AN ASIAN TIG ER AND AN ORANG BELANDA FIFTY YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND MALAYSIA, 1957-2007

Caroline Drieënhuizen

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Translated to English by the Minister of Foreign Affairs m June 2007. Edited 2008 by the Royal Outch Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

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@ Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 2008. All rights reseNed. No part of th1s publicatton may be reproduced,

stored in a computer database or pubhshed in any form or by any means for commercial purposes without the prior permission of the Embassy

of the K1ngdom of the Netherlands, Kuala Lumpur.

Design La Scheers Co Sdn Bhd

CONTENTS Pref ace

lntroduction

1. The early years 1957-1965. The basis for future decades of bilateral

relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia

1.1. The lead-up to independence in 1957

1.2. The basis for contacts between the Netherlands and Malaya

1.3. Dutch diplomatie representation in a fledgling state

1.4. A new phase in the Netherlands and Malaysia relations

1.5. Cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands based

on a cherished common heritage

2. The period of consolidation 1965-1976. The emergence of Malaysia as a

politica! player on the world scene

2.1. lmproving trade relations

2.2. Konfrontasi and affirmative action in favour of Malays

2.3. Cultural and academie relations: Dutch efforts to help Malaysia

2.4. Personal diplomacy on the back burner

3. The turbulent years 1976-1990. Birth and development of a tiger

3.1. An Asian tiger and the West

3.2. The uphill struggle to interest the Netherlands in Malaysia

3.3. Heritage and cultural activities in the service of trade

4. The boom years. 1990-1997. The tiger reaches maturity

4.1. Towards the millennium

4.2. The Netherlands increasingly in the limelight in Malaysia

4.3. Further progress in cultural relations

5. From 1997 to 2007, Malaysia on track for new success with more

cooperation with the Netherlands

5.1. The crisis of 1997 and lightning recovery

5.2. lncreasingly important politica! and economie relations

5.3. Relations based on a growing interest in the common cultural heritage

5.4. Culture and trade

Conclusions

Ambassadors

Not es

Bibliography

Archival sources

5

7

8

8

9

12

13

16

17

17

20

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25

28

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35

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46

46

PREF ACE As one could read in a commemorative edition of The Sunday limes

of 25 August 1957 (issued as a supplement to the New Straits limes

during the festivities tor the celebration the 50th anniversary of the

independence of Malaysia), Mr. Markus Rosenberg Polak carne to

Malaysia as the first Chargé d'Affaires designate to the new country

together with the special envoy of the Prime Minister tor the Merdeka

celebration, Count Willem F.L van Bylandt. His arrival marked the beginning of 50 years of Malaysian-Netherlands

diplomatie relations. The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands thought this to be an excellent opportunity to

commission a study of the history of these relations. A fascinating story emerges from the facts that Ms. Caroline

Drieënhuizen has brought to light from the archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Netherlands was still entangled with its colonial legacy in lndonesia in those early days and Malaysia played

an important role as a conduit tor its regional relations. Soon however Malaysia in itself would take its rightful

place as the focus of attention. Not surprisingly for a merchant nation as the Dutch, the interest would be primarily

economie. After all the Dutch East India Company, or VOC as it is more commonly known in its Dutch abbreviation,

had already an established presence in Malacca since 1641. Many other Dutch companies, as ABN-AMRO Bank.

Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever, have had a relationship with the country tor more than a century. The development

of Malaysia can also be read through its trade and investment relations. 50 years ago, Malaysia was primarily

an exporter of primary goods such as tin and rubber and imported Dutch finished products. Nowadays not only

is Malaysia also known as an important exporter of electronic products and palm oil, but it also has become a

major investor in the Netherlands. The relations thus matured to the benefit of both countries. The Netherlands

is Malaysia's second largest trading partner within the European Union (EU). In 2006 Malaysian experts to the

Netherlands (mostly electronic goods, palm oil and timber) were about 6.3 times greater than its imports (mostly

chemica! products, machines and transport equipment and electronic goods). The Netherlands was the second

largest investor in Malaysia in 2006.

Relations in other fields, such as culture and education, have developed as well. An important context tor these are

the EU-ASEAN and ASEM structured meetings, through which frequent interaction takes place, at the EU-ASEAN

Summits, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASIA Europe Meeting and ASEM interfaith dialogue.

Although the relationship is thriving, there is still a lot more to be done. Preparing for the celebration of 50 years

of diplomatie relations, we found out that The Netherlands and the Dutch are relatively unknown to average

Malaysians. People think mainly about a friendly country with windmills and tulips. This is the reason why the

Netherlands Embassy is werking together with the Malaysian Dutch Business Council and Dutch companies in

Malaysia to promote the Netherlands and Dutch products. with our motto 'Holland, More than tulips'. From our

side it is positive to note that ever-increasing numbers of Dutch tourists are getting to know Malaysia every year.

All of this is indeed promising for the future of the relations between the two countries.

Lody Embrechts

Ambassador

5

INTRODUCTION In late April 2006, in the lead-up to the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Malaysia's independence. a Malaysian

journalist asked the Ambassador of the Netherlands to Malaysia, Lody Embrechts. what he thought had been the

high points of bilateral relations between their two countries. Embrechts referred to the Dutch East India Company

and toa recent visit by the Prime Minister of Malaysia to the Netherlands. probably a personal highlight: "Did you

know that the first oil palms were tour seedlings introduced by the Dutch? Definitely, a high point was the vis t of

H.E. Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, to the Netherlands in May 2005."' Embrechts' response encompasses all

the elements featured in the account you are about to read: relations based on trade in the form of the introduction

of the oil palm by the Dutch East India Company, common elements in the culture and history of Malaysia and the

Netherlands in the early modern era. and personal relations between individuals in high office.

There are few other countries with which Malaysia has had such prolonged and virtually uninterrupted bilateral

relations. Relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands date trom the same period as those between the

Netherlands and what is now the lndonesian archipelago: the first treaty that the Dutch East India Company

concluded on behalf of the Dutch state with a hereditary ruler of part of present-day Malaysia was signed in 1 603.

The city of Melaka was seized by the Company from the Portuguese in 1641 and was to remain in Dutch hands right

through to 1824. When the Federation of Malaya was formed. this history was to influence its political boundaries.2

For the Dutch East India Company, Melaka was a good base from which to control shipping through the Malacca

Straits. lt also became the entrepöt for goods produced in the surrounding area, such as tin trom Perak. In 1 795

Malacca was occupied by the British and in 1824 it became a British territory. All the British territories in the area

- Penang, Wellesley, Malacca and Singapore - were placed under a single collective administration and became

a crown colony known as the Straits Settlements. The administrative centre of the colony was initially located in

Penang but soon moved to Singapore, when that settlement emerged as the fastest growing urban area. In the

nineteenth century, the area experienced rapid economie growth. lnfrastructure was developed, 50% of all the

world's tin carne to be produced there and the rubber industry also became an extremely profltable part of the

local economy. This rapid economie growth attracted a flood of immigrants, for example trom China and India. The

resulting immigrant communities preserved their own cultural traditions and customs intact, without creating any

local hybrid culture. In this respect, the country was unique.

Malaysia gained its indeoendence in 1957 and official relations between the state of Malaysia and the state of the

Netherlands date trom that time. What were the nature and purpose of these relations, and how should they be

seen in their historica! context. in particular in relation to developments in Malaysia and the Netherlands?

In this account, the name 'Malaysia' is used to denote the present-day country. This did not come into being

until 1 965. after the fermer British colony of Singapore joined the Federation of Malaya in 1 963. At that time,

it was decided to change the name of the federation to Malaysia. Even though Singapore decided to leave the

federauon again in 1965. the name 'Malaysia' continued to be used after its secession. In this account, therefore,

the name 'Malaya' is used to denote the country prior to 1 963 (the area now known as West Malaysia or Peninsula

Malaysia; North Borneo was not part of the present state). The name 'Malacca' is used to denote the area known

to the British under that name and to the Dutch as 'Malakka'. This is the peninsula on which the city of Malacca

(now known as 'Melaka', and cal led by that name in this account) is situated. In present-day Malaysia, the name

'Malacca' denotes a federal state.

In addition, a distinction is drawn between 'Malaysians' and 'Malays', and between the rwo adjectives 'Malay' and

'Malaysian'. The term 'Malaysians' embraces all the ethnic groups resident in Malaysia, while the term 'Malays'

denotes one particular ethnicity. Accordingly, the adjective 'Malay' refers only to that ethnicity, while the adjective

'Malaysian' refers to the entire nation.

7

1. THE EARLV VEARS 1957-1965 The basis f or f uture decades of bilateral relations between

The Netherlands and Malaysia

1.1. THE LEAD-UP TO INDEPENDENCE IN 1957

After 1945. the process of decolonisation got under way swittly in Asia and proceeded relatively fast. Britain took

the lead, proving to have little difficulty in surrendering power via the transitional stage of 'dominion' status. By

1951, the British colonies were already sovereign states within the British Commonwealth. This made the move

to complete independence less traumatic. In 1 94 7, India (then comprising the entire territory of present-day India

and Pakistan) and Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) became independent. Burma followed in 1948 and the Malacca

peninsula was expected to do likewise in the near future. In 1948. British officials worked with the rulers of the

Malay states and the leaders of the nationalist party known as the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)

to design a framework for a modern style of government and citizenship. All three parties agreed that the new

Federation of Malaya should comprise nine Malay states and the British settlements of Malacca and Penang. The

main emphasis was on interracial cooperation, unity and harmony between the various ethnicities in the country.

Malaya had an extremely diverse population: by 1957 the country had a population of 5.2 million, including 2.2

million Malays and other 'indigenous' peoples and 3 million non-Malays, such as lndians and Ch inese.3 lt was

decided that the indigenous inhabitants of the country (the Malays) should enjoy a 'special position', that each of

the states should retain sovereignty and that Malay should be the national language and Islam the religion of the

new Federation. In 1948, however, an anti-colonial insurgency was mounted by Communist sympathisers in the

Chinese community and Britain feit it necessary to suspend moves towards independence until the insurgency

had been put down and relations between the Malay and Chinese communities had recovered. lt was not until

1953 that the Communist guerrillas had been truly suppressed. The first elections were held in 1 955 and were

won by a coalition of three politica! parties. each with a different ethnic background: UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese

Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress Association (MICA). In 1951 Tunku Abdul Rahman (or 'the

Tunku'. as he was called in official Dutch and Malays1an documents. 'Tunku' being his princely t1tle in Malay)

became the public face of the alliance and following independence the country's first prime minister.• The date for

independence was chosen in cooperation with Britain. On 31 August 1957, the new nation state of the Federation

of Malaya was born, although it remained a member of the British Commonwealth.

8

Throughout the 1950s, Dutch foreign policies were characterised by a certain ambivalence. The Netherlands

was updating its relations w1th ether countries but there was still a streng undercurrent of colonialist feeling.5 In

September 1952, Joseph Luns and Jan Willem Beyen were jointly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. although

the former was a minister without portfolio. In practice, Beyen became responsible primarily for multilateral and

European relations, while Luns took care of bilateral relations and affairs outside Europe.6 Beyen remained in

post until 1956. With its partly colonial and partly modern liberal attitude. the Netherlands had mixed feelings

about Malayan independence. At the independence ceremony on 31 August 1957, the Dutch government was

represented by its new Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Count W.F. L. van Bylandt. He had come

over from Jakana, where he had served as ambassador until the previous year. On behalf of the Netherlands, he

recogn1sed Malaya as an independent state within the British Commonwealth. This made the Netherlands one of

the first countries to recognise Malaya. On 1 7 September, the country became a member of the United Nations,

indirectly implying that it had become an internationally recognised nation state.

1.2. THE BASIS FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND MALAVA

The Netherlands had had contacts with the Malay Peninsula long before the British colony gained its independence.

Malacca was a Dutch possession until 1824 and the Dutch colonies in the East lndies were very close by: it is

less than 80 ki lome tres bet ween Sumatra and Melaka. Prior to 1957, Dutch trade with Malaya consisted mainly of

the distribution of Dutch goeds in the lndonesian territories of the Riau archipelago. Sumatra and Borneo. Politica!

and commercial contacts continued following lndonesian independence in 1945 and increased after the end of

the Second World War. Even so. contacts between Malaya and the Netherlands during this period were inspired

principally by the Netherlands' relationship with its former cofony. Shortly after the War, the Netherlands had set up

a consulate in Singapore. In the late fifties, Sukarno's anti-Dutch policies drove a number of Dutch citizens to leave

lndonesia and seek refuge in Singapore, where the consulate-general found them hotel accommodation.

Through to the late sixties and early seventies, Dutch imports from Malaysia continued to consist mainly of the

raw rubber, oil seeds and tin that the country had been importing from the area for the past three hundred years.

Only a handful of Dutch entrepreneurs visited the country and they were mainly representatives of major concerns

like Shell. Unilever. the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPMJ shipping company and Philips. In the immediate

post-war years. the location of Malaya in relation to Dutch interests in lndonesia was still extremely important. In

the face of the Sukarno regime's anti-Outch policies of the fifties, trading companies based in Jakarta moved their

headquarters to Malaya.7 In March 1948, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines introduced fortnightly flights between Penang

and Medan on Sumatra and opened an office in Penang to administer them.8 In 1949, partly due to developments in

View of Melaka by Johannes Vingboons. A reproduction of the same watercolour was presented by the Netherlands to

Ma/aysia. Johannes Vingboos. circa 1665. Watercolour; 44 x 96 cm. Source: Atlas Mutual Hentage.

9

lndonesia, the small Dutch community of around a hundred people started to expand as ever more Dutch nationals

arrived to work. for example, in the rubber trade and toa lesser extent in the tin-mining industry.9 There was already

an active Dutch social club in Kuala Lumpur to serve the original community.

For decades, Malaya had been the most profitable of Britain's colonies. lt was a major supplier of commodities

like tin and tropical cash crops. lt offered the West good investment opportunities and an export market for

manufactured products. The success of former colonies like Malaya was due in part to Britain's efforts to modernise

their technological bases in the past and to build an efficient infrastructure to meet its own needs and those

of the international market.10 Malaya's success continued to depend heavily on the global economy. Following

independence, the country had to maintain its impetus without outside assistance. That it was able to do so was

due to the Tunku's ambition to modernise the country. Malaya's foreign policies were initially inspired by the fear

of Communism and a certain distrust of the West and of efforts to promote trade. Malaya was not pleased by the

way US businessmen took decisions about experiments with synthetic rubber or tin and the sale of commodities

like tin and rubber without considering the interests of Malaya itself. Accordingly, Malaya's foreign policy attitude

towards the West was somewhat hesitant and suspicious.

In 1 957, the Netherlands expected Malaya to cease viewing the Netherlands primarily as a colonial power and to

see it as 'a country that is organisationally, technologically and administratively highly developed and that would

therefore be in a position to assist the Federation in its economie development' .11 And Malaya did indeed seek to

draw on Dutch technica! expertise, although the image of the Netherlands as a colonial power was to suNive in the

country's politica! rhetoric for many more years.

This reputation was not to the Netherlands' advantage at a time when i t was becoming evident that the independent

Asian countries intended to form a new power bloc on the global politica! scene and that Western nations would

have to take account of their potential influence. Moreover, the Netherlands was keen to provide support in the

form of development assistance for Malaya's growing economy. This. alter all, was a time when development

assistance was seen in part as an antidote to Communism, and in 1954 the battle against Communism was the

main reason for Dutch development assistance. And Malaya had proved particularly susceptible to Communism. as

witness the Communist guerrilla insurgency against British colonial rule in the late forties and early fifties. In fact,

this was probably why the Netherlands was so quick to recognise Malaya as an independent nation state and so

keen to assist the country thereafter.

Shortly after independence. ten wholly or partially Dutch-owned companies were based in Malaya, most of them

pursuing activities directed towards lndonesia. Examples included Van Lee r's steel drum factory, trading companies

like the Borneo Sumatra Handel-Maatschappij. the Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij and LE. Tels & Co's Trading

Society, and the KPM shipping company.12 During the late fifties. there was increasing Dutch business interest in

Malaya, 13 probably due in part to the dwindling of the lndonesian market tor trade goeds and investment. By 1965

the number of wholly or partially Dutch-owned companies had increased to nineteen and the number of Dutch

nationals resident in Malaya totalled 440.14 There was fierce local competition within Malaya; Dutch entrepreneurs

had to rely on the good reputation of Dutch products as regards quality and on the attractive packaging of their

products.1s The best-selling Dutch products in Malaya tended to come from distinguished companies like Erres

Radios (which merged with Philips in the sixties). Verkade (biscuits and confectionary), Van Houten Cacao (cocoa).

Van Melle (biscuits and confectionary} and Friesche Vlag (milk products).

After independence, the Tunku was keen to achieve the economie and social development of the country. The

Tunku improved the country's already good infrastructure. realising that this was a necessary precondition lor

economie growth. At that time, the airport at �uala Lumpur was not designed to accommodate heavy air traffic.

lf Malaya was to keep up with advances in aviation and reap the associated economie benefits, it needed to be

transformed into an international airport. To gather information and ideas. the Tunku was keen to visit Schiphol

airport and Fokker in the course of 1960.16 The Netherlands had started negotiating an aviation agreement with

Malaya as soon as the country's forthcoming independence was announced. The negotiations proved difficult,

but in April 1958 the Netherlands signed an agreement with Malaya giving KLM the right to make a stop-over i n

10

Kuala Lumpur once a week. The Netherlands emphasised the many potential economie benef1ts of the agreement

to Malaya: more tourism. more jobs. a higher income from taxes like landing lees and fuel charges, etc. On 21

April 1959, the first scheduled flight on KLM's new Singapore - Kuala Lumpur - Amsterdam route landed at Kuala

Lumpur. Over the years, these rights were constantly extended: in 1960, KLM obtained landing rights lor a new

route to Kuala Lumpur itself17 and in 1963 it was granted rights lor a weekly seNice to the city.18

Film star Orchid Wong visited Amsterdam in ear/y 1961 to

publicise the introduction of a scheduled jet seNice from

Amsterdam to Singapore. Source: Dutch National Archives,

The Hague. Anefo Collection, photographer: E. J. Anefo, 6 January 1961. 911.9486.

For the Dutch aviation industry, however, Malaya was not

an end in itself. lt was merely a stopping-off point on the

way to the ultimate destination: lndonesia. During the

period around 1 963, the issue of landing rights at Singapore

likewise revolved principally about the expansion of air

links to Jakarta.19 When Sukarno denied KLM landing

rights at Jakarta as part of the anti-Dutch measures he was

introducing around this time. the Netherlands responded

by signing aviation agreements with Malaya just before

the new nation gained its independence. These rights

have been of great significa nee in the history of diplomatie

relations between the Netherlands and Malaya. The

interests of aviation companies are first and loremost

economie in nature and to pursue them companies have

to obtain landing rights in countries. Whether they do so

in a particular country depends to a great extent on the

goodwill that exists between nations. So relations in

the aviation world are closely linked to general politica!

relations and commercial interests. For this reason.

aviation policies are often regarded as a barometer of

genera! bilateral relations.20 The fact that the Netherlands

was one of the first countries to be granted landing rights

i n Malaya is therefore a good indication of the friendly

relations between the two countries. However. KLM did

not immediately exercise the rights it had acquired. The

reason lor this was that its scheduled flights could not physically land at Kuala Lumpur. In 1960. KLM had begun

using its first jet airliner, the DC-8, and the runway at Kuala Lumpur's old airport was too short to land aircraft of that

type. The new service was therelore suspended between 1961 and the opening of the new airport By contrast,

the airport at Singapore was big enough to accommodate even the latest airliners. Glamorous film stars trom the

city were used to publicise the new seNice in the Netherlands. In Malaya, a new airport called lor new aircraft

and in the early sixties the country ordered them from Fokker: in 1 963 Malaysian AirlinesA took delivery of five

new Fokker Friendships. The landing rights granted to KLM in Malaya and the approaches made by the country to

the Netherlands with the intention of improving its technological knowledge base show the warmth of relations

between the two countries right trom the start.

"Today's Malaysia Airlines and Singapore Airlines are both descended trom a single forerunner: Malayan Airways Limited,

established in 1937. In 1947 this airline started running flights from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur, lpoh and Penang. In 1963. following the birth of the new state of Malaysia, the name of the company was changed to Malaysian Airlines Limited. When

Singapore seceded from the rest of Malaysia. the governments of Malaysia en Singapore continued to be major shareholders in the company. Accordingly, Malaysian Airlines continued under the name of Malaysia-Singapore Airlines, but in 1971, when that

contract was broken too. the two states reverted to running their own separate airlines: Singapore Airlines and Malaysian Airlines

System Berhad.

11

1. 3. DUTCH DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN A FLEDGLING STATE

The friendly relations between the two countries were reflected in the establishment of a Dutch legation 1n the

new state. On 14 August 1957, a Royal Decree established a Dutch legation in the newly independent state. based

in Kuala Lumpur. Previously, there had been only a consulate, established shortly after the Second World War in

Singapore. That consulate continued to exist and to serve Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo.

The earlier honorary consulate in Kuala Lumpur was closed on independence and replaced by the legation.21 From

1957 to 1959, Markus J. Rosenberg Polak represented the Netherlands in Kuala Lumpur as chargé d'affaires ad

interim with the mie of 'legation counsellor'. When the separate consulate in Saigon was closed down, he also

became chargé d'affaires tor the non-Communist state of South Vietnam. He arrived in Kuala Lumpur in mid­

August 1 957, flying in and leavmg his wife to follow on by boat with their tour children and a domestic help.22

He was welcomed to the new state of Malaya by Consul Genera! Duco Middelburg, who had been in post in

Singapore since 1954 and who spoke the following words:

'Firstly. I would like to congrawlate you on your appoincment in Kuala Lumpur. Fora politica/ obseNer, it is most

interesting co follow current developmencs in Southeast Asia. I am sure that you wil/ enjoy your new job. Apart

from chat. Kuala Lumpur is an agreeable place to live. perhaps rather hot during the day but generally delightfully

coo l after sunset. lt is rather quieter and more rural than the densely populated city of Singapore and certainly not

insalubrious. Life here is especia//y nice for small children, better than in Europe. '23

Middelburg suggested a list of things that Rosenberg Polak should bring with him from the Netherlands: a head of

chancery, two secretaries, encryption material, an escutcheon bearing the coat of arms of the Netherlands. a set

of reference books, office equipment, stationery and place settings tor eighteen

Dutchman tor KL legadon

MR. Marltus Rosenberi Polak, the charce d'llJ!altea­deslgnate Of the ruture Ne­therlaods leKatlon at Kua­la Lumpur, who arrived In Singapore by Kl.111 yester­day.

He wlll ltaYe tor Kuala Lumpur on Tbursday wlth Count WUlem F. L. �-an By­landt, the �ethcrlands s�­clal ambassador to the mer­dek.a celebrations. wbo is expected to reach Siniapore on Tuesday.

Source: The Sunday Times

August 25 1957

people.24 Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague proved to

have addressed the question with less zeal. Middelburg had known about the

country's torthcoming independence a year in advance and had immediately

advised the ministry to set up and equip a new mission in Kuala Lumpur. His

pleas feil on deaf ears and in the summer of 1 957 the ministry proved to have

done nothing concrete. On 20 June 1 956, Middelburg had asked the ministry

tor permission to produce a provisional plan tor the accommodation of the

Dutch mission in Kuala Lumpur; it was not until a year later, on 2 July 1 957, that

permission was eventually granted. As early as February 1957. Middelburg had

toreseen that the fledgling state would be unable to cope with the growth in the

government apparatus and the invasion of toreign diplomatie missions. He feared

a lack of suitable accommodation and asked the Ministry - in vain - to look into

potential premises.25 In July 1957, six weeks prior to independence, his worst

fears were confirmed when it emerged that no premises were available within

the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The envoys of countries like France,

Great Bntain. the United States and lndonesia had snapped up premises tor their

missions in the new state. They had had more choice, because they generally

had more money to spend and greater power to act. The government intended to

build a new diplomatie quarter, but by August 1 957 the land designated tor it was

not even ready tor development.26

Eventually, Rosenberg Polak tound room tor the legation at the Federal Hotel,

on what is now the Jalan Bukit Bintang in Kuala Lumpur. But his problems were

not at an end. The chancery was seriously understaffed and developments in

lndonesia were creating extra work for it. In February 1 956, lndonesia seceded

trom the federal union with the Netherlands and the following year it started

taking far-reaching economie measures against the Netherlands because of

1 2

its posit1on in the conflict concerning New Guinea. There

were strikes in Dutch-owned businesses, lndonesia banned

impons of Dutch goods, Dutch nationals were expelled trom

the country and Dutch companies were expropriated and

eventually nationalised. Comb1ned with its understaffing,

these developments placed the Dutch chancery in Kuala

Lumpur under great pressure. Rosenberg Polak complained

that he was having constantly to juggle his priorities. so that

the 1957 annual report could not be completed until March

1 958. Despite the serious understaffing of the chancery,

Rosenberg Polak tool< on no new staff lor the first few

months because he feared the effect of hiring an additional

(expensive) hotel room both on his budget and on security.

In late February 1 958, however. he feit compelled to take

on an extra employee. because existing staff members

were snowed under with administrative work and serious

backlogs were building up.27 In 1959, Rosenberg Polak was

transferred to Nigeria and succeeded by a new ambassador,

Dr Robert Hans van Gulik, and in May 1 960 it was decided

to make the mission an embassy.

Malaya was Van Gulik's second posting as an ambassador.

From 1956 to 1959 he had been Minister Plenipotentiary in

war-torn Beirut. prior to which he had worked as a diplomat

The first representative of the Netherlands in the new/y

independent state of Malaya: Markus J. Rosenberg Polak

was Chargé d'Affaires ad interim from 1957 to 1959.

in various missions in places as diverse as China, India, Source. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Washington and Japan. Van Gulik had a great interest in

Chinese language and culture. He held a doctorate in the field and wrote books on 1t. To the genera! public.

however. he was better known for his Judge Dee novels. In Kuala Lumpur. he taught at the university and became

fascinated by the gibbons. never tiring of observing these intelligent anthropoid apes as they swung through the

tal! trees in the garden of his residence.

lnstead of Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Van Gulik was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary

(the dtfference being that. whereas the job of a chargé d'affaires is officially to represent the Minister of Foreign

Affairs in a foreign country, that of the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary is to represent the Dutch

head of state in dealings with another head of state. In 1960 he was even promoted to the rank of ambassador

(whose task is likewise to represent the head of state in dealings with another head of state. but in a far more

personal way). This ïnflation' in diplomatie ranks reflected a worldwide trend in diplomatie circles immediately after

the Second World War. The lateness of its arrival in Malaya was no doubt connected with the late date at which the

country achieved independence and the relative importance of the country in contemporary international relations.

1.4. A NEW PHASE I N THE NETHERLANDS AND MALAYA RELATIONS

In 1960 it was decided that both the Netherlands and Malaya should upgrade their representations to embassies.

trade between the two countries was even expected to expand. Dutch experts were still being hired in, tor example

in relation to the expansion of the harbour at Port Swettenham (nowadays called Pon Klang).

The island of Borneo was divided into tour separate states: the lndonesian province of Kalimantan in the south, the

Sultanate of Brunei in the north and the two British colonies of Sarawak and British North Borneo, later to become

known as Sabah. Malaya, supported by Britain, was trying to bring Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah within the Federation

of Malaya. while the Philippines were also claiming Sabah tor themselves. Sukarno had always observed and

sought to maintain the Dutch 'colonial' borders of the lndonesian arch1pelago: that was the reason tor the conflict

13

Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysian Prime Minister from

1957 to 1970, photographed on 8 January 1965. Source:

Outch National Archives, The Hague, Anefo Collection,

phorographer: Evers J. Anefo, 1965. 917-3202.

with the Netherlands over New Guinea and why Sukarno

had refrained trom annexing territories like East Timor.

Sukarno's policy of confrontation distracted attention from

the internal problems of lndonesia. However, what is certain

is that he feit both politically and economically threatened by

the prospect of areas in northern Borneo becoming part of

Malaya with British support. Sukarno would have preferred

to see the emergence of a fiercely anti-imperialist, anti­

colonial state that could be an ally to lndonesia. Accordingly,

lndonesia resorted to a policy of aggressive opposition

known as Konfrontasi (Confrontation).

Until December 1 962, lndonesia's resentment against

Malaya remained confined to oral criticism and a degree

of communication remained possible between the two

countries. Therewas some improvement in relations between

lndonesia and Malaya in the course of 1960. Sukarno stated

explicitly that he did not intend to make any claim on British

North Borneo. According to the Dutch reports, the Tunku

responded to this by immediately abandoning his attempts

to mediate between the Netherlands and lndonesia on the

issue of New Guinea and actually getting the Malaysian

delegation to vote against the Dutch proposal in the UN. The

annual report of the Dutch embassy in Kuala Lumpur added

that it was unclear whether there was any causa! connection

between the two.28

After these events, however, tension between Malaya and lndonesia escalated between 1962 and 1 966. lndonesia's

attitude to Malaya became increasingly hostile, so that trom the late fifties to 1962 both the Netherlands (because

of New Guinea) and Malaya were in a state of virtual warfare with lndonesia. In 1 963 Foreign Minister Joseph Luns

restored friendly relations with lndonesia and the two countries signed an agreement. Commercial relations were

restored and even stepped up, even though virtually all the Dutch companies in lndonesia had been nationalised

since 1 958. The Netherlands also provided economie assistance for lndonesia. primarily in the form of orders from

DAF. Malaya was naw once again ideally located to serve as a base for Dutch attempts to export to lndonesia.

Major flows of trade resulted. although - for reasons which are naw unclear - a large proportion of them were

described in 1963 as 'shady'. These practices with lndonesia and the major drop in experts gave rise to discontent

in Malaya.

In May 1 963 the tensions between Malaya and lndonesia seemed to be approaching resolution when Abdul

Rahman and Sukarno met in Tokyo and decided to suspend hostilities. The following July, however. the treaty was

signed creating the new independent state of Malaysia (including Singapore). lndonesia regarded this as a violation

of its agreement with Malaya. The United Nations. alarmed by lndonesia's aggressive attitude. saw the restored

relations between lndonesia and the Netherlands as an opportunity to ask the Netherlands to mediate in the

conflict between lndonesia and Malaysia. Luns demurred. saying that he saw no immediate possibility of this.29 He

was afraid of jeopardising the Netherlands' newly restored friendship with lndonesia and its commercial relations

with Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover. there were other, lslamic and non-European, countries which were in a

better position to act as a mediator or 'middlernan'.30 In lndonesia, however. there was enthusiasm for the idea

that Luns should mediate between h and Britain since talks between the two countries had reached an impasse.

Accordingly, lndonesia's Foreign Minister, Subandrio. explicitly requested Luns· help, insisting that the Netherlands

need not take sides but could remain a neutra! party in the conflict.31 Eventually, in January 1966, Luns allowed

himself to be persuaded and proceeded to act, not so much as a mediator, but as an intermediary, 32 although by

mid-April of that year it even looked as though Luns was going to mediate between the two states.33

1 4

The Konfrontasi damaged the Malaysian economy, and especially that of Singapore, which had only just joined the

Federation that year. Although its main impact was on the lndonesian economy itself, Malaysian imports declined

by 28% and experts by 30% in the first six months of 1964.34 That year. Singapore's Minister of Finance issued

a powerful warning that any country that '(would] assist lndonesia in the economie confrontation of Malaysia'

would run the risk of being excluded from the Singaporean market. In Singapore there were fears that Dutch and

other support would enable lndonesia to exclude Singapore from trade between it and the rest of the world. The

Malaysian threats caused serieus anxiety in the Dutch business community in Singapore:

'Business people who have visited the {Outch/ Embassy since then have se/dom failed to plead their own cause

by pointing out that it would be unwise to sacrifice trade between the Netherlands and Ma/aysia, however modest

it may be in the context of total Dutch exports, in favour of the profits to be gained trom economie transactions

between the Netherlands and the bankrupt Republic of lndonesia. '3s

lndeed, Dutch commercial interests in Malaysia were hit by measures taken by the government of Singapore,

where 'feelings of rancour and resentment' had the upper hand. According to the Dutch, these measures were

dictated by the 'extreme nervousness and hypersensitivity'36 that dominated the mood in Singapore especially

and communicated itself to the rest of Malaysia: Dutch goods were henceforth to be subject to import licences

for Singapore.37 Relations between the two countries were further disrupted by a number of minor upsets in

bilateral relations. lt became known. tor example. that the Dutch delegation to the 'World Assembly of Youth' had

abstained from voting on Malaysia's admission to the organisation.38 Accordingly, the Dutch business community

in Malaysia gave an enthusiastic welcome to the initiative taken by an Amsterdam man called A.F.C. Wiesinger

to set up a 'Malaysia Fund' to allay the suffering demonstrably being caused by the Konfrontasi to sections of

the Malaysian population.39 Wiesinger was a former Financial Secretary of Netherlands New Guinea and in that

capacity had probably experienced the ill effects of lndonesian politica! game-playing in the sixties. Various initiatives

were launched to restore good relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands, most of them generated by the

business community and the Dutch embassy in Malaysia. The Dutch business community in Singapore pleaded for

a five-year credit to be granted to Singapore and another contemporary initiative concerning the donation of period

books to the Kuala Lumpur-based National Archives of Malaysia led the current ambassador. L. Kruytbosch, to

sigh, ' I hope it will gain official approval, because we can certainly do with some positive publicity'.'0 In 1964, there

was little sympathy for the Dutch position when the Netherlands refrained trom congratulating Malaysia on the

anniversary of its independence on the grounds that the queen had already congratulated Malaysia once that year

and never congratulated a country twice in the same year. The Dutch business community was incensed by the

obstinacy shown on this occasion, considering that 'in respecting lndonesian hypersensitivities there is no need to

tread on the Malaysians' toes'.41 Summit meetings between Malaysia. lndonesia and the Philippines in the winter

and summer of that year proved fruitless. The Konfrontasi continued.

Relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia were dominated by Dutch commercial interests. During the

1960s, the Netherlands began to give more substantial tinancial assistance to 'developing countries':2 lt was only

after 1 963 that development aid became less colonial in nature and more independent of direct economie benefits.

Under B.J. Udink as Minister for Development Cooperation, the work expanded enormously!3 Post-independence

Malaysia was still regarded as a developing country and voices were raised in the Netherlands in favour of granting

credit to Malaysia. a move that was expected to benefit Dutch exports to the country."" Between 1 960 and 1963,

the Netherlands sent twelve technica! experts to Malaysia as pan of the UN Technica! Assistance Programme and

awarded twelve research grants. Because of Malaysia's membership of the Colombo Plan, the appointment of the

Dutch expert on ports and dredging proved to be relatively cheap for the Netherlands. The Colombo Plan was an

organisation set up in 1950 to promote the social and economie development of countries in Asia and the Pacific

reg ion.

1 5

1.5 . CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MALAVSIA AND

THE NETHERLANDS BASED ON A CHERISHED COMMON HERITAGE

Cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands were based primarily on the two countries' shared

history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and expanded steadily following independence. Malaya was

unembarrassed about showcasing its Dutch and British past. The British High Commissioner for Malaya between

1 952 and 1 954, Genera! Sir Gerald Templer, had established a museum in a small but elegant Dutch colonial house

with a view of the sea. In 1 958 the Netherlands donated to it a copy of a watercolour sketch by Johannes Vingboons,

showing a view of Melaka shortly after the city's capture by the Dutch East India Company. Rosenberg Polak was

delighted with Malaysia's efforts to preseNe and restore the surviving reminders of the Dutch presence in Melaka.

He saw them as presenting opportunities for strengthening the relationship between the two countries:

'/t appears to me that the aim of preserving and maintaining all these reminders of the Outch period in Malacca is

worthy of support. Ouite apart trom that, moreover, it seems to me that it would be good for relations between the

Netherlands and the f/edgling Federation of Ma/aya if the Netherlands were to show itself ready to offer a he/ping

hand in expanding the museum 's collection. '45

What Rosenberg Polak had in mind was gifts trom the Dutch government sector and trom private donors in

the Netherlands, such as commercial companies. He also thought it might be possible tor the little museum

in Malaya to be sent objects on loan trom Dutch museums. Dutch willingness to support the museum was

further increased by the actions of Aerdenhout journalist W.L. Brugsma: following a visit to the museum

in Malaysia, he wrote a number of articles about it tor Dutch newspapers.46 Around this time, the forts

built by the Dutch East India Company in the early modern period were also starting to attract interest

in the Netherlands and Malaysia. An employee of the Dutch National Archives in The Hague, Mrs MAP.

Meilink-Roelofsz. conducted a detailed study of Fort Dingding on the island of Pangkor and the results were

forwarded to Malaysia for use in the conservation and restoration of the buildings.47

The Netherlands was also keen to introduce the population of Malaysia to contemporary Dutch culture as a

way of increasing their gene ral interest in the country. Exhibitions we re held on Dutch subjects, usually with

the support of the Dutch embassy in Kuala Lumpur. For example, an exhibition of Dutch graphic art in 1961

attracted many schools and a Frans Hals exhibition in 1 962 was well-visited by the standards of the country.

Sometimes the diplomatie network was also set to work tor charitable purposes. In October 1 958, a show of

folk costumes was held to raise money tor a leper colony. The Malaysian organisers asked the Netherlands to

provide a 'typical' Dutch folk costume for this purpose, but this proved difficult to arrange. Since the costume

was needed at very short notice, Rosenberg Polak asked for an example of female folk costume trom the

village of Arnemuiden in Zeeland to be flown out urgently to Malaya in the diplomatie bag.43

16

2.THE PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION 1965-1976 The emergence of Malaysia as a political player on the world scene

2.1. IMPROVING TRADE RELATIONS

Singapore's worst fears were to some extent realised: i n 1965 a proportion of the Netherlands' exports to lndonesia

were transported directly to Jakarta, and no Jonger via Singapore . The Konfrontasi was having an impact on trade

routes. Bul not all export products were affected in this way. Certain flows of goods were maintained or even

increased. This was especially true of organic chemica! products, cotton fabrics and goods for construction work.

In the course of the seventies, moreover, oil was discovered in Sarawak. Previously, the Netherlands had imported

lndonesian coffee, tea and rubber via Singapore; now it did so directly, because of the lndonesian trade measures.

Accordingly, Singapore sawa decline in trade in these products. Exports of some Dutch products to Singapore and

Malaysia also declined. As already mentioned, development assistance became less colonial in character and was

stepped up. During this period, technica! assistance was also provided. The Netherlands was more than willing

to offer it, in the hope that it would influence the attitude of Malaysia in faveur of the Netherlands. On 30 August

1965, the new airport in Subang was opened. Representatives of the Netherlands attended the opening because

Dutch experts had helped to develop the new facility. The Netherlands was sending experts to Malaysia on a fairly

regular basis: in 1 968, for example, they included a forestry expert, a doctor and a manager.49

At first sight, Malaysia appeared to offer the West better opportunities than any other country in Asia. lt was

thriving economically, not a dictatorship and governed by a conseNative but pro-Western elite. To escape its

economie dependence on the export of tin, Malaysia was trying to promote the cultivation of export crops, reduce

food imports and improve its balance of trade. The country's first economie plan, produced in December 1 965,

focused on expanding industry through the involvement of foreign technica! expertise and financial assistance.50 To

attract foreign investment, a law entered into force in 1 968 offering favourable fiscal conditions. Two years later a

free trade zone was established.51 From the sixties onward, the Netherlands - like many other Western countries

- had great confidence in Malaysia, especially because of the country's politica! stability, and financial and technica!

assistance flowed in. In the course of the decade the Netherlands sought to forge closer economie ties with the

country. Malaysia had much to offer the Dutch economy and the Netherlands was keen to invest in the country

before competitor nations like France and Germany got in on the act. In the mid-sixties, therefore, the Netherlands

established a 'Country Desk' and a local office of the Malaysia Division to promote economie relations between the

1 7

Malaysian Deputy Prime Mimsrer Tun Abdul Razak and his wife Tun Rahah

Tan Sri Noah vis1ting Oueen Juliana and Prince Bernhard. Source: Dutch

National Archives. The Hague. Anefo Col/ection, photo-graphers: E.J.

Anefo and Kroon, 1968 921.3543.

two countries.52 In addition, the Chamber of

States launched a plan to hold a Dutch week

as well as a French and an Australian week

in Kuala Lumpur's Weid Supermarket.53 With

all th1s going on, news of a forthcoming

Malaysian trade mission to Europe and

the United States (including a brief visit to

the Netherlandsl was warmly welcomed.

However. as the director of the Economie

Information Service (EVD) stressed to the

Dutch Ambassador to Malaysia. it was

important to avoid giving the impression

that the Netherlands was inviting the

(probably large) delegation. because then

the Netherlands would have to meet its

subsistence costs and that was not such a

welcome idea.54

Between 1 3 and 1 6 May 1968, the Deputy

Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak,

visited the Netherlands with his wife and

children. Even though it was a private visit,

the Malaysian embassy in the Netherlands decided to become involved. Joseph Luns, as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

rece1ved Razak. because the Prime Minister. Piet De Jong, was out of the country. The Office of Foreign Economie

Relations pointed out to Luns that Malaysia was particularly important toa number of Dutch companies. such

as Fokker. and suggested that the arrangements for the visit should take account of this. Accordingly, Luns took

Razak to visit places like the Fokker factories. the Verenigde Machine Fabrieken engine plants and the Werkspoor

museum of industrial history. However. the humanitarian and social side of Dutch life was also emphasised by a

visit to Het Dorp, a well-known model settlement for severely physically disabled people situated near Arnhem.

According to the Malaysian newspaper the Eastern Sun. Luns spoke about Razak and Malaysia in glowing terms:

Foreign Minister Joseph Luns meeting the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku

Abdul Aahman at Schiphol. 1968. Source: Dutch National Archives. The

Hague, Anefo Collection, 1968.

18

'The relations between our two countries

are of Jong standing and, I am pleased to

say, leave nothing to be desired. (". ) Our

long acquaintance which goes back to the

early 7 7'h een tury has fostered our friendship

and the way in which your Government

and people handle the problems with

which Malaysia has been and is confronted

since you became an independent nation is

admirable and has set an example for other

nations. 1ïs

The Sultan of Selangor. the Malaysian state

in which Kuala Lumpur is located, also

visited the Netherlands with his wife. His

visit prompted the Dutch embassy to take a

host of photographs, designed to enhance

the Netherlands' reputation in Malaysia.56

The ambassador saw a great future for

joint ventures and. at the announcement of

plans to construct a new airport in Penang,

Malaysian Sultan Aziz Shah and his wife visiting Oueen Juliana

at Soestdijk. 7 July 1965. Source: Dutch National Archtves, The

Hague. Elsevier Collection. photographer: E. J. Anefo / Ertc

Koch. 1965. 078-0794.

the Chief Minister8 of the state of Penang made a plea

for KLM to land there weekly. The granting of landing

rights is. as we have seen earlier. an indication of the

friendly relations between the two countries.

Although Asia was becoming popular among Western

1nvestors at this time because of the rapid expansion

occurring in some Asian economies. Malaysia was

still being virtually ignored. The country was looking

for foreign investors. Despite their apparent common

interests. an initia! Dutch attempt at rapprochement

had proved fruitless. In 1 966, however. the Malaysian

Minister of Economie Affairs visited the Netherlands and

in July 1969 there was personal contact between the

Malaysian Minister of Trade and lndustry and a Director­

General from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to

discuss cooperation.57 The Netherlands was offering

Malaysia relatively little bilateral assistance compared

with what it was giving to lndonesia. Help in the form of experts was coming as a result of Malaysia's membership

of the Colombo Plan organisation (established in May 1 950 with a view to achieving social development through

international assistance). In addition, Malaysia was benef1ting trom Dutch multilateral assistance via ECAFE

(Economie Commissions for Asia and the Far Eastl and the Asian Deve!opment Bank. Major bilateral assistance

was not available, because Malaysia was not on the Netherlands' list of programme countries.c lndonesia was on

the list and was receiving a great deal of assistance. despite controversy surrounding the fact in the Netherlands.

This situation was obseNed by Malaysia with a degree of pique. given the tendency of the country to compare 1ts

situation with that of lndonesia,58 and was hard for Dutch diplomats to explain.

Malaysian Minister of Economie Affairs Lee Swee Aun arriving ar Schiphol

in June 1966. Source: Dutch National Archives. The Hague. Anefo

Collect ion, photographer: E. J. Anefo. 29 June 1966. 919304 7.

8 All the federal states of Malaysia that are not kingdoms (i.e. Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak) have such 'chief ministers' (Ketua

MenteriJ.

c Programme countries were countries given extra help by the Dutch government. in the form of funding, campaigns. lobbying

or public education.

19

2.2. KONFRONTASI AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN FAVOUR OF MALAYS

Post-independence Malaysia faced a number of problems. From the start, the government was determined to

eradicate poverty among the 'indigenous native'0 population of the country. Between 1 966 and 1 970. it made the

first attempts to prornote development among the country's rural population by means of village schools, clinics

and irrigation schemes. The state also provided support tor Malays wishing to start up their own businesses. This

led many Chinese entrepreneurs to 'malayanise' their management in order to share the benefits on offer. During

the era of Konfrontasi. the country had been united by a feeling of 'us against them' (the common enemy being

lndonesia) but when hostilities died down the old ethnic tensions re-emerged. Malay had become the national

language at the time of independence but many Chinese and lndians rejected it. In July and August 1 964 there

were race riots in Singapore when Malays feared that the Chinese were going to deprive them of their politica!

dominance. Five years later. when the UMNO-led coalition suffered a major defeat in the 1969 elections and the

largely Chinese opposition parties won, the result was an outbreak of rioting and violence. Dutch nationals were

never a target of the unrest, although the lslamic community in Malaysia certainly made anti-Western noises. In

1 965, Singapore decided to give up its membership of the Federation of Malaysia after only two years and to go it

alone. Early that same year, the first Malaysian Ambassador to the Netherlands was appointed, based in Bonn. The

following year. an ambassador to the entire Benelux was appointed. this time based in The Hague.

The Konfrontasi continued at least until 1966. In October 1965, President Sukarno's entire top military echelon

was assassinated. The event marked the beginning of the Suharto regime and heralded the gradual end of the

Konfrontasi. Five months tater, however, lndonesia's perceived threat to Malaysia was still not entirely gone: in

March 1 966, the Malaysian ambassador could still say that, while he understood the Netherlands' wish - in view of

its history - to create closer economie and politica! ties with lndonesia. he hoped that the country would postpone

any economie support until the policy of Konfrontasi carne to an end.59 This happened later that year when the main

source of support for Konfrontasi and Sukarno -the mighty Communist Party of lndonesia (PKIJ - was crushed.

Du ring the Konfrontasi, the population of Malaysia had publicly expressed its disgust at the Dutch policy of supporting

lndonesia on a number of occasions. The genera! attitude towards the Netherlands was one of distrust, irritation

and hostility. Across the board, there was a feeling that the Netherlands was indifferent to the development needs

of the country and that Dutch businesses were concerned only with their own profits. In the spring of 1966, the

Malaysian ambassador apologised tor this, saying that the Malaysian public had no idea how much support the

Netherlands was giving his country. He suggested that any further Dutch support could best be given directly, rather

than via multilateral networks. However, the Netherlands thought that simultaneous multilateral aid to Malaysia,

Singapore and lndonesia was likely to provoke far less jealousy.60 In the summer of 1 965, A.F.C. Wiesinger was

arguing the case tor the fund he had set up to provide care and financial support for the Malays1an victims of the

Konfrontasi. He attacked Sukarno both in an advertisement in the Telegraaf newspaper and in a pamphlet sent

to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with a request for a financial contribution to the fund. And, he

added, 'The Malaysia Fund looks on with horror - though not passively -as the unwieldy monster that is lndonesia

prepares with the economie support of the Netherlands to strangle little, hard-werking Malaysia as part of its

despicable 'crush Malaysia' policy'6'. lt was partly due to this kind of rhetoric that Wiesinger was not taken more

seriously. The press was quickly alleging that the Malaysia Fund was a one-man band. that Wiesinger had a chip on

his shoulder because he had failed to obtain the post of inspector of finances 1n Netherlands New Guinea in 1 962.

and that he was only supporting Malaysia because of the country's opposition to Sukarno.62 Wiesinger's request

for funds was rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By this time, the Malaysian public's resentment towards the Netherlands was gradually dying down, although the

Dutch authorities were still asking citizens to tread carefully in their contacts with Malaysia. At the end of August

1 965, when the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Luns. paid a three-day visit to Malaysia with his wife, he

was prepared for critica! questions but encountered no ill feeling at all.63

0 The term 'ind19enous native' meant anyone not of Hindustani or Chinese descent. They were known as the bumiputra.

20

The inter-ethnic tensions in Malaysia at the end of the sixties made Dutch investors rather more cautious. Dutch

investment was already waning and the riots of May 1969 made almost all foreign companies abandon their

interest in the country. The Malaysian government took measures to attract new investors and preserve existing

investments. lt strove to eliminate the root cause of ethnic conflict: the economie 1nequahty between ethn1c

communities that had developed under British rule. In 1970 the Tunku launched the Second Malaysia Plan. to be

implemented between 1971 and 1975. lt announced the 'New Economie Policy', which was aimed at reducing

poverty by raising incomes and creating jobs for the country's entire population, irrespective of ethnicity. The

government strove to reduce the share of foreign businesses in the economy trom just over 63% to 30%. The aim

was to prevent foreigners from dominating the economy and pursuing policies directed exclusively at their own

interests. rather than those of the country at large. Malaysia preferred to see foreign investors setting up processing

industries and industries that would reduce the country's imports and increase its exports. Strict government

measures to this effect were introduced as early as 1 975.

This whole array of measures rather negated the charms of Malaysia's relatively cheap manpower and good

infrastructure. In the seventies and eighties, the country was no longer the paradise it had once been for foreign

investors. Foreign investment declined. In 1 973 !here was an economie recession and public disaffection increased.

especially among students and large sections of the proletariat. They stood up for the interests of the peasants, who

were extremely poor, especially in the northern stat es of the Federation. The number of Malayan Communist Party

guerrillas had grown following the race riots of 1 969 and they were becoming increasingly active; in 1 974 and 1 975,

there were guerrilla attacks even in Kuala Lumpur. Penang and lpoh.64 Nevertheless. and despite the stagnating

exports of agricultural products due to the economie crisis in the West. the Malaysian economy recovered in

1976 and by the end of the seventies the investment climate was even being described by the Netherlands as

'excellent'. The result was a revival of Dutch interest. The Netherlands offered assistance with ASEAN projects

and agreed to requests for advisors. Around 1 980, the economie revival was boosted further by developments in

che oil market. Oil now became one of Malaysia's main experts. Together with the exponential growth in exports of

tropical timber and palm oil. this meant that by the last two decades of the twentieth century Malaysia was almost

a 'developed' country.

In the seventies, Malaysia was a rising star in As1a. lt status was reflected in the choice of the country to organise

the 1975 men's Hockey World Cup. In March that year. in the Merdeka Stadium, the Dutch team defended the

world title they had won in a home game two years earlier. lt ended in a disappointing ninth position. Malaysia

carne fourth.

Strangely enough, the relationship between Malaysia and lndonesia began to improve almost immediately after

the end of the Konfrontasi. Their rapprochement was helped by the establishment of the Association of South-East

Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1 967. At the same time, there was a steady improvement in Malaysia's relations

with the Netherlands; the sultans of Pahang and Selangor had already visited the Netherlands between 1 965 and

1969 and in 1 970 the Malaysian Prime Minister. Tun Abdul Razak, visited lndonesia at the invitation of President

Suharto.65 In August 1 975, the new Dutch Ambassador to Malaysia, J.H. Delgorge, made a good start when the

modes of address in his letters of credence and the letter of recall to the Yang di-pertuan Agong proved to be entirely

correct. The Malaysian head of protocol was delighted. lt seldom happened and he sometimes received letters

addressed simply to 'the King of Malaysia'. Unfortunately, the Netherlands was also prone to making gaffes. In

1 973, as in 1 964. the country had failed to congratulate Malaysia on the anniversary of its independence. This time,

the Netherlands had simply failed to realise that it was the tenth anniversary. Nobody had alerted the Dutch state

to the fact. Even so, in 1 976 when eight Malaysians were caught trying to smuggle drugs into the Netherlands.

bilateral relations between the two countries proved to be good and there was close cooperation between the

Dutch and Malaysian police.80

21

2.3 . CULTURAL AND ACADEMIC RELATIONS:

DUTCH EFFORTS TO HELP MALAYSIA

The tenor of cultural relations between the Netherlands and Mataysia was set fotlowing independence and they

continued in much the same vein. Various successful exhibitions of reproduction pictures were organised on artists

like Van Gogh. The most successful activities organised by the Netherlands were those based on the Dutch East

India Company heritage. A group of enthusiastic Malaysians launched a scheme to restore a number of Company

buildings and it was suggested that Malaysia would be extremely pleased if the preparatory and consultancy werk

could be done by Outch specialists. The belief in Malaysia was that the Netherlands still had specialist knowledge

of such buildings. while Malaysia did not. Like Rosenberg Polak in the past, the current Dutch Ambassador to

Mataysia, J.H. Oelgorge. was delighted by the country's attitude: 'they (want tol preserve and restore the Dutch

historie buildings in the best possible way. lt seems to me therefore that this endeavour, being likewise of great

cultural interest to the Netherlands, deserves every possible support.'67 The ambassador got the support he was

looking for, but only on condition that the restoration of the Outch buildings would be phased and that the project

would relate primarily to the Dutch rather than the British legacy. Subsequently, however. the scheme suffered

serieus delay.

Another activity in which the Netherlands was frequently involved was the organisation of exhibitions to celebrate

Malaysian Children's Day. Outch children were invited to produce relevant exhibits and the exhibitions sometimes

included dolls dressed in colourful Outch folk costumes and photographs of KLM aircraft and Fokker planes.68

Closer academie relations were also established over this period. The University of Malaysia was interested in the

Netherlands because of its knowledge of lndonesia and its language, which was a variant of 'standard' Malay. In

1967 the Netherlands funded a language laboratory and a literature course was run together with the library of the

General HospitaJ.69 Around this time, there were regular visits to the Netherlands by a variety of Malaysian missions.

For example, in February 1975 a training delegation trom Sarawak spent five days in the Netherlands finding out

about Dutch agricultural expertise; in October 1976 a representative of Tourist Oevelopment Cooperation Malaysia

visited the Netherlands; in March 1 977 Or Mohamad Haji Salleh, the director of the Malaysian language and literature

institute at the National University of Malays1a in Kuala Lumpur. paid a v1sit to Leiden; in May 1 977 senior officials

of the Malaysian Ministry of Finance spent time in the Netherlands and in October 1 979 Malaysian engineers

toured Europe. including the Netherlands. They were interested in structures like the Eastern Scheldt and Moerdijk

bridges because Malaysia was planning to build a bridge linking Penang to the mainland. The 13.5 kilometre long

Penang Bridge was eventually completed in 1985. In mid-October 1979. Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister. Datuk

Seri Or Mahathir Mohammad, headed a trade mission to Switzerland. Sweden and the Netherlands. Last but not

least. on 28 and 29 November 1979 a delegation visited the Netherlands to inspect the country's palaces. A new

palace was to be built for the new Yang di-pertuan Agong, the elected king of Malaysia.e and its architecture was

intended to be inspired by that of European palaces of the past. The delegation visited London and Paris, as well

as Amsterdam.'o but the palace that was eventually built shows little resemblance to any known palace in Europe.

Finally, there was also scientific cooperation in fields such as biology.

2A. PERSONAL DIPLOMACY ON THE BACK BURNER

This may be an appropriate point at which to insert some further details about the Dutch ambassadors to Malaysia

over this period. In 1966 Ambassador Kruytbosch was given additional responsibility tor Cambodia and that country

remained among the responsibilities of his successors, G.J. de Graag (1969-1972) and J.A. Kernkamp (1973-

1975). In 1975 the arrangement was ended when Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge carne to power. Malaysia was

a first ambassadorial appointment tor both Kernkamp and Kruytbosch. lndeed. it would seem that Malaysia has

E The Yang di-perruan Agong is elected from among the traditional rulers of the various states of the Federation of Malaysia.

22

• •

frequently been used as a place to break in novice ambassadors. Perhaps it was and is a goed place to practise. Thorn Leeson. who was appointed chargé d'affaires in the independent city state of Singapore in 1 966, was promoted the fotlowing year to the rank of ambassador. The ambassadors posted to Malays1a during this period seem to have led a fairly isolated existence. Contacts between the Dutch and Malaysian governments remained extremely limited, apart from odd reciprocal vis1ts by government representatives. In late November 1976, the Malaysian ambassador to the Netherlands suddenly heard that the Oeputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. Or Mahathir Mohamad, was visiting England, Germany and the Netherlands with his family. The visit was of a private nature and Mahathir wanted no fuss. However. the ambassador decided to give the visit more cachet. He swiftly organised a dinner and reception for the Oeputy Prime Minister and issued invitat1ons to various Outch dignitaries. The ma1onty were unable to find time in their diaries at such short notlce but the Minister of Fore1gn Affalfs and various prominent members of the business community and government circles were able to attend. Mahathir was also treated toa visit to the Royal Tropical lnstitute (KIT) and a boat trip around the canals of Amsterdam.71 The following year. he returned to the Netherlands and visited Philips. In September that year, the junior minister at the Malaysian Ministry of Finance. Richard Ho, also visited the Netherlands. showing an interest in the 'duty free' shops at Schiphol and the task of the customs service and airport authorities in this regard.72

23

3 . THE TURBULENT VEARS 1976-1990 Birth and development of a tiger

3.1. AN ASIAN TIGER AND THE WEST

I n the course of the seventies and eighties, Malaysia experienced large-scale industrialisation and technological

reform. This resulted in huge economie growth and by the early nineties the country was well on the way to

equalling the status of Singapore as an affluent industrialised state. In 1991 the government plotted a new

economie policy designed to ensure that the pace of modernisation would be such that by 2020 Malaysia would

be a 'fully developed country'. The Sixth Malaysia Plan included action to attract foreign investment. improve the

intrastructure, reduce poverty, industrialise the country and privatise its economy. Once again, the Malays were the

main focus of the new policy but new, for the first time, the aim was to encourage self-reliance.73

As expected, these measures produced a genera! rise in the standard of living in Malaysia; whereas in 1970 around

60% of the population were still living under the poverty line. by around 1997 the figure was down to a me re 6%.

Even so, the country's economy still remained largely dependent on Japan and the West. This did not stop Malaysia

trom regularly displaying a provocatively self-assured attitude. lt was the only country in Southeast Asia that

showed itself capable to sustaining a Western-style parliamentary system of government. However, the Malaysian

democratie regime was not a Western democracy. Malaysia was an Asian democracy with its own specifically

Asian ethics and values. Mahathir and Lee both feit that this variant was 'better' than Western democracy, with its

focus on the individual rather than the commonality, lack of social deference and disregard for religion.

Having been Deputy Prime Minister under Prime Minister Hussein Onn, Dr Mahathir Mohamad became premier

in 1981, a title he was to hold until 2003. He was Malaysia's longest sitting and most controversial prime minister.

He was apt to be churlish and, as we have already seen, ambivalent towards the West. This attitude was bom

primarily of irritation at the economie inequality i n the world and at Western arrogance. He advocated action against

the major industrialised countries and in September 1986, at the summit of non-aligned states, he launched the

motto 'Us Agarnst Them'.7' This attitude was prompted in part by the economie recession that had hrt Malaysia in

1981 and reached bottom in 1985. The main cause of the slump was the country's dependance on the international

market and Mahathir blamed colonial or fermer colonial powers and major world powers like the United States.

Shifting focus, he looked east to see how Japan and Korea had achieved development. He feit that the social and

economie development of Malaysia would benefit trom following the example of Japanese and Korean work ethics

24

,

and management policies. This was the source of Mahathir's emphasis on Asian values. With their prospering

countries and Asian-style democracy, Mahathir and Lee set an example tor ether countries in the region to follow.

In 1971 the country had sought within ASEAN to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality

and in 1980 it argued tor the establishment of a nuclear-tree zone. Nevertheless, Malaysia was failing to live up to

twentieth-century Western standards: in the eighties, Western nations began to criticise the human rights situation

in the country. In March 1 983 the Netherlands, in the persen of ex-prime minister Dries van Agt. criticised Malaysia

for passing the death sentence on a number of arms smugglers.75 In 1948 the British authorities in charge of the

country had declared a state of emergency in response to the threat posed by the Communist Party of Malaya.

Twelve years later, in 1960, the state of emergency was lifted but the lnternal Security Act USA) was introduced

instead. This was a permanent measure designed to neutralise the remaining Communist threat in the country.

The Act gave the authorities the power to arrest people arbitrarily and to hold them for Jong periods without charge

and even without access to a lawyer. In the seventies, it was still possible to justify this by claiming that it was a

legitimate response to the 'Communist threat', but thereafter this argument was no longer credible. In 1975 the

Act was tightened up following guerrilla attacks, which enabled the authorities to claim that its purpose was to

safeguard inter-ethnic harmony and economie stability. After all, the Malaysian constitution gave (and still gives)

the authorities powers to limit freedom of speech and expression if this is necessary or expedient in the interests

of state security and public order and if the multi-ethnic society is in jeopardy. In addition. the freedom of the press

has been subject to statutory limitations ever since 1 984.

From the 1 980s to around 2000, numerous Western countries (including the Netherlands) were openly critica! of

the ISA. Thrs did nothing to improve Mahathir's already stormy relationship with the West. Ever since the sixties,

Malaysia had been a fierce criuc of colonialism and 1mperialism and Mahathir himself was highly critica! of the

West in genera!. He once remarked that when he looked back over the twentieth century, he saw two world wars,

nuclear bombs dropped on Asian cities, the holocaust and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia - all the fault of the West.76

Once, when former Dutch Prime Minister Dries Van Agt ventured to criticise Malaysia's imposition of the death

penalty for the possession of firearms, Mahathrr put him firmly in his place by retorting that he should take a look

at the Netherlands' own past, and in particular the actions of the Dutch East India Company. Moreover, Mahathir

blandly observed, 'Digul ( . . . . ) was a Dutch creation'.n He was referring to Boven Digul, a notorious and remote

internment camp on the south coast of Papua New Guinea, to which the Dutch had once banished lndonesian

nationalist leaders. Mahathir feit that, in view of their own past actions, the Dutch had no right to talk about human

rights. In 1988, Malaysia was pressed by the EEC on the subject of the ISA but refused to back down. Since 1 1

September 2001, the West has ceased to criticise the ISA as countries like the United States have themselves

introduced similar laws and Malaysia now defends the existence of the law by pointing to the fear of terrorist

attacks.

Van Agt's ramarks led to a new deterioration in relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands and caused a

degree of panic, especially in the Dutch business community.

3.2. THE UPHILL STRUGGLE TO INTEREST THE NETHERLANDS IN MALAYSIA

Although the Netherlands had no great interest in Malaysia at this time. it still wished to remain on good relations

with the country. In 1 978, tor example, the Netherlands wanted to address the drugs problem, which had become

an issue in relations between the two countries in 1976. The Dutch Minister of Justice, Job de Ruiter, had extensive

talks on the subject in Malaysia. Hong Kong, Thailand and Singapore.75

In the late seventies, the Netherlands designated Malaysia a priority country for export promotion and a number of

trade missions ware organised. In the summer of 1 979, Mahathir - then still Deputy Prime Minister - visited the

Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland in a tour designed to promote Malaysian exports. The presentations he gave

in the Netherlands had roused interest in Malaysian industry. This led to v1sits being paid to Malaysia first, in mid­

September 1 980, by Dr C. A. van der Klaauw (Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977 to 1981 l and later by the State

25

Prime Minister Dries Van Agt and State Secretary tor

Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek leaving tor Malaysia

and Thailand in 1982 'to prepare the ground' for Dutch

business. Source: Outch Nauonal Archives. The Hague,

Anefo Collection, photographer. E. J. Anefo / Kroes, 13 March 1982. 932.0389

Secretary for Economie Affairs. The aim was to improve

and expand existing economie relations. In the same year,

it was decided that Philips should expand the Malaysian

telephone network.;9 In the spring of 1982, the Prime

Minister, Dries Van Agt, visited Malaysia and Thailand

to promote Dutch experts and. he said, 'to prepare the

ground in Asia for the Dutch business community'.60 Van

Agt took with him a team of journalists. a crew trom the

TV current affairs programme TROS Aktua, and a number

of gifts. These included an antique Frisian doek tor the

Malaysian Prime Minister. Mahathir. This doek had been

the subject of some discussion because of its price. Dutch

officials had suggested that Mahathir might be presented

with a large delftware jar as a cheaper alternative, but in

the end the clock was chosen despite the expense.s1 Gifts

were without doubt a regular part of the diplomatie effort.

When Van der Klaauw and his wife visited Malaysia. he

took a whole catalogue of presents with him: not only

many delftware items induding a tall, lidded vase. a

huge decorative plate. a large plate with gadrooning. one

ordinary and one small plate and a large ashtray, plus a

Leerdam glass decanter and vase. a massive volume of

reproductions of all Rembrandt's paintings, books about

prints in Dutch (because the English-language versions

were no longer available), four Makkumware tiles with

pictures of windmills or sailing ships, art books called

The World of Rembrandt and The Age of Rembrandt, an

electnc razor. eight cufflinks decorated with the arms of the

Netherlands, and fifteen key rings with s1milar decoration

for the police and chauffeurs.82

The ground was certainly well prepared in those early years. In 1 982, a major Dutch construction company called

Wilma Bouwbedrijf wanted to get involved in house-building in Malaysia and Philips' engineering arm (Inter­

Engineering / lnterarco) was keen to win hospita! building contracts (a sector only recently opened up to foreign

competition). In the course of his visit to Malaysia. Van Agt exerted himself on behalf of companies like Ventilex

Recycling BV, which was seeking contracts to build three household waste processing plants in Kuala Lumpur, and

Everts en Van der Weijden Exploitatie Maatschappij/ which was pursuing an order to supply railroad ties. In 1986,

the Netherlands was the biggest foreign investor in Malaysia. surpassing even Japan, but this was acknowledged

to be an exceptional situation created mainly by a major petrochemical project.83 As one of the largest partly

Dutch-owned companies, Shell anyway accounted for a large proportion of the Outch share in the Malaysian

economy. Although there is every indication that there was a positive trend in Dutch investment in Malaysia,

criticism continued to be voiced concerning a relative lack of interest in the country. According to the Haagsche

Courant newspaper, Van Agt's visit in 1 982 was too little, too late: while Malaysia was proving hugely attractive to

international business. hotels were booked solid and the price of land was fourteen times what it had been. the

country still remained relatively virgin territory for the Dutch business community and few Dutch businessmen

were finding their way there. The newspaper quoted Hans Hoyng. director of Unichema Malaysia (a subsidiary of

the Dutch Unilever concern) as saying:

F A subsidiary of the Oranje-Nassau group in The Hague.

26

"I can't understand why you see so few Outch entrepreneurs here (.") the Netherlands is letting fantastic

opportunities go to waste. The rate of growth in this country is just unbelievable. But you see hardly any Outch

companies doing anything about it. Although there's a vast amount going on here. There's a huge need for factories.

houses, bridges, buildings, roads, everything. And especially for technica/ expertise. "114

Hoyng wondered what was wrong with the mentality of the Dutch business community. He was probably

unaware of the tact that. while the Dutch authorities were encouraging investment in Malaysia, they were by

no means prepared to do so at all costs. During Van Agt's visit, Malaysian officials suggested to h1m that he

should appoint an official in Malays1a to assess trom the inside in which sectors Dutch investment could bring

the best returns. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was unwilhng

to invest any more money in Malaysia. The Dutch ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. J.B.E.O. van Hoeve. was

flabbergasted •

'/ find it incomprehensible that no resources should be available for an expert posting. Although Malaysia also

stands to benefit to some extent trom such a posting, the offer is a clear gesture to the Netherlands to create an

opening tor an official who can assess from the inside m which sectors Dutch investment can prove frwtful ( ... )

lt seems inconsistent to send a mission at the level of the P.M. and then to respond to one of the few directfy

positive points made by saying that there are no resources ava1fabfe - a concfusion which Malaysia wil/ certainfy

not understand. "85

Even so. the Netherlands was praised by Mahathir in 1982 as the only country that really believed in

free trade, whereas - he said - other developed countries were now wrapping themselves in a cloak of

protectionism alter years of free access to developing countries. This statement was connected with the

genera! economie recession which afflicted most of the world following the oil crisis of 1 979 and which hit

Malaysia hardest in 1981, as well as with Mahathir's reservations about Western countries generally. The

situation was exacerbated by the tact that some Asian countries were boosting their experts by producing

goods which had in the past been manufactured in the industrialised West and in Japan. Many industrialised

countries in the West feit threatened by this trend and responded by introducing high import tariffs to protect

their own industries. They tended to justify this by citing human rights violations. poor werking conditions.

or the absence of the right to strike and form trades unions. Countries in Asia were outraged. As a rule, their

irritation was expressed via diplomatie channels but Mahathir regularly criticised the West's stance with an

outspokenness untypical of Asia. The Netherlands attempted to maintain its trade relations with Malaysia.

for example by sending experts in the otf-shore industry to assist Malaysia's national oil company, Petronas

(Petroleum Nasional Berhad). Like Pernas (Perbadanan Nasional) and HICOM (Heavy lndustry Corporation

of Malaysia), this company was a business established by the government and still in government hands.

Such businesses provided employment and training for Malaysian students and created new technica! and

administrative jobs by investing in the growing economy. Between 1981 and 1985. Malaysia experienced

an economie downturn. In 1985 the country was hard hit by the fall in the price of oil but recovered. In the

autumn of 1 987. the old aviation agreement (dating trom 1 966) was expanded: trom the following April. a

second weekly Malaysian Airlines flight trom Kuala Lumpur was to be allowed to land at Amsterdam. From 1

April 1 992, KLM expanded its flight schedule to Kuala Lumpur: henceforth there were to be two direct flights

a week to the city. In 1995 Martinair introduced a freight service to Penang and representatives of Schiphol

Management Services visited Malaysia to advise on the new international airport at Kuala Lumpur.

The Netherlands did not conceal its admiration of the way in which Mahathir was developing Malaysia's social

structures and economy. lt sought to maintain good relations with Malaysia for the sake of Dutch commercial

interests in the country. In 1 985 a considerable number of Dutch VIPs visited Malaysia. On 21 February, for example,

acting in her capacity as a member of the executive committee of the Netherlands Red Cross. Princess Margriet

(a sister of Oueen Beatrix) visited a Malaysian transit camp for Vietnamese boat people. In 1 979 Malaysia had

27

been prepared to take in Vietnamese refugees arriving by boat only if ether countries were wilhng to admit them

afterwards. That same year. the Netherlands had accepted more than 1200 such refugees from Malaysia, as wel!

as a further thousand rescued by the Dutch navy from beats in surrounding waters.Sö In March 1 985, the Minister

of Transport. Public Works and Water Management, Neelie Smit-Kroes, headed a Dutch public and private sector

deputation visiting Malaysia to discuss with the Malaysian authorities the potential for greater cooperation in the

transport sector. In July, the Dutch State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Wim van Eekelen, was in Kuala Lumpur in

connection with a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers followed by a dialogue with various parties, including the

EEC. Finally, the State Secretary for Justice, Virginie Korte-van Hemel, visited Malaysia to discuss the refugee crisis

and how Malaysia was dealing with it.87

3.3. HERITAGE AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN THE SERVICE OF TRADE

Within the Netherlands, there was a growing awareness of the existence of a Dutch national heritage in Malaysia

and items of historica! and cultural interest in Dutch archives and museums began to be returned to Malaysia.

When news reached the Netherlands of the survival of a large quantity of Dutch archival material in Malaysia which

nobody there could read, there was a desire to strengthen cultural relations. Pleas were made for scholarships

to be given to Malaysian students and lectures to be provided to make the Malaysian public more aware of

the common heritage. In 1982 it was suggested that two trainee archivists from Malaysia should be given the

opportunity to attend a course in both modern Dutch and the form of the language written in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries. These students would then be able to join a group of trainee lndonesian archivists in Jakarta.

The Netherlands was disinclined to conclude a cultural treaty with Malaysia; it cla1med that, for financial reasons, it

could only offer help on an ad-hoc basis.88

In the spring of 1984, divers looking for treasure discovered the 'Risdam'. a ship belonging to the Outch East

India Company that had foundered off the coast of Malaysia in 1 727. The Netherlands sought to have the vessel

returned to the Netherlands, but the Malaysian authorities insisted that the ship should remain there. Eventually

it was agreed that the Netherlands would, nevertheless, assist with the excavation of the ship.89 The story was

repeated in the nineties when two more Dutch East India Company wrecks, the 'Nassau· and the 'Middelburg',

were discovered off the coast of Port Dickinson. And at the end of 1 987 the Malaysian air force was to return the

favour by offering its (completely disinterested) services in recovering the wing of a Second World War bomber

of the air arm of the Royal Netherlands East lndies Army (KNIL). The aircraft had crashed in thick jungle in eastern

Borneo. The following year, the wing featured in a 75th anniversary exhibition of the Royal Netherlands Air Force

which opened on 31 March 1988 at the air force museum in Soesterberg.

In 1979 there were plans for the restoration of Melaka's seventeenth-century "Stadhuys" (centre of Dutch colonial

administration in the city). These suffered serious delay but eventually an architectural historian, Professor C.L.

Temminck Groll. suggested that his former student, Laurens Vis, should conduct a preparatory study of the building.

Vis had graduated with great distinction on the strength of a final-year dissertation on the colonial architecture of

Jakarta. Following initia! research in the archives in The Hague, he went out to Malaysia in November 1 979. After

some delay in lts publication. his report finally appeared in December 1982 - JUSt in time for the otflc1al opening

of the new Malacca State Museum of History, which was housed in the building. One of the speeches at the

opening was given by Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who had become Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981. While

the other speakers all spoke highly of the Dutch and PortugueseG representatives, Mahathir barely mentioned the

involvement of these countries and entirely ignored the considerable contribution they had made to the project.

Some Europeans attributed his attitude to his wish to forget the colonial past.90

In 1988 the Director of the Westfries Museum in Hoorn (North Holland), Ruud Spruit, began compiling a list

of items to be exhibited at the Stadhuys museum as part of a display about the Dutch East India Company. At

G Malacca was a Portuguese possess1on trom 151 1 until its seizure by the Dutch 1n 1641.

28

the time, Spruit was already preparing a little bookH about the history of Malaysia, which was to be published

by SDU the following year. Around the same time, the Dutch community in Malaysia had collected funds for

the restoration of Christ Church. an eighteenth-century Dutch church used for its services. In January 1981, the

Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade, Has Beyen, paid a v1sit to Malaysia in connection with (among other things)

the floating Holland Expo Il exh1b1tion in Port Kelang. During this period, documentaries were shown trom the

embassy's collection and Radio Television Malaysia made regular use of tapes sent to it by the transcription service

of Radio Netherlands Worldwide.91 In September 1 985, a Dutch television film crew werking for the Veronica

channel visited Melaka to shoot footage for a series on the Dutch overseas. Based on an idea by Jan Dorresteijn,

the series examined the Dutch colonial past and was made in collaboration with the University of Leiden's Centre

for the History of European Expansion and a trust for the Cultural History of Netherlanders Overseas. Other more

or less cultural activities were also organised to promote the Netherlands in campaigns run at two-yearly intervals

in cooperation with the Malaysian Dutch Business Council (an organisation representing a large number of Dutch­

owned businesses in Malaysia). In December 1988, for example, a campaign was run in various local shopping

centres under the banner 'Surprising Holland' and in May 1992 a hotel organised a Dutch Food Festival in Kuala

Lumpur and Penang. This was opened by the ambassador of the day, B. de Bruyn Ouboter. Another worthwhile

tradition was the provision of flnancial assistance for Malaysian students. Several fellowships were awarded each

year to hand-picked recipients.

By 1985, the Dutch community in Malaysia had grown to around 909 people (not counting Shell staff in Brunei).

There had been various changes of ambassador. On 31 May 1 980, J.H. Delgorge retired from his post as ambassador

and returned to the Netherlands. Malaysia had been his first and only ambassadorial post. He was succeeded by

J.B.E.P. van Hoeve. under whom the Dutch embassy moved in March 1 983 to a new address (Jalan Mesra 4) in

Kuala Lumpur. (In 1976, the Penang consulate had been found premises in the Algemene Bank Nederland building.)

Then, in 1984, Van Hoeve was succeeded by F.H. Peters. Once again, Malaysia was his first and only ambassadorial

post. Five years later, 8. de Bruyn Ouboter took over trom him. Again, Malaysia was his first ambassadorial post,

but in 1 993 he was to move on to Helsinki.

"Ruud Spruit. Her land van de sulrans. Maleisié en het kolonial1sme (The Hague, 1989).

29

4 . THE ' BOOM' VEARS, 1990-1997 The tiger reaches maturity

4.1. TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM

B y 1986 it was clear that one of the aims of Malaysian economie policy had been achieved; the private sector was passing into Malaysian hands. In 1990 less than 30% of it was foreign-owned. The Malaysian government relaxed its policies accordingly. This triggered an economie boom, with many foreign companies rushing to invest. Malaysia was one of several Asian countries which experienced a dramatic pace of economie development in the late eighties. Dutch experts to Asia increased by 46% between 1988 and 1993 and by 70% between 1992 and 1 996. Malaysia was becommg 1ncreasingly independent of the West. lts growing affluence meant that the country could permit itself greater freedom and where Malaysia led other Asian countries followed.92 Europe's attitude to Southeast and Eastern Asia was also changing. The spectacular economie growth of the region seemed to be driving Europe to modify its patronising, paternatistic behaviour and moderate its criticism.

In the early nineties. for example, Malaysia began to resist the campaigns of Western environmental defence

organisations to reduce deforestation. When Austria raised its import duties on hardwood about this time, Malaysia

responded by imposing economie sanctions on Austrian interests. tndonesia followed in Malaysia's footsteps

and in 1993 Austria gave in and reduced its tariffs again. The otherwise excellent bilaterat relations between the

Netherlands and Malaysia were also overshadowed by sensitive discussions about the protection of the tropicat

rainforest.93 Malaysia's Minister of Primary Industries, Dr Lim, seldom refrained trom advismg the Nethertands to

amend its own ecologically unfriendty methods of forestry before criticising Malaysia on this point.90 However,

Malaysia was the Netherlands' main source of sawn tropical timber. In October 1 993 a meeting of a bilaterat worl<ing

group on tropical timber was held and between May 1 995 and December 2000 the two countries cooperated

on the development of a system enabting Malaysia to meet the Netherlands' standards for sustainable forest

management. The very fact that it was possible to hold tall<s was a great relief to the Netherlands. However. there

was no softening in Malaysia's attitude towards other Western countries and Malaysia attached strict conditions

to a concrete advance in bilateral cooperation with the Netherlands on environmental matters.95 At the ASEAN

summit held in Kuala Lumpur in January 1992. Malaysia was outspol<en in arguing that the security of Southeast

Asia should not be permitted to depend on the vicissitudes of US policy. Asian countries were unsure whether

the US would be prepared to intervene in the case of any conflict. They thought this uncerta1nty was undesirable

and Malaysia argued that they should keep control of their own affairs. In 1997, when the Malaysian economy

30

collapsed, the country refused help from the IMF (until<e lndonesia and Thailand) and lil<ewise when the tsunami

struck in 2004 Malaysia refused to accept any l<md of f1nancial aid.

For many years, growth rates in the Malaysian economy were steady and around 1 9�0 they �ec�me spectacular.

Between 1987 and 1994. tor example, the economy grew by 8% a year. W�ereas in th� e1ghues the econom·�

had still been based on traditional commodities lil<e palm oil, rubber and tin, by .the m1lle�rnum the count':

main products included computer chips, electronics and air conditioning systems. Since the s1xt1e�. the �alays1an

economy had moved from import substitution to assembly and on to the manufacture of goods w1th a h1�h added

value. The Netherlands' main experts to Malaysia were manufactured goods. food products and machines. The

only impediment to growth was Malaysia's inadequate infrastructure, especially 1n the area of power supp.ly an�

· · 29 September 1992 the entire Malay Peninsula suffered a complete power failure. telecommunications. on ·

97 d h ·

Towards the end of the eighties, only 30% of the country's labour force was engaged in �griculture an t e ma1.n

exports were electronic and electrical equipment. hardwoods and crude oil. Japan continued_

to be the .country s

leading foreign investor and main trading partner. but the Netherlands was its second largest trad.ing pa�ner in the EU�

In the nineties, Malaysia separated its stoel< marl<et from that of Singapore in order to reduce 1ts service charges.

The Netherlands was keen to share

in this economie success. although it

also feit threatened by it. In 1994 the

Dutch Ministry of Economie Affairs

argued that it was time to ensure that

the Netherlands could withstand the

economie rise of countries in Asia.99

China and lndonesia were seen as

the main priorities. The Netherlands'

interest in Malaysia was still marginal

(and vice versa}, even though diplomats

and leading figures in the private sector

had been arguing ever since the early

eighties that the Netherlands should

seel< to exptoit Malaysian economie

growth. In tact, compared with other

European countries, the Netherlands

had paid very little attention to Asia

at all. The Dutch business community

seemed to have been wary of getting

involved. Malaysian businessmen were

quite right when they complained to

the Dutch embassy that 'the Dutch are

sleeping'.

By the early nineties. government

in the Netherlands was showing a

marked interest in countries lil<e China

and lndonesia, and resources were

being made available for this. but it

was some years later before interest

began to be shown in Malaysia. lt was

not until the mid-nineties that it began

to be argued that the public and private

sectors should join forces to exploit

the economie boom in Asia. Not only

Snapshots of the 'Window on Holland' events held m Malays1a in 2003. The

emphasis was on the traditional Outch 1cons: picturesque folk costumes, tulips,

windmills and bulb fields. Source· Window on Holland website: http;/jwww.

mdbc.com.my/gal/ery2/V/woh2003/

31

should efforts be made to achieve more rapid growth in the Dutch economy, but the country should also make

itself a champion of free trade in the multilateral arena. The Dutch government set out to promote Dutch interests

in Southeast Asian markets via a policy of bilateral action.100 The politica! and commercial worlds joined hands.

In 1992 Malaysia received visits both from a multidisciplinary Benelux mission and trom the Dutch Minister of

Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Hanja Maij-Weggen. The brief of the Benelux mission was to

concentrate primarily on small and medium-sized öenterpnses. while the minister was to focus first and foremost

on larger cooperative projects. This raised high expectations of closer economie cooperation but questions were

soon being asked about the effectiveness of the mission. lt was a long time before the Malaysian Prime Minister,

Mahathir. responded to the Netherlands' invitations to come over for a visit and parliamentary contacts remained

non-existent. I n 1 993. the Netherlands invested more heavily in Malaysia than any other EC country except Great

Britain. However, this was mainly due to investment by Shell. Otherwise, Dutch investments would have been

equal to those of the ether EC countries. I n 1992, Schiphol airport was engaged to provide consultancy services in

relation to the expansion of the international airport at Kuala Lumpur and the Malaysian government finally decided,

after considerable hesitation, to set up a Malaysian Trade and Distribution Centre in Rotterdam. The centre was

partially funded by the Netherlands. By the following May, Malaysia had 64 companies that were wholly or partially

Dutch-owned. The main players were Shell, Philips, Guinness Anchor (Heineken) and Lever Brothers. Although

turnover and investments were many times greater than they had been 40 years earlier, the number of Dutch or

semi-Dutch companies had not greatly increased in that time. Nevertheless. there was some growth in Dutch

economie activity in Malaysia and vice versa. The Netherlands was the transit port for all Malaysia's imports of

European products, while Malaysia offered the Netherlands above all an attractive investment climate. However,

the Netherlands' imports trom Malaysia exceeded its exports to that country. In April of 1 993, the Malaysian

Minister of International Trade and lndustry visited the Netherlands and, to mark the occasion, the ABN-AMRO

Bank organised a seminar on investing in Malaysia.101

Mahathir continued to be a dominant personality with a lively distrust of the West. In 1 993 he tried, in his usual

provocative manner, to restore peace to Bosnia via channels that included the Dutch Prime Minister (Ruud Lubbers).

Mahathir had previously expressed frequent criticism of what he saw as the European Union's indecisiveness

concerning the war in Bosnia. He now asked Lubbers and some other European premiers. including those of ltaly

and Germany, to use their 'good offices' and 'considerable influence' to achieve an immediate cease-fire. His

request was probably motivated by feelings of religious solidarity with the Moslem population of Bosnia. •02

4.2 . THE NETHERLANDS INCREASINGLY IN THE LIMELIGHT I N MALAYSIA

Although these developments meant that relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia were closer in 1 994

than ever before, it was suggested in that year that these relations should be further expanded, with closer personal

contact between ministers and an improved, more coherent presentation of the Netherlands by government and

the private sector. lt was pointed out that Asians attached great value to personal contact between mfluential

individuals and suggested that the Netherlands had failed suffic1ently to exploit the power of personal diplomacy

in the politica! field.

With Kuala Lumpur once more showing an interest in agriculture and in foreign investment, and with the Netherlands

starting trom 1 995 really to seek a share in Malaysia's growing economy, by around the millennium there was an

emerg1ng desire to step up contacts between holders of high office in the two countries. lt was some time since any

Dutch minister had visited Malaysia and the last time that a Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs had been there was

in 1982. In 1 995, therefore, thoughts turned once again to such a visit. There was a feeling in the Netherlands that

the balance needed to be restored and Malaysia was insistent in urging more frequent visits. Between 1996 and

1 998, therefore, no fewer than three state secretaries visited Malaysia: Anneke van Dok-van Weele for Economie

Affairs, Michiel Patijn for Foreign Affairs and Jan Gmelich Meijling for Defence. However, Malaysia was still not

satisfied: in 2002 the country reiterated its wish for more frequent visits.

32

-

To promote the Netherlands in Malaysia, the Dutch embassy had entered into a partnership with the Malays1an

Dutch Business Council. The latter organised Dutch pavilions at two trade fairs and at the Malaysian version of

the Floriade World Horticultural Exhibition. The embassy played an acttve part in these ventures but. apart from

the maritime sector, the Dutch business world showed little interest. A biennial Dutch week was instituted under

the title 'Window on Holland'. This was expected to be attended by a trade mission from the Netherlands and

the Malaysian ministry also showed an interest in the event. Traditional examples of Dutch culture have been

deployed at these events to promote the country: clogs and clog-makers, stepped gables, windmills and regional

folk costume. The events have served their purpose. in that they have generated a great deal of interest in the

Netherlands. In addition to them. in 2005 extra efforts were made to promote the Dutch defence industry at that

year's Malaysian arms fair. the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMAJ. The Netherlands

continues to invest considerable energy in the promotion of 'Holland' and the Dutch private sector. The Dutch

diplomatie mission in Malaysia also works hard to promote trade relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia,

especially in the agriculture, water and logistics sectors. Shell and Petronas have long worked hand in hand, as have

the Port of Rotterdam and Port Kelang. Over the decades, therefore. the Netherlands' main activity in Malaysia

has consistently been the promotion of Dutch private sector economie interests and politica! decisions have been

inspired by this key preoccupation. An important example is been the 'open skies' treaty concluded between the

two countries in April-May 1 996 to enable the two national airlines to make unlimited reciprocal use of airports,

subject to very few restrictions. This was a considerable advance on the aviation agreement of 1966.

4.3. FURTHER PROGRESS IN CULTURAL RELATIONS

Cultural relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia have become ever closer, although no cultural treaty

has ever been concluded. The majority of initiatives have come from the Netherlands - either the Dutch embassy

in Malaysia or the arts world in the Netherlands - where there has been a mounting interest in the past and in

the country's overseas cultural heritage, encouraged by the celebrations marking the 400th anniversary of the

founding of the Dutch East India Company. The majority of cultural events in Malaysia have been organised in

close cooperation with the Erasmus Huis (the Dutch cultural centre) in Jakarta. In 1 989, the town of Hoorn (in

North Holland) entered into a twinning arrangement with Melaka. Although the arrangement was initiated by

Melaka, it was probably prompted by the interest shown in Malaysia by Ruud Spruit. the director of the town's

Westfries Museum. Difficulties in communication were subsequently experienced as a result of a variety of cultural

factors and the twinning arrangement was given a low priority. especially by the municipality of Hoorn. Ruud

Spruit occasionally represented the town authorities in Malaysia in his capacity as director of the museum. '03

In 1993, a chair in 'Malay Studies' was established at the University of Leiden and two years later the section

was given extra support by the establishment of a Malaysian Resource Centre at the KITLV/Royal Netherlands

lnstitute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies in Leiden in collaboration with the National library of Malaysia.

The Malaysian embassy was closely involved tn the establishment of the cha1r. The first Malays1an nat1onal to be

appointed to the chair was to be Professor Muhammad Salleh. The University of Leiden was aware of Malaysian

interest in Dutch academie expertise on lndonesia. lt wanted to expand its own interest in lndonesia and exploit

its existing expertise to achieve further cooperation in the ASEAN region. There were also close relations between

the Netherlands lnstitute of International Relations Clingendael and the Malaysian lnstitute for Diplomacy and

Foreign Relations. In the Netherlands, voices were raised in favour of a more profound politica! dialogue between

the Netherlands and Malaysia via these two institutes and the lnstitute of Strategie and International Studies. In

1 994, the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and the University of Malaya were to recruit a lecturer in Dutch. A Dutch

Cultural Fund was established in Malaysia. lncreasing numbers of cultural activities relating to the Netherlands

were being organised in Malaysia (around ten a year) and the Dutch authorities were also trying to nurture the

growing interest in the Netherlands in other ways. In 1 995, the Dutch embassy in Malaysia set up the Netherlands

Alumni Association of Malaysia (NAAM) for Malaysians who had studied in the Netherlands. A previous attempt to

do this in 1984 had come to grief, but this time the association gained a firm footing.

33

Dutch support was also provided for cultural institutions: a Dutch art historian was sent out, among other things to

hel� the Sabah State Museum prepare an exhibition of textiles and to provide staff training. In 1 996. it was once

again suggested (as some decades earlier) that Malaysian historians should learn Dutch in Jakarta so that the

could study Dutch archival sources in Malaysia and an initiative was taunched to establish a Dutch historica! studie� programme in Malaysia.10<> Apparently, earlier attempts had eventually come to nothing. The TANAP (Towards a

New.Age of P�rtnership) programme focused in a similar way on the shared Malaysian heritage. TANAP made it

poss1ble tor As1an students from countries once administered by the Dutch East India Company to receive grants

to enable_ them to learn Dutch and conduct research in the Netherlands and in the country appropriate to their

research mterests. In 1995. the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ABN-AMRO Bank held an exhibition called

'The Overseas Business of the Dutch'. One aim of the exercise was to establish cfoser ties with museums in Kuala

Lumpur. Penang and Melaka.

34

5. FROM 1997 TO 2007 Malaysia on track f or new success with more

cooperation with the Netherlands

5.1. THE CRISIS OF 1997 AND LIGHTNING RECOVERY

The long period of spectacular economie growth in Malaysia carne to an end in 1 997. The change was

fairly unexpected, even though Dutch experts had detected warning signs as far back as 1994. The rapid

growth in the Asian economies together with the low exchange rate of the American dollar had made

people reckless. Banks and finance corporations had been giving out loans for years and investors had

sunk a small fortune in projects. When the value of the dollar increased and export opportunities started

to disappear, investor confidence plummeted and panic struck. In the summer of 1997, there was a

sudden and completely unexpected fall in the value of the Thai baht, dragging down other currencies.

including the Malaysian ringgit. lt was a major crisis. Banks and stock exchanges found themselves on

the verge of collapse and Western investors and specula tors withdrew. Mahathir lashed out at the West,

blaming it for the crisis. and opted for a solution of his own in defiance of the advice of the IMF.

Once the situation had stabilised. the Malaysian economy emerged with a steady - but no longer

spectacular - growth rate. Amazingly enough, however, by 1999 economie growth was actually back

on course. Throughout the final decade of the twentieth century, other Asian tigers (India and China

foremost among them) developed with astonishing speed. Malaysia could not compete w1th them on

low pay and had to rely principally on 'high-end' investments. The Netherlands remained among its top

five foreign investors. In 2004, the Netherlands feit that Malaysia's aim to become a 'fully developed

country' by 2020 would prove over-optimistic. While 1t seemed already to have achieved that status

so far as the cities were concerned. the rural areas still had a long way to go before they could qualify

as fully developed. In mid-2006, the Ninth Malaysia Plan was announced. Human development was

to be a key focus and the Netherlands was happy to help by providing scholarships and establishing a

Netherlands Education Support Office (NESO). Another key focus of the plan was agriculture.

35

5.2. INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi succeeded Mahathir. after the latter had decided to stand down The . •

. new

pre�1er s moderate and conciliatory politica! stance and less anti-Western attitude brought an improvement in

relat1o_ns bet�:en the Ne�h:rlands and Malaysia. Abdullah visited the Netherlands in May 2005 and had talks with

the Prime_ Minister and M1n1ster of Foreign Affairs (Jan Peter Balkenende and Bernard Bot). They were able to use

the occasion to promote vanous Dutch interests in a practical way and the talks were to produce an effective boost

to trade b�tween the t�o countries. The Dutch embassy was subsequently able to use Abdullah's admiration for

Dutch a?nculture to bn�g abou_t a great improvement in relations between certain major Dutch and Malaysian

companies. As part of th1s exerc1se. a crew from the Malaysian television station TV 3 visited the Netherlands in the

summer of 2006 to make a programme mainly devoted to modern Dutch agricultural technology, but also touching

on Dutch culture (such as the celebrat1ons surrounding the 400th anniversary of the birth of Rembrandt).105

For �any years. the desire expressed by Malaysia in 1994 and again more explicitly in 2002 that ministers and other

P_r�m1nent Dut.ch f1gures should visit the country remained unfulfilled. Several state secretaries (Junior ministers)

v1s1ted Malays1a between 1 996 and 1 998 and in December 2005 the State Secreta"' for Defence Ce d

K · · d

. · ' . es van er

naap, v1sne Malays1a a_nd India. but more senior Dutch ministers were seldom glimpsed there. In 2001. the

Dutch business community and embassy in Malaysia suffered serious loss of face due to the cancellation of

State Secretary Van_ �oof's planned visit to the Malaysian national arms fair. the Langkawi International Maritime

and Aeros�ace Exh1b1t1on (LIMA). Similarly, planned visits by the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Trade and the

Dutch M1n1ster of E�onom1c Atfairs had to be called off because of ·conflicting diaries·.1os They simply hadn't been

planned far enough 1n advance.

Westerners found Malays1a an extremely pleasant place to live andwork. The only fly in the ointment was competition

from other countries in the region. The attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 1 1 September 2001 caused

no unrest (apart from a demonstration outside the American embassy). The lslamic politica! movement in M 1 ·

act Il d d . . . .

a ays1a

u� Y re uce 1ts act1v1t1es as a result of them. Malaysia remained politically and macro-economically stable and

the links between the Netherlands and Malaysia were unaffected by international developments following the

events of �001 . However'.

th_ose relations were not strengthened by visits to Malaysia by senior Dutch figures. The

Dutch business community in Malaysia were particularly keen to receive politica! support and the Dutch embassy

�anted to pr�mote the Netherlands on the Malaysian market. Alter all, Dutch experts to Malaysia and Malaysian

invest':1ents in the. Netherlands had for decades lagged far behind Dutch imports and investments in Malaysia.

The ex1stence and 1mportance of the Netherlands as a trade partner and source of to · · re1gn 1nvestment needed to

be made clearer to the genera! public The embassy itself had a major part to play in this· it needed to do

t · · bi' f

· more

o ra1se its pu ic pro lle and disseminate information. lt also undertook this kind of promotional activity in the

m o r e t h a n t u 1 i p s

h o l l a n d m a l a y s i a 2 0 0 7

The logo for the festivities marking 50 years of diplomatie

relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia. The

slogan is intended to suggest that there is more to the

Netherlands than the usual tourist clichés.

Source: Outch Embassy in Malaysia.

Netherlands. providing information about Malaysia as an

export market and a regional entrepöt.

Finally, trom 16 to 1 8 February 2005. the Minister of

Economie Affairs, Laurens Jan Brinkhorst. paid a visit

to Malaysia. Singapore and lndonesia. The theme of his

visit to Malaysia was innovation and Dutch private sector

interests in the technology of the country. His visit was

followed in early November 2006 by one by the Minister

of Agriculture. Nature and Food Ouality, Cees Veerman.

These visits raised the profile of the Netherlands in the

Malaysian business world, particularly in view of the tact

that the last visit by a senior Dutch minister had taken

place as Jong ago as 1991, but Malaysian policymakers

still knew almost nothing about the country. Accordingly,

the Netherlands went to spread the idea that it was a

36

country of economie and commercial interest to Malaysia. An effective contribution to this effort took the form of

a special supplement issued along with the Malaysian New Sunday Ttmes on 30 April 2006 to mark Oueen's Day

(the official birthday of Oueen Beatrix of the Netherlands). The Netherlands also aspired to project an image of 1tself

as a good place to study.

Between 1997 and 2007, Malaysia also carne to play an 1ncreas1ngly important rele in the energy field. Malays1a had

been a gas and oil exporter for some time. but now also began to produce bio-fuel. Major investments were made

in the Netherlands by consuucting and taking over refineries. In the fore1gn policy field, Malaysia continued to look

east and aspired to be a modern. moderate lslamic nation with room for a range of ethnicities. The continuing

fear of religious radicalisation and the escalation of ethnic tensions were not helped by worldwide anxiety about

terrorism and lslamic fundamentalism. In 2006 an attempt was made to estimate the probability of terrorist action

by a small number of extremist groups in the country.

Throughout the period, Dutch-Malaysian relations we re excellent on the whole, although from time to time specific

events cast a shadow. In 2000, for example, controversy surrounded the supply of Dutch submarines to Malaysia

because the vessels could be deployed in any conflict concern1ng the disputed Spratly islands.101 And then there

was the Danish cartoons controversy. The Malaysian Ambassador to the Netherlands. Noor Farida Ariffin, wrote

to the then Minister for European Affairs. Atzo Nicolaï, asking for clarificat1on about the publication of cartoons

of the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. Jyllands Posten. and an inteNiew with him on the subject in

the Dutch newspaper, NRC Handelsblad. The cartoons had caused a storm of protest in the lslamic world. The

ambassador took particular umbrage over the way in which N1colaï had taken the side of the Danish newspaper.

This was in contrast to the stance adopted by the Prime Minister. which had been much appreciated in Malaysia.

Balkenende had emphasised both the right to freedom of speech and that anyone who used that right should

take responsibility for the consequences. 108 The consternatton about the affair soon died down. The Netherlands

was never even mentioned in the Malaysian press and the embassy was never approached by local journalists.109

This is in line with Malaysia's genera! attitude to events in the Netherlands: the Malaysian media merely picked up

international agency reports about the assassination of Theo van Gogh and the scandals surrounding Ayaan Hirsi

Ali, but made no comment of their own. To date. events in the Netherlands have always been seen as remote trom

Malaysian concerns. 110

Another, recent event has likewise had few consequences for the friendly relations between the two countries. In

2006, while chairing the summit of the Organisation of the lslamic Conference. the Malaysian Minister of Foreign

Affairs. Syed Hamid Albar. condemned a proposal made in the Netherlands to ban the burkha. Malaysia has always

been an active member of the OIC, an organisation of 57 lslamic states. Right-wing MP Geert Wilders. who had

proposed the ban. feit that Malaysia was interfering in the Netherlands' internal affairs and demanded that the

Malaysian ambassador be reprimanded. Fortunately. this never took place, since it would only have made matters

worse. The responses given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Bot, to questions asked in the House of

Representatives make it clear that Bot did not feel 1t necessary to rebuke the ambassador. He thought dialogue

was far more important and to summon an ambassador to appear in relation to a something that was not even a

concrete legislative proposal was certainly not likely to improve international relations.111

Tournaments like the men's Hockey World Cup, held in Kuala Lumpur in February and March 2002. were goed for

the image of both Malaysia and the Netherlands. Malaysia was organising the Hockey World Cup for the second

time i n its history and the Dutch embassy held a reception for its national delegation. The Netherlands carne third

in the tournament. In September of the same year. Malaysia also hosted the Southeast Asian hockey tournament

and the Netherlands once again organised a reception to mark the event. At the time of writing, in 2007. the two

countries are celebrating fifty years of diplomatie relations. Under the slogan "Holland. more than tulips". the

embassy is striving to raise the image of Dutch products. with a particular emphasis on the agriculture, defence

and education sectors. The events taking place will include new activities launched in 2006. such as a film festival,

a design show and, in response to current developments in Europe, a forum on lslamic banking.

37

5.3. RELATIONS BASED ON A GROWING INTEREST IN THE COMMON

CULTURAL HERITAGE

Malaysia is one of the few countries in Asia that has accepted Dutch contributions and efforts to preserve the

common colonial cultural heritage in the East without too much difficulty. lndeed, in Malaysia itself there has

been some increase in interest in that heritage, as witness the establishment of an association of Malaysians with

Dutch ancestry. However, this interest does not seem to have become at all widespread. A report compiled in

2000 identif1es little interest 1n the shared heritage and few available local sources of funding for 1t. The dominant

impression of the colonial past in the public mind is apparently one of exploitation of Malays by the Western

powers. People in Malaysia are strongly focused on the present and the future. Any interest in the past tends to be

commercially motivated. The Malaysian state seems to believe that tourists will be attracted by a Disneyland-style

restoration of historie buildings.112 In the Netherlands, on the other hand, there seems to be a steady and continuing

growth in interest in the domestic and overseas cultural heritage. This is demonstrated by the many activities

launched in this area. such as the excavation of the "Avondster" (a vessel of the Dutch East India Company sunk

off Sri Lanka), and the existence of a multitude of relevant organisations. such as Heritage Today.

In 2001 an exhibition on the common heritage was held in Malaysia in cooperation with the Dutch National Archives

in The Hague. lt was on show for two months in Kuala Lumpur, followed by a further month in Melaka, where a

large part of it unfortunately caught fire and went up in smoke just before it was due to be dismantled. Sadly, the

fire was probably due to mistakes in museum management. However, the Dutch embassy did not g1ve up and

started work on a follow-up event. A seminar was organised on Malaysian hiscory trom Dutch sources and 2002

saw the presentation of a book based on the seminar.

During the Dutch Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2004, the by now almost traditional annual film

festival was held by the Dutch embassy and a lecture was organised on contacts between Europe and Asia in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition, the Netherlands stepped up its cultural relations with Malaysia.

There we re regular otticial visits to Melaka and friendly contacts were maintained both with governmental institutions

like the National Archives of Malaysia, the Melaka state government and museums. and with non"9overnmental

organisations such as the Badan warisan heritage trust and the local history society in Melaka. There was a desire

to publicise the Dutch heritage in Malaysia both in Malaysia and in the Netherlands and to maintain good relations

with the local authorities in relation to the Dutch cultural heritage. The Netherlands was even keen to work hand in

hand with partner countries on the preservation of common cultural heritage and to create a multilateral framework

tor its preservation. In 2002 the embassy in Kuala Lumpur advocated the inclusion of Malaysia in the Netherlands'

list of common cultural heritage priority countries because of the existence of 'centuries-old remains with a Dutch

cultural and historica! dimension'.113

5A. CULTURE AND TRADE

In April 2003, a number of events were organised to promote cultural and commercial relations between the

Netherlands and Malaysia, including public exhibitions of Dutch art and culture.

In 2005, there were more activities, such as an exhibition of Dutch folk arts (including folk costume and traditional

crafts) and one on religious architecture in the Netherlands. Active Dutch support for cultural events and organisations

proved a highly effective way of boosting the Netherlands' image in Malaysia. Small concerts were held at the

embassy itself. organised where possible in cooperation with the Dutch private sector, and there was an EU film

festival, held in Kuala Lumpur and involving Dutch films like 'Liever Verliefd' (a.k.a. 'Love to Love') and 'Paradise

Girls', as well as the Bntish film about the Dutch artist Vermeer, 'The Girl with a Pearl Earring'. The event provided

useful promotion for the Netherlands. All these activities served primarily to extend the embassy's network and an

exercise in public diplomacy.

38

2005 also saw the establishment of the Netherlands-Ma laysia Association (VNM).114 This organisation aims to build

good relations at a "people-to-people" level both by providing the Dutch public with a source of information on

Malaysia and by organising activities like visits to Malaysia. 1 15 In November 2006, for example, the chairman of the

association. Professor Edward Fr;etman, advised the Dutch authorities in the Nether1ands that a number of Dutch

pensioners were considering emigrating from lndonesia to Malaysia.

Most recently, in 2006 Malaysia has launched a publicity campaign under the banner "Visit Malaysia 2007"

and proposed the establishment of a Malaysian tourist office in Amsterdam to help promote Malaysia in the

Netherlands.1 16

In 2000 the Dutch embassy in Kuala Lumpur moved into a brand new, purpose-built building. Three years later, a

large proportion of the Malaysian federal bureaucracy moved to Putrajaya, the new centre of federal government

administration just outside Kuala Lumpur. The new city is named after the country's first prime minister, Tunku

Abdul Rahman Putra, and became the administrative centre in early 2004. A prestige project launched by the

country's last prime minister, Mahathir, and now cherished by Abdullah. it is intended to become a modern garden

city covering an area of 5000 hectares and featuring parks. botanica! gardens and boulevards. The entire city is

intended to employ a paperless system of administrat1on based on the latest information and communications

technology. lt is likely that the embassies will also move out to Putrajaya in due course. At the time of writing (in

2006), the city is still tairly empty, but the expectation is that all government offices (and all the foreign embassies)

will be concentrated there within the next few years. Only time will teil.

39

CONCLUSIONS The Netherlands and Malaysia have had virtually uninterrupted relations ever since the latter's independence in

1957. Right trom the start, relations have been influenced by mutual economie interests and the common cultural

heritage. Politica! activities have invariably been subservient to these and especially to trade considerations. This

account has focused primarily on politica! and cultural relations. which have generally been in the service of trade.

Relations over the last fifty years can be divided into three quite separate phases.

The first phase. trom around 1 945 to 1965, was largely dominated by the decolonisation of lndonesia and the

problems this posed both for Malaysia and tor the Netherlands. The key focus at this time was the decolonisation

of lndonesia. the entire issue of New Guinea and the policy of Konfrontasi. At no subsequent time in the last fifty

years has the history of the two countries been so closely interwoven. Relations during this period were therefore

based principally on developments in gtobal polities.

The second phase. extending from 1 965 to the late eighties. was marked by a degree of stability and continuity and

relatively little contact between the two countries. Malaysia was busy turning itself in to one of the most affluent

and dynamic countries in Asia. while the Netherlands' main focus outside the West was on development aid. Since

Malaysia never was a priority country for Outch development cooperation, relations between the two countries

were reduced to a minimum during this period.

This changed somewhat in the early nineties. Between the late eighties and the present day, Malaysia - like a

number of other countries in the region - has become an 'Asian tiger' developing at break-neck speed. The country

presented major commercial opportunities but the Netherlands was very slow to respond to them. White interest

in the Chinese and tndonesian economies had begun to develop as early as 1990. it was not until around 1 995

that any substantial Dutch interest was shown in the Malaysian economy. Even then, attention focused mainly on

countries like China, India, lndonesia and. of course. Japan. The period has. however. seen the emergence (in the

Netherlands at least) of a lively interest in the history of the Dutch East India Company and. more particularly, in

the common cultural heritage.

Throughout all three periods, the Netherlands' interest in Malaysia and vice versa has been inspired principally by

the economie opportunities on offer. That said. it should be noted that Dutch experts to Malaysia and Malaysian

investments in the Netherlands have almost always fallen far short of Dutch imports from Malaysia and Dutch

investments in that country. Politica! action and even cultural activities have tended to be subservient to trade;

events like 'Window on Holland' are used in Malaysia to promote the idea of the Netherlands as a valuable trading

partner.

The events of 1 1 September 2001 have not created new problems in Malaysia. but they have made the West

view Malaysia in a different light. Malaysia has sharply condemned the attacks but also drawn attention to the

sometimes over-simplistic attitude of the West towards sensitive issues like the Danish cartoons. Prior to 2001,

Western ideals in areas such as human rights were frequently subordinated to the interests of trade with Malaysia.

Since that date, criticism of Malaysia in such areas has been completely silenced by the emergence of new anti·

terrorism laws in many Western countries. The potential of personal diplomacy as an effective politica! instrument

has not been sufficiently recognised by the Netherlands and may present great opportunit1es in future.

To sum up, although it is fair to say that in the recent history the general relations between Malaysia and the

Netherlands have been dominated by developments in the field of trade and investment, these exhibited a

considerable degree of continuity, cordiality and politica! appreciation of the historica! connections between the

two countries and the heritage that has resufted from that shared history. Despite the apparent lack of real politica!

commitment, trade and investment flourished. The positive developments in these fields merit to be matched by

an enhanced involvement in other sectors of cooperation.

40

H.E. Markus Rosenberg Polak.

Chargé d' Affaires a.i.

1956 - 1 959

H.E. Johan Kernkamp,

Ambassador 1973- 1975

H.E. Bartholomeus de Bruyn

Ouboter,

Ambassador, 1989 - 1993

H.E. Robert van Gulik.

Ambassador 1959 - 1963

H.E. Johann Delgorge.

Ambassador 197 5 - 1980

H.E. George Arnold.

Ambassador 1993 - 1998

41

H.E. Lucas Kruytbosch.

Ambassador 1963 - 1968

H.E. Johan van Hoeve.

Ambassador 1980 - 1984

H.E. Conrad van Toeren.

Ambassador 1 998 - 2001

H.E. Gerard de Graag.

Ambassador 1969 - 1972

H.E. Frans Peters.

Ambassador 1984 - 1989

H. E. John von Mühlen.

Ambassador 2001 - 2005

NOT ES (ENDNOTES) 1 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (ArBuZa), DOA. cultural relations between Malaysia and the

Netherlands, 1 995-2005, inv. no. 0011 9.0uestions for the Ambassador of the Netherlands, late April 2006.

2 Anonymous, Korte schets van het ontstaan van de Federatie van Malaya en van Singapore (probably The

Hague 1957). Unpublished report by the Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3 Cheah, Boon Kheng, Malaysia: the making of a nation (Singapore 2002) 3 - 5.

• Ibid .• 4 and 26.

5 Duco Hellema, Hellema. Duco. Neutraliteit en vrijhandel. De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse

betrekkingen (Utrecht 2001) 180.

6 Ibid .. 1 79.

7 ArBuZa. Mission archives Singapore, 1955- 1964. Code 9: 911 .0, box 9. Malaysia - Singapore, 1955 - 1959.

8 ArbuZa. ministry archives, code 9: 911 .0, Malaysia - General reports 1 956 - 1 957. inv. no. 01388. Annual

report on the Federation of Malaya 1960, dd. 1 1 April 1961.

9 ArbuZa, ministry archives, code 9: 911 .0, Malaysia - Annual reports 1955 - 1964, inv. no. 01387. Annual

report 1957, 13. 10 Jan Pluvier. Zuidoost-Azië Een eeuw van onvervulde verwachtingen (Breda 1999) 13. 11 ArbuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 911 .0. Malaysia - Genera! reports 1956 - 1 957, inv. no. 01 388. Annual

report on the Federation of Malaya 1960, dd. 1 1 April 1961. 12 ArbuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 911.0, Malaysia - Genera! reports 1956 - 1957. inv. no. 01388. Annual

report on the Federation of Malaya 1960, dd. 1 1 April 1961. 13 ArBuZa, Mission archives Singapore, 1955 - 1964. Code 9: 911 .0. box 9. Malaysia - Singapore, 1955 - 1 959. 14 ArbuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 91 1 .0, Malaysia - Annual reports and genera! reports, vol. 1 1965 - 1974,

inv. no. 1 006. Annual report on Malaysia 1965. 15 ArbuZa. ministry archives, code 9: 9 1 1 .0. Malaysia - Annual reports 1955 - 1964, inv. no. 01387.

Consular annual report 1956.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid. 19 Ibid.

19 ArbuZa, ministry archives, code 5, 554.1 Malaysia - Netherlands aviation agreements, vol. 1 1963 - 1964.

Letter from Ambassador to Malaysia L. Kruytbosch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. dd. 5 September 1963.

20 Marc Dierikx,'Een spel zonder kaarten: KLM-landingsrechten als nationaal belang, 1945-1957', in: O.A.

Hellema, C. Wiebes, B. Zeeman (eds.), Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken: Derde Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis

van de Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek (The Hague: Sdu, 1 997), 1 1 -25, see p. 13. 21 ArbuZa, Mission archives Kuala Lumpur 1975 - 1965, inv. no. 102: Establishment and upgrading of the

Kuala Lumpur mission. letter from Singapore Consul-Genera! D.G.E. Middelburg to the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, dd. 2 April 1 957.

22 Ibid., letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Singapore Consul-Genera! D.G.E. Middelburg. dd. 22 July

1957.

23 Ibid., letter from Consul-Genera! D.G.E. Middelburg to M.J. Rosenberg Polak. dd. 25 July 1957.

24 Ibid .. 25 Ibid" letter from Consul-Genera! O.G. E. Middelburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dd. 25 February 1957.

26 Ibid., letter from Consul-Genera! D.G.E. Middelburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, undated.

27 ArbuZa, ministry archives, code 9: 9 1 1 .0. Malaysia - Annual reports 1955 - 1964, inv. no. 01387. Annual

report on the Federation of Malaya 1957, 13. 28 ArBuzA. ministry archives, code 9: 911 .0, Malaysia - Annual reports 1955 - 1964, inv. no. 01387. Annual

report on the Federation of Malaya 1961, 1 1 - 1 2.

29 ArbuZa, ministry archives, code 9: 913.221 .1 . Malaysia and lndonesia. Policy of confrontation vol. 111, 1965 - 1966,

inv. no. 1463. Secret coded message from Luns in NY to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dd. 21 January 1965.

42

-

30 Ibid.

3i Ibid" coded message trom Luns to Londen. dd. 7 January 1966.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid" copy of a top secret cabinet memorandum trom Minister Luns to the Secretary-General. dd. 7 April 1966.

J.< ArbuZa. Mission archives Kuala Lumpur 1975 - 1965, code 9: 912.20" Malaya - Nether1ands. inv. no. 14: Letter

from Ambasssador L. Kruytbosch in Kuala Lumpur to M. H. Damme jr. of Werkspoor, dd. 6 October 1964.

35 ArBuZa, ministry archives, code 9: 911 .0. Malaysia - Annual reports 1955 - 1 964. inv. no. 01387. Annual

report 1963, 53.

36 ArbuZa. Mission archives Kuala Lumpur 1 975 - 1965, code 9: 912.20 .. Malaya - Netherlands. inv. no. 14. Letter

trom Ambasssador L. Kruytbosch in Kuala Lumpur to M. H. Damme jr. of Werkspoor, dd. 6 October 1964.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

JS Ibid" letter trom Ambassador to Malaysia Lucas Kruytbosch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph

Luns, dd. 25 November 1964.

40 Ibid .. Lucas Kruytbosch to J. Rookmaaker. dd. 1 7 September 1964. �1 ArBuza, ministry archives. code 9: 911 .33 Malaysia - National communications. inv. no. 1018. Kuala Lumpur

embassy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dd. 2 September. 1964.

•2 Hellema, Neutraliteit, 202.

•3 Ibid., 202 - 246.

� ArBuZa. Mission archives Kuala Lumpur 1975 - 1965, code 9: 912.20" Malaya - Netherlands. inv. no. 14.

•5 ArBuza. ministry archives. Malays1a - Official travel by Dutch representauve in Malacca 1955- 1 963,

inv. no. 01406. Letter trom Kuala Lumpur Chargé d'Affaires ad interim M.J. Rosenberg Polak to Minister

of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Luns. dd. 21 November 1958.

'6 Ibid.

41 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 8: 81 1.2, file 466: Malaysia - Dutch historie buildings, 1 958 - 1962.

4a ArBuZa. Miss ion archives Kuala Lumpur. 1 956 - 1965. code 8: 823. 7 1 . Exhibitions. box 10. Letter from

Rosenberg Polak to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dd. 2 2 September 1958.

49 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 9: 912.12. Malaysian visits to the Netherlands 1968 - 1971, inv. no. 2224.

50 Pluvier, Zuidoost-Azië, 397.

51 Ibid" 481 .

52 ArBuZa. Mission archives Singapore 1 965 - 1 974, code 6: 610.2. economie relations Malaysia - Netherlands,

1964, 1965 - 1 971. inv. no. 233.

53 Ibid., Netherlands Chamber of Trade Promotion, Malaysia Chamber of States T. van Duvyvenbode to Van

der Most van Spijk, Manager. The Nethertands lnsurance Company dd. 9 July 1965.

5" Ibid" Director of the EVD in The Hague to the Dutch ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, dd. 17 December 1964.

55 ArBuza, ministry archives. code 9: 912.12, Malaysian visits to the Netherlands 1 968 - 1971, inv. no. 2224:

Malaysian krant Eastern Sun, 16 May 1 968.

56 Ibid., Malaysia - Visits by the Sultan of Selangor 1965 - 1969, inv. no. 2226. s1 ArBuza, ministry archives. code 6. Economie cooperation between Malaysia and the Netherlands.

agreement 1968 - 1970, inv. no. 00058.

sa Ibid .. letter trom Kuala Lumpur embassy to the minister without portfolio in charge of matters relating to

assistance for developing countries. dd. 21 April 1970.

ss ArBuza, ministry archives, code 9: 912 . 1 . Dutch attitude to Malaysia, 1965 - 1973, inv. no. 2223: Notes

following the visit by the Malaysian ambassador on 2 March 1 966, dd. 22 March 1 966.

60 Ibid. 61 Ibid .• letter trom A.F.C. Wiesinger to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. dd. 20 August 1965.

62 Ibid., letter trom the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch ambassador in Jakarta. dd. 20 May 1965.

63 Ibid" visit by Luns and his wife to Malaysia, 29 August - 1 September 1965.

6-< Ibid" 417.

s5 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 9: 912.1, Malaysia -Travel by official representatives. 1965 vol. 1 1. inv. no. 4553.

66 ArBuza, ministry archives, code 9: 911 .30. Malaysia - Official travel vol. 111 1 976 - 1 983, inv. no. 5705.

43

61 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 8: 811.2. Malaysia - Restoration of historie buildings, dd. 1 978 - 1 983. inv

no. 6759. 68 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 8: 814.2. Malaysia - Various exhibitions 1975 - 1980, 1983 - 1984. inv. no. 6768.

69 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 9: 912.12 Malaysian visits to the Netherlands, 1968 - 1971. inv. no. 2224.

'0 ArBuza. ministry archives, code 8, 8222.22. Malaysian visits to the Netherlands. vol. 1, 1975 - 1 980, inv.

no. 000813. 11 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 9: 912.12. Malaysian visits to the Netherlands, vol. 11 1975 - 1 983. Letter

trom the ambassador in Kuala Lumpur to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. inv. no. 7146, dd. 30 November 1976.

n Ibid.

73 Pluvier. Zuidoost-Azië. 538.

" Pluvier. Zuidoost-Azië, 484.

75 ArBuza. ministry archives, code 9: 912.1 . Malaysian relations with the Netherlands. vol. 111 1975 - 1983,

inv. no. 7144. DO/VZA memorandum on the Malaysian premier. '6 Ben Knapen. 'Democratie op z'n Aziatisch', M. Het maandblad van NRC Handelsblad, February 2007, 30

- 34, see p. 33.

n ArBuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 912.1. Malaysian relations with the Netherlands. vol. 111 1975- 1 983,

inv. no. 7144. DO/VZA memorandum on the Malaysian premier. dd.17 March 1 983.

78 Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1977 - 1978.

79 Ibid" letter of 3 July 1980 trom Van Agt to the Malaysian premier. Datuk Hussein Onn.

80 ArBuZa, Mission archives Kuala Lumpur, 1 965 - 1984, code 9: 912, inv. no. 00017. Visit to Malaysia by

Prime Minister Dries Van Agt, 1982. 81 Ibid .. coded message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Kuala Lumpur, dd. 27 February 1 982.

82 ArBuZa. Mission archives Kuala Lumpur, 1965 - 1984, code 9: 912. inv. no. 00016. Visit to Malaysia by

Prime Minister Dries Van Agt (including reports). 1980.

83 ArBuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 911.0 Malaysia - Annual reports. 1982 - 1 983, 1 985 - 1989. inv. no.

3421. Annual report 1986, 33.

84 Haagsche Courant. 27 March 1 982.

e:. ArBuZa. Mission archives Kuala Lumpur, 1965 - 1 984. Coded massage trom Kuala Kumpur to the Ministry

of Foreign Af fairs. dd. 1 April 1 982. 86 ArBuZa, ministry archives. code 9: 911.0 Malaysia - Annual reports. vol. I l 1 975 - 1 982, inv. no. 579 Annual

report 1980.

8' ArBuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 9 1 1 .0 Malaysia - Annual reports. 1982 - 1 983, 1 985 - 1989. inv. no.

3421. Annual report 1985.

88 ArBuZa. Mission archives Kuala Lumpur, 1965 - 1 984. Memorandum trom ACS to DOA / ZA, dd. 1 6

February 1982.

89 ArBuZa, ministry archives. code 8: 810.21 Malaysia - cultural relations with the Netherlands, 1977, 1980,

1982. 1984. inv. no. 06768.

90 ArBuza. ministry archives. code 8: 81 1.2. Malaysia - Restoration of historie buildings, dd. 1978- 1983. inv. no. 6759.

91 ArBuZa, ministry archives. code 9: 91 1 .0 Malaysia - Annual reports, 1 982 - 1 983. inv. no. 3421.

92 Duco Hellema and Mei Li Vos, 'De herontdekking van Oost-Azië. Nederlands buitenlands beleid herijkt?'

Internationale spectator 53, no. 1 (1 998), 32 - 40.

93 ArBuZa, DDl/DOA. Malaysian foreign policy. Diplomatie relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands.

1995, inv. no. 00453. Review of Malaysia 1994. Kuala Lumpur embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. dd.

4 January 1995. 9" ArBuZa, ministry archives. code 9: 911 .0. Ma!aysia - Annual reports 1990 - 1994, block 1988 - 1994. inv.

no. 695. Visit by State Secretary Van Rooy, dd. 1 0 - 1 4 October 1992.

95 Ibid. First half-yearly report 1994. 14.

96 Ibid. Economie Annual report 1 992. 9.

9' Pluvier. Zuidoost-Azië, 544.

98 Ibid .. 525.

99 Ministry of Economie Affairs report. Focus op Azië. As quoted in: Hellema. Neutraliteit, 378.

44

100 Ibid. 101 ArBuZa. ministry archives, code 9: 9 1 1 .0. Malaysia - Annual reports 1 990 - 1994, block 1 988 - 1994. inv.

no. 695. Half-yearly report 1993. 9.

102 ArBuZa. ministry archives. code 9: 912.1 Malaysia - Attitudes and diplomatie relations with the Netherlands

1988 - 1 994. inv. no. 1444.

103 ArBuZa. current DAO file. cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands. 1995-2005, inv. no.

00119. E-mail trom Peter Noordermeer to Corien Sips. dd. 6 March 2002.

1� Ibid. Preliminary proposal to set up a program of Dutch Historica! Studies in Malaysia under the auspices

of the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Malaysia. Drafted by M.R. Fernando. University of Science, Malaysia,

dd. January 2000.

105 ArBuZa. current DAO file, cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands 2006 - present.

106 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intranet, Annual plan !IATEI for Malaysia 2005.

101 ArBuZa. DAO. diplomatie relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands. 1997, inv. no. 00202. Ouestions

put in the House of Representatives by M.B. Vos. Green Left Alliance (IATEJ. to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Josias Van Aartsen, on 6 September and 3 October 2000.

1oa ArBuZa, DAO. cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands, 1 996 • 2005. inv. no. 00119. Letter

trom Malaysian Ambassador Noor Farida Ariffin to State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Atzo Nicolaï. dd. 1 0

February 2006. 109 Ibid" Kuala Lumpur embassy to DPZ. DAO. DVL and DAM. dd. 2 March 2006. 1 10 Ibid" massage from the Kuala Lumpur embassy to DVL. DAO and DAM, dd. 19 May 2006. 1 1 1 Intranet, response to questions by Wilders on Malaysia's criticism of the government intention to ban

clothing that covered the face. Asia and Oceania Department, dd. 1 2 December 2006. 112 ArBuZa. DAO. cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands. 1 996 - 2005, inv. no. 001 19.

Memorandum trom the Kuala Lumpur embassy to the Ministry's Cultural Cooperation, Education and

Research Department, dd. 2 February 2000. 113 Ibid., Memorandum trom Ambassador Von Mühlen to the Ministry's Cultural Cooperation, Education and

Research Department, dd. 4 July 2002.

1" ArBuZa, current DAO file on cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands. 2006 - present.

11s See Internet site: www.nederland-maleisie.nl 11e ArBuZa, current DAO file on cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands, 2006 - present.

45

B IBL IOGRAPHY

SECONDARY SOURCES

• Boon Kheng, Cheah. Malaysia: the making of a nation !Singapore 2002).

• Caljé, P.A.J. and J.C. den Hollander. De nieuwste geschiedenis (Utrecht 1992).

• Dierikx, Marc, 'Een spel zonder kaarten: KLM-landingsrechten als nationaal belang, 1945-1957'. in

DA Hellema, C. Wiebes and 8. Zeeman (eds.). Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken: Derde Jaarboek voor de

geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek (fhe Hague 1 997). • Geus, P.B.R. de, De Nteuw-Guinea kwestie. Aspecten van buitenlands beleid en militaire macht (leiden 1984). • Hellema. Duco and Mei Li Vos, 'De herontdekking van Oost-Azië: Nederlands buitenlands beleid herijkt?',

Internationale Spectator 52 no. 1 (1 998) 32 - 40. • Hellema, Duco, Neutraliteit en vrijhandel. De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse betrekkingen

(Utrecht 2001 ). • Kersten, A.E., 'Nederland en de buitenlandse politiek na 1 945', in: Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden

vol. 1 5 (Haarlem 1982), 382 - 400. • Knapen, Ben, 'Democratie op z'n Aziatisch'. M. Het maandblad van NRC Handelsblad, February 2007, 30- 34. • Pluvier, Jan, Zuidoost-Azië. Een eeuw van onvervulde verwachtingen (Breda 1 999).

PRIMARY SOURCES

• Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs yearbooks • Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual plans

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Archive of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague:

MINISTRY ARCHIVE, CODE 9:

Period 1955 - 1964:

911.0 Genera! reports, inv. no. 1388

911.0 Annual reports, inv. no. 1 387

9 1 1 .30 Official travel, inv. no. 01 406

Period 1965- 1974:

911 .0 Annual reports and gene ral reports, vol. 1 1965 - 1 975. inv. no. 1 006

911 .30 Reports on official visits 1 966 - 1967. inv. no. 1013

911 .33 National communications, 1 965 - 1974, inv. no. 1 0 1 8

912.1 Relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia. 1965 - 1973, inv. no. 2223

912.12 Malaysian visits to the Netherlands. 1 968 - 1971, inv. no. 2224

912.12 Malaysia - visits to the Netherlands by the Sultan of Pahang, 1 965, inv. no. 2225

912.12 Malaysia - visits to the Netherlands by the Sultan of Selangor, 1 965 - 1 969, inv. no. 2226

912.12 Foreign service and corps diplomatique in Malaysia, 1 965 - 1974, inv. no. 4551

912.12 Malaysia - foreign policy, 1965 - 1973, inv. no. 4552

912.12 Visits by official representatives, 1 965 - 1973. inv. no. 4553

Period 1975 - 1 984:

911.0 Annual reports, 1975 - 1983, inv. no. 579

911 .30 Malays1a - official travel, 1976 - 1983, inv. no. 5705

46

---

9 1 1 .33

911 .7

912.1

912.12

912.2

912.2

Malaysia - national communications, 1976 - 1 983. inv. no. 5708

Malaysia - press releases. inv. no. 5709.

Dutch attitude to Malaysia, 1975 - 1983, inv. no. 7144

Malaysia - visits to the Netherlands, 1975 - 1983. inv. no. 7146

Malaysia - Foreign service and corps diplomatique. 1975 - 1984, inv. no. 5573

Malaysia - foreign policy, 1975. inv. no. 5572

Period 1985 - 1994:

911.0 Annual reports, 1985- 1988, inv. no. 3421

911.0 Annual reports 1990-1994

912.12 Malaysian visits to the Netherlands. 1985 - 1 988, inv. no. 3417

912.1 Attitudes and diplomatie relations between Malays1a and the Netherlands, 1985 - 1 988, inv. no.3418 1.2

912.2 Attitudes and diplomatie relations with Malaysia, 1 988 - 1 994, inv. nos. 821 and 1444

Period 1995- 2004:

Annual reports since 2001 on Intranet

(Number not yet assigned) - Promotion of diplomatie relations between Malays1a and the Netherlands,

1 995 - 1999, inv. no. 720

(Number not yet assignedl - Diplomatie relations between the Nethertands and Malaysia, 1997 -2002, inv. no. 202

Period 2005 - present: (Current files) - Diplomatie relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia, 2005 - present

DEPARTMENTAL ARCHIVE, CODE 8:

Period 1965 - 1964:

815.5 Malaysia- tourism. 1 964. inv. no. 1374.

81 1 .2 Malaysia - Dutch historie buildings, 1958- 1962, inv. no. 466

Period 1 975 - 1984:

822.22 Malaysian visits to the Netherlands, 1975 - 1 980, inv. no. 813

810.21 Malaysia - cultural relations with the Netherlands. 1977 - 1984. inv. no. 6754

814.2 Malays1a - various exhibitions, 1 975 - 1 984, inv. no. 6768

811 .2 Malaysia - restoration of historie buildings, inv. no. 6759

813.1 Malays1a - scientif1c cooperation w1th the Netherlands, 1978 - 1979, inv. no. 1883

810.21 Malaysia - cultural relations with various countries, 1978, inv. no. 1 880

Period 1985 - 1 994: (Number not yet assigned) - Correspondence on cultural relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands,

1993 - 1996, inv. no.

Period 1995- 2004: (Number not yet assigned) - Cultural relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia, 1996 - 2005. inv. no. 1 1 9

(Number not yet assigned) - Correspondence o n cultural relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia, 2002,

inv. no. 435

Period 2005 - present:

(Current files) - Cultural relations between the Netherlands and Malaysia, 2006

47

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS:

Period 1 965 - 1974:

Malaysia. foreign policies and attitudes and diplomatie relations with various countries. inv. no. 1282

Policy of confrontation and possible mediation by the Netherla nds. 1 965 - 1966. inv. nos. 1463 and 1464

MISSION ARCHIVES SINGAPORE:

Period 1955 - 1964:

Closure and establishment of overseas missions. 1960 - 1965, inv. no. 102

Period 1 965 - 1974: 21.21

Economie relations between Malaysia and the Netherlands. 1964 - 1971, inv. nos. 233 and 234

Confidential documents, 1955- 1964:

91 1 .0 Malaysia - Singapore. 1 955 - 1 959, box 9

912.20 Malaysia - Singapore, 1957 - 1961, box 9

912.1 O Netherlands - Malaysia, 1964, box 1 3

91 2. l O lndonesia - Malaysia. 1956 - 1958, box 1 3

MISSION ARCHIVES KUALA LUMPUR:

Period 1 957 - 1 965:

1 O Mission reports, 1958 - 1965, box 1

102 Establishment and upgrading of the mission in Kuala Lumpur. 1957, box 1

130.1 Details of staffing, 1957 - 1965, box 2

600 Genera! economie reports on Malaya - Malaysia, box 6

610.30 Economie and technica! assistance and cooperation with Malaya, box 6

810.3

810.4

823.71

Museums. libraries. archives, collections, box 9

Lectures, box 9

Exhibitions. box 1 0

912.20 Malaya -The Netherlands. box 1 4

Period 1 965 - 1984:

912.0 Visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs to Malaysia, 1 980, inv. no. 1 6

913.0 Visit by Prime Minister Van Agt to Malaysia, 1982, inv. no. 1 7

9 1 4.0 ASEAN, 1967, inv. no. 41

600 Economie cooperation between the Netherlands and Malaysia, 1975 - 1 978, inv. nos. 57 and 58

912.20 Position of the Netherlands in Malaysia, 1965. inv. no. 161

48

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