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PPR 227 Foreign Policy of Contending Powers - Coursework Assignment 1

“American power and influence in the world is in a state of irreversible decline”. Discuss.

Power and influence of the United States is in a state of decline but it is not irreversible and also not

a decline relative to other contending powers. First, there are few constraints on the actions of the

US as a hegemon and these are not gradually tightening. Secondly, despite the US economy and

political function becoming increasingly less potent, it has re-emerged from economic complications

before, and is more than capable of doing so again. Third, other contending powers such as Brazil,

Russia, India, China (BRIC) and the EU, have become noticeably influential militarily, politically

and/or economically so that in some matters US chooses to no longer act independently without

their consent. However, economic problems that the US faces are not unique to the superpower,

and each potential rival has its own internal instabilities that prevent them from challenging the US.

Finally, the US has established its political connections around the world and with an ideological

accord, more so than potential contenders. Even if other economies surpass an arbitrary threshold

it will not force the US to withdraw from its hegemonic position.

In politics, the term power refers to the ability to influence and alter the actions, thought, or

behaviour of other social groups, organisations, cultures or countries. Power is also the ability to

discourage an actor (on the international stage) from taking an action they otherwise would have1.

Social psychologists John R. P. French and Bertram Raven suggested that there are five bases of

power which are as follows: Coercive, Reward, Legitimate, Expert and Referent2. Most are

1 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press,

Page 427 2 http://changingminds.org/explanations/power/french_and_raven.htm

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complimentary or interdependent. For example, an authority (legitimate power) without the power

to enforce it (coercive power) will be meaningless, as the League of Nations was in the 1930’s.

Since the Pax Americana era and for most of the American (20th) century, the US has attained of all

of these types which it still holds today. The first argument is that the US not only remains the sole

superpower, but also faces comparatively weak systemic constraints on the global exercise of its

power3. ‘There are 192 member states of the United Nations. To have troops stationed in more than

nine of every ten countries on earth is beyond the wildest dreams of any previous imperial power’4.

America’s president faced on many occasions this dilemma of backing up his Nobel Peace Prize

whilst simultaneously confronting international doubt arisen from the Iraq War after Bush. How

does the US remind the world of its inexhaustible power and influence in an era of increasing

peace5? Considering the decreasing frequency and intensity of conflicts globally in the past two

decades6, if Obama is less military active than his predecessors it does not mean that the US is

relatively less militarily active. This is why has Obama been criticized for withholding military action

in other scenarios. For example, the UN should be more condemning of the Syrian regime7 but

Russia and many Americans were not keen on intervening in Assad’s chemical weapon controversy.

Obama, despite being more than capable of acting anyway, decided to avert these strikes to avoid

disapproval of allies. Unfortunately for Obama’s reputation, if he does not fully utilise the military

might of the US contending powers may question, as some have, the authority the US imposes on

the international stage. This view can be misleading and cause analysts to jump to conclusions (as

the declinists have). 3 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press,

Page 410 4 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/boxed-constraints-us-foreign-policy

5 David Barash and Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies Third Edition, 2014 SAGE publications, page 14

6 David Barash and Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies Third Edition, 2014 SAGE publications, page 16

7http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/17/why_has_the_un_given_assad_a_free_pass_on_mass_m

urder_syria?page=0%2C0

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Since his inauguration in January 2009, Obama has conducted numerous operations in areas of

political conflict: diplomatic discussions about nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea8, drone

attacks in Pakistan9, intervention in Libya on the plea of the Arab League10, the killing of Osama Bin

Laden11, and more. Each of these is a distinct example that there is no leash around America’s neck.

Perception of a country’s power and influence is therefore just as important as the reality of its

power and influence. In short, the constraints on US foreign policy are very limited and so any

restraint would be more caused by domestic economic problems in the US, but nonetheless neither

of these is sufficient to revoke the US’s global dominance.

The second argument is that these economic issues - although causing greater strain on the US than

other countries – are relatively inconsequential and the US has recovered from them before.

Declinists argue that the financial crisis in 2007/2008 was a clear turning point into accelerating

decline. Additionally, the American economy has amassed a national debt of over $17 trillion12, a

Federal deficit of around $600 billion, and trade deficit of $40.6 billion. However, as seen in the

graph shown on the next page, there is a trend of stability and the capability to recover in

unexpected discomforts as shown in 2009. This is a good indicator of the exaggeration of US

economic decline.

8 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119861.htm

9 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/world/asia/04drones.html

10 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/libya-no-fly-zone-united-nations

11 http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/osama-bin-laden-is-killed-by-us-forces-in-

pakistan/2011/05/01/AFXMZyVF_story.html 12

http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2013-10-21/us-national-debt-over-17-trillion-surges-328-billion-single-day

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Image from: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://docbea.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/trade_124.png

According to the IMF, the US is the sovereign most pivotal for facilitating global economic growth, in

the wake of the slowdown in China and other major emerging economies13.‘For all the economic

strength of Europe (which may be waning) and of China (which is certainly waxing), the United

States is still immensely and unprecedentedly rich, while military might and economic strength are

combined with a matchless cultural dominance’14. Declinist arguments feature a near myopic focus

on aggregate GDP, but for referent power GDP/capita (PPP) is much more important; where PPP of

US = 49,965, EU = 33,527, and China = 9,23315).

13

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/global-economic-growth-fo_b_4166587.html 14

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/boxed-constraints-us-foreign-policy 15

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc

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Since WW2, the US has largely been able to avoid making difficult ‘guns or butter’ decisions precisely

because of its hegemonic role in the international economy16. USD’s role as the international

system’s reserve currency allows the US to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot.

As long as the international community believes that the US will repay its debts, and that

uncontrollable inflation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the US can finance its external ambitions

and domestic socio-economic programmes by borrowing money17. Due to established diplomatic

relations, this position will be accountable to more than just flat GDP. In all, the US economy is still

the single largest national economy and its problems are watched closely thus by no means

irreversible.

The third argument is that potential super powers have their own interior problems which amass

the already established US influenced world prevent them from exceeding the superpower. Counter

arguments to the declinist’s predicaments suggest that potential superpowers’ status as an

emerging superpower is more perceived than it is real.

From the most threatening candidates, the EU is on par with the US and most of its ideology with a

long history of cooperation to support it. McCormick argues that the nature of power has changed

since the Cold War-driven definition of superpower was developed; he argues that control of the

‘means of production is more important than control of the means of destruction’. Even if this were

the case, there would be no challenge or incentive to take on its role. As it was during the Cold War,

Europe needs the US much more than vice versa. Owen suggests “to make the USA more responsive

to European preferences, the EU would have to enhance its own military might. However, Europeans

will prefer to avoid the costs of doing so, because their security is not threatened by a powerful USA

16

Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press, page 418 17

Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy Second Edition, published 2012 Oxford University Press, page 416

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which shares European liberal values18”.

Declinist or not, one cannot ignore the spectacular rise of China. However, ‘China is far from being

considered a trustworthy ally to the international community, sitting on the periphery of many

international decision-making processes, for a number of reasons19’:

China has yet to disavow the brutal oppression of President Bashar al-Assad, and, along with

Russia, has held up UN resolutions condemning the regime.

China is also North Korea's last ally, a thoroughly unfortunate distinction.

A massive population implies that GDP per capita would be significantly lower in China, given

that both economies are similar in bulk. (PPP of US 49,965, EU 33,527, and China 9,23320)

China's relationship to human rights is anything but progressive.

Censorship of the press and the Internet, restrictions on freedoms of religion, expression,

association, prohibition of many independent labour unions and organizations, and the

repressive policies against many people in Western China and Tibet spell trouble for the

leaders in Beijing on the international stage21.

“Even though the US is no human rights saint, she currently holds legitimacy with a team of allies

who prize consistency and stability, making a global shift in power highly unlikely22”.

If China continues on this path of questionable governance and cavorting with questionable allies,

no serious block of internationally influential states will support a Chinese hegemony over the

current US one. As a synopsis, China will remain a strong regional and international player, but one

that plays second fiddles to the US

The final argument is that the US is politically and ideologically connected with enough of the world

18

http://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG1_2003/ARTOWEN.HTM 19

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/why-us-hegemony-is-here-t_b_4258264.html 20

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc 21

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/why-us-hegemony-is-here-t_b_4258264.html 22

Ibid.

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to retain its hegemonic status, and therefore is not in relative decline to other powers. International

legitimacy is derived from and defined by a global coalition of the willing – this is where the US

reigns supreme,23 and their ace in the hole. ‘Until this allegiance to the US breaks down, she will

remain the absolute world superpower24’. The US wields a power of influence, persuasion, and

leadership on the international stage that no other state comes close to. She sets international law,

ignores international law, and is accountable to no one. China, while clearly jockeying for authority

and power, does not yet have legitimacy.

Even if the USD role as International System Reserve Currency is under question, simply because of

the already established preferable association in the international community this will not change,

particularly not to China.

Members of the G8 or even G20 such as the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, etc. will not simply

support China the moment its GDP crosses some arbitrary threshold. “The United States and China

perceived that they needed each other because both were too large to be dominated, too special to

be transformed, and too necessary to each other to be able to afford isolation25.” If anything, in a US

confrontation with China, the vast majority of Asian nations will seek to avoid choosing sides26,

which is still in favour of the US.

A good example is the recent French invasion of Mali, where it was the US who provided the

23

Ibid. 24

Ibid. 25

Henry Kissinger, On China, Published 2011, New York: The Penguin Press, page 487 26

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201533.html

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necessary support27, in effect running the operation to combat Islamic militants. It is unlikely the

world will see a scenario where France, a country with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,

calls first on China over the US. Undoubtedly, China has a regional influence increase substantially in

recent years. A situation in which it is the Chinese and not the US to lead a successful international

coalition of allies is unrealistic.

Kang suggested "There's not a lot of evidence that China is picking a fight with the United States28".

Regardless, the US has and will continue to take assertive measures against Chinese aggression in

fear of the possibility of Hu Jintao’s ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’ becoming side-lined29. This can be

interpreted as increasing frequencies of power struggles where the US takes preventative and

aggressive measures against any signs of expansionism by China. A recent example was when Beijing

announced the right to monitor Senkakus30, a chain of islands off of Japan. “On November 23rd,

China's Ministry of Defense released a map showing part of its Air Defense Identification Zone

(ADIZ), a contested area in the East China Sea31” Fish explains. On November 25th the US flew two B-

52 bombers over Senkaku without informing Beijing. China's publication of the zone is undeniably a

provocation but it is also in line with international norms of airspace and transparency32. The US

Federal Aviation Administration warns of "use of force" in the "case of non-compliance33." In

scenarios like this the US is taking action can imply the US feeling genuinely threatened by Chinese

expansionism. Likewise, it can also be seen that the US chose to demonstrate its dominant position

in most global affairs and shows that it is not afraid to oppose China if need be. Whether or not

China is challenging the US in a way that is subtle, outright, or not at all - this does not change the

27

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/16/so-why-did-france-invade-mali-anyway 28

http://www.cfr.org/china/promise-pitfalls-chinas-peaceful-rise/p10446#p9 29

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status 30

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/26/imitation_is_the_securest_form_of_flattery_china_us_national_security 31

Ibid. 32

Ibid. 33

Ibid.

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relative US power and influence in the world.

From history we do learn that sudden sprouts of hegemonic countries are doomed to fall into an

over-confidence stimulated trap of strategic overstretch. Expansion creates enemies who in fear

for their own survival unite against the perpetrator and soon restore the previously existing balance

of power. As was Vienna in 1815, Versailles in 1919, Yalta/Podstam in 1945 and the Soviet downfall

in 1989 restoring the power equilibrium was difficult to maintain. However, with the increasingly

gradual and prolonged rise of the US, a shift in the balance of power dynamic in the 21st and now

globalized century is very different and requires more than economic or military potency. It requires

ideological values (such as democracy and an appreciation of human rights as in the case of the US),

reputable and influential allies which other countries not only agree with but can look up to. From

this it can be deduced that (impending) external drivers of decline are far outweighed by America’s

own internal drivers. For the time being at least, the US is showing and is in no danger of losing its

allies or influence.

Ultimately, despite visible political dysfunction and detriments in the US economy it’s political and

military status is still inexorably that of a world hegemon and this is unlikely to change in the near

future. In a multilateral world where nuclear weapons are more abundant they act as a deterrent

which disincentives any military confrontation between them. This makes the military a less

important factor when asserting power and influence on potential superpowers. This does however

make the military very important when asserting coercive power and influence onto non-

superpower countries or entities. With the US military consisting of 43% of the world’s military

spending34, the US is comfortably the monopoly of military power. The US economy is

approximately a quarter of nominal global GDP, and has the highest Purchasing Power Parity of any

34

http://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/

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economy. Despite also having the largest debt and indications of decline, the US economy is still

sufficiently strong to retain its hegemonic role in world politics. Goldman Sachs annual report stated

that only by 2050 the BRIC economies can eclipse that of the G635, and each potential contender has

its own restraints that make the US in better position of holding onto the hegemonic role. Brazil is

experiencing a cultural and economic boom making it influential in South America but has a severe

income gap and a significant impoverished population. Russia’s population is shrinking and the

labour market is suffering ‘brain drain’, paving the way towards “global irrelevance36”. India is

relatively corruption free, a growing population and economy37, but “resists its own rise38” with a

muddled foreign policy and strategy for the future. Chinese human rights controversy and closed

nature do not inspire loyalty from other countries, particularly from the western hemisphere. In all,

speculation about the rise of contending powers is not undeserved but has been exaggerated in

many cases.

Candidate name: Alexander Wielgos

Candidate number: 3327 2417

Word count: 2583

35

http://www.goldmansachs.com/our_firm/investor_relations/financial_reports/annual_reports/2003/features/innovativebrics.html 36

http://www.newsweek.com/decline-putins-russia-its-way-global-irrelevance-65847 37

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-09/news/29382860_1_third-largest-economy-superpower-india-s-gdp 38

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139098/manjari-chatterjee-miller/indias-feeble-foreign-policy

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University Press

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/

David Barash and Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies Third Edition, 2014 SAGE

publications

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2013 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-white/why-us-hegemony-is-here-

t_b_4258264.html

Tania Branigan, China monitored US B52 Bombers’ flight through disputed air-zone, The

Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/27/china-air-defence-zone

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Published 2008 Cambridge University Press

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http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/boxed-constraints-us-foreign-policy