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Searching for a Strategy toTeach Strategy

LARRY E. GREINERARVIND BHAMBRI

THOMAS G. CUMMINGSUniversity of Southern California

We contend that the content of the required MBA strategy course in top-tier businessschools has moved away from interdisciplinary thinking and practice toward an almostexclusive emphasis on theory and analysis. The once accepted Harvard model ofcapstone integration and learning-by-doing through case discussion is now much less invogue. Consequently, strategy students today tend to experience a rather abstractapproach to learning about strategy presented through the limited prism of a theoreticaldiscipline. Even classroom discussions of cases are often guided by instructors to confirmthe utility of a particular theoretical framework, instead of serving as an open-endeddiscussion of problems and solutions. After presenting our evidence and argumentsagainst the current trend, we present some examples of MBA programs that give moreemphasis to practice, including USC’s Executive MBA program, where priority is placedon integration and implementation without sacrificing, we believe, essential theories andanalytical skills. Finally, we explore the implications from our analysis for additionalsolutions in other strategy teaching contexts.

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SEARCHING FOR A STRATEGY TO TEACHSTRATEGY

Few of today’s strategy professors have receiveddoctoral training in the pedagogy of teaching stra-tegic management. Moreover, many of these fac-ulty members, because of their past training, leantoward either economics or organization theory inthe treatment of course content. The consequenceis that MBA graduates are frequently well trainedin drawing sharp analytical insights in terms of aparticular discipline but lack the necessary prep-aration in other concepts and skills to become ca-pable strategic leaders. Although we have noquarrel with theoretical training, which is obvi-ously necessary, we remain concerned about thegrowing lack of integration across the businessdisciplines and the neglect of practical skill train-ing in the teaching of strategic management.

The consequence is that MBA graduatesare frequently well trained in drawingsharp analytical insights in terms of aparticular discipline but lack thenecessary preparation in other conceptsand skills to become capable strategicleaders.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF STRATEGY COURSE

The origins for developing a pedagogical ap-proach to teaching strategic management go backto the Harvard Business School (HBS) in 1912 whenthe first business policy course was founded(Cruikshank, 1987). It included executives comingto class to discuss practical problems in their com-panies, ranging from strategic issues to plant lay-out and personnel problems, and it involved stu-dents in active discussion and presentation of theirsolutions—thus was born the case method. Thiseffort also spawned the first research on strategy,which consisted largely of case writing. DuringWW II, a training program was introduced at HBSfor senior government administrators, and the con-cept of “general management” first came into be-

We received valuable feedback and suggestions from the edi-tors, anonymous reviewers, and Julia Liebeskind, JonathanJaffee, Kyle Mayer, Nandini Rajogopalan, and Arturs Kalnins.

� Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2003, Vol. 2, No. 4, 402–420.

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ing, which also reflected what the school calledthe “administrative point of view.”

After WW II, the Harvard curriculum was revisedin 1946 by a faculty vote, and the resulting busi-ness policy course was born, rapidly becoming thestandard for similar courses at other businessschools. The HBS policy course was required andpositioned in the second year of the MBA program,and it became known as the “capstone” experi-ence. It was taught largely through cases and dis-cussion led by senior faculty, many of whom hadprior business experience. The course content fo-cused on the entire firm and its future direction,building on the functional disciplines known asthe “elements of administration,” which were cov-ered in the first year. The course was advertised asthe place where “it all comes together,” given itsheavy emphasis on integration and practice.

The case method of teaching was prescribed asthe dominant pedagogy for all HBS courses in the1946 changes, and this teaching approach laterbecame widely used at most business schools, es-pecially in policy/strategy courses. During theteaching of cases, there were no “right answers,”just “good questions” and “better answers,” al-though one HBS professor claimed he “sure as hellknew when there was a wrong answer.” The Har-vard professors also taught this method to all doc-toral students, producing graduates who moved onto initiate strategy courses at other businessschools. Faculty from around the world came toHBS for training in case teaching, and thousandsof cases were developed at Harvard to be pub-lished in teaching casebooks and widely distrib-uted through its case clearinghouse.

Of interest, and contrary to much of today’s de-ductive theory in the teaching of strategic manage-ment, the HBS case method advocated that everycompany situation was unique and not easily ame-nable to generalization. The learning emphasiswas on inductive reasoning as students were ex-pected to learn through Socratic debate and ex-change in sharpening not only their analyticalabilities, but also their intuition, judgment, andbehavioral skills (Christensen, Andrews, & Bower,1973; McNair, 1954).

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING FOR PROFESSIONALS

As originally applied, the case method of teachingbusiness policy emphasized the role and impor-tance of “doing” in the learning process as stu-dents argued their various points of view aboutsituations for which there were not supposed to be“right answers.” It drew on a tradition of educationabout how people learn through directly experi-

encing the phenomenon in question, especially inthe acquisition of practical knowledge and skills(Dewey, 1910; Whitehead, 1947; Moore, 1981). It alsoparalleled similar experiential learning ap-proaches being used in other professional schoolsat the time, such as “rounds” with doctors in med-ical schools, “moot courts” in law schools, and“internships” in schools of public administration(Barrows & Tamblyn, 1980; Nuy & Moust, 1990).Learning-by-doing continues to gain attentionamong researchers and educators (Clift, 1990,Boshyk, 2000; Hutchings & Wutzdorff, 1988; Kolb,1984). It is particularly relevant to educational set-tings in professional schools where students needto acquire competence and experience in translat-ing complex cognitive knowledge into everydaybehavior and lasting skills.

Today, corporate recruiters increasingly seekbusiness graduates who can both make good stra-tegic decisions and execute them effectively(Bossidy, Charan, & Burck, 2002). Students need tobe able to make analytical judgment calls on thespot in ambiguous settings, as well as to demon-strate the necessary behavioral skills to transformstrategic decisions into tangible results producedby employees. Such professional expertise in-cludes a good deal of what Donald Schon (1983,1987) has called “knowledge-in-action,” which in-volves both cognitive and behavioral capabilitieswhere decisions and actions take place spontane-ously in relation to the environment (Polanyi, 1983;Sternberg & Horvath, 1999). Knowledge-in-actioncannot be fully verbalized or described, which iswhy professionals often know more than they canpublicly articulate. This contrasts with explicit andtheoretical knowledge, which emphasizes mindover behavior and advocates lessons that can becodified and explained.

Knowledge-in-action cannot be learnedsimply through lectures and readings;instead, it requires a healthy dose oflearning-by-doing.

Knowledge-in-action cannot be learned simplythrough lectures and readings; instead, it requiresa healthy dose of learning-by-doing. Because it islearned “in use,” considerable trial-and-error be-havior and practice are involved. By analogy, peo-ple learn to ride a bicycle or to play golf by per-forming the task repeatedly until it becomes tacitknowledge and spontaneous to one’s behavior.Similarly, many professionals learn professionalbehaviors in the course of trying to perform them,

2003 403Greiner, Bhambri, and Cummings

usually starting with a supervised practicum andmoving gradually toward real-world activities.Moreover, as Schon (1983) has astutely observed,professionals learn to confront the messy unantic-ipated problems inherent in their practice by re-flecting on their actions. When faced with novelproblems, new behaviors are tried out and as-sessed; they are thought about and talked about.Thus, professionals learn and develop knowledge-in-action by continually reflecting on their ownbehavior and its consequences (Daley, 1999).

Such “reflection-in-action” was a key aspect ofHarvard’s pioneering strategy course. Studentslearned how to think and act strategically throughreflecting on their behavior in highly interactivecase discussions, causing them to adjust day afterday and case after case as they gradually adoptednew behaviors and thought patterns. Such learn-ing-by-doing helped students translate conceptsinto action.

Knowing–Doing Gap in Business Schools

Recently, there is growing criticism that businesseducation, which includes the teaching of busi-ness strategy, has lost its original strong connec-tion between learning and doing (Bailey & Ford,1996; Mintzberg & Gosling, 2002; Pfeffer & Fong,2002). Learning today is far more focused on con-cepts and tools than on behavioral skills and ac-tion taking. The leading business schools empha-size research over teaching, and most new facultymembers are selected for their content knowledgeand research skills, not for their expertise in teach-ing management practice. Only a small minority ofbusiness school professors have actually workedas executives in business organizations or servedas senior managers in their own academic organi-zations.

As pointed out in Porter and McKibben’s (1988)seminal report on management education, the ne-glect of behavioral and implementation trainingcan result in students graduating with strong con-ceptual expertise but weak skills in applying it toachieve positive results—hardly good news forcorporate recruiters. This failure contributes to apernicious problem facing many organizations to-day, what Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) have termed the“knowing–doing gap.” In their view, managerstend to know too much and do too little, resulting insmart plans and ideas that rarely get imple-mented. A large part of the blame, in their opinion(and ours as well), lies with modern businessschools where students primarily learn how tothink and talk smart, but not to act smart. Theylearn how to say and write smart things, and get

rewarded for it with high grades. They use thosesmart skills to impress recruiters and get goodjobs, thus perpetuating the knowing–doing gap.

A large part of the blame, in theiropinion (and ours as well), lies withmodern business schools where studentsprimarily learn how to think and talksmart, but not to act smart.

Our focus here is on business schools and theirlack of learning-by-doing in the currently requiredbusiness strategy course. We have chosen to focuson the strategy course because of its importanceand potential for helping students learn how tobridge the disciplines and close the gap betweenthinking and acting in the overall leadership oforganizations. After all, strategic business prob-lems are seldom captured by a single discipline,nor can one retreat to books for strategic solutionswhen called upon to react in “real time.”

Graduates without adequate strategy formula-tion and implementation skills will not be pre-pared to later assume senior-level positions. Ofcourse, one might retort that graduates today don’tneed much training in strategic practice becausethey won’t be in senior positions for a number ofyears. Even early career managers, however, needto understand the strategic context for decisions intheir companies, as well as to possess the skill tointegrate business disciplines in their own deci-sion making. Moreover, many of these graduatesare likely to find themselves addressing strategicissues in their initial jobs as newly hired consult-ants or in staff positions at corporate headquar-ters. We also think it unrealistic to assume thatmanagers will suddenly acquire strategic capabil-ities when they are promoted to senior positions.More likely, they will need to demonstrate thisability in order to get promoted.

TODAY’S TYPICAL STRATEGY COURSE

We surveyed the required MBA strategy coursesat the top-20 business schools, as ranked byBusinessWeek in 2002. By focusing on these “elite”programs, our assumption was that certain prac-tices for teaching strategic management hademerged among them, and that these practiceswere likely in effect today not only at these schoolsbut at many other schools emulating them.

Our review consisted of examining course de-scriptions and syllabi from all the highly rankedschools, as well as interviewing several faculty

404 DecemberAcademy of Management Learning and Education

members at these same schools. We recognizethere is the possibility that course descriptions andsyllabi don’t represent what is actually taught, al-though when we cross-checked through interviewsthere seemed to be close agreement. We citemainly the Web-based course descriptions here,because these tend to be more concise than longerdocuments, and the Web content is usually keptcurrent and offered as a school’s official position.

The results reveal that the traditional requiredHarvard Business policy course is barely alive,having changed considerably over the years, andnow resembling its past only as a mere require-ment for all MBA students. The Harvard forefathersof the course would not recognize it today. Instead,its content and that of other required strategycourses has moved away from practice to empha-size theory and analytics at the explicit knowledgelevel. Remarkably, Harvard’s strategy course de-scription on the school’s Web site reveals a narra-tive without any words denoting the importance ofpractice and action taking, such as “management,”“organization,” “leadership,” “change,” or “imple-mentation:”

The objective of this course is to help studentsdevelop the skills for formulating strategy,and provides an understanding of: A firm’soperative environment and how to sustaincompetitive advantage. How to generate su-perior value for customers by designing theoptimum configuration of the product mix andfunctional activities. How to balance the op-portunities and risks associated with dy-namic and uncertain changes in industryattractiveness and competitive position. Stu-dents learn to: Develop a mastery of a body ofanalytical tools and the ability to take anintegrative point of view. Use these tools toperform in-depth analyses of industries andcompetitors, predict competitive behavior,and analyze how firms develop and sustaincompetitive advantage over time. Particularattention is paid to competitive positioning;understanding comparative costs; and ad-dressing issues such as cannibalization, net-work externalities, and globalization.

The rest of the “top 20,” with two notable excep-tions at the Universities of Michigan and NorthCarolina, indicate an almost exclusive emphasison theory and analysis, slanted mostly toward in-dustrial economics but with a few schools empha-sizing organization theory. The strategy course de-scription below from the Darden School at theUniversity of Virginia is typical of the many re-

quired strategy courses with a heavy economicsand finance orientation:

We begin with an overview of corporate anddivisional strategies, followed by an intro-duction to industry analysis and a number ofadditional analytical tools and concepts.These include labor productivity, economiesof scale and growth, corporate capitalcharges and EVA, cash flow and its relation-ship to growth, and the valuation of acquisi-tions and divestitures using both market mul-tiples and DCF analysis. We then analyze anumber of generic, focused strategic prob-lems/opportunities. The analysis/methodol-ogy will then be extended to include a multi-divisional corporate setting and decisionsregarding tradeoffs among feasible sets ofcorporate goals. Finally, we will analyze acompany composed of ten operating unitsalong with three acquisition targets, from theperspective of both the parent company andthe individual operating units and potentialacquisition targets. This will lead to a deter-mination of the most effective portfolio ofbusinesses for on-going operations and allowfor the forecast of future corporate perfor-mance under a range of financial scenarios.

Interviews with a sampling of strategy facultymembers from the top-20 schools suggest that, re-gardless of their underlying discipline orientation(i.e., economics or organization theory), instructorstend to lecture frequently about their preferred the-ories and models, supplemented by the occasionaluse of cases to gain practice in using the advo-cated theories. Today’s case teaching approachappears to be heavily deductive, with instructorsguiding students, sometimes unintentionally, to“answers” that confirm the validity of conceptsbeing taught. This approach contrasts sharplywith Harvard’s original open-ended approach,which used cases that inductively explore theopinions and intuitions of students for solving theproblems of a particular company.

In another significant departure from the Har-vard tradition, all but two of the top-20 schoolshave positioned their required strategy courses inthe first year of their MBA programs, usually in thespring semester. Surprisingly, a few schools actu-ally begin the first year with the strategy course,thereby abandoning the capstone notion com-pletely, while a few start and end the year withstrategy acting as bookends for the interveningfunctional disciplines. Harvard has also trans-ferred its course to the end of its first year. Move-


ment of the strategy course to various places in thefirst year suggests that it is being taught moreoften as a separate academic discipline, compet-ing alongside the other business disciplines. Wedetected little indication in the 20 course descrip-tions that any linkage is being made with sur-rounding courses, such as collaborating with fac-ulty from other disciplines in the planning andteaching of the strategy course.

Against the Trend

Only one of 20 course descriptions, the Universityof Michigan’s, closely resembles the original Har-vard course:

This course focuses on the job, perspective,and skills of the general manager in diagnos-ing what is critical in complex businesssituations and finding realistic solutions tostrategic and organizational problems. It isdesigned to build upon previous requiredcoursework in the MBA program drawingupon the integration of various functional andtechnical areas and providing a “total busi-ness” perspective. Since the focus is on prag-matic, action-oriented, general managementskills, the course will be taught primarilythrough the case method.

Michigan also backs up its practice-orientedstatement with its Multidisciplinary ActionProjects (MAP) program, which is conducted as theonly “course” in the last 7 weeks of the first-yearcore program. All students work in teams on strat-egy consulting projects with a cross-disciplinaryteam of faculty serving as advisors to each team.Its course description goes into great detail on theproject format, which is presented as “Michigan’sbusiness residency program because of its similar-ities to how medical schools teach students to gofrom text books to practicing medicine.”

In another dramatic exception to the dominanttrend, the Flagler School at the University of NorthCarolina has completely reorganized its first-yearcurriculum into sequential themes with an integra-tive experiential exercise on business strategy atthe end of each theme. This approach is notable forits emphasis on integration, practice, and experi-ential learning. The course description on Flagler’sWeb site reads as follows:

To keep pace with changes in the businessworld and to make our graduates as compet-itive as possible, the MBA Program imple-mented a new core curriculum in fall 2000.

This innovative curriculum is based on abusiness process model. Themes are: analyz-ing capabilities and resources; monitoringthe marketplace and external environment;formulating strategy; implementing strategyand assessing firm performance. The aca-demic year is comprised of four modules or“mods.” The mods are arranged around thesethemes, which follow the cycle of running abusiness. What students learn across coursesis pulled together by an integrative exercisein each mod. The integrative exercises, whichare tied to the four themes of the businessprocess model, are: evaluating a company(Mod 1); business plan exercise (Mods 2 and3); business simulation (Mod 4).

The Reflective Challenge

These results cause us to question why so manytop schools are headed away from integration andpractice and toward a relatively narrow focus ontheory and analysis. Part of the explanation, in ouropinion, stems from strategy scholars’ preoccupa-tion with being seen as strong in theory and re-search. Industrial economists and organizationtheorists have clearly established a strong re-search presence in strategy, and they have donemuch to place the field on a secure academic foot-ing. Although we agree that the strategy disciplinehas made rapid headway and gained credibilityfrom a research point of view, this does not meanthat this same preoccupation should be transferredto the classroom experience.

A more troubling explanation lies within thepolitics between disciplines at some businessschools. One senior strategy faculty member at atop-ranked school, who understandably prefersto remain unnamed, told us, “Our economics-oriented faculty did a ’take-over’ of the strategycourse from our more organizationally mindedfaculty. They wanted to add more theory andcalculus to the course” (personal communica-tion). These discipline battles have unfortunateeffects on students because theoretical ortho-doxy inherently restricts the range of strategicproblems being considered and the types of so-lutions that are entertained.

A key step toward rethinking the design of therequired strategy course is to consider what shouldbe its overall structure and objectives. Should it bemultidisciplinary? Should it integrate with othercourses around it? Should the course be mainlyanalytical in its focus? How much practice shouldbe included in the course? Should it take respon-sibility for teaching about strategic change and


leadership? Although these questions are all rele-vant, the overriding question should be: “What arethe necessary conceptual and behavioral skills re-quired of strategic leaders today and in the fu-ture?”

Today’s strategy faculty might argue that therequired strategy course is already headed in theright “scientific” direction by presenting conceptsvalidated by empirical research. Unfortunately, aswe all know, a long lag exists, often 3–5 years,between research discoveries and their publica-tion in journals and textbooks. Moreover, researchon business strategy is rarely conclusive about the“final truth” on a given issue. There is usually alarge amount of unexplained variance in the mostrigorous research studies, meaning that even sta-tistically significant results may have relativelylittle practical relevance for understanding a spe-cific issue in a particular company. As a result,strategy faculty members often differ in their inter-pretations about what “content” should be taughtand how to teach it, causing the same course toappear differently in the hands of two facultymembers at the same school. Personal preferenceand psyche comfort often dictate the selection ofwhat content to teach and how it is to be taught.

Potential senior executives must learnhow to conceive and enact newstrategies in messy situations wherethere is often little time for systematicdata gathering, and where manystakeholders must become involved andmotivated for the firm to move forward ina coherent direction.

Despite these many uncertainties about whatwe know or don’t know about the existing knowl-edge base in strategic management, all instruc-tors must decide what to teach and how to teachit. In our opinion, a “scientific” approach ori-ented primarily at the conceptual and analyticallevels may be appropriate for a doctoral semi-nar, but we see it as too abstract and narrowlylimited in substance for teaching MBA studentswho aspire to nonacademic careers. Potentialsenior executives must learn how to conceiveand enact new strategies in messy situationswhere there is often little time for systematicdata gathering, and where many stakeholdersmust become involved and motivated for the firmto move forward in a coherent direction.

SHORT HISTORY OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

In seeking to determine a course structure and setof objectives for teaching strategic management,one can turn in many directions for clues. An easyalternative is to join the majority of peer schools inemulating what is already being done (which to-day means a theoretical and analytically orientedcourse), or at the other extreme, one can return tothe original Harvard model with its almost exclu-sive attention to practice through the discussion ofcases. Neither alternative provides a solid founda-tion for educating tomorrow’s senior executives;moreover, if either alternative is followed, studentsare likely to be misled or uninformed about how tocope with the broad range of complex strategicissues ahead of them. They will be facing realissues occurring in real companies involving realpeople.

Our clues for a third approach come from exam-ining the evolving history of the developing field ofstrategic management. The value of this history isit lends perspective to the present situation, allow-ing us to incorporate the wisdom of the past andsee the trends toward the future. As in all appliedfields, knowledge about strategic managementhas evolved as managers have faced issues notpreviously encountered. New strategic theoriesand frameworks have been continuously inventedto solve these issues. Interestingly, some theorieshave endured; for example, the “five forces” and“resource-based” perspectives are well over a de-cade old, and systemic theories of fit and align-ment are even older—yet all are still being taughtand widely regarded as useful.

Therefore, by taking a historical perspective, wecan detect the outlines of a possible foundation forconstructing tomorrow’s required strategy course.It informs us about not only well-established con-cepts, but also about certain enduring strategicissues and the types of skills required of strategicleaders. Drawing on several accounts of the his-tory of strategic management (shown below in ab-breviated form) is our interpretation of the evolu-tion of major strategic concepts, models, issues,and required skills (Ghemawat, 1997; Grant, 2001;Kay, 2000; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2000).

1940s–Budget Extrapolation and Financial Goals.This era focused narrowly on financial numbers,usually extrapolating them from one year to thenext in forming a plan. Strategic plans becamenothing more than extended financial forecasts;thus, if this year’s sales were up 5%, then nextyear’s should be up likewise. And probably thatwas all that was needed, because it was just afterWW II when growth was easy and little hard-


headed conceptualizing was required. Mostly, tac-tical planning was called for in organizing produc-tion to keep up with demand (Drucker, 1955; Katz,1955). Only in a very limited way were the seedssown for more modern definitions of managementthat included systemic ways of thinking and therelationship between planning and organizing.The most enlightened management book of the erawas Functions of the Executive authored by anexecutive, Chester Barnard, who provided a holis-tic view of the firm and its overall managementchallenges (Barnard, 1938).

1950s–Long-Range Planning and Formal Models.Broader planning methods were introduced in thisperiod, moving beyond simple financial projec-tions to include other aspects bearing on corporatesuccess, such as new product development, capitalallocation, and human resources management.Formal strategic planning systems became popu-lar, with an emphasis on top-down, calendar-driven plans prepared and coordinated by special-ized staff units. General Electric led in this effortwith its large corporate staff and detailed plan-ning books. Complex planning models were devel-oped at GE and elsewhere in academe, with manyof them depicted as decision trees containing amultitude of variables for consideration in formu-lating a strategic plan (Ansoff, 1965).

1960s–The Business Idea and Corporate Identity.In this decade, the strategy field is characterizedby more reflection and conceptualization as exec-utives are asked to determine their “company iden-tity.” For example, the top executives of an airlinecompany might ask, “Should we only be in theairline business or should we be acquiring hotelsbecause we are in the travel business?” Many ac-quisitions took place in this era of the conglomer-ate and diversification. The concepts of “SWOTAnalysis” (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities,Threats) and “distinctive competence” were madepopular for determining a company’s identity (An-drews, 1971; Selznick, 1957).

1970s–Competitive Advantage Analytics. Therapid conglomeration of the previous decadefueled a boom of new analytical frameworks de-veloped mainly by strategy consulting firms.These included the Boston Consulting Group’s“growth share matrix” and “experience curve,” andthe “GE-McKinsey matrix,” which were used todiscover the relative advantages of various busi-ness units in contributing to the entire firm(Haspeslagh, 1982; Rumelt, 1974). The decade in-cluded Michael Porter’s landmark book in whichmicroeconomics was applied to the analysis ofindustry profitability and potential sources of com-petitive advantage. Terms such as barriers to entry

and first mover advantage became part of every-day strategic language (Porter, 1980, 1985). Sce-nario planning techniques also became popularfor dealing with uncertainty and unanticipatedconsequences (Wack, 1985).

1980s–Strategy Implementation, Capability, andAlignment. During this era, disillusionment withanalytical models set in, as many well-designedstrategies remained mere plaques on the wall inexecutive suites. Management teams frequentlyignored their stated business strategies while act-ing to satisfy their own personal goals and politi-cal agendas (Argyris, 1985). As a result, attentionturned to developing concepts and concrete stepsfor managing change, especially around aligningthe strategy and organization with cultural valuesand leadership practices (Peters & Waterman,1982). The conglomeration phase of the sixties andseventies was reversed as companies focusedmore on their “core competencies” (Hamel & Pra-halad, 1994; Ulrich & Lake, 1990). The “resource-based” view of the firm gained currency, its propo-nents proposing that competitive advantage isgained through building off internal resources thatare rare, nonsubstitutable, and inimitable (Barney,1991; Collis & Montgomery, 1995). Unrelated diver-sification was “out” and focused growth was “in”for taking advantage of core competencies andother resources. A more holistic definition of stra-tegic management emerged with the concept of theneed to achieve a better and tighter “fit” betweenmany internal elements within the firm (strategy,organization, leadership, rewards, technology,etc.), so as to move a firm forward in a coherent andunified strategic direction (Ansoff, 1984; Miles &Snow, 1985). The McKinsey “7-S” model reflectedthis emphasis.

1990s–Strategic Leadership and Reengineering.This era of Jack Welch at GE revealed how impor-tant it is for senior executives to lead a companythrough effective strategy implementation and ma-jor transformation. For these leaders, strategy wasembodied in the person of the CEO and her/hisdaily behavior and decision making (Welch, Tichy,& Charan, 1989; Welch & Byrne, 2001). Emphasiswas placed on the leader’s ability to articulate thestrategy and motivate others to commit themselvesto its implementation. The CEO was viewed as aheroic role model for other managers to emulate.These risk-taking executives were also willing tocompletely reengineer the corporation, selling offbusinesses or acquiring others, usually with theconcept of the value chain in mind (Hammer &Champy, 1993). Economically oriented theories,such as transaction cost theory and various con-cepts of shareholder value became more common


in strategic analysis and acquisition planning.Success stories of the era included companies suchas Southwest Airlines, which achieved “value in-novation” through a committed and engaged work-force. Southwest’s rallying goal became “competi-tive advantage through people” (Ghoshal &Bartlett, 1997; Pfeffer, 1994). In addition, many strat-egy discussions occurred in the context of globaldevelopment and the difficult problems of interna-tionalizing a company (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989;Yip, 1995). The strategy field had clearly broadenedits focus beyond traditional conceptions of for-mulation and implementation to include dailyleadership.

2000s–Strategy Making and Continuous Re-newal. Today, in a global environment that is tur-bulent and unpredictable, strategic plans are nec-essarily shorter, less concerned with details, andmore flexible (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). New e-business technology and hypercompetition arecausing chaotic changes in industries. As a result,the practice of strategic management is emphasiz-ing only a few accomplishable near-term initia-tives and a limited set of financial goals, instead ofdetailed 5-year plans with lengthy goal lists. Hu-man capital is taking on even greater significancewith a growing focus on knowledge managementand organization learning (Davenport & Prusak,2000). The capacity of the organization and its em-ployees to adapt to continuous change (rather thanthe heroic leader) is seen as the newest source ofcompetitive advantage (Collins, 2001). In addition,organizations are becoming more virtual and de-pendent on other organizations as they reach be-yond themselves for outsourcing, supplier alli-ances, and Web-based endeavors (Hagel &Armstrong, 1997; Moore, 1996; Tapscott, Ticoll, &Lowy, 2000; Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Just how thefirm can effectively govern itself and its allianceshas become a major strategic issue.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COURSE DESIGN

Reflecting on this historical account, we infer twomajor building blocks that should underpin anyrequired curriculum in strategic management.First, there is the need to impart an overarchingconcept—even philosophy and set of beliefs—thatcomprise what we call the “strategic mind-set.”This consists of what one should know about thepractice of strategic management in the moderncorporation, including its role and importance, aswell as the many ways that it can be formulated,enacted, and changed. Without this overall strate-gic perspective reflecting a balanced treatment ofcontent, disciplines and issues, students can be

easily misled or uninformed about the realities ofstrategic management.

The second building block exists at the appliedlevel, consisting of specific analytical and behav-ioral skills. Simply remaining at the conceptual or“mind-set” level can leave students without thenecessary skills to apply their learning. Our his-torical review further suggests that the reality ofstrategic decisions today and in the future willrequire students to learn to deal spontaneouslywith incomplete information about complex strate-gic problems and to have the ability to influencekey players and the workforce in committing them-selves to a firm’s strategic direction (Leavitt, 1989).

The Strategic Mind-set: Comprehensive andDynamic

From the historical record just discussed, we caninfer a set of eight principles that make up a co-herent and integrated framework—a “strategicmind-set”—which, we believe, needs to be taughtand learned by students in any required strategycurriculum. These principles are more importantthan learning about any single theory or disci-pline, and they should underpin and guide contentselection taught throughout a required strategycourse. In essence, these principles represent ma-jor “learning messages” that need to be amplifiedand conveyed in ways that are not just understoodbut become instinctive to the behavior of students:

1. Strategic management is comprehensive andintegrative. In companies, the concept of strategicmanagement has evolved from a simple, formalplanning exercise conducted once a year into abroad and organic point of view embracing manykey elements that influence and leverage the fu-ture direction of the firm, including market focus,value-chain position, financial goals, organizationstructure, leadership, technology, managementvalues, teamwork, controls, and rewards. In thisdefinition, an espoused strategy such as “low-costprovider” remains abstract and impotent unlesscombined with many of the above elements to turnit into reality.

2. All major business disciplines are relevant. Nosingle discipline, theory or conceptual framework,or course can completely capture the complexityand dynamics of today’s strategic management.Knowledge and skills from all business disciplinesare needed to understand strategy formulation andimplementation. In this view, the current trend, inwhich the emphasis of strategy courses is nar-rowly placed on economic and financial theories islikely to be a serious mistake, as would be a curric-ulum based solely on organization and leadership.


3. Strategic thinking and behavior are highlydynamic. Over the past decade, companies havelearned to live in a fast-moving world, fueled byintense global competition, rapid technologicaladvances, and many other factors that serve tobreed environmental uncertainty. Therefore, in-stead of using terms such as formal long-termplanning, we must now engage in real-time infor-mal planning with limited time horizons of 2–3years, and even then the firm’s leadership mustremain flexible and continuously adaptive to newthreats and opportunities.

4. Constant search for competitive edge withhigh returns. Numerous theories and techniquescontinue to evolve for explaining how companiescan position themselves in the marketplace to winagainst competitors. Companies are challengeddaily in allocating resources to gain a competitiveedge and benefit financially. Even when this edgeis attained, competitors rapidly find ways to retal-iate and thereby cause further and continuouschange in a firm’s competitive strategy and po-sition.

5. Every firm is indeed unique in its strategiccapabilities. Although general theories and tech-niques can be helpful in strategic analysis, theessence of strategy making will continue to de-pend on each organization’s talent, leadership,and resources. No single organization possessesthe same capabilities, history, products, culture,talent, strengths, and weaknesses as its competi-tors. So every organization will have to devise atailor-made strategy and implementation effort.

6. The firm’s strategy and organizational contextmust align and reinforce each other. A firm’s strat-egy must closely fit not only with its market envi-ronment but also with its organization capabili-ties, made up of its design, culture, and leadership.In fact, building innovative and flexible organiza-tions provides a necessary foundation for execu-tives to create and continuously reinvent strate-gies. Resilient leaders and nimble organizationscan more easily act rapidly to exploit new oppor-tunities and fend off threats.

7. Strategic management requires spontaneousthinking and doing. If strategy is to be enacted, itmust be envisioned and reflected in the daily be-havior of many leaders and employees within thefirm. Under today’s dynamic conditions, much ofthis thinking and behaving must become naturaland “automatic”—to the point where spontaneousdecisions and immediate changes in strategy cantake place without lengthy analysis. By then, itmay be too late.

8. Strategic change will happen frequently. Intoday’s world, a firm’s strategy will likely change

on a continuous basis and occasionally in one bigtransformational move when the organizationfinds itself in serious trouble or facing a discontin-uous technological change in its environment. Re-gardless, executives need to be highly skilled atimplementing all types of strategic change.

Taken together, these eight principles encour-age students to adopt a “mind-set” that conceivesof strategic management as: (1) comprehensiveand integrative across disciplines, (2) requiring awide range of analytical and behavioral skills,while, (3) making and behaving strategic decisionsunder highly dynamic, uncertain, and changingconditions. Although this sweeping conception ap-pears to us as unheeded in the design of manycurrent strategy courses, numerous scholars beforeus have made these same points (Mintzberg, Ahl-strand, & Lampel, 2000). Interestingly, from an ex-ecutive’s perspective, all eight principles areclearly illustrated and supported in Louis Gerst-ner, Jr.’s recent enlightening account of the IBMturnaround (2002). This book should be requiredreading for all strategy professors.

The current challenge before us is to use a com-prehensive set of principles, such as the eightabove, to provide the foundation for designing andteaching the strategy curriculum. If students aretaught and can absorb a holistic strategic mind-setreflecting these basic principles, they will be bet-ter able to appreciate the importance of learning awider variety of concepts and applied skills.

The Applied Skills: Analytical and Behavioral

Our review of strategic history clearly indicatesthat students must also acquire certain appliedskills if they are to function effectively as strategicleaders. These include not only a wide range ofanalytical skills for diagnosing strategic issuesand planning realistic action steps, but also thebehavioral skills involved in formulating, imple-menting and changing a firm’s strategy. These twoskill sets of analysis and behavior are closely re-lated and interdependent. Analytical expertisewithout the complementary behavioral skills to in-volve others in the total process can result in bothbadly formulated strategies and failed implemen-tation. Conversely, effective behavior without thesubstance of a sound strategic analysis confinesone to motivated employees who are groping in thedark.

Table 1 summarizes the required skills that fitunder each of the two major skill sets. Analyticalskills include frameworks and techniques for diag-nosing and changing strategic situations. Theyprovide future executives with a toolkit that can be


drawn on and used effectively depending on therequirements of the specific situation. Behavioralskills enable a strategic leader to navigatethrough messy organizational and political situa-tions in order to devise an acceptable strategy thatwill be implemented.

We describe these skill sets more as questionsthan answers for course planners. While all seemrelevant, faculty must rely on their informed judg-ments as to how to define which skills to teach, andhow to go about it. We hope our questions aresufficiently suggestive to form a mirror againstwhich all of us can reflect and to ask ourselves ifwe are teaching the appropriate skills in our cur-rently required strategy courses.

Answers to these skill-related questions will no

doubt be difficult to come by or agree on. We dothink, however, that no single course or facultymember can possibly convey all the required skillsto students, especially given the inherent limits ofcourse time and instructor capabilities. To rely ex-clusively on one required strategy course, as is thecurrent practice, causes unfortunate tradeoffsabout what should and should not be taught.These choices, as we have suggested, are currentlybeing made in favor of economic/financial theoryand analytical thinking over behavior and practice.

In contrast, our reading of the historical evolu-tion of the field suggests that the “how” of strategyexecution needs to be treated with as much em-phasis as the “what” of strategic content. Althoughstrategy instructors may contend that they address

TABLE 1Analytical and Behavioral Skills

Analytical Skills Behavioral Skills

Content AwarenessWhat are the key concepts, theories and models in

use today for understanding strategy formulationand industry dynamics, and where did they comefrom?

What are the main analytical methods in use today?What are the key strategic issues facing companies

today—globally and by industry?What are likely to be the major strategic issues

facing senior executives in the future?What are the useful theories and methods for

introducing and succeeding at various types ofstrategic change?

What are the well-documented cases and researchfindings on those companies that have succeededor failed at setting new strategic directions?

Content-In-UseHow many different analytical frameworks are

needed, and can be absorbed, by students andexecutives alike? Which are most understandableto nontrained executives?

How can we use analytical tools outside theclassroom to organize and understand data fromspecific companies and industry situations?

How does one recognize patterns in messy andmissing data, and then infer strategic issues fromthem?

How can we frame strategic alternatives and thenrecommend a desirable course of direction?

In what format can the leader put into writing orwords the company’s strategic direction so that itclearly communicates to employees, the media,and investors?

How does an executive develop a realistic plan ofaction that takes account of trade-offs in priorities,timing, and political considerations?

Developing the StrategyHow can the leader act to gather data relevant to

strategic direction when much of this information israrely evident or perhaps even intentionally withheldfrom the leader?

How does one act interpersonally to involve others intrying to conduct a diagnosis and infer conclusions?

How does the executives’ personal involvement in theorganization affect the quality of their analyses, aswell as the validity of data made available to them?

How can the leader translate academic concepts into anunderstandable strategic language for others whohave not been exposed to the same technicallanguage?

Implementing the StrategyWhat steps are needed to mobilize the executive team

and the rest of the organization to implement thestrategy?

How does one respond to others when they bring upimplementation problems of resistance, negativefeedback, and objections?

How does one behave to create a sense of urgency tomotivate others so they want to alter the firm’sexisting strategy?

How can the leader articulate the firm’s strategy inunderstandable and convincing terms to investors andemployees?

How can one build political coalitions to support thestrategy?

How does the leader locate and persuade the rightpeople to take on key jobs while moving others out?

How can one lead in a way that keeps mangers focusedon implementing the strategy when daily eventsdivert attention?

How can one act in ways to demonstrate personalcommitment to the strategic direction while alsosignaling openness to change?

How can one quickly revise the strategy when undergreat pressure and competitive threats?


the action issue with lectures, readings, and casediscussions, this approach still causes students tomiss out on valuable learning that can occur onlyfrom the experience of actually taking action onstrategic issues. Such learning through actual be-havior is a key part of gaining professional exper-tise in many professions (e.g., rounds in medicalschool), and should be essential to learning theapplied skills and appropriate mind-set for becom-ing a strategic leader. Obviously, we cannot makeall our students CEO for a day, so we need toinvent new learning methods that simulate strate-gic reality as much as possible, and then helpstudents reflect on their actions as they encounterthese new learning environments.

LIVING EXPERIMENT

We will use USC’s Executive MBA program as aconcrete example of “walking the talk,” which rep-resents our attempt to bridge the knowing–doinggap in the strategy curriculum. Although we be-lieve our approach to teaching strategic manage-ment is unique, we have no intention of setting itup as a paragon for emulation. We prefer that it beseen as a living experiment spanning over 18years, with many strengths and weaknesses. Butwe hope to stimulate others to re-examine theirapproaches and to experiment further.

To gain a clearer picture of the USC program, wefocus on its second-year curriculum because it isentirely devoted to teaching strategic manage-ment from an integrative point of view, as well asto conveying the essential applied skills. The cur-riculum emphasizes the need for managers toframe strategic problems holistically and to be-have effectively in reaching solutions. Without in-tegration, a newly conceived strategy will be miss-ing in key elements, and without leadership skills,it will not be implemented effectively.

Achieving a Strategic Mind-set

To provide a comprehensive and integrative viewof strategic management, the curriculum is struc-tured around five specific “themes” or modules,each composed of three to four disciplines selectedfrom finance, marketing, communications, strat-egy, entrepreneurship, technology, and organiza-tional behavior. The second year begins with a10-week theme on understanding the strategic en-vironment, then moves to an 8-day internationaltrip to look at companies in the global environ-ment, followed by a 10-week theme on formulatingstrategy, and another 10-week theme on strategyimplementation.

As an example, the first theme of the second yearis titled “Understanding the Global Business Envi-ronment.” In this theme, international finance ad-dresses macroeconomics and comparative econ-omy; communications teaches the importance ofleaders as negotiators and spontaneous speakersto multiple stakeholders; marketing teaches howto recognize and exploit niche opportunities inhighly competitive and changing global markets.

Achieving integration within themes across fac-ulty members with strong egos and deep attach-ments to their disciplines has not been easy (this isprobably the main reason integration has nottaken hold in many business schools). Despite put-ting in place the thematic structure, our faculty didnot move quickly toward integration; in fact, theyacted more as a herd than a team, going theirseparate ways while politely acknowledging oneanother. As a result, we created the following sixmechanisms to support integration in the program:

1. A theme coordinator for each theme to leadthe theme faculty members in planning andarranging the schedule, team teaching,project design, workload, and grading.

2. Required team teaching sessions built intothe schedule, which for each theme are heldin the opening session and also four to sixtimes during a theme.

3. Frequent use of a single case for a concludingfinal exam on which theme faculty base theirindividual questions to probe unique but re-lated perspectives.

4. A single grade for each theme based on amerger of individual faculty grades. The fac-ulty members meet to combine their gradesand agree on a final distribution.

5. Uniform policies to assure common treat-ment by faculty on grading, attendance, andworkload.

6. Special feedback sessions, called “pub ses-sions,” where theme faculty members appearas a team and listen to student comments,followed by refreshments in the university’sfaculty center.

Team teaching has become an important peda-gogical method for conveying a strategic mind-setto our students (as well as for building mutualrespect among the faculty). Faculty members areconstantly experimenting with their various ap-proaches to team teaching; some jointly teach acase, others participate from the side while one isup front teaching, and some work together in work-shops, advising students on cross-disciplinaryprojects. As an example, in one of our themes,finance and organizational behavior professors


discuss newspaper accounts of two successful le-veraged buyout (LBO) attempts. They then workback and forth in front of the students, leading adiscussion about how the management ap-proaches in each company either solve or detractfrom the financial and strategic restructuring ofeach firm.

The entire second year has become, in essence, alengthened, coordinated, and extended “capstone”strategy course. A side benefit is that faculty mem-bers, because of their many team-teaching experi-ences, have developed a more integrated perspec-tive for the contribution of their respectivedisciplines. As a result, all instructors in the sec-ond year now increasingly teach their discipline’scontent from a strategic perspective.

Learning Analytical and Behavioral Skills

Given the dynamic and highly uncertain nature oftoday’s economic, social, and political environ-ment, students need to learn that corporate leadersmust act out the firm’s strategy through their be-havior on a daily basis. They have little time torefer to a theoretical framework or to conduct alengthy study before making strategic decisions.Consequently, our program helps students to gainnot only a strategic mind-set but also a wide rang-ing set of analytical and behavioral skills. Wewant students to be able to make judgment calls inambiguous settings and to feel confident in actingas spontaneous leaders when real-time strategicdecisions are required.

To accomplish the imparting of applied skillsand behavior, the second year of the USC programputs students through a continuous series of learn-ing-by-doing exercises and projects, which repeat-edly involve them in analyzing strategic issuesand engaging in behaviors typically identifiedwith strategic leadership. In the formative years ofour program, these exercises were limited only totwo consulting projects, one in the first year andanother in the second year. However, we expandedthe number of exercises and projects when stu-dents increasingly demanded greater relevanceand application in our teaching about strategicmanagement and its related disciplines. The fac-ulty slowly reached the obvious conclusion thatthere is a big difference between hearing aboutconcepts in the classroom and practicing them inreal-world settings. So we gradually introducedmore “hands-on” exercises intended to embed stra-tegic thinking and action taking in the minds andbehavior of students. These experiences are de-signed to enable them to try out new behaviors andapplications, and then reflect on their results for

continued learning and development. This inten-sive exposure is similar to that practiced by ath-letic teams in preparation for game time—repeti-tive drills across a variety of situations so athletescan respond automatically and reflexively whenfaced with similar situations in actual games.

Although we still use cases in our program, theyhave become less important than the experientialmethods that now occupy half of the second-yearcurriculum (lectures and cases compose the otherhalf). First, we frequently bring senior executivesinto the classroom to act as role models for stu-dents. Although faculty members are obviouslyimportant to the learning process, the studentsidentify more with executives. These executivesdiscuss strategic issues in their companies andtheir approaches to corporate leadership. All fac-ulty members are expected to bring speakers intotheir classes, and this past year there were 14executive speakers.

Next is our widespread use of simulations, exer-cises, and field projects throughout the secondyear—all designed for students to practice strate-gic analytical skills and to reinforce certain behav-ioral capabilities. Listed below is a brief descrip-tion of the major exercises and projects usedduring the second year, each of which is usuallyimplemented across all disciplines in a theme, al-though in a few instances within a single disci-pline.

1. Publishable Paper (all program faculty mem-bers involved). Students are asked to investigate atopic in their industry and draft an article that theymust submit to a trade journal. They are requiredto take a senior executive and strategic viewpointon the topic. All faculty members in the programparticipate in the evaluation process; each facultymember reads and comments on four papers in tworounds of drafts. The objective is to train studentsto analyze industry issues by going out to gatherdata and to hone their behavioral skills by prepar-ing an article for a practice-oriented audience,written in everyday terminology. Each year aboutone third of the students in the class (25) succeed inpublishing their articles.

2. Mark–Strat Simulation (marketing facultymember). This widely used simulation occurs in an8-week strategic marketing exercise conducted inteams, with each team running a company andcompeting against other teams. Here students aretrained to set and revise strategies in response toperformance feedback, and to do so while interact-ing with other team members. Analytically andbehaviorally, they apply analytic models, examinedata, and make strategic decisions on a real-timebasis. Moreover, they must learn to work as an


“executive team,” influencing each other as theytry to reach consensus on strategic decisions.

3. Meet the Press (communications faculty mem-ber). Students are given a strategic dilemma, suchas, “You are the CEO of Ford facing reporters ques-tioning you about the Explorer turnover problem.”Reporters from the Los Angeles Times and USC’sAnnenberg School of Communication play the roleof reporters quizzing each executive. These en-counters are videotaped for self-examination andpeer critique. The purpose of this exercise is totrain students to respond to a strategic crisis in aspontaneous manner while acting under pressure.

4. Debate Competition on Sociopolitical Issues(finance, communications, and marketing faculty).Pairs of student teams are assigned the same de-bate topic chosen from a range of contemporaryissues, such as “Was NAFTA a Good Idea?” or“Should consumers have control over the release ofpersonal information given to companies?” Eachpair debates its topic in front of the class, followedby feedback from university debate coaches. Thistraining emphasizes the ability to stand on one’sfeet and articulate a persuasive point of view in afew words about a complex macro-issue concern-ing a major sociopolitical issue affecting the cor-poration. All this occurs under pressure as theclass observes and assesses which team comesacross as most convincing.

5. International Trip (finance and organizationalbehavior faculty members). Here, students take an8-day trip to two countries where they hear fromsenior executives, government officials, and visitcompanies. This training is intended to create first-hand awareness of comparative economic systemsand cultural differences in conducting businessabroad, as well as to enhance students’ confidencein negotiating their way in unknown cultures—skills often required of strategic leaders today.

6. Merger and Acquisition Project (finance andstrategy faculty members). This 11-week projectinvolves teams of students assigned to investigatea major merger deal currently in the news, evalu-ating the price to be paid and the merger’s likelystrategic implications. Two teams compete on thesame deal. It is both a finance and strategy projectin that the merger has to be evaluated for both itsfinancial and strategic value. The competingteams search out data on their assigned compa-nies, study their industries, prepare financialspreadsheets, and develop a “briefing book” forthe class before making an in-class presentation.Class members then react to each team’s briefingbook and presentations, providing constructivefeedback.

7. Entrepreneurship Project (faculty members

from USC’s Entrepreneur Program). Each student isrequired to create a new business concept anddevelop a business plan, which is written up as aprospectus in a short document. Here, studentslearn about the strategic aspects of entrepreneur-ship and how to integrate different disciplines tosupport their new business concepts. Facultymembers evaluate and give feedback on each pro-posal.

8. Writing a Statement of Strategic Direction(strategy faculty members). This exercise teachesstudents how to make strategy clear and compel-ling by learning to write a strategic plan in con-crete and easily communicated terms. The plan isdivided into five key sections relevant to a firm’sintended strategic direction, preferably all statedon a single page with bullet points under each offollowing five topical headings: (1) determine com-petitive logic and market tiebreakers, (2) set keyfinancial goals, (3) create rallying goal, (4) set or-ganizational guidelines and management values,and (5) determine key action initiatives. In perform-ing this exercise, students are required to usemany of the analytical tools acquired earlier in theprogram, and to translate abstract strategy con-cepts into conversational rhetoric. They are taughtthe value and use of an applied strategic vocabu-lary, using such words as choice, focus, goal, align,team, consensus, collaborate, clarity, organize,communicate and behave in phrasing their bulletpoints.

9. Strategy Consulting Project (strategy and or-ganizational behavior faculty members). This con-cluding field project occurs in the second-to-lasttheme just before graduation; it involves smallteams of four to five students assigned to perform astrategic analysis and to make an oral presenta-tion to a client’s top-management team. Teammembers must locate their projects by selling aprospective client company on its value. This as-signment lasts for 11 weeks and involves extensivefieldwork supplemented by five half-day work-shops conducted during class time. The most un-usual part of this project is the final presentation.Rather than write a lengthy written report, as istypical in similar projects, each team is required tomake an oral presentation to the client’s top-management team and to submit a videotape of itspresentation. The tapes and presentation over-heads become the final product for faculty evalu-ation. A feedback report is given to each team byfaculty evaluators.

It is interesting how students struggle with thisconsulting project despite having received a greatdeal of training in analytical tools for strategicanalysis up to this point. They rapidly learn that


real companies are “messier” and more incom-plete than classroom cases, and that relevant dataare both hard to obtain and analyze for patternsrevealing strategic issues. Students also learn tostand up before real CEOs, distilling their ideasinto persuasive insights, and facing tough ques-tions.

Continuing Challenges

Needless to say, our program continues to facedifficult challenges. Few of our incoming studentsarrive with a well-developed strategic mentality,despite 8–12 years of work experience. Most havebeen rewarded early in their careers for pragmaticproblem solving, not strategic thinking and behav-ior. Although we find that conveying the appropri-ate analytical tools and frameworks is a challeng-ing task, our biggest hurdle remains one of helpingstudents recognize that learning theories and an-alytical models are only the intellectual startingpoints to understanding strategic management; inaddition, the applied skills of analysis, implemen-tation, and behavior still remain.

Our program has to be continuously and activelymanaged and coordinated because of its integra-tion, projects, and team teaching and grading.There is always something coming loose. Facultymembers make assignments that conflict with oth-ers. New faculty members have difficulty adjustingto our team approach. Students like to play off onefaculty member against another. Projects take con-siderable time and effort to manage. New contentfrom developments in the business world needs tobe introduced, yet we are squeezed for time andspace.

Heavy demands are placed on faculty time, farbeyond those encountered in standard teachingprograms. Frequent informal lunch meetings forfaculty are typical, as well as a required half-dayannual planning meeting of all faculty. Teamteaching, advising on projects, and joint gradingall require a large amount of time and effort. As aresult, it is a challenge to devise special ways toreward faculty members. Their main need is timefor research and writing, not money, so our mosteffective solution is to free up time by arranging forfaculty to teach fewer sessions combined into in-tensive blocks of half-day class sessions held onlyonce per week. In this way, faculty members areinclined to give more effort while finishing theircommitments sooner than in a normal one-semes-ter course that meets twice a week for 80 minuteseach time. As for occasional new faculty members,their transition is made easier by becoming part ofa supportive theme team. Course-based programs

often make this transition difficult because facultymembers are treated as being in competition witheach other for teaching ratings.

Many issues mentioned above also exist in otherMBA programs, although we probably feel themmore intensely because we have created high ex-pectations about course integration, faculty coor-dination, and hands-on training (Schlesinger,1996). When we fall short, students are disap-pointed and they readily let us know.

We constantly assess our progress, although it ishard to measure in precise terms. Keeping in mindthat attributions about causality are problematic,we think that to date, several signs point to con-sistently positive results. On a survey taken by allstudents at the end of each theme in the secondyear, the “overall learning” scale from 1 (low) to 5(high) has never fallen below an average of 4.0,and usually runs about 4.4. The program itself isranked 6th worldwide in the 2002 BusinessWeekrankings, and 10th in 2003 US News, and its em-phasis on integration has been praised by thesepublications. We have also been invited to givefrequent demonstrations of specific aspects of thecurriculum at the national Executive MBA Councilmeeting of EMBA directors each year. The EMBACouncil conducts an annual “exit survey” of stu-dents, and we consistently score higher than peerschools on all items related to student learningand satisfaction. Another positive sign is that thefaculty members strongly prefer to stay in the pro-gram; indeed, we have never had a serious requestto leave. In recruiting students, we consistently fillour entering class with 70 to 75 students each year;many of whom are attracted by the program’s the-matic integrated approach, team teaching, andpractice training, which we use as selling pointsagainst more traditional programs in the localmarket. Among our program’s alumni, approxi-mately 120 out of 1,000 graduates are currentlyat the “C” level (Chairman, CEO, COO, CFO,and CIO).

SUGGESTIONS FOR OTHER STRATEGYPROGRAMS

Our objectives in this article are to provide a crit-ical perspective on current practices in teachingstrategic management and to encourage greaterexperimentation by others in the future. We realizethat we have taken a different path at USC, whichworks well for us but may not for others. We be-lieve that most faculty members in other businessschools, including nonstrategy faculty, will agreethat strategic management should be taught andrequired in their MBA programs. Students of all


ages and positions need its perspective for dailydecision making and advancement in their ca-reers. The key issue is how to structure and teachthis important subject.

Keep in mind that we are quite in favor of the useof theory and research findings in courses on stra-tegic management; it’s just that we don’t think theyshould be the only or even the main emphasis inpreparing students for the future, and used bythemselves, they can even be misleading.

The first place to begin is in the training of doc-toral students in strategic management. Little con-tent about pedagogy is presented in most pro-grams; rather, students learn about teachingindirectly from observing their senior professorsand from teaching a few courses, mainly to under-graduates. Most doctoral students are not madeaware of experiential training methods that gobeyond case teaching and lecturing. Even the Busi-ness Policy and Strategy Division of the Academyof Management is negligent on this front; only twosessions out of 137 for the 2003 program refer toteaching or curriculum design, both conducted inthe PDW program. But the issues go beyond peda-gogy into areas of content related to strategy im-plementation—will doctoral students be taughtmore than a narrow range of theories related to

strategy formulation and analysis? Will they alsocover theory and research findings related to strat-egy implementation, strategic change, and strate-gic leadership? Clearly, our doctoral programsand the Academy need to do more. A good way tobegin is to design and conduct half-day workshopsin our doctoral programs and in the PDW programof the Academy.

New MBA students typically enter school havingpreviously acquired a number of thought and be-havioral habits that reveal limited tacit knowledgeabout stategic management. To move them off thishabitual level of behaving and thinking requiresmore than the minimal conditioning providedthrough case teaching, which provides only initialpractice at analytical skills but little in the way ofaction taking. Figure 1 depicts the educational pro-cess of habit breaking through the use of a varietyof repetitive exercises, and how our USC programpositions itself to deal with this issue relative toother types of strategy teaching.

Although many MBA programs and their strat-egy courses leave leadership training to theirorganizational behavior courses, this can easilymislead students into thinking that strategic man-agement is largely an analytical exercise withoutbehavioral consequences. As a result, they mistak-

FIGURE 1Behavioral and Analytical Skill Acquisition Through Tacit and Explicit Knowledge Methods


enly assume that the process of strategy formu-lation contains within itself the solutions for im-plementation, or that implementation followsformulation in a logical sequence. These are mis-taken learning lessons, failing to recognize thateven seemingly minor decisions about who to in-clude in the strategy formulation process can af-fect both the substance of strategic conclusionsand the degree of commitment to a subsequentplan of action.

Our program is based on a fundamental as-sumption that strategic content and related behav-ioral skills must be addressed simultaneously inthe curriculum, and that this interconnection bemade clear in the learning process. At the sametime, we recognize that it has been much easier toimplement our integrated second-year curriculumin an EMBA program for experienced managersthan in a long-established MBA core program foryounger students. Our program is relatively small(total of about 155 students and 18 faculty in thefirst and second years at same time), involves afixed curriculum and a dedicated senior facultyteam. Traditional full-time programs tend to belarger with more instructors who have a greaterdiversity of teaching and practical experienceamong them. Also, we are well aware that theculture and reward systems of business schoolstend to reinforce the independence of disciplines,thus making it difficult for integration to occur.

We do think, however, that varying degrees ofchange can be attempted in schools that want toexperiment but not go as far as we have. Certainly,EMBA-type programs can be considered a primetarget for change; most are currently organized asreactive replicas of their full-time, discipline, andcourse-based programs. Our view is that EMBAprograms can be leaders in curriculum innovation,and that there can be spillover to the regular MBAprogram. For full-time programs, especially inschools where the strategy course occurs in thefirst year, an effort can be made to restructure theentire first year, resembling something like thesecond year of our thematic structure, or the firstyear cited earlier at the University of North Caro-lina, or the concluding 7-week project at the Uni-versity of Michigan. Another good exemplar is theradical change made by the University of Denver’sDaniels College of Business in its full-time pro-gram, which replaced 22 courses with 7 interdisci-plinary megacourses. This effort was intended as“transdisciplinary,” so that total learning wasgreater than the sum of its individual parts(Fukami, Clouse, Howard, McGowan, Mullins, Sil-ver, Sorensen, Watkins, & Wittmer, 1996).

Short of this dramatic form of restructuring, the

strategic management course can be repositionedat the end of the first year and presented to stu-dents as the program’s “capstone course.” In thatposition, its content can be built upon that of pre-vious courses and integrated with surroundingcourses. Integration with these other courses mightbegin with small steps involving one or two cross-functional, team-teaching sessions, and laterevolve to a field-based strategy consulting projectwith faculty from different disciplines acting asadvisors to project teams. We have found thatbreakthroughs are often possible when instructorsfrom different disciplines begin to realize that stu-dents react more favorably to all of the faculty’sdisciplines when they are presented within a stra-tegic context. In addition, we don’t think it is ask-ing too much to suggest that discipline-trainedfaculty teaching strategic management reach outto learn more about (and respect) other relevantdisciplines, including not only economics and or-ganization but also leadership, marketing, and op-erations.

Even if links with other courses and facultymembers are not possible, the strategy course it-self can be restructured to include a greater em-phasis on applied skills to be acquired throughhands-on projects and exercises. The challengehere, because of limited class time for a course, isto find innovative ways to teach theory and ana-lytical skills while simultaneously engaging in do-ing-type projects. Our view is that the pedagogyfor developing these skills is still in a primitivestate when it comes to the availability of excellentexperiential methods. We have had to invent manyof our own, and we hope these methods will lookrather crude and obsolete in the years ahead.

Behind these possibilities, we need to addressthe fundamental question of “who” should beteaching the strategy course. If so many of today’sdoctoral students are discipline trained, it may betoo much to ask that they suddenly embrace morepractice into their courses. Clearly, we need disci-pline-trained teachers and it would be stupid tosuggest sending them out to work as executives forseveral years. More practical solutions have to befound by including additional material on practicein doctoral training and pairing junior faculty withsenior faculty mentors when the latter go out to doconsulting. Another approach would be to makethe first 7 weeks of an MBA program theoreticallyfocused and taught by a teacher capable in thatarena, and then the last 7 weeks of the first yearcould be devoted to practice taught by highly ex-perienced part-time executives and consultants.An even more intriguing, although more costly ap-proach, would be to team up an academic with a


practioner teacher in the same course, or a theo-retical faculty member with a practice-orientedone, so that they could go back and forth to achievegreater balance and integration. It may come tosplitting the faculty into two career tracks, re-search and clinical, with the latter responsible forteaching strategic management. This would be aregrettable solution because of the value of inter-change between research and practice.

Clearly, each school and its faculty memberswill find themselves at different places on thisspectrum of issues and opportunities; therefore,each program will have to operate within its ownresources and faculty culture to move forward. Wecontinue to believe that the overriding challengefor those of us teaching strategic management is tofind ways to integrate with other disciplines, aswell as to invent learning methods that requireincreased practice of both analytical and behav-ioral skills.

As we proceed, more knowledge about the teach-ing of strategic management needs to be sharedbetween schools. It is remarkable how little weknow and discuss among ourselves about teachingas compared to the many existing forums for shar-ing research interests. It is even more worrisomewhen we realize how little research has been con-ducted to evaluate alternative teaching models,especially when research is at the heart of thefaculty enterprise. Ironically, we continue to investin a questionable strategy curriculum for whichthere is little empirical evidence to support its cur-rent direction and learning value.

We need to know much more about what hap-pens to our students in their future careers, be-cause the biggest challenge for teachers of strate-gic management will come when alumni attemptto apply their learning “real time.” Meeting thatchallenge will become everyone’s final exam, al-though it comes rather late for making corrections.In the interim, if schools and strategy faculty ac-cept the challenges put forth here, we are hopefuland optimistic about the results.

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Dr. Larry Greiner (DBA, HarvardBusiness School) is professor ofmanagement and organizationat the Marshall School, Univer-sity of Southern California. Heis the author of numerous pub-lications on the subjects of or-ganization growth and develop-ment, management consulting,and strategic change. He hasbeen Academic Director of theUSC Executive MBA Programfor the past 15 years.

Dr. Arvind Bhambri (DBA,Harvard Business School) is as-sociate professor of manage-ment & organization at theMarshall School, University ofSouthern California. His re-search interests include stra-tegic change, competitivestrategy, global business de-velopment, and leadership. In2002, he received the GoldenApple Award for outstandingteaching in the Marshall CoreMBA program.

Thomas Cummings (PhD, Uni-versity of California, Los Ange-les) is professor and chair of theDepartment of Management &Organization at the MarshallSchool, University of SouthernCalifornia. His major researchand consulting interests in-clude designing high-perform-ing organizations and strategicchange management. He is thevice president and programchair of the Academy of Man-agement.


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