A LATE ANTIQUE DEBATE ON THE MATERIAL WORLD:

PLOTINUS’ DISCUSSION WITH THE GNOSTICS IN ENNEAD II

9 [33] By Nicola Spanu, PhD

LECTURE HELD AT THE DEP. OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW –

JUNE 2015

1. Plotinus’ life

Porphyry, the favorite among Plotinus’ disciples, conveyed to us a detailed biographical account of

his master’s life in his book entitled Life of Plotinus.

Plotinus was born in the Deltaic Lycopolis, in Egypt, in the year 204 A.D. Then he moved to

Alexandria of Egypt, where he became a disciple of Ammonius Saccas, of whom little is known;

Porphyry says that Plotinus started to be interested in philosophy when he was 28 years old.1

After spending 11 years at Ammonius’ school, Plotinus’ interest in philosophy had grown so much

that he decided to travel to the far East in order to acquire a deep knowledge of both Indian and

Persian philosophy; lured by the possibility of fulfilling his dream, he joined the military campaign

against the Persians organized by the Roman emperor Gordian III; unfortunately, however, the

Roman army was defeated and the emperor killed, so that Plotinus was forced to abandon his plans

and take refuge in the border town of Antioch.2

He arrived in Rome at the age of 40, during the reign of Philip the Arab.3 One of his first disciples

was Amelius Gentilianus, at that time an enthusiast follower of Numenius of Apamea, a very

famous middle-Platonic philosopher who lived in the 2nd

century A.D.4 Porphyry reports that he

met Plotinus in Rome in the year 263 A.D., during the reign of the Emperor Gallienus.5 Among the

disciples of Plotinus remembered by Porphyry there were physicians, poets, but also rich

businessmen like Castricius Firmus as well as members of the Roman senatorial aristocracy.6 Some

women too attended Plotinus’s school;7 Porphyry also reports that Plotinus tutored children whose

fathers were illustrious men of senatorial rank.8 Although Plotinus was always loved by his

disciples, only Eustochius the physician looked after him when he fell gravely ill (at that time he

was living in Campania, a region in Southern Italy); as for the favorite disciples, Porphyry was in

Sicily, where he was sent by Plotinus in order to recover from a serious depression; Amelius was in

the city of Apamea of Syria while Castricius was in Rome. Plotinus died in the year 270 at the age

of 66.9

2. A brief description of the Ennead II 9 [33]

The Ennead II 9 [33], the treatise some parts of which will be the topic of this paper and that I have

commented and translated into English from the Greek text edited by A.H. Armstrong,10

constitutes

the thirty-third of the fifty-four treatises that make up the entirety of Plotinus’s work, as it was

1 Porphyry, Porphyry on Plotinus. Ennead I., with an English translation by A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press – London: William Heinemann, 1966), 3. 5. 2 Porphyry, Porphyry on, 3. 5-20.

3 Ibid., 3. 25.

4 Ibid., 3. 45.

5 Ibid., 4. 5-10.

6 Ibid., 7. 5-50.

7 Ibid., 9. 5.

8 Ibid., 9. 5 – 20.

9 Ibid. , 2. 30.

10 See Plotinus, Ennead II. 1-9 with an English translation by A.H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, no. 441

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press – London: William Heinemann, 1966), 224-300.

preserved by Porphyry. Plotinus composed a first group of 21 treatises during the years 254-263

A.D.; a second group of 24 treatises, among which the Ennead II 9 is included, was written in the

years 264-268; finally, Plotinus wrote the remaining 9 treatises in the last two years of his life (268-

270).11

Although I have used the word ‘treatises’ with regard to Plotinus’ writings, they were not conceived

by him as systematic expositions of his own views,12

as a true philosophical treatise should be, but

as a series of written notes on the arguments discussed by him during his lectures13

and submitted to

a limited number of his disciples only.14

Plotinus asked Porphyry to reorganize and correct his

writings, which were included by him in six groups of nine treatises each, called Enneads from the

Greek word ἐννέα, meaning “nine”. By structuring Plotinus’ work in this way, Porphyry was able to

obtain what for him was the sacred number 54. Porphyry grouped Plotinus’ treatises that concern

moral philosophy in the first Ennead; those that discuss physics in the second and third; those

dealing with the Soul in the fourth; and those concerning the Intellect and the One, namely

Plotinus’s treatises on metaphysics, in the fifth and sixth Enneads.15

Even after Porphyry’s reorganization of Plotinus’ writings, they remained highly unsystematic

texts;16

this means that the interpretation of their content from a modern scholarly perspective can

be at times very challenging.17

In order to overcome this problem, the modern researcher must

immerse himself/herself in the text first, and then try to discover the basic argument on which the

secondary ones are grounded.

The quest for the basic argument of each treatise is sometimes made easy by the titles appended to

them. However, I must point out that these titles were not given by Plotinus himself but by those of

his disciples whom he considered worthy to read his writings, and, after he started working on the

edition of Plotinus’ work, by Porphyry himself.18

This means that the title of each treatise does not

always reflect Plotinus’ thought but that of his students.

A good example of this is the Ennead II 9 [33] itself, which was entitled by Porphyry19

Against the

Gnostics. Porphyry was particularly interested in studying Christianity and its different branches,

including Christian Gnosticism, as it is testified by his famous treatise entitled Against the

Christians.20

The modern reader, however, must not be misled by Porphyry’s interest in Christianity

and jump to the conclusion that the disciples whose views Plotinus engages with in the Ennead II 9

[33] were Christian Gnostics in the specific, heretical, meaning of this word.

In my book, on which this paper is based, I have tried to show that it is more accurate to say that

some Christian and Gnostic views were embraced by those of Plotinus’ disciples whom Porphyry

would label as ‘Gnostics’ and that they linked these Gnostic doctrines with many Platonic and

Plotinian concepts.

3. Interpreting the Ennead II 9 [33].

How then must the modern interpreter approach the study of the Ennead II 9? What was the

purpose of Plotinus delivering these lectures which were brought together into the Ennead II 9?

What is the Platonic background of Plotinus’s ‘Gnostic’ disciples with regard to their views?

11

With regard to the writing-up of Plotinus’s treatises see Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 4-6, 12-24. 12 Plotino, Enneadi, XIII. With regard to Plotinus’s way of writing his works see Denis O’Brien, ‘Comment écrivait

Plotin? Etude sur Vie de Plotin 8. 1-4’ in La Vie de Plotin. I, 329-367. 13

Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8, 28-30. 14

Ibid., 4. 15-17, 12. 15

Plotino, Enneadi, XIV-XV. 16

Ibid., XIII. 17

Ibid., XV. 18

Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 24. 2-3, 72. 19

Ibid., 16. 10-12, 44. 20 Porphyrius, Gegen die Christen, Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosoph.-hist. Kl.

1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1916).

In order to attempt to answer these questions, I had two methodological approaches at my disposal.

The first, which could be called the traditional one, because it has been constantly used by scholars

over the past century, is based on the idea that Plotinus’ Ennead II 9 is nothing but what Porphyry

indicated by the title: a polemical treatise written by Plotinus against those of his disciples who had

embraced Gnosticism before entering his school of philosophy.21

This approach is present in one of

the first academic studies of the Ennead II 9, namely Carl Schmidt’s treatise Plotins Stellung zum

Gnosticismus und Kirchlichen Christentum,22

where Schmidt grounds his detailed analysis of the

Ennead II 9 on the idea that this text is the theatre of the clash of two antithetical worldviews or

Weltanschauungen: the first championed by Plotinus, who is conceived of as the defender of the

classical tradition, especially the Platonic one; the second by his Gnostic disciples, who are seen as

the bearers of a new doctrine, namely Gnosticism, which they try to reconcile with Plato’s

philosophy though they regard Gnosticism as superior to Platonism.23

This reading of the Ennead II 9 is present in all the studies that followed Schmidt’s. In the

beginning of the twentieth century Richard Harder published his German translation of the Ennead

II 9,24

followed by his study on the connection between this Ennead, which is the thirty-third in the

chronological order, and the three Enneads that precede it, namely V 5 (32), V 8 (31) and III 8

(30).25

According to Harder all these Enneads originally formed one work, the so-called ‘große

Schrift’, divided by Porphyry into four parts in order to reach the sacred number of fifty-four

treatises.26

An apparently alternative view of the controversy between Plotinus and his Gnostic disciples

appeared in the fifties, when Hans Jonas published Gnosis und spätantiker Geist – Die

mythologische Gnosis,27

followed by its second part, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist, Von der

Mythologie zur mystischen Philosophie.28

Jonas’ approach seems to be the exact opposite of

Schmidt’s, because he thinks that Plotinus himself was heavily influenced by Gnosticism. Jonas

grounds his theory on a detailed analysis of some concepts present in Plotinus’ philosophy, like that

of τόλμα, a Greek word which refers to the ‘arrogance’ that led the Soul to fall from the spiritual

dimension; according to Jonas, the fact that Plotinus makes use of this concept clearly shows that he

was influenced by Gnosticism.29

However, although Jonas’ position seems to turn Schmidt’s approach upside down, it is still based

on the idea of a Weltanschauungskampf, because it regards Gnosticism as a conceptual whole that

came into collision course with Plotinus’ Platonism, seen as another autonomous system of thought,

and managed to turn it into a new doctrine, that is, Plotinus’ philosophy itself. In the same way,

Plotinus’ disciples tried to reconcile their Gnostic views with Plato’s and Plotinus’ philosophy in

order to establish their own doctrine (εἰς σύστασιν τῆς ἰδίας αἱρέσεως).30

21

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 10. 3-9. 22

Carl Schmidt, Plotins Stellung zum Gnosticismus und Kirchlichen Christentum (Leipzig, 1900). 23

Schmidt’s views have been discussed below, see 89-97. 24

Richard Harder, ‘Plotins Schrift gegen die Gnostiker,’ Die Antike 5 (1929): 53-84. 25

Id., ‘Eine neue Schrift Plotins,’ Hermes 71 (1936): 1-10. For a detailed analysis of the “große Schrift” see Francisco

Garcia Bazán, Plotino y la Gnosis (Buenos Aires: Fundación para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura, 1981). 26

Ibid., 7-10. We cannot further discuss Harder’s opinion here, because it would require a detailed analysis of all the

other Enneads mentioned above, while we have decided to focus on the Ennead II 9 [33] only. 27

Hans Jonas, Gnosis und spätantiker Geist-Die mythologische Gnosis. Mit einer Einleitung und Methodologie der

Forschung, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, no. 63 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck

& Ruprecht, 1954). 28

Id., Gnosis und spätantiker Geist, Zweiter Teil, Von der Mythologie zur mystischen Philosophie. Erste und zweite

Hälfte. Herausgegeben von Kurt Rudolph, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments,

no. 159 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993). 29

Id., ‘The Soul in Gnosticism and Plotinus’ in M.P. Schul-M. P. Hadot, ed., Le Néoplatonisme-Colloques

Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969 (Paris: Éditions du Centre

National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1971), 45-53. Jonas’s position has been discussed below, see 130-137. 30

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 6. 6-7.

In the 60ies the French historian Henri-Charles Puech31

hinted at the possibility that Plotinus’

Gnostic disciples were not alien to Platonism but instead profoundly immersed in it; however, he

confined himself to hinting at this theory without developing it through a systematic study of the

Ennead II 9.32

As we have seen, the approach of past scholarship was generally based on the assumption of a

fundamental opposition of two Weltanschauungen: the rational and the mythical, the Platonic and

the Christian Gnostic, the philosophical and the theological. However, if this interpretation is

correct, some obvious questions would remain unanswered, like, for example:

Why in the Ennead II 9 [33] does Plotinus never label his interlocutors as ‘Gnostics’ and

why does he invite them to obtain the good, cultured and harmonious gnosis (εὐγνμώμη/

πεπαιδευμένη καὶ ἐμμελής γνῶσις),33

not deterring them from becoming truly what they

claimed to be, namely Gnostics?34

Could we explain Plotinus’ attitude towards his Gnostic

disciples with the assumption that Plotinus does not call them Gnostics because they had not

attained yet what for him was the true gnosis?

Why does Plotinus explicitly calls them ‘disciples’ and ‘friends’?35

Why does he emphasise that their doctrines are linked with Plato’s philosophy?36

To answer these questions, another approach has been tested here, which makes the effort to

interpret in a different way the controversy between Plotinus and his Gnostic disciples. We could

define them as ‘interlocutors’ or, more precisely, as ‘disciples with double allegiance’, since they

try to be faithful both to Plato’s philosophy and to views which are close to what modern historians

define as ‘Gnosticism’. It must be pointed out that this definition has been proposed in order to help

the modern scholar to distinguish between the disciples with double allegiance and the rest of

Plotinus’ disciples, who had not taken part in this debate, which revolved around doctrines that the

disciples with double allegiance had learnt from other, probably Gnostic, masters, before becoming

disciples of Plotinus.37

Plotinus explicitly distinguishes his disciples with double allegiance from their previous masters,

because he thinks that these cannot be convinced of their own mistakes,38

while his disciples, whom

he numbers among his own friends (τοὺς γνωρίμους), are for him still in time to rediscover the

straight and narrow path.39

According to my reading, the Ennead II 9 [33] is not the battlefield of two antithetical worldviews,

namely Platonism and Gnosticism; on the contrary, I think that it is a dialogue, sometimes harsh,

between a master of philosophy and his own fully accepted disciples. This dialogue had the

objective of leading the disciples to understand and interpret ancient philosophy in the right way

and to reflect about some of the ideas that they held and which are commonly found in what has

been defined by modern scholarship as ‘Gnosticism’. Plotinus’ disciples with double allegiance do

not regard Gnosticism as distant from Plato, who is considered by them as a forerunner of some

basic Gnostic concepts, such as the Soul’s fall from the spiritual world, the absolute separation of

the intelligible or spiritual world from the sensible or material one, of the human Soul from the

physical body, of goodness from evil. In contrast, Plotinus refuses to accept the idea that Plato is a

31

Henri-Charles Puech, ‘Plotino e gli Gnostici’ in Francesco Zambon, ed., Sulle tracce della Gnosi I. La Gnosi e il

tempo II. Sul Vangelo secondo Tommaso, 4th

ed. (Milan: Adelphi, 2006), 115, 116 note 2, 117-118, 126 (original title:

id., ‘Plotin et les gnostiques’ in E. R. Dodds, W. Theiler, P. Hadot, H. Ch. Puech, H. Dörrie, V. Cilento, R. Harder, H.

R. Schwyzer, A. H. Armstrong, P. Henry, Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique, t. V

[Vandoeuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1960], 159-190). 32

With regard to Puech’s position see below 140-150. 33

Plotinus, Ennead II, 8. 6; 13. 12-13; 16. 58-59. 34

Ibid., 15. 26-29. 35

Ibid., 10. 3-4. 36

Ibid., 4. 1-3; 6. 11-33, 49-50, 63-65; 17. 1-12. 37

Ibid., 10. 5-6. 38

Ibid., 10. 10-12. 39

Ibid., 10. 9-10.

precursor of Gnosticism in the historical meaning of this word, even if he is aware that Plato’s

doctrines can be interpreted in a dualistic and therefore Gnostic fashion. He agrees with his

disciples with double allegiance on the fact that for Plato the material dimension is different from

the intelligible or spiritual one, as well as the Soul is different from the physical body; however,

Plotinus thinks that their different nature does not necessarily imply that the distance between them

is unbridgeable as his interlocutors thought, because he thinks that the spiritual and material

dimensions are two different but compatible manifestations of the very same reality, namely being,

which contains in itself all possibilities of existence, including material and spiritual being. This is

the true gnosis that Plotinus, who in this respect proves to be a real Gnostic master, has tried to

make his interlocutors obtain by writing the Ennead II 9 [33]. He invites them to ponder attentively

on the content of his argument in order to achieve the right gnosis (εὐγνμώμη).

If what I have said so far is true, the denominations ‘Gnosticism’ and ‘Gnostic’ in their historical

meaning will no longer be suitable for the purpose of interpreting the controversy between Plotinus

and his disciples with double allegiance. However, considering that these words are commonly used

by modern historians to define a precise current of thought of Late Antiquity, namely Gnosticism,

they can be kept, but it is better to write them between inverted commas whenever we want to stress

that they do not indicate a doctrine alien to Plotinus’s philosophy, but a gnosis that only in some

respects differed from the gnosis which Plotinus himself claimed to possess. This in turn means that

we have to do with two different types of gnosis: the first championed by Plotinus’ friends and

disciples, the second by Plotinus himself, who, therefore, was not less ‘Gnostic’ than his ‘Gnostic’

disciples. My book has tried to show that the controversy between Plotinus and his interlocutors

revolved around their different concept of what the true gnosis really is and of what kind of

relationship it has with the ancient tradition in general and Plato’s philosophy in particular.

4. Plotinus’ debate with the Gnostics on the true interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of

the material world as image of the intelligible one

As I have said above, the Ennead II 9 [33] represents an unsystematic text whose complexity could

with difficulty be summarized in this presentation. As a consequence, I have preferred to single out

one of the main topics that Plotinus discussed with his ‘Gnostic’ disciples, that is, whether or not

this material world must be despised for being inferior to the spiritual, intelligible world of the

Platonic ideas.

Plotinus had already said in chapter nine of the Ennead II 9 [33] that the good man must be

benevolent towards all beings,40

because the Platonic Good is such. In contrast, Plotinus says, every

wicked man, even before the doctrine of the disciples with double allegiance was established, used

to censure the gods and, even if he had not been totally wicked, he would have become so at the

very moment he had despised the gods.41

In chapter 16 of the Ennead II 9 [33] Plotinus criticizes his interlocutors’ rejection of this world and

of the sensible gods in it,42

that is, of the stars, which for him were living beings endowed with a

divine soul. His goal is to show to his disciples that if they do not love all beings, and, in particular,

the sensible gods, also their love for the intelligible gods, that is, the Platonic ideas, will lose value;

since the sensible gods are the true image of the intelligible ones, despising them also implies a

rejection of the intelligible model of which they are an image. The stars’ souls, Plotinus’ says, are

worthy of being loved because they are in control of their material shell, so that mundane cares

never get in the way of their contemplation of the intelligible dimension; on the contrary, humans

are rarely capable of overcoming their material constraints because they have little control of the

material aspect of their being, such as in the case of the physical body and of the passions thereof.43

40

Ibid., 9. 52-53 and above 198-199. 41

Ibid., 16. 3-6. 42

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 16. 1-3. See also ibid., 6. 69; ibid., 13. 1-3. 43

Ibid., 11-13. See also ibid. 5. 1-16.

Plotinus specifies that the sensible gods and this world exist by virtue of their relationship with the

intelligible world, from which they have come into existence in the same sense as an image derives

from its model.44

4.1 This world is not far from God but participates in His power

Plotinus wants to exhort his disciples with double allegiance to put under scrutiny their supposed

gnosis of the relationship between the intelligible gods and this material world.

If they do so, they will understand that they do not really know the intelligible beings, but only

think they know them.45

If they did know them, Plotinus points out, they would know that every

being has to give of itself to what comes after it, in the same sense as fire warms what gets close to

it;46

this means that the intelligible gods cannot remain alone, but have to communicate their being

to the beings that come into existence from them.

But if this material world and the sensible gods exist by necessity and represent the true image of

the intelligible world, they already participate in it; as a consequence, God, who is the summit of the

spiritual dimension, will extend His providential care to all beings, without partiality. Plotinus

cannot accept the opposite argument as it was presented by his disciples, who believed that God’s

providence does not reach this evil material world, and takes care of the elect only;47

on the

contrary, God is in All (πᾶσιν οὖν παρέσται) and in this cosmos (ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε), whatever the

manner of His presence (ὅστις ὁ τρόπος), so that this cosmos indeed participates in Him (ὥστε καὶ

μεθέξει αὐτοῦ ὁ κόσμος).48

If God were far from this cosmos (εἰ δ’ ἄπεστι τοῦ κόσμου), not only would God be far from the

Gnostics too since they live here below, but He would also be totally unknown to them.49

The

simple fact that man can think of God demonstrates that He is not separated from man. But if God is

close to man, who lives in the material universe, this will in turn have providential care from God (ὅ

γε κόσμος ἐκεῖθεν ἔχει), so that it is fair to say that the cosmos has neither been abandoned by God

nor will it be (καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται οὐδ’ ἀπολειφθήσεται).50

In addition to what has been said with

regard to God’s providence, Plotinus points out that God’s providential care concerns more wholes,

like the world, than parts, like in the case of a restricted number of people supposedly appointed by

Him as His own elect. Why? Again, because God is the Platonic Good and His providential care has

to extend to all beings, no one excluded; otherwise, God would not be the absolute Good but a

‘relative’ good, because He would be good to some beings but not to others. Moreover, parts cannot

exist separately from the All of which they are parts, so that the individual beings have to be parts

of a whole like the universe in order to participate in God’s providential care. If the parts of the All

44

Ibid., 16. 13-14. 45

Ibid., 16. 15-17. 46

With regard to this fundamental tenet of Plotinus’s philosophy see above 76-79. 47

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 16. 17-20. 48

Ibid., 16. 28-30. See also Plotinus, Ennead V, V. 2. [11] 1. 1, 58. The participation of this world in God is emphasized

by Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism, 10. 3. 40-45 and Atticus in Eusebius, Preparatio, XV. V. The Plotinian idea

that God ‘is in All’ (πᾶσιν οὖν παρέσται) can also be found in some Christian writers. See, for example, Paul’s

discourse at the Aeropagus in Acts 17: 28; Clément de Rome. Épître aux Corinthiens, ed. A. Jaubert, Sources

chrétiennes 167 (Paris, 1971), 28; Aristides, Apologia, 13; Athenagoras, Legatio, 10; Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, 1. 4-6;

Hermas, Die apostolischen Väter I. Der Hirt des Hermas, ed. M. Whittaker, Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller

48, 2nd edn. (Berlin, 1967), 26. 1; Origen, , II. I. 3. Rowan A. Greer has rightly pointed out that the

Valentinian conception of the fall from the divine pleroma is confuted by Irenaeus (in the second book of his Against

the Heresies) on the basis of the idea (also present in the passage of The Shepherd of Hermas quoted above) according

to which ‘God contains all things, but is uncontained’. This principle implies that the Valentinians cannot ‘posit either a

separate creator or a void’ out of the divine world, because, given that both the void and the separate creator have come

into existence from God, they cannot be separated from Him, but must be necessarily traced back to Him; see id., The

dog and the mushrooms, Irenaeus’s views of the Valentinians assessed in: The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, 1, 156-161,

164-165. 49

Ibid., 16. 30-32. 50

Ibid., 16. 32-35.

were separated from it, not only would they not participate in God’s providence, but they would not

exist at all, because they exist as parts of the All.51

Similarly, our human souls do not exist

independently from the Soul of the All, which, Plotinus says, is much more in communion with

God than human souls are.52

In order to show that the material world is connected with the intelligible one, Plotinus gives the

example of a musician and a geometer. Both have to direct their minds towards the intelligible

world in order to practice their craft: the musician needs to have the idea of harmony well clear in

his mind if he wants to produce harmonic sounds with his musical instruments; the geometer in turn

has to think of the ideas of geometrical figures before drawing them. But, Plotinus asks, although

they are focused on the intelligible world, would they not be glad to perceive with their senses the

sensible images of the ideas which they ponder in their minds, such as beautiful harmonious sounds

or geometrical figures?53

4.2 The material world can be transcended through a process of mental abstraction from

its constraints

In chapter 17 of the Ennead II 9 [33] Plotinus returns again to the topic of his interlocutors’

interpretation of Plato.54

He now tries to stifle their attempt to ground their disparagement of

physical body and material world on those Platonic passages where the whole material nature

(πᾶσαν τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν) is regarded by Plato as inferior (χείρονα) to the intelligible, spiritual,

one.55

Plotinus explains that Plato’s acknowledgment of the sensible cosmos as subordinate to the

intelligible reality does not at all imply its rejection, as the Gnostics thought, but its recognition as

mere image of its intelligible, spiritual, archetype.56

The material world, being an image, is inferior

to its ideal model, but its inferiority does not mean that it is worthless.

Plotinus wants the disciples with double allegiance to understand that if they really desire to

transcend the sensible cosmos, they must find inspiration in Plato’s dialectic science57

and, by virtue

of a process of mental abstraction, simply separate the intelligible archetype of this world from its

material manifestation58

(ταύτην περιελόντας τῇ διανοίᾳ).

After doing that, they will discover what remains (τὸ λοιπόν), namely an intelligible sphere

(σφαῖραν νοητήν) that in a way could be regarded as the form imposed upon the matter of this

universe (τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ κόσμῳ εἶδος ἐμπεριέχουσαν), which, by giving it a shape, created an ordered

cosmos.59

How does this happen? Plotinus explains that the intelligible world is the archetypical

model of this cosmos, containing in itself the intelligible forms or Platonic ideas of all sensible

beings; these intelligible models are contemplated by the Soul of the All and then communicated by

it60

as actual forms of the things to be to its middle and inferior parts, which in turn impress them on

the shapeless matter of this material universe. Therefore, we cannot arbitrarily regard the intelligible

world as alien to the sensible one; on the contrary, they are mutually interrelated by virtue of the

mediation of the middle and inferior parts of the Soul of the All.

If, Plotinus says, the Gnostic disciples will carry out the process of abstracting the form of this

world from its matter, they will discover, in a subordinate position in comparison with the

intelligible sphere, souls in their order (ψυχὰς ἐν τάξει) and without material bodies (ἄνευ τῶν

51

Ibid., 16. 35-36. 52

Ibid., 16. 36-37. 53

Ibid., 16. 46-51. 54

With regard to this topic see above chapter 3. 55

See for example Plato, Phaedo, 66B-67B. 56

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 8. 19-21. 57

See, for example, Plato, Republic, VI, 504A-511E; VII, 531D-533C. 58

We follow Bréhier, who translates ‘par la pensée’, Ennéades, 135. This method of abstraction is also described by

Plotinus in the Ennead V, V. 8. [31] 9, 264-268. 59

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 17. 5-7. With regard to this process see Porphyry, Sententiae, 40. 60

Plotinus, Ennead IV, IV. 3. [27] 11, 70-72.

σωμάτων), which give magnitude to the cosmos (μέγεθος δούσας) and extend (προαγαγούσας) it to

its maximum extension (εἰς διάστασιν) according to the intelligible pattern (κατὰ τὸ νοητόν).61

4.3 The material world has the degree of beauty that pertains to it

Plotinus has no difficulty in recognizing that this world is not as beautiful as the intelligible one.

However, he cannot follow his interlocutors in their rejection of this universe in its entirety.

Although this cosmos is not beautiful, it can participate in the beauty of the intelligible world

through the mediation of the middle and inferior parts of the Soul of the All, with which it is

directly interconnected. Again, Plotinus invites his interlocutors not to despise a being because it is

inferior to another; on the contrary, each being is important, however insignificant this may be,

because the All can exist only if each of its constitutive parts performs the function that is assigned

to them in the context of the universal oikonomia, not otherwise.

4.4 The beauty of this cosmos mirrors intelligible beauty

But if the disciples said that they are not moved by sensible beauty (εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτοὶ φαῖεν μὴ

κινεῖσθαι), and that they do not see any difference between ugly and beautiful bodies (μηδὲ

διαφόρως αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ὁρᾶν σώματα), they would also, Plotinus says, be unable to see any

difference between scandalous (αἰσχρά) and virtuous (καλά) ways of life (ἐπιτηδεύματα), or

between good and bad sciences (μαθήματα) or good and bad theories (θεωρίας), so that, in the end,

they would be incapable of seeing God (οὐδὲ θεὸν τοίνυν) who is the Good and the Beauty in

themselves.62

Plotinus wants his interlocutors to understand that, since the five senses are the basic perception

tools through which man knows outer reality, sensible beauty is the first type of beauty man comes

into contact with; afterwards, he has to raise himself to more and more perfect manifestations of the

idea of beauty, like that of virtuous ways of life and of intelligible ideas, until the ultimate beauty,

namely God as the Beauty in itself, has been reached.63

Therefore, if someone is not moved by sensible beauty, which is the most evident and easy to

recognize, he would also be incapable of seeing the beauty of virtues and ideas, which are more

refined types of beauty compared with the sensible one.

In addition, Plotinus points out that sensible beauties (ταῦτα) exist because of first beauties (διὰ τὰ

πρῶτα); however, if sensible beauties do not exist (μὴ ταῦτα), neither do intelligible ones (οὐδὲ

ἐκεῖνα).64

Although sensible beings are inferior to intelligible ones, because they have come into

existence from them, they are as important as these, which could not be what they are, namely cause

and principle of existence to inferior beings, if sensible beings did not exist.

But, if the disciples with double allegiance still insisted on criticizing earthly beauty (τοῦ τῇδε

κάλλους), they would do well, Plotinus says, to despise the beauty in boys and women (ἐν παισὶ καὶ

γυναιξί), in order not to be overcome by lack of self-control (ὡς μὴ εἰς ἀκολασίαν ἡττᾶσθαι).65

In

this passage Plotinus wants to say that if the disciples do not manage to reach divine beauty through

the contemplation of the sensible one, because this leads them away from God by binding them to

this world, they are allowed, as extrema ratio, to despise the sensible beauty in boys and women,

but not, of course, in the sensible cosmos as a whole.

By contemplating sensible beauties, man can admire God who created them (τὸν πεποιηκότα) and

believe that they have come from the intelligible world (ἐκεῖθεν), because their beauty represents an

61

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 17. 7-8. 62

Ibid., 17. 25-29. 63

Plato, Symposium, 211C-D. See also Plotinus, Ennead V, V. 9. [5] 2, 288-290, where Plato’s Symposium is expressly

quoted by Plotinus. 64

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 17. 29-31. 65

Ibid., 17. 31-34.

image of the intelligible beauty (τὸ ἐκεῖ κ ά λ λ ο ς ) , which is unutterable (ἀ μ ή χ α ν ο ν ) and does

not depend on sensible beauties (οὐκ ἐχόμενον τούτων). Therefore, the disciples have to raise

themselves from these sensible beauties (ἀπὸ τούτων) to the intelligible ones (ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα), without

rejecting them (μὴ λοιδορούμενον δὲ τούτοις).66

4.5 The wise man is capable of enduring his life in the material world

But maybe (ἴσως), Plotinus says, the disciples with double allegiance will counter the argument that

he has developed so far by saying that while their doctrine pushes the philosopher away from his

physical body (φεύγειν τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν πόρρωθεν μισοῦντας),67

Plotinus’ philosophy is not only

unable to free the soul from its material constraints, but also keeps it bound to them (κατέχειν τὴν

ψυχὴν πρὸς αὐτῷ).68

The disciples believe that human soul can attain spiritual freedom only by severing every link it has

with the material dimension, which includes the physical body. Plotinus’ interlocutors are

convinced that sensible and intelligible dimensions are irreconcilable, so that any attempt to find a

common ground between them is doomed to fail. They interpret Plato’s doctrine according to which

the material world is an image of the world of ideas in the sense that since the material world is a

mere image, it is necessarily inferior to its intelligible model and, as a consequence, totally

irreconcilable to it and worthy of being despised by the philosopher. As a consequence, the

disciples cannot endorse Plotinus’ attempt to reconcile matter and spirit, sensible and intelligible

dimensions and, finally, body and soul, by interpreting Plato in the light of the philosophy of the

One, which states that all oppositions and conflicts, even that between matter and spirit, are

reconciled in the One and by the One, in which all opposites are harmonized without being

annihilated.

Plotinus makes a great effort to tackle his disciples’ counter-argument directly, not only because it

calls into question his capacity to make his disciples transcend the constraints of the material body,

but also because it casts doubts on the correctness of his exegesis of Plato’s doctrine of the material

world as image of the spiritual one. In fact, given that Plato’s goal is to drive the soul of the

philosopher out of the physical body, as Plato himself states in the Phaedo,69

if Plotinus is shown by

his ‘Gnostic’ disciples to be unable to attain this goal, his claim to be a true interpreter of Plato

would be completely falsified.70

How does Plotinus answer his interlocutors’ counter-argument? He gives the example of two people

who live in the same beautiful house (δύο οἶκον καλὸν τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκούντων); one of them reviles

the structure of the house and he who created it (τὸν ποιήσαντα), while the other not only does not

disparage the house (τοῦ δὲ μὴ ψέγοντος), but also praises its creator, waiting for the time to come

when he will leave it (ἐν ᾧ ἀπαλλάξεται). The first person could think he is wiser than the second,

because he knows that the house has been built with materials that are far inferior to those of which

the true house in heaven is made up; however, Plotinus says, this person is only deceiving himself,

because he ignores (ἀγνοῶν) that he is incapable of bearing his condition of inhabitant of the house

where he currently lives (ὅτι τῷ μὴ φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα διαφέρει).71

This metaphor means that the wise man does not find the human condition so unbearable to lead

him to regard the whole material world as evil. On the contrary, he is capable of enduring his

present state because he knows that this will cease when the time comes for him to leave the

66

Ibid., 17. 37-44. 67

We follow Bréhier who translates: ‘Leur doctrine, diront-ils, peut-être, nous éloigne du corps et nous donne de la

haine pour lui […]’, Plotin, Ennéades, 137. 68

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 18. 1-3. According to Tertullian Marcion disparaged the body and denied its resurrection;

see id., Adversus Marcionem, 1. 24. 69

See, for example, Phaedo, 79E-81A, where Socrates says that philosophy leads man to renounce the body and its

limitations and to accept death as the final liberation from the corporeal prison. 70

Plotinus, Ennead V, 1 [10] 8. 7-16, 38-40. 71

Plotinus, Ennead II, II. 9. 18. 4-16.

physical body and return to his real home in the intelligible world. The wise man knows that,

although the material world is inferior to the intelligible one, it has been built by a good maker, so

that does not regard it as evil, but believes that it mirrors imperfectly the goodness of its good

Creator.