Annual Report 2017 - AERB

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

ANNUAL REPORT2017

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARDNIYAMAK BHAVAN, ANUSHAKTI NAGAR

MUMBAI-400 094

Website: www.aerb.gov.in

AERB Annual Report - 2017

FUNCTIONS OF THEATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

Develop safety policies in nuclear, radiation and industrial safety areas for facilities under its purview.

Develop Safety Codes, Guides and Standards for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of different types of nuclear and radiation facilities.

Grant consents for siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning, after an appropriate safety review and assessment, for establishment of nuclear and radiation facilities.

Ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements prescribed by AERB during all stages of consenting through a system of review and assessment, regulatory inspection and enforcement.

Prescribe the acceptance limits of radiation exposure to occupational workers and members of the public and acceptable limits of environmental releases of radioactive substances.

Review the emergency preparedness plans for nuclear and radiation facilities and

nuclear and radiation facilities and prescribe the syllabi for training of personnel in safety aspects at all levels.

Take such steps as necessary to keep the public informed on major issues of radiological

Maintain liaison with statutory bodies in the country as well as abroad regarding safety matters.

Promote research and development efforts in the areas of safety.

Review the nuclear and industrial safety aspects in nuclear facilities under its purview.

Review the safety related nuclear security aspects in nuclear facilities under its purview.

Notifying to the public, the ‘nuclear incident’, occurring in the nuclear installations in India, as mandated by the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.


CONTENTSPage No.

MISSION STATEMENT

HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES

ORGANISATION CHART OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

KEY FIGURES OF THE YEAR 2017

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER 1. SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES .........................................1

1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES .................................................1

1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION ...................................................................2

1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS ............................9

1.4 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES ...................17

1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION .........................................................................................22

1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION ...............23

1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES ................................................................26

1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION .......................................................29

CHAPTER 2. SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF RADIATION FACILITIES ...................................35

2.1 APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES IN MEDICAL, INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH .....................................................................................................35

2.2 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF RADIATION FACILITIES ............................................39

2.3 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION ...............................................44

CHAPTER 3. REGULATORY INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIATION FACILITIES ........ 47

3.1 REGULATORY INSPECTION PROGRAMME ...........................................................................47

3.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES .................50

3.3 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF RADIATION FACILITIES ................................................51


CHAPTER 4. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES .................. 57

4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ......................................................................................................57

4.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES ..................................................................................................59

4.3 BASIS FOR ACCEPTABLE DOSE TO OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES .................................................................................................63

4.4 INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AERB FOR DOSE REDUCTION .....................................................63

CHAPTER 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ............................................................................... 65

5.1 ROLE OF AERB IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN, DURING EMERGENCY AND POST EMERGENCY .................................................................65

5.2 REVIEW OF PREPAREDNESS FOR SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY AT NPP SITES................................................................................................................................66

5.3 HARMONISATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS OF NPPs ..........................66

5.4 CREATION OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTRE AT NPPs ..................................67

5.5 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY MONITORING CELL AT AERB ............67

5.6 PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY IAEA ............................68

5.7 DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ..........68

5.8 PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES ..........................................................................................68

CHAPTER 6. REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS .................................................................. 71

6.1 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ...................................71

6.2 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED/AMENDED ......................................73

6.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER REVISION/DEVELOPMENT ..............................................74

6.4 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER PUBLICATION IN HINDI ....................................................74

6.5 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT SAFETY STANDARDS ..................................................................75

CHAPTER 7. SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH ..................................................................... 77

7.1 THERMAL HYDRAULICS SAFETY STUDIES .........................................................................77

7.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT STUDIES ...................................................................................................79

7.3 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES ..................79

7.4 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT ................................................................................81

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7.5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES .........................................................................................................82

7.6 REACTOR PHYSICS STUDIES ...................................................................................................84

7.7 STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE BACK END OF THE FUEL CYCLE AND SOIL REMEDIATION ...................................................................................................................84

7.8 STRUCTURAL AND SEISMIC ANALYSIS ................................................................................85

7.9 OTHER SAFETY ANALYSIS STUDIES .....................................................................................86

7.10 AERB FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAMME ............................................................86

CHAPTER 8. INITIATIVES FOR ENGAGING WITH STAKEHOLDERS AND PUBLIC ......... 89

8.1 AERB AND MEDIA ......................................................................................................................89

8.2 COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS ..................................89

8.3 PUBLIC/STAKEHOLDERS’ AWARENESS PROGRAMMES ...................................................90

8.4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REGULATORY INTERFACE (NCRI) ...................................92

8.5 DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ MEET .........................93

8.6 THEME MEETINGS /SPECIAL MEET .......................................................................................93

8.7 EXHIBITIONS ...............................................................................................................................97

8.8 ADVERTISEMENTS AND ARTICLES ........................................................................................98

8.9 TECHNICAL INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES ..................................................... 99

CHAPTER 9. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................... 103

9.1 PORTAL FOR PUBLIC FEEDBACK .........................................................................................103

9.2 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT 2005 ......................................................................................103

9.3 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS ..............................................................................................104

9.4 AUDIT BY COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL (CAG) .........................................104

CHAPTER 10. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION .................................................................... 105

10.1 STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY ...................................................105

10.2 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT .............................................................................................107

10.3 CONTRIBUTION IN INTERNATIONAL PEER REVIEW .......................................................107

10.4 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN IAEA IRRS MISSION FOR OTHER COUNTRIES ..................108

10.5 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES ..........................................108

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CHAPTER 11. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE ...............113

11.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION ..............................................................................................113

11.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FULL PARTICIPATION) ACT, 1995 AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RESERVATION POLICY FOR SCHEDULED CASTES / TRIBES / OBC ..................................................................................113

11.3 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................113

11.4 TRAINING ...................................................................................................................................115

11.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALK /COLLOQUIUM ............................................................................116

11.6 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ...............................................................................................117

11.7 PROMOTION OF EXCELLENCE IN HUMAN RESOURCES ................................................118

11.8 AERB AWARDS FOR MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE .......................................................118

11.9 WELFARE ACTIVITIES FOR AERB EMPLOYEES ................................................................124

11.10 RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION ...............................................................................127

CHAPTER 12. PROMOTION OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE .......................................................... 131

12.1 PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR HINDI IMPLEMENTATION .........................................131

12.2 PUBLICATIONS IN HINDI ........................................................................................................131

12.3 HINDI TALKS / WORKSHOPS / SEMINARS ..........................................................................131

12.4 HINDI COMPETITIONS.............................................................................................................133

CHAPTER 13. FINANCE .................................................................................................................... 135

13.1 ANNUAL BUDGET UTILISATION ...........................................................................................135

13.2 FUNDS UTILISATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ..........................................135

13.3 FUNDS UTILISATION ON PUBLIC OUTREACH PROGRAMMES .....................................135

13.4 GRANTS TO RESEARCH PROJECTS ......................................................................................136

PUBLICATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 137

ABBREVIATION ..................................................................................................................................143

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES) ...................... 148

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LIST OF TABLESTable Title Page No.No.

1.1 Safety Review Committee Meetings of the Power Projects .............................................................2

1.2 List of Operating Nuclear Power Plants .........................................................................................10

1.3 Meetings of Safety Committees .....................................................................................................11

1.4 Licensing of Operating Staff ..........................................................................................................16

1.5 List of Facilities Authorised for Safe Disposal /Transfer of Radioactive Waste ............................16

1.6 Status of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Other Facilities ..........................................................17

1.7 Meetings of Safety Review Committee of Fuel Cycle Facilities ...................................................20

1.8 Status of R&D and Other Facilities ................................................................................................23

1.9 Unit-wise Comparison of Reportable Occupational Injuries in DAE Units for 2017 ....................26

1.10 Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries ..................28

.......................31

3.1 Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Facilities under Construction and Commissioning .................50

3.2 Regulatory Inspections of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors .....................50

3.3 Regulatory Inspections of Industrial and Fuel Cycle Facilities ......................................................51

3.4 Regulatory Inspections (Security Aspects) .....................................................................................51

3.5 Regulatory Inspections of Radiation Facilities ...............................................................................52

4.1 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2017) .................................................................60

4.2 Radiation Doses (Effective) received by Workers in Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions in the Year 2017 ....................................................................61

4.2 (a) Radiation Doses (Effective) received by Workers in Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions in the Year 2016 ....................................................................61

4.3 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities (2017) ........................62

5.1 Site and off-site Emergency Exercises carried out in the Year 2017 ..............................................66

7.1 New Research Projects Approved ..................................................................................................87

7.2 Research Projects Renewed ............................................................................................................87


LIST OF FIGURESFigure Title Page No.No.

1.1 Distribution of Unit-wise Reportable Injuries in DAE Units in 2017 ...........................................27

1.2 Year-wise trend of Frequency Rate in DAE Units .........................................................................27

1.3 Year-wise trend of Severity Rate in DAE Units ............................................................................27

1.4 Year-wise trend of Injury Index in DAE Units ..............................................................................28

1.5 Year-wise trend of Incidence Rate in DAE Units ..........................................................................28

1.6 Year-wise trend of Fatal Injuries in DAE Units .............................................................................28

1.7 Type of Accidents in DAE Units in 2017 ......................................................................................28

1.8 INES Scale .....................................................................................................................................29

......................................................................31

........................................................................................31

..........................................................................................31

4.1(a) Public Dose at 1.6 km Distance for NPPs ......................................................................................58

4.1(b) Total Effective Dose in Different Zones during the Year 2017 ......................................................59

4.2 Collective Dose (Person-Sv) at NPPs .............................................................................................60

6.1 AERB Regulatory Safety Document Development Process ..........................................................72

7.1 Temporal variations of Interface Velocity during the Chugging Phenomenon ..............................78

7.2 Variation of Mass Flow Rate of Air with Temperature Difference .................................................78

7.3 Variation of Peak Pressure as a Function of (a) Pipe Diameter, (b) Steam Pressure ......................78

7.4 Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of Thermal Plume Spread due to Thermal Discharge from KKNPP ...................................................................................................80

7.5 Total dose due to (a) I-131 and (b) all Important Radionuclides considered for the Postulated Accident Scenario ...........................................................................81

7.6 Schematic of Multi-unit PSA Methodology ...................................................................................82

7.7 Water Vault and Test Vessel for COMREF .....................................................................................82

7.8 HYMIF Experimental Test Set-up ..................................................................................................83

9.1 RTI Queries replied during the Last 5 Years ................................................................................103

The mission of the AERB is to ensure the use of ionising radiation and nuclear energy in India does not cause undue risk to health of people and the environment.

MISSION STATEMENT

iAERB Annual Report - 2017

HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) continued to carry out safety monitoring and regulatory supervision of nuclear and radiation facilities under its purview. Regulatory safety oversight was carried out on operating power plants, nuclear power projects (under site evaluation/under construction), several fuel cycle facilities, research units and large numbers of radiation facilities spread across the country.All operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities under AERB’s purview operated safely during the year and radioactive discharges as well as doses to occupational workers were well within prescribed limits. The radioactive releases from nuclear power plants remained well within the limits authorised by AERB and the effective dose to public around the nuclear power plant sites was far less than the annual limit of 1 mSv. The maximum individual radiation dose among occupational workers has also remained well below the annual limit of 30 mSv.

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE YEAR

Licencing of Nuclear Power Projects

Clearance for Raising Reactor Power Up to 100% FP (Commissioning Phase-C3) of KKNPP Unit-2 – January 13, 2017

Clearance for Operation of KKNPP Unit-2 at Rated Power for Limited Duration (100 Effective Full Power Days) – May 29, 2017

Clearance for First pour of Concrete (FPC) of KKNPP-3&4 – June 23, 2017

Renewal of Licences of Nuclear Facilities

Licence for operation of 10 nuclear power plants viz. MAPS, KGS-1&2, TAPS-1&2, RAPS-3&4 and RAPS-5&6

Licence for operation of nuclear facilities viz. HWP-Kota; NFC, Hyderabad; Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal; Banduhurang mine and Tummalapalle mill

Licence for operation of CORAL, IGCAR

Licensing/Consent of Radiation Facilities

14,607 Licences for medical, industrial and research radiation facilities

5,584 permissions for procurement of radioactive sources and 944 permissions for procurement of equipment/devices

iiAERB Annual Report - 2017

2,345 authorisations for disposal of disused radioactive sources in radiation facilities.

Declaration of more than 66,259 diagnostic X-ray units in eLORA out of which 46,247 equipment registered as on December 31, 2017.

Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities

Posted onsite observers at four NPP sites viz. Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Kakrapar and Kudankulam

24 inspections of nuclear power projects and 43 inspections of operating power plants

51 inspections of industrial and fuel cycle facilities

1,025 inspections of medical, industrial and research radiation facilities

Conducted nationwide campaign of enforcement inspection of Medical Diagnostic X-Ray units covering 166 enforcement inspections; sealed 78 equipment and issued warning for seal to 163 X-ray equipment.

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) at NPPs

emergency exercises at three NPP sites.

Completed design review of On-Site Emergency Support Centre at NPPs (implementation in progress).

Regulatory Safety Documents

Approved two Safety Guides and uploaded on AERB website.

IAEA and provided comments.

10 AERB safety documents have been translated in Hindi.

Safety Analysis and Research Development

Simulated table-top off-site emergency exercise at NAPS, TAPS and KGS sites were modelled using the in-house developed atmospheric dispersion models.

Hydrogen mitigation facility (HYMIF) (phase-1) is commissioned in SRI Engineering Hall, Kalpakkam with the objective of determining the performance and safety characteristics of hydrogen mitigation devices and providing inputs for regulatory decision making.

An experimental facility is commissioned at SRI and experiments were carried out

iiiAERB Annual Report - 2017

Public Information and Safety Promotional Activities for Stakeholders

6 Theme meetings were organised on various subjects for stakeholders of NPPs.

Two special meets were organised one on ‘Security of Radioactive Material (RAM)’ and another on ‘Accredited Personnel Monitoring and Bio-Dosimetry Laboratories’.

9 Awareness programmes were conducted on radiation safety covering a wide target audience. In addition, 40 Safety Awareness programmes were conducted at various radiation facilities during regulatory inspection.

Published advertisements in print media to sensitise the users on requirements of AERB for use of medical X-ray equipment as well as use of radioactive sources or radiation generating equipment. Also published in monthly magazine ALARA of ISRT.

InFocus Advertorial in monthly magazine ‘Shubhyatra’ of Air India and ‘Railbandhu’ of Indian Railways in November 2017 issue.

Displayed exhibits on the safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear, radiation facilities and display of safety documents, in relevant conferences/workshops.

International Cooperation

Held bilateral and multilateral meetings with delegations from USNRC, CANDU Owners Group (COG) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).

Hosted 5th meeting of Reactor Physics Working Group (RPWG) of International VVER Regulator Forum at SRI, Kalpakkam.

Signing of bilateral arrangement between AERB and Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) on April 08, 2017 for the exchange of technical information and co-operation in the regulation of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

Explore means of future cooperation between agencies of Japan and AERB as a future step to recent bilateral agreement between India and Japan on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)

Indian Delegation led by Chairman AERB, with experts from AERB, BARC, NPCIL and the Indian Embassy at Vienna, participated in the 7th Review Meeting of Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).

India submitted its National Report for review by the Contracting Parties in on August 2016, on which received total 224 questions and provided answers to all these questions within the stipulated time.

ivAERB Annual Report - 2017

Public Accountability

136 RTIs questions were replied during the period.

Responded to 28 parliamentary questions.

Provided all the relevant information during CAG Audit.

Human Resource Development

Augmentation of manpower by recruiting 15 personnel in various categories (12

developing soft skills.

Towards the aim of continual knowledge upgradation of its staff, AERB organised:

Two refresher training courses on ‘Industrial Safety’

Two technical talks and 8 colloquia

A lecture series on ASME training course for almost 6 months, comprising of 50 lectures

Kalpakkam

Infrastructure Development

New website was launched on August 15, 2017, to make it more user-friendly and more people centric to enhance the transparency and public outreach.

Construction of Regional Regulatory Centres at Kolkata and Chennai is in progress.

Tenders were invited for construction of AERB Niyamak Bhavan-C building.

and Radiation Plants”

8 press releases were issued in Hindi and published in daily newspapers.

Four Hindi workshops were conducted.

Special Activities

AERB implemented follow up actions on suggestions and recommendations made by IAEA-IRRS.

The National Conference on Regulatory Interface (NCRI) was organised for stakeholders of NPP and Radiation Facilities.

vAERB Annual Report - 2017

New Initiatives

Accreditation of Laboratories: Initiative was taken to bring out clarity of roles of NABL, AERB and BARC w.r.t. recognition/accreditation procedures for testing and calibration in radiological measurements, identifying the gaps in requirements and

of interest or duplication of activities arising out of such overlapping responsibilities.

Transport of Radioactive Material by Air: Review of IAEA regulations for safe

vis-a-vis national legislation was taken up to identify various agencies/ competent authorities for overseeing the requirements for various modes of transport. Review of the regulations for safe transport of radioactive material by air was also taken up to bring out clarity w.r.t the roles and responsibilities of Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and AERB.

Table-top Exercises: With emphasis on early phase decision making, table-top emergency exercise was conceptualised on Emergency Action Level. During the year, trial table-top emergency exercises were successfully conducted at NAPS (November 8, 2017) and TAPS (December 16, 2017). It was observed that the evolved table-top emergency exercise methodology will stand as an effective tool to evaluate the decision making of emergency managers in response to an emergency situation, especially during the early phase.

viAERB Annual Report - 2017

COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD

Chairman, AERB

Members

Shri S. A. Bhardwaj

Shri D. K. Shukla

Chairman, SARCOP

Dr. K.V. Raghavan Distinguished Professor, INAE

Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, Hyderabad

Dr. Harsh K. GuptaPresident, IUGG,

National Geophysical Research Institute

(NGRI), Hyderabad

Dr. G. K. Rath Professor and Head

Department of OncologyAIIMS, New Delhi

Prof. Devang V. Khakhar Director, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay,

Mumbai

viiAERB Annual Report - 2017

Remembering........ Dr. K. V. Raghavan

AERB mourns the untimely demise of Dr. K. V. Raghavan on October 12, 2017. He was the longest serving Board member of AERB.Dr. Raghavan will always be fondly remembered by us in AERB for his invaluable wisdom and insights in the deliberations of the Board. He was an internationally renowned Chemical Engineer, a Fellow of the Indian National Academy of Engineers (INAE) and its Vice President.

Dr. K. V. Raghavan, AERB Board Member (October 2001 to October 2017)

viiiAERB Annual Report - 2017

v

SRI NPSD OPSD R&DD DRI DRA&C DRP&E

RSD

Board of AERB

Chairman, AERB

Executive Director, AERB

Accounts Administration

NSARG

NSAD

S

E

C

R

E

T

A

R

I

A

T

Board of AERB

B O A R D

NFRG

Regional Regulatory Centres

Southern Regional Regulatory Centre Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre Northern Regional Regulatory Centre

NFRG : Nuclear Facilities Regulations GroupNSARG : Nuclear Safety Analysis and Research GroupDRI : Directorate of Regulatory InspectionDRP&E : Directorate of Radiation Protection and EnvironmentDRA&C : Directorate of Regulatory Affairs and Communications

OPSD : Operating Plants Safety Division

NPSD : Nuclear Projects Safety Division

NSAD : Nuclear Safety Analysis Division

RSD : Radiological Safety Division

R&DD : Resources and Documentation Division

SRI : Safety Research Institute

ORGANISATION CHART OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

ixAERB Annual Report - 2017

KEY FIGURES OF THE YEAR 2017

Staff Members

Board Meeting

Meeting (Project Safety Committee)

Meeting (Review of Operating NPP)

Meeting (Fuel Cycle and Other Facilities)

Meeting (Review of Radiation Facilities)

Press Releases

Regulatory Safety Documents (till date)

340

03

44

119

20

19

08

165

Renewal of Licences (NPP)

Renewal of Licences for Nuclear Fuel Cycle, R&D Facilities

Licences (Radiation Facilities)

Operating Personnel Licensed

RSO Approvals for RF

Permissions for procurement of Radioactive Sources

10

06

14,607

157

2,729

5,584

Regulatory Inspections

Inspectors (NPP)

Inspectors (Operating Plants)

Inspectors (Radiation Facilities)

34

44

54

Inspections (Nuclear Facilities under Construction)

Inspections (Operating NPP)

Inspections (Industrial Safety)

Inspections (Radiation Facilities)

Enforcement Inspections of Diagnostic X-ray facilities

X-ray Equipment Sealed

24

43

51

1,025

166

78

X-ray units declared in eLORA

X-ray Equipment Registered in eLORA

66,259

46,247

Theme Meeting/ Special meet

Safety Awareness Programmes

RTI Questions Replied

8

9

136

xAERB Annual Report - 2017

MANAGEMENT SYSTEMAERB has established a regulatory framework, which involves stipulating the safety requirements,

during various stages viz. siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation etc. All Nuclear Power Projects (NPP) undergo an elaborate and in-depth safety review during various consenting stages.

A well-established multi-tier safety review mechanism is followed for safety review during various stages of projects in all the nuclear power projects, back end fuel cycle facilities and radiation facilities.

The safety review process is supplemented by planned and special/surprise regulatory inspections (RI) as established in regulatory safety documents of AERB. Compliance with the recommendations

observations arising from RIs are reviewed in safety committees and considered before giving clearance for subsequent stages.

Besides safety review of NPP and back end fuel cycle facilities, security related submissions are also reviewed during the stage-wise consenting process. Similarly multi-tier safety review mechanism is followed for safety review of operating power plants and fuel cycle facilities.

AERB established a Quality Management System (QMS) compliant with ISO 9001:2008, which is

System (IMS) to meet expectations of the stakeholders.

Quality Management System (QMS)

during the years 2009, 2012 and 2015. QMS under ISO 9001:2008 has been implemented in AERB for its core regulatory processes viz. consenting activities, regulatory inspections and preparation of regulatory documents. Under the purview of ISO standard, surveillance audit by BIS is carried out every year and internal audit is carried by trained auditors of AERB once in a year.

Executive Committee (EC) of AERB conducts the management review to ensure suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of QMS at AERB. This review includes assessing quality policy and quality objectives.

Internal audit of AERB was carried out during September 2017 as per the ISO procedures and Quality Manual of AERB. There were 41 observations. No non-conformances (NCs) were reported during the audit. All the observations have been complied.

xiAERB Annual Report - 2017

The pre-audit meeting was conducted on August 28, 2017 to schedule the internal audits. The post-audit meeting was conducted on November 9, 2017 to review the observations arising from the internal audits and its compliances by the respective audited divisions.

BIS surveillance audit was carried out during December 19 - 20, 2017 for evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of IS/ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management System (QMS) at AERB. The function/activities of MR/Top Management, SSED (now merged with NPSD), NSAD, and R&DD were audited. No non-conformance (NC) was reported by BIS auditors during the audit.

An awareness programme covering topics on QMS aspects viz. (i) Transition from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015; (ii) Internal audit under QMS and (iii) Graded approach in review of radiation facilities was organised on October 18, 2017 at AERB. A plan was chalked out in consultation with BIS towards transition to and implementation of ISO 9001:2015 within the stipulated time.

Integrated Management System (IMS) of AERB

The regulatory and other supporting processes and activities carried out by AERB are managed through an existing management system compliant to above mentioned ISO standard and also to earlier IAEA guidance GS-R-3. The system followed in AERB underwent review by IAEA during the IRRS mission in March 2015 and their suggestions are being taken as inputs during the implementation of IMS to achieve and sustain quality standards comparable with those of nuclear fraternity worldwide.

Meanwhile IAEA in the year 2016 revised the guideline for management system to GSR Part-II 'Leadership and Management of Safety' to include leadership in process management. Chairman, AERB constituted a committee to frame the Integrated Management System of AERB in line with the IAEA safety standards. In-parallel, individual Directorates and Divisions were developing their process documents clarifying interfaces and methods for achieving quality expectations. The review

international practices.

xiiiAERB Annual Report - 2017

During the year 2017, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) continued to monitor safety aspects of all facilities and activities involved in nuclear energy and applications of ionising radiations. AERB also continued to strengthen itself as a more

AERB continued to carry out its functions with the support of its secretariat and technical divisions. The Board met three times and reviewed the safety status of operating Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Power Projects under construction / commissioning, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Radiation Facilities.

of main and safety vessels, primary sodium circuit, secondary sodium circuit and the safety grade decay heat removal (SGDHR) circuit up to 180°C.

sodium in the secondary sodium storage tanks,

circuit (SSMC-1&2) in both the loops as well as for commissioning of both the loops of the SSMC.

AERB Board Meeting in Progress

PFBR Progressing towards Commissioning

Highlights of overall achievements for the year are as follows:

Safety Surveillance of Nuclear Power Projects

AERB granted clearance to Kudankulam (KK) unit-2 (1000 MWe) for operating at rated power for limited duration of 100 effective full power days on January 13, 2017. AERB gave consent for

KKNPP-3&4.

AERB issued permission for Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) for integrated pre-heating

Four units of 700 MWe pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) are under construction at Kakrapar, Gujarat (KAPP-3&4) and Rawatbhata, Rajasthan (RAPP-7&8). Periodic regulatory inspections are being carried out in these units.

of computer based systems and reviewing of commissioning procedures and technical

Review is in progress for site excavation clearance of four units of 700 MWe PHWR at Gorakhpur, Haryana site (GHAVP-1 to 4).

Safety Surveillance of Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors

There are twenty one nuclear power plants in operation in India. The radioactivity releases from all the nuclear power plants were below the

public in the vicinity of NPP sites was far less than

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xivAERB Annual Report - 2017

the annual dose prescribed by AERB. The radiation exposure to occupational workers in these plants was also below the prescribed limit.

AERB renewed the licences for operation of MAPS, KGS-1&2, TAPS-1&2, RAPS-3&4 &

reported from the operating nuclear power plants. The reports on these events were reviewed in AERB to see the adequacy of investigations, corrective actions, lessons learned and the need for any regulatory actions. All the events were of INES level-0 (corresponding to deviations below scale) except the one event at Tarapur which was of level 1 (detail in Section 1.8).

involves cutting, removal and disposal of coolant channels was completed in KAPS-2 after approval from AERB. The second phase of EMCCR campaign was in progress.

Safety Surveillance of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and other related Industrial Facilities

AERB issued consent to UCIL for construction and commissioning of Magnetite (as by-product) plant at Turamdih mill. AERB renewed the licence for operation of Banduhurang Mine, Tummalapalle Mill, Zirconium Complex Pazhayakayal, NFC-Hyderabad, HWP-Kota and 2000 Amp Sodium Test Cell at HWP-Baroda.

AERB renewed licence for operation of K-130 Cyclotron at VECC, Kolkata and granted clearance for stage-2 commissioning of TWINDUS Linac-2 at RRCAT, Indore. AERB granted commissioning of Agricultural and Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF) of RRCAT at Choithram Mandi, Indore, which is a technology demonstration plant housing indigenously developed 10 MeV, 5 kW electron Linac accelerator for radiation processing of food and agricultural products. AERB granted clearance for Stage-2 (i.e. erection of sodium storage tanks, structure and components) in Sodium Technology Complex at IGCAR.

aspects and also focuses on the construction safety aspects of nuclear power projects and other nuclear facilities under construction. In the year 2017, there were three fatal accidents, at TAPS-1&2, ECIL, Hyderabad and FRFCF, Kalpakkam. These accidents were investigated and reviewed. AERB stipulated additional measures for strengthening safety management at these facilities and disseminated the lessons learnt from these accidents to all DAE units.

The details of safety surveillance of nuclear facilities including Industrial Safety status in DAE units during this period are given in Chapter-1.

Safety Surveillance of Radiation Facilities

AERB issued 14,607 consents for operation (licence, authorisation and registration), 349 Type approvals, 2,729 approvals of Radiation

permissions for import/procurement of radiation equipment and 5,584 permissions for procurement of radioactive sources (imported and indigenously manufactured).

The details of safety surveillance of these facilities during this period are given in Chapter-2.

Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities

AERB carried out 24 regulatory inspections for nuclear facilities under construction, 43 regulatory inspections of operating NPPs and research facilities, 51 inspections of industrial and fuel cycle facilities, 15 inspections of nuclear facilities for physical protection systems affecting safety and 1,025 radiation facilities.

AERB has posted Site Observer Teams (SOT) at three more sites viz. Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam and Kakrapar in addition to Kudankulam where continuous on-site AERB coverage exists since commissioning activities of KKNPP-1.

The details of regulatory inspection of nuclear and radiation facilities during this period are given in Chapter-3.

xvAERB Annual Report - 2017

Enforcement in Nuclear and Radiation Facilities

AERB carried out unannounced inspections in major cities/towns and covered 166 number of medical diagnostic X-ray facilities. Total 78 number of X-ray equipment were sealed and warning was issued for sealing of 163 number of X-ray equipment in view of their non-compliance. Few other enforcement actions like periodic suspensions of licence of the facility / RSO were taken against reported violations of regulatory requirements in industrial radiography practices.

The details of enforcement actions are given in relevant sections of Chapter- 2 and 3.

Emergency Preparedness

Annual site emergency exercises were conducted at 7 nuclear power plant sites. Off-site emergency exercises to be conducted once in two years, were carried out at Tarapur, Kalpakkam, Kaiga and

and 3 Off-site emergency exercises as observers.

A new system for conducting off-site emergency exercises is in developmental stage in which Emergency Action Levels (EAL) are used to conduct table top exercises. Such exercises were conducted at Narora and Tarapur sites during the month of November and December 2017 respectively, which have shown encouraging output.

The Status of Environmental Safety and Occupational Exposures are given in Chapter 4. The Status of Emergency Preparedness of the Nuclear Facilities is given in Chapter 5.

Regulatory Safety Document Development

During the year, two new Safety Guides viz.

Report (SAR) for Nuclear Power Plants” (AERB/

Facilities” (AERB/RF-RS/SG-3) were approved and were uploaded on AERB website. AERB reviewed 17 draft safety standards and 8 draft

commented.

The Status of Regulatory Safety documents are given in Chapter 6.

Research & Development and Safety Studies

AERB focused on the areas covering severe accident studies for PHWR, thermal hydraulics safety studies, reactor physics studies, radiological assessment and environmental safety studies and integrated risk assessment for multi-unit NPP site.

As part of experimental investigations on mitigation aspects under Design Extension Conditions (DEC), the Hydrogen Mitigation Facility (HYMIF) was commissioned in SRI Engineering Hall, Kalpakkam. In light of KAPS incident, R&D works were initiated to study the corrosion aspects of Zr-2.5%Nb. An experimental facility was commissioned at SRI Chemistry laboratory and experiments were carried out to assess the corrosion

AERB continued to promote and fund research projects on reactor safety, radiation safety, front and back end fuel cycle safety related problems and industrial safety at academic institutions under the Safety Research Programme. Two new projects related to radiation safety viz. ‘Studies on levels of Natural Radiation in the Environment Hill Districts of Manipur’ and ‘Improving Radiation Safety Standards in Dental Practice’ were approved and four on-going projects were renewed.

The details of various activities of safety assessment and research are presented in Chapter-7.

Public Outreach Activities

AERB hosted a 3-day National Conference on Regulatory Interface (NCRI)-2017 at Mumbai with an objective to foster an environment wherein, the Licencees, Stakeholders and Professional Associations could interact, discuss and provide valuable feedback to AERB on various issues related to Nuclear / Radiation Safety, regulatory requirements and practices world-wide, emerging trends in design and manufacturing, challenges in supply chain and effectiveness of quality assurance

xviAERB Annual Report - 2017

programmes. More than 300 delegates participated in the conference.

Nine programmes focusing on the aspects of enhancing radiation safety awareness were conducted for target audience. In addition 40 safety awareness programmes were conducted at various radiation facilities during regulatory inspections.

AERB launched its new website www.aerb.gov.in on August 15, 2017. The intent of the new website is to make it more user-friendly, to enhance the transparency and public outreach. Information on regulatory activities on operating nuclear power plants, events, radioactive discharges, occupational exposures etc. are provided on the website and are updated periodically.

AERB provides information to its stakeholders through other means also like annual reports, press

issued during this period.

AERB advertisements were given in print media on aspects of obtaining requisite consents for possessing or use of radioactive sources/radiation generating equipment and requirements for medical diagnostic X-ray units.

AERB also participated in some of the science and technology fairs for displaying exhibits on the safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear and radiation facilities.

Apart from above mentioned activities, AERB timely provided response to queries posted by the members of public.

The details of AERB initiatives for engaging with stakeholders and public accountability are presented in Chapter- 8 and 9.

International Cooperation

Bilateral and multilateral meetings were held with delegations from USNRC, CANDU Owners Group (COG) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).

AERB signed a bilateral arrangement with Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) for the exchange of technical information and co-operation in the regulation of nuclear safety and radiation protection. Also, entered in bilateral agreement with Japan for the co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

AERB hosted 5th meeting of Reactor Physics Working Group (RPWG) of International VVER Regulator Forum.

The 7th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) was held at the Headquarters of IAEA in Vienna, Austria from March 27 - April 7, 2017 in which Indian Delegation led by Chairman AERB with experts from AERB, BARC, NPCIL and the Indian Embassy at Vienna participated. India had submitted its National Report for review by the

Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB during Inauguration of NCRI-2017

xviiAERB Annual Report - 2017

schools of BARC, IGCAR and NFC and transfer of experienced personnel from operating plants and R&D institutes. As on December 31, 2017,

is 340.

As a part of competence development, AERB continued to train its staff by organising training programmes, management development programmes (MDP), workshops, on-job training at nuclear facilities, refresher courses, technical talks, colloquia, participation in DAE’s Administrative Training Institute (ATI) etc.

AERB is upgrading the infrastructure at its Headquarter and regional regulatory centers.

The details on human resources development and infrastructure and welfare activities are presented in Chapter-11.

Contracting Parties in August, 2016. A total of 224 questions on the report were answered within the stipulated time. The detailed report is made available on AERB website.

Indian delegation also organised a side event on March 28, 2017 wherein a detailed presentation was given on the Pressure Tube (PT) leak events at KAPS units and their status of investigations.

The details on AERB’s contribution at various international fora are presented in Chapter-10.

Human Resource Development and Infrastructure

AERB augmented the technical manpower substantially by inducting postgraduates through AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme (AGFS) in IIT Bombay and IIT Madras and through training

Indian Delegation in 7th Convention on Nuclear Safety Meeting at IAEA

1AERB Annual Report - 2017

1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Nuclear facilities in India are sited, designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in accordance with strict quality and safety standards. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) oversees the safety of the nuclear and radiation facilities and has been mandated to frame safety policies, lay down safety standards and requirements. AERB has established a regulatory framework, which involves stipulating the safety requirements, issuance of

through safety reviews and inspections during various stages viz. siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation etc.

All nuclear facilities undergo an elaborate and in-depth safety review during various stages. The objective of safety reviews and assessment at various consenting stages is illustrated below:

The safety reviews related to the consenting decisions and safety monitoring during various

stages are carried out through multi-tier system of safety committees. The committees include experts

and instrumentation, thermal hydraulics, structural analysis, reactor physics, seismology etc., relevant to nuclear and radiation safety. The higher level Committees include experts from academia, national R&D institutes, and government bodies. The multi-tiered system of safety reviews follows

following graded approach and is based on

AERB in its regulatory documents.

In this approach, the issues of greater

level committees for their satisfactory resolution. Recommendations of these committees concerning the various safety issues and consents are further considered by AERB for arriving at regulatory decisions. This arrangement ensures comprehensiveness of the reviews and effective

the chosen site meets the Site Evaluation Criteria and is suitable for the proposed type and capacity of the plant from environmental considerations

the proposed plant design and the applicant’s statements and commitments meet the regulatory requirements, the proposed construction meets quality requirements

the test program and procedures are consistent with requirements, the performance of the plant is as per

safety analysis for the as-built facility has been carried out to meet the regulatory requirements

the operational limits and conditions are consistent with regulatory requirements and an adequate level of safety is maintained during operation through proper operational and maintenance procedures and

requirements, and conditions for renewal of consent as prescribed by AERB.

Sitting

Commissioning

Construction

Operation

Chapter 1

SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES


Additionally, AERB carries out periodic regulatory inspections to check conformance with regulatory requirements and consenting conditions.

The licence for operation of the facilities is given after ensuring its satisfactory construction and commissioning as per the approved design, complying with the quality requirements and the

licence for operation is given for a maximum

for operation is considered based on separate application along with a comprehensive safety review as per the laid down requirements and process.

AERB has also been entrusted with the responsibility of review and assessment of nuclear security aspects for different types of nuclear facilities in India. AERB has issued various regulatory documents specifying nuclear security requirements for nuclear facilities. Depending on the project stage, security aspects are reviewed against relevant regulatory requirements. Multi-tier approach is adopted for review of security aspects also.

Security review structure in AERB was restructured in September 2016, with constitution of a Committee for Reviewing Security Aspects (CRSA) and a working group (CRSA-WG) under CRSA, for carrying out review of nuclear security aspects of nuclear power plants (NPP), security of radiation source in radiation facilities and during transport etc.

CRSA undertakes the detailed study to identify the security aspects related to safety (including cyber security related to safety) which are required to be brought under the regulatory purview of AERB and submits recommendations to AERB. CRSA also reviews draft AERB regulatory documents and updates existing documents related to security of nuclear and radiation facilities based on new information including internationally available information.

The safety status of the nuclear facilities i.e. nuclear facilities under construction; operating nuclear power plants and research reactors; nuclear

fuel cycle and other related industrial facilities; overall safety performance of the nuclear facilities in operation and construction; R&D units and other facilities; industrial safety of nuclear facilities; and

the year 2017 are covered in following sections.

1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

AERB has established an elaborate system for in-depth safety review of nuclear power projects and fuel cycle facilities that are under construction. For this purpose, different stages of ‘regulatory

SitingConstructionCommissioning

Important outcome of the safety reviews and assessments related to nuclear power projects and fuel cycle facilities are given in subsequent paragraphs.

The number of meetings of the important safety review committees of the facility undergoing reviews are given in following table:

Table 1.1: Safety Review Committee Meetings of the Power Projects

Project Safety Committee Number of Meetings

ACPSR-LWR 6

ACPSR-PHWR & PFBR 1

PDSC-PFBR 6

PDSC KKNPP-3&4 8

PDSC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, GHAVP-1&2)

2

PDSC (DFRP, FRFCF and DFMF) 2

CESC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, GHAVP-1&2)

16

DSRC-NFC 3

Total 44


(A) NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS

A1. Light Water Reactor Based NPPs

(i) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project Unit-2

Based on satisfactory review of Phase-C2 commissioning tests and plant performance, clearance for Phase-C3 commissioning of KKNPP-2 was granted for raising the reactor power upto 100% FP. In Phase-C3 commissioning,

commissioning tests related to reactor physics, calibration of Neutron Flux Monitoring Equipment (NFME) and performance tests on In-Core Monitoring Systems (ICMS) were carried out. Subsequently reactor power was raised to 100%FP and the Phase-C3 dynamic tests viz., tripping of 2 out of 4 Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs), TG trip test with operation of BRU-K (condensate steam dump valves), Tripping of one CCW pump, tripping of one Condensate Extraction Pump (CEP-2), TG load shedding to zero value (Gross Load Rejection

System (PHRS) etc. were carried out successfully. Plant performance data with stabilised reactor power operation at 100% FP for 7 days was submitted by KKNPP-2.

Subsequently, AERB reviewed application for operating Unit-2 at rated power for limited duration i.e. 100 effective full power days (EFPDs) and granted clearance for operating the Unit-2 for 100 EFPDs. Thereafter site submitted a request for extension of clearance up-to February 28, 2018 which was reviewed and extension was granted. Presently, KK Unit-2 is operating at 99.5%FP, 1000MWe.

During the course of commissioning activities, AERB Site Observer Teams (SOT) were deputed regularly to KKNPP site for physical

and recommendations made by AERB as well as to witness various commissioning tests. The reports sent by SOT were regularly reviewed for necessary follow up at AERB.

Following are the highlights of Safety Review of KKNPP Unit-2:

(a) Out-of-Pile Testing of Prototype Double Check Valve

After carrying out extensive type testing of prototype Double Check Valve (DCV) at Russian Federation, as recommended further out-of-pile tests were carried out by NPCIL for 170 hot cycles in one of the DAE facility at Kalpakkam. The performance of DCV was found acceptable and meeting the design intent. After completion of hot testing, visual inspection of prototype internals was carried out and no indications were observed. These valves were installed in KK Unit-1 and tested for 3 cycles at 130°C and performance was found satisfactory.

(b) Implementation of Design Change Notice (DCN) for New DCVs

Site submitted a proposal for implementation of DCNs (similar to that of KKNPP-1) of new DCVs for installing in KKNPP-2. These DCNs of new DCV for KKNPP-1 were already reviewed and accepted. In view of this, AERB permitted to implement the peripheral DCNs (excluding installation of DCVs) such that the implementation of DCNs does not have any safety impact on existing system and can be reverted back if new DCVs are not installed. However, separate proposal for installation of new DCVs in KKNPP-2 along with action plan for establishing the reliable performance of new DCVs needs to be submitted.

(c) Main Outfall (MOF) Sampling

During liquid radioactive waste (LRW) discharge through Unit-2 (on trial basis to check

value on west side was observed to be below detectable limit, however on east side, the value observed was 0.36 Bq/ml (limiting value is 1 Bq/ml). Since the discharge point is on east side, a higher concentration of radioactivity is expected on the east side of discharge canal compared to west side before it joins sea. Site was asked to relocate the location of sensors for realistic/representative measurements.


Steam leak was found on the RCP-2 differential pressure transmitter impulse line, on the discharge side. As leak was in the non-

the impulse tubes of Unit-2 and based on the same corrective measures in other supports of impulse tubes were also incorporated.

(e) Implementation of Manual Updating of LHGR Limiting Value

Site submitted a proposal on manual updating of LHGR limiting value based on burn-up in lower level system of ICIS of Unit-2 (similar to that of KKNPP-1) which was reviewed. Similar proposal on manual updating of LHGR limiting values were already reviewed and accepted for KKNPP-1. In view of this, KKNPP-2 was permitted to implement the similar manual updating of LHGR limiting value and incorporate the feedback experience of implementing the same in KKNPP-1.

(f) Revised schedule of implementation of AFR Facility

NPCIL submitted a note providing status of Away From Reactor (AFR) for KKNPP-1&2 and addressing the postulation of liner leak in L-section of SFP compartment (which is the largest compartment) and consequent action plan for SFA storage.

(ii) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (Unit- 3&4)

Subsequent to AERB Clearance for Site Excavation for KKNPP-3&4 on January 21, 2016, Site completed excavation activities including consolidation grouting for main plant buildings. NPCIL submitted application seeking Consent for First Pour of Concrete (FPC) of KKNPP Unit-3&4 on April 27, 2016 and progressively submitted the Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports (PSARs) Chapters relevant for FPC clearance along with changes w.r.t. KKNPP-1&2.

KKNPP Unit-3&4 plant design is a repeat design of Unit-1&2, which was extensively reviewed in AERB, hence review process for Unit-3&4 was optimised to detailed review of design differences impacting safety and compliance to AERB safety code on ‘Design of Light Water Reactors based Nuclear Power Plants’.

Aspects reviewed broadly included those related to site characteristics and analysis/design of civil engineering structures, updated work

geotechnical investigations, analysis and design methodologies of SSCs including results of seismic

in foundations of safety related structures, construction methodology, mix design and QA during construction.

Based on safety review AERB granted clearance for FPC to KKNPP- 3&4 on June 23, 2017 with certain stipulations. FPC activities at Site were started and are currently in progress. AERB accorded approval for commencement of construction activities of various buildings.

AERB Site Observer Teams (SOT) were deputed regularly to KKNPP Site for physical

activities. The reports sent by SOT were reviewed for necessary follow up.

The following are the highlights of safety review of KKNPP-3&4:

(a) Design Basis Flood Level (DBFL)

During excavation clearance, a detailed study towards evaluation of the run up due to short period waves using coupled models was recommended

estimated Design Basis Flood Level (DBFL) is

DBFL (5.56 m) even under beyond design basis scenarios for the site as the safe grade elevation of the KKNPP site is 7.5 m above MSL.


Geotechnical Investigations

AERB, as part of Excavation Consent, asked NPCIL to take up additional geophysical studies to verify existence of lineament reported in literature. Based on satisfactory review of these additional investigations, existence of any additional seismogenic feature was ruled out. Post excavation,

were carried out and outcome investigations were reviewed.

(c) M35 Grade Concrete

The 28 day compressive strength for M35 concrete from batching plant is found to meet the requirements of minimum strength. The green concrete temperature control and workability requirements at the point of pumping were found

compressive strength will be met for cube as well as cylinder specimens by ensuring testing of cylinder specimens at same frequency as that of

in the regulatory inspections.

(d) QA Manual for Design and Construction

Overall QA aspects are covered in PSAR Chapter-17 and in QA manual. These have been reviewed and found to be satisfactory. For

covering the SSCs which are under Indian scope has been reviewed. Revised QA manual for Construction was reviewed by AERB and found to be satisfactory.

A.2 Fast Breeder Reactor based NPPs

(i) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

Pre-commissioning activities related to commissioning of secondary sodium system,

fuel handling equipment etc. are in progress at Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). Earlier, in February 2017, PFBR undertook Leak Rate Testing of Reactor Containment Building at designed pressure.

Based on satisfactory review of the prerequisites and other safety related aspects, AERB granted permission on April 24, 2017 for integrated pre-heating of main and safety vessels, primary sodium circuit, secondary sodium circuit and the Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal (SGDHR) circuit up to 180o C.

AERB also granted permission for melting

storage tank on June 6, 2017 and clearance for

Sodium Main Circuit (SSMC-1&2) on June 30, 2017 and permission for commissioning of both loops of SSMC on December 22, 2017.

AERB Site Observer Teams (SOTs) were deputed to PFBR Kalpakkam Site since July 2017, for independent regulatory monitoring safety aspects related to the ongoing commissioning activities. The reports sent by SOT were regularly reviewed for necessary follow up.

Secondary Sodium Pump


A.3 Pressurised Heavy Water Rectors based NPP

(i) KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8

Safety review of twin units of 700 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water Rectors (PHWRs) each at Kakrapar, Gujarat (KAPP-3&4) and Rawatbhata, Rajasthan (RAPP-7&8) are in progress. Civil construction activities related to safety and non-safety buildings were in progress at KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8.

AERB carried out the safety review of PSAR chapters pertaining to site characteristics and design of civil engineering structures. GHAVP is an alluvial site, which poses several challenges with respect to analysis and design of civil engineering structures. AERB undertook review of the NPCIL submittals pertaining to detailed seismo-tectonic and geotechnical investigations for GHAVP site. Review of reports related to estimation of design basis for external events, especially ground motion,

investigations were completed.

To eliminate the potential for liquefaction, scheme of ground improvement was proposed,

mock-up at site. The proposed scheme along with the results of mock-up were reviewed and accepted, with certain stipulations regarding quality control during actual execution.

KAPP-4 IC Dome Liner Erection

Construction of major structures like Reactor Building Containment and Internal Structures is nearing completion. After erection of major equipment like End-shield, Calandria, Steam Generators, Diesel Generators and core components like Calandria Tubes (CT), Pressure Tubes (PT), Reactivity Devices etc. are being installed. Functionality tests and pre-commissioning activities on few systems were started.

(ii) GHAVP-1&2

AERB issued siting Consent for four units (700 MWe PHWRs) at Gorakhpur, Haryana site (GHAVP-1 to 4) in 2015. Design of these units at GHAVP-1 to 4 is similar to KAPP-3&4 and

NPCIL submitted application seeking clearance for excavation for GHAVP-1&2.

Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB and AERB


AERB undertook a detailed review of the analysis methodology for safety related buildings incorporating soil structure interaction (SSI)

compliance. Based on safety review excavation consent of GHAVP-1&2 is under consideration.

Highlights of safety review of PHWRs under Construction (KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8) are given below:

(a) Indications in the welds of the Central Top Hatch Beam (CTHB) of KAPP-4

An Event Report (ER) for the observed liquid penetrant examination (LPE) indications in the welds of the Central Top Hatch Beam of KAPP-4 was reviewed at AERB. Based on the feedback w.r.t. KAPP-4 CTHB, AERB recommended to

ensure strengthening of quality surveillance during manufacturing of the safety critical equipment and thorough review of Vendor’s Quality Management System.

(b) Re-rolling of Calandria Tube (J-8) at KAPP-4

An Event Report for the Calandria Tube (CT) shifting by ~3 mm to South end at channel J-8 at KAPP-4 after rolling at North end was submitted. The CT was removed after carrying out

in post-installation tests. ER is under review at AERB.

(c) Pre-stressing Procedure and Sequence for the Inner Containment at KAPP-3&4

AERB continued the safety review of civil engineering aspects for the under construction 2x700 MWe PHWR NPP units at KAPP. Reports related to pre-stressing procedure and sequence for the inner containment were reviewed and accepted, based on which pre-stressing activities commenced at KAPP site. AERB also reviewed the approach undertaken for ultimate load capacity analysis of inner containment structure vis-à-vis the material models and the failure criteria adopted for the analysis.

(d) Erection of Dome Structure of Primary Containment of RAPP-7&8

Primary containment of 700MWe PHWR is provided with liner for reducing the leakages through the containment. For ease of construction, dome structure along with the liner was pre-fabricated at ground level and placed over the Primary Containment wall. Detailed review of installation of major equipment in the Reactor Building, mechanical aspects of ring header of Containment Spray System etc. was completed.

(B) FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS

Safety review activities related to fuel cycle facilities continued during the year.

Ground Improvement-Trial using Replacement of

Soil-Cement Mix at GHAVP


B.1 Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant

Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) is being set up at Kalpakkam for reprocessing of the spent fuel from Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) on regular basis and demonstration of reprocessing process of the PFBR spent fuel. While the construction activities in the main process plant have reached completion, civil construction activities in the Head End Facility (HEF) of the plant, which houses the cells required for receiving and initial processing of spent fuel subassemblies, are nearing to completion. In the main process plant, pre-commissioning checks are in progress.

The seismic design bases of the plant buildings of DFRP were as per the then prevailing Indian Standard IS 1893 - 1975, as the Kalpakkam site was categorised under Zone II as per the standard. In line with the recent regulatory requirements relating to seismic design inputs for nuclear facilities and the latest assessment of the seismic design inputs that were worked out for the Kalpakkam site, AERB had asked DFRP to take up a seismic re-evaluation of DFRP with respect to the latest ground motion parameters derived for Kalpakkam site. In compliance to this, DFRP has now submitted a document on seismic re-evaluation of DFRP plant, which is currently under review.

B.2 Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF)

FRFCF is an integrated facility being set up at Kalpakkam. The facility will be used for recycling the spent fuel from PFBR, including fuel fabrication and assembly, reprocessing and waste management. AERB issued consent for construction of this facility in the year 2013 and subsequently granted extension of Consent for Construction of FRFCF during December 2016. Presently, civil construction activities of Waste Management Plant (WMP), Core Subassembly Plant (CSP), Fuel Fabrication Plant (FFP) and Reprocessed Uranium Plant (RUP) are in progress. AERB is following up the safety aspects related to construction.

AERB had reviewed the institutional mechanisms at the site for quality assurance aspects related to construction of the facility, based on which the facility was asked to establish a comprehensive mechanism for addressing of QA/QC aspects during procurement, manufacturing, construction and commissioning of equipment, in

Multi Pin Chopper for FRFCF

Waste Management Plant

Fuel Fabrication Plant


B.3 Nuclear Fuel Complex, Kota (NFC-K)

500 Tons Per Annum (TPA) PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF) and 165 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication Facility (ZFF) are being setup at Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Kota to meet additional demand of nuclear fuel supply for the 4 nos. of 700 MWe PHWRs coming up at RAPP-

of each 250 TPA PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility and 65 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication Facility will be set up and 100 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication Facility will be added in second phase in near future.

AERB issued siting consent for NFC-K on May 28, 2014. Subsequently, AERB has given clearances for site grading, various construction activities such as boundary wall, peripheral road, watch towers, construction power, temporary storage shed and non-plant buildings, construction of which is under progress.

Review of analysis and design of critical civil engineering structures for the proposed NFC at Kota were completed. The most important part of the facility is the PHWR fuel fabrication facility (PFFF), which is designed as per the seismic loads corresponding to maximum credible earthquake of IS-1893. Other structures of NFC-Kota are designed for design basis earthquake as per IS-1893.

Safety review of application and submissions towards grant of consent for construction of plant building of NFC-Kota is under progress.

1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS

1.3.1 Operational Safety Review

AERB carries out safety review and monitoring of operating NPPs and research reactors following multi-tier review process. Exhaustive review takes place during review of application for renewal of licence. Currently there are 21 operating nuclear power plants in the country. The details of these NPPs indicating their capacity, commencement of operation and validity of current operating licence is given in Table 1.2.

1.3.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued

During the year, a number of applications from the utilities were reviewed and licences for operations /clearances / permissions were issued.

Renewal of licence for operation of MAPS under Factories Act, 1948 up to December 31, 2020

Renewal of licence for operation of KGS-1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 up to May 31, 2022

Renewal of licence for operation of TAPS-1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 initially up to December 31, 2017 and subsequently up to March 31, 2021

Renewal of licence for operation of RAPS-3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 up to October 31, 2022

Renewal of licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up to March 31, 2020

Renewal of Licence for operation of CORAL, IGCAR under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up to September 30, 2017 then extended up to March 31, 2018.

1.3.3 Safety Review of Operating Nuclear Facilities and Research Reactors

Number of meetings conducted by various safety committees/standing committees/expert group during the year are given in Table 1.3

The safety status of operating NPPs and research reactors is described below:

(i) Tarapur Atomic Power Station

TAPS-1&2

The licences for operation of TAPS-1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 were valid till March 31, 2017. Station submitted applications for renewal of these licences up to December 31, 2017. These applications were


NPP Unit Site / District / State Type

Gross Capacity (MWe)

Commencement of Operation

Validity of Licence

Tarapur Atomic Power Station

TAPS-1Tarapur/Palghar/

Maharashtra

BWR160

October-1969 March 2021TAPS-2 160

TAPS-3PHWR

540 August -2006August 2021

TAPS-4 540 September -2005

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station

RAPS-1#

Rawatbhata/ Chithaurgarh

/RajasthanPHWR

100 December-1973August 2019

RAPS-2 200 April-1981

RAPS-3 220 June-2000October 2022

RAPS-4 220 December-2000

RAPS-5 220 February-2010March 2020

RAPS-6 220 March-2010

Kakrapar Atomic Power Station

KAPS-1 Kakrapar/Tapi/Gujarat

PHWR220 May-1993

July 2019KAPS-2 220 September-1995

Madras Atomic Power Station

MAPS-1 Kalpakkam/Kancheepuram /

Tamil NaduPHWR

220 January-1984December

2020MAPS-2 220 March-1986

Narora Atomic Power Station

NAPS-1 Narora/Bulandshahar /Uttar Pradesh

PHWR220 January-1991

June 2018NAPS-2 220 July-1992

Kaiga Generating Station

KGS-1Kaiga/

North Uttar Kannada / Karnataka

PHWR

220 November -2000May 2022

KGS-2 220 March-2000

KGS-3 220 May-2007April 2018

KGS-4 220 January-2011

Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant

KKNPP-1Kudankulam/Thirunelveli/Tamil Nadu

VVER 1000 December-2014 July 2020

# Unit under shutdown since 2004 and the reactor core is defueled.

Table 1.2: List of Operating Nuclear Power Plants


reviewed in safety committees and AERB extended the above licences up to December 31, 2017.

Subsequently, station submitted a combined application for renewal of licence for operation under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 till March 31, 2021. AERB reviewed the application through its multi-tier review process. During review, it was noted that station has made satisfactory progress towards resolution

RPV inspection, core shroud health assessment, replacement of small diameter pipings, health assessment of biological shield, transfer of spent fuel subassemblies stored in dry casks, drywell

Works related to installation and commissioning of CFVS and containment inerting system are in advance stage and are expected to be completed in

forthcoming two unit outage which is scheduled from last week of December 2017. Station has also planned to carry out inspection of safety related civil structures in the same outage.

General performance of TAPS-1&2 with

environment is satisfactory except for the fatal accident that occurred while transporting the cask over long distance using forklift. Subsequent to the accident, practice of using the forklift for transferring the waste casks has been discontinued. Waste casks are now transported using trailer. Station has technical and administrative capability for continued safe operation of the units. Based on above, AERB renewed the licence for operation of TAPS-1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 up to March 31, 2021.

Table 1.3: Meetings of Safety Committees

Name of the Safety Committee/Expert Groups No. of Meetings

SARCOP 17

TAPS-1&2 Safety Committee 10

PHWR Safety Committee-1(RAPS-1&2, MAPS-1&2, NAPS & KAPS-1&2)

14

PHWAR Safety Committee-2(KGS-1&2, KGS-3&4, RAPS-3&4 & RAPS-5&6)

12

PHWAR Safety Committee-3 (TAPS-3&4) 08

Kudankulam Safety Committee (KKNPP-1) 11

IGCAR Safety Committee (RR & CORAL) 05

Standing Committee on Reactor Physics (SC-RP) 10

Standing Committee on Control, Instrumentation and Computer based Systems (SCCI&CS) 06

05

Expert Group on Coolant Channels (EG-CC) 17

Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants (CESCOP) 04

Total 119


TAPS-1 is under shutdown since June 04, 2017 for refuelling, maintenance, surveillance and in-service inspections. During this refuelling outage, RPV core belt region weld joints have

Inspection System (BARVIS). Upper shell weld joints have been re-inspected using Weld

inspection results and subsequent assessments are in progress.

(ii) Kaiga Generating Station

KGS-1&2

Licences for operation of KGS-1&2 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 were valid till May 31, 2017 and October 09, 2017 respectively. KGS-1&2 had submitted application for renewal of these licences to AERB, which was reviewed through multi-tier review process.

Review assessment indicated that the performance of KGS-1&2 with respect to nuclear, radiological and industrial safety has been satisfactory. The units have been operated in accordance with the requirements of Technical

(ISI) of safety related SSCs are being carried out as per the approved ISI program. ISI results

safety related SSCs and plant is capable for safe

to a members of public residing at exclusion zone were well within the limit prescribed by AERB. Majority of short and medium term post Fukushima

and actions are in progress for implementation of long term measures such as installation of PARS, creation of OESC etc. In view of above, AERB renewed the licence for operations of KGS-1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 till May 2022.

(iii) Rajasthan Atomic Power Station

RAPS-3&4

Licences for operation of RAPS-3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 were valid till October 31, 2017. Station had submitted applications for renewal of these licences to AERB, which were reviewed through its multi-tier review process.

It has been noted that performance of RAPS-3&4 with respect to nuclear, radiological and industrial safety has been satisfactory. In-Service Inspection (ISI) of safety related SSCs are being carried out as per the approved ISI program.

degradation in safety related SSCs and plant is

dose to a members of public residing at exclusion zone are well within the limits. A number of safety

have been implemented to enhance the plant safety. Majority of short and medium term post Fukushima

and actions are in progress for implementation of long term measures such as installation of PARS, creation of OESC etc. In view of above, AERB renewed the licence for operation of RAPS-3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act, 1948 up to October 31 2022.

RAPS-5&6

Licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 was valid till May 31, 2015. AERB had earlier extended the licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 for limited duration i.e. up to December 31, 2017 in order to facilitate completion of actions. After completion of pending actions, station submitted application for renewal of licence for the remaining licensed period i.e. May 31, 2020 which was reviewed through multi-tier review process.

It was noted that the performance of RAPS-5&6 has been satisfactory. Station has resolved most of the operational problems and has revised


many mandatory documents as earlier. It was also noted that licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 under Factory Act, 1948 is valid till March 31, 2020. In order to synchronise these two licences and facilitate issuing a common licence in future, the licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 was renewed up to March 31, 2020.

(iv) Madras Atomic Power Station

MAPS-1&2

Licence for operation of MAPS under Factories Act, 1948 was valid till January 17, 2017. Station had submitted application for renewal of this licence. During review, it was noted that the general performance of MAPS with respect to industrial safety, health and environment is satisfactory. Adequate staff strength exists in safety section, medical section and welfare organisation.

requirement. In view of this, licence for operation of MAPS under of the Factories Act, 1948 was renewed up to December 31, 2020.

(v) Compact Reprocessing of Advanced Fuel in Lead mini Cell

The reprocessing of FBTR spent fuel is being carried out at CORAL (Compact Reprocessing of Advanced fuels in Lead cell) facility of IGCAR. Licence for operation of CORAL under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 was valid up to March 2017 for the reprocessing of total 14 FBTR spent Fuel Sub-Assemblies (FSA). Subsequent to completion of reprocessing of 14 FSAs, CORAL had submitted an application for continuation of operation for reprocessing additional 14 FSAs of FBTR.

During review, it was noted that as per the existing safety report, the facility is designed for reprocessing of 14 FSAs of FBTR due to limitation imposed by the waste tank capacities. The proposal entails regular operation of the facility which is beyond the original design intent. In view of this, AERB had decided to keep the facility in shutdown condition till review against stipulated requirements of AERB for regular operation is completed.

Considering above, licence of the CORAL facility was extended up to September, 2017 subject to keeping the facility in safe shutdown condition in

carrying out reprocessing operation during this period.

Subsequently, CORAL had requested to extend the current licence till March 2018 in order to complete the activities related to ageing management, residual life assessment of major component and dose reduction, which are part of licensing requirements. The application was reviewed in detail by AERB and licence of CORAL has been extended up to March 2018 to complete the pending activities, subject to keeping the facility in safe shutdown condition in compliance

(vi) Update on Investigations on Incidents of Leakage from the Coolant Channels in KAPS- 1&2 units

KAPS-1&2 units had experienced the events of leak from the coolant channel on March 11, 2016 and July 01, 2015 respectively. As reported earlier, the sections of the failed coolant channels from these units were removed and brought to BARC, Mumbai for Post Irradiation Examination. Apart from the observation of cracks in these channels, examination of these coolant channels also indicated shallow multiple localised corrosion spots on their outer surface. Removal and detailed examination in laboratory of three more healthy channels, and in-situ non-destructive examination

the reactors indicated that localised corrosion has taken place practically in all the coolant channels of KAPS-1&2. Presence of some trace impurity

used in the annulus gas system of such reactors. It is indicated that the gas supply since 2012 could have presence of such impurity.

Detailed investigations through series of experiments carried out simulating the reactor environment conditions of radiations,


temperature etc., have now revealed that the localised corrosion had occurred due to presence

in the CO2 gas. Through these experiments it has been established that presence of such trace impurity in annulus gas mixture forms certain products under reactor environment conditions, which are capable of causing localised corrosion on the coolant channels under prolonged exposure condition. Inspections were performed in all the other PHWRs in the country, after the events in

that the localised corrosion phenomena was limited to KAPS-1&2 reactors alone. Based on

for CO2 gas and its quality assurance checks have been made more stringent for all operating PHWRs. The capability of coolant channel leak detection system was also analysed and found to meet the design requirements.

Presently, both the units of KAPS are under En-Masse Coolant Channel Replacement (EMCCR)

which involves cutting, removal and disposal of coolant channels, has been completed in KAPS-2 after approval from AERB. The second phase of EMCCR campaign is in progress. Activities of cleaning and inspection of retained core components i.e. calandria tubes, AGMS bellows, lattice tubes and bearing sleeves have been completed satisfactorily. Installation of coolant channel assemblies is in progress. In KAPS-1, defueling of core, draining and drying of PHT system have been completed. PHT system feeder cutting and disposal activity is in progress.

(vii) Coolant Channel Inspection in TAPS-3&4

TAPS-4 was shut down on April 23, 2017 for Biennial Shutdown (BSD) activities. During this BSD, as per in-service inspection (ISI) requirements, inspection of coolant channels was


carried out. During these inspections, multiple indications were observed on the interior surface of two pressure tubes (PTs). AERB recommended station to carry out inspection of additional ten channels. During these inspections, multiple indications were observed on the interior surface in all inspected channels. Coolant channel L-08 was observed to have crack-like indications on ID side. In view of this, TAPS-3 was also shut down on July 11, 2017 for inspection and health assessment of coolant channels. AERB had stipulated that the restart of TAPS-3&4 would be subject to regulatory review and clearance.

Subsequently, inspection of a number of coolant channels was carried out in TAPS-3&4.

that all these indications are volumetric in nature except the indications observed in channel L-08 of TAPS-4. Structural integrity assessment has been

the requirement given in code. Channel L-08 has been defueled and isolated from the main PHT system. Based on the extensive safety reviews carried out and the corrective measures taken by NPCIL, AERB granted permission to start TAPS-3&4. Subsequently, both units are synchronised to grid and performance of both units has been satisfactory since synchronisation.

1.3.4 Safety Assessment of Operating Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in the wake of Accidents at Fukushima Daiichi NPPs

Safety assessment carried out post Fukushima accident, indicated that the Indian NPPs have inherent strength in dealing with external hazards. However, certain safety enhancements were

rare external events exceeding the design bases and enhancing severe accident mitigation capabilities.

long term measures. Implementation of the short and medium term actions is completed. Actions are in progress for the long term measures which include provision of Containment Filtered Venting

System (CFVS), implementation of hydrogen management provisions, establishing On-site Emergency Support Centre (OESC) etc. AERB is closely monitoring the status of implementation of

The generic Technical Basis Document (TBD) on ‘Accident Management Guidelines (AMGs)’ for Indian PHWRs and BWRs has been

accident management guidelines are in place at all stations. With respect to hydrogen management in the containment during severe accident, a generic Design Basis Report on Passive Catalytic Recombiner Device (PCRD) has been reviewed and accepted by AERB. The design basis for OESC

being constructed in phased manner at all the sites. Installation of CFVS at TAPS-1&2 is near completion and design basis report for CFVS at PHWRs is under review.

AERB also reviewed the design basis reports and preliminary analysis/design reports for the OESC building being constructed at Kalpakkam site. Based on the review, permission was granted to start the construction activity of OESC at Kalpakkam.

1.3.5 Licensing of Operating Staff

Operating personnel of NPPs are required to go through a licensing procedure which includes clearing checklists, written exams and

NPP operating personnel responsible for control room operation namely Shift Charge Engineer (SCE), Assistant Shift Charge Engineer (ASCE)

assessment committee constituted by AERB, which includes AERB representatives. A candidate after successfully completing the pre-requisites of licensing procedure, including clearing checklists, written exams, walkthrough and scrutiny of training records, appears before this committee and only after satisfactory performance, the candidate is licensed /re-licensed for the given position.


During the year, 17 meetings were held for licensing/re-licensing of operating personnel responsible for control room operations at operating plants. Total of 157 candidates were licensed / relicensed. In addition to above, 20 personnel for operation of FBTR (5 Senior Shift Engineers, 1 Senior Fuel Handling Engineer, 8 Junior Shift Engineer, Junior Fuel Handling Engineer and 5 Control Room Assistant / Field Supervisors) and 1 Shift Engineer for operation of CORAL were licensed / re-licensed . Details are given in Table 1.4.

1.3.6 Authorisation for Safe Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive Wastes for DAE Facilities under GSR-125

The existing authorisation of all authorised facilities are valid up to December 2018. All these facilities submit the periodic waste disposal reports to AERB to demonstrate compliance with the authorisation conditions.

During the year, application has been received from NFC for change in authorised limits due to change in process at NFC facilities. This is presently under review in AERB. Turamdih

mill had also submitted application for change in authorised limits due to capacity enhancement. This is also under review in AERB.

A list of DAE facilities authorised for safe disposal/transfer of radioactive waste is brought out in Table 1.5.

Table 1.4: Licensing of Operating Staff

PlantsNo. of Persons Licensed Licensing Committee

MeetingsSCE ASCE ASCE (F) CE CE (F)

TAPS-1&2 6 4 NA 3 NA 2TAPS 3&4 8 9 1 7 3 2RAPS-1&2 1 1 1 1 - 1RAPS-3&4 3 1 3 6 - 1RAPS-5&6 1 3 4 4 - 1MAPS-1&2 3 3 1 3 1 2NAPS-1&2 9 8 - 7 4 2KAPS-1&2 3 3 3 9 4 2KGS-1&2 2 7 1 3 - 2KGS-3&4 3 5 2 2 1 2KKNPP-1&2 - - NA - NA -Total 39 44 16 45 13 17

Table 1.5: List of Facilities Authorised for Safe Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive Waste

S. No. Name of DAE Organisation No. of

Facilities

1 Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL)

10

2 Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) 03

3 Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) 05

4 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL)

14

5 IGCAR 05

6 Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT)

05

7 Technology Demonstration Plant (HWB)

01

Total Number of Authorisations 43


1.4 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

1.4.1 Operational Safety Review

The nuclear fuel cycle facilities and other related industrial facilities under the regulatory control of AERB are mines and ore processing plants of Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL), mineral separation plants and chemical processing plants of Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Zirconium

Table 1.6: Status of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Other Facilities

Type of Facility Name Functional Status District /

StateScope of the

FacilityValidity of Current

Licence

Facilities Operated by UCIL

Mines Narwapahar In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand

Underground uranium mine

Renewal of licence under process

Turamdih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


December 31, 2018

Bagjata In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


June 30, 2020

Mohuldih In operation Singhbhum (E)/Jharkhand


October 31, 2019

Jaduguda Shutdown Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


Statutory clearance from Forest Advisory Committee awaited

Bhatin Shutdown Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


Statutory clearance from Forest Advisory Committee awaited

Tummalapalle In operation Y.S.R. Kadapa/ Andhra Pradesh


February 28, 2018

Banduhurang In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand

Opencast uranium mine

June 30, 2018

Ore Processing Facilities

Jaduguda In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand

Uranium Ore Processing

December 31, 2020

Turamdih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Jharkhand


February 28, 2018

Tummalapalle Under Trial operation

Y.S.R. Kadapa/ Andhra Pradesh


December 31, 2019

Complex (ZC), Heavy Water Plants (HWP), Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD), Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) and some of the facilities of Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). In addition to this, Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and other facilities handling Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) are also regulated by AERB with respect to radiological safety aspects. The list of fuel cycle facilities is presented in Table 1.6.



StateScope of the


Licence

Facilities Operated by IREL

Mines Chavara In operation Kollam/Kerala

Mineral Separation

August 19, 2019

Manavalakurichi In operation Kanyakumari/Tamil Nadu

Mineral Separation

August 19, 2019

Ore Processing Facilities

OSCOM Chatrapur

In operation Ganjam/ Odisha Mineral Separation

August 19, 2019

OSCOM Chatrapur

In operation Ganjam/ Odisha Monazite Processing

April 30, 2020

Udyogamandal In operation Ernakulum/ Kerala

Rare earths compounds and Uranium production

November 11, 2018

Facilities Operated by NFC

Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities

NFC, Hyderabad

In operation Hyderabad/ Telangana

Fuel fabrication August 31, 2022

Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal

In operation Tuticorin/ Tamil Nadu

Reactor grade Zirconium sponge production

June 30, 2021

Facilities Operated by HWB

Heavy Water Plants

HWP-Kota, Rawatbhata

In operation Rawatbhata/ Rajasthan

Heavy water production

December 31, 2020

HWP-Manuguru

In operation Khammam/Telangana

Heavy water production

June 30, 2020

HWP-Baroda

Heavy water production suspended

In operation, (Solvent production and K & Na metal plant)

Vadodara/Gujarat

Tri-Butyl Phosphate (TBP) and Potassium metal production.

May 31, 2021

HWP-Hazira

In operation Hazira /Gujarat Heavy water production

July 31, 2018

HWP-Thal

In operation Raigad/ Maharashtra

Heavy Water production

December 31, 2019



StateScope of the


Licence

Heavy Water Plants

HWP-Tuticorin Heavy water production suspended

In operation

activities like solvent production plant)

Tuticorin/Tamil Nadu

Production of solventsTiAP, DHOA, D2EHPA-II

Application for Renewal of Licence for Operation dated 04-12-2017 is under review.

HWP-Talcher

Heavy water production suspended

In operation

activities like solvent production plant)

Angul/Odisha

Production of solventsTBP, 10B enriched Boron, D2EHPA, TOPO, TAPO, DNPPA

August 31, 2020

TDP-Chembur

Main Plant operation is shutdown(Some systems are operated in closed loop for developmental activities)

Mumbai/Maharashtra

Crude Sodium Di-Uranate

October 31, 2021

1.4.2 Licence Renewed/Issued

AERB continued its regulatory supervision of fuel cycle facilities. During the year, a number of applications from the utilities were reviewed and licences were renewed/issued/extended to various DAE units under the Factories Act, 1948 / Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. The

years.

Licence for operation of Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad was renewed up to August 31, 2022.

Licence for operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal was renewed up to June 30, 2021.

Licence for operation of 2000 Amp Sodium Test Cell at Heavy Water Plant- Baroda was renewed up to May 31, 2021.

Licence for operation of Banduhurang mine was renewed up to December 31, 2017 from June 30, 2017.

Licence for operation of Tummalapalle mill was extended up to December 31, 2019

Licence for operation of HWP-Kota was renewed up to December 31, 2020.

1.4.3 Safety Review of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Number of meetings conducted by various safety committees for fuel cycle facilities and other industrial facilities during the year is given Table 1.7.


The highlights of safety review of the operating fuel cycle and other industrial facilities are given below:

(i) Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL)

The mines at Narwapahar, Turamdih, Banduhurang, Bagjata, Mohuldih and Tummalapalle were under normal operation. Operations at Jaduguda and Bhatin Mine are under shutdown. The mills at Jaduguda and Turamdih were in operation during the year. Tummalapalle mill is in trial operation during the span.

During the year, following proposals were reviewed:

Renewal of licence for operation of Banduhurang Mine was reviewed and the licence was extended up to June 30, 2018 subject to compliance of pending recommendations.

Setting up of Magnetite (as by-product) plant at Turamdih Mill was reviewed and consent for construction and commissioning of magnetite plant was granted.

Licence for operation of Tummalapalle Mill was reviewed and the licence for trial

operation was extended up to December 31, 2019 subject to resolution of certain issues.

Renewal of licence for operation of Turamdih Mill is under review.

(ii) Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL)

Rare Earth Division at IREL Udyogamandal and Mineral Separation Plants (MSP) of IREL at Chavara, Manavalakurichi and Chatrapur operated safely during the year. Monazite up-gradation operations were under progress in Monazite up-gradation plants at IREL OSCOM, Manavalakurichi and Chavara. Monazite Processing Plant (MoPP) at IREL, Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM), Chatrapur were in operation.

The following proposals were reviewed:

Proposal for permanent storage of Thorium Oxalate available at RED, Udyogamandal in transit storages.

Proposal for processing of crude SDU (Sodium Di Uranate) received from Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP) of Heavy Water Board using the existing facilities at RED, Udyogamandal as one time campaign.

Table 1.7: Meetings of Safety Review Committee of Fuel Cycle Facilities

Name of the Committee No. of meetings

Design Safety Review Committee for Nuclear Fuel Complex (DSRC-NFC) 3

Design Safety Review Committee for Uranium Extraction Projects (DSRC-UEP) 2

1

UCIL-AMD Safety Committee 2

BSM-NORM Safety Committee 2

NFC Safety Committee 5

HWP Safety Committee 3

IGCAR Safety Committee (Other Facilities) 2

Total 20


(iii) Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) and Zirconium Complex (ZC)

All the plants of NFC, Hyderabad and ZC, Pazhayakayal operated safely during the year. The following proposals of NFC and ZC were reviewed.

Application for Renewal of Licence for Operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal

Licence for operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal was renewed for a period of one year i.e. up to June 30, 2017 to allow ZC to comply with pending AERB recommendations. Zirconium Complex has satisfactorily addressed the pending recommendations viz. submission

Based on satisfactory compliance to AERB

recommendations, the licence for operation of Zirconium Complex was renewed further for a period of four years beyond June 30, 2017 i.e. up to June 30, 2021.

Application for Renewal of Licence for Operation of Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad

Application for renewal of Licence for operation of Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Hyderabad was reviewed and based on review, AERB renewed licence for operation of NFC, Hyderabad with enhanced product capacities up to August 31, 2022. AERB also reviewed the condition assessment of various plant buildings at NFC-Hyderabad as part of the periodic safety review for licence renewal. In general the condition of buildings was found to be satisfactory. Buildings which required repair and rehabilitation

approaches were proposed by NFC, which was considered by AERB.

SARCOP Members visit Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad


(iv) Heavy Water Plants

The heavy water plants operated safely during the year. Heavy water is produced at HWP-Kota, Manuguru, Thal and Hazira. While, heavy water production is suspended at HWP-Baorda, Talcher and Tuticorin due to unavailability of feed synthesis gas from fertiliser plant. Presently, HWP, Baroda is engaged in production of potassium metal, sodium metal and Tri Butyl Phosphate (TBP) solvent.

Production Plant (VSPP) at HWP, Talcher is under normal operation and Versatile Solvent Synthesis Plant (VSSP) at HWP, Tuticorin is not operating. Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP), Chembur is under trial run due unavailability of feed from Phosphoric acid plant of RCF, Chembur. The following proposals were reviewed:

Renewal of Licence for HWP-Kota

Application for renewal of licence for operation of HWP-Kota was reviewed and based on review, AERB renewed licence for a period of three years up to December 31, 2020.

Renewal of Licence for Operation of 2000 Amp Sodium Test Cell at HWP-Baroda

Application for renewal of Licence for operation of 2000 Amp Sodium Test Cell at HWP-Baroda was reviewed and based on review, AERB renewed licence for operation of 2000 Amp Sodium Test Cell at HWP-Baroda up to May 31, 2021.

(v) Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD)

Exploration work at various sites of AMD in northern, southern, eastern, western, central and south-central regions was in progress. Considering the low hazard potential these sites are inspected once in two years.

(vi) Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) Facilities

Periodic radiological reports submitted by these facilities were reviewed. Application for renewal of registration for operation of facilities for processing Columbite and Tantalite ores by M/s Metallurgical Products India Pvt. Ltd was reviewed

by AERB Safety Committee and recommended to renew the registration subject to resolution of

operational data and radiological surveillance data in the application.

1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

1.5.1 Safety Performance of Nuclear Facilities in Construction

KKNPP - 2

KKNPP-2 completed Phase-C3 commissioning tests as per approved procedures and 100 EFPDs operation of KKNPP-2 is expected

2018. The results of all commissioning tests were reviewed vis-à-vis requirements of commissioning procedures/ITPs and results were found to meet the acceptance criteria.

In addition to it, as recommended, KKNPP-2 operated continuously for 7 days at 100% and submitted plant performance data for the said period demonstrating satisfactory performance. However, during Phase-C3 commission stage, there were few instances resulting in shutdown of KKNPP-2 for attending the maintenance/overhauling of some components. During power raise to 100% FP passing of the MSR dump valves to condenser was observed, in order to attend the same, unit was brought down to hot shutdown state. After carrying out necessary maintenance/overhauling on MSR dump valves, reactor was started back. During Phase-C3, steam leak was found on the RCP-2 differential pressure transmitter impulse line, on

was brought to cold shutdown state. As the leak was in the non-isolable location from the MCP,

technique was adopted.

KKNPP–3&4

First Pour of Concrete (FPC) activities are being performed safely at Site and Job Hazard


Analysis (JHA) for the same was reviewed and found to be acceptable.

PFBR

P r e - c o m m i s s i o n i n g / c o m m i s s i o n i n g activities at PFBR are in progress. There were no major reportable incidents at PFBR calling for enforcement actions during the period.

KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 and GHAVP-1&2

There were no major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions during construction and equipment erection stage of KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8. Pre-project activities are in advanced stage of completion at GHAVP site.

DFRP and FRFCF

There were no major reportable incidents calling for enforcement actions during equipment erection of DFRP.

There was a fatal accident of a contractor’s person within the premises of the FRFCF project site On December 12, 2017 due to a vehicular accident involving a mobile telescopic crane of a contractor. The accident is currently under investigation. The details of which are given under section 1.8.

NFC-Kota

Construction of Non-plant buildings and site preparation activities for the plant buildings are in progress at NFC-Kota Site.

1.5.2 Safety Performance of the Nuclear Facilities in Operation

are implemented. The operational performance of all the NPPs has remained satisfactory during last year. There was one fatal accident that took place at Tarapur Atomic Power Station - 1&2 on April 06, 2017. Details of which are given under section 1.8.

operating NPPs were reviewed in detail in AERB to see the adequacy of investigations, corrective actions, lessons learned and the need for any regulatory actions.

All fuel cycle facilities operated safely during the period. However, there was a fatal accident that took place on June 25, 2017 at ECIL Hyderabad, the details of which are given under section 1.8.

1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION

Safety review of Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre (VECC), Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology (RRCAT), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) was done by AERB apart from the Fuel Cycle Facilities. The status of R&D units and other facilities are presented in Table 1.8.

Table 1.8: Status of R&D and Other Facilities

Type of Facility Name Functional Status Scope of the Facility

Validity of Current Licence

Facilities operated by VECC, Kolkata, West Bengal

Particle Accelerator Research Facility (PARF)

Room Temperature Cyclotron (K-130)

In operation Heavy ion acceleration

August 31, 2022

Super Conducting Cyclotron (K-500)

Commissioning Heavy ion acceleration

No time limit

Medical Cyclotron Project

Equipment Erection Cyclotron machine along with 3 beam lines for production of radio-pharmaceuticals

March 31, 2018


Type of Facility Name Functional Status Scope of the Facility

Validity of Current Licence

Facilities operated by RRCAT, Indore, Madhya Pradesh

LASER 150 TW Ti: Sapphire Laser System

In operation 90 TW – for regular and 150 TW- trial (25 femto-second)

June 30, 2021

PARF TWINDUSLINAC-2

Stage 1: Installation,Testing and Commissioning

Electron Acceleration 10 MeV, 1 kW

June 30, 2019

PARF TWINDUSLINAC-1Agricultural Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF)

TWINDUSLINAC-1 is Shifted from RRCAT to ARPF, Choithram Mandi. In Commissioning stage

Technology Demonstration for Food Irradiation10 MeV, 1 kW

January 19, 2023

PARF INDUS-1 In operation 450 MeV, 100 mA Electron Storage Ring

August 31, 2018

PARF INDUS-2 In operation 2.5 GeV, 200 mA SRS

March 31, 2021

Accelerator Electron LINAC In operation 10 MeV, 10 kW January 31, 2018

LASER 1 PW Laser System Construction 1 PW(femto second)

August 31, 2018

Facilities operated by IGCAR, Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu

Accelerator 1.7 MV Tandetron Accelerator

In operation 1.7 MV August 31, 2021

Accelerator 150 kV Accelerator In operation 150 kV August 31, 2021

Facilities operated by ECIL

Electronic component development

ECIL Hyderabad In operation Production of Instrumentation, Control & Communication systems and other Electronic components.

June 30, 2020

Electronic component development

ECIL, Tirupati In operation Production of Nuclear Industrial Instrumentation systems, EVM & VVPAT power packs etc.

October 31, 2021


1.6.1 Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre

The Room Temperature Cyclotron (K-130) was under operation delivering alpha and proton beams of various energies and intensities. Commissioning of Super-conducting cyclotron and Radioactive Ion Beam facility are in progress. The equipment erection of medical cyclotron, which will be used, for commercial production of isotopes for Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) isotopes as well as high end technological research is completed. The following proposal was reviewed by AERB.

Renewal of Licence for Operation of K-130 Cyclotron, VECC, Kolkata

K-130 room temperature cyclotron of VECC was in operation since 1977 and is being used for R&D studies. Based on the review of the performance of the cyclotron, the licence for operation was renewed.

1.6.2 Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology

INDUS-1 Synchrotron Radiation Source was under operation with beam energy of 450 MeV and beam current of 100 mA delivering synchrotron

INDUS-2, which is a synchrotron cum electron storage ring, was under operation at 2.5 GeV (max) beam energy and beam current of 200 mA (max). Six beam lines of INDUS-2 have already been authorised by AERB for carrying out experiments. In addition to these major accelerators, other accelerators and Laser Facilities/Projects at RRCAT are being periodically reviewed. The following proposals/issues related to RRCAT were reviewed.

Commissioning of stage-2 of TWINDUS Linac-2

RRCAT is developing TWINDUS Linac-2 with 6 kW beam power and 10 MeV beam energy. Clearance for commissioning at low power was issued to RRCAT. After satisfactory commissioning at low power, RRCAT has applied for full power

commissioning of the accelerator. After review of the application by AERB, clearance for the Stage-2 Commissioning was granted.

Permission for operation of Vertical Test Stand (VTS) for testing of Superconducting RF Cavities

Vertical Test Stand (VTS) is being used to test the Superconducting RF (SCRF) cavities. It is used to measure Q (Quality) factor: a measure of the rate of energy loss. SCRF can be used for development of high intensity proton accelerator. The proposal for multi-cell SCRF cavities from RRCAT was reviewed by AERB and based on the review the permission for testing of SCRF cavities in VTS was granted.

Commissioning Consent for Agricultural and Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF)

ARPF is based on 10 MeV, 5 kW electron linear accelerator at Choithram Mandi, Indore. It is a technology demonstration facility of RRCAT for food process. For this RRCAT has indigenously developed electron Linac which was successfully commissioned at RRCAT, Indore. The machine is now relocated in Choithram Mandi, Indore. RRCAT applied for commissioning of this Linac at new location. The proposal was reviewed by the AERB and based on the review, the commissioning consent was granted.

1.6.3 Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR):

The following clearance/ trial operations of IGCAR Facilities were granted after review:

Clearances for conducting experiment with sodium in Mini Sodium Experimental Facility (MINA), Sodium Cable Fire Facility (SOCA), Sodium Fire Experimental Facility (SFEF) and Sodium Fuel Interaction Facility (SOFI) at IGCAR were granted on May 17, 2017.

Fabrication Facility (ICFF)” at IDEAS building, IGCAR was granted on August 29, 2017.


Clearance for conducting experiment with sodium in Mockup RISHI facility at IGCAR was granted on September 25, 2017.

Clearance for Stage-2 (Erection of sodium storage tanks, structure and components) in Sodium Technology Complex, FRTG, IGCAR was granted on September 28, 2017.

1.6.4 Electronics Corporation of India Limited:

All the manufacturing Units of ECIL were in operation.

1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

1.7.1 Occupational Injury Statistics of DAE Units:

The compilation of Occupational Injury Statistics for the year 2017 for DAE units (other than BARC facilities and mines of IREL & UCIL) provides the data on accidents and analysis of number of injuries and loss of man-days. Details are presented in Table 1. 9.

During the calendar year 2017, there were 24 reportable injuries including 3 fatalities with a loss of 19,372 man-days [including 9 man-days lost due to previous years injury at KAPS-1&2] compared to 31 reportable injuries including 3 fatalities with a loss of 19,802 man-days in 2016. During the calendar year 2017, one fatality each has occurred at TAPS-1&2, ECIL, Hyderabad and FRFCF, IGCAR, Kalpakkam.

The year 2017 recorded a Frequency Rate (FR) of 0.16 as compared to 0.23 in the year 2016 and a Severity Rate (SR) of 136.76 as

Table: 1.9: Unit-wise Comparison of Reportable Occupational Injuries in DAE Units for 2017

Unit

C1No. of

Lost Time (Reportable)

Injury

C2No. of

Man-days Lost

C3No. of Fatal

Injury

C4No. of

Employees

C5Number of Man-hours

Worked

C6Frequency

Rate(C1x106)

C5

C7Severity

Rate(C2x106)

C5

C8Injury Index

(C6xC7)1000

C9Incidence

Rate(C1x103)

C4NP Plants 3 6292 1 14430 35028850 0.085 179.62 0.0154 0.20NP Projects 2 148 0 12743 42705737 0.04 3.46 0.0002 0.15HWPs 3 624 0 4927 12040649 0.24 51.82 0.0129 0.60IRELs 2 30 0 536 1248760 1.60 24.02 0.0385 3.73NFCs 3 141 0 4122 9785900 0.30 14.40 0.0044 0.72UCIL Mills 2 38 0 2368 5017280 0.39 7.57 0.0030 0.84ECIL 3 6043 1 2725 6786840 0.44 890.39 0.3936 1.10IGCAR & FRFCF

6 6056 1 6179 16448361 0.36 368.18 0.1343 0.97

AMD 0 0 0 2996 5083800 0 0 0 0BRIT 0 0 0 1047 2085624 0 0 0 0VECC 0 0 0 962 192400 0 0 0 0RRCAT 0 0 0 2425 5221804 0 0 0 0Total 24 19372 3 55460 141646005 0.16 136.76 0.0232 0.43

SARCOP Meeting in Progress at ECIL, Hyderabad


compared to 150.04 in 2016. Similarly, the year 2017 recorded an Injury Index of 0.0232 as compared to 0.035 in the year 2016 and an Incidence Rate of 0.43 as compared to 0.61 in 2016.

better safety performance of the DAE units among other similar industries in the country. Table 1.10 gives the comparison of incidence rates in some of the DAE units with other similar industries in the country.

during the period from any of the operating units of DAE under the purview of AERB.

Distribution of unit-wise reportable injuries in 2017 are presented in terms of percentage in Figure 1.1. Year-wise trend of Frequency Rate (F.R.), Severity Rate (S.R.), Injury Index (I.I.), Incidence Rate (I.R.) and Fatal Injuries in DAE Units along with its Trend Line is shown in Figure 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 respectively. This trend indicates that the F.R., S.R., I.I., I.R. and Fatalities in DAE units are in decreasing trend since 2001.

Type of accidents in DAE units in 2017 are shown in Fig. 1.7 which indicates that the fall of persons type accidents (29%) are maximum and followed by fall of object (21%) and stepping on/striking against/struck by object (21%).

BHAVINI, 4%

ECIL-Hyderabad, 13%

IGCAR, 25%

TAPS 1&2, 4%IRE OSCOM, 9%

UCIL Tummalapalle Mill,

8%

HWP Kota, 8%

HWP Manuguru,

4%

NFC Hyderabad,

13%

KAPP 3&4, 4%

MAPS 1&2, 4%

KKNPP 1&2, 4%

Fig. 1.2: Year-wise trend of Frequency Rate in DAE Units

Fig. 1.3: Year-wise trend of Severity Rate in DAE Units

Fig. 1.1: Distribution of Unit-wise Reportable Injuries in DAE Units in 2017

1.41

1.050.92

0.54

0.74

0.27

0.48

0.48

0.5

0.41

0.23

0.33

0.270.21

0.13

0.230.16

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

206.

8

319.

87

321.

9618

7.98

404.

63

161.

74

245.

4660

.72

527.

44

105.

12

166

157.

34

219.

2715

8.2

122.

36

150.

04

136.

76

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018


Fig. 1.4: Year-wise trend of Injury Index in DAE Units

Fig. 1.6: Year-wise trend of Fatal Injuries in DAE Units

Fig. 1.5: Year-wise trend of Incidence Rate in DAE Units

Fig. 1.7: Type of Accidents in DAE Units in 2017

Table 1.10: Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries(Data Source- Pocket Book of Labour Statistics - 2015 published in February 2017,

Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Govt. of India ISSN 0971 5398)

Industry Type

Incidence Rate (per thousand workers

employed)

Fatal Non-Fatal

Heavy Water Plants (2017) 0.00 0.60

Manufacture of Chemicals & Chemical Products (2013) 0.25 1.12

Nuclear Fuel Complex (2017) 0.00 0.72

Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products except Machinery and Equipment (2013) 0.07 0.18

Nuclear Power Plants (2017) 0.06 0.13

Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply (2013) 0.46 0.63

0.29

2

0.33

7

0.29

50.

102

0.29

90.

043

0.11

80.

029

0.26

60.

043

0.03

8

0.05

2

0.06

0.03

3 0.01

6 0.03

5

0.02

3

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

3

6

8

5

12

4

5

1

10

2

3 3

5

2 2

3 3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

3.25

2.592.41

1.43

1.83

0.69

1.21

1.15

1.25

1

0.58

0.83

0.70.53

0.33

0.61

0.43

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

29%

21%21%

13%

4%8% 4%

Fall of Persons

Fall of Object

Stepping on, Striking Against or Struck by Object excluding Falling Objects

Caught in or Between Objects

Exposure to or Contact with Extreme Temperature

Exposure to or Contact with Electric Current

Exposure to or Contact with Harmful Substances including radiations


1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION

AERB requires NPPs to report certain events that occur in the plant which have or may have impact on operational safety. Under the reporting system established by AERB, the events reportable to the regulatory body are divided into two categories, termed as,

(a) Events, and

This categorisation of events is done based

operational safety experience feedback. Based on the established reporting criteria, Event Reports

submitted to AERB. The SERs received from the operating NPPs are rated on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INES rates events at seven levels (1 to 7) depending

below.

3 are called ‘Incidents’. The level 0 or below scale means events that have no nuclear and radiological

detail by AERB and measures to prevent recurrence of such events were recommended.

Construction

KKNPP-2 during the year.

(a) During performance test of Annulus Passive Filtrations System (KLB50-80) in Phase-C3, differential pressure was not observed across one

suction line of KLB Train#60 was plastered with cement (blanked condition). The suction side of KLB Train#60 was blocked during blocking of unused penetrations prior to start of Hot Run of Unit-2, as this was not marked or tagged. Cement which had blocked the suction side of KLB Train was removed. Test for KLB train#60 was repeated which was reviewed and found acceptable.

(b) During the dynamic test for tripping of one CCW pump, steam supply to TDFPs got changed over as intended, but due to the increase in the inlet pressure of steam supplied, both TDFPs got accelerated and tripped on over speed (3600 rpm). EDPF’s discharge control valve did not open on auto and caused level reduction in SG’s which resulted in EP. The event was reviewed

steam supply changeover pressure interlock and electrical driven feed pump (EDFP) starting logic were taken. Same test was repeated successfully

(c) After completion of C3 phase tests, there was non-availability of forced core cooling for more than 30 minutes while unit was being cooled down due to unavailability of JNA pump. As per procedure RCP were switched off after cooling primary circuit upto 98oC and one JNA pump was being taken in service for reactor core cooling, however discharge valve had failed to open. It was

Fig. 1.8 : INES Scale

Events rated at level 4 and above are termed as ‘Accidents’. The accidents at Chernobyl NPP in former USSR (now in Ukraine) in April 1986 and Fukushima NPPs in Japan in March 2011 were rated at level 7 on INES. Events rated at levels 1, 2 and


decided to connect another JNA pump for reactor

causing rise in pressure of primary and isolation of JNA circuit from primary. After reducing pressure in primary, JNA circuit was reconnected and forced core cooling of primary system was ensured. It was recommended that surveillance testing frequency of motor operated valves of safety systems should be augmented. Site informed that review of operability of motor operated valves of safety system is in progress.

(d) Reactor was brought down to HSD state from 90%FP due to suspected passing of turbine steam dump valves. In order to inspect and attend the observed problem, steam side of all SGs were isolated by closing MOIVs of respective SGs. SG-2 level as read by sensor recorded a dip in value. On sensing the change in SG level, SG-2 level CV which was in auto mode, got opened and started making up of SG-2 level as per its level program which was in ON condition. This resulted in increase of pressure in SG-2 to >7.84 MPa which led to EP actuation. Site informed that this event occurred due to malfunctioning of SG-2 level sensor 20JEA20FL006 which maintains SG level at ~3.8 m during startup of Unit. The event was

to be kept OFF and gate valve of respective control

3.8m were taken.

(e) KKNPP-2 was operating at 94%FP, one of the pressure transmitters reading of steam supply

This caused generation of repeated anticipatory signal for both TDFP-I and TDFP-2 unloading.

level drop in all SGs and EP actuated on SG low level. The event was reviewed and corrective

interlock (generation of anticipatory closure of TDFP steam control valves by only once during steam supply changeover) was taken.

(f) KKNPP-2 was in hot shutdown state after EP actuation on SG low level. Leak search was conducted inside UJA. Steam leak was found on the RCP-2 differential pressure transmitter impulse

leak, reactor was brought to cold shut down state. As the leak was in the non-isolable location from

Ice plugging technique was adopted. The leaky tube was removed by cutting. Repair of the leaky portion of impulse line nozzle at RCP-2 discharge was successfully done after isolating the leak by ice plugging. The repair weld joint was examined through VT, DPT and RT. Three main contributors

discharge line, fatigue failure due to mechanical

analysis for the impulse tubes of Unit-2 and based on the same corrective measures in some supports have been incorporated.

Considering the events occurred during Phase-C commissioning of Unit-2 due to human errors by operating personnel, AERB directed NPCIL to strengthen the Operator training and human performance for operating personnel.

were reported from operating NPPs. Out of these,

1&2 was not rated on INES as it was related to industrial safety and had no relevance to nuclear and radiological safety. The number of SERs in each NPP and their ratings on INES are given in Table 1.11.

For the purpose of analysis, the events were categorised as per the IAEA-IRS coding system.

respectively.


NPP Number of Event of INES-0

Number of Event ofINES-1

Number of Event of INES-2 and above

Totalevents

TAPS-1 & 2 0 0 0 1*TAPS-3 & 4 2 1 0 3RAPS-1 & 2 2 0 0 2RAPS-3 & 4 1 0 0 1RAPS-5 & 6 0 0 0 0KAPS-1 & 2 1 0 0 1NAPS-1 & 2 3 0 0 3KGS- 1 & 2 0 0 0 0KGS- 3 & 4 1 0 0 1MAPS-1 & 2 4 0 0 4KKNPP-1 11 0 0 11

Total 25 1 0 27

* Industrial safety related event, so INES is not applicable.

Affected Systems of SERs Causes of SERs

Primary Systems; 40%

Essential Reactor Auxiliary

Systems; 3%Electrical Systems; 23%

Feedwater, Steam and

Power Conversion

Systems; 17%

I & C Systems; 17%

Mechanical Failure; 32%

Electrical Failure; 24%

Chemistry related failure; 8%

I & C failure; 22%

Human factors; 14%

Human Performance related-Personnel work practices, work

organisation; 11%

Human Performance related- Procedure

unavailability/ incompleteness/non-

compliance ; 22%

Human Performance related- Training; 6%

Equipment related- Design configuration & analysis ; 25%

Management related Causal Factors; 6%

Equipment related- Maintenance, testing or surveillance ,

installation ; 11%

RCA under progress; 11%

Others; 8%


During biennial shutdown of TAPS-4, maintenance on a valve in poison injection line from poison tank to calandria was taken up after forming an ice plug. After completing maintenance on the valve, ice plug thawing operation was performed. During this operation, a leak developed from the valve bonnet. Maintenance personnel arrested the leak by tightening the bolts of valve bonnet. In the meantime, about 4.75 tons of tritiated heavy water escaped from moderator system. The event had no implication to reactor safety, but had radiological

tritium uptake exceeding the investigation level (i.e. 4 GBq/m3). Maximum radiation exposure to a plant personnel due to the event was 14.43 mSv. The cause of the event was attributed to inadequate maintenance procedure, absence of leak testing requirement for the valve after maintenance and weakness in contingency planning. Following the event, appropriate actions have been taken to address these shortfalls / weaknesses.

Fatal Accident at TAPS-1&2

The victim got crushed under the wheels of a forklift while crossing the road near plant main gate on April 6, 2017. The forklift was being used for

TAPS-1&2 to Solid Waste Management Facility

was placed inside a cask of height 6 ft and 4 ft 9 inch diameter and weighing about 7 tons.

Immediately after the accident, AERB had stopped the transfer of radioactive solid waste from TAPS-1&2 to SWMF, BARC till completion of review of operating procedure and clearance of the same by AERB. Subsequently, AERB carried out regulatory inspections on April 7, 2017 and on April 20, 2017 for investigation of the accident. Detailed review of the incident revealed that the forklift operator was driving with a hindered vision due to size of the cask and this was the major cause

of the accident. Station has now stopped the use of forklift for transport of waste. Now the waste casks are being transported using trailer.

were reviewed in detail and measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidence was recommended. The analysis and recommendations of the accident were forwarded to all units of DAE for information and lessons to be learnt from this incident.

A brief description of events along with review and recommendations/directives of AERB is given below.

(a) On June 25, 2017, one fatal accident took place at Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), Hyderabad. New cabling work (11kV, 3 core 300 mm2 XLPE) was planned to be carried out by ECIL for providing electrical supply to Hall 4 and 5 of Electronics Manufacturing Services Division (EMSD), ECIL for which licensed electrical contractor at Hyderabad was awarded the contract for supply and installation of distribution transformers and related HT/LT. As a part of the contract, the work of lifting and terminating 300 mm2. XLPE cable was planned to be executed on June 25, 2017 (Sunday) involving nine contract workers. ECIL generally follows a practice of carrying out electrical maintenance activities during Sundays and holidays to avoid disturbances to production activities. In order to perform the assigned job, existing power to 11kV switchyard of ECIL had to be disconnected. Supervisor of contractor was informed telephonically (by ECIL employee from the M/s Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Company Limited (TSSPDCL) Substation) in the afternoon about the disconnection of power supply from TSSPDCL substation to ECIL switchyard. Prior to start of work, Supervisor ensured no power in the line using discharge rod. Thereafter, the deceased was instructed to remove the horn gap fuses (at height around 14 feet on Dipole structure) to carry out the cable work. The victim climbed the structure without wearing PPEs


he tried to remove the 2nd HGF, he received an electric shock and fell on the ground and received head injury.

AERB reviewed the fatal accident and noted that multiple sequential deviations/ violations comprised direct causes of the fatal accident and concluded that the event was a result of unsafe work procedure, assumed work pressure to complete hazardous activities ignoring basic safety measures, work around existing for considerable period, inadequate supervision of the contractor work and working on electrical systems not under the purview of ECIL with full knowledge of ECIL

culture at ECIL. AERB decided to depute an AERB Observer at ECIL for a month to observe effectiveness of implementation of roadmap for improving safety management system. Accordingly, AERB Observer Team (AOT) was deputed at ECIL from October 03-28, 2017. Based on site visits, AOT strongly emphasises the need

for drastic improvement in safety management system and safety culture of ECIL.

(b) On December 12, 2017, a fatal accident had occurred at FRFCF, Kalpakkam ‘lay down’ area of M/s Tata Projects Ltd (TPL). During manoeuvring of a mobile crane, the helper of the crane who was guiding the crane operator for reversing the vehicle, got caught in between the left rear end of the vehicle [counter weight of mobile crane] and a vertical scaffolding pipe of a nearby temporary structure, resulting into internal head injuries and subsequent death. This incident was reviewed by Industrial and Fire Safety Committee (I&F-SC) of AERB. The root cause of the accident as established

systems to prevent unsafe working conditions and unsafe working practices at work place”. Some of the important recommendations made by the safety committee were; establishment of dedicated safety organisation at FRFCF, need for improvement in workers training and work assignment, medical management system and measures to be taken for ensuring that reverse movement of long chassis vehicles is avoided.


2.1 APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES IN MEDICAL, INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH

Radiation sources such as radioisotopes (192Ir, 60Co, 137Cs, 170Tm, 75Se, 241Am, 99mTc etc.) and radiation generating equipment (X-ray machines, accelerators etc.) are being used in multifarious and ingenious ways to achieve overall societal health and prosperity. The radiation sources have a wide range of applications in the industries, medicine, agriculture and research institutions and

AERB regulates these facilities/institutions. These sources have the radiation hazard potential ranging from high to very low. Proper design, handling and disposal methodologies are required for ensuring safe and intended use of radiation sources. Regulation of these sources is in accordance with the radiation hazard potential involved and the extent of use in the public domain.

A glimpse on the various applications of these sources and their licensing status is as given below.

DescriptionNo. of Facilities /

Equipment Licensed as on December 31, 2017

MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES

Teletherapy In teletherapy (branch of Radiotherapy) tumour is treated using ionising radiation keeping radiation source(s) at certain distance. The radioisotopes like 60Co and radiation generators such as Linear Accelerators are used. They are of high radiation hazard potential.

448 facilities with 648 teletherapy units

Brachytherapy In brachytherapy (branch of radiotherapy in which the source is kept very near to the lesion) the isotopes used are 192Ir, 137Cs, 90Sr, 106Ru, 125I and 60Co with activity range from few MBq to GBq. They are of moderate radiation hazard potential as compared to teletherapy.

283 Remote After Loading and 51 Manual After Loading equipment

Chapter 2

SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF RADIATION FACILITIES




Cath Lab X-rays are used in medicine as an important diagnostic tool. Diagnostic Radiology using X-rays are:

Interventional Radiology equipment (Cath-Lab and C-Arm):

These equipment are used in operation theatres for various interventional procedures and pose moderate radiation hazard to patients and medical professionals involved in operation of the equipment. The C-Arm equipment is of low to moderate hazard potential.Computed Tomography (CT):

These equipment are of moderate radiation hazard potential to both worker and patient.General purpose Radiography and Fluoroscopy equipment and Dental equipment:

These constitute around 70-80% of all X-ray equipment that are used, and are of low to very low radiation hazard potential, to both worker and patients.Mammography, Bone Mineral Densitometer:

These equipment are of very low radiation hazard potential.

1,360 Cath Lab equipment

3,179 CT equipment

41,988 other medical X-ray equipment

Computed Tomography

Radiography and Fluroscopy

Nuclear Medicine Facilities

In Nuclear Medicine, radio-pharmaceuticals, such as 99mTc, 131I, 201Tl and 18F are used for diagnosis and treatment. 18F radiopharmaceuticals are routinely used in PET-CT facilities, while 131I is used for diagnosis and treatment of thyroid cancers. The facilities using radio pharmaceuticals are of moderate-low radiation hazard.

272 facilities. (PET-CT, SPECT and Gamma Camera)




Medical Cyclotron Radio-isotopes that are used in Nuclear Medicine are generally produced in Medical Cyclotron facilities. Cyclotrons are utilised for the production of 18F labelled radiopharmaceuticals. The medical cyclotron facilities are of moderate to high radiation hazard potential.

18 facilities

INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES

RPF Radiation Processing Facilities (RPF) including Gamma Irradiators and Electron Beam Accelerators are used mainly for radiation processing of food, sterilisation of healthcare products and crosslinking of polymers in cable industries. Radiation processing of food items includes inhibiting sprouting, delay in ripening, microbial decontamination, insect disinfestation, shelf-life extension etc. The activity range is about few PBq (1015). They are of high radiation hazard potential.

19 Gamma Irradiators

8 Accelerator Facilities

IRED Industrial radiography using Industrial Radiography Exposure Device (IRED), is one of the important non-destructive (NDT) methods used for study / evaluation of weld joints, castings etc. Radioisotopes like 192Ir, 60Co, 170Tm, 75Se and different

industrial radiography. The activity range is from few TBq to few tens of TBq. The X-ray energy range is from few hundreds of keV to few MeV. They are of high to moderate radiation hazard potential.

554 facilities with 2,701 equipment




GIC Gamma Irradiation Chamber (GIC) is basically used for research and development and also in blood banks for irradiation of blood and its components. Usually 60Co and 137Cs radioisotope are used in this application. The activity ranges from few tens of TBq to few hundreds of TBq. They are of high to moderate radiation hazard potential.

Irradiator based on X-ray generator are also used in blood banks.

102 facilities with 118 devices

Nucleonic Gauges Nucleonic Gauges also known as Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices (IRGD) are used for monitoring and measuring of physical parameters such as thickness, level, density, coating thickness, elemental analysis etc. Sources used for nucleonic gauges are gamma sources such as 60Co, 137Cs, 241Am etc., beta sources such as 85Kr,

90Sr, 147Pm, 204Tl and neutron sources such as 241Am-Be and 252Cf. The activity range is from MBq to GBq. They are of low radiation hazard potential.

1,920 facilities

Well Logging Radioactive sources are used in well logging application for exploration of oil, coal, geophysical logging etc. The sources used are mainly 137Cs, 241Am-Be, some calibration sources such as 60Co, 226Ra, 232Th etc. and neutron generators (e.g. Deuterium-Tritium (DT)). The activity range is from kBq to GBq. They are of moderate to low radiation hazard potential.

63 facilities

APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES IN RESEARCH AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS




Consumer Goods Manufacturing Facilities

Consumer products such as smoke detectors, thorium gas mantles and starters, gaseous tritium luminescence devices use exempt quantity of radioactive sources. They are of very low hazard potential. However, regulatory control exists on the manufacturing facilities of these devices.

15 facilities

Facilities using Sealed Sources

Though sealed radioactive sources are used in various industrial and medical applications, but here sealed source means those used in education, research and calibration purposes. The activity range is from kBq to GBq. They are of low to moderate radiation hazard potential.

259 facilities

Facilities using Unsealed Sources

Unsealed sources are used in various research and academic institutions such as agriculture, veterinary science, tracer studies etc. They are of low radiation hazard potential.

213 facilities

2.2 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF RADIATION FACILITIES

2.2.1 Issuance of Consents

Consenting process involves the issuance of consent, in the form of Licence, Authorisation or Registration (in the order of decreasing hazard potential), to operate the equipment/ facility. Type Approvals are issued to manufacturer/ supplier for

equipment conforming to the regulatory standards. Approvals are also issued as an interim consent towards the respective Licences. No Objection

to import either equipment or radioactive source, after which the stakeholders need to obtain either a Type Approval or the respective consent for use. AERB has a system of multi-tier review process (i.e. review by AERB and its Safety Committees)


for various consents depending on the hazard potential involved. The process of issuance of various consents is as per AERB Safety Guide on ‘Consenting Process for Radiation Facilities’ (AERB/RF/SG/G-3).

The transportation of radioactive material (including that of nuclear material from nuclear

by AERB in Safety Code for the ‘Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials’ and is in line with the

safe transport of radioactive material.

The number of licences and other consents issued during the year are as follows:

Consent Practice Equipment/ Facility/Activity Number Issued

Licence

Radiotherapy Linear Acceleratorand Tele-cobalt

67

Nuclear Medicine Medical Cyclotron Facility 10PET-CT and SPECT-CT 55

Diagnostic X-ray Interventional Radiology 427Computed Tomography 913Manufacturing facilities of diagnostic X-ray equipment

11

Radiation Processing Facilities (RPF) 13Industrial Radiography 140Research Accelerators 2

Authorisation

Radiotherapy HDR Brachytherapy 31Gamma Irradiation Chamber (GIC) 19Well Logging 2Nuclear Medicine Facilities 67Diagnostic X-ray Facilities Suppliers 18

Service Agencies 21

Registration

Diagnostic X-ray 12,593Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices (IRGD)/ Nucleonic Gauges

73

Facilities using radio-isotopes for research

Unsealed sources 68Sealed sources 33

Consumer Products Manufacturing Facilities 24Type A package 20

Type Approval/ RenewalRadiotherapy 23Interventional Radiology 18Computed Tomography 12


Consent Practice Equipment/ Facility/Activity Number Issued

Type Approval/ Renewal

Diagnostic Radiology 118

Industrial Radiography Exposure Device (IRED) 12

Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices/Nucleonic Gauges 62

Well Logging Source 47

Consumer Products and Scanning Facility 57

NOCs Issued for Import of Equipment

Medical Linear Accelerator 64

Tele-cobalt 12

Radiotherapy Simulator 12

PET-CT/SPECT-CT 29

RAL Brachytherapy Unit 35

Diagnostic Radiology 66

Computed Tomography 6

Interventional Radiology 7

Industrial Electron Beam Accelerator 1

Industrial Radiography Exposure Devices (IRED) 260

Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices/Nucleonic Gauges 400

Scanning Facilities 52

Permission for Procurement of Radioactive Sources

Practice Indigenous Imported

Industrial Radiography 1038 362

Well logging - 175

Nucleonic Gauges 80

GIC 13 -

Thorium Nitrate - 3

Consumer Products - 535

Tele-cobalt source 40 4

HDR Brachytherapy - 386

MAL Brachytherapy 6 7

Nuclear Medicine 2,734

Radio Immuno Assay (RIA) 34

Radioisotopes used in Research Facilities 167


Consent Equipment/ Facility/Activity Number Issued

Disposal of Radioactive Sources (permission for transportation of radioactive material for safe disposal)

Exported to the original supplier 1,521

Disposal in Authorised waste management facility within the Country

824

Disposal of Contaminated Material 02

Transport of Radioactive material form radioactive material

160

Intermediate Approvals leading to issuance of Licence:

Consent Equipment / Facility Number Issued

Other Approvals

Site Medical Cyclotron 3

Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 5

Industrial Accelerator Radiation Processing Facility 5

Layout plan Radiotherapy 306

Nuclear Medicine Centres 120

Medical Cyclotron 1

Research Centres 56

Sources Storage Pit (well logging) 9

Source Storage Facility (Industrial Radiography) 273

Industrial Radiography Enclosure 175

Gamma Irradiation Chamber 12

Scanning Facilities 12

RIA 5

Design and Construction

Research Accelerator 1

Radiation Processing Facility 4

Commissioning Medical Linear Accelerator (Radiotherapy) 53

Tele-cobalt 8

RAL Brachytherapy Facilities (HDR) 28

Radiotherapy Simulator 8


Consent Equipment / Facility Number Issued

Other Approvals

Commissioning Medical Cyclotron 4

Industrial Radiography Enclosure 115

Well Logging Source Storage Facility 63

Decommissioning Tele-cobalt units 15

Remote After Loading (RAL) brachytherapy unit 1

Gamma Irradiation Chamber (GIC) 2

Nuclear Medicine 15

Simulator 10

Source Movement Well logging 748

Industrial Radiography Exposure Devices 2,239

IRGD/Nucleonic Gauges 26

Source replacement/ replenishment

Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 8

2.2.2 Safety Committees for Radiation Facilities

The safety committees review the radiation safety aspects of medical, industrial and research institutions which use radioactive sources/ radiation generating equipment.

The committees also recommend issuance of licence for operation or issuance of Type Approval,

based on their review. The committees consist of

academic institutions apart from the experts from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) and AERB.

Name of Committee Abbreviations Number of Meetings

Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation SARCAR 3

Accelerator and Laser Safety Committee ALSC 2

Safety Review Committee for Radiation Processing Plants SRC-RPP 2

Committee on Safe Transport of Radioactive Material COSTRAM 5

Committee for Recognition of Calibration Laboratories for Radiation Monitoring Instruments

CRCL 1


Name of Committee Abbreviations Number of Meetings

Committee to Review functioning and Accreditation of Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESL) at NPPs and other Radio Analytical Laboratories (RAL)

CORFAL 1

Committee for Accreditation of Personnel Monitoring Laboratories CAPML –

Committee for Investigation and Review of Exposure in Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Radiation Facilities

CIRENURA 3

While the built-in safety of the equipment and institution’s operational preparedness towards safety are ensured by adhering to requirements

radiation safety is carried out by the AERB

RSOs are thus not only acting as extended arms of the regulatory body at every radiation facility, but are also the pivotal interface between the radiation facility and the regulatory body.

The number of RSOs approved for different practices during the year are as given in following table:

2.3 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

(i) Violations of Regulatory Requirements by Radiotherapy Facility

AERB carried out special regulatory inspection during June 2-3, 2017 for investigation of complaints received against a Radiotherapy

Type of Practice Number Type of Practice Number

Radiotherapy 404 Radiation Processing Facilities 19

Nuclear Medicine 134 Industrial Radiography 266

CT and Cath-lab Centres 1622 Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices 165

Research Centres 63 Well Logging 16

Gamma Irradiation Chamber 40

Centre, alleging violations pertaining to radiation safety norms in the institute. During the inspection, AERB team observed several non-compliances, major ones being providing false calibration date for well type chamber in e-LORA system, non-provision of TLD badges to students, performing brachytherapy treatment without verifying the position of applicators by appropriate imaging system and shortcomings in carrying out the Quality Assurance tests of radiotherapy equipment.

was issued against the institution on June 27, 2017. Institute admitted certain lapses in its response to show-cause. The representatives of the institution were invited to present their case before the AERB safety committee. While admitting the lapses, the representatives assured of implementation of corrective measures to address all the non-compliances. AERB observed that person entrusted with the dual responsibilities as licencee and RSO in the institution had failed to discharge his duties and did not have the requisite administrative authority


for ensuring overall effective implementation and management.

Enforcement Actions:

(a) Institution was directed to transfer the responsibility of Licencee to Employer or a suitable radiation professional of Radiotherapy Department, with adequate empowerment to discharge the overall responsibilities of Licencee in an effective manner.

(b) Suspension of RSO approval for a period of three months.

(ii) Unauthorised Loaning and Operation of Industrial Radiography Device

During an unannounced regulatory inspection, on December 26, 2016 it was observed that personnel belonging to an Ahmedabad based radiography agency were operating an Industrial Gamma Radiography Exposure Device (IGRED) belonging to a Delhi based radiography agency. During investigation it was found that the device was taken on loan basis. For loaning of the device no prior permission was obtained from AERB.

AERB has taken following enforcement actions on May 09, 2017 against the agency who loaned the device.

Enforcement action was also taken against the facility which had taken the IGRED on loan basis. (This is the same facility as referred in point (iii) below)

Enforcement Actions:

Suspension of licence to operate radiography devices for a period of one year.

Suspension of RSO approval to carry out industrial radiography work for a period of one year.

(iii) Detachment of the Source assembly of Industrial Radiography Device

Incident of detachment of the source assembly from driving unit due to breakage of driving unit ball tip was reported by a radiography agency based in

Mumbai. However on investigation, it was revealed that the above radiography device does not belong to the agency that operated the device and in turn was loaned by another radiography agency based in Kolkata. Though the incident happened on July 06, 2017, the Employer/ Licencee of the radiography agency did not report the same to AERB within the

Enforcement Action:

Suspension of the licence of radiography agency who loaned the radiography device for a period of one year with effect from October 30, 2017.

Follow-up of Radiation Incident Reported in Year 2016

Radiation Injury to the Untrained Person in Industrial Radiography

of an untrained and unmonitored person, who had been engaged for radiography work by a radiography agency at Ahmedabad was reported to AERB on December 22, 2016. The source pigtail with radioactive source (30 Ci of 192Ir) got decoupled from the driving cable and remained in the guide tube during operation of IGRED. The said person continued the radiography job without knowing that the source was in exposed condition, since he was not provided with a radiation survey meter. Later he found that the pigtail was in the guide tube. Without knowing the repercussions, he lifted the source by bare hand and put the source back into the IGRED, which resulted the radiation injury.

The person was neither a trainee nor had undergone any radiation safety program and was not provided personal monitoring device (TLD badge) and radiation survey meter for handling radiography device. AERB issued show-cause notice on December 30, 2016 to which institute submitted response on January 31, 2017 and same was discussed in AERB Apex committee. Subsequently, AERB took following enforcement actions against the institution on May 09, 2017.


Enforcement Action:

Revoke the Licence of radiography facility, who engaged the untrained person on radiography work.

Radiographer of radiography institution to carry out industrial radiography work for a period of one year.

INITIATIVE ON PATIENT DOSE MONITORING

Project Report on Patient Dose Recording and Monitoring:

AERB discussed a proposal on patient dose monitoring from Tata Memorial Hospital (TMH), Mumbai on November 08, 2016 in a meeting held at AERB with representative of TMH and representatives of manufacturers/suppliers of computed tomography (CT) and interventional radiology (IR) equipment. The objective of the meeting was to develop a mechanism for linking of patient doses in CT and IR procedures with patient

dose(s). This tracking of radiation dose would be helpful for alerting the medical practitioner(s) on medical dose history of the patient for taking informed judgment on the medical exposure or repeated radiological procedures. Analysis of

patient doses would also be helpful for establishing national level ‘Reference Criteria’ on the appropriate use of radiological examinations.

A pilot project for recording and monitoring of radiation doses of patients undergoing medical diagnostic procedure as well as IR procedure were deployed at TMH. TMH used Aadhaar no. of patient, wherever possible, as unique identity number for tagging radiation dose record of each individual patient. A meeting was held on April 11, 2017 at TMH, Mumbai with representatives of TMH, All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), Delhi and AERB for discussion on collecting and monitoring of accumulated dose to the patients undergoing diagnostic radiology procedure. AIIMS representatives mentioned that patient dose recording and monitoring system is already deployed in the Department of Neuroimaging and Interventional Neuroradiology of AIIMS, Delhi. On May 29, 2017 AERB requested AIIMS to run a similar pilot project on radiation dose recording and monitoring system for the patients undergoing diagnostic radiology as well as IR procedures at AIIMS.

The inputs received from this project would be helpful for devising a roadmap for implementation of radiation dose recording and monitoring system at national level.


3.1 REGULATORY INSPECTION PROGRAMME

Regulatory inspection programme is one of the key regulatory processes. The inspection programme provides a high level of assurance that licensed activities are conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and in conformity with safety and security objectives. In AERB, a comprehensive and systematic annual inspection programme is prepared to oversee various Licensing/Consenting stages of the facility viz. siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning and release from regulatory control.

The regulatory inspections are carried out as per the guidelines given in AERB safety guide on 'Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement in Nuclear and Radiation Facilities (AERB/SG/G-4)'. Inspections are carried out periodically as well as under special circumstances. Generally, the inspections are carried out with prior announcement. AERB also carries out special

as deemed necessary. The provisions of the guide as applicable to different types of facilities are further elaborated in the respective safety manuals on ‘Regulatory Inspections and Enforcement’ for NPP and Research Reactors (AERB/NPP/SM/G-1), Fuel Cycle Facilities and Related Industrial Facilities (AERB/NF/SM/G-2) and Radiation Facilities (AERB/RF/SM/G-3).

AERB carries out Regulatory Inspections (RI) of the nuclear, industrial and radiation facilities under its regulatory purview to check compliance to regulatory requirements and consenting conditions. The inspection report is prepared and forwarded to the facility for taking corrective actions. The

inspections are broadly categorised adopting the graded approach for follow up of their review and resolution. The facility is required to submit

frame. These action taken report and RI responses are reviewed in AERB for disposition and need for enforcement actions, if any. AERB may also initiate enforcement actions, if in its opinion the licencee has violated the conditions of the licence wilfully or otherwise or misinformed or did not divulge the information having bearing on safety, after specifying the reasons for such actions. The regulatory inspection team can also initiate enforcement actions on-the-spot, if necessary, in cases of serious non-compliances. The enforcement actions may include one or more of the following:

(a) A written directive for satisfactory

detected during inspection;

(b) Written directive to applicant/licencee for improvement within a reasonable timeframe;

(c) Orders to curtail or stop activity;

licence; and

(e) Initiate legal proceedings under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.

Formation and Functioning of Directorate of Regulatory Inspection (DRI)

In order to integrate, harmonise and improve

activities of AERB, a separate dedicated Directorate of Regulatory Inspections (DRI) has been formed within AERB. DRI is primarily responsible for

Chapter 3REGULATORY INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIATION FACILITIES


organising RIs at facilities. DRI is mandated to plan and coordinate RI activities covering both safety (radiological and industrial) and security aspects. In addition, it has to program and deploy on-site observers. DRI has to take measures to achieve synergy and convergence of purpose and resources for the RI program. The working process of DRI and interface with safety review divisions is depicted below:

DRI prepares a consolidated plan for inspection of all nuclear and radiation facilities considering the following:

potential magnitude and nature of the hazard associated with the facility or activity

outcome of safety review

results of previous inspections

progress of activities at the facilities

available resources, and

guidelines provided in existing regulatory documents.

The inspection plan considered;

Four routine inspections at each operating nuclear power plant in a year covering 2 to 6 inspection areas,

Two routine inspections of each nuclear power plant under construction in a year covering 4 to 6 inspection areas

Four routine inspections of nuclear power plant under commissioning in a year covering 4 to 6 inspection areas.

The plan also envisages conduct of special regulatory inspections for important activities or events at nuclear facilities and conduct of unannounced inspections.

AERB has posted onsite observer team at three sites [Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam and Kakrapar] in addition to Kudankulam where continuous on-site AERB coverage exists since commissioning activities of KKNPP-1. The observers provide continuous onsite coverage of the operating as well as under construction NPPs. This has led to


establishment of continuous regulatory presence at 4 NPP Sites which covers 11 operating NPPs, 2 NPPs under commissioning and 6 NPPs under construction.

during regulatory inspections of nuclear and industrial facilities has been revised to bring out the

DRI has also revised the categorisation of

deviation. The reported deviations are categorised

described below;

which may not affect systems, structures or components related to plant or personnel safety.

may affect the safety of the plant or personnel together with certain other failure(s).

can affect the safety of plant, personnel or the environment in future, if remains uncorrected or involve certain unanalysed plant conditions which may affect safety.

can affect the safety of plant, personnel or the environment and needs urgent corrective action(s) by the facility.

Reported deviations are categorised as White,

The closure of the Green, Orange and Red

and acceptance of the corrective actions.

review to arrive at the appropriate follow-up or enforcement actions. Further, instead of the existing practice of recommending actions for resolution of the reported deviations, the Licencee is required to

identify the corrective actions and implement the same for resolution of the reported deviations. The

considered by AERB after review and acceptance of the corrective actions. The Licencee has its own internal mechanism for resolution of White

sample basis during subsequent inspections.

In case of radiation facilities, the inspection plan envisaged prioritisation of inspection of the facilities having reported cases of excessive radiation exposures and the facilities from where periodic safety status reports are not received as

measure, awareness programmes on radiological safety aspects were added to routine inspection activities to improve compliance to regulatory requirements. While AERB has been effectively regulating the high hazard nuclear facilities and other radiation applications, it is facing challenges in bringing the widely spread Diagnostic X-ray facilities under its regulatory control. Although, X-ray facilities are of low hazard potential, they need to be operated in accordance with AERB’s regulatory requirements. In this connection, AERB conducts special unannounced inspections in major cities/ towns in the country and sealed/ issued warnings to the facilities which failed to meet the regulatory and safety requirements.

The regulatory inspections are carried out by headquarter and its regional centres i.e. the Southern Regional Regulatory Centre (SRRC), Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre (ERRC) and Northern Regional Regulatory Centre (NRRC). In addition, Directorate of RadiationSafety (DRS)/ Radiation Safety Agency (RSA) in some states are also authorised to carry out regulatory inspections for ensuring radiation safety of medical diagnostic radiology X-ray equipment installed in the respective states.

The information on regulatory inspections conducted at various nuclear, industrial and radiation facilities during the year is given in the following Sections:


3.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES

AERB carries out regulatory inspections of the nuclear facilities as a safety audit measure to ensure compliance with the AERB safety requirements and stipulations. Emphasis is given on aspects related to project management, safety culture, quality assurance, civil construction, equipment storage and preservation, fabrication and erection of major safety related components, documentation, commissioning activities,

and emergency preparedness.

The information on the routine and special regulatory inspections carried out by AERB during the year for the nuclear and fuel cycle facilities under construction and commissioning is given in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Facilities under Construction and

Commissioning

ProjectNo. of Inspections

Routine Special

KKNPP-2 2 -

KKNPP-3&4 3 -

KAPP-3&4 3 1

RAPP-7&8 3 1

PFBR 4 1 (Unannounced)

DFRP 1 1 (Unannounced)

FRFCF 2 -

GHAVP-1&2 1 1

Total 19 5

Table 3.2: Regulatory Inspections of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and

Research Reactors

FacilityNo. of Inspections

Routine Special

TAPS-1&2 2 -

TAPS-3&4 3 2 (1 unannounced)

RAPS-1&2 3 -

RAPS-3&4 3 -

RAPS-5&6 3 -

MAPS-1&2 3 2

NAPS-1&2 2 2 (1 unannounced)

KAPS-1&2 2 1

KGS-1&2 3 -

KGS-3&4 3 -

KK-NPP-1&2 3 -

IGCAR (FBTR, KAMINI, IFSB)

2 -

IGCAR, CORAL 1 -

IGCAR, RML 1 -

IGCAR, RCL 1 -

IGCAR, FRTG 1 -

Total 36 7

AERB follows-up the implementation of all the recommendations made during these inspections. The number of regulatory inspections of NPPs and research facilities is given in Table 3.2

In addition to the routine inspections, a site observer was posted for a short period at ECIL-Hyderabad (during October, 2017) to oversee the implementation of improvement actions in ECIL.

Physical protection systems of NPP for security of systems affecting safety is carried out

During the year, a total of 43 regulatory inspections of operating NPPs and research facilities were carried out, which included 36 scheduled inspections for nuclear and radiological safety aspects and 7 special inspections.


once in a year. The details of inspection during the year for nuclear and fuel cycle facilities is given in Table 3.4 below.

Table 3.4: Regulatory Inspections (Security Aspects)

Facility No. of Inspection

FRFCF 1

DFRP 1

GHAVP 1

RAPP-7&8 1

MAPS 1

IGCAR (CORAL) 1

IGCAR (FBTR & IFSB)

1

TAPS-1&2 1

TAPS-3&4 1

NAPS 1

KKNPP-Site 2

PFBR 1

HWP-Kota & HWEAC 1

KAPP-3&4 1

Total 15

Table 3.3: Regulatory Inspections of Industrial and Fuel Cycle Facilities

FacilityNo. of Inspections

Routine Special

HWP-Kota 2 -

HWP-Thal 4 -

HWP-Hazira 2 -

HWP-Manuguru 3 -

HWP-Baroda 1 -

HWP-Tuticorin 1 -

TDP/RCF, Chembur 1 -

NFC-Hyderabad 3 -

ZC-Pazhayakayal 2 -

UCIL-Jaduguda mill 1 -

UCIL-Turamdih mill 1 -

UCIL-Bagjata mine - 1 (unannounced)

UCIL-Tummalapalle mine

2 -

UCIL-Tummalapalle mill

1 -

IREL-Chavara 1 -

IREL-Udyogamandal 1 -

IREL-OSCOM 2 1 (unannounced)

VECC 1 -

BRIT/ISOMED 1 -

BSM&NORM Facilities

17 -

ECIL Hyderabad 1 -

RRCAT 1 -

Total 49 2

3.3 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF RADIATION FACILITIES

The information on the routine and special regulatory inspections carried out by AERB during the year for the radiation facilities is given in Table 3.5.

Enforcement Actions against Errant Medical Diagnostic X-Ray Facilities

As part of the nation-wide campaign to ensure increased compliance and regulatory


Table 3.5: Regulatory Inspections of Radiation Facilities

Radiation Facility Type of Inspection No. of facilities/ institutes inspected

Radiotherapy Periodic 168

Medical Cyclotron Includes Site and Periodic 8

Nuclear Medicine Includes Pre-commissioning and Periodic 104

Diagnostic Radiology (DR)(carried out by AERB)

Excessive Exposure Investigation, Type Approval, Special

190

QA Service Agency 28

DR Equipment Manufacturers 11

Diagnostic Radiology (carried out by AERB and Directorate of Radiation Safety)

On sample basis 154

Industrial Radiography Periodic, Excessive Exposure Investigation, Type Approval, Special

68

Radiation Processing Facilities Includes Site, Pre-commissioning, Periodic and Special

15

Gamma Irradiation Chamber Periodic 29

Well Logging Periodic 17

Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices /Nucleonic Gauges

On Sample basis(Vulnerable/ Inactive Facilities)

196

Calibration Facilities, Radio analytical lab, Research facilities using sealed sources

On sample basis 14

Consumer Products Manufacturer Periodic, Type Approval 18

Container Scanner Special 4

Research Accelerator Periodic 1

Total 1025

coverage of medical diagnostic X-ray equipment, AERB carried out unannounced inspection of facilities in major cities/towns in the country viz. Bhopal, Indore, Ujjain, Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kakinada, Rajahmundry, Chiplun, Ratnagiri, Bhubaneshwar, Cuttack, Rohtak, Sonepat,

Bahadurgarh, Dehradun, Rishikesh, Mussorie, Paonta Sahib, Chandigarh, Kolhapur, Thiruvananthapuram, Alappuzza and Thrissur, covering 166 number of medical diagnostic x-ray facilities. During these inspections, 78 number of diagnostic equipment were sealed and warning for


and radiation safety requirements.

TrivandrumAlappuzzaThrissurVisakhapatnamKakinadaRajahmundryChiplunRatnagiriKolhapur

RohtakSonepatBahadurgarhDehradunRishikeshMussoriePaonta SahibChandigarhBhubaneshwarCuttack

Regulatory Inspection of Nucleonic Gauge Installations

Before start of the campaign, AERB had put out notices in various leading national dailies, directing utilities who have not yet obtained Licence/Registration to come forward

e-governance portal (e-LORA) of AERB and within 6 months obtain the requisite Licence/Registration.

Sealed

Sealed

Sealed


The surprise inspections carried out at various cities/towns in the country, revealed that certain diagnostic X-ray facilities have still not complied with the regulatory requirements of AERB and accordingly requisite enforcement actions were taken against such facilities. The above actions taken by AERB received wide media attention.

Though the X-ray equipment are of low radiation hazard potential, it is important that

ATTENTIONAll owners of Medical Diagnostic X-ray Equipment

Have you obtained Licence for operation of your X-ray equipment for ensuring radiation safety...?

Operation of Medical X-ray equipment without AERB (Atomic EnergyRegulatory Board) Licence is an offence under Atomic Energy(Radiation Protection) Rules 2004, promulgated under Atomic EnergyAct 1962.

DO NOT DELAY – Several X-ray equipment have been sealed by AERBfor operating without AERB Licence.

Message from AERB

Act Now – Ensure Radiation Safety – Register in eLORA – Be assured

Licence can be obtained online through AERB’s web application eLORA (e-Licensing of Radiation Applications) System.

Visit AERB website www.aerb.gov.in for more information

While undergoing prescribed medical X-ray examination, public is advised to ensure that X-ray equipment is Licensed by AERB

Issued by: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board(Government of India)Niyamak Bhavan, AnushaktinagarMumbai – 400094 (Maharashtra)

Choose between

Operating Licence

orSealing of X-ray

equipment

they are installed and operated in accordance with

by AERB. AERB issues the requisite Licence/Registration after ensuring that they conform to the

The details on enforcement actions taken by AERB against Medical Diagnostic X-ray facilities, published in Newspapers are given below.

AERB Advertisement on Licensing requirements for Medical Diagnostic X-Ray Equipment in Leading Newspapers


various Diagnostic Radiology facilities of Kakinada, Rajahmundry on 6-7 Dec., 2017 published in Regional Newspapers

facilities of Visakapatnam on 4-5 Dec, 2017 telecasted in Regional TV News

channels and National News papers


of Haryana state during Dec, 2017 published in Regional Newspapers

in Regional Newspapers


Chapter 4ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES

4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

Environmental safety in the vicinity of nuclear installations is ensured through control on radioactive discharges into the environment and environmental monitoring. These radioactive discharges are mainly in the form of liquid and

operation of the facility.

The waste management aspects are reviewed throughout the lifecycle of the plants, right from the siting stage, to construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning stage. Based on the satisfactory review of the arrangements made by the plant for safe management of radioactive wastes, AERB issues authorisation under the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 with respect to the quantity

safe management of radioactive wastes in form of Safety Code ‘Management of Radioactive Waste (AERB/SC/RW)’ and has issued several guides thereunder providing guidance on various aspects to meet the requirements of the Code. The Safety Code deals with the requirements for radiation protection aspects in design, construction and operation of waste management facilities and the responsibilities of different agencies involved. The Code is also applicable to the management of radioactive waste containing chemically and biologically hazardous substances, even though

applicable as per relevant standards.

the members of public near the operating NPPs due to the discharges from the plants shall not exceed annual limit of 1 mSv (i.e. 1000 micro-Sievert). This is in line with the limits recommended

by International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Based on this limit, AERB

through gaseous, liquid routes, in the Technical

apportionment is small fraction of the annual dose limit (1mSv/year) to public. While specifying these limits, it is ensured that the discharge is controlled within public exposure limit of 1000 micro-Sievert

of 1000 micro-Sievert for NPP site. The actual discharges from the plants are seen to be well

are submitted by the plant sites to AERB in prescribed forms. AERB also conducts regular inspection of these plant sites to verify compliance

prior to renewal of licence for operation of these facilities, the adequacy of waste management

the environment are thoroughly reviewed.

The independent Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESL) of the Health, Safety and Environment Group, BARC, carry out environmental surveillance at all the operating nuclear power plant sites. The liquid and gaseous radioactive wastes discharged to the environment during the year 2017 from the operating units were only a small fraction of the prescribed technical


discharges from Indian 540 MWe PHWR (TAPS-3&4) for the year 2017 are given below, which are comparable to the reported discharges from other international nuclear power plants of this type.

Radiation dose to members of the public near the operating plants is estimated based on gaseous release and measurements of radionuclide

concentration in items of diet, viz. vegetables,

air and water. It is seen that the effective dose to public around all NPP sites is far less than the annual limit of 1mSv (1000 micro-Sievert) prescribed by AERB. The effective doses to the members of the public (Year 2013 to 2017) due to the release of

in the Figures 4.1 (a) and 4.1 (b).

Solid Rad. Waste ProducedTritium

(Bq/Unit)Tritium

(Bq/Unit)FPNG

(Bq/Unit)Volume

(m3/Unit)Activity

(Bq/Unit)30.1

Fig. 4.1 (a): Public dose at 1.6 km distance for Nuclear Power Plants(AERB prescribed annual limit is 1000 micro-sievert (μSv))

Tarapur Site Rawatbhata site Kalpakkam site Narora Site Kakrapara Site Kaiga Site Kudankulam site

2013 6.94 27.40 15.52 0.56 0.92 0.8 0.001

2014 8.71 41.01 23.14 0.44 0.76 1.10 0.081

2015 3.04 35.58 30.39 0.36 0.42 1.10 0.022

2016 4.24 16.97 30.06 0.50 0.40 1.30 0.075

2017 3.41 40.21 31.20 0.37 0.22 1.30 0.012

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Effe

ctive

dos

e (μ

Sv)

Note: Public dose at Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam sites are relatively higher as compared to other reactor sites, due to release of Ar-41 from RAPS-2 and MAPS.


4.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES

(RSO) and alternate RSO are designated by the Competent Authority to implement the radiation protection programme. The RSOs are entrusted with the responsibility for providing radiological surveillance and safety support functions. These include radiological monitoring of workplace, plant

out exposure control, exposure investigations and analysis and trending of radioactivity in plant systems.

All NPPs have established radiological surveillance programme and work procedures intended to control the occupational exposures. AERB Safety Manual on 'Radiation Protection for Nuclear Facilities' (AERB/NF/SM/O-2

Levels (IL) for occupational workers to control the individual doses. As per AERB directives, for an

occupational worker annual dose limit is 30 mSv, with the condition that it should not exceed 100

constraint for radiation exposure of temporary worker is 15 mSv.

For better exposure control, individual cases are investigated and controlled at an early stage

limits. The following Investigation Levels (ILs) are applicable to the nuclear facilities.

Monthly dose - 10 mSv

Quarterly dose - 15 mSv

Annual dose - 20 mSv

The information on number of workers in NPPs who received dose between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30 mSv during the year 2017 is given in Table: 4.1. In the year 2017, there was no case of individual radiation exposure above the prescribed annual dose limit of 30 mSv.

Fig. 4.1 (b): Total Effective Dose in different Zones during the Year 2017(AERB prescribed annual limit is 1000 micro-sievert (μSv))

Tarapur Site Rawatbhata Site Kalpakkam Site Narora Site Kakrapara Site Kaiga Site Kudankulam Site

1.6km 3.41 40.21 31.20 0.37 0.22 1.30 0.012

1.6-5km 1.62 18.39 17.64 0.24 0.15 0.90 0.003

5-10km 0.70 7.16 6.76 0.17 0.13 0.70 0.001

10-15km 0.43 2.91 3.40 0.14 0.13 0.60 0.001

15-30km 0.25 1.37 1.35 0.12 0.13 0.40 0.0007

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45Ef

fect

ive d

ose

(μSv

)

Note: Public dose at Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam sites are relatively higher as compared to other reactor sites, due to release of Ar-41 from RAPS-2 and MAPS.


Table 4.1: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Nuclear Power Plants (2017)

NPPNumber of Monitored

Persons

Average Dose for

Monitored Person (mSv)

Number of

Exposed Persons

Average dose for Exposed

Persons(mSv)

Number of Workers received Dose in the range

< 20(mSv)

20-30(mSv)

>30 (mSv)

TAPS-1&2 1321 2.23 1058 2.78 1321 0 0RAPS-1&2 823 0.85 546 1.29 823 0 0MAPS-1&2 1251 2.05 1111 2.31 1251 0 0NAPS-1&2 1111 0.86 757 1.26 1111 0 0KAPS-1&2 1554 2.28 1264 2.81 1553 1 0KGS-1&2 1433 0.98 1069 1.31 1433 0 0RAPS-3&4 1362 0.24 703 0.47 1362 0 0TAPS-3&4 1487 1.66 1230 2.01 1487 0 0KGS -3&4 1191 0.51 655 0.93 1191 0 0RAPS 5&6 1005 0.19 392 0.48 1005 0 0KKNPP 2286 0.19 457 0.95 2286 0 0

Figure 4.2 gives collective dose for operation and maintenance of NPPs for last 5 years.

Fig. 4.2: Collective Dose (Person -Sv) at Nculear Power Plants

TAPS-1&2 RAPS-1&2 MAPS-1&2 NAPS-1&2 KAPS-1&2 KGS-1&2 RAPS-3&4 TAPS-3&4 KGS-3&4 RAPS-5&6 KKNPP

2013 4.48 1.34 2.47 2.34 0.92 2.06 1.71 2.66 0.93 0.87 0.013

2014 2.85 3.09 2.72 2.13 1.38 1.64 2.16 0.90 0.85 1.24 0.08

2015 3.42 0.73 1.97 2.64 2.23 1.18 1.43 1.96 0.84 0.56 0.20

2016 2.397 2.646 1.599 2.646 2.410 1.828 2.337 2.482 0.522 1.038 0.084

2017 2.94 0.70 2.57 0.95 3.55 1.41 0.33 2.47 0.61 0.19 0.43

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5


The information on number of workers in medical, industrial and research institutions who received various doses during the year 2017 is given in Table 4.2.

The information on number of workers in medical, industrial and research institutions, who

exceeded radiation exposures in different ranges during the year 2016, was given in Table-3.2 of AERB annual report for the year 2016. The information for the year 2016 is now updated incorporating the outcome of excessive exposure cases that have been concluded and is given in Table 4.2(a) below.

Table 4.2: Radiation Doses (Effective) received by Workers in Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions in the Year 2017*

Category of Radiation Worker

No. of Monitored

Persons

Averaged Dose for

Monitored Persons (mSv)

No. of Exposed Persons

Average Dose for Persons (mSv)

No. of Workers received Annual individual Dose

Excluding zero dose D (mSv)0<D 20<D 30<D D>50

Diagnostic X-rays 97458 0.23 34959 0.64 34957 2 0 0

Radiation Therapy 13527 0.14 4019 0.48 4019 0 0 0

Nuclear Medicine 2531 0.41 1355 0.77 1355 0 0 0

Industrial Radiography 7152 0.39 2619 1.07 2619 0 0 0

Radiation Processing Facility

71 0.02 7 0.20 7 0 0 0

Research 3890 0.09 962 0.36 962 0 0 0

Total /Avg. 124629 0.23 43921 0.65 43919 2 0 0

* Data (External dose) as on February 16, 2018 with National Occupational Dose Registry System (NODRS). The data does not include excessive exposure cases above investigation levels which are currently under investigation.

Table 4.2 (a): Radiation Doses (Effective) received by workers in Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions during 2016*

(updated after investigations on workers who have received doses above investigation levels and receipt of more data)


No. of Monitored

Persons

Averaged Dose for






Diagnostic X-ray 94732 0.28 37388 0.71 37365 20 3 0

Radiation Therapy 13167 0.19 4966 0.51 4966 0 0 0

Nuclear Medicine 2577 0.51 1568 0.85 1568 0 0 0


Table 4.3: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities (2017)

Type of Facilities

Location

Number of

Exposed Persons

Average Dose for Exposed

Persons (mSv)

Maximum Dose of Exposed

Persons (mSv)

No. of workers received dose in the range

< 20 mSv

20 – 30 mSv

>30mSv

Uranium mines (UCIL)

Jaduguda 251 0.33 0.65 251 0 0

Bhatin 63 0.10 0.34 63 0 0

Narwapahar 865 4.58 7.54 865 0 0

Turamdih 456 5.74 10.99 456 0 0

Bagjata 175 6.95 8.07 175 0 0

Banduhurang 47 2.58 3.05 47 0 0

Mohuldih 129 3.84 6.41 129 0 0

Tummalapalle 805 3.86 9.02 805 0 0

Uranium mill (UCIL)

Jaduguda 696 3.04 7.56 696 0 0Turamdih 429 1.50 2.90 429 0 0

Tummalapalle 506 0.38 0.93 506 0 0

Thorium mines and mills (IREL)

Chavara 68 0.4 2.3 68 0 0

Manavalakurichi 149 1.69 11.8 149 0 0

Chatrapur 454 2.83 15.3 454 0 0

Udyogamandal 255 1 7.51 255 0 0

Fuel Fab. (NFC) Hyderabad 1258 0.94 8.83 1258 0 0

Total 6606 6606 0 0


No. of Monitored

Persons

Averaged Dose for






Industrial Radiography

7211 0.44 2708 1.17 2698 8 1 1

Radiation Processing Facility

81 0.10 15 0.52 15 0 0 0

Research 4170 0.13 1194 0.47 1194 0 0 0Total /Avg. 121938 0.28 47839 0.72 47806 28 4 1

*Data (External dose) as on February 16, 2018 with National Occupational Dose Registry System (NODRS). The data does not include excessive exposure cases above investigation levels which are currently under investigation.

The information on number of workers in various Fuel Cycle Facilities who received radiation doses less than 20 mSv, between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30mSv during the year 2017 is given in Table 4.3.


4.3 BASIS FOR ACCEPTABLE DOSE TO OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES

The dose limits for exposure from ionising radiation for occupational workers and the members of the public are prescribed by AERB in its Directive No.01/2011 under Rule 15 of the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. These dose limits are based on the ICRP recommendations and IAEA Safety Standards on Radiological Protection and are in line with the international practice and standards.

The estimated dose to the members of the

from nuclear facilities at a site shall not exceed an effective dose of 1 mSv in a year.

Observance of Dose Limits

The exposure control consists of application of primary dose limits, action levels such as investigation level and operational restrictions. Operational restrictions are established based on dose, dose rate, air activity and surface contamination levels etc., at workplace such that the exposure of workers does not exceed the applicable dose limits. Individual exposures exceeding the investigation levels are investigated and reported to AERB. All cases of exposures exceeding the annual limits are reviewed by AERB committee.

Authorised Limits of Environmental Releases / Discharge

The discharge of radioactive waste from a NPP is governed by the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987. It is mandatory for the NPP to obtain authorisation under these rules from the Competent Authority

annually to AERB indicating the actual quantity of radioactive waste discharge.

Discharge constraints are set at a much lower value than the authorised limits to achieve

constraints are usually set at 50-65% of authorised

discharge limits taking into cognisance differences in NPP system design. The operating data shows that releases from NPPs have been a small fraction

4.4 INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AERB FOR DOSE REDUCTION

(i) Review of Radiation Protection Aspects during Project Stage

During design and commissioning stages, it is ensured that an elaborate radiation monitoring system consisting of area radiation monitors, process monitors, environmental monitors and

trend and instantaneous readings of the monitors for exposure control. Based on the operating

control have been incorporated progressively in the Indian NPPs.

(ii) Operation Phase

Radiation protection programme during the operation of NPPs is revised and approved by AERB. This programme comprises of organisational, administrative and technical elements. ALARA measures are put in place for exposure control of the plant personnel and the public. AERB ensures that plant management makes adequate review of the implementation and the effectiveness of the radiation protection

for each NPP is authorised by AERB to carry out radiological safety functions.

The environmental surveillance programme is also reviewed to evaluate the impact of operation of the NPP on the surrounding areas of the plant

exposures are below the regulatory limits.

(iii) Collective Radiation Dose Budgeting

Collective dose budget is prepared by each NPP annually on the basis of jobs that are likely to be executed and collective dose consumed in the previous years as well as the existing radiological condition in the plant. The aim is to minimise the


collective dose in line with ALARA principle. AERB carries out review of the budget. Any upward revision of the budget requires adequate

AERB.

(iv) Review of Radiological Safety Aspects

Routine quarterly and annual reports on radiological safety aspects are prepared by the RSO of the NPPs. The reports are reviewed at AERB and necessary corrective measures required for exposure control are recommended to respective NPP.

(v) Regulatory Inspection and SOT

During the regulatory inspection,

data, radioactive waste disposal data and quality assurance programme in radiation protection are checked. Additionally, AERB also conducts regulatory inspections during Biennial Shutdown (BSD)/ Refuelling Shutdown (RSD) of NPPs to ascertain compliance with radiation protection procedure. Access control to various zones is observed by Site Observer Team (SOT) members. Any violation in safety norms during movement of personnel or material is brought to the notice of plant authorities for appropriate action and it is ensured that there is no repetitive violation.

(vi) Review of Radiation Exposure to Occupational Workers

The radiation exposure to the occupational workers is periodically reviewed by AERB based on the health physics reports. The exposure cases exceeding the regulatory constraints/ limits are primarily investigated by the exposure investigation

committee at each NPP and subsequently by the AERB Safety Committees.

(vii) Exposure Control and Implementation of ALARA

AERB ensures that all nuclear plants have radiation safety programmes and work procedures intended to control the occupational exposures. Exposures to site personnel are controlled by combination of radiation protection measures such as:

(a) All NPPs have ALARA committees at station and sectional level. Periodic ALARA reviews are conducted at the NPPs to identify areas for dose reduction and implement corrective actions.

(b) The operating experience on radiological events at NPPs in India and in other countries is reviewed and the lessons learned are communicated to all concerned station personnel.

(c) Improved collective dose budgeting.

(d) Restricting the external exposure by means of shielding, remote operation, source control, rehearsing the work on mock ups and minimising the exposure time.

(e) Minimising the internal exposures by source control.

(f) Periodic review of radioactive work practices

(g) Periodic training of radiation workers on radiation protection aspects.


Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in India are designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in conformity with relevant nuclear safety requirements. These requirements ensure an adequate margin of safety so that NPPs can be operated without undue radiological risks to the plant personnel and members of the public. State of the art safety measures are provided based on principles of defense-in-depth, redundancy (more numbers than required) and diversity (back-up systems operating on different principles). These include fail safe shutdown system to safely shutdown the reactor, combination of active and passive (systems working on natural phenomena and not needing motive power or operator action) cooling systems to remove the heat from the core at all times and a robust containment

Notwithstanding these, it is mandatory to develop Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) plans as a measure of abundant caution. These plans are prepared in accordance with the national laws and regulations and deal with the effective management of any eventuality with a potential to pose an undue radiological risk to the plant personnel and public.

Similarly, EPR plans are ensured for nuclear facilities under the purview of AERB handling hazardous chemicals namely ammonia and hydrogen sulphide based Heavy Water Plants (HWP) and some of the heavy water plants catering to the production of solvents. These plans are prepared as per AERB Safety Guidelines on ‘On-Site’ and ‘Off-Site’ Emergency Preparedness for non-nuclear installations and deal with the effective management of any eventuality with a potential to pose an undue chemical risk to the plant personnel and public.

The establishment and submission of emergency preparedness and response plan is one of the pre-requisites for licensing of radiation facilities (RF).

5.1 ROLE OF AERB IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN, DURING EMERGENCY AND POST EMERGENCY

AERB lays down the requirements and provides guidance for preparation of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) plans. AERB reviews and approves the EPR plans for both plant and on-site emergency situation whereas offsite emergency plans are reviewed by AERB and approved by the District Authority / Local Government. Periodic inspections are carried out to ensure that the arrangements and infrastructure for effective emergency response are in place. It is further ensured that the plans are tested through periodic exercises as prescribed by AERB Codes and Guides. A dedicated group within AERB oversees the above task.

of the respective stations are tested by carrying out periodic emergency exercises involving the station authorities, district administration, and the members of public on sample basis. These exercises are used for twin purposes:

a) Familiarisation of personnel concerned with the management and implementation of emergency response and protective measures, and

b) Assessment of the adequacy of these plans and improvement in them based on feedback from exercises. It is also ensured that each Shift Crew of the plant takes part in these exercises at least once a year.

Chapter 5

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS


Plant Emergency Exercises (PEE) are carried out once in a quarter by each NPP. The Site Emergency Exercise (SEE) and Off-Site Emergency Exercise (OSEE) are carried out by each site once in a year and once in two years respectively. During the periodic regulatory inspections of NPPs, AERB reviews the preparedness of plants to handle emergencies to verify that this is in accordance with the approved plans.

The number of site and offsite emergency exercises carried out at NPP sites in 2017 is

emergency exercises carried out at two sites and offsite emergency exercises at three sites.

Table 5.1: Site and Off-site Emergency Exercises carried out in the Year 2017

NPP Sites SEE OSEETarapur 1 1Rawatbhata 1 0Kalpakkam 1 1Narora 1 0Kakrapar 1 0Kaiga 1 1Kudankulam 1 1Total 7 4

5.2 REVIEW OF PREPAREDNESS FOR SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY AT NPP SITES

AERB conducts regulatory inspections to check the emergency preparedness at all NPPs.

inspections on emergency preparedness aspects and participated in Off-site emergency exercise as observers at 3 NPP sites viz. Kaiga, Kalpakkam and

emergency exercises at 2 NPP sites viz. Rawatbhata and Tarapur. These OSEEs were generally in line with the approved EPR plans. The observations made during these exercises and inspections were sent to stations for implementation of the corrective actions. The coordination among plant personnel,

exercise was good and their response / actions were timely. The observer’s reports on these site and off

being discussed in AERB for appropriate corrective actions and guidance.

5.3 HARMONISATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS OF NPPs

Successful demonstration of EPR plans is a mandatory requirement for issuing licence for operation of NPPs. AERB ensures that necessary

Demonstration of contamination checking in public domain during Off-Site Emergency Exercise at Kalpakkam site

Demonstration of Bus decontamination in public domain during Off-Site Emergency Exercise at Kalpakkam site


EPR plans are in place and they are successfully demonstrated before issuing regulatory consent for First Approach to Criticality. AERB evaluates all

assessment, and ensures the periodic revision of these plans.

During review and revision of plant EPR of few of NPPs, AERB felt the need of harmonisation of plant, site and offsite EPR plans of NPPs. Keeping this in view, standard templates on plant and site EPR plans were prepared by NPCIL in line with latest published IAEA safety standards on EPR (GSR part-7, GS-G-2.1, GSG-2 and GSR part-3) and all NPPs were asked to revise their plant and site EPR plans accordingly. Harmonised plant EPR plan of all NPPs was approved by AERB and site EPR plans of NPPs are in the process of approval.

Off-site emergency preparedness plan is in the process of restructuring. This plan is being bifurcated into two parts, Part-1 will be related to

the effects of offsite emergency situation, whereas

about protective actions in public domain. Part-1 will be approved by AERB and Part-2 will have approval from District Authority. This task is being done in collaboration with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).

5.4 CREATION OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTRE AT NPPs

Based on the reviews undertaken on safety assessments of Indian NPPs, in light of the accident at Fukushima NPPs, AERB had mandated the requirement for establishing the On-Site Emergency Support Centre (OESC) at all NPP sites. AERB had constituted an Advisory Committee to develop the guidelines for establishing OESC at all NPP sites. This facility will have capability to withstand

their respective design basis for the NPP. The building will be designed with requisite shielding

for protected stay of response personnel for extended duration. AERB after a detailed review, accepted the generic guidelines for establishing OESC and had asked NPCIL to submit design basis

in accordance with these guidelines. The design

implementation is in progress.

Decision Support System (DSS) for nuclear emergencies is intended to provide comprehensive and timely information to emergency managers on an emergency situation arising from a nuclear accident. Based on the radiological monitoring readings of installed radiation monitors and meteorological conditions, the Decision Support System (DSS) estimates the projected public dose. These estimates are used to decide appropriate protective actions in the public domain. A decision has been taken to implement DSS progressively at all the NPP sites.

5.5 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY MONITORING CELL AT AERB

The implementation of off-site emergency preparedness and response plan during actual emergency situation in public domain is the responsibility of District, State and National Authority and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). As per the existing requirements, the information of any nuclear and radiological emergency situation in India is to be reported to these authorities, including AERB. In order to strengthen the monitoring of progress of response actions during nuclear and radiological emergencies and the review of these actions, a Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Monitoring Cell (NREMC) is established at AERB. The cell consists of experts who repeatedly demonstrated expertise in activating the cell on short notice to analytically assess the emergency situation and the actions performed by various agencies to handle the emergency. The NREMC, with the infrastructure of communication facilities, documents and protocols to obtain


the information during the emergencies from concerned agencies and standard operating procedure (SOP) was activated during the off-site emergency exercises conducted at NPPs to review its effectiveness.

5.6 PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY IAEA

India is signatory under the IAEA

Accidents and Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”. Under these conventions, India has agreed to provide

within its jurisdiction that could affect other countries and any assistance can be provided in the case of a nuclear accident that occurs in

Management Group, Department of Atomic Energy (CMG-DAE) is the national contact point for India for these conventions. Periodic exercises are conducted by IAEA for training and preparedness of the involved agencies. These exercises are of three types,

ConvEx-1 covers communication and

ConvEx-2 covers aspects related to requesting and / or providing assistance during emergencies, and

ConvEx-3 cover all aspects of early

During the year 2017, representative from AERB participated in the exercises conducted under this convention.

5.7 DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

In pursuance of the objective of ensuring safety of occupational workers and members of the public, as well as protection of environment, the AERB has been entrusted with the responsibility of laying down safety standards and enforcing rules and regulations for normal and emergency conditions in a facility. Although enough guidance

is available to handle nuclear and radiological emergency situation, national requirements on this subject do not have legal framework. In view of this, AERB has decided to prepare safety code on emergency preparedness. The document preparation work is in progress.

In order to communicate various aspects of nuclear and radiological emergencies in effective manner, a Technical Document (TECDOC) on emergency preparedness and response actions is also under preparation at AERB.

5.8 PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES

System of preventive action is based on the projected dose and other response action is based on the releases of radioactivity. The emergency response plan takes into account the deterministic effects, stochastic effects and socio-economic consequences to the public and environment. This is ensured by keeping residual doses well below the reference levels in line with IAEA.

The generic criteria and operational criteria have been established for appropriate protective

of NPPs and are being used for implementation of protective actions.

For the purpose of emergency planning and preparedness, the current AERB requirements call for establishment of on the site (on-site) and off the site (off-site) zones around each NPP. The exact size and shape of each zone is a result of detailed planning which includes consideration of the

features of the area, and demographic information. This planned strategy provides a substantial basis to support activity beyond the planning zone, in the extremely unlikely event it would be needed.

In accordance with the severity of the potential consequences, emergency situations are graded as Plant Emergency, Site emergency and Off-site emergency. The plant conditions during accident scenarios i.e. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) are the basic guidance for declaration of emergency based on hazard analysis.


AERB and NPCIL are working on

Emergency Level” which provide rapid and coordinated response through the emergency

offsite emergency exercises is in developmental stage in which these EALs are used to conduct table top exercises. Such exercises were conducted at Narora and Tarapur sites during the month of November and December 2017 respectively, which have shown encouraging output. Based on EALs,

protective measures are actions taken to mitigate the consequences of a radiological event and protect site personnel, members of public and livestock from radiation. On the time scale, these protective actions are implemented as precautionary protective actions and urgent / early protective actions. These include sheltering, administration of prophylactics, control on consumption of contaminated foodstuff and if needed, evacuation. It is essential to ensure that the response measures would reduce the overall

what it would be, in the absence of such measures.


Chapter 6

REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS

One of the mandates of AERB as given in its constitution is to develop Safety Codes, Standards and Guides for different phases for different types of plants, keeping in view the international recommendations and national requirements. Accordingly, AERB has put in place a well-established process and mechanism for development of regulatory safety documents. The framework for regulatory document development in AERB involves a multi-tier review system. The experts from Technical Support Organisations (TSO), National R&D Centres, Industries, Academic Institutes and Government Organisations apart from retired specialists having experience in

also involved in the process as appropriate.

The dynamic process of regulatory document development takes into account the following aspects:

Outcome of discussions/safety reviewsRequirements felt during consenting or enforcement processNew regulatory and technological developments relevant to AERBInternational practices

practicesExperience/feedback from nuclear and radiation facilities

Regulatory safety documents issued by

order of hierarchy:(a) Safety Codes(b) Safety Standards(c) Safety Guidelines(d) Safety Guides

(e) Safety Manuals(f) Technical Documents

The requirements covered in safety codes, safety standards and safety guidelines are mandatory in nature. Safety guide is a safety document containing detailed guidance and methodologies that are acceptable to AERB to implement the

Safety guides are recommendatory in nature.

6.1 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

AERB has established a process for development, review, revision and publication of Regulatory Safety Documents (REGDOCs) for use in regulation of nuclear, fuel cycle and radiation facilities. Experts, utility and stakeholders are involved in the development of the regulations and guides by direct involvement as well as through comments and feedback throughout the development process. Technological advances, research and development work, relevant operational lessons learned and institutional knowledge are considered as appropriate in development/revision of the regulations and guides.

Methodology is established for development/revision of AERB regulatory safety documents. Safety Document Development Proposal (SDDP) is prepared by AERB staff based on the requirement (for preparation or revision of a REGDOC). The said SDDP is submitted to Advisory Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ACNRS) which is Apex Committee for review of the REGDOCs. Based on the recommendation of ACNRS, SDDP is approved by Chairman, AERB and subsequently the R0-draft of revised or new REGDOC is prepared

chart depicting this process is given below:


The initial draft is then reviewed in a time bound manner by a Task Force (TF)/Working Group (WG) duly constituted for the purpose. The draft is then submitted to ACNRS for their review. Revised draft is circulated among the experts, both within and outside DAE for obtaining their review comments. The resulting draft is sent for approval from Chairman, AERB. In case of Safety Codes, the draft is put up on AERB external website for

disposition of public comments is carried out. The disposition is submitted to ACNRS before placing it to Board for approval/publication.

AERB has issued regulations and safety documents which provide adequate coverage commensurate with the radiation risks associated with the facilities and activities, in accordance with a graded approach. Till date, AERB has published about 165 regulatory safety documents.

Publication & Distribution

Public Comments

(Safety Codes)

Review by

Experts

Chairman, AERB / Board

Disposition of Public Comments by R&DD & Review by ACNRS

In-house preparation of Initial Draft Copy of New or Revision of Existing Document

SDDP Prepared by AERB Staff; Review by ACNRS and Approval by Chairman, AERB

Review by Advisory Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ACNRS)

Review by Working Group (WG)/Task Force (TF)

App

rova

l & Is

sue

Rev

iew

Sta

gePr

epar

atio

n St

age

Fig. 6.1: AERB Regulatory Safety Document Development Process


The progress on regulatory safety documents during the year is given below:

6.2 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED/AMENDED

This year two Safety Guides have been approved and uploaded on AERB website.

1) Safety Guide on “Standard Format and Contents of Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for Nuclear Power Plants” (AERB/NPP/SG/G-9)

The safety analysis report (SAR) of a nuclear power plant (NPP) is the main safety document for design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning and contains all relevant information to demonstrate the overall safety of NPP, such as design bases, site and plant characteristics, safety analyses and conduct of operations etc. SAR is prepared by the applicant for submission to the regulatory body to enable it to assess the suitability of the plant for consenting.

The objective of the Guide is to provide guidance for preparation of the SAR by the applicant, bringing out the possible content and structure of an SAR. Use of this format will help to ensure completeness of the information provided. It is applicable for preparation of SAR of all types of NPP designs.2) Safety Guide on “Medical Cyclotron

Facilities” (AERB/RF-RS/SG-3) Medical cyclotrons are used to produce positron emitters, used for PET-imaging, as well as other radioisotopes used in SPECT imaging. Medical Cyclotron Facility (MCF) consists of cyclotron vault and control room, radiochemistry and radiopharmaceutical production areas (R & R), Quality Control (QC) laboratory, radioactivity dispensing, packaging and dispatch areas, cold-chemistry laboratory areas, change rooms and personnel radiation surveillance area (such as decontamination area). Different types of MCF are being operated in the country.

This Guide is intended to apprise the utilities on the regulatory and radiation safety requirements that need to be ensured during the various stages such as setting up of a MCF, operation, maintenance and decommissioning. It addresses medical cyclotrons of both types namely self-shielded and bunker type along with the safety requirements of the radiochemistry laboratories associated with the MCF. In addition to this, it also covers regulatory requirements for Types I to III categories of MCF, while only broad guidelines are given for Type IV MCF.

The following safety documents are amended with respect to certain clauses.

1) AERB Safety Standards on “Design of Concrete Structures important to Nuclear Facilities” (AERB/SS/CSE, 2001)

Concrete Structures important to Nuclear Facilities” [AERB/SS/CSE, 2001] was amended. The amendments were made in Clauses related to

to acceptance criteria of the test and the provisions pertaining to corrective treatments during the test and design for bond.

2) AERB Safety Manual on “Hydrogen Release and Mitigation Measures under Accident Conditions in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor” [AERB/NPP-PHWR/SM/D-2]

Release and Mitigation Measures under Accident Conditions in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor” [AERB/NPP-PHWR/SM/D-2] was amended. The amendments were made in Clauses

recombiner devices for revision of the temperature requirements.


6.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER REVISION/DEVELOPMENT

The R0 drafts of the following regulatory safety documents were prepared:

1) AERB Safety Code titled ‘Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities’ (AERB/SC/G (Rev.1)).

2) AERB Safety Code titled ‘Design of Pressurised Heavy Water Based Nuclear Power Plant’ (AERB/NPP-PHWR/SC/D, (Rev.1)).

3) AERB Safety Code titled ‘Design of Fast Breeder Based Nuclear Power Plant’ (AERB/NPP-FBR/SC/D, New).

4) AERB Safety Guide titled ‘Design Basis Events (DBE) for Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors’ (AERB/SG/D-5, (Rev.1)).

5) AERB Safety Guide titled ‘Design of Electrical Power Systems of Nuclear Power Plants’ (AERB/SG/D-11, (Rev.1)).

6) AERB Safety Guide titled ‘Consenting Process for Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors’ (AERB/NPP&RR/SG/G-1, (Rev.1)).

6.4 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER PUBLICATION IN HINDI

The following AERB safety documents are translated in Hindi and are in the process of publication:

1) Design of Light Water Reactor Based Nuclear Power Plants (AERB/NPP-LWR/SC/D, 2015)

2) Nucleonic Gauges and Well Logging Applications (AERB/ RF-IGD/SG-1, 2015)

3) Safety Aspects in Design and Operation of Heavy Water Plants (AERB/HWP/SG-1, 2014)

4) Life Management of Heavy Water Plants (AERB/HWP/SG-2, 2014)

5) Criteria for Planning, Preparedness and Response for Nuclear or Radiological Emergence ( AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 , Rev.1, 2014)

6) Commissioning of Pressurised Water Reactors Based Nuclear Power Plants (AERB/NPP-PWR/SG/O-4, 2014)

7) Site Evaluation of Nuclear Facilities (AERB/NF/SC/S , Rev.1, 2014)

8) Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation, Closure and Monitoring of Tailing Management Facilities for Uranium Ore Processing (AERB/FE-FCF/SG-4, 2013)

9) Radiological Safety in Handling Beach Sand Minerals and Other Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (AERB/FE-FCF/SG-5, 2013)

10) Protection against Internally Generated Missiles in Nuclear Power Plants (AERB/NPP/SG/D-3, 2013).

6.5 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT SAFETY STANDARDS

AERB reviews draft IAEA documents as

of IAEA and provides comments. The following IAEA safety standards/DPPs were reviewed during the period:

6.5.1 IAEA Draft Safety Requirements Documents

1) Radiation Safety of Accelerator Radioisotope Production Facilities (DS 434)

2) Remediation Process for Areas Affected by Past Activities and Accidents (DS 468)

3) Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (DS 474)

4) Arrangements for Public Communication in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (DS 475)


5) Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities (DS 478)

6) Design of the Reactor Coolant System and Associated System in Nuclear Power Plants (DS 481)

7) Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (DS 484)

8) Ageing Management and Programme for Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants (DS 485)

9) Design of Fuel Handling and Storage Systems for Nuclear Power Plants (DS 487)

10) Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (DS 489)11) Human Factors Engineering in the Design of

Nuclear Power Plants (DS 492)12) Format and Content of the Package Design

Safety Report (PDSR) for the Transport of Radioactive Material (DS 493)

13) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (DS 495)

14) Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (DS 496)

15) Security of Radioactive Material in Use and in Storage and of Associated Facilities (NST 048)

16) Security during Lifetime of a Nuclear Facility (NST 051)

17) Developing a Nuclear Security Contingency Plan for Nuclear Facilities (NST 056)

6.5.2 IAEA Draft Document Preparation

1) External Events Excluding Earthquakes in the Design of Nuclear Installations (DS 498)

2) Application of the Concept of Exemption (DS 499)

3) Application of the Concept of Clearance (DS 500)

4) Protection against Internal and External Hazards in the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants (DS 503)

5) Arrangements for Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (DS 504)

6) Source Monitoring, Environmental Monitoring and Individual Monitoring for Protection of the Public and the Environment (DS 505)

7) Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (DS 506)

8) Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (DS 507)


Chapter 7

SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH

AERB recognises the importance of safety analysis and research in support of its regulatory process. In-house safety research and development (R&D) helps in obtaining deeper insights into the issues concerning nuclear and radiation safety to

regulatory decisions. Safety analysis activities are carried out by Nuclear Safety Analysis and Research Group (NSARG) of AERB that includes Nuclear Safety Analysis Division (NSAD) in Mumbai and Safety Research Institute (SRI) at

research is pursued in other divisions as well. Several important developmental studies were taken up and completed during this year. A brief overview of these activities is presented in the following sections.

7.1 THERMAL HYDRAULICS SAFETY STUDIES

7.1.1 Long-term Containment Heat Removal System

The containment integrity must be ensured during hypothetical/severe accident conditions. Engineered safety systems in the existing plants can cool the containment atmosphere and reduce the pressure for design basis and certain beyond design basis accidents. In case of extremely unlikely multiple failure scenarios such as loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) with no active cooling systems available due to station blackout (SBO),

need to be removed from the containment to ensure its integrity. Feasibility studies for a long term passive heat removal system for containment of 700 MWe PHWR using thermal hydraulic system codes were carried out for the prototype and scaled down experimental model. The results indicate that

natural circulation in the loop is able to remove the heat from the containment atmosphere and maintain the containment pressure below the design pressure.

7.1.2 Calandria Vault Dew Point Monitoring System Performance for RAPS and MAPS

The annulus gas monitoring system (AGMS) of a standard PHWR is used for detecting leakage from pressure tube (PT) and calandria tube (CT).

vault dew point monitoring system in old PHWRs like RAPS and MAPS. Process dynamics model for MAPS-1&2/RAPS-2 was developed to assess the leak detection capability of calandria vault dew point monitoring system. Leak corresponding to VLR (Variable Leak Rate) with crack growth from Leak Start Crack (LSC) to Critical Crack Length (CCL) has been simulated. The time for reaching dew point alarm value was estimated. Further, assessment was performed for evaluating beetle alarm in calandria vault drain line utilising operator experience as well as analysis insight.

operator intervention to shutdown, cool-down and depressurise the reactor.

7.1.3 Parametric Studies on Direct Contact Condensation of Steam in Vapour Suppression Pool

A thermal hydraulic model has been developed from fundamental conservation laws to investigate the unsteady direct condensation of steam. Extensive numerical studies were undertaken using the above model to study the effect of important geometrical and process variables to capture essential features of such phenomena. The objective of this study is to support the design of upcoming Water and Steam Interaction Facility


(WASIF) Phase-II experimental program. A

condensation process when steam is injected into water is shown in Fig. 7.1.

7.1.4 CFD Analysis on Passive Residual Heat Removal System

A CFD model of air-steam heat exchanger of passive residual heat removal system was developed. The heat exchanger was modelled as a porous medium using appropriate mathematical formulations. The objective was to investigate

under various operating conditions. It was found

the entire range of steam temperature conditions

found to be increasing with the rise in steam temperature as expected (see Fig.7.2). The study provided insight into certain fundamental aspects of systems employing natural convection for decay heat removal.

7.1.5 Numerical Investigation of Condensation Induced Water Hammer Transients

Investigation of condensation induced water hammer phenomenon (CIWH) using RELAP5/

of various parameters. Parametric studies were performed with respect to test pipe diameter and upstream steam pressure. The CIWH phenomenon is observed in all cases. With increase in pipe diameter the peak pressure increases and attains a maximum value for a 50 mm diameter pipe (Fig.7.3). For the given geometrical and operating

Fig. 7.1: Temporal variations of Interface Velocity during the Chugging Phenomenon

Fig. 7.3: Variation of Peak Pressure as a Function of (a) Pipe Diameter, (b) Steam Pressure

Fig. 7.2: Variation of Mass Flow Rate of Air with Temperature difference

a. b.


conditions, peak pressure attains a minimum at around 6 bar steam pressure. These studies were performed to support the experimental work jointly taken up with BARC in the area of CIWH.

7.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT STUDIES

7.2.1 Development of a Code for Analysis of Accident Conditions in PHWRs

for the coolant channels and lumped analysis for other components/structures of the reactors is under development. In the present form, the code has the capability to simulate coolant channel heat-up, fuel failure and hydrogen generation during in-channel phase of the accident and has been applied to study of accident sequence in 700 MWe, standard 220 MWe and MAPS reactors. The code is also augmented to study effect of steam limited condition on hydrogen generation within a coolant channel and to study design extension conditions (DECs) in MAPS.

7.2.2 Hydrogen Distribution in Presence of Recombiners for KGS-220 PHWR Containment using 2D CFD

An analysis to study the distribution of air, hydrogen and steam in a standard PHWR containment during a postulated accident scenario of multiple failures involving Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) coincident with Loss of Emergency Core Cooling System (LOECCS) and Loss of Moderator Cooling (LOMC) has been

number of recombiners for hydrogen removal. The results indicate that prescribed number of

to maintain the hydrogen concentration within safe limit.

7.2.3 Safety Assessment of Old PHWRs

With the objective of assessing the safety of old PHWRs for an accident scenario involving multiple failures such as LOCA with loss of ECCS and loss of spray system, simulations were carried out using system thermal hydraulics code RELAP5.

The innovative approach was adopted for modeling of entire phase of the transient, which emphasised on modeling of multiple PT-CT contacts and channel collapse. The time of complete evaporation of moderator was estimated which will be an input for assessment of severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) intended for arresting the progression of the accident.

7.2.4 Estimation of Hydrogen Generation during Molten Fuel Coolant Interaction

In a very unlikely scenario of hot molten corium interacting with the cold water (MFCI), additional hydrogen generation may occur and this may pose an additional challenge to the hydrogen management system. Present study is focused on estimation of hydrogen generation during interaction of corium with water. Methodology for estimation of hydrogen was developed based on the results of experiments reported in the literature. It was found that the hydrogen generation depends on degree of fragmentation of the melt, debris

surrounding water among others.

7.3 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES

7.3.1 Source Term and Atmospheric Dispersion Studies for Emergency Exercises at NAPS and TAPS

Source term estimation and atmospheric dispersion studies were carried out for the postulated scenario that was considered in the table-top emergency exercise. For the emergency exercise at NAPS, seismic induced LOCA along with failure of safety systems was considered. Accident progression and SAMG actions for water injection to calandria and calandria vault are assumed as per the information received at nuclear and radiological emergency monitoring cell (NREMC) during the exercise. Based on the postulated accident progression during the exercise and standard analysis results available, release from the fuel, retention in PHT, release into the


containment, retention and decay in containment,

the atmosphere were estimated. Further, using the estimated activity release, detailed dispersion modeling is carried out to infer the affected sectors and the respective dose levels. This information would be utilised while taking decisions for various intervention measures such as sheltering, distribution of iodine prophylaxis, evacuation etc. With the estimated release term, dispersion study is carried out establishing the in-house capability for monitoring and regulatory decision making during emergency situations.

7.3.2 Nuclear Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) for NPP Sites

Towards AERB’s efforts in strengthening the monitoring capability of an emergency situation, in-house tools are being developed.

planning is generated for Tarapur and Kakrapar sites. Environmental baseline data such as village boundary map, population data, data on emergency planning zones is collected and incorporated in the graphical user interface (GUI) based information system for off-site emergency management.

This GIS based system is developed to provide real time information such as possible affected area, population to be evacuated, evacuation routes, transport requirement, nearest hospitals, primary health centres etc. for proper emergency preparedness and management.

7.3.3 Mapping of Condenser Coolant Discharge along Kudankulam Sea by Processing Satellite Thermal Data

Spatial and temporal characteristics of the thermal plume spread due to the thermal discharge from KKNPP site and sea surface temperature pattern around KKNPP with respect to seasons using satellite Thermal Infra-Red data (Landsat 7 band 6 B2, Landsat 8, band 11) shows that the difference between the intake and the mixing zone at receiving body is well within the limit. Fig.7.4 shows the thermal plume spread.

7.3.4 Investigation of Radionuclide (Gaseous and Aerosols) removal in Water Pools Employed in Wet Scrubbers

The capability of existing numerical models for estimating the removal of radioactivity (gaseous and aerosols) and heat absorption capacity in scrubber tank (ST) are further enhanced. The

a.

Date: 20.2.2017Plume max. Temp: 27.4°CAmbient Temp: 25.0°C

Plume Length: 1.2 kmPlume breadth: 0.5 kmDirection of plume: West


Plume Length: 2.8 kmPlume breadth: 1.0 kmDirection of plume: East


Plume Length: 1.6 kmPlume breadth: 1.0 kmDirection of plume: South

Fig. 7.4: Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of Thermal Plume Spread due to Thermal Discharge from KKNPP


mathematical models consist of mass and species balance equations. The model was employed to review the proposed CFVS for TAPS-3&4 and

design calculations were carried out to check the adequacy of vent pipe sizing, scrubber tank water

through CFVS was clearly brought out through a parametric study. The possibility of compressible

7.3.5 SRI - IGCAR Radiological Surveillance System

The computer code has been developed by SRI, AERB for a LAN based online radiological surveillance by analysing the real-time environmental gamma measurements. The updated system with enhanced capability collects online data through TCP/IP from 10 instruments installed at various locations at Kalpakkam.

7.3.6 Radiological Impact Assessment Studies of various Postulated Severe Accident Scenarios for a Typical Complex Terrain

Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) model coupled with Lagrangian Particle Model (LPM) was employed to study the plume dispersion for

various postulated accident scenarios for a complex terrain site. LPM generally gives spatial distribution of concentration in the study area as the output. For radiological impact assessment, it is more desirable to know the radiation dose rather than the concentration. For this purpose, LPM was suitably

ground deposited activity, and the cloud gamma dose. For a severe accident, in which many of the retention mechanisms are expected to still work and allow release of only a very small percentage of activity to the environment, the dose distribution due to 131I and all important radionuclides for the postulated accident scenario at the site are shown in Fig.7.5.

7.4 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT

7.4.1 Multi-unit PSA Activities

A task group for Multi-unit PSA is formed to carry out the integrated risk assessment for an

report on estimation of site level risk at multi-unit NPP site is prepared. This report provides the update on the progress made in other countries in development of a multi-unit PSA methodology. The in-house developed methodology for multi-unit risk assessment is presented in Fig 7.6. The

Fig.7.5: Total dose due to (a) I-131 and (b) all Important Radionuclides considered for the Postulated Accident Scenario

a. b.


Fig. 7.6: Schematic of Multi-unit PSA Methodology

proposed methodology describes a systematic way

unit NPP sites.

7.4.2 Reliability Assessment of various Systems of KAPP-3&4, 700 MWe NPP

As part of independent regulatory assessment, the reliability analysis of frontline systems and support systems of KAPP-3&4 were performed using RISKSPECTRUM. The detailed system models were developed for various systems such as shutdown cooling system, shutdown system-1, boiler feed water system, auxiliary feed water system, emergency core cooling system, etc. The common cause failure modes were considered in modelling and system unavailability values were estimated. The estimated system unavailability numbers were in good agreement with submitted results.

7.5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

7.5.1 Design of Core Melt Retention Facility Test Set-up

To investigate the in-vessel corium retention capability of calandria vessel during core collapse accident, Core Melt Retention Facility (COMREF) is being set-up. The objectives of experiment

are two fold; (a) to demonstrate the ability of the calandria vessel to act as core catcher, (b) to

the outer surface of calandria vessel. In-principle approval for conducting six experiments has been obtained from IGCAR Safety Committee-Other Facilities (IGCAR-SC-OF) based on the safety report containing detailed numerical and safety analyses. The test vessel and water vault are fabricated and are shown in Fig.7.7

Fig. 7.7: Water Vault and Test Vessel for COMREF


7.5.2 Commissioning of HYdrogen MItigation Facility (HYMIF)

HYMIF (Phase-1) has been commissioned. In the experiment, hydrogen and air mixture was released into the model PAR at 100 LPM with 1

a bank of two palladium catalyst coated cordierite plates. HYMIF experimental setup is shown in Fig.7.8. Augmentation of the facility and further studies are in progress.

7.5.3 Experimental Studies on Zr-2.5%Nb Corrosion at SRI Chemistry Laboratory

Using in-house experimental facility, many experiments have been carried out related to the corrosion aspects of Zr-2.5%Nb. Several parametric

programme including ethylene, chlorine, formaldehyde and formic acid as impurities in CO2 carrier gas, temperature effect etc. Purge mode was employed and specimens were subjected to scanning electron microscopic studies coupled with elemental analysis for the morphological changes in the Zr-2.5%Nb specimen. Corrosion spots obtained were critically assessed for different parameters including elemental composition, formation of by-products etc.

7.5.4 Photon and Neutron Energy Response of Thermoluminescent (TL) Dosimeters

As per the common practice, thermoluminescence (TL) method is the main choice for ionising radiation dosimetry. In order

various thermoluminescence dosimeters (TLD) used in nuclear facilities including medical and industrial applications, theoretical simulations were carried out to investigate the relative TL response of the most commonly used TLD materials to a wide range of photon energies.

on TL response of CaSO4:Dy was also studied. Additionally, the neutron response of LiF:Mg,Ti based TL materials with different concentrations of 6Li was estimated in terms of the number of 6Li(n, t)4He capture reactions for a wider range of neutron energies.

7.5.5 Determination of Mass Absorption 90S/90Y Beta Particles in

Aluminium

Study of attenuation of beta particles in matter is of great importance due to its wider applications in nuclear, agricultural and medical industries. Experimental measurements and theoretical Monte Carlo (MC) simulations have been carried out to determine the attenuation and the mass absorption

90S/90Y emitted beta particles in aluminium. A Geiger Muller counter has been used for counting the beta particles as a function of aluminium thickness. For inter-comparison, theoretical MC calculations are carried out, simulating an equivalent experimental set up, to score electron intensity vs. aluminium thickness. Normal incidence of beta particles from the disc shaped 90S and 90Y sources independently and with combination of 90S/90Y source are considered in theoretical simulations.

Fig. 7.8: HYMIF Experimental Test Set-up


7.6 REACTOR PHYSICS STUDIES

7.6.1 In-house Reload Safety Evaluations for Cycle-3 of KKNPP Unit-1 Reactor

on reload safety evaluations of Cycle-3 of KKNPP Unit-1 VVER-1000 reactor was carried out. Core follow simulations were carried out for Cycle-3 core. An indigenous computer code system, EXCEL-TRIHEX-FA, was employed to study the important core physics parameters such as critical boric acid concentration, core average burnup, relative radial, axial and 3D peak factors, various

a function of effective full power days (EFPD). Comparison with the design calculations showed good agreement for all parameters. For Cycle-3 also, the reactor was found to attain criticality with the critical boric acid concentration closer to the predicted value.

7.6.2 Development of Computational Tools for Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident Analysis of Fast Reactors

Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident (HCDA) in fast reactors is designated as a beyond design basis accident with extremely low probability of occurrence. HCDA progresses in various phases namely: pre-disassembly, transition, disassembly and mechanical consequences. A computer code has been developed indigenously to simulate the core energetics during various phases. The mathematical model consists of coupled point kinetics and 2D hydrodynamics in Eulerian framework. The developed model has been tested and validated against benchmark problems.

7.6.3 Validation of Multi-Point Kinetics Model with AECL Benchmark

A Multi-Point kinetics model was developed to circumvent the inadequacy of point kinetics approach in the widely used system code RELAP5 for analysis of reactivity induced transients

involving asymmetric core behaviour. To validate the multi-point kinetics model, the AECL 7236 benchmark problem on ‘Three dimensional kinetics benchmark problem in a heavy water reactor’ was selected. It has been observed that the multi-point kinetics model results are in close agreement with the benchmark, establishing the credibility of multipoint model for asymmetric nuclear transients.

7.7 STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE BACK END OF THE FUEL CYCLE AND SOIL REMEDIATION

7.7.1 Remediation of Contaminated Water using In-house Synthesised Sorbents

In order to develop methodologies for the remediation of contaminated soil and water and also for the Technically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (TENORM) arising from oil and gas industries, a variety of sorbents are being developed in-house at SRI Chemistry

chitosan, graphene oxide and graphene sheets were synthesised in-house and evaluated for the uptake of Cesium using simulated waste solutions. Also, N-Succinyl chitosan and N-Maleyl chitosan based

coordination with academic institutes and studies are in progress for evaluating the membrane for Cesium uptake studies. Uptake of Cesium and Cobalt has been successfully demonstrated using the in-house synthesised sorbents such as chitosan and graphene oxide.

Level Liquid Waste by Electrochemical Method

To demonstrate the application of electrochemical methods for the destruction of

Autolab PGSTAT AUTOLAB 302N (Potentiostat/galvanostat) was employed. For the degradation


ammonium thiocyanate and ethylene di-amine tetra acetate (EDTA) was taken up. In order to

conditions such as applied potential, electrode

of experiments were carried out using constant voltage methods. Samples were withdrawn from

Nearly 75% of ammonium thiocyanate and 80% EDTA could be degraded by a constant voltage method.

7.7.3 Evaluation of Thermokinetic Parameters of Extractants used in the Back End of the Fuel Cycle by Calorimetric Studies

diluents are being developed and evaluated for wide variety of applications in the nuclear industry covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Tetra (2-ethylhexyl) diglycolamide (TEHDGA) is a potential extractant for the separation of minor actinides from High Level Waste (HLW) while Calix Crown is being employed for the recovery of Cesium from HLW. Studies were taken up to understand the thermal decomposition of alternate diluents and extractants under adiabatic conditions and assess their reactive thermal behaviour using accelerating rate calorimeter (ARC). The studies have given useful inputs for arriving at safety margins using the novel extractants. The present study indicates that the two extractants studied are safe from the self-accelerating decomposition point of view.

7.8 STRUCTURAL AND SEISMIC ANALYSIS

7.8.1 Rotor Dynamic Analysis of PFBR Primary Sodium Pump

A rotor dynamic analysis is performed to

pump shaft. A generalised rotor dynamics program was formulated to predict the response of any rotor system which includes consistent mass, gyroscopic and axial load/gravity effects. A parametric study was also carried out to assess the effects of stiffness of HSB, added masses, and boundary conditions on the natural frequencies, critical speeds and overall responses were predicted. It is observed that HSB clearance are

impeller in operating conditions to avoid pump seizure.

7.8.2 Determination of Bounding Flaw Size for Volumetric and Planar Indications in Pressure Tubes in PHWRs

Pressure tubes are important safety Class-1 components where the fuel resides and nuclear heat is transferred to the coolant. In order to assure the safety of pressure tube during service, in-service inspections are carried out as per approved regulatory documents. During in-service inspections, selected tubes undergo detailed

presence of indications, then detailed evaluation needs to be carried out. A crucial parameter which needs to be estimated is the maximum allowable

were evaluated for delayed hydride crack (DHC) initiation in PHWR pressure tube for sustained hot condition.

Bounding axial and circumferential planar

principles. The evaluation was carried out for

sizes arrived are important for regulatory decision making in assessing the safety of the pressure tube.


7.9 OTHER SAFETY ANALYSIS STUDIES

7.9.1 Soil Structure Interaction, Liquefaction and other Hazard Assessment Studies for GHAVP Site

Gorakhpur Haryana site (GHAVP) is an alluvial site with depth to bedrock estimated to be around 350m. Soil structure interaction (SSI) is a major consideration for heavy structures founded on such soil. Combined pile raft foundation system (CPRF) is proposed for the GHAVP site. In order to gain

specialised software SASSI, AERB has initiated the SSI analysis of a sample pile-raft system obtained from the literature.

Liquefaction hazard assessment was undertaken in AERB using the state of art empirical method and acceptance criteria recommended by

test/studies undertaken by NPCIL. Apart from design basis ground motion parameters, parametric variation of magnitude of earthquake and PGA was performed to discern sensitivity of liquefaction hazard at site with respect to ground motion variability and estimation of margins.

Also, AERB has undertaken an in-house Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) for GHAVP site. The ground motions derived at the base rock based on the PSHA studies are propagated to the ground level using a specialised

in-built capacities to perform randomisation of soil, rock shear wave velocity and dynamic

conducted considering the hazard at bedrock as input. The work indicated that the proposed design Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is higher than the PGA estimated hazard from PSHA; but need for augmentation of proposed design spectra at

7.9.2 Ultimate Load Capacity of RAPS-2 Containment

AERB undertook numerical simulation to assess the structural behaviour of RAPS-2 containment under design extension condition (DEC) and evaluation of containment leakage rates for internal overpressure as a part of Consequence Analysis for Emergency Preparedness for RAPS (Level-2 and Level-3). In addition to estimation of failure, behaviour of containment is evaluated with respect to various performance indicators, such

etc. Performance assessment is carried out using

ABAQUS software. Pressure based on the criteria

times of design pressure (Pd), i.e. 2.74Pd, whereas

1.2Pd. Initiation of considerable air leakage through containment wall was estimated at 1.5Pd. Functional failure of the containment structure is estimated at 1.85Pd based on sharp change in slope in pressure vs. leakage rate curve.

7.10 AERB FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAMME

AERB promotes and funds research in radiation safety and industrial safety as part of its programme. AERB Committee for Safety Research Programmes (CSRP) frames guidelines for the same and also evaluates, recommends grants for research projects and monitor their progress periodically. During this period, CSRP recommended two new projects. It also approved the renewal of four ongoing projects. The details are given in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.

Universities, Research Institutions and Professional Associations for holding symposia and conferences on the subjects of interest to AERB. During this

Seminars, Symposium and Conferences.


Table 7.1: New Research Projects Approved

S. No. Project Title Principal Investigator Organisation

1. Studies on levels of natural radiation in the environment hill districts of Manipur

Dr. S. Nabadwip Singh Oriental College, Takyel, Imphal

2. Improving radiation safety standards in dental practice

Dr. A. Saravanakumar PSG Institute of Medical Sciences Research and Hospitals, Coimbatore

Table 7.2: Research Projects Renewed

S. No. Project Title Principal Investigator Organisation

1. Studies on environment radioactivity levels in and around Chitrial uranium mineralised areas of Nalgonda district, Telangna state

Dr. Ch. Gopal Reddy Osmania University, Hyderabad

2. Biological effects of low dose alpha particle radiation exposure to blood lymphocytes for biodosimetry

Prof. P. Venkatachalam Sri Ramachandra University, Chennai

3. Studies on microbial diversity and ecology in the vicinity of a coastal NPP in relation to water quality and nutrients

Prof. S. Karutha Pandian Algappa University Karaikudi, T.N

4.beam CT with local and global HU correction strategies and deformable image registration based adaptive radiotherapy

Dr. B. Paul Ravindran CMC, Vellore


Chapter 8INITIATIVES FOR ENGAGING WITH STAKEHOLDERS AND PUBLIC

AERB has the mandate to keep the public informed on radiation and nuclear safety related matters. AERB views public outreach as an essential element to build a long lasting trust and

Towards this, AERB has been maintaining a website with all relevant and updated information; issuing press releases on contemporary issues, publishing Annual Reports etc. AERB has stepped up drive to address public concerns and provided information to the public through print and electronic media on various topics of public concern.

8.1 AERB AND MEDIA

As and when required, AERB conducts press

topical issues. Also, issues press releases with an aim to keep members of public informed about its important activities. The press releases are issued in English as well as in Hindi. During the period eight press releases were issued:

(i) AERB shuts down operation of some of the medical diagnostic X-ray facilities at Bhopal, Indore and Ujjain owing to non-compliances issued on January 23, 2017.

(ii) Enforcement actions against two industrial radiography institutions issued on May 22, 2017.

(iii) AERB grants Clearance for First Pour of Concrete of Kudankulam NPP Unit 3&4 issued on June 23, 2017.

(iv) 34th DAE Safety & Occupational Health Professionals Meet at Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, NPCIL during June 28-30, 2017 issued on July 05, 2017.

(v) AERB shuts down operation of some of the medical diagnostic X-ray facilities in Trivandrum, Kerala issued on August 31, 2017.

(vi) AERB shuts down operation of some of the medical diagnostic X-ray facilities in Kolhapur, Maharashtra issued on October 5, 2017.

(vii) AERB mourns the untimely demise of Dr. K. V. Raghavan, Board Member, AERB on October 12, 2017 issued on October 17, 2017.

(viii) AERB shuts down operation of non-compliant diagnostic X-ray facilities in Dehradun, Mussorie, Rishikesh, Paonta Sahib and Chandigarh issued on October 17, 2017.

Detailed press releases are available on AERB website.

8.2 COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS

AERB provides all necessary information to its stakeholders through its website, annual reports,

AERB website plays a pivotal role in keeping the public informed on issues related to radiological safety, major regulatory decisions, special technical reports etc.

Information on operating nuclear power plants including, validity of operating licence, regulatory

discharges, occupational exposures, rated power capacities of all operating NPPs etc. are provided on the AERB’s website and the information is updated on monthly basis.


The AERB annual reports contain information on safety status of nuclear and radiation facilities

by licencee and the regulatory inspectors.

8.3 PUBLIC/STAKEHOLDERS’ AWARENESS PROGRAMMES

AERB pursues its public outreach activity with an aim to reach out to various stakeholders and bring awareness on the aspects of nuclear, radiation and industrial safety. It also helps in making AERB’s safety oversight and review process more visible.

8.3.1 Stakeholder Awareness Programmes

There has been an accelerated growth in the application of ionising radiation technologies in

of radiation sources, there is concern about the likelihood of harmful effects of radiation. Apart from effective regulatory controls in place, AERB primarily focuses on enhancing awareness on safe use of radiation sources amongst stakeholders. Towards this, AERB routinely conducts awareness programmes to a wide variety of audience with

of radiation safety. These include the radiation workers, safety personnel, manufacturers/ suppliers of equipment/sources, personnel from the industry, university faculty and students. The following is the list of awareness programmes conducted by AERB during the period.

In addition, 40 Safety Awareness programmes were conducted at various radiation facilities during regulatory inspection.

Area Topic Target AudienceImportance/ additional

information

Diagnsotic Radiology

‘Radiation Safety and Regulatory Requirements in Medical Radiography’ during January 28-29, 2017 at Palghar, Thane

Delegates of Radiographers Association of Maharashtra (RAM) Conference

To make stakeholders aware on radiation safety and regulatory requirements in diagnostic radiology

‘Occupational Radiation Safety in Hospitals’, on February 8-11, 2017 during 67th Annual National Conference of Indian Association of Occupational Health at India Habitat Center, New Delhi

Delegates of Indian Association of Occupational Health

Awareness on occupational radiation safety in diagnoistic radiology

‘Radiation Safety Aspect and Regulatory Requirement in Dental Radiology’ held during February 17-19, 2017 at Vashi, Navi Mumbai

Delegates of Indian Dental Association (IDA) conference

To enhance awareness on radiation safety and applicable regulatory requirements in dental radiology



information

Diagnsotic Radiology

‘Radiation Safety and Regulatory Requirements in Interventional Radiology’ at Kolkata during February 22-25, 2017

Delegates of Indian Society for Vascular and Interventional Radiology (ISVIR) Annual Conference

To enhance radiation safety awareness

also participated in panel discussion on topic ‘Radiation Dose Management in the Interventional Radiology’

‘Safety Awareness vs. Safety Regulations’ during Conference of Radiographers Association of Maharashtra (Pune Chapter) on June 04, 2017 at Deenanath Mangeshkar Hospital, Pune

Radiographers in diagnostic radiology

To sprade awareness on radiation safety and regulations for diagnostic radiology

‘Radiation Safety in Cardiology’ on June 24, 2017 at Coimbatore. The Summit organised by the Cardiological Society of India

Delegates of International Summit on Preventive Cardiology

Awareness on radiation safety in intervention radiology

Radiotherapy ‘e-Licencing of Radiation Applications (e-LORA) and Regulatory Process of Radiotherapy Practice’ on March 16, 2017 at Dr. B. Borooah Cancer Institute, Guwahati

Radiotherapy personnel form North Eastern states and suppliers of radiotherapy equipment and concerned staff of Dr. B. Borooah Cancer Institute, Guwahati

To disseminate information regarding the regulatory process of radiotherapy practice in e-LORA. Also focused on the diagnostic radiology

Consumer Products and

Scanning Facility

Awareness programme on ‘Radiation Safety in Container Scanning Facilities’ was conducted at Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), Nhava Sheva, Uran on June 20, 2017

Customs Department involved in container scanning using radiation equipment

Awareness on radiation safety and in operation of container scanners


8.4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REGULATORY INTERFACE (NCRI)

AERB hosted a three-day National Conference on Regulatory Interface (NCRI)-2017 during November 28-30, 2017 at Mumbai. The

with a purpose for engaging all its stakeholders associated with use of nuclear energy and ionising radiation sources towards further strengthening nuclear and radiation safety. The objective of the conference was to foster an environment wherein, the Licencees, Stakeholders, Professional Associations could interact, discuss and provide valuable feedback to AERB on various issues related to nuclear/ radiation safety, regulatory requirements, practices world-wide, emerging

trends in design and manufacturing, challenges in supply chain and effectiveness of quality assurance programmes.

More than 300 delegates participated in the conference, with representation from the NPCIL, BHAVINI, NFC, Nuclear component manufacturing industries and various professional associations such as Indian Radiologists Association, Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPI), Nuclear Medicine Physicists Association of India (NMPAI), Indian Society of Radiographers and Technologists (ISRT), Association of Radiation Oncologists of India (AROI) and Association of NDT Service Organisation of India (NAASO), amongst others.


information

Radioactive Contamination

Awareness on ‘Radioactive Contamination in Steel Products’ was conducted at All India Stainless Steel Industries Association, Mumbai on March 31, 2017

Agencies in Steel industries like supplier of raw material, export

manufacturers of stainless steel utensils and members of All India Stainless Steel Industries Association

To spread awarness about the incidents of detection of radioactive contamination in stainless steel product and safe handling of such radioactively contaminated material till its disposal

Chairman, AERB delivering the Inaugural address during NCRI-2017 Delegates from Radiation Facilities in NCRI-2017


8.5 DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ MEET

The 34th DAE Safety & Occupational Health Professionals’ Meet was jointly organised by AERB and NPCIL during June 28-30, 2017 at Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project Site. Themes

Human, Organisational and Technological Factors

Diseases–Silent Killer of the Millennium” for Occupational Health. About 250 delegates from various DAE units and Aided Institutions and exhibitors participated in the Meet.

Shri V. B. Sant, Director General, National Safety Council, delivered the prestigious Dr. S. S. Ramaswamy Memorial Endowment Lecture,

to Industrial Safety” in line with the topic of the theme w.r.t industrial safety. The ‘Occupational Injury Statistics and Fire Statistics -2016’ for DAE units was released during the meet.

safety appliances, public awareness and safety and regulatory aspects was organised during the Meet

the interaction between industries and DAE units.

The AERB Industrial Safety Awards and Fire Safety Awards for the year 2016 were presented to the winners of the DAE units by Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB.

8.6 THEME MEETINGS /SPECIAL MEET

AERB organises and /or participates in discussion meetings and other professional meets to deliberate on nuclear and radiation safety awareness and the system of regulatory regime followed by AERB and the basis of regulatory decision making process. The details of such events are given below.

8.6.1 Theme Meetings

(i) Regulation and Management of Nuclear Facilities / Projects

Management of Nuclear Facilities / Projects with respect to Storage and Preservation and Quality Assurance of Safety Related Equipment/ Components during Construction and Commissioning” was organised at AERB, Mumbai on February 23, 2017. Eight speakers delivered the talks on the various topics related to theme of the meeting. A video on storage and preservation was also streamed during the theme meeting. The meeting was attended by 109 participants from all DAE units, invited experts and AERB staff.

Inauguration of 34th

Professionals Meet

Release of ‘Occupational Injury and Fire Statistics - 2016’ during 34th

Professionals Meet


(ii) Man-Rem Reduction Methodologies in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Operations and Maintenance

Two days theme meeting on Man-Rem Reduction Methodologies in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Operations and Maintenance” was held during February 16-17, 2017 at SRI Kalpakkam. The meet was jointly organised by Safety Research Institute (SRI), AERB and Association of Waste Management and Remediation of the Environment (AWARE), Kalpakkam. The theme meeting was intended to take a consolidated look at the current practices in fuel cycle operation and maintenance including special activities, R&D activities carried out for the minimisation of waste, man-rem reduction methodologies, environmentally benign technologies etc. in nuclear fuel cycle operations and maintenance. Around 100 participants from

different DAE units such as IGCAR, BHAVINI, MAPS, BARC and AERB participated in the meet.

(iii) Preparedness and Response to Nuclear Emergencies: Recent Developments

A theme meeting on "Preparedness and Response to Nuclear Emergencies: Recent Developments" was organised at AERB, Mumbai on March 14, 2017 to address recent developments in the area. About 80 delegates and invitees from NPCIL, BARC, IGCAR and AERB participated in the theme meeting. Presentations were made on overview of recent developments in emergency preparedness and response (EPR) such as National Laws; Regulations and Requirements on EPR; Hazard Assessment and Protection Strategy; Emergency Planning Zones and Distances; Assessment and Declaration of Emergency; Protective Actions; Reference Levels and Termination of Emergency, Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) and Roles and Responsibilities of EPR organisation as per National Disaster Management Plan (2016). The recent developments in regulatory requirements and guidance and Real time Online Decision Support System (RO-DSS) were highlighted. Case studies on EPR in Korea and EPR due to severe conditions in Light Water Reactors (LWR) were also presented. The meet brought out several improvements in EPR by incorporating the recent

Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB delivering Inaugural Address during the Theme Meeting on

Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB delivering inaugural address during the Theme meeting on ‘Man-Rem Reduction Methodologies in Nuclear

Fuel Cycle Operations and Maintenance’


developments in the regulatory requirements and national disaster management plan. The integrated and coordinated emergency management system to handle the nuclear emergency was emphasised.(iv) Emergency Preparedness and Response

Action from Onset of the Accident at Fukushima - An Update

AERB is continuously involved in monitoring the developments and radiological status at Fukushima Dai-ichi site. In this regard, three theme meetings have been conducted by AERB in preceding years. A fourth theme meeting

Response Action from onset of the accident at Fukushima- an Update” at AERB, Mumbai on March 30, 2017. The mandate of the theme meeting

management and radioactive waste management aspects of Fukushima Accident. During the meet, IAEA report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Technical Volume-3 (Emergency Preparedness and Response) was presented. Further, presentations were made on Fukushima Dai-ichi plant status, emergency preparedness aspects and radiological waste management. A review of Japan’s Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) System and the International EPR framework prior to the accident was also presented. The meet brought out various aspects of emergency management which

preparedness manuals of NPPs and revision of related regulatory documents.(v) Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accidents in

Fast Reactors

Disruptive Accidents (HCDA) in Fast Reactors” was organised during May 18-19, 2017 by the Safety Research Institute at Kalpakkam. The meet was intended to take a consolidated look at the existing knowledge and current status of ongoing computational and related experimental works in the area of HCDA and identifying the gaps, if any. Around 70 delegates from various units of DAE participated in the meeting in which invited talks

were delivered by eminent speakers from various R&D organisations and academic institutions, who

and development areas concerned with fast reactor safety and accident analysis. The outcome of the deliberations in the meeting has provided thrust and direction in establishing a platform for collaborative research works for analysis of HCDA by advanced computational methods and intensive experimental works.

(vi) Building Trust and Credibility with Public through Effective Risk Communication

As a regulator, it is very important to keep public informed on the issues of safety concern, which requires effective communication with public and stakeholders to build trust and credibility. With this view a theme meeting on ‘Building Trust and Credibility with Public through Effective Risk

on August 22, 2017 at AERB, Mumbai. Prof. Arti D. Kalro, IIT Bombay, Mumbai was invited for special lecture. The following presentations were organised during the meeting:

(a) ‘Building Trust & Credibility with Public: A Regulatory Perspective’ by Shri Soumen Sinha, AERB.

(b) ‘Risk Communication to Public from Utility Perspective and Experience’ by Shri S. K. Malhotra, Raja Ramanna Fellow and Secretary, Atomic Energy Education Society (AEES), Mumbai.

Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB delivering inaugural address during the Theme Meeting on ‘Hypothetical Core

Disruptive Accidents in Fast Reactors’


(c) Crafting Effective Modes of Communicating Complex Technical Information using Public Relation by Prof. Arti D. Kalro, IIT Bombay, Mumbai.

8.6.2 Special Meet/Awareness Programme

(i) Security of Radioactive Sources at Radiation Facilities

An awareness programme on ‘Security of Radioactive Sources at Radiation Facilities (RFs)” for Law Enforcement Authorities and RFs' personnel (i.e. Employer/Licencee/RSO) possessing Category-1 and 2 sources in Mumbai, Thane and Navi Mumbai region was organised on March 29, 2017 at AERB, Mumbai. The objective of the awareness programme was;

to bring the personnel from Law Enforcement Authority and Radiation Facilities on a common platform for information on security of radioactive sources

to familiarise them with the requirements for security of radioactive sources and their implementation as per the AERB Safety Guide on Security of Radioactive Sources

to inform about the responsibilities of Law Enforcement Authorities and RFs for ensuring the security of radioactive sources.

Total 110 participants attended the

rank of DCP, ACP, Police Inspector, Police Sub-Inspector of Mumbai, Thane and Navi Mumbai

DCSEM attended the programme.

In addition to presentations related to the meet, visual clips on security of radioactive sources and demonstration of radiation monitoring instruments was arranged for familiarisation with radiation detection instruments.

Speakers Delivering Talk on Building Trust and Credibility with Public through Effective Risk Communication

Inauguration of Security Awareness Programme for Law Enforcement Authorities and Radiation Facilities Personnel


Shri S. Jagannathan, Additional Director General of Police (Training & Special Unit), Maharashtra Police and Shri S. Mervin Alexander, Joint Secretary (A&A), DAE inaugurated the programme. The programme was well appreciated by the participants and representatives from Law Enforcement Authority requested to conduct more such programmes for awareness among police personnel.(ii) Accredited Personnel Monitoring and Bio-

Dosimetry Laboratories A special meet for accredited Personnel Monitoring Laboratories (PML) and Bio-dosimetry Laboratories was organised at Mumbai on March 30, 2017. The prime objective of this meet was to ascertain the improvement in quality of personnel monitoring services catered to various radiation facilities wide across the country and to share impediment faced by the stakeholders and remedies therefore in providing personnel monitoring services. Representatives from PMLs, Bio-dosimetry labs together with experts from RP&AD, BARC and AERB attended the meet. The presentations on various topics such as, ‘Techniques of Bio-dosimetry and its Limitations’, ‘Main features of National Occupational Dose Registry System’, ‘Familiarisation with e-LORA module for processing of Excessive Exposure cases’ and ‘Requirements for Accreditation of PMLs’

from PMLs and Bio-dosimetry laboratories made a brief presentation and shared their experiences and concerns on;

Casual attitude of institutions for availing PMS servicesNon-genuine excessive exposure issuesReverse loading of the TLD cardsTLD cards worn above the lead apron

8.7 EXHIBITIONS

AERB participates in science and technology fairs where it displays exhibits on the safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear and radiation facilities

including its safety documents. The exhibits are aimed at giving correct perspective on radiation doses received and provide public, a glimpse of the technical aspects of regulation. The response to the AERB's exhibits at these science fairs was extremely encouraging with visitors of various age groups and students visiting the stalls and getting informed about AERB and its role. During the year, AERB displayed exhibits and interacted with public at following events:

An exhibition stall was set up in the Annual Conference of Indian Society for Vascular and Interventional Radiology (ISVIR) held during February 22-25, 2017 at Kolkata.

the delegates and distributed awareness

An exhibition stall was set up in multidisciplinary conference on Interventional Oncology "Synergy India 2017" held during August 5-6, 2017 at Mumbai. The conference was jointly organised by Tata Memorial Centre (TMC), Mumbai and ‘Indian Society of Vascular and Interventional Radiology (ISVIR)’ in collaboration with ‘Synergy’, Miami, USA. The conference was attended by about 300

Radiology.


Posters describing role of AERB, radiation

badges and AERB e-licensing process (e-LORA) were exhibited in the stall. The pamphlets on ‘Radiation Safety in Fluoroscopy’ and information brochures on regulatory requirements and radiation safety aspects in Interventional Radiology were

interacted with delegates and received the feedback on eLORA. Most of the delegates expressed that training on radiation safety should be included in professional education and AERB should introduce

radiation safety.

8.8 ADVERTISEMENTS AND ARTICLES

AERB publishes advertisements in print media once every six months in order to sensitise the users on requirements of obtaining regulatory consent from AERB for use of medical X-ray

equipment as well as for users of radioactive sources or radiation generating equipment.

Advertisement in Monthly Magazine ALARA

AERB Advertisement on ‘Licensing Requirement for Diagnostic X-ray Equipment’ was periodically published in monthly magazine ALARA – published by Indian Society of Radiographers and Technologists (ISRT).

In-Focus Advertorial in Shubhyatra and Railbandhu

AERB published In-Focus advertorial in the Air

Railways in-board magazine ‘Railbandhu’ in November 2017. The objective of the advertorial is to highlight the role of AERB to a wide range of audience namely, passengers traveling by Air India (Domestic & International) and Indian Railways. The content featured about AERB’s overall

AERB’s Advertisement on handling of Radioactive Sources published in leading nationwide Newspapers


radiation facilities, especially X-ray facilities.

8.9 TECHNICAL INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

AERB believes in sharing its technical expertise with various Government Bodies,

participating in preparation and revision of Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) documents, Site Appraisal Committee of Ministry of Environment & Forest (MoEF), Working Groups on Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plans constituted by National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) etc. AERB encourages its technical divisions in providing project guidance to undergraduates and post graduate students from various Universities/Colleges.

Towards resolving generic issues related to radiation safety due to handling of radiation sources for various applications, AERB interacts with various ministries.

8.9.1 Interactions with Concerned Ministries on issues related to Radiation Safety

AERB is associated with various agencies in the process of ensuring radiation safety in medical radiation facilities and industries handling radiation sources. AERB is routinely interacting with various ministries for resolution of generic issues related to radiation safety due to handling of radiation sources for various applications. Towards this, AERB has interacted with various concerned ministries including:

Interaction with National Accreditation Board of Laboratories (NABL) for the purpose of Accreditation of Radiological Laboratories

Initiative was taken towards review of the process being followed for recognition/accreditation of radiological laboratories by AERB. In the past AERB has accredited/recognised many laboratories associated

In-Focus Advertorial in ‘Shubhyatra’ of Air India


Dosimetry, Radio-analysis, Environmental Survey and Radiation Monitoring Instruments. Since NABL has the mandate for accreditation of such laboratories, a preliminary meeting was arranged with all the stakeholders, viz. NABL, BARC (as it maintains radiological standards) and AERB, in order to understand their respective roles and responsibilities. It was concluded that while it is the role of NABL to accredit the radiological laboratories, the role of AERB will be limited to oversee radiological safety in such laboratories like any other radiation facilities handling radiation sources. Further, it was opined to make an attempt to identify areas needing improvement, overlapping responsibilities and duplication of work and prepare a roadmap for a smooth transition.

Interaction with DGCA for Transport of Radioactive Material by Air

Initiative was taken to review IAEA regulations for safe transport of radioactive

6, 2012 edition vis-a vis national legislation to identify various agencies/competent authorities for overseeing the requirements while transporting radioactive materials by various modes of transport. Review report suggested that different ministries have role in the transport of dangerous goods including radioactive materials depending upon modes of transport namely, road, rail, air and sea. To start with interaction with various agencies, based on their responsibilities, transport of radioactive materials by air was taken up. The main agencies involved in safe transport of radioactive materials include Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and Airport Authority of India (AAI). So a preliminary meeting was arranged with representatives from DGCA and AAI to have clarity about the roles and responsibilities of all these agencies including the scope and regulatory jurisdiction of AERB with respect to transport which includes

in-transit storage at the airport. It was concluded that the regulation for handling of radioactive consignments including the in-transit storage facility located at airports is primarily under the purview of DGCA as per the prevailing laws and AERB’s role is limited to issuance of shipment approval and grant import and export permission for radioactive consignments. Further, it was

study of the scope and extent of regulations for safe transport of radioactive material by air including in-transit storage and handling at airports, for identifying areas needing improvement, overlapping responsibilities and duplication of work, and suggest means and methods to address the same.

Interaction with Central Drugs Standards Control Organisation (CDSCO) for the import permission for radiopharmaceuticals in India.

Meeting with Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) at Directorate of Foreign Trades (DGFT) in connection with Pre-shipment Inspection Agency (PSIA).

Interaction with Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity (DAVP) regarding the audio visual advertisement on diagnostic radiology licensing requirements.

Attended the meeting of Expert Committee for evaluation and appraisal on the project entitled, "Gamma Radiation Plant for Medical Device Reprocessing in Hospitals"

Attended meeting of Standing Committee on Tertiary Cancer Care Program.

8.9.2 Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS)

Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), the National Standards Body is involved in standards formulation apart from its other activities. During

review and revision of BIS documents and participated in the meetings conducted by BIS as Member of Committees/Sectional Committees of BIS as detailed below:


As members of BIS committees, AERB

conducted by BIS on Development of BIS codes related to ‘Cement and Concrete’ and ‘Earthquake Engineering’.

of Electromedical, Diagnostic Imaging and Radiotherapy Equipment Sectional Committee (MHD 15) at BIS, New Delhi and provided inputs on radiological safety requirements of new Indian Standard of Medical Diagnostic X-ray Equipment.

8.9.3 Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF)

As a member of Site Appraisal Committee of MoEF for Nuclear Facilities and Strategic

the meeting and provided inputs.

MoEF Committee for RAPS-5-8 at RR Site, Rawatbhata on June 22, 2017.

8.9.4 Participation in Radiological Emergency Exercise

on Radiological Emergency Exercise at Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Hyderabad during July 11-13, 2017 conducted by Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The purpose of conducting this exercise at airports has emerged on the backdrop false incident on leakage from radioactive consignment reported on May 29, 2015 at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi.

For this exercise a scenario related to radioactive consignment was created and observations were made and communicated to the stakeholders/agencies for further improvement in radiological emergency scenarios.

8.9.5 Project Guidance

Every year many students from several academic institutions like IITs, BITS and other universities get an opportunity to work with AERB scientists and engineers on emerging R&D topics related to safety as part of their academic curriculum. Technical divisions of AERB provided project guidance to undergraduate engineering

provided guidance as follows:

Guidance Provided by Safety Research Institute (SRI), AERB Kalpakkam

Technical guidance was provided to university student(s) in the area of RS-GIS techniques. For this purpose, topographical maps and satellite data were used to generate various thematic layers for Kalpakkam site.

Guidance Provided by NSAD, AERB

Guidance provided to three students on their projects titled, ‘Extreme Value Analysis’, ‘Fission Product release Model’ and ‘Calandria Vault Dew Point Monitoring System’.

Two students worked on the project titled ‘Human Error Probability Estimation using HEP models’.

One student worked on the project titled ‘Numerical Modeling of Point Reactor Kinetics’.

Another student worked on the project titled, ‘Estimation of Reactivity from Known Power History’, ‘CFD Simulation of a PHWR Coolant Channel’ and ‘Linear Stability Analysis of a Nuclear Reactor’.


9.1 PORTAL FOR PUBLIC FEEDBACK

As an initiative towards ‘Minimum Government, Maximum Governance’, AERB has launched electronic licencing system i.e. e-Licensing of Radiation Applications (e-LORA portal). All the consents for radiation facilities are issued through eLORA. Feedback on consenting process for radiation facilities was obtained through this portal.

9.2 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT 2005

Under this Act, access to information from a public agency has become a statutory right of every citizen. The management of AERB

is committed to disclosure of all relevant information in public domain as is permissible under the Act. Required measures were taken on the implementation of 'Right to Information Act’ (RTI) and the required information has been put on AERB website. The total number of RTIs handled during the period was 136 of which 60 RTIs were related to the diagnostic radiology. AERB has also received 12 No. of RTI appeals against replies. Year wise RTI queries replied by AERB are given in Figure 9.1.

In addition to above, the frequently asked questions under RTI were compiled and uploaded on AERB website for reference of the public.

Chapter 9

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Fig. 9.1: RTI Queries Replied during the Last 5 Years


9.3 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS

Parliamentary questions and sub-questions related to regulation of nuclear and radiation facilities were received and replied. During the period AERB responded to 28 parliamentary questions. The questions answered with implications to radiation safety were broadly on following issues:

Regulation of handling radioactive material in India

Radioactive waste disposal and discharges

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants and clearances for new NPPs.

Guidelines for physical protection of nuclear facilities.

Use of radiation technology and radiopharmaceuticals.

Treatment of People Affected by Nuclear Disaster

Guidelines for Research and Diagnostic Facilities

Administrative issues, such as Backlog vacancies etc.

9.4 AUDIT BY COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL (CAG)

Department, Mumbai has carried out Entity Audit of Accounts of AERB during December 19, 2017 to

2015-16 and 2016-17. No major irregularities were reported during the audit.


India is a contracting party in the framework of several international instruments promulgated for establishing a global regime for cooperation in promoting safety in facilities/activities. Pursuant to this, AERB actively participates and contributes in several multi-lateral international platforms working for promotion of nuclear / radiological safety in facilities/activities across the globe. AERB has entered into bilateral arrangements/agreements with the regulatory authorities of several other countries.

10.1 STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

10.1.1 Bilateral Meeting between AERB and USNRC

The 15th bilateral meeting between Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) took place at Maryland, USA during March 6-10, 2017. The bilateral technical meeting included the observation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) ingestion pathway evaluated exercise as well as visit to Phoenix National SAFER Response Center to view emergency backup equipment as U.S. industry’s post-Fukushima safety enhancements. On March 10, 2017 the NRC and the AERB delegation participated in the bilateral technical meeting. The aspects related to regulatory structure of AERB, its functioning and the legal provisions empowering the regulatory body were highlighted by AERB during the meeting. AERB also provided information on new reactor construction, newly published regulatory documents and challenges with public communication. NRC provided information on current operating reactor issues, new reactor construction materials, oversight and area of interest for research. The preparedness for

nuclear emergency in both the countries was also discussed.

10.1.2 Visit of CANDU Owners Group (COG) delegation to AERB

A three member delegation led by Mr. Fred Dermarkar, President & CEO, CANDU Owners Group (COG) visited AERB and held discussions with senior management of AERB on June 01, 2017. The discussions primarily focused on sharing of information on the progress made on pressure tube leakage incidents of KAPS and evolving an information exchange mechanism.

10.1.3 NEA Delegation Commends AERB

A four member delegation of Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) led by Mr. William D. Magwood, Director General, NEA held a meeting with senior management of AERB in Mumbai on November 21, 2017. India participates in technical committees of NEA such as Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (CNRA), Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and NEA Working Groups as an adhoc-invitee. In addition, India also participates in activities related to various Task Groups and projects of NEA. During the joint meeting, both

Chapter 10

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Delegation of CANDU Owners Group (COG)


AERB and NEA emphasised strengthening the nuclear safety through collaborative activities. NEA elaborated on the lessons learnt from Fukushima accident and various measures taken to implement the new insights. Director General, NEA appreciated the technical expertise which AERB is bringing to NEA and advocated for further strengthening of AERB participation in NEA activities. He informed the decision of NEA Steering Committee to upgrade the status of India from ‘Adhoc-Invitee’ to ‘Participant’ and handed over letter inviting India to join CNRA and subsidiary bodies as ‘Participant’.

10.1.4 Visit of Japanese Delegation to AERB

India and Japan, recently, entered into a Bilateral Agreement for the co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to take forward the bilateral co-operation and to explore the area of future co-operation, a two member delegation led by Dr. Kazuhiro Tsuzuki, Senior fellow, the Institute of Applied Energy (IAE) visited AERB on December 5, 2017 and interacted with AERB Sr. Management. The delegation had prepared questionnaire covering aspects of regulatory framework of India, relationship of AERB with international bodies, status of legislation related to nuclear safety etc. which was discussed in the meeting. Dr. Tsuzuki briefed on the Japanese nuclear policy, present status of operating as well as under construction NPPs in Japan, ongoing decommissioning activities at NPP

site, decommissioning of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP and status of Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

10.1.5 Visit of URENCO Team to AERB

A two member team from URENCO Ltd. along with Prof. Nawal Kant Prinja, Technology Director, Clean Energy, Wood PLC, UK visited AERB on December 20, 2017. The delegation discussed on the concept of Uranium Battery (U-Battery) and the regulatory processes/challenges associated with it in India. Apart

participated in the discussion. Uranium battery is being developed by a consortium of companies led by URENCO, utilising international expertise and capabilities. U-Battery is a micro nuclear reactor powered by TRISO fuel which will be able to produce power and heat for a range of energy needs. The regulations associated with these types of technologies in India were explained to the foreign delegation. The information shared during the discussion was informative and enriching.

10.1.6 Meeting of the RPWG of International VVER Regulator Forum

The 5th meeting of Reactor Physics Working Group (RPWG) of International VVER Regulator Forum was organised by AERB at the Safety Research Institute (SRI), Kalpakkam, during

RPWG member countries (Russian Federation, Germany, Hungary and India), eleven participants


from AERB, BARC and NPCIL participated in the meeting. The meeting provided a platform for knowledge sharing on the recent developments in computational methods used for neutronics and thermal hydraulic analysis of VVER type NPPs and eventually, the opportunity for collaborative activities.

10.1.7 CANDU PSA Working Group

The CANDU PSA Working Group (CPWG) organised the annual meeting at Ottawa, Canada during October 23-27, 2017. The meeting was attended by 18 members of CPWG member countries operating CANDU type reactors. Four presentations were made by India. The presentations included current status of PSA activities, use of

of plant damage states of Level-1 PSA, regulatory review process and a status update of previous tasks on CANDU PSA.

10.1.8 CANDU Senior Regulators’ Meet

The CANDU Senior Regulators’ Meet (CSRM) was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina during November 13-17, 2017. The meeting was attended by representatives from nuclear regulatory bodies of Argentina, Canada, China, India, Korea, Pakistan and Romania. Presentations were made by India on coolant Channel life management and

service for long term operation (LTO) and update on incidents of leakage from the coolant channels in KAPS- 1&2 units. The meeting provided a technical platform to interact with senior regulators of other CANDU countries and discuss the current issues such severe accident management, operating experience feedback, post-Fukushima safety enhancements etc.

10.2 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

10.2.1 Bilateral Arrangement between AERB and BAERA, Bangladesh

An arrangement was signed on April 08, 2017 between the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory

Authority (BAERA) for the exchange of technical information and co-operation in the regulation of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The arrangement will enable, among other things, sharing of knowledge and expertise on various issues related to nuclear and radiation safety, education and training of the regulatory personnel and relevant assistance related to development of regulatory requirements.

10.3 CONTRIBUTION IN INTERNATIONAL PEER REVIEW

10.3.1 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)

Nuclear Safety on March 31, 2005. The objectives of the Convention are to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide, to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards, in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionising radiation from such installations; and to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences, should they occur. The Convention places certain obligations on the States operating nuclear power plants. The obligations are based on the principles contained in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals document "Fundamental Safety Principles (SF-1)" and cover for instance, siting, design, construction, operation, the availability

assurance and emergency preparedness.

The Convention has a peer review process, wherein the Contracting Parties are required to submit national reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at the meetings of the Contracting Parties, to be held at the IAEA. These review meetings are held once every three years. The 7th review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety was held at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria from March 27 to April 7, 2017. Total 77 Contracting Parties participated in the review meeting.


India submitted its National Report for review by the Contracting Parties on August 15, 2016. The report updated how the Government of India

6 through 19 of the Convention. All land-based NPPs including storage, handling and treatment facilities for radioactive materials attached to the NPP and directly related to the operation of NPPs were covered in the national report. This report also addressed the national position with regard to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety for the implementation of the objectives of the CNS that was adopted on February 9, 2015. India received a total of 224 questions on this National Report and provided answers to all these questions within the stipulated time.

An Indian Delegation led by Chairman, AERB, with experts from AERB, BARC, NPCIL and the Indian Embassy at Vienna, participated in the review meeting. The presentation and peer review of the National Report of India was held on March 29, 2017 in Country Group (CG-7), for preparation of the Country Review Report. The Indian presentation was well received and all the questions were satisfactorily answered by the Indian delegation.

Indian delegation also organised a side event on March 28, 2017 and shared experience on the Pressure Tube (PT) leak events at KAPS units and their status of investigations.

The National Report to the CNS along with answers to the questions posed on the report and the country review reports have been uploaded on the AERB’s website.

Chairman and Executive Director, AERB in 7th CNS review meeting at IAEA

10.4 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN IAEA IRRS MISSION FOR OTHER COUNTRIES

The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) is designed to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure of States for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. The intention is to peer-review the regulatory framework of the host country so as to make it a robust regulatory body with respect to all its regulated facilities and activities.

the IRRS mission of Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Nigeria during July 2- 12 2017 as IAEA-IRRS team member. The review was carried out against the IAEA safety standards and requirements.

10.5 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES

AERB experts have been actively participating in various activities of IAEA and have been contributing at various other international fora. AERB is the national coordinator for IAEA- International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) based reporting of events and IAEA/NEA - Incident Reporting System (IRS) and Fuel Incident

AERB participates in various Technical and Consultants’ meetings organised by IAEA on a range of topics for NPPs, fuel cycle facilities, radiation facilities, transportation of radioactive


materials. AERB has been participating in IAEA Coordinated Research Programme (IAEA-CRP) and NEA joint projects and information exchange programmes.

10.5.1 Participation of AERB in the NEA/MDEP Activities

AERB continued to coordinate the activities related to India’s participation in the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). During the period AERB experts contributed in the following programmes:

CSNI activity on benchmark on the seismic capacity of reinforced concrete shear walls (CASH) at Paris, France.

meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activates Working Group on inspection practices.

For Multi-unit PSA, inputs were provided for the two documents being prepared by the NEA-WGRISK Working Group on the

CFD simulations for different tests for assessing the recombiner performance have been carried out by AERB experts, as part of OECD/NEA upcoming ‘Thermal–hydraulics, Hydrogen, Aerosols and Iodine Project’ (THAI-3).

As part of OECD/NEA MDEP VVERWG TESG-SA (Severe Accident), AERB position on PARs and ESBO were provided for preparing the common position of various regulators. These include challenges addressing hydrogen recombiner’s reliability and effectiveness during the plant life and understanding of the strategies and challenges in addressing extended station blackout.

10.5.2 AERB’s Activities as MDEP Member

The Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP) is a multilateral co-operational program amongst the national nuclear regulatory bodies. The objective of the program is to

Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB along with participants of 31st Steering Technical Committee of MDEP at IAEA, Vienna


enhance multilateral co-operation; to encourage multinational convergence of codes, standards and safety goals and implement the MDEP products in order to facilitate the licensing of new reactors. However, national regulators retain sovereign authority for all licensing and regulatory decisions.

AERB is a member of the MDEP since 2012. The current membership of MDEP consists of 15 national nuclear regulatory bodies. These are Canada, People's Republic of China, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

AERB continued its association with the MDEP in Policy Group, Steering Technical Committee and few of the design and issue

EPR, VVER and AP1000 reactors and also in issue

and Control (DICWG), Vendor Inspection Cooperation (VICWG) and Codes and Standards (CSWG).

During the year, AERB actively participated and contributed in following meetings:

MDEP Conference on New Reactor Design Activities & MDEP Policy Group Meeting

MDEP VVER Technical Experts sub-group on RPV & primary circuits

MDEP meeting: 39th meeting of CNRA & 62nd meeting of CSNI

Participated in the 15th meeting of the AP1000WG

Participated in Steering Technical Committee Meeting (STC) of MDEP and International Conference on topical issues in Nuclear Safety

Participated in MDEP Digital Instrumentation and Control Working Group (DICWG) meeting

10.5.3 Other International Meetings/Training/Workshops

During the year, AERB experts participated in following international meetings:

6th meeting of PSA Working Group of WWER Regulatory forum at Prague, Czech RepublicWorkshop pertaining to round robin analysis on ‘Improving the Robustness Assessments Methodologies for Structures Impacted by Large Missile at Medium Velocity (IRIS), Phase-III: Induced Vibration’ at EDF Lab Paris-Saclay, FranceExpert faculty in the IAEA Workshop on Safety Aspects of Long Terms Operation (SALTO) on Civil Structures at Angra NPP, BrazilIndo-US Technical Exchange Programmme on Security by DesignIPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Services) Workshop3rd Mongolia-India Working Group MeetingRegional Training Couse (RTC) on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities organised by Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai, JapanPlenary Session Talk during the 37th Annual Conference of Canadian Nuclear Society

10.5.4 Participation of AERB in IAEA Activities

participated and contributed in the following Technical and Consultancy meetings by IAEA:

7th Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)Meeting of Commission on Safety Standards (CSS)Technical Meeting on the CANDU Senior RegulatorsReview Meeting of IAEA IGALL (International Generic Aging Lessons Learnt) Phase-3 Working Group 3 on Civil Structures


Meeting of WWER Regulatory Forum

Meeting of PSA Working Group of WWER Regulatory Forum

International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety: Safety Demonstration of Advance Water Cooled NPP.

ISO/TC85/SC2 & WG Meeting on Radiological Protection

Consultancy Meeting to review and revise the INES User's Manual 2008.

Meeting of Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC)

61st Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference Member of Indian Delegation

IAEA National Workshop on Review and Assessment by the Regulatory Body.

Annual Meeting of the INES Advisory Committee (INES-AC)

Technical Meeting on CANDU Probabilistic Safety Assessment

Consultancy meeting to Develop the International Reporting System, Blue Book-201502017 (7th edition)

Technical Meeting on Recent Development in International and National Management System Standards, Including Quality Management Aspects

International Conference on Radiation Protection in Medicine: Achieving Change in Practice

53rd meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activates working Group on inspection practices.

IAEA Conferences / Workshops / Training Programmes on various themes of interest:

Workshop on Advances in Understanding the Progression of Severe Accidents in Boiling Water Reactors at IAEA

IRIS Phase III Benchmark Workshop

Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB along with participants of Annual Meeting of INES-AC


Workshop on ‘Regulatory Supervision of Fuel Cycle Facilities’

Train the Trainers Workshop on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.

Workshop for Senior Managers on Leadership and Culture for Safety

Workshop on use of a Harmonised Safety Culture Framework

Regional Workshop and Table Top Exercise on Management of the

Response to Nuclear Security Event at NPP

Pilot Workshop on Arrangement for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency.

Training course at ICTP-IAEA International School on ‘Nuclear Security’

IAEA National Workshop on Review and Assessment by the Regulatory Body.


Chapter 11

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE

11.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION

AERB manpower is being augmented at various levels and through various channels in view of the expanding nuclear power programme and increasing number of radiation facilities in the country. This is being done through fresh recruitments, transfer of experienced personnel from operating plants and R&D institutes like BARC and IGCAR and induction of postgraduates through AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme (AGFS) in IIT Bombay and IIT Madras.

Total sanctioned strength in AERB as on December 31, 2017 is 459 comprising of 387

However in position strength is 340 comprising

of Administrative / Accounts / Auxiliary.

11.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FULL PARTICIPATION) ACT, 1995 AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RESERVATION POLICY FOR SCHEDULED CASTES / TRIBES / OBC

During the year 2017, AERB recruited 15

through BARC and IGCAR Training School in

belonging to scheduled caste (SC) was recruited as Upper Division Clerk (UDC). Two candidates were recruited as Stenographer Grade-III. There is one backlog vacancy in ‘Person with Disabilities Quota’ due to resignation of a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) on July 31, 2017. Rosters are maintained as per the orders on the subject. The backlog vacancies are being worked out and periodic reports and returns are sent to DAE.

11.3 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

11.3.1 Development of Information Technology Infrastructure

(i) AERB New Website

The new website of AERB was launched on August 15, 2017. The intent of the new design of the website is to make it more user-friendly and more people-centric to enhance the transparency and public outreach. Attempts are being made to make the website more and more content rich from technical as well as public interest point of view.

(ii) Performance Improvement of e-Licensing for Radiation Application (e-LORA) Portal

It was observed in the recent past that the number of licencees and other service seekers of eLORA program are growing exponentially. To ensure the availability and performance of the application, some major changes were carried out in the architecture of eLORA from August 2017 onwards. These changes include increase in number of active virtual machines and enhancement of the bandwidth of the eLORA leased line.

(iii) Enhancements in Internal IT Infrastructure

like website and eLORA are largely dependent on condition of the internal back-end IT infrastructure of AERB. To improve the performance and availability of internal IT infrastructure of AERB, several steps were taken during this year, which include introduction of link-load balancer to ensure the equal distribution of internet bandwidth for various services like internet, email, domain name service etc. and introduction of centralised back-up system for all the users and distribution of encrypted pen-drives for all AERB employees.


(iv) Implementation of Pre-developed Software Applications

To avoid various hassles in the software development lifecycle and the consequent delays in the implementation of the software, two pre-developed software applications viz. Payroll from IGCAR and Corporate Human Assets and Resources Management System (CHARMS) from NPCIL including on-line Annual Performance Appraisal (APAR) system were implemented at AERB.

11.3.2 Development of AERB, SRI and Regional Regulatory Centres

(i) AERB and Regional Regulatory Centres

AERB is establishing Regional Regulatory Centres and the progress of work is as follows:

70% completion of Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre (ERRC), Kolkata building construction

40% completion of Southern Regional Regulatory Centre (SRRC), Chennai building construction.

In addition, clearances related to construction of Niyamak Bhavan - C building at Head Quarter have been obtained from Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) and tenders were invited by DCSEM.(ii) Engineering Hall at Safety Research

Institute The SRI Engineering Hall was inaugurated by Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB on May 20, 2017 in the presence of Dr. A. K. Bhaduri, Director, IGCAR. Dr. Bhaduri then dedicated the

for all the experimental facilities in the engineering hall. The performance of boiler was demonstrated.

Chairman, AERB and Director, IGCAR, inaugurating the Engineering Hall at SRI

Construction of Regional Regulatory Centers at Chennai and Kolkata in progress


11.4 TRAINING

As a part of competence development, AERB continued to train its staff by organising training programmes, workshops, on-job training at nuclear facilities, refresher courses, technical talks, colloquia and participation in DAE’s Administrative Training Institute (ATI) etc. AERB also imparted training on regulatory and safety aspects with respect to nuclear and radiation facilities to other organisations on request.

11.4.1 Training imparted to AERB Staff

Induction Training was provided to the

were posted to NPP sites for gaining familiarity

(ii) Refresher Training Course on Industrial Safety

Two refresher training courses on Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 were conducted

and October 9-13, 2017. Twenty lectures were delivered by in-house experts on industrial safety.

(iii) Training Programme on Topics related to ASME

The lecture series on ASME training course were conducted for almost 6 months (February to September 2017). This course comprised of 50 lectures. The lectures were given by Dr. H. S. Kushwaha, Former Director, HSEG, BARC who is an expert in the subject. The course had been especially formulated for mechanical engineers.

participated in the course.

(iv) Training Course on topics related to NDT and Radiation Safety

training programmes:

Radiological Physics and Advisory

Division (RP&AD), BARC for short term training course on ‘Nucleonic Gauges’ and ‘Research Application of Ionising Radiation’ to enhance the knowledge and familiarisation with regulations of these facilities.

ISNT Level-II training on

at Mumbai.

was conducted during October 30- November 03, 2017 at AERB.

during February 14, 2017 to September 12, 2017.

(v) Simulator Training on PFBR

In order to familiarise the AERB staff with the operation of the upcoming PFBR, a simulator

Participants of NDT Training Programme

PFBR, Kalpakkam


AERB Participants and Faculty of Management Development Programme (MDP) at YASHADA, Pune

February 28, 2017 to March 10, 2017 at the full scope simulator training facility at PFBR, Kalpakkam.

this training programme. As a pre-requisite for the simulator training, in-house classroom training was also arranged at AERB on important plant systems of PFBR and also on analysis of some of the design basis events (DBE).

exercises. The simulator lesson plan covered various events and simulation of fuel handling systems (fuel handling startup authorisation, inclined fuel transfer machine, operation of rotatable plug and transfer arm etc.). Lectures were delivered by experts from IGCAR and BHAVINI on Design Basis Events for PFBR, detectors used for core monitoring and improving human performance, which were found very useful and applicable in regulatory activities.

(vi) Management Development Programme

A three days residential training programme was conducted during March 17-19, 2017 for

on ‘Management Development Programme (MDP)’ at HDFC Training Centre, Lonawala. The training was conducted by Ms. Tessie

executed the programme successfully. A total

was conducted during December 11-15, 2017

on ‘Management Development Programme (MDP) at YASHADA, Pune. A total of 26

11.4.2 Training Imparted for Other Organisations

Third Fundamental Programme on Nuclear Energy (FPNE) was conducted by DAE

during January 8, 2017 to February 17, 2017. AERB Module of FCNE-10 on ‘Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Cycle Facilities’ was given by AERB faculty.

Internship for 13 students was conducted from May 22, 2017 for two months. Students from different academic institutes like BITS Pilani, VES’s Institute of Technology, Mumbai and VES College of Arts, Science & Commerce, Mumbai had joined AERB for internship.

11.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALK /COLLOQUIUM

Towards the aim of continual knowledge upgradation of its staff, AERB conducts technical talks/colloquia on regular intervals. The topics are meticulously chosen in line with the mandate and


of nuclear and radiation industries, legal aspects, regulatory practices and aspects enhancing personal and interpersonal effectiveness etc.

11.5.1 Technical Talk

Two technical talks were organised during the period on following topics:

‘Insights Gained through the Participation in Working Group on Reactor Physics Analysis (RPWG) of VVER Regulator forum’ was conducted on August 4, 2017.

‘Understanding Leak Testing Methods / Techniques’ was conducted on October 26 and 27, 2017 by Shri L. M. Tolani, Ex Chief Engineer (QA), NPCIL.

11.5.2 AERB COLLOQUIA

Eight colloquia were conducted during the period on various topics of nuclear, radiation and industrial safety.

(i) ‘The Lessons Learnt and Not Learnt from the Three Nuclear Power Accidents: TMI-2; Chernobyl and Fukushima’ by Prof. Bal Raj Sehgal, Emeritus Professor, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden, which was one of the unique learning experiences on the three nuclear events and opportunity to gain knowledge on severe accidents, their mitigation and management.

(ii) ‘ASN Safety Review of Areva’s Creusot Forge site- A Vendor Experience’ was conducted on February 15, 2017.

(iii) ‘Human Factors in Safe Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), Three -Mile Island, Chernobyl & PAKS’ on May 26,

Shri Sekhar Bhattacharya & Shri J. Koley.

(iv) ‘Regulatory Oversight through Effective Inspection’ by Dr. R. Bhattacharya, Former Vice-Chairman, AERB and Senior Advisor, World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), on June 2, 2017.

and Technological Factors in Safety and Practices’ by Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB on July 7, 2017.

(vi) ‘Anomaly affecting the Flamanville EPR Reactor Vessel: A Follow up’, by Shri R. P. Gupta and Dr. Mayank Verma, NPSD, AERB on August 11, 2017.

(vii) ‘TAPS-3&4 Coolant Channel Inspection Results and Review-2017’ by Smt. Sonal Gandhi, OPSD, AERB on November 24, 2017.

(viii) ‘BWR-720 MWe -LOSS OF AC POWER (CLASSES III and IV)’ by Shri Srisht Pall Singh, Former AERB was conducted on October 6, 2017.

11.6 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

11.6.1 Knowledge Portal

A 'Knowledge Portal' is functional on the internal website of AERB, as part of knowledge preservation and easy retrieval. Training/refresher course/teaching material, proceedings of Conferences and Seminars, etc. were included in the portal at regular intervals. AERB Codes/Guides/Manuals are also included on the portal.

11.6.2 AERB Library

A well-equipped library is maintained in AERB. A total of 58 new publications have been added during the period and with this, the total collection of publications has gone up to 10,568. In addition, 20 Journals were subscribed during the period. Reference and information services have been provided to the users and visitors of the Library. List of New Additions, World Nuclear News, NucNet News, NEA News Bulletin etc., are circulated in digital form regularly by sending e-mails to AERB staff. Table of Contents of new issues of important journals of AERB's subject interest are also circulated regularly by email alerts.


11.7 PROMOTION OF EXCELLENCE IN HUMAN RESOURCES

detailed below:

Shri A.D. Roshan, SO(G), NPSD acquired Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in ‘Tsunami Hazard Assessment of Indian Coast’ in February 2017 from Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai.

Shri Ajai S. Pisharady, SO(G), NPSD acquired Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in ‘Seismic Fragility Analysis of a Nuclear Containment Structure using Modal Pushover Analysis’ in August 2017 from Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai.

Smt. Shylamoni P., SO(F), R&DD acquired Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in ‘Derivation of Ground Motion Parameters Maximising Damage Potential using Simulation Technique’ in August 2017 from Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai.

11.7.2 Promotion

During the year, 19 employees were promoted under the Merit Promotion Scheme.

11.8 AERB AWARDS FOR MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE

AERB started its award scheme from the year 2012 to promote excellence among its staff and recognise outstanding achievements of those engaged in regulatory and associated R&D activities. AERB award scheme comprises of individual awards as well as group achievement awards. The categories of awards are: Young

Special Contribution Award, Leadership Award-1 (lower than SO/G), Leadership Award-2 (SO/G and above), Meritorious Service Award and Group Achievement Award. In all these categories, awards for the year 2016-17 were distributed during the AERB Annual Day function on November 15, 2017.

Shri S.K. Mehta, Former Director, Reactor Group, BARC & Chairman, ACPSR, AERB was the Chief Guest of the function. Shri S.P. Sukhatme and Shri S. S. Bajaj former Chairmen, AERB also graced the occasion. During this occasion former Chairmen shared their experiences on Nuclear Regulation in India and provided valuable insights on future challenges ahead and the way forward.

To know expectations of young generation about AERB, a talk on ‘‘My Vision of AERB” was delivered by Shri Subrata Bera, NSAD and Shri Soumyajyoti Kar, RSD (recipients of Young

Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB and Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB addressing the AERB Staff during AERB Day Celebration


Chairman, ACPSR, AERB addressing the AERB Staff during AERB Day Celebration

Cat. 2: Outstanding Performance/ Special Contribution Award

1. Shri Anuj Kumar Deo, SO/E, NSAD

2. Shri C. Nachiketa, SO/E, NPSD

1. Shri Dinesh M. Rane, SO/E, RSD2. Shri Vivek Gupta, SO/E, NPSD

Cat. 3: Leadership Award Leadership Award-2

Cat. 4: Meritorious Service Award

Shri. V. Balasubramaniyan, Outstanding Scientist and Director,

NSARG and SRI, AERB

1. Shri Puran Singh, Technician (G)

2. Smt. Parvathi Harinarayanan, Upper Division Clerk

Shri S. P. Sukhatme and Shri S.S. Bajaj, Former Chairmen, AERB addressing the AERB Staff during AERB Day Celebration

Shri Subrata Bera, NSAD and Shri Soumyajyoti Kar, RSD delivering Talks on


Shri Anuj Kumar Deo, NSAD received the

Shri Dinesh M. Rane, RSD received the ‘Outstanding

Shri Puran Singh Technician (G), AERB received ‘Meritorious Service Award’

Shri C. Nachiketa, NPSD received the

Shri Vivek Gupta, NPSD, received the ‘Outstanding

Smt. Parvathi Harinarayanan Upper Division Clerk Accounts Division,

AERB received ‘Meritorious Service Award’

Shri V. Balasubramaniyan, Outstanding Scientist and Director, NSARG and SRI , AERB received the


Cat. 5: Group Achievement Award:Group 1: Developments in Nuclear Reactor Dynamics and Reactor Physics

Name Designation DivisionSmt. Reeta Rani Malhotra SO(G) C&RPDDr. Obaidurrahman K. SO(F) NSADShri Santosh Kumar Pradhan SO(F) NSADShri Gour Mohan Behera SO(F) C&RPDShri Prashant Sharma SO(E) NSADShri Susheel Kumar SO(E) C&RPDDr. L. Thilagam TO(E) SRISmt. Bharati Ingavale SO(D) NPSDShri Soumen Koner SO(D) C&RPDShri Amandeep Singh SO(D) C&RPDShri Vivek Kale SO(D) NSADShri Rakesh Kumar SO(D) NSAD

Group 2: Investigation of Incidents involving Excessive Exposure in Radiation Facilities

Name Designation DivisionShri Manas Kumar Pathak SO(G) ERRCShri Rajesh Kumar Yadav SO(F) RSDShri Rajoo Kumar SO(E) R&DDShri Senthil Kumar M SO(E) SRRCShri Pradip Kumar SO(E) RSDShri H.G. Desale SO(D) RSDShri Rajendra Shete SO(D) RSDSmt. Swathy K Nair SO(D) RSDShri Chand Pasha SA/C RSD

Developments in Nuclear Reactor Dynamics and Reactor Physics

Investigation of Incidents involving Excessive Exposure in Radiation Facilities


Group 3: Documentation for Regulatory Review of PFBR

Name Designation DivisionShri Animesh Biswas SO(G) NPSDShri Rajnish Kumar SO(F) NPSDKum. Swati V. Burewar SO(F) NPSDShri Anjit Kumar SO(F) NPSDShri Surendra Jain SO(E) NPSDShri Suresh Kumar G SO(E) NPSDSmt. Bharati Ingavale SO(D) NPSDShri Rahul Shukla SO(D) NPSDShri Suvadip Roy SO(D) NPSDKum. Ananya Mohanty SO(D) NPSDShri Vasudev SA/C NPSD

Group 4: Secure Socket Layer – Virtual Private Network (SSL-VPC) Solution: Cyber Security, Software Project, IT Infrastructure Management, Review of Nuclear Security, Computer Hardware etc.

Name Designation DivisionShri M. M. Kulkarni SO(H) R&DDShri E. R. Titto SO(F) R&DDShri Pradeep Chandra Gupta TO(D) R&DDShri Surya Teja. A SA(C) R&DD

Group 5: Implementation of Integrated Management System and tools like Safety Performance Indicators and Safety Culture Indicators of Operating NPPs

Name Designation DivisionSmt. Sonal Gandhi SO(F) OPSDShri N. Khandelwal SO(E) OPSDShri Swapnil Meshram SA/C OPSD

Documentation for Regulatory Review of PFBR


Group 6: Public Communication and Outreach

Name Designation DivisionShri L.R. Bishnoi SO/H SSEDDr. Pankaj Tandon SO/G RSDShri Hemant K. Kulkarni SO/G C&RPDSmt. Reeta Rani Malhotra SO/G C&RPDDr. R.M. Nehru SO/G SRRCDr. C. Senthil Kumar SO/G SRIShri A.D. Roshan SO/G SSEDShri Neeraj Kumar SO/F OPSDDr. Obaidurrahman K SO/F NSADSmt. Manisha Inamdar SO/F RSDKum. Swati Burewar SO/F NSADShri Soumen Sinha SO/F C&RPDShri P. Bansal SO/F RDDShri Amit Sen SO/F RSDShri A. Shrivastava SO/F OPSDShri Susheel Kumar SO/E NSADSmt. V. Anuradha SO/E RSDShri R.K. Chaturvedi SO/E RSDShri Pradip Kumar SO/E RSDSmt. Minakshi Mishra SA/C RDDKum. Shobhashri SA/C RDDShri Ajeesh SA/C RSDShri Ashok Gerira APO(G) Admn.Smt. Nalini B APO(E) Admn.Smt. Suma Panicker Asstt. Admn.Smt. Deepika A. Kushwaha Steno-II C&RPD

Secure Socket Layer – Virtual Private Network (SSL-VPC) Solution: Cyber Security, Software Project, IT Infrastructure Management, Review of

Nuclear Security, Computer Hardware

Implementation of Integrated Management System and tools like Safety Performance Indicators and

Safety Culture Indicators of operating NPPs


Public Communication and Outreach

11.9 WELFARE ACTIVITIES FOR AERB EMPLOYEES

11.9.1 International Women’s Day

International Women's day is celebrated every year at AERB with a large participation from its women employees, wherein debate and speeches are organised on the topics of common interest. A cultural programme was organised on March 08, 2017 by women employees in AERB Auditorium. Two talks were organised one on ‘Women Health Matters’ and another on ‘Yoga for

were well received by participants. Indoor games were also organised as part of the celebration and all the ladies actively participated in the competitions.

11.9.2 AERB Staff Club Activities

AERB staff club conducts sports and cultural activities for the welfare of the staff and family

(gym) is being maintained by the AERB Staff Club

the year, tournaments were conducted for Cricket, Swimming, Brisk walk, Table Tennis, Badminton, Chess and Caroms successfully.

The AERB Annual Day was celebrated on

hundred and forty persons (540) consisting of AERB staff and their family members graced the occasion. The family members of AERB staff also participated in this annual cultural programme. During the programme a video clip on AERB activities was presented for awareness of family members. An exhibition was arranged where AERB staff and family members exhibited their art work. The participants of the cultural programme were presented with mementos in appreciation of their talent. The prizes were distributed to the winners of tournament held in 2016 and 2017.

International Women’s Day Celebration at AERB


11.9.3 World Environment Day Celebration

World Environment Day is celebrated on the 5th of June every year for encouraging awareness and action for the protection of our environment. The theme for the year 2017 was ‘Connecting People to Nature – in the City and on the Land, from the Poles to the Equator’. As a part of it, a talk by Shri Vijaya Raghavan, a Naturalist

11.9.4 International Yoga Day

International Yoga day was celebrated on June 21, 2017 at AERB with a large participation from AERB employees. A talk on

delivered by Shri R. V. Raghavan, Yoga Guru followed by relaxation and meditation session for

Celebration of International Yoga Day at AERB

11.9.5 Vigilance Awareness Week

AERB celebrated the ‘Vigilance Awareness Week- 2017’ during October 30 to November 04, 2017. This year the theme of Vigilance Awareness week was ‘My Vision-Corruption Free India’. A Pledge was taken by AERB Staff. A poster competition was also organised during the week. Vigilance Quiz was conducted and many employees actively participated in it. A lecture on ‘Preventive Vigilance and a glimpse on Conduct Rules’ was delivered by Shri Anjani Kumar, Dy. Legal Advisor, DAE.


Shri Anjani Kumar, Dy. Legal Advisor, DAE delivering lecture on ‘Preventive Vigilance and a Glimpse on Conduct Rules

11.9.6 Swachhata Pakhwada

launched by the Government of India, AERB celebrated ‘Swachhata Pakhwada’ during April 1- 15, 2017. All the staff of AERB took a Swatchchhata Shapath (Cleanliness pledge). Various activities

and canteen; weeding out of old/obsolete records were carried out. The speeches and slogans writing competitions on ‘Swachhata Mission’ were organised during the period. The awards were

their workplace.

A poster competition organised during Vigilance Awareness Week


11.10 RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION

S.No. Name Designation Date of

Retirement Remarks

1 Smt. Ratna Pradeep SO(G) 24-03-2017 Voluntary Retirement

2 Shri. S.N. Rao SO (H ) 31-03-2017 Superannuation

3 Shri Leo Babu Joseph Work Assistant (B) 31-05- 2017 Superannuation

4 Smt. Nalini Balachandran Assistant Personnel 04-07-2017 Voluntary Retirement

5 Shri S.R. Bhave SO(F) 31-07-2017 Superannuation

6 Smt. Reeta Rani Malhotra 31-07-2017 Resignation

7 Shri P. R. Krishnamurthy OS & Director NFRG and OPSD

31-10-2017 Superannuation

8 Shri V.V. Pande SO (H) & Head, IPSD 31-10-2017 Superannuation

9 Shri Y.K. Shah SO(G) 31-10-2017 Superannuation


Photo Gallery AERB Annual Day 2017 CelebrationPhoto Gallery AERB Annual Day 2017 Celebration

Shri S. Bansal, President, AERB Staff Club delivering Welcome Address and Smt. Sadhvi Srinivasan, General Secretary, AERB Staff Club presenting the Staff Club Annual Progress Report


AERB Premier League Winner – 2017 Winner of Chess Tournement - 2017


Chapter 12

PROMOTION OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

AERB is committed to implementation of

India. It has an established programme for the

AERB proactively initiates a series of various activities for the propagation and implementation

publications, training programmes, workshops, talks, annual competitions and divisional inspections.

AERB also contributes in the joint activities

of BRIT, Heavy Water Board, DCSEM, DPS and AERB.

Our objective is to create favourable environment for the use of Hindi and to motivate and encourage staff members to do their work in Hindi. For promotion of Hindi some of the activities conducted are given below:

12.1 PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR HINDI IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation Committee (OLIC) were

organised to discuss on various issues related

language in AERB.

This year, Chairman AERB, Shri S. A. Bharadwaj, assumed the charge of Chairman,

Committee (OLIC) of AERB.

(ii) DAE incentive scheme for working in Hindi has been introduced and employees are actively participating in the scheme. Twelve awards were given under this scheme.

12.2 PUBLICATIONS IN HINDI

(i) 10 AERB safety documents have been translated in Hindi and these are under process for publication in Hindi.

(ii) AERB Bulletin has been translated in Hindi and same is under process for publication.

(iii) 7 press releases were issued in Hindi and published in daily newspapers.

(iv) Licences, authorisations and inspection reports were issued in Hindi.

(v) Total 27,480 letters were sent in bilingual and 68 were sent exclusively in Hindi.

12.3 HINDI TALKS / WORKSHOPS / SEMINARS

(i) Four Hindi workshops were conducted (2 in Administrative Training Institute and 2

Language Coordination Committee. 19

workshops.

(ii) World Hindi Day was celebrated on January

Language Co-ordination committee of AERB and four DAE units namely, DPS, HWB, DCSEM and BRIT.

Chairman AERB, Shri S.A. Bharadwaj, presiding over

Committee (OLIC)


On the occasion of World Hindi Day, Dr. Mohisin Khan, HOD, Hindi Department, Alibaug University was invited as the guest

as a World Language”. On this occasion, Renowned Hindi poet and lyricist Shri Chandan Rai also presented his Hindi poems.

The programme was very effective and was well appreciated by the audience.

in Hindi on July 28, 2017. The theme of

Nuclear and Radiation Plants”. Shri A. N. Verma, Chief Executive, Heavy Water Board was invited as the chief guest in the seminar. 120 participants from various units of DAE

in Hindi were presented in the seminar. An e-magazine consisting of all the 7 papers was also released on this occasion.

(iv) Hindi Day was celebrated on September 14,

Co-ordination Committee. AERB hosted this programme. Renowned poets Shri Subhash

Dignitaries on Dias during World Hindi Day Celebration

Shri S. A. Bharadwaj, Chairman AERB, Shri A.N. Verma, CE, Heavy Water Board and Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB, releasing the CD of e-magazine

Dr. Mohisin Khan, delivering talk during World Hindi Day Celebration

Shri S. K. Malhotra, Raja Ramanna Fellow and Secretary AEES, delivering lecture in Hindi Seminar


Kabra and Shri Prakash Kumar were invited in this programme. On this occasion Shri Subhash Kabra delivered a lecture on ‘Our languages-our pride’, he also recited his famous poems. Shri Prakash Kumar also presented his poems.

The programme was well appreciated by the audience.

(v) A health talk on ‘Obesity Related Health Challenges’ in Hindi was delivered by Dr. Milind Lankeshwar, Medical Division, BARC on December 12, 2017.

Dr. Milind Lankeshwar, delivering talk on ‘Obesity Related Health Challenges’

AERB Staff Member Presenting the One Act Play ‘Vridha Ashram’

Artists of Musical Band performing in Hindi Prize Distribution Ceremony

Dignitaries on Dias during Hindi Day Celebration

12.4 HINDI COMPETITIONS

A prize distribution ceremony was organised on February 17, 2017 for the winners of the Hindi competitions held in November 2016. Total 32

number of prizes in three language groups. The highlight of the day was the musical program by ‘Symbol Blues Musical Group’, who belted out

the present era.

The staff members of AERB also presented a one act play on this occasion.


Marking the Hindi Day Celebrations, a series of Hindi Competitions were also held during September 6-12, 2017, on behalf of the

at V.S. Bhavan, Anushakti Nagar, Mumbai.

The Competitions included Self-written poetry competition, debate competition, extempore speech

AERB won prizes in these competitions and they were awarded on the occasion of Hindi Day.


Chapter 13

FINANCE

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board receives

for meeting its expenditure of recurring nature whether capital or revenue. AERB has full powers to operate its budget, which it prepares and submits to the Central Government for approval. The Central Government allocates the budget in the separate head of accounts of AERB.

13.1 ANNUAL BUDGET UTILISATION

Actual expenditure during the period was Rs. 73.78 crore, Rs. 7.65 crore under Plan Capital, Rs.1.24 crore under Revenue i.e. Grant-in-Aid and Rs. 64.89 crore under Non-Plan. This includes

assistance for projects of AERB interest to academic institutes and for seminars/ conferences etc. Expenditure for Capital plan was mainly for R&D activities, implementation of eLORA

Regional Regulatory Centres and Niyamak Bhavan – C at AERB headquarters.

Tendering activities for the enhancements required in the infrastructure facilities in AERB including AERB Board Room, conference rooms, communication facilities, sanitation facilities etc. were under progress. Internal painting of Niyamak Bhavan-A was completed. Construction activities are started for Southern Regional Regulatory Centre (SRRC) at Chennai and construction activities progressed well for Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre (ERRC) at Kolkata.

Non-Plan expenditure consists of mainly day-to-day running expenditure of AERB viz.

programmes etc.

13.2 FUNDS UTILISATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Funds were utilised for procurement of software for analysis work at headquarters and at SRI Kalpakkam, radiation protection instrument, experimental facilities for R&D activities etc.

Funds were also utilised for redevelopment of AERB website, centralised back-up solution, establishing disaster recovery centre for AERB (e-LORA/ OAS), introduction of link-load balancer to ensure the equal distribution of internet bandwidth for various services like internet, email, domain name service and procurement of encrypted pen-drives. Implementation of continuous improvement plan for e-LORA covering important activities such as: increase in the number of active virtual machines and enhancement of the bandwidth of the e-LORA leased line.

13.3 FUNDS UTILISATION ON PUBLIC OUTREACH PROGRAMMES

AERB conducted awareness programmes during 2017 on Radiotherapy, Diagnostic X-ray, Consumer Products and Scanning Facility, Facilities providing Personnel Monitoring Services and Security of Radioactive Material (RAM). During the period, AERB displayed exhibits at Annual Conference of Indian Society for Vascular and Interventional Radiology and conference on Interventional Oncology at Mumbai.

Press releases were issued in English as well as in Hindi. AERB published advertisements in


leading newspapers in order to sensitise the users on requirements of obtaining regulatory consent from AERB for use of medical X-ray equipment as well as for users of radioactive sources or radiation generating equipment. Advertorials were published in Air India and Indian Railways in-board magazines.

13.4 GRANTS TO RESEARCH PROJECTS

AERB provides grants to academic institutions for research projects to carry out safety research in the areas of interest. The outcome of the research is used in AERB for framing the new regulations, safety review and analysis.


PUBLICATIONS

NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL JOURNALS:

Jha Somnath, Roshan A.D., Bishnoi L.R.,

Basis Seismic Demand” (2017). Nuclear Engineering and Design.(2017.01.006)

Jha Somnath, Roshan A.D., A.S. Pisharady,

for Earthquake Beyond Design Basis –

Nuclear Engineering and Design, (2017.02.026)

Moloy K. Chakraborty, Sourav Acharya, Ajai S. Pisharady, Roshan A. D. and L. R. Bishnoi (2017) "Assessment of Ultimate Load Capacity of Concrete Containment Structures Against Structural Collapse", Nuclear Engineering and Design, 323 (2017), pp 417-426.

Exposure using CCD Imaging Technique for CaSO4:Dy TL dosimeters’ published in Radiation Protection Dosimetry on March 2, 2017.

Vivek A. Kale, K. Obaidurrahman, Avinash

Postulated Rod Drop Incident in a PHWR”, Journal of Life Cycle Reliability and Safety Engineering,Vol.6, Issue 2, 119-126, 2017.

Subrata Bera, D. Datta and A. J. Gaikwad,

imprecise failure data”, Life Cycle Reliability and Safety Engineering (2017).

Anuj Kumar Deo, P. K. Baburajan, R. Srinivasa Rao, U. K. Paul, Avinash J.

a typical PHWR”, Life Cycle Reliability and Safety Engineering (2017).

of Concern in Safety Critical Electronic Systems", pp-110-119, Vol-4, Issue-5, International Journal of Modern Trends in Engineering and Science, May 2017.

M. Boopathi, R. Sujatha, C. Senthil Kumar,

Approach for Quantifying the Software Code Coverage Using Genetic Algorithm in Software Testing”, International Journal of Bio-Inspired Computation, May 2017.

Susheel Kumar, S. Hari Kumar, C. S.

of Nuclear Power Program in India”, pp-146-159, Volume 101 Part A, November 2017, Progress in Nuclear Energy, an International Review Journal.

Nilesh Agrawal, Seik Mansoor Ali, V.

Recombiner Concept for Severe Accident Management in Nuclear Power Plants”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume 323, pp 359-366 (2017).

Aneesh Prabhakar, Nilesh Agrawal, Vasudevan Raghavan, Sarit K. Das,

in the Unventilated Vertical Cylindrical Enclosure of AIHMS Facility Under Wall Temperature Induced Natural Convection”, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume 323, pp 367-375 (2017).


Aneesh Prabhakar, Nilesh Agrawal, Vasudevan Raghavan, Sarit K. Das,

and Distribution of Helium and Hydrogen Gases inside the AIHMS Cylindrical Enclosure”, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, Volume 42, pp 15435-15447 (2017).

U. Pujala, L. Thilagam, T. S. Selvakumaran, R. Baskaran, D. K. Mohapatra, B. Venkatraman,

Hall using Monte Carlo Simulations”, Brazilian Journal of Radiation Sciences, 05-01 (2017), 01-13.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES/TRAINING:

Jolly Joseph Kaitheth, Jeongsoo Kang,

Estimation and Biological Shielding Evaluation of a Medical Cyclotron Using a Monte Carlo Simulation Method.” Transactions of the Korean Nuclear Society Autumn Meeting Gyeongju, Korea, October 26-27, 2017.

Krishna Chandran R., Seik Mansoor Ali, V.

of Condensation Induced Water Hammer Transients”, Proceedings of the 24th National and 2nd International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017), December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad.

K.N.V. Adinarayana, Seik Mansoor Ali, V.

of Radionuclide Migration in a NSDF using PORFLOW”, Proceedings of the 24th National and 2nd International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017), December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad.

Nilesh Agrawal, Seik Mansoor Ali, V.

Channel Heat-up During the Event Initiated by LOCA and Failure of ECCS in PHWRs”, Proceedings of the 24th National and 2nd International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017), December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad.

T. Sai Praneeth, Nilesh Agrawal, Seik Mansoor

of a Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner with Radiation Heat Transfer”, Proceedings of the 24th National and 2nd International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017), December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad.

Tejaswi Abburi, Seik Mansoor Ali, V.

in a Ventilated Enclosure”, Proceedings of the 24th National and 2nd International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017), December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad.

NATIONAL CONFERENCES / WORKSHOPS:

Arun Aravind, C. V. Srinivas and H. Seshadri,

for Atmospheric Dispersion”, 13th National Symposium on Nuclear and Radiochemistry, February 6-10, 2017.

Ramakrishna P, Balakrishnan. S and K. Ananthasivan Chemical Characterisation of Fe-Zr alloys by different Analytical Technique”, NUCAR, February 6-10, 2017, KIIT University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha.

C. Jayalakshmi Generation of Geo-Spatial Database for NPP Sites”, the proceedings of National Technology Day Meet-2017, IGCAR, Kalpakkam, May 12, 2017.

M. R. Priya and L. Thilagam An Optimised Shield Design for Am-Be Neutron Source”, the proceedings of National Technology Day Meet-2017, IGCAR, Kalpakkam, May 12, 2017.


C. Senthil Kumar, M. Karthick, T. Paul Robert and V. Balasubramaniyan Modelling Approach for Organisational and Cognitive Factors Human Reliability in Industrial Applications”, in 34th DAE safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet, Kudankulam NPP, June 28-30, 2017.

L. R. Suryawanshi, H. K. Kulkarni, R. P.

and Organisational Factors (HOF) during different stages of Indian NPPs”, in 34th DAE Safety Occupational Health Professionals Meet, KKNPP, Kudankulam, June 28-30, 2017.

Avimanyu Banerjee, ‘Occupational Injury Statistics & Fire Statistics 2016’ in 34th DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet at KKNPP, Kudankulam, June 28 - 30, 2017.

and Technological Factors in Nuclear and Chemical Disasters” in 34th DAE Safety and Occupational Health Professionals Meet at KKNPP, Kudankulam, June 28 - 30, 2017.

Krishan Kumar, Suddhasattwa Ghosh, B.

Impedance Spectroscopy Analysis of redox behaviour of Uranium in Liquid Cadmium in LiCl-KCl Eutectic”, in ICONEST 2017 conference, August 10-12 2017, Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc), Bengaluru.

Smriti Sharma, "Incident Reporting in Radiotherapy: Improving Safety of Patient, Public and Occupational Worker", 21st National Conference of Association of Radiation Therapy Technologists of India (ARTTICON-2017), Nashik, October 14-15, 2017.

Smriti Sharma, G. Sahani, Pankaj Tandon and A.U. Sonawane, "Structural Radiation Shielding Design of Gamma-Knife Facility",

conference of Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), Jaipur, November 3-7, 2017.

Dr. G. Sahani, Dr. Pankaj Tandon and Dr. A.U. Sonawane, "Radiation Safety Assessment of Proton Therapy Facility In India", Conference of Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), Jaipur, November 3-7, 2017.

Dr. Rajib Lochan Sha, Alok Pandey, Pankaj Tandon, A. U Sonawane, " Probabilistic Safety Assessment of GammaMed plus iX HDR Brachytherapy Equipment", the proceeding of Conference of Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), Jaipur, November, 3-7, 2017.

Pramod Dixit, Subhalaxmi Mishra, Palani T Selvam, D .D. Deshpande, Sanket Yavalkar,

developed Medical Accelerator”, Conference of Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), Jaipur, November 3-7, 2017.

B. Mishra, Dr. G. Sahani, Dr. Pankaj Tandon,

With e-Licensing of Radiation Application (e-LORA) For Radiotherapy Practice”, Conference of Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), , Jaipur, November 3-7, 2017.

B. Mishra, Mahesh M., Dr. G. Sahani, Dr.

Sources and Applicable Security Measures for Radiation Sources used in Radiotherapy”, Conference of Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), Jaipur, November 3-7, 2017.

Subrata Bera, U. K. Paul, D. Datta, A. J.

release under Accident Condition”, International Conference on Modelling


and Simulation-2017(MS-17), Kolkata, November 4-5, 2017.

Subrata Bera, Dhanesh B. Nagrale, U. K.

Aggregation of Extreme Value Analysis Models”, International Conference on Modelling and Simulation-2017(MS-17), Kolkata, November 4-5, 2017.

Amandeep Singh, Obaidurrahman K.,

on Finite Difference Method for Neutron Diffusion Equation”, Advances in Reactor Physics-2017 (ARP-17), December 6 - 9, 2017, Mumbai.

Santosh K. Pradhan, Obaidurrahman K. and

Effects in Multipoint Kinetics Formulation”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in

& Beyond” (ARP-2017), December 06-09, 2017, Mumbai.

Amandeep Singh, H. P. Gupta, Susheel

Reactor Power Transient Using Multiphysics Code”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances


Rakesh Kumar, Vivek Kale, Obaidurrahman

Analysis of PFBR”, DEA-BRNS Symposium

Reactors: Now & Beyond” (ARP-2017), December 06-09, 2017, Mumbai.

overview of Core Reactivity Anomaly Surveillance in NPPs”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in Reactor Physics:

2017), December 06-09, 2017, Mumbai.

Vivek Kale, S.K. Dubey, Obaidurrahman K.,

DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in


Subrata Bera, S. P. Lakshmanan, D. Datta, U.

of Epistemic Uncertainty in Power Defect


Oscillations in Scaled up Power Reactors”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in


D. K. Mohapatra, S. S. Singh, V.

of Sodium Voiding on Core Disruptive Accident Energetics in Fast Reactors”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in


Neutronics Analysis of AP-1000 using Monte Carlo Method”, DEA-BRNS Symposium


Physics Analysis of AP-1000 by Deterministic and Monte Carlo Methods”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in Reactor Physics:

2017), December 06-09, 2017, Mumbai.


Regulatory Aspects of Fast Reactors”, paper presented in the form of a Technical Talk, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in


D. K. Mohapatra, S. S. Singh, V. Balasubramaniyan and H. P. Gupta,

Core Disruptive Accident in Fast Reactors”, DEA-BRNS Symposium on Advances in


Alok Pandey and JVK Sunil Kumar,

Accelerator based Container Scanner”, conference of Non Destructive Evaluation (NDE-2017), Chennai, December 14-16, 2017.

NEWSLETTER ARTICLES

C. Anandan, C. Senthil Kumar and V.

in Environmental Management”, AWARE Newsletter, June 2017.

Rem Reduction Strategies in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities”, AWARE Newsletter, June 2017.


ACNRS Advisory Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety

ACOH Advisory Committee on Occupational Health

ACPSR Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review

AERB Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

AFR Away From Reactor

AGFS AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme

AGMS Annulus Gas Monitoring System

AIHMS AERB IITM Hydrogen Mixing Studies

AIIMS All India Institute of Medical Sciences

ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable

AMD Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research

AMG Accident Management Guideline

AOT AERB Observers Team

ASCE Assistant Shift Charge Engineer

ATI Administrative Training Institute

BARC Bhabha Atomic Research Centre

BARVIS BARC Vessel Inspection System

BIS Bureau of Indian Standards

BITS Birla Institute of Technology and Science

BRIT Board of Radiation & Isotope

Technology

BSD Biennial Shutdown

BSM Beach Sand Minerals

BSM-NORM SC Beach Sand Minerals & Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials Safety Committee

CAG Comptroller and Auditor General

CANDU Canada Deuterium Uranium

CCL Critical Crack Length

CCW Condensate Cooling Water

CEP Condensate Extraction Pump

CESC Civil Engineering Safety Committee

CESCOP Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants

CFVS Containment Filtered Venting System

CMG Crises Management Group

CNRA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities

CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety

CORAL Compact Reprocessing of Advanced Fuels in Lead Cell

CSNI Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations

CSP Core Sub-assembly Plant

CSRP Committee for Safety Research Programmes

CSS Commission on Safety Standards

ABBREVIATIONS


CT Calandria Tubes/Computed Tomography

CV Calandria Vault

DBFL Design Basis Flood Level

DBR Design Basis Report

DCN Design Change Notice

DCSEM Directorate of Construction, Services & Estate Management

DCV Double Check Valve

DEC Design Extension Condition

DFMF Demonstration Facility for Metallic Fuel Fabrication

DFRP Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant

DGCA Directorate General of Civil Aviation

DGFT Director General of Foreign Trade

DPS Directorate of Purchase and Stores

DRA&C Directorate of Regulatory Affairs and Communications

DRI Directorate of Regulatory Inspection

DRP&E Directorate of Radiation Protection and Environment

DRS Directorate of Radiation Safety

DSRC Design Safety Review Committee

DSRC-DP Design Safety Review Committee

DSRC-NFC Design Safety Review Committee for Nuclear Fuel Complex

DSRC-UEP Design Safety Review Committee for Uranium Extraction Projects

DSS Decision Support System

EAL Emergency Action Level

EC Executive Committee

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

ECIL Electronics Corporation of India Limited

EFPD Effective Full Power Days

eLORA electronic Licensing of Radiation Applications

EMCCR En-Masse Coolant Channel Replacement

EPP Emergency Preparedness Plan

EPR Emergency Preparedness & Response

EQ Equipment/ Environment

ERRC Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre

ESL Environmental Survey Laboratories

FBTR Fast Breeder Test Reactor

FE-FCF Front-End Fuel Cycle Facilities

FFP Fuel Fabrication Plant

Analysis System

FP Full Power

FPC First Pour of Concrete

FPNG Fission Products Nobel Gases

FRFCF Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility

FSA Fuel Sub-Assembly

GHAVP Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut Pariyojana

GIC Gamma Irradiation Chamber

GIS Geographical Information System


HCDA Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident

HEP Human Error Probability

HSEG Health Safety and Environment Group

HWP Heavy Water Plant

HYMIF HYdrogen MItigation Facility

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICMS In-Core Monitoring Systems

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection

IGALL International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned

IGCAR Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research

II Injury Index

IIT Indian Institute of Technology

IL Investigation Levels

IMS Integrated Management System

INES International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

IPSD Industrial Plants Safety Division

IR Incidence Rates

IRED Industrial Radiography Exposure Device

IREL Indian Rare Earths Limited

IRGD Ionising Radiation Gauging Device

IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRS Incident Reporting System

ISO International Organisation for Standardisation

JHA Job Hazard Analysis

KAPP Kakrapar Atomic Power Project

KGS Kaiga Nuclear Power Station

KKNPP Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project

LHGR Linear Heat Generating Rate

LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident

LOECCS Loss of Emergency Core Cooling System

LOMC Loss of Moderator Cooling

LSC Leak Start Crack

LWR Liquid Radioactive Waste

MAPS Madras Atomic Power Station

MCF Medical Cyclotron Facility

MDEP Multi-national Design Evaluation Program

MDP Management Development Programme

MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forests

MoPP Monazite Processing Plant

MSL Mean Sea Level

NAPS Narora Atomic Power Station

NCRI National Conference on Regulatory Interface

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NEA Nuclear Energy Agency

NFC Nuclear Fuel Complex

NFME Neutron Flux Monitoring Equipment

NFRG Nuclear Facilities Regulation Group


NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material

NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NPSD Nuclear Projects Safety Division

NREMC Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Monitoring Cell

NSAD Nuclear Safety Analysis Division

NSARG Nuclear Safety Analysis and Research Group

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OESC On-site Emergency Support Centre

Committee

OPSD Operating Plants Safety Division

OSCOM Orissa Sand Complex

OSEE Off-site Emergency Exercise

PCRD Passive Catalytic Recombiner Devices

PDSC Project Design Safety Committee

PEE Plant Emergency Exercises

PET Positron Emission Tomography

PFBR Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

PHRS Passive Heat Removal System

PHWR Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor

PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment

PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

PSHA Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

PT Pressure Tube

QA Quality Assurance

QMS Quality Management System

R&D Research & Development

RAPP Rajasthan Atomic Power Project

RAPS Rajasthan Atomic Power Station

RCF Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers

RCP Reactor Coolant Pumps

REGDOC Regulatory Safety Documents

RI Regulatory Inspection

RIA Radiological Impact Assessment

RP&AD Radiological Physics and Advisory Division

RPF Radiation Processing Facility

RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel

RRC Regional Regulatory Centres

RRCAT Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology

RSA Radiation Safety Agency

RSD Radiological Safety Division/ Refuelling Shutdown

RTI Right to Information Act

RUP Reprocessed Uranium Plant

SA Severe Accident

SAMG Severe Accident Analysis & Management Guidelines

SAR Safety Analysis Report

SARCAR Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation


SARCOP Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants

SBO Station Blackout

SC Safety Code

SCCI&CS Standing Committee on Control for Instrumentation & Computer Based Systems

SCE Shift Charge Engineer

SCRF Superconducting RF

SC-RP Standing Committee Reactor Physics

SDDP Safety Document Development Proposal

SEE Site Emergency Exercise

SFA Spent Fuel Assembly

SFP Spent Fuel Pool

SG Safety Guide

SGDHR Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal

SM Safety Manual

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SOT Site Observer Team

SPECT Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography

SR Severity Rate

SRI Safety Research Institute

SRRC Southern Regional Regulatory Centre

SS Safety Standard/ Stainless Steel

SSC Structures, Systems and Components

SSED Siting & Structural Engineering Division

SSI Soil-Structure Interaction

SSMC Secondary Sodium Main Circuit

STC Steering Technical Committee

SWMF Solid Waste Management Facility

TAPS Tarapur Atomic Power Station

TBD Technical Basis Document

TBP Tri Butyl Phosphate

TDFP Turbine Driven Feed Pump

TDP Technology Demonstration Plant

TECDOC Technical Document

TENORM Technically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials

TF Task Force

TLD Thermo Luminescence Dosimetry

TPA Tons per Annum

TRANSSC Transport Safety Standards Committee

TSO Technical Support Organisation

UCIL Uranium Corporation of India Limited

USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

VECC Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre

VLR Variable Leak Rate

VSPP Versatile Solvent Production Plant

VVER Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor

WG Working Group

WMP Waste Management Plant

ZC Zirconium Complex

ZFF Zircaloy Fabrication Facility


INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES)

Level/ Descriptor Nature of the Events Examples

7MAJOR ACCIDENT

Major release: Widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.

Chernobyl NPP, USSR (now in Ukraine), 1986Fukushima NPP,Japan, 2011

6SERIOUS ACCIDENT planned countermeasures.

Kyshtym Reprocessing Plant, Russia,1957

5ACCIDENT

WITH WIDER CONSEQUENCES

Limited release: Likely to require partial implementation of some planned countermeasuresSevere damage to reactor core / several deaths from radiation.Release of large quantities of radioactive material within

exposure. This could arise from a major criticality accident or

Windscale Pile, UK, 1957Three Mile Island, NPP, USA, 1979Goiania, Brazil, 1987

4ACCIDENT

WITH LOCAL CONSEQUENCES

Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in implementation of planned countermeasures other than local food controls.Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1% release of core inventory.

quantities of radioactive material within an installation with a

Tokaimuro, Japan, 1999Saint-Laurent des Eaux NPP, France, 1980Fleurus, Belgium, 2006Mayapuri Incident,India, 2010

3SERIOUS INCIDENT

Near accident of an NPP with no safety provisions remaining.Highly radioactive sealed source lost or stolen/misdelivered without adequate radiation procedures in place to handle it.Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/h in an operating areaSevere contamination in an area not expected by design, with a

Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit for workers/ Non-lethal deterministic health effect (e.g. burns) from radiation.

Vandellos NPP, Spain, 1989Ikitelli, Turkey, 1999.

Yanango,Peru,1999

2INCIDENT consequences

Exposure of member of public in excess of 10mSv/exposure of a worker in excess of the statutory annual limits/ Radiation level in an operating area of more than 50 mSv/h

expected by designFound highly radioactive sealed orphan source, device or transport package with safety provisions intact./ inadequate packaging of highly radioactive material sealed source

Forsmark.Sweden,2006Atucha, Argentina, 2005

1ANOMALY in depth remaining/ low activity lost or stolen radioactive

source, device or transport packageOverexposure of member of public in excess of statutory limits.

Breach of operating limits at a nuclear facility/ theft of radioactive source

0DEVIATIONS

BELOW SCALE


Indian Delegation in 7th review meeting of Convention on Nuclear Safety, at IAEA, Vienna, Austria

Annual Report 2017 - AERB

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Transcript of Annual Report 2017 - AERB