Post on 24-Feb-2023
Post-2014 Afghanistan and Its Impact on Northeast Asia
Nadine Godehardt and David Shim
The economic, political, and social situation in post-2014Afghanistan remains uncertain, particularly because the effects ofthe US drawback from Afghanistan on national and regional sta-bility are rather difficult to foresee. In this article, we explore howthe debates about post-2014 Afghanistan impact others’ thinking.Afghanistan forces national governments and political leaders toreflect deeply on their policies toward Afghanistan and the widerregion. Hence, the “Afghanistan problem” becomes a geopoliticalimagery within other countries’ discourse. Here we scrutinize theimpact of post-2014 Afghanistan on South Korean and Chinese for-eign policy practices, enabling us also to become familiar with Chi-nese and South Korean understanding of their political position inAsia. KEYWORDS: China, South Korea, post-2014 Afghanistan, geopo-litical imagery.
AFTER THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN IN 2010, WHERE
world leaders agreed on a timetable for Afghanistan’s securityforces to take over responsibility for the war, and following Pres-ident Barack Obama’s speech in June 2011 announcing atimetable for ending US involvement, it became clear that USengagement in post-2014 Afghanistan would take place on verydifferent terms. Then came the announcement and actual imple-mentation plan for the withdrawal of the International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF), which had a strong impact on theregional and international debate about the post-2014 security sit-uation in and around Afghanistan. It meant, quite simply, that ifonly limited international forces are going to remain inAfghanistan, others, in particular its regional neighbors, have tostep in and need to be prepared for post-2014 scenarios.
Once the decision was made to withdraw US troops fromAfghanistan, the Obama administration began a campaign to high-light the significance of Asia for world politics and for the United
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States. In the fall of 2011 President Obama announced that Asiawould be a top priority for US security policy. Secretary of StateHillary Clinton emphasized that “the future of politics will bedecided in Asia” (Clinton 2011). Official US rhetoric emphasized“the pivot or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific.” In fact, thisshift was actually a restatement of an interest that had longexisted. Hence, the rebalancing might best be characterized as acontinuity and expansion of policies that had been in place underformer administrations. What is new is the increasing economicinterest of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. The Obamaadministration’s decision to begin negotiations about the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2010 was a clear sign of his willingness toset a new benchmark for relations with Asia-Pacific allies.
International developments also put the US drawback fromAfghanistan into a different perspective for its Asia allies. Onewas the Obama administration’s reservations about using forceagainst Syria after the Bashar al-Assad regime crossed what hadbeen marked as a “red line” in its use of chemical weaponsagainst regime opponents. Second was Russia’s annexation of theCrimea region of Ukraine, which the United States protested butdid not otherwise contest. Last but not least of these developmentswas the still unclear political situation in post-2014 Afghanistan.Many Asian allies of the United States, primarily Japan and thePhilippines, raised concerns about US willingness to back them interritorial disputes and in moments of crisis. Consequently,Obama’s trip to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippinesin April 2014 was meant to address and ease these concerns.Obama further wanted to reassure his Asian allies that the USadministration was in fact still serious about its geostrategic inter-est in their region.
Although the causality between the US drawback fromAfghanistan and the rebalancing toward Asia may be questioned,what is apparent is that Obama intended to fortify US foreignpolicy after the costly experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thereemphasis on the Asia-Pacific region is one specific aspect ofthis new orientation, particularly the increasing US interest instrengthening relations with core allies in Asia such as Japan orSouth Korea. The US drawback from Afghanistan and the rebal-
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ancing to Asia, in combination with increasing US cautiousnessabout actively intervening in international crises, is being care-fully watched by US allies in the Asia-Pacific. As a result,“Afghanistan” and in particular the “post-2014 situation inAfghanistan” clearly now have a different and wider meaning,with an impact on other countries’ political practices. This lat-ter aspect is crucial for our inquiry. We understand the USannouncement of the withdrawal from Afghanistan as geopolit-ical imagery, and we are mainly interested in analyzing howthis imagery has affected political practices in China and SouthKorea.
In other words, the US drawback from Afghanistan, like thenotion of a “post-2014 Afghanistan,” stands for events that have notyet happened. These notions are signs that are yet to be filled withmeaning depending on the specific context in which they are dis-cussed. Debates about a post-2014 Afghanistan are seldom aboutAfghanistan as such but about how this particular future mightimpact others. Those others, in our case meaning national govern-ments and political leaders, must reflect on policies toward Afghan-istan or the wider region. Consequently, “Afghanistan” becomesgeopolitical imagery within the respective national discourse.
China, South Korea, and Afghanistan
In a nutshell, an analysis in China or South Korea of the debatesabout the US withdrawal from Afghanistan or the post-2014Afghanistan situation tells us much more about these two coun-tries and their foreign policy practices than actually aboutAfghanistan. Both countries are of particular interest for ouranalysis because their positions on Afghanistan are quite different.South Korea is an important US ally; it participated in the ISAFinvolvement. China, on the other hand, is a regional neighbor ofAfghanistan and in fact the biggest competitor of the UnitedStates in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese leadership usuallycriticized the Western intervention in Afghanistan, yet Chineseexperts often pointed out that the maintenance of regional securityalso depended on US (and ISAF) engagement.
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South Korea is our first object of analysis. We start by dis-cussing South Korea’s emerging role in regional and global affairs.Against this background, we identify and assess South Korea’sgeopolitical imagery. While it makes sense to view South Korea’sforeign policy practices from a traditional middle-power perspec-tive, meaning for instance a focus on limited policy fields orinvolvement in multilateral cooperation and international institu-tions, we must also take into account South Korea’s more assertiveand forceful stance on global political issues. South Korea has notonly been active in the global economy, environment, and devel-opment cooperation; it is also a provider of security, with severalcivil-military engagements in international hotspots, among themost significant of which is the Afghanistan deployment.
South Korea’s engagement in Afghanistan, which started inDecember 2001, has to be seen in the context of its militaryalliance with the United States. Consequently, the decision of theObama administration to pull back from Afghanistan in order togive its pivot to Asia more weight is significant for South Koreain several ways. The central argument that is advanced here isthat, to put it briefly, the US rebalance toward Asia coincides witha South Korean “pivot” toward Asia, as recent geopolitical initia-tives illustrate, in particular the “New Asia Initiative” under for-mer president Lee Myung-bak and the “Eurasia Initiative” undercurrent president Park Geun-hye.
Second, we look at China, a direct neighbor of Afghanistan.Due to major investments in the Aynak copper mine in 2007 andin three oil blocks at Amu Darya Basin in 2011, China was seenas a potential major economic partner of Afghanistan. Because ofthe country’s key role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), China was also considered a possible regional securityguarantor by the international community. However, China hastaken a rather low-profile attitude toward Afghanistan. In manyways, China’s understanding of the situation in Afghanistan isclosely related to the country’s policy toward its troublesomeWestern province of Xinjiang. Thus, Chinese politicians look atthe US drawback from Afghanistan as one of their country’snational security problems, specifically in terms of post-2014Afghanistan’s implications for political stability in Xinjiang.
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Although China took over some political responsibility fortwo to three years following the crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan in2010, today the country’s policy toward Afghanistan is rathercharacterized by a wait-and-see approach. Post-2014 Afghanistanis also a touchstone for China’s reemphasis on the importance ofgood-neighbor relations with Asia, particularly the new economicdevelopment initiative—the Silk Road Economic Belt, whichlinks China to the greater Eurasian region—that President Xi Jin-ping introduced in September 2013.1
The US Drawback from Afghanistan and South Korea’s Pivot to Asia
More Than a Middle Power
Discussions about South Korea’s emerging role in regional andglobal affairs have gained much momentum in recent years(Hwang 2004; Rozman 2006; Robertson 2007; Zhu 2007; Kang2010; Park 2011; Snyder 2012; Kalinowski and Cho 2012; Shimand Flamm 2013).2 While these debates mainly took place in pol-icymaking and academic circles, international media outlets haveincreasingly participated in these discussions. South Korea nowhas to be viewed from something other than a traditional middle-power perspective, especially since it has engaged in more force-ful power politics from time to time. We are thinking, forinstance, of Seoul’s strong stance against North Korea followingthe sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Islandby North Korean artillery in 2010; the successful operation ofSouth Korean navy commandos against Somali pirates in 2011;and South Korea’s assertiveness regarding its dispute with Japanover islands in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and with China overBeijing’s expansion of its air defense identification zone.
To raise its profile on the world stage, South Korea has hosteda range of major diplomatic events—for example, concerningglobal security (the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit), economy(the 2010 G-20 leaders’ meeting), and development (the 2011High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness). Seoul has also launched
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its own political initiatives, such as Financial Safety Nets, theNew Village Movement, and Green Growth. These were not onlymeant to comprise and connect different policy fields under theheading of “rule making”—including security, economy, trade,development, environment, and culture—but also have found res-onance in global and regional contexts.3
Being heavily dependent on world trade, South Korea is eagerto secure business opportunities for fueling its economic growth.For that reason, it has concluded a series of free trade agreements,among them with the world’s three largest economic zones: theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, andthe United States. As a result, approximately 60 percent of theworld is now part of South Korean “economic territory” in termsof gross domestic product (GDP).
Beyond its economic efforts, South Korea is currently partic-ipating in active peacekeeping and military operations in interna-tional hotspots including Afghanistan, Lebanon, South Sudan, thecoastal waters off Somalia, and the Kashmir region. In this way,the country is helping provide and maintain regional security andstability (Roehrig 2013).
One of South Korea’s most significant international engage-ments is its troop deployment to Afghanistan. Intermittently, SouthKorea, as part of the ISAF, has supported the Afghan governmentwith reconstruction, training, and medical supply assistance sinceDecember 2001, when a US-led coalition overthrew the ruling Tal-iban regime. In contrast to China, which considered Afghanistan a“virtual problem” (see below), South Korea’s engagement inAfghanistan was politically intended from the beginning, despitechanges in administration from center-left (Kim Dae-jung and RohMoo-hyun) to center-right (Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye).In fact, Seoul was one of the first US allies to participate in “Oper-ation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.
This commitment clearly has to do with Seoul’s militaryalliance with the United States—a security guarantee againstNorth Korean threats since 1953, when both sides concluded amutual defense treaty. The alliance was affected in several wayswhen the Obama administration decided to reduce its troops inAfghanistan in order to enhance its Asia pivot. On the one hand,
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the pivot showed, at least rhetorically, a continued appreciation ofallies in the region such as South Korea. But it possibly also indi-cated Washington’s efforts to contain or counterbalance the rise ofChina, a geopolitical situation that Seoul arguably wishes toavoid, since both the United States and China are, as Kang Choi(2012, 39) puts it, “indispensable” for South Korea.
The South Korean Pivot
In contrast to current scholarship on the implications of the USpivot to Asia for South Korea, which usually did read Washing-ton’s rebalance as evidence of a power struggle between theUnited States and China (Choi 2012; Chun 2013), our centralargument is that the US drawback from Afghanistan, and byextension its renewed focus on Asia, gives South Korean foreignpolicy more room to engage in or deepen other geostrategicendeavors. One example is South Korea’s current orientationtoward the Central Asian region (Fumagalli 2012; Hwang 2012).The US rebalance toward Asia coincides with, or facilitates, SouthKorea’s own pivot toward Asia.
Recent South Korean geopolitical strategies, such as the“New Asia Initiative” under former president Lee Myung-bakor the more recent and much-touted “Eurasia Initiative” of cur-rent president Park Geun-hye, exemplify Seoul’s Asia pivot.This is not to suggest that Asia was completely absent fromSouth Korea’s political geography or that the US drawbackdecision determined Seoul’s Asia policy options. Rather, weattempt to read these developments as geopolitical imagery inthat South Korea’s engagement at the Hindu Kush is less about,say, nation building in Afghanistan and more about itsgeostrategic direction.
The New Asia Initiative is significant insofar as it functions asa South Korean claim to regional leadership in Asia (Cossa 2009;Zhu 2009). Positioning itself as a bridge between developed anddeveloping countries in Asia, the South Korean governmentattempted to increase its clout by focusing on the expansion ofcooperative relations in economy, energy, environment, culture,and security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2011). What
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is important here is not only that South Korea’s regional horizonhas broadened, but also that Seoul’s bigger rivals, in particularChina and Japan, are its main addressees in the competition forregional influence (Hundt 2011).
The Eurasia Initiative complements Seoul’s pivot to Asia and,by extension, the above-mentioned geopolitical imagery. Pro-posed by President Park in October 2013, the Eurasia Initiativeenvisions building an energy and logistics infrastructure that con-nects the European with the Asian continents. The central idea isa so-called Silk Road Express, which would involve constructionof roads and railways that would run from the South Korean sea-port of Busan through North Korea, Russia, China, and CentralAsia to Western Europe. The initiative also intends to link EastAsia with the Northern Sea Route, a shipping lane of increasingimportance for trade that reaches from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Another South Korean proposal is to link the energy infra-structures of energy consumers (e.g., South Korea and China)with energy producers (e.g., Russia and the Central Asian states),and build electric power networks and gas and oil pipelines (Park2013). While that idea resembles China’s vision of a “New SilkRoad”—a reason that President Park proposed in July 2014 to linkboth initiatives—it also underscores Seoul’s greater goal of open-ing up North Korea in order to make it more accountable for itsbehavior. South Korea’s long-term strategic doctrine is relevanthere, in particular Park’s “Trust-building Process on the KoreanPeninsula” and the “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initia-tive” (Park 2014). At the same time, the idea also reflects theimportance Seoul attaches to Central Asia, evident in the Parkadministration’s active diplomacy—its holding of bilateral sum-mits with key regional players such as China, Kazakhstan, Russia,Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Taken together, these initiativesshow that the South Korean government views its always tenserelationship with North Korea in the broader perspective of pro-moting multilateral and regional cooperation (Robertson 2014).
Since, as we have argued, South Korea’s contributions inAfghanistan have to be seen in the context of its security alliancewith the United States, it would be logical that receding USinvolvement in the Hindu Kush would be followed by receding
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South Korean involvement. However, although Seoul ended itscivil-military operation in June 2014, though leaving staff andmaterial to keep assisting Kabul, it has increased efforts to engageand support other regional states in Asia. In that way, Afghanistanagain functions as a geopolitical imagery that helps to positionSouth Korea in the greater game of regional politics.
China’s Wait-and-See Approach to Post-2014 Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s Security Implications
Afghanistan has not been a top priority in China’s diplomacy. Incrucial moments of modern Afghan history, such as during theSoviet occupation (1979–1989), the coming to power of the Tal-iban in 1996, and the new war led by the United States and itsNATO allies since 2001, China took a low-profile stand onAfghanistan. As Zhao Huasheng (2012, 2) rightly argues, Chinahas only “very limited goals in Afghanistan” and is not interestedin getting militarily involved there. Since Chinese leaders stillespouse the principle of nonintervention, they do not see China’smain task as rebuilding Afghanistan politically. In addition,China’s economic interests are rather specific and tightly focusedon exploitation of energy resources and rare earths.
China’s greatest concern is that the situation in Afghanistancould actually impact on stability and security in Xinjiang. In2013 a new wave of Uighur-led attacks occurred in Urumqi, theprovincial capital of Xinjiang, as well as in major cities outsideXinjiang.4 Chinese officials linked most of these incidents toUighur terrorist or separatist movements such as the East Turk-istan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which aims to establish an inde-pendent state in Xinjiang. After September 11, 2001, the Chinesegovernment pointed to the ETIM as being responsible for over200 violent incidents in Xinjiang (SCIO 2002). Since then theETIM and other East Turkistan organizations have also been fre-quently linked with the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Against this back-ground, Afghanistan and especially its borderlands—between
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Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Afghanistan and Turk-menistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—are seen from Beijing as apossible backyard for terrorists and separatist groups of the EastTurkistan movement. Thus, “Afghanistan is regarded as the mostserious threat from outside” by Chinese leaders (Zhao Huasheng2012, 3). Consequently, rather than develop mechanisms to main-tain stability in Afghanistan, they preferred to secure Xinjiang andprevent spillover effects from Afghanistan.
Despite its low profile on many questions concerningAfghanistan, Chinese leaders continued to have high-level diplo-matic meetings with the Karzai government, underlining the overallfriendly relationship between the two countries. Karzai’s first visitto China was in 2002. Four years later the countries signed a Treatyof Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation, underscoringChina’s pivotal interests in security cooperation and naturalresources exploration (China Daily 2006). The friendly diplomaticrelationship certainly facilitated access by Chinese companies tothe Afghan market and resources. Chinese companies won the bidfor two major natural resources projects. In 2007 the MetallurgicalCorporation of China (MCC) and the Jiangxi Copper Corporation,China’s biggest copper producer, closed a deal to develop theAynak copper mine southeast of Kabul. This deal marks the singlelargest foreign investment in Afghanistan to date. In 2011 the ChinaNational Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) together with its Afghanpartner, Watan Oil & Gas, was awarded three exploratory oil blocksat Amu Darya Basin located in northwestern Afghanistan.
Contrary to other foreign bidders, Chinese firms usuallyinclude a huge package of infrastructure measures in their offers.In the case of the Aynak copper mine, “MCC agreed to develop a400-megawatt thermal power plant and coal mine to feed it, [and]the water supply . . . and a railway to connect the mine to Pakistanand Tajikistan via Kabul” (Downs 2012, 71). These investmentsprovoked a lot of skepticism in the West about China’s “realintentions” in Afghanistan. It was argued that China only offeredvery limited aid to support Afghanistan’s security but still wontwo big contracts, in particular the Aynak copper deal (ZhaoHuasheng 2012, 6). Downs points out that the Chinese bids onlysucceeded because “ISAF has made Afghanistan safe for Chinese
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investments” and “US troops are indirectly providing security forthe Chinese companies by patrolling the area in which they oper-ate” (Downs 2012, 65–66).
Downs’s argument points to the Chinese attitude before 2010–2011 when Afghanistan stood for a security problem that others,particularly the United States, had to deal with. This attitude,however, changed after the announcement of the US withdrawaland the crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (discussed below).For the next two to three years we observed the reemergence ofthe “Afghanistan imagery” in China’s academic and political dis-course. Since then the Chinese government has apparently real-ized that Afghanistan is not only a problem in the neighborhoodbut a problem China must address.
China’s Changing Concerns and Options Since 2010–2011
A serious energy crisis in the winter of 2009–2010 led to a rapidrise in energy costs in Kyrgyzstan. Feeding on long-term publicdissatisfaction with the regime, violent demonstrations overenergy emerged against President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s adminis-tration in early April 2010. The riots forced Bakiyev and his fam-ily to flee the country. Although Bakiyev officially still heldoffice, opposition leaders quickly announced that Roza Otun-bayeva was the new leader of the interim government. A fewmonths later, heavy clashes occurred between Kyryzs and Uzbeksin southern Kyrgyzstan, notably in Osh, which represents astronghold of Bakiyev’s supporters.
During these clashes the country descended into near civilwar, leaving the interim government with limited control over thesouth. The chaotic situation directly affected China’s economicinterests in Central Asia and also endangered the thousands ofChinese entrepreneurs and workers who were resident in Kyr-gyzstan. However, China’s reactions were rather limited, offeringonly $732,000 worth of medicine, medical equipment, food,drinking water, blankets, and tents (Bodeen 2010). Instead, theChinese government focused on flying out around 1,300 Chinesenationals living close to Osh (Bodeen 2010).
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In the following two to three years, this incident—in additionto the announcement of the US drawback from Afghanistan—trig-gered a lively discussion among Chinese experts about the capa-bilities of China and of the SCO to deal effectively with mattersof regional security. Many experts argued that China, within theframework of the SCO, needs to be able to respond to crimesagainst humanity or natural disasters in a member state.5 Otherexperts highlighted the limited practical options for the SCO, aswell as for China, when it comes to actually intervening in thedomestic affairs of another member state. After all, the principleof nonintervention is in the SCO’s charter and is a crucial part ofChina’s foreign policy portfolio.
However, the situation in Kyrgyzstan, and especially depic-tions in the Chinese media of the chaos in Osh, undoubtedlychanged how Chinese academics and politicians discussed the“Afghanistan problem.” “Afghanistan” no longer stood for fearabout the situation on the ground in Afghanistan but rather for thepotential spillover effects from Afghanistan (because, for instance,of civil war or the absence of an effective government) to CentralAsia and Xinjiang. The Chinese concern was therefore not somuch about securing the short border between Afghanistan andXinjiang, but about maintaining control over the borderlandsbetween Afghanistan and the three neighboring Central Asianrepublics. In the aftermath of the Kyrgyz crisis, Chinese experts,therefore, again underscored the possibility that the borderlandcould develop into an area of retreat for terrorist groups that couldsupport the Uighur separatist groups in southern Xinjiang. Inaddition, small arms and light military equipment could illegallybe moved along the same route.
In addition, an unstable post-2014 Afghanistan could alsoweaken the political systems in Central Asia and facilitate publicuprisings similar to the demonstrations and protests in the Arabworld—the so-called Arab Spring. Chinese experts also empha-sized the risk that in the shadow of Afghanistan, the intensity ofinternal conflicts in the neighborhood could also increase, such asbetween Uzbeks and Kyrgyz (Lang 2013). Others worried aboutpossible changes of power in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a con-cern that points to the difficult relationship between political
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elites and local populations in the different Central Asian coun-tries.6 However, the greatest fear for China still was the potentialspread of domestic or regional crises from Central Asia to Xin-jiang.7 Hence, the Chinese leadership’s key policy challengeswere to strengthen bilateral ties with Afghanistan and further inte-grate Afghanistan in existing regional mechanisms.
Bilaterally, the most visible result of China’s renewed focus onAfghanistan was the first official Chinese visit to Kabul since 1966by then–Communist Party Politburo member Zhou Yongkang inSeptember 2012.8 Zhou’s visit underlined the specific Chineseinterests in Afghanistan, beginning with concern about the securitysituation. In this regard, China agreed to train 300 Afghan policeofficers in the next four years (Pantucci and Petersen 2012). Chi-nese interest in Afghanistan’s natural resources was another aspectof Zhou’s visit. After all, Zhou had been deeply involved withChina’s energy sector, having worked at CNPC for thirty-twoyears and apparently having had links to the 36.2 billion RMBSichuan Petrochemical Ethylene Plant (Naughton 2013). In linewith the strategic partnership that was signed between both coun-tries in June 2012, the Chinese government promised 150 millionRMB in aid to Afghanistan.
Zhou Yongkang’s visit seemed designed overall to demonstratethe Chinese government’s sense of responsibility for developmentsin Afghanistan. Beijing seemed determined to react to the mainlyWestern accusations that China was only interested in monopoliz-ing control of Afghan natural resources and energy consumption,without providing any public goods for Afghanistan.
Regionally, the SCO is important as a mechanism for discus-sion of regional security questions among member states,observers, and dialogue partners. Already in the mid-2000s, Chinaaimed for a stronger integration of Afghanistan into the SCO,mainly for two reasons: the fights against terrorism and drug traf-ficking. In 2005 the so-called SCO-Afghanistan contact groupwas established. It was one of the first efforts to bring togetherrepresentatives of the SCO Secretariat, permanent envoys of themember countries, and representatives of the Afghan embassy inChina. In 2009 the SCO member states and the Afghan govern-ment adopted a “Plan of Action” on combating terrorism, illicit
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drug trafficking, and organized crime. Although the goals of theSCO action plan were rather clearly articulated, they were neversuccessfully implemented, having been “quickly overshadowedby other conferences that actually raised money and launched col-lective projects regarding Afghanistan” (Weitz 2011).9 Drug traf-ficking, for example, always topped the agenda and was central toall parties involved, but the SCO member states never put anyeffective mechanisms for fighting it into practice.
The Chinese government, however, remains determined thatAfghanistan be officially integrated in the framework of the SCO.During the twelfth SCO summit in June 2012 Beijing activelypushed for Afghanistan’s acceptance as an SCO observer state.Besides the bilateral strategic partnership between China andAfghanistan, SCO observer status was a strong political symbolfor both countries. China was especially interested in a closer col-laboration with Afghanistan in the framework of the RegionalAnti-Terror Structure (RATS), which was established in 2004.Within RATS the SCO member states mainly exchange intelli-gence and compile a database of terrorist, separatist, and extrem-ist groups in the region. RATS has rather successfully served as a“hub for sharing intelligence and harmonizing legislation andapproaches to counterterrorism among its member states” (Aris2013, 5). Since Afghanistan was identified by the SCO as a poten-tial backyard for terrorist groups, strengthening intelligence coop-eration with the Afghan government made sense.
Actual results on the ground are difficult to measure, how-ever. In a nutshell, although SCO member and affiliated stateshave a common understanding of security issues related toAfghanistan and of nontraditional security challenges, the organ-ization has not yet been able to develop or implement mecha-nisms that would facilitate effective responses to emergingregional security crises or permanent regional security problems.This means the SCO lacks instruments such as antidrug forces,joint border controls, confidence-building measures, disaster con-trol mechanisms, or collective preparedness measures for uncon-trolled migration flows (Peyrouse 2012).10 Hence, it is no wonderthat even in the eyes of many Chinese experts, the SCO seems tohave failed.11 For China, the SCO summits and various meetings
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rather provide opportunities to approach member states bilater-ally or a platform to strengthen economic relations with specificcountries.
China’s Reserved Attitude Toward Afghanistan in 2014
How China currently aims to tackle its “Afghanistan problem” isillustrated by the many meetings that take place apart from theSCO mechanism in either a bilateral or trilateral framework—forinstance, with India or with Pakistan and Afghanistan (CIIS 2013;Panda 2014). In these dialogues, China acts as a mediator or host,in line with Xi Jinping’s “host diplomacy.” The main intention isto offer a neutral place for exchanges of view. What this approachsuggests is that China mainly conducts discussions about securityissues with specific partners and no longer within the SCO frame-work. It is a way to keep an eye on Afghanistan without gettinginvolved too deeply, since much of the enthusiasm of 2012 inbilateral relations between China and Afghanistan has been lost.Work at the Aynak copper mine site is stagnating due to majorsecurity problems and discovery of an archaeological dig atop thesite. Today, production at the mine is already five years behindschedule. In addition, falling copper prices have forced the MCCto renegotiate the 2007 deal. According to many Chinese experts,most of the Chinese workers have already left the site.
There have also been problems with oil extraction from theAmu Darya Basin. It was halted in August 2013 because Uzbek-istan hesitated to approve the transit agreement. Whether Chinawill play a more active economic role in Afghanistan after theISAF withdrawal is now uncertain. What is apparent is that theChinese government, by itself or within the framework of theSCO, has not yet developed any measures to actually supportregional stability or secure its investments in Afghanistan.China’s activism that peaked in 2012 has given way to a wait-and-see mentality toward post-2014 Afghanistan, which trans-lates into the conclusion that China should not be the country tosolve Afghanistan’s problems.12 The only thing that China stilldoes is to provide a platform for regional actors to exchangeviews on the issue.13
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In short, recent developments underscore that the Chinesegovernment is not going to take the lead in maintaining regionalsecurity. Furthermore, China clearly has no leverage in control-ling the effects of a post-2014 Afghanistan on the wider region.
Conclusion
During his ten-day trip to Central Asia in September 2013 Xi Jin-ping gave an important speech at the Nazarbayev University inKazakhstan, where he announced a new Silk Road Economic Belt(SREB) for the greater Eurasian region (Godehardt 2014b). Offi-cially, this initiative is understood as China’s regional vision andlong-term plan for bringing benefits to every country that decidesto participate in it. The SREB seeks to build on China’s relation-ships with Central Asian countries and expand the success of thatrelationship to the greater Eurasian region, meaning eventually toEurope.
The SREB is another Chinese attempt to stabilize theEurasian region by means of economic development, particu-larly through Chinese investment in infrastructure, pipelines,and communication. However, it remains uncertain whetherAfghanistan will be included in this economic developmentplan. Post-2014 scenarios for Afghanistan invariably are unclearabout its national security situation, making it likely that Chinawill hold on to its wait-and-see position. Furthermore, Xi’sannouncement of the SREB, alongside Chinese discussionsabout the US drawback from Afghanistan and uncertaintiesabout the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan, underscores ourassessment of China’s primary interest. It is not stability insideAfghanistan but rather the prevention of spillover effects fromAfghanistan to neighboring regions and in particular Xinjiang.Understanding China’s “Afghanistan problem” as geopoliticalimagery thus facilitates a new perspective on China’s regionalforeign policy and position in Asia.
With regard to South Korea, we conclude that its engagementin Afghanistan was not primarily triggered by the idea of assistingthat country but was initially intended to underline the alliance
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between South Korea and the United States. After all, every SouthKorean government is aware that the country could face a situa-tion where it would have to rely heavily on US support. But addi-tionally, South Korea’s engagement in Afghanistan is a way tohighlight and underpin the country’s own role or, for that matter,political practice in the wider Asian sphere. While one of SouthKorea’s objectives is to promote economic links with differentparts in Asia, particularly the greater Eurasian region, support ofAfghanistan via development aid is being treated separately. Thus,Afghanistan has been omitted from the Eurasia Initiative (Park2013). Hence, the South Korean debate about the geopoliticalimagery of Afghanistan illustrates how Seoul’s foreign policy nowhas a new understanding of the geographic scope of Asia, whichnot only comprises Northeast and East Asia but also the widerEurasian region.
Notes
Nadine Godehardt is a research fellow at the German Institute for Interna-tional and Security Affairs in Berlin. Her main research areas are China’sforeign policy, particularly regional challenges in Asia. She is also interestedin international relations theory, regionalism, and the role of aesthetics, visu-ality, and spaces in international politics. She can be reached at nadine.godehardt@swp-berlin.org. David Shim is assistant professor in the Depart-ment of International Relations and International Organization at the Uni-versity of Groningen, Netherlands, and associate research fellow at theGIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg. His research expertise includestheories of international relations, visual studies, political geography, criticalgeopolitics, theories of discourse, and East Asian studies. He is interested inthe visual and spatial dimension of global politics and works at the intersec-tion of international relations, geography, and area studies. He can bereached at david.shim@rug.nl.
1. See the article by Gao and Xiao in this special issue. It comes to arather different assessment of China’s and the SCO’s approach and potential.
2. This passage builds and expands on the analysis in Shim and Flamm2013.
3. For example, in the field of development cooperation, countries andinternational organizations have endorsed and emulated South Korea’smodel of development. These include Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, and Tan-zania as well as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and thePacific of the United Nations. In sustainable development, Seoul has beenable to gather substantial political and financial support for its initiative to
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convert South Korea’s Global Green Growth Institute into an internationalorganization.
4. Since October 2013, several attacks have occurred. At that time, a carwith three Uighurs crashed into the Tiananmen Gate. In June 2014, threepeople were sentenced to death; two of the accused were from the Uighurminority (Makinen 2014). Further attacks took place in Kunming andGuangzhou.
5. Expert interviews in November and December 2010; see also Gode-hardt 2014a, 165, 151.
6. Expert interview in Beijing, October 29, 2013. In particular, the pres-idential elections in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan represent a real challenge,since it is quite uncertain how they are going to be organized (Gizitdinovand Clark 2014; Sikorskaya 2014).
7. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences annual report on CentralAsia discusses the various difficulties of the political system. However, theauthors also emphasize that a rapid worsening of the situation is not to beexpected (Sun and Wu 2013).
8. Zhou Yongkang was a member of the Standing Committee of thePolitburo from 2007 to 2012, mainly responsible for domestic security mat-ters. In December 2012 Zhou was under investigation for abuse of powerand corruption. The new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping is clearly tar-geting him for political reasons, since he was also an ally of the disgracedformer senior official, Bo Xilai (Naughton 2013).
9. Text of the SCO Action Plan can be found at UN Office on Drugs andCrime 2009.
10. After all, states such as Tajikistan, which are crucial to regional sta-bility, do not have the financial capabilities, equipment, or personnel to con-trol the borders with Afghanistan. Thus, they are somewhat dependent onfinancial support, which the SCO, however, cannot provide.
11. Several interviews with Chinese experts in Beijing and Shanghai inOctober and November 2013.
12. Interview with Chen Ji Dong, Sichuan University, in November 2013. 13. In the context of China’s “host diplomacy,” the fourth conference of
the Istanbul (Heart of Asia) Process was held in Tianjin in August 2014.
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