Post on 08-May-2023
The cosmic role of the Logos, as conceived from
Heraclitus until Eriugena
Vladimir de Beer
Abstract
In this article the cosmological and metaphysical dimensions of
the Logos concept in the Hellenic and Patristic traditions are
explored. Heraclitus initially depicted the logos as the
ontological link between the One and the many, with the logos
thus serving as the foundation of both rational discourse and
natural law. This concept was elaborated and modified by a
number of eminent Hellenic and Christian thinkers. Among them
count Plato, Philo of Alexandria, the New Testament authors
John and Paul, Plotinus, Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Clement of
Alexandria, Augustine of Hippo, Dionysius the Areopagite,
Maximus the Confessor and John Scottus Eriugena.
Introduction
Prior to embarking on a discussion of any philosophical or
theological concept, one should take cognizance of its
etymology. Being related to the Greek verb legō, meaning to
relate, speak, or say, the noun logos primarily means the word
by which the inward thought is expressed and also the inward
thought or reason itself. From this basis further meanings of
word, story, or reason are derived (Liddell and Scott 2004,
408, 416). By the fifth century B.C. the term logos had obtained
the additional meanings of cause, ratio, and proportion, and by
the next century also those of general principle and definition
(McKirahan 1994, 133). Finally, in the New Testament the Logos
signifies both Word and Reason (Liddell and Scott 2004, 417).
In view of the lasting relevance of the Logos concept in both
the Hellenic and Christian traditions, we will provide a brief
survey of its origins and development.
Philosophical foundations
The Logos concept was introduced into Western thought by the
enigmatic yet brilliant thinker Heraclitus of Ephesus (ca. 540-
480 B.C.). Heraclitus outlined the dimensions and functions of
the Logos and its corollaries as follows (quoted in Richard
McKirahan’s translation, with the fragment numbers in
parentheses):
This logos holds always but humans always prove unable to
understand it, both before hearing it and when they have
first heard it. For though all things come to be in
accordance with this logos, humans are like the
inexperienced when they experience such words and deeds as
I set out, distinguishing each in accordance with its nature
and saying how it is (1).
For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common.
But although the logos is common, most people live as if
they had their own private understanding (2).
What is opposed brings together; the finest harmony
(harmonia) is composed of things at variance, and
everything comes to be in accordance with strife (8).
Things taken together are whole and not whole, [something
which is] being brought together and brought apart, in tune
and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity, and
out of a unity all things (10).
The kosmos, the same for all, none of the gods nor of
humans has made, but it was always and is and shall be: an
ever-living fire being kindled in measures and being
extinguished in measures (30).
The turnings of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is
earth and half fiery waterspout … Earth is poured out as sea,
and is measured according to the same ratio (logos) it was
before it became earth (31).
You would not discover the limits of the soul although you
travelled every road: it has so deep a logos (45).
Listening not to me but to the logos it is wise to agree
that all things are one (50).
War is the father of all and king of all, and some he
shows as gods, others as humans; some he makes slaves, others
free (53).
God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace,
satiety and hunger, but changes the way [fire], when mingled
with perfumes, is named according to the scent of each (67).
They are at odds with the logos, with which above all they
are in continuous contact, and the things they meet every
day appear strange to them (72).
It is necessary to know that war is common and justice is
strife and that all things happen in accordance with strife
and necessity (80).
To God all things are beautiful and good and just, but
humans have supposed some unjust and others just (102).
The soul has a self-increasing logos (115).
From Fragments 1 and 2 we can deduce the basic meaning of the
logos for Heraclitus, namely that it is constant; it unfolds as
the ‘together’ in beings; and everything that happens is in
accordance with this constant ‘together’ (Heidegger 2000, 135).
Since the logos provides a hermeneutical key for understanding
the whole of reality, understanding the logos is the most
important of all human activities. Furthermore, the logos is
common, because it applies everywhere and is an objective
reality (McKirahan 1994, 130, 133). Due to the presence of the
logos, reality displays both unity and plurality (Fragments 10
and 50). For the Ephesian thinker there could be no harmony
without differentiation, since harmony is a relation among
different things (Fragment 8). To humans strife appears
destructive, but in reality strife is responsible for the
generation of things (Fragments 53 and 80). The activity of the
logos guarantees that all things are one and one thing is all
(McKirahan 1994, 134-135). Evidently, for Heraclitus the logos
is the ontological link between the One and the many, that is
to say between cosmic unity and plurality.
Due to the presence of the logos, Heraclitus contends, the
becoming and change that characterise the world do not occur in
a chaotic way. The manner in which the logos rules the cosmos is
by determining the conflict between opposites, thereby
providing a deeper unity and harmony underlying the changes
flowing from the conflict (Fragment 67). The logos is therefore
the ground of all that exists, and it rules the cosmos through
divine law. Heraclitus ostensibly viewed fire as the material
form of the logos, and as such fire is also subject to the law
of the logos (Dreyer 1976, 42). However, it has been
persuasively argued that for Heraclitus, as with the rest of
the Ionian thinkers, fire (or water for Thales and air for
Anaximenes) does not signify the material element only, but
rather symbolises the metaphysical reality of Universal
Substance (the Prakriti of Indian philosophy) that underlies the
world of empirical phenomena (Schuon 1984, 71). This
metaphysical caveat should be kept in mind during the remainder
of this discussion.
In a marked theological advance on polytheism, Heraclitus
declared the logos to be the only god, with the entire cosmos
standing under its law. That is to say, the logos is the law of
nature, determining all changes in the physical cosmos. In this
way the logos provides the primeval rationality and order of the
cosmos, so that god, nature, and humans form a deep-lying unity
(Dreyer 1976, 43). In addition, just as the cosmos has positive
connotations of goodness and beauty, for Heraclitus the logos
has rational connotations linking it with justice, law, and
soul (McKirahan 1994, 142). The logos is therefore the cosmic
principle that establishes rational order in the world
(Blackburn 2008, 215). It could be stated that the kosmos
displays rationality and intelligibility due to the active
presence of the logos.
Furthermore, the logos enables us to apprehend the principles
(logoi, the plural of logos) of things, thus making rational
discourse possible (Blackburn 2008, 215). Although logos and
legein (to speak) are related, discourse is not the essence of
logos, Martin Heidegger asserts, which is rather the
‘gatheredness of beings themselves’. In other words, logos is
the constant gatheredness of beings that stand in itself, i.e.
Being, and therefore phusis and logos are the same (Heidegger
2000, 137-138). Nonetheless, in the Hellenic conception
language is a reflection of reality, as is suggested by the
etymological link between logos, legō and legein. The logos thus
entails both epistemological and ontological dimensions, with
the former deriving its reality from the latter. This link also
provides the reason for the Ephesian philosopher’s celebrated
predilection for paradoxical expressions, since reality is
complex in nature (McKirahan 1994, 133). As Heraclitus declared
in Fragment 123, ‘Nature loves to hide.’ It is therefore not
surprising that the father of the Logos concept became known
among later generations as ho skoteinos – the dark or obscure one
(Dreyer 1976, 40).
Heraclitus conceived the first principles (archai, the plural of
archē) of the cosmos to be fire, water, and earth (Fragment
31). Interestingly, he omits air, which had figured so
prominently as archē in the thought of some of his Ionian
predecessors (notably Anaximenes). Among the three elements
fire is granted priority by Heraclitus, on account of its
having an active and controlling role in the cosmos. Likewise
in the human individual the soul gives life and direction to
its bearer, and therefore fire and soul are used
interchangeably. Fire is also identified with the logos,
according to which all things happen (McKirahan 1994: 138-140,
144). It is clear that Heraclitus did not conceive of fire in
the material sense only, but primarily in the metaphysical
sense.
According to the testimony of Sextus Empiricus, Heraclitus
connected intelligence (or mind, nous) with the logos, since
what surrounds us is rational (logikos) and intelligent
(noētikos). Accordingly, humans become intelligent by drawing in
the divine logos through breathing. However, during sleep our
intelligence is separated from natural contact with its
surroundings by means of the passages of perception; and when
we awaken to commence the new daily cycle, we again become
sensible (McKirahan 1994, 146, 147). This notion implies that
human intelligence is dependent upon the indwelling presence of
the logos, through which humans have the potential to
participate in the Divinity.
Heraclitus’ teaching on the primacy of the divine logos, and the
contrast between the unstable world of appearance and the
rational order underlying it, would be continued by Plato and
the Stoics (Blackburn 2008, 164). Plato introduces his
cosmology in the dialogue Timaeus with a fundamental
differentiation (which is not to be confused with metaphysical
dualism): ‘As I see it, then, we must begin by making the
following distinction: What is that which always is and has no
becoming, and what is that which always becomes but never is?
The former is grasped by understanding (noēsis),1 which involves
a reasoned account (logos). It is unchanging. The latter is
grasped by opinion (doxa), which involves unreasoning sense
perception (aisthēsis alogos). It comes to be and passes away, but
never really is’ (Timaeus 27d-28a). In other words, for Plato
there exists a realm of eternal, unchanging being (i.e. the
intelligible world) which is grasped by rational understanding,
as well as a realm of ephemeral, mutable becoming (i.e. the
sensible world) which is grasped by sense perception. This
metaphysical notion would exert lasting influence on Western
philosophy and theology.
1 The noun noēsis could also be translated as thought or intelligence;
Liddell and Scott, Lexicon, 466.
In Plato’s cosmology the world of sensible phenomena, that is
to say the realm of becoming, is interposed between the
extremes of true being (i.e. the Forms, which are outside time
and space) on the one hand and non-being (which is equivalent
with empty space) on the other. The material realm of sensible
objects is conceived as simultaneously real, on account of
participating in the Forms, and unreal, on account of existing
in non-being. For Plato the participation of matter in the
Forms is made possible by the World-soul, which as the bearer
of reason (logos) is situated between the Forms and matter
(Dreyer 1976, 100). Therefore each existing thing has its own
logos, through which it participates in an intelligible
archetype, or Form.
Further development of the Logos concept occurred in the Stoic
philosophy that became prominent in the Hellenic-Roman world
from the third century B.C. onwards. The Stoic cosmology was
based on the notion of the logos spermatikos, the ‘seminal reason’
which is the source of cosmic order (Blackburn 2008, 215). The
logos spermatikos is thus the active principle operating in
lifeless matter. From this is derived the Latin notion of the
anima mundi, the soul of the world, since soul is that which
gives life. Accordingly, humans are also viewed as possessing a
portion of the divine logos (Tripolitis 2002, 38). The role of
the multiple logoi indwelling the natural world is therefore
analogous to that of Plato’s Forms.
Building on the ontological concepts developed by Plato and the
Stoics, the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus distinguished
between four modes of being: the One, the Intellect, the Soul,
and matter. The first three modes of being are intelligible and
named hypostases (hupostaseis),2 comprising a divine trinity
(Oosthuizen 1974, 57-58, 83). As stated by Plotinus, ‘There is
the One beyond Being; next, there is Being and Intellect; and
third, there is the nature of the Soul’ (Enneads, V.1.10). The
relation between the three hypostases is vividly depicted by
Plotinus: ‘Intellect is the primary activity from the Good and
the primary essence from that which remains in itself. But
Intellect is active around the Good, in a way living around it.
2 The plural of hupostasis, literally ‘that which is set under, a support’,
from which is derived ‘reality’ or ‘substance’ (Liddell and Scott, 2004,
743); that is to say, the equivalent of the Latin term substantia.
Soul dances outside this looking at it and, in contemplating
its interior, looks at God through itself’(Enneads I.8.2).
Borrowing Stoic terminology, Plotinus reasons that through the
contemplation of the One via the Forms, the Intellect produces
the logoi spermatikoi (‘seminal reasons’) that serve as the
productive power of the Soul, which is the active or generative
principle within Being (Enneads V.9.6-7; Moore, Plotinus). The
level at which the Soul becomes fragmented into individual,
embodied souls, Plotinus continues, is nature (phusis). Since
the purpose of the individual soul is to maintain order in the
material realm, and since the essence of the soul is one with
the highest Soul, there will necessarily occur in the sensible
realm a type of order (doxa) that is a pale reflection of the
order (logos) prevailing in the intelligible realm (Moore,
Plotinus). This Neoplatonic notion implies that due to the
presence of soul via the logoi, the natural order displays a
measure of intelligibility.
Throughout the Enneads Plotinus employs the term logos, in the
meaning of ‘expressed principle’, to indicate the image of the
higher as it is found in the lower. The active presence of the
logos in nature is outlined as follows: ‘In fact, the underlying
and worked-upon matter comes to form bearing these [hot or
cold], or becomes such when the expressed principle, though it
itself does not have the property, works on it; for it is not
necessary for fire to be added in order for matter to become
fire, but rather an expressed principle [to be added], which is
not an inconsiderable sign of both the fact that in living
beings and in plants the expressed principles are the
producers, and the fact that nature is an expressed principle,
which makes another expressed principle, a product of it,
giving something to the underlying subject, while it is itself
static’ (Enneads III.8.2). In this way Plotinus refers to the
rules or laws in the World-soul which are manifested in the
‘body’ of nature (Dillon and Gerson 2004, 37). The notion of
‘laws of nature’ was hereby provided with a firm metaphysical
foundation, namely the activity of the logos in the physical
world.
Early Judeo-Christian reception
An unequivocally theistic understanding of the logos was
provided by Philo of Alexandria. In his seminal synthesis of
Hebrew theology and Hellenic philosophy, the Platonic
distinction between the intelligible and sensible worlds is
maintained. The link between God and the world is the eternal
Ideas, or Forms, which are the thoughts of God. With this
insight the Alexandrian thinker became the first in a long line
of thinkers to identify the intelligible Forms of Plato with
the divine thoughts. First among the Ideas is the Logos, whom
Philo calls the first-born Son of the uncreated Father
(Chadwick 1967, 142). It could not have been problematic for
the early Church to effect the transition from Philo’s
depiction of the Logos as the ‘first-born of God’ to the
Christian doctrine that the Logos, identified with Jesus
Christ, is the ‘only-begotten Son of God’ (i.e. the Father).
Furthermore, for Philo the Logos is the mediator through which
God creates the cosmos. As commented by Edward Moore, ‘Thus we
see Philo linking the cosmos to the intellectual realm by way
of a mediating figure rather like the Platonic World-Soul.
Borrowing a term from Stoic philosophy, Philo calls the
thoughts of the Logos “rational seeds” (logoi spermatikoi), and
describes them as having a role in the production of the cosmos
which, he insists, was brought into being out of non-being by
the agency of God’ (Moore, Middle Platonism). In this way Philo
affirmed that the transcendent God does not directly interact
with the world as its creator, but through the operation of the
Logos. Since the divine Logos is the creator of the world, Philo
continues, it is also the ontological link between all the
components of the world. That is to say, the various levels of
being that constitute the cosmic hierarchy are held together by
the power of the Logos (Chadwick 1967, 143). As the Alexandrian
thinker declared, ‘the Logos of the living God is the bond of
everything, holding all things together and binding all the
parts, and prevents them from being dissolved and separated’
(Friedlander 1912, 114-115).
In the New Testament the term logos is used numerous times, in
the majority of cases indicating a spoken word, story, or
message. The only exceptions to this meaning of logos occur in
the prologue of the Gospel of John (1:1-14), where the Logos is
depicted as a pre-existent divine Being (En archē ēn ho logos, kai ho
logos ēn pros ton theon, kai theos ēn ho logos: ‘In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’); in the
first epistle of John (5:7), where the Logos is mentioned
together with the Father and the Spirit (i.e. in a Trinitarian
sense); and in the book of Revelation (19:13), where Christ is
referred to as the Logos of God (Strong’s Concordance). In the
light of these scriptural affirmations, it is imperative for
Christians that the incarnate Logos should primarily be
worshipped as the cosmic Christ and not only as the self-
sacrificing preacher of righteousness from Galilee.
It has been suggested by Kitty Ferguson that since logos can
better be translated as ‘reason’ or ‘rationality’ instead of
‘word’, the prologue of John could be rendered in Pythagorean
and Platonic terms as follows: ‘In the beginning was Reason.
And Reason was with God, and Reason was God. Reason was with
God in the beginning. Through Reason all things were made;
without Reason nothing was made that has been made. In Reason
was life, and that life was the light of men... Reason became
flesh and lived among us’ (Ferguson 2011, 204). Such a
rendering would indeed be an elegant and theologically sound
depiction of Christ as divine intermediary between the mind of
God (i.e. the Father) and the created order.
In early Christian theology the cosmic role of Jesus Christ is
depicted by the Apostle Paul in virtually identical terminology
to that of Philo. Thus Paul wrote to the church in Colossus:
‘He [i.e. Christ] is the image (eikōn) of the invisible God, the
first-born over all creation. For by Him all things were
created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and
invisible… And He is before all things, and in Him all things
consist’ (Colossians 1:15-17; New King James Version). The
latter phrase could also be rendered as ‘in Him all things hold
together’ (ta panta en autō sunesthēken), as in the Revised Standard
Version. This apostolic teaching accordingly represents a
Christian version of Philo’s notion of the divine Logos as
cosmic ontological nexus.
The early Christian appropriation of the Logos concept has not
escaped the notice of latter-day critics. According to Martin
Heidegger, for instance, it was with Christianity that the
misinterpretation of Heraclitus and his teaching on the logos
began. Thus in the New Testament, notably the prologue of the
Gospel of John, logos does not mean the Being of beings, but one
particular being, namely the Son of God. This Christian notion
is correctly attributed by Heidegger to Philo, who saw the logos
as the mediator (mesitēs) between God and creation. In this way
Christ came to be seen as the logos of salvation and of eternal
life. It is suggested by the German philosopher that this
understanding is far removed from that of Heraclitus, in whose
thought nature (phusis) and logos comprise a unity (Heidegger
2000, 133, 143). However, we suggest that Heidegger’s criticism
does not invalidate the Logos concept of Christian theology,
since the latter is based on divine revelation as expounded by
means of reason (Greek dianoia) and not on the precepts of
Hellenic philosophy as such – however valuable these have
proven in the Patristic exposition of Christian theology.
Patristic development
In the second century of the Christian era Justin Martyr
continued the Johannine Gospel’s identification of the Logos
with Jesus Christ. For Justin this notion entails both
ontological and epistemological dimensions, as is the case with
the logos of Heraclitus. In his First Apology Justin modifies the
Stoic notion of spermatikos logos to indicate the divine Word sown
as seeds of truth among ‘all people’ (para pasi). This universal
presence of the Logos is evident when the Hellenic poets and
philosophers spoke of matters such as the immortality of the
soul, punishments after death, and the contemplation of
heavenly things (Bouteneff 2008, 60). For Justin the divine
Logos is thus the Reason that inhabits all things. This is
particularly the case with the rational creation, so that
rational beings such as Socrates and Abraham could be viewed as
Christians before Christ. Each rational being participates in
the universal Logos, and the reason why philosophers differ
among each other is that each has a degree of access to the
truth, whereas Christ is the fullness of truth (Chadwick 1967,
162).
Justin accepted the Platonic doctrine that the transcendent God
is too elevated to interfere with this world. The Lord God
(Yahweh Elohim) of the Hebrew scriptures therefore refers to the
Logos, which is the Son of God (Chadwick 1967, 163).
Accordingly, Justin maintained Philo’s identification of the
Logos with the Angel of the Lord, begotten from God as a
rational power before all creatures: ‘I shall give you another
testimony, my friends, from the Scriptures, that God begot
before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational
power [proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy
Spirit, now the Glory of the Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom,
again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and Logos’ (Dialogue with
Trypho, Chapter 61). Evidently, Philo conceived of Jesus Christ
as the Logos who reveals God to humankind in various ways: in
the words of the sacred scriptures, in the theophanies therein,
and ultimately in the Incarnation (Bouteneff 2008: 58). The
Logos was thus viewed by some of the earliest Christian
theologians as divine intermediary from the onset of God’s
dealings with humankind.
In his Apology, addressed to the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius,
the early Christian philosopher Athenagoras continues Justin’s
identification of the Son of God with the Logos, through which
the universe is created. After mentioning elements of truth
concerning God and the cosmos in the teachings of the
Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, Athenagoras
depicts the relation between God the Father, the Logos, and the
material world as follows: ‘But the Son of God is the Logos of
the Father, in idea and in operation; for after the pattern of
Him and by Him were all things made, the Father and the Son
being one. And, the Son being in the Father and the Father in
the Son, in oneness and power of spirit, the understanding and
reason (nous kai logos) of the Father is the Son of God... He
[i.e. the Son] is the first product of the Father, not as
having been brought into existence (for from the beginning,
God, who is the eternal mind (nous), had the Logos in Himself,
being from eternity instinct with Logos (logikos)); but in as
much as He came forth to be the idea and energizing power of
all material things, which lay like a nature without
attributes, and an inactive earth, the grosser particles being
mixed up with the lighter.’ The creative activity of the Logos
extends to the angels and ministers, Athenagoras asserted,
‘whom God the Maker and Framer of the world distributed and
appointed to their several posts by His Logos, to occupy
themselves about the elements, and the heavens, and the world,
and the things in it, and the goodly ordering of them all’
(Apology, in Dembski et al 2008, 22-23). Therefore, since God
created all things through the Logos, the universe reflects
reason (logos) (Dembski et al 2008, 18). The rational structure
of the cosmos is thus attributed by Athenagoras to the creative
activity of the divine Logos.
Regarded as the most important theologian of the second
century, Irenaeus of Lyons virtually identified the Logos with
God the Father: ‘But God being all Mind, and all Logos, both
speaks exactly what He thinks, and thinks exactly what He
speaks. For His thought is Logos, and Logos is Mind, and Mind
comprehending all things is the Father Himself. He, therefore,
who speaks of the mind of God, and ascribes to it a special
origin of its own, declares Him a compound Being, as if God
were one thing, and the original Mind another’ (Against Heresies,
in Dembski et al 2008, 49). Another theologian among the
second-century Apologists, Theophilus of Antioch, affirmed the
emerging Patristic consensus that having brought forth his
Logos and his Spirit, God (i.e. the Father) creates the world
through the Logos. The Genesis statement regarding God’s
creation of humankind, ‘Let us make’, is understood by
Theophilus as indicating the Logos and the Spirit as the
creative hands of God. The reference to God walking around (in
the paradise narrative) is read as the Logos assuming the role
of the Father (Bouteneff 2008, 69, 71). With this
interpretation Theophilus continues the Christian doctrine
regarding the transcendence of God the Father towards the
created order, which in turn necessitates the Logos as
intermediary between God and creation.
The earliest of the justly famous Alexandrian theologians,
Clement, continued the reconciliation of reason and revelation
suggested by Philo and Justin. Just as music, arithmetic and
astronomy prepares the mind for philosophy, so does philosophy
prepare the soul for theology which rests on revelation. Faith
and knowledge therefore goes hand in hand, since all truth and
goodness derive from God. For Clement the Logos, which is
Christ, is the principle uniting the fragments of knowledge
(Chadwick 1967, 168-170). This appreciative stance towards
‘pagan’ learning represents a marked contrast to that of
Clement’s Latin contemporary Tertullian, who notoriously
argued: ‘What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What
concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What
between heretics and Christians?’ (On Prescription against Heretics,
5.1, in Ciholas 1978). Alas, Tertullian’s dismissive attitude
towards Hellenic philosophy has over the past five hundred
years been continued by much of Protestant theology with its
insistence on sola scriptura, thereby misunderstanding the
mediating role of the Logos between God and humankind.
In a remarkable display of religious universalism (which should
not be confused with doctrinal egalitarianism), Clement
reasoned that human knowledge of God existed ever since it was
granted to Adam and Eve. Consequently, monotheism was common
among early humans, before the Law was given to the Hebrews and
philosophy to the Greeks, and prior to monotheism degenerating
into polytheism. The Alexandrian theologian held further that
the Incarnation of Christ was a special case of divine
immanence by the Logos, since the transcendent God (i.e. the
Father) does not have direct contact with the world. Continuing
Philo’s notion of cosmic mediation, Clement taught that Christ
is the Logos who descended from heaven to mediate between
Creator and creation. Christ is also the head of the cosmic
hierarchy of being which is kept together by the Holy Spirit.
Moreover, for the Alexandrian theologian the Incarnation of the
Logos is the central event in the divine economy, through which
humankind can be educated and restored (Chadwick 1967, 176-
178). In this way Clement adapted the Logos concept obtained
from Hellenic philosophy in the light of scriptural teachings –
an approach that was followed by most of the Patristic
thinkers.
Although Plotinus did not explicitly ascribe the term Logos to
the second hypostasis of his divine Trinity, his theology was
influential on the Latin Patristic thinker Marius Victorinus, a
fourth-century convert from Neoplatonism. Victorinus
distinguished between the Logos interior to God and the Logos
related to the world by means of creation and salvation
(Theological Treatises on the Trinity, in Clark 1981, 25). This notion
could be regarded as a transposition onto the theistic-cosmic
level of the distinction made by Philo between the logos
prophorikos and the logos endiathētos, or the ‘uttered word’ and the
‘word within’ (Kamesar 2004, 163-181).
The leading theologian of the Latin Patristic tradition,
Augustine of Hippo, continued the Logos Christology of his
predecessors. In an exegesis of the opening verses of Genesis,
the North African bishop reasoned that God created the world by
means of His eternal Logos, since there was no physical voice
or time yet. Therefore, ‘in the beginning’ means ‘in the co-
eternal Word’ (The Confessions, Book 11, Chapters 6-9). Augustine
continued Philo’s notion that the Logos contains the eternal
Forms as divine thoughts. Furthermore, the Latin theologian
affirmed the creation of the world by the Logos with the Stoic
and Neoplatonic notion of ‘seminal reasons’ (Latin rationes
seminales). Thus Augustine asserted that the unfolding of all
natural kinds was due to their creation in seminal form at the
beginning. Even miraculous deviations from the ordinary course
of nature are due to the seminal reasons implanted by God in
the created order. Similarly, all human beings were contained
seminally in Adam, while their individual forms only came to be
later. Therefore God is the ultimate creator of all new beings,
Augustine affirmed (Knuuttila 2001, 104).
According to some of the Greek Patristic theologians, human
rationality corresponds to the rationality in nature that is
established by the divine Logos (Nesteruk 2003, 21). However,
according to Athanasius of Alexandria the rationality of the
created order is ontological rather than epistemological. In
his work Against the Gentiles, Athanasius rejects the Stoic and
Neoplatonic notion of seminal reasons (logoi spermatikoi),
suggesting instead that the logoi in the created order represent
the indwelling Logos. Thus the cause of rationality in nature
is the Logos, implying that both the sensible and intelligible
realms are embedded in Christ (Nesteruk 2003, 23-25).
Furthermore, in his On the Incarnation the Alexandrian theologian
criticises the ‘Gentiles’ for ridiculing the Incarnation of the
Logos in a human body, although they confess ‘that there is a
Word of God, that He is the Governor of all things, that in Him
the Father wrought the creation, that by His providence the
whole receives light and life and being, and that He is King
over all, so that He is known by means by the works of His
providence, and through Him the Father.’ Athanasius then
expresses his agreement with the Greek philosophers when they
say that the universe is a great body, of which every part is
inhabited by the Logos. Therefore the Incarnation follows as a
logical corollary: ‘But if it is right and fitting for Him
[i.e. the Logos] to enter into the universe and to reveal
Himself through it, then, because humanity is part of the
universe along with the rest, it is no less fitting for Him to
appear in a human body, and to enlighten and to work through
that’ (On the Incarnation, in Dembski et al 2008, 212-213). This
reasoning by Athanasius is surely one of the most elegant
arguments concerning the Incarnation of the divine Logos.
Contrary to the materialistic reductionism of the Cartesian-
Newtonian scientific paradigm, and in a striking anticipation
of quantum physics, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor
viewed matter as a fact of energy. In terms of this dynamic
notion of matter, the world and everything in it is the
effected word (logos) of God (Yannaras 1991, 40). On account of
the theistic rationality of the natural order, the human reason
in its encounter with nature meets another reason. In other
words, the human knowledge of nature is dialogical (Yannaras
1991, 41). This ontological-epistemological link (ultimately
deriving from Heraclitus, as we have noted) also serves as
indictment of the human encounter with the natural realms,
which has for the most part assumed the form of a thoughtless
monologue enforced by technology.
Another Cappadocian theologian, Gregory of Nazianzus, declared
in his Fourth Theological Oration that each created thing has its own
essential reason (logos). Since the divine Logos grants
ontological reality to the whole of the created order, nothing
can exist if it is not grounded in the Logos. This affirmation
implies that God does not create wilfully, but with a reason
(Lossky 1978, 56). In other words, the logos of each created
thing, including living beings, is a micro-reflection of the
divine Logos. For the Greek Patristic thinkers in general, the
creative role of Christ is that of the eternal Logos that
articulates all creatures into being. In this way each creature
is called by the Logos out of the abyss of non-being into the
reality of being (Kuraev 2001).
It is not surprising that the leading exponent of Patristic
mystical theology, Dionysius the Areopagite (also known as the
Pseudo-Dionysius), contributed to an explication of the role of
the Logos. In his cosmology the principles (logoi) of all things
live as patterns (paradeigmata) in the divine nature, from where
it proceeds into the intelligible and sensible worlds. As the
indwelling logoi in creation they are the means by which the
intelligible and sensible worlds return to their Creator, so
that the logoi may also be viewed as ascensions (epistrophai), the
Areopagite reasoned (Divine Names IV, 4; V, 8; VII, 3; Sheldon-
Williams 1967, 462-463). In this way Dionysius continues the
Neoplatonic notion of a procession (proodos) from the One to
the many and a return (epistrophē) of the many to the One.
The Greek Patristic concept of the logoi was extensively
developed by Maximus the Confessor, building on the earlier
contributions by the Cappadocian theologians, Dionysius the
Areopagite and Evagrius of Pontus (Nesteruk 2003, 251). In the
cosmology of Maximus, ‘Each created thing has its own logos, or
principle, which derives from God and makes each thing what it
is. Humans can contemplate the logoi in creation and thereby
attain knowledge of God. These created logoi participate in the
Divine Logos’ (Dembski et al 2008, 505). The Confessor taught
that the divine Logos holds together the eternal logoi of
created things. These logoi cannot be detected empirically or
mentally, but can be contemplated through the purified
intellect, or nous (Nesteruk 2003, 25-26). Continuing Origen’s
concept of multiple incarnations of the Logos, Maximus viewed
the Logos as the supreme divine mediator. A variety of
‘incarnations’ are ascribed to the Logos, ranging from the logoi
of the world, the spiritual meanings of the scriptures, the
virtuous life of believers, and supremely in Jesus Christ
(Blowers 2003, 21).
Based on this all-pervading presence of the Logos, Maximus
postulated the existence of three universal laws, namely the
natural law, the scriptural law, and the law of grace. In his
Letter to Thalassius these laws are summarised as follows: ‘In
short, then, the law of nature is the natural reason seizing
control of the senses in order to rid them of the irrationality
from which arises division among human beings who share the
same nature. The scriptural law is the natural reason, after it
has ridded the senses of irrationality, acquiring a spiritual
desire as well, a desire for mutual solidarity with others
sharing the same nature. The law of grace consists in a
supernatural reason, and transforms nature, without violating
it, unto deification. It also displays, beyond comprehension,
the supernatural and superessential Archetype in human nature,
as in an image, and exhibits the permanence of eternal well-
being’ (Ad Thalassium 64, in Blowers et al 2003, 169). Thus the
universal laws established by the Logos embrace the natural,
the spiritual, and the supernatural realms.
For Maximus, the reason (logos) of a created thing is the point
of contact between itself and the Godhead. Simultaneously, the
logos of a thing is also the end or purpose (telos) towards which
it aspires (Lossky 1991, 98). Or, stated in terms of
Aristotelian metaphysics, the logos of an organism or an object
is not only that which grants existence, but is also the final
cause of that which exists. Since the totality of the logoi is
contained in the divine Logos, Maximus reasoned in his Difficulties
(known in Latin as the Ambigua), the logoi are the principles
that pre-exist eternally in the divine Mind. An important
distinction is made by the Confessor, namely that the logoi do
not represent the divine nature, but they are in reality the
divine volitions. Viewed from different perspectives the logoi
are simultaneously one and many: they are one in actuality as
the Being of the trinity being, well-being, and eternal well-
being; and they are many in potentiality as the unfolding of
this trinity (Sheldon-Williams 1967, 497-498). In this way the
Greek theologian relates the Logos concept to the Aristotelian
teaching that God is pure actuality, whereas formless matter is
pure potentiality and therefore requires actualisation into
substance by means of the logoi.
Maximus taught further that the logoi are mysteriously hidden
under the surface of created being. An antinomy has been
pointed in this regard out by Alexei Nesteruk: the logoi are
both transcendent, being pre-existent in God, and immanent,
manifesting the divine presence in creation (Nesteruk 2003,
102). Furthermore, although the logoi are realised in the
existence of things, they are not part of the created order –
instead, they manifest the existential purpose (telos) of
things. The logoi are rooted in the divine Logos, as Maximus
asserted, but they are not dissolved in it and therefore retain
their individuality. To illustrate the relationship between the
Logos, the logoi, and the created order in the Patristic
understanding, the Neoplatonic analogy of the circle could
meaningfully be employed: its centre is the Logos, its radii
are the logoi, and its circumference is the created order, both
sensible and intelligible (Nesteruk 2003, 103).
The universal presence of the logoi also confirms the
providential care of God over the created order, Maximus
reasoned. With characteristic metaphysical acumen the Confessor
states the case for the logoi of providence as follows: ‘For the
permanence of what is, and its order and position and movement
and the consonance of the extremities with the middle, the
agreement of the parts with the wholes, and the union
throughout of the wholes with the parts, and the unblurred
distinction of the parts one from another in accordance with
the individuating difference of each, and the unconfused union
in accordance with the indistinguishable sameness in the
wholes, and the combination and distinction of everything with
everything else (not to limit myself to particulars), and the
eternally preserved succession of everything and each one
according to form, so that the logos of each nature is not
corrupted by confusion or blurring – all this shows clearly
that everything is held together by the providence of the
Creator God’ (Difficulty 10, in Dembski et al 2008, 512-513).
Moreover, by relating the logoi to the divine energies and not
the divine essence, Maximus preserves the fundamental Greek
Patristic distinction between the transcendent essence of God
and the immanent energies of God. In this understanding, God’s
creative activity in the world manifests through the divine
energies and are described through words (another meaning of
logoi). These energeiai, or alternatively logoi, form and sustain
all visible and invisible things in the world. In this way a
similarity exists between the Confessor’s notion of the logoi
and the concept of divine energeiai as expounded by Gregory of
Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory Palamas (Nesteruk
2003, 101-102).
The grand synthesis: Eriugena
In his magisterial ninth-century synthesis of Greek and Latin
Patristic theology with Neoplatonic philosophy, as presented in
the Periphyseon (subtitled On the Division of Nature), John Scottus
Eriugena ascribed a pivotal cosmic role to the divine Logos,
which is identified with Jesus Christ. In his cosmology the
Irish-Carolingian scholar depicted all of the created order,
both intelligible and sensible, as partaking of a double
movement. This represents a Christian version of the
Neoplatonic scheme of a procession (Latin exitus) of all things
out of God and a return (reditus) of all things to God. These
movements should not be viewed as separate processes, Eriugena
asserted, since they are linked by the human reason that
ponders them. Moreover, the Logos is the link between the
cosmic ebb and flow of procession and return (Periphyseon Book
II 526, Book III 642; Carabine 2000, 29, 53). A close link
between the ontological and the rational is thus affirmed, in
continuation of both the Hellenic and Patristic traditions.
Eriugena postulates that God creates the world of sensible
phenomena through the primordial causes (Latin causae
primordiales), which are infinite in number and not finite like
the Platonic Forms (Moran 1989, 263-264). It is argued in Book
III of the Periphyseon that since the Logos is eternal, the
primordial causes are eternal in their nature. Also, as the
Logos is infinite, so the primordial causes reach into infinity
in their effects. In Book IV of the same work Eriugena contends
that just as the primordial causes are one in the Logos, so
their effects are one in the human reason (Sheldon-Williams
1967, 527-528). Employing the terminology of Dionysius the
Areopagite, the Irish scholar identified the primordial causes
with the Greek Patristic prototypes (prōtotupa), predestinations
(proorismata), divine volitions (thea thelēmata), and the
principles (logoi) of all things. All visible and invisible
things exist through participation in the logoi, Eriugena
continues, while the latter participate in the one Cause of the
divine Trinity (Periphyseon Book II, 15, 205). The Platonic
doctrine of participation is discernible in this reasoning,
although Eriugena deviates therefrom by extending participation
to the intelligible world in addition to the sensible world.
In view of the foregoing, the whole of reality could be viewed
as a theophany, or God-appearance. Eriugena approvingly
mentions Maximus the Confessor’s dictum that a theophany
entails a descent of the Logos onto human nature through divine
grace, and a simultaneous ascent of human nature to the Logos
through love. Through this double movement in which divine and
human love meet, theophany arises (Periphyseon Book I, 449). In
this way the Irish thinker grounded the human experience of the
cosmos in the reciprocal action between divine and human love,
mediated by the Logos.
However, Eriugena differed from the Greek Patristic consensus
by postulating the primordial causes as created (representing
his second division of reality, after God as Creator), whereas
the divine energies are conceived as uncreated. This divergence
has been explained by Vladimir Lossky as due to an attempt by
the Irish scholar to maintain the substantial character of the
divine Ideas (i.e. the primordial causes), so that they become
the first created essences instead of the uncreated energies
(Lossky 1991, 96). Nonetheless, although the primordial causes
are said to be eternally present in the divine Word (or Logos),
Eriugena do not view them as co-essential with God the Father,
who precedes all things made in the Word (Carabine 2000, 54).
It appears that with his notion of primordial causes through
which God creates the sensible world, Eriugena fused the
Hellenic Ideas and logoi with the Patristic divine energies or
volitions. Accordingly, these creative causes are viewed as
both eternal, being contained in the Logos, and temporal when
they are mixed with matter to constitute the physical cosmos
(Periphyseon Book III, 636).
As could be expected from such a profound thinker, the Logos
concept was also applied by Eriugena to his anthropology. He
reasoned that human nature consists of two trinities,
reflecting the divine Trinity. Thus essence and intellect
indicate the highest part of human nature, power and reason
(logos) indicate the middle part, and operation and perception
indicate the lowest part (Periphyseon Book II, 568). A
teleological implication of Eriugena’s anthropology is that the
human reason (logos) is enabled to perceive the intelligibility
in the natural world (for example, as beauty and design) on
account of the presence of the divine Word (Logos), through
whose logoi the world comes into being.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the Greek Patristic concept of the logoi
indwelling the created order is broadly similar to the notion
of seminal reasons as developed by Augustine. However, the
Augustinian concept differs from the Patristic stance in that
the latter conceive of the logoi as uncreated, since they
originate in the Logos. Yet both seminal reasons and logoi can
be perceived due to the intelligibility of the created world
(Nesteruk 2003, 36, 251). We contend that the same argument
applies to the primordial causes of Eriugena, since they are
the creative means by which the Logos grants both being and
intelligibility to the created order.
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