Anarchic Orders .andBalances of Power

Two tasks remain: first, toe')(aminethecharacteristic~of anarchy and theexpectations>about outc.omes . associated with anarchic realms; .sec~~d, . t~exan-.ine the wayS in which expectationsYa1'¥,as,thestl'uct:u~~?fananarchl~ systern ahangl:lsithrough··changl:lsin the distribution of ·capabllltles:a~Go,s~~at~ons.The second t;:..sk,undertaken in Chapters 7,8, and 9, requires C~~~!'l-I'!~? dIffer•.ent international systems. T .ch I now tur~to,;;~~~~~t~,:com.-Phsh~d.byd' , ''c,...................................... ·'~(lQm.·..es:inian.aI'.li;h1

.li;anghler-"rawm~som~i90~p!'l-K; ................•.......ar¢l1'.iq,Jt¢i!:lm~( .

1. VIOLENCE AT HOME AND ABROAD .The state among statl:lS, it ;'ilf/(5ftensaid, conducts its affairs in the hroodIngshadow. of .••.iolence.Because'some statesmay.atan~ ti~~us~force,.a~l statesmU5.t;be;pllepal'echto.,de"so~or live at the mercy oHhelr mlhtanly ~ore vlgoro~snei;5hbors. A!r\ongstates"thl:lstateof naturejsastateob~f1,:. ThIS ISmeant ~o~ Inthe sense.that wacr constantly oecu.rs btl,t;J.·l;l...;.,~. ·~t,~l.~b .state dechldl~g

.' f "',' Whet er Infor itself whether or not to use orce,"",f1,I1:... ... '. 1the family, the community, or the world at , contact without at eastoccasional conflict is inconceivable; and the hope that in the absenc~ of an agentto manage or to manipulate conflicting parties the use of force WIll always be

~listicf1,lly.entert,~ire~:. J\:no,n~.~era~ ..an.'0~gstates,e9f ..gP;V'~~I;'\n.l¢l;'\t;is~s~~c.iat~;;~i+b.t~~,!)I;(il,trl,'~pqe..of····

Th~';t'hreat of viole:cea~ ther~c:rrent use of force are saidto distinguishinternational from national affairs. But in the history of the world: surely .mostrulers have had to bear in mind.thattheir subjects might use force to reSIst or

overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated with the threat ofviolence, so also is its presence. A haphazard list of national tragedies illustratesthe point all too well. The most destructive wars of the hundred years followingthe defeat of Napoleon took place not among states but within them. Estimates ofdeaths in China's 1aipirtg Rebellion, which began in 1851 and lasted'13 years,range. as high as 20 million. In the American Civil War some 600 thousand peoplelost their lives. In more recent history, forced collectivization and Stalin's pUrgeseliminated five million Russians, and Hitler exterminated six million Jews, Insome Latin American countries, COllPSd'etats and rebellions have bee~ normalfeatures of national life. Between 1948 and 1957, for example, 200 !thousandColombians were killed in civil strife~ In the middle 1970$most inhabitants of IdiAmin's'Uganda must have felt their lives becoming nasty, brutish, and short,quite as in Themas·Hebbesrs state of nature. If such casesconstitute·aberratjqm;;;they are uncomfoFtably<cemmon ones. We easily lese sight of the fact thatstruggles to achieve and maintain power, to establish order, and to <':ontrivea

. kind of justice within states, may be bloodier than wars among them.If i!p.arqhy.is.ideptified ..with chaos, destruction, and death, then thec,Qisijpc•.

fi(5nbetw:een;m.aXqhyig~dg9Yeromeptd~~sn()t,. ten.~~mll~h.WhichismOl'e pre-c:adous: the life of a state among states, or of a government in relation toitssub~jects7 The answer varies with time and place. Among some states at some times,the actual or expected OCcUrl'enceof violence is low. Within some states at sometimes, the actual or expected occurrence of violence is high. The.1J,$e.9ffors~,orthe constant fear of its use, are not sufficjent gl'Ollngsf()~c3.i$9~~isQirii.ntercnational..from dQmestiq affairs. If the possible and the actual.use of force markboth national and international orders, then no durabledistinction.betvieenthetwo realms can be drawn in terms of the use or the nonllse of force".No hllmartorder is proof against violence.

To discover qualitative differences between internal and external affairs onemust look for a criterion other than the occurrence of violence. The distinctionbetween international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or thenonuse of force. but in their different structures. But if the dangers of beingviolently attacked are greater, say, in taking an evening stroll through downtownDetl'oit than they are in picnickipg along the French and German border, whatpractical difference does the difference of structure make?

...·jnt~~!).l:}t~9/i1agY(I;;·9/i1~a~tig~nel,'at~$(';()nfl.i(:.tanc3.atf ". ,., atj9!).i!I'p.;g

d~fl¢gitirna~,·.arl'force ·.<i~W·· oappiy.'a···\iarietybf·~a:ric:tions'<toc&i't~ii()l"fS1,tpj'¢¢ts';dfsome use pdvate force, others may appeal to the government. AgovernmeIlthas no monopoly on the use offorce, as is all too evident. An effec·

._~~---~------_ .. , ------- •.•••••• I.Z.d·······-·(rj·.,y·,'f,,·,.·v·;-,'I

G,l~A.;qp~>·••...1; .• e;'~!it&~i~a~':;;iS'~ii!i~:!1\!l§A:~~.i~t~111'l~PE1l!1~~l'\~~,Yap~s4~PEl#\qir;~·9I\·~~¢th~J;.1i.p·~1i~rgis.;.b.riafliized,with r~latlons of aut~e!;ity~l?e<:~fJeq~$ti!-plished,. or remaInSformally unorganized. Insofar as apl!~lq{isfR··.. its units are freeto specialize, to pursue their own interests wit outconcem or developing .th~means of maintaining their' identity and preservi~~ their security. int~e.~resenceof oth~rs. They are free .to specialize beca.use\~~~~;h~~~.~Q.fe~s,ell<.lo,f,ea.ft~e.'. .··g·ge.swjt~sR~:ia.li~ariR.I\;Iftn6se·whospedalize

, iHon inspeciil1ization ensues. Goods are manu-f<\;~t)i1irecl,grain ispJ;odu<te.d, law and order are maintained,c;ommel1ce is con-.clucted, and.filil'ancial'se11Yicesare provided. by people who ever more narrowlyspecialize. In simple economic terms, the cobbler depends on the t.ailor for .hispants and the tailor on the c'obbler for hisshoes, and each would be ill_cladWIth-out the services of the other. In simple political terms, Kansas depends onWashington for protection and tegulationand Washington depends on Kansasfor beef and wheat. In saying that in such situations irtterdependence is close, oneneed not maintain that the one part could notlearn t~1ive.\'Iitho~t. theot~er ..Oneneed only say that tlle·eo$tjof4)I~eakingtheinterdependent'relatlon.wouldbehigh.Personsuan.clc"institutions•.depend .•heavily··on····one··.another because"of'the"'diHerenttasks.they.petiform.an.d.therdiHerent,goodsthey,p110duGe.andexchange. 'The partsof a polity bind themselves together by their··differences (d. Durkheim 1893,p.212). '. .

DiHerences between national and international structures are reflected ill<theways the units of each system d~Rj1,'}e;.thei!-'eI\<:l,sandclevelQ.p:the;means:forreach-.ingc;th!ll.1\\i;i'lii1:';~!),Jl~ji;!tli~q:;Ji;~~l~i;like'Uliitsc;oa~P.In hierarchic realms, unlike unitsinteract.ln:Fa;l1f"anarchiC,:ireil(ll!Il,.the•...·!J,{'lits...ai;ef¥p<:~i9J;}~l!X...~iWn1ir}~IJ,Q;:··...telJ,d.··.to.rernaire.$o.Like units work to maintain a measure of irid~penaen~e and may evenstrive for autarchy. In a hierarchic realm, the units are differentiated, and theytend to increase the extent of theitspeciali;lation. l})ifferentiated,units·becomecl()selY"41tterdepert'd~nt,·the··more· ..closel¥"··~9a.~§(,t1).eiI;···.~ n ..'..•.•~r:9<:eeQ§.'aecauseBfthe.~ifferenceof struc:ture,< '.. ' . .and·iilt'er~

~!Ze'~~9~gIl~t~Q1J,~a.ret'W();di$tin~~<:ol!l<:ePt$.So as to follow. the logi~tnonitionto '. .'. e meaning for a given term t~:O\lg~out one's dis·

to describe the condition; ..:witP¥~nations ande:theconditioni~ hem.

t':" .... '~)ll')tJ.•••,

Although states arelik:units functionally, they differ vastly in theirc:apabilities~ Out.ofsuch !differences~0rIlethin~ ofa division of labor develops(se~ Chapter 9). ;t;~eililiMisi(;ln:iof'laboracros$n<ttion$,however, is slight incom~pansonwith the highly articulated division of labor within them. Integrationdraws the parts of a nation dosdy together. lnt!lrdependenceamong nationsleaves them loosely connected. Although the integration of nations is often talkedabout,Jt seldom takes place. Nations could mutually enrich themselves byfurther dividing not just the labor that goes into the production of goods but alsosome of the ()the~J1i$1<s~~~yperf()rm,.s\lch as politicalmaIl~gerIl:~t~ndrIli~~~.ryd~fe1J,~e\' . ..•~r:1i~i9nlJ,ot~l<e.place'?'EhestP4c.~re.;~f'.internati~lllpelitl(;s .nofstatesintwowa.ys;.·· .' . '. ..

Ix1a,sel~~help,§Y§tep1.each of the units spends a portion of its effort, "liOEinf-onwardillgits;,o,wngood,c:iout in providing.them,e<\;I1s!of,pl,1c:!lte~tilJ,gL'itself,ag3.'i:1i's.t,othe1is. Specialization in a system, of divided labor w~rks to everyo~~;sadvantage, though not equally so. Inequality in the expected distribution of theincreased product works strongly against extension of the division of laborinternationally ..When faced with thepossibilitYo{S8~P~!-'~~in~t9F;;tlwt\l<tlgain,sta.~e~t!,~tfeelm$e@\;!'l,'.e·l'liIustaskhowthe·· .. .. eyare com~pe~ledto ask not 'Will bQth of us gain1" but ........•.. f an expectedgain. is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one:;'on¢ state )fuse its dispro-portionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.Even the. prQspect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their

.cooperation so long as each fears how.theoth!lr.will ..l.lse;i.ts'!ittl&re~sed,;liili!pab.ilities.Notice that. the impediments to collai:Joration.ma:y not lie in the character and theimmediate intention of either party. Instead,' the condition of insecurity __at theleast, t!;le"'l.lncertaintyofeach about the other's future intentions a1'ldactions--works;against"tmeir.cooperation. .

In any self~h~lp~ystem,units WOl'ry~b6ut.their:'$1.l11Yiv:a.l,al'td;;;the).w.ortiYconclitiol1ls•.tb.eil';b~ha~iQr.€>ligoP9listic;maRkets:H~itt~~!f;c:!l9P~ri;l.tipnof firms inmuch. the;·;'Wi;l.Y!.thi!-t·;;inh~pnational-politil:al···.·.s.tr\lctqp~silin1it,the"cq,l(1)'e:ratIq,lnL.O:£st<\;t.es• . vernments, wl;J,ethel1\;£j1imsI,;s14~i¥~,';;~l'tdProspe '. Pi d'" '. . .. ' "'; ...• rms nee not pl,'otect t~mselvesphysica t assau ts om ber ·rins. They are free to concentrate on theireconomic int.erests. As economkentities, however, they live in a self-help world ..All want to IncreaSe profits. If they run undue risks in the effort to do so, theymust e~p~ct t.o.suffer.the c.onsequences. ~ William. Fellner says, it is "impossibleto maxI.mIzeJOIntgams WIthout the collUSIVehandlIng of aU relevant variables."And thIS can be accomplished only by "complete disarmament of the firms inrelat!bn to .each other." But firms cannot sensibly disarm even t() increase their~rofIts .. ThIS stat~ment qualifies/rather than contradicts, the assumption thatf~rms ~Imat maxI;num.profits. to maxinii2;eprofits tomorrow as w!lIl as today,fIrms fIrst have tosu~lve. PoolIng all resources implies, again as Fellner puts it,

-~---------~........•....•.•.....-....--.-MiCas,

"discounting the future possibilities of all participating finns" (1949, p. 35). ~utthe future cannot be discounted. The relative strength of firms changes over timein ways that cannQt be foreseen. Firrns are constrained to strike a compromisebetween maximizing their profits and minimizing the danger of their own demise.Each of two firms may be better off if one of them accepts compensation ~rom theother in return for withdrawing from some part of the market. But a fIrm thataccepts smaller markets in exchange for larger profits will be gravely dis-advantaged if, foI' example, a price war should break out as part of a renew~dstruggle for markets. If possible, one must resist accepting smaller markets lr\

return for larger profits (pp. 132, 217-18). "It is,"Fellner insist~:unotadvi~a~le todisarm in relation to one's rivals" (p. 199). Why not? Because the potentIalIty ofrenewed warfare always exists" (p. 177). Fellner's reasoning is much like thereasoning that led Lenin to believe that capitalist countries would never be able.tocooperate for their mutual enrichment in one vast imperialist enterprise. Like ·tvnations,oligopolistic firms must be more concerned with relative strength than ,".f'with absolute advantage. 0/

All'?J;\jof:P9Ssible,.g~h:tsith1!!t'may,ifacYiqr"9tll!!lisfmOr!!V .in which the structure of international

co':>pc~raHQnof states ..A state also worries lest it

ohe larger a state's

Y xpor s, e more it depends' on oters. The world's well-beingwould be increased if an ever more elaborate divisicjn of labor were developed,but states would thereby place themselves in situations of ever closer inter.dependence. Some states may not resist that. For small and ill-endowed states thecosts of doing so are excessively high. But states that can resist becoming evermore enmeshed with others ordinarily do so in either or both of two ways. Statesthat are heavily dependent, or closely interdependent, worry about securing thatwhich they depend on. The high interdependence of states means that the states inquestion experience, or are subject to, the common wlnerabilitythat high inter-dependence entails. Like other organizations, states seek to control what theydepend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency. This simple thoughtexplains quite a bit of the behavior of states: their imperial thrusts to widen thescope of their control and their autarchic: strivings toward greater self-sufficiency.

Structures encourage certain behaviors and penalize those who do. notrespond to the encouragement. Nationally, many lament the extreme develop.ment of the division of labor, a deveiopment that results in the allocation of evernarrower tasks to individuals. And yet specializat;ionproceeds, and its extent is ameasure of the develppment of societies: In a formally organized realm a

m~sstoenhante the welfare of their peo-er state$. And yet the ways of states change

little. In an unorg~nited realm each unit's incentive is.to put itself in a position tobe able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so. Theintemationalimperative is "take care of yourself"! Some leaders of nations mayunderstand that the well~being of all of them would increase through their par-ticipation in a fuller division of labor. But to act on the idea would be to act on adomestic iinperative, an imperative that does not run internationally. What onemight want to do in the absence of structural constraints is different from whatone is encouraged to do in their presence. States do not willingly place themselvesin situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations ofsecurity subordinate economic gain to political interest. . .

What each state does for itself is much like what all of the others are doing.They are denied the advantages that a full division of labor, political as well aseconomic. would provide. Defense spending; moreover, is unproductive for alland unavoidable for most. Rather than increased well-being, their reward is inthe maintenance of their autonomy. States compete, but not by contributing theirindividual efforts to the ioint production of goods for their mutual benefit;, Hereisa second big .diHerencebetween international-political and economic systems,one which is.discussed in part I, section 4, of the next chapter.

motives and outcomes may well be disjoined should now be easily Seen.Stl,j!,!~t17J.'I(I~~ii!,~~~~¢tN{(lFi(5nsto\ffii:ta¥e\f;:\1:QJ'!.~eq1J,eJi\q!lS'!ftheY;:j~el'le;::J'!.&1t!6inFen([edi:ltQ!'flh;a¥e'~Surely most of the actors will notice that, and at least some of them will be able to .figure out why. They may develop a· pretty good sense. of just how structureswork their effects. Will they not then be able to achieve their original ends byappropriately adjusting their strategies7 UnfortuI\ately, they often cannot. Toshow why this is so I shall give only a fewf!)(aznples; once the point is made, thereader will easily think of others. .

.If shortage of a commodity is expected. all are collectively better off if theybuy less of it in order to m9derate price increases and to distribute shortages equi-tably. But because some will be better off if they lay in extra supplies quickly, allhave a strong incentive to do so. If one expects others to make a run on a bank,one's prudent course is to run faster than they do even while knowing that if fewothers run, the bank will remain solvent, and if many run,· it will fail. In sllchcases, pursuit of individual interest produces. collectiv.e results that nobody

------------------ .._~z..t!llIi-•• 7311ii·-liiiiiillilil7i1- IiIsiiII-'liMlim.'.M"Siii-iiiiiiiiiiiliijillLi· iilil

wants, yet individuals by behaving differently will hur~ themselve~ wi~out alter-ing outcomes. These two much used examples estabhsh the mam pomt. Somecourses of action Icannot sensibly follow unless you dQ too, and you ~d I can-not sensibly rollowthem unless we are pretty sure that many others WIllas we~l.Let us go more deeply into the problem by considering two further e!<:ampl!lsxiln

"s,,9meiieetail.· .. .......•..........•.......•......•.... !"' ••••••

.... ... Each of many persons may choose ·\!il;.lii~~~·!gg!Plli~~t:!lJ;ta'rii!r~~l:\~~t~!it~;~t~~e;atll;~~' Cars offedlexibilityin scheduling and in choice of destination; yet at hmes,i~b~d weather for example, railway passenger service is a much wantedconve-nience. Each of many persons may shop in supermarkets rather than at cornergrocery stores. The stocks of supermarkets are larger: and thei~ prices lo,::er; 'yetat times the corner grocery store, offering; say, credit and delIvery servIce, IS amuch wanted convenience. The result of most people usually driving their owncars and shopping at supermarkets is to reduce passenger service and to decreasethe number of corner grocery stores. These results may not be what most peoplewant. They may be willing to pay to prevent services from disappearing. And yetindividuals can do nothing to affect the outcomes. Increased patronage would doit, but not increased patronage by me and the few others I might persuade to fol-low my example.

We may well notice thatou!%.be}l[ctViii0'i~.;.ptu~uvlle§!li1tnWfati;tgd.f.~;g~q12!~H~S,but weare also likely to see that such instances as these are examples of what Alf:ed E.KabJil\1%lilre§cj)\i15~§"aS';!~!taF'8'~I~~ellll!I\'geS'!!that!iir'e'1\)"t'dt1gk~ia1:alJutib¥"the'iaccumulattl2~.@~i"smallJ!!''a~e:¥$l!5ft~l.Im'"'st!l'c~{si·t:Q'ations;;!people!!!.iU'.ei1'¥i!i)tim~iqf:,!the••~ltyr~n)rc!o.f!..§mall2,~cisiens," a phrase suggesting that "if one hundred consumers choose option x,~~dthis causes the market to make decision X (where X equals .100 x), iUs notnecessarily true that those same consumers would have voted for that outcome ifthat large decision had ever been presented for th~ir explicit consideration" (Kahn1966,.p. 523). If the market does not present the large question for decision, thenindividuals are doomed to making decisions that are sensible within their narrowcontexts even though they know all the whil~ that in making such decisions theyare bringing about a result that most of them do not want. Either that or theyorganize to overcome some of the effects of the market by changing its struc-ture-for example; by bringing consumer units roughly up to the size of the unitsthat are making pro<;lucers'~ecisions. This nicely makes the point:· So long as one'fl~~*~~1~~~ls~~ug£ut@\{Ufi\iFee~~~a,jit\\iSiin6;t!PQ$~:;::::~~~;:~~:~~:::~:::::~:~~;i:ij·~~}~~~~~~~~~~m~~lf~!~l:\~#g\1~~eW'&;usl~W~e~p.!som«{merchants sell on Sunday, others roiY h'l,)1{g".tQ,,¢lI!»so.iJil:Qrcl.erctoreroaincqropeti,t4ve"eventhough most prefer a six-<layweek. Most are able to do as they

~", ..:> . .' "

please only if all are required to keep comparable hours. The only remedies·forstrong structural effects are structural changes.

Structural constraints cannot be wished' awaystand this.porations

althou h·many fail to under--nations, cor-

along with· their own,or t e,sake Qf the system and not for their own narrowly

vantage. n the 19SC1S,as fear of the world's destruction in nuclear Wargrew, some concluded that the alterrtatiVe to"wol'ld".destr.uction,,,was,wodCl.·,giscarmament. In the 1970s, with the rapid growth of population, pov~rty;a~dpollution, some concluded, as one political scientist put it, that "states must meetthe needs of the political ecosystem it'\.i~~~I~~~I~it'J."l~t'\.~i~~S?~..~~~rt~t'\.t'\.~BHBtigp"(Sterling 1974, p. 336). '"ijb;eiiill1'f~~!!5ti<1inal,inter~st':;tnl.is.tiib~:\i!~if~i~;;i!ai1ii:fii·i~;ifl1atmeans anything at all,

at are the con itionsthat would make nationsilUng to obey the injunctions that are so often laid on them7Bew'

ca:if"tbeY";;Itesal:veji,the.itensiQn.,betw.e~n,pursuing.theirjo.wlkinteres~s.~n<;l;iii\~~ing.forthe,;sakePQ€:iitheisYstem7 ..canJb;e!Id'one~ altlii'()"~g'h;'manywringrctlfeil':cwan'CfS:Zan'a1'pfeai!l.iiflfl '.., The very problem, however, isthat rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wantedresults. With each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take eareof the system. *.

A strong sense of peril and doom may lead to a clear definition of ends thatmust be achieved. Their achievement is not thereby made possible, The p()ssibil-ity of effective· action depends on the ability to provide necessary }lleans. Itdepends even more so on the existence of conditions that permit naHans andother organizations to £ollow appropriate policies and strategies. World-shakingproblems cry for global solutions, but there is no global agency to prQvide them.Necessities do not create possibilities. Wishing that final causes were efficient·ones does not make them so. . .

Gl'eC!!t!i~,@,§!f,~!i'2~r.!bei[accompilished0onlyZ1:ly;!agents10f"gneat;,caI'la~iU.ty.That 'iswhy st . t;!si,are.·called·on.to,.de..¥*h;.!.t,.is.ne~iessary

~Put differently,states facea "prisoners'dilemma." If each pf twoPartiesfoJl~wshis ownmtere~t,~othend up ~orse off t~anj~ each ac;~dto achievejoint interests. For thoroughexat;'m~tlonof.thelogiCof suchSituations,see.Snyderand Diesing1977; for briefandsug-gestiveInternationalapplications,seeJervis, January 1978.

theories. Among economists the distinctioni~~el~~derstood. Among political··scientists it is not. AI;I have explained, a%Tll"fcroeeGttofuictheory is a theory of the~~~lret built up from assumptions about the b~haMiori'(j£'i'li!l'dti\Ytd\i!~l~i'The theoryshows how the actions and interactions of th~~~i~~f~~~and affect the marketand how the market in turn affects them. A'im'ic;Ji~~l¥e0i!Y;tisa theory about thenatii(;f~al1ilee~l1\t!')mybuilt on supply, income, and demand as systemwide aggre-gates. The theory shows how these and other aggregates are interconnected andindicates how changes in one or some of them affect others and the performanceof· the economy. In· e<:onomics~.bot~.~icro.and mac:ot~~o.:ies. ~e~l~it~l~:~erealms. The8laiffe:relii(1Jt}iibetWl!eff01tIl~rtl;;isi;f0:'GnG.iR(jt;\!inclmlll;;sizeit(jf;lltliie;;(jbjeets,.~fst~!iiy,b . .e1f;~;l~~~I!!t;\r¢Ji:\;¥is;;G()nst~u¢~~ltlf';!:~~~~~~~~~~..."..h:v;slrowhO~f)~,the:l;in;terl\fa;ti'Q1'i'§I~ls~stem'ifs;,.,:move'd:;bY.' . One cani~.;gin~ what some of them mightbe.-amount of world GNP, amount of worldimports and exports, of deaths in war, of everybody's defense spending, and ~fmigration, for example. Th:giitheOi!lY!;~!~,~~,!~o~;so~.e.thing·Rli~ela!;macril'le€!1InomIctheory in the style of John Maynard Keynes, although it is hard to see how theinternational aggregates would make much sense and hciw changes in one orsome of them would produce changes in others. I am not saying that such atheory cannot be constructed, but only that I cannot see how to do it in any waythat might be usefuL The decisive point, anyway, is that a"!ilit~(jiEi1ithej[~Jlo&;inte,,+

fV!"~ cies with comparable capabilities exist internationally. Who would act on thepossibilities of adjustment that a macrotheory of international politics mightreveal7 Even were such a theory available, we would still be stuck with nations asthe only agents capable of acting to solve global problems. We would s.m have torevert to a micro political approach in order to examine thecortditions that makebenign and effective actic)1lby. states separately and collectively more or lesslikely. .

Some have hoped that changes in the awareness and purpose, in the orga~ni~ation and ideology, of states would change thequaHtY of international life.

. a·

. The problem is not in theirstupl ity or ill will, although one does not want to claim that those qualities areli:lckiJ;\g.The depth of the difficulty is not .understood until one realizef; thatintelligence and goodwill cannot discover and act on adequate programs. Early inthis century Winston Churchill observeclthat the British~Gertnannaval racepromised disaster and that Britain nadnorealistic choice other than to run it.States facing global problems are like individual consumers. trapped by the

"tyranny.ofsmall decisions:' States, like consumers, can get out of the trap ~nlyby changmg the structure of their field of activity ..The message bears repeating:The only remedy for a strong structural effect is a structural change.

of bankruptcy in t e economic rea m an 6 war ina wor 0 ree states. It is also one in which organi~ational costs are low. Within'an ec.0nomy or ,:ithi~ an internat~onal or~er, risks may he(~~~~~Jjjor lessened bylf~i'~~i~i$~i~j~~~~~.~~~,f:l!j!\lt!j!it~g;li,~q~.t~:;~!it!pn':tg§~N~!Q~{~l-!'~~~);!j)3W§~I:~.\ito~~i~~t¥~N~t .at IS, y erectmg agencies witheHective.a.uthority and elt~!f~,~t~~'!i;;~~~t~m;·.g~.r~l'~~it,yS:;overnmente:n~rges where t~e.funchons of regulation and management'the~selves become dIstmct ~ndspeclah~ed tasks. The costs of maintaining a hier·~rchicorder are freque~tly Ignored by those who deplore its absence. Or$anihons have at least two alms' to get something done and"tQ'·'mli'i1il'~a,·;,•.tI!f~'·'i!l',"j;\!'"organizations. ~~n~ii6'f¥tth'~miiae~i~ifieg!!~tl$;!alr~Gtfl!'dj't0~li~a?tf~~':~;~~~d~u~e:;e'ii!?'i'!,The leaders of orgamzations, and political lea .of the .matters their organizations deal with.

ther but b exceUin

the fir~t a~d most important concern is not to achieve the aims e emers 0 an?rgamZaho.n ~ay have but to se(:Urethe contin,uity andhealth pf the or~anizationItseIf(cf. DIesmg 1992, pp.19;8~204; Downs 1967, p .262'"'70 . .

M'om;gr;~!tnWit:lII!'i;!lr In hierarchicorders, moreover, the means 0 Substantive .issues becomeentwirted with e t II Thh' h' d' '. . e con ro ers. eIerarc IC or· ermg of pohtIcs adds one to the already numerous obje~ts of

struggle, an~ the object added is at a new order of magnitude.. If the rIsks ~f war ar~ unbearably ~i?h, can they be reduced by organi~ing to

mana?~ the affaifs ·of nahons7 At ,a mInImUm, management requires controllingthe milItary forces th.at a:e at the dIsposal of states. Within nations, organizations~a~e t~ work to mamtam themselves. As organizations, nations, in working tomamtam themselves, sometimes have to use force against dissiclent elements andareas. AI;hier~rchica1sy~tems,governments nationally or globally are disruptedby the. defe<:tlonof malor parts. In a society· of states with littlec:oherenceattempts at world government would founder on th~ inability of an emerging cen:

tral authority to mobilize the resources needed to create and maintain the unity of .the system by regulating Cl-ndmanaging its parts. The prospect of world govern-ment would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war. This calls to mindMilovan Djilas's remirtisc;enceof World War II. According to him, he and manyRussian soldiers in their wartime discussions came to believe that humanstruggleswould acquire their ultimate bitterness if allm~n were subject to thesame social system, "for the system would be untenable as such and various sectswould undertake the reckless destruction of the human race for the sake of. itsgreater 'happiness' " (1962, p. 50). States cannot entrust managerial powers to acentral agency unless that agency is able to protect its client states. The morepowerful the clients and the more the power of each of them appears as a threat tothe Others, ihe. greater the power lodged in the center must be. The greater thepower of the center, the stronger the incentive for states to engage in a struggle tcontrol it. . ..

States, iike people, are inse<;ureinproportion tothe extent of their freedom.·Iffreedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted. Organizations that establishrelations of authority and control may increase security as they decrease free-

. If IJ:'Iightdoesnot make right·lhas!i!inte

·il'ifijJ:l:gl;j'.tiia;~i!ttlielilifggn~J?itb,~,,~~~ngeiii!,th'e,Kcre'llire';ife~oItDrC!lI,!itj'~;ec~m~1i;;In contrast,

among similarly constituted entities. The power of the strong may deterweak from asserting their claims, not because the weak recognize a kind· of

rightfulne$s of rule on the part of the strong, but simply because it is not sensibleto tangle with them. Conversely, the weak may enjoycorisiderable 6'eedom of .action if they are so far removed in their capabilities from the strong that the lat-

. ter ·are not much bothered by their actions or much concerned by marginalincreases in their capabilities.

n tea sence of organization, people or states are free to eave oneanother alone. Even when they do not do so, they are better able, in the absenceof the politics of the organization, to concentrate on the politics of the problemand to aim for a minimu:magreement that will permit their separate existencerather than a maximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity. If might de-cides, then bloodystniggl~~overri~~t~a,~T:~f~;a,sil: be avoided.

Natmnal'1~illitl'!E'!"fl)rce"of:l~gEv~~rti~~i'i~'~~~7l-cl~e~4niftme"·nam,e"o£,,rightLandj1;Jisf'ia';~raf~'''f~''~mp1t5yea!ifdi!;ltke;)fiai~e,ofi,it$;';oWn.

. els challenge a government's claim to authority;they question the rightfulness of its rule. Wars among states cannot settle ques-tions of authority and right; they can only determine the allocation of gains andlosses among contenders and settle fora time the question of who is the stronger.National~y, relations of authority are established. Internationally, only relationsof strength result. Nationally, private force used against a government threatensthe political system .~Eoill(!e;;i;useli"by,)a;st~S!:'\;i"illo,m;,~ll~iDJ~:z;~a-. ... to'over~

hort of a drive tohegemony, the private use of force does not t reaten the system of internationalpolitics, only Some of its members: War pits some states against others ina

E§:~_In· the vertical horizontal dichotomy , international structures assume· the proneposition. Adjustments are made internationally, but they are made without a for-malor authoritative adjuster. Adjustment and accommodation proceed bymutual adaptation (d. Barnard 1948, pp. 148~52; Polanyi 1941,pp. 428~56).Action and reaction, and reaction to the reaction, proceed· by a piecemeal pro~cess. The parties feel each other out, so to speak, and define a situation simul~taneously with its development. Among coordinate units, adjustment is achievedand accommodations arrived at by the exchange of "considerations," in acondi-tion, as Chester Barnard put it, "in which the duty of command and the desire toobey are essentially absent" (pp. 150-51). Where the contest is over considera~tions, the parties seek to maintain or improve their positions by maneuvering,bybargaining, qr by fighting. The manner and intensity of the competition is deter-mined by the deSiresand the abilities of parties that are at once separate and inter~acting.

Whether or not by force, each state plots the course it think$will best serveits interests. If force is used by one state or its use is expected, therec;:ourseofother states is to use force or be prepared to use it sirtglyor in combination: Noappeal can be made to a higher entity clothed with. the authority and equippedwith the ability to act on its own initiative. Under such conditions the possibilitythat force will be used by one or another of the parties looms always as a threat intheba'ckground. In politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In internationalpolitics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and con-stant one. To limit force to being the ultima ratio of politics implies, in the wordsof Ortega y Casset, "the previous submission of force to methods of reason"(quoted in Johnson 1966, p.. 13). The constant possibility that force will be usedlimits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the

I'- .

settlement of disputes. One who knows that pressing too hard may lead to warhas strong reason to consider whether possible gains are worth the risks entailed.The threat of force internationally is comparable to the role of the strike in laborand ritanagementbargaini~g. "The few strikes .that take place are in a sense," asLivernash has said, "the cost of the strike option which produces settlement.sinthe large mass of negotiations" (1963, p. 430). Even if workers seldom strike,.their doing so is always a possibility. The possibility of industrial disputes lea~ingto long and costly strikes encourages labor and management to face difficultissues, to try to understand each other's problems; and to work hard· to findaccommodations. The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead to longand costly wars has similarly soberingeffeets.

Ihave described anarchies and hierarchies as though every political order were ofone type or the other. Many, and I suppose most, political scientists who write ofstructures allow for a greater ,and sometimes for a bewildering, variety of types.Anarchy is seen as oneendofa continuum whose other end is marked by thepresence of a legitimate and competent government. International politics is thendescribed as beirig flecked with particles of government and alloyed with ele-ments of community-'-supranational organizations whether universal or re-

. gional, alliances, multinational corporations, networks of trade, and what not.International-political systems are thought of as being more or less anarchic.

Those who view the world as a modified anarchy do so, it seems, for tworeasons. First, anarchy is taken to mean not just the absence of government butalso the presence of disorder and chaos. Since world politics, although n9treliably peaceful, falls short of unrelieved chaos, students are inclined to see alessening of anarchy in each outbreak of peace. Since world politics, although notformally organized, is not entirely without institutions and orderly procedures,students are inclined to see a lessening of anarchy when alliances form, whentransactions across national borders increase, and when international agenciesmultiply. Such view!!confuse structure with process, and I have drawn attention.to that error often enough.

Second, the two simple categories of anarchy and hierarchy do not seem toaccommodate the infinite social variety our senses record. Why insist on reducingthe types of structure to two instead of allowing for a greater variety1 Anarchiesare ordered by the juxtaposition of similar ~nits, but those similar units are notidentical. Some spedalization by function develops among them. I-Uerarchies areordered by the social division of labor among units specializing in different tasks,but the resemblance of units does not vanish. Mut;:hduplication of -effort con-tinues. All societies are organized segmentally or hierart;:hit;:allyin greater or

le~ser degree. Why not, then, define additional social types according to theml~tu:e of organizing principles theyembody1 One might conceive of someSocI~tlesapproac~ing the purely a~archic,.of others· approaching the purely.hier-archlC, and of S.hll others re~ectlng specified mixes of the two organizationaltypes. In .~archles the exact hkeness of units and the determination of relationsby capabl1It~ alone would describe a realm wholly of politics and power withnone o.f the. In~eractio.n of· units guidedhy. administration and conditioned·by~~th~nty. In hI~rarchIe~ the complete differentiation of parts and the .fullSPec-lf1ca~l~n of. theIr. functIons would produce a. realm wholly of authority andadmInIstratIOn WIth none oUhe interaction of parts affected by politics ·andpowe~•.Alth~ug? su~hpureorders do not exist, to distinguish re-.lrni;.by theirorganIzIng prInCIplesISnevertheless proper and important. .

Increasing the number of categories would bring the classifkation of soc:ietiescloser to reality. But that would b~ to move away from a theory claimingexplanatory power t~ a .less theo.retIcal system promising greater descriptive~ccurac~. O~e w~o WIshesto explam rather than to describe should resist movingIn that dIrectIon If resistance is reasonable. Is in What does one gain by insistingon. two ty~es when admitting three or four would still be to simplify boldlyl0negams clanty and econo~y.of concepts. A new concept should be introduced onlyto cov~r matter~ that eXIstIngconcepts do not. reach. If.some societies are neitheran.ar~hlc nor hierarchic, if their structures are defined by some third orderingprincIple,. then we would have to define a third system. * All societies are mixed .Elements In them represent both of the ordering principles. That does not meantha~ so.me s~c::ietiesa~eordered according to a third principle. Usually one caneasIly IdentIfy the principle by which a society is ordered. The appearance ofanarc~ic se~to.rs within hierarchies does ;not alter and shouid not obscure the~rd.enng pnncI~le of the larger system, for those sectors are anarchfconly withinlImIts. The a~trlbutes and behavior of .the units populating thOSesectors withinthe larger system differ, moreover, from what they would he and how theywould be~ave_outside of it. Firms in oHgopoHsticmarkets again are perfect exam-ples of thIS.They struggle against one another, but becau!i'ethey neednot prepareto defend t~emselve.s.p.hysically, they can afford to specialize and to participatemore fully m the diVISIonof economic labor than states can. Nor do the 'statesthat populate an anarchic world find it impossible to work with one another. to~akeag~eemer:ts limiting th~ir ~r~s, and .to cooperate in establishing organ~a-hons. HIer~rchlC elements WIthm Internahonal structures limit and restrahl the

·E~.ile ~urkheim's depic.tio~.ofs?Ii~ary and mechanicalsocietiesstill pnlvides the bestexp lcatt~nof the two ordering prIncIples.and his logic in limitingthe tYpesof society totwo continuesto be compellingdespite the efforts of his many critics to overthrow it (seeesp. 1893).I shalldiscusstheproblem at somelengthin ilfllturework. . .

exercise of sovereignty but only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy ofthe larger system. The anarchy 6f that order' strongly affects the likelihood ofcooperation, the extent·of arms agreements, and the jurisdiction ofinternationalorganizations. .

But what about borderline cases, societies that are neither clearly anarchicnor clearly hierarchic7 Do they not represent a third type7 To say that there areborderline cases is not to say that at the border a third type of system appears. Allcategories have borders, and if we have any categories at all, we have borderlinecases. Clarity of concepts does not eliminate difficulties of classification. WasChina from the 1920s to the 1940s a hierarchic .or an anarchic realm 7Nominally anation, China looked mo~e like a number of separate states existing alongside oneanother. MaoTse-tung in 1930, like Bolshevik leaders earlier, thought that strik-ing a revolutionary spark would "start a prairie fire." Revolutionary flameswould spread across China, if not throughout the world. Because the inter-dependence of China's provinces, like the interdependence of nations, wasinsufficiently close, the flames failed to spread. So nearly autonomous wereChina's provinces that the effects of war in one part of the .country were onlyweakly registered in other parts. Battles in the Hunan hills, far from sparking anational revolution, were hardly noticed. in neighboring provinces. The inter-action of largelyself-.sufficient provinces was slight and sporadic. Dependentneither on one another econ6mically nor on the nation's center politically, theywere not subject to the close interdependence characteristic of organized andintegrated polities.

As a practical matter, observers may disagree in their answers to such ques-tions as just when did China break down into anarchy, or whether the countriesof Western Europe are slowly becoming one state or stubbornly remaining nine,The.point of theoretical importance is that our expectations about the fate ofthose areas differ widely depending on which answer to the structural questionbecomes the right one. Structures defined according to two distinct orderingprinciples help to explain important aspects of social and political behavior. Thatis shown in various ways in the following pages. This section has explained whytwo, and only two; types of structure are needed to cover societies of all sorts.

IIHow can a theory of international politics be constructed7 Just as any theoryr.1ustbe. As Chapters 1 and 4 explain, first, one must conceive of internationalpolitics asa bounded realm or domain; second, one must discover some law-likeregularities Within it; and third, one must develop a way of explaining theobserved regularities. The first of these was accomplished in Chapter 5. Chapter 6so far has shown how political structures account for some recurrent aspects of

the behavio~ of states and for certain repeated and enduring patterns. Whereveragents and agencies are coupled by force and competition rather thim byauthority and law, we expect to find such behaviors and outcomes. They areclosely identified with the approach to politics suggested 1:lythe rubric,Realpolitik. exhaustively listed, are these:

t'ileaspi¥l~l$i .

~ iI61g,~ "t'\W'1)1~~§'t"'S~~~ft'Ilfm~~;success is t e u hmate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving andstrengthening the state. Ever· since Machiavelli, interest and necessity-andraison d'etat, the phrase that comprehends them-have remained the key con-cepts of Realpolitik. From Machiavelli through Meinecke and Morgenthau theeIement$ of the approach and the reasoning remain constant. Machiavelli standsso clearly as the exponent of Realpolitik that one easily slips into thinking that hedeveloped the closely associated idea of balance of power as well. Although hedid not, his conviction that politics can be explained in its own terms esta1:llishedthe ground on which.dilmt"'~cf~~JIl:heory can be built.

Realpolitik indicates the methods\:,ywhich foreign policy is conducted andprovides a rationale for them. Structural constraints explain why the methods arerepeatedly used despite differences in· the persons and states who. use them.

. rai•.• ~.a'i'tll~~_~at er, that is what the theory should do. If there is any distinctively

political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it. Arid yetone cannot find a statement of the theory that is generally accepted. Car¢fullysurveying, the copious balance-of-power literature, Ern~t Haas discovered eightdistinct meanings of the term, and Martin Wight found nine (1953, 1966). HansMorgenthau; in his profound historical and analytic treatment of. the subject,makes use of four different definitions (1973). B'ltrartr<ieJJ~~ee.~.!;g$"l"i~•• ~i,~.;';~~_"§iH!l!!~\~i~~;~.F' Some view it asa guide to statesmen; other~ as a cloak .that disguises their imperialist policies.q•••••.•••••••lft..,..;.j,J.".., ••~1._1,•••••'__ ,~~1'~j;!'~1II.'iiiliU:i"'~.,,-'Ili'W••~'••'Ill!~j;1S_1,~-".1l1W_"'••M'.Ml~~~~~~~~_~,~~tf.!1L§~I~~~~l!!S.~~5fiW •• _~~V·~~~~II"ifii1t1!i!~_i".slliilrl_~~_!h1·_.~~~iI!>.' . dl!I,,· ...•.Ri.L'S ..' .... , ·.~,.j~'~~li.

To believe that one can cut through such confusion may seem quixotic. I .shall nevertheless try. It will help to hark back to ~everal 1:lasicpropo~itions abouttheory. (1) A theory contains at least one theoretical assumption. Such assump.tions are not factual. One therefore cannot legitimately ask if they are true, but

•Along with .the explication of balance-of-power theory in the pages that follow, thereadermay wish to consult a historicalstudy of balance-of-powerpolitics in p~actice.Thebestbriefwork isWight (1973).

should be made. For those who deny the distinction; for those who deviseexplanations that are entirely in terms of interacting units, explanations ofinternationalpolitic:sareexplanations of foreign policy, and explanations offoreign policy are explanations of international politics. Others mix theirexplanatory claims and confuse the problem of understanding internationalpolitics with the problem of understanding foreign policy. Morgenthau, forexample, believes thafproblems ofpredicting foreign policy and of developingtheories about it make international-political theories difficult, if not impossible,to contrive (1970b,pp. 253-58). But the difficuItiesofexplaining foreign policywork against contriving theories of international politics only if the latter reducesto the former. Graham Allison betrays a similar confusion. His three "models"purport to offer alternative approaches to the study of international politics.Only model I, however, is an approach to the study of international politics.Models II and III are approaches to the study. of foreign policy. Offering thebureaucratic-politics approach as an alternative to the state-as-an-actor approachis like saying that a theory of the firm is an alternative to a theory of the market, amistake nocompetenfeconomist would make (1971; d. Allison and Halperin1972). If Morgenthau and Allison were economists and their thinking continuedto follow the same pattern, they would have to argue that the uncertainties ofcorporate policy work against the development of market theory. They have con•.fused and merged two quite different matters.·

Any theory covers some matters· and leaves other matters aside ..Balance-of-power theory is a theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated actionsof states. The theory makes assumptions about the interests and motives ofstates, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints thatconfine all states. The dear perception of constraints provides many dues to theexpected reactions of . states, but by itself the theory cannot explain thosereactions. They depend not only on international constraints but also on thecharacteristics of states;. How will a particular state react? To answerthatques-tion we need not only a theory of the market, so to speak, but also a theory aboutthe firms that compose it: What will a state have to react to 7 Balance-of-powertheory can give general and useful answers to that question. The theory explainswhy a certain similarity of behavior is expected from similarly situated states.The expected behavior is similar, not identical. To explain the expected differ-ences in national responses, a theory wouId have loshow how the differentinternal structUres ofstates affect their external policies and actions. A theory of

'The confusioniswidespreadand runs both ways. Thus HerbertSimon thinks·the goal ofclassical¢coriomictheoristsis unattainablebecausehe wron~y.believesthat' they weretry-~g "topredic~ thebehavior·of rational manwithout makingan empiricalinvestigationofhISpsychologIcalproperties" (1957. p. 199). ..

:-:-', , ., ":tJii. ·:"}i:~

foreign policy would not predict the detailed content of policy but instead wouldlead to different expectations about the tendencies and styles of differentcountries' policies. Because the national and the international levels are linked·theories of both types, if they are any good, tell us Sl;lmethings, but not thesall'i;things, about behavior and outcomes at both levels kf. the second partsofChap~ters 4 andS). .. .

gAt

t lspom pause to as how good the theory so far eveope is.~efore subjecting atheory to tests, one asks whether the theory is internally

consistent and whether it tells us some things of interest. that we would not knowin its absence. That the theory meets those requirements doe.snot mean that Hcansurvive tests. Many people prefer tests that, if flunked, falsify a theory. Somepeople, following Karl Popper (1934, Chapter 1), insist that theories are testedonly by attempting to falsify them. Confirmations do not count because. amon~other reasons, confirming cases may be offered as proof while consciously or notcases likely to c:onfound the theory are avoided. This diffic:ulty, I suggest later, islessened by choosing hard cases situations, for example, in which parties havestrong reaSons to hehave contrary to the pre9ictions of,one's theory. Confirma~tions are also rejected because numerous tests that appear to confirm a theory are.negated by one falsifying instance. The conception of theory presented in Chap~ter 1, however, opens the possi1?ility of devising tests that confirm, If a theorydepicts a domain, and displays itsorganization·ancl. the connections among itsparts~ then we c:ancQmpare features of the observed domaIn with the picture thetheory has limned (cf. Harris 1970). We can ask whether expeqed behaviors andoutc?mes are repeatedly found where the conditions contemplated by the theoryobtam.

Structural theories, moreover, gain plausihility if similarities of pehavior areobserved across realms that are different in substance Put Similar in structure andif differences of behavior are observed where realms are similar in su.pstanc:~blj.t·different in structure. This special advantage is won;lnternational~poIiticalthe?ry gains credibility from the confirmation of certain theories in economics,SOCiology,anthropol0!W' and other such nonpoIiticaIfieIds.

Testing theories, of CQUrse, always means inferring e~pe<:tations,orhypotheses, from them and testing those expectations. Testing theQries i.sa diffi~cult and subtle task, made so by the interdependence of fact and theory, hy the

elusive relationbetweef\reality and theory as an instrument for its apprehension.Questions of truth af\dfalsityare somehow involved, but so are questions of use-fulness and uselessness.;In the end, one stiCkswith the theory that reveals most,even if its validity is suspect. I.shall saymorea!:mut the acceptance and rejectiond theories elsewhere, Here I say orlly enough to make the relevance of a fewexamples of theory test~ng clear. Others can then easily be thought of. Many areprovided in the first part of this chapter and in all parts of the next three,although I havenotalways labeled them as tests or put them in testable form.

Tests are easy to think up, once one has a theory to test, but they are hard tocarry through. Given the difficulty of testing any theory, and the added difficultyof testing theories in such nonexperimental fields as international politics, weshould exploit all oUhe ways of testing I have mentioned~by trying to falsify,by devising hard confirmatory tests, by comparing features of the real and thetheoreticalworlds, by comparing behaviors in realms of similar and of differentstructure. Any good theory raises many expectations. Multiplying hypothesesand varying tests are all the more important because the results oEtesting theoriesare necessarily problematic. That a single hypothesis appears to hold true maynot be very impressive. A theory becomes plausible if many hypotheses inferredfrom it are successfully subjected to tests. .

Knowing a little bit more about testing, we can now ask whether expecta-tionsdrawn from our theory can survive subjection to tests: What will some ofthe expectations be? Two that are closely related arise in the above discussion.According to the theory; balances of power recurrently form, and states tend to

. emulate the successful policies of others. Qanthese expectations be subjected totests? In principle, the answer is "yes." Within a given arena and over a numberof years, we should find the military power of weaker and smaller states orgroupings of states growing more rapidly, or shrinking more slowly, than that ofstronger and larger ones. And we should find widespread imitation among com-peting states. In practice, to check such expectations against historical observa~tiQns is difficult.

Two problems are paramount. First, though balance-of-power theory offerssome predictions, the predictions are indeterminate. Because only a looselydefined and inconstanh:ondition of balance is predicted, it is difficult to say thatany given distribution of power falsifies the theory. The theory, moreover, doesnot .lead one to expect that emulation among states· will proceed to the point~herecompetitors become identical. What will be imitated, and how quickly andclosely? Because the theory does not give precise answers, falsification again isdifficult.· Second, although states may be disposed to react to international·con~straints and incentives in accordance with the theory's expectations, the policiesand actions of states are also shaped by their internal conditions. The failure ofbalances t()form, and the failure of some states to conform to the successful prac-

tices of other states, can too easily be explained away by pointing· to effects·produced byJorces that lie outside of the theory's purvier"

In the absence of theoretical refinements that fix expectations with certaintyand in detail, what. can we do? As I have just suggested, and as the sixth rule fortesting theories set forth in Chapter 1 urges, we should make tests ever moredifficult. Ifwe observe outcomes that the theory leads us to expect even thoughstrong forces work against them, the theory will begin to command belief. Toconfirm the theory one should not look mainly.to the eighteenth-eentury heydayof the balance of power when great powersin convenient numbers interacted andwere presumably able to adjust to a shifting distribution of power by changingpartners with a grace made possible by the absence of ideological and othercleavages. Instead, Oneshould seek confirmation through observatil;mof difficultcases. One should, for example, look for instances of states allying, in accordancewith the expectations the theory gives rise to, even though they have strong rea~sons not to cooperate with one another. The alliance of France and Russia, madeformalin 1894, is one such instanc:e (see Chapter 8, part I). One should, for exam-pIe, look for instances of states making internal efforts to strengthen themselves,however distasteful or difficult such efforts might be. The United States and theSoviet Union following World War II provide such instances: the United Statesby rearming despite having demonstrated a strong wish not t() by dismantling themost powerful military machine the world had ever known; the Soviet Union bymaintaining about three million men under arms while striving t() ac:quirea (;()stlynew military technology despite the terrible destruction she had suffered in war.

These examples tend to confirm the theory. We find states f()rming balancesof power whether or not they wish to. They also show the diffic;ulties oj testing.Germany and Austria~Hungary formed their Dual AIlian<:;ein 1879. Sincedetailed inferences cannot be drawn from the theory, we cannot say just whenother states are expected to counter this move. France and RU$ia waited until1894. Does this show the theory false by suggesting that states mayor may not bebrought into balance? We should neither quickly conclude that it does nor lightlychalk the delayed response off to "friction." Instead, we should examine diplo~macy and policy in the 15~year interval to see whether the theory serVes toexplain and broadly predict the actions and reactions of states and to see whetherthe delay is out of accord with the theory. Careful judgment is needed. For this,historians' accounts serve better than the historical summary I might provide.

The theory leads us to expect states to behave in ways that result in balancesforming. To infer that expectation from the theory is not impressive if balancingis a universal pattern of political behavior, as is sometimes claimed. It is not.Whether political actors balance each other or dimbon the bandwagon dependson the system's structure. Political parties, when choosing their presiden-tial candidates, dramatically illustrate both points. When nomination time

apprcaches and no one.is estabIlshed as the party's strong favorite,;a.number ofwould-be leaders contend; Some of them form coalitions ~ocheck the progress ofothers. The maneuvering and balancing of would-be leaders when the party lacksone is like the external behavior of states. But this is the pattern· only during. theleaderless period. As s00rl as someone looks like th~ winner, nearly all jump onthe bandwagon rather than continuing to build coalitions intended to preventanyone from winning the prize of power. Bandwagoning, not balancing, becomesthe characteristic behavior. •. .

Bandwagoning ;a.ndbalancing behavior are in sharp contrast. Internally,losing candidates throw in their lots with the winner. Everyone wants someone towin; the members of a party want a leader established even while they disagreeon Who it should be. In acompetition.for the position of leader, bandwagc;>ningissensible behavior where gains are possible even for the losers and where losingdoes not place their security in jeopardy. Externally, states work harder toincrease their own strength, or they. combine with others, if they are fallingbehind.lna competition for the position of leader, balancing is sensible behaviorwhere the victory of one coalition· over another leaves weaker members of thewinning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones. Nobodywants anyone else towin; ::'loneof the great powers wants one of their number to emerge as the leader.

If two coalitions form and one of them weakens, perhaps because of thepolitical disorder of a member, we expect the extent of the other coalition'smili-tary preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen. The classic example of the lattereffect is the breaking apart of a war-winning coalition in or just after the momentof victory. We do not expect the strong to combine with the strong in order toincrease the extent of their power over others, but rather to square off and lo.okfor allies ""homighthelp them. In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only ifsurvival is assured can states safely seeks-uch other goals as tranquility, profit,and power. -Becausepowei' is a means and not an end, states prefer to join thewea:<er of two coalitions. They eannot let power, a possibly useful means,become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek issecurity. Increased power mayor may not serve that end. Given two coalitions,for example, the greater success of one in drawing members to it may tempt theother to risk preventive war, hoping for victory through surprise before dis-parities widen. If states wished to maximize power, they would join the strongerside~and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. Thisdoes not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced

. by thesystem. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to main-tain their positions in the system.

·Stephen Van Evera suggested using "bandwagoning" to serve astheopp~site of"balanci.'1g, "

Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it isthe stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both moreappreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achievesenough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking;Thus Thucydides records that in the Peloponnesian War the lesser city states ofGreece cast the stronger Athens as the tyrant and the weaker Sparta as theirliberator (circa 400B.C., Book v, Chapter 17). According to Werner Jaeger,Thucydides thought this "perfectly natural in the circumstances," buts;a.w "thatthe parts of tyrant and liberator did not correspond with any permanent mpralquality in these states but were simply mask$ which would ont'!day be inter-changed to the astonishment of the beholder when the palance of power wasaltered" (1939, I, 397). This shows ;a.nice sense of how the placement of sMesaffects their behavior and even colors their characters. It also supports th~proposition that states balance power rather than maximize it. States can seldomafford tom;a.kemaximizing power their goal. International politics.is too serious ;a.business for that. ..

I4l:e"t1:l.e01'¥1Idepictsi!,iD;temaH@~all,·P9U;t;,i,S~i'~~·'il·$Qm···QeClle19iQ,Jme,ehanacteristi¢s"thateompetitorsiare'expect'~(:i'to(disp'il 'questlon·P£~lr,~"ilf\.9,theI;"test,·;or",U1,e'ltheo!,¥,·Thefate of each state depends on its responsesto what other states do. The possibility that conflict will be conducted by !orceleads to competition in the arts and. the instruments of force. Competitionproduces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors. Thus Bism;a.rck'sstartling victories over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1870 quickly led themajor continental powers (;a.ndJapan) to imitate the Prussianmilitary staff sys-tem, and the failure of Britain and the United States to follow the patterp simplyindicated that they were outside the immediate arena of competition, Contendingstates imitate the milit;a.ry innovations contrived by the country of grl;!atestcapability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and eventheir strategies, begin to look much the same all over the world. Thus at the turnof the century Admiral Alfred von· Tirpitz argued successfully. for building abattleship fleet on the grounds that Germany could challenge Britianat sea onlywith a naval doctrine ;a.ndweapons similar-to hers (Art 1973,.p. 16). .

The effects of competition are not confined narrowly to the military realm.Socialization to the system should also occur. Does it? Again, because we canalmost always find confirming examples if we look hard,w~ try to find cases thatare unlikely to lend credence to the theory. One should look for instances ofstates coi\forming to common international practices even though for internalreasons they w~uld prefer not to. The behavior of the Soviet Union in its earlyyears is one such instance. The Bolsheviks. in the early years of .their PQwerpreached international revolution and flouted the conventions of diplomacy.They were saying, in effect, "we will not be socialized to this system." The atti-

tude was well expressed,by Trotsky, who, when asked what he would do asforeign minister, replied'''I will issue some revolutionary proclamations to th~peoples and then close up the joint" (quoted in Von Laue 1963, p. 235). In a com-petitive arena, however, one party may need the assistance of others. Refusal t~play the political game may risk one's own destruction. The pressures ofcomp~tI-tionwere rapidly felt aniireflected in the Soviet Union's diplomacy. Thus Len~n,sending foreign minister'Chicherin to the Genoa Conference of 1922, bade 1umfarewell with this caution: "Avoid big words" (quoted in Moore 1950, p. 204).Chicherin, who personifi'edthe carefully tailored traditional diplomat rather th~nthe simply ul1iformed revolutionary, was to refrain from inflammatory rhetoncfor the sake;()f working. deals. These he successfully completed with that otherpariah powe~and ideological enemy, Germany. .

The clo~ejuxtapo~ition of states promotes their sameness through the disad-vantages that arise from a: failure to conform to successful practices. It is this"sameness,"aneffect ()f the system, that is so often attributed to the acceptance ofso-called rules of state behavior. Chiliastic rulers occasionally come topower. Inpower, most of themqtiickly change their ways. They can refuse to do so, andyet hope to survive, only if they rule countries little affected by the competitionof states. The socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pace that is setby the extent of theirinv~lvement in the system. And that iSar\other testablestatement. '" .

The theory leads to many expectationsabout behaviors and outcomes. Fromthe theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior, whether ornot balanced power is the end of their acts. From the theory, one predicts a strongtendency toward balance in the system, The expectation is not that a balance,once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will berestored inane way or another .. Balances of power recurrently form, Since thetheory depicts international politics as a competitive system,. one predicts morespecifically that states will display characteristics common to competitors:namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system.In this chapter, I have suggested ways of making these propositions more specificand cOncrete so as to test them. In remainirig chapters, as the theory is elaboratedand refined, additional testable propositions will appear.

1Structural Causes and

Economic Effects

Chapter 6 compared national and international systems and showed how behav-ior and outcomes vary from one system to another. Chapters 7,8, and 9l:omparedifferent international systems and show how behavior and outl:ornes vary insystems whose ordering' principles endure but whose strUl:tures vary throughchanges in the distribution of l:apabilities across states. The question posed in thischapter is whether we should prefer larger or smaller numbers of great powers.Part I carries the theory further. Part II moves from theory to practice. *

1. COUNTING POLES AND MEASURING POWERHow should we count poles, and how can we measure power7These questionsmust be answered in order to identify variations of structure. Almost everyoneagrees that at some time sincethe warthe world was bipolar. Few seem to believethat it remains so. For yeilrs Walter Lippmann wrote of the bipolar world;is beingperpetually in the process of rapidly passing away (e.g., 1950 and '1:963).Manyothers now carryon the tradition he so firmly established. To'reach the conclu-sion that bipolarity is passing, or past, requires some odd counting. The i~diri.a-Hon to count in funny ways is rooted in the desire to .arrive at a particular answer.Scholars feel a strong affection for the balance~of-power world of Metternich andBismarck, on which many of their theoretiCal notions .rest. That was a world inwhich five or so great powers manipulated their neighbors and maneuvered foradvantage. Great powers were once defined according to theircapabHities. Stu_dents of international politics now seem to look at other conditions. The abilityor inability of states to solve problems is said to raise orlower their ri:inkings. The

*Someparts of this chapt~rand the next one were W'riUena; a.study of i~terdep~ndencefor theOep<lrtmentof State,whoseviewsmay differfrommine.' .,