be slow—but, with good will, sure. It can be fostered by empirical studiesof developing global consciousness. Is it or is it not occurring? How and where?

History is really not only about the past. Itis part and parcel of the present and future.Humans have been gifted with the ability to look behind, at the moment, and toward the future. It is this time sense that helps distinguish Homo sapiens from other species. Let us be very conscious of this fact as we go about our mundane work as historians.

Bruce Mazlish Comparing Global History to World History

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