V Simposio internacional de jóvenes investigadores en traducción, interpretación,estudios interculturales y estudios de Asia oriental

Barcelona, July 4, 2014

Marco Zappa PhD student

Department of Asian and North-African StudiesCa'Foscari University of Venice

Branding Japan: Development Aid as a Tool to Establish a Competitive Identity

Introduction

As Chinese economic and political influence grows abroad1, Japanese engagement in

Southeast Asia may represent a decisive move in the future of East Asian international

relations. This paper will investigate the relationship between Official Development Aid

(ODA)2 and the diffusion of Japanese culture in Vietnam through the agency of official

institutions, such as as the Japan Foundation one. To the aim of this paper, official

statistics about bilateral ODA flow (f.y. 2007-2013) and the opening of a Japan Foundation

branch in Hanoi in 2008 will prove useful case-studies. Three reputation surveys (two by

private institutions and one by a Ministry and a private company) will also be taken into

account.

Much has been written on Japanese foreign aid policies in the last three decades.

Particularly in 1980s and 1990s, as Japan rose as an “aid great power” (Yasutomo: 1990),

discussions on Japanese Official Development Assistance mushroomed (Yasutomo: 1990;

Arase: 1994; Soderberg: 1996; Schraeder, Hook, Taylor: 1998). However, only recently

and in few cases (Vyas: 2008) scholars have focused on the relationship between the role

1 The China-Japan “rivalry” has been analyzed by Faure, Guy et al. (2010). For a deeper analysis ofChina's rise and its consequences for the international and the East-Asian system of relations, see alsoKang (2007).

2 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as aid flows tocountries and territories identified by the Development Co-operation Directorate that is “provided byofficial agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies” and“administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as itsmain objective”; it must be “concessional in character” and convey “a grant element of at least 25 percent(calculated at a discount rate of 10 per cent)”(DAC-OECD, 1972).

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of economic institutions and those of cultural ones contributing to a state's “soft power”.

Foreign aid initiatives, in fact, do not merely involve economic dynamics.

In other words, ODA and popular culture may be crucial in establishing what Simon Anholt

(2009) labeled as “competitive identity” or “nation branding” in the global market, given the

growing importance of such a concept in defining a certain aspects of a government's

public policy (i.e., diplomatic relations, tourism, economic and social capital attraction,

etc.). In this sense, it might be useful to refer to the notion of “symbolic power” as

described by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977)3.

This paper will therefore address the following questions as: how are economic and

cultural influences coordinated and is there a political aim to this? Can a growing economic

cooperation influence the national reputation of a country among the recipient country's

society? Can development aid be considered a form of “symbolic good” and a source of

“symbolic power” à la Bourdieu?

Japanese power: between softness and symbolism

The debate on Japanese “soft power” has been around since the early 2000's. A historical

reason for this could be traced back in the economic downturn which afflicted Japan

between the second half of the 1980's and the first years of the 1990's. In May 2002,

Foreign Policy had a long article by Douglas McGray entitled “Japan's Gross National

Cool”, in which the author argued that Japan sat on a “formidable reserve of soft power”

which could be used to restore a “national message” in order to, on the one end, restore

confidence in the national population and, on the other, attract foreign talents who could

contribute to the future growth (McGray: 2002).

Another article in the Asahi Shimbun in March 2008, read: “To have more friends in the

international society, let's cultivate 'soft power'”. The piece explicitly referred to Joseph

Nye's (1990) description of a transition in the realist conception of power in international

relations: from a coercive power exercised via military capacity, to a co-optive power

3 The work by Pierre Bourdieu did not address International Relations (IR) directly. However, hints toBourdieu's social theory may be found in Alexander Wendt's social constructivism (Wendt:1987) andmore explicitly in the recent attempts by Fréderic Mérand and Vincent Pouliot (2008) and Didier Bigo(2011).

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exercised via diplomatic and cultural tools4. Hence, the article by the Asahi underlined the

connection between Japan's “lost decade” in the 1990s, and the success of its popular

culture abroad, which came to be considered “cool”(Asahi Shimbun, 2008).

To this end, the article presented the case-study of Indonesia, which during the Pacific

War was occupied by Japanese military and at least until 1974, when the then Japanese

prime minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Jakarta, had reportedly a strong anti-Japanese

sentiment (Asahi Shimbun, 2008). So how did the dominant post-war representation of

Japan in Indonesia changed? The article cited economic and cultural reasons: one was

the 1985 Plaza Accord which increased the inward flow of Japanese industrial capital and

tourism toward Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries as Malaysia and Thailand5.

Along with this, the amount of “cultural transfers” from Japan – especially animated films,

music and food – to these Asian countries grew (Iwabuchi, 2002). As Yasumoto (2011)

pointed out, cultural transfers spurred adaptation and remaking which fitted local contexts

(Yasumoto: 2011, 3-4). Such a consideration is particularly useful to the scope of this

paper: as Iwabuchi's research into Japanese popular culture expansion in Asia showed,

Japanese enterprises or media executives reproduce clear hierarchies of power which

reflect contemporary economic relations between Japan and other Asian countries (Allen:

2004).

Japan Foundation and Asia

The Japan Foundation (Kokusai kōryū kikin) (hereby JF) is considered one of the agents

of Japanese soft power (Vyas: 2008). Among the aims of the Foundation, there is the one

to carry out “comprehensive international cultural exchange programs throughout the

4 According to Nye since the end of 1970s the diffusion of technologies and sophisticated weapons inindustrialized advanced countries as well as in less advanced countries have changed the nature of worldpolitics. Thus, the ability of great powers “to control their environments” is diminished (Nye, 1990: 163).Therefore, such a co-optive power is “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that othercountries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own” (Nye, 1990: 168).

5 In 1985, due to a 50 per cent appreciation of the dollar from 1980 to 1985, representatives from thegovernments of the then five main economies in the world (US, Great Britain, France, West Germany andJapan) agreed to depreciate the dollar in relation to the German marc and the Japanese yen. Somenoted that as a consequence of the appreciation of the Japanese national currency and the consequentincrease in Japanese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) abroad, there was an overall economic growth inSoutheast Asia's newly industrialized countries (NICs), especially in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand andthe Philippines, the so-called East Asian Miracle (World Bank:1993; Thomsen:1999; Belderbos,Zou:2006). This boosted a urban middle class which had been developing since the 1970's (King: 2008).As Mark Berger puts it, the Plaza Accord and a global drive toward economic liberalisation, resulted in adramatic increase of Japanese corporate investment in Southeast Asia (Berger: 1997, 273).

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world” and building “the foundation for promoting the understanding of Japan as well as

mutual understanding between the people of Japan and people from the rest of the world”

via Japanese language teaching and the promotion of Japanese culture abroad6. The aim

of this paper is to discuss the mutual enforcement of culture and development projects in

Japan-Vietnam bilateral power relations7. Hence, it might be useful to present a brief

description of the JF.

Analysing the role of the JF in China, Vyas describes it as one of the several state-level

agencies involved in foreign affairs, education, tourism and industry which the

governments of Japan have used to trade on Japan's reputation and image (Vyas: 2008).

To put it in Simon Anholt's words, it is one of the institutions involved in establishing

Japan's “competitive identity” abroad (Anholt: 2009). The origin of the JF can be traced in

the Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, which during the 1930's and 1940's was in charge of

promoting Japanese culture and the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Dai tōa

kyōeiken) (Takahashi: 1998 cit. in Vyas: 2008). However, its official establishment as a

special agency of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (tokushuōjin) dates back to 1972. In 2003,

the Japan Foundation was reformed and was granted a status of “independent

administrative corporation” (dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin). The aims of the reform were “a) to

increase administrative efficiency, b) to align the Foundation's activities more with MOFA

policies, and c) to enable the Foundation to attract more funds from outside the

government” (National Diet of Japan: 2002 in Vyas: 2008).

Seen from a brighter perspective its role can be crucial in forging stronger “connections”

(tsunagari) thus creating an “Asian community” (Ajia kyōdōtai) (Iriye: 2013). However, it

has been noted that the cultural interchange promoted by the JF have preferred the

traditional “one way cultural promotion”, thus enforcing the foreign policy goals of its

ministerial supervisor, the MOFA (Vyas, 2008). In fact, one could see a parallelism

between the trend in aggregate ODA flow from 1970's to early 2000's and the total

expenditure of the JF in the same period.

6 See http://www.jpf.go.jp/e/about/outline/about_01.html accessed June, 18th, 2014.7 A deeper analysis of the relationship between culture and development may be found in Nederveen

Pieterse (2010).

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Figure 2: ODA flows 1962-2002. Source: Akiyama; Nakao (2005).

Figure1: Japan Foundation Expenditure (1972-2003). Source: Japan Foundation (2003a) in Vyas (2008).

The case of the opening of a new Japan Foundation branch in Vietnam less than six years

ago may be particularly explanatory. The Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange

in Vietnam (Betonamu Nihon bunka kōryū sentā) was established as the fifth JF center for

cultural exchange in Southeast Asia. According to the JF, its establishment was a a

response to the demand of Japanese language learning in the country. As a 2006 survey

showed, in Vietnam there were 30 thousand Japanese language learners, a 90 per cent of

whom were university students. In cooperation with the Vietnamese Ministry of Education,

the JF has carried out a 10-year project of support to high school Japanese language

learners. In addition, the centre promotes cooperation with research institutes dealing with

Japanese studies and offers a wide range of cultural activities as stage performances, art

exhibitions and film festivals (JF: 2012).

In conclusion, could Japanese cultural influence exerted through state-agencies like the JF

be interpreted as a reflection of the development initiative to which the MOFA has been

committed in the last decade? To answer this, an overview of Japanese ODA may be

useful.

The scope of Japanese ODA8

Since the early post-war period, ODA has been a key element of Japanese foreign policy

toward developing countries especially in the 1989-2001 period, when Japan emerged as

world's top donor (Arase: 2005). The roots of Japanese foreign aid flow to Asia can be

found in the 1950's war reparations to Japan's former colonies9. The then prime minister

Yoshida Shigeru may have seen an opportunity to boost Tokyo's national interest, namely

national security and prosperity (kokueki) in a more pacific, thus “softer”, way than the

Pacific War military aggression. Such disbursement also provided the chace for the post-

8 Parts of this paragraph have been presented in Zappa (2014): 'Development as a Brand? Japanese Aidto Asia and the Case of Vietnam in a Historical Perspective' in Proceedings of the 6th Next-GenerationGlobal Workshop and 1st KUASU International Conference, Kyoto University (in print).

9 In 1952 Burma agreed on a 200 million dollar war reparation plan; in 1956, the Philippines reached anagreement on a 550 million dollar plan in yearly instalments over 20 years; in 1958, Indonesia accepted a220 million agreement; Vietnam ratified the San Francisco Treaty, receiving nearly 39 million dollar(MOFA). Moreover, if one considers Southeast Asia's richness in raw materials, war reparations were anoccasion, using the words of prime minister Kishi Nobusuke at a Budget committee of the House ofRepresentatives in 1960, to secure “as many raw materials as possible, and sell manufactured goodsoverseas” (Sato: 2013,14). It is possible to argue that Kishi's words revealed a new interest towards Asia,which needed to be coordinated by a set of institutions (a research institute, a special fund and a bank forAsian development) through an effective economic policy.

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war leadership to rehabilitate Japan's national image in front of the newly born

international community (tsukiai)10.

Writing about Japan's ODA and the “underlying thought” behind it in 1980 (Nihon no

kaihatsu enjo: sono kiseki to rinen), Katō Junpei argued that it was the attainment of “self-

reliance” (jiritsu) and of “self-help” (jijo) by the recipient country (Katō: 1980). However,

commentators have tended to underplay the humanitarian reasons in favour of more

“practical” reasons, namely economic and diplomatic ones. Those became apparent in

1980's, when ODA were fundamental in Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's comprehensive

security policy (sōgō anzen hoshō) (Akaha, 1991).

However, according to Satō (2005), it should be pointed out that after 1985's Plaza Accord

and the beginning of the so-called “bubble economy”, under international pressure,

Nakasone administration had to “make its ODA as one of the three pillars of policies

counterbalancing the trade surplus along with domestic demand expansion and promotion

of imports” (Satō: 2005, 74). In addition, they may have a role in the development of a

favourable environment for foreign capital attraction and , eventually, in the economic

success of the developing country (Katada: 2001 and Takamine: 2006).

In fact, as Yasutomo points out, aid's convenience and availability as a diplomatic tool

ought not to be overlooked: it may help to forge “positive” relations with other countries or

serve as a “lubrificant” in case of strained ties with a specific country (Soderberg: 2006)11;

and, on the other hand increase Japanese international prestige (Yasutomo: 1990, 500-2).

In a broader sense, as noted by Ampiah (1997) with regards to Japanese aid to Tanzania

in the first half of 1990s, ODA may have a role in “political marketing” – that is, in making a

recipient country perceive the donor in a way that suits the political aims of the donor itself.

10 The term kokueki means national interest; the term tsukiai means “company”,“association” even“friendship”. These two words acquire significance when we consider the scope of Japanese ODA in the1970s. It was a process directed by both an endogenous (kokueki) and an exogenous pull. The conceptswere introduced in the field of Japanese ODA studies by the scholar and UN advisor Hasegawa Sukehiro's 1975 The objectives of foreign aid: Japanese aid for domestic prosperity and international ascendencyand cited in Arase (2005).

11 Yasutomo particularly refers to the 1970's oil crises which resulted in an energy crisis in Japan which wasdependant on oil imports from OPEC countries. A re-negotiation of Japanese political stances in theMiddle-East toward a more pro-Arab position and an increase in aid toward Sub-Saharan Africa werenecessary tools for Japanese diplomacy to ensure the country a constant supply of energy (Yasutomo:1990 and Satō: 2005). On the other hand, Marie Söderberg (2006) focuses on the role of Japaneseforeign aid in the maintainance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia and in negotiations with NorthKorea.

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In this perspective, the findings of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu about the concept of

“symbolism” in social practices may be particularly explanatory12. Symbolic power

(Bourdieu: 1977) is a discoursive practice which structures reality and “tends to establish a

gnoseological order”. What contributes to the establishment of such an order is the

relationship between who exercises power and who is subjected to it (Bourdieu: 1977,

407-8)13. This may be true when inequal political, economic and cultural relations are in

place between states. In fact, as Kasahara (2004) noted, the Japan-Asia relationship in

terms of “development”, as expressed by the the gankō keitai (flying geese) formula14,

implied a hierarchical structure with Japan at its top.

Japanese ODA to Vietnam: an overview

To this respect, Vietnam is a relatively late-comer. In fact, Japanese interest toward

Vietnam as a strategical recipient of financial and cultural flows seems to have risen only

in the last decade. As Ohno (2009, 84-86) pointed out, since 2001, the Socialist Republic

of Vietnam has been among the top four recipients of Japan's aid. Official Development

Assistance has provided nearly two trillion yen in infrastructural and social development

projects in the last few years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's data). This trend is

clearly illustrated by fig. 3, which refers to FY 2012.

12 Assuming that inter-state relations are, as product of the interactions between states which arefundamentally socially constructed entities (Wendt: 1987) that have to be conceived in terms of practicesand situated in a certain field (Bigo: 2011).

13 Bourdieu argues that this kind of power has a definite social function: symbols are in fact instruments of“social integration” which creates “consensus”on the sense of the social world thus contributing to thereproduction of the pre-existing social order. Therefore, according to Bourdieu, symbols serve as alegitimation of the social order and its hierarchies. Their efficacy lies in the fact that as products of aspecialist activity, they are designed in order to make non specialist believe that the social order they livein is natural (méconnaissance) (Bourdieu: 1977, 407-9).

14 According to this economic model of development defined by the Japanese economist AkamatsuKaname (1961), industrial development is the leading force of economic development. This can beattained through the adoption of industrialised advanced countries' industries in order for a less advancedcountries to catch up with them on the path of development (Korhonen,:1994).

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ODA impact has been particularly relevant since 1993, when Tokyo and Hanoi normalized

their relations, and the bilateral ODA flow restarted after a 20 year hiatus15. As figure 3

shows, Japan's aid initiatives in Vietnam focus on a) infrastructural and poverty reduction

projects, financed through ODA loans; b) grant assistance to scholarships and

environment-linked projects ; c) technical cooperation (MOFA, 2012)16. Figure 4 shows in

greater detail the relative amounts of Japanese aid from 2007 to 2011.

15 As identified by UN's HDI ranking. The case of Vietnam clearly shows that Japanese aid is mainlydirected to middle-low income countries. contradicting the DAC guidelines on boosting help to the leastdeveloped countries (Potter, 2012: 17).

16 In detail, among a) projects are National Highway N.1, North-South Express way, Hanoi's Noi Bai airport,power plants, etc.; among b) projects: Poverty Reduction Support Credit, Human Resource DevelopmentScholarship; Afforestation in Central and South Vietnam; among c) projects: training in food, education,public health and fund management sectors. Further details on the entity of Japanese aid in Vietnam canb e f o u n d o n J a p a n ' s M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s w e b s i t e a t t h e l i n k :http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/data/pdfs/vietnam.pdf (retrieved February 9, 2014).

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Figure 3: Total ODA disbursement for East Asian region (2012). Source: MOFA (2014).

Bilateral diplomatic relations were in place since 1973 but remained cold after the demise

of South Vietnam and the newly born Socialist Republic of Vietnam's rapprochement with

the USSR. However, since 1986, Vietnam has undergone a process of massive political

and economic process of reform, called doi moi (literaly “renovation”) (Masina: 2006). This

state-mediated process of opening the country to the global market economy spurred an

unprecedented growth, which helped to reduce poverty by a third and favoured the

transition from an import-substitution economy to an export-oriented one. In 1995, Vietnam

joined ASEAN and secured a stronger relationship with Japan and the other South-east

Asian countries. The joining of ASEAN was followed in 1998 by that of APEC and finally in

2007 after a long negotiation, of WTO, thus ensuring fairer access for Vietnam exports to

the international market (Kokko: 1998, 319-321).

With the launch of the Japan-Vietnam Joint Initiative in 2003, under Koizumi

administration, the relationship between the two countries gained further strength. In fact,

economic cooperation has ushered in activism by Japanese cultural institutions as the JF

in further promoting Japanese language education in Vietnam as well as artistic, cultural

and scientific exchange between the two countries17.

17 For instance, in November 2013, a Japanese film and animation festival was hosted in Hanoi with thesupport of the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs and the Japanese Image Council to celebrate the40th anniversary of Japan-Vietnam bilateral relations and enhance mutual cultural comprehension. See'Betonamu de Nihon animation tokushu jōei, gekiba anime kara tampen made 19 sakuhin' ,A n i m e a n i m e . j p , N o v e m b e r 2 , 2 0 1 3 , r e t r i e v e d F e b r u a r y 1 1 , 2 0 1 4 f r o mhttp://animeanime.jp/article/2013/11/02/16171.html

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Figure 4: Japan's ODA flow to Vietnam (2007-2011). Source: MOFA (2013).

Reputation surveys

In this regard, how is the bilateral relation perceived in the public sphere? Did ODA play a

role in establishing a positive image of Japan as a “developed country” among the

Vietnamese public?

According to 2014 Globescan-PIPA country reputation survey commissioned by the Bbc,

“global views of Japan have continued to follow a downward movement”

(GlobeScan/PIPA: 2014, 21). However, out of 23 countries surveyed, 19 leant positive

towards Japan. Consequently, Japan appears to be among the top 5 positively ranked

countries. In 2012, it was rated first (GlobeScan/PIPA: 2014).

In 2012 AUN Consulting Inc., a Japanese marketing consultancy agency, conducted a

survey among the top 10 Asian countries by GDP (Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong,

Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) on their people's degree

of fondness of Japan18. The results (Figure 5) show that the country where Japan is

appreciated the most is Vietnam. Nearly 97 percent of the interviewed responded

positively, confirming the good reputation Japanese enjoys in the country (AUN

Consulting, 2012). As shown by the survey, the Vietnamese’s fondness of Japan is higher

than that of Thai and Filipino. 45 per cent of Vietnamese responders told AUN Consulting

that they “like Japan very much”, while 52 per cent told that they “like Japan”.

18 According to AUN Consulting Inc., answers from 100 male individuals for each country, aged 18 on, werecollected. The survey was articulated in five questions: 1. Do you like Japan? 2. Do you like Japanesepeople? 3. Would you go to Japan on a trip? 4. Do you like Japanese goods and services? The possibleanswers were: “Very much” (daisuki); “yes” (suki) “no” (kirai); “Not at all” (daikirai). The majority (97 percent) of Vietnamese respondents declared that they like (suki) Japan or they like it very much (daisuki);98 per cent of them answered positively to the second question as well. The third question presentsslightly different outcomes, as respondents from Philippines (95 per cent) and Singapore (94 per cent)showed more interest in tourism to Japan. Finally, 62 per cent of Vietnamese respondents said they “likevery much” Japanese products and serv ices . Ret r ieved February 10, 2014 f romhttp://www.globalmarketingchannel.com/press/2012110602

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The survey of figure 3 gives only a general hint on Vietnamese public's appreciation of

Japan. A reputation survey commissioned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ipsos Hong

Kong in 2013 (MOFA/Ipsos: 2014) was more specific in its targets. The survey was

directed to ASEAN countries (in particular: Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines,

Myanmar, Malaysia and Indonesia). The general “fondness” in Japan, Japanese culture

and Japanese products appears to have political consequences19. In particular, the survey

showed that Japan is the “most reliable ally for ASEAN countries” (mottomo shinrai dekiru

kuni). Figure 4 shows the impact of ODA on the public opinion in the seven ASEAN

countries20.

19 Answers from 2,144 respondants were collected by Ipsos Hong Kong. In particular, 302 Indonesia, 317 inMalaysia, 309 in Myanmar, 307 in the Philippines, 305 in Singapore, 300 in Thailand and 304 in Vietnam.Further details about age or sex of the respondants were not provided (MOFA/Ipsos: 2014).

20 The original question was: “To what extent the Japanese economic and technical cooperation (Officialdevelopment aid, ODA, etc.) has favoured the development of your country?” (日 本 の 経 済 技 術 協 力 （ 政 府開 発 援 助-ODA な ど ） は 自国 の 発 展 に ど の 程 度 役 立 っ た と 考 え ま す か ？ ) (MOFA/Ipsos: 2014)

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South Korea

China (PRC)

Taiwan

Hong Kong

Thailand

Malaysia

Singapore

Indonesia

Vietnam

Philippines

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Do You Like Japan?

Not at all

No

Yes

Very much

igure 5: Source: AUN Consulting (2012).

Conclusion

This paper has argued that there may be a link between flows of capital (especially ODA),

flows of “cultural transfers” and a certain reshaping of the Japanese image abroad.

Japanese “soft power” than, might not be perceived just as related to the success of its

popular culture, rather as a relational form of power that comprises an economic aspect

too. This relation has appeared in the presentation of the case of the opening of Japan

Foundation branch in Hanoi in 2008 in the midst of growing Japanese flows of aid for

development to Vietnam. In this sense, it has been proposed that the notion of “soft power”

as only dependant on cultural factors may have to be reconsidered. The notions of

symbolic capital and symbolic power à la Bourdieu appear to be more pertinent. In fact,

analysis of the success of Japanese language and popular culture in East Asia ought not

to overlook the strategical disbursement of development aid, which may affect, as the

reputation surveys show, the popular perception of the donor country.

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igure 6 (Source: MOFA/Ipsos Hong Kong: 2014)

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