A practical guide to the comparative case study method in political psychology

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A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology Juliet Kaarbo University of Kansas Ryan K. Beasley Baker University The case study, as a method of inquiry, is particularly suited to the field of political psychology. Yet there is little training in political science, and even less in psychology, on how to do case study research. Furthermore, misconceptions about case studies contribute to the methodological barrier that exists within and between the two parent disciplines. This paper reviews the various definitions and uses of case studies and integrates a number of recent insights and advances into a practical guide for conducting case study research. To this end, the paper discusses various stereotypes of the case study and offers specific steps aimed at addressing these criticisms. KEY WORDS: case study, comparative method, research design. The field of political psychology has become increasingly populated with individuals capable of speaking both the language of political science and the language of psychology. This is valuable for building theory and understanding the nature of the empirical domains of interest. Methodologically, however, there remain some persistent obstacles between the two parent disciplines that, in our view, unnecessarily hinder empirical cross-fertilization and advancement. Both social psychologists and political scientists, for example, study the structure and content of mass belief systems, but tend to use different methods (experiments and surveys) and different statistical techniques (analyses of variance and regressions). Margaret Hermann (1989) has indicated that methodological differences between political science and psychology threaten to make the promise of a field of political psychology merely a fantasy. If we are going to continue to develop an interdisciplinary Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1999 369 0162-895X © 1999 International Society of Political Psychology Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

Transcript of A practical guide to the comparative case study method in political psychology

A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case StudyMethod in Political Psychology

Juliet KaarboUniversity of Kansas

Ryan K. BeasleyBaker University

The case study, as a method of inquiry, is particularly suited to the field of politicalpsychology. Yet there is little training in political science, and even less in psychology, onhow to do case study research. Furthermore, misconceptions about case studies contributeto the methodological barrier that exists within and between the two parent disciplines. Thispaper reviews the various definitions and uses of case studies and integrates a number ofrecent insights and advances into a practical guide for conducting case study research. Tothis end, the paper discusses various stereotypes of the case study and offers specific stepsaimed at addressing these criticisms.

KEY WORDS: case study, comparative method, research design.

The field of political psychology has become increasingly populated withindividuals capable of speaking both the language of political science and thelanguage of psychology. This is valuable for building theory and understanding thenature of the empirical domains of interest. Methodologically, however, thereremain some persistent obstacles between the two parent disciplines that, in ourview, unnecessarily hinder empirical cross-fertilization and advancement. Bothsocial psychologists and political scientists, for example, study the structure andcontent of mass belief systems, but tend to use different methods (experiments andsurveys) and different statistical techniques (analyses of variance and regressions).Margaret Hermann (1989) has indicated that methodological differences betweenpolitical science and psychology threaten to make the promise of a field of politicalpsychologymerelya fantasy. Ifwearegoing tocontinue todevelopan interdisciplinary

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0162-895X © 1999 International Society of Political PsychologyPublished by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

language, methodological dialogue must replace the current tendency towardsimultaneous monologues.

Nowhere is the methodological gulf in understanding wider than when politi-cal psychologists contemplate case study research (Tetlock, 1983). Indeed, areview of the articles published inPolitical Psychologyover the past decade revealsthat the case study is one of the most popular methods, but is most often used bypolitical scientists—especially those who study American leadership, internationalrelations, and comparative politics.1 Psychologists who publish in this journal tendto use survey, experimental, or content-analytic techniques.2 Psychologists onlyoccasionally use the case study method.3

Practitioners of case study research, whether political scientists or psy-chologists, lack a common language for their investigation. Alexander George’s(George, 1979; George & Bennett, in press; George & McKeown, 1985; George& Smoke, 1974) method of “structured-focused” comparison is perhaps the mostused resource for those engaging in this methodology. His articulation of theprocedures involved in the case study method have provided a sturdy methodologi-cal foundation for hosts of empirical investigations. Yet many are less thanforthright in articulating the rationale of their chosen methodology. Indeed, Ragin(1987) suggested that “most investigators who use case-oriented strategies . . . arenot self-consciously methodological; that is, they do not regard the case-orientedstrategies they use as formal methodologies” (p. 34).

Although there has been a resurgence of attention to the case study methodwithin a variety of disciplines (see, e.g., Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg, 1991), we arguethat there has been insufficient attention to and internalization of these develop-ments within political psychologists’ parent disciplines. This is true despite thedegree to which many political scientists embrace this technique and the tendencyfor many psychologists to eschew it. Our purpose here is to summarize and integratea number of these recent insights and advances into a practical guide for conductingcase study research, thereby providing greater direction and a common languagefor those engaging in this type of research and highlighting the merits and value ofthis technique for those more inclined to avoid it. Toward this end, we draw on

1 Recent examples of case study research in these subfields include Fishel’s (1992) case study of aCalifornia legislator’s development over time, Gilbert’s (1995) case study of President Johnson forthe political effects of illness, Steinberg’s (1991) case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the roleof shame and humiliation in conflict deterrence, Farnham’s (1992) case study of Roosevelt during theMunich Crisis as an example of prospect theory, and Groth and Britton’s (1993) case study of theSoviet Union for the psychopolitical foundations of a garrison state.

2 Recent examples of research with these techniques include Fife-Schaw and Breakwell’s (1990) surveyof teenagers to predict the intention not to vote, Milburn and McGrail’s (1992) experiment on theeffects of cognitive complexity of news presentation, and Suedfeld’s (1992) content analysis ofnewspaper editorials during times of positive and negative relations between pairs of countries.

3 Exceptions include Raven’s (1990) case study of the MacArthur-Truman relationship as an exampleof interpersonal influence and Tiedens’ (1997) comparative case study of two Polish ghettos for violentresistance during the Second World War.

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numerous writings on the case study and comparative case study methods. We arenot intending to provide an array of novel reasons to use the case study method.Rather, we are attempting to integrate observations regarding this method into acoherent program for its use in a research effort, with particular attention to thefield of political psychology. In this sense, we are not comparing the case studymethod to other methodologies, but instead are attempting to address variousperceived shortcomings and stereotypically founded criticisms within a practicalguide for actually doing case study research.

In this effort, we explicitly avoid any direct discussion of numerous andengaging epistemological issues that are part of the current debate in politicalscience on the value of interpretation and the role of positivism in the socialsciences.4 The case study method is particularly prone to evoke discussions of thenature of theories, the possibility of general laws governing human behavior, andother fundamental issues of investigation. Although important, these issues are notcentral to our discussion. Instead, our effort concerns the basic decisions andchoices that must be made in the practical application of the case study method.

In both political science and psychology, there exists a stereotype of the casestudy that includes an idiosyncratic, historically specific, and atheoretical charac-ter; a lack of control; an inability to generate a sufficient number of data points totest theory; and a highly suspect “interpretive” character that allows the analyst todraw favorable conclusions about hypotheses and to find support where no suchsupport exists. Certainly, the ways in which case studies have been performed andused have frequently been rather divergent from the standards of systematic inquirycurrently widely accepted in both political science and psychology.

The reasons that the case study has fallen between the stools of methodologicalrigor and empirical value are numerous. Among political scientists, the compara-tive case study is often equated with cross-national comparison. The writings oncase study research tend to be associated with the subfield of comparative politicsand are not widely read in other subfields. Further, political scientists have paidinsufficient attention to recent discussions of the comparative method and casestudy research found in public administration and sociology. Psychologists, on theother hand, tend to associate case study research with the clinical “case” or patientanalysis and are generally unaware of the political science scholarship on the useof case studies. Overall, we believe that political psychologists could be made moreaware of the different meanings of case study, the different types or purposes ofcase study research, and the steps involved in case study research design, and thatthey can make good use of the method as part of a systematic comparativemethodology without necessarily succumbing to its traditional pitfalls.

4 See, for example, the “Review Symposium: The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Gary King,Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba’sDesigning Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in QualitativeResearch” in the American Political Science Review(1995); George and Bennett (in press).

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Defining “Case Study”

The terminology pertaining to “case studies” is frequently confusing. Ragin(1987) noted that “the term ‘case’ and the various terms linked to the idea of caseanalysis are not well defined in social science, despite their widespread usage andcentrality to social scientific discourse” (p. 1). For example, a “case” may be asingle instance or data point, such as a subject in an experiment, a survey respon-dent, or the non-occurrence of war between belligerents (King, Keohane, & Verba,1994). Alternatively, it may be a uniquely bounded phenomenon in a historical orgeographical sense, such as the case of Munich, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,or the Watts riots. Indeed, the term “case” can have a variety of meanings, eachwith important implications regarding empirical investigation.

When the term “case” is joined by other terms such as “study,” “analysis,” or“method,” the picture does not become any clearer. For example, Orum et al. (1991)defined a case study as “an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitativeresearch methods, of a single social phenomenon” (p. 2). Lijphart (1971, 1975) sawthe case study as a single case that is closely associated with the comparativemethod, as contrasted with experimental and statistical methods. George andMcKeown (1985) indicated that a case study focuses on within-case analysis toevaluate claims about causal process. Finally, Yin (1994) defined a case study as“an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within itsreal-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and contextare not clearly evident; and . . . [that] relies on multiple sources of evidence”(p. 13). Clearly there are different definitions of cases and case studies, and thishas made systematic analyses of the value and purposes of this technique difficult.

We recognize that coming to some consensual understanding of the terms“case,” “case study,” or, more generally, the “case method” is extremely difficult(see Ragin & Becker, 1992), yet without some understanding of what these termsare meant to convey, it is even more difficult to offer any practical guidance incarrying out an investigation. For our current purposes, we offer basic definitionsof several terms. We consider acaseto be an instance, or a data point, and in thissense we do not draw any distinctions about how a “case” is further defined orarrived at in an investigation. Cases can be experimentally derived measurements,survey responses, or classifications of historical events (such as “war/no war”). Wedefine acase studyto be a method of obtaining a “case” or a number of “cases”through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturallyoccurring context, without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or thecontext. Thecomparative case studyis the systematic comparison of two or moredata points (“cases”) obtained through use of the case study method.

This definition has a number of implications. First, we do not assume aparticular purpose of the investigation, such as developing causal inferences ordetailing historical occurrences. A case study can be used for a variety of purposes,several of which we articulate below. Second, we do not assume that multiple

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sources of evidence must be used (as does Yin’s definition above), although wesuspect that this will frequently be necessary. The case study, in other words, oftenuses a number of techniques for gathering information—from interviews to surveysto content analysis—but it is not necessary to use multiple sources or types ofevidence in order to perform a case study. Third, we offer no particular distinctionbetween qualitative and quantitative aspects of a case study, nor do we draw aparticular distinction between narrative and analytic aspects (see Abbot, 1992;King et al., 1994). Indeed, we feel that case studies can be very qualitative andnarrative in form, and they can be very quantitative and analytic in form. Fourth,the issues of context and manipulation are central to our definition. The phenome-non is studied as it occurs within its context, and neither the phenomenon nor thecontext are directly manipulated by the researcher. Finally, our definition allowsfor comparison of several case studies and is not limited to single case studies.5

Types of Case Studies

Our definition of the case study does not imply a single purpose for aninvestigation. Indeed, there are many uses of case studies that have been outlinedby a variety of scholars (e.g., Eckstein, 1975; Lijphart, 1971; Van Evera, 1996;Yin, 1994). In our effort to offer a practical guide for the case study method, wecondense these previous discussions into a single, accessible form. In doing so, wehope to highlight the potential value of case studies for a variety of purposes aswell as lay the foundation for our arguments regarding the need for greatersystematicity in comparative case studies when theory development or testing isthe goal. We present the different uses or types of case studies as though theinvestigator will be using a single case study, although this typology in no waylimits analysts to investigate only one case at a time.

Using Cases for Description

The first type of case study is what Lijphart (1971) referred to as “atheoretical”and what Eckstein (1975) called “configurative-idiographic.” Here the analyst isprincipally interested in the case itself, and is typically attempting to gain aGestaltor holistic picture of the event or phenomenon. Generally, with this use of casestudies, the analyst is more interested in the case than in some theory or hypothesis.Certainly description requires some preconceived ideas or points of reference thatmight be considered the foundation of theory, but the principal purpose of the case

5 Several scholars within the social sciences have written extensively about the importance and purposeof the comparative method (see, for example, Collier, 1993; George, 1979; Lijphart, 1971, 1975;Ragin, 1987). The comparative method should, in our view, be distinguished and disentangled fromthe issues surrounding case studies and the case study method. Comparison is the very foundation ofscientific methodology. In other words, comparison need not be distinguished from other methods,but can be considered to be a foundation of methodology itself.

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study does not directly involve that set of preconceived ideas. Rather, the case ismeant to be an end in and of itself. With this use of the case study we often observeanalysts using intuitive and descriptive accounts that attempt to lead to somegeneral “understanding” of the case.6 The use of the term idiographic (as contrastedwith nomothetic) quite directly indicates that the case will not be generalizable orthat the case study will not seek to establish general rules of behavior.

Using Theory to Explore Cases

In contrast to the “configurative-idiographic” or “atheoretical” case study,a researcher may choose to use some theory or set of hypotheses to direct hisexamination of a particular case. This use of the case study is “disciplined-configurative” (Eckstein, 1975) or “interpretive” (Lijphart, 1971). Here, the focusis still on the case, but the analyst explicitly uses some theoretical foundation inorder to examine or interpret the case. Although there may be some “feedback”from the case to the theory—such as whether the theory is inappropriate forunderstanding the case, or whether no theory currently exists that effectivelyilluminates the case—the focus is still mainly on the case. After such an endeavor,we should know the case in a “theoretically familiar” form. Here, however, thepurpose of the analyst may be to provide a mechanism whereby changes can beeffected on a particular organization, institution, or actor that was the subject of the“interpretive” case study. In other words, the interpretation of the case may bedesigned to effect changes along the lines of the given theory. The interest remainson the case (or the actor or actors of the given case), but the theoretical interpretationof the case may provide some prescriptive leverage.7

Using Cases to Develop Theory

The third type or use of case studies is what has been termed “hypothesis-generating” (Lijphart, 1971) or “heuristic” (Eckstein, 1975) case studies. Here theanalyst specifically investigates a case in an effort to develop testable hypotheses.In this sense, the case study is being used to build theory; the analyst examines a

6 Some might argue that this type of case study should be further divided into “historical” and“interpretive,” with the former being an attempt to present events or circumstances in an effort toreveal the case, and the latter being an attempt to gain an understanding of the case from the perspectiveof the actors involved. We, however, have not opted to divide this particular use of the case studyalong these lines, as our intention is to provide a more general set of uses of the case study. Further,following Ragin (1987), we consider that interpretive approaches to case studies are not in competitionwith other types of approaches.

7 Freudian analysis applied to a patient, for example, interprets the patient’s past behaviors and activitiesaccording to a more or less defined theory, often for the purpose of changing the patient according tothat interpretation. Decision analysts may evaluate the past behavior of an organization according totheories about group performance specifically to offer modifications in the organization’s compositionor behavior according to that theory’s prescriptive implications for the case.

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specific set of concepts in order to develop generalizable theory from particularinstances. The selection of cases is based on the nature of the theory that is beingconstructed, rather than on a particular case that is otherwise of some interest tothe researcher. The focus, in other words, shifts from being explicitly on the caseto being explicitly on the theory. In these types of case studies, the analyst istypically looking at fewer variables than would be true for the configurative-idiographic case study, which uses a moreGestaltapproach to the investigation,and specifically attempts to develop a broad and informed picture of the case. Thisis very similar to the sort of “introspective examination” that psychologists oftenengage in as they are constructing a hypothesis regarding individual behavior orcognition. They might, for example, ask themselves “how do I, as an expert, thinkabout things” when they are attempting to develop a theory of expert cognition.8

Using Cases to Explore and Refine Theory

Another use or type of case study increasingly focuses the analyst on a specifictheory. This has been termed a “plausibility probe” by Eckstein (1975), whosuggested that plausibility “means something more than a belief in potentialvalidity plain and simple . . . [and] something less than actual validity, for whichrigorous testing is required” (p. 108). Here the analyst is presumably interested inperforming some labor- or cost-intensive study, and thus is benefited by examiningcertain aspects of the theory at stake within the confines of an empirical instance.It is an inductive feedback device within the context of the particular empiricaldomain to which the analyst’s theory speaks. Further, this use of the case study isparticularly important with novel hypotheses or theories, such that an existing bodyof evidence cannot be referenced in speculating about the plausibility of a suspectedrelationship. This assists the analyst in determining whether an empirical instanceof a particular phenomenon can be reasonably found, whether the operationaliza-tions of key variables are in concert with the data available, and/or whether theposited relationship or relationships between and among variables are consistentwith expectations.9 In this latter form, the plausibility probe helps to avoid a costlyexploration of an implausible explanation.

8 Using a case study as a “deviant case” (Lijphart, 1971) offers the potential for expanding the natureor scope of an existing theory. Here the analyst specifically chooses a case that deviates from thepattern predicted by theory, and then attempts to examine the case in an effort to uncover additionalvariables that may be lacking in the original theory. In this sense, the deviant case differs from aheuristic case study in that a theory already exists that is being examined. A deviant case, however, issimilar to a heuristic case in that both are attempting to establish new hypotheses or propositions. Inother words, the deviant case can elaborate a theory by suggesting new hypotheses or additionalconditions under which a certain relationship may or may not hold. In this sense, the deviant case andthe heuristic case are similar.

9 Goldmann (1988), in an appendix entitled “A Note on the Utility of Weak Theory and Weak Tests,”suggested that using the case study in a fashion similar to the plausibility probe is of value for “testing”weak theory, in that it can “lead to an improved understanding of the problems and possibilities ofoperationalization” (p. 227).

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This is very similar to many aspects of the pilot study in experimental methods.It is rare that an experiment is constructed in the office, run in the laboratory, andpublished in a journal in swift order. Experimental psychology is replete withefforts to probe the plausibility of an expected relationship, and the experimentalmethod is an iterative cycle that effectively incorporates numerous steps designedto refine theories and hypotheses before testing them.

Using Cases as Tests of Theory

Case studies can also be used as single tests of an established theory, either toconfirm or infirm (Lijphart, 1971) or to investigate a crucial case (Eckstein, 1975).The distinction between confirming and infirming rests principally in the nature ofthe findings, that is, whether they support the predictions of an existing theory(confirming) or whether they call that theory into question (infirming). In eitherevent, the process involves specifying in exacting fashion the variables to bemeasured and the hypotheses to be tested. Further, a case must be selected suchthat it fits the parameters of the theory that is being investigated. Once a populationis specified (in more or less precise form), then a sampling procedure that maxi-mizes random selection will tend to offer the most compelling interpretation to thegiven results of the study.10 Once performed, the case study will stand as a single“test” of a given theory, and the weight affordedthattest in terms of its commentaryonthattheory will be a function of the way in which the case was chosen, the theoryspecified, the variables operationalized and measured, and the conclusions drawn.

Some cases, it can be argued, offer the potential to make a particularly compellingstatement about the theory involved. This has been termed the “crucial case” study(Eckstein, 1975) and purportedly offers a critical test of a theory, in contrast to the“uncritical” or “routine” testofferedbyothercaseexaminationsofagiven theory.Here,the analyst intentionally selects a case where alternative explanations of a negativefinding(a findingother thanthatpredictedby the theory)arenotplausible.This requiresboth that the theory can be completely specified in terms of empirical expectations,and that a case exists such that mitigating factors do not exist. As Eckstein himselfacknowledged, this is rare within the social sciences, although how crucial a case iscan be considered along a continuum that allows more or less boisterous claims on thepart of the researcher regarding the support or lack of support afforded by the test.

Steps to Comparative Case Study Research

Much of the writing in political science on the case study method has focusedon justifying the case study or on the different purposes of case studies. There has

10For a discussion on the important and deceptively difficult question of populations and case studies,see Ragin and Becker (1992). See also Yin (1994) for a discussion of statistical generalization(generalizing to a population) versus analytical generalization (generalizing to a theory).

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been less attention paid to how to do case study research. Even in research methodstextbooks, chapters devoted to the case study give the student few guidelines forhow to construct a research design for the case study method (e.g., Baker, 1988;Isaak, 1985; Johnson & Joslyn, 1991). Our purpose in this section is to outline forresearchers who choose the case study method the important steps for case studyresearch. What issues are likely to arise in the design of case study research? Whatdecisions must the researcher face? What types of evidence are compatible withcase study research? These are the questions addressed in the following guidelines.In doing so, we want to integrate the advice from a number of fields and offer apractical guide for conducting case study research.

Although most of these steps to case study research would apply to many ofthe above uses or types of case studies and to single as well as multiple case studies,our treatment focuses on comparative case studies with the purpose of examininghypotheses as critically and systematically as possible. In other words, althoughthere is an important role for case studies in interpreting a single historical case andin serving as a heuristic for theory construction, we discuss the steps researcherswill take when they use the case study method to compare two or more cases inorder to draw implications about an existing theory or single hypothesis. We focuson this type of case study because it is the furthest afield from the “stereotype” ofcase studies as idiosyncratic, historically specific, and atheoretical. We do notintend to suggest that the other uses of the case study are not of value, or that manyof these steps could not be applied to improving the other types of case studies.Rather, we find it least confusing to present these steps with a particular use of thecase study in mind. However, many of the issues we discuss are not necessarilylimited to this purpose of the case study.

To date, the best guide for comparative case study research is AlexanderGeorge’s “method of structured, focused comparison” (George, 1979; George &Bennett, in press; George & McKeown, 1985; George & Smoke, 1974).11 Accord-ing to George (1979), the comparison is “focusedbecause it deals selectively withonly certain aspects of the historical case . . . andstructuredbecause it employsgeneral questions to guide the data collection analysis in that historical case”(pp. 61–62; emphasis added). George and his colleagues have outlined severaltasks for researchers who choose the structured, focused case comparison. Theseguidelines overlap significantly with the steps we discuss below, although weconsolidate some tasks, divide others, and integrate other scholars’ advice forconducting case study research in our discussion. Our aim is both to incorporateprevious discussions of case study research from other disciplines (e.g., publicadministration and sociology) and to offer guidelines for conducting case studiesthat are accessible and meaningful for political scientists, psychologists, andpolitical psychologists.

11In his recently published collection of “memos,” Stephen Van Evera (1996) also offered step-by-stepadvice for case study research.

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Of course, these steps are fairly standard in research design. They are thetraditional steps researchers follow when designing research using almost anymethod, yet they are rarely followed for case study research. The form that thesesteps take in comparative case study research differs somewhat from that for otherresearch methods. For example, how reliability is enhanced in a research design isdifferent for case studies than for experiments, although the same logic underliesreliability issues in both types of research. Thus, what follows is a discussion ofhow traditional research design issues play out in the comparative case studymethod.

Step 1: Identify Specific Research Question for Focused Comparison

The first step in comparative case study research, just as for any other method,is to formulate the specific research question. What phenomena do you want toexplain? What is the dependent variable? The type of research questions mostappropriate for case studies are “how” and “why” questions—that is, questionsfocusing on the underlying process, on the causal nexus between the independentvariables and the phenomena to be explained. Examples are “How do voters choosecandidates?,” “Why do unanimity decision rules produce compromise outcomesin group decision-making?,” and “How do leaders manage information inconsis-tent with their beliefs?” Frequency questions (“How often do different values ofthe dependent variable occur?”) are not appropriate for comparisons of a smallnumber of cases (Yin, 1994).

At this point, the researcher wants to focus the research on a specific phenome-non and be clear what class of events the research will address. Focusing theresearch question is an essential part of George’s “focused comparison” and isLijphart’s (1971) advice for dealing with the “too many variables” problem. AsLijphart (1971) argued, researchers comparing case studies “must avoid the dangerof being overwhelmed by large numbers of variables and, as a result, losing thepossibility of discovering controlled relationships” (p. 690). Developing a focusedresearch question is the best way to identify the most important variables. Theidentification of the class of phenomena is also a crucial part of this first step andwill help the researcher both to identify cases for selection and to answer thequestion “What is this a case of?” For example, suppose you are interested in therelationship between leaders’ personalities and decision-making outcomes. It isimportant at the outset to focus on what leaders you are interested in. In other words,does the research question apply to all leaders, or to leaders of particular countriesor types of political systems? Focusing on particular types of leaders would makethe identification of explanatory variables and case selection much more manageable.

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Step 2: Identify Variables From Existing Theory

The next question the researcher asks is “What independent or explanatoryvariables or conditions have been found or hypothesized to explain the dependentvariable?” This is usually accomplished by an extensive literature review. Theresearcher should then specify which aspects of existing theory will be singled outfor assessment, again focusing the research question. A large list of potentialexplanatory variables investigated in a small number of cases yields an indetermi-nate research design, and thus the case study researcher must choose a focused setof candidate explanatory variables to investigate (King et al., 1994). One advantageof case study research, however, is the ability to track other variables in the casesthat may not be the primary focused explanatory variable(s), but may be importantlater in the interpretation of the relationships discovered. This is not uncommon inexperimental studies, wherein measures are frequently taken for a host of variableswhether or not they are of central concern to the study.

The researcher should also make explicit which of the variables to be investi-gated are hypothesized to be most important for explaining the phenomenon. Inother words, does the theory suggest any ordering of the possible independentvariables? Are any conditions hypothesized to be necessary or sufficient? Hypothe-sized intervening relationships should also be specified at this point. Althoughmany research methods are aided by this a priori inventory of relationships amongvariables, the case study comparison requires it because this will drive the next stepof case selection.

Step 3: Case Selection

The most important (and difficult) stage in comparative case study research isthe selection of cases. Cases can, of course, be drawn randomly from a populationto eliminate the danger of selection bias. Yet drawing a random sample is often notpossible because the universe of cases is not known or is not accessible.12 At theheart of systematic investigations is the idea of control. To establish the relationshipbetween two or more variables, it is necessary to minimize variability in othervariables that may affect the investigated relationship. In the experimental method,this is approximated by dividing subjects into experimental and control groupsthrough some form of random assignment. With the use of certain statisticalmethods, the same type of control can be achieved through the use of partialcorrelations. Although here no “assignment” of subjects to conditions occurs, theinfluence of certain variables on the relationship being examined can be controlledfor statistically. Control for the comparative case study method is achieved through

12As King et al. (1994) indicated, random selection does not always solve the problem of selection bias.See Collier and Mahoney (1996) for an excellent and detailed discussion of the issues surroundingselection bias in qualitative research.

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case selection. There are three important tasks in selecting cases that involvecontrol: selecting comparable cases, selecting cases that vary on the dependentvariable, and selecting cases across subgroups of the population to address alter-native explanations.

3a. Comparable cases.Comparability is the heart of any scientific investiga-tion and thus is not unique to case study research (see Ragin, 1987, p. 1). Compa-rability is the basis of Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) “most similar systemsdesign” in which the researcher chooses cases as similar as possible to minimizethe number of explanatory variables.13 Without comparability, of course, theresearcher will not know if the variation seen in the cases is due to theexplanatory variable under consideration or to the other differences betweenthe cases (Lijphart, 1971). For example, suppose you are interested in howjuries aggregate individual preferences into a group decision and you hypothe-size that the size of the jury is the best explanation for this process. If your casesinclude juries from different cultures, different time periods, and different legalsystems, you do not know whether the differences in the group decision are dueto the explanatory variable (jury size) or to the other differences between thecases (culture, time period, and legal system). Thus, if you have reason tobelieve culture, time period, and legal system affect how juries make decisions,you would want to choose cases that are comparable on these dimensions inorder to focus on the effect of size.

Comparability depends on the theoretical basis of the study. Cases do not haveto be comparable on dimensions that do not (or are assumed not to) impinge on therelationship under investigation. Just as experimentalists are generally not con-cerned about (or at least tolerate) differing weather conditions on the multiple daysthat an experiment takes place (a problem not corrected by random assignment ofsubjects to groups), comparative case study researchers should not be concernedabout irrelevant differences in their cases. Building on the previous example, ifyour theory or previous evidence suggests that jury size affects the group aggrega-tion process regardless of culture, time period, or political system, these variablesdo not have to be considered to make cases comparable. This stands in contrast toDiesing’s (1971, pp. 187–188) advice to pick cases that are geographically similarand that have similar histories if the theory does not suggest relevant dimensionsfor comparability. The theory should be more capable of distinguishing impor-tant factors. Cases should not be chosen for comparability on non-theoreticallyderived properties.14 Instead, researchers should choose cases in an effort to

13Although Przeworski and Teune’s “most similar systems design” focuses on choosing comparablesystems, the same principle applies to any level of analysis.

14A prerequisite for choosing comparable cases is to define what a “case” or the unit of analysis is forthe investigation. Thus, choosing comparative cases directly follows from the first step of focusingthe research question and identifying the class of phenomena that the question addresses. Is a “case”a case of jury decision-making (for which any case of a jury decision would yield a comparable case),or is a “case” a case of jury decision-making in Western cultures, in the late 20th century, in

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control for known or suspected alternative causes of the relationship underinvestigation.

3b. Cases with variation in the values of the dependent variable.The mostbasic rule in case selection is that selection should allow for the possibility ofvariation in the values of the dependent variable (King et al., 1994). Withoutvariation in values of the dependent variable, the researcher cannot make any causalinference about the phenomenon because the same explanatory variables may bepresent in cases in which the phenomenon is absent. This problem led John StuartMill (1843/1974) to caution scholars against this “method of agreement,” andMill’s caution has been echoed by many later writers on the case study (e.g., Achen& Snidal, 1989; Collier, 1993; Geddes, 1990). Despite such advice, case studyresearchers continue to examine cases of deterrence failure (and not cases ofdeterrence success), cases of revolution (and not cases in which a revolution didnot occur), and cases of crisis decision-making (and not cases of routine decision-making). Such studies can eliminate a hypothesized explanation if it is not presentin the cases (Collier, 1995; Collier & Mahoney, 1996), but cannot conclude that afactor present in the cases is related to the dependent variable.

To ensure the possibility of variation in the values of the dependent variable,case study researchers have two choices: selecting cases based on variation in thevalues of an explanatory variable, and selecting cases based on variation in thevalues of the dependent variable (the latter being Mill’s “method of difference”).The first option, selecting cases based on categories of an explanatory variable,causes no inference problems and is therefore considered to be the best solution(King et al., 1994). With this strategy, for example, the researcher interested in therelationship between stress and the quality of decision-making would choose casesin which stress was present (or high) and cases in which stress was absent (or low)and then proceed to investigate how these independent variables related to thequality of decision-making.

One of the drawbacks to this strategy (and hence one argument for choosingthe second strategy of selecting cases based on variation in the values of thedependent variable) is that often it is the value of the dependent variable (i.e.,that a revolution occurred) that is already known to the researcher. If theresearcher already knows the values of the dependent variable, then this is thesame as selecting the cases on both the independent and dependent variables.This might cause bias in the case selection if the cases are chosen in such a waythat the independent variable matches up with the known value of the dependentvariable in the hypothesized direction (King et al., 1994). Furthermore, re-searchers are often inherently interested in explaining the dependent variable

common-law systems (for which cases must be comparable on these dimensions)? The definition ofthe unit of analysis must come from the researcher’s theoretical focus or from the population to whichthe hypothesis applies.

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(e.g., poor decision-making or revolutions); that is what motivates them to do thestudy. Choosing cases based on variation in the values of the dependent variablehastheadvantageofallowingtheresearcher tosaysomethingabout thedependentvariable under investigation upon its completion. If, using the previous example,cases in whichstress (the explanatory variable)was presentandabsentare chosenand stress turns out to be unrelated to decision-making quality (the dependentvariable), then this is all the research can conclude. If, on the other hand, cases ofgood and poordecision-making (the dependent variable)are chosen, then, even ifstress turnsout tobeunrelated, theresearchercan investigateothervariables in thecases that might be related todecision-makingquality.15

3c. Choosing cases across population subgroups.In addition to choosingcomparable cases that vary on the values of the dependent variable, case studyresearchers should consider choosing cases with an alternative explanation in mind.In other words, the case selection design may include variation across somedimension associated with an alternative explanation of the relationship beinginvestigated. What the researcher attempts to do in this step is to demonstrate thatthe relationship holds across different subgroups of a population. This gives theresearcher, upon the conclusion of the study, the opportunity to challenge analternative explanation.16

For example, if you are interested in how personality characteristics affect themaintenance of enemy images, in addition to choosing cases in which an enemyimage was maintained and cases in which an enemy image changed, you mightconsciously choose cases before and after the end of the Cold War. This caseselection would ensure that you could say something about the relationship underinvestigation, regardless of the time period. If cases only from the Cold War era oronly from the post–Cold War period were examined, you would be open to thecriticism that the study’s results only apply to that particular era. An alternativetheory might suggest that the nature of enemy images is completely different inthese two historical periods of the international system—that enemy images, forexample, are much more malleable in the post–Cold War world regardless ofpersonality characteristics. Of course, choosing cases across different subgroupsof a population proliferates the number of cases needed.17

The difference between choosing comparable cases (step 3a) and choosingcases across population subgroups (step 3c) concerns the expectations about the

15A final point in favor of choosing cases based on variation in values of the dependent variable is that,in many cases, researchers hypothesize multiple (often competing) explanatory variables. Thus,choosing cases based on the (single) dependent variable to ensure variation would be a simpler formulafor case selection. See Collier and Mahoney (1996) and Van Evera (1996) for additional issuesconcerning case selection and variation in the dependent variable.

16Choosing cases across subgroups associated with an alternative explanation to show the maximumleverage of the hypothesis is consistent with Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) “most different systemsdesign.”

17See King et al. (1994), chapter 5, for more specific advice on this issue.

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applicability of the hypothesized relationship. In choosing comparable cases, theresearcher is recognizing the limits of the hypothesis, arguing that it onlyapplies to cases that are comparable on a certain number of theoretically deriveddimensions. In choosing cases across subgroups, the researcher is purposefullystretching the investigation of the hypothesis across a variable derived from analternative explanation.

Step 4: Operationalize Variables and Construct a Case Codebook

The fourth major task in designing a comparative case study, and one that isoften overlooked, is to operationalize the variables under investigation. The re-searcher is essentially constructing a case “codebook” to guide the collection ofevidence for the variables in the study. Indeed, King et al. (1994) argued that suchrecording and reporting the way the data were collected is even more important incase studies than is case selection.

George (1979) conceived of the variables in the form of structured questionsthat the researcher asks in each case:

Using a standardized set of questions in the controlled comparison isnecessary to assure acquisition of comparable data from the several cases.In this way, the method of structured, focused comparison will avoid theall-too-familiar and disappointing experience of traditional, intensivesingle case studies in the past which, even when they were instances of asingle class of events, were not performed in a comparable way and hencedid not contribute to an orderly, cumulative development of knowledgeand theory about the phenomenon in question. Instead, as conducted inthe past, each case study tended to go its own way, reflecting the specialinterests of each investigator and often, somewhat opportunistically,being guided by the readily available historical data rather than by a welldefined theoretical focus. As a result, the idiosyncratic features of eachcase tended to shape the research questions differently. (p. 62)

George’s structured questions—the “structured” element of his “structured, fo-cused comparison”—are similar to what Yin (1994, p. 70) called a “case studyprotocol,” a list of case study questions and identification of potential sources ofevidence for answers.

Although we enthusiastically endorse George’s advice to investigate the samevariables across the set of cases in the form of structured questions, we argue thatthe case study researcher needs to go beyond structuring questions and to structureanswers as well. In other words, the same set of general categories of answers, orvalues of each variable, should guide the researcher across the cases. The key is tospecify in advance what is necessary for the case analyst to see in the evidence tocode a variable in a particular way, to make a judgment of its value. This allowsfor enhanced intracoder reliability (the case study analyst uses the same set of

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criteria to assign variables particular values) and provides a basis for intercoderreliability (the same set of criteria to assign variables particular values can beused by different analysts). In many case studies, of course, variables will bequalitatively judged on the basis of subjective interpretations of transcripts, diaries,etc., but even in this way, a priori categories of the possible variable values canincrease systematicity and reliability.

Just as in the construction of answers to surveys, the analyst should treat theoperationalizations of the possible values of the variables seriously. Operationali-zations should be general—applicable to the class of phenomena, not just to thespecific case under investigation—so that the case codebook could be applied tocases not in the study. Just as for any codebook, categories, to the extent possible,should be exhaustive for all possible answers in all cases. Of course, categoriesshould be mutually exclusive. If some variables have multiple indicators in theiroperational definitions, the researcher should specify a meta-decision rule fordeciding the value of the variable. For example, if there are several indicators forcoding a leader as a crusader personality and there are several indicators for codinga leader as a pragmatist personality, the codebook should specify how to deal withmixed evidence when indicators of both personality types are found in the evidence.

The exact nature of the operationalizations of the variables will, of course,depend on the data sources to be used in the investigation. One advantage of acomparative case study research design is that a variety of types of data andtechniques for extracting data can be used (Yin, 1994). Content analysis, surveydata, archive data, descriptive statistical analysis, focus groups, and interviews areall compatible, not competitive, with case study research. The use of multiplesources is one way to enhance the construct validity of operational definitions (Yin,1994, p. 34).18

In addition to specifying in advance the operationalizations of the variables,case study researchers can enhance the reliability and validity of case studies inother ways. Case study researchers can use judgments made for entirely differentpurposes by other researchers to avoid having measurements be influenced by thehypotheses (King et al., 1994). King et al. also advised using qualified experts tocode the variables who do not know the theory being tested. Even non-expert coderswho are blind to the hypotheses could demonstrate the intercoder reliability of thevariable measurements, although this may be difficult with certain types ofevidence.

Case study researchers may also consider conducting a pilot study: “The pilotcase is used more formatively, assisting an investigator to develop relevant linesof questions—possibly even providing some conceptual clarification for the re-search design as well” (Yin, 1994, p. 74). Pilot studies may be necessary when

18Yin (1994) also argued that the use of multiple sources of evidence allows the researcher to develop“converging lines of inquiry, [or] a process of triangulation” of data sources that makes conclusionsfrom case studies much more convincing (p. 92; emphasis in original).

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operationalizations do not exist from previous studies or are not specified com-pletely by the theory.19 After looking at a similar case with similar evidence thatwill not be included in the main study, the case analyst is often better able tofine-tune the operationalizations.

The tasks involved in the construction of a codebook—constructing structuredanswers and structured questions, identifying multiple sources of evidence, testingfor intercoder reliability, investigating pilot cases—may seem to be tedious workfor a small number of cases. Yet this step addresses the most often heard criticismof the case study: unreliability. Following rules for systematic extraction of data,and reporting these rules to readers, enhances the credibility of conclusions fromcase studies. Unfortunately, this step is rarely taken in case study research (George,1979).20

Step 5: Code-Write Cases

Once the codebook is constructed and the evidence is accumulated, thevariable should be coded and the results presented. These are actually two separatetasks. Indeed, Yin (1994) suggested creating a case study database, different andseparate from the report, arguing that “too often, the case study data are synony-mous with the evidence presented in the case study report, and a critical reader hasno recourse if he or she wants to inspect the database that led to the case studyconclusions” (p. 95).

In terms of presentation, the narrative remains the most used and preferredform (Yin, 1994). The narrative case study tells a story based on the variables andcoded values and allows the researcher to show the variables in their context.21Thisis a way to demonstrate the realism and temporal progression that is an advantageof the case study method.22 In the narrative, any uncertainty on the part of theanalyst should, of course, also be presented (King et al., 1994). The length anddetail of the narratives depends on the research question, the number of variables,and the number of cases.

Although the narrative form of presentation demonstrates the richness of thedata, it is not the only form available to the case study researcher and indeed canbecome impossible when a large number of case studies are involved. Alterna-tively, the case analyst can present a question-and-answer format or present only

19This is one of the uses of a case study to explore and refine theory discussed earlier.20Analysts are, of course, still free to observe variables not included in their codebook, and even to

question the particular operationalizations that they have chosen. A codebook should not hinder thevaluable insights afforded analysts as they examine phenomena in their naturally occurring context.These, however, should be noted as such when researchers report their findings.

21For a discussion of different purposes of case narratives, see Abbott (1992, pp. 62–80).22The narrative form also has the advantage of conforming to the way people think about events. As

Pennington and Hastie’s (1986) research demonstrates, people think in terms of stories, not in termsof comparing the values of variables in isolation.

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coded results in table form with short case descriptions in an appendix (Yin, 1994).Combinations of narratives and short descriptions might be used, depending on theresults. For example, the researcher might want to demonstrate in more detail thecases that fit or do not fit the hypotheses the best. In whichever form the case analystchooses to present the cases, the presentation of results should include more explicitdiscussion of method than is usually found in case studies (George & McKeown,1985).

Step 6: Comparison and Implications for Theory

After the cases have been coded for the variables, the case study analyst looksfor patterns within and across cases. In the congruence procedure, the analystdetermines whether any independent variables differentiate across the differentoutcomes of the dependent variable (George & McKeown, 1985). In other words,the analyst asks: Does the value ofx relate to the value ofy in the predicted way?

The analysis stage can follow another form of logic in which a patternpredicted by the theory is matched against the pattern seen in the cases. In otherwords, a number of different explanatory variables must be present and related toeach other in the right form for the hypothesis to be accepted. This technique of“pattern matching” is a key advantage of the case study method (Campbell, 1975;Collier, 1993). In pattern matching, a single predicted pattern can be compared tothe pattern observed in the cases or, alternatively, mutually exclusive rival patternscan be compared for their consistency with the pattern observed in the cases (Yin,1994, p. 108). This essentially increases the number of observations made withineach case study. In recanting his earlier “strong rejection” of the case study method,the well-known psychologist Donald Campbell (1975) applied the statistical con-cept of degrees of freedom to case studies. According to Campbell, theories usuallyhave a number of predictions that the social scientist uses to “pattern match” againsta single case. In other words, degrees of freedom in a case study means “testing”multiple implications of the theory.

When the pattern that is investigated is temporal in character, the case analystengages in what George and McKeown (1985) termed “process tracing” or inves-tigating a “decision process by which various initial conditions are translated intooutcomes” (p. 35).23 As Yin (1994) argued, “the ability to trace changes over timeis a major strength of case studies—which are not limited to cross-sectional or staticassessments of a particular situation” (p. 113). However, the data requirements forprocess tracing are considerably greater than for the simple congruence procedureand thus may not be practical for some case study research.

23For George and McKeown (1985), process tracing means more than the analysis of temporal patternswithin cases; it also involves interpretivism in that it is “an attempt to reconstruct actors’ definitionsof the situation” (p. 35).

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Examining the multiple implications of the theory or engaging in processtracing within a single case study also results in certain limitations that should bemade clear by the case analyst. Much like choosing comparable cases by minimiz-ing variation on alternative explanatory variables, examining patterns and pro-cesses through time within a single case study does not allow for any between-casesvariation. Although a particular observed pattern may or may not conform totheoretical predictions, it is difficult within a single case study to determine whethera particular set of observations is idiosyncratic to that case or not. Further, aparticular pattern of observations within a single case study could be due to theimpact of a causal factor that cumulates through time but which is thought to beindependent of the causal process revealed in the case. For example, a particularpattern of activity of presidential initiatives to secure approval of legislation mayreflect a predicted pattern of intensification through time due to a particularpersonality trait, but for a given president regarding a particular initiative it mayalso reflect a gradual accumulation of initial conditions such as public opinion,economic prosperity, or other non–personality-based factors. Of course, investi-gating more than one case study at a time helps to address some of these concerns,as patterns and processes noted within one case study can then be systematicallycompared to the other case studies that have been comparably performed.

Once the initial assessment of the theoretical implications is made, the casestudy analyst may want to “return” to the cases to investigate candidate explana-tions for the relationships discovered. In other words, certain interpretations arisingfrom the initial conclusions can often be discounted or suggested by analyzing the“extra” material included in the case studies. Although the researcher may need todesign a new research plan and select new cases to better “test” these implications,case study research can offer the researcher more material on which to buildspeculative interpretations of results. This is a heuristic value built into every casestudy research design.

Conclusions: Why Should Political Psychologists Care Aboutthe Case Study Method?

It is our hope that this examination of the case study method will help to guideresearchers in their use of this methodology and will begin to dispel severalstereotypical conceptions of the case study method. As we suggested at the outset,the case study has been plagued by various misconceptions, attributable more tothe way it has been used than to its actual potential. We have suggested that,although valuable as a tool for understanding idiosyncratic historical events, themethod is also valuable as a tool for generating and exploring theories and testinghypotheses. Further, we have offered various techniques for dealing with the issueof the ratio of observations to hypotheses. We have also offered, by way of a reviewof general design procedures, a set of steps for gaining some measure of control inthe comparative case study method. Although by definition our conception of the

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case study method disavows direct manipulation of either context or phenomenon,case selection procedures do allow a degree of discrimination in determiningrelationships between and among variables that is similar to that afforded byexperimental manipulation or statistical control. Finally, the resounding critique ofsubjectivity on the part of the researcher has been addressed by suggestingprocedures that can significantly improve the systematicity and reliability of thecase study method.

Beyond the general value of case study research, the case study method isparticularly suitable for political psychology. We base this proposition on MargaretHermann’s (1986) identification of the tenets of the field of political psychology.In her answer to the question “What is political psychology?” Hermann proposedfive common themes that characterize research in this area:

1. Focus Is on the Interaction of Political and Psychological Phenomena

2. Research Is Responsive and Relevant to Societal Problems

3. Context Can Make a Difference

4. Emphasis Is on Process as Well as Outcome

5. There Is a Tolerance of Multiple Methods for Gathering Data

Comparative case study research, we believe, is particularly relevant to the lastthree of Hermann’s tenets.24

First, case study research is relevant to the tenet that context can make adifference. Hermann (1986) wrote that “within political psychology there is ahealthy dialogue and debate” on the importance of contextual factors such as time,culture, and political structures, but that “there is a growing recognition that suchcontextual factors help not only to shape what an individual is like, but also to limitwhat an individual can do politically” (p. 3). Case study research internalizes thistenet, as “context” is part of the definition of the case study offered earlier in thispaper. Case study research means that a real-world phenomenon is investigatedwithin its naturally occurring context, with the recognition that context can makea difference.

Second, the case study method is consistent with the tenet that the process isas important as the outcome. Hermann (1986) argued that

psychological and political phenomena often seem to have their mostdirect impact on one another in determining political processes as opposed

24This is not to suggest that the case study method is not relevant to the first two tenets. Case studyresearch is certainly appropriate for the study of the interaction of political and psychologicalphenomena and for research that is responsive and relevant to societal problems. Indeed, ourdiscussion in this paper of case studies whose goal is intervention and the desirability of choosingcases based on variation in the values of an interesting dependent variable reflects this second tenet.Our point in this section, however, is that there is something about the case study methodin particularthat is consistent with the last three of Hermann’s tenets.

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to political outcomes. Once delineated in one political setting, descrip-tions of processes offer the possibility of generalization to other politicalcontexts with somewhat similar characteristics. By ascertaining whatsome of these cross-cutting processes are, political psychologists canbegin to build more general explanations and theories. (p. 3)

Case study research is often directed at identifying the underlying process. Asdiscussed above, the most appropriate research questions for case study researchare “how” and “why” questions. Furthermore, pattern matching (especially tem-poral pattern matching or process tracing), as a technique for analysis in case studyresearch, emphasizes the process by which initial conditions are translated intooutcomes. In this sense, process is central to most case study research.

Finally, case study research is compatible with political psychology’s toler-ance of multiple methods for gathering data. As Hermann (1986) wrote, “politicalpsychology appears not to be wedded to one type of methodology. Its practitionersemploy a variety of methods” (p. 3). Not only can the case study method serve tocomplement other research methods, it can also be multimethodological in itself,as a number of techniques (e.g., content analysis, archival analysis, interviews) canbe incorporated into a case study research design.25

Clearly, then, the case study method can be a valuable research tool and isparticularly suited to the needs and interests of those studying within the field ofpolitical psychology. In this light, it is unfortunate that some of the misconceptionsabout case studies have contributed to the methodological barrier between politicalscience and psychology. It has not been our argument here that the case studyshould supplant other methods, nor have we tried to systematically articulate eachadvantage and disadvantage associated with case study research relative to othermethods. Rather, we hope to have provided a practical guide to doing case studyresearch and in the process helped to dispel certain misconceptions and therebyfurther the development of a common language for political psychology.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Earlier versions of this paper were presented as part of the methods workshopseries at the Summer Institute of Political Psychology at The Ohio State University,1992–1997. We would like to thank the participants in those workshops, as theirquestions and comments helped to refine our thinking about this topic over theyears. We also thank Alexander George as well as the editors and anonymousreviewers for suggestions on earlier drafts. Correspondence concerning this articleshould be addressed to Juliet Kaarbo, University of Kansas, Department of PoliticalScience, 504 Blake, Lawrence, KS 66045. E-mail: [email protected]

25See Tetlock (1983) on the advantages of multimethod convergence in political psychology.

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